

CHINESE STRATEGIC CULTURE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial
fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “**Chinese Strategic Culture in the Post-Cold War Era**” submitted by S.RAJASIMMAN for the award of degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of this university has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university. This is his original work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Chairperson
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Supervisor 30-7-2007
Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli

*Dedicated to my
Dad*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank God, my parents, sister, and JNU for providing me with their blessing and encouraging me to do what I believe in.

As I begin to write words acknowledging my supervisor, Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli, I remember Rosenau, according to whom the meaning of dissertation for its creator is wide open to psychoanalytical interpretation. Some even say that it represents the ninth month in the birth of an adult. My experience with my supervisor gave me the courage to step out of the edge and describe something I longed to. Sir, thank you for challenging me, to see and describe my understanding of this discipline and knocking hard on my aura.

I thank Prof. Gopalji Malvia and Dr. Uttam Kumar, University of Madras, Chennai, from whom I received my first lessons in strategic affairs. I also thank my teachers Dr. Alka Acharya and Dr. Varaprasad, Centre for East Asian Studies, JNU, for helping me understand China.

I thank my friends for not laughing very loudly and pretending to be serious whenever I discussed my dissertation with them. I am not mentioning their names since the list is long; however the list is also distinguished.

In my case all the fears of completing this dissertation provided me with a challenge that I would like to live with, all my life.

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It is time that we write a new chapter in the annals of international relations in which the phenomena of the big bullying the small, the strong lording it over the weak and the rich oppressing the poor are removed completely from the face of the earth..

President Jiang Zemin

(1995)

INTRODUCTION

On June 30, 1995, the German Parliament approved the government's decision to send troops to Bosnia in what would be Germany's first combat mission abroad since World War II. In 1994, the Constitutional Court of Germany ruled that Germany could participate in international actions with the approval of Parliament. This verdict provided the legal basis for sending troops abroad. In May, 2005, France declared that it will resume its nuclear tests. It also favoured resorting to force to stop the armed conflicts between the Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, marking new efforts to revamp the French foreign policy. In 1995, the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet passed a resolution entitled "Taking lessons from history and reaffirming the determination for peace." Japan is steadily advancing from an economic power to a political and military power, as can be seen in the proposal of United Nations Peace and Cooperation Bill, which allowed the government to send troops to the Gulf in the name of co-operating with the U.N. The bill was however aborted due to strong internal and external opposition. There seems to be a revival of behaviour of World War veterans after five decades of change in behaviour experienced after the end of World War II. As an exception, India conducted nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998. India's claims to nuclear status were not a direct consequence of structural constraints it operated in but a product of its national ego. Why this behavioural change is occurring? Why these nations are particularly predisposed to this change in behaviour? These questions have not been satisfactorily answered by realist or liberal paradigms, which are regarded to have maximum explanatory value. This study proposes, 'ideational sources' to be responsible for these changes.

Recent literature on China has come out with 'China Threat Theory' due to its fast paced economic and military might. This study attempts to look at this factor from a strategic cultural perspective. 'China Threat Theory' cannot be proved solely on the basis of its emerging comprehensive national power. 'Will' of a nation, an intangible component of national power is not empirically measurable, and therefore ignored from mainstream analysis of Chinese strategic behaviour.

In order to understand the ideational sources for Chinese strategic behaviour, this study employs strategic culture. Sources such as Presidential statements¹, government documents, statements by senior political leaders, bureaucrats, and military leaders are considered to represent Chinese strategic culture. The beliefs, values, opinions, and ideas expressed in these sources are assumed to influence Chinese strategic behaviour. However, this causal linkage is difficult to prove in the absence of any standard methodology. Therefore this study constructs a belief system as expressed by Chinese elites during the period of post-Cold War. Beliefs regarding security, threat, use of force, interdependence, national interests and objectives have been given more weightage. Analysis is based on how these prevalent beliefs function along with the conceptualisation of use of force (cultural understanding of use of force).

Disadvantage in using the above mentioned sources is due to the instrumental nature of rhetoric. This problem is solved by giving more weightage to those beliefs, values, opinions, and ideas that have high repetition frequency. Such as peaceful reunification, peace and development, peaceful coexistence, multipolarity, hegemonism, power politics etc.

The first chapter describes the existing scholarship on strategic culture, the rationale and scope of this study, methodological debates, objectives and justification to use this approach of strategic culture. The second chapter attempts to link certain strategic cultural variables from recent past and find its signature on the strategies adopted in the post-cold war period. These are not necessarily causal linkages, but identified existence of continuing strands of strategic culture in two different time periods. As a concept 'Chinese use of force' must remain more or less similar if not same in 't' and 't+1' time periods. Facts are scattered over the post Cold War period, since it is being used only to validate the existence of certain belief and therefore not arranged chronologically. Different sub-concepts constitute the concept of use of force. These are as following:

- 1) Concept of specific law
- 2) Concept of whole situation
- 3) Concept of strategic retreat
- 4) Concept of mobile warfare
- 5) Concept of active and passive defence
- 6) Concept of evaluation of use of force

The concepts of specific law, whole situation, and evaluation of use of force are purely ideational in nature, whereas concepts of strategic retreat, mobile warfare, and active and passive defence are to an extent influenced by material condition. The study attempts to link together the understanding of these concepts by Chinese elites.

The third chapter describes the beliefs held by China in the post-Cold War period. The years, 1995 and 2000 A.D have been considered important in the post Cold War Period. Intensification of Taiwan Strait conflict peaked during these two years. Chinese beliefs regarding its environment, use of force, interdependent foreign economic relations, and material condition have been searched to have signatures of strategic cultural mindset. It accounts for those traits that have changed and those that continue in similar or different form. How Chinese conceptualisation (with respect to use of force) functions within this constructed belief system of China in post-Cold War Era is an objective of this study, and thereby proposing an explanation to Chinese strategic behaviour (with respect to use of force) in present times.

The reason for selecting this post-Cold War period in determining the basic traits of Chinese strategic culture is due to difficulty in establishing a testable link between the earlier sources like the Confucius teachings and the experiences gathered while employing force during the long imperial era. National policy employed by early leaders in the post-revolutionary period deliberately attempted to undermine the teachings of earlier philosophers in order to find legitimacy for their own ideology. Of course, this is not to refute that the later part of CCP rule in China has again called for rejuvenation of earlier social order. Moreover, the time gaps at which some of these policies were

implemented are strong evidences suggesting that the earlier social order was not easily replaceable². This is not to emphasis that earlier sources are invalid, but that they have been strongly influenced and adulterated by later schools. The changes can be attributed to both internal and external causes³. Sources of strategic culture rooted in distant past argue for the defensive mindset that shapes Chinese use of force⁴. This is not a readily acceptable proposition.

There is a shortage of real time events in post-Cold War period where China may have used actual force (war). Though minor uses of force and threat to use force have existed, these have not been considered to make analysis. Taiwan crisis (1995-96) qualifies to be a case for study due to the following reasons;

- (1) Taiwan is associated with China's humiliation beginning with the Opium War 1840
- (2) During the post-Cold war period Chinese elites have been most vociferous and rhetoric about Taiwan, thereby giving opportunities to verify cultural influences
- (3) Taiwan is associated with China's need to reunify
- (4) Taiwan, is an crisis where unfavourable outcomes to the conflict is unacceptable to China
- (5) China has repeatedly threatened employment of use of force on China if policy of peaceful reunification does not bring results

Though Chinese use of force prior to post-Cold War period is valuable sources on how Chinese conceptualise use of force, these have not been taken up for study. The premise being that it may not help in understanding the present Chinese strategic behaviour. Moreover, it is important to identify a case amidst the reality of post-Cold War, which is governed by Chinese strategic culture constraints. Revolutionary changes have been taking place within the realm Chinese strategic thinking. However, the strength of

strategic culture lies in its endurance in surviving these changes and yet influencing Chinese strategic behaviour.

The central theme of this dissertation is to prove the following:

- 1) Existence of strategic cultural influence in the post-Cold War era
- 2) Chinese strategic behaviour being a product of strategic cultural constraints
- 3) Chinese strategic behaviour being a product of existing belief system

This will highlight the need for special unit specific theories, in place of general theories like realism and liberalism in predicting Chinese strategic behaviour.

CHAPTER I

THE APPROACH OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

Chinese historians and politicians have for many years pondered the reasons for Chinese military defeats in war during the nineteenth century. Noted historian Hu Sheng, while contemplating over the question “Why were the Chinese defeated with such ease in every battle?” says, according to Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), a high-ranking minister in the late Qing Dynasty who was in charge of military, political, and foreign affairs, inferior weaponry was the real cause of China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War⁵. However, Hu contradicts the statement saying: “In fact the real reason for China’s defeat rested with Li’s attitude shared by his fellow bureaucrats advocating a “Westernisation movement”. If Imperial China had not opted for compromise and capitulation, and assumed an attitude of fighting to the end would China have emerged victorious? In economic terms China was a sleeping giant, and was still industrially and agriculturally backward. Politically speaking, the country lacked strong, far sighted and advanced leadership. From an international standpoint, China lacked allies, especially with regard to a united anti-Japanese front. Militarily, the country lacked the muscle to defend her territory.

China’s strategic behaviour is assessed primarily from a power-political perspective, using elements of realist approach to international relations. In this approach the focus of analysis rests principally on the state as a political entity dedicated towards ensuring the internal and external security of both elite and populace. Material factors such as the country’s geographical position, resource endowment, economic size, and military power are emphasised as critical determinant in the assessment of a state’s capability to provide security. Moreover, internal and external power relations are measured on material factors, and form the primary basis of threat perception and overall security calculations and actions. Choice of use of force, in ensuring security, has also been analysed from this perspective. Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih (1993:41), while assessing eleven instances of Chinese use of force since 1840, claim that non-material factor-*national image*- played a crucial role in explaining why China took to arms⁶. The primary argument here had been that Chinese employment of force could not be completely explained by rational choice analysis or realist paradigm. The primary assumption behind the argument was that non-material (ideational factors such as ideas,

self-image, experiences, beliefs, values) factors may have determined Chinese strategic behaviour with regard to use of force. This was not to emphasise that non-material factors were the sole determinant, but that these functioned along with material factors. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to identify the non-material factors which may or may not combine with structural factors to shape the formulation and implementation of China's strategic behaviour.

The primary reason for undertaking this approach in analysing Chinese strategic behaviour is that since 1949, and even before, there have been certain contradictions in Chinese strategic behaviour. This has been particularly apparent with regard to the Chinese use of force. As William H Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim (2006:4) argue, few expected Mao Zedong's non-descript million-man peasant army to defeat Chiang Kai-shek's three million soldiers with modern, heavy weapons⁷. The People's Republic of China (PRC) resorted to violence in 72 percent of its foreign policy crises as opposed to 18 percent in the case of United States and 27 percent in the case of Soviet Union (Alastair Ian Johnston, 1995)⁸. Despite its limited capabilities, China resorted to force against even stronger powers. In the post-war era China was the only power to attack both superpowers, the United States in Korea in November 1950 and the Soviet Union at Zhenbao Island in 1969. Its methods of attack, from the reliance on magical Boxers⁹ (1900) to symbolic shelling of the enemy on alternate days (Taiwan 1958), were equally unorthodox (Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu-Shih, 1993: 124). Increasingly, since the rise of liberalism and capitalism, orthodox analysis remains puzzled by China's apparent disconcert for high casualties and costs (Korean and Sino-Vietnamese Wars) and disjunctions between military action and political results (Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnamese Wars) . The PRC has used force against its neighbours at least 12 times since 1949, and it is argued by strategic culturist that all these instances were a departure from Clausewitzian forces-based war.

China's use of force with regard its beginnings, motives, processes, or termination of wars cannot be predicted with confidence in present times. China has differed in using force similar to the way realist and liberals predict. All these instances of use of force had

one similarity that this study intends to prove. China has used force regularly but reluctantly. Chinese use of force is more subjective and supplementary in nature. Western understanding (Clausewitzian) of use of force is more complementary in nature. Use of force complements United States doctrine of 'pre-emption' and 'regime removal'. Chinese strategies *per se* do not include the option of use of force. Their strategies are designed to achieve the objectives without the use of force. However, it is important to note that Chinese do not avoid the use of force. In other words Chinese are not constrained by internal or external circumstances to avoid use of force. Chinese strategies under natural circumstances will not include use of force due to the influence of its strategic culture. China is used to resolving its disputes without the use of force. This belief or ideational milieu is a product of Chinese civilisation history. It has existed in many forms though, for example after the opium war in 1840 and before strong revolutionary period in 1937, in the words of Allen Whiting,

Moreover, China's response to foreign penetration between 1840 and 1937 rarely included outright military resistance. Instead, reliance on alternative means, including diplomacy, international law, appeals to world opinion and passive non-resistance characterised an effort to preserve territorial integrity under conditions of increasing internal weakness and growing external threat. (Allen Whiting, 1975: 244)¹⁰.

In their analysis of Sino-Indian war, Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih (1993:201-209) argue that the Chinese used force in order to achieve the objective of international tranquillity and create conditions for domestic reconstruction and appropriate diplomacy. Jonathan and Shih further argued that the ultimate objective of this exercise was to build an appropriate Chinese national image. The war was not fought to show China's strength, gain territory or humiliate India-although all these may be the by-products. The war was also a show of Chinese self-restraint, which was meant to induce self-restraint on the part of India and other aggressive parties. Chinese troops moved forward quickly after China launched an offensive against the Indian army on October 20, 1962. Zhou Enlai graciously offered to withdraw 20 miles behind the disputed border line. After a lull of three weeks on November 18, 1962, China launched

its second offensive. After two days China announced a unilateral ceasefire and declared that it would begin withdrawing from all positions within ten days. According to Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu-Shih (1993:207) the way Chinese forces were used in this war to show the reluctance towards employing military force. This point was accepted by the then Indian Ambassador to China, Pannikar,

It was the attitude of a brother who was considerably older and well established in the world, who prepares to give his advice to a younger brother struggling to make his way. Independent India was welcome, but of course it was understood that China, as the recognised Great Power in Asia after the war, expected India to know her place¹¹. (Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu-Shih, 1993:204)

A similar pattern of confusion, paradox, and dilemma appeared in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. China invaded Vietnam, a former ally, after announcing its intent to do so, not because of vital interest but to recall the Vietnamese to their proper place in the world. When Chinese troops had finally seized Lang Son, at great cost, Beijing unexpectedly announced a unilateral withdrawal and recalled its forces to China. Euro-American Clausewitzians could explain neither why China needed to occupy Lang Son with massive casualties nor why it withdrew from decisive terrain without any political concessions from Vietnam. This contradiction in Chinese behaviour exists even in the present time. Lau Siu-Kai argues that the Hong Kong policy was primarily driven by utilitarian calculations of national interest, and the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. Its primary goals were to secure a less-threatening external political environment and to make calculated use of Hong Kong for China's economic development. By allowing Britain to rule Hong Kong in 1949, China made an exception to its ideological lines. Western intellectuals frequently complain about the ambiguity and secrecy surrounding the Chinese military doctrine, its deployment, its budget, its weapon research and development programme, and its current order of battle, and attribute it to the lack of transparency in China's social system. Zhang and Yao hold the view that this is because they overlook the role played by deep-rooted philosophical thinking in which ambiguity is not only a means to achieve an end but also an art to be explored with imagination. Concealment, deception, and secrecy, are all salient ingredients of traditional military

stratagem, have to do more with China's traditional culture than its current social system (Suisheng Zhao, 2004)¹². Similarly, China unlike its western counterparts must base its legitimacy on its superior virtue and morality (in line with Confucian culture), and must explicitly pass moral judgement on the conduct of other nations. PRC must pass moral judgements on other parties before entering into serious negotiation with them in order to claim advantage in negotiation. From the western point of view this is the last thing a nation would do on the eve of serious negotiations. This is evident from Chinese behaviour with regard to erstwhile Soviet Union and India. It was in a deliberate exercise that China built up a case for India being an imperial, before launching offence on its borders in 1962. These specific behavioural styles can only be attributed to Chinese traditional strategic culture. It is not to emphasise that Chinese traditional strategic culture completely determines the behavioural style but at least influences it to an extent.

The dominant existing perception on the image of China is that of an ancient culture possessing a weak martial tradition, a predisposition to seek non-violent solutions to problems of statecraft as exemplified by the thinking of sages like Sun Zi and Confucius, and a defensive-mindedness, favouring sturdy fortifications over expansionism and invasion. Great Wall of China is also interpreted to be representative of the defensive orientation of Chinese strategic culture. Andrew Scobel (2003)¹³ argues that the Great Wall epitomises Chinese preference for defence over offence, positional warfare over mobile warfare, and maintenance over expansion. The wall is held up as the prime example of a Chinese strategic tradition that is very different from that of western countries. While assessing the philosophy of Chinese military culture, William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim (2006)¹⁴ claim that Chinese thinking on use of force is a complete departure from its western counterpart. According to them, history has focussed China's strategic cultural development – like those of several other cultures – along the path of weakness confronting strength. Understanding technology as only a subordinate to human will, Chinese strategist have historically drawn their power more from the people and from nature. Chinese strategic culture has consistently rejected the western way of warfare, with (its) obsession with successful campaigns and engagements, many of them hollow, or ensuring tactical success often at the price of strategic ruin¹⁵ (William H. Mott

and Jae Chang Kim, 2006:1). In contrast to western military philosophy which endorses maximum use of force against the enemy to completely eliminate the opponent, Chinese military philosophy aims at neither maximum use of force nor complete elimination of the enemy. Therefore, its concept of victory, domination and enemy vary from its western counterparts. The whole idea behind the Chinese use of force does not seem to be same as its western counterpart. The implication is that resisting threats to territory, defending borders, or protecting other tangible national interests are not the ultimate purposes for using force (William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, 2006).

Another set of scholars like Muthaiah Alagappa (1998), view Chinese strategic behaviour is constrained by factors that are deeply rooted in its history¹⁶. This implies two things, firstly, it regards historical factors only as a constraint and not a sole determinant of strategic behaviour and secondly they argue that deep rooted historical beliefs and values constrain the actual number of strategic choices available to formulate Chinese strategic behaviour and thereby affecting it. Alastair Ian Johnston uses the term preferences to indicate that the influence of strategic culture may lead to certain preferences over others which may not be altered even by material factors. Andrew Scobel (2003), too, strongly discounts the study of material factors in the determination of Chinese strategic behaviour. He puts emphasis on the study of strategic culture, organisational culture and political culture in the determination of Chinese strategic behaviour. While analysing the 1995-1996 Taiwan strait crises, Andrew Scobel (2003) emphasises that the Chinese strategic decisions were more influenced by the attitudes of the soldiers than that of the statesmen. The underlining point is that Chinese strategic behaviour cannot be purely assessed from a perspective where China is merely responding to a stimulus in external environment. In a different set of work on strategic culture, scholars develop their argument by highlighting the weakness of the realist paradigm in explaining the Chinese strategic behaviour with regard to its use of force. Scholars like John Glenn find inconsistency between China's strategic behaviour as it should be in accordance with principles of realism and what it actually is. This void is presumably the result of ignorance of the non-material factors by realism. Its central

belief that states of undifferentiated units try to maximize power, where power is defined in material terms, is not readily acceptable to its critics.

