POVERTY AND HUMAN SECURITY: RETHINKING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**POVERTY AND HUMAN SECURITY: RETHINKING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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

Praveen Dhanda

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Chapter 1

Introduction

If through our wisdom we could secure elementary human needs, there would be no need for weapons of war.

Mahatma Gandhi

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in final sense, a theft from those who are hungry and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Human security is a relatively new concept, but one that is now widely used to describe the complex of interconnectivity between threats. The concept refutes the traditional notion of security, which is the security of states from military threats, and focuses on the security of individuals. This approach recognizes menaces beyond direct violence to include several other threats, of which poverty is an important component. Poverty is conceptualized as a primary human security threat, not only because it can induce violence which can in effect threaten the stability of the state, but because it is a threat to the well being of individual too.

The concept of human security can be described as 'absence of insecurity and threats', i.e. freedom from 'fear' (of physical, sexual or psychological abuse) and 'want' (of gainful employment food and health). Human security, therefore, deals with the capacity to identify threats, to avoid them when possible, and to migrate their effects when they do occur (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007:39). Thus, human security has a potential to serve as an effective tool to understand contemporary challenges to people's wellbeing and dignity. As asserted by Ramesh Thakur:

> 'Human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades the quality of life... is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life-economic growth, improved

access to resources, social and political empowerment, and so on- is an enhancement of human security' (1997: 53-54).

The notion of human security is contested and its various definitions, meanings and conceptualizations are furiously debated. There is no deficit of definitions, critiques and counter-critiques. However, there is consensus among the proponents of human security that its primary goal is the protection of individuals, but this consensus breaks down over exactly what threats individuals should be protected from. Scholars are divided on the minimalist vs. maximalist debate on the conceptual theorization of human security.

Minimalist approach to human security focuses on the safety from direct threats, individual's physical integrity and to some extent satisfaction of basic needs. Thus, the approach basically focuses on 'freedom from fear'. The main threats addressed in this approach are traditional threats such as armed conflicts. It is argued that the virtue of this approach lies in its analytical quality and policy applicability. Scholars like Keith Krause, Andrew Mack, and Keith MacFarlane are votary of minimalist conceptual theorization.

The broader or maximalist approach adds 'freedom from want' and a 'life of dignity' to the narrow understanding which principally focuses on 'freedom from fear'. This view, by enlarging the concept of human security brings in the violence inherent in the structures as well as structural inequalities and distributional injustice. Proponents of the "broad" concept of human security argue that the threat agenda should be broadened to include poverty, hunger, disease, and natural disasters and so on. The direct violent threats and indirect violence both are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity, and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity. In its broad sense human security includes social, psychological, political and economic factors, encompassing psychological needs and individual relationship with the community. Leaning, for instance, brings in the non-material aspects and argues that 'individuals must also be able to support basic psychological needs for identity, recognition, participation and autonomy' (Leaning 2004:354).

Thus the maximalist conceptualization argues for a 'life of dignity' along with 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. It encompasses both material and non material

dimensions of human security threats. It puts people at the heart of agenda of security studies. The maximalist conception looks at the both the socio-psychological aspects including identity, recognition, participation and dignity, along with economic and other threats. Belief in the essential 'indivisibility' of the human security threats is the biggest virtue of the concept.

The present study attempts to build up a case for this broad conceptualization of human security. The underlining theme is that the essential indivisibility of human security threats is perhaps the strongest point of the concept. It has been argued that only the broad/maximalist conceptualization of human security can work as an 'integrated' solution for 'multifaceted' issues (Hampson 2004: 349).

Further, only the maximalist framework can work as an 'organizing concept', which because of its equal stress on material (physical, direct, economic security threats) and non-material (dignity encompassing socio-psychological security threats) facets can analyze real human security threats. It is only under the flag of maximalist conceptualization, the objectives of human security-'freedom from fear', 'freedom from want' with 'life of dignity' for individuals- can be ensured.

Poverty, from this point of view, is considered as a primary security threat because it makes human being less secure. Poverty is increasingly seen as a root cause of conflicts both within and across national borders. There are studies which has made an attempt to show a considerable link between poverty and violence. Non-material dimensions (like shame, humiliation) of poverty provide a sense of exclusion, of marginalization, of oppression, which may give rise to enmity and extremism. It has been argued that in a world free from poverty, guns will have more reasons to be silent. This is precisely why many international agencies have taken the issue on the agenda, and consider it as a primary security threat.

Human security is conceptualized not merely as 'freedom from fear' but also as 'freedom from want' and a 'life of dignity'. Human security relates to the protection of the individual's personal safety and freedom from direct and *indirect* threats of violence

(Bajpai 2000b *emphasis added*). The dimension of 'freedom from want' and a 'life of dignity' give us insights to visualize poverty *itself* as a form of multifaceted violence.

Besides the debate on the linkages between poverty *and* violence and poverty *as* violence, the conceptualization and theorizations on poverty itself is a controversial issue. The conceptualization of poverty both by the international agencies and scholars is problematic. According to the UNDP *Human Development Report (HDR)* (UNDP, 1994), poverty is a human security threat. It says that economic security, where main threat is poverty, requires a basic assured income, either from productive work or from government financed social safety nets. Thus, in the mainstream literature, poverty is understood in economic or material sense. Other important facets of poverty, particularly the non material aspects, are not taken into account in the understanding of poverty.

The issue at the stake is that conventional 'objective' approach to poverty, which reduces it to 'technocratic' measurable *income*, is not sufficient to understand the broad phenomenon of poverty. From this standpoint, poverty is understood as disadvantaged and insecure economic conditions which pertain to material aspects alone. But poverty is not merely a disadvantaged economic *condition* but it is also as a shameful, corrosive social *relation* (Jones and Novak 1999). This facet represents non-material aspects of poverty. Non material aspects of poverty includes; lack of voice, disrespect, humiliation, assault on dignity and self esteem, shame and stigma, powerlessness, denial of rights, and diminished citizenship (Lister; 2004:7). These aspects can easily be traced to social structures which are deeply embedded in the existing social patterns of representation, interpretation and communications. These social patterns create stereotypical image of the 'poor'. Because of these relational aspects, 'the poor' is reduced as 'Other'. 'Othering' can be described as a process by which identity of a particular group, by social and/or psychological ways is constructed. This identity is often represented inferior and 'binary opposite' to 'Self' through a complex relationship of power and often gets manifested though 'language'. By declaring someone 'Other', persons tend to stress what makes them dissimilar from or opposite of another, and this manifests in the manner in which they represent others, especially through stereotypical images. It is a serious assault on the 'dignity' of individual. Therefore, conceptualization of poverty is partial

without these non material dimensions of poverty. This conceptualization of poverty, in turn, has implications for the study of human security.

While much of the ink has been spent on the concept of human security and poverty separately, meaningful efforts are yet to take place to integrate them. This study makes an attempt to see the two in an integrated manner. Hence a broad rubric of human security and poverty shall structure the inquiry. The work will interplay between these two themes and will explore the multiple aspects of poverty linking it with the human security discourse. The aim of this inquiry is to question the legitimacy of the established paradigms of narrow 'security' and 'poverty'. The study argues for an alternative, better, comprehensive and more inclusive understanding of human security and of poverty too.

The present study is about the *conceptualizations* of human security and poverty. While dealing with conceptualizations, it is important not to confuse concepts, definitions and measures, particularly in the study of areas like poverty and human security. Concepts operate at a fairly general level and they denote a general idea about something. They are wide frameworks in which definitions and measurements are developed. In a nutshell, they are about meanings. The study of concepts also includes how people talk about and visualize that particular object of inquiry. Thus, conceptualizations are much broader. Definitions on the other hand are more precise statement of what distinguishes the object of inquiry. Generally, they are embedded in a particular outlook. Measures show more narrowing down of focus. They are operationalzing definitions or tools so that one can identify and count (Lister 2004).

The importance of concept building lies in the fact that they are essential and fundamental step to the process of reasoning. They are the frameworks through which we think, criticize, explain, argue, analyze and in fact make sense of the world. We construct the epistemology of the world not simply by looking at it, but by developing and constantly refining these 'nets' which helps us to make sense of it. That is precisely why the concepts are understood as building blocks of human knowledge. Concepts are so deeply embedded in the epistemologies of all modern disciplines that it will be naïve to confine them to any particular branch of study. Hence, the conceptualizations developed and argued in the present work are important for the study of world politics too. The

study argues for an alternative understanding of human security, which is gaining currency in academic and policy formulating circles in recent years.

However, different conceptualizations reflect different philosophical underpinnings and offer different research agendas. Conceptualizations matters because the art of conceptualization is an act of power which marginalizes some and empowers others. Hence the nature of the concepts should be inclusionary instead of exclusionary. Implicit to these 'tools' is the truth that these 'nets' to capture reality presents different understandings and hence distinct policy responses. Concepts set the agenda not only for research but also for the actions of governments and international institutions. For instance in the case of poverty, David Green argues that 'the manner in which a writer defines poverty reflects his [*sic*] underlying assumptions about the human condition and his preferred role for government' (1998: 12). Ultimately it is the concept which gets translated into policy. If the conceptualizations are narrow and 'Othering', the actions are bound to be exclusionary.

This study is written with the assumption that concepts are part of politics and are also responsible for constructing particular kinds of politics. For instance, monetary, material and mainstream approach to poverty 'has arisen as a result of the globalization of Western culture and the attendant expansion of the market' (Thomas, C 2005: 647). With the expansion of Western style of living, poverty is increasingly seen as economic condition and economic yard stick is increasingly used to measure and to judge all societies. Hence the nature of the concepts, it has been argued, must not be parochial and narrow.

One needs to grapple with many fundamental issues of epistemology while writing about concepts. This includes positioning the work into some of the basic debates in the theory of knowledge. One such issue is 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity'. Objectivity asserts that true knowledge is, or should be value neutral. Thus objective knowledge is knowledge of observing things as they are. This study holds that objectivity is neither possible nor desirable. The collapse of the distinction between fact and value, particularly by the advent of anti-foundational theories, has challenged the wisdom which believed in the fact-value dichotomy. As Gadamer (1989), asserts, the distinction between the object and

the subject and hence the research and researcher can not be ensured. This is precisely because we all make the sense of world with our pre-suppositions and pre-conceptions. These 'pres' make the theorizer an active participative inhabitant and not as a neutral 'outside observer'. Hence the reality 'outside' can not be observed and at best it can only be interpreted (Derrida 1976).

Dismissing objectivity should not be understood as falling to the other extreme and joining the celebrations on the other end of spectrum. Though, with a full tribute to the 'post-modernist' thinkers, this inquiry is cautious about the possible effects of 'nihilistic' moral and epistemic relativism embedded in antifoundationalist fragmentation. Rejecting objectivity without a possible alternative, the study holds, is simply a dead end and will lead us nowhere.

An escape from the above discussed two extremes is perhaps possible by bringing in the elements of normative ethic and morality in social science research. As put by Piki Ish-Shalom 'following Kantian tradition, I understand *morality* and *normative ethic* to be systematic assertions of right and wrong those are universally applicable. Therefore, I claim, they have the potential to serve as the foundation of science' (Ish-Shalom 2006: 307). With keeping an eye on this claim, it can be argued that the concept of human security derives its foundational premises from this Kantian call. It puts people at the centre of agenda and frames a notion which transcends the spatial and temporal dimensions.

Another fundamental debate, related to the above, which needs a serious engagement here, is on the 'Universal' and 'Particular'. Post-colonial theories ask us to place our work between the traps of 'Universal' and 'Particular' (Spivak 1999, Chakrabarty 2000, Cheah 2003, Mudimbe 1988). Universal, as 'posts' have put it, is unacceptable, because it often excludes us. But the present work is written with a notion that universal offers us a chance to participate in the global stream of humanity. With 'global connections' i.e. increasing inter-connectivity everywhere, it is neither feasible nor desirable to stick to the particular. Moreover, universal claims do not actually make everything everywhere the same or identical. As with the help of broad conceptualizations, which have been argued

in the present study, the specificities can be easily harmonized. Broad concepts have potentiality to accommodate particularities. The maximalist conceptualizations can adapt to the socio-economic, structural and cultural contexts by allowing space for circumstantial factors. Therefore they offer universalities which is compatible with specificities.

In the case of human security, it is perceived that all security needs are not the same. But the broad conceptualization can allow for the circumstantial elements in the meaning of these needs. With this 'enlarged-universality' 'human security must be regarded as universal, global, and indivisible ...just imagine for a moment that every drug that quietly kills, every disease that silently travels, every form of pollution that silently roams around the globe and every act of senseless terrorism all carried a national label of origin, much as traded goods do. That would bring sudden realization that human security concerns today are more global than the global trade' (Ul Haq 2003: 30). Similarly, though the socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts shape the experience of poverty, phenomenon of poverty in the era of globalization means that the causes of poverty are increasingly common to both North and South (Townsend 1993, Townsend and Gordon 2002). Breaking down the intellectual barriers between South and North could do much to enrich and revitalize thinking about poverty (Maxwell 2000). Hence 'poverty at the same time is both culture-bound and universal' (Oyen 1996: 4).

The present study is interdisciplinary in nature. To identify the central themes, it is essential to dig deep in the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the concepts. Dealing with fundamental issues about concepts is not possible by restricting the study to a single discipline which often 'arose because of the arbitrary compartmentalization in the universities for the preparation of curricula and the facility of teaching' (Mukherjee 1990: 3). Both the roots, and the implications of the concepts transcend the 'professional boxes' popularly known as disciplines. It is extremely difficult to grasp the notions of human security and poverty by limiting the inquiry to one discipline. Hence, the nature of the present study is interdisciplinary in nature.

The human security concept is knitted around a 'vital core of human life' by expanding the epistemology of violence build in the structures. Human security holds that human miseries are far more complex than the 'grips' and 'precise frameworks' of professional disciplines. The complexities of miseries need a useful interdisciplinary dialogue. For instance, for material-monetary manifestations of poverty, one needs to engage with economics and for the notion of social exclusion incursions are necessary in the area of sociological theory. The notion of 'the poor' as 'Other' can only be theorized with the help of information arbitrage from disciplines like postcolonial school in cultural theory. Further, if politics is all about the 'struggle over the use and distribution of resources' (Held 1987: 275, 277) and over symbolic representation, then the whole above discussed phenomenon can not be divorced from the discipline of politics. Therefore the critical links between various facets of miseries are collected from the fields of various disciplines and their utility is assessed in conceptualizing both the concepts of human security and poverty.

Here, it is essential to say a few words about the title of the present work which is 'Poverty and Human Security: Rethinking Conceptualizations'. Here, the usage of 'Poverty' prior to 'Human Security' does not necessarily denote the hierarchy and the prioritization between the two concepts. This work tries to argue that broad conceptualization of human security has implications for the study of poverty and that the vice versa is equally true. In other words, broad conceptualization of poverty also has implications for the study of human security. In the present case, human security framework is dealt first, and then its implications for the study of poverty are studied in that framework. Indeed, the study argues not only for the broad concept of human security but equally for the broad concept of poverty. The title puts the word 'poverty' in the first place because two of the three core chapters of this work deal with poverty. However, for the purpose of analysis, human security framework is used to study the concept of poverty.

Chapters and Themes

As stated earlier the present study argues for a broad, comprehensive, alternative and inclusive conceptualizations of human security and poverty. For the purpose of analysis,

second chapter is dedicated to the debates around human security. The chapter explores and illustrates the contested concept of security and builds up the case for human security approach. Because human security puts people at the centre of analysis, for many the framework is a 'misfit' for IR (international relations) theory. A counter critique is build up in this chapter to respond to such critiques. The orthodox mainstream and alternative theories of international politics are dealt in detail with a critical perspective. The chapter compares and contrasts these paradigms with human security approach. Further, the debates on minimalist/maximalist manifestations of human security are discussed and an attempt is made to establish a case for maximalist framework because of its inherent strength to work as 'an integrated solution for multifaceted issues' (Hampson 2004: 349).

The virtue of holistic and inclusive character of the concept is highlighted by bringing in the notion of poverty. An implication of the maximalist conceptualization of human security on the study of poverty is examined through a *'twin'* analysis. It has been argued that only the maximalist concept of human security can visualize the linkages *'between'* and *'within'* threats. By between, I mean that a domino effect *'between'* poverty and violence (this also includes the approach which sees poverty *as* violence). By *'within'* I mean the domino effect also works *'within'* the concept of poverty in the midst of its various facets (including the material and non-material ones).

The above said 'twin' analysis structures the next two chapters. The **third chapter** deals with the *'between'* and explores the connections 'between' poverty *and* violence. But human security is ultimately about the security of individuals; therefore it can not stop just at the causal relationships between poverty and violence. It has to deal with the more subtle connections which force us to see poverty itself *as* violence. It has been perceived that poverty, on its own accord, is violence at a colossal scale. The chapter concludes that a broad human security framework analysed in the second chapter can only provide insights into or map both overt and covert violence linked with poverty.

Chapter four looks *'within'* the concept of poverty. The virtue of the broad concept of human security is proved by looking into the various manifestations of poverty. Poverty, dominantly, has been understood in terms of material monetary-based conception, which has been accepted almost universally by most of the governments and international

organizations. This chapter refutes this hegemonic understanding and develops an alternative 'poverty wheel', which harmonizes both the material and non-material facets of poverty. The discourses of poverty are explored to build up a case for bringing in the non-material facets in agenda. The 'poverty wheel' shows the complex interconnectivity and interdependence in the material and relational/symbolic aspects of poverty and allows us to analyze these aspects which work under 'domino effect' and hence they stand 'indivisible'. After mapping this alternative conceptualization of poverty, the maximalist-minimalist debate on human security is revisited. It is forcefully argued that because various facets of 'poverty wheel' are 'indivisible', they demand an 'integrated' solution. This 'integrated' solution can only flow from maximalist approach of human security. Because of its equal stress on economic, political, and socio-psychological aspects, only this framework can capture both the objective and subjective causes/aspects of poverty.

The **concluding chapter** traces the common threads running through the study. The main findings and implications of the inquiry are revisited in brief in this chapter.

Chapter- 2

Debating Human Security and Re-examining Theories of World Politics

Security is 'essentially' a 'contested concept' (Smith 2002) and so is human security. However, human security poses some new and interesting questions which are of paramount importance. One of the core questions is the *'security of whom'*? For realists, often called holders of 'timeless wisdom', state is a referent object of security. However, the majority of conflicts in the world today are 'within' the states. But realism is methodologically incapable of dealing with these crucial human security threats. Perhaps the biggest virtue of the concept of human security is that it drags out the concept of security from the realist grip. It puts safety of the people at the core of the agenda by both 'broadening' and 'deepening' the concept. Broadening means 'the consideration of non-military security threats' and by deepening means 'that the field is now more willing to consider the security of individuals and groups, rather than focusing narrowly on external threats of states'(Paris 2001:97). It is generally accepted, among almost all concerned international organizations, governments and scholars that human security implies security of individuals.

Another crucial question is *'security of what values and security of what'?* Where human security puts the people first, it argues for the values and goals such as dignity, equity and solidarity. The maximalist (broad) conceptualization of human security argues for 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' along with a 'life of dignity'. Thus by holding these values at core, it recognises threats which can be both direct and indirect together with their interdependence.

