

**MILITARY BASES OF THE UNITED STATES IN
OKINAWA: IMPACT ON ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
LIFE**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

NENGNEITHEM KIPGEN



JAPANESE STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEWDELHI-110067

INDIA

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जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI- 110 067 (INDIA)



Phones : 91-11- 2670 4346
Fax : 91-11-2670 4346

Date:27/07/2009


DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation entitled "*Military Bases of the United States in Okinawa: Impact on its Social and Economic Life*" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The Dissertation has not been submitted for any degree of this University or any other university.



NENGNEITHEM KIPGEN

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


(Professor Srikanth Kondapalli)
CHAIRPERSON, CEAS




(Professor Lalima Varma)
SUPERVISOR

*DEDICATED TO MY
PARENTS*

HEPA le HENO

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Nengneithem Kipgen

PREFACE

Okinawa's strategic location continues to serve the security interests of the U.S and Japan. With a history of hosting the military bases since the end of the Second World War, Okinawa till today is home to one of the largest U.S military bases situated anywhere in the world.

This stationing of the military bases over a long period has served not only the security interests of the Japan- U.S alliance but also has numerous socio economic implications for Okinawa as well. The Okinawan economy post Second World War was called as the 'base economy' due to its huge dependence on the bases. Since the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, this dependence on the bases has reduced slightly but the contributions of the bases to the economy continue till date.

The social lives of the Okinawans have also been influenced due to the presence of the Bases. Along with the American military personnel came the western culture or the American lifestyle which brought in with them the western culture or the American lifestyle. The bases have also been responsible for environmental pollution and crimes in the prefecture. The rape of a girl in 1995 by U.S personnel triggered a deep and serious emotional response not only among the people of Okinawa but throughout Japan. Protests and campaigns demanding reduction of the bases are witness regularly.

As long as the U.S military is based, the Okinawans have to continually bear the burden of Japan's security arrangement with the U.S. However, the right of everyone to live in peace should also be respected and both the concerned countries need to look into the Okinawan problem and find a permanent solution which will reduce the heavy burden put on the Okinawan people.

Introducing the dissertation, the first chapter looks at Okinawa as a prefecture of Japan with a brief history. The literature accounts for the purpose of this study have also been highlighted along with the theoretical framework.

The second chapter traces the importance of Japan-U.S security relations since the end of the Second World War. Forming the backbone of Japanese foreign policy, the very significance of Okinawa lies in this security arrangement. The impact of the bases on the economic life of the people is discussed in the third chapter. The fourth chapter traced the extent in which the social life of the Okinawans is influenced by the military bases. The various social implications on the people as a result of the bases are also discussed. The fifth chapter gives a conclusion of all the chapters where the possibility of Okinawa without the bases is discussed. An attempt is also made in analyzing the future Japan-U.S relations wherein lies the possibilities of reducing the burden from Okinawa.

ABBREVIATIONS

ATARA-----	Alliance Transformation of Realignment Agreement
BRAC-----	Base Realignment and Closure Programme
CFC-----	Chloro Fluru Carbon
DFAA-----	Defense Facilities Administration Agency
DU-----	Depleted Uranium
DPF-----	Dugong Protection Fund
EASR-----	East Asian Strategic Report
FEN-----	Far Eastern Network
FAC-----	Forward Air Control
GSDF-----	Ground Self Defense Forces
GNP-----	Gross National Product
GDP-----	Gross Domestic Product
GRI-----	Government of Ryukyu Islands
G8-----	Group of Eight
HDI-----	Human Development Index
MOFA-----	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MCAS-----	Marine Corps Air Station
NDPO-----	National Defense Programme Outline
NATO-----	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO-----	Non Governmental Organisation
NIMBY-----	Not In My Backyard
OEN-----	Okinawan Environmental Network
SOFA-----	Status of Forces Agreement
SDF-----	Self Defense Forces
SCC-----	Security Consultative Committee

SACO-----Special Action Committee on Okinawa
USCAR-----Unites States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu
Islands
U.S-----United States
USFJ-----United States Forces in Japan
WMD-----Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWF-----World Wildlife Fund

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
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CHAPTER I

The continued presence of the military of the United States¹ in Okinawa even after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s is sufficient to understand the importance of Okinawa in the Asia Pacific region. The strategic location of the island ensures the U.S interest in the Asian region is protected. Okinawa's proximity to potential regional trouble spots assures the early arrival of U.S military forces due to shorter transit times and reduces potential problems that could arise due to late arrival. The cost of this presence is shared by the Government of Japan, which provides bases and other infrastructure on Okinawa rent-free and pays part of the annual cost of Okinawa-based Marine Corps forces. As of December, 2007² the total number U.S military personnel in Japan was 33,164 which included the army as 2,483 personnel, navy 3,734, the marine corps 14,226 and the air force as 12,721 personnel.

1.1 Okinawa, a Japanese Prefecture

Okinawa is one of the smallest prefectures in Japan. It is an archipelago located between Taiwan and Japan. It consists of some 160 islands extended in an area of 400 km. from South to North and 1,000 km from East to West. The administrative name of "Okinawa" is given to these islands meaning "the land of extended rope" alluding to the attenuated nature of archipelago. However, they are also known by the names "Luchu," "Loochoo" and "Liukiu." It accounts for approximately 0.6% of the total land area of Japan, and is the nation's South western-most prefecture. Approximately 1.35 million people live on fifty of these islands.

The climate is humid and sub-tropical, with an average year-round temperature in Naha, the Okinawan capital, of 22.4°C (72°F). It is 16°C (60°F) even in the winter month of January, which is also the month when the cherry blossom is celebrated. The average rainfall is 2,000 mms (about 79 inches) a year, considerably higher than the average for the rest of Japan, and half of it falls in the summer typhoon season between May and September. Much of the rain tends to flow quickly to the sea via the very short Okinawan Rivers (the longest of which, the Urauchi on Iriomote Island, is a mere 19.4 kilometers, or 12 miles).

¹Note: Henceforth shall be termed as the U.S

² US Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309 A), December 31, 2007

1.1.1 **People:** The origins of the “Ryukyu people” cannot be traced with a high degree of scientific precision, but it is probable that they were parts of certain tribes which migrated from the Asiatic mainland to Japan Proper.³ An ancient legend first recorded in 1605 A.D. links the ruling family of the Ryukyus with royal blood in Japan.⁴ It is said that Tametomo, a distinguished warrior of the Minamoto clan and descendant of a former emperor, after defeat by the Taira clan in 1165, escaped to the Ryukyus. Here he married the sister of an official of Naha and became father of a gifted son who later became Shunten, first king of a new and able line of Ryukyuan rulers. The story, even though unsubstantiated by clear historical evidence, has nevertheless been regarded as history. Among people placing great value on lineage and unbroken imperial rule, this story has powerful emotional force in establishing cultural bonds between the Ryukyus and Japan proper.⁵ In official and popular Japanese consciousness, the inhabitants of the prefecture differed in variously ‘racial’ origins, innate capability, culture customs and loyalty. The original source of the modern day Ryukyuan people is disputed. There are scientific evidences which points to their descent from a people related to both the Jomon of the prehistoric period and the Ainu of today and that they are physically distinct from the Japanese who have descended from migrants who entered Japan from Korea only 1300-2,300 years ago.

³ There is evidence to support the assumption that the Amabe tribe which settled in the Ryukyus was closely related to the tribes which migrated to Japan. The contemporary Okinawan historian, Kanjun Higaonna (Higaonna is the Okinawan rendition; Higashionna is the name by which he is now known in Tokyo) summarizes this evidence in *Outline of Okinawan History* (Tokyo, 1950), p. 1.

⁴ The legend is found in one of the earliest histories, *Chfazan Sekan*, compiled in 1650 by Choshu Haneji, and is repeated in subsequent histories.

⁵ The Tametomo story can be neither substantiated nor disproved. Western as well as Japanese histories retell the story with no indication of the possibility of its legendary character. Among the standard Western historical works which do not distinguish it from more authenticated historical data are: James Murdoch, *A History of Japan*, 3 vols. (London, 1925), Vol. 1, pp. 311-12; Leavenworth, cited in appended Bibliographical Note, p. 107; Roy Hidemachi Akagi, *Japan's Foreign Relations* (Tokyo, 1936), p. 59. Commodore Perry repeats that “the race of kings reigning in Lew Chew is related to the imperial family of Japan. . . .” *Narrative*, Vol. 1, p. 253. Among those expressing doubt as to the authenticity of the story are: Higaonna, *Outline of Okinawan History*, p. 8, and Basil Hall Chamberlain, “The Luchu Islands and their inhabitants” *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 5, p. 316 (April, 1895). Professor Haring maintains that the Tametomo story is probably a deliberate fabrication by the Japanese to support their control over the islands. See Douglas G. Haring, *The Island of Arnami Oshima in the Northern Ryukyus*, pp. 74-75, (cited in appended Bibliographical Note).

Evidence also confirms that the islands were never part of formal Japanese territory until their annexation in 1872. The Okinawans are a mild mannered, courteous, and subservient people who greatly resemble the Japanese but do not value exactness, orderliness and cleanliness to the same degree to that of the Japanese. Generally the people live a very simple life. Their staple food is the sweet potato supplemented by rice, soybeans, vegetables, fish and pork. Their standard of living is generally lower than that of the mainland.

The main Okinawan Island today hosts thirty-eight major installations covering twenty three thousand and five hundred hectares, or about eighteen percent of Okinawa's land mass.⁶All four U.S military services—including the huge facilities of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force and the Kadena Air Force Base⁷—are stationed on the island. The number of U.S military personnel on the island at any point of time is about twenty five thousand (around a quarter of the entire U.S presence in Asia), and the combination of their dependents and U.S civilian contractors brings the total American defense-related presence up to fifty thousand.

1.2 Importance of the bases in the Region

The strategic environment in East Asia has been changing swiftly in the first decade of the twenty first Century. The geo-political dynamics taking shape in East Asia today pose serious strategic challenges to U.S primacy in the region which has prevailed since 1945. Its primacy today is under challenge by China primarily. The stupendous economic growth of China enables it to carry out a significant military modernization and up gradation of its machine and strategic assets posing a challenge to the U.S. On the contrast, the U.S for the last eight years has been active in the Middle East and consequently was distracted from the strategic affairs of East Asia unlike before and has

⁶ These figures do not account for the ongoing implementation of the SACO initiatives adopted in 1996. SACO anticipates that eleven facilities and areas will be completely returned or reduced, decreasing the total area occupied by USFJ to 18,500 hectares.

⁷ The Third Marine Expeditionary Force is the only permanent forward-deployed Marine force with an integrated air-ground-logistics capability. Kadena airbase is the largest air force base in East Asia and home to a hundred aircraft of the Fifth Air Force Command's Eighteenth Wing.

not been able to focus on the region. Both China and Russia have also moved strategically closer to each other and thus posed a challenge to the unquestioned strategic predominance of the U.S in the region. The overwhelming challenge is the need to try to shape the global and regional geo-strategic and economic environments to encourage and facilitate China's peaceful and constructive evolution as a great power.

Other key strategic challenges facing the U.S at present in the region are the ongoing real prospect of interstate conflict, particularly on the Korean Peninsula and over Taiwan. A war over Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula has the potential to embroil the U.S in a large scale war that could be very costly in terms lives, wealth, power, and prestige. Ongoing tensions over Taiwan, stemming from Beijing's opposition to Taiwanese independence, China's military modernization, its growing power projection capabilities, its expanding diplomatic relationships, its massive economic presence, and its drive for energy and other resources are of increasing concern among many in strategic circles in the U.S. The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 and its 2006 annual report to Congress on China's military power noted that China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S.⁸

Former Chairman Jim Leach of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific observed that "it is in Asia where the United States will face its largest geopolitical challenges in the years ahead."⁹ He also noted that "maintaining a robust overseas military presence has historically been a key element of the United States national security policy in the Asia-Pacific." This forward presence promotes regional stability and "has been maintained by successive U.S administrations, all of which have

⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China*, Annual Report to Congress 2006 and Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006.

⁹ Opening Statement, Representative James Leach, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Hearing on "America and Asia in a Changing World," September 21, 2006 quoted in U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region CRS Congress Report, January 22, 2007

emphasized the linkage between our network of alliances and friendships to a regional environment in Asia conducive to confidence in economic growth.”¹⁰

In this context, the central objectives of the U.S strategy in the region need to be identified. To foster political stability, to maintain access to the regional markets, to ensure freedom of navigation and to prevent the rise of any hostile hegemon, the U.S has maintained their military bases in the East Asian Region till today particularly in Korea and Okinawa, Japan. Maintaining an overseas military presence is a cornerstone of U.S National Security Strategy and a key element of U.S military policy of “shape, respond and prepare.” In Asia, U.S force presence plays a particularly key role in promoting peace and security in regional affairs. However, this presence, while serving a critical shaping function, is but one element of general U.S overseas engagement in the Asia-Pacific region that includes everything from conventional diplomacy to international trade and investment to people-to-people contact in educational, scientific and cultural exchanges.

The diversity of U.S activity reflects comprehensive U.S overseas engagement to protect and promote security interests in Asia. U.S military presence in Asia has long provided critical practical and symbolic contributions to regional security. The U.S forces are stationed in Japan and Korea, as well as those rotated throughout the region, promote security and stability, deter conflict, give substance to our security commitments and ensure our continued access to the region. U.S military presence in Asia serves as an important deterrent to aggression, often lessening the need for a more substantial and costly U.S response later. Today deterrent capability remains critical in areas such as the Korean Peninsula. A visible U.S force presence in Asia demonstrates firm determination to defend U.S, allied and friendly interests in this critical region. U.S bases in Japan and Korea remain the critical component of U.S deterrent and rapid response strategy in Asia. U.S military presence in the region also enables the United States to respond more rapidly and flexibly in other areas.

¹⁰ Ibid

Thus the presence of the U.S military in the East Asian region not only serves its interests but also maintain the peace and security of the region. Okinawa's geographic location and infrastructure, capable of supporting large military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, makes it vital to U.S national interest in the region.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW: The literature on Okinawa is mostly divided on the subject of the U.S military, and its consequences on the people. Many articles state that accidents and crimes committed by American military personnel pose an obstacle to the island's tourist industry. They also claim that a diversified economy is not possible where prime real estate is used for the U.S military bases. Others claim that islanders see the American presence as a trade-off. The heavy infusion of subsidies by Japanese Government from Tokyo (to compensate for the bases) is welcome where the unemployment rate is nine percent and the living standard is far below from that of the mainland. These articles claim that when the former Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota opposed both Tokyo and Washington about the Marines' presence in Okinawa, he was voted out of office in late 1998. His successor, Keiichi Inamine, was willing to comply with Tokyo and Washington. As a result, on top of the \$80 million set aside in 1998 to promote economic development in the region, local towns willing to accommodate U.S troops and facilities could count on an additional \$20 million annually through 2003. Additionally, in July of 2000, Okinawa was selected to host the G8 economic summit (of the leaders of major industrial nations) which brought considerable profits to the economy of the prefecture. Holding the summit in Okinawa was a deliberate plan of the Japanese Government and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. (Tim Shorrocks, 2000 *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Vol 5, no,22) The author recommended that the Okinawa G8 meeting would provide an opportunity to rethink U.S security policies in Asia and begin the process of withdrawing forward based U.S ground forces from Japan and Korea.

As far their history is concerned, since the Satsuma conquest of 1609, it has been a struggle for integrity against the attempts of more powerful states to use Okinawa to further their own interests. Caught in conflict between "big powers" the Okinawans have often been powerless. (George H Kerr, 1958) This was felt most bitterly in 1945 when

the Japanese command unable to accept the possibility of defeat or even withdrawal made no plans for the protection of civilian lives or the preservation of historical records. The American forces intent on military objectives on the other hand took the lives of one out of eight of the islands' people rendered the rest hungry and homeless. Since then the status of Okinawa have been reverted to a diplomatic pawn in the hands of both the Japanese and American governments.

Michael S. Molasky (2001) in "The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Memory" offers an analysis of the occupation literature written and published during the postwar period. The mid-1990s for Japan were a period of dislocation. The Japanese economic miracle peaked and then weakened. It was during this period that Japan made efforts to redefine its alliance with the U.S. The Okinawan problem also became an issue of concern in the Japanese policy making.

In the mid-1990s, as **Funabashi Yoichi** described, Japan-U.S alliance was 'drifting' (Funabashi Alliance Adrift, 1997) – in large part because of the loss of its obvious common enemy, the erstwhile Soviet Union. When Japan and the U.S failed to come to terms with each other in lengthy rounds of trade negotiations, the U.S Congress questioned the rationales for the alliance with Japan. Even more ominously, the rape then highlighted the wider 'Okinawan problem' and directed international attention simultaneously to the U.S foreign military's violence against local women, the violation of landowners' rights, and especially to the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) that granted various privileges to the U.S forces. These questions pointed clearly to a larger one: Do overseas U.S foreign military bases threaten the security of the population rather than protect it? The legitimacy of the bilateral alliance was seriously in question. Post 9/11 is an era characterized by increased asymmetrical threats and terrorism, deeper global cooperation concerning counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), growing U.S unilateralism, as well as isolation and the birth of the Bush Doctrine.¹¹

¹¹ The Bush Doctrine set out in numerous speeches by the President and other high-level officials and summarized in the September 2002 "National Security Strategy of the United States," consists of four

Post 9/11, the Japan-U.S alliance is still important and has grown stronger. (Stephanie A Weston, May 2004) Although the U.S views the world from a more global strategic perspective than Japan's position as a 'middle power', Japan cannot afford to be internationally passive as a member of the global community. In its own national interest, Japan continues to show strong support for its alliance with the U.S. The present peace constitution and laws limit the terms of its engagement, since the end of the Cold War Japan has progressively moved forward to change the parameters of its support for the alliance. Without doubt, part of the process towards formulating its own national security vision in the twenty-first century includes revision of the Midterm Defense Program (FY 2001– 2005)¹² and updating of its 1995 National Defense Program Outline.¹³

The U.S initially occupied Okinawa fearing future Japanese aggression and at the same time realized importance of the island's strategic location. Although the U.S became colonial masters over Okinawa, American colonialism differed in quality and style from that of the other 19th and early 20th century imperial powers. (Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, 2000) Misbehavior and crimes by military personnel occurred too frequently and unfortunately did not end with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. The island did not profit the U.S in any economic sense, its commercial or investment value proved negligible. Rather the U.S contributed heavily to the islands' economic reconstruction and its political stability. The American presence benefited the Japanese and the

elements. First and perhaps most importantly, democracies are inherently peaceful and have common interests in building a benign international environment that is congenial to American interests and ideals. Second, this is also a time of great threat from terrorists, especially when linked to tyrannical regimes and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A third major element of the Bush Doctrine is that deterrence and even defense are not fully adequate to deal with these dangers and so the United States must be prepared to take preventive actions, including war, if need be. In part because it is difficult to get consensus on such actions, and in part because the US is so much stronger than its allies, the United States must be prepared to act unilaterally. Thus the fourth element of the Doctrine is that although the widest possible support should be sought, others cannot have a veto on American action.

¹² The Midterm Defense Program includes specific guidelines for Japan's defense capability to be carried out based on the National Defense Program Outline.

¹³ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Overview of Japan's Defense Policy 2002*, 3. 'The National Defense Program Outline specifies the defense capability of Japan as it should be and its detailed goals of defense build up by taking the international situation into consideration. After that, it has been reviewed based upon changes in the international situation including the end of the Cold War and the increasing expectations of the role of the Self Defense Forces.

Okinawans to a significant degree. The U.S military bases affected the Okinawan social life in terms of economics, education, religion, social and cultural changes and changes in women's role.

Despite the economic gains of the Okinawans from the military bases, anti base sentiment antibase sentiment is regularly expressed by the Okinawans. A number of direct and indirect impact on the people is seen not only in terms of crimes committed by the military but the harmful environmental effects as well resulted in strong anti base sentiments. For example, a brutal 1995 crime committed by U.S military personnel on the island inflamed public opinion against the bases. However the antibase activity of the late 1990s was defused rather quickly into tacit continuing acceptance by Okinawans of the base presence, even as U.S bases elsewhere in the world closed in response to protest activity. As **Alexander Cooley and Kimberly Marten** argued that the Japanese government's unique system of "burden payments" provides incentives to Okinawans both to highlight the negative effects of the U.S presence and to support the continuation of the bases for economic reasons. (**Base Motives: the Political Economy of Okinawa's Antimilitarism, 2006**) The trilateral base-bargaining relationship serves the interests of Washington, Tokyo, and a politically critical majority of Okinawans themselves. The economic payoffs and incentive structures that characterize relations among Tokyo, Okinawa, and Washington help sustain the U.S presence in a relatively stable political equilibrium. Material incentives, properly targeted at the micro level, have overcome the prevailing antimilitarist norms and become the primary source of political interests in the base discussions. Using an elaborate set of public goods and selective incentives, the Japanese mainland government has secured Okinawa's majority acquiescence to the continuing U.S presence.

1.4 Understanding the Research Questions: after tracing the brief history of Japan and Okinawa in particular in the first chapter, the following three chapters will mainly look into the research questions. Second chapter will discuss the security arrangements between Japan and the U.S wherein the importance of Okinawa in their relations lies. How important is the security relations with the U.S is analysed from Japanese point of

view. And in the light of their relations what is the future of Okinawa? Are the bases likely to be removed in the near future? What are the views of the Okinawans towards the military bases? Studying the economic impact of the bases on Okinawa over the years since the end of the Second World War, the third chapter will answer questions like the extent on which the Okinawans are dependent on the bases. Are the bases beneficial to them? What have the bases contributed to the Okinawan economy? Looking into all these questions, the Okinawan economy will be traced from before the Second World War to the present.

Dealing with the social impact of the bases on Okinawa, the various influences to the culture and society, to what extent is the prefecture Americanized will be discussed in the third chapter. Apart from this, the various campaigns against the bases, the various kinds of pollutions that create health hazards to the locals will also be looked at. How do the bases affect the society and in what ways are they affected? What if the bases have not existed, what would be the condition of Okinawa? Will it be better or worse than the present scenario? All of these will be discussed in the third chapter.

1.5 Theoretical Framework: The Dependency Theory

The above research questions would be examined in the light of the dependency theory in particular employing the theory proposed by Theotonio Santos. According to Theotonio Dos Santos, “dependency is a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between those and world trade assumes the form of dependence when some countries can expand and be self sustaining while other countries can do this only as a reflection of that expansion which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development.” Dependency theory appeared in the 1950s as a critical reaction to the conventional approaches to economic development that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. There are two dependency theory traditions (Dos Santos, 2002). The first is the Marxist influenced by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, and developed by André Gunder Frank with important ramifications in the works of Samir Amin, Theotônio dos

Santos, Arghiri Emmanuel, and Aníbal Quijano. The second dependency tradition is associated to the Structuralist school that builds on the work of Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado and Aníbal Pinto at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. This Structuralist approach is best represented by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto and by the subsequent contributions from Peter Evans, Osvaldo Sunkel and Maria da Conceição Tavares. Other schools of thought were heavily influenced by dependency theory and expose, in some respects, very similar views, in particular, the so-called world-systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein and his followers (Topik, 1998) would argue that dependent development was feasible. The vigorous process of growth in some parts of the developing world in the 1950s and 60s seemed to justify the views of the latter group. However, the enduring process of stagnation after the 1980s Debt Crisis has led to a reconsideration of the relevance of dependency situations.

Both groups would agree that at the core of the dependency relation between center and periphery lays the inability of the periphery to develop an autonomous and dynamic process of technological innovation. The lack of technological dynamism, and the difficulties associated with the transfer of technological knowledge are the main cause of the underdevelopment of the periphery with respect to the center. The main contention between the two groups was ultimately related to the possibilities of economic development in the periphery. Marxists would argue that development in the periphery – meaning fundamentally catching up with the center – was impossible, while Structuralists would argue that dependent development was feasible. The vigorous process of growth in some parts of the developing world in the 1950s and 60s seemed to justify the views of the latter group.

“Dependency is.....an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected”.(Theotonio Dos Santos,

"The Structure of Dependence," in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971, p. 226)

Based on the observation that within many spatial systems sharp territorial contrasts exist in wealth, economic advancement, and growth-"development"- between economic heartlands and outlying subordinate zones. Theotonio Dos Santos emphasizes the historical dimension of the dependency relationships in his definition. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining. The other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.

The strategic interdependence of Japan and the U.S has resulted in the underdevelopment of Okinawa which is dependent on their relation. Here in this context, mainland Japan taken as the core and Okinawa as the periphery, the dependency proposition is applied to analyze the economic backwardness of the Okinawans and also the extent in which it is dependent on the core. The existence of a core within the periphery is also being taken into consideration. The military bases here acts as a 'core' within the periphery even as the latter depended on it for its economy while it supplied the needs of the bases in terms of services and raw materials.

