

Geopolitics of Oil: A Case Study of Iraq

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "*Geopolitics of Oil: A Case Study of Iraq,*" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated

To

My Nation

Next to acquiring good friends, the best acquisition is that of good books.

-Colton

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
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
Chapter-I: Introduction: Historical and Geographical Background

Figure No. 1: Historical Map (A).¹



¹ National geographic : Iraq maps , News, Picture National Geographic .www.nationalgeographic.com/iraq/21k

Figure No.2: Physical Map (B).



² National geographic : Iraq maps , News, Picture National Geographic .www.nationalgeographic.com/iraq/21k

Chapter I

Introduction

Historical and Geographical Background

“Geopolitics as an approach to the study of international relations stresses the importance to locations among nations. Thus, geopolitics emphasizes geographic factors as important determinants of government policy and major dominants of the relative power position of states. In this report on energy, these locational factors are emphasized, as they must be, in considering access to raw materials generally.

In turn, the importance of various geographic factors changes with development in many areas, including the passage of time, advances in technology, the need for access to raw materials, and changes in national and international political goals and judgments as to legitimate means of pursuing intentional objectives.

Moreover, geographic and locational factors vary in importance with changes with changes in the international system itself; there are new international actors (new nations as well as multinational corporations, international organizations and regional economic and military organizations): the legitimacy and adequacy of the traditional actors, of nation-states themselves, is a subject for debate, power becomes more widely dispersed; superpowers often find themselves confounded by lesser states who find room for maneuver within the stalemate created by nuclear weaponry. Interdependence, in terms of mutual dependence as well as interpenetration, is a reality. And it is within this continuously changing international environment that geopolitics and access to raw materials will evolve.

Are there geopolitical factors related to energy and raw material supplies that suggest the outline of new international relationships for the decades ahead? Which areas, by dint of their control over which geographic factors will be strategically and economically important in the future? What combinations of states are made likely by these geographic factors? If energy heartlands, to the world community, will there be “energy heartland” other than the Middle East, of undisputed significance, access to which will be of prime importance?

Because all major primary energy resources dependent on a host of additional actions necessary to (1) transport to them in transports form and (2) transport them to consuming areas. moreover, factors other than resource location are essential aspects of the geopolitics of energy. The logistical supply lines, the technology, and the processing facilities without which the raw resources are of little value will also have implications for international politics.

Finally, the continuous interaction between factors influencing supply (reserves, processing, new discoveries, growing energy consumption, and energy research and technology and factors influencing demand (economic growth, resources requirements of particular economic system, and availability of substitutes), which gradually give different resources and geographic factors different importance over time, is also an important aspect of the geopolitics of energy”.¹

“The Republic of Iraq has an area of 434,920 sq. km. (267,970 sq. miles) with a coastline of a meter 58 km (36 mile). Its maritime claims extend to 12 nautical miles, of territorial waters. In July 1989, its population was approximately 18 million with an annual growth of 3.8 per cent. The demographic distribution of the Iraqi population is as follows:

Arab	-75 to 80 per cent
Kurdish	- 15 to 20 per cent
Assyrians, Turkomans	- 5 per cent

The languages spoken are Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian and Armenian, Christians and others. The literacy rate is about 55 per cent while 97 per cent of the total population practices Islam. The balance 3 per cent is Christians and others. The Republic of Iraq has 18 administrative provinces. The Ba’th party has been in power since the coup in 1958. Universal adult suffrage is practiced. Iraq is a member of the United Nations (UN), the Arab league, OPEC and other international organisation

¹ Conant, Melvin A. and Ferne Racine Gold (1978): *The Geopolitics of Energy*, Colorado, West view press Boulder.

History of Iraq

The world's first known civilization and other early cultures developed along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in what is now Iraq. The ancient Greeks called part of Iraq, and the surrounding region Mesopotamia (between rivers) because it lay between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. For thousands of years, civilizations here have deepened on controlling flooding from the two rivers and on using their waters for irrigation.

Mesopotamia was the cradle of the ancient civilization of the Sumerians. From 700 B.C. the Area became the hub of contention between its neighbours, the Iranian s in the East and the Hellenized states in the West. In the 7th century A.D. the Arabs conquered the vast area ruled from Medina and later Damascus till 750 A.D. when the Abbasids established their power in Baghdad. With their distraction 1258, control was wielded by the Mango's or Persians till the second decade of the present century when the British supported it.

During the 19th century, the Persian Gulf became a British lake. In 1911 Lord Curzon asserted that British political interests expended up to Baghdad and even beyond. Soon after the declaration of World War. The British occupied Basra (22 November 1914). Followed by the capture of Baghdad (11 March 1917)). And Mosul (7 November 1918) having occupied the crucial and vast tracts of territory, the creation of a new state and grand of mandate in 1920 were mere formalities for British in the process of legitimizing British control.

Iraq is one of the New Arabian states created artificially and arbitrarily in West Asia under the post World War I settlement. As a politically and geographically defined and demarcated state, the history of modern Iraq begins in 1920 when, after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the three erstwhile villages of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra were amalgamated to form one single political entity. In their meeting at San Reno in April 1920, the Allied powers, assigned the mandate of Iraq to Britain. The British created a monarchy in 1921 and installed Faisal, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca. as the king of Iraq.

The Iraqi cast line between Faw peninsula and Umm Qasr Island in the Persian Gulf is unusable for shipping. The main Iraq port of Basra is nearly 140 miles

away from the Persian Gulf up the Shatt al- Arab, the only Maritime link available for Iraq. Even in the best of times it has a three month cargo bottleneck. Umm Qasr, the Iraqi Naval Base on the border with Kuwait can only be reached by sea, through narrow passage between the Iraqi shore and the Kuwait Islands. The approach to Faw peninsula and the entrance to the Shatt al- Arab estuary is dominated by Iranian artillery and naval posts on and around Abadan Island. Lack of strategic depth makes Iraq vulnerable to air strikes from Israeli aircraft and US bases in the region.

Oil Resources

Iraq is the only member of the OPEC whose oil exports cannot reach the outside world without having to cross-foreign territory in the north (Syria, Lebanon and Turkey) or coming in close proximity of Iranian territory. Iraq's domestic prosperity depends on oil exports for which it has to depend on the goodwill and cooperation of its neighbors who conversely do not have to depend on Iraq for anything. Political instability and upheaval racked Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Turkey in the late seventies which adversely affected Iraq's oil revenues,

The Iraqi government was unable to benefit substantially from the quantum increase in oil prices in the mid 1970s. Due to loss of contracts attributable to nationalization of oil transit of Iraqi crude oil from its northern Kirkuk fields to Syrian ports through an existing pipeline. Till 1976 the explorations for new oil fields in Iraq were minimal. In 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) USA estimated that Iraqi oil reserves were 36 billion barrels, Saudi Arabia 150 billion barrels, Kuwait 71 billion barrels, Iran 60 billion barrels. As per British estimates the Iraqi oil potential stood at 95 billion barrels and daily production in 1979 was 2.9 million Barrels per day.

Crude oil accounted for approximately 97 to 98% of all Iraqi exports with the main destinations being France, Japan, Spain and the U.K. Its imports comprise of machinery, finished goods and food with the main sources of import being Japan, Germany, France, UK and USSR. In 1988 the GDP of Iraq was 34 billion US dollars with a per capita income of \$1950. The industrial base of Iraq comprises of steel, Petrochemical, cement and oil refineries with major concentration being around the

capital city of Baghdad and the port of Basra its inflation rate is presently about 40 per cent per annum.

The present Baathist regime came to power in 1968 after a military coup, led by Ahmed Hassan al – Bakr , and a group of civilians, the chief of the Iraqi security force attempted an abortive coup in which the Defense Minister was killed and the Minister of the Interior wounded. His accomplices were executed and the internal security force substantially purged and reorganized. Between 1968 and 1977, Iraq's potential power was under cut by its evident lack of economic, military and political capability.

Saddam Hussein as President

In July 1979, President, Ahmed Hussein as- Bakr stepped down for health reasons and Saddam Hussein was elected in his place. Saddam Hussein, a lawyer by profession was , only 41 years old when he assumed presidency of the Republic of Iraq in July 1979. Previously, ministers used to report independently to the President. On assuming presidency, Saddam reportedly ordered regular cabinet meetings for the first time in eleven years. Salaries of civil servants and the military were increased. 725 political prisoners, mostly Kurds and Shiite demonstrations were released, Emerged political stronger and in full control of the situation which lasted less than five weeks, Saddam Hussein put an end to alleged attempts by the Iraqi Communist party to organize cells in the army . He suspended publication of the Communist party's newspaper for criticism of the government and removed all communists from the cabinet and the National Progressive Peoples Front (a coalition). 22 party organizers were summarily executed for alleged subversive activities.

On detection of a deep rooted conspiracy to destabilize his government, Saddam ordered immediate imprisonment of large number of suspects and execution of traitors, witnessed by Saddam and his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) the executions were carried out in public in the capital city of Baghdad. Over 50,000 demonstrators witnessed the Executions on 08 August 1979 and roared "Death to the traitors". The conspirators named Syria and President Assad as the originator of the plot. The conspiracy reflected the ambitions of Assad to emerge as the leader of the unified Iraqi –

Syrian Ba'ath party. The Soviets were also blamed for the post because members of the Community Party had been purged from the cabinet.

Since November 1978 President Saddam Hussein dominated the Arab summit meetings and condemned the Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel indicated by the United States. He is the first modern Iraqi leader to contemplate restoration of the legendary power of ancient Mesopotamia. Western politicians and diplomats as well as men of the Arab world regard him and members of his RCC. They chose to live in isolation from the rest of the world. Friendly relations were cultivated only if Iraq was convinced that resumption of good relations would benefit its national cause and that of other Arab states,

Iraqi politics over emphasizes internal sectarianism and factionalism. The large Shiite Population of resentful of its meager senior political or administrative positions and sharp conflicts also divide the military and political elites. Factionalism and open quarrelling have become progressively confined to civilian circles, military officers choosing to stay out of politics and regular troops have not been called to take sides in political conflicts.

International Relations

Economy and Political Allies

France has been the main economic ally of Iraq. It obtained sophisticated military hardware from France in exchange for crude oil. It also obtained the experimental Osirak Nuclear reactor from France with confirmation of being supplied with an initial charge of highly enriched, weapon uranium. Canada, West Germany, Belgium, Japan and Ireland were also pressurized into wide ranging economic and political commitments in exchange for oil. Mutual security pacts were drawn with Saudi Arabia. In spite of a political rift, Iraq gave economic aid worth 200 million US dollars to Syria. Iraq has also improved their relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization led by Yasser Arafat. Emerging as a political leader in the Non Aligned Nations conference, Saddam was responsible for numerous initiatives,

In October 1979, Saddam became the first Arab head of state to break with Iran's Islamic fundamentalist regime, challenging the authority of the Ayatollah. He said, "The

Koran was written in Arabic, God destined the Arabs to play a vanguard role in Islam". He declared the Iranian revolution as a non-Islamic revolution. He also announced his intention to intervene militarily in Bahrain if the Iranians made any move to implement their non-territorial claims. The world misjudged his capabilities and paid little attention to the developments that took place in Iraq during the period 1978 to 1980. Saddam emerged stronger on the economic and diplomatic planes. Iraq stockpiled a wide range of arsenal

Kuwait

Location

Both geographically and politically, Kuwait dates back from the Middle of the 18th century when two major related events occurred. The first was its geographical identification in a map drawn by a Danish , explorer , Kursten Nebuhr , who spelt it as 'Kuet" The second development was the emergence , in 1756 , of sheikh Sabah Bin Jabir, who is considered as the founder of the Sabah Dynasty and founded the city of Kuwait (diminutive of the Arabic word "Kut" Meaning fortress) . Providing an outlet to the sea, Kuwait's location on the shores of the Persian Gulf bestowed upon commercial and strategic importance, consequently, the country has attracted the attention of many external powers at different period.

British Conflict

In 1776, Britain came in contact with Kuwait when the East India Company made it the South Eastern port of their desert mail route to Aleppo in Syria. The acquaintance become closer when, in 1792 annoyed by the Turkish encroachments, the company transferred its Agency from Basra to Kuwait. In 1821, a British political officer was in Kuwait. Thereafter, Kuwait gradually became an administrative unit of Mesopotamia and its ruler became subordinate of the Governor of Basra. In 1871, the Turkish Governor of Baghdad, Midhat Pasha, conferred the title of Qaim Maqam (Deputy Governor Prefect) on the Sheikh of Kuwait. Kuwait was classified as a 'qaza' (lesser district) of the 'Sanjag'(district) of Najd in the 'vilayet' (province) of Basra . The Sheikh's acceptance of this title was his "acknowledgement "of "Turkish Suzerainty". But within a year.

Middle fell from power and the Turkish authority in Kuwait relapsed into its previous ineffectiveness. During the Sultan of Turkey period 1756-1871 Kuwait was not under effective control of the Turkey although it paid tributes to the prior to the last decade of the 19th century , Kuwait was not under effective control of the Turks the relationship between Kuwait and Turkey was of a nebulous character. During this decade, Kuwait became the scene of scramble among Turkey, Russia, Germany and Britain, who were eager to construct a railway line from the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf'.²

² S, Kumar (2004), *Saddam Hussein End of an Era*, India, Shubhi Publications Gurgaon Haryana.

Chapter - II: Geostrategic significance of the region and role of oil in the Iraq's economy.

Chapter-II

Geostrategic significance of the region and role of oil in the Iraqi economy

The emergence of political geography as a branch of geography, geopolitics and geostrategy has been repeatedly by different political geographers, different political geographers have used Geostrategy repeatedly. Geostrategic regions are seen as inseparable concept in this context and defined as micro region, which reflects grouping of states within the international system. Such groupings are united by measure of complimentary in behavior and outlook and may have potential for further interaction. Geostrategic regions are influentially large to exert a worldwide influence and are units over which certain elements of power could be applied and with certain minimal levels of unity in outlook in trading activates.

In this context Middle East or West Asia has been important Geostrategic region in the post second world war period because of its tremendous potential uninterrupted supplies of fuel and hydro-carbon resources for next few decades. The United States which was self isolated in affairs of Europe and Asia emerged as a major power in the post World War II international scenario. Furthermore American emergence as sole super power in the post cold war period has forced it to show its greater interest in the geostrategically important West Asia from where it can dictate its global agenda with much more vigor. By now, the USA has succeeded its Geostrategic goal in the region and establishes its strong linkages by coverts and overt means. How ever Iraq has always been thorn in the USA flesh by pursuing anti-US agenda until very recently. When the Saddam Hussein regime has been thrown out by US mightily on slight by large US geostrategic interest has been a fulfilled partially, in the region.

Before going in to the heart of the topic we should understand what does geostrtegic mean and why the West Asian region, in general, and Iraq in particular, is such an important geostrategic region in US perspective. The definition of geostrategy can be

developed from collective process of geopolitics, geographic and economics. Especially with respect: of the nation, geostrategy is generally understood as a part of geopolitics.

Geostrategy

Other scholars were focusing not on the state but on the world and were trying to find patterns on state development and behavior. They took global view of geopolitical affairs and recommended policies or strategic to be followed by their governments.

Geostrategic Views

1. The control of sea lanes was important to a state. Therefore, put an emphasis on a strong navy. But there were fundamental factors and affected the development and maintenance of sea power.³
2. Seversky forcefully advocated a geopolitical view of the world based on air power. He declared that sea power has reached the twilight and deplored inefficient attention to air warfare being paid by the United State and its allies. He prounded a totally new strategy and organization for victory through air power.⁴

“It is not geostrategic thinking itself that is a decision trap. Oil is becoming a more scarce resource, compared demand, and it is time to start not only one scarce resource, compared to demand, and it is time to start not only one but both available lines of action, to improve energy efficiency and to secure supply of oil since the worlds is still a set of nation states, any government who neglects the geostrategic aspect is likely to be criticized by its citizens and rightly so, it is the solution to the geostrategic problem that represents the danger , it is wrong if every nation starts to grab as much oil as possible without regard for the needs of other notions. The goal as must be to create an efficient world-wide structure for oil production and a network distribution that can give all nations as much oil as long as possible at the same time energy efficiency is increased and to do so in way that energy is produced by other means than by the burning of more oil. That requires international cooperation on a grand scale, not mercantile theory reflexes

³ Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890). , *The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660-1783* , New York

⁴ Alexander, P. de Seversky (1942), *Victory Through Air Power*, New York .

The academic world now has a task to alert politicians and public opinion to the growing energy problem. Since there is an obvious need for geostrategic thinking, whether we like it or not, the alert should also highlight the inherent danger of the wrong approach to such thinking. The latter task is probably the most important one and the most difficult and unrewarding one”.⁵

Iraq is located in the Middle East, produces oil resources, which are utilized by all the, western countries but faces tough competition between developed, and underdeveloped countries.

Oil has geostrategic significance in Iraq’s economy because of its abundant production in this region and its supply to industrialized countries. It also a vital fact that, developed countries are dependent on oil to fuel the machines and other related systems in their countries.

“The geopolitical significance of oil derives, from two central factors:(1) oil, like fuel and feedstock, is the lifeblood of the industrialized economies, and (2) oil reserve and production tend to be geographically concentrated in certain less developed countries. In effect, oil reserves and production are most abundant in small number of developing countries, while the need for adequate and continuous supply of oil in very large volumes is most urgent in the developed, industrial states”⁶ To go further in the history and know the details regarding oil data we can have a look at the following,


Oil is the considerable the “swing” fuel, compensating for all shortfalls in the production of alternative energy sources: to the extent that shortfalls do materialize in the production and the development of coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy, oil will be called upon to play a greater role. The forecasts assume that, in the future, GNP growth rates return to trend or exceed the forecast assumptions, that, oil will have to supply a greater share of increased energy equipments. Since forecasts tend to be overly influenced by correct and short-term events there is a reasonable chance that the assumed growth rates are, in fact too low. To the extent that reduced oil demand was more a result of recession than that of higher prices, economic recovery should spur oil demand. To the

⁵ Ingolf, Kiesow (2005), *Quest for Oil and Geostrategic Thinking*, Sweden, National Defense Research Agency.

⁶ Conant, Melvin A. and Gold Ferne Racine (1978), : *The geopolitics of Energy* , Colorado, westiew press Boulder , pp. 31.

extent that the price of near-term energy alternatives has moved in line with world oil prices, the incentive for substitution which may also involve purchase of new equipment and other investment costs is reduced, while the incentive for development of indigenous sources of oil has increased.

Figure No.3: Oil Infrastructure of Iraq⁷




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⁷ National Geographic : Iraq Maps News , Picture National Geographic www.national Geographic .com/iraq /21k



Figure No.3: Oilfields and Facilities of Iraq⁸



Importance of oil

So far as the importance of oil is concerned, it is a fact that each country urgently require oil, energy, natural gas because without it, country suffers lot in

⁸ University of Texas Libraries-Iraq Maps.
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/.../iraq.html>

development point of view, countries like the US , Japan and European countries (called Industrialized countries) imports oil from this region. Their Energy supply depends on import of oil.⁹

The industrialized countries will remain dependent on oil imports to meets the great share of oil demand. Dependence on imports, given little likelihood of major new oil discoveries, is equal to dependence on OPEC oil, particularly Middle East and North Africa oil.

Dependence on energy imports is a necessary fact of life for Europe, Japan, and United States. Even assuming that Natural Gas and Uranium, and possible enriched Uranium will also have to be imported. However, the natural resources base of the United States -with its extensive oil resource base of the is more favorable than that of any of its allies.

Particular stress must be given to the involvement of, and interrelationship between, all steps in energy development and supply. Delays or inadequacies in providing any part of the infrastructure will affect the whole. Thus the large scale on which these undertakings are required may lie beyond the experience and capability of great private enterprises.

World total recoverable reserves of 2 trillion barrel though exist: 55 percent or 1.1 trillion barrel has already been discovered. The addition of probable reserves to proved reserves does not alter the concentration of oil resources noted earlier ultimately recoverable reserves proved, some 513 billion are located in the Middle East alone.

Total ultimately recoverable reserves undiscovered in the Middle East are estimated at over 663 billion barrels. Some 513 billion have already been discovered, but relatively little has been produced, leaving huge reserves for future exploitation. The largest undiscovered reserves are believed to be in the Soviet Union and china. It is believed that out of some 478 billion barrels of reserves in the USSR, only about 178 billion have been discovered.

⁹ Conant Melvin A. and Gold Frne Racine(1978), *The Geopolitics of Energy*, Colorado,west view press Boulder, PP.31.