The discipline of strategic culture is largely indebted to Jack Snyder (1977:8) who first coined the term while assessing the contradictions in the strategies of Soviet Union and United States with regard to nuclear weapons¹⁷. Snyder (1977) emphasised that United States' belief that Soviet Union would employ nuclear weapon on its own line of thinking was wrong. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was never part of Soviet strategy. The United States, on the other hand, tended to exhibit a tendency towards a sporadic messianic and crusading use of force that was deeply rooted in the moralism of the early republic, and in a fundamental belief that warfare was an aberration in human relations (Alastair Ian Johnston, 1995). Later, Alastair Ian Johnston in his seminal work on this subject identified three generations of scholars. According to Alastair Ian Johnston, the basic criteria of classifying these had been with regard to methodology and definitional issues. The first generation conceptualised strategic culture as the sole determinant of strategic behaviour. Methodologically, it treated strategic culture as an independent variable to completely explain the dependent variable, strategic behaviour. The assumption here was that strategic culture represented all those factors that determine strategic behaviour. This assumption was problematic since the concept of strategic culture was unwieldy- which included almost everything under the sun- and therefore did not allow any space for a non-cultural explanation. The second generation scholars largely conceptualized strategic culture as instrumental. In other words, they saw strategic culture's utility in providing rationale or justification of strategic behaviour. Instrumentality implied that decision-making elites could rise above strategic cultural constraints by manipulating it. Therefore, in his conceptualisation of strategic culture, Alastair Ian Johnston plays down the instrumental nature of strategic culture by saying that those elements of strategic culture which are used to justify a particular decision do not act as a constraint in the selection of that choice. The third generation which emerged in the 1990s tended to be both more rigorous and eclectic in its conceptualisation of ideational independent variable and more narrowly focused on particular strategic decisions as dependent variables. The emphasis was on using military culture, political-

military culture, and organisational culture as the independent variable, but all took the realist edifice as target, and focused on cases where structural-materialist notion of interest could not explain a particular strategic choice. The sources of these cultural values were, however, believed to be less deeply rooted in history, and clearly the product of recent practice and experience. The approach of Chinese strategic culture deliberates on the uniqueness of strategic behaviour among different nations due to variance in their strategic culture. Apart from history, national experiences, geography, culture, natural resources, and people, “conceptualising of use of force” has significant effect on strategic culture of a particular nation. Strategic culture is or can be traced back to the very beginning of a nation’s history. In other words, sources of strategic culture is scattered over long duration of time. There has so far been no consensus with regard to the question as to which period in history should be considered for the demarcation of sources of strategic culture¹⁸. However, the difference in strategic cultures, apart from certain determinants as mentioned above, can also be attributed to the time period when strategy as a discipline came into existence in different nations. Uniqueness of Chinese strategic culture is due to the difference in its understanding of concepts. Works of Sun Zi and Carl Von Clausewitz, though belonging to different time periods, are important representatives of Chinese and Western strategic culture respectively. Sun Zi understood war to be of vital importance to the state and a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Here war is directly related with security and destruction, however Clausewitzian understanding varies. Clausewitz defines war as: *War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will*. Mao on the other hand saw war as product of social class struggle, and therefore inevitable. Clausewitz emphasises on the nature of war (violent) and the objective of war (compel our opponent to fulfil our will), and thereby treats war as an instrument in the hands of state. Sun Zi on the other hand treats war as an “inevitable occurrence of event” during the course of a nation’s life. Its objective, according to Sun Zi, seems to be to security from destruction. This difference in conceptualisation of use of force may have a role in the grave variance in the security related behaviours of China and Western countries. Since use of force has been conceptualised in China as a defensive mechanism to be employed in order to ensure security from destruction, it can be argued that non-expansionist behaviour of China

during the entire course of its national life is directly or indirectly related to the way in the way use of force has been conceptualised by it. However, this can be a sweeping generalisation which needs to be verified. According to Alastair Ian Johnston's conceptualisation of strategic culture, a particular behaviour which is unexplainable by rational and structural factors can be explained by strategic cultural factors. Non-expansionism on the part of China is not well explained by non-strategic cultural schools¹⁹. Rationally and structurally, there are no evident reasons to explain China's general tendency to be non-expansionist and its use of force, as also its abrogation of expansionist use of force. The only plausible explanation follows from the study of the fact that China's belief in expansion of territories was constrained, if not determined, by the way use of force was conceptualised. This difference in conceptualisation of war has implications for various other concepts that make up for war. For example, the concept of victory is seen as a condition in which 'will' is deliberated on the opponent, in Western understanding (Anatol Rapoport, 1968:348). Since Chinese view war as an instrument to ensure security, victory is a realisation of status quo.

This was in direct contradiction with the first generation scholars who believed the sources of strategic culture to be deeply rooted in history. The definition of culture used by the third generation was- "culture either presents decision-makers with limited range of options or it acts as a lens that alters the appearance and efficacy of different choices" (Alastair Ian Johnston, 1995)²⁰.

Alastair Ian Johnston (1995) identifies six ways of conceptualisation of strategic culture which are as following:

- No exogenous variables need be taken into account, strategic culture directly explains strategic choice for one of two reasons a) it provides strategic options, b) exogenous actors are considered to be part of strategic culture.
- Strategic culture provides a preference ranking of choices that is insensitive to change in structural variables such that its predictions are distinct, say, from determinate version of structural realism. Here strategic culture does not explain

why a particular choice was exercised but why particular choice though logical was preferred over the other.

- In the third instance, strategic culture could be conceived of as a consistent set of ranked preferences that persist across strategic context. Thus changes in exogenous conditions interact with a constant strategic culture to produce variation in the composite independent variable.
- Directly linking strategic culture to organisational culture.
- Strategic culture as an instrument, justifying policy, and excluding alternatives to debate in the domestic game, while decisions are made on an entirely different basis.
- How the experiences held in t time effects the decision in $t+1$ time, for example the core belief that “central leadership” is central to China’s national security.

The importance of “central leadership” is a cultural trait originating from civilisational status of China. During the imperial time, dynastic rulers were constrained by the vast geography of China. It was challenging to administer such a vast area. Cultural assimilation was one strategy through which foreign dynasties ruled China. Chinese social order was used as the basic foundation to enforce rule. “Central leadership” is not just a phenomenon in Chinese politics but also a core feature of its society. The reference here is to the family system (*filial piety*). Under no circumstances will the authority of central leadership be compromised. Chinese use of force in Tiananmen Square in 1989 is a recent example. China in the post-cold era has exhibited its objective “political reforms following economic reforms”. Political reform may liquidate Chinese central leadership. It is assumed that the best results of economic reforms may not be realised in the absence of central leadership. “Central leadership” is a strategic cultural trait. One of China’s basic goal and task in maintaining national security is to safeguard the political, economic and cultural rights and interests of the Chinese people, crack down on criminal activities of all sorts and maintain public order and social stability (China’s National Defence, 2004)²¹.

According to Johnston, material factor in conjunction with strategic culture completely explains strategic behaviour. If the explanation generated by these two varies with the explanation generated by using material factors alone, it would imply the following. Firstly, it would certainly prove that strategic culture exists and influences strategic behaviour. Secondly, it will be possible to ground it in empirical terms.

Another way of conceptualising strategic culture is to read it in terms of preferences. Presumably, many options are available to decision makers caught in a strategic dilemma. However, it is not always that the best option is put to use; other options, some more instantly and others more reluctantly, are preferred. This would be found to be consistent over a period of time, and thus help in forming a pattern with respect to a country's strategic decision making. If consistency and pattern exists then it could be possible to identify and determine strategic culture. Similar to the above-mentioned conceptualisation is the method of classifying the nature of strategic options. Strategic options can be classified as optimal or sub-optimal and rational or irrational. In case it is found that there is a visible pattern of sub-optimal or irrational options, then the reasons can be attributed to ideational, non-material, cultural factors that constitute strategic culture. It is, however, suggested that ideational factors should still be regarded as epiphenomenal, where as structural constraints should be deemed the primary cause of state behaviour. Another conceptual point relates to the view whether strategic culture should be taken as a dependent variable or as an intervening one. Alastair Ian Jhonston identifies two schools: 1) treatment of strategic culture as an intervening variable, where culture has secondary importance to material factors 2) strategic culture as an independent variable that may explain particular strategic decision.

Having conceptualised strategic culture in such a way, to empirically ground it, it is important to precisely define strategic culture. The term 'strategy' is traditionally used to refer to the way military power is used by governments in pursuit of their interests. It is the methodology designed to optimise benefits and minimise costs in pursuit of national objectives. The term culture is, on the other hand understood to, firstly, be the property of collectivities as opposed to the individuals who constitute them; secondly, have distinct

connotations, and profound differences are assumed to exist between different collectivities; thirdly, be relatively stable in comparison with material conditions, and change only gradually, if at all, over time. The term strategic cultural, implicitly, describes the culture of strategies. It is the property of collectivities associated with strategic decision-making, as opposed to the individuals who constitute them, and are distinct and profound to other strategic cultures. Strategic culture is assumed to be relatively stable in comparison with material conditions. However, the rate of change of strategic culture lags behind that of material condition. Having put to use strategic culture is unlikely to be of much help in explaining why option A was chosen over alternative B – but it may be of great help in understanding why A and B were considered, while no thought was given to C, D or E (Alastair Ian Johnston, 1995:).

There are numerous attempts in literature to define strategic culture, although Snyder's (1977) definition is often used as a benchmark by many writers. For Snyder, strategic culture refers to;

The sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and pattern of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have achieved through instruction and imitation of each other with regard to nuclear strategy²².

This above-mentioned definition fails to provide a testable link between strategic culture and strategic behaviour. Conditioned emotional response is hard to ground and account for. And patterns of habitual behaviour need not necessarily occur due to non-material factor.

Alastair Ian Johnston, in seeking to obtain a notion of strategic culture that is falsifiable, invokes an even broader definition;

An integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting preferences, by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in inter-state political affairs.

By this definition, Alastair means that strategic culture should not be distinguishable from non-strategic variables but should also provide decision makers with a uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which predictions can be made about behaviour. Valerie M. Hudson (2001) while developing a research agenda on strategic culture claims that there cannot be any one “right” definition of culture²³. However, a particular definition may be better suited to the type of study one wishes to conduct. If one is primarily interested in predicting what a nation will do next in a certain international situation, a dramaturgical definition may be useful. If one is interested in how internal forces in society are persuaded to support a foreign policy, the politics of shared meaning would be a good place to start from (Valerie M. Hudson, 2001). The task of defining culture, or strategic culture for that matter, is even more complex when Katzenstein’s argument is accounted for. He contends that the most influential cultural elements with respect to a specific foreign policy issue are the most difficult to ascertain methodologically. This is because since all the members of a culture are cognizant of the element, they find no need to mention it or debate its applicability (Katzenstein: 1996)²⁴.

Research on symbolic elements of strategy suggests that strategic culture may not have a direct, independent and societal specific effect on strategic choice. Therefore, strategic culture may have an observable effect on state behaviour, but contrary to much of the existing literature on strategic culture; it may not be unique to any particular state. If this is so, then it cannot be claimed that strategic culture is present and has direct effect on behaviour. The approach of strategic culture while setting a research agenda assumes the following: first, strategic culture approach identifies specific national tendencies that are derived from historical experience, thus ‘cancelling out the notion of a universal assumed rationality’. Second, strategic culture refers to collectives, whether military organisations, policy communities or entire societies. A strategic culture thus provides certain enduring attitudes, assumptions and beliefs shared by the collective, which will lead to a particular interpretation of material conditions. Third, strategic culture assumes the existence of a perceptual lens or milieu through which information is received, mediated and processed into appropriate responses.

It is debatable whether strategic cultural factors affecting strategic behaviour are deeply rooted in history or more clearly the product of recent practice and experience. In order to find an acceptable solution to this problem, it is important to understand the factors that bring about a change in cultural factors over a period of time. If culture was assumed to be the property of a collectivity-nation, region, class, ethnic community, formal organisation, party- the property would be similar to beliefs, values and attitudes generally true for all members of that collectivity. While beliefs, values, and attitudes held by a collectivity are enduring, strategic culture can evolve over time and undergo dramatic transformation as a result of major disruption, such as defeat in war, invasion or occupation, and the emergence of a radically new political system, leader, or philosophical outlook. Such was the case with Japan and Germany after defeat in World War II, and also with the Soviet Union in the mid 1980s after Mikhail S. Gorbachev's accession to power and adoption of "New Thinking" (Andrew Scobel, 2003). Andrew Scobell argues that there does not seem to have been any radical change in Chinese strategic culture, certainly since 1949 if not for hundreds perhaps thousands of years. It is argued if at all major reorientation has occurred with regard to Chinese strategic culture, it was during warring states period (403-221 B.C.) In this regard, the claim, made by Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu-Shih (1993), that Chinese use of force had always been directed to reinforce a national image, and had less to do with material end than to certain strategic cultural influence indicates the continuity in Chinese strategic thinking. From this, it can be deduced that strategic culture endures over a period of time and also subject to change by strong exogenous factors. For Jeffrey W. Legro, variations in both cultural and non-cultural variables are natural. For him, cultural and non-cultural variables are rooted in recent experience, and not in deep historical practice as posited by the first generation²⁵. Similarly, Elizebeth Kier, views political-military culture as a product of changing domestic political contexts; hence varying as domestic politics varies. Therefore, it remains inconclusive whether sources of strategic culture are deep rooted in history or in recent practice, and it can only be proved by appropriate methodology and empirical testing.

The sources of strategic culture have been generally referred to the historical sources which are considered to be the best representatives of cultural variables. Alastair Ian Johnston (1995) identifies the following sources where strategic cultural variables can be identified: writings, debates, thoughts, words of strategists, military leaders, national security elites, weapons design and deployments, war plans, images of war, peace portrayed in various media, military ceremonies and even war literature. He adds that predominantly formative experiences of the state and philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the states and its elites give rise to strategic preferences. It is debatable if object of sources representing cultural variables have to necessarily belong to distant past. If strategic culture exists and influences present strategic decisions then it will also be reflected in object of sources of the present. However this element has to be proved and this study seeks to justify this in its concluding chapter.

As mentioned above, strategic culture owes its merits to the demerits of the dominant school of realism. Considering the various²⁶ strands of realism as highlighted by Brian C. Schmidt (1994), except neoclassical realists all others focus on material sources, states, international anarchy, security maximisation, and power maximisation. It is only the neoclassical realist who believes the nature of power to be based on both material sources and psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. Realists generally base their analysis on rationality. Any deviance from rationality is attributed to human nature. The neo-realist framework discounts the accumulated weight of the past in favour of a forward-looking calculation of expected utility. Assumptions of neo-realist paradigm are: 1) functionally undifferentiated units that seek to optimise their utility; 2) utility is un-problematically defined as power, often as capabilities and resources; 3) maximisation of capabilities. These assumptions are held to be problematic by non-realists who fail to view a unit within international structure as a functionally undifferentiated unit. This difference in assumptions opens up different set of challenges for both the schools. Neo-realist is challenged to justify why differences exist between various units with regard to their strategic behaviour if they are functionally undifferentiated. On the other hand strategic culturists are left with the task of justifying why there are similarities among units if they are functionally different to

each other. Apart from classical realist all major strands of realism conceptualise power in terms of material. This is held to be problematic. Power can be conceptualised in various other ways, like power can be conceptualised in terms of time, context, logistics, and opportunity. In their assessment of the philosophy of Chinese military culture, William H. Mott and Jae Chang Kim (2006:15) elaborate on the Chinese strategic doctrine – *Shi* – which conceptualised power as something that emerged in the combination of men’s heart, military weapons and natural condition. It strongly emphasised on three factors: the people, the context and the enemy. Neo-realists consider strategic choices to be optimal ones and constrained by variables like geography, capability, threat and a tendency of states to refrain from certain behaviour. Strategic culturist on the other hand claim that strategic choices do not follow directly from changes in threat, technology, or organisation but from pattern of successful campaigns in a society’s history, geography, economy and politics (William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, 2006) . Neo-realism fails to explain the factors that gave rise to the disposition of military capabilities known as structure; why some states are involved in that disposition and not others, and how they reached that position. The constructivist on the other hand believes that individual political actors cannot create their own world, but are compelled to interact within an external world created by the projections of other agents similarly engaged in the act of construction. The products of past interactions which are created from the expectations and actions of actors are required to work within the framework of past and present interaction and structure.

Strategic culture on the other hand is not opposed to rationality *per se*. Strategic culture is in agreement with the limited notion of rationality. Culture does not explain particular choices which individuals make. Its explanatory power is primarily restricted to setting the agenda. Culture at best introduces biases in perception; it limits vision and range of choice (Alastair Ian Johnston, 1995). Strategic culture is argued to be a short hand expression for a ‘mind set’ which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviours, problems and solution which are logically possible. Strategic culture agrees with limited rationality where strategic culture simplifies reality, it agrees with process rationality where strategic culture defines ranked preferences or

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narrow options, and also with adaptive rationality where historical choices, analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice. However, strategic culture disagrees with game rationality which, like neo-realist framework, discounts the accumulated weight of the past in favour of a forward-looking calculation of expected utility (Alastair Ian Jhonston, 1995). According to Alexander Wendt, there is nothing intrinsic within the anarchical structure of the international environment to produce the security dilemma and the self-help behaviour exhibited by states. Anarchy as Wendt claims is what states make of it and security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature of course. Once institutionalised, such a dilemma may be hard to change but the identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings that are always in process (Alexander Wendt, 1992)²⁷. Wendt argues ‘a gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing from one in the hands of an enemy, and enmity is a social, not material, relation’ (Alexander Wendt, 1992). In other words, material factors depend on our pre-existing identities and perception of others. This is only to argue that material condition may not comprehensively explain a particular behaviour. While pondering over the question of why ‘ideas’ are important, Jeffrey W. Legro observes that leaders may use ideas to rationalise their actions but such ideas are hardly a constraint on their actions, and certainly not a cause of them. He argues that ideas influence change and are not simply a product of change. The emphasis is on actors having alternative preferences for which various strategies are adopted to achieve these preferences. A particular choice regarding which strategy is to be adopted is a matter of ideas and beliefs. Legro further argues that “if problem complexity is too great – possibly because of unreliable information on the state of the world - then substantive rationality results do not hold.” Therefore, it is important that the decision makers hold a mental model²⁸.

The central assumption of strategic cultural approach is that elites socialised in different strategic cultures will make different choices when placed in similar situations. This leaves two challenges, one each for strategic culturalist and structuralist. Structuralists need to explain why this assumption, which contradicts their own assumption, is false. The strategic culturalist needs to explain why there are similarities in choices made by elites when placed in similar situations. Therefore, strategic culturalists

do not claim that their predictions will certainly disprove the predictions made by structuralist. In general, strategic cultural prediction may or may not be similar to ahistorical and structural prediction. In terms of predictory value, strategic culture and a non-cultural and ahistorical approach have no priori whatsoever for these two to be same or different (Alastair Ian Johnston, 1995).

To claim that a nation has its own homogenous strategic culture across time may not be true. The sources of strategic culture are argued to be multiple. The inputs that go into shaping a particular strategic culture may end in bringing about competing strands of strategic culture. This is held to be the major weakness of the earlier work by strategic culturalists, who according to Alastair Ian Johnston, belong to the first generation. If strategic culture is held to be the single independent source which directly influences strategic behaviour and if this linkage fails to occur then it can only be logically deduced that strategic culture fails to exist. Since strategic culture is unit specific it has to be necessarily unique to a particular country. The range of strategic options available to one state may be great enough for it to significantly overlap with other states. In this case strategic culture loses its characteristics of being a falsifiable proposition. Strategic culture in this sense can also be approached from a comparative point of view. Explanations in this regard could focus on comparing strategic decisions of two different countries placed in similar strategic dilemma where all material constraints are assumed in equal significance for both countries.

