

**THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for award of the degree*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SHARMISHTHA MAJUMDAR



**CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI 110067**

2006



July 26th, 2006


DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled “**The European Union and Conflict Resolution in Central and Eastern Europe**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.


SHARMISHTHA MAJUMDAR

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Professor Shashi Kant Jha
Chairperson, CES


Professor Rajendra K. Jain
Supervisor

Acknowledgements

Foremost, I must thank my supervisor Prof. Rajendra Kumar Jain. I value his vast experience, versatile approach and his interest in this dissertation. I am especially grateful to him for his consideration and support during a time of extreme personal crisis.

I am also thankful to the rest of the faculty members of the Department of European Studies for their sustained advice during my two years at the Department.

I have no words to express my gratitude to my parents, my sister and brother-in-law for constantly encouraging my academic pursuits.

My special thanks to my cousin Sajni for having assisted me with the arduous task of typing my dissertation without any complaints (at least not in front of me!).

Finally, I acknowledge the moral support of all my friends and thank them from the bottom of my heart.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice	1
II	The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and Conflict Resolution in Central and East European Countries	40
III	The Balkan Imbroglio	70
IV	Conclusion	100
	Bibliography	

Chapter One

Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice

Introduction

Two thirds of the countries of the world are either suffering from political tension and violent conflicts or find themselves in the aftermath of a destructive conflict or war. As a consequence, local and international organizations are working in these zones of violent conflict to reduce the suffering of the population by helping to re-establish security, monitor human rights, build peace or support efforts to rebuild democratic and economic structures that are essential for sustainable peace.

The European Union's conflict resolution efforts are a part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With the end of the Cold War and the end of a bi-polar constellation in world politics, the challenge for the European countries to formulate their own common position with regards to changes in the outside world became even greater. Moreover, the 1990's saw a proliferation of civil conflicts in many countries of the world, which affected European trade relations and demanded a reaction from Europe. These conflicts called for a contribution to conflict prevention, crisis management, mediation peacekeeping and conflict resolution.¹

Since the EU maintains a broad range of relations in terms of trade, investment, migration, tourism, as well as communication among others, it has the potential to exercise considerable leverage and contribute in a comprehensive way to conflict prevention. This is however a long-term strategy. In the meantime, there are risks of accumulated conflict potential in many regions of the world leading to many more outbreaks of civil war. When large-scale military operations take place, the EU often plays second fiddle to the United States.

¹ Gerd Junne, "The European Union and Conflict Resolution", Paper presented at the International Seminar on "The European Union and World Politics" organized by the EC Delegation in New Delhi, Fundação Oriente, JNU-EUSP, Centre for Human Sciences, New Delhi, 22-23 May, 2003, p.3

The aim of this dissertation is to assess the role of the European Union as an international actor in conflict prevention and resolution. In order to keep the study more focussed we are only examining the role of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe, taking into account the case of the Balkans and the various instruments that the EU has at its disposal to resolve conflicts. The study is based on the hypothesis that the lure of membership provides the EU with a powerful instrument to prevent conflict outside the EU's immediate borders by suggesting the advantages of "good behaviour" to eager candidate countries. Secondly, there is greater scope for the European Union to prevent and resolve conflicts in Europe than anywhere else, especially where its knowledge and the efficacy of instruments of conflict prevention like economic sanctions and conditionality is limited.

The dissertation has been divided into four chapters. The first chapter delves into conflict resolution in EU external policy and the instruments of conflict resolution used by the EU. We examine the constraints which hamper the EU's capacity for conflict resolution and crisis management.

In the next chapter we look into the fifth enlargement of the European Union and how the Copenhagen criteria for membership has led to conflict resolution and stability in Europe.

Chapter 3 looks into the situation in the Balkans in the 90s. We examine the cases of Bosnia in detail, while looking into the failure and success of the European Union in resolving the conflict.

Finally, the last chapter examines the "soft power" of the EU, i.e. its tendency to use its instruments of conditionality among others instead of military power to resolve conflicts. The overall conclusions of the dissertation will also be highlighted.

Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice

The theory and practice of conflict resolution has evolved largely in the context of the Cold War since the end of the Second World War. Within the domain of conflict theory, conflict is defined as a situation where different actors are pursuing incompatible goals. This assumes that the goals or interests are recognized by the conflicting parties.

The reasons for conflict vary, and predicting how it may evolve is a complex task. There is an evident need for enhanced common analysis of root causes of conflict and of signs of emerging conflict. Poverty, economic stagnation, uneven distribution of resources, weak social structures, undemocratic governance, systematic discrimination, oppression of the rights of minorities, destabilising effects of refugee flows, ethnic antagonisms, religious and cultural intolerance, social injustice and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and small arms are factors which aggravate conflict. These signs should not only be analysed, appropriate action needs to be taken as well. An early identification of risk factors increases the chances of timely and effective action to address the underlying causes of conflict.

A further definition of conflict holds that conflicts involve apparently incompatible values, where the task of a third party may be to help the recognized parties to specify their values more explicitly, so as to facilitate the resolution of the conflict.²

The role of the third party is that of a mediator. Mediation is a form of conflict resolution in international politics which stresses the vital role of a third party in the process of creating peace and facilitating agreement between erstwhile disputing actors.³ Another writer argues that mediation is the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an *acceptable, impartial and neutral third party* who has *no authoritative decision making power* to assist disputing parties in *voluntarily* reaching their own *mutually acceptable*

² Rupesinghe, Kumar (1995), *Conflict Transformation*, New York: St Martin's Press, p. 73

³ Jones, Deniol Lloyd (2000), "Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical Theory", *Review of International Studies*, 26, p. 648

settlement of the issues in dispute.⁴ Mediation is also an idea and practice which is held together by certain family resemblances. These family resemblances are commonly recognized to be divided into two main sub-groups.

A first approach emphasizes manipulation, forms of power, process of bargaining, coercion, the ideas of *quid pro quo*, leverage and compromise. This is called a “bargaining” or “power-political” approach to international mediation.⁵ This tradition has the following terms in its vocabulary: mediation, power-politics, leverage, sticks and carrots, states as actors, international structures, settlement rather than resolution and it also has a sense that there are quantifiable issues and outcomes in any international dispute.