Further, important question is *'by what means this complex security will be advanced'*? The Canadian government, which is principally associated with the notion of human security, suggests that peace building, peacemaking, disarmament, economic development etc are the key areas for human security endeavours. Governments should avoid using short term solution by hard power and the discourse of development should be extended to security discourse.

The Human Security concept evolved at a time of great international shifts. The end of Cold War lifted the shadow of bipolar politics that clouded security relations between countries. In the meantime globalization rapidly changed international rules, regulations and national barriers to facilitate the faster flow of capital, ideas and technology. New non-state actors have come to play a critical role in the international political system, some as threats, and others as bridges between communities and societies. In these circumstances the role of the state underwent fundamental transformation and traditionally accepted conception of power was contested. While the nation-state remains a prominent actor on the global stage, it is no longer the only one. More than ever before, global (supra-national) and local (sub-national) forces affect the security of individual *human beings* in equal manner. Moreover, the last decades have witnessed an increasing number of examples of nation-states not only in fulfilling their obligation as protectors of the security of their own citizens, but as the very *cause* of their insecurity. The traditional correspondence between national security and individual security, once the foundation of post-Cold War security studies, is no longer an adequate basis for understanding the landscape of security challenges. These shifts necessitated a new thinking that would address problems and trade-offs linked with the age old question of development and security. Development of the concept of human security is a step in that direction. This evolution has profound implications for the study of international security. It invites a revaluation of the presuppositions and limits of traditional security studies, on the one hand, and of development studies, on the other. Human security places ethics as the foundation of all actions and considers how the concept of human security relates to, and potentially challenges the existing values and institutions of political and social life (Tadjbakhsh 2006).

Thus, human security debunks the traditional notion of security, which is the security of states from military threats, and focuses on the safety of people and communities. Once the referent object of security is changed to individuals, it then proposes to extend the notion of 'safety' to a condition beyond mere existence (survival) to worth living, hence, well-being and dignity of human beings. 'It is precisely why; poverty is conceptualized as human security threat- not because it can induce violence which threatens the stability of

state, but because it is a threat to the dignity of the individuals. This is human security in a nutshell' (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007:9).

Realists can 'legitimately' argue that a multidimensional approach to human security sacrifices precision for inclusiveness. In the international jungle, only a 'lean' conception of security can provide effective tool to cope with the 'mean' enemies. However, this is a time for the realists to get 'real'. The majority of conflicts in the world today are internal. The annual mortality rates, related to Afro-Asiatic poverty runs in to several millions and it also excludes millions out of 'main stream' decision making by disempowering 'them'. Preventable annual deaths and marginalization, even at this scale, can not be accommodated in the analytical framework of 'national security'. 'When rape is used as an instrument of war and ethnic cleansing, when thousands are killed by floods...when citizens are killed by their own security forces, then the concept of national security is of zero analytical and policy utility'(Thakur 2004: 347). In order to cut down the 'high politics' to its size, and to demarcate the commonalities and differences of human security with other paradigms, a proper analysis of the major theories of world politics is necessary. Theories, as Robert Cox puts are 'always *for* some one and *for* some purpose' (Cox 1986:207). The theories are not only tools to 'grasp' reality, but they also shape reality in their own way. Thus the 'theories' of world politics analysed next section[1] are full world views and paradigms with inherent political agendas.

Paradigms compared

(Neo)Realism and its road to security

Realism is perhaps the most dominant theory of world politics. It marches 'triumphantly' among the group of theories which deals with the complex phenomenon of world politics.

[1] A word of caution is essential before engaging with these theories. Experts in any one of these theories can declare the present discussion essentially skin deep. However, the analysis presented here is based on those points about which there is a considerable consensus among scholars of the discussed theory. The aim here is to pick up a 'shared core' of these theories to compare and contrast this with that of human security. With apology in advance to the experts I would like to say that the theories dealt here are *intentionally incomplete.*

Despite some worthy differences, a common core or a 'realist minimum' can be identified. Keohane identified the core into: state as actor, state as rational, and state as power maximizer (Keohane 1986). However, the major arguments of realpolitik can be summarized in the triple 'Ss': Statism, Survival. Self help.

The 'shared core' of realism

Statism

State and 'Statism' is the centrepiece of realism. This involves two claims. First, states are pre-eminent actors. Morgenthau assumes that the subject of science of international politics is the behaviour of states (1978). It offers 'state as actor' model of the world. For realists *states are principal actors* and the study of international politics focuses on these units. Realists also hold that the states are both unitary and rational. Second, state 'sovereignty' signifies the existence of independent political community, one which has judicial authority over its territory.

The realist notion of security is corollary to its 'state centric' assumption. The paradigm appears to operate according to the assumption that domestically, the problem of security is solved. The presence of a sovereign authority implies that individuals need not to worry about their own security. The institution of state is there to provide them security in the form of system of law, police protection, and other 'legitimate' coercive measures. Therefore, the community 'inside' the state is safe and can pursue good life. 'Outside', i.e. in international system, however, there are insecurities, dangers and threats to the very existence of states. Thus, the problem of security means 'security of states'. Thus realism, from its basic premises, underlines the dichotomy between 'inside' and 'outside'.

Survival

The next assumption which unites perhaps all realists is the assertion that in international politics, the pre-eminent goal is 'survival'. Waltz, the neorealist guru, argues, 'beyond the

survival motive, the aim of states may be endlessly varied'. (1979:91) Henry Kissinger similarly asserts that 'a nations survival is its first and ultimate responsibility' (1977:204) However, there is a controversy among the realists as to whether the accumulation of power is an end in itself or the ultimate concern for the state is 'security'. Defensive realists, as Waltz and Grieco (1997) hold that state have security as their permanent interest to preserve their current position rather than seeking to improve them. On the opposite, offensive realists like, Mearsheimer (2001) hold that state always desire more power, because no amount of power can make them fully secure. Thus from the stand point of the concept of survival, defensive realists argues that the existence of status quo between nations, because of the balance of power between them, lessens the competition for power. While, on the other hand, offensive realists hold that the competition is always keen because of the unending struggle for power.

Thus concept of 'survival' is the logical outcome of state centric understanding of the international politics. The typical 'inside'/ 'outside' dichotomy, again provides space to the realists to argue for the 'realist' understanding of the nature of international politics as 'jungle' and provide justification for state centricism.

Self-help

Kenneth Waltz makes a departure from the early realists and argues that the key difference between the domestic and international orders lies in their structure. In the international system, contrary to the domestic one, there is no higher authority to prevent and counter the use of force. Therefore security can only be achieved through self-help. In an anarchic structure, Waltz argues, 'self-help is necessarily the principle of action' (1979: 111).

Thus the 'security dilemma', rests on the assumption that a constant competition between the states is permanent in an anarchic structure of international 'jungle'. Due to this security dilemma states find it very difficult to trust one another and often view the intention of others in a negative light. In this scenario, balancing of power and alliance

formation is obvious. This balancing and alliance formation constructs the realist road to security.

Thus, realist image of international politics is based on some assumptions. Realists hold that the states are both unitary and rational actors. Realists typically assume that for states, national security is the paramount priority and this is single most important and permanent national interest. This paramount national interest can only be realised through a rational management of power (defined mainly in terms of military power). Further, high politics, constituting military and political issues, dominate the agenda.

Critics of (neo) realism

Statism: a helpful assumption or foundation of problems?

The proposition that the state might be essentially problematic or contested entity is omitted from the neorealist theory. As Ashley puts it '...once one enters this theoretical discourse among neorealists, the state as actor needs no defence. It stands without challenge.'(1986: 269) The belief in 'inside'/ 'outside' dichotomy are corollary to realist obsession with 'state'. Realist theory operate according to the assumption that, domestically the problem of security is solved. However on the 'outside' the problem of insecurity still remains.

Taking a note of this internal/external dichotomy Vanaik argues that 'international relations is not simply about interstate relations but also about the internationalization of domestic conflicts and domesticisation of international conflicts' Moreover 'sovereignty lies in the people, not in some abstract entity called state' (2005: 402). Ashley's (1986) main objection is also that neorealism neglects domestic factors. So because of its limited vision, *realpolitik* is unable to handle these issues properly, which are related to both 'domestic' and 'international'.

Realism believes in the 'map notion' of the state. It treats state as a territorial, homogeneous category. This national territorial totality is not fit for all practical analytical purposes. As argued by Vanaik, 'since there is no serious systemization of the conceptual differences between state, society, nation and government, there is a constant slippage between these terms- they are used as virtually synonyms-instead of being seen as distinct entities which should not be confused or merged (Vanaik 2005:403).

Scholars also criticize (neo) realism from state centric standpoint arguing that realism is methodologically incapable of visioning beyond the state. This conservatism is in the 'genes' of neorealism. Ashley argues 'despite neorealism's much ballyhooed emphasis on the role of hard falsifying tests as the measure of theoretical progress, neorealism immunizes its statist commitments from any falsification' (1986:270).

In fact, the notion of 'sovereignty of state' is central to political realism and it is a logical outcome of its state centricism. The concept of sovereignty originated with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which while recognising the territorial jurisdiction of kings and princes entailed a policy of non interference within their claimed and defined territorial boundaries. In this 'mutual recognition' by the European princes of each others sovereignty was not some form of 'hobbesian contract', which should be treated final, and which should be taken in account in contemporary times. People were nowhere in this 'contract' and hence the idea based on this notion of sovereignty is unacceptable.

As Anderson argues in his seminal work (1991) how people come to believe that as individuals, they are members of a particular nation which is 'entitled' to sovereignty over a peace of territory. Anderson put forward his view that the nation as imagined community is both 'limited' and 'sovereign'. It is imagined because the members of the nation never know most of their fellow members. It is 'limited' because no nation sees itself as coterminous with humanity. Hence it can be derived that sovereignty, like nation is also abstract.

The argument is that, sovereignty rests with the people and not with some abstract entity, popularly called state. As argued by Vanaik:

> 'Because the people are potentially divisible so also is sovereignty. Not even the most democratically organized state can be the sole or permanent repository of sovereignty which must always be earned and constantly sustained. Neither state nor social elites can be the sole or privileged interpreters of the question of sovereignty' (2005:405).

The argument is that one can not assume a permanent 'unified' 'sovereign state'. And once this destabilising logic is set into motion, this will undermine political realism's wisdom.

Hence, it can be argued that the fundamental assumption of political realism, i.e. 'statism' is deeply flawed. There is no clear definition of state in realism and it keeps its hard core out of falsification criterion.

Human security points of departure and objections

Human security criticises this statist approach of world politics on the basis of crutial objections/differences. First, on the basis of *'referent object'*. Human security argues that the 'statist' approach is problematic because of its excessive focus on the security of states. Often the wellbeing and security of individuals are overshadowed by the concept of 'state security'. Neorealism, believes in territorial totality of state, and overlooks domestic conditions of state and focuses solely on the 'international system'.

Second, on the basis of *different values* it is worth a detailed analysis. Human security's objection is about the value neutrality in the study of social studies. Neorealism tends to create theories 'scientifically' and claims that it explains the reality as it is. The scientific structures of neorealism come from fixed structures of international anarchy. It draws its inspiration from positivist philosophy which claims that there are objective rules in society, and they can be observed scientifically. Post-positivist deconstructs this notion arguing from the stand point of Vico's philosophy which argues that social world is not

'out there'. It is 'constructed by man' (Vico in L. Pompa 1982). If the social world is constructed, then 'reality' is alterable.

By using Michel Foucault, Richard Ashley (1986) attacks neorealism because of its positivist moorings. He points out that, science as value neutral is a troublesome and problematic thought. The analyst's biases are always rooted in his/her pre-theoretical conceptions which make each observation value laden. If it is so then positivism itself becomes an ideology. It endorses meta-historical faith in scientific observations that positivist science itself cannot question. Hence all knowledge has its socially rooted commitments and biases. Neorealism, under positivist influence, considers anarchy 'out there' and out of discourse which is methodologically incoherent.

Here, the structural dimension of realism is worth considering. Structuralism, in general terms is the doctrine that the structure of a system is more important than the units. Structuralism can be traced back to Ferdinand de Saussure (1916). In Saussure's view, all language can be analysed as structural system of relations. A 'sign' is thus held to meaning because of its relationship to other words, not because it refers to a particular object. Structuralism thus can be described as an attempt to explain the objective conditions which constitute all linguistic and social concerns. The same concept has been borrowed in the discourse of international politics by Kenneth Waltz (1979). Thus for structural or neorealism, the whole structure is important and most comprehensive way to 'grasp' the dynamics of international relations.

Because of its structural dimension, neorealism is hostile to the concept of *change.* It freezes the structure and makes it static and eternal. If meaning is determined by rigid structures, then how history is possible? For Keohane, realism is particularly weak in accounting for change. He argues that as a research programme realism shows signs of 'degeneration'. He clearly shows that realism does not meet tough standards of Lakatosian 'progressiveness' (Keohane 1989). Similarly Ashley attacks the independence of structures and argues that this 'frozen abstraction' can not accommodate the concept of change. He further asserts that the greatest triumph of totalitarian propaganda is not by

doing some thing itself but by refraining from doing. Because neorealism makes the units as prisoners of structures, it has some dangerous effects. He points out four dimensions of history, the four P's, about which neorealism is silent. First, neorealist structuralism denies history as *process*. Second, neorealism denies the historical significance of *practice,* the moment at which people are active participants in the construction of the world. Third, neorealism denies the limitation of *power*. Fourth neorealism forces us to interpret *politics* under structural conditions. These are the dangerous effects of the 'agenda setting' of neorealism (Ashley 1989).

Canadian scholar, Robert Cox, argue that theories like neorealism serves the interest of those who prosper under the prevailing order, which is the inhabitants of developed states, and more particularly the ruling elites. They do so by making the current configuration of international relations appear neutral and immutable. When realists falsely claim to be describing the world as it is, as it has been, and it always will be, what they are in fact doing is reinforcing the ruling hegemony in the current world order. According to the scholar, structural realism reinforces and legitimises the status quo (Cox 1989).

Human security categorically differs from those scholars who argue that theories and disciplines can not be based on normative value laden framework. A range of scholars in social sciences has brought the values back in the study of social sciences. Amartya Sen brought back the values, for instance freedom in case of development (Sen 1999a) to the core of economic theories earlier based on utilitarian and technocratic approaches.

Human security attempts to make a similar ethical departure form dominant theories of security and world politics which deals with 'facts' and not 'values'. These theories deal with 'what is' not what 'ought to be'. The 'ethics of theories' should be taken seriously because 'theory is always *for* some one and *for* some purpose' (Cox 1989:207). Theories do not merely describe reality but in the process of 'explaining' reality they themselves become an agency and shape reality (Shalom 2006).

Thus, human security makes an *'ethical rupture'* from state centred realism. State sovereignty and territorial integrity are the embedded values in political realism (Bajpai 2000a). Human security proposes a new normative framework of world politics advocating an ethical idea of how human beings might achieve security (Alpes: 2004). It makes a case for some fundamental shifts in world politics. These shifts argue for wider ethical concerns in world politics.

First of these shifts is the argument that, security of human beings holds a moral priority than security of states. As argued above, the abstract ideas of both state and sovereignty derive their relevance and legitimacy from the people. Thus, the security of people should be the core of security agenda. Human miseries can not be eclipsed in the name of state or sovereignty or 'national security'.

Second, human security by linking the individual with global stability puts forward the idea of a society of human kind, which is above the society of states. Thus the idea of state security is narrow and excluding. However, the idea of human security is broad and inclusive. Human security advocates a world in which all human beings are 'freed from want' and 'freed from fear', a world where fundamental rights and dignity of individual are respected (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

Human security digs deep and widens the *perceptions of threats*. Traditional security studies deals with the study of the security from violence. Violence can be divided in to *somatic* and *structural* violence. Somatic violence is the violence as 'normally' understood: that is the deliberate attempt to hurt or kill someone. On the other hand structural violence happens when people die or get hurt even without someone's intention but nevertheless due to deeper and entrenched factors. Human security also deals with this kind of violence. By bringing people at the core of agenda, the perception of threats also changes according to their freedom, dignity and wellbeing. It also believes in the mutual interdependence of threats.

Human security also differs with realism on the basis of *means of protection*. Realist road to security goes through hard power, with special focus on making alliances and balance of power. Human security advocates and promotes the idea that interests can be promoted through soft power, long term cooperation, and preventive measures (Bajpai: 2000a).

Human security challenges the neorealist paradigm, and redefines the perception, meaning of violence and threats, and looks beyond realist security dilemma. It identifies and recognises threats which go beyond interstate military threats.

The Liberal Claims and Human Security

Second theory which dominates the analysis of international politics in a substantive manner is liberalism. As Tim Dunne argues, 'although realism is regarded as the dominant theory of international relations, liberalism has a strong claim to being the historical alternative. Rather like political parties, realism is like the 'natural' party of government and liberalism is the party of opposition' (Dunne 2005:186). Based on the philosophical underpinnings of early thinkers like Locke, Bentham, Kant etc., liberalism is an umbrella term encompassing a range of theories. However, following are the key points of this mega theory.

For liberals, international relations are not only about state-state relations. It is also about transnational relations. Transnational relations include relations between groups, organizations, NGOs, transnational movements and people. Unlike realist, they argue that states are not the only actors in world politics. They also assert that states are not the unitary actors, but they are composed of competing individuals. Liberals also challenge the realist notion of the state as rational actor.

However, like realists, neoliberals hold that the international system is anarchic. But they believe that the behaviour of the states can be regulated by means other than the use of hard power. They focus on the importance of interdependence and the regimes created to manage these interactions.

Keohane and Nye argue that post-war complex interdependence is qualitatively different from earlier and simpler kind of interdependence. Earlier the 'high politics' of security and survival had priority over 'low politics' of economic and social affairs. But under the conditions of 'complex interdependence' it is no longer the case because, first, relations between states, in contemporary era, are not the relations between states only. They take place at various levels via many different actors and branches of government. Second, there is a host of trans-national relations between individuals between groups and states (Keohane and Nye 1977). Liberalism puts its full faith in commerce, and considers it the best method for achieving peace. For them, it provides the foundation of common interests. Globalization, interdependence, and free trade have ample scope of achieving the ideal of security.

Liberals extends the agenda of international politics. They assert that security does not mean national security in the conventional military and material capabilities, but also includes economic, social and political factors. Realist believes in the perpetuality of conflicts. However, liberals are optimistic and argue that it is possible to reduce conflicts through regulation of behaviour of states by common values and multilateral institutions.

Similarities and differences with human security

There are lots of commonalities between the two paradigms namely human security and liberalism. For instance, both sociological liberalism and human security believes that international relations not only studies relations between governments; but it also studies the relations between private individuals, groups and societies.

Like liberals human security maintains that the states are not the sole units in international system. Both, human security and liberalism see the system as multicentric. Liberals highlight the advantages of cooperation and stress the fatality of conflict. Human security stands in the tradition of these liberalist innovations: expanding the threats and broadening the range of actors taken into account (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007: 87)

But human security retains in sharp disagreement with the liberal understanding of world politics. Human security debunks the liberal view on security because:

First, it believes that liberal assumptions are still embedded in the narrow 'statist' view of world politics. Liberalism builds its theoretical 'web' around the state and most of the time revolves around it. 'Liberal seriousness' about the commitments for building an alternative paradigm away from state centric realism can be judged from the declaration made by its gurus: 'It is not possible to imagine dramatic conflict or revolutionary change in which the use of threat of military force over an economic issue or among advanced industrial countries might become plausible. Then realist assumptions would again be a reliable guide to events'. (Keohane and Nye: 1977:28)

Second, liberalism puts too much emphasis on market and commerce. Human security's vision of world politics goes far beyond market. In fact some times it holds that market is the cause of human sufferings.