The literature on strategic culture assumes the sources of the present strategic culture to be placed in the distant past. Any analysis from this point of view only helps in generalisations and does not culminate into any credible predictions. In order to identify the sources of strategic culture Alastair Ian Johnston identifies three levels of inputs into a states strategic culture:

- A macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethno-cultural characteristics, and history

- A societal level consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society
- Micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations

A macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethno-cultural characteristics presumably remain stable over a period of time and therefore its contribution in shaping strategic culture remains relatively stable. A societal level consisting of social level consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society are too dynamic with regard to stability. Therefore accounting for change at this level can be a very difficult endeavour. The third level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil military relations by its very nature becomes the best input into strategic culture for the purpose of analysis. Andrew Scobel, while analysing the Taiwan Strait crisis (1995-1996) accounts for this level and concludes that the hawkish attitude of the soldiers was the primary reason behind the crisis. This crisis, the first crisis in the post Deng Xiaoping era was in contradiction with the earlier crisis, where the statesmen were more hawkish when compared to the soldiers. Thereby indicating a change in the mind set of civil-military relations. Even from the point of view organisational culture, military as an institution, qualifies as an ideal institution in preserving and adding value to traditional strategic culture. Furthermore, Andrew Scobell (2003) suggests that security studies ought to broaden the concept of culture to include the existence of multiple layers of culture: military culture, civil-military culture, as well as strategic culture. This study therefore considers some of the above mentioned layers (military, bureaucracy, and polity) for analysing Chinese conceptualisation of force and evaluates its functional relation with the environment (Chinese) in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER II

CHINESE CONCEPTUALISATION OF USE OF FORCE

Though the recent development in China during the post Cold war era has not particularly led to territorial expansion or employment of offensive means to control its periphery, it is evident that the means by which China seeks to control its periphery has significantly changed²⁹. Primary concern for strategies in the three periods varied. Confucius was primarily concerned with the creation and maintenance of proper civilian government, and achievement of these ends meant the privileging of moral suasion over coercion. Sun Zi has not advocated the shrinking use of force; he largely dealt with tactical level of war. Here Sun Zi advised battle commanders to opt for strategies which consumed less use of force. Therefore, it was not to minimise the use of force but to recommend a strategy that would lead to an effective management of the use of force. According to Johnston, China engaged in a total of 3,790 recorded internal and external historical wars from 1100 B.C. to 1911 (end of the Qing Dynasty). Moreover, in the time of the Ming dynasty alone, China engaged in an average of 1.12 external wars per year through the entire dynasty Alistair Ian Johnston (1995). Therefore, even though, theoretically speaking the ancient philosophers argued for less coercion, China's actual behaviour suggests otherwise³⁰. The primary weak link in strategic cultural theories based on ancient sources is that they allow only broad unfalsifiable generalisation. For example, analysis of war frequency in Imperial China would suggest broad variations in Chinese use of force in three different period of the empire³¹. Frequency of war was not the highest during the early periods, but almost all empires have fought wars during the early period. The highest frequency of war occurred during the fag end of each empire³². Song Dynasty (907-1279) employed the maximum use of force between 1214 and 1263. Variations have occurred during the middle period. Later Dynasties, Yuan (1279-1368), Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), and Sing Dynasty (1644-1911), fought no wars during their middle period. Yuan Dynasty resorted to least or no force in mid-thirteenth century (roughly 1338-1363), Ming Dynasty used no force during late fifteenth and early sixteenth century (roughly 1489-1538), and Ming Dynasty did not fight any war during the late sixteenth century (roughly 1689-1713). However, early Dynasties of Tang (618-907) and Song (907-1279) used force during the middle period and in both these Dynasties the frequency of war during the middle period has been more than the frequency of war during the early period. A deduction from this analysis would suggest

that post war China (1949-till date) has been consistent with Imperial China in using force during its early period. However, to argue that the absence of war during post-1979 period is consistent with the middle period of Imperial China would be to state that China is presently in its middle period. This is contestable. All Chinese dynasties have survived for more than a century; the shortest Dynasty was Yuan Dynasty. Moreover the absence of war during the middle period was largely due to the empire's capability to control its periphery by non-military means. China is presently not controlling its peripheral region as it did during the Imperial period. Therefore, China is still in its early period, consolidating and developing its national power and central authority. According to Johnston, the Chinese state will usually choose elimination of an opponent through offensive force over static defence or accommodation when it clearly enjoys a superior military position and confronts minimal political or economic repercussion (Alistair Ian Johnston, 1995: *). China in the post-Cold War period has not reached this position of strength. Mao emphasised on unanimity of subjective and objective condition (Mao, 1936). Though the subjective need of internal stability and central authority remains similar in both Imperial and post-revolutionary period, objective conditions have changed. China, in Imperial era, confronted the external states from a position of strength. However, post-revolutionary China confronts a technologically and militarily advanced external environment. This highlights the need to base strategic cultural source in recent history. This study, therefore assumes, formative years of Peoples Republic of China (1921-1978) as the period where strategic cultural variables are rooted; this would help in establishing link between Chinese strategic behaviour in the post-cold war period as well.

Chinese use of force can be analysed from four different time periods: the imperial period, the period of hundred years of humiliation (1840-1949), the Kuomintang period and the communist period. Many factors that were unique to each of these periods have been varying. For example, the idea of Chinese national image had gone through serious alteration in all these three periods. The belief that China was the centre of the earth surrounded by other small barbarous nations dominated the self image of China in the imperial era. The second phase, which dominated the period from 1840-1949, was

guided by the belief of a technologically weak China confronting the expansionist countries of the west who were overwhelmingly superior in technological feats. However in the communist period (1949-till date), Chinese national image is a hybrid of the two earlier national self-images. While it accepts the fact that it is still inferior to its western counterparts, it strives to achieve the middle kingdom status³³. Use of force in these different time periods has also differed in almost all the factors that influence it. Arguably, the insight gained from this long historical experience influences the way Chinese use force in the present times. It is to say that certain factors have continued to exert influence while certain others have not. The concept of annihilation, which was not strictly encouraged by ancient military philosophers in China, went through dramatic changes during the communist period. Mao called for annihilation, and emphasised that annihilation was an important criteria for victory in military campaigns (Mao, 1936). Continuity is seen in cases of strategic traits. China, even in this modern era, largely favours strategy that reflects the situation of the weak confronting the strong. This can be attributed to the hundred years of humiliation when Chinese territories were annexed by foreign powers and unequal treaties imposed upon them. This is only to highlight that the present strategies regarding Chinese use of force, at least as ideas, are well rooted in the past. Chinese national image and use of force have not presented a positive or directly proportional relationship. Chinese self image of a central kingdom superior to its neighbours was not directly derived out of its military superiority³⁴. In other words, China's sinocentric world view did not result primarily from nor rely upon an ability to exercise clear military dominance over its neighbours. China's self-image as a great power during the imperial era derived primarily from the dominant influence China exerted over the Asian region by virtue of the sheer size, longevity, cultural and bureaucratic influence, and economic wealth of the Chinese heartland and the Chinese state that ruled it³⁵. China's Asian policy in the post-cold war era has been influenced by this self-image perception. Stating China's basic position on Asia's development in the 21st century, Hu Jintao put forward four goals:

First, greatly develop the economy to enhance the living standard of the Asian peoples, which not only concerns Asian people's livelihood, but also the peace and stability in the world, including Asia. Second, unite to further strengthen

regional economic cooperation. Mutual beneficial cooperation and joint development is the only way for Asian countries to further the development of all of Asian society and sharpen its competitiveness in the international world. Third, set up a new concept of security and safeguard feasible peace and stability in Asia. The new development of hegemony and power politics constitutes a threat against peace and development of the world. Only through cooperation rather than confrontation, consensus rather than imposing one's views on others, can neighbourliness between various countries and joint development be realised. Fourth, meet the requirements of the times and actively push forward the establishment of a just and fair international society. A new international political and economic order should be based on the consensus principles regarding international relations, and reflect the spirit of peace and equality.

The policy of equality among Asian neighbours at superficial level do not confirm to the middle kingdom approach. The functioning of the policy is based on the assumption that "what is good for Asia is good for China". This policy is to an extent idealistic. Competition among developing countries is being tried to be neutralised by raising common concerns and equity approach. For China, this policy will bring about best results only if China happens to be the central to Asian development. Hu Jintao further stated that "China cannot achieve development without Asia, and Asia cannot realise prosperity without China". It is consistent policy of the Chinese Government to strengthen the good neighbourly relations with its surrounding countries. The belief being, functional relationship between China and Asia is presently not in China's favour. In other words Chinese superiority has not reached the level that existed during the middle kingdom period. China has engaged in economic and security arena with its Asian neighbours in its own terms. However its engagement is more constrained than motivated. China pursues a foreign policy of building a good-neighbour relationship and partnership with its neighbours, trying to create an amicable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood, and vigorously pushing forward the building of a security dialogue and cooperation mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region.

According to China's National Defence (2004), after the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) more than six years ago, it has evolved into an important mechanism for promoting regional security, stability and development. It has set up a relatively complete organizational structure and laid a sound legal basis, and

successfully initiated cooperation in security, economic and other fields. In 2003, the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism and the Agreement of State Parties of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the Regional Counter-terrorism Agency took effect. The SCO held meetings of chief procurators and ministers of defence, and conducted joint counter-terrorism military exercises in pursuance of the convention and agreement. In January 2004, the SCO Secretariat and regional counter-terrorism agency was formally inaugurated in Beijing and Tashkent. The Tashkent Summit Meeting of the SCO signed the Tashkent Declaration and the Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illegal Turnover of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and the Precursors Thereof in June 2004. The SCO also set up the mechanism of regular meetings between security committee secretaries of its member states to strengthen security and cooperation.

China understands the importance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and is devoted in developing it further. At the 11th ARF Foreign Ministers' Meeting in 2004, China proposed the following initiatives for the future development of ARF:

- To maintain its forum nature and adhere to the basic principles of decision-making through consensus
- Taking an incremental approach, and moving at a pace comfortable to all members so as to encourage the initiative and active participation of all members
- To continuously strengthen and consolidate confidence-building measures (CBMs) while actively addressing the issue of preventive diplomacy, so as to gradually find out cooperative methods and approaches for preventive diplomacy that are suitable to the region and fitting the current needs
- To increase participation of defence officials, promote exchanges and cooperation among militaries of the countries concerned and give full play to the important role of the militaries in enhancing mutual trust
- To highlight cooperation in non-traditional security fields such as counter-terrorism and combating transnational crimes

For the 2003-2004 Forum, China and Myanmar hosted two intersessions in Beijing and Rangoon respectively on CBMs. China also hosted the ARF Workshop on Drug-Substitute Alternative Development in September 2004 in Kunming, Yunnan Province, and the ARF Conference on Security Policies in November 2004.

In October 2003, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea held their fifth meeting, and issued the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation Among themselves. This confirmed that the three countries would work together to intensify security dialogues and extend exchanges among defence and military officials in East Asia, and strengthen cooperation in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation. The realisation of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula was also on the agenda. In essence the logic behind this engagement is to avoid conflicts and encourage cooperation. This is motivated by Chinese concern for peaceful regional environment to seize the opportunity in the post-cold war era to ensure its national development. China believes that development and security can be ensured only be based on international and universal trust. Effective cooperation can be achieved on the basis of mutual trust. China advocates the abolishment of 'security' based on 'absolute security' of one's own, at the price of sacrificing the security interest of other countries. China presently advocates the need to establish security environment based on 'win-win' situation or 'all win' situation.

Realist and liberal paradigms do not explain this behaviour satisfactorily. These paradigms view Chinese strategic behaviour (cooperation) in terms of constraints. Realist paradigm subscribes to structural constraints while liberal paradigm subscribes to material constraints. This study proposes that China's cooperative behaviour is inherent in its strategic culture and has strong influence in the present times.

Assuming this proposition to be true, it becomes important to view China's strategic behaviour not as a function of constraints, as is the case with realists and liberals. During the post-Cold War China has repeatedly expressed that the present international security environment is in compatibility with its overall national interest. It is also to be remembered that strategic cultural approach does not intend to explain

strategic behaviour as in a process or interaction. It is opposed to game rationality. Chinese cooperative behaviour in the post Cold War era may also be influenced by the ideational milieu (mental model) that China holds about cooperation. In other words it is important to locate Chinese understanding of 'cooperation' in Chinese strategic culture.

In this regard an ancient strategic concept of *shi* comes across with some explanatory value. In the present era of post-Cold War, Chinese have adopted cooperative strategies to find resolution to their border disputes. Assumably the non use of force to resolve border disputes cannot be directly attributed to reasons that realists and liberals put forward. It may not be appropriate to call these strategies *cooperative*, but *cooperative strategies with Chinese characteristics*. Cooperation is an interactive behaviour as viewed by realist and liberals, where interaction is between undifferentiated state units differing in power, measured in terms of material capability. This difference in power and capability is assumed to induce constraints on strategic behaviour of the undifferentiated unit actor. China is strategically cooperative even while it is not interacting since its strategic culture is predisposed to do so. United States is considered to be superpower since it has least structural constraints and therefore regarded as having strategic edge over others. China's growth in the post-Cold War era in terms of economic, military, and comprehensive national power is expected to decrease or increase China's structural constraints that it is facing presently. This logic is subscribed by realist and liberals in predicting China's strategic behaviour. However it is clear from the above analysis that China's strategic behaviour is not a function of structural constraints but something else. Sun Zi (China's renowned sage and military general circa 4th Century BC) emphasised on "preservation of vital interest of a state without use of force"³⁶. Chinese traditional thinking on strategies deliberately does not include use of force, due to cultural constraints. Chinese concepts of power, force, and material condition look very unique and differ functionally with its western counterparts³⁷. *Shi* is defined as the "propensity of things" that relies on assessing, shaping, and exploiting the situation and events for moving toward an overall favourable direction (Francois Jullien, 2004:20). The concept of *Shi* is made up of four key aspects.

- First, *shi* is the reflection of the idea of *qi* and *zheng*. *Zheng* is the conventional approach. In military terms, it is the regular order of battle. The unconventional and extraordinary means of mobilising troops known as *qi* has its inexhaustible variation.
- The second aspect of *shi* is the creation of an overwhelming force with irresistible unleashing power against the adversary.
- The third aspect of *shi* is about developing a favourable military situation with great potential to achieve political objectives.
- The fourth aspect of *shi* is about new initiatives and its maintenance. The *shi* is to make the enemy to confirm to the situation that is favourable to the state and sustain pressure on him. The application of *shi* is quite relevant to deception, stratagem, intelligence, deterrence, etc.

China's search for comprehensive national power in the post Cold war era has close links with the concept of *shi*. However, this causal linkage can be proven empirically with difficulty. China's economic reassurances (one country, two systems) to Taiwan in this regard are worth noting. Through this strategy China has been able to confirm Taiwan to the situation which is favourable to China³⁸. This strategy serves two important objectives that China must adhere to due to cultural constraints. This strategy keeps off 'use of force' as part of grand strategy to achieve the strategic cultural objective of 'peaceful reunification'. Therefore Chinese non-use of force in Taiwan Strait and its objective to peacefully reunify is not a function of structural or material constraints, but strategic cultural constraints³⁹. Also by this logic Chinese cooperation need not necessarily translate into friendship and alliance, it is an adaptive posture to maximise the gains from a particular situation or opportunity. Chinese elites in the post-Cold War era have consistently expressed that China should make best use of the international environment. Though 'cooperation' in appearance is a benign behaviour, its true intent

remains unknown. Moreover China's traditional strategic thinking does not include 'friendship' but 'acquaintances' and 'adversaries'.

SUB-CONCEPTS OF USE OF FORCE:

CONCEPT OF SPECIFIC LAW:

We must study not only the laws of war in general, but the specific laws of revolutionary war, and the even more specific laws of revolutionary war in China. (Mao, 1936)

Mao classified use of force into three; 1) under general circumstances 2) under revolutionary circumstances and 3) under revolutionary circumstances of China⁴⁰. While acknowledging that war was the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations states, or political groups, Mao emphasised on an understanding of the actual circumstances of war, its nature and its relation to other things, in order to win. Chinese use of force is employed under specific environment of China, and therefore having its own specific circumstances and nature as distinct from war in general. Circumstances differed with respect to time, place and nature. All the three determinant of circumstances have varied in each historical stage (Mao, 1936). In general terms, present Chinese circumstances are marked with general geo-strategic significance and growing national capabilities. It's increased and expanded involvement in and influence over the international community is higher than the last time China used force against Vietnam in 1979. Even under changing or evolving circumstances the objective of use of force remains general. To paraphrase Mao, "the aim of war is to eliminate war". In other words use of force, was essentially to eliminate adversaries' use of force. However, Chinese use of force during the post-revolutionary period does not conform to this doctrine⁴¹. Present circumstances of China rule out confrontational strategies, since it is preoccupied with the national goals of economic development and enhancement of national power. According to Mark Hong (2006), China was presently facing the following problems, the huge poverty and

unemployment; serious imbalances in development; the vast non-performing loans and other banking problems; extensive corruption; unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet; unfinished business from Tiananmen in terms of pent-up demand for democracy, human rights; inefficient state owned enterprises etc. Various economists have warned of looming problems such as insolvent state banks which have accumulated debts totalling 3.2 Trillion Yuan, huge budget deficits, hidden debts to pensions and social welfare payments by 2005 rose to a record 3 percent of GDP or US\$ 39 billion, as government spending expanded in order to create jobs. The government has no choice but to continue its huge spending to stimulate economy. However, he mentioned that China's economic growth has been sustained despite its huge problems - the government needs US \$500 billion to recapitalise state banks; US\$ 1 trillion to fund social welfare systems and that China had done well in managing itself economically due to the presence of an astute government. These constraints influence China's specific condition. They adulterate the strategic culture by having stronger influence on Chinese strategic thinking in the post-cold War era. Theoretically, strategic culture if existing should survive these influences. In terms of strategic behaviour, specific circumstances under which China operates presently makes it necessary to prioritise non-confrontational strategies over confrontational policies. China does not restrict this theory to it, but applies it in cases involving other countries. While speaking on peace-keeping operation, at the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, on September 27, 1995, Chinese vice premier and foreign minister Qian Qichen said that it was important to adopt a realistic approach and confine the operation within one's capability. Launch peace-keeping operations only when conditions are ripe and refrain, in whatever circumstances, from becoming a party to a conflict in deviation of the fundamental orientation of such operations⁴².

CONCEPT OF WHOLE SITUATION⁴³:

The concept of victory and concept of defeat is closely associated with the concept of whole situation. According to Mao, strategic victory determined by tactical successes alone was inaccurate since it overlooked the fact that victory or defeat in a war is first and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are properly taken into account. Whole situations are made up of many other partial situations. Defeat of a partial situation is acknowledged only when it adversely affects the overall situation. The view that strategic victory is determined by tactical successes alone is wrong because it overlooks the fact that victory or defeat in a partial situation may or may not adversely affect the whole situation. This explains the importance of taking into account the situation as a whole. Evaluation of use of force through this concept is different from an evaluation measured by any quantitative metric of casualties inflicted or received. According to Thomas Christensen, this concept enables China to use force in a particular instance with the goal of countering negative trends⁴⁴ that are extremely harmful to China's national interests (Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, Larry M. Wortzel, 2003). For example, Beijing judges the Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96) to have been a success because negative trends in Taiwan and the world were checked. China believed that the situation during Taiwan Strait crisis was not conducive to peace and stability on either sides of the Taiwan Strait⁴⁵. If China had not made a show of force, the situation would have deteriorated further. Therefore, China is predisposed to employ use of force in an effort to preserve, enhance or maintain a particular overall situation. Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, Larry M. Wortzel further argue that the implication of emphasising on the overall situation has helped China's leaders to forego the option of war when they do not like it. Furthermore, the PLA's current doctrine of limited war under high technology conditions also makes it likely that Beijing will see conflict as an acceptable risk. Today, from Beijing's perspective, the dominant trends in the world are supposed to be of peace and development. If "peace and development" are assumed to be the overall situation, then Chinese would be predisposed to use force which enhances or preserves this overall situation. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that a highly interdependent China, would shy away from using force because the cost for doing so exceeds the benefit⁴⁶. China's

approach to evaluating military campaigns implies that the objective material costs of a campaign would weigh less in Beijing's calculus than its subjective assessment of the impact of a campaign on several political, strategic, and military sub-criteria comprising its ability to control the overall situation. Deciding factor in employing force could be the concept of "overall situation" which happens to be a strategic cultural variable (Ron Christman, 2003)⁴⁷. Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (2003:266) also suggest that this concept could be traced to the Marxist-Leninist thought.