Based on the Japan-U.S Security Partnership and its implications on the island prefecture, this research proposal will be based on analyzing the different agreements between the two partners. Effects of the bases on the people are also studied from a historical sociological perspective tracing the history of the prefecture since Second World War. It will examine how historical analysis can contribute to understanding the social world in which the Okinawans live and the manner in which changes occurred in the contemporary world. It will develop an understanding of the historical influences on the contemporary Okinawan social world and how earlier changes are relevant today.

It will also critically analyze the developments post cold war between the two security partners and the socio economic impact of the bases on Okinawa. The inductive method would be employed to come to significant conclusion using both the primary source and more of the secondary sources.

1.5.1 Core within a Periphery: analyzing the condition of Okinawa, its relation with the mainland over the years and its relation with the military bases since the end of the Cold War, employ the dependency theory, the relation between the core and the periphery and further developed the possibilities of the existence of a “core within the periphery”. Okinawa, a periphery to the mainland Japan (core) has been used to satisfy the Japanese Government security policies, mainly because of its strategic location. The history of Japan shows that Okinawa was never treated as part of the mainland Japan. It was cut off from the mainland till the Satsuma conquest on 1608. Even after it became a prefecture of Japan the people never felt the feeling of oneness with the rest of the mainland mainly because its culture itself was also distinct due to the various relations it had maintained with other countries. In this context, Okinawa as a periphery was also left behind when the rest of the country pursue economic development and the industrialization of the economy after the end of the Second World War. Japan defeated in the war sought not to engage in any militarization and under the Yoshida Doctrine¹⁴ focused on developing its economy under the U.S security umbrella.

In this whole process while the rest of the country was pursuing industrialization, Okinawa reeled under direct military occupation, the people had no choice but to serve the interests of the military. With the total destruction of its infrastructure and its economy and abandoned by the Japanese Government, Okinawa was under complete military authority for 27 years. In this context, the military bases acts as a ‘core’ to the periphery (Okinawa) whereby the bases were used as a source to get raw materials and

¹⁴ It was named after Yoshida, a former Prime Minister of Japan who discovered that article nine could be used in Japan’s favor. With the presence of the US forces and nuclear umbrella to protect Japan and the constitution ban on military forces; Japan was free to pursue rapid economic development without the added economic weight of having to maintain a standing military that would drain resources badly needed to rebuild the economy. This came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine. (Cooney Kevin J, Japan’s Foreign Policy Maturation: A Quest For Normalcy, 2002)

labor to serve the interests of the bases. However, the bases did not profit from the prefecture as it had neither infrastructure nor any industry. Rather the bases generated employment which was the need of the time even as the unemployment was high in the prefecture post Second World War.

Table 1: Prefecture Economic Dependency on Military Bases, Fiscal 1996

Expenditure of military personnel and And civilian employee	¥50.5 billion
Income of Okinawan employees on base	¥52.8 billion
Rent for land occupied by military facilities	¥70.4 billion
Income from military-related transactions, Total	¥173.7 billion (total)
Economic dependency on bases (Percentage of gross prefectural expenditure)	4.9 %
Number of Okinawan employees on bases	8,443 (May 1972) (as of March 1998)

Source: www.pref.okinawa.jp

The Okinawan economy was thus dependent on the military bases and the Okinawans in turn also serve the bases in terms of providing labor that was required for the many military related services. The various reconstruction programmes and policies of the Occupation Government helped in restoring the Okinawan economy. However over the years this dependence on the bases has subsequently subsided since the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972.

This new proposition which I termed the core within the periphery will be further applied and tested in the subsequent chapters mainly in the economic and social impact of the military bases on the prefecture.

1.6 Brief History of Okinawa

From the Fifteen Century a flourishing autonomous state, the Ryukyuan Kingdom, emerged, developed its distinctive cultural and artistic style, and engaged in trading and cultural relations throughout the East and Southeast Asian region. Although it later became virtually obliterated from conventional historical memory, pre-modern Okinawa was an open, non-militarized, economic, cultural and political system, flourishing on the frontiers of the early modern Asia-Pacific. (Gavan Mc Cormack, 1998).

1.6.1 Ancient Ryukyus:

Earliest recorded event in Okinawan history dates from 605A.D when a trading mission sent by the emperor of China tried to obtain information about the Ryukyus and make a trade agreement both without success. Prior to that time as according to Paul E. Steiner, historical events are legendary and the origins of the people and their lands are closely connected with their religious tradition in as much as the religion is a system of ancestor worship which tended to preserve such information. (Paul E Steiner, *Okinawa and its People*, 1947) The Ancient Ryukyus generally refers to the period from the Twelve Century, at the beginning of the Gusuku (Castle) Period, through to the establishment of the Ryukyu Kingdom, to the invasion of the Ryukyus by the Shimazu Clan from Kyushu in 1609.

In many ways, the history of the Ryukyu Kingdom previous to the Meiji Restoration provides a depiction of an island kingdom that maintained a high degree of national sovereignty that was eventually shattered by colonial domination by the Satsuma-han in the Seventeen Century. . In the late Sixth and Seventh Centuries, when there emerged an ancient centralized autocratic government in Japan, the Southern Islands (Ryukyu Islands) appeared in the chronicles of Japan. During the Seventh and Eighth Centuries of the Nara and early Heian periods, when the imperial government remained strong, there

were frequent contacts between the Imperial Court and the Southern Islands. Islanders presented tributes to the emperor and received court ranks and titles, and some even took up permanent residence in the Japanese capital. In turn, the Court dispatched officials to the Southern Islands. In 735 A.D, the Southern Islands were placed under the jurisdiction of the Dazaifu (Government of Kyūshū) in northern Kyūshū. When Japan terminated the sending of embassies to China in 839 A.D, the Southern Islands' importance as the way station to China diminished. From the Tenth Century onward, the central authority in Kyoto gradually declined and paid less and less attention to the Southern Islands. In contrast was the emergence of local political power in Okinawa, as evidenced by the brisk castle-building activities of the tenth century and the appearance in 1187 of King Shunten, Okinawa's first historical ruler. Two hundred years later, in 1372, Ryukyu established a tributary trade relationship with Ming China, and later, trade was expanded to Southeast Asia. Ryukyu enjoyed prosperity as a maritime trading nation while Japan remained under the rule of the weak Muromachi Shogunate and in the turmoils of civil war. However, shortly after Japan was under the strong central authority established by the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1603, Ryukyu was forcibly brought within Japan's sphere by the military action taken by the Shimazu daimyo of Satsuma in 1609. From the earliest times, the Ryukyu Kingdom occupied a privileged position to the south of Japan due largely to its trade and cultural links with China. Despite the fact that Japan had exercised brief contacts with the kingdom from the Seventh to the Nine Century, its attempts to interfere with Ryukyuan domestic affairs virtually disappeared from Ryukyuan history until the Seventeen Century. Until that time, the Ryukyu Kingdom maintained its strongest economic and cultural ties with China, and remained in somewhat constant contact with the Asian continent, through China.

From the Fourteen Century on, the Ryukyu Kingdom developed a tributary relationship with China, which while symbolically signifying the Ryukyu Kingdom's status under China (as demonstrated in a pledge of loyalty made by the Ryukyuan King to the Chinese Emperor) basically maintained the Ryukyu Kingdom's independent status as a nation. China's preeminent status had several key implications for the Ryukyuan people. It provided legitimacy to the Ryukyuan Monarchy, and also established the manner in

which Chinese ethics and cultural customs were able to enter into the Ryukyus. Most importantly, however, its status as a tributary allowed the Ryukyu Kingdom access to trade with China, which would serve to boost the Ryukyus status in terms of mercantile affairs.

The Satsuma also used its control of Ryukyu as weapon against the Bakufu when it set itself up in competition with the Tokugawa delegation at the Paris Exposition of 1867 as the official representatives of the kingdom of Ryukyu and Satsuma. By the Fourteenth Century three great houses had developed and Okinawa was divided into three centers of power; the south, called Nanzan, the central area, called Chuzan, and the north, called Hokuzan. This was called the Sanzan or Three Kingdoms Period. The kingdoms had good ports and started to conduct active trading with China to increase their economic power. In the Fifteenth Century one of the leaders from the south, Sho Hashi, succeeded in unifying the three kingdoms. The Ryukyu Kingdom was born. The Ryukyu Kingdom built up trading relationships with China, East Asia, Korea, Japan, and other neighboring Asian and East Asian nations. This era has been called The Great Age of Trade.

The First Ryukyu Dynasty founded by Sho Hashi was succeeded by the Second Ryukyu Dynasty. Among the greatest of the kings was King Sho Shin, the third to ascend the throne in the second dynasty. During his reign, the kingdom was thoroughly organized, power was centralized and many construction projects were carried out. Sho Shin's reign is suitably called the Golden Age of the Ryukyus. During the Ancient Ryukyu period, Okinawa received influences from Japan and Asia. It experienced a blossoming of its own distinctive history and culture while forming and developing itself as an independent nation. But in 1609, due to a military invasion by the Shimazu Clan, the kingdom functionally lost its independence as a sovereign nation and became closely tied to the Shogunate system in Japan.

1.6.2 Satsuma Domination over the Ryukyus:

The great age of trade, which was established by the Ryukyu Kingdom throughout East Asia, ended with the appearance of the Western European powers in the Sixteen

Century.¹⁵ The amicable trade relationship which had been built with Japan began to show changes. The Shimazu Clan of Satsuma began to approach the Ryukyus with territorial ambitions, eventually culminating in a Satsuma invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom with a Shogunate sponsored military force in 1609. The Ryukyu Kingdom, weak militarily and having virtually no experience in battle after long peaceful years as a kingdom, was subordinated, without any real resistance, under the Satsuma clan. The Shimazu invasion did not result in the dismantlement of the Ryukyu Kingdom, and its hegemony by Satsuma was concealed from China. The year 1609 marked the beginning of Ryukyu's period of dual subordination to Satsuma and Bakufu on the one hand and Qing (after 1644) China on the other. The Satsuma manipulated and exploited the identity of the Ryukyu to its own advantage.

The Satsuma took control of the Ryukyus from the Ryukyuan monarchy, and placed the northern islands of Amami under direct Satsuma rule, while allowing the rest of the kingdom to remain under a sort of semi-colonial jurisdiction. For the next three centuries, as a vassal of the Shimazu daimyo (who himself was a vassal of the Tokugawa shogun), Ryukyu was a part of Tokugawa Japan, yet retained its own "king." Tokugawa's nationwide laws and edicts, such as the requirements for the national census and the anti-Christianity rule, were enforced in Ryukyu as in the rest of Japan. Study of Japanese learning and arts was encouraged for the gentry. Yet, Ryukyu was ordered to maintain the facade of independence *vis-à-vis* China and other foreign nations.

Satsuma imposed taxes to be paid in rice and other commodities. The lucrative trade and many other facets of life were controlled by their rules. The Ryukyus were also required to send processions to Edo (Tokyo) to pay obeisance to the Shogunate. Within this age of disorder, the Ryukyus were fortunate to have had the appearance of bold and able reform leaders such as Choshu Haneji and Saion. Facing up to the reality of Satsuma domination, they tried to save the Ryukyu Kingdom through policies based on cooperation with the Satsuma clan. It was time that the traditional political system of the Ancient Ryukyus

¹⁵ The Portuguese began to arrive after 1542, the Spanish from Manila and Mexico began to arrive by about 1580; the Dutch establish themselves at Hirado in 1611 and the British open a trading depot there in 1613. George H Kerr (1953) Ryukyu Kingdom and Province before 1945.

ended and the road to a new modern age in the Ryukyu Kingdom opened up. The Latter Period Ryukyus was an age of even more advancement and development. The kingdom actively absorbed culture from Japan and China. Harmonizing the diverse cultural influences from Japan and China developed most of the Ryukyuan culture's rich distinctiveness.

1.7 The Nineteen Century Ryukyu:

The beginning of the nineteen Century saw the western nations expand nation by nation into Asia. The national seclusion policy was abandoned in Japan and a modern state was established. As part of that process, the Ryukyu Kingdom was incorporated into Japan and the monarchy that had ruled the islands for 500 years was dissolved. When Okinawans went to Japan, they were forced to act like aliens, but when they were in Okinawa, they were to act like Japanese. Yet when Chinese envoys arrived for the investiture of the king, Okinawans had to get rid of everything—ranging from all Japanese coins in circulation in the island to men's undergarments—that might reveal Okinawa's true political status as a vassal to the Shimazu daimyo of Japan. In 1867 the Tokugawa feudal government was replaced by the new Meiji government. As Meiji Japan was a highly centralized modern state, Ryukyu was stripped of all pretenses of independence and of its tributary relationship with China, and in 1879 it was incorporated by Japan as Okinawa Prefecture.

All Okinawans were required or even forced to be "Japanese." In the early years of Meiji Japan, Okinawans were "Japanese" in their duties to the state—such as paying taxes and performing military service—but were denied the full benefits of citizenship, such as the franchise or local autonomy.¹⁶ These privileges were given to them only grudgingly and after a long struggle and wait. Still Japanisation proceeded inexorably, and by the 1940s, tested by all standards of citizenship, Okinawans were Japanese. In the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, Okinawa, of all the prefectures of Japan, suffered the heaviest casualties. Yet when Japan lost the war—that is, when the central political power of Japan collapsed—

¹⁶ For more details, see George H Kerr, "the Ryukyu Kingdom and Province before 1945".

Okinawa again found itself detached from Japan. This time, it was placed under the control of the U.S.

What the future held for the newly established Okinawa Prefecture was down a tumultuous road. Perhaps because of the difference in systems and customs there was a deeply rooted resentment of the old ruling class and the Meiji government in Tokyo. Because of this the Meiji Government adopted the "Ancient Customs Preservation Policy" toward the Ryukyus for the time being. According to this policy, the landholding system, taxation system, and local government system were all to remain as they were with no great or sudden reforms. This was to avoid any resistance that might come from the Okinawan side. However, the effect of the various policies toward Okinawa resulted in the prefecture falling behind in modernization in comparison to other prefectures and caused the citizens of Okinawa hardships.

The move toward standardizing education to the mainland Japanese standards, along the lines of the Imperial Rescript on Education, began to be thoroughly carried out in the latter half of the Nineteen Century, after the Sino-Japanese War. Subsequent to this, the inexperienced Okinawans were forced into battle in the Russo-Japanese War as members of the Japanese army. Once Imperial Japan constituted itself as a modern state (1868), it moved quickly to consolidate its frontiers. To the south that meant extinguishing the independence of the Ryukyus and incorporating them as Okinawa prefecture (1879), thereby opening the way to the process of assimilation as a discriminated frontier province, and impoverishment. By the time of the Osaka Industrial Exposition of 1903, Okinawan 'natives' was on display, along with Ainu and Taiwanese aboriginal people, as primitives.

1.8 Second World War and the Battle of Okinawa

By late October 1944, Okinawa was targeted for invasion by Allied forces. This invasion, code named 'Operation Iceberg' saw the assembling of the greatest naval armada ever. The battle of Okinawa, waged from March to June 1945, was the bloodiest of the either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki atomic bomb attacks. While precise estimates are impossible to accurately verify, most estimates use benchmarks of around 150,000 civilian deaths,

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some one-quarter of Okinawa's population at the time. The damage done to the natural environment was also staggering. During the eighty day battle an estimated 7.5 million howitzer rounds, over 60,000 naval shells, 20,000 rockets, and almost 400,000 hand grenades were fired just by the American side. Beyond the horrors this war caused to civilians and combatants alike, the effect was the utter environmental transformation of large sections of the island, especially the south part, where the most intense fighting and bombardments took place.

It is important to recognize the tremendous impacts this battle has had on Okinawan views of war and military, and the influence this has had on contemporary and historical Okinawan opposition to the bases, for as one U.S Naval officer was quoted as saying, "Of the many places on this globe that were touched by the withering blast of war I doubt if in any the life of the people has been more completely changed than on Okinawa."(Karasik, Daniel, 1948) Despite being a part of Japan politically since the Meiji era, Okinawa was still viewed as something quite apart from the home islands. Its people were racially, linguistically, and culturally different. This difference in the eyes of the mainlanders ultimately rendered Okinawa as "expendable" in Japanese government eyes; a pattern which has continued from the Second World War World, some would argue, until the present day. To the continuing anger of many Okinawans, Japan has never issued anything even resembling an apology for the suffering and sacrifices endured by the civilian population of Okinawa during the Pacific War. The Ministry of Education banned the mention of Japanese murders of Okinawan civilians during the battle from textbooks. An understanding of the suffering Okinawans endured and the attitude of the Japanese government towards them is integral to understanding the enduring strength of Okinawan anti-base and peace movements.

The Second World War was seen by many Okinawans as a chance to prove themselves loyal to the emperor and a true part of the Japanese nation. Instead, Okinawa was the site of one of most bitterly fought battles of the Pacific war, a tragic last stand before the Allied forces were to reach the Japanese mainland. One in four Okinawan civilians lost

their lives, totaling more than the number of Japanese military casualties. There were numerous incidents of mass suicide and murder to avoid being taken by the enemy.

For the Americans, winning Okinawa as a base was crucial for their invasion of Japan in the spring of 1946. "Okinawa would be the catapult from which this mightiest amphibious assault force ever assembled would be hurled."(Robert Leckie, 1995, p 28-31.) More importantly, the American victory at Okinawa shortened the war, dashing Japan's hopes of winning and weakening her tradition of honor and loyalty to the Emperor, which transcended her trust in firepower and material strategy. Therefore, the American victory at Okinawa was essential. A Japanese victory at Okinawa was equally important in order to "cripple or destroy the enemy [American] sea power that had brought the Americans so close to Japan proper."(Robert Leckie, 1995) Hoping to prevent the invasion, Japan mobilized her immense 32nd Imperial Army, her greatest kamikaze forces, the new *baka* (a piloted suicide bomb), and its most successful defense tactics. Failure to stop the Americans at Okinawa meant the unthinkable-an enemy land invasion of the Japanese homeland. Thus, never contemplating defeat, they fought fiercely for the tiny island. The Battle of Okinawa was a turning point because the devastation and remuneration in terms of lives were so high. The atrocities at Okinawa, the epitome of Pacific warfare, made it "the bloodiest land battle of the Pacific war."(James H. Hallas, 1996) American ground and naval forces reported 70,000 casualties.

The end of the Second World War thus resulted in the defeat of Japan after its unconditional surrender to the Allies in August 1945. It had become an international pariah and was completely turned into a devastated country. Okinawa was sacrificed by imperial Japan in the catastrophic conflagration of March-to-June 1945, when one-quarter of the population died. Thereafter the Japanese backwater, Okinawa, became the American 'hub of the Pacific.' It remained an American military outpost for the next twenty-seven years, a kind of East Asian Panama. In Japan proper, the Allied Occupation ended in 1952; in Amami, the most northerly of the Ryukyu Islands, in December of the following year; but in Okinawa itself and its adjacent islands it lasted until 1972. The

signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty¹⁷ between the Allied countries and Japan in 1951 formally ended the Second World War. This subsequently resulted in the formation of the most important bilateral alliance post war and since then they both have maintained this alliance till today. The importance of Okinawa lies in the light of their security arrangements and despite the end of the Cold war even, the bases continue to exist. The Japan-U.S security ties will be discussed in the next chapter wherein the importance of Okinawa lies.

¹⁷ On September 8, 1951, 48 countries signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty (the Treaty) to mark the formal cessation of World War II hostilities in Asia-Pacific between Japan and the rest of the signatories. Consisting of seven chapters and a preamble, the San Francisco Peace Treaty specifies the settlement terms of war-related issues while it provides an end to Japan's occupation. It came into force on April 28, 1952.

CHAPTER II

JAPAN –U.S SECURITY RELATIONS AND THE OKINAWA FACTOR

The security arrangement between Japan and the U.S after the Second World War has its implications on Okinawa, a prefecture of Japan which has been serving the interests of the two security partners since the end of the war. “The Japan-U.S security relationship is the bedrock of Japan's defense and the keystone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region”¹⁸. Here lies the importance of Okinawa whose strategic locations has resulted in the stationing of a huge U.S military bases post Second World War till today. Though constituting less than 1% of Japan’s land mass, Okinawa currently hosts 75% of the total U.S forces in Japan. U.S forces on Okinawa have been politically sensitive and an irritant in the bilateral relationship particularly since the 1995 rape of a Japanese girl by U.S military personnel. Other issues, such as noise and crashes of U.S military aircraft, have contributed to resentment by Okinawans of the large American military presence there.

Okinawan politicians have called for a renegotiation of the Japan-U.S Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a reduction in U.S troop strength. The U.S and central Japanese Government have opposed revising the SOFA, but Japan has increasingly pushed the U.S to alleviate the burden of its military presence in Okinawa.¹⁹ In this context, to know and understand the situation of Okinawa, it’s important to trace Japan’s security alliance with the U.S which has been known as the most important bilateral alliance in the world after Second World War.

2.1 A Background of their Alliance:

Since the end of the Allied Occupation of Japan which was a result of the Second World War, the Japan-U.S Security Treaty has been the keystone in Japan's arch of security and foreign policies. This security relationship did not start with the end of the Second World War but began with the arrival of the U.S fleet commanded by *Matthew C. Perry*,²⁰

¹⁸ MOFA Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation, May1, 2007.

¹⁹ For more on the Okinawan bases, see Sheila Smith, *Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia*. East-West Center, March 2006.

²⁰ To pursue increasing Western interests in the Ryukyus during the 19th century, the US deployed an expeditionary squadron commanded by Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry of Kingston, Rhode Island. The *Susquehanna* accompanied by four other ships arrived at Tomari, Okinawa on May 26, 1853.(Trafton Terry, *American Influence on Okinawa Culture before 1972*, 1991)

which led to the signing of a peace and amity treaty between the two countries and to the *Meiji* Restoration (1868). Maintaining close ties with the U.S has been the starting point for all Japanese foreign policy post Second World War.

The U.S and Japan have evolved from enemies in the Second World War to close allies today. The U.S signed the treaty of peace²¹ with Japan in 1951 at the San Francisco Peace Conference. This Treaty came into force in 1952 and was followed in 1960 by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security that serves as the basis of American-Japanese defense ties and grants the U.S the use of bases in Japan. With the peace treaty recognizing Japan as a sovereign nation and having a right to enter into collective security arrangements, and, further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizing that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, Japan subsequently entered into a security arrangement with the U.S in 1951. The Japan-U.S Security Treaty was created by the San Francisco Peace Conference. The 1951 Treaty declared that the U.S, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in expectation, ... that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression. Thus the U.S demanded that Japan create her own armed forces, which today are known as the Self Defense Forces (SDF). The treaty provided for U.S military intervention, at the request from Tokyo, in suppressing large scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers (Article I). Above all the 1951 Treaty reflected 'the U.S victory in the Pacific War... and its determination to maintain its influence over Japan in the post WWII period'. (Buckley Roger, 1992) The 1951 Security Treaty was revised in 1960 wherein all unfavourable elements to Japan of the 1951 Treaty were completely revised. It was not merely a modification of the old treaty; it rather was a new Treaty. The American obligation to defend Japan was made more explicit with Article V stipulating that:

²¹ The San Francisco Treaty was signed in 1951 between Japan and the Allied Powers. The Treaty stated that 'the state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23' (MOFA, San Francisco Peace Treaty, Chapter 1, Article 1) The Allied Powers also recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.

each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and security and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

In addition, Article I of the 1951 Treaty which guarantee the American military intervention in the event of Japanese domestic instability was deleted. Significantly, the two governments agreed that they would undertake occasional consultations 'regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened' (Article IV). Moreover, Article II prodded the U.S and Japan to 'eliminate conflict in their international economic policies' and to 'encourage economic collaboration between them'. This treaty has become a guideline for Japan's relations with the U.S forming a dominant pattern of Japan's international relations in the post Second World war era. The intensification of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s profoundly influenced the nature of the post war settlement and the future direction of Japan's international relations and its relation with the U.S.

Under the Yoshida Doctrine, close political ties were developed between the two countries. As a result of their security arrangements post Second World War, Japan agreed to the stationing of a huge U.S military bases in Okinawa which also has been a source of some tension between Japan U.S bilateral relations since the end of Second World War.²² Many crisis and issues are directly related to the military bases. Japan-U.S security relations over the years since its inception will be looked at in this chapter. How

²² The biggest crisis was perhaps the period before the revision of US-Japan Mutual Security Pact in 1970, when the height of students' movement against the US-Japan security alliance merged with the Japanese public request for Okinawa's repatriation from the US military government. With the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972, Japan and the US consolidated the alliance by making the US military presence in Okinawa permanent, while subsidizing the Japanese mass discontent with prolonged US occupation of what was considered a Japanese territory (See Tanji 2006, Chapter 6).

important is the Okinawan factor in their relation during the Cold War and post Cold War will be analyzed.

2.2 Security Relations during the Cold War

During the Cold War, Japan-U.S Security relations went through three distinct phases²³. The first period began when imperial Japan surrendered in 1945 and ended with the Korean War in 1950. During this period the U.S forces ruled Japan and drafted a constitution that paved the way for a fundamental transformation of the Japanese state by achieving two main goals i.e., the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. The compulsions for Japan to sign the treaty document at that time were two-fold: one, it was a vanquished power under U.S occupation and did not have too many choices two, that it followed the 'Yoshida doctrine' that would enable them to focus on economic reconstruction, with the U.S taking care of its security requirements.