Third, liberalism often maintains a silence on the human security issues like poverty. Like realism, liberals also keep human security threats out of agenda of world politics. Human security exclusively deals with threats which are behind human miseries and sufferings. It brings in the real security threats which deal with welfare of the common masses.

Thus despite some common points and 'common enemy', called political realism, human security makes a theoretical departure from liberal international relations theory. It transforms the idea of security, pushes it well beyond the liberal grips and puts people at the core of agenda.

Constructivism and Human Security

Constructivism deals with ideas, identities, norms and culture. Constructivism promises to unearth more subtle and complex issues often neglected by realist and liberals but which effects and shapes world politics. The end of cold war put a big question mark on the 'timeless wisdom of realism'. Constructivism, unlike realism, is perfectly compatible with the concept of change because it recognises that the world is socially constructed. The subjective, sociological and psychological elements are brought in to the study of world politics by constructivism which were traditionally neglected by 'material', 'objective', 'scientific' and 'rational' realism.

For constructivists, states constructs one another in their relations and in so doing they also constructs international anarchy, through 'inter subjective beliefs'. So anarchy is not a 'natural' or 'given' condition, but anarchy is what states make of it. International system is not the reflection of power relationships and the desire to dominate but of concepts and images (Wendet 1987, 1992).

Thus from constructivist's standpoint, realist notion of security and security dilemma is constructed and therefore it can be deconstructed. Onuf (1995) challenges the ahistorical, mono-variable realist view of security and forcefully argues that there is no single truth, and truths are linked to the arguments with which they are justified. Constructivists argue that the conflicts between states flows from the nonmaterial conditions like perceptions and do not stem from material conditions as realists argue.

Further, constructivists hold that knowledge shapes the mode of interpretation and hence construction of social reality. Drawing on Foucault, they argue that there are subtle connections between knowledge and power.

Constructivist also differs from realist on the understanding of power. While realists estimate power by 'counting tanks', roots of constructivism runs deep. They holds that power is not only the ability of an actor to get another actor to do what he/she would have

not do otherwise, but also as the production of identities and interests that limit the ability to control their fate.

Thus constructivists tries to deconstruct what is often taken for granted by the society. Most often the constructivists take empirical research in order to show the superiority of their claims. Although it is not a coherent theory, the paradigm shares a lot with the maximalist (broad) discourse of human security.

In fact, constructivists were the first in the field of world politics which tried to refute state centric approaches to security. Their view of security starts from individuals and their 'inter subjective perceptions'. They showed that identity matters and has an impact on conflicts (Katzenstein: 1996). The field can be further explored with the help of the concept of maximalist conceptualization of human security because it subscribes to non-material dimensions too.

Both constructivism and human security broadens the sphere of world politics. They consider individuals as referent point of security and bring in non-material dimensions of problems. The broad notion of human security, in particular, subscribes the idea that the determinants of security are not material only. The broad notion of human security also shares the idea of power with constructivism. Both hold that there are various faces of power. This study too, through the alternative conceptualization of poverty, will try to prove that power has various forms. It must not be understood in material terms only, but also the production of identities that limit the ability of some one to control their fate.

However, despite the above discussed similarities, human security goes far ahead than constructivism. Ideas, identities, norms can be counted as some aspects of human security and constitutes only a part of the paradigm. For example, poverty, as argued in the present study, is both a material and non-material problem.

Alternative Approaches

Alternative approaches to world politics, namely feminist school, critical security studies and post structuralism school, challenge and contest the traditional notion of 'security studies'. These approaches add value to the security discourse by refuting the realist notion of security and hence they share common premises with human security. A sweeping survey of the approaches shall be helpful in order to understand the 'essentially contested concept of security'.

Critical Security Studies and Human Security

Critical security studies present one of the most powerful critiques of traditional security paradigm. The writings in this arena can be divided in two categories (Smith 2002).

The first variant of critical security studies can be associated with Keith Krause and Michel Williams (Keith and Williams 1997). They re-examine the virtues and claims of traditional security studies with moorings on the state-centred security. The authors are dissatisfied with the orthodox views on security and forcefully put forward the arguments for the need to broadening and deepening security studies. The crux of the argument is that there is a need to move away from military dimension of states behaviour under anarchy and to focus on individuals, communities and identities. The approach is more interested in encouraging a variety of approaches to studying and practicing security.

A more focused definition of what critical security studies mean is given by Welsh school (includes Booth 1991 and Jones 1995). 'Human emancipation' is the key of critical security studies. Human emancipation here is defined as 'the freeing of people (as both individual and groups) from physical and human constraints which stops them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do'. The subject mater of orthodox security studies, dealing with war and the threat of war are thus some of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, structural oppression and so on. In fact security

and emancipation are two sides of the same coin for this approach. The quest for 'emancipation' and not the, 'power, balancing and order', thus produces genuine security.

The concept of critical security comes very close to human security in terms of refuting the traditional notion of security and putting people as the referent point. But the concept does not add up to a full fledged research programme and unable to put the path of 'emancipation' properly and precisely. It is explicit in rejecting realism but it does not add up to an alternative theory. Human security brings in the discourse of development and serves as an alternative to realist security paradigm.

Feminist Approach and Human Security

Feminist like Tickner holds that national security has been almost an exclusive male domain (Tickner 1992). This approach contests the idea of main (male) stream security, and argues that security of states does not automatically guarantee security for its members. The notion of state centred security throws its own people, particularly women out of the agenda and priorities. They show that women are ignored by the discipline of international relations. This is precisely because security has been considered a masculine arena. But in fact, security issues effect women more directly than men. They put weighty arguments in their favour arguing that: 80 to 90 percent of causalities of war are civilians; the majority of these are women and children. As pointed out by Ramesh Thakur (2004) rape of women is often used as a weapon in war. Further Smith (2002) argues that if we look at the economic, social, psychological dimensions of security the picture is even worse. Feminist scholars in general, argue for a more gender-just society in whole. This will, according to these scholars, come from the deconstruction of patriarchy. Feminists present a powerful critique of the mainstream security paradigm.

There are some underlining similarities between feminist theories and human security. Both hold that states are not the only unit of analysis in world politics. Both recognise the systemic links between international and domestic politics and recognise the importance of justice and find their roots in theories of rights and equity. Despite these similarities

there are considerable differences. First, though human security does recognise the existence and danger posed by patriarchy, it makes its referent point all individual rather than only women. Second, while the feminist theories remain useful critique of realism, but it lacks an alternative research programme. Human security provides an alternative operating manual with a strong agenda.

Radical Theories and Human Security

Both, marxists and human security advocates agree that world politics is much more than interstate relations. As Vanaik argues 'by its basic premise, political realism is incapable of theorizing the relationship between intra and trans-state actors' (Vanaik 2005: 411). Both believe in *change,* which their 'common enemy' (realism) is hostile to. While both tries to deconstruct political realism, both the paradigms have serious differences too.

"Marxists view human security as a repackaging of liberal humanitarianism, with its routine failure to address underlying social causes" (Thomas 2004: 353). On the other hand 'human security accepts the people centred premise of the radical approach, as it focuses on the development rather than developing a critique of imperialism as the dominant factor of the international relations. Further, radical theories use class rather than the individual as the basic unit of analysis' (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007: 90).

Thus the above described debate between various paradigms of world politics and human security helps us to demarcate the areas of conflict and overlap between them. It is clear that the concept of human security makes a 'methodological rupture' and 'ethical rupture' from the conventional security studies. Human security asserts that the best way to achieve security, both for states and international system is to increase that of the people. It re-conceptualizes security in terms of new means and solutions. The concept of human security brings back ethics and normative thinking in the discourse. It argues that core human values can not be sacrificed before 'big' but 'hollow' concepts like that of 'sovereignty'. This is the big shift which the concept brings to the conventional epistemology of security studies.

Conceptualizations of human security

The concept of human security was first evolved and conceptualized by international agencies, then by some states and presently it has become a major attraction of theorization in academic circles. The concept of human security is contested which means that there is no universally accepted definition, theorization or conceptualization of human security. However, the lack of agreed definition, according to Grayson, is not a conceptual weakness but it represents a refusal to succumb to the dominant 'political trappings of the disciplines' definitional project (Grayson: 2004, 357).

The UNDP report and Human Security

The history of the concept of human security goes back to UNDP's *Human Development Report* of 1994, which described the concept as 'freedom from fear and freedom from want'. It extended the human development discourse into security discourses: as it describes that 'for too long the concept of security has been interpreted narrowly as security of territory from internal aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign polity or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust'(UNDP:1994). Thus, for the first time a new 'design' was prepared by the UNDP against the realist 'strategic designs' for the maintenance of state security.

The report focuses on three major features of the concept. First, human security is a universal concern. Second, it is people centred therefore it is easier to achieve. Third, because the human miseries are interdependent and threats mutually fuel each other, therefore, human security does not stay within national borders. Thus it is concerned with how 'people live and breathe in society'. The report puts forward seven areas of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. It also fixes six main threats to human security namely: unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressure, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and international terrorism (UNDP, 1994).

Since then human security has been incorporated in the agenda by a number of states, international and regional organizations. Further, 'Human security network' (HSN) was formed by 13 countries namely, Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Jordan, Ireland, Mali, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and South Africa as observer, in the year of 1999. This network raised threats related to human security at higher levels of policy making in IR. UNESCO, in 2000, opened a discussion on revisiting security by launching an international network, SecuriPax Forum, for promoting human security and peace globally. Besides, Canada and Japan took special initiative and provided leadership and funding to include human security in global agenda (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

Canadian government's view on human security

Canada has taken human security paradigm in its foreign policy formation. It has also taken a leadership role in operationalzing it (Axworthy 1997, Hampson *et al.,* 2002; McRae and Hubert: 2001). Canada's human security policy is based on five points. One, *Public safety* by building international expertise with the capacity to counter growing cross border threats like terrorism, drug trafficking and spread of crime. Two, *protection of civilians* by establishment of legal norms, reduction of the human costs of armed conflicts, human rights field operations, and deployment of military forces in extreme situations to control atrocities and war crimes. Three, *conflict prevention* by strengthening the capacity of international community to resolve violent conflicts, building national and local capacity to manage political and social tensions with out restoring to violence, by using traditional economic sanctions to reduce the chances of civil war breakouts. Four, *governance and accountability* by fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions, with emphasis on building an effective criminal court and promoting reform of security institutions and encouraging corporate social responsibility. Five, *peace support operations* by bolstering international capacity to undertake these missions. It includes dealing with issues relating to women, providing policy to civil experts to undertake complex missions. In order to meet these

objectives, Canadian government launched a human security programme for the amount $ 10 million per year until 2010 (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

Thus, Canada's approach to human security is based on the idea of 'freedom from fear'. It focuses on 'material' threats which are mainly concerned with measures to lessen the effects of conflicts on people. The 'lean' conception developed by Canada does not go deep in to the notion of 'freedom from want' in real sense by ignoring the dignity and socio-psychological aspects of human security threats.

Japanese government's view on human security

The Japanese government's concept of human security is broader than the Canadian government's view. It goes beyond the 'lean' human security concept which associates solely with protecting human lives in conflict situations. It broadens the concept by bringing in the real threats like poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crimes, diseases like HIV/AIDS, issues related to refugees and other agendas such as anti-personnel land mines. To ensure 'human freedom and potential', the Japanese government holds that these issues need to be addressed from the perspective of human security, focussed on the individual, and requiring cooperation among various actors in the international community, including governments, international organization and civil society (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2000).

It is clear from the above description that Japan's view on human security brings in the important dimension of 'freedom from want' in the conceptualization of human security, but it still lacks another important aspect of 'dignity'. Although, the individual has become 'referent object' of security but on the 'action front', the approach maintains a 'state centric' approach. For the solutions of human security threats the concept still mainly depends on the efforts by states. Moreover, no clear effort is made at bringing in the socio-psychological elements, as done by some scholars, in the discourse on human security.

Academia/international commissions and the concept of human security

Along with the above-mentioned states, scholars in the academic circle also took an active part in the theorization of human security. Barry Buzan argues for a view of security which is broader than the realist notion, but 'leaner' than that of human security. He argues for a view of security which includes political, economic, societal, environmental, and military aspects (Buzan 1983). However, elsewhere the author discards the concept of human security as a whole, because for him the concept is 'reductionist, idealistic notion that adds little analytical value' (Buzan, 2004: 369) and thus has limited academic usability.

There are many scholars who call the concept of human security an essential tool to understand contemporary challenges to people's well being and dignity while other criticize the concept for lacking analytical rigour. Some focus on the 'material' threats while other bringing in the sexual, socio-psychological elements in to the discourse. Broadly the scholars on human security can be divided between 'minimalists' (those who support the narrow definition of human security) and 'maximalists' (those who are in favour of broad definition of human security).

'Minimalist' and 'Maximalist' Approaches to Human Security

The minimalist approach to human security limits itself with the idea of 'freedom from fear'. It deals with 'safety from direct threat, individual's physical integrity, and satisfaction of basic needs'. Threats included in the conceptualization are also of 'material' nature like armed conflicts and organized crimes. Canada's approach, as described earlier, will fall in this category. Minimalists boost of the merit of lean conceptualization because of its analytical rigour. It is because direct physical threats, dealt under minimalist approach can be observed 'practically' and hence can be removed.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty defends this narrower vision of human security. It conceptualizes human security in terms of direct

physical violence defined in terms of classical epistemology of threats as open conflicts and war. It goes on to argue that 'the fundamental components of human security- the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and human dignity- can be put at risk by external egression, but also by factors within a country, including "security forces"'(ICISS 2001:15). It is clear that the commission subscribes to the 'minimalist' conception of human security.

There are many scholars who argue for narrow conceptualization of human security. Keith Krause holds that human security is a powerful agenda only if properly/narrowly defined. He argues that human security ought to be about 'freedom from fear' and not about the broad vision of 'freedom from want'. On the other hand, he says, 'if we keep human security focussed on the "freedom from fear"- from the threat or use of violence- we can link it to a powerful and coherent practical and intellectual agenda'(Kruse 2004:368). Similarly S. N. Macfarlane holds that 'the widening of the concept makes the establishment of priorities in human security policy difficult' (MacFarlane 2004:369).

Andrew Mack is sceptical about the broad conceptualization of human security, saying that 'if the term "insecurity" embraces almost all forms of harms to individuals –from affronts to dignity to genocide–it loses any descriptive power' (Mack 2004: 367). For Murray and King, the essential elements of human security are those which are important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or poverty at great risk (King and Muray 2001). It is clear that the advocates of minimalist concept favour the minimalist theorization because of its analytical capability.

The *Maximalist* (broad) conceptualization of human security advocates the ideas of 'freedom from want' and 'life of dignity' along with 'freedom from fear'. It encompasses both 'material' (physical, direct, economic security threats) and 'non material'(dignity encompassing socio-psychological security threats) dimensions of human security threats. 'Human security network' 'visions' the concept in terms of security, development and dignity (http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu_e.php). Scholars supporting

the Maximalist conception of human security recognise a conceptualization which goes far beyond the classical violent threats defined in 'material' terms.

Kyle Grayson argues that the debates on the definition of human security are good for the health of the concept. As no workable definition exists, the concept enables broader and deeper questioning of the subjects usually and unjustifiably peripheral to the security studies. He unearths the power/knowledge nexus upheld by security studies in order to question the legitimacy of established paradigms. The scholar argues that the new, different and better policy orientations are possible by bringing in those options which were excluded before (Grayson 2004:357).

As commission on human security notes 'what people consider to be 'vital'–what they consider to be 'the essence of life' and 'crucially important'- varies across individual and societies. That is why any concept of human security must be dynamic' (CHS 2003: 4). 'Thus the commission's approach to human security bridges poverty and violence-freedom from fear and freedom from want-rather than choosing only one or another'(Alkire 2003: 32).

According to Peter Uvin, defining human security clearly or consensually is impossible. He argues that human security 'shares this essentially unfixable quality with many of the other key concepts in both personal and public life. The approach I have taken to define human security reflects its undefinable nature' (Uvin 2004: 352). Ramesh Thakur holds that 'human security is concerned with the protection of people from critical and life threatening dangers, regardless of the fact whether the threats are rooted in anthropogenic activities or natural events, whether they lie within or outside states, and whether they are direct or structural' (Thakur 2004: 348).

Jennifer Leaning, a Harvard professor, gives perhaps the most comprehensive definition of human security. For her, human security includes social, psychological, political and economic factors, encompassing psychological needs and individual relationship with the

community. Leaning argues 'individuals must also be able to support basic psychological needs for identity, recognition, participation and autonomy' (Leaning 2004:354).

Figure 2.1, maps some of the conceptualizations to show comparisons of 'security' and 'human security' developed by various scholars/governments/international agencies etc. The vertical axis shows the broadening of the nature of threats, from direct to indirect. The diagonal axis ranks the broadening of the concept in terms of 'freedom from fear' (at the beginning), 'freedom from want' (at the centre) and 'life of dignity' (at the end of scale). The horizontal axis traces the concept from narrow towards broad, in correspondence with the nature of actors which should be involved while advancing the agenda of 'security'/ 'human security'.



Figure (2.1) Expansion of the concept of 'security' towards 'human security' [adapted with changes from Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007)].

Thus, the maximalist category of conceptualizations argues for a 'life of dignity' along with 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. It encompasses both material and non material dimensions of human security threats. It puts people at the heart of agenda of security studies. The maximalist conception looks at the both the socio-psychological aspects including identity, recognition, participation and dignity, along with economic and other threats. Belief in the essential indivisibility of the human security threats is the biggest virtue of the concept.

A critique of narrow conceptualizations and virtues of the broad concept

The truth is that different conceptualizations reflect different philosophical underpinnings and offer different research agendas. Conceptualizations matter because the art of conceptualization is an act of power which marginalizes some and empowers others. Many times they are 'trojan horses' wrapped in some thing very different but actually have different agenda. Thus the 'element of power' that is inextricably linked with the definitional claims must be exposed or debated. When some one defines some thing, there must be analytic sensitivity given to the people/places/things that are marginalized. When an 'expert' claims to be providing a precise/scientific/workable definition of human security that is of practical use, he/she (intentionally or unintentionally) is in the process of excluding some people/places/things (Foucault 2003).

Conceptualizations set the agenda not only for research but also for the actions of governments and international institutions. Ultimately it is the concept which gets translated into policy. If the conceptualizations are narrow, the actions are bound to be exclusionary. This is precisely because broad conceptualization can offer those research agendas which are till now excluded for being 'alien to the discipline' or 'unscientific'. A broad definition is therefore crucial in transforming the ethos and raising those questions which are peripheral to the dominant security studies. It also encourages comprehensive measures to be applied to the issues that effect the every day lives of the people, subjective as they may be but of paramount importance. If security is ultimately a feeling then, human security must be a felt experience (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007: 37).