A second approach emphasizes the qualities of neutralities, consensus and impartiality and is called third party-facilitation or consultation. This tradition emphasizes a different set of characteristics: facilitation, communication, social psychology, the symbolic constitution of the social world, the role of non-state and individual interaction in the problem-solving workshop, the need for a genuine resolution, and the qualitative nature of issues and outcomes. This approach emphasizes how socio-psychological perceptions, which are obstacles to more deep and meaningful negotiations, can be broken down by a facilitator working within the intimate setting of a small group of key decision makers. Some facilitation theorists, most prominently John Burton, even argue that this type of conflict resolution, through the tool of the problem-solving workshop, can penetrate the fundamental reality and causal power of human need.⁶

Third-party approaches can be divided into two major streams based on the outcome sought – partial settlement of specific issues, or integrative resolution and transformation of conflict. Possible actors in both instances include private individuals, non-governmental organizations, diplomats, regional organizations as well as international

⁴ Moore, C. (1996), *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, London. p.14

⁵ Mitchell, C. (1994), ‘Conflict Research’ in A.J.R. Groom and L.Light (eds.), *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*, London: Pinter Publishers

⁶ See Burton, J. (1990), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, New York: St. Martins Press

organizations. Possible action can include arbitration, bargaining and negotiation, leveraged mediation, and/or facilitative problem solving workshops. In all but the last category, this process is generally seen as an exercise in power and influence.⁷

The integrative or transformational approach (which can use third-party facilitation as an operation method and facilitated problem-solving workshops as a specific tool in the peacemaking process), aims at finding outcomes acceptable to all parties to the conflict by exploring human, rather than institutional interaction. Human needs theory emphasizes that basic needs for security, identity and recognition are non-negotiable and cannot be compromised.

According to John Burton, conflict is not endemic in human nature, but arises under specific socio-economic structures in which basic human needs are frustrated. These include both ontological needs (such as physical security or political participation) and subjective psychological needs (such as the recognition of identity). Basic human needs are universal, permanent and essential to fulfilling the 'humanness' in man. Hence, unlike interests, they are non-negotiable.⁸ The suppression of basic human needs leads to the emergence of conflict. Actual conflict may either emerge or may remain latent.

Burton believes that basic human needs are not in short supply. In fact, their fulfilment is mutually reinforcing. The more secure is A, the more security will B enjoy. What may be mutually incompatible are particular "satisfiers", expressed through bargaining positions. It is the strategy (or type of satisfier sought) which leads to conflict. For example within most ethno-political conflicts, the drive for secession is not an end in itself. The underlying basic needs are those of communal security, recognised identity and self determination. The means through which the smaller community often seeks to satisfy these needs are positions (satisfiers) on independence or confederation. Yet these chosen satisfiers give rise to or entrench the conflict with the metropolitan state.⁹ The latter

⁷ Rupesinghe, *op cit*, p.74

⁸ Tocci, Nathalie (2004), "Conflict Resolution in the European Neighbourhood: The Role of the EU as a Framework and as an Actor", *European University Institute*, 2004/29, p. 5

⁹ Tocci, *op cit*, p.7

normally corresponding to the larger community, seeks to retain its territorial integrity in order to satisfy its own security and identity needs. It refuses to go beyond provisions for local autonomy or federalism. Hence the persisting conflict.

Third party conflict resolution based on human needs theory is usually carried out in a problem-solving workshop setting. An analytical approach is used to determine the overall nature of the conflict or intertwined conflict and all the potential actors. The next step is to facilitate movement of the parties beyond stated positions or interests, to the common ground of basic human needs. This type of approach can encompass attitudes, interpersonal relationships and social, political and economic structures.¹⁰

Problem-solving processes generally include: getting parties to define the conflict or conflicts as they see them; collecting and distributing information on general conflict processes as well as particular conflicts; determining which alternatives are available and trying to influence the parties' formulations and solutions; inventing alternative solutions; redefining the conflict on the basis of newly acquired information; conducting fact-finding efforts if more information is needed; and finally resolving the conflict on the basis of the range of options that have been exposed. However, problem-solving workshops are generally used in the pre-negotiation stage to help the parties get to the actual negotiations.

The basic needs and the problem-solving workshop approach made major conceptual contributions to conflict resolution theory and practice. Limitations on these approaches include distortions caused by faulty communications, difficulties in coping with the asymmetrical power balance in some conflicts, a lack of common cultural ground on the part of the actors in the conflict. At other times, problem-solving workshops are not conducted with the active parties to a conflict, or those who can influence the political process. In these instances, successes at the workshop level are not likely to be transferred in any meaningful way to the conflict.

¹⁰ Tocci, *op cit*, p. 8

Critical theorists view both conflict settlement and conflict resolution approaches wanting. In both ways both engage in conflict management, without tackling the underlying systems generating conflict. The conflict settlement school does so explicitly. It accepts the given power configuration and attempts to conserve it by managing conflict. But also the conflict resolution schools fail to deliver resolution through its excessive focus on subjective processes. The focus on perceptions and impartial hands-off mediation suggests that underlying structures generating conflict are left untouched. Conflict resolution efforts can solve, resolve and re-resolve the same conflicts through a re-conceptualization of relations. But the objective roots of conflict are not tackled. This is not to say that transformation of perceptions is not important. Simply that alone is insufficient.

Yet many of the concerns of critical thinkers were already integrated in the work of structuralists such as Johan Galtung in his analysis of structural violence. Galtung has elaborated the concept of violence, distinguishing between “intentional, manifest, physical and personal violence as opposed to unintended, latent, psychological and structural violence.”¹¹ Structural violence implies violence that is in-built in the system, characterised by inequality, underdevelopment and un-integrated socio-political systems. The elimination of structural violence is of fundamental importance to the quest for peace. Negative peace can be achieved with the elimination of personal violence, through a well-functioning legal deterrent system. But the attainment of positive peace, through the eradication of structural violence is more arduous. Positive peace can only be achieved through structural change.

According to Stuart J. Kauffman, peacemaking policy is at an impasse due to the rationalist paradigm underlying current conflict resolution practice. This paradigm overlooks key causes of ethnic wars and therefore, key obstacles to their resolution. In particular, diplomats and rationalist analysts tend to assume that the sides in the conflict are rational actors who recognise the cost of war and so prefer peace. They attribute

¹¹ Tocci, *op cit*, p. 9

violence solely to conflict over tangible issues and to the breakdown of institutional order, so they focus on interests and institutions in peacemaking.¹²

Kauffman further argues that the missing key to conflict resolution is to stabilize mass and elite preferences on both sides and around attitudes amenable to compromise and to mobilize a political coalition in favour of it. According to symbolic politics theory, ethnic conflicts are driven by hostile popular emotions toward out-groups, emotions harnessed by political leaders wielding emotive ethnic symbols. Playing on these emotions can however create a “symbolic politics trap” for the leader. Once a leader has aroused chauvinist emotions to gain or keep power, he and his successors may be unable to calm those emotions later, even if they wish to reverse course and moderate their policies. Therefore the way for third parties to address these problems is to promote not just peace, but also reconciliation, addressing the emotional foundations of hostile political attitudes and their symbolic expression, to help stabilize peace.