According to Wang Wenrong, one known "law of War" currently taught to PLA officers is the concept of "dealing with strategy and campaigns and battles on the basis of the overall strategic situation, there by having campaigns and battles become part of the overall strategic situation." Assumably Chinese strategies are deliberately intended to avoid any damage to the overall situation. China's cooperative behaviour in Asia in the post-cold War period is a testimony to this trait in Chinese strategic culture in the post-cold War era. China has signed land border treaties or agreements with Myanmar and 11 other neighboring countries, thus resolving boundary issues left from history with these countries; it is currently negotiating with India and Bhutan to settle boundary issues with those two countries respectively. Since 1996, China has set up bilateral consultation mechanisms on the law of the sea with the Republic of Korea and Japan, to exchange views on maritime demarcation and cooperation. In 2004, the Agreement between China and Vietnam on the Demarcation of the Beibu Gulf officially entered into force. In November 2002, China and ASEAN member-states signed another important agreement – the Declaration of the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea which rejected the use of force as a method of resolving territorial disputes among them. China has signed an agreement with ASEAN countries to establish a joint free trade zone with them by 2010, in 2001. By 2006 China became second largest trading partner of India. Not only political and economic relations between China and India but also their bilateral relations on security matters started to gain speed. While summing up a question on the Sino-Indian border dispute, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhang Qiyue said that in recent years, under the joint efforts from both sides, India-China border area is largely stable,". According to Chinese Foreign Ministry sources, no major problems have surfaced ever

since China and India reached an agreement in 1993 on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the LAC and an agreement in 1996 on increasing confidence building measures in the military field⁴⁸. In November 2003 their first joint naval exercises were held near Shanghai. In 2003 and 2004 China's and India's ministers of defence exchanged visits after a long interval. And also in 2005 new initiatives were made by China towards resolution of its long-standing and highly painful territorial dispute with India. In 1996 Russia and China signed in Shanghai an agreement "On strengthening military confidence-building measures in border areas" and one year later in Moscow – another agreement "On mutual reduction of military forces in border areas". These agreements (also signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) envisaged reduction of military personnel deployed on each side of the former Soviet-Chinese border as well as destruction or removal of armaments and other military equipment from the agreed 100 km- wide zone. These changes in Chinese strategic behaviour have roots in the alteration of their perception regarding their peripheral region. According to David Shambaugh, these changes have come about after the incident of Tiananmen Square (1989), when apart from Japan no Asian country reacted strongly towards China. Only Western powers reacted with sanctions. China's strategic behaviour has shifted due to this change in perception regarding its position in Asia. However, China was among the most vigorous claimants, when in the early 1970's, it made 'historic' claims over Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly (Nansha) island groups in the South China Sea (SCS). In February 1992, it adopted a domestic legislation called the "Law of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone", which contained authoritative pronouncements. Among these, article 2 was perceived as the most brazen. It defined "PRC's territorial land" as "the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan, and the various affiliated islands, including Senkaku, Pescadores, Pratas, Paracel, and Spratlys"⁴⁹. Chinese official maps released later made these claims explicit, which also included Indonesia's gas-rich waters off *Natuna Island*⁵⁰. In the past, China has often resorted to force to assert its claims in SCS; it clashed with Vietnam in 1974 over Crescent Islands (Parcels), again in 1988 over *Jhonson Reef* (Spratlys) and with Philippines in 1995 over *Mischief Reef*. The 1988 incident was violent, when 70 Vietnamese sailors were killed. These incidents of use of force were not merely stimulated by structural or material constraints. These were

opportunities that China seized. In 1974, South Vietnam was engaged in fighting with North Vietnam, and United States had seized its support for South Vietnam. In 1988, the Soviet support to Vietnam was on the ebb and by 1995; the U.S. military had withdrawn its bases in the Philippines. Concept of overall situation suggests that for China to use force, it should be in consistence with its overall situation. If China assumes that use of force on Taiwan will favour its overall situation or at least not displace it, then possibility of China prioritising use of force over non-confrontational strategies is high. Even while functioning under interdependent and globalised environment China has tried to keep choice of use of force open. In March 2005, the Chinese government passed the “Anti-Secession Law”, which reemphasised China’s “peaceful national reunification” policy, but was also emphatic over the use of “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” in case of any “act” or “incident” that could lead to Taiwan’s secession, or if the possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted⁵¹. It is an option to be exercised as and when such use of force favours the overall situation that China seeks to preserve. This belief on importance of “overall situation” was explicitly expressed by Chinese vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, when he mentioned that “Where consensus cannot be reached immediately, the parties concerned should exercise restraint and patience so as to prevent contradictions from intensifying and at same time try to create conditions and an atmosphere for an eventual peaceful settlement”⁵².

CONCEPT OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENCE:

The primary problem and a serious one too, is how to conserve our strength and await an opportunity to defeat the enemy. (Mao, 1932).

The concept of active defence is offensive defence, or defence through decisive engagements (Mao, 1936), and the concept of passive defence is actually a spurious kind of defence (Mao, 1936). According to Mao, real defence is the one which is active in nature. In other words, defence must be for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive⁵³. For Mao, concept of defence was different under Chinese condition, in comparison to other western conditions. According to Mao, the prevalent understanding

of this concept was that defence brings down the morale of the populace and fails in inspiring. Mao argued that this was not applicable under Chinese conditions⁵⁴.

The defensive continues until an "encirclement and suppression" campaign is broken, whereupon the offensive begins, these being but two stages of the same thing; and one such enemy campaign is closely followed by another. Of the two stages, the defensive is the more complicated and the more important. It involves numerous problems of how to break the "encirclement and suppression". The basic principle here is to stand for active defence and oppose passive defence. (Mao, 1936).

Strategic defence is a strategy adopted by the weak against the stronger adversaries. Once the power equation shifts and the weaker surpasses the stronger, it is in a position to and should adopt the policy of strategic offensive⁵⁵. This concept is not very different in its comparison with the opinion Clausewitzian school. According to Clausewitz, two principal forms of war, the offensive and defensive, have three basic motives. Destruction of enemy's force is a motive with both offensive and defensive forms of war. However, while offensive War includes conquest of a place and conquest of some object, defensive War includes defence of a place and defence of some object (Anatol Rapoport, 1968:317)⁵⁶. This concept applied in post-Cold War security scenario would imply that, under condition of limited war under high-tech condition constrained by quick reaction, will deliberate upon the doctrine of pre-emption. This concept has altered in the three periods (as mentioned above). Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih argue that unlike in the West, in China there was a general preference for defensive warfare over offensive warfare. Offensive warfare was morally wrong because it implied that the emperor was not morally supreme and attractive to barbarians. Here defence is being related to the weakness of the Chinese Navy, the uncertain capabilities of Chinese army, the natural strength of defensive fortifications as city walls, the weakness of available weapons, the huge population of China and its vast size (Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih, 1993:32). Mao's conceptualisation does not tally with the idea of defensive warfare as mentioned by Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih. Mao views defence as a form of offence under the objective conditions, as mentioned above. The concept of counter-offensive is different from concept of offensive. Yet, it has many

similar working principles; the difference being that counter-offensive occurs under the condition of offensive employment of force by the adversaries. The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is on the defensive. Counter-offensive is initiated after a successful strategic retreat when necessary conditions for counter-offensive have been created. Such a condition is unfavourable to the adversaries. It is employed best during the fag end of a defensive campaign. According to Mao, the sole task of counter-offensive is to achieve decisive battle between two armies. What is called active defence refers chiefly to this strategic counter-offensive, which is of the nature of a decisive engagement. In the stage of counter-offensive there are many problems, the chief of which are the initiation of the counter-offensive, the concentration of troops, mobile warfare, and war of quick decision and war of annihilation (Mao, 1936).

According to Liu Huaqing, China should not repeat the historical humiliation, so he advocates,

It is quite necessary to concentrate our efforts on the issue of how to enhance the building up of our country's coastal defence. History tells us that whether one has maritime sense and can pay attention to the building of coastal defence is supremely important to the rise or decline and the honour or disgrace of a nation...Comrades in our army must have an even deeper understanding of the importance of enhancing our coastal defence⁵⁷.

China's doctrinal shift of the mid-1980's also aimed at making the PLA Navy capable of an operational 'reach' (sea control, as opposed to sea denial) up to first island chain by 2000, up to the second island chain by 2020, and a global power-projection by 2050. However, following China's 1996 showdown with the US in Taiwan straits, the operational doctrine was aligned to *deterrence*, which implied a strategy with greater emphasis on sea-denial capabilities, and basing the most potent assets in the *East Sea Fleet* bases located across the Taiwan Strait. Submarines have been the key instruments for this strategy, which is reflected in their high induction rate (Among these are the ballistic missile submarines reinforcing the nuclear deterrent, if its adversaries dare to intervene militarily in a conflict over Taiwan. According to Shen Zhongchang, certain cutting edge technologies (are) likely to be applied first to naval warfare

Direct attacks on naval battlefields will become possible from outer space, high altitudes and remote land bases because naval battle space is going to expand unprecedentedly.

He argues that the essential forms of future naval warfare will be:

- Underwater aircraft carriers and undersea mine-laying robots
- Anti-submarine warfare will restrict submarines in shallow water zones
- The submarine will rise in status to become a major naval warfare force
- Submarines will make missile attacks on air targets
- Long-range precision strikes by warships, carrier-based aircraft, and missile

Shen Zhingchang also expressed that the “mastery of outer space” would be a prerequisite “for naval victory with outer space becoming the new commanding elevation for naval combat”. Zhingchang also notes that “There is no doubt that during the revolution, combat theory and concepts will be largely modified”. Ming Zengfu of the Air Force Command Institute argues that ‘the air battlefield will become decisively significant’ in future warfare. According to Zheng Shenxia,

The Air Force must be able to take down the enemy’s operational system by striking the seams and ripping the fabric... the ultimate goal of the parties involved is not to occupy the other’s territory but to check the enemy country and take initiative at the negotiation table. Since the Air Force can achieve this without escalating the conflict its applicability remains high⁵⁸.

Xiao Jingmin and Bao Bin while elaborating on the land operations said their will be “profound changes in the operational concept” in the twenty-first century because of military revolution. Xio and Bao believed that⁵⁹:

- Battle space will be extended to hundreds or several thousand kilometres.
- The front and rear of the battlefield will be attacked simultaneously
- The strategic rear area might be the first target of attack
- Time and speed will have new meanings
- Enemy C3I systems and high threat weapons will be the main targets
- Information attacks and firepower will be combined
- The destruction of numerous enemy forces will no longer be the primary task.

This change in tactical and operational level doctrine is an example of strategic cultural adaptation to its threat environment. This adaptation has come in appropriate time for China while taking into account its real time conditions. Though an approach of strategic culture cannot decode why China is adapting, it can explain the delay. China views that it was humiliated in the past and therefore emulating its humiliations was not appropriate for it. Japan on the other hand could emulate the west since traditionally Japan is inclined to respect and honour any superior country. This is also the reason for Japan not apologising to China with regard to war crimes. At the end of World War II, Japan was occupied by only United States, where as Germany was occupied by European countries as well as United States. Japans thinks that it was defeated by United States only and not China, therefore does not express apologies to China. Chinese strategic culture has differed in adapting, for example the status of Buddhism and Christianity.

Presently, in the realm of strategic science China has adopted to Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) especially after the use of force by United States in the post-Cold War era. However its adaptation has been emulative in nature. In other words, Chinese belief in this regard suggests that China is not trying to create a countervailing force but a similar force. At tactical level China is trying to achieve parity with its adversaries in terms of military hardware and software, doctrine, and operational theory. And there by remaining consistent with the concept of active defence and ancient strategic thinking 'supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy'- *shang bing fa-mou*.

CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC RETREAT

Clausewitz argued that use of force does not progress by a continuous but by an intermittent movement, and that, therefore, between the separate bloody acts, there is a period of watchfulness during which both parties fall into the defensive (Anatol Rapoport, 1968:294). Concept of retreat, which in Jiangsi was called "luring the enemy in deep" and in Sichuan "contracting the front", is again a strategy employed by the weak

against the strong adversary. The objective of strategic retreat is primarily to conserve military strength and prepare for the counter-offensive. Mao argued that in order to prepare for a counter-offensive, one must select or create conditions favourable⁶⁰ to launch counter-offensive. The condition of population actively supporting the strategic retreat was considered to be the most important criteria⁶¹. However, this concept is best applied under overwhelming superiority of adversary. China under the present circumstances is not absolutely inferior to its adversaries but only relatively inferior. When Sun Zi said, "*Avoid the enemy when he is full of vigour, strike when he is fatigued and withdraws*", he was referring to tiring and demoralising the enemy so as to reduce his superiority. In 1962 Sino-Indian War one week separated the Chinese ultimatum for talks from the first clash of 20 September; one month after came the 20 October offensive, with the unilateral cease-fire still another month later, 20 November⁶². Similar patterns of use of force are evident in Chinese use of force against Vietnam, Laos, and Korea (Allan S. Whiting, 1972:57). Retreat as a concept as per Clausewitzian thought refers to the action of an army which has lost power in a battle and is broken. And, therefore, a second battle unless fresh favourable circumstances come into play, would lead to a complete defeat, perhaps, to destruction. Though Chinese and Western understanding of retreat are largely to preserve and restore strength, the position from which it is done varies in both the cases. Chinese retreat with the objective of exercise of strength; in other words, it is a predetermined move to enhance its position in a conflict (Antlov Rapoport, 1968: 359-360).

China's national defence policy continues to adhere to doctrine of people's war, while preparing to meet all kinds of contingencies⁶³. This element is contestable due to certain intervening variables. The solution of a "peoples' war," which might have sufficed against land powers such as Soviet Union, is now viewed to be irrelevant in the context of future maritime adversaries such as Taiwan, Japan, and the United States, where "limited wars under high-tech conditions" would increasingly require material resources⁶⁴. Furthermore, China appears to have been greatly impressed by the experience of the Gulf War where the technologically superior coalition forces provided a sharp and pointed preview of the devastating punishment that could be inflicted on any

adversary possessing an obsolete force structure, doctrine and capabilities (Xiong Guangkai, 2006: 186-189)⁶⁵. The concept of strategic retreat is less significant in today's circumstances, mostly due to the changes in Chinese external environment. The proportion of informationised equipment in the U.S. Army already accounts for more than 50% of its total equipment, while that of informationised equipment in the U.S. Navy and Air force have surpassed 70%. In 2004, Japan began building a carrier-like frigate with a displacement of 13,500 tons and is also trying to develop space reconnaissance means (Xiong Guangkai, 2006). The Chinese defence policy is also oriented towards achieving capability to function under high-tech conditions. The PLA aims at building an informationalised force and winning an informationalised war, deepens its reform, dedicates itself to innovation, improves its quality and actively pushes forward the RMA with Chinese characteristics with informationalisation at the core (China's National Defence, 2004).

The concept of a "people's war" was developed by Chairman Mao Zedong during the anti-Japanese War (1913-1945) in China. In its essence, it is a recipe for drowning the invading enemy forces in a sea of defenders; it implies a total mobilisation of China's population for better defence and depth (Giri Deshingkar in Manoranjan Mohanty and Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, 2005: 85-86)⁶⁶. It is a strategy to nullify the strength of the invading force. This strategy guarantees no quick victory, but neither does it envisage defeat for the Chinese people. Two out of three elements which make up the PLA's land armies – the Field Armies, the Provincial Armies and People's Militia⁶⁷ – are designed and equipped to operate locally in their own areas. Only Field Armies can be deployed beyond their region. However the reliance on this strategy for future use of force is not very high. The strategy of "people's war" demands a high degree of political, economic and military decentralisation. It is also dependent on the popular support that the PLA and central leadership enjoy. This curtails China's ability fight a protracted war beyond the region where it enjoys such support. Urbanisation, economic reforms, importance of coastal regions in overall economic growth lessens the chances for use of this strategy. Since China launched its reform and opening-up programme, the state has consolidated border and coastal law-enforcement functions in organisations responsible for public

security, customs, inspection and quarantine, maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, marine affairs and environmental protection. China has also established and reinforced the border public security force, and border and coastal law-enforcement contingents for marine affairs, anti-smuggling, fisheries administration and maritime surveillance (China's National Defence, 2006).

China has increased its expenditure in militia weaponry and equipment, with priority given to equipment for air defense, emergency response and maintenance of stability. Out dated weapons are being decommissioned. Militia training reform has been deepened; a four-level system for organizing training is practiced, the four levels being

- provincial military commands
- prefectural military commands
- people's armed forces departments of counties (county-level cities or municipal districts)
- basic-level people's armed forces departments

China claims that by interlinking training as well as joint training and exercises with active PLA units, the militia has boosted its capabilities of conducting rapid mobilization and carrying out its specialized tasks. In 2003, the PLA border defense force took over the defense of the China-DPRK border and the Yunnan section of the China-Myanmar border from the border public security force, thus enabling the state to integrate land border defense and administration. By strengthening its administration and control, and building a modern border and coastal defense force featuring joint military-police-civilian efforts in defense and administration, China endeavors to strengthen its border and coastal defence. According to China's National Defence, 2004;

China has invested more than RMB 2 billion in construction of border defense infrastructure, building over 20,000 km of patrol roads, over 6,000 km of barbed-wire fences and installing some 600 sets of monitoring equipment. Construction of coastal defense infrastructure, including duty piers, monitoring stations and centers and auxiliary facilities has been underway since 2004.

CONCEPT OF MOBILE WARFARE⁶⁸

The concept of mobile warfare as opposed to positional warfare was a style ingrained by China after it tasted disastrous defeats at the hands of United Nations troops led by United States during the Korean War in 1950. The Chinese People's Volunteers' (CPV) wins came with tactical surprise and good mobility off-road and away from heavily patrolled highways, but after 7 months of vicious combat in five separate campaigns the battlefield finally stabilised at roughly the mid-line of the Korean Peninsula on the 38th Parallel. Their bitterest lessons from the Korean War came in the trenches and deep tunnels of the front line and under the incessant storm of American bombing which deprived them of adequate food, ammunition, sleep, sanity, and – lives (John J. Tkacik, Jr, 2003)⁶⁹. Though Mao had articulated the advantages of mobile warfare over positional or static warfare, hard lessons were learnt only after the Korean War (Mao, 1938: 187-267). Positional warfare was a strategic cultural variable whose relevance was undermined by real experiences faced by China in the battle field. Mobile warfare is primarily designed to produce advantages for the weak opponent confronting the stronger. Stronger, equipped with superior mechanised forces, could rout the weaker adversary relying on its positional strength. According to Mao, mobility essentially meant- "*Fight when you can win, move away when you can't win*"; in other words, this concept encouraged the Chinese troops to disengage when it was unable to convert a campaign into victory. However, Mao admitted that positional warfare should be employed for the tenacious defence of particular key points in a containing action during the strategic defensive, and when, during the strategic offensive (Mao, 1936). Mao also warned that the waging of mobile warfare involves many problems, such as reconnaissance, judgement, decision, combat disposition, command, concealment, concentration, advance, deployment, attack, pursuit, surprise attack, positional attack, positional defence, encounter action, retreat, night fighting, special operations, evading the strong and attacking the weak, besieging the enemy in order to strike at his reinforcements, feint attack, defence against aircraft, operating amongst several enemy forces, by-passing operations, consecutive operations, operating without a rear, the need for rest and building up energy (Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis, 1996: 488-524)⁷⁰.