The Second Phase in their security relations during the Cold War lasted from 1950 to 1960. American military occupation formally came to an end during this period. The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951 between the Allied Powers and Japan. It recognized the full sovereignty of Japan. At the same time, it was followed by a highly unequal Security Treaty between the U.S and Japan. This treaty, among other things, allowed the U.S to station troops on Japanese soil for the dual purposes of safeguarding Japan's security, as well as the security of East Asia as already discussed in the above paragraph. The Korean War offered opportunities to Japan to strengthen its economic and political independence. LaFeber argued that the Korean War was the rebuilding of Japan as the Marshall Plan was for rebuilding Western Europe. (LaFeber Walter, 1997) The nuclear umbrella enabled Japan to maintain its defense budget to roughly one percent of its Gross National Product (GNP).

The third phase was marked by signing of a bilateral defense treaty in 1960 under which the U.S successfully integrated Japan politically, economically and strategically into its global campaign to contain communism. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members stressed the importance of the traditional role of the Treaty of Mutual

²³ This chronological classification follows Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, 'the revised US Japan Security Guidelines: Implications for Beijing and Taipei' Issues and Studies Vol 34 No 4, April 1998: 72-89.

Cooperation and Security, which has enabled a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan while providing U.S. security assurances to the Government of Japan. U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. Unlike the old treaty, the 1960 treaty committed the U.S. to defend Japan and to consult the Japanese before putting forces into action under the pact's provision. This treaty had a ten year old duration and under article 6 of the treaty the U.S. retained special basing privileges on Japanese soil which proved critical as a staging ground and workshop for U.S. forces during the Vietnam War²⁴. U.S.-Japan defense relations then entered a period of uncertainty because of U.S. President Richard Nixon's so-called Guam Doctrine²⁵ of 1969. One major irritant was resolved when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Nixon signed a joint communique that returned administrative control of the Okinawa islands to Japan in 1972. However it was agreed that the U.S. would continue to maintain large military bases on the island. The establishment of the bilateral Security Consultative Committee in 1976 led to greater defense cooperation, including joint planning for response to an attack on Japan.

In 1978, the two countries signed the Guidelines for U.S. Japan Defense Cooperation which further strengthened their security relations.²⁶ Mainly as a result of its spectacular economic growth during the Cold War, Japan in the 1980s was paying a substantial amount of the cost of stationing the U.S. troops in Okinawa. In 1981, Japan and the U.S. agreed that Japan would expand its commitment to sea lane defense within one thousand miles. The new "*burden-sharing*" allowed U.S. naval forces to concentrate on other roles and in other areas of the Pacific. While Japan was also willing to pay an increasing share of the U.S. defense costs, it was technologically the most capable non-nuclear force in the region at the end of the Cold War.

²⁴ A protracted military conflict (1959–1975) between the Communist forces of North Vietnam supported by China and the Soviet Union and the non-Communist forces of South Vietnam supported by the United States.

²⁵ The Guam Doctrine called on U.S. allies to provide for their own defense, the normalization of relations between China and the United States, and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

²⁶ Complete text of "1978 Guidelines for Japan U.S. defense cooperation", see Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan: Response to a New Era

With Japan's increasing economic power, the bilateral security relationship entered a period of competition and rivalry. Since the late 1980s, at least economically, the bilateral relationship appeared to enter into a new period on the basis of a more "*equal partnership*". (Cossa, Ralph A, 1997). However, this cannot be said of the bilateral security relationship. The nature of the "*patron client relationship*" within the "*unequal alliance*" was to remain basically "*unequal*". While the U.S has the treaty obligation to defend Japan, the latter has no defense obligation in circumstances where U.S territory or U.S troops in East Asia are attacked.

Summing up, the Japan-U.S alliance during the Cold War was significant for maintaining peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region which helped Japan to become an economic giant at the same time promoted U.S interests in the region. It is also important to acknowledge the impact of their relations on Okinawa which had to bear the huge burden due to the presence of the U.S troops. Chalmers Johnson admitted that America's two major wars against Asian communism-Korea and Vietnam could not have been fought without their bases in the Japanese territory. (Chalmers Johnson, 1999)

2.3 Post Cold War Relations

Although Japan had played a vital role in U.S containment policy during the Cold War, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War called into question the viability of the Japan-U.S security pact. For many decades their alliance has served as bedrock of peace and prosperity in the East Asia region (Hwang Balbina Y, 2004). The significance and importance of the Japan-U.S Security Treaty declined since the end of the Cold War even though the Treaty was not eliminated. "The end of the Cold War reduced Japan's cleavage vis a vis the U.S even as Japan was no longer an important ally in the fight against Communism" (Cooney Kevin J, 2002) Japan benefited more from the relationship in relative terms even though both sides share absolute gains from the Security arrangement.

As argued by Yoichi Funabashi, the first half of the 1990s saw the relationship deteriorate and adrift mainly as a result of decreased perception of regional security threat, increasing trade frictions, and bureaucratic inertia or inattention. (Yoichi Funabashi, 1999) one of the reasons why their relations entered a low phase was Japan's \$13 billion contribution²⁷ towards the Gulf War which was not much appreciated by the U.S. Japan's foreign policy and strategists stated that the "boots on the ground" and not "checkbook diplomacy" were vital to play a prominent role in international affairs. Japan's 1947 pacifist Constitution prevented it from joining the allied coalition, which was deeply Japanese domestic support for Japan-U.S security in general, and U.S bases on Japan in particular, continued to decline. Japan came under censure for what is called checkbook diplomacy despite its huge financial contributions towards the war.

Amidst these developments, many in the U.S and Japan stressed the importance of improving both the operative and the political credibility of the alliance. For instance, Michael J. Green, a Japan analyst argued in 1998, "As long as U.S. forward engagement remained credible, it is unlikely Japan would choose neutrality or appeasement if Beijing challenged U.S hegemony". (Michael J.Green, 1998, p 15).

The Gulf War was an eye-opener for Japan along with the post Cold War challenges of an emerging powerful neighbor in China, the Taiwan Straits issue and the tension in the Korean Peninsula. Both in the U.S and Japan, policy makers supported and corroborated the need to redefine the alliance. The report of the Advisory Group on Defence Issues or the Higuchi Report entitled '*The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*' released in August 1994 recommended that "it would be necessary to take advantage of the alliance network, centering around the U.S for security cooperation". (Akio Watanabe, 2003, p 241)

Symbolizing a paradigmatic shift, the Nye Initiative represented the increasing awareness of the need to update, refocus, and recommit the Japan-U.S alliance. The central figure

²⁷ For details, refer to Courtney Purrington, "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the 'Iraqi Shock' on Japan", *Pacific Affairs*, 65 (2), Summer 1992, pp. 161-82

behind this report was Joseph Nye²⁸, whose views of U.S strategy and the American media's understanding of that strategy in the post-Cold War world were important for highlighting the different coverage of the incident in Okinawa. More importantly, because of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, U.S forces in Korea would have to be stationed there, whereas it became clear that the troops in Japan were to be "roaming" troops for strategic response to emergencies in the region and beyond. Therefore the maintenance of the Japan-U.S Security Treaty was essential for the stability of the entire region. The report implied that the most important issue for Japan-U.S relations is security, including an area that extends beyond the Japanese islands to include a more regional coverage. In the view of *Nye*, "*Security is like oxygen - you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about.*" (Joseph Nye, 1995) Accordingly, the U.S was still needed for maintaining political order and a security framework that will sustain economic growth. The central objectives of the new U.S strategy were to foster political stability, maintain access to regional markets, ensure freedom of navigation, and prevent the rise of any hostile inclinations or the development of a policy of aggression towards other nations.

The East Asia Strategic Report²⁹ (EASR) prepared by Joseph Nye was one part of a trilogy that included Europe and the Middle East. The significance of this is that the report was part of the U.S global strategy and meant that U.S troops in Asia, in particular in Japan and even more so in the bases in Okinawa, could be sent to the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the redefinition of the Japan-U.S Security Treaty, including the maintenance of bases in Okinawa, has global as well as regional implications. On the one hand, this type of report is just one of the strategic reports that are regularly issued by the Pentagon. The report acknowledged Japan's most generous host-nation support in maintaining U.S troops.³⁰ The new National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO) of Japan, introduced in

²⁸ Joseph Nye was the Assistant Secretary Of Defense of the first Clinton Administration and presently Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard University.

²⁹ The U.S Department of Defense released the East Asia Strategy Report on 27 February, 1995 setting out United States security strategy for the East Asia and Pacific region. The document explains why U.S. national interests require the continuing presence of approximately 100,000 troops in Asia.

³⁰ Text of the United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region, U.S Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, February 24, 1995.

a revised form in 1995, also called for stronger military ties with the U.S to ensure both the security of Japan as well as the Asia-Pacific region. The Taiwan Strait crisis³¹ of 1996 gave a clarion call to both the Japanese and American leaders to strengthen their security ties. The then U.S President Bill Clinton and the Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro issued a joint declaration on security in 1996 to revise the 1978 framework for defense cooperation.

The Guidelines for U.S Japan Defense Cooperation³² issued in 23rd September 1997, gave the U.S and Japanese governments' 'greater flexibility to respond to crisis, but that flexibility also implies a greater integration of planning and decision making precisely the sort of integration that the Japanese side has resisted so far' (Curtis L, Gerald, 2000). Section III, IV and V of the Guidelines discussed how the U.S and Japan would cooperate under three different scenarios. Under normal circumstances, actions in response to armed attacks against Japan, and cooperation in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.

Under the new guidelines, the scope of Japanese SDF role with regional hostilities has also expanded. The most significant and controversial aspect of this guideline was its provision on joint military cooperation on situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also explained that the concept in areas surrounding Japan is not geographical but situational. It also required that the two governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts to prevent such situations from occurring.

31 The crisis was the result of a face-off between Chinese and US forces in Taiwan in March 1996. China carried out missile tests and exercises in international waters near Taiwan just prior to the presidential elections there. For details, see Nishihara Masahashi, (ed.), The US-Japan Alliance: New Challenges for the 21st Century. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000, pp.71-102. The US deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups, including one based in Japan, off Taiwan. The crisis and joint communiqué triggered fears among Chinese experts about the US use of Japanese bases in the future Taiwan scenarios

32 This new Defense Guidelines outline functional areas of cooperation in the event of a regional crisis that has a direct effect on Japanese security. These functional areas include rear area logistical support for US forces, sea lane patrol, intelligence sharing, noncombatant evacuation operations and other missions that would not put Japanese forces into forward combat roles in third countries but would prove critical to facilitating successful resolution of conflicts

2.3.1 Post 9/11 Japan's Relation with U.S under Koizumi Junichiro

The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon marked the beginning of a new chapter in international relations. It had major implications for Japan – not only because it is a close ally of Washington, but also because it provided Tokyo with a rationale to review its own security concerns within the parameters of the peace constitution. The ‘mistakes’ of the first Gulf War and Japan’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’, which drew widespread censure, provided a grim reminder to the Japanese government and policymakers, that any further reluctance to measure up to the expectations of its ally would translate into a crack in the partnership and expose them to the risk of ‘abandonment’. Expressing shock and ‘anger’ over the attack, Japan offered its support and assistance to the U.S in its war against terror. (Kyodo News Service, 2001)

Japan announced a seven-pronged action plan to deal with the situation. Former Prime Minister Koizumi rushed to the U.S for a two-day visit and announced that his country would “provide cooperation that suits its national power.” Japan set up a task force comprising the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers to take crucial decisions pertaining to assistance to the U.S and addressing domestic security concerns. “Strongly supporting” the American air strikes in Afghanistan, Koizumi said he had conveyed to President Bush for the U.S “stand against terrorism...from a long-term perspective.” (*Kyodo New Service*, September 25, 2001).

Even in Iraq, despite massive protests on the domestic front, the Japanese government sent the SDF³³ in a non combatable role to the region – a step taken for the first time after Second World War. Two significant aspects of the dispatch were: One, the area was still a combat zone, and two, no U.N sanction was backing the U.S attack. It was for the first time that the SDF joined such a multinational force.³⁴ The significance of the Japanese decision to send troops to Iraq cannot be denied. It can be attributed to Japan’s assertiveness at two levels – one, as an important member of the international

³³ For an overview of the Japan’s SDFs, see Arpita Mathur, “Changing Role of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces”, *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies*, 12 (1), April 2004, pp. 16-29

³⁴ According to the statement issued by the government, the SDF is expected to ‘cooperate’ (not ‘participate’) with the multinational force, “Cabinet seals SDF mission in Iraq”, *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 19, 2004.

community, and two as an effective and dependable ally of the U.S. In fact, Japan stood in support of the U.S decision to attack Iraq even without U.N sanctions, when prominent European countries like France and Germany opposed the step and refused to send troops. The gradual expansion in the scope of activities of the SDF to meet the requirements of the situation in Iraq thus simultaneously increased Japanese contribution to the alliance.³⁵ According to former Japan Defense Agency Director General Shigeru Ishiba, the twin reasons for sending troops to Iraq were to serve Japan's national interests by bringing stability to a region from which Japan imports almost all its oil and secondly, to strengthen the Japan-U.S alliance.³⁶ There is no doubt that after the crisis faced by Tokyo during the first Gulf War, it has chosen to be a more active participant— a step taken to maintain its relevance in the alliance

The U.S welcomed Japan's positive contributions toward the fight on terrorism post 9/11, including the passage of the Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Law, deployment of ships to the Indian Ocean, co-hosting the Afghanistan Reconstruction Conference; support for the U.S pre-emptive attack on Iraq and adoption of a new Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. President Bush, on his visit to Japan on 17 October 2003, thanked Koizumi for his government's decision to provide US\$1.5 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. The U.S also appreciated Japan's subsequent dispatch of the SDF to Iraq for humanitarian assistance, peace building and logistical support in non combatant areas.

Under Koizumi, Japan undertook significant revisions of its security stance, as seen in two overlapping official reports, the Araki Commission Report and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).³⁷ The reports emphasize the need to make the Japan-U.S


³⁷ The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, an advisory committee established by the Prime Minister's office, produced the Araki Commission Report to recommend a new approach to Japan's security policy. The tenets of the Araki report were adopted into the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY2005, which outlined the official policy.

alliance more robust and credible, and single out missile defense, intelligence exchange, and operational coordination as areas for cooperation.

The new framework presented a shift from considering the alliance as only a means to defend the territory of and areas surrounding Japan to adopting a global perspective that viewed the security of Japan and the region as linked with international stability. Further, the NDPG specifies that Japan and the U.S would improve operational coordination “in areas surrounding Japan,” a clause interpreted to refer to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Under Abe Shinzo, the Japanese Defense Agency was upgraded to a full ministry for the first time since the end of the Second World War. Concurrent with Japan’s internal reviews, Japan-U.S bilateral initiatives reinforced the new and expanded commitment to security cooperation by establishing common strategic objectives, outlining major command changes, explicitly identifying the stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula as common priorities in the Pacific region for the first time, and calling on China to make its military modernization more transparent.

These unprecedented agreements and statements emerged first through the working-level DPRI, launched in 2002, and later at the cabinet level through the SCC, (also known as the “2+2” meeting), composed of the U.S Secretaries of Defense and State and their Japanese counterparts. The October 2005 “2+2” report outlines the major command changes agreed to by Japanese and U.S officials. This shifted 300 American soldiers from the 1st Army Corps headquarters from Washington State to Camp Zama (twenty five miles southwest of Tokyo) to establish a forward operational headquarters. (The headquarters were opened in December 2007.) The GSDF would also base a rapid-response headquarters at Camp Zama. A bilateral and joint operations center will be built at Yokota U.S Air Base (about twenty three miles northwest of Tokyo) to enhance coordination between the Japanese and U.S air and missile defense command elements. The headquarters of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, meanwhile, would be moved from Okinawa to Guam, reducing the number of marines by about 8,000.

U.S Bases in Shaded Colours



Source: <http://images.google.in>

2.4 Okinawa, an Issue in the Japan-U.S Security Alliance

The overall Japan-U.S security relationship requires a U.S basing presence.³⁸ Japan-U.S defense relations are governed by a uniquely one-sided security treaty and also by Japan's postwar constitution which prohibits Japan from creating a military organization with offensive capabilities.³⁹ The end of the Second World War saw Okinawa receiving a disproportionate share of the burden for maintaining U.S Japanese security relationship and implementing American military strategy in Asia. 'Constituting only 0.6% of Japan's total land area, Okinawa houses 75% of the U.S troops stationed in Japan on thirty nine bases, one of the largest concentration of U.S forces anywhere in the world'. (Shorrock Tim, 2000) Calling Okinawa a Cold War Island, Chalmers Johnson argued that the Japanese Government has so far been successful in making Okinawa, the most remote prefecture serve as the garbage dump of the Japan-U.S Security Treaty. (Chalmers Johnson, 1999).

The value placed upon Okinawa by the U.S is high due to a variety of factors, including the human toll paid by the U.S troops during the 1945 campaign, the subsequent huge investments in military base construction on the island, the persistent neutralist sentiments and strong opposition to nuclear weapons in Japanese political life, and most important of all, the continuing "conditions of threat and tension in the Far East"-a pet phrase of American policy-makers. The U.S decision to retain Okinawa for an indefinite period seems to have been made as early as 1949, and has remained basically unchanged ever since. During the first four years after the war, no definite over-all policy toward the island was discernible. Since 1950, the strategic value of the Okinawan bases seemed to have increased due to the rise of Communist China, the Korean War, and the continuing conflicts in Southeast Asia. All of these have strengthened the argument that military necessity requires the retention of Okinawa.

³⁸ For recent assessments of the U.S. basing presence in Japan and the evolution of the broader security relationship, see Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*; Michael J. Green and Patrick Cronin, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Changes in an Era of Uncertain Power* (London: Macmillan, 2003); and John G. Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *Reinventing the Alliance: US-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change* (London: Macmillan, 2003).

³⁹ For an outstanding discussion of the role of the US in creating Japan's constitution, see John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999).

The U.S military has maintained forward deployed forces throughout Japan since the end of the Second World War. Initially these were occupation forces, but gradually this posture changed with regional and world events and with the signing of the Treaties of Peace and Security in September of 1951, between the U.S and Japanese governments. With the advent of the Korean War (1950-53) and Japan's new role in Asia as a forward deployment center and repair facility for U.S forces, the importance of Okinawa to both the countries increased during the Cold War years. During the Cold War, American bases in Okinawa provided a crucial staging arena for the projection of American power and rear area support. Chalmers Johnson argued that America's two major wars against Asian Communism – in Korea and Vietnam could not have been fought without bases on Japanese territory. (Chalmers Johnson, 1999).

The problem of Okinawa had been that of incompatibility between U.S emphasis upon its military value and the Okinawan' opposition against control. They criticized the U.S for their position which is in contradiction to the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam proclamation in which the victors promised to covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. They also felt that the proposal to place Okinawa under U.S trusteeship would be in contravention of Article 77 of the UN Charter, which stresses as well as Article 78 which declared that the trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which become members of the U.S.

Table 2: Number of Facilities, Land Use, Military Personnel and their Dependents

NUMBER OF FACILITIES	37
Land Area Occupied By Facilities	23,687.4hectares,10.4%of prefecture land
Number of Military Personnel Employees and their Families	Total 50,826 Military Personnel, 26, 282 Civilian Employees, 1,679 Family Members, 22, 865

Facility numbers and land areas as of March 2003.

Military personnel members are as of September 2004.

Source:OkinawaPrefecture,MilitaryAffairsBaseDivision, <http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view>

2.5 Post Cold War Implication on Okinawa:

To maintain stability in the East Asian Region post Cold War, the Nye Report emphasized the need for the U.S to maintain 100,000 troops, concentrated in Japan and Korea. The key to understanding the bases issue in Okinawa is the East Asia Strategic Report⁴⁰. The EASR issued in February of 1995, was important, especially from the point of view of the Okinawan base issue and Japan-U.S relations as already discussed. The background to the Okinawa incident is important because, while the Japanese media were aware of the Nye report to a considerable extent and covered the new strategic plan of the U.S, during the reporting on Okinawa they did not fully report the background connection between the opposition movement in Okinawa and U.S global strategy. For the U.S side, the rape of a girl in Okinawa had implications for the maintenance of the bases in Okinawa, the redefinition of the Japan-U.S Security Treaty, Japan-U.S relations, the post-Cold War strategy in East Asia and the global strategy of the U.S.

Their alliance today aimed at promoting regional stability and harmony amongst all states in the region. The reduction of marines from about 18,000 to 11,000 on Okinawa seeks to quell the political controversy that has surrounded the presence of U.S forces in the southernmost part of Japan for years. Public outcry against the bases has continued since the 1995 rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by U.S personnel and was renewed after a U.S military helicopter crashed into a crowded university campus in 2004. In addition to the 1995 rape conviction, complaints about noise pollution from the air bases and concern about safety issues after the crash of a helicopter in August 2004 convinced alliance managers that the burden on Okinawa's urban areas needed to be reduced in order to make the alliance more politically sustainable.

At the same time, the U.S recognized that issues revolving around U.S bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa, are still a big issue today. In the 1990s both nations worked on redefining their alliance. Part of these efforts included SACO recommendations to alleviate some of the situations incurred by the presence of the U.S military in Okinawa.

⁴⁰ EASR, which is the Pentagon's blueprint for its strategy in East Asia after the Cold War, including the role of US military forces in Japan, the U.S-Japan Security Treaty and the bases in Okinawa.

For the most part, the recommendations in the report were carried out. However, some unresolved problems include disagreement over a time limitation for the new Futenma base, a reduction in the number of bases, return of base land to local citizens, noise and air pollution issues as well as the number of criminal actions relating to U.S. stationed military. As part of the realignment of U.S. bases, U.S. officials agreed to move most aircraft and crews constituting the Marine Air Station at Futenma (a highly populated area) to expanded facilities at Camp Schwab, located in a less-congested area of Okinawa. The challenge of replacing Futenma had dogged alliance managers for years: since 1996, both sides had worked to implement SACO Report, which called for the return of 12,000 acres of land to the Japanese, provided that appropriate replacement facilities were arranged. With the DPRI review and the revitalized alliance, new momentum led to a tentative agreement in 2006.

However, implementation of the agreement has been slow and reflects the longstanding struggle between the Okinawan and central Tokyo governments. Some signs of compromise emerged under Fukuda's Administration, but public opposition and cost overruns threaten to further stall the relocation plan. Although resolving the base realignment issues is anticipated to consume the bulk of bilateral efforts in the short term, U.S. and Japanese officials envision sweeping changes to the entire defense relationship. The "2+2" reports outline a new alliance approach to both enhance the defense of Japan and to move beyond traditional realms of cooperation. Areas specifically mentioned for cooperation include air defense, ballistic missile defense, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, maritime security operations, search and rescue efforts, intelligence and surveillance, humanitarian relief, reconstruction assistance, peace-keeping, protection of critical infrastructure, response to WMD attacks, mutual logistics support, provision of facilities for a non-combatant evacuation, and the use of civilian infrastructure for emergency purposes. Joint efforts in several of these areas have existed for decades, whereas other programs are in their infancy. Security and regional analysts have offered a

range of opinions on which areas are most appropriate for further development of joint capabilities.⁴¹

2.6 Okinawans Response to the Bases:

In the view of Okinawans, Tokyo did not live up to the promise of Vice- Admiral *Minoru Ota* (at the end of World War II) in future to give “*special consideration*” to the Okinawans. (Shimada Haruo, 1997) More than 250,000 people on the island, nearly one fifth of the present population of Okinawa, died in the battle of Okinawa at the end of the Second World War. A lot of issues have been a result of the bases which would not have been otherwise. Though their local anger has been aroused against foreign military presence, it is even more directed towards the Japanese and Tokyo than to the U.S soldiers on the island bases. Okinawa’s ex governor, *Masahide Ota* had hoped all U.S bases in the islands would be close by 2015. (Sakurada, Daizo, 1998.) However, till now the complete removal of the bases is not likely rather the troops have been realigned in other places some in the same prefecture.

Furthermore, an *Okinawa Problem Committee* was created as a channel to consider the issues from the viewpoint of the Okinawan residents. Although some progress has been made since the rape incident in September 1995, many issues are still unresolved. The proposed return of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (an airstrip in the middle of a congested Okinawan City) in 5-7 years like other questions involve many practical problems.

Perhaps the largest single point of debate is over the specific number of U.S military personnel stationed in Okinawa as compared to the remainder of Japan. The people of Okinawa are also very well aware of the imbalance of restructuring and draw down that has occurred in other parts of Japan as opposed to their tiny prefecture. They are also aware of the significant reductions in U.S forward presence in Europe because of the end

⁴¹ See “CSIS Japan Chair Study Group, *New Roles and Missions: Transforming the U.S.-Japan Alliance.*” Japan Chair Platform. July 12, 2006.

of the Cold War. Over the last quarter century the U.S returned just 15 % of the land it occupied in Okinawa, compared to 60 % of the property it used on the mainland.