Kaufman thus defines ethnic civil war as a civil war in which the key issues at stake, that is the express reasons political power is being contested, involve either ethnic markers such as language or religion or the status of ethnic group themselves.

Existing strategies of conflict resolution fail in ethnic wars because they are based on an inadequate understanding of how ethnic identities work, why group members mobilize for war, and how they can be mobilized for peace. The instrumentalist-rationalist school argues that all civil wars result from a struggle between essentially rational groups of individuals over tangible interests, such as wealth or power.¹³

The key insight symbolist theory offers on the problem of conflict resolution is that ethnic violence is rooted in an internal politics based on manipulating ethnic symbols to generate strong hostile emotions. The basic function of any political symbol is to create

¹² Kaufman, Stuart J. (2006), “Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic Wars”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 43, No. 2, p. 202

¹³ Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild (1998). *The International Spread of Ethnic conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

around conflicts of interest a myth of struggle against hostile, alien or subhuman forces as a way to mobilize support.¹⁴

Stable peace, in sum, requires not just a political settlement but also reconciliation. According to an ideal definition, reconciliation is characterised by mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, as well as fully normalized, cooperative political, economic and cultural relations. All of these elements are of course matters of degree.¹⁵ Existing conflict resolution and peace-building approaches are typically unsuccessful in resolving ethnic wars, because they pay insufficient attention to reconciliation.

The role that reconciliation initiatives could play in promoting peace can best be understood by showing how they fit into a comprehensive peace-building strategy. Creating such a strategy must start with some considerations of timing and sequencing. The following four phases can give an idea of how to put the pieces together.

Phase 1: Setting the Stage

Analyses typically refer to this phase as “getting to the negotiating table”, but this is too simple a notion. The challenge is getting to the table in propitious circumstances.¹⁶ If any party to the conflict believes it can benefit from continued fighting, it will act as a “spoiler” and block the road to peace, so third parties may have to tip the balance of military power against such actors. If multiple third parties support multiple sides in conflict, resolution requires either the acquiescence of some in their rivals’ military victory, or recognition, by local parties and their sponsors alike, that they have more to gain from peace than continued war. Once the balance of power favours those who want peace, the time is right for a ceasefire.

¹⁴ Kelman, Herbert C. (1997), *Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict*, New York, St Martin’s Press, p.197

¹⁵ Bar-Tal, Daniel & Gemma H. Bennink (2004), “The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process”, in Yakov Bar-Siman-Tov (eds.) *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 15

¹⁶ Kaufman, *op cit*, p. 207

The second aspect of this phase is “getting to the table”, or “pre-negotiation”. The critical third-party role here is played by mediators, whether provided by states or international organizations.¹⁷

Early on, however, informal Track II talks can play an important role. Track II talks are a particular form of “problem-solving workshop” pioneered by psychologists such as Kelman.¹⁸ The aim of such workshops is to bring together people from opposing sides of a conflict, so they can replace their mythical beliefs about the other side with better information and replace their hostility and fear with enough understanding to make compromise peace look attractive and attainable. If successful, these experiences start to build trust among participants across group lines. “Track II diplomacy”, in particular, involves problem-solving workshops carried out by elites who have access to top leaders but are not part of the official leadership. Such talks allow for an informal, and often more creative, exploration of options than formal leaders are willing to risk. The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo process, for example, began as an informal series of discussions between two Israeli academics and some members of the PLO leadership. They were then expanded into formal negotiations.

Phase 2: Negotiation and Political De-escalation

The issue which is generally neglected at this stage is political de-escalation. For example, the parties to the conflict and the mediators should make continued negotiations contingent on official steps towards reconciliation by the sides. To begin with, this means a prohibition against hate speech by leaders, and the media they control, when addressing their own population. As long as leaders on either side are continuing to involve themselves in the symbolic politics trap by arousing hostile emotions against the other side, negotiations are a waste of time. Threats from mediators to withdraw their mediation are low-cost and appropriate, thus adjourning talks until they stop is the right way forward.

¹⁷ Bercovitch, Jacob (1997), “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice”, in Zartman, I. William & Lewis Rasmussen (eds.) *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, Washington D.C.:United States Institute of Peace, p.128

¹⁸ Fisher, Ronald J. (1996) *Interactive Conflict Resolution: Pioneers, Potential and Prospects*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.

The country or group sponsoring the negotiations should also establish a single fund, under the control of the mediators, to promote a wide range of peace-building activities. An adequate sum of money is essential to ensure that the reconciliation effort is on a sufficient scale and that most initiatives are coordinated to prevent duplication of work at cross-purposes. The scale of the effort should be large enough that a substantial portion of the middle-range leadership on both sides eventually participates in some peace-building activities, so a significant network of support for the peace process is created. When one compares to the millions often spent on peacekeeping and economic aid, such a level of funding represents only a small marginal increase in the costs of a major peace-building effort.

Cultural efforts which are funded especially aimed at the mass media, are also appropriate in order to support the effort to humanize the enemy and counteract hostile attitudes. The creation of media outlets supportive of peace is also appropriate, as was achieved with radio Jambo in Burundi in the 1990s.¹⁹ This is not an endorsement of censorship, but the mediators can fund non-profit organisations to produce human interest stories, films and even pay to have them printed or broadcast. They should also, when necessary, convince the parties not to block the dissemination of the products.

Another appropriate sort of initiative is to provide training for journalists on how to reduce bias. A key goal of such efforts is to combat the hostile effects of segmented media markets, in which different media outlets each play to the hostile feelings of one party to the conflict.²⁰ The message for the media at this stage, and the theme of problem-solving workshops, should focus more on emotional than substantive issues i.e. less “let’s share the disputed land and more ‘they’ are not evil monsters but human beings who have suffered as we have, and it is possible to deal with them.”

¹⁹ Gardner, Ellen (2001), “The Role of Media in Conflicts”, in Luc Reyhler & Thania Paffenholz (eds.), *Peacebuilding: A Fieldguide*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, p.308

²⁰ Snyder, Jack & Karen Ballentine (1996), “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas”, *International Security*, 21(2), p.10

This stage is also a good time for leadership acknowledgement of the other side's suffering and of their own side's suffering and of their own side's partial responsibility. Such acknowledgement is critical in the reconciliation process. Post war German acknowledgement and repudiation of the Holocaust and of Hitler's aggression, for example – especially Willy Brandt's emotional visit to Auschwitz – played an important role in enabling German reconciliation, not only with Israel, but also with European neighbours.