The concept of mobile warfare has been adopted by China and is being operationalised in post-Cold War period. According to 15th Party Congress September 12, 1997,

We should press ahead with the army building and reform so as to make the people's Liberation Army a more revolutionary, modernised and standardised army....It should adhere to the strategy of active defence, improve its quality and take the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics. ...the army should intensify its education and training, and upgrade its defence capabilities under modern technology and especially high-tech conditions. We should strengthen the army by relying on science and technology...gradually upgrade weapons and other equipments.

According to Srikanth Kondapalli (2004:76), PLA has been stressing on the logistics modernisation to meet future warfare needs. The PLA in this regard introduced three major reforms to their logistics unit: "linking the logistics work of the three services, carrying out socialised logistics support, and improving the ability of field operation mobile support."⁷¹ According to the 2000 White Paper, logistics modernisation are geared to provide

...flexible and effective field facilities for logistical supply, sustainment support, medical aid and emergency repair, surface replenishment, air refuelling and manoeuvrability support for the second Artillery Force." (China's National Defence, 2000).


According to Srikanth Kondapalli (2004:78), China has conducted more than 300 military exercises in the last five decades with their numbers increasing after the modernisation programme was launched in 1978. In October 2000, the "Golden Autumn Ten" exercise held by the PLA was called by Chinese media as an epitome of the Chinese military Practice of strategic transformation of innovation for developing modern warfare capability, and declaration for the PLA to march into the new century and to leave behind the 20th century. Elite combat and combat supporting units of different services and arms were called in for this exercise. These included rapid response units, amphibious armoured units, mechanised units, digital artillery units, special force units, marine corp units, paratroop unit, airborne units of the three services, warships, strategic ballistic

missile units, and air defence units. Over 10,000 soldiers were mobilised for this exercise⁷². The concept of mobility is also reflected in the changes taking place with regard to Chinese Infantry divisions. The earliest red army unit built up in Jinggang Mountain has been transformed into a light mechanised division. Another division that contains the known “Hard Bone Sixth Company,” which is deployed in the Nanjing MR, has been transformed into an amphibious mechanised division from a traditional infantry division. The third division, which contains the known “Sharpshooter Fourth Company”, has been transformed into an armoured mechanised infantry division. These three newly transformed infantry divisions could achieve the objective of engaging opponents in long distance warfare.

THE CONCEPT OF EVALUATING USE OF FORCE:

Whether victory or failure, Chinese understanding is in a different context in comparison to their western counterpart. Western leaders weigh military success in terms of dominant quantitative indicators⁷³; to include weapons and equipment destroyed, personnel killed in action, and public approval ratings. According to Mao, conditions are classifiable into ‘Subjective condition’ and ‘Objective condition’. In general, Western assessment would deliberate on objective conditions while attempting to evaluate use of force. According to Ron Christman, China’s known criteria for measuring the effectiveness of military campaigns prioritise evaluation of success in terms of the impact on the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to control the “overall situation”(Ron Christman,2003:253). Direct military, strategic, and political results are secondary in nature when compared to the leadership’s subjective assessment of its control of the overall situation. Chinese use of force during the post revolutionary period is consistent with this concept. More than the objective gains, the subjective gains stood high when China seized using force. This concept largely borrows from the concept of Whole/Partial situation as articulated by Mao (1932). This method of evaluation of use of force through subjective gains can be traced back to China’s civil war experience as a weak participant in the Civil War. Since Red Army was more constrained by objective conditions in comparison to a better equipped Republican Army, it had to minimise the risk originating from poor objective

condition and maximise the gains coming out of subjective conditions⁷⁴. This variance in assessing the effectiveness of use of force has motivated China to employ force in a manner that calls for attention. The Sino-Indian War and Sino-Vietnam War ended with less or no objective gains (Allan S. Whiting, 1972: 55-66). Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu-Shih argue that ‘national image’-a part of subjective condition-guided China’s strategic culture (Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih, 1993). It is inherent in Chinese strategic culture to win without fighting.



→ Does not Favour → Adaptive → Dependent on

This model describes the functional relationship of various sub-concepts of use of force as described in this chapter. Concepts of specific law, evaluation of use of force, whole situation in the post-Cold war era do not favour ‘Use of Force’. Chinese believe that ‘whole situation’ in present times is dominated by ‘peace and development’. Any use of

force will retard this process. However the tactical aspects of use of force favour the 'use of force'. Existing strands of Concepts of active and passive defence, mobile warfare, and strategic retreat in the post-Cold war era is an example in this regard. However, this study has not been able prove this link. China's high frequency interaction with the world has constrained it to adapt to its external tactical environment, this need has influenced these concepts. Moreover, China's material condition in the post-Cold war era has improved the process of China's adaptation.

**BELIEF SYSTEM-IN THE POST-COLD
WAR PERIOD**

BELIEFS REGARDING EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

The year 1990 is considered to be the end of Cold-War when world strategic patterns began to experience multi-polar development by Chinese⁷⁵. In 1990 United States and erstwhile Soviet Union held four summit meetings between their Presidents and more than 20 meetings between the Foreign Ministers, resulting in far reaching co-operation in arms control, bilateral relations and resolving regional conflicts. It seems impossible for this cooperation trend to reverse (Hu Xueze and Bing Jinhu, 1991: 14-20). While articulating over the world issues, the then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen highlighted the following beliefs held during the immediate period following the end of Cold-War. According to the minister new power centers were emerging and the world's strategic pattern was following a path of 'multipolarisation'. The general world situation was considered to be in a transitional period in which the old order had collapsed and yet a 'new one had not taken place'. Due to these two factors the Minister believed that in this transitional period international situation were 'volatile' and 'world did not enjoy peace'. According to Premier Li Peng, the world was undergoing complicated and profound changes. On the whole, the international situation was moving towards greater relaxation, with an increasing tendency to settle disputes through peaceful negotiations. The Premier believed that, under the influence of a growing 'trend towards multipolarity', the vast number of developing countries was playing an active role in international affairs (Shi Zhi, 1995)⁷⁶. Economic factors were more and more prominent in international relations. However, the premier reiterated that hegemonism and power politics continued to hang on 'Regional armed conflicts persisted' and the world was not tranquil as it was still plagued by 'many destabilizing and uncertain factors'⁷⁷. The Chinese belief regarding the prevailing tranquillity amidst volatile condition is not directly attributable to the absence of one of the pole of the bipolar world order which marked the cold-War era. While speaking at the Special Commemorative Meeting on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United States on October 24, 1995, President Jiang Zemin provided the logic behind this belief. According to the President due to the rapid expansion of productive forces and advancement of science and technology, world economy had reached an unprecedented level in size and sophistication. 'Forces preserving peace and containing

war had increased steadily'. Mankind had secured peace for half a century in which enormous social progress had been made⁷⁸. This positive development was accompanied with the belief that 'unfair and irrational international political and economic order has not been changed' and hundreds of millions of people in the developing world were still struggling with poverty⁷⁹. The survival and development of mankind remain confronted with a multitude of formidable challenges⁸⁰. Sha Zukang provides another reason for this belief, according to which, though the world situation had undergone numerous changes. One thing however has not changed, that being the global strategic pattern. Throughout this time the major powers have constantly maintained the strategic balance. This strategic balance ensured that the peace of the world could be preserved and was the reason why large-scale world war had been avoided for more than 50 years (Sha Zukang, 2000). Assumably the fundamental belief regarding the post Cold-War era is inclined towards possible occurrence of disturbances. This belief as highlighted by the then President Jiang Zemin was largely due to the difference in development between the North and South and the gulf between the rich and poor⁸¹. This belief is also responsible for the Chinese opposition to United States development of National Missile Defence System (NMD)⁸². Chinese President Jiang Zemin told Russian President Vladimir Putin during the summit meeting of the "Shanghai Five" in Dushanbe that China supports Russia's position on Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM), stating that the integrity of the ABM Treaty must be maintained. Both China and Russia were upset when the Clinton administration pressed the U.S. Congress to allocate an additional US\$2.2 billion to the development of a National Missile Defence (NMD) system. The leaders of the two nations see the NMD system as a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, a corner stone of international armed accords. While delivering a speech at the plenary session of the UN millennium Summit on 6 September, 2000, President Jiang Zemin emphasised on the existence of hegemonism and power politics. According to the President factors such as ethnicity, religion, territorial disputes or quarrels over resources lead to local conflicts. Separatist, terrorist and extremist forces of various kinds caused 'unending damage to the international community'. The President further reiterated that our planet was still far from being a stable and tranquil place since the environment, illegal drugs, refugees and other global problems were becoming increasingly serious⁸³.

China regards both its peripheral region and extra-peripheral region to stable. However it does claim that regional violence continues to occur within this stable environment. Xiong Guankai, the then Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Chairman of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, while speaking at the International Forum on China and the World in the 21st Century in September 2001, mentioned statistics that show that in the eleven years between 1990 and 2000, over 130 local wars and armed conflicts broke out around the world, an average of over 10 each year. In the first half of 2001, another 6 local wars and armed conflicts in the world have been added to the total (Xiong Guangkai, 2003: pp.169-191). According to the China's National Defense White Paper (1998) influence of armed conflicts and local wars on the overall international situation had been remarkably weakened. In the past, when the two major military blocs confronted each other, armed conflicts and local wars in some regions seriously disturbed world security and stability. This indicates the belief that international situation is suited for launching local armed conflicts. Therefore, seen as a threat to peace and stability. In international relations geopolitical and military security though being central to Chinese security concerns, role of economic factors is becoming more outstanding along with growing economic contacts. China is presently attempting to build its national strength in areas of economy and science and technology. Chinese concept of security in theory is inverse to western concept of security. China believes it cannot guarantee peace by an increase in arms, nor by military alliances. New concept of security stresses on the need to build trust and common interests. "Associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbours", this maxim in military affairs holds that 1) solving disputes by non-military means 2) being wary of war 3) strategically gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck. These ideas are sourced out from strategic cultural context. Strategically gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck has no or less relevance in today's time. China weapons procurement suggests otherwise. China has tried to learn from the use of force in Gulf, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq. Hi-tech weapons and present military strategy support the concept of pre-emptive strike to achieve best military objectives⁸⁴. According to China's National Defence White Paper (1998), outer space belonged to all mankind, and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes to

benefit mankind. To this end, China stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons deployed in outer space. It opposes the development of anti-satellite weapons. China maintains that the international community, the big powers with the capacity to utilize outer space in particular, should take the following realistic steps to prevent a weaponised outer space:

- A complete ban on weapons of any kind in outer space, including anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons, so as to keep outer space free of weapons;
- a ban on the use of force or conduct of hostilities in, from or to outer space;
- and all countries should undertake neither to experiment with, produce or deploy outer space weapons nor, to utilize outer space to seek strategic advantages on the ground, for example, using disposition of the important parts of ground anti-missile systems in outer space for the purpose of developing strategic defensive weapons.

In 2006, China conducted the anti-satellite missile tests without violating any of the international treaties it had committed itself to. This is only to highlight the rate of learning and adapting to challenges offered by modern hi-tech battle field environment. This example also exemplifies intrusions in strategic culture due changes that have come about in post-Cold War era, specially after the use of force in Gulf, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq. An assessment of strategic behaviour in this context explains the need for China to achieve parity in terms of weaponry vis-à-vis its adversary, but fails to explain the actual use of force in political context. Troop reduction that followed doctrinal changes of 1980's does not reflect on Chinese inclination towards non-use of force to resolve questions of war and peace⁸⁵. Doctrinal changes resulted due to change in Chinese belief that threat of large scale global war had significantly reduced, however major change in the imbalances in relative strength among nation were believed to be same. The Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1985 adopted a new strategic calculus, which altered the doctrine of 'preparation of war to peacetime army building'. The doctrine of 'peacetime army building' had two central objectives, first to postpone or contain a large scale world war and second to prepare for fighting and winning all sorts of local war and armed conflict. However, why there was a strong expectation for a short duration war than a

long duration of war was not clear. Since the policy of defence modernisation was introduced in China in 1973 two major changes with regard to war doctrine have taken place, first in 1973, when the doctrine of 'peoples war' changed to people's 'war under modern conditions' and the second in 1985 when the doctrine of 'people's war under modern condition' changed to 'local war under modern conditions'. Doctrinal changes have also taken place with regard to 'fighting local war under hi-tech conditions' to 'winning local war under hi-tech conditions' in the post Cold war era. Conceptually 'local war' (*Jubu Zhanzheng*) is not just characterised by geographical limits, but includes the following features.

- Local war is less military oriented and more political oriented
- In a local war fighting is accompanied with talking
- Final resolution is determined by negotiation

The conceptualisation of local war has strategic cultural flavours, such that use of force under specific condition is used to effect an overall political situation. Final objective is being attempted to be realised not with force but by talking and negotiating, thereby confirming to the Chinese strategic cultural notion of victory. It is essential for China to achieve its objectives with no or minimum use of force.

China believes that in order to enhance peace and stability in Asia it is important to raise the living standards of Asian People. East Asia as a region has witnessed lesser issues on peace and stability due to its higher standard of living. China demarcates and has expressed its idea of Asia in opposition to West. Stating China's basic position on Asia's development in the 21st century, the then Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao said

Unite to further strengthen regional economic cooperation. Mutual beneficial cooperation and joint development is the only way for Asian countries to further the development of all Asian society and sharpen its competitiveness in the international world.

China is certainly looking at a consolidated Asian strength vis-à-vis west⁸⁶. In present times China's security concerns have moved beyond its immediate region. Hu Jintao's speech on "new concept of security" is an indicator to this transition. It is in Chinese national interest to safeguard feasible peace and stability in Asia. So far the immediate strategy has been stressing on cooperation rather than confrontation, consensus rather than imposing one's view on others. As an idea and not as a strategic policy, this strategy has its origin in the tributary state system. This is not to argue that it is *per se* so. The link is not yet visible in terms of realtime events, since these strategies are futuristic in nature. The best results that this strategy would produce can be effectively realised only in long run when certain conditions of the "Three middle kingdom" are restored. Hypothetically this condition would arrive when China becomes superior in terms of national power in comparison to its immediate neighbours, who were earlier referred to as barbarians. China will have to perform the task of "centre of gravity" in Asia⁸⁷. Advancement of Chinese economic interaction in Asia has led to a collection of countries to have alarming trade deficit with it⁸⁸. Stating China's Asia policy, Hu Jintao:

China cannot achieve development without Asia, and Asia cannot realise prosperity without China. It is the consistent policy of the Chinese Government to strengthen the good neighbourly and friendly relations with its surrounding countries⁸⁹.

Hu Jintao claims that this policy has its origin in the "Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence"⁹⁰ initiated by China and some Asian countries, in order to form the basis for establishing friendly and cooperative relations with all Asian countries. Hu Jintao, further claims that this idea influenced the Chinese strategy regarding the settlement of the question of boundary demarcation with most of its Asian neighbours. Another strategy highlighted by Hu Jintao includes "shelving disputes and going for joint development"⁹¹.

Though China perceives the role of external powers in the Asia Pacific region as a stabilising factor, it accounts for and prepares to meet challenges arising from it. In a speech given by Taiwan's Foreign Minister Tien Hung-Mao in Los Angeles in November 2000, the minister called for United States help to stabilise security in the region, in

consistence with Taiwan Relation Act, Six Assurances and Taiwan Policy Review. This involvement by the United States, according to the minister would solve the problems of isolation and insecurity faced by Taiwan⁹². This idea was further strengthened when Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services said that Taiwan's security was essential in Asia and was also in the national interest of the United States⁹³. According to a White Paper released by the US Defence Ministry (2000), in case of war on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S.government is ready to deploy as many as 6,90,000 troops. The deployment forces also include 160 Naval ships and aircraft carriers and some 1,600 military planes, so the United States can counteract an enemies attack in the initial stages of a conflict⁹⁴. The European Parliament (EP) passed an amendment to its resolution on the European Union's (EU) diplomatic and security policy on 30 November 2000, urging the 15-member bloc to strengthen political relations with the republic of China on Taiwan. The amendment resolution urges the Council of Ministers, the EU's decision making body to find feasible ways to forge closer political ties with Taiwan with a view to helping press for early resumption of dialogue between Taiwan and mainland China as well as supporting Taiwan's young democracy⁹⁵.

The first priority in today's China is to create a favourable environment for economic development. China will not have any interest in expanding its frontiers even if it is economically strong, but will continue to devote itself to peace and stability of the whole world. According to the self-image described by China in 1998, it believed that China had large population, a poor foundation, uneven regional development and underdeveloped productive forces will continue for a comparatively long period of time. China also believes its development requires an environment of long-term institutional peace, especially a favourable peripheral environment. In terms of its future international role, China will always be an important force defending world peace and regional stability. It has not mentioned the likelihood of use of force to enforce on this self-image (China's National Defense, 1998). Jiang Zemin stressed that expanding opening up to outside world on the basis of self-reliance is the policy that China must pursue for a long time to come. He said since China started to implement the policy of opening up to the outside world, its total closure or semi-closure has been changed and the level of its

economy and technology has been improved. Jiang stressed that China must unswervingly expand the opening up. Meanwhile, it should be seen that there are still some problems in expanding foreign economic relations. The belief behind the opening up seems to be – introduction of advanced technology from outside in combination with development and creation of domestic advantages. Though it was important to utilise foreign funds, it was necessary to attach importance to the indigenous accumulation of funds. Shedding light on how the policy of opening up look towards the end, Jiang said “In talking about independence and self-reliance, we do not mean blind opposition to things foreign. In talking about independence and self-reliance, we do not mean to cut off our country from the outside world and shut our door for domestic construction, but to push the opening up to a new and higher level.” There by not clarifying what he actually meant by ‘higher level’. Deductively, China perceives threat in opening up to outside world, though it legitimately accepts it. China intends to allow under no circumstances, achievement of temporary economic growth at the expense of cultural and ideological progress. He stressed the promotion of advanced ideology and culture must keep pace with the strategy of economic development and be included in the overall plan for national economic and social development⁹⁶. Imposing one’s own social system, mode of development and values upon others and willfully threatening them with isolation and sanctions can only begin by harming others in the beginning and end by hurting whoever does it⁹⁷.

BELIEFS REGARDING USE OF FORCE

On October 13-16, 2000, the PLA held its largest show of military training achievements since its large-scale military skills contest in 1964. The military exercises were carried out at four sites. The primary location was a military shooting range in a Beijing suburb. The other three sites were training bases in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, used by ground forces; in the Bohai Sea, for the Navy; and in Northeast China, for strategic missile troops. The show also was the PLA’s highest level activity for exchanging high-tech military training achievements in the past 36 years. China is striving to become a modern maritime giant in the 21st century. According to Wang Shuguang, the 21st century

will be a new era in which humans will understand the ocean, and fully utilize and protect maritime resources. China is trying to develop its maritime economy, marine science and technology, and enhance marine management and protection⁹⁸. China's military posture is defensive and it has adopted a positive stance over disarmament. In 1985, it reduced its armed forces unilaterally by 1 million. China opposes the arms race and in 1992 signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is also a member state of the treaty on prohibition of chemical weapons, since the early 1980's China has turned part of its defence industry over to civilian production has accounted for 70 percent of the defence industry's overall output.