2.7 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)

In 1995, the U.S. and Japanese governments, with representatives from the Okinawa Prefecture Government, formed SACO to address issues like reduction of the bases and facilities .The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S alliance.⁴²

The SACO agreements, the BRAC process in the U.S and the draw down in the early to mid nineties in Europe shared some very basic goals. The U.S military took significant reductions in infrastructure, fiscal resources, and significant force structure over four to six year period in an effort to reduce operating expenses and the footprint their remaining forces would occupy. This was based on a change or a perceived change to the threat from the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations and it allowed the U.S and its NATO allies to reap a “peace benefit” by drawing down its forces in Europe and reducing the size of their respective military forces.

Four major categories or goals were developed as part of the SACO agreements. The first initiative calls for an overall reduction of the area used by U.S forces by approximately 20%. This was to be accomplished through a series of consolidations or elimination of bases, housing areas, and training facilities. Some of the these efforts required new construction of facilities on bases that would be retained long term for U.S or Japanese Self Defense forces and the Japanese government agreed to pay the costs associated with this first category. One of the specific initiatives that came from this category was the proposed relocation of MCAS-Futenma. This topic was so controversial, as it is located in the middle of a densely populated section of southern Okinawa, that it became a separate working group under the overall SACO process. Progress in this area has been

⁴² Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda Minister of State for Defense Kyuma Secretary of Defense Perry Ambassador Mondale The SACO Final Report December 2, 1996. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html>

steady, with a large area already returned or on a specific timetable tied to construction of new facilities, but a second critical facility relocation is still open ended. The Naha Military Port is planned for relocation onto Camp Kinsen, an existing base identified for long-term use.

However, final agreement on this location as well as the question of dual civilian and military is yet to be reached. This issue may require the same effort that finally brought resolution on the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) at Futenma, establishing a separate working group under SACO. The second initiative was adjustments to training and operational procedures. Parachute training for Army and Air Force Special Forces personnel was relocated from the main island of Okinawa to an adjacent island called Ie Jima. 155mm artillery live-fire training is now conducted on the mainland of Japan and artillery firing over Highway 104 was terminated unless it was in support of a crisis. Additionally, physical conditioning road marches would no longer be conducted on public roads. These were perhaps the easiest of the four major sections within the SACO agreements and all were implemented quickly. The third initiative was initiation of noise reduction efforts, all of which dealt with flight operations from Kadena Air Force Base and MCAS-Futenma. This effort requires construction of baffling materials, relocation of specific type aircraft to either mainland Japan or back to the U.S, and a limitation of night operations at Futenma. Again, significant progress has been made on most of the requirements in this category with details on unit moves to be worked as part of the ongoing negotiations. Construction of noise abatement countermeasures is complete at Kadena and night flight training at Futenma was modified.

The final initiative calls for improvement in SOFA, between the U.S and Japan. The specifics on this category are difficult to measure as they center on an intangible variable of information flow that is hard to quantify, a desired change from Okinawa's perspective on handling of U.S personnel who have been allegedly involved in criminal acts, and finally the question of access to U.S military facilities in general. Neither side can claim complete success in this category due to the broad nature of items covered by the SOFA

agreement and the time it takes to make any changes that are agreed upon as part of SACO.

Additionally, each time specific issues are addressed in this category another one arises leaving the door open for criticism. Some positives have been achieved over the past four to six years. Information flow between the U.S military and the people of Okinawa has greatly improved with the reestablishment of the Okinawa Area Council. This initiative was originally started back in the early 1960s, but disappeared over the years following Okinawa's reversion back to the government on mainland Japan. The council has senior military representatives from all four services as well as prominent elected officials and business leaders. They come together annually to discuss issues relevant to the interaction of U.S personnel and the people of Okinawa.

SACO has already reduced the amount of land area used by U.S forces and will reach its goal of 20% upon completion of the additional construction on bases that are slated for long term use. SACO actually represents the status quo course of action concerning U.S military presence on Okinawa as part of the overall forward presence in the region. The process will continue over the next decade as the two governments reach agreement on additional details for facility relocations and return of unnecessary lands. This process does not fully address the other major concern from the Okinawans perspective, and that is the total number of U.S personnel stationed there. The governments of Japan and the U.S continue to hold a full range of consultations so as to further strengthen the Japan-U.S security arrangements, including the realignment of U.S forces, Japan. Furthermore, the fact that the U.S has an unwavering commitment to carry out its defense obligations towards Japan has been reconfirmed on repeated occasions. For example, immediately after the announcement of the conducting of a nuclear test by North Korea in 2006, President Bush stated that the U.S will meet the full range of its security commitments to Japan. In addition, at the Japan-U.S Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) held in May 2007, the U.S reaffirmed that the full range of U.S military capabilities forms the core of extended deterrence, which also provides U.S deterrent force to Japan, while supporting U.S commitments to the defense of Japan.

Moreover, during talks between Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura and U.S Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who visited Japan in November 2007, both sides reconfirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S alliance, with the Japan-U.S security arrangements at its core, as well as their commitment to reinforcing the Japan-U.S alliance into the future. Policy-makers and commentators have explained the rationales for this alliance mostly from realist and neo-realist perspectives. Anarchical outlook and basic lack of trust prevail in relevant discussions of the East Asian security environment. Balance of power and alliance politics are crucial means to survive in such an environment. In the postwar period, the Japan-U.S alliance has been justified in precisely these realist terms. Realists consider that relations among states are naturally anarchical because there is no authority above states. Although it has long history dating back to Hobbes or even Thucydides, this outlook became dominant in the aftermath of the Second World War as a critique of idealism and liberal institutionalism based on universal values (Carr 1946, Morgenthau, 2005). Two world wars, a holocaust and nuclear warfare put an end to these dreams. Balance of power, especially military power, is considered a more reliable avenue for order in international relations. Given the anarchical character of the international system, individual states, should always behave in a way that maximises national interest defined in terms of securing safety and survival by increasing its relevant capabilities.

According to realists, order-building should be the primary concern of diplomacy and foreign policy. Alliances and war preparation are among the most important instruments for states to achieve order in international relations that is inherently unstable. Neorealist theory radicalizes the realist argument. It assumes a state's behavior to be structurally – and completely – determined by the anarchic international system. The state necessarily behaves so as to maximize its chance of survival. Imperatives within states are different. International politics, according to an influential neo-realist theorist Kenneth Waltz, needs to be considered separately from domestic politics. Affairs within the state related to society, history and even economics need to be understood in different structural constraints from those in international system (Waltz 1979: 79-80, 91-92, 100-101). Classical realism on the other hand, makes room for consideration of domestic affairs

such as history, while neorealists are able to filter them out as 'domestic affairs'. The neo-realist logic permits a more exclusive focus on power and maximizing of state safety; unconstrained by internal complications, especially where these might involve consideration of ethics and morality. For foreign policy-making, this neorealist thinking was particularly influential during the Cold War.

2.8 CONCLUSION:

From 1972 to the present, U.S military personnel continue their forward basing in Okinawa through the security treaty between the U.S and Japan. This treaty was updated in 1997 and recently reaffirmed by the former Bush administration when the U.S State Department released a joint statement by President Bush and Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi. This joint statement summarizes the general concept of our forward-presence militarily in Japan, but what makes Okinawa so important to this security equation? Okinawa is strategically located and positioned at the confluence of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. From here, U.S military forces are postured to respond to contingencies in Korea and other threats in Southeast Asia. This region accounts for over one-third of U.S trade (in excess of \$500 billion per year) and 34% of the Gross World Product. (US Department of State, 2001)The Asia-Pacific region also plays host to some of the largest world economies outside the U.S, that being Japan, Korea, and China. It is also home to some of the world's largest armed forces: the Peoples Republic of China, Russia, India, North Korea, and South Korea.

Despite the recent change of power in the U.S and very frequent change of leadership in Japan, there is no doubt that their relations will continue taking the strategic importance of Okinawa in the region. Even as there were mixed reactions⁴³ in Okinawa to the newly elected U.S President, one thing is for sure that Japan-U.S relations will not be ignored rather would be taken into importance to maintain security in the Asia Pacific region as always.

⁴³ Areas hosting U.S. forces show mixed reaction to Obama victory, Thursday 6th November, 05:39 AM JST, 2008, Japan Today <http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/areas-hosting-us-forces-show-mixed-reaction-to-obama-victory>

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE U.S. MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA.

3.1 Introduction

The fact that 75% of the U.S military based in Okinawa, for more than 68 years itself is an indication that these military bases have an implication on the prefecture's economic life. Okinawa experienced a drastic change after the Second World War. The impoverished agricultural backwater that depended on emigration to keep the population down to a supportable level was transformed into a largely urban economy where living standards were improved tremendously in the postwar population explosion⁴⁴. Not only the population but also the Okinawan economy has experienced an unprecedented high rate of growth after the war. From fiscal 1955(the year when GNP estimation started) to 1971 immediately before reversion to Japanese administration, real GNP of Okinawa rose sharply from U.S \$ 163 in 1955 to \$ 678 in 1971 more than four times.(Ken Fukunaka, Tsuneo Oshiro,1983) One of the outstanding features of the postwar Okinawan economy was its extraordinarily heavy dependence on U.S military expenditures. These once accounted for 30-40% of Okinawa's gross products from the late 1950s through the early 1960s. At the peak in 1967, the U.S forces directly employed about 50,000 Okinawans and it is estimated that one fourth of the total labour force was hired in jobs made as a result of military expenditures. These were drastically reduced after reversion. Okinawa was Japan's poorest prefecture from its incorporation in 1879 and it has remained so. There are both positive and negative effects of the bases on the economic life of the prefecture.

3.2 Okinawan Economy in the Pre Occupation Period:

Okinawa was Japan's poorest prefecture from its incorporation in 1879 and it has remained so since Okinawa's early poverty was reinforced by government policies, particularly exceptionally heavy taxes. Nature of their economy was agricultural with very little industries. Agriculture was the principal industry of Okinawa. About 75% of

⁴⁴ The population of Okinawa increased slowly from 487,000 (1905) to 572,000 (1920) then stagnated until after the war. The first reliable estimate for the postwar period was 699,000 for 1950. Thereafter population has continued to increase at a high rate. It was 883,000 in 1960 and reached 1,105,000 in 1980. The average annual increase rates during 1950-1960, 1960-1970, 1970-1980 were 2.6%, 0.7% and 1.7% respectively.

the household on the island was engaged in farming. By the device of extensive terracing many hillsides have been utilized for agriculture. Their farms were usually small over half of them being less than 1.3 acre. The subtropical and maritime climatic conditions were suitable for crops like sugarcane and pineapples. Sweet potatoes and rice were also cultivated. Between 1899 and 1935 about 15% of the Okinawan population emigrated either to the mainland or overseas in search of employment as there was no enough employment in Okinawa. The largest number of emigrants went to Hawaii, Brazil, the Philippines and Peru mainly as agricultural laborers. By 1945, about 332,000 Okinawans (some born overseas) were living abroad mainly for better employment opportunities.

A major blow dealt to the Okinawan economy by Tokyo was the decision in the 1920's when world sugar prices collapsed to encourage sugar cultivation in the colony of Formosa at the expense of Okinawan producers. (Laura Elizabeth Hein, 2003). The chief agricultural products were sugarcane, sweet potatoes, pineapples, and rice. The outstanding crop was sweet potato which was the staple food for both men and animals and also used for the manufacture of alcohol and liquor. Sugarcane was the principal commercial crop and it occupied about one quarter of the total cultivated area. Sugar and canned pineapples accounted for most of the exports. Rice was next in importance. A variety of other cereals, vegetables and some fruits were also grown. There were a number of cattle, horses, hogs, and goats but hogs were by far the most numerous. Fishing was also there but not of outstanding importance.⁴⁵ A variety of small industries were established in Okinawa. Prominent among them were linen weaving, silk weaving, panama hat making, ceramics and manufacture of machine and tools, lacquer ware building materials and household implements.

3.3 Okinawan Economy during the Occupation Period:

“During the Occupation Period, Okinawa was largely left out of the economic boom that propelled the rest of Japan to remarkable heights” (Pradyumna Prasad Karan, Dick Gilbreath, 2005)

⁴⁵ In 1939, only 1700 persons were registered as crew members of 125 commercial fishing boats although a great number of natives fish from small sailing dugouts in the offshore waters.

With the end of the Second World War and the subsequent defeat of Japan, Okinawa where the biggest battle was fought was in total destruction. The Battle of Okinawa ravaged the main island. In May 1945, even as the battle raged, U.S military authority bulldozed abandoned villages and scraped precious topsoil for landfill to build B-29 airstrips, as well as military roads and storage depots in preparation for the planned invasion of mainland Japan. By 1947 as according to Takaeme Eiji, “more than one third of the arable land had been paved over or was behind barbed wire, and many more farmers were forced to leave by a regulation that declared off limits all land within one mile of larger American housing sites”. (Takaeme Eiji, 2002) During the nearly three decades of U.S military occupation, the Okinawan economy was effectively reduced to the provision of support services for the U.S military bases including many bars and brothels. Although agriculture and fishing remained the occupations of most of the population in the Ryukyus, the region experienced considerable industrial expansion during the period of U.S occupation from 1945 to 1972. Okinawan economy was transformed from a subsistent agricultural economy to a more service and wage based economy. The U.S military thus succeeded to shift the Okinawan economy to the U.S base dependent economy noting that the U.S base-related income would enable Okinawa to make a self-sustainable economy.

3.3.1 Economic and Industrial Reconstruction: The task of the U.S military government that was stationed from 1945 was to be a part in the reconstruction of the Okinawan economy that had collapsed. The objective of the military government was to shift as much as administrative burden into the hands of the Okinawans while they retained ultimate authority. To accomplish this they revived as quickly as possible government institutions which had collapsed during the war. Predominantly agricultural in character not only did the Okinawan economy undergo extensive destructional appropriation by the military of the arable land but it also experienced the almost complete destruction of stores, warehouses, banks, transportation facilities and also almost all of the retail and wholesale facilities for production and distribution. Thus the military government took the responsibility of reconstructing and reviving the already collapse economy.

The Okinawa Central Bank was set up on June 1946. The Department of Commerce and Industry selected eight industries and started their reconstruction. In 1958, the U.S military government intended to liberalize Okinawa's economic system from the regulated trade system to a more market oriented economic system. For industrial promotion, funds were utilized to carry out general construction projects. The construction projects employed homeless, jobless Okinawan laborers and gradually, a war torn economy began to piece itself.

Even before the war, Okinawan agriculture though largely devoted to the production of food crops doesn't supply all of the islands' needs. More than two thirds of the rice consumed, about one half of the soybeans, and about one fourth of the wheat and barley consumed had to be imported from abroad. (Leonard Weiss, 1946) The widespread destruction and appropriation of arable land by the military forces along with the above factors made it necessary for military to import food to feed the population. The military government also encouraged the development of agricultural schools and experimental farms and gardens and promoted the reestablishment of local and central agricultural associations which before the war served the Okinawans as purchasing, marketing, credit and agricultural information agencies. The military government also undertook to supply the fisheries with necessary supplies and equipment. Okinawan industries were also important to the rehabilitation of Okinawan economic life though at a lesser degree than agriculture. Industries were established to manufacture iron products, including farm tools and equipment, other type of tools, household utensils and related items. Cement and clay roofing mainly tile important for housing programme; mats used by Okinawans to sleep on; pottery, supplying dishes, container and other household items: lumber, needed for Okinawan housing and other purposes, charcoal used as a fuel, textiles, wood products, salt and other items.(US Naval Military Government, Okinawa, Jan 15,1946)

3.3.2 Exploitation of Okinawa in the Occupation Period

The military during the Occupation period did to an extent revive Okinawa's economy at the expense of the people. The only resource left with them after the war was the lands the best of which were confiscated for the construction of the military bases. The richest lands and most important locations remain outside Okinawan control, which makes it

impossible to draw up any integrated plan for the development of Okinawa as a whole. The bureaucratic and corporate power of Tokyo was so much greater than that of local Okinawan administration. Tokyo's priorities were rooted in the interests of "Japan as a state or in the global economy that a distinctively Okinawan identity has been difficult to conceive or implement." (Gavan McCormack, 1998).

For the Ryukyuan, land ownership was more than a livelihood being an integral part of the Okinawan identity it was freighted with ancestral and communal values. Land appropriation by the U.S for building military bases tore the very fabric of the Okinawan society. With nothing but their labor to sell, they work on the bases and construction sites, building airfields military highway and housing for American soldiers and their families. Monetary relationships practically ceased and barter and direct relief from military government took their place. Residents were accommodated in the concentration camps even as the U.S had occupied 45,000 acres of land for base construction. The areas occupied by the U.S forces were mostly farmlands that the military. With the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) Ordinance 109 on land acquisition issued in April 1953, the U.S military conducted further land expropriation⁴⁶.

The U.S manipulated the Japanese and Okinawa currency exchange rates. In Okinawa, the U.S issued the military currency, the B yen. While, at the beginning, the Japanese yen carry about the same value, the U.S soon set the exchange rate at 120 B-yen to the dollar (1948-57). This made the B-yen three times stronger than the mainland yen, 360 yen to the dollar. Taking advantage of the weak yen, Japan was able to promote export and restrict import, and this facilitated the reconstruction of domestic industries. Toward Okinawa, the U.S adopted an opposite policy. As the B yen was made artificially strong, Okinawa was made to be dependent on imports for most daily necessities, even rice, which came from California. Okinawa and its people were thus tightly bound to the

⁴⁶ Within ten days from the issue of ordinance 109, armed soldiers and bulldozers entered flatter farmlands and houses at a time when the local farmers were trying to reconstruct their livelihoods with what was left after the war.

bases. For some time during the military rule, one third of the local income was from the U.S bases.

The U.S bases have unquestionably constituted a form of institutionalized discrimination against the Okinawan people. The issue raised is fundamentally one of the equitable distributions of the social, environmental and economic costs for the U.S bases presence in Japan. As Taira argued that 'life for Okinawans involves a high level of fear and anxiety that they might be robbed, raped, or killed by American soldiers, or that disasters might descend out of the blue or crop up from nowhere at any time.'(Koji Taira, 1997, p 2) Aside from argument that the U.S bases actually infringe the human rights of Okinawans as laid down in the Japanese Constitution, as argued by Morishada Maeshiro, "it is an undeniable fact that Okinawa bears a disproportionate burden of the U.S military presence in Japan". (Morishada Maeshiro, 2000) Even though the U.S bases provided income, it was not accompanied by any accumulation of capital, or by any production.

Okinawa's economy remained dependent on demand generated by the U.S military facilities, and the prefecture developed a unique economic structure that lacked the engine of growth for industrial production. In 1970, as anti base protests in mainland Japan raged 7,000 Okinawan workers went on strike to protest U.S plans to cut almost 2,000 jobs which was a result of the budget cuts from Washington. Job security was a serious concern among the Okinawan workers, as it was for all employees of military collaboration whose job depended in essence on the state of worldwide tension which necessitated a global base system. Any proposal to reduce the number of U.S military installations in Okinawa always included discussion and disagreements over the effect of base closings on the workers and on the Okinawan economy general.

Okinawa during the prewar and wartime decades, was the most backward Japanese prefecture (ultimately devastated by war), and also during the 1945-72 U.S. period. Its industrial and social infrastructure of communications, education, health and welfare was inadequate; the economy during these two and a half decades heavily depended on revenue from the bases; and there was no plan for Okinawan development as such. The U.S bases overshadowed all attempts to bring Okinawa to the levels of the rest of the

country. Tourism and industry, potential avenues of economic development could not flourish in the shadow of the huge military presence.

3.4 Post Reversion Okinawan Economy:

After Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972, the leading section of the Okinawan economy shifted from income from the U.S bases to public-works projects. Government transfer income has increased sharply and become the single most important factor contributing to the sustained growth of Okinawa since reversion. Its relative share in the income rose from 26.5% in 1972 to 39.5% in 1978. The prefecture's economy thus became dependent on fiscal buttresses, and there was no basic change to the fact that Okinawa lacked facilities for its own industrial production. The prefecture still had no base that it could call its engine of growth. No doubt Okinawa was able to grow substantially, first through income from the U.S bases and then through public works and tourism. Although its per capita income is the lowest in Japan, when compared internationally it is still among the group of industrialized nations. The problem lies in that this income level has not been created through industrial activities.

Since Reversion, the income derived from the U.S. military bases decreased from 15.4 % of the total economy to 4.9%. Despite the fact that these are U.S military bases, both the Okinawan prefecture and Japan shoulder the burden of paying for the bases. The Okinawan prefectural government pays for the cleanup of live ammunition drills and the Japanese government pays for the electricity on military bases and for military personnel highway toll costs. All in all, the government pays approximately \$100,000 per year for each U.S military personnel stationed in Okinawa. Additionally, despite the separation of church and state in Japan, public funds often go towards the development of entities like churches on U.S military bases.

Many Okinawans still depended on the bases directly or indirectly for their livelihoods even after the reversion. The bases prevented prefecture leaders from developing the area economically; an extra ordinary number of Okinawans continued to depend on the bases for their livelihood even as the rest of Japan competed with the U.S for economic dominance. In the late 1990's, almost 8000 Okinawans worked directly on the U.S

installation and many more depended on US patronage for their business and services. (Anni P.Baker, 2004, p 133)

Post Reversion, the situation in Okinawa had improved somewhat as Japanese investment aid had helped to create modern water sewage and medical systems while unemployment was twice as high in Okinawa as in the rest of Japan which suggest that there was an improvement. (Anni P.Baker, 2004). The U.S Marine Corps presence had decreased by several thousand in the early 1990's but not significantly enough to make a difference. In the mid 1990s about 28,600 of the 47,000 Americans stationed in Japan lived and worked on fourty four U.S facilities in Okinawa. Okinawa's once self-sufficient rice economy was drastically shaken-up by the impact of imports first from the U.S, then from Japan proper. Having squared, rationalized, and often irrigated its fields, and having reorganized its agricultural sector to meet the requirements, Okinawan farmers are still hard-put to compete in the globally open agricultural commodity market. Cash crops-sugar, pineapples, pork, even flowers-are proving either marginal or exact so heavy a toll from the environment as to be unsustainable in the long term.

Sugar cane and pineapples were two crops thought to be specially suited to Okinawa. With liberalization of pineapple imports (1990), however, Okinawa's fruit was costing about two to three times the world market price. Its canneries shrank from 23 to 1 (1997), and only a heavy subsidy from Tokyo kept the industry going at all. A 1995-6 study found pineapple plantations, which accounted for only 3% of Okinawa's agriculture, responsible for over half of the soil run-off on the islands as a whole. Sugar cane was similarly problematic, with Okinawan sugar costing seven to eight times world market prices for raw sugar. Some new agricultural sectors, such as the pork and (cut) flower industries, have been more successful. Both have a significant export orientation, but they too exact a different kind of price. In the case of flowers, the industry is increasingly conducted along mainland lines, in vinyl house structures with heavy reliance on energy and chemical inputs. Insecticides, at 3,661 kilograms (16,606 pounds) per year, were the most commonly used agricultural chemicals in Okinawa, and seven of the nine varieties employed are designated as toxic.

3.4.1 Tourism: After reversion, one industry that has grown significantly is tourism. The number of tourists visiting Okinawa in 1971 hovered around the 200,000-level, but that figure has since increased, reaching more than 4.5 million in 1999. Since the prefecture's hosting of the Okinawa International Ocean Expo in 1975, the tourism industry has grown in leaps and bounds. This industry is most likely to play a leading role in Okinawa's economy for years to come.

In addition, another sector whose presence in Okinawa has become marked in recent years is information technology. While the IT revolution is having a major impact on the global economy, Okinawa is no exception. Indeed, up to now, Okinawa's possibilities within the boundaries of economies defined as being based on industrial production were quite limited, given the inconveniences of being positioned in a remote island zone. Limits to resources, markets and technology put the brakes on industrial growth. However, because there is no handicap of distance in the realm of information and telecommunications, it becomes possible to relatively expand Okinawa's chances of achieving growth. The biggest feature of Okinawa's industry is its large proportion of the tertiary industry centered on the service sector. The tourist industry developed especially rapidly after the Okinawa International Marine Expo held between July 1975 and January 1976. (MOFA, 2000). Tourism now plays a leading role in the tertiary industry. Additionally, the proportion of the construction sector is also becoming relatively high.

Tourism is the most successful business next to the revenue generated from the U.S. military bases in contemporary Okinawa after the end of the formal U.S. military occupation in 1972. The index of Okinawan tourism for 2003 shows that 98% of 5,080,000 tourists in the year were from mainland Japan. The state's financial dependency on tourism marked the highest amount of 16.1% in 2001, next to the revenue outside the prefecture (56.1%), and followed by the base revenues (8.0%). (Tourism Survey by Prefectural Government, 2004). The Mihama Town Resort American Village's theme is *America*, and it entertains 8.3 million people annually which is about seven times as the population of Okinawa, and nine tenths of it are Okinawans. The American Village was built "at the sites of the former U.S. military's Hamby airfield and

Maymosscolor firing range after they were demolished and returned” to the town⁴⁷ This landscape picture of the American Village with the above statement portrays a layer of bilateral power structures which camouflage the intersections of tourism and militarism. Teresia Teaiwa’s neologism “militourism,”⁴⁸ is useful in discussing the American Village of the neocolonial landscape.