Mediators and parties alike are justified in insisting on such actions. If leaders cannot commit such statements before a deal is struck, their sincerity is questionable. Their ability to implement a deal is even more dubious if their followers are not ready to hear unpleasant truths about their own side. For this reason, such acknowledgements should eventually be made a condition of continued negotiation.

The period of negotiations is also the time to begin playing up symbols that can be used to mobilize support for peace and to begin undermining the myths and symbols that justify hostility. Most importantly, leaders must develop tools for gathering support without extreme nationalist appeals. That is, they must construct, usually from existing elements of their national myth-symbol complex, a language for talking publicly about peace and reconciliation that resonated emotionally with their followers, to enable them to counter emotional nationalist appeals. Efforts in the media and in other areas of popular culture can help by providing or reinforcing the symbols leaders use to evoke such a response. Rituals supportive of peace – such as Israeli Prime Minister Rabin's attendance at peace rallies – should also be fostered.²¹

Leaders on both sides should also be expected to encourage their subordinates to cooperate with these efforts, including participating in problem-solving workshops. The way these workshops typically work is to gather "opinion leaders" from both sides in an informal, often academic, setting that permits the reanalysis of their conflict as a shared

²¹Ross, Marc Howard (2004), *The Management of Conflict: Interpretation and Interests in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven, Connecticut : Yale University Press, p.219

problem and the generation of some alternative courses of action'.²² In such workshops, the first step is often to moderate participants' hostile mutual attitudes. It is favourable if meetings begin with the participants' sharing of their personal experiences of conflict, it helps humanise each side for the other by attaching a human face to the previously anonymous and easy to ignore suffering of the adversary. This is necessary, because psychologists have found that emotionally based attitudes, like ethnic hostility, are hard to change except through emotional appeals. In the best case, these experiences start to change intergroup relations by building at least cordial if not friendly relations across group lines, replacing purely hostile ones. These changes, if extended, could then work to change the public mood and political dynamics within groups, so that leaders would be rewarded for moderate rather than hostile policies towards the rival group.

One potentially promising audience for such initiatives is young people, who are likely to be both more impressionable than their elders and easier to goad into violence unless dissuaded.

Another target for these efforts should be the transnational support networks for hardliners. Many conflicts are fuelled to a significant degree by money and hardline attitudes from émigré or pan-ethnic groups, who often support the more extremist factions. Leaders and activists in these émigré and pan-ethnic organisations must therefore be included in reconciliation initiatives, to try to discourage them from blocking deal ratification or supporting spoilers later on.

The key point is that the various reconciliation initiatives, only modestly effective in isolation, can theoretically be made mutually reinforcing. Problem-solving workshops often have the strongest immediate effects, but they can include only a limited number who then face pressure to abandon their newfound moderation once they return to their society.²³ However, media stories, official speeches and cultural events can assure the

²²Mitchell, Christopher quoted in Lederach, John Paul (1997) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, p.47

²³ Kaufman. *op cit*, p. 210

participants that their new moderate feelings are in the air. All of this could help to prepare public opinion to support ratification and implementation of a settlement

Phase 3: Deal-Making and Political Mobilisation

This is the stage in which negotiators find a specific formula for settling the tangible issues at stake, and leaders mobilize their groups to ratify it. Formal acceptance of a formula should be preceded by problem-solving workshops that allow middle range and grass-roots leaders to experience the same trade-off problems faced by their superiors. The more fully committed middle-range leaders are to an eventual deal, the easier it is for their chiefs to implement the deal.

At the grass-roots level, the ground for ‘selling’ a deal should be prepared in the media, through major speeches by leaders and evocative ceremonies marking the conclusion of the agreement. This must be accompanied by a continued public relations effort aimed at promoting both the emotional acceptability of a deal and the substantive acceptability of its key terms, again including art, film, and entertainment television in addition to news media. In addition to symbolic appeals, therefore, this is the time to release new information – for example, studies detailing the economic costs to both sides of continued conflict and the likely economic benefits of a peace agreement.²⁴ This is also the time for leaders to fully mobilize their political parties on behalf of their efforts and to increase cooperation with autonomous peace groups. Capacity-building efforts should also be funded to help pro-peace NGOs in the region to expand.

Participation in problem-solving workshops should also be expanded to new and less likely sets of participants by this stage, to try to erode opposition to the settlement. Key constituencies might include veterans groups and émigré groups. Additionally, wide-ranging public relations and public education efforts are essential. One creative example comes from Mozambique, where a UNICEF-funded ‘Circus of Peace’ toured the country,

²⁴ Kaufman, *op cit*, p. 210

using drama and arts to explore the challenges of war, conflict, and reconciliation.²⁵ Similar sort of arts-based programmes, including cultural fairs and dramatic presentations designed to foster reconciliation, have also been employed in Northern Ireland.

The culmination of these efforts is ideally a referendum, election, or other formal ratification process that commits the society as a whole to implementation of the agreement. Such a process (e.g. the referendum in Northern Ireland) forces political leaders to articulate their reasons for supporting a compromise peace and therefore provides the occasion for them to create and deepen a mainstream discourse in favour of peace. It provides an opportunity for pro-peace forces to coalesce and provides the voters with the opportunity to commit to reconciliation through a vote specifically on that issue. This is important because the psychology of commitment then works to motivate them to continue to support it. A successful vote can then be used to legitimate implementation as carrying out the explicit will of the people. The charges of betrayal cannot then hold true.

Phase 4: Implementation and Reconciliation

The key factors that have been identified for the implementation of the peace process include supportive international interventions, well-designed and inclusive settlement agreements, and quick economic benefits that give ordinary people a tangible stake in peace.²⁶

Additionally, however, there must be continued attention to the emotional bases of political activity. Hardliners often try to destroy peace agreements, and in ethnic civil wars they usually succeed. Political and cultural leaders therefore need to continue their efforts to reinforce the emotional power of their discourse in favour of peace, and of the symbols that they evoke in that discourse, so hardliners cannot force them back into the symbolic politics trap. Achieving this goal requires giving newly created institutions some symbolic power to attract loyalty and compliance.

²⁵ Lederach, John Paul (1997) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. 54

²⁶ Stedmen, Stephen John et al. (2002) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.356

Staying out of the symbolic politics trap also requires, a redefinition of group identities – not necessarily of who belongs to the group, but of what it means to be a member.²⁷ The importance of “chosen traumas” in group mythology needs to be downplayed to reduce the importance of the group sense of victimization. For that reason, the importance of public rituals of mourning and reconciliation become more important in the implementation period. For example Truth Commissions, like that in South Africa, provide catharsis by providing public acknowledgement of victims’ suffering.