Some 300 billion barrels, mostly in East Siberia, there for are the out yet to be discovered. Large addition to reserves in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan are not anticipated. Only huge new fields could challenge the role of Middle East producers'. The to free world reserves that will be made will come from the extension of existing fields and from offshore areas, or so contemporary opinion asserts.

In the International Energy Outlook2005 (IEO 2005) reference case, world demand for crude oil grows from 78 million barrels per day in 2002 to 103 million barrels per day in 2015 and to just over 119 million barrels per day in 2025 much of the growth in oil consumption is projected for the emerging Asian nations, where strong economic growth results in increase in oil demand. Emerging Asia China and India accounts for 45 percent of the total world increase UN oil use over the forecast period in the IEO 2005 reference case.

The projected increase in world oil demand would require an increment to world production capability of more than 42 million barrels per day relative to the 2002 crude oil production capacity of 80.0 million barrels per day. Producer in the organization of petroleum. Exporting countries (OPEC) are expected to the major source of production increases. In addition, non-OPEC supply is expected to remain highly competitive, with major increments to supply coming from offshore resources, especially in the Caspian Basin, Latin America, and deepwater West Africa. The estimates of incremental petroleum are based on current proved reserves and a country by – country assessment of ultimately recoverable petroleum, the substantial investment capital required to produce the incremental volumes is assumed to exist, and the investors are expected to receive at least a 10 percent return on investment.


The oil resource base is defined by three categories. Firstly, oil that has been discovered but not produced. Secondly, increases in reserves resulting mainly from technological factors that enhance a field's recovery rate. Thirdly, undiscovered oil that remains to be found through exploration. is derived from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) mean estimate. Which is an average assessment over a wide range of uncertainty for reserve growth and undiscovered resources. The IEO2005 oil production forecasts are based on the USGS mean estimate.

Table1. Estimated world Oil Resources, 1995-2025 (Billion Barrels)¹⁰

Region (Mature Market Economies)	Proved Reserves	Reserves Growth	Undiscovered	Total
United State	21.9	76.0	83.0	180.9
Canada	178.8	12.5	32.6	223.9
Mexico	14.6	25.6	45.8	86.0
Western Europe	15.8	19.3	34.6	69.7
Japan	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.5
Australia /New Zealand	1.5	2.7	5.9	10.1
(Transitional Economies)	-	-	-	-
Former Soviet Union	77.8	137.7	170.8	386.3
Eastern Europe	1.5	1.5	1.4	4.4
(Emerging Economies)	-	-	-	-
China	18.3	19.6	14.6	52.5
India	5.4	3.8	6.8	16.0
Other Emerging Asia	-	-	-	-
Middle East.5).5	(729.6)	(252.5)	(269.2)	(1,251.3)
Africa	100.8	73.5	124.7	299.0
Central and South Africa	100.6	90.8	125.3	316.7
Total World	1,277.7	730.2	938.9	2,946.8
OPEC	885.2	395.6	400.5	1,681.3
Non -OPEC	392.5	334.6	538.4	1,265.5

¹⁰ Sources: 1970 and 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA).International Energy Annual 2002 DOE/EIA-0219 (2002) Washington, DC. March 2004 Website: eiodoe.gov/iea2010 and 2025: EIA System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005)

Figure No.4: World oil production in the Reference case by Region, 1970, 2002, 2010, and 2025.



Sources: 1970 And 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Annual 2002.DOE/EIA-0219 (2002), (Washington,DC,mrch 2004),website www.eia.doe.gov/iea/2010/.2010 and 2025:EIA,system for the Analysis of global Energy Markets (2005). Sources: 1970 and 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Annual 2002 DOE/EIA-0219 (2002)

World oil demand

“The advantages of oil as a fuel source include: availability in sufficient quantity, low cost; ease of transportation and versatility and easy substitution for other energy sources. World oil consumption over the past twenty-five-year. And the same period witnessed a fourteen-fold increase in west European oil consumption in the past, the growth in consumption has exceeded the overall energy consumption growth rate

All forecasts suggest that slower economy growth will result in slower rates of growth in energy consumption. Higher prices, in addition to slower rates of GNP growth, will result in some moderation in the oil consumption growth rate. Even at slower rates of economic growth and with higher oil price, oil consumption will continue to increase, and absolute level of oil consumption will remain high and required substantial imports.

The situation may not be as unfavorable as it might have been in the absence of slower energy growth rate and higher oil prices, but oil demand and oil import dependence remain high.

The forecasts all paint a similar picture; increasing volume of oil imports, if developments in alternative energy sources include in forecasts fail to materialize, the volume of oil demanded more rapid economy growth than that assumed in the forecasts would have similar effect. Oil demand growth may continue to moderate as conservation effort take effect and alternative energy sources begin to make a contribution to total energy at the same time, however, oil production in the industrialized state may peak and level off or even decline, suggesting a continued need for oil imports".¹¹

Oil imports will increasingly have to come from OPEC countries, particularly from the states of the Gulf. The volume of oil required to meet the world to meet the world's growth energy demand will be even greater in the future.


"In the emerging economies strong expansion of oil use is projected, as robust economies, growth fuels demand for oil to fuel burgeoning industrial sectors and rapidly expanding transportation use, The fastest growth in oil demand is projected for the emerging Asia economy, at an average rate of 3.5 percent per year over the forecasts period, and the other emerging economy regions also are expected to experience fast – paced increase in oil use. From 2002to2025, consumption of petroleum is projected to increase on average by 2.1 percent per year in, 2.5 the Middle East percent per year in America, and 2.7 per year in Africa. Economic development in Asia will be crucial to long –term growth in oil market. China, India and other nations of emerging Asia are expected to experience combined

Economic growth of 5.5 percent per year between 2002 the highest rate of growth in the world. This robust expansion in gross national product (GNP) translates to a 3.5 percent annual increase in regional oil use. The projected evolution of Asian oil demand in the reference case could strengthen an economic tie between the Middle East and Asia, as Asian nations rely more and more Middle East oil supplies.

¹¹ Conant, Melvin A. and Gold Fern Racine (1978), *The Geopolitics of Energy*, Colorado, Westview press Boulder , 1978,pp.50.

On a regional basis, two parts of the world account for most of the projected growth in world oil demand: emerging Asia and North America (figure A.) outside North America, oil consumption in the mature market economy regions grows much more slowly-by 0.3 percent per year in both western Europe and mature market Asia, reflecting expectation of slow growth or decline in population and economic growth over the next two decades” .¹²

Figure No.5 (A): World Oil Consumption by End-Use sector,2002-2025.




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¹² International Energy Outlook 2005, Energy Information Administration Official Energy Statistics from the U. S. Government.

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/oil.html>.

¹³ Source: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219 (2002), (Washington, DC, March 2004). web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/projections:EIA.system for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).¹³

Figure No.(B): World oil consumption by region and countryGroup,2002 and 2025



14

Oil Prices and Main Supplier

Oil prices have been highly volatile over the past 25 year, and periods of price volatility can be expected in the future principally because of unforeseen political and economic circumstances, it is well recognized that tension in the **Middle East**, for example, could give rise to serious disruptions of normal oil production and trading patterns, on the other hand. Market forces can play a significant role in restoring balance over an extend period. High real prices deter consumption the emerging of significant competition from large marginal sources of oil, which current are uneconomical to produce and other energy supplies. Persistently low prices have the opposite effects.

If OPEC production level is barely adequate to meet free world oil import requirements, it seems reasonable to ask it should be remarked that a combination of economic and

¹⁴Sources: 2002.Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Annual 2002 DOE/EIA-0219 (2002) Woshington.DC march 2004 web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea
2025EIA, system for the Analysis of Global Energy Market (2005)¹⁴

political factors will determine actual OPEC production level include population factors , high –population countries need to maximize oil revenue structures of economy , “oil as a percent of Gross National product ,oil as a percent of exports will give some indication of the importance of oil in any given economy.

“Development plans” will suggest the need for imports and hence the income needed to pay for imports. Than can be useful indicators of a country’s future income requirements “oil reserves, countries with larger reserves can produce at high levels and still be sure of future production, price, “price becomes an important consideration. If price are high, countries with low oil reserves, high rate of income from lower levels of production. Regional politics, where regional politics may have influenced production levels. The Saudi Arabia made clear their decision was contingent upon “progress” toward a Middle East settlement (Israel) and progress “in the North-South toward dialogue in Paris. Political factor then may influence oil production levels in the future.

The reference case increased efficiency of industrialized Asian consumers; and growth in Asian production. (Figure A.) .

But the current burgeoning Middle East –Asian oil nexus that began to take shape in the 1990s appears a permanent structural feature of the new global, Information Age Oil Market that has changed dramatically over the past two decades.

Middle East oil Supplies




Figure No.6 (A): Middle East Oil supplies, 1995 and 2015.Manning Robert A. (2000).¹⁵

The Future of Geopolitics of Iraq:

Jiang Zemin visit to Saudi Arabia in November 1998, during which he proclaimed that China is forming "a strategic oil partnership" with Riyadh. This was an intriguing

¹⁵ Manning, Robert A (2000), *The Asian Energy Factor*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan Press ,PP.76.

choice of word, considering Beijing's penchant for declaring more generic "strategic partnership" with Russia, South Korea, France and other countries. In 1995, Beijing decided to import 3.5 million tons of crude oil from Saudi Arabia annually (less than 1 percent of Saudi production). Jiang brought an entourage of Chinese business officials, signed oil cooperation agreement, and discussed a \$1.5 billion refinery and petrochemical complex in Southern china that would use Saudi oil

There has been an acceleration in Japan of exploiting and in many cases, concluding business deals between Asian and Gulf / Middle East officials in recent years. In addition to its efforts in Saudi Arabia, China has invested in ton petroleum is in a joint venture with European companies to development the South gas fields in Iran as well as oil fields in Iran and Yemen. Both India and Indonesia have explored investing in the Tuba oil field in Iraq. Japan has steadily cultivated Gulf producers, with investment in Saudi Arabia, in Abu Dhabi, and in oil and gas in Oman, and along with South Korea has invested in Qatar to produce LNG. Japan developed the Khafji oil field in the Neutral Zone, divided between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait n the 1960s. The Khafji field produces 300,000b/pd; 70 percent goes to Japan, part of nearly 1 million b/pd Japan imports from Saudi Arabia. But in early 2000, Japan failed to renew its production contract with Saudi Arabia.

A three-step approach was used to determine the composition world oil supply in the three IEO2005 oil supply price cases. The first step determined whether the oil resources base would be sufficiently robust to meet worldwide demand .The second step determined how much non-OPEC oil (both conventional and non conventional) could be produced at the assumed price path an important certain in the second step was whether, producers would receive an adequate rate of return on their investment (usually 10 percent). With total non-OPEC supply having been established, the third step assumed that the remainder of the worldwide demand would be met by OPEC producers and determined an appropriate production capacity for each OPEC producer.

It is important not that this simple three –step approach did and did not assume. A business –as usual oil market environment was assumed. Disruption in oil supply for any reason (war, terror, weather, geopolitics) where not assumed. It was assumed that all non-OPEC oil projects that show a favorable rate of return on investment would be funded,

and that OPEC would act as the residual supplier of oil to the world. For the forecast period out to 2025, there is sufficient oil to meet worldwide demand. Peaking of world oil production is not anticipated until after 2030.

In the IEO2005 reference case, world oil supply in 2025 is projected to exceed the 2002 level by almost 41 million barrels per day. Increase in production are expected for both OPEC and non-OPEC producers; however, only about 41 percent of the total increase is expected to come from non-OPEC areas. Over the past two decades, the growth in non-OPEC oil supply has resulted in an OPEC market substantially under its historic high of 52 percent in 1973. New exploration and production technologies, aggressive cost-reduction programs by industry, and attractive fiscal terms to producers by government all contribute to the outlook for continued growth in non-OPEC oil production.

The reference case project that about 59 percent of the increase in petroleum demands over the next decades will be met by an increase production by member of OPEC rather than non-OPEC suppliers. OPEC production in 2025 is project to be more than 24 Million barrels per day higher than it was in 2002 (figure A and B.). The IEO2005 estimated of OPEC production capacity in 2010 is slightly less than those projected in IEO2004, reflecting a shift toward non-OPEC supply project in scenario with higher prices. Some analysts suggest that OPEC members might pursue significant prices escalation through conservative capacity expansion decisions rather than undertaken major production

Middle East oil Supplies





Figure No.6 (B): 2015 Middle East Oil Supplies
(Thousands of barrels per day). Manning Robert A. (2000).¹⁶

¹⁶ Manning ,Robert A. (2000), *The Asian Energy Factor* ,New York ,Pal grave Macmillan Press .PP.76.

Figure No.7 (A) and Figure No.7 (B):¹⁷



¹⁷ Source: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA) *International Energy Annual 2002*, DOE/EIA-0219 (2002), (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, *System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets* (2005).


The role of oil in the Iraq's economy

He states that, "statistically, one way to measure the relative Importance of oil in the Iraq's economy is to trace the behavior of oil revenue. In 1960 Iraq's income oil, which amounted to \$ 266 million, rose to \$521 million in 1970. But the extraordinary development of the 1970s such as the OPEC led phenomenal rise in oil prices, nationalization of the oil sector, the Iranian revolution and continued rise in exports pushed Iraq's oil income from \$1 billion in 1971 to \$26.1 billion in 1980. With such rise in income there was an associated increase in the relative importance of the oil sector from a mere 3 percent in 1950 to 56 percent in 1980. This meant that Iraq's dependence on oil became irreversible.

But what does it mean to be oil based or an oil dependent economy? It means among other things the following.

- a. Economic activity employment and income are determined by the amount of oil revenue the economy receives from selling its oil abroad .In other words people's livelihood and economy security has become highly dependent on what happened to the world oil market.
- b. Oil revenue become the foundation of the state in that oil income, which flows into state coffers, has become its primary sources of revenue instead of tax revenue .The state now can use its newly found source of income and power as it pleased: to build its armed force and security an organization, to provide social services, to expand the civil service, to distribute funds to its favorite groups regions of the country and to wage wars.
- c. Oil also became the main source of fund for investment in industry, agriculture, health and education and the nation's infrastructure.
- d. Oil revenue enabled the state break its financial dependence on its citizens. In other words the state no longer needed its citizens to collect taxes to finance its activities.

Figure No. 8: Economic Activity of Iraq¹⁸



It is worth pointing out that the 1970s, also witnessed the Growth of Iraq's oil industry in its entire component, as funds were available for investment. This investment was never to be duplicated in the next two decades because of the Iraq Iran war and the UN imposed sanctioned following the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. But as we know an oil dependent country has no control over its oil income since such

¹⁸ National Geographic : Iraq Maps News , Picture National Geographic www.nationalgeographic.com/iraq/21k

income is determined by how much you can sell and at what price factor that are determine by force in the international politics economy which are beyond the control of any one oil exporting country. This was very clearly the case when Iraq's oil income collapsed first in the context of the Iraq-Iran war and then in the context of the UN sanction region.

In the 1980, the success of energy conservation measures and the emergence of new oil exporting had a depressing effect on OPEC's and Iraq's oil fortunes. The problems of Iraq was compounded by the devastation of the Iraq-Iran war which resulted in a sharp decline in the contribution of the oil sectors from 56 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 1989. And for the first year of the 1990s this contribution declined to some 4-5 percent as Iraq ceased to be an oil exporting country".

Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided about 95% of the foreign exchange earning's in the 1980s financial problems caused by massive expenditure in the eight-year war with Iran and damage to oil export facilities by the Iran led the government to implement qusterity measures borrow heavily, later reschedule foreign debit payment: Iraq suffered economy losses from the war at least US\$100 billion. After hostilities ended in 1988. Oil exports gradually with the construction of new pipelines and restoration of damage facilities. A combination of low oil prices, repayment of war debates of reconstruction resulted in a serious financial crisis, which was the main short-term motivation for the invention of Kuwait.

Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, subsequent international economic sanction, and damage from military action by an international collision beginning in January 1991 drastically reduction economic activity. Although government policies supporting large military and internal security forces and allocating resources to key supporting of the Ba'ath party government have the economy, started in December 1996, was to have improved conditions for the average Iraqi citizen.

For the first six phases of the programs of the (each phase lasting six month's) Iraq was allowed to export limited amount of oil in exchange for food, medicine. And some infrastructure spare parts. Subsequently investigation of the programme has revealed significant corruption, with highly – placed UN officials and much of the money from oil sales being redirected in to weapons research and acquisition by the Iraqi

military.

In December 1999, the UN Security Council authorized Iraq to export under the program as much oil as required to meet humanitarian needs. Iraq changes its oil reserve current from US dollar to Euro in 2000. Oil exports were more than three quarters of the prewar level. However 28% of Iraq's export revenues under the program were deducted to meet UN compensation fund and UN administration expenses. The drop in GDP in 2001 was largely result of the global economic slowdown and lower oil prices. Following the 2003 invasion of the Iraq, economy to a great extent shut down: attempts are underway to revive it from the damages of war and rampant crime.

During his year as the chief executive of Iraq. Ambassador Paul Brewer issued a series of orders designed to restructure Iraq's broadly socialist economy in the with neo-liberal thinking order 39 laid out the framework for the privatization of everything in Iraq aside from the " primary extraction and initial prices sung of the oil reserves themselves, and permitted foreign capitations to repatriate 100% of profits earn security situation meant that Brewer's privatization plane was not implemented during his tenure, through his ordered remain in place. Privatization of the oil industry, in addition to around 200 other state owned businesses, is currently scheduled to being sometime in late 2005, although the federation of oil union in Iraq opposes it.

Iraq's resumption of oil expert under a new government would expose OPEC to considerable uncertainly. Flows of Iraq's oil to the world market unconstrained by OPEC quotas could further erode the cartels already limited ability to set prices and might even trigger a price war, eating into the profit of its member countries, such an outcome would surely delegate the Bush administration as well as buyers of gasoline in the United States, the world's largest oil consumer that the real purpose of Bush war in Iraq was to put in place a government that would break OPEC. Such an outcome would dismay the world's largest oil producers. Saudi Arabia , Kuwait and Iran.¹⁹

¹⁹ Alasdair, Abbas (2001), *Oil , Sanctions, Debt and The Future* , Arab Studies, volume 23, Number 4, Fall.

Chapter - III: oil and Iran – Iraq War

Chapter -III

Oil and Iran –Iraq war

The Iran-Iraq war has been the longest and one of the most impenetrable inter-state conflict since the Second World War. In some ways it is untypical of wars in the non-industrialised world. Both in its duration and in its stakes, which are less material or territorial than they are 'moral' to ideological. In other respects, the war resembles other s in the Third world. Particularly in the military engagements, and above all in their planning, has shown a distinctly unprofessional touch. Whether or not this war is a model for future wars rather than towards low-intensity wars or seasonal engagements, cannot be answered definitively²⁰

At the out set it is important to locate the historical events along with the courses and subsequent consequences there of. War like any social phenomenon, has both its general and specific causes .On the general level, war can be abdication out huts of a deep –roofed historical conflict. Such a conflict may arise form ethnic, national or religious enmity, from completion over natural resources or territory, or ever regional or global hegemony .The specific causes of war lie in the subjectivity interpretation of such festival conflict and assessments regarding adequate means for handing it at a given moment. Assessments derive from such factors as the world views images and beliefs of the relevant leaders, from bureaucratic protects (power struggles within the ruling elites).

In the case of Iran-Iraq war, here the war had begun because of the boundary reasons. If we see the world scenario that is India –Pakistan conflict for land (Kashmir), India –China, Palestinian –Israeli South America Chile and Argentina argument to Falkland, Germany attack Poland under leadership of Hitler and so many countries involved in Boundary and racial conflicts.

In the case of the Iran-Iraq war, the general cause is often attributed to the ethnic and religious divide that has separated Arabs and Persian, shi'its and Sunni Muslims since at the seventeenth century seen in long –term historical perspective , the current

²⁰ Chubin Shahram and Tripp Charles (1988), *Iran and Iraq At War*, London, I. B. Tauris & co Ltd.

Iran –Iraq war is just another phase in a struggle between the two countries that stretches back to millennium or more, “The war is “the latest outbreak in an age- old struggle between the Persians and a run for dominating of the Gulf and the rich Tigris and Euphrates valley to its north acceding to another observer of the conflict.

It argues that geopolitics is the most important single factor has influenced origins of Iranian –Iraqi relations for generation and, in consequence, accounts for the outbreak of the war. More concretely, the war began because the weaker state Iraq attempted to resist the hegemonic aspirations of its stronger neighbour, Iran to reshape the regional status according to its own image.²¹

First, it overlooks lengthy periods of cooperation between these two groups motivated both by shared religious and cultural affinities and by converging economic interest such as trade. Second, intensive as it was during the Umayyad (661-750) and the early Abbasid (750-945) caliphates, Iraqi –Persian was disrupted in the latter part of the tenth century, with the deco demise of the Abbasid Empire, to be seemed only in the aftermath of World War- I. History which gives us the clear out understanding and complete account of the same .the Para is therefore being presented below

“ Although the 1975 peace agreement with Iran had vitally ended the Kurdish rebellion, Iraq was dissatisfied and wanted a return to the shat al - Arab boundary were it controlled the whole waterway, And also the Withdrawal of Iranian forces from Abu Musa and Tunb Islands.