According to Teaiwa, militourism “is a phenomenon by which military or paramilitary force ensures the smooth running of a tourist industry, and that same tourist industry masks the military force behind it” (Teresa Teaiwa, 2008) This militourism signifies the Chatan Town’s use of the U.S military history on Okinawa and describes the militarized and imagined American paradise as a profitable commercial tourist site. The U.S military here is “a great influence” on Okinawan culture, and uses it as a cultural resource for their development of the tourist economy. Thus, for them, the U.S military bases in the town are politically and economically indispensable.

The 2000 G8 Summit was held in Okinawa which was not a typical or ideal place to hold such a security-heavy event. But one of the ideas to conduct the Summit there was to develop and promote the Okinawan economy especially the tourism sector. The impact on the economy was a further increase in the number of tourists visiting the prefecture. Since then, there is success in inviting international conferences and events to Okinawa after Okinawa's attractiveness is presented to those from other parts of Japan and to foreigners through domestic and foreign mass media reports on Okinawa's fine nature, history, and culture.

⁴⁸ Militourism is a phenomenon by which military or paramilitary force ensures the smooth running of a tourist industry, and that same tourist industry masks the military force behind it. The roots of militourism in the Pacific go back as far as Ferdinand Magellan's first (and last) encounter with the natives of Guam in 1521 Page 251 of Teresa Teaiwa, Reading Paul Gauguin's Noa Noa with Epili Hau 'ofa's Kisses in the Nederends: Militourism, Feminism, and the "Polynesian" Body.

After the reversion, the U.S military has also been regarded as the provider of material benefits for the local Okinawan economy. There were short term material benefits like rent incomes for the landowners of the private properties used by the U.S military, relatively secure employment opportunities that the bases provide for the local population, goods and services catering for the military and construction projects that the subsidized public works bring in.

3.4.2 Fiscal Transfers from Tokyo:

In exchange for Okinawa bearing this “special” or “unequal” burden, the Japanese central government offers public works projects and budget subsidies to Okinawa’s prefectural and municipal governments and selective incentives to certain Okinawa’s economic sectors. Taken together, these economic payoffs are sufficient to sustain Okinawan acquiescence for the U.S military presence. The carrot-and-stick policy periodically wielded by Tokyo over the prefecture in annual budget appropriations, especially the awarding of massive public works projects that mushroom across the island. **Fiscal** transfers from the center have steadily increased since Okinawa’s 1972 reversion to Japanese sovereignty and, by the late 1990s, totaled 900 billion yen, more than the combined annual value of Okinawa’s other three big income sources—tourism, agriculture, and direct base revenues. Between 1972 and 1999, developmental subsidies from Tokyo totaled in excess of 5 trillion yen. (Masaaki Gabe, 2000) The basic Japanese government policy was to pump government money into Okinawa for the purpose of creating significantly large groups of beneficiaries from the bases. Land owners whose land had been taken as base sites were the first such beneficiaries the government targeted.

Providing these fiscal transfers is always a better strategy for Tokyo than renegotiating the SOFA or the actual terms of the Japan-U.S security agreement, options that antibase activists would prefer. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular perceives that too many SOFA demands could cause the U.S to leave.

Consequently; Tokyo regularly offers large-scale economic inducements to Okinawa to acquiesce to the evolving Japan-U.S basing agenda. For example, funding of the Western

Okinawa Developmental Project, an ambitious plan by the Japanese government to landscape and develop a large strip of the island's largely underutilized western coast, is tacitly contingent on the successful implementation of one piece of the SACO plan, namely, the relocation of the Naha military port away from the overburdened capital facilities area to the nearby Urasoe city. Some commentators also alleged that Tokyo linked its surprising decision to make Nago the host of the 2000 G8 Summit to both the town's and the prefecture's commitment to support the SACO-mandated relocation there of the Futenma Air Base which was a charge officially denied by Tokyo. (Kenzaburo Oe, 2000). Even antibase Governor Ota, prior to his electoral defeat, succumbed to Tokyo's economic pressures. In exchange for Ota's dropping his opposition to renewing the base leases in 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto agreed to an economic package for the prefecture that included 5 billion yen (\$45.7 million) in developmental aid. Beyond Tokyo's broad economic assistance to the prefecture government, the U.S basing presence also provides additional income and selective incentives to politically important groups within Okinawan society.

The Japanese Government pays approximately \$100,000 per year for each member of the U.S military stationed in Japan. It pays for electricity on the bases, and highway tolls for U.S military personnel. Japanese tax money supports shopping centers, schools, libraries, and churches on the bases (even though the Japanese constitution separates church and state). More than 70% of the total cost of U.S. bases in Japan is borne by Japan. Economic concerns were central in the Okinawa Governor's election of November 1998. The emphasis was on the relative weakness of the Okinawan economy rather than the fact that the Japanese economy is generally in decline. The incumbent, Governor Ota, who consistently opposed the presence of U.S bases, lost his bid for a third term to a pro-business candidate, Keiichi Inamine, backed by the central government in Tokyo. For many voters, Inamine's promise to improve the Okinawan economy seemed to be the deciding factor in the closely-contested election. In 1999, the Japanese government decided to build an offshore runway for U.S military use. The plan was to replace Futenma Air Station with a new heliport in Henoko, Nago city (northern Okinawa). Accordingly, the Japanese government provided an economic "reward" fund of \$850

million over 10 years to develop the northern area of Okinawa—the usual Japanese Government method to keep the matter quiet.

3.4.3 Land Owners as Main Beneficiaries:

Perhaps the biggest material beneficiaries from the U.S basing presence are the private owners of the land where the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) facilities are located. Unlike the mainland, where the percentage of private base-related landownership is just 9 % in Okinawa, 67% of the land used for military facilities is privately owned. Landowners receive direct rental payments from the government of Japan for the use of their property, and in return, Tokyo provides it free of charge to USFJ. Most of this land belongs to owners who have become dependent upon these leases as a primary source of income. In 1952, the U.S issued 20 years leases on confiscated land, with payment at 6 % of its assessed value, to 57,000 land owners including some who had been forcibly evicted by U.S military forces in tanks and then arrested for resisting the expropriation. With the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, the Japanese government assumed responsibility for rental payments to landowners. The conflict over land rights, a flashpoint in the anti base movement throughout the 1950's and 1960's ebbed only after the Japanese government inserted itself financially between the U.S military and the local landowners and substantially increased payments. However in 1982, a landowner began selling one tsubo plots of land (3.3 square meters) initiating a movement that eventually produced three thousand land owning antibase activists. (Miyume Tanji, 2002)The central governments' response to Okinawa with the military bases in recent years has been to silence the land owners by dramatically increasing the payments.

In 2001, 31,704 landowners in Okinawa received base-related rental payments totaling 85.43 billion yen. Of these, 16,590 (52.3 %) received annual payments of less than 1 million yen (around \$8,000), 12,195 (38.5 %) received between 1 and 5 million yen, and 2,919 (9.2 percent) received more than 5 million yen.⁴⁹The rent coming from Tokyo is generally agreed to exceed fair-market value. According to one informed Okinawan

⁴⁹ The Distribution of Annual Rent Related to U.S.FJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa” (Table from an unpublished briefing, 2003, Defense Facilities Administration Agency

observer, both local governments and Tokyo have an incentive to hike the rental payments frequently: local governments get more tax revenue if the property value appears higher, while Tokyo can appease both the local population and the U.S government by demonstrating that its contribution to U.S basing costs has increased. Moreover, in many cases, landowners are permitted to work portions of their land or to sublet it to others (the so-called tacit farmers) to do so, thereby earning additional income from the property. On several Okinawan bases, U.S military officials allowed local farmers to use the ring of land immediately within the outer perimeter fences to grow sugarcane, sweet potatoes, soybeans, and other crops.

Politically, landowners are organized into associations based on locality. The vast majority of these associations are represented by the Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military Purposes, which negotiates and lobbies the prefecture and central government on rent-related issues. The federation was strongly opposed to the 1996 base-reduction referendum, and in areas with the highest proportion of private landowners, voter turnout was lowest. Plans for the reduction or closure of U.S facilities usually precipitate a drop in the value of the related land prices. (Alexander Cooley, 2006) It is understandable why landowners, then, want to see the bases remain open. Another category of targeted recipients of base-related funds is the communities adjacent to U.S bases, whose citizens can claim that their well-being has been disturbed by the U.S presence.

While a large portion of the land is still under the control of the U.S, rents paid by the military to Okinawan landowners are creating serious problems in the Okinawa society. That is, landlords became fixated on a higher level of living from rents and they are aging. For these landowners, demanding relocation of military base or slashing rents amount to bankruptcy or sentence to death. Therefore landlords cannot raise voice to demand the withdrawal of U.S military base, and a wedge driven between the proponents of the withdrawal is deepening. Around the base, the gap of wealth and poverty is widening between those who own land used for military purpose and those who do not own any land at all. The government of Japan, which pushes ahead with establishment

and maintenance of U.S military base and requisition of land, threatens and controls livelihood and mindset of landowners through rents paid on land for military use. By doing so, it formed a group of Okinawan people who readily tolerate military base, further dividing Okinawan residents. The issue that most intimately links Okinawa's economic problems to the military bases is payments for use of land by the U.S. The Okinawan landowners were offered small lump sum payments for the huge land tracts that the U.S military appropriated. This resulted in island wide protests amongst the landowners who insisted on retaining ownership rights and the legal framework for eventual return of their land.

The Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) provides "burden-easing" funds to municipalities as a function of the number of U.S servicemen they have on their territory. These funds go to build such things as city halls, public libraries, and swimming pools, which are often spectacularly luxurious in relatively small and economically disadvantaged towns. The DFAA also makes compensation payments to individuals for noise pollution, environmental countermeasures, and violations of fishing rights in traditional waters. Individual citizens and local townships can petition the DFAA if they have a verifiable grievance that is shown to be a direct consequence of the U.S basing presence.

Base revenues (revenues generated by military-related transactions), which consists of salary paid to Japanese base employees, rental fees for land used by the U.S military paid to the local landowners and money spent by SOFA status people in the local economy, have played an important role in the prefecture's economy. For instance, at the time of Okinawa's reversion, base revenues accounted for 15.6% of prefectural gross expenditure. Rents and income from base-related activities now make up about 5% of the economy compared to 15 % in 1972. Some landowners have been more than willing to let their land to the U.S military, and have earned regular income from these rents. Others, especially the "Anti-War Landowners," always opposed the enforced appropriation of their family's land. Still, owners with land used for bases are only 34,000, or 2.6% of the total population of Okinawa.

Table 3: Base Revenues (revenues generated by military-related transactions)

	1972	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997	2001
Expenditure of SOFA status people (100 million yen)	414	462	694	512	546	556	542
Salary of Japanese base employee (100 million yen)	240	291	306	376	500	529	510
Rental fee for land lease (100 million yen)	126	261	374	428	568	743	849
Total revenue from military related Transactions	780	1014	1374	1316	1614	1827	1,901
Economic dependency on bases (ratio of military related transaction accounting for gross prefectural income %)	15.6%	8.7%	7.50%	5.1%	5.1%	5.1%	5.1%

Source: Military Base Affairs Division, 2002

Since reversion, the percentage of base revenues within Okinawa's gross expenditure has reduced over the years as the rest of the prefectural economy expanded. By 2001, it has declined to approximately one third to stand at 5.1%. However, the value of base revenues has approximately doubled from 78 billion yen at the time of reversion to 1,901 billion yen in 2001. Thus, base revenues still remain a large source of income for Okinawa's economy as one of the essential element in the prefecture's economic activities.

A related group directly benefiting from USFJ presence in Okinawa is local construction companies, who build the agreed-upon public works and developmental projects. DFAA officials have no formal quotas for awarding projects to local companies, but they face political pressure to choose Okinawan companies when possible. Construction is the leading industry in Okinawa, and these companies are a key constituency in the island's

probase business lobby. In 2001, out of the 204 base-related contracts granted to Okinawa Prefecture, 176 (86 %)—valued at 14.6 billion yen— were granted to contractors based in Okinawa.⁵⁰ This percentage and total value would be even higher if they were not constrained by the Japanese state’s strict contracting procedures. According to the laws governing the tender process, any contract worth over 240 million yen must be awarded to a “category A” firm, where category status is based upon the number of employees and the structure of the corporate hierarchy. No Okinawan construction company yet fits this profile. Hence, the largest of these projects are undertaken, by default, by mainland companies that in turn, may subcontract much of this work back to local firms.

U.S. bases are the second largest employer in Okinawa and contribute over \$3 billion a year to the local economy, almost \$3,000 per year for every man, woman and child in Okinawa. The most valuable assets of the bases, however, are the men and women who live on them and who volunteer their skills and enthusiasm for a wide range of benevolent activities. Military and civilian personnel and their families volunteer to teach English in Okinawan schools, clean up beaches and public parks, maintain orphanages, old age homes, and host the largest Special Olympics in Japan. U.S facilities environmentalists and archeologists work with their Okinawan counterparts to find better ways to manage the environment and preserve cultural assets. On-base universities open their doors to Okinawan students and the Navy Hospital provides high tech internships for local doctors.

When Condoleezza Rice visited Japan as the former Secretary of State to discuss the U.S military realignment, she said that a large-scale reduction of the U.S troops in Japan would cause major economic losses. (Tadaaki Kawata Executive Board Member, Japan Peace Committee,) However, new contradictions have been emerging under the on going U.S forces realignment. Based on the law to promote the realignment of the U.S forces, the government stated to provide subsidy to municipalities that cooperate with the reorganization plan. The municipalities cannot get subsidy only with hosting

⁵⁰ DFAA, “Awarded Contracts of Construction to Companies Located in Okinawa Prefecture” (Table from an unpublished briefing, 2003)

bases. In order to receive the subsidy, they have to accept the reorganization plans. The new law has changed the nature of government base-related subsidies from "compensation" to base burdens to the tools of appeasement and threatening of local governments. This has increased repulsion of local people and governments. In addition, since the realignment plans of Okinawa include the return of some U.S military facilities, there is a change emerging in the consciousness of those who have depended on bases to make living.

3.5 Economic Implications on Okinawa without the Bases

The economic risk of continuously relying on bases has become apparent, which has raised public concern for the future. Referring to measures to promote local economy mainly by constructing buildings, the Okinawa Times stated that they have made municipalities meet the shortage such as a maintenance cost for the buildings; the government subsidy which is called "advantageous" to local governments hosting U.S bases might be a double-edged sword which affects their financial situation. There is an increasing doubt about the argument that U.S bases will promote local economy, which is getting to be a significant factor to help develop public opinions for the removal of bases.

Table 4: Unemployment Variations in Different Prefectures of Japan

PREFECTURE	UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%)
	IN 2003
Tokyo	5.0
Kyoto	6.0
Osaka	7.6
Hiroshima	4.6
Nagasaki	5.3
Okinawa	7.8

Source: Statistical Year 2005 Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan.

In December 1999, for example it pledged an astonishing annual hundred billion yen supplementary stimulus package, mainly earmarked for large construction projects. The

money was promised just after Inamine Keiichi who supported the Tokyo government's position on keeping the bases in Okinawa, wrested the governorship of Okinawa from longtime opponent to the bases, Governor Ota Masahide and was universally seen as a quid pro quo for muting opposition to the bases.

Alternative economic strategies have been unsuccessful till date. One much discussed concept is to develop Okinawa as the southern exchange hub of Japan. That is a free trade zone for regional Asian trade, a concept in part in memories of the historical Ryukyu kingdom as a regional crossroads. In preparation, they have designated Okinawa as a free trade zone with low investment taxes for new businesses, relaxed import quotas, streamlined visa requirements and special incentives for high technology ventures including a new high tech school of graduate studies with an international focus. However few Japanese or international enterprises have relocated to the development zones. The decade long recession throughout Japan makes this a singularly unpromising moment to begin ambitious new ventures that rely heavily on foreign investment⁵¹

Even as it's more than 37 years that Okinawa has existed as a Japanese prefecture after its reversion one large group of workers wants to see the U.S presence continue. Okinawa reverted to Japan from U.S control 36 years ago, and despite the political change in Okinawa, life continued much the same for thousands of local residents who work on the bases. Even as anti-military groups conducted demonstration,

⁵¹ Report by the Committee of Industrial and Economic Promotion and Deregulation Study, posted on the Okinawan Prefectural Government website www.pref.okinawa.jp/97/

Futenma Air Base



Source: <http://images.google.co.in>

base workers are apprehensive at how a reduced American military presence can affect their livelihoods "Okinawa's economy has grown up with the bases," said a pro-military group leader. "The bases will always be important" and noted that nearly 10,000 Okinawa residents work directly for the U.S military, and that tens of thousands of others derive significant income as a result of military bases, troops and families spending money here.

In 2006, the Secretary General of the Base Workers Union⁵², Masaharu Shimonaka, said that more than 9,000 are currently employed by the U.S military. He pointed out that more than 20,000 applicants apply each year for the coveted American Master Labor Contract positions, which pay much more than other Okinawa jobs. The military bases hired 531 new workers in 2005, and Shimonaka says there have already been 600 applicants for positions that year. Shimonaka and his wife have both worked for the U.S forces for many years, and say "base worker pay is better than off base." (Weekly Japan Update, 2006) The couple earned nearly \$4,600 a month for a 40-hour work week that includes Saturdays, Sundays and holidays off, plus bonuses. The proposed transfer of 8,000 U.S marines to Guam is projected to cost one-third of the local labor force on the bases. In real terms, Shimonaka says, it will put 3,000 people out of jobs and into an economy where there are relatively few jobs available, and those at a compensation level well below what the Americans pay. Base workers argue that the Okinawa economy will suffer heavily from any base reductions and troop withdrawals, with little prospect of replacement employment sources.

The return of Futenma and some other U.S facilities is part of an overall realignment package agreed to by Tokyo and Washington with the aim of reducing the burden on Okinawa and other communities with U.S bases, such as noise and safety issues, while maintaining U.S deterrence. But concern over the possible economic impact from a reduced U.S military presence is shared by many in Okinawa, where the unemployment rate was 7.9 %, and the worst in Japan. "Of course it would be best if there were no military bases in Okinawa at all and everyone could still make a living. But the ideal and

reality are different," said Hitoshi Sato, a volunteer guide at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum in Itoman, which commemorates the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. In the case of the Futenma Air Station, which occupies 25 % of Ginowan, 92 % of the 481-hectare base belongs to about 2,800 individual landowners who earn a combined 6 billion yen in rent per year from the Japanese government, according to the Ginowan municipal government.

In addition, about 4,300 local employees working at U.S military facilities in Okinawa are likely to be affected one way or another in the planned realignment, including some 200 at Futenma, according to the All Japan Garrison Forces Labor Union. Tsuneo Teruya, Chairman of the union's Okinawa District Headquarters, said, "This will be the first time that the bases will really be consolidated or returned and there will no doubt be a significant impact on our jobs. We are in a very difficult position" he said. There is no exact estimate of how many and who will be affected as the government has not provided any details on which bases will be reorganized and what kind of reemployment measures will be taken.

Shigeo Yamauchi, head of Ginowan's Military Base Liaison Section, emphasized that base-related income in the prefecture accounts for only 5 % of Okinawa's economic productivity, down from 15 % in the 1970s. He also cited the successful example of Chatan, which has developed into a popular shopping area since the land there was returned. But Yamauchi agreed that if the land returns under the latest plans are realized, active engagement by the central government in development of the returned areas is essential. "Ginowan city cannot do this by itself and neither can Okinawa Prefecture. We need the state's support, both technically and financially," he said.

Table: 5 Three key factors in Okinawa's Economy;

(In Billion yen)

	1972	2004
1. U.S Military Bases	78 (15.6%)	201(5.3)
2. Public investment and Public Expenditure	117(23.4%)	1449 (38.2%)
3. Tourism	40 (8.0%)	363 (9.6%)
Total GDP of Okinawa	501	3,792

Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government

3.6 Present Economic Scenario

Tourism and agriculture dominate the economy today. U.S bases take up 20% of the land area—land that could be used more productively to benefit local people. U.S troops live in spacious, fenced-off enclaves—some with golf courses and swimming pools—in marked contrast to the close-packed cities nearby. Kin, a small, old town of 10,000, for example, is squeezed between Camp Hansen, which houses 5,000 marines, and the sea. The city of Ginowan has been built around the sprawling MCAS Futenma, one of the largest airfields in Asia. Local people cannot enter the bases. Traveling around them adds miles to everyday trips. In communities near the bases, employment is skewed towards servicing the military—in stores, car repair businesses, restaurants, bars, and prostitution. In addition, 8,813 local people work on the bases (as of 2004). However, the Okinawan economy is less dependent on the U.S bases than before.

Table 6: Industry by Sector as of 2006

	OKINAWA	NATIONWIDE
PRIMARY SECTOR	1.8	1.3
SECONDARY SECTOR	14.4	27.7
TERTIARY SECTOR	88.8	75.4

Industrial composition (%): relatively higher in the service sector

Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

Table 7: Economic Growth and Life Satisfaction of Japan

Ranking	GDP (2000)	HDI(2000)	Life Satisfaction (2002)
Top 1	Tokyo	Tokyo	Tottori
2	Aichi	Aichi	Tokushima
3	Osaka	Shiga	Nagano ④
4	Shiga	Shizuoka	Ishikawa
5	Shizuoka	Fukui	Nagasaki
Bottom 5	Kagoshima	Akito	Hiroshima
4	Saitama	Kagoshima	Iwate
3	Nagasaki	Nagasaki	Akita
2	Nara	Okinawa	Shiga
1	Okinawa	Aomori	Kochi

Source: National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, Japan Cabinet Office.

The table shows Japanese prefectures ranked at the top five or at the bottom five by Human Development Index (HDI), GDP and Life Satisfaction in Japan. The top five by HDI are Tokyo, Aichi, Shiga, Shizuoka, and Fukui. On the other hand, the top five by GDP are Tokyo, Aichi, Osaka, Shiga, and Shizuoka. The top five by HDI and the top five by GDP show significant overlap, mainly because GDP is the most influential component in HDI, due partly to the fact that educational data and health data do not differ so much

across the nation. A similar tendency is also found among the bottom five by GDP and HDI. However, if we look at the figures from sub-regional groupings we find some differences between prefecture ranking by GDP and one by HDI. For prefectures in the Hokkaido, Tohoku and Kyushu regions, their rankings by GDP are higher than those by HDI. In contrast, for prefectures in the Kansai and Kanto regions, their rankings by HDI are higher than those by GDP. Looking from the above table, we can see that Okinawa as a prefecture has the lowest GDP among the forty seven prefectures. Even in terms of its HDI⁵³, it's the second last only to Aomori. This indicates that the prefecture still continues to remain as one of the poorest amongst the prefectures.

The economic recession that has continued in Japan since 1990 began earlier in Okinawa and its impact has been harsher there. Per capita income has hovered around 70% of the national average for the last decade. Unemployment rates in Okinawa prefecture have been substantially higher than the national average every year since 1973, often more than twice the national rate. The number of unemployed persons in the whole of Japan in May 2009 was 3.47 million, an increase of 28.5% from the previous year.⁵⁴ The unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted, was 5.2%. In 2008, prefectural unemployment was 7.44%⁵⁵ while nationally 4.7% of the population was unemployed.⁵⁶

3.7 Observation:

Thus as seen from the above description, the existence of vast U.S military bases in Okinawa has a huge impact on the local economy. We cannot deny the fact that base-related revenues, such as salary paid to Japanese employees who work on the bases, lease fees for landowners, and consumption activities by military personnel, civilian employees and their dependents, do support the prefectural economy. Although most Japanese

⁵³ HDI has three major components of development indicators: income, education, and health. Using the composite index of human development, HDI revealed that the Japanese, on average, have access to good public services and a high income base. The latest HDI ranking put Japan at 8th in the world (UNDP 2007), which is consistent with our general views about Japan's development: it has a solid economic base, high educational attainment, and strong health services.

⁵⁴ Labour Force Survey, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, May 2009

⁵⁵ Trend of unemployment rate(Seasonally adjusted) By Okinawa Prefectural Government, Statistics Division Department of Planning

⁵⁶ Okinawa per capita income was 72.8% of the national average in 1998. Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry- Okinawa websitellogb.go.jp/move/english/index.e.html

people wanted a reduction in the base presence, the idea of eliminating them altogether raised serious questions. While the bases were responsible for the lack of economic development in Okinawa, their removal would not immediately bring an economic boom rather they would destroy what little economic prosperity existed. So many Okinawans were dependent on the bases and the U.S personnel that even measures designed to minimize other problems could strike home economically. The share of the U.S base related income had largely decreased since the reversion in 1972, but was still 5% in 2005.