Efforts aimed at revision of school curricula also belong in this stage. Durably replacing myths justifying hostility requires promoting the writing and teaching of fair minded history instead of the ethnocentric and scape-goating kind. Joseph Montville, for example, has helped organize national processes for writing a common, non-discriminatory history in both Bosnia and Burundi. In the 1950s, a similar Franco-German initiative contributed to the revision of history teaching in those two countries, promoting removal of references to each country as the “hereditary enemy” of the other.²⁸

What must be kept in mind is that violent conflict is a relationship between societies, not just leaders or armies, and that conflict resolution means remaking that relationship into a peaceful and constructive (though certainly not conflict-free) one. This must be done primarily at the implementation stage. It should include some degree of economic cooperation, which creates numerous opportunities for constructive mutual engagement.

But ideally, it should also include peaceful contacts on a range of other levels – educational and cultural contacts, professional and administrative interactions (e.g. cooperation for transportation and law enforcement), and so on. This is necessary emotionally, because the previous attitudes of hostility and fear cannot simply be exercised; they must be replaced or at least balanced by some more positive feelings. It

²⁷ Long, William J. (2003) *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in conflict Resolution*, Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press

²⁸ Ackermann, Alice (1994) “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process in Postwar Europe: The Franco-German Case”, *Peace and Change*, 19(3), p.240

is also necessary practically, since failure to cooperate on issues of mutual concern will inevitably engender hostility which might contribute to re-igniting the conflict.

Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Management

A theoretical approach to conflict leads us to identify three dimensions, which can be expressed as chronological phases: “Conflict prevention looks to prevent violent trials of strength from even breaking out and is necessarily a long term project, although it may require urgent interventions at the last minute. The European Commission defines conflict prevention as actions undertaken over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.”²⁹

While conflict management has been defined by the Commission as, “actions undertaken with the main objective to prevent the vertical (intensification of violence), or horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing violent conflicts.” Conflict management is directed towards preventing escalation once conflict has begun and has been a familiar part of conventional strategic thought since 1962. It is a short term ‘fire-fighting’ operation.

Conflict resolution is concerned with trying to re-establish peace, preferably on a permanent basis, after the failure of prevention and management strategies. It is largely a matter of the medium term.³⁰

Evolution of Conflict Resolution in EU External Policy

The enormous cost of resources and human suffering, caused by violent conflicts calls for major efforts in preventing conflicts. This is above all a moral and political imperative, but it also makes economic sense. It is a lot cheaper to channel conflict into dialogue and

²⁹ See http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/development_old/prevention/definition.htm cited in Bayne, Sarah (2003), “Conflict Prevention and the EU: From Rhetoric to Reality”, *International Alert and Saferworld*, p.22

³⁰ For more details please refer to Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention (Brussels, European Commission, COM [2001] 211 Final, 11 April 2001

constructive action than to deal with the consequences once it has degenerated into violent confrontation. Given the importance of the EU on the international scene, its interests and ambitions and the considerable resources it has committed to assistance and co-operation, there is no doubt that the EU should play its part in these efforts.³¹

The EU is in itself a peace project, and a supremely successful one. It has underpinned the reconciliation and peaceful development of Western Europe over the last half century, helping to consolidate democracy and to assure prosperity. Through the process of enlargement, through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, through its development co-operation and its external assistance programmes, the EU now seeks to project stability also beyond its own borders.

According to the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001), development co-operation provides one of the most powerful instruments at the Community's disposal for treating root causes of conflict over the long term. This reflects recognition within the Commission and the EU more generally, of the linkages between conflict and poverty, and the importance of mainstreaming conflict prevention into development co-operation in areas such as education, health, infrastructure, in addition to an emphasis on areas such as security sector, governance and human rights.

In addition to these longer-term measures, growing emphasis has been placed in the shorter term measures of both civilian and military crisis management, both within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Initiatives have taken place to enhance EU capabilities to undertake a range of military crisis management tasks within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the enhancement of better co-ordination of the Union's and member states' civilian crisis response tools, in particular in the fields of policing, rule of law, civil protection and civilian administration.

³¹ Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM (211), Brussels 11.04.2001

During the years of European Political Cooperation (EPC) between 1970-1993, conflict prevention was not an explicit policy goal. European Political Cooperation started outside the framework of the European Economic Community in 1970. The EPC constituted an intergovernmental forum. Conflict prevention was the over-riding concern in almost all the particular contexts in which European diplomacy engaged.

The philosophy of 'civilian power' was in itself an acknowledgement that the EC could not be a player once conflict entered a military phase and therefore for reasons of both principle and necessity EPC spent much energy on attempts to defuse some of the world's most dangerous disputes.³²

Beyond the European continent, the EU model could serve as an example for other regions in encouraging states to reduce political tension, to increase economic interdependence and to create greater mutual trust between countries. There are many examples of regional groupings that the EU endorses. Mercosur, which brings together Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and which has received EU support since its creation in 1991, is a striking example. It has played a significant role in consolidating democracy and the rule of law in all its member states, and particularly in Paraguay.

It was also through Mercosur that these countries began to set up confidence-building measures in the field of defence. Vis-à-vis Mercosur as well as many other regional organisations around the world, a great deal of the EC assistance has been aimed at strengthening common regional structures.³³

³² Hill, Christopher (2001), "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol 6, p.317

³³ The Commission currently supports the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the South African Development Community (SADC) as well as Cariforum and Pacific Islands Forum. This year, a major project will be launched (with a budget of around EUR 15 million) to strengthen the SADC's administrative capacities. The Commission is also planning to support the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). The establishing of a Customs Union between the 6 countries of the San Jose Group, in Central America will also be supported by the Commission.

Likewise, an important objective of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is to improve economic and trade cooperation between these countries on a regional basis. This Partnership Agreement has seen some evidence of an increased use of political dialogue, a willingness to engage in more political activities such as demobilisation and support for peace processes; efforts to support non-state actor engagement and the adoption of a policy of “constructive engagement” with conflict affected countries.³⁴

In its relations with the six countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the Community is also trying to stimulate their integration through a customs union. In this regard, it hopes that at some stage Yemen will be able to join the co-operation within the GCC. Community assistance can also be targeted specifically at regional structures with a clear conflict prevention brief. In this spirit, the Commission has supported the Organization of African Union (OAU) mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) conflict-prevention mechanism, the Lusaka Peace Process in the Democratic Republic of Congo through the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Burundi Peace Negotiations. The Commission intends to devote more resources to these initiatives in the future. In particular, it is ready to support the SADC initiatives on light arms and drug trafficking.