²¹ Karsh ,Efraim (1990), “Geopolitical Determinism:The Origines of the Iran-Iraq War, ” *Middle East Journal* Vol.No.2 spring .




Figure No.9: The Iran- Iraq boundary along shatt al-Arab. Drysdale Alasdair and Blake Gerald H. (1985).²²

Which Iran had occupied in 1971 Conflict also became evident after the Iranian Revolution over demanded for autonomy in Iran's Khuzestan , which Iran accused Iraq of encouraging. On addition, Iraq's Sunni leadership was suspicious of shi'ite Iran and fearful that the Islamic Revolution in Iran might spreads its own shi'its are in the ability in Iraq Border fighting between Iran and Iraq occurred frequently and as 1980 progressed, an open warfare began on 22nd September when Iraqi forces advanced in to Iran along a 480-km front. Iran had ignored Iraqi diplomatic efforts demanding the withdrawal of Iranian forces from ain ul-Qis in the border. Iraq maintained that this territory should have been returned by Iran under the 1975 agreement. Iraq therefore abrogated the shatt al-Arab agreement on 16 September.

Most commentators agree that, resistance was fierce than he expected, however, and stalemate was soon reached along the invasion for a solution. In the spring of 1982 Uranium forces launched successful counter –offensives, one in the region of Dezful in March, and another in April, which resulted in the recapture of Kkhoramshahr by the

²² Drysdale Alasdair and Blake Gerald H (2002), *The Middle East and North Africa A Political Geography*, New York , Oxford University Press .

Iranians in May.

By late June 1982 Saddam Hussein had to acknowledge that the invasion of Iran had been a failure, and he arranged for the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian territory. In July the Iranian army crossed into Iraq, giving rise to the heaviest of the war thus far.²³

The Origins of the Iran- Iraq War

The understanding of war as a social, collective phenomenon demands a prior attempt to understanding the community engaged upon it. This requires examination of the cultural, historical legacy shaping its distinctive character and moral universe. Equally important is the study of the distribution of power within the community producing the particular form of government, which is both the product, and the manipulator of a historically determined value system. The dominant leaders who emerge from this process, will make the decision to commit the community to war and must seek to conduct the war that

Following in accordance not only with the value that they espouse, but also with the demands placed upon them by the structure that maintains their power. In the process, an impression of formed of the moral and structural imperatives determining perception of the nature and utility of war , as well as of the instruments required for its prosecution and the proper objective of its initiation.

Consequently, it is important in seeking to understand the origins of the war between Iraq and Iran that an effort should be made to examine the factors which led to the perception of the Iraqi Government in the autumn of 1980 that war was the most advantageous and perhaps the only possible, way of recording Iraq's relation with Iran. This requires analysis of three orders of question, corresponding, firstly, to the nature of the Iraqi state and the regime by which that state is ruled. The second concerns the perspectives of the regime regarding the Justification for war, as well as the instruments appropriate to its prosecution. This involves the leader's ideas not only of Iraq's moral rights and their own imperatives as rulers, but also of Iraq's structural capacities, of

²³ The Middle East and North Africa 2004 50th Edition ,Europa Publication , Taylor &Francis Group London and New York.

course, there is the question of the image formed of Iran and of the utility of war at a particular time to achieve the required objectives.²⁴

Superpowers and the Iraq -Iran

As in all other spheres of activity, Saddam Hussein's Prime consideration regarding the nature of Iraq's relations with outside powers has been the degree to which that relationship will facilitate his task of political survival and the consolidation of this regime. This has been less the case during working to establish his own undisputed claim to rule Iraq. In both cases, it has been important that's he should ensure access to the resources to outside powers with a minimum of constraint on his own freedom of action or of contradiction with the purposes by which sought to justify his hold on power. It was vital, therefore, that during the war external aid should not be allowed to infringe the jealously guarded political autonomy of the regime. Whatever help he might elicit under the duress of war, mere military survival would be worthless it replaced in jeopardy his own political future by being seen seriously to compromise the dictates of Iraqi independence. As Al-Jumhuriyya expressed it, 'Iraq will refuse to permit its relations with refuse to permit its relations with a world power to become the relations of servant to master.'²⁵

Prior to the war, the massive and rapid increase in oil revenues had allowed the Iraqi Government to steer an increasing non- aligned course. During the 1970 s and under Saddam Hussein's growing influence, this had meant weakening Iraq's hitherto almost exclusive reliance on the aid and support of the Soviet Union. In a relatively short space of time between 1974 and 1979, the Soviet Union lost its position as Iraq's major trading partner to a number of Western states. Its monopoly in the supply of military equipment to the expanding Iraqi armed forces was eroded by Iraqi purchases of major weapons systems from France. Furthermore, significant differences emerged in Iraqi and Soviet perceptions of regional issues, from the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan.²⁶

Revolutionary Islamic Iran's view of the world is North /South rather than an East / West perspective. It sees the superpowers as similar and as the quintessential

²⁴ Chubin Shahram and Tripp Charles (1988), *Iran And Iraq At War*, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd London,

²⁵ Al-Jumhuriyya, 5 September 1987.

²⁶ Abdulghni, J. M. (1984), *Iraq and Iran: the Year of Crisis* London: Croom Helm, pp.160-65).

oppressors, seeking to impose themselves on the rest of the world. As one Teheran commentary observed: Both Moscow and Washington wish to dominate the Middle East, each pursuing its own particular policy'.²⁷ Another aspect of this view has been the belief in the centrality of mission of the Islamic republic, its vital importance to the superpowers and the threat that it poses to their interests, and hence their collusion in wishing to weaken it. This conveniently feeds a conspiratorial view of the world, while making of Iran a martyr nation being punished for its resistance. Comments such as those of Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's are illustrative of this view:²⁸

Internal opposition to Saddam Hussein

As well as the deteriorating military situation, Saddam Hussein was confronted by a number of other threats to his position from within Iraq. 'The front or revolutionary, Islamic and national forces', consisting of Kurds, exiled Shi'ites and disaffected Ba'ath party member, formed in 1981 with the backing of Syria – whose president Assad was as anxious as Ayatollah Khomeini if Iran to see the downfall of Saddam Hussein, his Ba'athist rival. In northern Iraq, Kurdish rebels were becoming active again and there existed the possibility that Iraq's majority Shi'ite community (55% of the population) would turn against the Sunnis the sect of the Iraqi leaderships. However, the bulk of Iraq's Shi'ites seemed to distrust the harsh fundamentalism of Khomeini's Iran. Against this background, Saddam Hussein was re-elected chairman of the RCC and regional secretary of the Arab Ba'ath socialist party, and in July 1982, having purged his administration, was apparently more firmly control than ever.

In November 1982 new opposition arose from the supreme council of Iraqi opposition groups under the leadership of an exiled Shi'ite leader, Hojatolislam Muhammad Baqir Hakim, in Tehran. However, as the war with Iran degenerated into a conflict of attrition, after the first Iranian advance into Iraq, the severe burden that it placed upon the country's economy emerged as the most critical concern for Saddam Hussein in following the destruction of Iraq's Gulf terminals, the closure of the pipeline across hostile Syria and the decline in oil prices. Iraq was searching for ways to avoid

²⁷ Tehran: Home Service, 22 July 1985, in BB/SWB/ME, 31 July 1985 (A/7-9).

²⁸ Tehran: Home Service, 6 July 1985, in BBC/SWB/ME, 9 July 1985 (A/6).

defaulting on payments for foreign construction contracts and was already borrowing money from friendly Gulf States.

In October 1983 there were rumours of an attempted coup in Baghdad, led by the recently dismissed head of intelligence, Barzan at-Takriti and a memumber of senior army officers who were later reported to have been executed.

An abiding problem for Iraqi governments has been the question of Kurdish autonomy within Iraq .the drain on military and financial resources resulting from efforts to contain Kurdish secessionist forces was of particular significance at this time, since costly equipment and manpower was being diverted from critical areas in the war with Iran. Unable to fight wars on two fronts, Saddam Hussein South an accommodation with the Kurds, series of talks with Jalal Telabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and of an estimated 40,000 Kurdish soldiers beginning December 1983 , after a cease-fire was agreed. The PUK demanded the release of 49 Kurdish political prisoners, the return of 8,000 Kurdish families, moved from Kurdistan to southern Iraq and the extension of the Kurdish autonomous area to include the oil town of Kirkuk. The talks could have provide only parties solution, as they did not included the KDP , which sought to further the cause of Kurdish by siding with Iran (and which was antipathetic towards the PUK). Through of a government of national unity, including the PUK and the ICP, were short-lived. The dialogue between the two sides was resumed and continued sporadically with Saddam Hussein would have had to make major concessions to the PUK such as granting Kurdish control if Kirkuk province, were Iraq's main oilfields are situated, and giving the Kurds a size able fixed share of national oil revenues, and this he was unlikely to do. Negotiation on Kurdish autonomy collapsed again in January 1985 and fighting broke out in Kurdistan between PUK guerrillas and government troops after 14-month cease-fire. The PUK balanced the government's continued persecution and execution of Kurdistan containing the Kirkuk oilfields in autonomy talks; and an agreement with Turkey to act jointly to quell Kurdish resistance, which had been made in October 1984. The PUK the rejected the offer of an amnesty for Saddam Hussein's political opponents at home and abroad in February, and fighting continued.

The Iran-Iraq war, October 1983-december 1984

Beginning in October 1983, Iran launched a series of attacks across its northern border with Iraq. About 700 sq km of Iraqi territory were gained, threatening the last outlet for Iraqi territory were gained, Iraqi exports of petroleum through the Kirkuk pipeline. Iraq intensified its missile attacks and bombing raids against Iranian towns and petroleum installations. During the autumn of 1983 It's took delivery of five French-built Super Etendard fighter aircraft. With these, and with the Exocet missiles already in its possession, Iraq threatened to destroy Iran's petroleum export industry, centred on the Kharg Island oil terminal in the Gulf. Iraq did not use Super Etendards and Exocet missiles in tandem until the end of March 1984 in the Gulf. Iran responded by promising to make the impassable to all traffic including exports of one sixth the west's petroleum requirements by blocking the Strait of Hormuz, if Iraqi military action made it impossible for Iran to export its own petroleum by that route.

Despite approaches from the UN and various governments (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria among them), Iran refused to negotiate with Iraq and was adamant that nothing less than the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian territory and the agreement to pay reparations for Iranian territory and the agreement to pay reparations for war damages could bring hostilities to an end.

In August 1982 Iraq declared a maritime exclusion zone in the Gulf, extending from the Khor Abdullah channel, at the mouth of the Shatt al- Arab waterway, to a point south of the Iranian port of Bushehr. This zone included the Kharg Island oil terminal. Iraq carried out sporadic attacks on shipping (not only tankers) making for Kharg or returning from it, or fired indiscriminately on ships well outside the one. The aim was to make the export of petroleum from Iran as difficult and expensive as possible and by the and, by the threat of military action, to deter shipping from using Iranian ports, thus starving Iran of vital oil revenues. These tactics succeeded to a limited extent. Rates of insurance for shipping using the gulf rose dramatically' and Japan' the largest customer of Iranian oil, briefly ordered its tankers not to use Iranian ports in mid-1984. Iraq refrained, however from implementing its threat to attack Kharg Island itself and tankers loading there until May 1984. When the attack came, it was not immediately

followed up, and the sequence of isolated attacks of limited effectiveness seeded to other Gulf States were shown when Iran retaliated by attacking Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti tankers and tanker using oil terminals belonging to those countries. During 1984 the conviction grew that neither Iran nor Iraq possessed the capability to give effect to its worst threats.

Iraq certainly had no shortage of financial and military supporters. Egypt is estimated to have supplied military equipment and spare parts worth more than US\$2,000m, according to The Washington Post, the People's Republic of China sold arms to Iraq worth \$3,100m. between 1981 and 1985 (compared with sales to Iran; over the same period, worth \$575m.); Brazil and Chile sold weapons to Iraq; the USSR (previously officially neutral in the war) increased its aid, following a rapprochement with Iraq in March 1984, and had already sold SS-12 missiles to Iraq and the USA supplied helicopters and other heavy military equipment, though it remained officially neutral. Both the USA and the USSR also sold arms to Iran.

In February 1984 Iran launched an offensive in the marshlands around Majnoon Island, the site of rich oilfields in southern Iraq, near the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Iraq failed to regain control of this territory, and was condemned for using mustard gas in the fighting. Iraq subsequently established extensive and formidable defensive including a system of dams and embankments, along the southern front, near Basra, in anticipation of a possibly decisive offensive by Iran, which some 500,000 men were there.

In 1984 the balance of military power moved in Iraq's favour, and the USA and the USSR both officially neutral in the war with Iran, provided aid. The USSR increased its military aid and following a rapprochement in March between the two governments, received by Iran's responsibility for supplying an estimated two-thirds of Iraq's total armaments and much of its ammunition. At the end of 1987 it estimated that the USSR had supplied Iraq with military aid worth US\$10,000m, since lifting a ban on arms sales in 1982. The USA assisted Iraq with the USA re-established full diplomatic relations in November 1984, more than 17 years after they had been broken off by Iraq following the Arab - Israeli war of 1967.

Iraq had a substantial advantage in the strength of its air force. At the end of 1984 Iraq

had 580 combat aircraft, only 50 to 60 which were thought to be operational. On the ground, Iraq's tank force was superior in numbers and sophistication.²⁹

The Iran –Iraq war, 1985

Resumption in December 1984 of Iraqi attacks on shipping in the Gulf, in particular on oil tankers using the terminal at Kharg Island caused a sharp increase in hull insurance rates. Iran's oil exports fell to a record low level in military activity, in a pattern, which became familiar during the next four years insurance rates were reduced and custom returned. Attacks on shipping continued but Iraq failed decisively to exploit its superiority in the air. The Kharg Island oil terminal remained operation, and largely undamaged for much of 1985 and Iran was quite successful in circumventing Iraqi attempts to debilitate its oil exports industry. It consistently offered oil a discount and rebate deals to attract customers deterred by the high cost of war Insurance, and in February established a makeshift floating export terminal at Sherri Island, militarily a much less exposed location (journeys to which commanded lower rates of insurance), 800km (500miles) south – east of Kharg , from where it received its oil by tanker shuttle,

In March Iran committed an estimated 50,000 troop to an offensive on the southern front in the region of the Hawizah marshes, east of the Tigris. Iranian forces succeeded in crossing the Tigris and for a time closed the main road connecting Baghdad and Basra before being repulsed. Iraq was again accused of using chemical weapons during this engagement.

In June 1984, the UN engineered the suspension by Iran and Iraq of attacks on civilian target. However, In March 1985, with the war on the ground at a stalemate, Iraq resorted to air raids on Iranian towns and declared Iranian air raids On Iranian towns and declared Iranian airspace a war zone. Saddam Hussein stated intention was to carry the war to be to every part of Iran until Ayatollah Khomeini should decide to come to the negotiation table. The first Iraqi air raid on Tehran in four years took place in March. Although Iraq initially identified its targets as industrial, government and military installations only, thousands of civilians inevitably were killed as Iraqi aircraft attacked more than 30 Iranian towns with bombs, missiles and shellfire. Iran retaliated with

²⁹ The Middle East and North Africa 2004, 50th Edition, Europa Publications, Taylor & Francis Group London and New York.

shelling and air raids of its own on Iraqi economic, industrial and civilian targets, and with ground-based missile attacks on Baghdad itself. In this instance, Iraq was taking full advantage of its military superiority. In March king Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt unexpectedly visited Baghdad to show their support for Saddam Hussein, despite the fact that full diplomatic relations had not existed between Egypt and Iraq since Egypt's signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

The UN secretary -General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, visited both Tehran and Baghdad in April to try to establish a basis for peace negotiations. Iraq made it clear that it was interested only in a permanent cease-fire and immediate peace negotiations; while Iran, though placing less official emphasis on the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime as a pre-condition of peace, accepted that, if he acquiesced in the other conditions, including the payment of reparations calculated by Iran at US\$350,000m. In March 1985, he would fall anyway.

Twice during 1985 (in April, and June) President Saddam Hussein ordered a suspension of air raids on Iranian cities, as an inducement to Iran to begin peace negotiations. On both occasions Iran ignored the gesture and Iraqi air raids were resumed. In response to a joint Iran-Libyan strategic alliance, which was becoming more open in character, Iraq withdrew its diplomatic mission from Tripoli in June 1985 and asked the Libyans to withdraw theirs from Baghdad. Iraq had severed its diplomatic links with Libya in late 1980, accusing al Qaddafi of assisting Iran in the war, but limited diplomatic contact was restored and Libya was said to have had diplomatic representatives in Baghdad since 1984.

Until mid-1985, Iraq had failed to launch attacks against the main Iranian oil export terminal on Kharg Island of sufficient frequency or intensity seriously to threaten the continuation of oil exports. In August, however, it made the first of concentrated series of raids on Kharg, causing a reduction in Iranian oil exports from 1.2m, B/d - 1.5m, B/d in September. Exports from Kharg were temporarily halted during the latter half of September. During October - December the raids became progressively less frequently and less damaging in their effect, and, by dint of rapid repairs and the taking up of Kharg's ample spare capacity, the Iranian ministry of oil was able to claim in October, with little exaggeration, that exports of oil had risen to 1.7m, b/d Between August and the

end of 1985 some 60 attacks on Kharg Island were reported. Despite Iran's earlier success in minimizing the effect of Iraqi raids and in developing alternative means of exporting oil (such as the floating terminal at Shirri Island), by the end of 1985 exports from Kharg had reportedly been reduced to trickle compared with its 6.5m. B/ d capacity, and Iraq had turned its attention to the tankers shuttling oil to Shirri Island for transshipment.

In February 1986 Iraq announced an expansion of the area of the Gulf from which it would try to exclude Iranian shipping. Previously confined to the waters around Iran's Gulf ports, the area was broadened to include the coast of Kuwait. Attacks on tankers and other commercial vessels in the Gulf were intensified by both sides during 1986 Iraq continued to attack Kharg Island and tankers shuttling oil to Shirri Island, and in August an Iraqi raid demonstrated that the Shirri export facility itself was vulnerable to attack, bringing about an immediate doubling of insurance rates for vessels travelling there. Iran was forced to transfer more of its oil export operations to the remoter floating terminal at Larak Island, at the mouth of the gulf, but this, too proved accessible to Iraqi aircraft, employing mid-air refuelling facilities, and was itself attacked in November. Loading berths, refining facilities, and several tankers docked at Iran's Lavan Island and oil terminal, were destroyed or badly damaged by Iraqi raid in September 1986.

In the War, the next important engagement in terms of land gained occurred in 1986, when, on 9 February, Iran launched the Wal-Fajr (Dawn) offensive, some 85,000 Iranian troops (leaving about 400,000 uncommitted on the southern front) crossed the Shatt al - Arab waterway and, in 11 February occupied the disused Iraqi oil port of Faw, the Persian Gulf, and according to Iran, about 800sq km of the Faw peninsula. From this position, within sight of the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan, commanding the Khor Abdullah channel between the Faw peninsula and the island, Iran threatened Iraq's only access to the Gulf and, if it could extend the offensive to the north-west, Iraq's Umm Qasr naval base. However, the marsh and then desert terrain to the west was not conducive to further Iranian gains and the position on the Faw peninsula was defensible only with difficulty, given the problem of maintaining supply lines across the Shatt al - Arab. At the same time as the attack upon Faw, Iran began a complementary operation along the Faw Basra road to divert Iraqi forces.

At the end of February 1986 the UN Security Council, while urging for a cease-fire, effectively accused Iraq of starting the war. Despite heavy fighting, Iraq failed to dislodge an estimated 30,000 Iranian troops from in and around Faw . The proximity of Kuwaiti territory to the hostilities notwithstanding, Iran promised not to involve Kuwait in the war, provoked that it did not allow Iraq the use of its territory (part of which, Bubiyan Island , is claimed by Iraq for military purposes.