Critics fearfully object that a broad concept can lead to 'analytical blunders' (Mack 2004, Paris 2004, Buzan 2004). However lack of rigidity is the strength of the concept, because defining means 'exclusion'-exclusion of those who are powerless. Human security provides an analytical freedom in which the interdependent variable of threats can be studied. It provides a research programme which remains largely free from prejudices. The 'objective' conceptualization is not possible because threats are subjective in nature. The concept of 'mutual vulnerability' (Nef 1999) aptly applies to the interconnectivities 'between' and 'within' threats. Hence, conceptualizations should be broad. The strength of the concept of human securities lies only in maintaining and advancing its plurality.

Human security as a guide for research and policy formation

The broad definition of human security provides 'integrated solution for multifaceted issues' (Hampson, 2004: 349). It implies useful inter-disciplinary dialogue. The Commission on Human Security also proposes a much broader definition around a 'vital core of human life' by enlarging the epistemology of violence builds in the structures. According to the Commission on Human Security, structural inequalities and issues of distributive justice are beyond the direct violence but they affect the vital core of human life (CHS, 2003). The maximalist paradigm of human security is apt for grappling with the multifaceted issue of poverty which affect the vital core of human life, i.e. dignity.

Human security is concerned with the security of 'societies, groups and individuals'. The questions like 'does poverty', for example 'fuel violence within societies' is in the category of label called 'human security'. Further, as Roland Paris, who is one of the critics of the human security concept argues 'scholars working in the human security branch of security studies would not need to adjudicate the merit or validity of human security per se, but rather they should focus on more specific questions that could be clearly defined'. (Paris: 2001:97-101). In the case of present study, the specific question is of conceptualization about poverty.

For many scholars human security does not appear to present a particularly useful framework of analysis and many call it a useless 'shopping list of threats' (for example, Krause 2004, Buzan 2004). This is precisely because of the broad character of the concept. The irony is that often the social scientists are prisoners of their 'professional boxes' (popularly known as disciplines). Human security helps in looking beyond these 'boxes' wherever necessary. It believes that human miseries are far more complex than these categorizations. This is precisely why; the comprehensive concept of human security encompasses both physical security and other notions of social, economic, cultural, and psychological wellbeing. The strength of the concept lies in its comprehensiveness and inclusiveness, which provides scope to identify causal relationships 'between' and 'within' threats. By 'between', I mean the relation *between* various threats. For example, poverty can fuel terrorism in various conditions (the view which sees poverty itself *as* a form of violence can also be analysed under this rubric). By 'within', I mean the various facets of a particular threat, for instance economic, social, cultural and sociological. In fact the nature of threats or human miseries are not unidimentional and can only be understood by taking into account their various facets. So there is a need to look 'between' and also 'within' threats.

Implications for the study of poverty

Human security recognises threats which are interlinked and interconnected in 'domino effect': 'Poverty and inequality, for example can lead to insecurity and conflicts' (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007: 16-17). A similar domino effect also works 'with in' the concept. For the study of poverty, human security can serve as a powerful research programme, precisely because of two reasons. First, it provides scope for investigating the domino effect 'between' causal relations of poverty and conflicts. Second, it has been argued that a similar domino effect also works 'with in' the concept between its various facets. A look from the human security standpoint shall help in unearthing multiple aspects of the phenomenon of poverty by looking 'with in'.

Domino effect: 'between' poverty and conflicts

Poverty, particularly from the security point of view, is worth studying. However, the study can be appropriately done only under the flag of maximalist conception of human security. There are studies which show that there are causal link between poverty and violence. However, many scholars perceive poverty itself as a form of violence. Because of these two links, namely poverty *and* violence and poverty *as* violence, many international agencies have taken poverty on the agenda and consider it a primary security threat. Poverty makes human being less secure; it also undermines states and makes them less secure. Poverty is the root cause of many conflicts. Non material dimensions of poverty provide a sense of oppression, of exclusion, of marginalisation and give rise to extremism. In a world free from poverty, guns will have more reasons to be silent. Moreover, poverty itself is a subtle violence which adversely affects human lives in multiple ways. The relationships between, poverty *and* violence and poverty *as* violence, are dealt in the third chapter and thus an attempt is made to argue that poverty is an important human security threat.

Domino effect: 'with in' various facets of poverty

Poverty is understood from the dominant standpoint, as disadvantaged and insecure economic conditions which pertain to material aspects alone. But a serious exploration 'with in' the phenomenon of poverty will conclude that it is not merely a disadvantaged economic condition but also as a shamefull, corrosive social relation. This facet of poverty represents non-material aspects of poverty. All these facets are interlinked and work under 'domino effect'. Meaning that these facets (material and nonmaterial) are not only mutually interlinked but they also enforce each other. However even though inextricably associated with the material aspects of poverty, these non material aspects are not theorized properly. This is the subject matter of third chapter. Here an attempt will be made to argue that maximalist approach, dealing with social, psychological, political and economic factors together, can only provide 'an integrated solution for multifaceted issues' like poverty.

Chapter 3

Human Security and Poverty: Poverty *and* Violence and Poverty *as* Violence

Introduction

Violence takes place in a complex set of situations in which a multiple variables play a role. However, in general, when accompanied by other factors like weakened institutions, failed governance, or lack of respect for political and individual rights, or regional ethnic or group income and asset inequalities, it appears that poverty generally increases the probability (risk and vulnerability) of human insecurity and violent conflict. (Colletta in Chen *et al.* 2003).

However, on the other side of the equation, for scholars like Amartya Sen (2001), under-development and violence may be inter connected but poverty reduction can not be the sole policy instrument for conflict resolution. Avoiding conflicts and removing deprivation are separate ends although they can serve as a means to remove each other. Poverty itself is a form of violence, which can ruin millions of lives.

Thus within the academic understanding of human security, poverty and violence can be analyzed under two broad rubrics. First standpoint tries to establish critical linkages between poverty *and* violence ('greed' and 'grievances' model can be clubbed into this category) while second simply sees poverty itself *as* a form of violence (as observed by 'structural violence' model). The former view looks at a direct causal relation between poverty and violence, while the latter advocates 'fighting poverty for its own sake'. Put other way, former considers only overt form of violence while the latter view goes deep and tries to unearth 'covert' forms of violence. Second views the subtle forms of violence and holds that poverty itself is violence at a colossal scale.

In recent academic theorization, there is an increasing tendency to look at security and development discourses together. It will be appropriate to map these conceptual shifts in the beginning which led to the merger of security and development discourses.

The conceptual shifts

During the mid-1990s, the issue of conflict became a central concern with in mainstream development policy. Security studies, once a specialized discipline in international relations is now an important part of development discourse. Indeed, development concerns have become increasingly important in relation to how security is understood. In the present scenario, it is generally understood that international organizations should take into account various conflicts and their effects and, wherever possible, gear their work towards conflict resolution and helping to rebuild war torn societies in a way that will avert future violence. Such engagements are essential if development and stability has to prevail. These concerns are well represented in the policy statements of leading inter-governmental organizations, international financial institutions, donor governments, United Nations agencies, influential think tanks, international NGOs, and even large private companies (Dufflield 2001). For instance, UNDP considers security as an intrinsic aspect of development. The agency developed the concept of 'human security' to encompass not just the achievement of minimal levels of material needs, but also the absence of severe threats to them of an economic or political kind: 'job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of security all over the world' (UNDP 1994). Many organizations, like SAND (Security and Development) have made an attempt to view the development and security discourses together. For instance, SAND declares it self as 'an organization that focuses on documenting, investigating and consulting on practical measures that can be undertaken to improve security and the conditions for basic development in all regions of the world' (http://sand.miis.edu/). Thus there is an increasing tendency to look at the two different, but interlinked concepts of security and development.

The inter-relationship between security and development has grown in profile from the early 1990s, as donors and development practitioners started visualizing the development and security terrain together. Infact, the changing nature of conflicts in the post cold war era has significantly altered the mainstream understanding of security. As earlier understood, conflicts are no longer between states but within states.

An accelerated growth in the civil society actors, which engaged themselves in the conflict and post conflict situations is also responsible for the merging of development and security discourses. The engagement of these actors with the international agencies and national governments played a significant role in the understanding that underdevelopment is dangerous not only for the stability of the concerned country but also for the global security. They also put forth the view that new threats like, HIV/AIDS and SARS, drug trafficking, environmental threats, the migration of unemployed and those who are suffering from poverty, are not confined to national boundaries and have global nature. NGOs, particularly those working in the humanitarian and development fields, have raised the profile of human security concerns. The report sponsored by UNDP named the 'Experiences from the Field: UNDP-CSO Partnership for Conflict Prevention' (2005) explicitly recognises the role of CSOs in the related issues at the ground level. The report analyses the multiple roles which many big and small grass root level CSOs played in mediation and project implementations in the conflict prevention in the 'poor' countries like Nepal, Ukraine and Cyprus etc.

Many scholars argue that underdevelopment is potentially dangerous. As pointed out by Draman (2003) 'West Africa contains 11 of the world's 25 poorest countries and is currently one of the unstable regions of the world'. It has been in general argued that on an average, 'poor' country suffer more internal conflicts than richer countries. This thinking led to a consensus that there is a potential causality between poverty and conflict, or the fact that countries suffering from massive poverty has a higher probability to suffer a war (Rodier 2004). For scholars, underdevelopment is the principal cause behind the violent threats and therefore development should be seen as a security strategy (Duffield 2001).

Changing global norms in parallel to the liberal peace model has also significantly influenced discourses on development and security. This model interprets development, dominantly in terms of economic growth, and argues that a constant growth based on neo-liberal patterns can reduce the incidents of violent situations. For instance Collier argues that every 5 percent increase of annual growth rate can reduce the risk of conflicts by 20 percent (Collier 2000b). From this point of view, the magic of high economic growth can bring down the probability of violence.

The above discussed factors led to a merger of the notion of 'security' and development. However, the history of this merger, in one form or the other, can be traced to 1948, when peace, development and human rights were explicitly linked by the charter of the United Nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights included 'security of person' and 'social security' in its agenda in 1960s. The Brandt commission, in 1980, was watershed in this direction. It categorically connected insecurity in the world with global inequality and underdevelopment. And in 1990s, because of the above analyzed factors the 'merging of development and security discourse led analysts to look increasingly into economic and social factors as root causes of violence in their conflict models' (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007: 146).

Poverty-Conflict Nexus

There is a lot of disagreement about the specific relationship between poverty and conflict. Many scholars, like Draman (2003) argue that poverty is both a cause and a consequence of conflict. The relationship is perceived as two-fold: poverty leads to conflict and vice versa. As Duffield points out 'development is ultimately impossible without stability and at the same time, security is not sustainable without development' (Duffield 2001: 16). Meaning thereby, while conflicts can be caused by poverty or underdevelopment, poverty or underdevelopment can be a cause of violence. But, some other studies are skeptical about the process of linking poverty to conflict. For instance, Humphreys (2003) has not found evidence for establishing a correlation between

inequality and conflict. Despite the above said concerns, many scholars conclude that the causality links between violence and poverty still remain to be fully explored and the literature in this field is yet to gain maturity (Colletta in Chen *et al.* 2003,Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, Sen 2001, Duffield 2001).

However, there are a number of theoretical and empirical studies that have made an attempt to establish the link between poverty and conflicts. The critical linkages between poverty and direct or physical violence (so forth violence means direct and physical violence, unless otherwise specified) can be explained with the help of various models, which have explained the critical phenomenon in various ways.

The 'Greed' model

This model is developed by Collier and his team who undertook their research sponsored by the World Bank and International Peace Academy. Warfare, according to Collier, is better understood as an instrument of enterprise and violence as a mode of accumulation (Collier 2000a). The greed hypothesis of Collier and Hoeffler is based on rational choice econometric approach. It has been argued that conflicts often persist because some powerful actors benefit through the manipulation of scarcity, smuggling etc. and have no interest in resolving the conflict. For instance, the conflict situations permits people, more precisely uneducated young men to get employment as soldiers; it also offers the opportunity to loot; to profiteer from shortage and aid; to provide conditions for arms trade; and to promote illegal trade in various commodities. The authors argue that wherever alternative opportunities are few and possibilities of enrichment by war are high, the instance and duration of war are likely to be higher.

However, for Collier, secondary factors can also assist this primary cause of violent conflicts. These factors vary from geographical factors like a dispersed population and difficult geographical situations which makes it hard for the government to control wars. (Collier 2001). The 'greed' thesis advocates that the government and international community can reduce the important risk factors of war by making it more difficult for

rebel organizations to get established in the very first place. This agenda can be advanced in various ways. First, by creating the conditions which makes these groups unpopular (for instance, by providing effective basic services so that people do not get attracted to the rebellion's promise of wealth). Second, by making it more difficult for these groups to run parallel economy. This can be done by, for instance, increasing the number of security personnel. Democratic ethos, human right issues and good governance are inextricably linked with peaceful coexistence of groups. The econometric study calculated that every year of education reduces the risk of conflict by around 20 percent; and every 5 percent increase of annual growth rate also reduce the risk of conflicts by 20 percent (Collier 2000b, 97).

Similar study, sponsored by the World Bank, professed that the economic gain which some of the groups have made through war economy could lead to a lavish life style of that particular group which ultimately contributes in sustaining the conflict (Coller *et al.* 2003). Thus, the study concluded that violence is not a product of people's demand but it is often seen as an opportunity to plunder. In other words, conflicts are not driven because people have certain grievances but, rather by powerful economic motives (greed) of a particular section. This particular section gets substantive benefits from the conflict situation, and hence it is in interest of this group to promote violence.

David Keen, another great advocate of 'greed' thesis, argues that violence should not be seen as a breakdown of development process, but rather as an alternative system of profit grabbing, as violent conditions provide a form of veil to hide the real actions of the group which grab booty. These actions, on the other hand, in peace times would have been punishable crimes. To substantiate his argument Keen cited examples of pillage, control of trade, profit from arms, use of forced labour (as in the case of Myanmar and Sudan) the depopulation of land and during war transfer of land to the victorious, and selective use of aid by the various groups which seek profit in war like situations (Keen 1997). Thus for Keen too violent conflicts are product of powerful economic motives of a particular group which benefits immensely from violent conditions.

However, the greed model, because of its severe drawbacks, can be criticized on various fronts. In fact, econometric studies embedded in rational choice theories and individualistic notions, are genetically incapable of observing grievances or the voice for justice.

One of the main drawbacks of the greed model is that it glosses over the history of the conflict and the saga of exploitation, colonialism. It is unable to adapt to the just demands and the rights of certain group and club these demands also as 'greed'. This model from its very basis dismisses movements and struggles based on the genuine grievances of people that arise due to oppression, suppression, subjugation and violation of rights, which may be morally justified. The examples in this stream are ample like, the struggle for independent East Timor, struggle against the oppression of people under 'military boots' in Tibet, or the Palestinian movement. The danger with the greed model is that it clubs all these just movements into criminal politics and in a way permit the use of armed forces to suppress these movements. The causes of conflict may be complex one but this model oversimplifies the phenomenon and reduces it to econometrics and greed aspect of human nature. For instance, can the Mohajir conflict in Pakistan be simply put under this compartment called 'greed' when it is a struggle for equal citizenship rights? By homogenizing all these rebellions/ movements and other forms of protest and dissent in to one mass, in fact Collier covertly argues for status quo and suppressing voices of dissent and protest. He removes all legitimacy from the right to protest and dissent. In fact, 'by confusing legality with legitimacy, Collier's model could lead to unlimited support of a state, whatever responsibility it may have in the conflict' (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007: 149-50).

Further, the greed model builds up its entire hypothesis around 'local' greed and immunes 'greed' of the transnational players, like multinational companies, in the process. As put by Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 'it has been repeatedly studied for instance that many multinational companies have an interest in natural resources and thus become stakeholders in the conflict' (2007: 150). Thus, the danger of the greed model of analysis is that it suggests narrow ways of conflict resolution, without making proper attempts to

unearth the root causes. Thus this limitation of greed model logically paves way for 'grievance' model which tries to understand causalities of violence in relatively comprehensive way by focusing on the concept of justice.

The 'grievance' model

The grievance approach, associated with Francis Stewart, focuses on the failure of the responsibilities of states towards its citizens and takes in to account issues like poverty, deepened inequalities, weak institutions, lack of social security as the fundamental causes of violence. As argued by Stewart (2000) "about half low income countries as a whole have been subject to major political violence." For him causality works both way; underdevelopment lead to conditions which are conducive to violence and violence can lead to underdevelopment. Before this merger of development-security terrain, conflict prevention has been regarded as a desirable political objective but independent of poverty reduction or human development agenda.

Broadly, this model argues that if there is a group conflict there must be sharp economic differences between conflicting groups along with differences in political control. There are three types of connections explored by Stewart (2004) between development and security; *first*, immediate impact of security/insecurity on well being, where security is the objective, *second*, how security/insecurity affects development and growth: where security plays an instrumental role towards another objectives within the developmental realm such as attaining growth and *third*, how security is affected by development and growth: where security is or is not the end result and/or intention of development is seen as having an instrumental role towards security objectives.

Security for Stewart is an intrinsic aspect of development and insecurity always has heavy development costs: economic growth is almost always negatively affected by conflict, foreign exchange is derailed, and conflict induces general capital destruction and collapse of formal economics, investment and consumption. Using a grid of analysis provided by Amartya Sen, conflict thus induces falls in market and public *entitlements*, with highly unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of conflict.

He asserts that if development is thus adversely affected by insecurities, security also depends upon development. There are economic explanations of conflicts, such as horizontal inequalities that can motivate groups within the population to opt for war in order to realign imbalances of power and wealth. There is also an element of private motivation, with the prospect of individual economic advantages to be gained through war. Finally, there can be general failure of the 'social contract', vested inside the formation of a state, and violence can erupt from this breakdown.

For Stewart, a clear pattern emerges which could be called the Security-Development-Security Nexus: indeed promoting security is a substantial part of what we mean by societal progress, conflict has heavy development costs, so promoting security is instrumental to development, while inclusive patterns of development are an important element in avoiding conflict, development being instrumental to security. The link is also valid for global insecurities which do impact growth, for instance international terrorism which has negatively affected the tourism economies of many countries.

Hence in conclusion Stewart argues that there is a need to acknowledge that in developing countries, in particular, and in the world as a whole, there are strong three-way connections between security and development.

Dower (1999), following the similar league, observes that that at root there is a link between 'violence' and 'violation', for example of rights. He further broadens the scope of the model and by bringing the issues of 'justice' and 'environmental balance' in the agenda. He argues that development and the reduction of violence should be seen as immediately and favourably connected with each other and also with justice and environmental balance. There is a strong underlying assumption that 'real development' involves peace. Dower argues that broadly, these components are mutually supportive and enforce each other, irrespective of how they are precisely conceptualized. He claims that peace, justice and environment are mutually supportive and development generally relates to the whole picture.

Thus, the grievances model focuses on the concept of justice, and argues for a much deeper look into the causes of violence. The strength of grievance model is that it is sensitive to the genuine demands of people. This model focuses on the group dimension of conflict rather than specific individuals as argued by 'rational choice', 'econometric' greed model. It stands for more just approach and also contests that violence is a product of selfish desire of certain groups to grab booty, as advanced by 'greed model'. It brings in, human security approach that questions the patterns of growth itself in order to view violence in a more comprehensive manner. However, the model leaves out the various dimensions of violence like violation of rights, biased nature of state, alienation, deprivation, repression, 'self-other' construction and building of 'stereo-types' as a form of violence. These aspects, under the umbrella of maximalist approach to human security, can be taken into account for analysis.