The presence of the U.S military bases definitely did affect the local Okinawan Economy to a large degree even as other sectors particularly tourism has in a big way contribute to their economy. However one cannot deny the fact that even tourism to an extent is also due to the U.S military presence as already noted in the chapter. The Okinawan economy in the coming years will continue to be affected by their presence, and at the same time, their removal in any case will also have an impact on the economy.

CHAPTER IV

U.S MILITARY BASES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE OKINAWANS

4.1 Introduction:

Isolated for centuries, the people of Okinawa differ ethnically and linguistically from the rest of Japan; they have a common social history and have a distinct Ryukyuan identity. The very presence of the U.S military bases and their activities in Okinawa has an impact in the social life and culture of the Okinawans. The bases impact on the local Okinawan economy had already been discussed in the previous chapter. Despite the fact that the presence of the U.S bases did contribute significantly to the economy of the island, it also threatened to erode Okinawa's unique culture. The social life of the Okinawans has always been influenced by other cultures even before the presence of the military bases. Okinawa today is multicultural in the sense that there are many cultures within that interact over the centuries. The American and the Japanese legacies are highly visible in Okinawa where they co exist with other forms of Okinawan culture. Images of Okinawa today incorporate a vast number of icons, historical, cultural, linguistic, social, political, economic and military. It's a highly complex diverse historically, culturally and linguistically rich society. Even before the coming of the U.S military bases, the Ryukyus were considered a "melting pot" of Asian cultures and the people of Okinawa pride themselves on this diversity. This cultural blending and nonviolent approach to life so adeptly described in this quote, "their gentleness of spirit and manner, their yielding and submissive disposition, their hospitality and kindness, their aversion to violence and crime" (George H Kerr, 2000, p 21) contribute significantly to their views of U.S military forces on the island as well as their perceived treatment by the Government of Japan.

The Okinawan culture though closely related to that of the Japanese culture is however distinct in that it historically received more influence from the Chinese and has separate political and religious traditions. Their culture is close to that of the Southern China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia which reflected their long history of trade with these regions. To the Okinawans, living with U.S military bases meant that their society inevitably interacts with American political, economic and social practices. Such inter-ethnic, racial

power relations have not only generated conflicts but also created new cultures in Okinawa that continues today. Like that of the economic impact, the military bases also have both its positive and negative effects on the social life and culture of the Okinawans.

Socio cultural effects of the military bases on the Okinawan society are indeed innumerable. Along with the U.S military bases came changes in the society like that of better infrastructure, the food habits of the locals, their lifestyles, the imposition of English language along with many harmful effects on the environment. Examples are inconveniences to civil air transportation due to restrictions on the use of air space; closures of port facilities and waters to civilian shipping, fishing, or recreational activities because of naval and other military requirements; deadly effects of toxic wastes of the bases seeping into the soil or running off into the sea; deafening noises of bombers, fighters, and helicopters which physically damage young school children and disrupt their learning processes; accidents in the air and on the roads caused by U.S military aircraft and vehicles; destruction of nature by live-ammunition artillery exercises, which also deny civilian access to highways in the exercise areas; crimes committed by off-duty service personnel against civilians and their properties (Koji Taira, 1997). This chapter will therefore look into all these effects that have not only positive influence on the society but also the negative effects which seemed to have a more impact on the local Okinawans.

4.2 Pre Second World War Okinawan Society: Western interests in the Ryukyu had started in the Nineteen Century when the U.S deployed the ‘expeditionary squadron’ commanded by Commodore Perry⁵⁷ under whose initiation the Compact of Friendship and Commerce Agreement was signed in Naha on 17 July ,1854. Perry’s visit to Shuri Castle caused dismay and apprehension among the Okinawan Officials. “Knowledge of western culture which was eagerly sought by the Japanese in the late Tokugawa era and even more eagerly after the Meiji Restoration was introduced into the Ryukyus by the

⁵⁷ The ship in which Commodore Perry had carried out the ‘expedition squadron’ was called Susquehanna and was accompanied by four other ships. They arrived at Tomari, Okinawa on May 26, 1853. A year later in March 31st, 1854, with the signing of the treaty of Kanagawa, Japan was open for trade with the West opening two ports, (Hokadate and Shimoda for that purpose.

way of Japan. And after a considerable filtering it was the practical, technical, scientific knowledge particularly in public health medicine, agriculture and plant breeding knowledge which the Japanese could adopt, modify and extend for their own uses throughout the empire that was valued". (Glacken 1955, p 299) Many of the social changes occurring at the turn of the twentieth Century were precipitated by a revolutionary plan which permitted individual ownership and inheritance of land. A direct result of the Japanese Policy on Okinawa, this shift from a communal to private ownership had a profound effect on the traditional Okinawan community life, since it eliminated the feudal system.

With the fall of the Ryukyu Kingdom and the subsequent formation of the Okinawa prefecture in 1879, Okinawans were subjected to the policy of assimilation and Japanisation. Assimilation was promoted in Okinawa in the name of modernization and the idea of Japanese culture was closely associated with the notion of modernity and civilization. Despite the Japanese assimilation towards Okinawa, pre war Okinawa had an ambiguous status. An example indicating Japan's subtle modernization of Okinawa was the Okinawan acceptance of short hair 'which resembled the western style' (Glacken 1955:230) men and boys in Ryukyu had worn their hair long.⁵⁸ Even after attaining Japanese citizenship, they were always left out from the mainland and never fully benefited the privilege of Japanese citizenship. It remained the poorest prefecture in the country having the lowest per capita income, an under developed infrastructure and the worst access to healthcare, education and other modern institutions. They were under privileged in what Thomas Marshall called 'social citizenships' namely the rights to security, to economic welfare and to the life of civilized being as determined by the standards prevailing in the society. (Thomas Humphrey Marshall, 1950 p 10). Their social life had transformed as the old social structure of royalty, nobility, gentry and common men was broken up. Many Japanese from the mainland came to fill the administrative and managerial positions created under the new government forming new elite, taking precedence over the old aristocracy and finally replacing them

⁵⁸ A patch of the crown was shaved, and the long glossy hair was gathered into a tight knot on top and held there with two hairpins. (Trafton, Terry: 1991).

During the Second World War, the only land battle in Japan was fought in Okinawa which witnessed the horrors of the war. Thousands were killed. At the same time, everything was destroyed. The very little infrastructure that existed was damaged severely and many valuable cultural treasures were lost. Irreplaceable cultural assets, which had been passed down from ancestors, were burned to the ground. Okinawa also suffered from environmental destruction, poverty, starvation, and other calamities that interfere with the building of a peaceful society. They had to rise up from the rubble and ashes and begin the recovery from catastrophic devastation of the war. Postwar conditions especially the presence of the Americans has directed the interests of the younger generations to technology, applied science and western political ideas.

4.3 Social Impact during the Occupation Period:

With the Occupation of Okinawa by the U.S military after the Second World War, there was total disruption of normal life and destruction of infrastructure and economic life of the island as a result of the War. With this situation, the restoration of old customs and traditions was not as essential as the reconstruction of cities and roads. On 5 December, 1950, the military government in Okinawa was changed to USCAR. The purpose of the USCAR was to help develop a democratic Ryukyu Government, to build the economy under a system of free enterprise and to improve health and living standards. Their primary concern was 'civilian relief and rehabilitation' (Mc Cune, 1975). USCAR became the GRI (Government of the Ryukyu Islands) less than two years later. In 24 April, 1946 Okinawa Central Administration was established. For the maintenance of public safety, forty three Police Stations were installed and the "Department of Civilian Police" was established and seven district courts were set up in 1946. A judiciary had been created in 1946. Administrative authority was established with the Island Group Government. In 1952, the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was inaugurated that exercised judicial, legislative and executive powers. Under the government of the Ryukyu Islands several measures were undertaken to rebuild the society. The important measures taken up were listed below:

4.3.1 Education: USCAR'S decision to make Japanese the language of instruction in Okinawan schools was an attempt to alter Okinawan culture in serving their interests as English language was essential to run the administration in their own terms. With this, the school textbooks were prepared in occupied Japan were reproduced in Okinawa and used to teach Okinawan school children English and U.S history. Okinawa's school system gradually underwent change to bring about more democratic ways of handling students. The Department of Education became the department of civil information and education. Dissemination of democratic ideals into the young minds was part of their mission. A model of American three year junior high school began in Okinawa in 1948. New additions to a curriculum which already included English language studies were American and English literature.

The English language institute was founded in Nago in 1953. The school accepts Ryukyuan students with the triple aim of teaching then English, improving their skills and developing their understanding of western culture. U.S Government, history and literature comprised the primary curriculum. Lectures and required written assignments were in English, communication in Japanese was actually discouraged. Lieutenant General Paul Caraway⁵⁹ was the most well known High Commissioner in Okinawa who worked for the improvement of English education in Okinawa. He viewed that what people needed the most was opportunities to brush up their skills in practical English which would be useful in their jobs. Of all the participants in the English language programme, the biggest group was made up of military base employees.⁶⁰ Caraway introduced and tried to practice three controversial education policies, the establishment of the English language center, re-introduction of English in elementary schools and establishment of English commercial high school or English trade school. University of Ryukyu was established in 1950 for higher education.

⁵⁹Lieutenant Paul Caraway was the Third High Commissioner of the USCAR and was in office from January 1961 to July 1964.

⁶⁰ Base employees constitute the largest group in the English language programme helping them in their work making them more efficient. With the increase number of military installations in Okinawa, the bases generated much needed employment opportunities. By 1969, the bases were responsible for the employment of 60,000 Okinawans. (Reed, 1969:117,119)

4.3.2 Public Health Programmes: were responsible for declaring mortality rates and generally improved health among the Okinawan people. U.S authorities with the assistance of various support agencies sponsored a comprehensive school lunch programmes which changed the 'dietary habits' of Okinawan school children as according to Mc Cune (1975). Large quantities of wheat and other grains were imported from the U.S for this programme. In 1946, three general hospitals, five local hospitals, ninety three clinics, and six pharmacy supply stations went into practice. U.S authorities with the assistance of various support agencies sponsored a comprehensive school lunch programmes which changed the dietary habits of Okinawan school children.

4.3.3 Christianity: Christian Missionaries were not welcome in Okinawa as in mainland Japan even though they began to appear in Okinawa in the 16th Century when the burgeoning western powers sought to gain access to East Asian shores. Due to severe persecution of Christians by the Japanese military rulers who conquered Okinawa in 1609, the missionaries⁶¹ were unable to achieve any significant results. However it was encouraged by the military government and as such supported the missionaries. Most of the Christian missionaries during the Occupation period were 'American evangelists' (Shinji Yamashita et al, 2003). Both the Catholic and the Protestant church movements gained considerable support from military chaplains after Second World War. Several American Catholic missionaries came to Okinawa and established an orphanage, a dispensary, schools, and churches. By 1965 the Catholic Church in the Ryukyu Islands had a membership of three thousand six hundred and seventy seven professed Christians. Bible classes were organized in several villages and the Christian mission at Nago was founded in 1945. A Bible college was opened in 1948. These resulted in summer camps, new missions, and larger congregations were the results of the American missionaries.

As Iriye argued "the U.S was turning Okinawa into an occupied land where americanisation proceeded as if in direct proportion to the retreat of Japanese power" (Iriye Akira 1974, p 125) although their actions were not entirely altruistic, their substantial contribution was critical for the survival of the Okinawan people.

⁶¹ The first Protestant missionary was Dr. Bernard Jean Bettelheim who was sent by the 'Loochoo Naval Mission' as a medical emissary in May 1846 aboard the British ship *Starling* (Roy, 1962, p 65)

4.3.4 Impact in the Language: The English Language Center established in 1963 catered to the needs of the military administration that needed to employ local Okinawans who had good command over English. It was an agency of the USCAR. The Japanese and U.S governments are working to establish an international school in Okinawa Prefecture that promotes English education among Japanese children with the help of the U.S military. The military-sponsored English education program was proposed by Wallace Gregson, who used to serve as the U.S military's Okinawa area coordinator. With the help of the two governments, as well as teachers and the business community in Okinawa, Gregson has created a nonprofit organization to establish such an international school in Okinawa.

4.3.5 Impact on the Women: Women have always been the victim of violence and exploitation wherever military bases are situated and Okinawa is also no exception. Contrary to the assured safety of the military personnel and their dependents, the lives of women and children of local community in Okinawa have been targeted of violence over the years since the establishment of the U.S military bases. During the Vietnam War, women working around the bases were often target of violence by the soldiers who returned from the battle fields of the Vietnam War. Rape cases were also rampant. Three to four women were strangled to death yearly. In the survey conducted in 1969, about 7,400 women worked in the sex industry. These women earned dollars in the still economically poor society. They were forced to sell sex because of a large amount of loan imposed on them in the forced managed prostitution. Many of these women experienced to be nearly strangled to death more than once, experience that left many of them suffering from trauma. Because of the obligations imposed on the women who were expected to observe the traditional Okinawan family system, women maintained a more restricted lifestyle than the men; however there were also exceptions in this regard. Women who had emigrated from Okinawa to other countries and had returned were more independent and liberal than the others. Examples were those women who had lived in Hawaii where American influence had impacted their daily lives. Having the most decisive influence however were American cinema and Far East network (FEN) radio, television which frequently portrayed women as impulsive and independent. Later

generations of Okinawan women became more “westernized in appearance and conduct” (Trafton Terry, 1991).

4.3.5.1 Prostitution: *‘Women were also the ones who were the primary victims of sexual and other forms of physical violence committed by military personnel on the island’* (Ruth Ann Keyso, 2000). Prior to the Second World War, prostitution in Okinawa was primarily confined to one licensed quarter of the city of Naha, where, it is estimated, there were between 2000 to 4000 prostitutes. There were probably a few brothels in other port towns as well. There are still brothels which cater exclusively to Okinawans, but they are in the minority, and are not included in the present analysis. “Commercialized prostitution was neither new to Okinawa nor a result of contact with Americans” (Yehudi A. Cohen, 1958). Its existence covers a relatively long period of time. The number of prostitutes increased after the war, and estimates of this number vary widely. In the past, as many as one in thirty Okinawan women were employed as prostituted women for the U.S military in “A sign” bars⁶². Entertainment districts were built close to military bases immediately after the war. In some cases U.S military authorities returned land taken for bases to Okinawan planners for purposes of building entertainment areas⁶³. In 1969, at the height of the U.S war against Vietnam, the Okinawan police estimated that 7,362 Okinawan women were working in prostitution though others estimated this number to be 10,000 or more.

Before Reversion in 1972, the discussion of an anti-prostitution law⁶⁴ was brought up in the Okinawan Government assembly on two separate occasions, but nothing was done because of the large economic benefit contributed by these women—larger than the agricultural industry (pineapple and sugarcane combined). The women were coerced into

⁶² “A” sign stands for “Approved.”

⁶³ Shinmachi district in Oroku (now part of Naha city) was initially appropriated by the U.S. military. However, after discussion between Okinawan planners and the military authority, an area for entertainment was returned by US authorities.

⁶⁴ Prostitution has been illegal in Japan since 1959, and this law was effective in Okinawa as of July 1, 1972, two months after Okinawa became a prefecture of Japan.

prostitution through economic hardship, given the lack of meaningful alternatives. Although counted as part of the underground economy, their wages made a significant contribution to the Okinawan economy. Women are the ones who worked for the U.S military since the post war years in club as waitresses, in stores as cashiers, and in private homes as maids. They were the ones who married the GIs either for love, for money and also bore their children. “Women were also the ones who were the primary victims of sexual and other forms of physical violence committed by military personnel on the island”.(Ruth Ann Keyso,2000) A more negative influence on the women was the large number of illegitimate babies left by the U.S personnel⁶⁵ .

Today, more than 7,000 Filipinas, whose home economy is far weaker than that of Japan, are the prostituted women—on entertainment visas—for U.S military personnel in Okinawa, even though prostitution is illegal in Japan. In this context one is reminded of the most famous 1995 rape incident of a fourteen year old girl⁶⁶ by three military servicemen. This was one more horrid incident that marked a long history of crimes committed by the U.S military in Okinawa post Second World War. The U.S court martial delivered a death sentence but the prisoner returned to the U.S which made it difficult for the Okinawan public to follow up the consequent procedure of the sentence. In less than a week another U.S soldier raped a child. Violence directed towards the local population by U.S military staff, especially rape revealed the crudest aspect of the crimes that was committed by the military. This two incident particularly the yomiko

⁶⁵ Each year an estimated Okinawan baby is abandoned by the fathers of their children and the situation remains dire till today. In 1998, a group of mothers joined together and form the Amer Asian School in Okinawa specifically for this child.(Anni P.Baker,2004)

⁶⁶ This was the Labor Day holiday for US forces in Okinawa, and the three men — two Marines and one sailor — had been partying all day in the capital city of Naha, an hour south of Kin. According to a fourth Marine who was with them earlier in the day, the three plotted to “get a girl” after failed attempts to meet women in Naha. Unwilling to join them should they follow through with their plan, he left the others, but did not report the plan to authorities or do anything to stop the impending crime. (Linda Isako Angst, 2001)

the local population by U.S military staff, especially rape revealed the crudest aspect of the crimes that was committed by the military. This two incident particularly the yomiko

Mihama's American Village in Chatan Town



Source:<http://www.okinawa-information.com/mihama-american-village-atan-okinawa>

chan incident have a special significance in the history of violence perpetrated by the U.S military staff in Okinawa.

4.3.6 Infuse of American Culture:

The presence of the U.S military has had a great influence on Okinawa's culture. A perfect example is the Mihama area of Chatan, where a portion of its land is developed into an American style village specifically meant for entertainment and a good tourist spot. Its main concept is "America" even though the political consciousness of the Town people has been against the bases. American Village imitates a water-front shopping mall in San Diego, California and attempts to spatialize "cheerful and openhearted America." On the other hand, despite the local memory shared by the Town people, it represents neither the cruel Battle of Okinawa in 1945 nor the oppressive U.S military governance until 1972. Moreover, it even commodifies militarism for tourist consumption. It can be said from this that American Village has created a new place in which American and Okinawan cultures interact and represents a historical place where forgetting the memory of the place is encouraged to promote the local economy. "Mihama has food, clothing, music, and entertainment that mostly resemble American taste. The design and architecture of the sidewalks and buildings will give you the feeling of being in America" (Ayano Ginoza, 2005). The American Village entertains about 8.3 million people annually⁶⁷, which is about seven times as the population of Okinawa., and nine tenth of it are Okinawans. The American Village for some Okinawan women is a space which fulfills their desires to raise their social status and class. It is a refuge where they could escape from the old Japanese social system. American Ryukyuan friendship nights became popular to not only the military men but also for the young Okinawan women. The carefully designed popular images of an American landscape lure the younger GIs and Japanese women in particular. For Okinawan women, the Village at night is "a date place" where GIs and Okinawan women meet. The visual celebration of American

⁶⁷ The index of Okinawan tourism for 2003 shows that 98% of 5,080,000 tourists in the year were from mainland Japan. The state's financial dependency on tourism marked the highest amount of 16.1% in 2001, next to the revenue outside the prefecture (56.1%), and followed by the Base revenues (8.0%) (*Tourism Survey by Okinawan Prefectural Government* 2004).

popular cultural landscape in the American Village invites Japanese women as the main participants in redefining and sustaining the meaning of the powerful American image.

These glimpses of affluent America enhanced the sense of contrast between prosperity and adversity and there were those who felt that this “taste of good, clean, affluent American life” was responsible for increased delinquency among younger Okinawans. “American slot machine triggered a craze for gambling among the islanders that has resulted in bankruptcies and suicides” (Guille and Murakami, 1972).

4.3.7 Influence in the Food Habits:

Food eating habits of the younger generation in Okinawa today has been affected by a large number of fast food chains that has been a result of the stationing of the military bases. Doctors there blame the servicemen for bringing hamburgers, French fries and canned meat to the island earlier than to the rest of Japan. Chains such as McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken are among the operators of more than hundred fast-food outlets on Okinawa. Before 1945, Okinawans consumed mostly fish, soybeans, seaweed, vegetables and pork. The diet was rich in antioxidants, minerals, omega-3 fatty acids and proteins that helped protect against strokes and heart attacks. Those that retained the traditional diet are healthier than their peers. The older cohort of Okinawans (aged 65-plus) is remarkable in many ways.⁶⁸

Of particular interest is that they possess among the highest functional capacity and the longest survival in Japan, the country with world's longest-lived population. Life expectancy at birth for the year 2000 was 86.0 years for Okinawan women and 77.6 years

⁶⁸ The CR (caloric restriction) status of the older Okinawans appears to be due, in part, to a high level of occupational energy demand from their main vocation as farmers. This was coupled to low caloric intake from an energy-poor but nutrient-dense diet rich in Okinawan sweet potatoes, other vegetables, legumes, and other foods low in energy density. The Okinawan sweet potato, with a caloric density of 1.0 kcal/gram, has been the main carbohydrate of the Okinawan diet from the 1600s until approximately 1960, accounting for more than 50% of calories. The higher caloric density of the traditional Japanese diet is partly due to their higher consumption (75% of calories) of high caloric density Japonica (white) rice, with a caloric density of 1.5 kcal/gram. (Bradley J. Willcox et al, 2007)

for Okinawan men, respectively. Life expectancy for the septuagenarian cohort (life expectancy at age 65) is the highest in Japan, and possibly the world, at 24.1 years for females and 18.5 years for males, respectively". (Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2000) This compares to 22.5 years and 17.6 years for the same birth cohort in mainland Japan and 19.3 years and 16.2 years for the corresponding U.S birth cohort of females and males, respectively.

Younger Okinawans who stray from the traditional diet and follow a sedentary lifestyle end up with the same health problems that are being increasingly faced by younger people in the U.S, that is, diabetes and other health complications of obesity. The case reported below is taken from an article titled "Okinawans Health Problems Blamed on American Food" showing that obesity is becoming a problem in Okinawa as in Japan among the younger generations and here is an excerpt:

"Tomomi Inose is overweight and diabetic. Her poor health is a result of six decades of U.S. influence on Okinawa. Growing up in postwar Okinawa alongside the U.S. military's largest overseas bases, she developed a bigger appetite for hamburgers and sodas than for the fish and vegetables that sustained prior generations. "My body instinctively craves for succulent meat," Inose, 46, said at the hospital where her blood-sugar level is tested monthly to monitor the type 2 diabetes that has impaired her vision and increased her risk of heart disease..."

Known throughout the world as the longest living people, the Okinawans today specifically the younger ones who had adapted to the American lifestyles are shown to be suffering from many diseases which are mostly related to unhealthy eating ways brought in by the fast food chains in and around Okinawa.

4.3.8 Western Music: Postwar western popular music entered Japan via the bases and became a part of Okinawan culture. The presence of U.S military bases has had a strong influence on U.S popular music in postwar Japan and Okinawa. The golden age of the entertainment sector geared toward U.S soldiers was the 1960s and early 1970s.

Increasingly entered another social cultural context; first commercialization by the record industry in Tokyo, and then as a tourist resource for local community development. Western popular music in postwar Okinawa — first jazz just after the Second World War, and second rock ‘n’ roll after the 1960s — was totally a by-product of the U.S bases, as were the sexual and other entertainment service sectors in towns near the bases.

Japanese recording industry brought about a breakdown in the segregation of culture between American and Okinawan. In the mid 1980s, some musicians from the first generation planned a rock music festival for Okinawan people. It was entitled ‘Peaceful Love Rock Festival.’ The first was held in 1983 in Koza city, and it has been held every year until now. Okinawa has changed enormously in the nearly two decades of American control. There’s no doubt that some of the American impact on the society will always remain in Okinawan culture.

4.4 Environmental Pollution: The world's military forces are responsible for the release of more than two thirds of CFC-113 into the ozone layer. During the Cold War, the U.S and Soviet armed forces produced enormous amounts of hazardous wastes. “As a result of naval accidents there are at least fifty nuclear warheads and eleven nuclear reactors littering the ocean floor. There are more nuclear reactors at sea than on land. The Pentagon generates five times more toxins than the five major U.S chemical companies combined”.(A Briefing Paper for States and Non-Governmental Organizations, International Peace Bureau, Geneva, August 2002). The U.S military bases are the largest single source of US environmental pollution and the extent of their environmental pollution in Okinawa is also enormous. Okinawan environmental problems have become visible in the process of the vast social changes that took place post Second World War. This is the period roughly speaking the 1970s in which the Okinawan environmental movement appeared during the Okinawa reversion period. It was during this period that environmental affairs became infused with attempts to protect the endangered natural environment.

The term environment post Second World War meant the social environment where humans live. Just as Okinawa had recovered from the war, the department of health and welfare focused on sanitation, disease control and public health. The primary concern was better health. The negative impact appearing on their health, communities and environment were brought on by U.S military activities which irresponsibly left military waste and created other environmental problems. The existence of the vast U.S military facilities and areas in the Okinawan prefecture has had various impacts on the Okinawan people's lives and the environment. Because construction of a new base requires a huge undeveloped area, these construction projects have destroyed the natural environment and degraded the invaluable biodiversity including, but not limited to, endangered species among the subtropical islands of Okinawa.