The Faw offensive prompted a change in tactics by Iraq. In May 1986 Iraq made its first armed incursions into Iran since withdrawing its forces from Iranian territory in 1982. An area of about 150sq km of Iranian land was occupied, including the deserted town of Mehran (about 160 km east of Baghdad), but Iran recaptured the town in July and forced the Iraqis back across the border. Also in May, Iraqi aircraft raided Teheran for the first time since June 1985, signalling a new wave of reciprocal attacks on urban and industrial targets in Iran and Iraq that continued for the remainder of 1986. For perhaps the first time during the war, Iraq took full advantage of its aerial superiority to damage Iran's industry and to floating terminals near the mouth of the Tigris. The ruling Arab Ba'ath socialist party held an extraordinary regional conference, the first since June 1982. Three new members were elected to the party's regional command, increasing its number to 17. Naim Haddad who had been a member of the regional Command and was subsequently removed from the RCC, since their formation in 1968, was not re-elected to the regional command and was subsequently removed from the RCC on which he was replaced by Saddam Hussein the chairman, or speaker, of the National Assembly. The changes effectively strengthened Saddam Hussein's position as leader of the party.

A meeting between the ministers of foreign affairs of Iraq and Syria, scheduled for June 1986, which was heralded as the beginning of reconciliation between the two countries, was cancelled at the last minute by president Assad of Syria. However rumours of a rapprochement were revived by reports that President Hussein and President Assad had met in secret in Jordan in April 1987. Ministers from both countries met on several occasions in the ensuing weeks, and the reopening of the oil pipeline from Haditha, in Iraq, to the Syrian port of Baniyas, was discussed. There were, however, no public

statements from either side to confirm the improvement in relations.³⁰

The Iran-Iraq War, 1987

From mid -1986 onwards Iran was reported to be reinforcing its army at numerous points along the Iraqi border .when an Iranian offensive (Karbala-4: after the holy shi'ite city Iraq) was launched on 24 December, it came, as anticipated, in the region of Basra, but fail to penetrate Iraqi defences on four islands in the shatt al - Arab waterway on 8 January 1987 a two-pronged attack (Karbala-5) was launched towards Basra. Iranian forces, attacking from the east, established a bridge head inside Iraq. Between the Shatt al.

-Arab to the west, and the artificial water barrier, Fish Lake, to the east, and slowly advanced towards Basra, sustaining heavy casualties; while an assault from the south - east secured a group of islands in the Shatt al- Arab; (on 13 January Iran mounted the Karbala-6 offensive in north -east Iraq.) by mid -February Iranian forces from the east had advanced to within about 10km of Basra but further gains were made and the Karbala-5 offensive was officially terminated at the end of the month.

In January 1987, at the light of the Karbala -5 offensives President Hussein of Iraq offered, and in the following months demonstrated its ability to launch attacks at several points from one end to the other of the 1,200 -km war front. The Karbala-7 offensive in March penetrated north eastern Iraqi territory to a depth of about 20km in the Gerdmand heights, near Rawanduz only some 100km from Iraq's largest oilfields, at Kirkuk. In April, on the southern front, Iran launched the Karbala-8 offensive from the salient 10, km east of Basra which had secured in Karbala -5 The Iranian claimed that the attack established a new front line about 1 km near Basra , west of the artificial twin canals water barrier though Iraq claimed that it had been repulsed. At the same time another offensive, Karbala -9 was mounted in the central sector of the war front from near the Iranian border town of Qarse -al- Shirin .

Iraq announced a two-week moratorium on its bombing of Iranian towns and cities of 18 February 1987, which Iran agreed to observe respect of its artillery and missile

³⁰ The Middle East and North Africa 2004, 50th Edition, Europa publications, Taylor & Francis Group London and New York.

bombardment of Iraqi cities. In April, following new Iranian attacks east of Basra, and well after the initially stipulated two-week period had expired, Iraq said that it was no longer bound by the unofficial agreement. However, Iraqi air raids did not resume in earnest until May.

Iraq continued to attack tankers shuttling Iranian oil from Kharg Island to the floating terminals at Shirri and Larak islands during the first half of 1986. However, an apparently accidental attack in the Gulf by an Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighter plane on the frigate USS Stark, part of the US naval force, which had been deployed in the Gulf to protect shipping, created a crisis in Iraqi-US relations. The fighter fired two Exocet missiles at the Stark, only one of which exploded, killing 37 US sailors. Iraq apologized for the error and desisted from attacks on tankers for the next five weeks. Although it is plausible that the attack was the result of error and inexperience on the part of the Iraqi pilot, Iraq had recently had occasion to record its displeasure at US policy retarding the war. In November 1986 it had emerged that the USA had changed its official policy of neutrality, and of three shipments of weapons and military spare parts to the Islamic Republic since September 1985. Then in December, it was reported in the Washington Post that the USA had been supplying Iraq with detailed intelligence information for at least two years, to assist it in the war with Iran. In particular, the USA's central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was said to have provided satellite reconnaissance data, to assist Iraq in its raids on Iranian oil installations and power plants. One month later, US intelligence sources revealed that the USA had, in fact, provided both Iran and Iraq with deliberately misleading information. The explanation of the apparent contradictions in US policy seemed to be that the USA had been trying to engineer a stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war to prevent either side from gaining decisive advantage. Iraq subsequently attributed the loss of the oil port of Faw in February 1986 to false intelligence reports supplied by the USA.

Tension in the Gulf escalated in May 1987 after the USA's decision to accede to a request from Kuwait for 11 Kuwaiti tankers to be re-registered under the US flag, entitling them to US naval protection. Apart from the financial aid it gave Iraq, Kuwait was a transit point for goods (including military equipment destined for Iraq, and for exports of oil sold on Iraq's behalf). Iran warned Kuwait on several occasions of the dire consequences of its continued support for Iraq, and between October 1986 and April

1987, 15 ships bound to or from Kuwait were attacked in the Gulf by Iran, and several Kuwaiti cargoes reregistered Kuwaiti tankers through the Gulf, Iran announced that it would not hesitate to sink US warships if provoked.

The possibility of a confrontation between the USA and Iran resulted in a rare display of unanimity in the UN Security Council, which on 20 July 1987, adopted a resolution (No.598) urging an immediate cease-fire to the Iran Iraq war; the withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognized boundaries; and the co-operation to Iran and Iraq in mediation efforts to achieve a peace settlement. Iraq agreed to abide by the terms of the resolution if Iran did so. Iran said that the resolution was 'unjust,' and criticized it for failing to identify Iraq as the original aggressor in the war. Moreover, it maintained that the belligerent US naval presence in the Gulf, effectively in support of Iraq, rendered the resolution null and void. However, by mid September Iran had by still not delivered an unequivocal response to the resolution. Iraq meanwhile, had halted its attacks on tankers in the Gulf in mid - July and Iran has exploited the lull by raising the level of its oil production and exports.³¹

The UN Fails to Enforce Resolution 598

Contrary to advice from Western governments, Iraq resumed attacks on Iranian oil installations in its attempts to secure a cease-fire through diplomacy, and made it less likely that the USSR could be persuaded to agree to the imposition of an arms embargo, whether against Iran alone or against both protagonists.

During the remainder of the year the UN secretary-general, Javier Perez de Cuellar sought a cease-fire formula which would be acceptable to Iran. 11 and 15 September 1987 was preceded by an intensification of Iraq attacks on Iranian economic targets. In Tehran, Iranian leaders told Perez De Cuellar that they supported the provisions in resolution 598 for the establishment of an 'impartial body' to apportion responsibility for starting the war, but that Iraq's consent in this matter had to be established before Iran would observe a cease-fire. For its part, Iraq was prepared to accept the ruling of a judicial body in determining responsibility for the war but refused to countenance any

³¹ The Middle East and North Africa 2004, 50th Edition, Europa publications, Taylor & Francis Group London and New York.

deviation from the original terms of resolution 598, which stated that a formal cease –fire should precede the establishment of such a body.

signs of an apparent willingness on Iran's part to modify its stand on resolution 598 forestalled attempts by the USA, the United Kingdom and France to promote their proposal of an arms embargo against Iran, and also-empted the adoption of diplomatic or the sanctions other by the Arab league, at its meeting in Tunis on 20 September 1987. An extraordinary session of the Arab League in Amman, Jordan, from 8-11 November, produced a final communiqué, which unanimously condemned Iran for prolonging the war with Iraq and for its occupation of Arab territory, and urged Iran to implement Resolution 598 without pre-conditions.

Following the summit meeting in Amman, the Iraqi government, in common with a number of other Arab countries re-established diplomatic relations with Egypt. During the summit, meeting had taken place between Saddam Hussein and President Assad, reviving speculation of a rapprochement between Iraq and Syria, which had supported Iran in war. President Assad however instructed the League's adoption of an Iraqi proposal that member states should sever their diplomatic links with Iran, and Syria subsequently averred that its good relations with Iran were unimpaired.

On 3 November 1987 the Iranian Deputy minister

Of foreign affairs, Muhammad Javad Larijanil stated that Iran would observe cease –fire if the UN Security Council, were to identify Iraq as the aggressor in the Iran–Iraq war. The USA and the United Kingdom interpreted this announcement as advice to forestall a change in soviet policy on the question of an arms embargo. The USSR had argued that Iran should be allowed more time in which to accept resolution 598. At the beginning of December, during further discussions with Perez De Cuellar in New York, large in made the additional condition that Iraq should agree to pay war reparations prior to the introduction of cease-fire, and cite Iraqi intransigence and the presence of US ships in the Gulf as the principal obstacles to peace.

On 22 December 1987 the USSR itself proposed discussions within the Security Council to consider a mandatory prohibition on the sale of arms to Iran, which would take place at the same time as discussions to the introduction of an international naval force in the Gulf, under controlling the region. Although all the fever permanent

members of the Security Council subsequently agreed of the need for further measure to be taken to ensure the compliance of both combatants with resolution 598, the USSR's insistence on the withdrawal of foreign navies followed by the deployment of a UN naval force in the Gulf, and the USA's growing military involvement in the area during 1988, prevented the adoption of an arms embargo.³²

Cease-fire in the Iran –Iraq work

During the first half of 1988 Iraq regained much of the territory which it had lost to Iran in previous years, taking advantage of Iranian military inefficiency and confused aid of a divided Iranian leadership. However the world was taken by surprise in July 1988 when, after 12 months of prevarication, Iran agreed, unconditionally, to accept Resolution 598.

In January 1988 Iran and Iraq rebuffed a Syrian initiative to engineer diplomatic end to the war by opening a dialogue between Iran and the Gulf States. After a lull of 10 days, Iraq resumed the so –called 'tanker war' accusing Syria of violating Arab solidarity against Iran, during 1987, according to Lloyd's of London, Iranian and Iraqi attacks had damaged 178 vessels in the Gulf (when cease-fire was proclaimed July , total of 546 vessels had been hit since 1981 m, when the 'tanker war' begin in earnest.)

At the end of February 1988 Iraq resumed the 'war of the cities' (which, apart from sporadic attacks, had been halted in early 1987), signalling the beginning of a series of reciprocal; raids of civil and economic targets in the two countries which lasted for several months,

During 1987/88, for the first time in six years, owing to poor mobilization, disorganization and a shortage of volunteers, Iran was unable to launch a major winter offensive and began to lose ground to Iraqi advances into government –controlled territory in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Iranian rouses, with Kurdish assistance, had established bridgeheads, particularly in the Mawat region, along the Iranian border,. The Kurdish part in these operations represented the largest Kurdish offensive since 1974/75, uniting forces from the KDP and the PUK which in November 1986, had agreed to –

³² The Middle East and North Africa 2004, 50th Edition, Europa publications, Taylor & Francis Group London and New York.

coordinate their military and political activities and were in the process of forming a coalition of Kurdish nationalist groups (see below) in March 1988, in retaliatory attack against the captured town of Halabja, Iraq is believed to have used chemical weapons, killing 4,000 Kurdish civilians, (in July Iraq admitted its use of chemical weapons during the war. A UN reports compiled in April had concluded that there were victims of chemical weapons on both sides; team of UN experts reported August that Iraq had used mustard gas against Iranian civilians.)

After the success of the Iranian –Kurdish offensive, the following months witnessed a catalogue of Iraqi victories over Iranian foresees, In march 1988 the National Liberation Army (NLA), the military wing of the Iranian resistance group, Mujahidn-e-Khalq, supported by Iraq, undertook a major offensive for the first time since its creation in 1987 attacking Iranian units in Iran's south –western province of Khuzestan. In mid-April Iraqi forces regained control of the Faw peninsula, where the Iranians, who had been unable to stride out to make further traditional fauns since capturing the area in 1986, had scaled down their presence. (Iran accused Kuwait of allowing Iraqi save.) Then in May, Iraq recaptured the Shalamchah area, southeast of Basra, driving the Iranians back across the Shatt al-Arab.

A radical military reorganization by Iran, undertaken in June and July 1988, failed to reverse the tide of defeat. Having won back more territory in the north of Iraq, near Sulaimaniya, in mid –June, Iraq recaptured Majnoon Island and the surrounding area in the al-Hawizah marshes (the site of one of the world's biggest oilfields), on the southern in front, at the end of the month. Also at the end of June, and in July, Iraq expelled Iranian forces from Iraqi territory in Kurdistan, recapturing the border town of mawat and key mountain areas to the north –east of Halabja. On 13 July, in the central sector of the front Iraqi forces crossed to Iranian territory for the first time since 1986, and captured the Iranian border town of Dehloran . The last pockets of Iranian occupation in southern Iraq was cleared by Iraqi troop in mid-July and, on 18 July; Iran officially announced its unconditional acceptance of Resolution 598. Iraqi troops in the central sector advanced further into Iran before retiring behind the border on 24 July. However NLA, over which Iraq claimed to have no control, launched a three –day offensive on 25 July, penetrating as far as 150 km into Iranian territory, before being forced to hurt. It was suggested that

the NLA was being used as a proxy by Iraq to prevent Iranian forces from reorganizing during a cease-fire which might prove to be only temporary. At the beginning of August, owing to uncertainty over the war, Iraq's general elections, which had been scheduled to take place at the end of the month, were postponed for six months.

The implementation of cease-fire was delayed by an Iraqi demand for the initiation of direct peace talks with Iran, under UN auspices prior to cessation of hostilities. Iran protested that Resolution 598. However, on 6 August 1988 Iraq withdrew its insistence of the necessity for direct talks to take place and, on the eve of the cease-fire following the end of hostilities. Accordingly, the cease-fire finally came into force on 20 August, monitored by a specially UN observer force of 350 officers, the UN. Iran-Iraq military observers group (UNIIMOG).³³

PEACE TALKS

Iran-Iraq had been in conflict for land dispute since 30 years back, both countries need to establish comprehensive peace settlement with diplomatic efforts. But couldn't succeed because of interference of superpowers i.e. the USA and the former USSR and their supports to Iraq and Iran respectively, Iraq and Iran had claimed their sovereignty on waterway. They wanted mutual accommodation and reached an agreement on Shatt al-Arab boundary. Later on the UN and USSR intervention in this Iran-Iraq agreement process through Resolution 598 which was passed in 1988.

Negotiation between Iran and Iraq for a comprehensive peace settlement based on the full implementation of resolution 598, began at foreign ministerial level in Geneva on 25 August 1988, under the aegis of the UN with question of the location of frontiers a matter of dispute, the requirement in clause one of resolution 598 for military forces to retire behind internationally recognized borders was causing a problem before the talks began, and once tested, they soon reached stalemate. Iran insisted that the Algiers agreement of 1975 between the two countries should be the basis for negotiations. According to the terms of the Algiers Agreement of 1975 between the two countries should be the basis for negotiations, according to the terms of the Algiers Agreement, which defined the

³³ The Middle East and North Africa 2004, 50th Edition, Europa publications, Taylor & Francis Group London and New York.

southern border between Iran and running along the deepest channel of the Shatt al-Arab waterway (the Thalweg line), the two counters exercise joint sovereignty over the waterway however., President Hussein of Iraq, who had been made Iraq invasion of Iran in 1980 , claiming that it had been made under duress, and commanded full Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt al –Arab, which Iraq held under previous agreements in through the Shatt al –Arab and the Gulf during the cease-fire ,unhindered by Iranian vessels. When Iran claimed to have stopped and searched an Iraqi cargo vessel which was making its way through the strait of Hormuz into the Gulf on 20 August 1988, Iraq (though) it denied the Iranian claim) threatened to resume hostilities if Iraqi vessels were harassed in this way. It also insisted that an agreement for the dredging of the Shatt al-Arab and the removal of sunken ships be finalized before the discussion of final (mainly Iraqi) troop withdrawals and the exchange of prisoners of war could proceed. Iran claimed that it was, technically, still at war with Iraq and was, therefore, entitled under international, law, to search Iraqi and other vessels for war supplies, for as long as Iraqi troops were in occupation of Iranian territory (an estimated 1,500sq km, according to Iran).

These disputers, lately concerning issues for which there was no provision in Resolution 598, delayed the implementation of their solution beyond the introduction of a cease-fire. Clause three, for example, urged the repatriation of prisoners of war. By mid-1988 the International committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had registered 50,182 Iraqi prisoners of war held in Iran. And 19284 Iranians held in Iraq, although the actual figures were thought one higher, as the Red cross had not been allowed access to all prisoners, In November, Iran and Iraq agreed to exchange all sick and wounded prisoners of war The first exchange took place in the same month, but the arrangements collapsed shortly afterwards, following a dispute over the number of prisoners involved. Resolution 598 also provide for the creation of an impartial judicial body to determine where the responsibility for starting the war lay .It was generally accepted that Iraq had initiated the conflict by invading Iran on 22 September 1980. Iraq, however, maintained that the war began on 4 September with Iranian shelling of Iraqi border posts. The negotiations for comprehensive peace settlement remained deadlocked for two years.

On 16 August 1990 President Hussein of Iraq abruptly sought an immediate,

formal peace with Iran by accepting almost all of the claims that Iran had pursued since the declaration of a cease –fire in the war in August 1988. On 10 September 1990 Iran and Iraq formally agreed to resume diplomatic relations.

The withdrawal of all armed forces to the internationally recognised boundaries verified and confirmed as complete on 20 February 1990 by UNIMOG, whose mandate was terminated on 28 February by the UN Security Council. Iran and Iraq subsequently inflated a ' confidence -building ' process of reducing the levels of troop and military equipment in the border areas. Prisoner exchange had continued until 1991 by when the multinational force commenced military operation to expel Iraq armed forces from Kuwait At this time Iran still held 30,000 Iraqi prisoners of was. Preliminary negotiations on the full implementation of Resolution 598 were also curtailed.

The publication in August 1991 of the report of a UN delegation sent to Iran - in accordance with the terms of Resolution 598 to assess the level of human and material damage caused by the war with Iraq seemed to indicate that the UN was once again considering the need for a comprehensive peace settlement. The Iranian Government releases its own assessment of the damage caused by the war: it estimated that Iran had experienced direct damage amounting to IR 30,811,00m. That's` 50 town and 4,000 villages were destroyed or badly damaged and that 14,000 civilians were killed and 1.25m. People displaced.

It then carried the war into Iraqi territory, but the speedy conclusion for which Iran had hoped did not materialize. In February 1983 Iran began major offensive in the area of Iraq's Misan province, about the impetus was soon lost, and a fresh Iranian assault in April was similarly indecisive. A further Iranian offensive in July (combined with operations to suppress renewed activity by Kurdish guerrilla in the area) saw its force entrenched 15km within northern Iraq. The attack seemed to be consistent with Iran's policy of waging a war of attrition, keeping Iraq war footing and thereby exerting pressure on the weakening Iraqi economy which might topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. Action by Iran prevented Iraq from exporting oil through the Gulf, and a pipeline through Syria was cut off. Iraq was able to continue the war only with financial aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

During the second half of 1983 Iraq stepped up missile and aircraft raids

against Iranian towns and petroleum installations, and, furthermore, too delivery of five French –built super Etendard fighter aircraft. With these, and with the Exocet missiles already in its possession, Iraq threatened to destroy Iran’s oil export industry, cantered on Kharg Island in the Gulf, which financed the Iranian war effort. Iran countered by declaring its intention to make the Gulf impassable to all shipping (one –sixth of the western world’s petroleum requirement passed through the Gulf) if Iraqi military action rendered it unable to exert oil from the Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz. In retaliation for the sale of super Etendard aircraft to Iraq, Iran severed most of its economic ties with France.

In March 1984, a further Iranian offensive succeeded in taking part of the marshlands around the southern Iraqi island of Majnoon, the site of rich oilfield, though oilfields, through at a great human cost. Iraq subsequently retook some of the territory it had lost it had lost, but seemed most intent on consolidation its defences than making further ground .A team of UN observers, sent in at the request of the Iranian government, found that Iraq had used mustard gas to counter the offensive .A long –awaited Oromoam offensive against fast Al –Basara failed to materialized. Iran delayed; Iraq developed a formidable network of defensive fortification along its southern brooder.