In addition, the Commission plays an active role in several regional initiatives in which stability and security are major concerns e.g. the Northern Dimension with countries of the Baltic Rim or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

In the earlier decades, the European Union made a constructive and enduring contribution in the Arab-Israeli dispute, in the Central American crisis of the 1980s, and in the end game of South African Apartheid. Without the persistent European attempts to demythologise the Palestinians while at the same time recognising Israel’s security

³⁴ Bayne, Sarah (2003), “Conflict Prevention and the EU: From Rhetoric to Reality”, *International Alert and Saferworld*, p.22

dilemma, the United States would have found it very difficult to move its own position on a Palestinian homeland.

Similarly, without the European willingness to take a different line from Washington on the leftist movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador, the United States might well have become embroiled in an even more serious military conflict than, through the Contras in El Salvador, it actually did. Finally, the miracle of a peaceful transition to democratic majority rule in South Africa is largely due to the efforts of the ANC and the people of South Africa. But the European Community also played its part, by the stick of sanctions (from 1985) and the carrots of aid, electoral monitoring and accession to the Lomé Convention.³⁵

Not everything EPC did was in the direction of de facto conflict prevention, partly because it was unsuccessful and partly because at times it was conflict producing. The human rights declarations by the EU criticising the policies of various governments might have been designed in the long run to build more legitimate and stable societies but in the short run they inevitably worsened relations between Europe and the governments concerned, and by the same token could also sharpen the contradictions between the forces of repression and reform. An example of the former is the Rushdie affair and Euro-Iranian relations, while the latter can be represented by the (somewhat belated) pressure on Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe over his suspension of the rule of law.

The general point is that even a pacifically-inclined actor like the EU cannot help but contribute to conflict at some level whenever it stands up to some perceived outrage, or protects its own interests against adversaries who do not share the "negotiation ethos" of diplomacy as compromise. This is not necessarily a bad thing, rather, it may be a necessary evil in the pursuit of a higher good than the avoidance of conflict at all costs.³⁶

³⁵ Ifestos, Panayiotis (1987), *European Political Cooperation*, Avebury: Aldershot, p.410

³⁶ Hill, *op cit*, p.318



TH-13062

Since the mid-1990s conflict prevention has steadily been creeping up the political agenda of the EU, both in line of the EU's own potential in this area and an increasing appreciation by donors and northern governments of the importance of this issue. Underlying the EU's approach to preventing and tackling violent conflict is an understanding of the importance of using a wide range of measures, extending across the full spectrum of external policy, targeted to address the root causes of conflict over the long term. Importantly, conflict prevention is increasingly no longer seen as a distinct activity, but rather a broader approach to policy making, which recognises that every measure or action at the disposal of the EU may play a role.

In recent years, the EU has attempted a more explicit strategy of conflict prevention and has had to apply it in some very testing circumstances. In the Balkans it made its most determined and sustained effort to prevent a bad situation from worsening, after the initial failure to keep the Yugoslav state intact. EU monitoring and tireless efforts at mediation made a contribution to the eventual Dayton settlement, and to insulation Kosovo from the main conflict.

In 1999, the Commission proposed the Stabilisation and Association process as a way of bringing every country of the region closer to Europe and its structures. The thinking was quite simple: it was felt that the best way to get the countries of the Western Balkans to avoid conflict and work towards European standards of political and economic behaviour was to hold out the prospect of EU membership one day, subject to strict political conditions, including a requirement for regional cooperation. The process is based on a policy mix that combines contractual relations along the lines of those enjoyed by the PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of Economy) countries under the Europe Agreements- programmes to assist the economic restructuring and institution-building needed to meet European standards, regional cooperation and free trade. The process represents a long-term commitment to the region and will, if it is to be credible, demand substantial human and financial resources for several years to come. There is little doubt that the solemn pledge underpinning the process is already having a major impact on the policies and behaviour of the countries concerned.

However, there have been glaring failures as well. The EU stood by helplessly in Somalia other great African tragedies of the 1990s, first with the genocide of the Great Lakes region, and then the sad deterioration of West African polities, in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. In most of these sub-Saharan cases the EU lacked the power, as well as the instruments and the will to make much of a difference. Some believe, however, that the case of Rwanda was more of a technical failure of prediction and the ability to act quickly and cohesively. It has certainly given a great impetus to the attempt to reform the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) so as to intervene preventively in the future.

The most obvious potential resource when confronting an international conflict, and one which still ultimately defines an actor's status, is that of military power.³⁷ This is an area that the EU has only just entered upon, and where its capabilities are in flux. Nonetheless over the last fifteen years considerable progress has been made, first through a revived WEU, which enabled the Europeans to distinguish their security interests from those of NATO as a whole. The WEU became a bridge, or a buckle between NATO and the EU, and the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which the two alliances agreed in 1996 provided the theoretical capability for the EU/WEU to use military force as an instrument of conflict prevention. There was then the "possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide", as given in the Treaty of Amsterdam.³⁸ Despite the apparent lack of interest in making such a decision at Amsterdam, the new Blair government in the United Kingdom was instrumental in producing the Anglo-French Declaration at St Malo on 4 December.³⁹ This represented a go ahead for the absorption of the WEU into the EU and the fifteen member states accordingly made formal decisions at Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 to set up a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).⁴⁰

³⁷ Hill, Christopher (2001), "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol 6: 315-333

³⁸ See Treaty of Amsterdam, 19 June 1997.

³⁹ See Franco-British Summit (1998), "Joint Declaration on European Defence", St Malo, December 4

⁴⁰ See Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki, 11 December 1999, on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

This was to be in parallel with the CFSP, to take over most of the WEU's functions in due course and, most significantly to provide the EU with a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men by 2003. As the Cologne Council concluded, 'the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the 'Petersberg tasks'.⁴¹

Insofar as security guarantees, collective or bilateral, are an important part of conflict prevention, the EU has for the time being no choice but to work with NATO in deciding the perimeter of the region which will be defended against any outside attack and within which a democratic peace is expected. It must also accept the graduated nature of individual Member State commitments on the security front. Opt-outs, both for particular countries and for the whole system on conflicts like that between Greece and Turkey, are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

A central challenge for EU conflict prevention policy will be to handle the grey area which exists between the 'hard' security guarantees of NATO, the 'soft' security assured by EU membership or its prospect, and the possibly alienated states in the exclusion zone beyond the Schengen frontier.⁴² In this zone fall many Balkan states, some Baltics, Belarus the Ukraine and Russia, the Maghreb, Cyprus and even the Levant.