It was during the late 1960s that the term *pollution* began to appear in both U.S and Okinawan files. For instance, one of the first official documents on pollution was “**Ishikawa Beach Pollution**”⁶⁹ which is included in the Preventive Medicine, Veterinary and Sanitation Files (1960-1971). In 1972, when Okinawa was reverted to Japan, the department of environment and sanitation was created and in 1974, the Department of Health and Welfare changed its name to the Department of Environment and Health.

U.S military activities cause various environmental problems. During combat training, live bombing exercises have caused environmental destruction, possible radioactive pollution due to Depleted Uranium (DU) weapons, and unexploded ordinances. From the maintenance of aircraft and military vehicles, leaked fuel, heavy metals, hazardous chemicals contained in paints, cleaners and solvents have caused contamination of the soil, air and groundwater. The maintenance of facilities has caused contamination in the air, soil and groundwater with heavy metals contained in paints as well as in the batteries. Even recreational activities, such as skeet shooting, have caused soil to become contaminated with lead. These allegations are not unfounded. At bases that have been closed or are being closed, soil contaminated with hazardous waste has been frequently

⁶⁹ Serious pollution of Ishikawa Beach was traced in part to night soil from Ishikawa city. Tests performed indicate that local contamination of the waters adjacent to the beach exceed normal limits allowed by most US Government Agencies. as the city had no satisfactory means of disposing its night soil, it had resulted in a public health problem of considerable magnitude.(Shin Yamashiro,2005)

found. In addition, flight trainings have caused various forms of noise pollution. Moreover, as U.S military bases occupy huge tracts of land in local communities, they have become obstacles for urban development and local infrastructure.

Specifically, daily aircraft noise, military aircraft crashes (fighters, helicopters, etc.), oil and fat spills, red soil runoff, mountain forest fires caused by live-fire exercises and other incidents and accidents stemming from U.S bases' activities result in health-related problems among residents living in the vicinity of bases and other negative impacts on Okinawan people and the environment. Highly carcinogenic materials (fuels, oils, solvents and heavy metals) are regularly released during military operations, affecting the land, water, air, and ocean, as well as people's health. Okinawan people suffer deafening noise from low-flying military aircraft. In other parts of Japan, U.S planes cannot leave or land after 7 pm. At Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa, they can leave or land any time, and generate severe noise. Students in schools near the bases often have classes disrupted due to noise, and suffer from poor concentrations. On 23 August, 2004, a U.S Marine CH-53D Sea Stallion (a heavy assault transport helicopter) went out of control and crashed into the administration building at Okinawa International University. Immediately after the crash, U.S marines occupied a large section of the campus and the public road running alongside the damaged building, allowing no one—not even the police or university officials to enter the site. Some debris flew into surrounding homes as far as 300 meters (984 feet) from the site. The U.S Naval hospital initially reported that the pilot was in critical condition but the U.S military did not release further information concerning the pilot or two other service members who were supposedly involved in the accident. In 1996, U.S marines fired depleted uranium shells into the ocean. The U.S military define this as a conventional weapon, but, officially, they are not allowed to fire depleted uranium in Japan.

4.4.1 Impact on the Health of Okinawans: A direct impact of the environmental pollution is the adverse effect on the health of the locals which is also one of their concerns. White Beach, a docking area in Okinawa for U.S nuclear submarines, is an area

where regional health statistics show comparatively high rates of leukemia in children and cancers in adults. In 1998, for example, two women from the White Beach area who had been in the habit of gathering shellfish and seaweed there died of liver cancer. Also local people are affected, sometimes killed, in traffic accidents caused by U.S troops. Additionally, increased numbers of low-birth weight babies and higher incidences of cancer and leukemia in adults and children have been documented and linked to carcinogenic military toxics, which include fuels, oils, solvents, and heavy metals. Many of these toxics have infiltrated the land, water, and air in Okinawa, and require massive funding for environmental cleanup, and yet the SOFA signed between the U.S and Japan contains no provisions for environmental cleanup. On top of this, Okinawan residents do not even have full disclosure on the locations and nature of these toxics, since the SOFA contains no provisions forcing Japan to release this information. Under SOFA, (Article 4), the U.S is not responsible for environmental clean-up of land or water. As in Korea and the Philippines, host communities do not have adequate information on the extent of military contamination. The Japanese Government does not release information about it. After years of complaints from host communities about live-firing drills, the Japanese government arranged for them to be transferred from Okinawa to four sites in mainland Japan, at Yausubetsu (Hokkaido), Kita-Fuji and Higashi-Fuji (near Mt. Fuji), and Yufuin (Oita Prefecture, Kyushu). Besides damage to the land, and fires caused by these drills, another environmental hazard is the unexploded ammunition left at the sites.

In 1996, for example, residents found out about the firing by U.S marines of depleted uranium shells into the ocean, despite laws prohibiting their use in Japan. U.S Government officials are supposed to notify local officials of such use, but many Okinawans doubt that such provisions are being followed. Military exercises in Okinawa with live ammunition have cause forest fires, soil erosion, earth tremors, and accidents that have had continual negative impacts on Okinawa's environment, which will require years to remedy. These exercises obliterate natural ecosystems, and leave lands barren and shell ridden for decades to come. A survey on health effects of aircraft noise on people residing living around Kadena Air Base conducted by the Research Study Committee of Aircraft Noise Influences to Health in March 1998 suggest that the

residents living around Kadena Air Base may suffer from both physical and mental effects due to the exposure to military aircraft noise and that such responses increase with the level of noise exposure. The birth rate of infants with low birth weights under 2500g in Kadena town, which is located in the most vicinal of Kadena Air Base, was 9.1%, while that of other municipalities around Kadena and Futenma Air Bases was on average 7.6%. The average rate of low birth weight over Okinawa Island was 7.0% (The Research Study Committee of Aircraft Noise Influences to Health, 1998)

4.5 Accidents are also common mostly involving the military and a very serious concern on the safety of the locals. A high school teacher, Arashiro Tashiaki at the age of five lost his father in March 1956 who was run over by a car driven by an American soldier who was subsequently arrested by the U.S military police. The U.S military courts handled the case and the ultimate say on all sentences of American citizens rested with the high commissioner. The verdict of Arashiro's father case was like other many similar cases pronounce not guilty. In case of common crimes against local residents, such as destruction of objects like cars, houses etc non payments in restaurants, bars and taxes, beating and naggings, the local police and residents had no ability to follow up the cases. The extra territoriality of the crimes and incidents caused by the U.S military members involving local residents was the most humiliating aspect of the foreign military's domination. In February 1963, a speeding U.S marine drove a military truck into a pedestrian crossing, ran over and killed a thirteen year old school boy. This is called the Kokubakun Incident after the boy. Military related incidents and accidents continue to climb. In October 1998, for example, a U.S marine killed a young woman in a hit-and-run accident. Residential communities surrounding the Kadena Air Base and the Futenma Air Station, located in Okinawa Island's central region, have to endure the impact of living in close proximity to base activities.

Article 3, Clause 1 of SOFA essentially shields the live firing exercises conducted on Okinawa from Japanese environmental laws. Habitual bombardment from Camp Hansen in the island's north has denuded large mountain surfaces in the impact area, and otherwise destroyed much of the natural environment. Even if that area is returned to the

people, mere partial restoration of that environment will take many years. Myriad shells have been fired at the range over many decades; countless unexploded ones remain buried there. The live firing exercises are a kind of deadly reminder of an unprecedented rain of explosives during the three months of the Battle of Okinawa. Although most of its unexploded shells were gradually removed during the twenty three years since reversion, Okinawa will continue spending \$2.4 million a year for their disposal. (Ota Masahide, 2001) Some experts estimate that another forty to fifty years will be needed to remove all the unexploded shells still scattered throughout our island.

Accidents have also caused problems like the crash of jet planes which is always tragic. In 1959, a U.S jet plane from Kadena Air Base crashed on a primary school and went up in flames. 17 houses and a community center surrounding the school were also burned down. Even now the parachuting exercises continue and crashes and the burning of jet planes take place so often. The residents around the bases are always exposed to the danger of a possible disaster. Some schools have conducted fire drills on the assumption of a crash of U.S plane. The neighborhood of the bases, however, has been getting more crowded with more houses and schools due to a population increase. If an accident happens, the efforts of a U.S soldier to look for room to avoid a disaster would be in vain in such populated areas around the bases. The bases that are hosted by major centrally located cities cut off traffic networks between the cities and their surrounding communities and cause traffic congestion on nearby roads. Furthermore, residential housing and other facilities are becoming congested and roads are poorly developed due to the irregular expansion and lack of zoning of residential and industrial areas in the vicinity of bases. The areas surrounding Naha Airport and Naha Port have excellent potential for industrial zones and other development, but the existence of the military bases prevents land from being secured and restricts regional promotion.

4.6 Noise Pollution: also remains a large issue impacting the Okinawan people. Despite the fact that in other parts of Japan, U.S aircraft cannot land after 7 p.m. planes in Kadena Airbase can land at any time, causing deafening noise due to the low-flying nature of the aircraft. In a 1996 report, low-birth weights in babies near Kadena have been attributed to the disruptive nature of airplane noise. Additionally, area school children must also deal

with these noise disruptions and the lack of concentration that these aerial exercises engender. The number of people affected by the aircraft noise exceeding the environmental standard for aircraft noise in Okinawa is estimated to be about 470,000, 38% of the prefectural population. Frequent take-offs, landings and engine testings incessantly disrupt their daily lives. In particular, the MCAS Futenma is located in the heart of a densely populated urban area, whose 16 schools suffer its incessant discharge of noise pollution. Since reversion, aircraft stationed in Futenma Air Station have been involved in crashes, emergency landings and other accidents that endanger the lives of nearby residents.

In the air space over Kadena Air Base, touch-and-go flights and flight manoeuvres by U.S military aircraft are conducted regularly as well as frequent engine tunings. These activities generate intolerable noise, which people residing near the base complain disrupts their daily lives. At Futenma Air Station, people residing around the station are exposed to intense noise generated by landings and take-offs during flight exercise and helicopter flight maneuvers conducted in the air space over the base as well as over residential areas. The noises not only disturb daily conversation and sleep but also disrupt classes, jam television and radio broadcasts, and are considered to cause physical and mental strains such as loss of hearing and fatigue. "The most serious impact of U.S military activities on surrounding communities in this country is presumably the aircraft noise exposure around Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station located in Okinawa Island, the Ryukyus." (The Research Study Committee of Aircraft Noise Influences to Health, March, 1998)

The SOFA agreement of 1960 has no environmental protection provisions and the Japanese government was not given any right to on-site investigations within US military facilities. Moreover, SOFA exempts U.S military forces from their responsibility to deal with environmental cleanup. The Okinawa Prefectural Government submitted bills to revise SOFA in 1995 and in 2000, which included environmental protection articles, to the Japanese and the U.S governments. But the Japanese government has preferred operational changes to SOFA rather than amendments to it.

4.7 Crime: Large numbers of crimes have been associated with the U.S military since their occupation and the heavier their presence, the more serious the dangers the U.S. military pose to the people of Okinawa. Okinawa people experienced increasing cases of U.S. military-caused accidents and crimes. The rape of a girl in 1995 was a typical example. The incident happened just when the Japanese government was examining plans to help overhaul 50-year old U.S bases in Okinawa into modernized, functional bases at the Japanese government cost.

On 29 June, 2001 a young woman was raped by an U.S soldier in Chatan, a town located in north east of the capital city Naha on the main island of Okinawa. (Yomiko Mikanagi: 2004) Cases of rape that involve the military and the local women as exemplified by the rape in Chatan are complex because of the international circumstances surrounding the perpetrators and the victims. This kind of rapes would not have occurred if the Japanese Government had not hosted the U.S military in Okinawa.

Table 7: SOFA Status of Crime Statistics on Okinawa

YEAR	BRUTAL CRIMES	ASSAULTS	LARCERIES	WHITE COLLAR	IMMORAL CONDUCT	OTHER	TOTAL
1972	24	77	51	26	1	50	219
1976	49	75	97	5	1	35	262
1980	35	44	168	21	1	52	321
1984	10	26	75	4	3	24	142
1988	6	20	133	3	2	13	177
1992	3	2	35	1	2	8	51
1996	3	6	44	1	3	14	70
2000	3	6	26	0	3	14	53
2004	12	1	23	3	4	16	59
2008	5	7	14	20	0	23	70

Source: Okinawa Prefectural Police, 2009

NOTE: Okinawa police defined heinous crime as murder, robbery, rape, arson or sexual assault.

The statistics shows that despite the number of crimes committed by SOFA related personnel every year, the number has subsequently come down over the years. For example, by the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, there were a total of 219 cases against the SOFA personnel. This rose to 321 cases in 1980 showing the crime graph of the military at the highest. Since 1984, the number of cases has decrease from 142 cases in 1984 to 70 cases in 2008. This is a decrease in more than half since 1984. This may be a result of proper disciplining of the military and also a result of the several campaigns headed by the locals.

4.8 Anti Base Sentiment: The negative effects of the military bases outweigh the positive influence on the people of Okinawa. Over the years Okinawa has witnessed a number of protests and demonstration against these bases which shows the anti military sentiment of the people. Protests have always been a result of numerous issues that has cropped up due to the bases. From the land issues, to the crimes committed by the SOFA personnel, environmental damages and others, one can trace the varied campaigns against the bases in various issues. Having shouldered the excessive burden of the military bases over the years, the people of Okinawa have strong desires for reduction and realignment of the U.S bases. The excessive burden imposed by the military bases on the people has resulted in anti base movement and an anti military culture, which is also an impact of the military on the society. Since Second World War, the people have protested against the bases for several issues that concerned them. Okinawa's postwar history is a history of struggle against the US military rule and military bases.

The first large-scale people's movement in Okinawa was the movement for Okinawa's return to Japan, carried out in 1951. The slogan for this movement was '*we want to return to the country of the Peace Constitution*'. As this slogan indicated, this was a movement to protest against the Japanese state for stealing the march. Okinawans felt that Japan was going to achieve independence, enjoying the benefit of the war renouncing Peace Constitution, while leaving Okinawa behind under U.S military rule. Yet, both the Japanese and U.S governments ignored the will of Okinawans who expressed their peace

aspirations by a signature collecting campaign to which the overwhelming majority subscribed.

In the fall of 1995, a new wave of struggle emerged in Okinawa, demanding the reduction and removal of U.S bases and the revision of SOFA. This was the third wave of anti-base struggle in Okinawa. The first was the island wide struggle in the middle of the 1950s and the second was the anti-war and anti-base struggle that lasted from the second half of the 1960s through the early 1970s. The third wave was triggered by the rape of a primary-school girl by three U.S soldiers in September 1995. This triggered huge protests against the bases which will be discussed in the following paragraph.

It was announced in April 1996, that the U.S Marine Airbase Futenma would be returned to Okinawa within five to seven years. Yet, as confirmed in the final SACO report at the end of 1996, the promise of return was made on the proviso that the facilities be relocated to an alternative site within Okinawa Prefecture. By the end of 1997, the relatively unspoiled and sparsely populated north-eastern coastline of Okinawa's main island, beside the village of Henoko, Nago City, was marked as the most likely site for relocation. In its initial stages, the opposition movement in Nago against these plans was highly "localised" in the sense that it had broad local support and was initiated by local residents. The Committee for Promoting a Local Referendum in Nago City on the Construction of the Heliport Base established in June 1997 was formed from an amalgamation of local opposition groups. By August 1997, the committee had collected over 19,000 signatures on a petition calling for a local referendum on the base issue, representing over half of the eligible voters in the entire municipality (Nago Citizen Committee, 1999).

The local referendum movement faced numerous obstacles of the kind often cited as limitations to the effectiveness of social movements in Japan. "These include strong bureaucratic resistance, lack of transparency and legislative limitations" (Riemann, 2003) the tools of economic compensation that are regularly used to neutralize NIMBY (not in my backyard) movements against unwanted facilities [*meiwaku shisetsu*] are even more

pronounced in Okinawa than in the rest of Japan, and within Okinawa are most prominent in more peripheral regions such as Nago (Kawase, 2002). More than 10 years have passed since an agreement to relocate the U.S Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa was reached, but the move is no where near happening till today despite several rounds of talk and agreements over the issue.

4.8.1 Anti Base Protests with the 1995 Rape Incident: Anti-base sentiment grew following the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three members of the U.S military in September 1995. After then-Governor Ota Masahide's announcement less than one month later of his refusal to act as proxy in the signing of leases of land utilized by the U.S military, the Okinawa "*base problem*" [kichi mondai] emerged as a major diplomatic and political issue. (Julia Yonetani, December 2004) No other confrontation between local and national governments in postwar Japan has placed the government in so compromised a position over a fundamental element of foreign policy. In the case of Okinawa, claims to local autonomy were made against Japanese nationalist, imperialist assimilationist policies and their legacies, in the name of alternative histories. In this way, Governor Ota's political challenge was also deeply embedded within contests over identity and history. More than any previous Okinawan governor, he drew connections between the base issue – and what he repeatedly termed the "*Okinawan problem*" – and struggles over democracy, identity, autonomy and cultural diversity. Similar crimes had been committed before and, whenever such occurred, people would protest indignantly. But this time the incident gave rise to a major movement that shook the U.S Japan military alliance to its foundations. This was partly because the incident occurred just when the situation surrounding Okinawa was changing in major ways. It was also because the Okinawa people had accumulated enough movement experience to react to it properly. The background was the rising level of consciousness about the rights of women and children as manifested in the Beijing Women's Conference and the conclusion of the Treaty on Children's Rights. In addition, the incident occurred when the redefinition of the Japan-U.S security alliance was being placed on the agenda. Also, the date was approaching of renewal of the base-land lease contracts with the anti-war landlords. For contract renewal, the Japanese government was to go through compulsory

land requisitioning procedures again. On the part of the U.S, it was facing the need to redefine the security alliance with Japan. The U.S felt it had to re-situate its alliance with Japan in a new post-Cold.

The 1995 struggle is characterized as a struggle for peace, human rights, and self-reliance. In this context, under the impact of the rape incident and the rising anger of the Okinawa people, the Japanese and U.S governments created a structure called SACO for readjustment and consolidation of the bases in Okinawa. The local government of Okinawa made it clear that no such plan would be accepted by the Okinawa people unless it included reduction of the bases. With this pressure, SACO had to discuss adjustment, consolidation, and reduction.

4.8.2 Women's Role in Anti Base Movements:

Women's group created networks of communication and information that reach beyond national boundaries. Through local feminist activists such as Naha city municipal council member Takazato Suzuyo, the Okinawan women's movement had forged extensive international links from the 1980s. An Okinawan delegation separate from the mainland Japanese delegation attended the 1985 Women's Conference in Nairobi. Numerous visits by activists to areas surrounding the Subic naval base in the Philippines also provided "opportunities to strengthen ties between women in different localities who shared similar problems and issues in relation to the military, the sex industry, and violence" (Tanji, 2003).

In September 1995, 71 Okinawan women traveled to China to attend the Beijing Women's Conference to testify to the conditions faced by them in their communities. Soon after returning home, they heard the news of the rape of the 12 year old girl by the U.S military personnel. They immediately began to work toward mobilizing support from citizens which turned out in an island wide protest against the bases in the next month i.e. October, 1995. In November the same year, they announced the establishment of Okinawan Women Act against Military Violence. In February 1996, the group began its American Peace Caravan, an extended sojourn around the U.S visiting universities, local

women's groups and Washington D.C to speak out about the rape and the problems faced by Okinawa as a result of the U.S military presence.

Okinawan women today communicate regularly with women's groups in the U.S, Republic of Korea, and the Philippines about women's issues in U.S military base communities. Takazato, now an elected representative in the Naha City Assembly has worked to gain greater awareness among local police and prosecutors of the need for counseling for rape victims, and a better representation of victim's interest in the investigation and prosecution of rape. Moreover, she and other women established a non profit center offering counseling to victims of rape and they continue to monitor and report on individual trials where U.S military personnel are charged with the crime. They have also been instrumental in gaining public attention and policy change within Okinawa for rape victims.

4.8.3 Transnational Links: The joint hosting of the G-8 Summit in Nago in July 2000 formed a peak for local and international networking in Okinawa over the U.S base issue. Numerous symposia were held in Okinawa, including the International Women's Summit, the People's Security Forum, and the International Environmental NGO Forum. Many international participants from these groups joined with activists from mainland Japan and residents of Okinawa in a "Human Chain" mass protest formed around Kadena Airbase on 22 July, 2000. Key members of the movement protesting against US Navy bombing on the islands of Vieques in Puerto Rico also attended a number of these forums. This subsequently became the catalyst for the strengthening of links between groups in Okinawa and Puerto Rico. A year later, in October 2001, a delegation to Puerto Rico was funded by the Okinawa Peace Network [Heiwa Renraku Kai].

4.9 Current Campaigns:

The current campaigns and protests are against the construction of new runways in the Henoko area and new construction of any military facilities. Their demands are "*No Relocation*" of military facilities, installations, or training within Okinawa or in other parts of the world. The last few years have seen a flurry of new environmental groups

take root in Okinawa, while some of the previously most active groups seem to be dormant. Newer groups include *Dugong Network Okinawa*, *People's Network Against Construction and Strengthening of Military Base, Okinawa-Yaeyama-Shiraho Association for the Protection of Sea and Life*, *Dugong Protection Fund Committee*, *Association to Walk in the Nature of Yanbaru*, *No to Heliport Association of 10 Districts north of Futami*, *No to Heliport 10,000 Voices Movement*, *Nago Citizen's Network*, *Okinawa International Forum for People's Security*, *Save the Dugong Foundation*, and many others. Longer established groups include the *Okinawa Environmental Network*, the *Okinawa Clean Beach Club* and its associated group *OCEAN*, and the *Okinawa Citizen's Recycle Movement*, among others. Two of the main groups exemplifying the coalescence of struggles against the bases and for environmental protection are the OEN and the SDF. One of the most well-known Okinawan environmental groups currently is the OEN, headed by a number of professors associated with Okinawa University, especially Dr. Jun Ui, the "godfather" of environmental studies in Japan. The OEN was formed in 1997 after the Japan Environmental Conference was organized by Ui in Okinawa. OEN has been involved with a number of controversial environmental issues in Okinawa: protesting a major land reclamation project currently underway at Awase tidal flats, investigating water pollution caused by livestock breeding in southern Okinawa, and investigating lead pollution from shooting on U.S. bases. As with most Okinawan environmental groups, currently the main issue OEN is involved with is the pending relocation of Marine Corp Air Station Futenma to Henoko. OEN has organized two international conferences on environmental issues, the first coinciding with the G8 Summit of 2000 held in Okinawa, the second in March of 2003. These conferences are efforts to both hear the views of other organizations working with military environment issues from around the world, as well as to further publicize Okinawa's military environment issues. Participants thus represent a range of organizations and nations, with an emphasis on Okinawa, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region. Much attention is focused on the effects of military bases upon the environment.

There is also the demand for changes in SOFA so that U.S. troops can be held accountable by local people and can be prosecuted by local laws if they commit crimes against

Okinawan people. Demands are also made so that the U.S military take responsibility for environmental cleanup. Seeking information on environmental contamination of land water, and the ocean as a result of U.S military activities the people have also demanded for the withdrawal of U.S marines and not their removal to another location which has always been the promise of the Japanese and the U.S governments. However complete removal of the marines from Okinawa is most unlikely considering their huge presence and their importance in maintaining the maritime security for both the partners.

4.9.1 Save the Dugong Campaign Centre was set up to improve national networks in opposition to the construction of the base (Miyagi Yasuhiro, 28 March, 2004). Previously, when the local population of dugong had been far greater, they had been prized for their tasty meat. Now local groups joined with international NGOs to advocate their protection. Okinawa was the world's northernmost habitat of the dugong, and the local population was under serious threat of extinction. It appeared increasingly likely that construction of the new base would include plans to reclaim a large section of the reef situated off the village of Henoko, Nago. The plan to reclaim one of the last coastal areas still containing healthy sea grasses for base construction was seen to increase the threat of extinction of the dugong⁷⁰. The movement calling for dugong protection utilized the dugong both as a symbol of the need for environmental protection and as a strategic response to international norms and national policy.

In January 2000, five Okinawa-based Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), including the DPF and the OEN, held a local press conference to announce their “Dugong Protection Fund Movement” (*jugon hogo kikin undo*) appeal. The fund was also supported by WWF Japan. The money raised through this appeal was used to fund dugong experts from James Cook University in Australia to visit Okinawa. (Julia Yonetani, 2004)

⁷⁰ The dugong was listed both as an official “Natural Treasure” (*shitei no tennen kinenbutsu*) by the Japanese government and as a species facing a high risk of medium-term extinction in IUCN’s red data book (IUCN Red List).