Although it had earlier declared a maritime exclusion zone, at North -East end of the gulf around Kharg Island and made cases well out did the zone, Iraq refrained from attacking taking using the Kharg Island oil terminal until May 1984. Iran retaliated with assaults against Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf.

Chapter - IV: Iraq moves in to Kuwait
Geopolitical Consequences

Chapter -IV

Iraq Move in to Kuwait Geopolitical Consequences

Physical and Social Geography of Kuwait

Kuwait lies at the head of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, bordering Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The area of the state of Kuwait is 17,818 sq km, (6,880sq miles), including the Kuwait share of the Neutral or partitioned Zone but without taking into account the increase in territory resolution from the adjustment to the border with Iraq that came in to effect in January 1993.

Although, for some time, the Gulf was thought to extend much further north, geological evidence suggests that the coastline has remained broadly at its present position, while the immense masses of silt brought down by the Tigris and Euphrates cause in the coast line is therefore likely, with possible changes since ancient times. The development of Kuwait (which means 'little fortress') owed much to its zone of slightly higher, firmer ground (giving access from the Gulf inland to Iraq) and to its reasonable good and sheltered harbour, away from nearby sandbanks and coral reefs,

The territory of Kuwait is mainly flat desert with a few oases. Annual rainfall of 1cm-37cm falls almost entirely between November and April, and there is spring 'flush' of grass. Summer shade temperature may reach 49°C (120°F), although in January, the coldest month, temperature range between -2.8°C (27°F-85°F), with rare frost. There is little inland drinking water, and supplies are largely distilled from sea water, and brought by pipeline from the Shatt al - Arab waterway, which runs into the Gulf.

According to census results, the population of Kuwait increased from 206,473 in February 1957 to 1,357,956 by April 1980 and to 1,697,301 by April 1985. It was estimated that in 1991, following the war to end Iraqi occupation, the population had declined to only 1.2 m. mainly as result to the departure of a large proportion of the former non - Kuwait resistance, who had previously formed a majority of the inhabitants. The census of April 1995 recorded a total population of 1,575,570, including 653,616 Kuwait nationals. By mid-2003 the population had increased to 2,546,700, according to official

estimates. During 1963-70 the average annual increase in Kuwait's population was 10% the highest growth rate recoded in any independent country. The average annual increase in 1970 -80 was 6.3% , although in 1985-90 the rate of growth slowed to 4.0% per year ,and the population actually declined by 4.8% per year during 1990-96. During 1980-99, according to the World Bank, the average annual rate of growth of the population had slowed to 1.8 % and the population was estimated to have declined by an annual average of 0.1% during 1990 -2002.

Much of Kuwait's previous population growth had been the result of immigration, although the country also had one of the highest natural increase rate in the world . The birth rate for the Kuwaiti population alone exceeded 50 per 1,000each year in 1973 -76 between 1957 and 1983 the non -Kuwait population grew from less than 93,000 (45% of the total) to about 870,000 (57.4%)most of them from other Arab States. At the 1995 census the non Kuwait population based on the definition of citizen ship then in use, recorded birth and only 4,227deaths. In 1995 females comprised just 42% of the country's population, including non -Kuwaitis.

According to the results of the1995 census, Kuwait city, the capital and principal harbor, had a population of 28,747 (compared with 44,335in 1985 and 60,525in 1980), although the largest town was Salmuiya, with 129,775 inhabitants. Other sizeable localities were Jaleeb ash-shuyukh (population, 102,169) and Hwalli (population 82,154).Immediately to the south of Kuwait, along the Gulf, is a Neutral of partitioned zone of 5,700sq km, which divided between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Each country administers its own half as an integral part of the state. However, the oil wealth of the wide zone remains undivided, and production from the on shore concession in the Neutral/partitioned Zone is normally shared equally between the two states.³⁴

³⁴ The Europa World Year Book 2004 ,volume II Europa Publications Tylor & Franis Group New York.

Figure No.10: Physical map of Kuwait³⁵



³⁵ University of Texas Libraries-Iraq maps.
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/...iraq.html>

Recent History

Kuwait became part of Turkey's Ottoman in the 16th century. During the later year of Ottoman rule Kuwait became a semi- autonomous Arab monarchy, with local administration controlled by a Sheikh of the Sabah family, which is still the ruling dynasty. In 1899, fearing an extension of Turkish control. The ruler of Kuwait made a treaty with the United Kingdom, acceptance British protection while surrendering control over external relations. Nominal Turkish suzerainty over Kuwait exuded in 1918, with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Petroleum was first discovered in Kuwait in 1938, but the Second World War interrupted exploration. After 1945 during resumed on a large scale, and extensive deposits of petroleum were found. Sheikh /Ahmad (ruler since 1921)was succeeded in 1950 by his cousin, Sheikh Abdullah as Salim as Sabah , who inaugurated a programme of public works and educational development , funded by petroleum revenues, which transformed Kuwait's infrastructure and introduced comprehensive system of welfare services.

Kuwait became fully independent on 19 June 1961, when the United Kingdom and Kuwait agreed to terminate the 1899 treaty; the ruler took the titled of Amir and assumed full executive power. Kuwait was admitted to the league of Arab States despite opposition from Iraq, which claimed that Kuwait was historically part of Iraqi territory, Kuwait s first election took place in December 1961, when voters chose 20 members of a constituent Assembly (the other Members being cabinet minister appointed by the Amir) .The Assembly drafted a new constitution, which was adopted in December 1962. A 50- member Majlish al-Umma National Assembly, the assembly was elected, under a limited franchise on January 1963. In the absence of formal political parties which remain illegal), candidates contested the poll as independents, although same month the Amir appointed his brother, Sheikh Sabah as – Salem as – Sabah (the heir apparent), to be prime Minister. Iraq renounced its claim to Kuwait in October, and diplomatic relations were established.

In January 1965, following conflict between the paternalistic ruling family and the democratically inclined Majlis, the owners of the council of Ministers were strengthened.

The Amire died in November 1965, and Sheikh Sabah , who was named heir apparent in may 1966. The neutral (partitioned) zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was formally divided between the two counters in 1969: revenues from oil production the area ate shared equally.

As Kuwait's petroleum sector expanded during the 1960s, the country became increasingly wealthy. The government effected an extensive redistribution of income, through public expenditure and a land compression scheme, but there was some popular discontent complaining corruption and official manipulation of the media and the Majlis. A more representative legislature was elected in January 1971. A further general election took place in January 1975, but in August 1976 the new Amir dissolved the Majlis, on the grounds that it was action against the best interests of the state. Sheh Sabah died on 31 December 1977 and was succeeded by crown prince January 1978 the new Amir appointed Sheikh Saad al -Abdullah as -Salim as Sahah to be his heir apparent. The new crown prince, hitherto Minister of Defense and the Interior, became Prime Minister in the following month. In accordance with an Amir decree of August 1980, a new Majlis was elected in February 1981, although only one -half of the eligible 6% of the population registered to vote.

The collapse of Kuwait unofficial stock exchange, the Soak al -Manakh , in September 1982 caused a prolonged financial crisis , and eventually led to the resignations of the Minister of Finance (in 1983) and of Justice (in 1985). The Majlis subsequently opposed several government measures, including proposed price increases for public services, educational reforms and legislation to restrict the press, and questioned the competence of certain ministers. In July 1986 the council of Ministers submitted its resignation to the Amir, who then dissolved the Majlis and suspended some articles of the constitution declaring his intention to rule by decree. The crown prince was immediately reappointed Prime Minister. An Amirei decree acceded the council of Ministers greater powers of censorship including the right to suspend publication of newspapers for up to two years.

In late 1989, the Amir refuses to accept a petition, signed more than 20,000 Kuwait citizens seeking the restoration of the Majlis. In January 1990 police dispersed two Pro-democracy demonstrations, although later on the month the government agreed to relax

press censorship. In June 62 % of eligible voters participated in a general election for 50 members of a provisional 'National Council'; a further 25 members were appointed by the Amir. The election was boycotted by pro- democracy activists, who continued to demand the full restoration of the Majlis.

Of all the states, Kuwait has been most vulnerable to regional disruption. Immediately after independence British troops were dispatched to support the country against the territorial claims by Iraq. The force remained until 1963, and relations between Kuwait and Iraq were stable until 1973, when Iraqi troops occupied a Kuwaiti outpost on their joint border. Kuwait none the less supplied aid to Iraq from the outbreak of the Iran- Iraq war in 1980. As a result, Kuwait petroleum installations and shipping in the Persian Gulf were targeted intermittently by Iranian forces, and pro- Iranian groups within Kuwait, to much of the 1980s. A large number of Iranians were among 27,000 expatriates deported in 1985-86, and in 1987, the Government initiated a five –year plan to reduce the number of expatriates on the Kuwaiti work –force. Kuwait resumed diplomatic relations with Iran following the 1988 cease-fire between Iran and Iraq.³⁶

Iraq –Kuwait Talks fail

Reconciliation talks between Iraq and Kuwait in their dispute over oil, borders and money apparently collapsed today and the Iraqi delegation left for Baghdad, sources said.

Senior officials from the two Gulf nations fielded to hold a reduced second round of talks despite intensive behind the scene efforts by host Saudi Arabia. The sources said Iraq maintained a hard – line on the two week old disagreement , they said speaking on condition of anonymity.

The sources said King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was expected to try to arrange a summit meeting between the Iraqi president Mr, Saddam Hussein and Kuwait's Emir , sheik Jaber al –Ahmed al-Sabha in an attempt to break the impasse.

The Egyptian president, Mr. Hosni Mubarak and other Arab leader also were trying to fuse the tension and bring the two sides back together.

³⁶The Europa world Book 2004 Volum.II Kazakhstan – Zimbabwe, Europa Publications Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York.

The most important issue on the table in Jeddah was the dispute over the border, which has been under marketed since Kuwait won independence tone down a vitriolic propaganda campaign against Kuwait, which among other things charged the Kuwait , which among other things charged the Kuwait leadership with being stooge of the US and intention destroying Iraq's oil and economic development . Baghdad government owned news papers today kept up a demand that Kuwait concede it has usurped Iraq's rights in the dispute.³⁷

Iraq Invasion of Kuwait

Prior to a meeting of the OPEC ministerial council on Geneva on 25 July 1990, Iraq had implied that it might take military action against countries, which continued to flout their oil production quotas. It had also accused Kuwait of violating the Iraqi border in order to steal Iraqi oil resources worth US \$ 2,400 m., and suggested that Iraq's debt to Kuwait, accumulated largely during the Iran – Iraq war, should be waived. On the eve of the OPEC meeting in Geneva, Iraq stationed two armored divisions on its border with Kuwait stationed two armored divisions on its border with Kuwait.

The Iraqi threat and military mobilization led to sharp increases in regional tension. Before the OPEC meeting in Geneva on 25 July 1990, president Mubarak of Egypt and Chedli Klibi, the Secretary Geneva of the Arab League, travailed to Baghdad in an attempt to calm the station. The USA meanwhile, placed on alert its naval forces stationed in Bahrain. At the conclusion of the OPEC meeting, how, the threat of Iraqi military action appeared to recede: both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to reduce their petroleum production, while OPEC agreed to raise its benchmark, price of crude petroleum from US \$21per barrel.

Direct negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait commenced in Saudi Arabia at the end of July 1990, with the aim of resolving disputes over territory, oil pricing and Iraq's debt to Kuwait. Kuwait was expected to emphasize a claim to the strategic islands of Arab. (After Kuwait obtained independence in 1961- it had formerly be under the protection to the United Kingdom Iraq claimed sovereignty over the country. Kuwait was placed under the protection of British troops, who were later with drawn and replaced by Arab League

³⁷ Jeddah , The Hindu Thursday , August 2 , 1 990.

forces. On 4th October 1963 the Iraqi government formally recognized Kuwait's complete independence and sovereignty within its present borders.) On 1st August, however, the talks collapsed, and on 2nd August Iraq invaded Kuwait taking control of the country and establishing a (short-lived) provisional free government.

There was no evidence at all to support Iraq's claim that its forces had entered Kuwait at the invitation of the country and establishing Kuwait, taking control of the country and establishing a (short-lived) provisional free Government.

There was no evidence at all to support Iraq's claim that its forces had entered Kuwait at the invitation of insurgents who overthrew the Kuwaiti Government. The invasion appeared more likely to have been motivated by Iraq's financial difficulties in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war in addition to strategic interests – Iraq had long sought the direct access to the Persian Gulf which it sought by occupying Kuwait.

The immediate response, on 2 August 1990, of the UN Security Council to the invasion of Kuwait was to convene and to adopt unanimously a resolution (No 660). Which condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; and appealed for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. On 6 August the UN Security Council convened again and adopted further Resolution (No 661), which imposed mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq and on Occupied Kuwait, 'with the exception of medical supplies and foodstuffs in humanitarian circumstances'.

As early as 3rd August 1990 it was feared that the economic sanctions being imposed on Iraq and Kuwait would be superseded by international military conflict. On 3rd August Iraq troops began to deploy along Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia, and the USA and the United Kingdom announced that they were sending naval vessels to the Gulf. On 7th August, at the request of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the USA dispatched combat troops and aircraft to Saudi Arabia, in order to secure the country's border with Kuwait against a possible attack on the country's border with Kuwait against possible attack by Iraq. US troops began to occupy positions on Saudi Arabia on 9 August, one day after Iraq announced its formal annexation of Kuwait. On the same day, the UN Security Council convened and adopted a unanimous resolution, which declared the annexation of Kuwait to be null and void, and urged all states and institutions not to recognize it.

The dispatch of US troops signified the beginning of operation Desert Shield for the Defense of Saudi Arabia, the end of January 1991 some 30 countries has contributed ground troops, aircraft and warships to the multinational force in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. By far the biggest contributor was the USA, which it was estimated, had deployed some 500,000 military personnel. Arab countries participation in the multinational force were Egypt , Syria , Morocco and the members of the- operation council for the Arab states of the Gulf Bahrain , Kuwait , Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It was estimated that Iraq had deployed some 555, 000 troops in Kuwait and southern Iraq by the end of January 1991.

Iraq's Invasion and annexation of Kuwait altered the pattern of relation prevailing in the Arab world. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, individual Arab states condemned Iraq's action, and on 3 August 1990 a hastily –convened meeting of the Arab league in Cairo agreed a resolution which condemned the invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces. At a summit mention of Arab for Iraq to withdrawal from Kuwait was retreated and 12 of the 20 member participation in the meeting voted to send an Arab deterrent force to the Gulf in support of the US-led efforts to deter potential aggression against Saudi Arabia.

As the crisis in the Gulf developed, Western diplomacy strove to maintain Iraq's isolation. the invasion of Kuwait had provoked widespread population support for Iraq , notably in Jordan , where there was huge Palestinian population, and also in the maghred sates. Although conducted with the approval of the UN, in pursuit of aims formulated in specific UN resolutions, and with the active over support of Egypt, Syria, Morocco and the Gulf states, both Operation Dessert Shield' and its successor, Operation Desert Storm, were world, to be US –led campaign to secure US interests in the Gulf region.

On 12 August 1990 Saddam Hussein proposed an interactive for the resolution of the conflict in the Gulf, likening Iraq's occupation of Kuwait the other conflicts on the Middle East, in particular the continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza strip and the Palestinian question. This was the first explicit example to so-called 'linkage 'in diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis in the Gulf. Practically , linkage would have amounted to the trading of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait for at least convening of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait for , at the convening of an ingression

accountancy the Palestinian issue , and it was repeatedly rejected by the USA ,which considered that ' linkage would reward Iraq's aggression and enhance the country's reputation in the Arab world.

The authority for the deployment of a multinational force for the defense of Saudi Arabia was contained which affirms 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. The UN Security Council warned, however, that its authorization would be necessary for the use of force to implement the economic sanction imposed on Iraq and Kuwait. Article 42 of the UN charter provide further taking of 'such action by , sea or land force as may be necessary to maintain international peace and security including these of blockade. In order to clarify the Charter's provisions, the USA drafted a resolution which would allow the UN to use legitimately the force necessary to maintain block against Iraq on 25th August 1990 the UN security council adopted resolution which requested, with immediate effect, member states deploying maritime force in the area to use such necessity under the authority of the security council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify the cargoes and destinations and ensure the implementation of the mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait .The resolution also invited all states to cooperate, by political and diplomatic means , to ensure compliance with sanctions.

Successive diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Gulf – undertaken , at different times by the UN and by numerous individual countries between August 1990 and mid-January 1991 foundered, virtually without exception, on Iraq's steadfast refusal to withdraw its force from Kuwait . Diplomacy was initially complicated by the treatment of western citizens residing in Iraq and Kuwait. On 9th August 1990 Iraq closed its border together an attack on Iraq by multinational in Kuwait were ordered to assemble at hotels prior to their removal to Iraq. Iraq announced that all foreign women and children were free to leave Iraq and Kuwait,, extending this permissions to all foreigners on 6th December ,

On 29th November 1990 the UN Security Council convened and adopted resolution (no. 678), drafted by the USA, which with reference to its previous Resolution

regarding Iraq's Occupation of Kuwait, authorities all remember states co-operation with the government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991, fully implements...the foregoing resolution, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolution and to restore international peace and security in the area. Iraq denounced Resolution 678, the first UN resolution since 1950 which authorized the use force, as a threat, and reiterated its demand for the UN security council to address equally all the problems of the Middle East.

'Operation desert storm' in effect, war with Iraq –in pursuance of the liberation of Kuwait, as demanded by Un Resolution 660, commenced on the night of 16-17 January 1991. It was preceded by the UN secretary – General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to Baghdad for talks with Saddam Hussein. The failure of this mission was widely regarded as signaling the inevitability of military conflict. On 14 January Iraq's National Assembly approved a resolution, which afforded the president all constitutional powers to respond to any 'US-led' attack.

The declared aim of the multinational force in Saudi Arabia, in the initial phase of operation desert storm, was to gain air superiority, and then air supremacy, over Iraqi forces in order to facilitate air attacks on Iraqi military and industrial installations. Hostilities commenced with air raids on Baghdad, and by late February 1991 total of 91,000 attack on air missions were reported to have been flown over Iraq and Kuwait by the multinational air forces.

The multinational force claimed air supremacy over Iraq and Kuwait on 30 January 1991, and air attacks were refocused on the fortified positions of Iraqi ground troops in Kuwait, in their campaign, the Iraqi air force appeared to have offered surprisingly little resistance, indeed, by 8 February it was reported that more than 100 Iraqi fighter aircraft had sought refuge in Iran, and the apparent good faith of Iran's reaffirmation of its neutrality in the conflict prompted speculation that they had been directed there deliberately in an attempt to prevent the total destruction of the Iraqi air force.

Iraq's most serious response to the military campaign waged against it was attacks southward on Israel. While these were of little military significance, attacks against it were Saudi missiles on Israel, while these were of little military

significance , they threatened to provoke Israeli retaliation against Iraq an the consequent disintegration of the multinational force, since it would been politically impossible for any Arab State to fight alongside Israel against Iraq, us air defense systems , averted the thereat of Israeli retaliation for the attack by late February 1991.In addition , Iraq launched 35scud missiles against Saudi Arabia.

On 6 February 1991 the Iraqi formally severed served diplomatic relation with the USA , the United Kingdom , France ,Italy , Egypt an Saudi Arabia .Between Augusts 1990 and January 1991 and many foreign embassies in Bangladesh had closed , and most countries had withdrawn their diplomatic staff before the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf.

On 15 February 1991 the Iraqi government abruptly expressivity willingness to deal with the UN security council resolutions pertaining to its occupation of Kuwait, However, its prefer to do so was foundational upon the fulfillment of a long list of requireaments (including an assurance the as Sabah family would not be restored to power in Kuwait and was accordingly unacceptable to the contras contributing it the multinational force. The offer to 'deal with the UN resolution was nevertheless thought to indicate a new flexibility on the part of the Iraqi leadership.

Soviet diplomacy came to the force in seeking to persuade Iraq multinational force could accept. On 21 February 1991 Iraq agreed to an eight-point soviet peace plan which stipulate that: Iraq should make a full and unconditional withdrawal form Kuwait; the withdrawal was to begin on to second day of a cease –fire the withdrawal should take peace within a fixed time –frame; after two –thirds of Iraq's forces had withdrawn form Kuwait, the UN –sponsored economic sanctions were to be repealed following a cease-fire; other details were to be discussed at a later stage.

The eight – point Soviet peace plan remained unacceptable the multinational force, not least because it stipulated that a cease – scale withdrawal o its force form Kuwait by noon (US Eastern Standard Time) on 23 February, and that the withdrawal should be completed within a one week. In response to this time containing six point- subsequently formally approved by Iraq in final attempt to avert a ground war in Kuwait and Iraq. However, once again the multinational force rejected the plan because it did not amount

to the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi force from Kuwait, which UN Security Council Resolution 660 demanded.