The one genuinely innovative aspect of the Treaty of Amsterdam in terms of the CFSP and one which promises more immediate pay-offs in terms of conflict prevention than other deterrence or security guarantees, was the incorporation of the 'Petersberg tasks' (not explicitly referred to as such, but clearly with a lineage deriving from the WEU Petersberg declaration of 1992.⁴³

⁴¹ Hill, *op cit*, p. 322

⁴² Hill, *op cit*, p. 323

⁴³ The Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU Member States listed the crisis prevention and management missions that WEU forces could conduct; 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'.

In fact, on close inspection these tasks are less to do with prevention than with crisis management and conflict resolution, as Article J.7.2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam implicitly acknowledges, by making no mention of conflict prevention – in fact the concept is still nowhere referred to in the revised Title V even after the Treaty of Nice.⁴⁴

It is true that by relieving humanitarian problems, acting as barrier forces and in particular by ‘peacemaking’, European forces would be preventing escalation and laying down some of the conditions for a more permanent peace in the post bellum, where that applies.

Although there is a long way to go before the EU fully realises its potential, there has been demonstrable progress in terms of developing institutional capacities and activities, which can support the implementation of the policy commitments to conflict prevention. Within the External Relations Directorate of the European Commission, a Conflict Prevention Unit has been established with the responsibility of mainstreaming conflict prevention priorities within Community policy (such as trade, development, environment issues). Within the Council, the introduction of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) has provided an important capacity for analysis and initiatives in support of conflict prevention. It has been argued by some that, if directed well, the recent merging of the Development and General Affairs Council has the potential to enable further coherence between conflict prevention activities emerging from development cooperation and those actions within the field of CFSP.

Indeed there has to be some question as to whether the military part of the new EU nexus is appropriate for this kind of intervention-prevention at all. The theory, insofar as it has been worked out, is evidently that of some form of division of labour, with the CFSP having the purpose of (and some capacity for) longer-term prevention, and the ESDP serving the needs of intervention when prevention fails.

⁴⁴ There is a passing reference in the associated ‘Inter-Institutional Agreement’ on the financing of the CFSP, but none in the ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit’.

The Potential of the EU Framework to Support Conflict Settlement and Resolution

A. The EU Framework and Governance

In most ethno-political conflicts with a secessionist or irredentist character, peace efforts depend on finding mutually agreed solutions to the questions of state sovereignty, which include constitutional provisions and governing arrangements. Negotiations are often hampered by the difficulty of finding common ground between the principal parties' rigid positions over statehood and sovereignty. The metropolitan state insists on the notion of territorial integrity and indivisible statehood and sovereignty, and as such accepts at most, limited forms of autonomy and federalism. The smaller (secessionist) entity, seeking some form of national self-determination, calls for divided sovereignty and favours confederal solutions if not outright independence.

When ethno-political conflicts are marked by incompatible positions over state sovereignty and they are either in the process of accession or have a realistic prospect of entering it, the Union's multi-level framework of governance could raise the potential for a breakthrough in agreements. Conflicts that would fall under this category include the decades old Cyprus conflict, as well as the conflicts in the western Balkans. In these cases the EU's multi-level framework of governance could aid conflict settlement and resolution efforts by allowing for a fundamentally transformed application of statehood, sovereignty and subsequently of secession.⁴⁵ A transformed application of sovereignty within the Union facilitates the search for alternative satisfiers that lie beyond the dichotomous options of single or divided sovereignty.

Although the Union is formed and constituted by its member states, through its policies and institutions it advocates the clear cut differences between monolithic and divided sovereignty. Sovereignty in practice is shared and no longer absolute and undivided.

⁴⁵ Tocci, *op cit*, p. 8

Decision-making and implementation in a given policy domain is determined by the distribution of competencies between the various levels of government. While different levels of government remain legally distinct, they become particularly inter-related through different channels of communication and policy procedures. The supra-national level penetrates the national and sub-national levels as several competences are dealt with either exclusively or in part by it. As a result the role of the second (state) level within the EU is fundamentally transformed.

The EU framework also increases the scope for third (sub-national) level roles in the EU policy-making. This does not entail that EU membership necessarily upgrades the roles of the third tier of governance. It rather allows enhanced opportunities for the development of the third level. Whether these opportunities are taken depends on the internal structure of the member states, i.e. on the extent to which regions already have pronounced roles within their state. If and when regional levels of government play important roles within their member state, their position can be enhanced further within the EU.

There are two ways in which the EU framework may transform the notion of sovereignty, and as such aid conflict settlement and resolution efforts. The first is that within the Union, levels of government (the European, national and the regional) become increasingly inter-dependant. The overall independence of each level is reduced. The search for indivisible sovereignty (whether this could rest in the centre or in the regions) thus becomes obsolete.

The second is that within the EU, federal systems that normally allow for a sharing of internal sovereignty, can allow for the expression of limited external sovereignty by federal entities. To the extent that this is the case and it is appreciated by the smaller entity in ethno-political conflicts, the perceived acceptability of federal (as opposed to confederal) solutions may arise. This in turn can help to bridge the gap between the proposed satisfiers advocated by the principal parties to the conflict.

B. The EU Framework and Citizenship

Ethno-political conflicts are typically not merely issue-related conflicts, but security and identity related conflicts. In view of the close connection with identity, positions on citizenship also tend to be characterised by mutually incompatible bargaining positions. Principal parties implicitly or explicitly view identity and citizenship through strictly ethnic and highly politicised lenses. This in turn leaves little space for negotiation and compromise.

The larger community identifies with the metropolitan state and advocates single citizenship (which is identified with the larger community). It would thus prefer to see the reintegration of the minority community into the majority culture. The smaller community, fearing this very reintegration (considered as domination) calls for divided citizenship.

The 'country' is considered to be constituted not by one, but by two or more peoples. An 'ethnic' and thus exclusive view of citizenship in turn often also reduces the scope for agreement on related questions such as refugee return, immigration and minority rights and other key elements on the conflict settlement agenda.

EU citizenship would not eliminate these tensions. However, the acquisition of EU citizenship could allow a gradual transformation of the concept of citizenship. Within the EU, citizenship is acquiring a different meaning and is currently being associated with human, economic and social rights rather than with exclusively national or community affiliations.

In other words, by fostering the view of a more 'civic' rather than 'ethnic' meaning of identity and citizenship, the Union could contribute to the search for alternative solutions to ethno-political conflicts within its borders.

C. The EU Framework and Borders

The transformed meaning of borders within the EU could also raise the potential for the resolution and transformation of ethno-political conflicts. The free movement of goods, services, capital and persons within the Union dilutes the meaning of territorial boundaries between member states.