4.10 Conclusion: The presence of the U.S military bases in Okinawa have not only diluted the already mixed culture of the people but their very presence has shown major implication on the lives of the people. The lifestyles of the people post Second World War has been influenced by the American lifestyle brought to them by the U.S military personnel. Their presence for more then 60 years has served as a catalyst of change in Okinawan lifestyle. But the case of Okinawa is not an isolated one when one looks at other regions in the world where military bases are located like Guam etc and for that matter even the colonization of many third world countries by the British Empire in the 19th and 20th Century. With the wave of globalization, westernization or Americanisation would have eventually crept into Okinawa even if the military bases were not there. On the rebound their presence in Okinawa for many years has resulted in diverse ways of influencing their society. Despite all that the military bases offered in both good and bad impact, the Okinawans till today maintained and uphold their unique culture from that of the mainland Japan. The very essence of the Okinawan culture has been preserved. Every culture every society is bound to be influenced from such a strong and alluring culture of the west especially to the younger generation.

Apart from the American culture that had been injected into the Okinawan society, more threatening is the negative influence which is a result of the many activities of the military from the crimes committed like rape, thefts, violence to the noise and pollution. This is indicated by the various harmful effects on their environment which pose serious concerns to health and safety of the people. On 8 July, 2009 Japan had asked the U.S to reduce aircraft noise as much as possible in Okinawa. 'Area residents have complained of continued noise from U.S military planes in Okinawa though flight training have been transferred from Okinawa to other parts of Japan several times a year since March 2007 in a bid to reduce noise'. (Japan Today, 2009) Their history of protests and anti military sentiment has definitely shown that people there are longing for an Okinawa that is safe and peaceful.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The social economic influence of the U.S military bases on Okinawa had already been discussed in the previous chapters. In the light of the security arrangements between Japan and the U.S, the importance of Okinawa will continue. Total removal of the bases is not likely to happen in the near future. The strategic location of Okinawa rather seems to be all the more important to the U.S and Japan in the Asia Pacific region. The bases will continue to affect the social and economic life of the Okinawans. The anti base movements and campaigns have indeed help in getting attention from the Japanese and U.S Governments. However, it still has a long way to go before the bases are returned and the people are given their rights to live peacefully.

5.1 An Okinawa without the Bases, a Possibility?

The condition of Okinawans would have been very different today if there were no military bases. What if the U.S military bases were not located in the prefecture right after the Second World War? With the total collapse of its infrastructure, the reconstruction of Okinawa would have been undertaken by the Japanese Government and perhaps it would have developed today like the rest of the prefectures. However considering the fact that Okinawa was neglected even before the war by the Japanese Government, the chances were that the prefecture would have been left alone to rebuild itself. Due to the presence of the military bases, Okinawans were more involved in solving the problems caused by the military bases rather than pay attention towards the development of the prefecture. With tourism as an attractive feature of the island, it would probably have more attractive tourists spot like other Pacific Islands. No doubt the bases do contribute to the promotion of tourism the condition would have been an altogether different without the bases.

With the World facing non traditional security threats like that of global warming, diseases etc which have no boundaries, the traditional security threats today no longer pose threatening as much as the non traditional threats. In this condition, the presence of the U.S military bases in Okinawa is not much a necessary, and the resources used in

maintaining the bases could very well be utilized to find effective ways of tackling the issues that affect the humankind.

However, the significance of the bases will continue to be justified in both Japan and the U.S. With North Korean crisis and the economic and military rise of China not only in the region but in the global arena, the U.S military presence in Okinawa acts as a balance not only for Japan-U.S but also for Japan which would have felt threatened otherwise. As Japanese Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishida has stated that ‘the presence of U.S. Forces in the Asia Pacific Region after the end of the Cold War prevents diverse regional instability from emerging and provides a good basis for a variety of international cooperation in the region ...’(Ishida Shigeru, *Regional Perspective on Asia-Pacific Security*. Singapore, 2003) This security relationship still continues to serve as a deterrent for peace and stability in Asia especially after post 9/11, the bases further continue to be important to both the countries with terrorism posing a threat to every nation.

5.2: Reducing the Burden

Japan and the U.S signed the Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement (ATARA) in 2006⁷¹ under which the Japanese government will make direct contributions of up to U.S \$2.8 billion for relocating some 8,000 U.S marines and their dependants from Okinawa to Guam. However, there have been problems in implementing the proposed realignment of U.S forces as it is dependent on the completion of the replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station from Ginowan to Nago. Japanese Government officials believe that ATARA should be revisited and reviewed, which

⁷¹ ATARA is the realignment roadmap agreement made between the U.S. government and the government of Japan on May 1, 2006, which would relocate approximately 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents to Guam. Under this agreement, the two governments will share the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of facilities and infrastructure improvements necessary to support the relocation. This includes \$2.80 billion in direct cash contributions, \$740 million in financial instruments to assist with utility infrastructure, and the \$2.55 billion in financial instruments to fund a housing public/private venture. The U.S. will fund the remaining costs, according to a 15 September, 2008 report on Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam.

would cause a delay in the relocation of 8,000 U.S marines to Guam. Democratic Party of Japan Vice President Seiji Maehara said recently that President-elect Barack Obama's diplomatic staff considers the proposed relocation plans of marines from the Futenma base to Camp Schwab in Nago, "unfeasible," according to the Mainichi Shimbun. Although the transfer to Guam of the marines from Okinawa must be carried out in tandem with the relocation of Futenma Air Station, the relocation process as pointed out by Japanese Government officials. To support this statement, Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of the U.S Pacific Command, said at a 5 November ,2008 press conference in New York, that the transfer of the 8,000 marines to Guam would likely be delayed, noting: "We won't be done by 2014, or maybe even 2015" (Keating Timothy,2008)

The demands for realigning the bases seem to be in the right track with the signing of an agreement between Hillary Clinton U.S Secretary of State and Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Hirofumi Nakasone in February, 2009. The agreement confirmed the relevant issues stipulated in the Roadmap⁷². This Agreement secures the actions by both Japan and the U.S, including the funding for the relocation of the U.S marines in Okinawa to Guam, which the two countries will jointly carry out. The Agreement also stipulated the U.S appropriate management of the funds provided by Japan and equal treatment for all of those who will be involved in the relocation project. This will lead to reducing the burden on the Okinawans. The Agreement also sets a legal framework for procedures to ensure that the U.S Government properly manages the fund provided by Japan, which is up to 2.8 billion U.S dollars.

The Okinawa prefectural authority conducted research on the possible effects of the return of U.S military facilities under the ongoing realignment. It estimated that the total loss in the revenue due to the return of U.S military facilities, including rent of the facility sites, base workers incomes, base-related sales, subsidies, etc. would be 191.1 billion yen a year; but the total sales by the activity of private sectors in the sites would

⁷² To reduce the burden of local communities while maintaining a sufficient level of deterrence in the region, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. compiled the "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" ("Roadmap") at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (the "2+2" Meeting) held on May 2006. As part of the implementation of the Roadmap, the two governments agreed to relocate the US Marines stationed in Okinawa (the III Marine Expeditionary Force) and their dependents to Guam.

annually be 870.7 billion yen; in addition to that, it would generate economic effects amounting to 911 billion yen and bring about the tax revenue of 125.3 billion yen. Thus, conversion of the sites to the civil use is overwhelmingly advantageous to local communities. This calculation is based on past achievements. For instance, the economic effects of the Naha New Urban District, built on the site of housing for the U.S. military personnel, amounted to 197.3 billion yen in 2002, while the revenue loss by the return of the site was 12.9 billion yen. The cost for the conversion, covered by the state, prefectural and city authorities, was made up by the 10-year tax revenues. In case of Chatan Town, its loss from the return amounted to 750 million yen per year; but it got the yield of 59.7 billion yen from the conversion of the site.

The first amount for the massive project to move 8,000 American marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 is about to be given to the U.S by Japan's government according to Weekly Japan Update on 16 July, 2009⁷³. Japan is to give 34.6 billion yen to cover initial infrastructure projects in Guam's Finegayan area and at Apra Harbor. Hirofumi Nakasone, Japan's Foreign Minister, and James Zumwalt, the charge d'affaires at the American Embassy in Tokyo, exchanged notes of the deal. The \$336 million is the first part of \$2.8 billion cash Japan will contribute to the 2006 Japan-U.S agreement designed to streamline realignment of troops and relieve the burden on local communities in Okinawa and mainland Japan.

5.3 Core within the Periphery: The U.S military bases in the prefecture acts as a 'core within the periphery'. The economic system of Okinawa was totally dependent on the bases during the Occupation Period. The Okinawan economy heavily depended on the U.S military expenditures which accounted for 30-40% of the Okinawa's gross products from the late 1940s through the early 1960s. Military expenditures, government payments and preferential treatment for agricultural products have been pointed out as the main factors underlying economic growth and structural change. The administration of the U.S in the prefecture before reversion period indeed made the bases as the epicentre of all activities.

⁷³ Japan gives \$ 336 million to start Guam Process, Date Posted 2009-07-16, Weekly Japan Update

With the reconstruction of the prefecture's infrastructure and economy under the initiative of the Occupation government, the bases were the centre of all economic activities benefiting the local populace. Till today the bases to a great extent are still at serving the interests of the military. The prefecture with not much natural resources apart from the land, (that was mostly confiscated by the U.S for the construction of the bases) the abundant labour was the only resource the prefecture utilized to sustain itself. In 1967, the U.S forces directly employed about 50,000 Okinawans and it is estimated that one fourth of the total labor forces was hired in jobs made as a result of military expenditures.

After reversion to Japan, military employees were drastically reduced to 7,219 (as of December, 1979) and now accounts for 1.7% of the total employed. Though the role of military expenditure has decreased, it is undeniable that the sustained expansion of military expenditures made the high rate of growth possible in the earlier period. The policy of free trade was important for development of Okinawan economy. Okinawa was used as a legal tender the B typed yen (1948-1957) and the U.S dollars (1958- 1972). Since the U.S dollar was the international currency, adoption of the dollar as the domestic currency meant free trade which in turn meant that agricultural products and others were freely imported.

Thus, the military bases served as a 'core within the periphery' which is justified specially in the aftermath of the Second World War when the prefecture was left with no choice but to depend entirely on the bases. However with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 and the immediate takeover of the administration by the Japanese Government, the role of the bases have subsequently subsided due to the various job opportunities provided by the Government and the drive to promote tourism which has been one of the sectors contributing to the economy as already discussed in the third chapter. No doubt the bases continue to contribute to the economy today even though its share has decreased since post reversion. The argument that the bases acts as a core within the periphery was most valid during the 27 years of Occupation period (1945-1972). Post Reversion there has been the shift of the bases as the core to Okinawa, the periphery as the core had been redirected towards the mainland as it regains its role

As discussed in the fourth chapter, not only has the military affected the economy of Okinawa, it had also brought in changes in the social life of the people either directly or indirectly. But more than that, the adverse effects on the people seemed to give more weightage. No doubt the bases brought in many changes that benefited the prefecture. Public opinion towards the bases is always divided. On many issues regarding the bases mostly the anti base protests and movements, the public is always divided with some percentage opposing the bases while some favoring the continuing presence of the bases. Those who sided with the bases are mainly those who benefited most from their presence like the landlords who are paid huge amounts of money as rent, and those people who worked in the military related services. One important affect of the military is the harmful environmental pollution in many ways for which the locals have much reasons to protests. Thus the affects on the society which do more harm than good are the issues which concern the citizens the most. On the other hand, impact on food habits and lifestyles of the younger generations does not seem to go off track. Even if the military bases were not present, wave of globalization would have set in. Okinawa as in the rest of the world youngsters would be updated with the lifestyles of the west which seems to be the common standard of any young generation anywhere.

5.4 Okinawans View of the New U.S Administration:

Before the inauguration of Obama as the new President of the U.S, calls have heightened him to resolve the Okinawan issues. (Kyodo World News Service, 20th January 2009). As one 63 year old community leader echoed his views, "I want him to come to Sunabe so that he can hear the noise himself including the roar of jet fighters is early in the morning". As Shoji Matsuda, head of a residents association of the Sunabe area in the town of Chatan, one of the municipalities hosting the U.S. Kadena Air Base said, "I hope the first black U.S President will understand the pain of Okinawa". Local residents complain of airplane noise that has worsened particularly since the deployment in January 2009 of six of the F-22 Raptor stealth fighters at the U.S Kadena Air Base. Also, Okinawa Governor, Hirokazu Nakaima, who visited the U.S in January, expressed hope that the new U.S administration will take an interest in Okinawa's problems and help resolve them. Similarly many residents have expressed their expectations that the Obama

administration will address the numerous issues the local residents have to face because of the military bases. All these expectations were followed by the visit of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. There is likely to be little difference between the administrations of President George W. Bush and ^{Barrack} Obama when it comes to U.S military strategy in the East Asian region with the region continuing to be important for the U.S.

5.5 Future Japan-U.S Relations: Despite the change of Government in the U.S, the Japan-U.S alliance seems fine in the present situation. The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Japan on 16 February, 2009 and simultaneously the Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso was the first foreign Prime Minister welcomed by Obama in his stint as the new President of the U.S Clinton's visit to Japan has an obvious symbolic⁷⁴ reason: going there first would mean a lot to the Japanese.

The present U.S Governments' policy towards Japan seems to be more or less the same with both the governments giving each other the importance as before and in this scenario, their policies towards Okinawa is directed towards the realignment of troops as has been the process till now. With the high growth rate of China at an average rate of 9.6 % a year, the country now holds the world's largest foreign exchange reserves, which stands at \$1.9 trillion. Japan is in second place, with slightly more than half that amount. The U.S and China are deeply interdependent in economic terms, though they may be wary about each other militarily. China holds roughly \$1 trillion of \$2 trillion in U.S foreign reserves. Japan will clearly feel uneasy if Obama reorients U.S foreign policy towards a China centric East Asia.

Issues that the Obama administration will prioritize would be the issue of sharing defense burden by Japan and Japan's greater engagement with Obama's multilateralism; and second, Japan's contribution to resuscitate the global economy and how Japan can help salvage the U.S economy. Obama faces huge challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Palestine, tensions in India-Pakistan relations, and North Korea. Obama would need to mobilize its allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to resolve conflicts under the banner

⁷⁴ Bill Clinton who as a President in 1998, spent more than a week in China in 1998 without once stopping in Japan, which is US' No. 1 ally in Asia. The visit of his wife taking Japan as her first overseas visit in Asia was indeed symbolic to the Japanese .Rajaram Panda, IDSAs Strategic Comments, 9 March ,2009

of multilateralism. Hillary Clinton would prefer to negotiate directly with North Korea and set her priorities to de-nuclearize North Korea, while Japan would want Clinton to take up the abduction issue. The Obama administration would be happy with Japan demonstrating greater self-reliance and autonomy in security affairs. Obama would expect greater contribution from Japan to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. This would involve greater burden-sharing and power-sharing. Thus, even while Obama will remain engaged in sorting out the mess in the domestic economy, East Asia is likely to receive lesser attention as compared to Obama's current preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East. As noted, Obama will seek active cooperation with China, while maintaining existing bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea.

Therefore, in pursuance of his policy of multilateralism, the Obama administration is likely to seek a new regional security architecture that combines a bilateral alliance system with a multilateral security cooperation regime. Prof. Chung-in Moon of Yonsei University, Seoul, observes: "We can expect the U.S will shift its emphasis from the logic of balance of power to that of the power of balance." The second nuclear tests conducted by North Korea on 25 May, 2009 triggered an emergency UN Security Council meeting which called for a global action against Pyongyang. Japan's Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone after meeting South Korean counterpart Yu Myung Hwan in Hanoi called the test a challenge to the whole of the international community⁷⁵. In this scenario with North Korea reluctant to give up its nuclear programme, both the U.S and Japan is unlikely to shift out or remove the bases from Okinawa.

Despite the Middle East getting more attention from the U.S, the Asia Pacific Region cannot be ignored. With the increasing tension regarding the North Korean nuclear issue and peaceful rise of China, the U.S policy towards the region will more or less be the same with very few changes. Thus Okinawa will continue to be of important significance to the U.S and also Japan in maintaining the security of the region.

⁷⁵ The state run Korean Central News Agency said the North successfully conducted one more underground nuclear tests on may 25 as a part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self defense in every way. In this context, Japan, Russia, South Korea,China and the US have been negotiating since 2003 to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear programmes in exchange for energy aid and security guarantees. (the Hindu, "North Korea conducts second nuclear tests", Tuesday May 26, 2009.


The complete removal of the U.S military bases from the prefecture is still a long way before the Okinawans have their victory over the bases. Till then the protests demonstrations and campaigns against the bases will continue. Both the Japanese and the U.S Governments will continue to appease the Okinawans through the compensations and assurances that the bases will finally go.

Therefore as long as the U.S military bases are stationed in the prefecture, the Okinawans have to bear and pay for the burden imposed on it as a result of the security arrangements between Japan and the U.S. There are also bases in other parts of the mainland but they are not as much affected as the Okinawans. For the simple reason that most of the bases are located in Okinawa which is inappropriate for its size has indeed shown much affect on the prefecture. And much of the attention as a result has been focused on Okinawa and today the image of Okinawa is always associated with the U.S bases. It has gained world wide attention because of the military presence and the numerous numbers of protests demonstration held by the Okinawans showing their displeasure against the bases. However, this image of Okinawa as a base for the U.S military has to an extent been diverted as not only associated with the military but also as a tourist spot which indeed is beneficial for the economy. An Okinawa without the bases would be much better for the future of Okinawa.

APPENDIXES


Appendix 1: List of Forty Seven Prefectures of Japan

- | | | |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1 Aichi | 17 Kagawa | 33 Osaka |
| 2 Akita | 18 Kagoshima | 34 Saga |
| 3 Aomori | 19 Kanagawa | 35 Saitama |
| 4 Chiba | 20 Kochi | 36 Shiga |
| 5 Ehime | 21 Kumamoto | 37 Shimane |
| 6 Fukui | 22 Kyoto | 38 Shizuoka |
| 7 Fukuoka | 23 Mie | 39 Tochigi |
| 8 Fukushima | 24 Miyagi | 40 Tokushima |
| 9 Gifu | 25 Miyazaki | 41 Tokyo |
| 10 Gunma | 26 Nagano | 42 Tottori |
| 11 Hiroshima | 27 Nagasaki | 43 Toyama |
| 12 Hokkaido | 28 Nara | 44 Wakayama |
| 13 Hyogo | 29 Niigata | 45 Yamagata |
| 14 Ibaraki | 30 Oita | 46 Yamaguchi |
| 15 Ishikawa | 31 Okayama | 47 Yamanashi |
| 16 Iwate | 32 Okinawa | |



Source: Maps of Japan, www.digi-promotion.com

Appendix 2. Aerial Photograph of U.S. Facilities



-
- FAC 6001 Northern Training Area
 - FAC 6004 Okuma Rest Center
 - FAC 6005 Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield
 - FAC 6006 Yaedake Communication Site
 - FAC 6007 Gesaji Communication Site
 - FAC 6009 Camp Schwab
 - FAC 6010 Henoko Ordinance Ammunition Depot
 - FAC 6011 Camp Hansen
 - FAC 6017 Gimbaru Training Area

FAC 6027 Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
FAC 6028 Tengan Pier
FAC 6029 Camp Courtney
FAC 6031 Camp Mctureous
FAC 6032 Camp Shields
FAC 6036 Torii Communication Station
FAC 6037 Kadena Air Base
FAC 6043 Camp Kuwae
FAC 6044 Camp Zukeran
FAC 6046 Awase Communication Station
FAC 6048 White Beach Area
FAC 6051 Futenma Air Station
FAC 6056 Makiminato Service Area
FAC 6060 Deputy Division Engineer Office
FAC 6064 Naha Port
FAC 6076 Army Oil Storage Facility
FAC 6181 Ukibaru Jima Training Area
FAC 6082 Tsuken Jima Training Area

Source: Military Base Affairs Division, <http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view>

Appendix 3: Number and Land Area of facilities in Each Prefecture

Prefecture	Number of facilities		Land Area of facilities		Land Area of prefecture (km ²)	Percentage of Total Area of Prefecture Occupied by the Facilities (%)
		Rank		Rank		
Nationwide	133		1,010,124		337,873	0.27
Hokkaido	17	2	344,463	1	83,453	0.41
Aomori	6	7	31,991	7	9,235	0.35
Iwate	1	13	23,265	10	15,278	0.15
Miyagi	3	10	45,698	6	6,861	0.67
Yamagata	1	13	1,310	24	7,394	0.02
Ibaragi	1	13	1,078	25	6,096	0.02
Gunma	1	13	5,802	14	6,363	0.09
Saitama	4	8	2,280	18	3,767	0.06
Chiba	1	13	2,102	19	4,996	0.04
Tokyo	7	5	15,785	12	2,102	0.75
Kanagawa	16	3	21,427	11	2,415	0.89
Niigawa	1	13	14,089	13	10,939	0.13
Ishikawa	1	13	1,606	22	4,185	0.04
Yamanashi	1	13	45,967	5	4,201	1.09
Gifu	1	13	1,626	21	10,209	0.02
Shizuoka	4	8	89,145	3	7,329	1.22
Shiga	1	13	24,539	9	3,855	0.64
Hiroshima	7	5	5,226	16	8,477	0.06
Yamaguchi	2	11	5,733	15	6,110	0.09
Fukuoka	2	11	1,414	23	4,839	0.03
Saga	1	13	14	26	2,439	0.00
Nagasaki	13	4	4,562	17	4,092	0.11
Oita	1	13	55,568	4	5,804	0.96
Miyazaki	1	13	1,801	20	6,684	0.03
Kumamoto	1	13	26,097	8	6,908	0.38
Okinawa	38	1	237,527	2	2,271	10.46

SOURCE: Okinawa Prefecture, Military Base Affairs Division
<http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view>

1. Number and land area of facilities in Japan and in Okinawa are based on data obtained from Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (as of March end, 2001).
2. Number and land area of facilities in other prefectures are based on data obtained from Defense Facilities Administration Agency (as of Jan.1, 2001)
3. Land area of prefecture is based on data obtained from Geographical Survey Institute.
Areas (11,018.99km) that are not clear which prefecture they belong to are not included in any of the prefectures. However, they are included in the total land area of Japan

Appendix 4: Comparison between U.S Military and Self Defense Force Bases in Okinawa and in Mainland Japan

A. Land Area of the Facility

Forces		Nationwide (Thousand m ²)		Okinawa (Thousand m ²)		Mainland Japan (Thousand m ²)	
U.S Military Base	Exclusive use	313,492	100%	234,454	74.8%	79,038	25.2%
	Temporary use	696,632	100%	3,074	0.4%	693,558	99.6%
	Total	1,010,124	100%	237,527	23.5%	772,597	76.5%
Self Defense Force Base		1,078,514	100%	6,421	0.6%	1,072,093	99.4%
Total		1,395,346	100%	243,691	17.5%	1,151,658	82.5%

B. Number of Facility

Forces		Nationwide (Thousand m ²)		Okinawa (Thousand m ²)		Mainland Japan (Thousand m ²)	
U.S Military Base	Exclusive use	89	100%	37	41.6%	52	58.4%
	Temporary use	58	100%	4	6.9%	54	93.1%
	Total	134	100%	38	28.4%	96	71.6%
Self Defense Force Base		2,894	100%	35	1.2%	2,859	98.8%
Total		2,983	100%	72	2.4%	2,911	97.6%


SOURCE: U.S Military Base in Okinawa, Military Base Affairs Division

<http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view>

Note:

1. Data obtained from Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (as of March end, 2001).
2. The total land area and number of the U.S Military and Self Defense Force facilities added together do not agree with the numbers in the columns that show the Total. This is because the Self Defense Force facility occasionally used by the U.S military is included in both of their numbers.
3. The calculation may not agree with each other because the numbers are rounded.

Appendix 5: Unemployment Rates of Japan and Okinawa (1972-2003)



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Statistics Bureau

Appendix 6: Number and Land Area of Facility and Number of Personnel by Forces

Forces	Number of Facility	16	42.1	179,296	75.5	15,317
Marine		7	18.4	21,433	9.0	6,755
Air Force		6	15.8	3,180	1.3	1,569
Navy		5	13.2	3,808	1.6	946
Army		3	7.9	29,557	12.4	-
Joint Use		1	2.6	254	0.1	-
Others						-
Total	38	100	237,527	100	24,587	100

Note:

1. The prefectural government has calculated the number of facility and the land area based on the data obtained from Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (as of March end, 2001).

2. Number of personnel is obtained from the four Forces.

3. "Joint usage" are facilities managed by two or more Forces (Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, Camp Shields, White Beach Area).


"Other" is Self Defense Forces facility which is occasionally used by U.S military (Ukibaru-Jima Training Area).

Source: U.S Military Base in Okinawa, Military Base Affairs Division

<http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view>

Appendix 7:


U.S. Troops Overseas 1950-2005*, by region



SOURCE: Calculations by Tim Kane, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation, based on annual records from Department of Defense, DIOR. * Data for 1951 and 1952 are estimated

Appendix 8:


Percent of U.S Troops in Foreign Countries



Source: Department of Defense Directorate for Information Operations and Reports as compiled by the author.

Appendix 9:

Number of U.S. Troops in Foreign Countries



SOURCE: Calculations by Tim Kane, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation, based on annual records from Department of Defense, DIOR. * Data for 1951 and 1952 are estimated

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