During the night of 23-24 February 1991 the multinational force launched a ground offensive for the liberation of Kuwait. Iraqi troops defending Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia were quickly defeated, offering little resistance to the multinational force. A flanking movement, far to the west, by French units and elements of the 101st US Airborne Division succeeded in severing the main road west from Basra, while the road leading north from Basra was breached by repeated bombing, divisions of Iraq's elite Republican Guards in the Kuwait area were thus isolated to the north of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and prevented from retreating towards Baghdad. On 28 February 1991 President Bush announced the war to liberate Kuwait, renounce its claims to Kuwait, and to release all prisoners of war. Iraq also indicated that it would comply with the remaining relevant UN Security Council resolution. On 3 March Iraq accepted the cease-fire terms that had been dictated, at a meeting with Iraqi military commanders of the military force, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf of the US army.

On 3 April 1991 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution (No. 687) which stipulated the terms for a full cease-fire in the Gulf. These terms were accepted on 5 April by Iraq's RCC, and the following day by the National Assembly. A subsequent Security Council resolution (No. 689), adopted on 9 April, created a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait to be monitored by military personnel from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.³⁸

³⁸ The Europa World Year Book 2004, Volume II, Europa Publications Taylor & Francis Group New York.

Figure No.11:³⁹



³⁹ National Geographic : Iraq Maps, News , picture National Geographic www.nationalgeographic.com/iraq/-21k

Superpower and ordered to Iraq

Sharply reacting to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the US president Mr. George Bush, today ordered freezing of all Iraqi assets in the US and in US banking institution over seas and dispatched the US aircraft carrier Independence to move towards the Gulf.

He also put on hold Kuwait's assets to prevent Iraq from seizing them. Mr Bush, who conferred with national Security Council. Was asked if he was contemplating military action against Iraq and he replied, I am not contemplating such action. And again, I would not discuss it even if it were, short of military action, however the US gave full moral support to Kuwait and pledged in the UN Security Council at New York that it stands shoulder to shoulder with Kuwait.'

In his comments at the white House, Mr. Bush said, the US strongly condemned the Iraqi invasion and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces "There is no place for this sort of naked invasion in today's world,'

The White House also issued a strong statement calling the Iraqi action against Kuwait 'a blatant act of aggression' it urged the international community to isolate Iraq.

Stop arms supply, soviet told:

The US secretary of state, Mr. James Baker, informed the Soviet foreign minister Mr. Eudurd Shevardnadze of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and asked him to halt all Soviet arms deliveries to Iraq, a report from Ulan Bator (Mongolia) said. According to soviet television, the Soviet Union will stop arms supplies to Iraq

Iraq not justified:

The Soviet Union called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and for the restoration of full independence, sovereignty and integrity of The state of Kuwait, Moscow report said the foreign ministry deputy Spokesman, Mr. Yuri Gromyko, said that the use of force cannot be justified in solving problems

between the states and stressed that the Iraqi incursion would undermine peace initiatives in West Asia.

No strong words from Kuwait:

There were no stronger words from the Kuwait side either and its ambassador told the council, Kuwait's request is not simple and clear: It is to stop this invasion and advance and make sure that the Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait immediately,"

The US strategy in the new phase of trouble in Gulf region after the eight – year – old Iran –Iraq war is to de-escalate the situation as soon as possible and isolated Iraq's president , Mr. Saddam Hussein , for the rest of the Gulf countries The despatch of the aircraft carrier independence does not portend any direct US involvement in Iraq –Kuwait conflict

The US has no alliance in relation to the Gulf. Further, the US policy has been to avoid direct involvement in third party fights; The Independence which is now moving towards the Indian Ocean will be berthed far away from the Gulf of Oman.

While the US has close ties with Kuwait and protected its oil tankers in the Gulf during the Iran –Iraq war relation between Washington and Baghdad have remained complicated .The US had no diplomatic relation with Iraq until 1984 when Iraq expelled the terrorist group headed by Abu Nidal which had targeted US and Israel for its attacks.

But in the same time, bilateral relations not warmed up and continues remain cool with US expressing constant concern over some of Mr. Hussein's statement which it views as bellicose towards Israeli and some of the Gulf States. The US also is critical of Iraq's human rights records and is suspicious of Baghdad's nuclear activities.

The UN resolution said the Security Council supported all efforts for negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait. The council specifically endorsed mediation efforts by the Arab league –"The Iraqi invasion posed" a breach of international peace and security," The measure was sponsored by Canada, Colombia, Ivory Coast Ethiopia, Finland France, the United States, Britain, and Malaysia. The resolution said the council would meet again to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the measure.

The Kuwaiti spokesman, Mr. Nasser al Sabeeh, said before the formal mention that Kuwait wants negotiations with Iraq to be mediated by the Arab league. But if its necessary, then we would seek UN Mediation ;

Arab league Meeting:

The Arab league secretary – General, Mr. Chedli Kilbi, responded swiftly to Kuwait request for a meeting of the Arab league council in Cairo, where the Islamic foreign ministers are holding a conference. All 22 Members of the Arab league were represented at the conference but Iraq's delegation leader, the Interior minister, Mr Samire Abdel – Wahab, flew home yesterday.

Egyptian sources also said the Saudi Arabia foreign minister, Saudi Arabian foreign minister Saud al-faisal, representatives of other members of the Gulf cooperation council – Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.

Britain France condemn Iraq

Britain condemned Iraq's invasion, calling it a grave threat to peace in the Gulf region and the foreign office minister, Mr. William Waldegrave said, "The world cannot safely stand back and fail to seek the reversal of the annexation of small state by a neighboring large one. The Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher would discuss the crisis with the US president at meeting in Colorado.

France condemned the Iraqi attack and demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraq forces. The North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) released a statement calling the Iraqi invasion a clear violation of the charter of the United Nations and strongly urge Iraq to settle its differences by peaceful means."

Yugoslavia summoned the Iraqi and Kuwait Ambassadors. It has also called for a meeting of Ambassadors of the non-aligned countries in Belgrade on behalf of Yugoslavia, as the chair – country of the movement

China, saying it was deeply concerned and worried over the situation called for an end to Iraqi military action in Kuwait.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Chakrapani R. The Hindu Friday Aug 3, 1990.

The Power Balance alters in west Asia

The balance of power the region has been altered “The Gulf States sided with Iraq during the war because they were so afraid of (Ayatollah Rudolph) khominis Islamic Revolution and the consequences for them; Hiro said in an interview,” They knew Saddam was a despot but they also know consequences of his defeated now the Gulf dynasties are in deep trouble because Iraq is still antagonistic to wards towards their continuing held on power and they sate now in conflict with Iraq

Mr. Saddam Hussein concentration on of the have and the have not in Arab society has elicited some sympathetic on the region including Iran under the Ayatollahs’ and inside the middle East He says the consequences for the Gulf leader of inviting in the US forces will be to provoke internal discontent.

The causes of the current conflict are predominately financial, The 1980-88 Iran – Iraq war, the longest of this century: led to more than a million casualties and lost barely \$1,200 billions,” Saddam is always been a very blunt Man.

Iraq was fighting Iran on behalf of all the Gulf states and he felt they owed him in terms of helping reconstruct the economy when that didn’t happen he went for the blunt solution ,Iraq has always had a historical claim on Kuwait and he knew the country well with Iran . He knew an invasion would be quick and relatively easy.

But although the invasion went according to plan I don’t think Saddam for saw the consequences He’s not given to too fine thinking about long-term consequences as can be demonstrated by his invasion of Iran a war which he felt would be over in three weeks.

Nevertheless, Iraq emerged stronger from then conflict with a more United Nation a and massive military machine.

Now Saddam will be hoping to buy time for himself. Each day which passes is in his favor as the differences between in United Nation and other Arab countries grow. Already some Egyptian newspapers are adding what their troops are doing in Saudi Arabia and even in the United States some commentators have asked whether we are fighting for democracy or feudalism.

The answer is neither of course. The west is fighting for cheap oil supplies this will come out in time and US president George Bush will have trouble keeping up the minimum in his favors.⁴¹

Invasion of Kuwait and Its Aftermath

“Reaction to the invasion on 2nd August 1990 was swift. In broad terms, no Arab state supported Iraq, but some, notable Jordan and Yemen, and for especially opportunistic reason, ‘Arafat and the PLO, hesitated to condemn the action outright. On a broader international level, the United Nations Security Council quickly passed a number of resolutions condemns Iraq. Resolution 660 of 2nd August called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troop Britain, France and the United State froze all Iraqi and Kuwait assets the same day, West Germany and Japan following suit a day late. On 3rd August Iraq move troops to the Iraqi – Sa ‘udi broder; on 4th August the American secretary of State and the soviet foreign Minister issued a joint declaration suspending arms deliveries to Iraq United Nation Resolution 661 on 6th August Iraq . On 7th August President Bush ordered an immediate airlift of American troops to Saudi Arabia, largely to defend that country from possible Iraqi attack, on 8th August Iraq proclaimed that Kuwait was an integral. Turkey and Saudi Arabia closed the pipelines running across their territories from Iraq. Arab and Asian against workers began to pour out of Kuwait across Iraq towards the Jordanian border, where they were crossing at the rate of 10,000-15,000 a day during August and September. Within a few days it become clear that western contract workers and visitors to Iraq were not going to be all allowed to leave; Saddam Hussein announced this explicitly on 18th August, western embassies in Kuwait were closed and their staff sent to Baghdad.

Over the next weeks and their staff sent to Baghdad numbers of Kuwait’s indiscriminately; they also rounded up all Iraqi’s in Kuwait many of whom were political refuges and took the in to custody. Several thousand Kuwait’s were arrested. Many have not been seen since. Hospital and other public building were stripped of their equipment, and looting of property and attacks on civilians became common peace .The price of oil

⁴¹ Paul Redfern ,The Hindu, Wednesday, August 29,1990.

rose steadily, from about \$ 40 by mid –September 1990; neither Iraq nor Kuwait was exporting oil.

Various attempts at mediation were made by a number of individual and groups, including King Hussein of Jordan President Mubarak of Egypt, the former British Prime Minister Edward Heath and the Arab League. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein begins to talk in terms of 'linkage' with Palestinian issue that is to assert that he would withdraw from the occupied territories. More joint United States –Soviet declarations were made condemning Iraqi's action although the Soviet Union always made it clear that it would not join in any military campaign against Iraq. On 15 August Iraq accepted Iran's peace terms unconditionally, restoring the status quo ante in the Gulf to what it had been under the Algiers agreements of March 1975.

In some parts of the Arab world, especially Jordan and the Occupied Territories and some of the towns of North Africa there was great popular ferment, and widespread support for Saddam Hussein presumably because of what was perceived as his brave defiance of the west and its local clients, in general there was little love lost between the Palestinians and the Arab Gulf states because of the way in which Palestinian émigrés had been treated there. Anti-American and Anti-Western feeling rose to new heights; ever alert to trends which he might turn to his own advantage, Saddam Hussein called for a jihad against the 'enemies of Islam'. The aged Ayatollah Abu 'l- Qasim al – Khu 'i, the senior Shi 'i, cleric in Iraq, issued a fatwa on 17 August, condemning any alliance of Muslims with unbelievers against other Muslims. Saddam Hussein combined to make appeals to Islamic sentiment over the next few months, rather quaintly castigating the station of non – Muslim troops on the sacred soil of Arabia. Since the non Muslim troops were several hundred miles from Mecca and Medina, this was rather broad interpretation of the idea of sacred soil'. Nevertheless, however ill the notion of the Saddam Hussein fighting a holy war of 'Islam against unbelief' suited the facts, his defense of the United States certainly gained him a good deal of knee-jerk support on the Arab and Muslim worlds.

At the end of November, the United Nations under great pressure from the United States issued Resolution 678, the most crucial yet. This authorized member states to use all necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait if it had not done so by 15

January 1991. Over the next few weeks several further mediation efforts were made, but Saddam Hussein remained adamant. During the autumn of 1990 the United States put together an anti – Iraq coalition of some 30 states, including Egypt and Syria, almost all of which sent token detachments to Saudi Arabia. In the coalition forces mustered some half a million troops.

When Saddam Hussein failed to respond to the ultimatum in Resolution 678 , the United States and its allies began to bomb various ‘strategic targets within Iraq on 17 January 1991, causing large numbers of civilian deaths and considerable damage to the country’s infrastructure, Iraq retaliated by launching scud missiles at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia . About fifteen Israelis died in Tel Aviv from causes attributable to the missile attacks; Israel did not retaliate. After some five weeks of bombing ground offensive was launched on 24 February, which ended with the rout and destruction of the regular Iraqi army on 27 February, when a cease –fire was declared; Iraqi troops had been driven out of Kuwait the previous day”.⁴²

Perceptions and Misperceptions Some considerations of the Background to the Invasion

After winning’ the war against Iran which always claimed to have fought on behalf the ‘Arab nation’, Saddam Hussein clearly found himself in something of a cul –de-sac . His armed force had increased enormously, from about 200’000 to one million men and his sophisticated weapons in the same proportion. This had also been extremely costly, in terms of casualties and damage to the physical infrastructure, and post – war economic recovery was precisely the sort of long, slow business that he did not have the cast of mind to attend to systematically. Demobilization of the vast army was politically difficult because of the serious damage done to the economy, which meant that there would be few employment opportunities for those who were released. So it was time for Saddam Hussein to assert himself once again in a grand gesture, and to assume the ‘leadership of the Arab nation.

⁴² Marion Farouk- Sluglett & Peter Sluglett , *Iraq Since 1958 From Revolution To Dictatorship*, I.B. Tauris publishers New York, 2001.

The decision to invade Kuwait probably had three principal roots: first, Saddam Hussein almost pathological ambition, and his desire to carve out a major leadership role for himself within the Arab world which the rather humdrum postwar realities were prevention. Second, the fact that he had created an enormous military machine which could not easily be run down; and third, the sense that the great changes taking place in Eastern Europe would mean that neither he nor 'the Arab masses' could continue to rely upon the Soviet Union and its allies. In general the decision was almost certainly based on a false set of premises, and extremely limited understanding of what the world outside Iraq and the world outside the Middle East would and would not tolerate. It should also be remembered that among Saddam Hussein's immediate entourage, advocates of wiser council might have been degraded by memories of the fate of those who had, at one time or another, told their leader the kind of truth he did not want to hear.

Three important points should be made here. In their place, in spite of the fact that Iraq had, and has, one of the most, if not the most, vicious and tyrannical regimes in the Middle East, Saddam Hussein always managed to attract a following both within Iraq and interest of the Arab world. Some of this was opportunistic in the sense that it was bought, but where it was not bought directly, Saddam Hussein's stridently anti-imperialist, and until 1984, anti-Zionist rhetoric found an echo in the streets and in the refugee camps in the Arab world, especially in Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as among certain Arab intellectuals.⁴³ Secondly, there was a sense, in both Arab and western business circles, that however wicked and ruthless Saddam Hussein might be, somewhat in the spirit of an earlier dictator who 'at least' made the trains run on time. Finally, although he would have lost the war with Iran had it not been for the arms and support he received from the west, the folk memory interregional was sufficiently selective (or short term) for it to be widely believed that, unlike most other Arab rulers, he had never been afraid to stand up to the west, in this respect Saddam Hussein always had his finger on the pulse of certain sentiments in the Arab world and knew how to exploit them;

⁴³ See, Kanan Makiya, *Cruelty and silence: war (1993), Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab world*, London, 231-327

It had long been clear, well before Gorbachev's assumption of power in 1985, that the Soviet Union was far too concerned about its relation with the west to throw its weight wholeheartedly behind any Arab policy of maneuvers, which might crucially threaten Israel. Nevertheless, since no Arab State or combination of Arab States had seriously entertained such ideas since 1973 this particular constraint had become less important, since Soviet assistance was still crucial in variety of other ways.⁴⁴ It was not until 1986, for example, that the United States and the west felt it prudent to make the high technology weaponry available to Iraq which enabled it to defeat Iraq in 1988 and to invade Kuwait in 1990. Until then, and indeed 'old gourd' remained in power in Moscow, Iraq could always count on deliveries of Soviet military material. To put things imperceptive between 1985 and 1989, Iraq spent nearly \$12 billion on arms, of which nearly \$7 billion went to the Soviet Union; France Iraq's second more supplier, received just over \$2 billion over the same perestroika. Hence, However welcome it was elsewhere, the new atmosphere glasnost and period of the latter part of the 1980,s and indeed, covertly from much earlier, Iraq had enjoyed very close relations with the United States and other western countries, partly because of its value and a market for armaments and for more conventional consumer goods, and partly because of the Ba 'th's state first communism and then against Iran. The United states supplied a considerable proportion of Iraq's agricultural needs ; in addition , the had been spectacular increase in Iraq's exports of oil to the Unites States together 1980 s in 1984 m 1.2 per cent of Iraq's cent of Iraqis oil 10.1 million barrels, went to the United states; in the forts seven months of 1990 alone (the invasion of Kuwait took place on 2 August the property, was 32.2 per cent ,or 514.5 million barrel ,just under 9 per cent of all United States.⁴⁵ oil imports . Again, as has been mentioned in the pervious chapter, throughout most of the 1980,s the United States and the West in general had not hesitated to build up Iraq's strategic arsenal (aften in contravention of the it own export regulations), and had also been very guarded in their criticism of Iraq's quite evidently egregious human rights record. Thus, when the clouds began to gather early in 1990, and the regime's activates began to come under inversely goodtime scrutiny on the part of those whose Saddam Hussein had come to regard as its

⁴⁴ See, Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *La Politique au Moyen Orient 1955 -1975*, Paris, 975 and Oles Smolansky, with Bettlie M. smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq:the soviet Questfor influence*, Durham NC,1991.

⁴⁵ Organixation of Petroleum ExportingCountry Countries, *Annual Statistical Bulletin*, Vienna, 1991.

friends,⁴⁶ the president seems to have come to the occlusion on the close relationship which had been forged between him and the west over the previous few years was coming to an end.

With his extraordinary ability to swim abreast of the changing political current in the region including his theatrical espousal of 'Islam' when that seemed to serve his purpose –Saddam Hussein made use to the widespread and by no means unjustified unease felt among the broad left 'in the Arab world that the end of the Soviet Union might well lead to unchallenged western and particularly United States dominance in there region. Beginning in February 1990, he launched a virulent campaign against the United States and Israel,⁴⁷ presenting himself as the only steadfast Arab leader capable of defending the Arab nation against the west and its allies in the region .The logical expression of such policy.

Nevertheless, while this bold and expensive gesture was one thing. persistence in it ht erase of overwhelming odds was quite another .one of the major unanswered questions of this whole episode be why Saddam Hussein continued in course of action in he could which because not conceivable have prevailed , instead of making a fairly honorable retreat . Nasser's seizure of Suez canal was often mentioned, but Nasser was taking over waters which ran thought his own country, in which he himself was extremely popular, and his cause was widely regarded as just in constant, Saddam Hussein had spent much of the previous decade paying his debts, but his forces also killed and imprisoned many of its inhabitant, laid the country, waste and took its portable assets off to Baghdad. This aside, there was also, no particularly in which Kuwait was engraved on every Iraqi's heart.⁴⁸ Most Iraqi was heartily sick of military adventures and had little entities for fighting after eight years of was with Iran. Furthermore, while the Kuwait is had certainly been grumbling at the prospect of being asked to pay for Iraqi rearmament for the foreseeable future,

⁴⁶ See Tareq Y. Ismael.(1982), *Iraq and Iran:Roots of conflict*, New York .

⁴⁷ Amatzia , Baram and Barry Rubin (1993) ,(eds.), *Iraq's Road to War*, New York, ,pp.12-13.

⁴⁸ Malik, Mufti,(1996), *Sovereign Creations: pan-Arabism and Political order in Syria and Iraq*, Ithaca, , p.139.

Again , as has been mentioned earlier,⁴⁹ any assessment of the real ' extent of Iraq's economic difficulties is necessarily subjective , in the sense that the decision to embark on a huge rearmament programmed (and the development of nucleus weapons capacity) was political choice a the than an urgent strategic necessity , given the prostration, furthermore necessity given the prostration of Iran after the war. Furthermore while the question of over – production and the low price of Gulf oil had been a live issue since the beginning of 1990 , an agreement generally Iraq's liking was reached (albeit somewhat reluctantly by the OPEC state at their mean at Geneva o 27 July, six days before the invasion of Kuwait .⁵⁰ Again, while Iraq's debts to the OECD states were considerable there had been no obvious indication of any diminution in the pace ad regularity of debt rescheduling.