The next section discusses the models which argue for fighting poverty, not because it is 'highly inflammable' or it can induce violence, but for its own sake. They consider poverty in itself as enough cause to work against it and which must be acknowledged without any further 'causality'.

Sen's Approach: fighting poverty for its own sake

Amartya Sen (2001) argues for a novel understanding of 'global inequality and persistent conflicts'. He observes a correlation but not causal relationship between violent persistent conflicts and massive economic inequality and poverty. But he argues that poverty should be removed for its own sake, not only for its connections with conflicts.

Sen warns against 'economic reductionism' where the whole phenomenon is explained ultimately by its hidden economic roots. According to Sen, there are three issues at least which stops him from making causal links between poverty and conflicts. First, the lack of empirical evidences. He accepts that there is no paucity of evidence of conflicts and confrontations in economies with a good deal of poverty and much inequality. But, at the

same time, he argues that there are also other economies with massive poverty but lacking any serious political turbulence.

Secondly, he argues that destitution can give reason enough to defy established rules, but it need not give people the actual courage and ability to do any thing very violent. In fact, for him, the argument goes the other way round. He observes that often enough intense sufferings have been accompanied by 'quite' and 'peace'. To fortify his argument, Sen asserts that the agents and particularly the leaders of violence often come from not so deprived groups. Osama Bin Laden is one such example.

Thirdly, for Sen, the *direction* of causality in the cases in which the co existence of economic poverty and violence is actually observed goes in the opposite direction. In other words, violent situations can lead to underdevelopment, instead of underdevelopment leading to violence. Thus, he argues that there is a strong causal link going from war and violence to famines and-destitution, than from the latter to former.

However, Sen accepts that though the economic reductionism is simple and naïve and there is no direct causal connection between poverty and violence, surely there are linkages that make poverty and deprivation influence the likelihood of conflict and violence. The chain of linkages is often quite indirect, but no less important for that reason.

Firstly, the long term effects of destitution can leave long-lasting imprints, and can contribute in future in generating rebellion and violence. Causal connections may not work instantly, but they can work over decades and even centuries. According, to the scholar, this happened in India as well. Famines typically occurred without major violence, but the memory of famines would be frequently be recalled by the masses as a proof of inequities of imperial rule.

Secondly, poverty provides a fertile soil for the recruitment of foot soldiers for the terrorist camps. While the leaders of the terrorists organizations often comes from

affluent families, it is generally observed that the soldiers of the terrorist organizations generally belongs to the lower strata of the society. Thirdly, political asymmetry can also enforce a sense of alienation which can further fuel violence. Sharp asymmetries in the political power structures can also feed a sense of alienation. Hence ameliorating massive inequalities of political power may be in this respect, an important instrument for the long lasting peace in a world of asymmetries. For example within the UN, these political asymmetries can be tackled by including the demands for greater democratic decision making process.

Thus, by analyzing the arguments of both the spectrums, following conclusions are observed by Sen. The causal connections between poverty and violence are weak. He also warns that 'while the temptation to accept economic reductionism in explaining conflicts and strife is easy to understand, it can sometimes be quite counterproductive. One of the most important conclusion pointed out by him is that the urgency of poverty removal should not remain parasitic on economic reductionism. He further argues that poverty is an evil in itself, and this must be acknowledged, without invoking any further- and ulterior- causal connections.

Indeed, Sen argues that if the justification of poverty removal is based principally on causal connections that may, on investigation, turn out to be doubtful, or at least not wholly robust, then the commitment to remove poverty would be dialectically undermined. Further, this is a particularly serious concern, since poverty and massive inequality are terrible enough in themselves to provide reasons for placing priority on their removal, without any indirect causal presumption. By declaring that 'just as virtue is its own reward, poverty is at least its own penalty', Sen comes closer to accepting that poverty is itself a form of violence.

Poverty is viewed *as* violence by model of 'structural violence'. Hence to understand the debate and to give it a logical conclusion, it becomes vital to discuss this approach.

The 'structural violence' and poverty

The concept of structural violence debunks the conventional understanding of violence in terms of direct or physical violence and digs deep to unearth the deeply embedded violence in social structures (Galtung 1985, Eckhardt 1992, Lawler 1995, Ryan 1995). The dominant understanding of violence refers to as an act of force exerted to impart physical harm or injury. As Des Gasper argues 'typically 'violence' has a negative connotation- violence is what damages something of value...this is the standard view of war'(Gasper 2005:116). Cameron focuses on physical violence as more observable to says that 'the concept of violence will be restricted to situations of activities between human beings where at least one person becomes physically damaged or is physically restricted without giving consent to the activity' (1999: 31-2). But he further accepts that '...certainly violence has several dimensions which, a purely physical perspective may not capture' (Cameron 1999:31-2). Thus, most often peace has been understood in negative terms, as the absence of war or armed conflict/violence. It is important to say particularly while dealing with the issue of poverty that this notion of violence is inadequate for at least two reasons. First, the notion of physical violence is based on the axiom that there is a direct link which joins the perpetrator and the victim of violence. It simply overlooks the fact that violence often operates in covert manner. Second, it refers exclusively to physical harm and injury and neglects socio-psychological aspects of violence. As Galtung argues 'we shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as *personal* or *direct,* and to violence where there is no such actor as *structural* or *indirect*'... 'There may not be any person who directly harms another person in structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances' (Galtung 1969: 170-171).

Indeed, the notion of structural/covert violence, associated with conception of 'positive peace'[1] refers not only to the absence of physical use of force between states, but any thing preventable which is understood as obstacle in human fulfilment and self

[1] Negative peace refers to the absence of direct violence. Opposite of it, is the concept of 'positive peace', which refers to the additional absence of structural and cultural violence.

realization. This silent violence can be countered by satisfaction of fundamental human needs, which can be socio-psychological in nature. The concept of structural violence goes far deeper than the conventional understanding of violence by dominant schools of thought in international relations, which conceive violence superficially.

The concept of structural violence tries to understand the embedded structures in society which maintains the dominance of one group, usually at the centre of power[2] over the majority usually outside this centre. This silent violence can manifest in various ways, from low wages to poor health, malnutrition, and often in more silent but dangerous things, like construction of 'self' and 'other' which can lead to a 'restricted' control over one's life. This silent violence can be a cause of breakout of direct violence.

Originally, the concept was developed in colonial situations with reference to the 'coloniser' and 'colonised'. But today the concept is widely used in cultural theory, peace studies in order to drag out the enduring but silent ways in which violence operates through repressive political, economic, socio-psychological and cultural structures.

As Galtung (1985) points out, apart from deliberately inflicting harm, commonly understood as violence, creating economic misery, repression, subjugation and alienation should also count as a form of violence. Thus taking away life is not the only effect of structural violence.

Broadly four types of violence can be identified in world politics. These are various faces or dimensions of violence. First, is the violence as understood in a conventional sense. This facet includes sufferings such as in war or armed violence. The general and dominant understanding of violence starts and ends with this. Second facet of violence can be identified as deprivation, which can be in the form of our fundamental material needs. Third facet of violence operates at subtle level in the form of repression, including loss of human freedoms to make choices of their want, speak out their beliefs and the

[2] Here the term power is understood as multi dimensional concept encompassing 'decision making', 'agenda setting', and as well as 'thought control' as elaborated by Steven Lukes (1974).

right to be an agency (right to speak and decide on their own behalf). In its fourth facet, violence works as alienation, alienation from one's community, one's work and even from one's own 'self'. This relates directly to the non material needs of a human being.

Second, third and forth, facet of violence, discussed above can be named as 'structural violence'. These dimensions are often neglected by overt form of violence. Structural form of violence can be traced to the social, political, economic and cultural structures of a society. One of the practical examples, as elaborated elsewhere in the chapter, of the studies on structural violence is traced by Peter Uvin in the case of Rwanda conflict of 1990s. Many other examples can be pointed out where 'structural violence' accompanied by underdevelopment made the situation explosive. As observed by Gasper 'Pakistan in the 1960s was lauded by many abroad; but the development imbalance between East and West Pakistan, in favour of the latter, culminated in the more populous East launching its own political movement, murderous repression by the forces of West Pakistan, and a bloody war' (Gasper 2004:120).

While dealing with the issue of poverty, 'structural violence' must be taken in account. As pointed out by Galtung '...in a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in lower classes, violence is exercised even if there is no concrete actors one can point out to directly attacking others' (1969:171). Thus, from this point of view poverty itself becomes a form of violence.

The conventional 'objective' approach to poverty, which reduces it to 'technocratic' measurable *income*, is not sufficient to understand the broad phenomenon of poverty. From this standpoint, poverty is understood as disadvantaged and insecure economic conditions which pertains to material aspects alone.

But poverty is not merely a disadvantaged economic condition but it is also a shameful, corrosive and coercive social relation. This facet represents non-material aspects of poverty. Non material aspects of poverty includes; lack of voice, disrespect, humiliation, assault on dignity and self esteem, shame and stigma, powerlessness, denial of rights, and

diminished citizenship (Lister; 2004:7). These aspects can easily be traced to social structures which are deeply embedded in the existing social patterns of representation, interpretation and communications. These social patterns create stereotypical image of the 'poor'. Because of these relational aspects, 'poor' is reduced as the 'Other'. Even 'commonsensical' terms like 'the poor', 'poor people' are not neutral and objective and can themselves be dehumanizing. Such structural aspects of the problem will be further developed in next chapter.

Montage: human security and various models to understand violence

Human security approach must recognize mutual vulnerability and inter dependence of threats. This, as emphasised in this study is perhaps the strongest point of the concept. Commission on Human Security asserts that 'human security in its broadest sense embraces more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompass human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential...freedom from want and freedom from fear...and these are inter related building blocks of human and therefore national security' (CHS 2003: 4).

Poverty, as a multifaceted violence plagues human lives because of its various dimensions. And human security, as put by Kanti Bajpai 'relates to the protection of the individual's personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence' (Bajpai 2000b). Thus, human security is not only about preventing 'overt' violence *per say* but about preventing 'covert' violence too.

Here, one conclusion, which stands out after analysing various perspectives on poverty and violence is that behind every conflict, a complex set of variables work. These can vary from economic, political, social and cultural factors. It has been often observed in various cases that conflicts are enhanced and accelerated by sharp group differentiation in economic assets and income, political participation, social exclusion and marginalization. These all facets are mutually linked and enforce each other. Action on any front alone is

not likely to work. An integrated framework to human security is required to tackle 'multifaceted' conflicts.

In fact, a mutual interdependence also works between *structural* and *direct* forms of violence. It is evident in Peter Uvin's study of Rwanda where he traces the connections between structural violence and direct violence in an explicit manner. He argues that if 'we define structural violence as consisting of the combination of the extreme in equality, social exclusion, and humiliation/assault on peoples dignity...[then] notwithstanding positive macro economic indicators, Rwanda [can be] characterized by a high degree of structural violence: during the years prior to the [1994] genocide, this structural violence greatly intensified' (1999: 50-51).

Taking a note of sharp inequalities in Rwanda, Uvin illustrates some instances of sharp inequalities. He asserts that this reality however contrasts sharply with the dominant image of Rwanda which was shared by donors and government officials alike. This image was of a country in which development was proceeding nicely under the capable leadership and a free market oriented government policies. For instance, he cites that 'according to 1988 ministry of the plan data, the lowest paid 65 per cent of public employees earned less than 4 per cent of all salaries, while the share of the top 1 per cent was 45.8 per cent'. He further points out that 'approximately half of all Rwandans are ultra poor, i.e. incapable of feeding themselves decently or investing productively... and perhaps 1 per cent are positively rich... [second,] social exclusion was deeply embedded...[and] foremost of a social and regional nature... from 1982 to 1984, nine tenths of all public investments [was in four out of the ten provinces]' (1999: 52-53).

Further to show the gravity of the inequalities, Uvin writes, 'while Gitarama, the most populous province after Kigali, received 0.16 per cent [national income], more than a third of the 85 most important government positions, as well as the quasi- totality of direction functions in the army and the security apparatus, were held by people from Gisenyi, the president's native province' (1999: 52-53).

Official's scornful attitude towards farmers, Uvin argues, bring us to the third element of structural violence, i.e. humiliation. Prejudices, according to him, existed in Rwanda not in one but two forms. 'One was the official racist "Hutu" ideology, which constituted the moral basis of the genocide. The other is the prejudice of what are locally called the *evolues*- the urban educated modern 'developed' people- versus their backward, rural, illiterate 'under-developed' brothers... an often extremely condescending, rude and manipulative attitude towards the masses...' (1999: 53-54).

In fact, Uvin concludes that such interaction between structural violence and racism created the conditions necessary for genocidal manipulation by the elites to be successful. Structural violence provoked the need for scapegoating among ordinary people. Further, the existence of a long standing racism allowed parts of the elite to build a genocidal movement on the basis of this need (Uvin 1999:54).

It is clear that the interaction between the structural violence further fuelled by other elements led to direct physical violence, which made Rwanda explosive. In a society, it is clear from Rwandan case, where 'structural violence' is taken seriously, guns will have more reasons to be active.

Hence, it can be argued that, both the approaches discussed in the chapter, namely; 'poverty *and* violence' and 'poverty *as* violence' should be considered complimentary rather than contradictory. Structural violence and direct violence can mutually enforce each other which is quite clear from Rwandan case. In fact, 'the inter play of development patterns, denial of rights, exclusions and rising aspirations combined together aggravate inequalities that ultimately lead to conflicts. The (maximalist) human security approach shows this inter connectedness' (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 164). Hence, subscription to this approach alone can arm us for pre-emptive measures which can be taken in advance to avoid violence.

Another conclusion which stands out is that even if it is accepted that there exists no *direct* causal relation between poverty and violence, poverty, just by the virtue of its own,

should be considered as violence at a colossal scale. As in case of human security Sen argues that human security is concerned with reducing and-when possible-removing the insecurities that plague human lives (1999b). Poverty is itself such a human security threat, which plagues human life.

A maximalist human security framework, it can be argued, can allow us to analyze security on a long term basis and can address the underlying structural forms of violence and can lead to 'positive peace' espoused by Galtung. Because of its equal stress on economic, political and socio-psychological facets, both the objective and subjective causes/aspects of poverty *and* violence and poverty *as* violence can be analyzed with this approach. A maximalist approach of human security can be an 'integrated' and substantive solution for 'multi-faceted' problems in true sense.

Chapter 4

Revisiting Conceptualization of Poverty

The chapter is about *concept* of poverty. The chapter is based on the axiom that like life, poverty is also multifaceted. The issue is that both, *non-material* and *material* manifestations of poverty can provide better framework for understanding of poverty. An attempt has been made to establish that poverty should be conceptualized not only in terms of disadvantaged and insecure economic *condition* but also as a shameful, coercive social *relation* (Jones and Novak 1999).

Poverty is considered as a primary human security threat. In its material manifestations, it can bring unacceptable hardship. There is also, often neglected, non-material/relational/symbolic dimensions of poverty, which constitute an integrated part of the problem. It has been argued here that a 'domino effect' works between these material and relational/symbolic facets 'with in' the concept of poverty. In other words, these aspects are complexly nested and mutually enforce each other. The inextricable linkages, between material and non-material aspects demand an 'integrated solution' which is compatible enough to encompass these facets. The broad conceptualization of poverty developed here has implications and helps to build a case for maximalist framework of human security. It has been argued that maximalist framework acknowledging both the material and non-material dimensions of threats can help to unearth these covert and subtle linkages.

To visualize poverty, both in terms of 'material' and 'non-material' aspects, there is need to think beyond 'absolute'-'relative' dichotomy and reconciliation of this paves way for an alternative, more sophisticated understanding of poverty. The relational/symbolic aspects like disrespect, humiliation, shame and stigma, assault on dignity and self esteem, denial of human rights, diminished citizenship, lack of voice, powerlessness etc. are inextricably linked to the concept of 'social exclusion' and 'Other'. 'Othering' can be described as a process by which identity of a particular group, by social and/or psychological ways, is constructed. This identity is represented inferior and 'binary

opposite' to 'Self' through a complex relationship of power and often gets manifested though 'language'. By declaring someone 'Other', persons tend to stress what makes them dissimilar from or opposite of 'Self', and is often done by labelling and creating stereotypical images. In order to explore the relational/symbolic/non material aspects of poverty and to theorize the matter in accurate manner, the concept of 'social exclusion' and 'Other' are dealt in detail. The broad rubric of the chapter is nested around the above said themes. Implications of the comprehensive conceptualization - with both material and non-material aspects- of poverty on the understanding of human security are dealt at the end of the chapter.

At the outset it is vital to say that the chapter broadly deals with the *conceptualization* and not with the definition or measurements of poverty. However the distinction between these three has been made in the introduction but to contextualize the discussion in this chapter, it is crucial to discuss them in short here. Concepts operate at a fairly general level. They are wide frameworks in which definitions and measurements are developed. In a nutshell, they are about meanings. The study of concepts also includes how people talk about and visualize the particular object of inquiry. Thus conceptualizations are much broader. Definitions are more precise statement of what distinguishes the object of inquiry. Generally they are embedded in a particular outlook. Measures show more narrowing down of focus. They are operationalzing definitions or tools so that one can identify and count (Lister 2004).

Broad vs. Narrow

Conceptualizations can be divided in to 'broad' and 'narrow' on the basis of two distinct understandings, meanings, images and discourses on poverty. Traditionally, and especially since Adam Smith, the concept of poverty is mapped around material deprivation. The dominant understanding of poverty is still based on absolute and reductionist understanding of poverty and that is quite evident in the notion of poverty subscribed by the international agencies like World Bank and most governments. World Bank report states that at the start of twenty first century, almost half of the people live in

a state of 'deep poverty' understood in terms of income less than of $2 a day (World Bank, 2001:3). Among the academic community, especially the economists, there is a tendency to almost exclusively subscribe to the conceptualization of poverty based on income, consumption and to some extent human welfare. For example, Hagenaars (1991) is of the view that poverty should be defined in terms of survival criteria, generally the amount of income required to acquire a minimum food calorie intake. Similarly Planning Commission in India has estimated that 27.5% of the population was living below the poverty line in 2004–2005, down from 51.3% in 1977–1978, and 36% in 1993-1994. The source for this was the 61st round of the National Sample Survey (NSS) and the criterion used was monthly per capita *consumption expenditure* below Rs. 356.35 for rural areas and Rs. 538.60 for urban areas (Government of India 2007, *emphasis added*).

Poverty by most of the national governments including India and most international agencies is understood in terms of material (based on income and consumption) deprivation. 'From the income perspective a person is poor if, and only if, her income level is below the defined poverty line. Many countries have adopted income poverty line to monitor progress in reducing poverty incidences. Often the cutoff poverty line is is defined in terms of having enough income for a specified amount of food' (Fukuda- Par and Kumar 2003: 39).

The influence of the 'material' poverty is such that even the 'social' concepts like exclusion are viewed from this lens. Studies on exclusion (like Appassamy *et al.* 1996, Kaijage and Tibaijuka 1996) are concerned only with material deprivation. This concept based on 'material' 'technocratic' understanding of poverty is under attack for reducing poverty to single dimension.