The above said facts are a broad summary of the dynamic nature characterising the Chinese defence mentality. To sum up, it would suffice to say that Chinese defence mentality displays strands between constraints and desires. In order to begin a discussion on Chinese beliefs regarding use of force, it becomes imperative to mention Taiwan. China has made constant exhibition of its intention to reunify Taiwan with military force if and only if peaceful reunification is not possible. This study assumes the need for unification is ingredient of Chinese national self-image. And therefore is not a product of other factors such as economics, strategic relevance etc, which of course remain important factor shaping the dynamics of inter strait relations.

It becomes self evident that in case of Taiwan being an issue associated with Chinese self-identity, China acknowledges the fact that it would resort to force in case a strong threat to identity occurs. Before proving this link between identity and Chinese use of force it becomes necessary to find the logic behind Chinese non use of force on Taiwan since its independence in 1949. This study proposes that the reason to not use force on Taiwan has ideational influences. It is not appropriate to compare Chinese use of force on Taiwan and any other country. If Chinese were believed to be holding the belief that people are central to any country, unjustified use of force against people is detrimental to China. If Chinese strategic culture is said to be functioning, then China has been consistent with it at least in respect to Taiwan. Strategy to use force has been in existence due to its value as a deterrent. Any actual use of force will be regarded as an insult to

Chinese supremacy in the region. A solution which would enforce upon Chinese supremacy will look like the solution to Hong-Kong. In 1998, China's Defence White paper stated that the stationing of the PLA troops in the region is an important symbol of the Chinese government's resumption of exercise of sovereignty over Hong-Kong under "one country two system". This crisis which had maximum potential to spark a conflict between the two sides of the strait did not transcend into armed conflict due to this factor also. This factor is not self evident in mainstream analysis of the crisis which largely subscribes to realist paradigm. They suggest that economic interdependence, United States intervention, and Chinese preoccupation with its own internal development affected the crisis from transcending to actual armed conflict. Chinese behaviour was largely restricted to the notions of brinkmanship, hawkish ness or belligerence (Andrew Scobell, 2003). It is evident from the start of the military exercises in 1995-1996 that it was not intended to graduate into actual armed conflict. Every manoeuvre was informed to other parties involved, in advance. Therefore presumably its objectives were limited and intended to be limited. All constraints were taken into account before the military exercises began and not during or after. Therefore crisis can be said to stand as an example which exemplifies the priority that China attaches with respect to actual use of force. Chinese elites have also related the use of force to the process of peaceful reunification. Peaceful reunification is not deliberated as a policy option as viewed under the realist paradigm. Peaceful reunification is a policy option since it is inherent in the strategic culture of China. Chinese sense of victory suggests that the best victory is when it is realised by no use of force. Use of force triggers many passions. Moral and just war have been the way the ancient Chinese philosophers have seen use of force. To argue otherwise that the cost involved in use of force in terms of both material and human value will not be completely wrong either. Chinese leaders have also deliberated that use of force will not realise the objectives of peaceful reunification. This argument holds true only if 'peaceful reunification' and 'use of force' are not merely seen as policy options but as ideas/beliefs held by political elites. These two beliefs differ with each other since they work against each other. Use of force does not realise the objectives attached with peaceful reunification, it destroys it. In other words, though the product-goal will remain

Taiwan in both these policies, prioritising 'peaceful reunification' over use of force has ideational linkages as described above.

To begin with, a counter argument to the largely held belief that economic interdependence increases the cost of achieving reunification goals. China has become more interdependent with the world at large after the opening up of its economy in 1978. China has not used force against Taiwan while it was less interdependent. Therefore interdependence solely cannot explain the Chinese belief on use of force. The next held belief is that, China opted for strategies that were not subscribing to use of force due the possibility of use of force by United States under the bilateral agreement between the Taiwan and US. China in the past has involved itself with the superpowers (Soviet Union and United States) in armed conflict. This is not to decode reality, but to highlight that if experience is an important source of behaviour then Chinese experience is a motivating factor to opt for use of force against an intervening state. Moreover, Chinese political elites constantly uphold and celebrate its employment of force against stronger opponents while constructing their national image.

According to Tang Tianri (2000), United States use of force in Iraq in 1990's had the following draw backs. First, the Iraqi people strongly opposed the United States. The United States had planned to make full use of UN resolutions to prolong the sanctions against Iraq indefinitely so that the dire poverty of Iraqi society would lead to a domestic revolution to overthrow Saddam Hussain. However, the sanctions haven't toppled Saddam, but they have risen increasing anti-U.S. emotions in Iraq. Second, U.S. allies have deviated from Washington's policy. Not long after the implementation of sanctions against Iraq, some Western allied countries established economic relations with Iraq regardless of U.S. opposition. France initiated the petroleum diplomacy and air links with Iraq. Third, voices of protest and opposition have arisen in the United States. On August 6, thousands of people from all walks of life massed in front of the Whitehouse to demand the sanctions be removed⁹⁹.

The above mentioned analysis is assumed to be a cultural product and an illustration of Chinese mindset on US use of force in Iraq. Out of the three factors mentioned above as the drawbacks of U.S. use of force, two have shades of Chinese strategic culture. The opposition of Iraqi people is seen as detrimental to U.S. objectives. In other words China

believes that if United States had the Iraqi people's support it would be better placed strategically. The opposition by the citizen's of U.S. reflects the need of the ruler to be in complete command of his resources and enjoy complete support of the people. Chinese believe under other circumstances use of force does not produce the best results. Thereby highlighting that Chinese understanding of use of force and its evaluation is not a product of structural or material constrain *per se* but also cultural constraints.

BELIEFS REGARDING INTERDEPENDENCE:

Chinese threat perception does not seem to involve economic interdependence as threat. Chinese view seems to be this: though economics and political security remain high on the political agenda, they do not enjoy parity. While suggesting that adherence to the principle of 'one China' is the basis for peaceful reunification the then President Jiang Zemin said "We do not challenge the development of the non-governmental economic and cultural ties by Taiwan with other countries. However, we oppose Taiwan's activities in expanding its territory internationally, aimed at creating 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan'," (Jiang Zemin, 1995). Further more, while elaborating the conditions under which Taiwan could join the United Nations, Shen Guofang said "Taiwan, as a province of China, cannot join the United Nations, which is an intergovernmental organisation of sovereign states". Presently, China only opposes Taiwanese claims to sovereignty-which is political concern for China disconnected with economics. Economic interdependence is viewed as a confidence building measure which will help in the peaceful reunification process. China while revealing for the first time, a package of policies for relations between Hong Kong and Taiwan after 1997, announced that non-governmental educational, scientific, technological, cultural and religious groups in Hong Kong may keep or develop relations with their counterparts in Taiwan on the basis of non-subordination, non-interference and mutual respect (Vice-Premier Qian Qichen, 1995). The regional dynamics in Asia-Pacific have largely remained unaltered even in the post Cold-War era. According to Han Tieying, Japan's National Defence White paper started to use "Cold War language", to stress that "Japan is in China's missile range." However, sense of security in Asia-Pacific has changed from military to economic and trade

interests. Hence, the nature of involvement has changed somewhat from what it was in the Cold War Era. In 1995, while meeting with a group of visitors from the Sino-Japanese Economic Cooperation Association, the then Chinese premier Li Peng said, "Sino-Japanese economic cooperation is built on the basis of equality and mutual benefits. Japan has provided loans for China's reconstruction, which is highly appreciated by the Chinese people," he said, adding, "Japan has also benefited much from it, for its economy has been boosted" (Ren Xianfang, 1995). However the former premier did not fail to mention that the invasion launched by the Japanese militarists inflicted great losses to China, which can never be compensated for by loans. Since this study does not intend to account for all the threat perception held by China, it only attempts to highlight the basic beliefs on threat held by China. Japan as a threat to China is not entirely attributable to notions that are generally held by realist. The Sino-Japanese is strained due to questions regarding history. The question on 'apologies' seems to be the fulcrum. China seems to make comparison between the behaviour of various countries which lost the World War II. According to Yue Lushi (2000) in Germany, any word or deed that whitewashes or defends the Nazi regime and Hitler, is regarded as a violation of the German constitution and is punishable in compliance with the law¹⁰⁰. In contrast, in Japan, Hideki Tojo, who was hanged as a War criminal by the Far East Military Tribunal, is worshipped as "a hero who devoted his life to his country" with his spirit tablet placed with that of his cohorts in Yasukuni Shrine. Since the late 1980's, some members of the Diet have gone to Yasukuni Shrine every year to pay homage to those war criminals¹⁰¹. According to Jin Chengmin, vice-curator of a Harbin – based Museum on crime of unit 731, a notorious branch of Japan's Kwantung Army for making germ warfare materials that were tested on more than 10,000 people in China during World War II. It was for the first time that China found the original rewards of the germ tests done by Japanese invaders during World War II¹⁰². Not just doctrinal changes but also at field level, Japanese have been displaying a shift in their defence posture¹⁰³. In 1995 The House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet passed a resolution entitled "Taking lessons from history and reaffirming the determination for peace."¹⁰⁴ Chinese believed that the resolution adopted by the Japanese Diet evaded the aggressive nature of the war launched

by Japanese militarists against China and other Asian countries. Therefore, this resolution had done nothing to help improve Japan's image in Asia and the world.

Reunification is also more than just a political concern for China. It is a remainder of the three unequal treaties imposed upon the Qing Dynasty¹⁰⁵ and Civil-War. Hong Kong and Macao issues were largely possible due to China's compromise and adaptation of the formulae of "one country, two systems"¹⁰⁶. In order to understand the interdependent relation between Taiwan and China the following facts regarding bilateral trade between the two countries comes handy. Following a high rate of growth in 1994, indirect trade between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits hit an all-time high. Between January and October, indirect trade volume reached US\$ 12.3 billion, up by 15.8 percent over the same period in 1993. During the same period, the mainland exported US\$1.64 billion worth of goods to Taiwan, up by 54.9 percent over 1993. Total volume for the year was believed to be over US\$2 billion. According to authoritative sources, the growth is due largely to an increase of raw material exports and selling back of manufactured products by Taiwan-invested enterprises in the mainland. A serious trade imbalance in the bilateral trade continued, however. Imports from Taiwan of machinery and electronics, chemical fibre and other raw materials for use by Taiwan enterprises were at US\$10.7 billion in the first ten months, up by 11.5 percent. Taiwan had a trade surplus of US\$ 9.06 billion, bringing the total surplus to US\$40 billion. The mainland is now Taiwan's second largest export market. The trade imbalance results largely from Taiwan's policy of restricting imports from the mainland. Taiwanese investment in this period (1995) occupied the second place among overseas investment in China's mainland, second only to Hong Kong. According to a recent survey, China's mainland is the first choice for Taiwan investors. Between January and November last year, the mainland accounted for 60 percent of Taiwan's total external investment¹⁰⁷. This argument gains further currency when the following fact is taken into consideration. .

Statistics mentioned by Statistical Communiqué of the State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China on 1994 National Economic and Social Development highlights the true nature of the Chinese 'interdependence' on Foreign Economic

Relations. The development of foreign trade was rapid. Customs statistics mentioned the value of exports in 1994 as US\$121 billion, which was 31.9 percent over the previous year, and the value of imports was US\$115.7 billion, an increase of 11.2 percent. The balance between imports and exports was further improved. The share of machinery and electronics products in exports rose from 24.7 percent to 26.4 percent. There was a significant increase in the import of raw materials, machinery and transportation equipment that was in short supply in the domestic market was significant. The document further stated that;

The export by foreign-funded enterprises continued to grow by a wide margin, with the value of their exports for the year amounting to US\$ 34.7 billion, up 37.6 percent, and their share in China's total exports rising from 27.5 percent to 28.7 percent. Continuous growth was achieved in the utilisation of foreign capital. In 1994, foreign capital actually utilised amounted to US\$45.8 billion, up 17.6 percent over the previous year. Of this total, US\$33.8 billion was in the form of direct foreign investment, up 22.8 percent. By the end of 1994, some 206,000 foreign-invested enterprises had registered in China, 40,000 enterprises more than those at the end of 1993. Economic and technical cooperation with foreign countries has made considerable progress. Construction projects and labour service projects contracted by China with foreign countries in 1994 reached US\$7.99 billion, up 17.5 percent over the previous year, and the accomplished operations revenue was US\$5.97 billion, up 31.5 percent. International tourism made encouraging progress. In 1994, China received 43.68 million foreigners, overseas Chinese and Chinese compatriots from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao who came to China as tourists or for visits, business or other activities, up 5.2 percent over the previous year. Foreign exchange income from tourism was US\$7.323 billion. The income increased by a large margin as compared with the figure in the previous year¹⁰⁸.

The then Premier Li Peng, while delivering the Report on the Work Of the Government at the third Session of the Eight National People's Congress on March 5, 1995 said "China will, as always, energetically develop multilateral and bilateral trade and economic relations with other countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and China is prepared to and should become one of the founding nations of the new World Trade Organisation". This example exemplifies that China in the post-cold War era is not of the belief that interaction with the external world will be detrimental to China's national interest. China clearly sees advantage in its international trade relations.

Chinese ancient strategic cultural belief of “middle kingdom” surrounded by small barbaric countries has been severely altered (with respect to foreign economic relations) in 1978 by opening up of economy. This belief has gained strength in the globalised and highly integrated nation-state system in post-cold war era. However the influence produced by foreign economic trade relations on the overall Chinese belief system regarding strategies is not very clear.

In December 2000, eyeing the huge profits to be produced by the opening of direct transport ties across the Taiwan strait, local aviation firms had been gearing up to set up strongholds in mainland China, according to industry sources. Anticipating this change the share prices of aviation companies went up by 10 percent. The much anticipated opening of the full transport links between the two sides of the strait were expected to generate at least NT \$ 30-40 billion worth of business opportunities, providing a major fillip for local carriers. In a meeting of shareholders, Far East Air Transport Corp, which has long been preparing to make inroads into mainland China, also made a decision to invest 35 million New Taiwan dollars in the mainland’s air cargo and passenger transport industry and related business, in the hope of gaining an upper hand in the lucrative market¹⁰⁹. An economic benefit of this nature was an expectation and not a goal. Direct air links between China and Taiwan enforces Taiwanese claims to sovereignty and recognition, therefore China discourages it. Presently flights from Taiwan stop over at Hong Kong before mainland.

The present strategic cultural traits indicate the priority given to political concerns (national image, national values) over economic benefits. The then Premier Li Peng, while delivering the Report on the Work of the Government at the third Session of the Eight National People’s Congress on March 5, 1995 said “Drawing up the Ninth Five-Year Plan and the long-term target for the year 2010 is an important task for us in 1995. The next 15 Years, especially the period covered by this plan is one of great significance for promoting the reform and opening up and our modernisation drive. Since we are formulating the mid-and long term plan while fostering a socialist market economy, we need to reform the method of planning and make sure that the plan is strategic in nature

and provides micro-control and policy guidance so that it should generally become a plan for policy guidance. Furthermore, “we should take into account all the factors related to economic growth, social development and the deepening of reform with a view to solving some major problems affecting the overall progress”. During the same speech Premier Li Peng said “Throughout the whole process of the reform, the opening up and the modernisation drive, we must unswervingly give equal importance to economic development on the one hand and to development of socialist culture and ideology on the other”.

IMPORTANCE OF MATERIAL CONDITION

China has always attached primary importance of safeguarding the state’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security. Following the opium war in 1840, China was gradually reduced to a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, and the Chinese nation was subject to imperialist power’s invasion, oppression, bullying and humiliation time and time again. In terms of policy description, National Defence Policy of China is characterised to be defensive nature. However, it is not certain if this nature will be maintained. Is this nature dependent on the temporary conditions in which Chinese are formulating this policy? According to the functional relationship between defence modernisation and national economic construction as stipulated by China in 2006, the policy is to modernise defence in order to serve national economic construction. However in practice the functional relationship is constrained¹¹⁰. China sites its disadvantages of national construction while making attempts to modernise defence¹¹¹. According to China’s National Defence Construction policy guidance, China engages in army building through diligence and thrift (China’s National Defence, 1998). China has gradually increased its defence expenditure on the basis of its economic development. This increase, however, is compensatory in nature, and is designed to enhance the originally weak defence foundation. China while calculating the costs of defence allocation emphasises on the following factors 1) needs of defense 2) the country’s financial capacities and 3) the principle of overall balance. These three factors are subject to change with time. Needs of defence have changed significantly and are expected to


change at a fast rate¹¹². A profound reform in the military field led by the development of high-tech weapons is expected to be taking place in the world. This in turn influences 1) weaponry 2) military system 3) combat training and 4) military theory. China while implementing the military strategy of active defense, strategically pursues the defensive policy featuring self-defense and gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck, and adheres to the principle: "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack." On the basis of its existing weaponry, China carries forward and claims to develop its fine traditions. It seeks to adapt to profound changes in the world's military sphere¹¹³, and makes proper preparations for defensive combat in the situation where modern technology, especially high technology, prevails¹¹⁴. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), has the following traits,

- smart weaponry
- leaner but better force structure¹¹⁵
- automatic command and control system
- automatic command and control system
- Multi-dimensional battlefields and systematised operation patterns.

While addressing the PLA delegation to the 10th National People's Congress on March 10, 2003, the President stated more clearly that "we should energetically push forward RMA with Chinese characteristic, so as to ensure that our armed forces keep up with the current rapid development of science, technology and RMA". Chinese financial capacities has been increasing and reflecting in the consumption in the defence construction. From 1979 to 1989, the average annual increase of defense expenditure was 1.23 percent. From 1990 to 2005, the average annual increase in defense expenditure was 15.36 percent (China's National Defense, 2006). The Sweden based Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) named China as the biggest weapons importer during the 2002-2006 periods. China at fourth position has now overtaken Japan to become the biggest military spender in Asia. It chalked up almost 50 billion dollars in military expenditures in 2006; according to the report (SIPRI, 2006). The final factor, the need for overall balance, is and will remain constant for coming years. China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and armed forces, in

accordance with the state's overall plan to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century (China's National Defense, 2006).

Economic construction will be prioritised even if it is at the cost of defence construction. China claims that its expenditure on defence has been less in comparison with many other countries. China's defense expenditure in 1997 was US \$ 9.80 billion, which was 3.67 percent of the US's, 61.25 percent of Russia's, 27.53 percent of Britain's, 26.7 percent of France's, 22.79 percent of Japan's, and 56.98 percent of the Republic of Korea's (China's National Defense,1998). In 2005, China's defence expenditure equaled 6.19 percent of that of the United States, 52.95 percent of that of the United Kingdom, 71.45 percent of that of France and 67.52 percent of that of Japan (China's National Defense, 1998, 2006)¹¹⁶. Any assessment of Chinese defence expenditure may not necessarily be universal since disputes over the expenditure figures exists. Chinese claim that the increase in the defence allocation does not validate the “China threat theory” (China National Defence, 1998 and 2006). Therefore, though the functional relationship between the economic construction and defence construction in terms of policy necessitate defence construction to serve economic construction, it is real time condition that China faces today, provides the meaning or real interpretation of the policy. This is only to suggest that in future the meaning of this policy may go through some transformation. The nature of this relationship may alter under deteriorating conditions of national economic construction or under excelling economic construction. Any threat to national construction will require the defence construction (under any given level) to restore the process of economic construction. Defence modernisation independently cannot explain the nature and characteristics of Chinese use of force. China's National Defence 1998 articulates the basic principle of modernization as “reducing quantity and improving the quality is a basic principle upon which the army is to modernized”. It still does not clearly express the intent behind defence mordernisation.