Finally, much has been made of the encourage arrangement which Saddam Hussein may or may not have received form the American ambassador in Baghdad, and to reiteration the State department's position that inter Arab territorial disputes were a matter for the parts the selves to solves. Howere , while she may have gone so far as to give the impression that the United States would look the other way if Iraq went about adjusting is its borders by taking over Kuwait s parts of the Rumayla oilfield, or quietly annexing the small islands of Bubyana and Warba (which Iraq had long been anxious to lease in order to expand its coastline on the Gulf), it was surely the height of wishful thinking on Saddam Hussein's part to imagine , as was later asserted , that he was being given an American go ahead for a full- scale invasion of Kuwait .

⁴⁹ See, Dilip Hiro (1984), "Cronical of the Gulf War", MERIPReports, No125/126 July/September 1984.

⁵⁰ See, Petre Sluglett, (1958), 'progress postponed: Iraqi oil Policy since the Revolution of' , in Kate Gillespie and clement M. Henry (eds.) ,oil in the New World Order,Gainesville, FL , 1995, pp. 227-256.

Chapter - V: Iraq war of 2003 and the
changing Geopolitical Consequences

Chapter -V

The Iraq War of 2003 and the Changing Geostrategic Scenario

Rimland Theory & Middle East Region

Rimland or inner crescent contains most of the world's people as well as a large share of the world's resources. Strategically, Rimland is more important than Heartland because this region is in between the Heartland and the matrimonial seas. It included all countries of the continental Europe (except Russia) Asia Minor, Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, South-East Asia, China, Korea, and East Siberia. All these countries lie in the Buffer Zone i.e. between sea-power and land-power. Spykman termed the contrast of the Rimland as "Amphibian States" because of their proximity of the narrow water ways and marginal sea. Surrounding the European continent, since the Asian marginal water control vital sea communication of the world therefore, are the pivotal areas during conflicts.⁵¹

Spykman wrote this theory at a time when World War II was still going on, i.e. in 1944. Therefore he advocated that the allied powers should have their future in such a manner that the consolidation of the Rimland by the enemies is prevented as far as possible. With the defeat of Germany and emergence of USSR as the master of the Heartland. "Spykman's Theory became the basis of American policy of containment of communist influence outside the Soviet Union. He gave the same statement on the American Geostrategy.

"The western part of the Middle East to become enclosed within the Maritime European orbit and Iran to maintain its separate geopolitical stance, the remainder of the region- Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Afghanistan, and Sudan would -would continue to constitute a shatter belt, albeit considerably smaller than present one. Polarization within such a reduced shatter belt region might be intensive if the United States continues to maintain a strong Military and economic presence in Saudi Arabia

⁵¹ K, Siddhartha(1998), *Nation-State Territory and Geopolitics*, Patana, Kishalaya Publishing.

and Russia succeeds in rebuilding close ties with an Iraq freed of international sanctions but still ruled by Saddam Hussein. The influence of Iran within the Gulf is also likely to grow. Afghanistan might well bark up under pressures from Pakistan and Iran, while Pakistan itself might crumble, with one or more of its parts becoming oriented to the Middle East.

What can be predicted with some certainty about the Middle East shatter belt is that it will continue to be a region of conflict and shifting alliances. What cannot be predicted with any measure of confidence is how these alliances may shift and what the region's borders may be".⁵²

The Rimland Concept


“ Nicolas John Spykman the Rimland theory through the presentation of map spykman development concept that the western Hemisphere is encircled by the Eastern Hemisphere Rimland concept of large number of politics areas with varying degree of independence as well as well as variety of races and culture. It has never been united or even completely controlled by one power political power and global strategic view are

combined in to extreme-abuse of power called geopolitical .the Spykman hypothesis on the global relationship as over generalization assumption but we are left with the problem of correlation the multivariate elements is national power on a global. As lacking as the as Rimland theories may be they do draw attention to creation element of world politics. Other have developed view on global relationship but none have attained the predictive power of Spykman although Spykman adopted most of Mackinder historical can geographical interpretation of political power the reflected the Mackinder doctrine of the Rimland and Spykman said if there is to be a slogan for the power politics of the old world. It must be.

⁵² Cohen, S. B (2003), *Geopolitics of the world system*, New York, Roman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Figure No. 12: Who Controls the Rimland rules Eurasia?

Who rules Eurasia Controls the Destinies of the World?



Spykman was based on the concept of sea power, Spykman referred to the countries of the Rimland as amphibian states because of their proximity to the marginal sea and narrow waterways surrounding the Eurasian land mass. The marginal sea is particular to the Eurasian continent; the only similar sea in the western Hemisphere is the Caribbean Sea. The Asian marginal water's control vital sea communication of the world and the pivotal areas in time of conflict.”⁵³

“The recent Iraq war has made the world further differentiable and complex. It resulted in exposing the strategies of hegemonic world leadership in the corporate sector, supported by the sole super power, the United States of America. The preparation, process and goals of the war had made it clear that the USA and her very limited allies were not really searching for the Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. Rather, the fundamental political economy behind the aggression was the attempt to control the rich

⁵³ Dikshit R. D., Political Geography (the Partiality of Politics), Tata Mc Graw- Hill publishing company limited, New Delhi, (2000).

oil fields in Iraq. However, unlike the Gulf war I, the United States found too many European powers unwilling to support the expedition. Similarly, leading Third world nations like India, Brazil and China expressed their objections to the war. The Iraq war also made it clear that Al-Qaeda camps were not active in Iraq and Saddam Hussein did not have ties with the architects of international terrorism. The net experience of the war clearly revealed that unipolarism will not survive long and the United States will have to address the realities of the emerging multilateral system. The challenges of Globalization process also demanded a balanced world order.”⁵⁴

Therefore the war in Iraq-2003, though widely turned as ‘Gulf War II’ is different from the original operation ‘Desert storm of 1991’. The war under study, through captioned by American as operation Iraqi freedom’ to eliminate Saddam Hussein to cripple Iraq’s liquid gold (oil resources) as well as to create and develop fear psychosis amongst other nations of the Gulf Region because USA wants establish herself as an increasingly unilateralist super power so that her wish respected by all the other nations failing which they would face doom.

The present work is an analysis of America’s war against Iraq 2003 in all its dimensions. This war is unique in more than one way in the Post World War II era. Its outcomes will not only affect the conflicting parties but the whole world and the United Nations too. This aspect finds a vital place in the work at hand.


Military and political experts in various articles concerning, the war under study have termed this conflict in their own way. Each of the expression made by them has some significance. War against Humanity, War for global hegemony, America’s Bomb V/s Bravery, Bloodshed for oil, The war of occupation, Unilateralist Superpower V/s World peace, An illegal war.”⁵⁵

⁵⁴ G. Gopa Kumar (2006), *Iraq War and the future world order*, New Delhi, icon publication.

⁵⁵ Sharma R. N. and Y.K Sharma, (2003), *Gulf War –II 2003 (before the beginning and after the end)* New Delhi Shubhi Publication .

Geostrategic Importance of Iraq for USA

Figure No.13: Iraq's oil patch⁵⁶



United states was self-isolated in the affairs of Europe and Asia, World War II and the ensuing cold war compelled the United States to develop America's emergence as Sole global superpower now makes an integrated and comprehensive strategy for Eurasia imperative, Eurasia is the world's politically assertive and dynamic stage , all the historical pretenders to global power originated in Eurasia . The most populous aspirants to regional hegemony, China and India are in Eurasia as are all the potential political or economic allegers to American primacy. After the United States the next six largest economic and military spenders are there as all are but one of the world's overt nuclear

⁵⁶ Business week / March, 2003.

powers, and all but one of the covert ones. Eurasia accounts for 75% of the World population, 60% of its GNP and 75% of its energy resources. Collectively Eurasia's potential power overshadows even America's.⁵⁷

“Control of Iraq and its oil resources and dominance over the region will not ensure the success of the Bush administration's game plan and could be the last hurrah of the exercise of solo power.

It may appear fanciful to talk of the beginning of the end of America's unilateralist hegemony just when it has entered the paradise of power “American's military reach Today defies description, its has entered the “paradise of power,” American's military reach today defies description. Its advances in the revolution of military affairs is unmatched. It can pulverize any peace it decides to Iraq . Yet America is reaching the summits of its power. The seeds of resistance have been sown around the world and the US is not likely to enjoy in the coming years the kind of unilateralist hegemony it has done recently. Control of Iraq and its oil resources and dominance over the region will not ensure the success of the Bush administrations game plan and could be the last hurrah in the exercise of solo power.

Any major new international trend takes time to mature, times years but mature it will. The consequences the Bush Administrations decision pour scorn over the United Nations and the world order would seriously hurt the UN in the long run, America has disabled itself by repulsing the international system, never before has been so isolated in the world, remember of the European parliament exclaimed “NATOs a busted flush the UN damaged, the US and European relations between the European union member states seriously damaged” And European relations between the European is out raged. No doubt. Efforts would be immediately afoot to repair these relations and bring the UN back in to the picture, and the UN would be.

To a greater or lesser extent, involved again. But whatever the apparent bonhomie things would never be the came again, the public, the intelligentsia, and the opinion-makers in the US would all have to ponder over whether the cost of this arrogant display of poet was worth such demonstration. They have to ponder over the lessons of history

⁵⁷ Zibgview, Brezezink (1995), *A Geostrategic for Eurasia: foreign policy: Challenges in the Post-Cold War Period*, Strategic Analysis December).

that power leads to hubris, leads to overreaching, and over – reaching to the edition of strength America remains and would remain a central power for many years but unilateralist hegemony could be fast eroded .

The Bush administration never wanted give peas a cancer .It was only interested in establishing the primacy of its own doctrines, its doctrines of pre-emption, unrivalled and unchallenged power , of changing and chewable coalitions instead of the present international system, all were evolved over years at many levels and diverse layers . One level was that of Dick Cheney, now Vice – President, and Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Defense secretary, Twelve years ago, they begin plotting the new course when Cheney was Defense Secretary and Mr. Wolfowitz one of his aides. They put together “ a new vision “ that America should brook no rival on the planet, now or forever, no matter friend or foe their” vision” was summarized in the so called “ Defense Planning Guidance document prepared by the aid under his mentors guidance, which for the first time, called for the preemptive use of military force. It virtually rejected multilateralism and talked of “ad hoc assemblies” such as alliances, current version of which is the shifting “coalition of the willing “curiously, the document singled out for potential rivals of the US France, Germany Japan and India and equally curiously, china was left out. Because of the uproar the leaked documents caused it was disowned at the time, but arguments in then gave now because a rationale behind the new militarization of the US foreign policy. The US president, George W. Bush reveling in the company of the fundamentalist Christian Right, embraced these ideas with enthusiasm and brought about another “coalition of the Willing”–Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence, and Condeleeza Rice, Secretary Adviser a part from Mr. Cheney and Mr Wolfowitz , to give a formal shape to an implement the new doctrines . They were given official sanction first in Mr. Bush’s state of the Union addresses in January, 2002, spelling out the so – called “axis of evil; and then four months later, in his commencement speech at West Point calling for “new thinking” in place of “doctrines of doctrine and containment”, and finally, in September last year with in to take control of West Asia and many other area to shape them according to its own requirements.

So, this war is about oil, and it is about hegemony, but not just hegemony. It is all about establishing total dominance over the world and its resources. But American run

the risk of being undone by this substitution of hard power for their soft power that has been holding sway over the world in the last half-century. Their enormous goodwill for the US after 9/11 is being rapidly dissipated; unprecedented resistance to U.S. dominance is developing virtually in all part of the world. As the former Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzinski, put it we are stronger than any than any one else but we are not capable of simply dictating to the entire world we are almost totally stymied on North Korea,” the danger of over-reaching is becoming evident to many US Opinion-makers, this could also aggravate military fatigue, of which there is already some evidence. The US threw in Iraq War. In addition, it was sustaining peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, protecting South Korea and Japan from any possibly aggressive move from the North Korea and was simultaneously “pursuing War against terrorism that stretches from Afghanistan (where it is keeping 8, 000 troops) and incurring a monthly expenditure of some \$ 1 billion and the caucuses to the Horn of Africa and South East warfare, likened by military analyst Ralpheters to the “Thirty years War that decimated western Europe in the 17th century” and was leading to a conflict priorities between the need to fight today’s war and the pursuit of the means to dominate tomorrow’s.

This military fatigue would increase substantially after the Iraq War. It is doubtful that in future the Americans would easily agree to be pushed by the administration into another conflict experiment, the resistant around the world snowball. The issue was not Saddam Hussein. The question was not whether we wanted to be with a brutal dictator and the peaceniks, as some people sneeringly mentioned. The issue was what kind of international system we would want established. The issue was whether we wanted to be in the company of world public opinion whether we wanted the UN to be strengthened or we wanted to endorse a single dominance, waiting for a few crumbs to be thrown to us from the central table. While resisting international lawlessness, we should look for opportunities to make common cause with US public opinion, which, sooner than later, would begin to shift in favor of multilateral international system. The aim is not to bring about a confrontation with Washington but to reach out to the democratic impulses of the democratic impulses to the American people of that peace and democratic development

could be ensured through consequently – arrive at decision within the international system and within the UN framework”.⁵⁸

“The US could install in Baghdad a regime favorable to its interests and get it to annul existing oil contracts on the plea that they were awarded on political considerations.

Few outside the “coalition of the willing” doubt that the second Gulf war is less about weapons of mass destruction and more about oil. The United States acutely aware of his global perception, assiduously denies it covert Iraqi’s abundant energy reserves and say they will be used for the benefit of the Iraqi people and that too, in conformity with international law and conventions. These statements, however, are neither here nor there’. They do not address the key issues – who will manage the Iraqi oil infrastructure the American military outputting. And how will it be used “for the Iraqi people more crucially, they are silent on what will happen to the existing oil contracts awarded to foreign oil companies’ after the existing of Saddam Hussein.

The unfolding of the war in Iraq and the statements made by the Bush administration suggest that the military occupation of Iraq could extend for a fairly long period of time, some say up to two years, if that is the case, will the US then represent Iraq in OPEC during this period? There can be no greater irony than the largest oil importing nation sitting in a producer’s cartel discussing production quotas to fine-tune prices. Under international law, the US and its allies would be deemed belligerents.

In the event, the traditional laws of occupation codified in Articles of the Hague regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 that set forth the rights and obligations of a belligerent occupying power vis-à-vis the occupied territory should apply. The rights and duties of the occupant power conditioned primarily by the necessity of maintaining order and administering the resources of the territory to meet the needs of the inhabitants and the requirements of the occupying forces.

Under the Geneva Convention, moveable state property – which includes oil – can be used by the occupant to support the cost of military occupation. The US law that governs similar situations – the law of land warfare – has a similar provision with respect to movable property in the occupied territory, now that the oil – for food programme had

⁵⁸ Dutt V.P, (2003), Has US over-reached its limits? The Hindu Friday, April 11.

been resumed; current level of Iraqi oil production will fetch around \$27 billion a year. Of which a quarter will go to the UN compensation fund.

That would leave less than \$20 billion a Year at prevailing prices compare this with the costs of military occupation and reconstruction, not to mention the cost of war itself. The US President, George W. Bush has already sought \$75 billion from the US Congress to partly fund the war effort. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution puts the post war cost of military occupation at \$ 50 billion to \$100 billion. It is to expect that the American and the British taxpayer's world be called upon to underwrite these humungous costs of war, military occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. The failure to secure the UN's backing for the attack has limited the financing options for the war effort.

Unlike in the first Gulf war, this time around, the US cannot expect Iraq's neighbors, already incensed over what they perceive as an unjustified and unprovoked aggression on their kind to foot the bill. The desperate attempts by Washington and London to rope the UN in to the post war reconstruction efforts reflects this ground reality. In the circumstances, the invitation to dip in to oil reserves at least to pay for the cost of occupation would be irresistible.

The other key issue that is of concern to the international community is the fate of the oil contracts awarded by Saddam Hussein to foreign investors oil companies from 20 countries among the members of the UN Security Council. But the US and Britain excluded have some form of title or claim to exploration and development of oil wells in Iraq. Even by international standards these deals are sizeable. For instance the Bin Umar and Majnoon oil fields promised to France's total final contract together produce upward of one million barrels of crude a day while Al Agha awarded to China can produce around 90,000 barrels a day, Apart from the cancelled Lukoil deal for West Qurna, five other Russian companies have been awarded or promised some prize oil concession in Iraq and these are still intact. For any potential investor, these deals mean huge profits. For any oil-importing country, they promise a secure source of supply which explains why France and Russia have vowed to defend their interests in a post Saddam regime. In the handling of the existing oil contracts, the US will be subject, in addition to the laws of occupation in the Geneva Convention, to American case law and the UN General Assembly resolution 1803 on

permanent sovereignty over natural resources(PSNR).The one common thread that runs through all the Source of intentional law is the advocacy of respect for private property rights. As for the legitimacy of the Saddam Hussein government in entering into these contracts, a fundamental principal of international law is that property rights awarded by an effective government constitutional or not, Well governed or a rogue state must be respected even after regime change. As for US case law ; in the *Perchman* case, Justice Marshall, Chief Justice of the US supreme Court, had that change of sovereignty did not impair the right of private property validly acquired. The PSNR limits the scope for Breach of international law profiles .It upholds the inalienable right of all the states to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests, and champions respect for the economic independence of states it further says” the provision of economic and technical assistance, loans and increased foreign investment must not be subject to condition which conflicts with the interests of the recipient state”

However all this is not to say that the contracts signed during the Saddam Hussein regime are their fore unassailable. The new sovereign, by virtue of its sovereignty, can do what it pleases with the country's resources even abrogate existing contracts, but under international law that would be considered as expropriation requiring compensation by the repudiation party by cleverly turned in to a double edged weapon to abrogate the existing contracts in the name of the “people of Iraq” on the plea that they were awarded on political considerations and were, Therefore against their interests. Besides, a determined party can get around most of the obstacles by Applying the fine print which required absence of corruption obligation to tenders public contracts, etc which may have been part of the domestic law, but had been suppressed by dictatorial regime. The validity and extend of the title of the various contenders for the Iraqi oil field will depend on the nature and terms of the contracts themselves about which there is little information in the public domain . But the US need not even fuss over the finer legal details it could install in Iraq a regime favorable to its interest and get it to annul existing contract on the plea that they were awarded on political considerations. Along with Russia and France, which have the biggest stakes in Iraqi oil, a whole host of countries are closely watching the US

mores, wondering which excuse would be used to jettison their won oil concessions in Iraq”.⁵⁹

“Iraq is not the only target: the target is the seizure of the bulk of the world’s cheap oil. And the objective is not is not merely to seizure oil: it is to shore up and expand US global hegemony.

The United States threatens action against Syria for its alleged supply of night – vision equipment to Iraq. A split in the leading bodies of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization threatens their very existence, American automobile firms have been doing out loan to customers at zero percent interest.

What links these seemingly unconnected facts to the invasion of Iraq? is widely acknowledged, by all but the US and the UK governments and their media empires that this war is about seizing Iraq oil. But Iraq is not the only target: the target is the seizure of the bulk of world’s cheap oil: it is the shore up and expand US global hegemony at a time when brink of a potentially devastating crisis.

The roots of the crisis lie in the characteristic feature of December advance industrial economics giant over cites through ought a range of important industries, the world can make 20 million cars more every year than can be sold and telecom networks are operating at just three percent of their capacity after a great splurge of investment in the 1990s.

By December 2002, 26.5 percent of American manufacturing capacity was idle - 3.5 percentage points more than it was during the 1990 -91 recessions.

It is peculiar feature of market economies that they are thrown in to closed by the ability to produce too much that is , given the desisting distribution of income .no doubt the demand for goods would pick up if income was widely redistributed but the would be anathema to private capital .

The current glut of capacity narrows profit margins and deters corporations from making investments or hiring workers: this, in turn further weakens demand. Even as it was claimed that the US was emerging from the recession. Unemployment continued to climb.

⁵⁹ Mahalingom, Sudha,(2003), Controlling Iraq’s oil, The Hindu Friday, April 4.

Indeed, over capacities today plague all the major developed economies- the US Europe and Japan. For the first time since the 1970s there are in recession at the same time. Japan has been in this state since the start of the 1990s while US economy has acted as the global motor of demand, taking in the world goods and pumping out dollars, now that motor is sputtering, and there is no sign of powerful demand- impulse from any other quarter, the international organization says in its latest global Employment Trend that “the world employment situation is deteriorating dramatically,” with 20 million added to the ranks of the unemployed last years, and vast number of underemployed or “working poor”

The Mumbai-based research unit for political economy's paper “behind the invasion of Iraq”(monthly review press, New York) argues that there is connection between these over – capacity and the current US drive to occupy the middle East . In order to stave off recession, the US Central Bank has been boosting demand by pumping in UN precedence amount of credit. Indeed, the US economy's remarkable boom of the 1990s occurred even as corporate profits were falling sharply. Demand and investment were only sustained by an explosion of cheap debt.