Although, material perspective focuses on an important aspect of poverty, it gives only a partial picture of the many ways in which lives of human beings can be blighted. Some body can enjoy good health and live quite long but be illiterate and thus cut off from learning, from communication and from interaction from others. Another person may be literate and quite well educated but prone to premature death because of epidemiological

characteristics or physical disposition. Yet a third person may be excluded from participating in the important decision-making process affecting her/his life. The deprivation of none of them can be captured by material based perspective based on level of income (Fukuda- Par and Kumar 2003). Thus poverty is too complex to be reduced to a single dimension of human life.

The notion of capability approach popularized by Sen makes a departure from the traditional understanding of poverty. An alternative perspective is presented by him about the definition of poverty. Sen explores the conceptualization in a broader perspective and asks why they matter. The Nobel laureate asserts that money is simply a means to an end and the goods and commodities it buys are simply particular ways of achieving functionings. He gives a relative dimension to his theorization, and argues that the role of income in achieving functionings varies between societies. Use of the same poverty line in different countries can be problematic because of the variation in necessary commodities. Hence he discards the money based approach. Moreover there are differences in the ability of people to convert money into capabilities (1985, 1992 and 1999).

The core of Sen's approach is an understanding of living as involving 'being and doing'. The two key terms in his works are 'functionings' and 'capabilities'. Here functionings simply means what a person actually manages to do or be involved in a range of things from elementary nourishment to participation in the life of community. Capability means what a person *can* do or be (these include how many choices are available to her/him). The underlying feature is the freedom people enjoy to choose between different ways of living. Thus, for Sen, poverty should be defined in terms of the 'failure of basic capabilities to reach certain minimally acceptable levels' (1992: 109).

Sen enhances understanding of poverty but this understanding has limitations. Having a certain level of capability, for example good health and education, are not enough. Taking a note of human development, from where human security also derives its basic premises, Fukuda- Par maintains 'that human development is broader than education and

health because human capabilities extend well beyond this areas' (Fukuda- Par 2003: 93). About Sen's insufficiency he notes that the broad and complex nature of human development reducing it to education and health alone will add little to concepts of human capital and basic needs. The alternative poverty 'wheel' (fig. 4.2) tries to draws a more comprehensive picture than Sen's approach.

Material and non-material manifestations are often seen in contradiction by poverty researchers. Carloine Moser (1998), after making a survey of development literature, asserts that the literature on the poverty sets up a dichotomy between 'conventional', 'objective' 'technocratic' and 'material' approaches that visualise poverty only in economic terms and consumption on one hand and 'subjective' approaches on the other. Some others argue that both the approaches have different philosophical assumptions (Shaffer 1996). Some scholars try to transcend this dichotomy between material and non-material approaches to offer complementary rather than competing research agendas (Bob Baulch1996b, Lister 2004). Bob Baulch makes an attempt to reconcile the material and non material manifestations of poverty. He draws an image of a pyramid in which top constitutes the material bases of poverty consisting of private consumption or income. Base widens by including the non-material manifestations of poverty including 'dignity' and 'autonomy' (Bob Baulch 1996a, b). The hierarchy implicit in the pyramid also indicates the importance and prioritization between the two manifestations (figure 4.1: 'Poverty Triangle').



Figure (4.1), The 'Poverty Triangle': showing hierarchical relationship between material and non-material manifestations of poverty [Adapted from Bob Baulch-1996b]

An alternative 'poverty wheel' is provided by Ruth Lister (2004), which represents a parity and interdependence between the material and non-material aspects of poverty. 'Material Core' represents 'unacceptable hardship' and the rim of the wheel represents 'relational/symbolic/non-material' manifestations of poverty. The material core and relational/symbolic/non-material aspects are inextricably linked with each other. The wheel shows the two way interdependence between material and non-material aspects and also the complex relationship and with in various facets of non material aspects (like shame, stigma, lack of voice, denial of human rights, diminished citizenship etc). Both the material hub and rim are culturally sensitive and shaped by social and cultural relations because of its broad character.



Figure (4.2) The 'Poverty Wheel' [adapted from Lister (2004)]

The complex relationship between the material and non material moorings, and also between various facets of non material aspects, of poverty can be analysed under the two broad rubrics of 'social exclusion' and 'Other*ing*'. With the help of these broad rubrics, a case is made in favour of non-material aspects of poverty which are of course inextricably linked with the material core. This broad conceptualization will have serious implications for the theorization of human security. Keeping an eye on this comprehensive poverty wheel, a maximalist framework of human security, encompassing both the material and non material dimensions of problems, is favoured. It has been

argued that 'development is about more than the growth of material output and should serve broader objectives of human well being' (Fukuda-Par 2003: 93). But before that, it is essential to survey the current state of the debate between the 'absolute' and 'relative' poverty. An attempt is made to reconcile the two approaches and to locate that 'reconciliation' in the broader conceptualization of poverty presented in this chapter.

The absolute-relative dichotomy

For many years, a vigorous debate persisted over relative versus absolute approaches to poverty. Relative and absolute poverty tap in to fundamentally divergent notions of deprivation (Shanahan and Tuma 1994). But, as argued in this chapter, a deeper analysis of the two notions paves the way for the reconciliation of the two moorings. They however represent different constructions of poverty, based on different understanding of needs, but they are not two distinct realities and hence can be visualized together.

Absolute poverty refers to a set standard which is the same in all countries and which does not change over time. An income-related example would be living on less than $X per day. Absolute notion of poverty, deployed in late nineteenth and twentieth century, is associated with Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree. These scholars of modern poverty research conceptualized poverty in 'absolute'; sense and argued that poverty means lacking sufficient money to meet basic physical standards. 'At its most basic, absolute poverty is defined in terms of survival; more commonly it refers to subsistence, linked to a basic standard of physical capacity necessary for production (paid work) and reproduction (the bearing and nurturing of children). Nutrition is central to such definitions' (Lister 2004: 21). 'An absolute standard means one defined by reference to the actual needs of the poor and not by the expenditure of those who are not poor. A family is poor if it can not afford to eat' (Joseph and Sumption 1979: 27). This notion of poverty is extremely important to discuss. Particularly Rowntree had an enormous influence on the study of poverty, which is still felt today (Bradshaw 2000a). Most of the governments, with some modifications or the other, subscribe to this understanding of poverty.

Relative poverty, on the other hand, refers to a standard which is defined in terms of the society/country in which an individual lives and which therefore differs between societies/countries and over time. This alternative 'relative' definition is developed by Townsend and comprehensively conceptualized in his *Poverty in the United Kingdom.*. He deconstructs the narrow 'absolute' model and argues that such notion of poverty debunks the social context. According to his alternative, relative definition 'individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diets, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns and activities' (Townsend 1979: 31).

European Commission, in 1984, subscribed to a similar definition. It stated 'the poor shall be taken to mean persons, families and group of persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the member state in which they live. However, this notion does not explicitly encompass the facet of social participation, which is at the core of the concept of 'relative deprivation' (Cited in Lister 2004). Townsend explicitly argues that relative deprivation occurs when people 'cannot obtain, at all or sufficiently, the conditions of life- that is, the diets, amenities, standards and services- which allow them to play the roles, participate in the relationships and follow the customary behavior which is expected of them by virtue of their membership of society'. Thus, this notion encompasses 'all the major spheres of life' (Townsend 1993: 36).

In order to understand the debate in a deeper manner, a further analysis is required of the notion of 'relative' poverty. While unpacking the concept we have to deal with the notion of human *needs.* How needs are understood is 'critical both to the absolute-relative

poverty dichotomy and to the ways in which the debate has moved beyond this dichotomy (Lister 2004: 24).

The literature dealing with the notion of human needs can be broadly categorized under two broad rubrics. First identifies needs as an 'objective fact' and 'universal'. Scholars subscribing to this notion eventually also subscribe to the absolute notion of poverty. Needless to say that this idea generally focuses on the material aspects of human needs. However, from the second aspect needs are understood also as 'socially constructed'. The idea of relative poverty is the logical corollary of this notion of human needs which focuses on the non material aspects along with the material aspects.

Human needs in a comprehensive way are theorized by John Veit-Wilson. Emphasizing social and psychological needs, he argued that 'the full range of intangible and material resources are required over time to achieve the production, maintenance and reproduction of the fully autonomous, fully participating adult human in a particular society to which he or she belongs... Material resources may support the physical organism, but it is the full range of social and psychological resources which are required for the experience of humanity' (1999: 85). Elsewhere he writes that the adequacy of resources should be evaluated 'in terms of acquiring and maintaining dignity and being able to take [or play] a respectable and recognized part in one's own society' (Veit-Wilson 1994: 14).

On the basis of Townsend's (1979) exposition of the nature of needs, he can be categorized in the above discussed latter camp, which holds that needs are socially constructed. He accepts that his conceptualization of needs is not novel, but he maintains that the implications of such conceptualization has not been fully realized previously. He cites Adam Smith to illustrate his point 'By necessaries, I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life but whatever the customs of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even for the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is strictly speaking not a necessity of life... but in present time ... a credible day labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt (1776: 691).

This phenomenon of to be 'ashamed to appear in public' is not confined to the North, and now increasingly becoming global in nature. Marshall Wolfe argues that 'people throughout the world are now exposed to messages concerning diversified and continually changing norms of consumption' and even the extreme forms of poverty 'are being penetrated in incongruous ways by elements of consumer culture' (1995: 90-1). In fact a bifurcated process of 'cultural inclusion' and 'structural exclusion' is going on. Although this process is most visible in societies of north, but globalization means that this process is no longer confined to these societies alone (Young Jock 1999). In other words, because of the phenomenon of globalization and increasing influence of western consumerism, the commodities are no more the means to 'fulfill' needs only. They have also become, because of the influence of consumer culture, tools of recognition. Lacking them, may lead to shame and humiliation.

This is precisely why the effects of so called 'consumer culture' has accelerated this process of exclusion. The dimension of the social and cultural construction of needs should be analyzed in modern consumer societies. When people are increasingly defined by what they have and what they maintains, the 'poor... are recast as "flawed consumers"' (Bauman 1998: 2).

Townsend's argues that even the needs like nutrition can not be separated from social, historical and cultural context. He writes 'the amount and the cost of food which is eaten depends on the social roles people play and the dietary customs observed as well as the kinds of foods made available through production and availability in markets. Food in all kinds of society is "socialized"...the specification of the costs of meeting minimum dietary needs in any society is as problematic as the specification of the costs of fulfilling the entire roles, participative relationship and customs enjoyed by the people' (1993: 31).

Human needs can not be reduced to single dimension, neither material nor non material. In fact these are not only mutually dependent but they mutually reinforce each other. Human beings are physical as well as social beings. In addition to physical ones, human

needs encompass a range of social expectations and responsibilities as well as psychological requirements. These needs, both physical and non physical, are not only independently important but realizing one is impossible without achieving the other. Acquiring material needs is essential for the full realization of non material needs and the vice versa. Human needs are thus located at both the material and the relational/symbolic non-material hubs, and hence are inextricable aspects of poverty.

Debating Rowntree-Townsend and revisiting 'absolute'- 'relative' dichotomy

Arguing on the basis of broad character of human needs, numerous scholars have criticized the conventional wisdom of Booth and Rowntree. Ringen argues that one of the logical conclusion of accepting the fact, that most basic needs are socially conditioned, is that the notion of absolute poverty falls apart (1987). The notion of absolute poverty constructs 'strict universals' which argues for a uniform agenda irrespective of space and time. The notion that, even basic needs are socially constructed automatically deconstructs this 'strict universal'. A number of other scholars have questioned the concept of absolute poverty. The notion also faced an aggressive attack from Townsend's relativist conceptualization.

Veit-Wilson in defense of Rowntree, points out that most of these criticisms are naïve and based on bad reading of Rowntree. He argues that the distinction which this pioneer made between 'primary' and 'secondary' poverty and his use of a subsistence standard, based on 'merely physical efficiency' to measure the former have been widely misunderstood. Rowntree, according to Veit-Wilson never believed that subsistence 'primary poverty' alone constitutes poverty. (1986: 69).

Whether, Rowntree talked about the relational and symbolic aspects or not, one thing which is very evident from his reading is that he considers these aspects secondary. Secondary, things often loose their meaning and people have a tendency to forget them. Hence there is need to develop a framework which considers both the material and symbolic/relational aspects in an indivisible manner.

Breaking the wall

Several attempts have been made to reconcile and integrate the two above discussed competing frameworks. Such a framework that is sensitive to both the 'absolute' and 'relative' notions of poverty. These attempts can be summarized in Sen-Townsend debate and further sophisticatedly covered in Doyal and Gough's theory of human needs. A substantive effort to transcend the dichotomy was also made in the "Copenhagen declaration" of 1995 agreed at the UN World Submit on Social Developement.

Sen has addressed this dilemma of dichotomy and 'reconciles the notions of absolute and relative approaches of poverty' (UNDP 1997: 16). Elsewhere in his theory of capabilities, he argues that what one is capable of or able to do is a matter of universal 'absolutes' and the means needed to realize this ability into actual being or doing take us into the area of 'relatives', because the things which people need to do or be are socially, culturally and historically determined (1983). He holds that an 'irreducible absolutist core in the idea of poverty' exists but this absolutist core works in a broad environment of capabilities which takes a 'relative form in the space of commodities' (1983: 161). He concludes that 'there is no conflict between the irreducible absolutist element in the notion of poverty (related to capabilities and the standard of living) and the 'thoroughgoing relativity' to which Peter Townsend refers, if the latter is interpreted as applying to commodities and resources...when Townsend estimates the resources requiring for being able to 'participate in the activities of community', he is in fact estimating the varying resource requirements of fulfilling the same absolutist need (1983: 161).

However, this ensued a debate.[1] Finally Townsend himself asserted that 'absolute or basic material and social needs across societies are the same, even when they have to be satisfied differently according to institutions, culture and locations' (cited in Townsend

[1] The part of the problem was because of the two different meanings subscribed by the pioneers. However Sen agreed with the social nature of needs (Sen 1985). The debate is summarized in Townsend (1993).

and Gordon 2000: 17). This has become the basis of reconciliation between absolute and relative notions of poverty.

The second effort to transcend the absolute-relative dichotomy can be found in the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, agreed at the 1995 UN World Submit on Social Development. According to this declaration, absolute poverty consists of 'severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information' and 'access to social services' as well as income (UN 1995: para. 19). This is distinguished, however inextricably as a part of, much broader notion of poverty called 'overall poverty' that means 'the total number of people living in poverty in a country' (Langmore 2000: 36). This 'definition' of 'overall poverty' is actually a conceptualization, expressed through a list of manifestations of poverty. These include 'lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods' through 'increased morbidity and mortality from illness' to 'social discrimination' and 'exclusion' and 'lack of participation in decision making and in civil, social and cultural life' (UN 1995 para. 19). Townsend himself later championed this two part conceptualization on the ground that it 'was designed to bridge the industrialized and developing countries and to afford a basis for cross-national measurement' (Gordan *et al.* 2000: 86) .

One conclusion which stands out is that it is possible and fruitful to transcend the sterile absolute-relative dichotomy. This is possible by acknowledging the broader and comprehensive conceptualization of poverty with a material core but this material core must be placed in relation to the other 'symbolic/ relative' aspects of poverty. This alternative 'poverty wheel' can be in harmony with maximalist framework of human security. After transcending the age old dichotomy, it will be feasible to explore it further and link it to the other dimensions of poverty through the 'lens' of 'social exclusion'.

Social exclusion and poverty

The concept of social exclusion is now a well established discourse in the study of poverty (Bhalla and Lapeyre 2004). Social exclusion is related not only to the lack of material wealth but also to a symbolic exclusion, social deprivation and incomplete participation in the main social institutions (Silver 1995). The merit of the concept lies in adding a non material dimension to the 'material core' which acts as a lens to visualise some of the facets of 'relational/symbolic' aspect of the poverty wheel which has been hitherto neglected by the 'technocratic' understandings of poverty. But the concept of social exclusion should not be used as an alternative to that of poverty as it is done by some scholars (see Bhalla and Lapeyre 2004). It is used here to get a grip over a number of important aspects of poverty which can help to advance the broad framework argued in this chapter.

The roots of the concept of social exclusion can be traced back to classical sociology. The concept is now widely used across disciplines including education, sociology, psychology, politics and economics. Weber associated this concept with the ways in which groups can secure and maintain privileges at the expense of those different from their own members. This privileges are maintained through a process of 'social closure' (Berting and Villain-Gandossi 2001). However, modern usages of the concept are more political than sociological in origin (Daly and Saraceno 2002). In contemporary terms, the concept is usually traced to France where in 1970s and 1980s it was used to refer to a range of marginalized groups who had fallen outside the net of French social insurance system (Evans 1998). Gradually, the concept was applied more widely to analyze the process of social disintegration and conditions of precariousness (Martin 1996, Choffe 2001). Soon the concept was theorized in the academic circles, for instance by Silver (1994), which made it popular. Several governments and international organizations have shown a considerable interest in the concept. EU has declared 'combating exclusion' as one of the social policy objective in 1997 (Mayes *et al.* 2001). Although the concept is still less popular in South, attempts have been made 'to fashion a notion of social exclusion which is not Eurocentric and relevant globally, in a wide variety of country-

settings' on the grounds that 'social exclusion occurs within all societies, but has different meanings and manifestations' (Gore and Figueiredo 1997: 3,8). Bhalla and Lapeyre concludes that 'while in both industrialized and developing countries, distributional/relational issues are important, their nature and characteristics vary (2004: 179).

However, because of the different meanings, the concept remains contested. Theorization by Hilary Silver (1994) can help us to make sense of the multiple meanings of the concept of social exclusion. Silver identifies three main paradigms on exclusion: first, is the *solidarity paradigm,* which explains exclusion in terms of lack of social ties between individual and society. This paradigm is embedded in French Republican thought. In the republican citizenship tradition, the emphasis is on *state's* responsibility to integrate the excluded. The *revenu minimum d'insertion* (RMI) programme[2] in France was elaborated from this perspective.

Second is the *specialization paradigm,* located in Anglo-American school of thought. In contrast to the 'solidarity' paradigm it is based on the assumption of 'atomised' individual. In this paradigm, exclusion is understood as a consequence of specialization: 'of social differentiation, the economic division of labour, and the separation of spheres (Silver 1994). Particularly, it results from market failures and unenforced rights. In this paradigm, greater emphasis is placed on *individual* responsibility within the construction of citizenship as a contractual exchange of rights and obligations.

Third, is the *monopoly paradigm*, under which exclusion is explained in terms of some groups, so called insiders, controlling or monopolizing resources to their advantage. It reflects Weber's concept of 'social enclosure'. Here 'exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status and political power and serves the interest of the included', who thereby maintain their monopoly of power and resources within a structure of inequality' (Silver 1994: 543). It is combated through the extension of full citizenship. Silver says, this

[2] The *Revenu minimum d'insertion* (RMI) is French form of social welfare and a strategy to promote 'inclusion'. It is aimed at people without any income who are of working age but do not have any other rights to unemployment benefit. It was created in 1988 by the Government of Micheal Rocard.

paradigm is dominant in Western Europe. It is clear that each of these paradigm 'attributes exclusion to a different cause and is grounded in different political philosophy' (1994: 539). Hence, it can be argued, that the concept of social exclusion is deeply embedded in the political ideologies.