This model describes the functional relationship of various beliefs discussed in the chapter. In the post-Cold War era, beliefs regarding external environment, inter-dependence, and use of force do not favour the actual 'use of force'. However these functional relationships are not governed by the material and structural constraints, but cultural constraints. China's material condition in the post-Cold War era has been used to favour the actual use of force.

CONCLUSION

This study while answering a few questions, raises many. Before beginning to describe it, the following two concepts need to be explained.

- Negative Strategy/goal
- Positive Strategy/goal

A 'negative strategy' by its very nature is designed to avoid a particular choice¹¹⁷. China has been analysed to have negative strategy with respect to Taiwan in the post-Cold War era. Realist arguments are based on the assumption that China adheres to the process of peaceful reunification since it is constrained by material and structural factors¹¹⁸. A cultural analysis of the Sino-Taiwan conflict suggests that peaceful reunification is positive strategy for China, in other words it is not avoiding the use of force. Peaceful reunification is also a strategic cultural objective-it has its lucid connections with Opium War, Sino- Japan War, and Civil War. It qualifies to be a strategy constrained by cultural constraints since it is crafted to achieve the objective of reunification without actual use of force. Therefore China is likely to use force only in the event of threat to 'peaceful reunification'.

China is still very backward, economically and culturally and needs decades or even over a hundred years of arduous efforts to overcome such backwardness...in order to attain the great goals of peaceful construction, the Chinese people are in urgent need of a long-term, peaceful international environment. (Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih,1993:202)

This statement was made by the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Indian Embassy in Beijing, in December 1959 after the 1958 Quemoy crisis¹¹⁹ and before 1962 Sino-Indian War¹²⁰. Both these instances of Chinese use of force were limited and did not achieve any particular political objective.

However, the quantum of use of force with respect to Taiwan is not predictable. Two hypothetical scenarios can be identified,

- 1) China uses force to reduce the threat on the process of 'peaceful reunification'
- 2) China uses the opportunity to control Taiwan with military

This study proposes that the final decision during a crisis will be more influenced by the first scenario. The second scenario is less likely to influence. It will satisfy 'Chinese National Image', 'Central Leadership', 'People', and PLA, if Taiwan is reunified in peace. Chinese concept of victory is constrained by strategic culture. China believes that its supremacy in the region will be established this way. Perhaps this being the reason for China being highly sensitive to this Taiwan issue. This sensitivity also overrules the liberal argument that China's growing economic interdependence with the world will constrain it from use of force, even in the above mentioned scenarios. Liberals too view Chinese strategic behaviour of peaceful reunification as a 'negative strategy'.

This being true, Taiwan's threat perception should be less concerned with Chinese military hardwares and should be more concerned with the strategies employed by China for peaceful reunification. This also undermines United States threat perception in East Asia with respect to Taiwan's security. Since strategic culture is not yet part of mainstream analysis (realists and liberals) of this conflict, it has not been criticised for its generality. China's strategic objective of peaceful reunification has been facilitated by its adversaries in post-Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era Taiwan entrepreneurs see mainland as a land of opportunities. If China is able to ensure Taiwan in an interdependent relationship, then it will help China reunify peacefully, sooner or later. Chinese strategic behaviour in the post-Cold War period may not be best predicted if the cultural constraints are not taken into account. Flaws in realist and liberal assumptions about China distort predictions.

This flaw in assumption may have spill overs, other aspects of Chinese strategic behaviour in the post-Cold War era, such as

- Strategic Cooperation/Partnership
- Interdependence
- Security Relations with Asian countries
- Alliance Formation
- Facilitating and Promoting Multilateralism
- Ensuring Peaceful Environment for National Construction
- Search for Comprehensive National Power


The true Chinese intent regarding these strategic behaviour cannot be predicted accurately without factoring in the cultural constraints that influence them. Uniqueness of China due to its absence from international stage for very long period, until its forced opening through Opium War makes its strategies different from other nations. Culturally China is not used to designing strategies to 'survive' as realists assume, Chinese strategised to ensure their supremacy against small neighbouring countries in the peripheral region. Cultural explanation of these strategic behaviour in the post-Cold War Period can either nullify or enforce "China's threat theory". If the concept of *Shi* functions in the post-Cold War era, then Chinese cooperation and partnership with Asian countries, could lead to Chinese domination of the region in future. However, to prove this point is beyond the scope of this study. Deception is an essential component of Chinese strategic culture, and it is designed to counter adversary's strategies and not his physical resources.

The flaws in assumption also lead to unpredictability of Chinese strategic behaviour. Former Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru complained of Chinese back-stabbing during the 1962 border crisis¹²¹. This statement was made after a good start by both neighbouring countries (Bandung Conference) in the immediate period of their independence. In late 1990s former defence minister of India made a public statement which named China as India's greatest threat. According to Srikanth Kondapalli (2005: 9),


China has argued that it is opposed to the threat or use of force in international relations and advocates settlement of international disputes through peaceful means. Laudatory as these statements are, if implemented sincerely by China or other countries, most of the conflicts that afflict the world could be solved. Nevertheless, the track record of China in this regard is inconsistent and contradictory, if not suspect...China's threat of use of force during the Indo-Pakistan conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999 is well recorded¹²².

In 1998, while Indian diplomats generated support for its nuclear tests in Pokhran, by citing Chinese threat factor, China was not seriously concerned with India conducting those tests. However, Chinese registered strong opposition to India making China a reason for its tests¹²³. Why does China not consider Indian nuclear tests as threat but objects to it being made an excuse? General theories like realism and liberalism cannot predict Chinese strategic behaviour since their assumptions are not China specific. Special theories which factor in Chinese uniqueness will have better explanatory value. General theories view China as a 'verb', in other words as an actor within the international system. China joined the international system late with some unique experiences, it was never part of the socialised world and therefore similar yardsticks cannot be applied to China. Special theories like strategic culture view China as a 'noun', in other words more importance is given to unit.

Chinese conceptualisation of 'use of force' has remained more or less similar by remaining constrained by cultural factors. The following two models summarise the description in chapter two and three and attempt to answer, how Chinese conceptualisation of 'use of force' functions within the constructed belief system in the post-Cold War era?



→ Positive → Reactive → Positive Reinforcement
 → Restoration



The first model describes the conditions important for China in order to use force. Hypothetically China will have to assure itself of three factors¹²⁴;

- Impact on the overall situation will be positive¹²⁵
- Moral and peoples support
- Central Leadership.

These factors will remain a strong cultural constraint, motivating actual use of force and thereby overruling the constraints offered by material and structural constraints. Chinese would terminate use of force as and when they positively reinforce the environment. Since material and structural factors remain as strong influences on Chinese strategic behaviour in the post-Cold War era (with regard to use of force), in the event of decision making in crisis, China may subscribe to culturally constrained mental model than a structurally/materially constrained model.

Inversely (refer second model), If China were to be least constrained by structural and material factors, its likelihood of using force will still remain less due to cultural constraints. If the above mentioned factors negatively favour Chinese evaluation of force then even under less structural constraints China may not use force. It is to say that China may not necessarily use force on Taiwan even if U.S. withdrew completely from the East Asian Region. This may be the reason why China has expressed that U.S. military presence in East Asia is a stabilising factor. According to the realist, China must attempt in keeping foreign military away from its periphery, China in this regard behaves contradictorily¹²⁶.

This study therefore concludes the following:

- 1) It is empirically provable that influence of strategic culture exists on Chinese strategic behaviour, in the present post-Cold War environment
- 2) There is likelihood of Chinese strategic behaviour being more culturally constrained than materially constrained
- 3) Chinese strategic behaviour need not confirm to the assumption of general theories of realism and liberalism (assumptions)
- 4) Requirement to employ special analytical tool like strategic culture in analysing Chinese strategic behaviour

¹ Experts believe that in China real power is not held by the President but the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The then President of People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin, held on to the Chairmanship of CMC even having resigned from Presidentship. However this study considers PRC Presidents statement as a cultural product representing the ideas and beliefs of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

² Leadership in China has employed different set of policies cultural trait. The policies varied during the leadership of Mao and in the post-Mao period when economic reforms started.

³ Internal causes pertain to political, technological revolution and external causes could be the threat environment.

⁴ During various periods of imperial history, military incursions into the known periphery and more ambitious efforts to expand China's political, economic, and military reach beyond the existing periphery were often strongly resisted by Confucian civilian bureaucrats and imperial advisors. Moreover this argument often derives from the belief that (a) Chinese philosophers and military theorists such as Confucius, Mencius, and Sun Zi generally eschewed violence in favour of accommodation, moral suasion, or stratagem.

⁵ Lio Haibo, "Unforgettable Aggression-Time to Ponder Two Sino Japanese War", Beijing Review, August 21-27, p.9

⁶ Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih (1993), *Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force 1840-1980*, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University.

⁷ William H Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, (2006), *The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture-Shih vs Li*, Palgrave Macmillan.

⁸ Alistair Ian Johnston, (1995), "Thinking about Strategic Culture", *International Security*, Vol.19, NO.4. (Spring), pp. 32-64.

⁹ The Boxers were, naturally, deeply motivated by traditional religious notions of polytheism and asceticism, drawn from Buddhism, Taoism and historical novels. All of their autonomous units emphasised their supernatural, powers, charms, elixirs and mobilisation of spirits. Many of their leaders were monks and priests. The Boxers believed that they were invincible spirit soldiers, immune to Western bullets through their magic, charm and boxing rituals. The Boxers believed that millions of spirited soldiers would arise to wipe out the foreign stain on China.

¹⁰ Allen Whiting (1975), *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p.244.

¹¹ Originally cited in Neville Maxwell (1970), *India's China War*, New York: Random House. p.261.

¹² Suisheng Zhao, (2004), *Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour*, (ed), Newyork: M.E. Sharpe.

¹³ Andrew Scobell, (2003), *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴ William H Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim (2006), *The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture-Shih vs Li*, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁵ PRC's military engagement with U.S. in the immediate period following independence was a strategic ruin with respect to Taiwan. External factors constrained Chinese natural strategic behaviour of revolutionary period.

¹⁶ Muthaiah Alagappa (1998), "Introduction", in Alagappa, (ed). *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Perspectives*, Stanford University Press.

¹⁷ Jack Snyder (1977), cited in Kerry Longhurst (2000), *Strategic Culture: The Key to Understanding German Security Policy*, University of Birmingham. p. 302.

¹⁸ This generalisation is made on the basis of all study material used for this dissertation and therefore an opinion of the author.

¹⁹ Non-strategic cultural schools include 1) Liberalism and its various strands 2) Realism and its various strands expect for classical and neo-classical realism.

²⁰ Alastair Ian Johnston, (1995), *Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²¹ White paper on national defence- China's National Defence 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 can be accessed at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/defence/defence.html>, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn> or <http://English.chinamil.com.cn>.

²² Jack Snyder (1977), cited in, Alastair Ian Johnston, (1995), *Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²³ Valerie M. Hudson (2001), *Culture and Foreign Policy*, (ed), Lynne Reinner Publisher.

²⁴ Peter Katzenstein, (1996), *The Culture of National Security* (ed), Newyork: Columbia University Press.

²⁵ This classification is mentioned by Alastair Ian Johnston. He generalises the whole of strategic culturist into three broad generations.

²⁶ Brian C. Schmidt classifies realists into the following four categories, (1) classical realism (2) Structural Realism I (Defensive) (3) Structural Realism II (Offensive) (4) Modified Realism.

²⁷ Alexander Wendt, (1992), "Anarchy is What Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organisation*, Vol. 46, No.2 (Spring). P.408.

²⁸ Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International order*, London: Cornell University Press.

²⁹ During the modern era, contact with industrialized nation-states, the related demise of Confucian concepts of state authority and inter relations, and the overall increasing demands of economic and military modernization have compelled Chinese state to significantly alter the means by which it seeks to control its periphery, while also limiting its ability to do so.

³⁰ For a pattern and frequency of war in Imperial China see Swaine, Michael D, Ashley J Tellis (2000) *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*, Santa Monica, calif: RAND. P. 47. This analysis highlights the fact that China is **violence prone**. (emphasis added).

³¹ An empires life is being categorised into three. Early, Middle, and late periods. Early period is associated with preservation and accumulation of central authority and consolidation and accumulation of territories. Middle period is associated with consolidation, development, and maximizing central authority. Late periods are associated with a declining central authority, internal chaos, and threat and actual invasion. This analysis is based on the data compiled by lee (1988), p. 362. cited *ibid*.

³² The external use of force was especially evident during the early stage of an imperial regime's existence, after domestic rule was consolidated, and was employed to reclaim lost territories or to increase Chinese

control or influence over the periphery. Violence against foreign entities was least evident during the last stages of a regimes existence, when the leadership was often internally divided and largely preoccupied with the suppression of internal revolts.Ibid p.50.

³³ "As a large developing country, China has before it an arduous task for modernization, which calls for prolonged and persistent hard work. China will mainly rely on its own strength for development, and therefore poses no obstacle or threat to any one. China needs a peaceful international environment for its own development, which in turn will enhance peace and development in the world. Holding high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, China adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defence policy of the defensive nature. China will never go for expansion, nor will it ever seek hegemony". (China's National Defence, 2004).

³⁴ A study conducted by RAND on *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* Claims that there have been instances in Chinese history where a powerful Chinese kingdom had failed to control its periphery through military means.

³⁵Ibid; P.15

³⁶ Sun Zi's writings have been retrieved from the biography of Sima Qian a Han Dynasty historian (206BC-220 BC). Sun Zi, *The Art of War* accessed from (accessed on 5 May, 2006) <http://sun.thefreelibrary.com/Art-of-War> also see the online version of The Art of War with other commentaries <http://www.chinastrategies.com/artwar.html>.

³⁷ Francois Jullien, (2004) *A Treaties on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking*.Honululu: University of Hawaii Press, p.20.

³⁸ China has ensured that all countries maintaining diplomatic relations with it should adhere to 'one China policy' and not 'two China' or 'one China' and 'one Taiwan' policy.

³⁹ This analysis deliberately does not take into account the irritants in this situation (US intervention and Taiwan independence)

⁴⁰ We must study the laws of war in general, we must also study the laws of revolutionary war, and, finally, we must study the laws of China's revolutionary war. (Mao, 1936).

⁴¹ This generalisation is derived out of analysis of all wars fought by China in the post-revolutionary period, where China has not largely emphasised on annihilation, for example the unilateral withdrawal of PLA during the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

⁴² For full text of the speech refer, Beijing Review, October 16-22, 1995. pp 19-21.

⁴³ Wherever there is war, there is a war situation as a whole. The war situation as a whole may cover the entire world, may cover an entire country, or may cover an independent guerrilla zone or an independent major operational front. Any war situation which acquires a comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation as a whole. (Mao, 1936)

⁴⁴ "In accordance with the needs of national development strategy, the PLA, by employing military means flexibly and in close coordination with political, economic and diplomatic endeavours, improves China's strategic environment, reduces factors of insecurity and instability, and prevents local wars and armed conflicts so as to keep the country from the harm of war." (China's National Defence, 2002)* p.13.

⁴⁵ Spokesmen of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Chen Jian and Shen Guofang mentioned this while answering corresponments' questions at the ministry's regular news briefings on July 4 and July 6, 1995. Beijing Review, July 24-30, 1995.

⁴⁶ The Chinese people are resolutely opposed to all separatist activities in whatever manifestation aimed at Taiwan independence," to foreign interference of any form, and to arms sales to Taiwan or entrance to military alliance of any form with Taiwan by any country in the world. We will never allow anyone to split Taiwan from China through whatever means. Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of "Taiwan independence, the Chinese people and armed forces **will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost?** (China's National Defence, 2004). (emphasis added)

⁴⁷ However, it remains to be seen whether Beijing would be willing to stick by these measures of effectiveness in wartime, especially a Taiwan Strait war. Approximately 60 percent of China's gross national product is consolidated in provinces along China's eastern seaboard, which has been referenced as an "economic centre of gravity" by PLA strategists. Ron Christman while making these counter arguments highlights the growing tussle between military strategist and civilian leaders on how to manage China's coastal development strategy and the vulnerability of major infrastructure in developing China (the Three Gorges Dam, for example). Ron Christman, (2003), "How Beijing Evaluates Military Campaigns: An Initial Assessment" in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, Larry M. Wortzel (ed) "The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75", Strategic Studies Institute: The Heritage Foundation.

⁴⁸ 2 December 2000, FE/4013 G/2-SWB.

⁴⁹ Text of China's February 1992 Law reprinted in United Nations, Law of the Sea Bulletin No.21 (August 1992), p.24 at http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletinpdf/bulE21.pdf.

⁵⁰ John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek (2002), **Security Risks of a South China Sea Conflict**, in (ed.by same authors) "Cooperative Monitoring in the South China Sea" Westport: Praeger, p.57.

⁵¹ "Full text of Anti-Secessuion Law", Articles 1 and 8, *People's Daily Online*, March 14, 2005 at (accessed on 5 July, 2006) http://english.people.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html.

⁵² For full text of the speech refer, "Foreign News Briefing", *Beijing Review*, October 16-22, 1995. pp 19-21.

⁵³ *Only a complete fool or a madman would cherish passive defence as a talisman.* (Mao, 1936).

⁵⁴ "*But our situation is different. With the slogan of defending the revolutionary base areas and defending China, we can rally the overwhelming majority of the people to fight with one heart and one mind, because we are the oppressed and the victims of aggression*". (Mao, 1936).

⁵⁵ "To adapt itself to the changes both in the international strategic situation and the national security environment and rise to the challenges presented by the RMA worldwide, China adheres to the military strategy of active defence and works to speed up the RMA with Chinese characteristics".(China's National Defence, 2004).

⁵⁶ Anatol Rapoport,(1968), *Clausewitz on War*,(ed), London: Penguin Books

⁵⁷ General Liu Huaqing, who is over 80 years old, is China's highest ranking military officer as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. These observations were made by him commemorates the 100th anniversary of Sino-Japanese War by listing the military challenges China faces. *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, Institute for National Strategic Studies.<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/chinview/chinasum.html>.

⁵⁸ These observations were made by Colonel Ming Zengfu of the Air Force Command Institute and Major General Zheng Shenxia in their articles '21st-Century Air Warfare' and " The Military Revolution",

respectively. *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, Institute for National Strategic Studies. (Accessed on 5 May 2006) <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/chinview/chinasum.html>.

⁵⁹ These observations were made by Colonel Xiao Jingmin and Major Bao Bin, both of the Strategy Department, Academy of Military Science, in their article "21st-century Land Operations". Ibid.

⁶⁰ These conditions are:

- (1) The population actively supports the Red Army.
- (2) The terrain is favourable for operations.
- (3) All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated.
- (4) The enemy's weak spots have been discovered.
- (5) The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state.
- (6) The enemy has been induced to make mistakes. (Mao, 1936)

⁶¹ "The first condition, active support of the population, is the most important one for the Red Army. It means having a base area. Moreover, given this condition, it is easy to achieve conditions 4, 5 and 6. Therefore, when the enemy launches a full-scale offensive, the Red Army generally withdraws from the White area into the base area, because that is where the population is most active in supporting the Red Army against the White army. Also, there is a difference between the borders and the central district of a base area; in the latter the people are better at blocking the passage of information to the enemy, better at reconnaissance, transportation, joining in the fighting, and so on". (Mao, 1936).