The US has the funds to do this because foreigners put their savings in dollar assets. Since the dollar is used for most international payment, the US can pay for its huge trade deficit now running at \$500 billions by merely printing more dollars. It is the US superpower status and in particular its control over the world's oil that have sustained its status as the safest bet for international capital. However, the US ability to soak up the world's savings is a double –edged sword .If a foreigner who holds half or more of the entire US currency should decide to dump the dollar, its value would plummet, leading yet more capital flying from the country. In order to prevent that , and to get foreign capital to return, the US would have to raise its interest rate steeply But given the vast addition to US debt in last two decades, a steep interest rate hike could have far more disastrous consequences for its economy than it did in 1980- the severest American recession since World War II ,Debt –laden US corporations and consumers would be unable to service their debts , and their assets would flood the market : asset prices would collapse, and banks –swamped with worthless assets instead of income –would, in turn, collapse.

If it is to continue to boot domestic demand with debt then the US must prevent the flight of the dollar that is made vastly more difficult by the emergence of the Euro. Europe's economy is comparable in size and character to that of the US. As a matter of sheer prudence, countries would wish to shift a portion of their foreign exchange reserves from the currency of an economy which has a runaway national debt. Moreover, a number of economies, which have been at the receiving end of US building may demand payment in Euros and shift their reserves to that currency in deliberate attempt to harm the US economy.

At some immediate cost to itself, Iraq has since November 2000, insisted on being paid in Euros. Iran has recently displayed interest in following suit. Venezuela, a similar victim of American intimidation, is a good candidate, and Russia is being wooed by the European Union to make the switch. The dollar's fall is prompting even those with good relations with the US to reconsider. A major oil economy in Euros is in the offing. As the demand for euros grows rapidly, demand for the dollar would drop equally rapidly, threatening the American economy with devastation consequences.

In the last five or six years, an important change has taken place in the international oil scenes. In the late 1990s, several large oil producers such as Iraq, Iran and Venezuela opened up development of their oil resources to foreign investments. Even Saudi Arabia invited bids for development of its natural gas. The contract that Iraq signed with the French, Russian, Chinese and Iranian firms were stalled, thanks to the sanctions regime. Iran however concluded deal with the French, Russian and Malaysian firms even as American firms –barred by US sanctions against that country gnashed their teeth. Venezuela's increasing assertiveness and consequent alienation from the US did not bode well for the future of American firms there. Kept the firms out of Libya and Sudan as well, and Chinese firms have been negotiating huge deals for Indonesian oil.

So before September 11, 2001 the US oil supremacy stood threatened and with it the dollar's supremacy and the ability of the US to contract limitless debt, the invasion of Iraq. It is now widely acknowledged, is merely a wider adventure by the US not only are grimes unfriendly to the US such as Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Venezuela and Libya being targeted. Amazingly, see nation are being discussed at the top level for invasion of even sling states such as Saudi Arabia, only the physical possession of the bulk of the world's

dwindling oil resources and their denial to their power would allow the US to maintain its oil supremacy as well as dictate terms on a variety of issues economic and strategic – to countries such as France and Germany, which are entirely dependent on oil imports as well as to China, the import dependence of which is rapidly increasing”.⁶⁰

The America's war strategy towards Iraq

Firstly observed, How Does the US Dominate the UN?

The UN in its origin was an American creation, primarily meant to take care of Great Power interests in general and of American interests in particular.

The United Nations was to a great extent the creation of the United States. According to George F. Kennan. (1925-1950) the formulator of the theory of containment of the Soviet Union, who was pressing at the creation, the plans for the creation of the United Nations represented some sort of an escape for the Secretary of State 'from the frustrations occasioned by his exclusion from the province of policy-making while the War was on. If he was not permitted to influence our war time diplomacy, he could at least divert himself, and lend some aura of significance to his activity, by encouraging and directing planning for post-war order'.⁶¹

There is no United Nations. There is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that is the United States, when it suits our interest, and when we can get others to go along the success of the United Nations during the Gulf war was not because

Successful, it was because the United States, through President Bush, demonstrated what international leadership, international coalition building International Diplomacy is really all about. When the United States leads, the United Nations will follow. When it suits our interest to do so, we will do so. When it does not suit our interests we will not.⁶²

Coming recent times, let us see how the official American machinery carries out its propaganda. The US Government has a number of web sites impressively organized to put across its case. Given below is a sample:

⁶⁰ Kannan Srinivasan, From Over-Capacity to War, The Hindu Thursday, April 10, 2003.

⁶¹ Kennan, George F. (1967), Memoirs, 1925-50, Little, Brown and Company, Canada, p. 217.

⁶² Bebbis, Phyllis (2000), Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Tokyo's Sun, Olive Branch Press, New York, XXIII.

In the aftermath of the attacks on America that killed thousands of innocents from 80 countries, Saddam Hussein said, 'America is reaping the thorns planted by its rulers in thawed.'

Iraq shelter sunspots terrorist organization that direct violence against Iraq, Israel and Western Governments.

Al Qaeda terrorist escaped from Afghanistan and are down to be in Iraq.

In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and former US president.

In 1995, after four year of deception, Iraq finally admitted it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War.

Were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993.

Iraq still employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians and retains physical infrastructure needed to hold a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy strength aluminum tubes used to enrich Uranium for a nuclear weapon.

On at least 10 occasions, Saddam Hussein's military forces have attacked Iranian and Kurdish targets with combinations of mustard gas and nerve agents through these of aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks.

UN inspectors believes Iraq has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and had failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that formed be used to produce biological weapons, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that sere used for this production of biological weapons.

In the late 1980' Saddam Hussein launched large -scale chemical weapons attack against Iraq's Kurdish population killing thousands. Former UN Human Right s special Reporter Max Van der Stoel's reports in April 1998 state that Iraq had executed at least 1,500 people during the previous year for political reason. Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation and rape. Wives are tortured in front of their husbands, children in the presence of their parents. Saddam blames the suffering of Iraq's people of on the UN, even as he uses his oil wealth to build lavish palaces for himself, and buy arms for his country. Child labor persists and there are instances of

forced labor. There are widespread reports that food and medicine that could have been stockpiled in warehouses or diverted for the personal use of some government officials

Saddam has held military training camps for children between 10 and 15 year of age. Human rights organization and opposition groups received reports of women with suffered from severe psychological trauma after being reaped by Iraqi personnel while in custody. Amnesty International reported that, in October 2000, the Iraqi government executed dozens of women accused of prostitution.

In 1991, the UN Security Council demanded that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands .Iraq's region agreed it broke its promise. Last year the secretary Central's high-level coordinator for this issue reported that Kuwait, Saudi, Indian Syrian, remain unaccounted for more than 600 people.

One American pilot is among them. Iraq possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the UN. Work at resting and production facilities show that Iraq is building more long-range missiles than it can use to inflict mass death throughout the region. It's been almost four years since the last UN inspectors set foot in Iraq, four years since the last UN inspectors build, and rest behind the cloak of secrecy. The first time we may be completely certain Saddam Hussein has a nuclear weapon is when, god forbids, he uses one.⁶³

⁶³ Fabian ,K. P (2003), *war on Iraq*, New Delhi, Somalia Publication .

Figure No.14: The War Zone ⁶⁴



“In his state of the Union Address last week, President Bush was unpersuasive in his claims of Iraqi progress towards nuclear weapon and of supposedly significant Between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. Yet, the president was still convincing on his central point that the time for war is near .Even those of us who have questioned the case for war over the last year, and who do not buy all of the Bush administration’s arguments for invasion even today need to find the fact that there soon will be no other plushier option.

Since his UN speech of September 12, 2002, Mr. Bush has adopted a firm out Patient Iraq policy. Overruling hardliners in his administration who favored war without further inspections of UN debate, Mr. Bush also elected to use multilateral channel to insist that Saddam disarm to he disarmed. Alas,

⁶⁴ Sharma ,R.N.and Y. K. Sharma (2003) ,The Gulf war –II 2003 (before the beginning and after the end) New Delhi, Shubhi Publications.

Saddam is not eliminating his handed weapons of mass destruction voluntarily, and hence we soon will need to lead a military coalition to do the job ourselves. The case is that simple.

In taking this basic approach, Mr. Bush heeded the counsel of multilaterals, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, the elder President Bush, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Tony Blair and many Democrats. It is now time for materialists to supports the President.

The multilateralism approach to Iraq was the right way to go. Otherwise, any US invasion of Iraq, however justified and however desirable for the people of Iraq, could have had huge consequences. It would have risked an anti –American terrorist backlash globally. As well as the destabilization of critical pro- US governments in places such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It would also have weakened the UN system and America’s alliances with a number of key countries.

Mr. Bush’s multilateralism approach was not weak –kneed and did not give any other countries a veto over American security policy. Nor did it give Saddam an easy way out. Sensitive to the concerns of vice president Dick Cheney and secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the inspections could easily fail, however, Mr. Bush rightly insisted on Quick results including the prompt destruction of large quantities of chemical and biological agents. Unfortunately, Saddam has not complied. The appearance of smooth inspections is no subtitle for disarmament.

There are problem with Mr. Bush’s arguments about why Saddam has to go. Take the nuclear issue. Saddam was certainly years away forming them to produce enough enriched uranium for even a single weapon regardless.. The fact that he has a home design and a small nuclear design team still in place means little. Princeton undergraduate have successfully designed atomic bombs before; the hard part is getting he material, and as best we can tell Saddam has made legal or no progress towards doing so. As for links between Saddam and Al Qaeda, yes, we know that in addition to being present in 60 other countries, al Qaeda operatives have occasionally turned up in Iraq. And Saddam has been immorally funding anti-Israeli terrorists in resents years as well. But none of this

begins to add up to a substantial link between Saddam and al Qaeda in planning and conducting strikes against western interests".⁶⁵


Current scenario is change like Middle East there is world largest reserved of oil and gas, which dominants world politics or influences the condition of political factor. For example, USA is largest importers of oil and gas, its need continue supplies oil and gas to sustain its economy. However, US foreign policy desired to capture oil reserved which control world economy.

"The present role of America, they want superpower, USA command sea power, Air power , military power , Britain , Afghanistan , Pakistan, Iraq ,Iran, Jordan , Syria , Israel etc They are pure applying the Rimland Theory.

Who control the Amuland rules USA?

Who rule USA controls the destinies of the world.⁶⁶

FigureNo.16:Amuland



⁶⁵Michael ,E. O'Hanlon (2003), A Time for war, foreign policy studies.

⁶⁶ Dikshit R. D. (2000) , Political Geography (the Partiality of Politics), New Delhi, Tata Mc Graw- Hill publishg company limited.

we can concentrate our attention on two three important things and forth it is no more a hidden fact and the open truth that America wants to be a super power and wants to dictate the world to achieve this objective. First of all America wants to strengthen its economic base along with percent security for its mechanical requirement. Oil is therefore become a central point for fulfilling the mechanical requirement (chemical energy of the America not only the requirement but also the economic growth). Has relations with oil supplies and America is intending to gain the status of super power but all this is being popularly in the name of "all for world to unite against anti-terrorist forces may not be using media of diplomatic strategy or may be in the of welfare is striving for building good trust and good faith with the Underdeveloped and developing countries but all for superpower!".⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Sharma R.K. and Y.K. Sharma (2003), Gulf War 2003 (Before the beginning and after the end),New Delhi, Subhi Publication.

Conclusion

Conclusion

Oil plays an important role in the economy of nations. One of the important basis of economy is explored & unexplored resource i.e. oil, coal, mine, natural gas forest etc. Each country wants to benefit from its resources for developments, tries to dominate, its neighbours for economical benefit. Thus market too influences Intentional politics.

The first Chapter discusses historic – geographical background of Iraq with continuity& changes.

War takes place for economic benefit, However, War always result in loss of economy. Thus, all things happen for economy, and economy depends upon Energy resources such as oil.

Second chapter provided Geostrategic significance of the region and role of oil in Iraqis economy.

Geostrategic Location and Natural Resources

Geostrategic location and national resources of the nation serve as prime insurance for the security and prosperity of the concerned nation, therefore the location of the Gulf as the oldest trade route is of prime importance because it is a meeting ground of the continents; Asia, Europe and Africa. The strait of Horing link it to Indian Ocean, Iraq had been the most dominant nation of the Gulf region having immense oil reserve and has a bone of contention for Global dominance.

Location, Resources and Military Power

The above narration clearly establishes Iraq's importance in Global context. The out come of the Operation Desert Storm 1991 and America's war against Iraq 2003 clearly establishes that the natural resource which is an insurance for national security and prosperity becomes a source of doom and devastation it the concerned nation does not possess adequate military might to counter the ambitions of the adversary.

Chapter Three is Oil and Iran-Iraq War. It would appear that the Arab-Persian conflict finds its roots in history, even from the pre-Islamic period. Whatever form it has

tended to take, the nature of the antagonism between Arab and Persians has perennial aspect. Bearing in mind the historical context, the following remarks can be made:

The region of Shatt-al-Arab, including Arabia Stats and the other lands in question, is Arab due to its geographical and historical background, its economy, its nationality legally recognize by international treaties conclude throughout its history.

The dominion of the Arabs over these territories is intimately linked to their history and to their extremely close relations with Iraq. Western travellers have testified to the fact: "this region is as different from Iran's as Germany is from Spain," it is for that reason that "even if Iraq and this region have known different destinies imposed by the course of history at certain times and national identity; one part of his area was always incorporated in Iraq and was in Iraq and was in permanent contact with its inhabits, it underwent all the external influences that Iraq was subjected to."

These quotations are evidence that this region has always been a political and cultural battleground between the Arabs and the Persians.

Despite its origins in the historical conflict opposing these two countries, the Iraq-Iran war has its own particular dynamics, in this respect; the following elements can be discerned, the following elements can be discerned:

This war is different from all classic warfare between two neighbouring countries because its consequences if not resolved in the near future; will continue to show an aftermath in different forms in more than one Arab country for years to come.

The war has thrusts the Middle East in to a new phase of its history. it is not easy for the observer to outline all of in its consequences. Without any doubt, this war marks a decisive turning pointing in the History of the region. Just as the times prior to the war displayed specific features, the post- war period will witness the revision of numbers varies. This new factor will produce its effects in both inter-Arab relations and the relations between the Arabs and the rest of the world.

The experiences of the post prove that peaceful and just solutions based upon mutual understanding are a must. On the contrary, experience also proves that partial solutions do not lead to peace, but quite often become the detonator or catalyzer of future confrontations. The Iraq-Iran war is in itself an exemplary case.

The fourth chapter is Iraq Move in to Kuwait Geopolitical Consequences (Iraq invasion of Kuwait) These consequences constituted a virtual catastrophe, not only befalling development accomplishments in Iraq and in assaulted Kuwait, but also impairing Arab national developments. In many years an overall development in Arab countries, apart from those other economic effects, have hindered and will continue to hinder the flow of labour and capital among Arab countries.

This study further indicates that the “argument of historic rights”, advanced by the Iraqi regime, has neither a logical nor a rational basis. For example, did it not occur to proponents of this argument that the Iraq claims for historic rights in Kuwait, which lies south of Iraq, may have been an open invitation to Turkey to claim historic rights in Northern Iraq? Why didn't

Iraq claim right in Shatt al-Arab and in Abadan, both of which were voluntarily ceded by Iraq to Iran?

The third issue that the Iraqi regime seeks to raise is that of distributing the wealth of the Arab nation. Iraq is, thus, proclaiming itself protector of the poor in the Arab world. This is a lost case. Iraqi arguments in this regard are refuted by the fact that Iraq itself is among the rich oil countries. Its revenues from oil exceed those of Kuwait and the Gulf cooperation council states combined. Nevertheless, Iraq did not extend the least contributing to less-developed Arab countries, nor did it attempt to relieve the poor and victims of famine and drought in Arab and African states, an economic study shows how greatly Kuwait alone was contribution in the form of aid and economic assistance to Arab countries, that have low rate of growth, or which are suffering from natural catastrophes.

This roundup book revives our hope of tackling the numerous issues evoked herein in a deeper and more elaborate manner. Supported by documents and irrefutable arguments. Thus, we would be furthering the aims of academic studies in a continuous pursuit in search of the truth.

Chapter five is Iraq War of 2003 and the changing Geostrategic scenario. Reveals America's war against Iraq in 2003 in real sense, this war aimed at achieving the hidden objectives of Desert storm of 1991 which remained unachieved at that time because as per U.N. Resolution , the objective of that time war was to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi Occupation. After the main Objective was achieved, as multinational force under US

leadership were about to race towards Baghdad and Basra when hostilities were called off by the UN. Therefore, US could not achieve leadership change in Baghdad and monopolise Iraq's oil resources.

Nature of the Conflict

The present conflict was as if two wild tigers in prime of their health were attempting to kill a half-fed rabbit. Their main target was to get hold of Saddam Hussein, dead or alive, most important, the victors have won the Iraq oil resource. President Bush has clearly warned Syria, Iran and North Korea to take lessons from Iraq.

Bush Doctrine

These three nations are symbolic of the real intention of America which is to warn the whole world that it will pursue the famous 'Bush Doctrine' propounded after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September. This clearly states that if you are not with us, you are against us, and accordingly you will pay for it.

Americans against the War

Though the US has tried its best to get the support of global public opinion in general and American people in particular for its policy of war against Iraq, but the anti-war demonstrations in various US cities were massive. When war broke out, a survey held to judge the American public opinion on the question of war ended in saying that approximately 30% of Americans favoured war while remaining 70% were against it. We find from the media reports that throughout the course of war, massive anti-war demonstrations took place in parts of America. Thus the Government of the people in America worked against the 'majority will' of its people and now after the war,

Forces of Occupation

The laws of war and provisions of the Geneva Convention clearly state that the victors in war owe the responsibility to provide effective civil administration in the territories they occupy after the war. But we have seen on television and read in news papers about the chaotic conditions that prevailed in Baghdad, Basra and other cities of Iraq after they were

conquered by American forces. The Government buildings were set on fire and government property including banks were looted in the presence of the forces occupying the concerned cities.

Unjustified and Illegal War

Experts of international Law belonging to a large number of countries including America and Britain have termed America's war against Iraq as unjustified and illegal. In their joint meeting in the second week of April 2003, Heads of the states of Russia , France and Germany have also come out heavily against US attack on Iraq and termed it as most unjustified war while asserting that reconstruction of Iraq should take place solely under the command, control and supervision of UN .

The legal community has said, "The US led attack on Iraq is unprovoked, unjustified, violates international law and constitutes an act of aggression."

"After failing to secure the second (UN) resolution to justify the use of military force on Iraq, the US and the British governments have unilaterally attacked a sovereign country after disarming and debilitating it with 12 years of comprehensive economic sanctions," said the signatories.

In the modern civilized world, America is considered to be an ardent believer of liberty and freedom of expression but during the war, it did not permit free flow of the information about the war and false stories were telecast and reported creditability of journalism was the greatest causality because white lies were propagated by American and British TVs. In the initial days of the war, US led media channels propagated that Saddam was dead, Umm Qasr had Fallen, 51st division had surrendered, chemical weapons factory was found at Najaf and civilian uprising had taken place in Basra but non of the above happened till the fall of Baghdad. Thus, US media war was equally bitter as her carpet-bombing of Iraq's civilian areas.

Impact on UN

UN had come into existence to save generations from the scourge of war. Its aim was to harmonise actions of nations to maintain international peace and function on the basis of sovereign equality of states to settle disputes peacefully, to avoid threat or use of

force and eschew interference except when authorized by these Security Council. The Iraq crisis has transgressed these principles; A superpower has not been able to “escape the murmurs of its discordant votaries”. Force, nevertheless, has prevailed over reasonableness.

It may be noted that along with of the members of Security Council, India, too have in clear terms demanded that US must win UN backing for military action in Iraq. UK and US used diplomatic and financial muscle to browbeat dissenting member states of the Security Council into changing their minds. They failed to secure UN backing for authorizing US to lead military action against Iraq France and Russia; the two permanent members of the Security Council warned that they would veto the said resolution. Under these circumstances, America decided to take military action against Iraq without UN backing because in February itself, President Bush told UN that UN resolution is not essential for the purpose.

US was increasingly isolated but President Bush opted to follow his doctrine “If you are not with us, you are against us,” which he has propounded after terrorist attack on World Trade Centre. America’s war against Iraq is a big jolt to UN and its implication will be of far reaching consequence.

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