More recently, Tilly has described exclusion in terms of exploitation and opportunity hoarding, defined in a situation in which members of a network acquire access to a resource, supportive of network activities (Tilly 1998). Thus, from this perspective, exploitation happens when resources are monopolized by some group(s) excluding others.

After having an introduction to the concept of social exclusion, it will be easy to draw its relationship with the concept of poverty. Analysis has shown the differences and similarities between the two concepts. Further, the implication of the concept on the study of poverty are discussed with an assumption that the concept of social exclusion 'stimulates fresh thinking in the area' (Chamberlayne and Rustin 1999:42).

Poverty and social exclusion: the relationship

Relationship between poverty and social exclusion has been viewed in various ways. Walker and Park (1998) traces a *sequential* trajectory of 'moving from income poverty to social exclusion' in which income poverty and social exclusion comes in a continuous and connected series. However the Council of Europe asserts both *sequential and causal* relationship between the two concepts. It says 'poverty may lead to social exclusion, in the sense that people are cut off from the labour market, do not take part in dominant behavioural and cultural patterns, loose social contacts, live in certain stigmatised neighbourhoods, and are not reached by welfare agencies' (2001: 7).This suggests that that link between social exclusion and poverty is expressed in terms of 'nested' patterns of 'overlap' (Gore and Fiegueiredo 1997) (see figure 4.3). The notion of overlapping relationship conveys that 'some people experience material poverty and social exclusion

simultaneously while others can be in poverty without being socially excluded or can be socially excluded without being poor' (Lister 2004: 82-83).



Figure (4.3) Relationship between 'poverty' and 'social exclusion'

Some scholars argue that social exclusion primary focuses on *relational* issues (Room 1995, 1999 Allen *et al.* 1998). According to Room, the focus of social exclusion and poverty are different. Social exclusion is related to relational aspects and poverty is associated with distributional core. However Bhalla and Lapeyre (2004) claim that the concept of social exclusion includes both the distributional and relational aspects and thus

is more comprehensive than the concept of poverty. Sen take a different stand and suggests that merit of the concept of social exclusion lies in its ability of making clear the role of relational/symbolic features in the deprivation of capabilities and thus in the experience of poverty (Sen 2000). Thus the concept of social exclusion can not supplant the concept of poverty. However it is essential to supplement the traditional material based understanding of poverty.

'Value addition' to the study of poverty

The concept of social exclusion compliments the concept of poverty in ample ways. It makes the study of poverty *multifaceted.* Social exclusion's ability to embrace social divisions brings in more comprehensive, multidimensional understanding than traditional notions of poverty (Berghman 1997, de Haan 1998,1999). The concept combines economic, social and political elements and shows that they are interconnected. It refers to mutual reinforcing process of deprivation with cumulative disadvantages which leads to a gradual erosion of recourses and opportunities overtime (Whelan *et al.* 2002). The concept brings in the vitalness of capabilities and provides a multipurpose exposure to risks. It focuses on the importance of relations and processes which forces the individual and groups towards the vicious cycle of poverty and deprivation.

The concept also goes beyond the 'basic commodities and goods' and adds a *qualitative dimension* to it. This particularly becomes important in the 'competitive' environment of globalization. Globalization contributes to social fragmentation by creating high income opportunities for fully integrated groups (for instance, the executive and managerial staff) who pursue a lifestyle characterized by a frantic consumption of status enhancing luxury and goods, referred as 'symbolic capital' by Bourdieu (1977: 171-97). 'The losers from the globalization are the rising number of the working poor and precarious job holders who can not obtain access to these opportunities and who experience a growing economic and social vulnerability' (Bhalla and Lapeyre: 2004: 190). Hence, there is an increasing need to stress upon the qualitative dimension to the services delivered to the people in poverty. The 'lens' of the concept of social exclusion directs us to the previously

unearthed problems, which has become more important in era of globalization, like conditions and quality of the services. Affordable access to qualitative services is crucial aspect of inclusion and hence poverty alleviation.

Many scholars emphasize that social exclusion is both a *process* and a *condition* (Silver 19994, Gore and Figueiredo 1997). However, the 'material' approaches to poverty focuses only on the final stage when poverty is at its extreme stage. It deals with poverty as a 'state' or 'condition'. So this approach cannot stop 'something' from 'happening'. It tries to tackle the problem only when it has happened. By focusing on the dynamic *process* of exclusion, this concept can stop those conditions from happening which pushes individuals and groups to the margins. Thus, it provides scope for protective 'mid way' solutions and can work as a preventive mechanism. However, the concept's merit also lies in the fact that it considers poverty as a 'condition' or 'state' too. Thus because of its greater breadth, the framework focuses on prevention and also on steps aimed at the promotion of exit form poverty (Hills 2002).

Technocratic 'material' approaches are 'universal' in very strict sense and are not sensitive to the 'particular' complexities. However, the concept of exclusion has a feature of relativity (Atkinson 1998). It is sensitive enough to the 'criteria', which is essential for a 'normal' life and which varies from societies to societies, The concept is time-specific, place-specific, and culture-specific and thus adds an element of 'relativity' to the study of poverty.

The broader framework of poverty, with elements of 'social exclusion', will provide better approach to policy making. Typically, the concept of social exclusion has encouraged a broader policy focus (Kenyon *et al.* 2oo3). It radically redesigns the policy orientations and canalizes it towards the issues like capability development, participation and integrated and protective policies. It provides both: 'reactive' policy and 'protective' policy- the former to assist those who are already in poverty and latter to avoid the new entries in the phenomenon. Further, it provides a different approach to work on empowerment to overcome 'unit' and also the 'structural' level obstacles. The concept

also provides a 'bottom up' approach by focusing on those who are at the bottom of society. By contrast, as observed by Fukuda-Par (2003), the basic needs approach treats human beings as beneficiaries rather than participants in making progress. But the approach of social exclusion stresses on enhancing capabilities, and hence changes the dynamics of poverty from 'power over' to 'power to' people.

Though the notion of social exclusion drags out the concept of poverty from economic sphere and enriches our understanding of poverty, it still lacks many other dimensions. The concept is also often criticised because of its ambiguity and vagueness. Some of the (un)accessed dimensions of the phenomenon called poverty can be explored in a novel way through the concept of the 'Other'. The concept also captures some of the above discussed issues in a more sharp and accurate manner.

Discourses of poverty: 'poor' as 'Other'

As argued at the very beginning of this chapter, poverty like life is multifaceted. As life, it can not be understood in purely material terms. As we turn our focus on the non material/ symbolic/ relational aspects of poverty, we come close to say that phenomenon, and hence the concept of poverty has to be understood as a lived reality also in terms of social relations- primarily between 'the poor' and the 'non-poor' (Waxman 1977, Becker 1997). Therefore it is vital to see how the more powerful 'non-poor' constructs 'the poor' as 'Other'. This section will look at the discourse of Other*ing* of 'the poor' by the 'non-poor' in dominant discourse.

The concept of Other can be traced back to various writings of Hegel and to be found in various approaches to epistemology, issues of identity and psychoanalysis. Major treatment of this notion can be observed in the works of Lacan, in Sartrean Existentialism and Derridean deconstruction. However, the most contemporary substantive use of the term is taken up by Edward Said in his path breaking study 'Orientalism' (1978). Here Said argues that the projection of the 'Self' and 'Other' constructs the identities of the 'subjects' through a relationship of power in which the 'Other' is a subjugated element.

Most often the 'Other' is presented as 'binary opposite' to the 'Self' and also inferior to it. Further, 'the location of the Other is primarily in language. It is through language that 'selves' and 'others' are mediated and represented' (Pickering 2001: 72). Thus, an attempt will be made to analyze how 'the poor' are 'Othered' through language and images.

The process of Othering is embedded in the patterns of daily life and the way people think, imagine and communicate things. This is closely associated with the patterns of behavior related to social process such as stereotyping. Stereotyping is an oversimplified and usually value laden view of the attitudes, behavior and expectations of a group or individual. Such views are often deeply embedded in prejudiced presuppositions. Riggins holds that stereotyping is a discriminatory form of labeling, which attains a taken-for-granted quality and serves to portray particular social group as homogeneous (Riggins 1997). Michael Pickering maintains that 'stereotyping attempts to translate cultural difference in to Otherness in the interest of order, power and control' (2001:204). However, in the case of 'the poor', stereotyping functions to *create* difference and thereby the Other. At the same time, those groups which are more likely to be 'poor' like women, racialized minorities and disabled persons, are themselves groups which are frequently Othered (Lister 2004). Even the way of classification by the 'experts' unintentionally draw upon these stereotypes and thereby also reinforce these images (Edelman 1977).

The process of Other*ing* is also associated with the construction of identities. In the complex relationship of power 'us' also constructs 'them'. In the present case the *relationship* between 'Self' and 'Other', legitimizes 'Self's privilege- rooted in superiority- and subjugation, suppression and oppression of the 'Other'- rooted in inferiority- together with socio-economic facets of poverty (Riggins 1997, Young 1999). As said earlier, in this process 'Self' not only defines 'himself' but also the 'Other' which is inferior to the 'Self'. In the whole process, the 'Self' denies the 'Other' the 'right to name and define 'himself/herself' (Pickering 2001). The power to name one's 'Self' has been accepted as a 'fundamental human right' (Riggins 1997: 8) and also important for

'political resource' (Silver 1996: 135). By the process of Othering, 'the poor' looses this basic human right of naming 'itself'. This has serious consequences for the notion of political agency which can be described in the form of 'diminished citizenship', which has been discussed later in the chapter.

In the whole process of identity construction naming becomes very significant. By naming things in a particular way, language constructs reality. 'Names' are never neutral and they carry huge baggage. As Clarke and Cochrane write 'how we name things effects how we behave towards them' (1998: 26). Hence the mental images of 'them'-'the poor'-have a powerful effect on the opinion, attitude and actions.

Thus, process of labeling even though non-material, its effects are not confined only to non-material dimension. The effects are symbolic, cultural, psychological, social and also material. The complex process does not stop only to the reduction of Other as a pessimist receptor. In the process of naming 'blame game' also enters. As Pickering asserts, in this complex process 'a strategy of symbolic exclusion' also operates which creates a 'commonsense' among the people to blame the Other for its problems (Pickering 2001: 48).

'Stigmatizing' labels

There exists a nexus between the process of stereotyping and stigmatization. Stigma is a culturally recognized attribute that is used to differentiate and discredit a person/group. The identification of stigma is used to reduce the person/group from a complex whole, to a single, tinted and discounted trait upon which all social *interaction* with the person/group will be based. Labeling a group in explicitly Othering way throws 'them' in the sphere of humiliation. One of the logical corollaries of stigmatizing labels is stigmatizing policies.

One such illustrations, where the terms used by the 'Self' for 'Other' was highly dehumanizing was with respect to the notion of 'underclass' as pointed out by many

scholars (Lister 2004, Bhalla and Lapeyre 2004) . The concept of 'underclass' gained currency in the US and UK in 1980s and 1990s. The contemporary concept of the underclass is a sanitized term for what was known in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the *undeserving* poor, usually long term welfare recipients. Characteristics of *undeserving poor* were: hostile street criminal, drop-outs, low-class prostitutes, and drug addicts, the hustlers, dependent on the underground economy, but rarely involved in violent crime, the traumatized drunks, drifters, homeless bag ladies, and released mental patients. The concept gained currency in 1980s and 1990s in the US and UK (Welshman 2002). 'Underclass' in the US is described as an alien ghetto group, stuck at the bottom of the society, whose values and behavior set them apart from mainstream society in America and the America dream of opportunity (Katz 1989, Gans 1995). Charles Murray made it popular in a series of newspaper articles and pamphlets. He writes 'by underclass, I do not mean people who are merely poor, but people who are at the margins of society, *unsocialized* and often violent (2001: 2 *emphases added*). The concept is highly exclusionary and Other*ing*. As Dean and Taylor-Gooby (1992) describe, the discourse on 'underclass' reframes the problem of poverty as the twin behavioral threats of dependency and delinquency. These concepts construct 'us' and 'them'. Murray (1996) uses the metaphor of 'plague' and Ralf Dahrendorf (1987) names 'them' as 'cancer'. Kushnic (1999) and Kingfisher (2002) cites some of the adjectives of 'brood mares', 'breeding mules', 'monkies' and 'animals in the government barn'. Such connotations legitimize the vilification and complete exclusion of the Other (Sibley 1995, Oliver 2001).

As has been argued, the concepts like that of 'underclass' are highly value laden and 'Othering'. Now it will be necessary to have a look at the most 'commonsensical' terms 'the poor', 'poor people' etc. These words are of course less problematic than those discussed earlier, but never necessarily unproblematic. Their historical and contemporary connotation means that these are not neutral terms (Novak 2001). The adjectives of 'the poor', 'poor people' is tainted by its double meaning of inferior, as in 'poor quality' or 'deficient'. The use of these words as an adjective can be experienced as insulting and demeaning (CoPPP, 2000). The words also carry implications for someone's identity,

which is highly inappropriate because poverty is an experience, not personal quality (Warah 2000). Henry Dean identifies a range of images or discourses to make sense of 'p' words (like 'the poor', 'poor people'). He concludes that these usages either serve to distance the speaker from the phenomenon or they peculiarly convey a negative image of 'something blameworthy, threatening or unspeakable' (Dean with Melrose 1999: 29, Dean 1992).

The process of 'Othering' is represented by the 'experts' and media. The images created by these in the minds of general public enforce stereotyping. Sometimes they represent 'the poor' as those who need pity from 'non-poor' and sometimes as passive objects of concern responsible for their own fate. They are seen as someone who needs to be 'helped or punished, ignored or studied' but rarely treated as equal fellow citizens with rights (Katz 1989). The images enforced are of both kinds-'undeserving welfare recipients' and 'deserving poor'-both equally dangerous. From the 'expert's arena, Harrington's, in *The Other America,* portrays imageries as 'internal alien' and 'underworld' (1962). Means of mass communication are also the main source of creating and reinforcing images of 'Others'. Most of the time, 'the poor' live below the media radar screen- unseen and unheard (Toynbee 2003). Whenever there is a talk about poverty, it is dominated by the 'experts'. And whenever 'the poor' themselves appear on the screen and allowed to speak, it is usually to illustrate the already set agenda rather than to provide their own analysis of the situation (Lens 2002). The implication of this process is that it injects a feeling of 'stigma', 'shame' and 'humiliation' among 'the poor'.

Injecting 'Stigma'

Stigma associated with the 'p' words (for instance 'poor people', 'the poor') can be illustrated how clothing and the way people dress express their emergent identity. As argued elsewhere in this chapter, Adam Smith recognized clothing as a key signifier of relative poverty, which can enforce shame while 'appearing in public'. As a study about childhood poverty found that wearing the appropriate clothes is a precondition for

friendship and avoidance of both bullying and exclusion. In this study the child explained that 'if you don't wear trendy stuff... not so many people will be your friend 'coz of what you wear' (Ridge 2002: 68). 'Geographies' of stigma also plays a important role in internalizing shame and humiliation. Willow observes that discussions about poverty with children living in deprived areas were all 'woven with the threads of stigma and shame' (2001: 12). Sometimes living in a particular geographical area and associating one's identity with that area may be 'shameful' for people.

It can be concluded that the lack of respect, stigma, shame, humiliation leads to the loss of dignity which further fuels the miseries which makes poverty so difficult to bear. This proves the importance of the nonmaterial/ symbolic/ relational aspects of poverty. The focus on the discourse facet of poverty helps us to unearth the relationship between material and non material manifestations of poverty and also helps us to look how the 'fibers of power' are nested through them.

Significance of stigma, shame and humiliation is not to be underestimated. They play an important role in maintaining inequality and social hierarchy (Lister 2004). They are painful injurious to identity, self respect and self esteem and shape how we feel about ourselves (Rawls 1973, Honneth 1995). 'The poor' also is the consumer of media. They hear and see the stigmatizing images and language (Soss 1999). The public images in long term have a potential to become self image. Shame is the logical corollary of the notion of stigma (Goffman 1968).

This has serious implications for the issues of 'recognition' and 'identity'. These issues are important because they are inextricably linked with 'political agency' of the people. Therefore, lack of 'agency' and 'voice' can further worsen the condition of the sufferers. The thrust of the argument is that people in poverty should be treated with dignity and respect because recognition as argued by Charles Taylor is 'not just a courtesy we owe people' but 'it is also a vital human need' (Taylor 1992: 26). Human rights violation is the corollary of this shame, stigma, humiliation and lack of respect.

Likewise, the World Conference on Human Rights affirms that extreme poverty and social exclusion constitute a violation of dignity (UN General assembly 1993: para. 25). The theorization of the relationship between human rights violation and poverty is two fold. First, *direct-* when poverty itself is seen as violation of human rights. Second, *indirect-* i.e. human rights violation through indirect symbolic/relational aspects of poverty. Indirect aspects are related to the concept of social exclusion and discourses of poverty, which have been dealt earlier.

Amartya Sen has conceptualized human rights which are ultimately grounded in the importance of freedom for human lives (UNDP 2000). Freedom here is different from the 'freedom' of libertarians which is freedom 'from' coercion and interference. Here freedom is used in a positive sense-'to' choose a life one has reason to value (Sen 1999). Freedom 'to' (choose a life one has reason to value) is inevitably linked to the fight against poverty. UN committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights has asserted 'the firm view that poverty constitutes a denial of human right' (CESCR 2001: para. 1). The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2002) underlines a human rights based approach for the conceptualization of poverty. It argues that such an approach 'leads to more adequate responses to the many facets of poverty... it gives due attention to the critical vulnerability and subjective daily assaults on human dignity that accompany poverty. Importantly, it looks not just at resources but also at the capabilities, choices, security and power needed for enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other fundamental civil, cultural, political and social rights'. Respect and dignity of all the members of human family is the foundation of human rights and poverty presents both direct and indirect threats to it.

Besides, citizenship is all about participation. Being part of the mainstream of the society involves participation in the social, economic, political, civic, and cultural arenas of life. Poverty denies such participation and therefore can reduce 'the poor' to second class citizens. It hampers the notion of 'agency' argued elsewhere in the chapter, which eventually adversely affects the notion of political participation. Active citizenship needs an involving 'agency' with a status of dignity, respect, rights and responsibility. The

relational/symbolic aspects of poverty take away the dignity, respect, rights and responsibilities. The whole process eventually results in to diminished citizenship. The importance of agency and voice is underlined by Fukuda-Par. He asserts that human development (from where human security derives its basic premises) is also concerned with human agency in diverse areas, especially participation in the life of community, in community decision making and in collective action to promote change. He argues that freedoms and enjoying the respect of others are not only goals but also have instrumental value. Human beings can be agents of change through ... the use of civil and political liberties to promote political change'. This includes both individual and collective actions (Fukuda-Par 2003). Amsterdam Declaration on Social Quality of Europe (1997) asserts that 'to be able to participate, citizens must have access to an acceptable level of economic security and of social inclusion, live in cohesive communities, and to be empowered to develop their full potential. In other words, social quality depends on the extent to which economic, social and political citizenship is enjoyed'.