⁶² Refer Allan S. Whiting, "The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by People's Republic of China" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol 402, and *China in the World Today*. (July, 1972), pp 55-66, for a comprehensive analysis of the *concept of retreat* and its implication in Chinese employment of force.

⁶³ Meanwhile, it adheres to the people's war concept and develops the strategies and tactics of the people's war. To meet the requirements of integrated and joint operations, the PLA endeavours to establish a modern operational system capable of giving full play to the overall efficiency of the armed forces as well as the national war potentials. The PLA conducts more training and exercises with specific objectives in order to raise its capabilities in coping with various crises and contingencies". (China's National Defence, 2004).

⁶⁴ "The PLA takes as its objective to win local wars under the conditions of informationalisation and gives priority to developing weaponry and equipment, to building joint operational capabilities, and to making full preparations in the battlefields". (China's National Defence, 2004).

⁶⁵ Increasing budgetary input into information technology development of the armed forces. The U.S. defence budget for the 2005 fiscal year signed by President Bush in November 2004 is as high as \$ 420.6 billion, a 4.8 % increase over that for the 2004 fiscal year, of which \$ 147.6 billion are earmarked for developing and procuring advanced armaments, a sum exceeding the total military expenditure of the four other major military powers-Japan, Britain, France and Russia-combined. According to the U.S. plan, during the 2009 fiscal year, it will catapult the expenditure in this sector to \$ 181.6 billion. Meanwhile, Russia plans to raise its 2005 defence budget to \$ 18.91, a 27.6 % increase over 2004. (*)

⁶⁶ Giri Deshingkar, (2005), in Manoranjan Mohanty, Mira Sinha-Bhattacharjea (ed), *Security and science in China and India*, New Delhi: Samskriti and Institute of Chinese Studies Centre for the study of Developing Societies.

⁶⁷ As an important component of the Chinese armed forces and the assistant and backup forces of the PLA, the militia force is an armed organization composed of the masses not released from their regular work. The militia is divided into two categories - the ordinary and the primary militia. The primary militia comprises rapid reaction detachments, infantry detachments, specialized technical detachments and

detachments with corresponding specialties. There are now 10 million primary militia members throughout the country. (China's National Defence, 2004).

⁶⁸ The PLA will promote coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capabilities, enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and war fighting capabilities. (China's National Defence, 2004).

⁶⁹ John J. Tkacik, jr, (2003), "From surprise to Stalemate: What the people's Liberation Army Learned from the Korean War – A Half-Century Later", in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, Lary M. Wortzel (ed), *The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75*, Strategic Studies Institute.

⁷⁰ Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis and John F. Corbett, jr, (1996), "Training Tommorow's PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks", *The China Quaterly*, June 1996, number 146.

⁷¹ From 1951-95 the PLA built about 100 highways in Tibet. Construction of the first expressway on the Tibet-Qinghai plateau of about 217 km from Xining to Lanzhou was started in 1999 with a cost of Yuan 4.5 billion (\$540 million). A railway line of about 1,000 kilometer is being planned for linking Qinghai with Tibet by 2007. Srikanth Kondapalli (2004), International Workshop on *External Strategy of the New Chinese Leadership*, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIJA), February 9-10 Tokyo, Japan. pp 70-89.

⁷² This section draws from "Polishing Sword: a Grand Exercise of This Century", in http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2005-07/06/content_3177291.htm.

⁷³ Scott Gartner while studying strategic assessment in war stressed that United States evaluated the effectiveness of use of force in terms 'dominant quantitative terms'. For example during the Iranian hostage crisis US used public approval ratings as quantitative indicator.

⁷⁴ Thus the four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a great revolution; a big and powerful enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determine the line for guiding China's revolutionary war as well as many of its strategic and tactical principles. (Mao, 1936).

⁷⁵ The reunification of a divided Germany on October 3, 1990 marked the collapse of the Yalta Accords, when heads of state of 32 European nations together with those from the United States and Canada gathered in Paris in November at a summit meeting of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, the 22 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact issued a joint statement declaring an end to an era in which division and confrontation in Europe had continued unabated for more than 40 years. Hu Xueze and Bing Jinhu (1991), "World situation unstable despite dentine", *Beijing Review*, Vol.34, No: 1, January. pp. 7-13, 1991.

⁷⁶ According to Qiang Ning (1995), economies in developing countries have increased on average 3.4 percent yearly from 1989 to 1991, and more than 5 percent a year between 1992 and 1994. The upward momentum of economic growth in developing countries over the last three years approaches that of the 1960's-70, when these countries' economies accelerated markedly. Eastern Asia was far ahead, with an annual average increase of 7.8 percent. Southern Asia has maintained a moderate increase of 4-4.5 percent. Latin America has realised a steady increase of 3 percent over four successive years. Africa has managed to maintain economic growth nearly equal to that of its population for the first time since the early 1990s. Economic growth accounts for a 3 percent rise in raw materials in 1994. The Middle East experienced a decline in its economy from a 4.8 percent increase in 1993 to a 1.4 percent in 1994, the slow growth due to a drop in oil prices. Refer "China's Socio-Economic Progress: 1991-1995", *Beijing Review*, December 18-24, 1995. p.9

⁷⁷ Report on the Work of the Government- Delivered at the Third Session of the Eighth National People's Congress March 5, 1995- Li Peng- Premier of the State Council. On September 27, 1995, the Chinese vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made a statement at the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly which again highlighted similar beliefs, for full text refer "Foreign Minister Addresses UN" ,*Beijing Review*, October 16-22, 1995. p-19

⁷⁸ For full text of this speech refer "Let us Work Better Together for a Better World", *Beijing Review*, November 6-12, 1995.p-19.

⁷⁹ This belief has remained constant as the statistical figures in 2000 for countries identified by United Nations as highly indebted poor countries owe about US\$200 billion in nominal terms. Of which, US\$60 billion is owed to institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, US\$20 billion is corporate debt, and other US\$ 120 billion is bilateral loans. Ren Xin, "Okinawa Summit Ends with Few Results", *Beijing Review*, August 14, 2000. p. 10-11.

⁸⁰ This description of post cold-War era has continued without change. On September 6, 2000, while speaking at the plenary session of the UN Millennium Summit, President Jiang Zemin said "The Cold War, which continued for nearly half a century, ended. The international situation on the whole had tended to relax and a tendency towards a multipolar world and economic globalization is quickly developing. Modern science and technology, with information technology and life science as its nucleus, is advancing by leaps and bounds. Mankind faces a rare opportunity. To seek peace and development is the common aspiration of people of all countries and also the main theme of our times. However, the unfair and irrational old international political and economic order has not fundamentally changed yet, and it is still an arduous task and has a long way to go to solve the two major strategic issues and establish a fair and reasonable new international political and economic order". For full text of this speech refer "Together Let Us Create a Beautiful World" *Beijing Review*, September 18, 2000. p.8.

⁸¹ According to President Jiang Zemin, "On one side are the developed countries of the North, which have continuously accumulated wealth, and on the other side are the developing countries of the South, which have fallen deeper into poverty. The rich get richer; the poor get poorer. The development of modern science and technology and economic globalisation have not benefited all countries of the imbalance in the world development has become acute. More than 1.3 billion people in the world live in abject poverty, with less than U.S. \$1 per capita in living expenses per day. The developed countries possess 86 percent of the world's total output value and occupy 82 percent of the export markets, while the developing countries which account for majority of the world's population possess only 14 and 18 percent respectively. May this situation remain unchanged, it will be hard to avoid disturbances in the international community, and promote the common development of all countries and realise universal prosperity". For full text of this speech refer *ibid*, p.8.

⁸² The Joint Statement by the Presidents of People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Anti-Missile Defence said " the development of the international situation fully proves the correctness of three documents: the joint statement on the Sino-Russian Relations at the turn of the century signed on November 23, 1998; the joint Press Communiqué on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) signed on April 14, 1999; and the conclusion and the comments on ABM made in the Sino-Russian Joint Statement on December 10, 1999, during the Sino-Russian summit in 2000. The statement also expresses that Chinese and Russian governments are in firm opposition to the U.S. deployment of National Missile Defence System. Refer "Joint Statement by the Presidents of Peoples Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Anti-Missile Defence", *Beijing Review*, August 7, 2000. p.15.

⁸³ For full text of this speech refer "Together let us create a Beautiful World", *Beijing Review*, September 18, 2000. p.8.

⁸⁴ In the 42-day-long Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. troops launched a total of 228 Tomahawk cruise missile, while in the Iraq war, around 800 cruise missiles were fired and about 20,000 bombs were dropped. Of these, precision-guided ammunition discharged, outnumbering the three previous local wars. In addition to

a massive number of Tomahawk cruise missiles and joint direct attack munitions (JDAM), the U.S. troops also used such precision-guided ammunition as high power microwave munitions (HPM) and joint standoff weapons (JSOW). Reliance on satellites was also high; U.S. military used nearly 90 satellites for uninterrupted supply of intelligence. Xiong Guangkai (2003) *International Strategy and Revolution in Military Affairs*, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. p.173.

⁸⁵ In the mid-1980s China's guideline for army building was strategically shifted from all-time preparedness against a large-scale war of aggression to peacetime construction, and the size and structure of the armed forces were adjusted accordingly. In 1985 the government decided unilaterally to cut its troops by one million men in real terms. By 1990, the total reduction had reached 1.039 million men. Since 1990 the size of the PLA has further shrunk through successive adjustments. When the drawdown of 500,000 has been completed, the total size of the PLA will be 2.5 million men. (China's National Defence, 1998)

⁸⁶ These observations were made by the then Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao while delivering a speech before the Indonesia Council on World Affairs on July 24, 2000. Refer "Hu Jintao :China's Asia Policy" *Beijing Review*, August 14, 2000. p.8.

⁸⁷ Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao while delivering a speech before the Indonesia Council on World Affairs on July 24, 2000 said "Facts have proven that China is an important driving force for Asia's development, as well as an important driving force for safeguarding stability in Asia". Refer *ibid.* p.8.

⁸⁸ Total imports of Bangladesh, Cambodia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam from China far exceed their exports to China. Source: UNCTAD and World Development Indicators (2003).

⁸⁹ *Ibid* (67)

⁹⁰ The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence include (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (2) mutual non-aggression (3) non-interference in each others internal affairs (4) equality and mutual benefit (5) peaceful coexistence.

⁹¹ This was mentioned in particular relevance to the Nansha question, when he mentioned China was actively participating in the making of a code of conduct for preserving peace and stability in the South China Sea.

⁹² Republic of China's Foreign Minister Tien Hung-Mao made the call in his first public speech in the United States since assuming his current post on 20th May 2000. 1 December 2000, SWB FE/4012 F/4.

⁹³ Visiting US Congressman Floyd D. Spencer, Chairman of the House Representatives committee on armed Services said that after exchanging views with senior leaders in Taiwan on 2 December 2000. SWB/FE/ 4014 F/3-4 December 2000.

⁹⁴ The size of the deployment forces has arisen from 4, 80,000 in the early 1990's to 6, 30,000 in the mid-1990 to 6, 90, 000 in 2000. 5 December 2000, FE/4015 D/4-SWB.

⁹⁵ The European Parliament, the EU's legislative arm, passed the pro-Taiwan amendment, which was jointly initiated by EP members Daniel Marc Cohn-Bendit and Monica Frasson with a vote of 482-485. 2 December 2000, FE/4013 F/4-SWB.

⁹⁶ These remarks were made by Jiang Zemin, the then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) during his speech at the closing meeting of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th CCP Central Committee on September 1995. For full text of this speech refer "Principles of Modernisation Drive", *Beijing Review*, November 6-12, 1995. Pp.7-14.

⁹⁷ This speech was made by the then President Jiang Zemin, on October 24, 1995, at the Special Commemorative Meeting on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United States. For full text of this speech refer "Let us Work Together for a Better World" *Beijing Review*, November 6-12, 1995. p.19-22.

⁹⁸ This observation was made by Wang Shuguang, Director of the State Oceanic Administration, at a national maritime meeting which opened on August 29, 2000. Refer "China Strives to Become Maritime Giant", *Beijing Review*, September 11, 2000. p.6.

⁹⁹ For full text refer Tang Tianri, "Ten Years after the Gulf War: U.S. Instead if Iraq Finds Itself Isolated", *Beijing Review*, September 11, 2000.p.10.

¹⁰⁰ Some other facts that assist this opinion: 1) Former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt when he knelt down on the snow-covered ground to mourn the Jews killed by the Nazis. 2) On January 25, 1970, Brandt, while visiting Poland, made a special trip to the monument commemorating Jewish Martyrs. 3) In January 2000, in order to strengthen the education of the younger generation as well as show the unswerving efforts the German people have been making in remembering the lessons of history, a memorial hall to commemorate the terrible deeds of the Nazis was set up in Berlin. 4) After the Second World War, Germany paid US\$ 12 billion in war reparation to the Soviet Union and US\$60 billion in Jewish people. 5) Germany has also signed an agreement with the United States, Russia and Poland, in which Germany agreed to pay 10 billion Deutsche marks to survivors and offspring of the labourers who had been forced to work for Nazis history. Yue Lushi "History, if Not Forgotten, Can Be a Guide for the Future", *Beijing Review*, September 4, 2000. p.9.

¹⁰¹ On August 15 of this year, 10 members of the Yoshiro Mori cabinet and 78 members of the Diet paid homage at Yasukuni Shrine in official or personal capacities regardless of strong opposition and condemnation by the Asian people. Ibid.

¹⁰² The bacterial experiments had been done from 24th September 1931 to 5th August 1940. 1 December, FE/4012 G/2 SWB.

¹⁰³ On 29 November 2000, Russian defence minister Igor Sergeev completed an official visit to Japan and in Tokyo he had talks with Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. During this visit, Japanese Navy (listed as Commander of the self-defence Fleet) Admiral Kataru Haregawa, talked about the possibility of the Japanese utilising nuclear submarines and a hotline between the Japanese Navy and the Russian Pacific Fleet. 1 Dec 2000, FE/4012/2-SWB.

¹⁰⁴ Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Shen Guofang while a question in this regard said that a handful of people in Japan and their political representatives have tried every means to distort history and legitimise the aggression. "News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry", *Beijing Review*, July 3-9, 1995.p.29.

¹⁰⁵ In a article published in *Outlook Weekly* reviewing the Hong Kong question on the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the current situation former deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, pointed out that Hong Kong had been Chinese territory since ancient times and that the Chinese government never recognized the three unequal treaties imposed upon China during the Qing rule. Ren Xin "'One Country, Two System' Moving Toward Reality" *Beijing Review*, January 30-February 5, 1995. P.22.

¹⁰⁶ According to former deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, the Chinese and British governments started their talks in September 1982. The talks went on smoothly as a result, and on December 19, 1984 the two sides signed the Joint Declaration. Then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher attributed the success to Deng Xiaoping's formula of "one country, two systems." Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ In March 1994, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress promulgated Taiwanese Investment providing the most complete guarantee to Taiwan investors. In April 1994, the State Council decided to further improve the investment environment, as well as to strengthen agriculture and

technological exchanges. Moreover, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits and the Taiwan Strait Exchange Foundation agreed to put economic and trade cooperation on the agenda for consultation. Refer Ren Xin, "Mainland, Taiwan Economic Ties Enhanced", *Beijing Review*, March 13-19, 1995. p.16.

¹⁰⁸ Refer "Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China on 1994 National Economic and Social Development" (released on February 28, 1995), *Beijing Review*, March 27-April 2, 1995. p.9-16.

¹⁰⁹ 2 December 2000, FE/4013 F/4-SWB.

¹¹⁰ At that time, it was decided that national defense should be both subordinated to and serve the country's overall economic development. As a result, national defense received a low input, and was in a state of self-preservation. From 1979 to 1989, the average annual increase of defense expenditure was 1.23 percent. However, the defense expenditure actually registered an average annual decrease of 5.83 percent, given the 7.49 percent average annual increase of the consumer price index in the same period. From 1990 to 2005, the average annual increase in defense expenditure was 15.36 percent. As the average annual increase of the consumer price index during the same period was 5.22 percent, the actual average increase in defense expenditure was 9.64 percent. (China's National Defense, 2006)

¹¹¹ In 2005, China's defense expenditure equaled 6.19 percent of that of the United States, 52.95 percent of that of the United Kingdom, 71.45 percent of that of France and 67.52 percent of that of Japan. China's defense expenses per serviceman averaged RMB107, 607, amounting to 3.74 percent of that of the United States and 7.07 percent of that of Japan. (China's National Defense, 2006)

¹¹² China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and armed forces, in accordance with the state's overall plan to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century. (China's National Defense, 2006)

¹¹³ The PLA gives priority to developing new types of equipment which are advanced and reliable in technical performance, and effective in operations. It is speeding up the development of integrated electronic information systems, enhancing the comprehensive integration of various types of weapon systems and support systems, and facilitating information sharing and fusion. The PLA is accelerating the retirement of redundant equipment, carrying out the prioritized, selective and phased retrofitting of equipment and informationization of equipment on active service, and tapping the potential of existing equipment. It is strengthening the systematic development of equipment to form a complete system of equipment, weaponry and equipment support. (China's National Defence, 2006)

¹¹⁴ Implementing the military strategy of active defense. The PLA ensures that it is well prepared for military struggle, with winning local wars under conditions of informationization and enhancing national sovereignty, security, and interests of development as its objective. It will upgrade and develop the strategic concept of people's war, and work for close coordination between military struggle and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and legal endeavors, uses strategies and tactics in a comprehensive way, and takes the initiative to prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars. (China's National Defense, 2006)

¹¹⁵ In 1985, 1997 and 2003, China announced that it would cut the size of the PLA by one million, 500,000 and 200,000 persons, respectively. By the end of 2005, China had completed reducing the PLA by 200,000 troops, and the PLA currently has 2.3 million troops. The PLA has made new progress towards the goal of being proper in size, optimal in structure, streamlined in organization, swift and flexible in command, and powerful in fighting capacity. (China's National Defence, 2006).

¹¹⁶ Defence expenditure of some countries in 2005 is as follows, U.S.-495.33 US\$ billion, Russia-18.603 US \$ billion, U.K.-57.88 US \$ billion, France-42.891 US \$ 42.891, Germany-31.139 US \$ billion, Japan-45.387 US \$ billion, and China- 30.646 US \$ billion.(China's National Defence, 2006).

¹¹⁷ This concept is borrowed from the discipline of psychology- 'Negetive Goal' and 'Positive Goal'. A human behaviour is said to be negetive goal oriented if the goal is pursued to avoid some other goal. For example If X intends to do 'g' in order to avoid 'h', then X is negetively goal oriented. If X intends to do 'g' in order not to avoid doing anything else, then X is positive goal oriented.

¹¹⁸ Material factors include (1) growing foreign trade relations (2) dependence on foreign resources and Structural factors include (1) disequilibrium in military power (2) disequilibrium in economic power.

¹¹⁹ China shelled Quemoy on alternate days at a fixed schedule in 1958 to assert its power, when such action had no particular military rationale.

¹²⁰ Originally cited in Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang (1980), *China Under the threat*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.18.

¹²¹ This statement was made by the then Prime Minister on floor of Indian Parliament.

¹²² Srikanth Kondapalli (2005), "Chinese Military Update", The Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, London. URL: www.rusi.org/asia.

¹²³ This observation was made by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director, Air Power Studies, New Delhi, in 2007 at a seminar on *China's Anti-Satellite Missile Tests -Implications for India*, organised by Center for East Asian studies, JNU, New Delhi.

¹²⁴ This study identifies only three, however possibility of others remain high.

¹²⁵ This process can also take place when China was to perceive a negative trend in its threat environment.

¹²⁶ Though Japan is cited as a reason for this behaviour.