Thus, one of the symbolic/relational aspects of the conceptualization of poverty is diminished citizenship. As human rights, troika of civil, political and social citizenship rights by Marshal (1950) is indivisible and interdependent (Lister 1990) these rights are vital to human dignity and respect (Honneth 1995, 2003). However, such rights are rarely embodied in the form of legal entitlements as a whole. For instance, fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution guarantee a non discriminatory access to legal process and civic liberties. These 'negative' rights and freedoms are guaranteed to all, however 'it can not legally ensure 'positive freedoms' or economic welfare in the form of guaranteed employment and guaranteed minimum income (Bhalla and Lapeyre 2004: 15). The denial of full citizenship rights is frequently identified as a signifier of social exclusion, and also important to the conceptualization of poverty (Scott 1994).

Besides, participation in the political process is inevitably related to 'Voice'. Poverty, both because of its material and non material dimension forbids people in poverty to have 'a right to say'. However, 'the right to say' is found vital in poverty reduction strategies. UN guidelines declares that 'a human right approach to poverty reduction ... requires

active and informed participation by the poor in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of poverty reduction strategies. The international human rights normative framework includes the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs. This is crucial and complex human right that is inextricably linked to fundamental democratic principles' (OHCHR 2002: 2). Poverty stripes away the ability to speak and become active citizens.

In the arena of human development the importance of the notion of 'agency' is highlighted by Fukuda-Par (2003). He observes that intrinsic to the human development approach (and human security), is the notion of human agency. People can not be considered as passive beneficiaries of economic and social progress, but must be regarded as active agents of change. About agency, in particular, he notes that human development (and human security) should see human beings as agents of change, with a focus on their productive capacity. According to him, in the era of rapid globalization when economic and political liberalization is shaping the context of development, capabilities to participate and the collective agency of social action have become more important.

This discussion raises a number of issues. Because both the non-material and material aspects are part of the 'problem' therefore both these aspects must be part of the 'solution'. Further discussion tries to find out this solution.

Towards politics of redistribution, recognition & respect

Self respect, according to Rawls is 'perhaps the most important primary good' (1973: 440). Sen (1999) asserts that self respect is the key functioning (for participation) and the notion is further explored by M. Nussbaum. While mapping the list of central human capabilities she gives emphasis to 'having the social basis of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others' (2000: 79). Poverty strips away this 'most important primary good' not only because of its material dimension but perhaps more because of the non-material one.

Some alterations in the symbolic behavior of the 'non-poor' are required to overcome this.

One is about the use of the language which is 'less distancing' by those who research and write about the issues (O'Connor 2001: 293). There is a rising consensus among anti-poverty activists not to use the terms like 'underclass' and to avoid the 'p' (like 'the poor', 'poor people') words. These words can be replaced with the terms like 'less well off' (H. Dean 1992). It has been argued that 'avoiding the word' makes 'avoiding the problem' much easier. (Dundee Anti Poverty Forum 2003: 11).

Hierarchical, 'silent' and subtle processes of power sculpt experiences of poverty in both its material and relational/symbolic aspects (Stammers, 1999). Both aspects are responsible for restraining the ability of people in poverty to exercise the power 'to' (do or achieve something in a positive manner). The distinction between two types of power is often described as power *'over'* and power *'to'*. The conventional view of power was associated with 'power' (of the agent) 'over' (subjects). However the concept of 'power' (of the subject) 'to' (achieve a goal of one's own choice) constitutes the second type of power. The discourses of poverty woks both ways, and both ways it increases the powerlessness of 'the poor'. It helps 'non-poor' to exercise power *'over'* 'the poor'. It also takes away potential of power *'to'* from 'the poor'. The complex subtle relationships of power however, can be analyzed through the second (Bachrach & Baratz 1962) and third dimensions (Lukes 1974) of power, in the form of 'agenda setting' and 'thought control' respectively. Second dimension of power denotes the ability to set or control the agenda, thereby preventing issues from being aired at the first place. The third dimension is associated with the ability to influence another by shaping what he/she thinks, wants or needs. People in poverty lack any agency and voice and hence the 'non-poor' exercise these dimensions too (second and third) 'over' 'the poor'.

In order to achieve 'dignity and respect' for the people in poverty requires 'constructively changing the ways in which ['they'] are represented in every aspect of life' (Hooks 1994: 170-2). The complex subtle power relationships cannot be countered with 'the politics of

renaming' alone (Schram 1995: 22). The 'politics of representation and recognition' has to be linked to the 'politics of redistribution' (Lister 2004). Politics of 'recognition' was popularized by the proponents of multiculturalism. The idea was based on 'accepting and respecting the difference'. As put by Jan Pakulski, 'cultural citizenship involves the right to be "different" (1997: 83). However, in case of 'the poor', however it is about the right to be 'the same' (Lister 2004) and hence can be called 'reverse multiculturalism'. In a nutshell, it can be argued that while multiculturalism is about 'accepting and respecting the differences' this 'reverse multiculturalism' about poverty requires 'accepting and respecting as same'.

Thus, it can be argued that, the comprehensive conceptualization of poverty, encompassing both material and non-material manifestations is superior to the unidimensional 'material' 'technocratic' understandings in two main respects. First, the present concept focuses on the multidimensional character of deprivation and poverty and can thus provide an insight into the cumulative factors that keep people deprived. Second, it also enables our analysis of poverty and deprivation as a result of dynamic causal factors. Answer to the powerlessness is possible only on the basis of broader conceptualization of poverty. As stated above, this needs both the politics of redistribution (material) and also recognition and respect (non-material). The politics of recognition and respect is essential for 'agency and voice'. What requires recognition is not a group specific identity but rather the status of group members as full partners in social interaction' (Fraser 2003: 113). This can be termed as 'participatory parity' (2003). The obstacles to this parity are both material and non-material. These are not separate domains but both are interconnected and inter-dependent. Hence this dual politics can only flow from the broad conceptualization developed here.

Looking '*with in*' the concept of poverty has substantive implications for human security conceptualization. One of the key arguments is that various facets of miseries, whether material and non-material, reinforce each other. All these facets are interlinked and work under 'domino effect'. They are interdependent and hence demand 'integrated' solution. 'Indivisibility' and 'interdependence' can be traced between various facets as it has been

observed in the case of poverty. A broad human security framework can only provide space to analyze 'poverty wheel' mapped in the previous pages. Because of its equal stress on economic, political, and socio-psychological facets, the maximalist human security framework can asses both the objective and subjective causes/aspects of poverty. A maximalist approach of human security can be an 'integrated' solution for 'multi-faceted' problems. Implications of broad understanding of poverty on the 'Minimalist'-'Maximalist' debate on human security are further dealt in detail in the concluding chapter.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The broad rubrics of the concepts of human security and poverty structure the present inquiry. After dealing with the conceptualization of human security, an attempt has been made to build up a case in favour of maximalist framework of human security. This has been done by bringing in the issue of poverty with the help of 'twin' analysis. First, by exploring the relations *between* poverty and violence (this includes the view which sees poverty *as* violence). Second, by looking *within* the concept of poverty. Exploration *'within'* the concept is further an attempt to argue for a broader conceptualization of poverty.

The concept of human security makes a fundamental departure from the mainstream/dominant theories of international relations. First chapter of study is dedicated to analyze the concept of human security. The present study holds that theories merely do not describe reality but they also shape it. Theories and concepts of international politics, in fact, are themselves actors in the grand theatre of global politics. Political realism, which enjoys influential say in corridors of power, due to its hostility with the concept of 'change', it has been argued, serves the current exclusionist status quo. Moreover, the theory is genetically incapable of viewing violence beyond borders and battalions.

This inquiry compares and contrasts human security paradigm with the dominant theories of international relations. It has been argued that human security constitutes a paradigm shift in international relations theory. It makes some fundamental ruptures from the realist understanding. First of this is regarding *'referent object'*. For neorealism, because of the anarchic nature of international 'jungle', state is the only referent object of security. Human security asserts the security of individual and argues that state security is a means and not the end of security agenda. The neorealist vision of security is based on the *values* of sovereignty, power and territorial integrity. However the notion of human security is based on the idea of individual freedom. Here the notion of freedom includes

physical safety, wellbeing, provision of basic needs and a life of dignity. Another point of departure, which is corollary of the above said values, is regarding the *nature* of security threats. Because of its limited vision, *realpolitik* confines itself to organized violence from other states and to some extent from some non state actors. Human security incorporates both direct violence-like international disputes, civil wars etc.- and also indirect form of violence- like poverty, oppression, disease, gendered violence etc. And lastly, human security also debunks the realist notion of security, on the issue of the use of *means*. Here, means stand for, how the agenda of security should be advanced. Realist security vision argues for 'balance of power' and 'making alliances' etc. Human security in contrast emphasises on the means like promoting human development, participation, democratization, promoting human rights etc. for advancing this complex security agenda (Bajpai 2000). Thus, it can be argued that, human security makes a fundamental rupture from the realist notion of security.

The concept of Human Security also debunks the liberal claims and argues that liberal assumptions are still embedded in the 'statist' view of world politics. Second, liberalism is obsessed with market and commerce. Human security vision goes far beyond market transactions. In fact, this vision is more about those who are unable to participate in market transactions embedded in liberalism. Thirdly, liberalism remains mum at the real security threats like poverty and inequality. Though human security shares some assumptions with approaches like constructivism and alternative approaches, it makes a rupture from these perspectives in some or the other fundamental ways.

The history of the concept can be traced back to 1994 UNDP report, which conceptualized human security in terms of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. The report maintained that under the shadow of 'strategic designs' of realist security vision, the real human security threats are devalued and overshadowed. Report points out seven major areas of human security; namely, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.

The theorization on the issue, after publication of the above said report, by many international agencies, governments and academicians can be broadly divided under rubrics of minimalist (narrow) and maximalist (broad) conceptualizations. The minimalist approach to human security restricts the concept to 'freedom from fear'. From the stand point of this conception, safety from direct threats, individual's physical integrity and to some extent satisfaction of basic material needs constitute the agenda of human security. Violence, from this approach, is also understood in its overt form, i.e. direct physical violence. Canadian government's view on human security is primarily based on the idea of 'freedom from fear' which can be categorized under this rubric. Further, the 'International Commission on State Sovereignty' also understood this notion by conceptulizing human security in terms of direct physical violence. Further a range of scholars like Keith Krause, S. N. MacFarlane, Andrew Mack, King and Murray and many others boost of the merit of this 'lean' conceptualization because of its analytical rigor.

Maximalist conception brings in the notions of 'freedom from want' and a 'life of dignity' along with 'freedom from fear' on to the agenda of human security. It encompasses both; the material (direct, physical, and economic) and non material (dignity and socio-psychological) threats. It takes in to account both; the overt (direct) and covert (indirect and subtle) forms of violence. To some extent, the conceptualization subscribed by Japanese government will fall under this category. It broadens the concept and advocates for the consideration of threats like poverty, environmental degradation, diseases like HIV/AIDS, outflow of refugees and so on. 'Human Security Network' also defines the concept in comprehensive manner and makes link between security, development and dignity. Scholars like Kyle Grayson, Peter Uvin, Ramesh Thakur, Jennifer Leaning, S. Tadjbaksh and A. M. Chenoy can be considered as the votaries of maximalist framework. This framework argues for equal importance to the notions of 'freedom from fear', 'freedom from want' and 'life of dignity'- rather than choosing only one or another. Belief in the essential indivisibility of all these facets of human security is perhaps the biggest virtue of the concept. The present study tries to build up a case and argues in favour of this maximalist framework.

Strength of the concept of human security lies in maintaining and advancing its plurality. The merits of broad conceptualization are proved by studying the implications of broad framework on the study of poverty.

There are studies which has made an attempt to find out causal linkages '*between*' poverty *and* violence. Further, some scholars view poverty itself *as* a form of violence. From the former standpoint, poverty can fuel violence and therefore it is potentially dangerous. The 'greed' model makes an attempt to unearth the linkages between poverty and violence. Developed by Collier and others and embedded in rational choice theory, the model argues that conflicts often persist because some powerful actors benefit through the manipulation of scarcity. These actors have no interest in resolving the conflicts. Thus for 'greed' thesis, violence should not be seen as a breakdown of development process, rather an alternative system of profit grabbing. This model has serious drawbacks and can be criticised for not being sensitive to the grievances of people and voices of justice. The model removes all legitimacy from the right to protest and dissent.

In contrast to the above model, 'grievance' model stands for a more just and pro people approach and also contests the notion that violence is a product of selfish desire of some mean groups to grab booty. This model focuses on the failure of responsibility of states towards its citizens and holds that issues like poverty and depended inequalities are fundamental causes of violence. The causality, for this model, works both ways: underdevelopment leads to conditions which are conducive to violence and violence can further lead to underdevelopment. This then becomes a vicious cycle from which it becomes extremely difficult to come out. Stewart, the chief architect of 'grievance' model, argues that if there is a group conflict, there must be sharp economic differences between conflicting groups along with differences in political control. Making a link between 'violence' and 'violation'; for example of basic human rights, grievance model focuses on the concept of justice. This model though takes a more just approach, but still lacks various important facets. For instance, it is unable to grasp various forms of 'structural violence' which plague human lives in more subtle ways.

Because of its limited focus on 'freedom from fear', minimalist framework of human security can analyse only the above discussed overt (direct) forms of violence. But as argued by many scholars, poverty should be taken in to agenda not only because it is 'highly inflammable' but for its own sake. Poverty itself- because of economic miseries, exclusion, deprivation, repression, suppression, subjugation and alienation associated with poverty- is violence at a colossal scale. The concept of 'structural violence', which debunks the traditional forms of violence, can be used to show silent and hidden forms of violence associated with poverty. Thus, from this standpoint, poverty itself is a form of violence and hence should be considered a human security threat without considering its 'causality' with conflicts.

The virtues of the maximalist approach, because of its equal focus on both the material (direct, physical, and economic) and non material (dignity and other socio-psychological) threats, can take into account structural form of violence too. Indeed, broad framework of human security can only fortify the argument, which considers poverty itself as a human security threat. Structural violence is often the precursor of direct violence and because of this interconnectivity both should be taken into account, and more importantly, not separately but simultaneously. Only maximalist framework of human security (with non-material dimensions) can analyse various dimensions of threats which plague human lives.

The case for maximalist framework of human security can be fortified further by looking *within* the concept of poverty. Poverty, as argued in the present study, is multifaceted and should be conceptualized not only in material (economic) but non-material terms (like shame, stigma, lack of voice, denial of human rights, diminished citizenship etc.) too. Poverty, since Adam Smith has been conceptualized in terms of material, monetary and technocratic forms. Indeed, there are many non-material dimensions, inextricably linked to the material manifestations, of poverty. From this stand point, poverty is not only an insecure economic *condition* but also a shameful, coercive social *relation.* In order to encompass, material and symbolic/relational/non-material aspects, an alternative poverty wheel (figure 4.2) is favoured in the study.

An inquiry *within* the concept of poverty is explored under two rubrics of 'social exclusion' and 'Other'. Indeed, these 'tools' are necessary to have a grip over a number of non-material aspects of poverty which can further help to advance the broad conceptualization (in terms of 'poverty wheel') of poverty. The concept of social exclusion helps us to make various 'value additions' in the study of poverty by bringing in the non-material dimensions of poverty. Besides many other ways, the concept compliments the study of poverty by focusing on importance of *relations* and *processes* which forces the individual and groups towards the vicious cycle of poverty and deprivation. In contrast, the material based understanding of the concept considers poverty as a *condition* only. The concept of social exclusion, it has been argued, goes beyond the basic commodities and goods and adds a qualitative dimension to the concept of poverty. Basic needs framework treats human beings as beneficiaries rather than participants. The social exclusion stresses on capability enhancing and therefore changes the dynamics of poverty from 'power over' to 'power to' people.

Discourses on poverty are explored by using the concept of 'Other'. Other*ing* is a process in which the identity of the subjugated 'Other' is constructed by 'Self' by complex relationships of power and language. The 'Other' is presented as binary opposite to 'Self' and 'inferior' to it. The study makes an attempt to analyze how by using 'stigmatizing labels', 'the poor' is constructed as 'Other' by the 'non-poor'. These stigmatizing labels inject a kind of lack of respect, shame, and humiliation which further leads to loss of dignity of 'the poor'. These elements have serious implications for the notion of 'agency' and 'voice' of 'them'. Through these elements we can conclude that poverty, also because of its non-material facets, can devalue various human rights and can lead to diminished citizenship. The focus on the discourses of poverty helps us to unearth the links between material and non-material manifestations of poverty and also enable us to look how the 'fibres of power' are nested through them.

The establishment of the fact that poverty has both, and equally important, material and non material manifestations, raises a number of issues. Because non-material ingredients are part of the problem so part of the solution can only come form non-material elements.

Politics of combating poverty must take into account the politics of redistribution along with the politics of recognition and respect. This politics of recognition and respect is essential for the 'agency' and 'voice' of the poor. This dual politics, of redistribution and respect, can only flow from broad conceptualization of poverty.

Unpacking of the concept of poverty has substantive implications for the conceptualization of human security. It can be argued that material and non-material facets of miseries like poverty are interwoven and mutually enforce each other. As shown through the concepts of 'social exclusion' and 'Other', both material and non-material, facets work under a 'domino effect'. These facets are 'interdependent' hence they demand 'integrated' solutions. Any serious study on poverty needs to consider both the material and relational/symbolic aspects. Human security should be theorized according to maximalist framework (with material and non-material dimensions) then only multifaceted issues like poverty can be taken into account properly. With equal stress on economic, political and socio-psychological facets, maximalist framework of human security can access both the objective and subjective causes/aspects of poverty. Thus with the help of 'twin' analysis, of *'between'* and *'within'*, it can be argued that only a maximalist framework of human security can work as an 'integrated' solution to 'multifaceted' issues.

The journey to build up a case for broad conceptualization of human security and poverty, in the mean time, has fundamentally altered some of the basic concepts like security, freedom, violence and peace. These concepts are central to the study of world politics. Hence, it becomes significant to summarize them here thematically.

In case of security, it can be argued that the maximalist concept of human security can play a role of junction, where the notions of development and security can be merged and reconcile. The concept drags out the notion of 'security' from realist grip and makes human beings as the centrepiece of security. Moreover, it allows us to take a grip over the 'horizontal' and 'vertical' connectivity of human security threats. Horizontal connectivity means connectivity between human security threats across borders. Here, vertical connectivity means linkages between 'global', 'national' and 'local' threats.

Violence is dominantly understood in overt (direct) forms. This understanding of violence focuses on physical violence and is restricted to situation of activities between human beings where at least one person becomes physically damaged. But the maximalist framework gives us sharp insight to look at covert (indirect) form of violence too. Corollary to this is the concept of 'positive peace'. Negative peace refers to the absence of direct physical violence. Opposite to it, is the concept of positive peace, which refers to the additional absence of 'structural' violence. Thus positive peace refers not only to the absence of the physical use of force between states, but any thing preventable, which is understood as obstacle in human fulfilment and self realization.

Further, in case of freedom, the concept enables us to interpret 'freedom' comprehensively and more deeply. Maximalist framework provides the agenda for 'freedom from fear', 'freedom from want' and a 'life of dignity'. Thus the concept drags out the notion of freedom from the dogma of liberal thought and visualize freedom as empowerment, as directing one's own destiny, as being one's own master.

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