As such, in cases of ethno-political conflicts where the drawing or the re-drawing of territorial boundaries is an issue on the conflict settlement agenda, the EU framework could raise the potential for an agreement. It would do so by increasing the feasibility of a non-linear border. This could in turn facilitate an agreement on territorial adjustments.

Structural funds could also be an important asset where the redefinition of territorial borders is contingent on economic considerations. In conflict ridden countries, structural funds could be spent on investment in renewal of economic infrastructures specifically linked to issues of territorial readjustment and the opening of previously blocked frontiers.

D. The EU Framework and Individual, Communal and State Security

Finally the EU framework can increase real and perceived individual, communal and state security. An increased sense of security, whether at individual, group or state level can in turn facilitate conflict settlement and resolution efforts, particularly when the difficulty in reaching mutually agreed solutions is increased by the mistrust between the principal parties. In this respect, the Union in view of membership, may provide important forms of non-military security guarantees.

EU membership can be viewed as a powerful guarantee of state security. It is far less likely that a state would be attacked (both from the outside and less still from the inside) as an EU member state. As such the need for hard external security guarantees, frequently a contested item on the conflict settlement agenda, would diminish or transform. EU

membership can also act as an important guarantee of individual security through its legal system, emphasizing human rights, non-discrimination, equal opportunities and fundamental freedoms. Individuals in EU member and candidate states, required to be members of the pan-European Council of Europe, have the right to individually bring cases to the European Court of Human Rights and be awarded compensation for it.

The 1993 Copenhagen criteria (which will be discussed at length in the next chapter) setting out the conditions of membership explicitly mention democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Under the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, Articles 6 and 7 allow for the suspension of the voting rights of a member state in the event of serious breaches of these legally entrenched rights.

The EU's Wider Instruments of Conflict Prevention

The list of EU instruments directly or indirectly relevant to the prevention of conflict is long: development co-operation and external assistance, economic co-operation and trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation, as well as economic or other sanctions, and ultimately the new instruments of ESDP (including information gathering for anticipating potential conflicts situations and monitoring international agreements).

Through these, the EU is already heavily engaged in conflict prevention. But it can and must improve the focus and effectiveness of its action in this area. It must be able to respond in a timely and tailor-made fashion, with an appropriate mix of instruments, to the specific situations as they arise. Ultimately, this is not just a question of streamlined decision-making and management procedures but, more fundamentally, of the common political will to respond. Despite the military ambiguities, the EU taken as a whole already has some attributes of a preventive capability, especially for the longer term.

Indeed, it can be argued that its very historical identity is fundamentally that of a conflict prevention system.⁴⁶

The most basic EU instrument is therefore that of what Gabriel Munuera has called “the power of attraction.” Munuera shows that the lure of membership can help to prevent conflicts outside the EU’s borders by suggesting the advantages of good behaviour to eager candidates (as with the Copenhagen Council’s membership conditions) and by giving the EU leverage where they do not take the hint. He cites the case of Slovakian Hungarian détente as an example. Munuera also rightly notes, however, that this effect wears off if countries become disillusioned with the pace of their accession, and if geography makes them less than plausible candidates.⁴⁷

For some states indeed, membership is not an option at all, and for them the attraction factor is weaker, working only in terms of wanting to be associated with EU positions (e.g. through the CFSP). They are the EU’s new semi-periphery, a group with fewer incentives to follow EU prescriptions. If the EU is serious about using enlargement as an instrument of conflict prevention – and there are of course many other motives for the policy, not all mutually compatible – then it will need to be very careful not to mislead potential candidates, and to combine the carrot of accession with other strategies which might work in the interim.

Those receiving contradictory signals about accession should have been anchored in some form of reassuring relationship with the EU, which might even in the end prove an acceptable substitute for membership. This is particularly the case in relation to the foreign policy cooperation, which need not be treated as an exclusive EU good. Guido Lenzi pointed out that the WEU had developed “a comprehensive and multilateral process of conceptual exchanges, political consultation and some operational cooperation

⁴⁶ Pinder, John (1996) “Community against Conflict: The European Community’s Contribution to Ethno-national Peace in Europe”, in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds). *Preventive conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organisations*, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, p.180

⁴⁷ Munuera, Gabriel (1994), “Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience”. *Chaillot Papers*, 15/16, p. 91

between more than thirty countries of Europe and the Mediterranean, a process however that has somewhat blunted the military alliance implications of the Brussels Treaty.”⁴⁸

Insofar as it created a sense of partnership and feelings of being sheltered by an umbrella of common security, this might have damped down incipient conflict both within the ‘family’ and between members and outsiders. The Slovenian-Italian example cuts one way on this, with the dispute of 1994 having been contained by the existence of the EU and WEU; Greece-Turkey cuts the other way, given that even common NATO membership has not been able to prevent simmering mutual hostility. Such an approach is based on an institutionalist logic which assumes that participation in common organisations and networks has a socialising effect, in this case spreading the values of the rule of law. The best that can be said for this theory is that it might be true, so long as the organisation does not grow too large and is not undermined by what goes on inside its member states.

The Organisation of American States and the Organisation of African Unity have not been enough by themselves to foster civil relations between and within the states of their respective continents. On the other hand, the EU itself has so far had an excellent record of domesticating antagonisms both inside and between its Member States. Ultimately it is a reasonable but unprovable hypothesis which could be helped to come true by the determined application of a number of instruments simultaneously.

The difficulty with the democratic path to conflict prevention is that even if states can be brought into a condition of rudimentary democracy sufficient to justify their entry into the EU, there can be no certainty that they will stay that way or indeed that they will not dilute that very stability which made the EU so attractive in the first place. If the democratic peace hypothesis holds, it does so on the basis of relations among states

⁴⁸ Lenzi, Guido (1998), “Defining the European Security Policy” in Jan Zielonka (ed.), *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, Amsterdam: Kluwer, p. 111

whose liberal institutions and close collaboration were reinforced if not created by the Cold War.⁴⁹

None of this is to imply that bringing, say, the states of the old Soviet bloc into the net of organisations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP), or into the orbit of the EU/WEU was a waste of time. On the contrary, this kind of overlapping institutionalism fosters communication, the spread of common values and the acceptance of some shared obligations. The instinct for a politics of inclusion over exclusion is generally correct, especially where liberal democracy is a condition of entry into the club.

The point is rather that both democracy and the membership of the IGOs created by democracies are a necessary but not sufficient means of preventing conflict. New, brittle democracies herded together into regional organisations which may become quickly overloaded by their very accession will not be any less prone to involvement in conflict – indeed it is possible that they will be more prone to internal upheavals if the new dispensations fail to meet the soaring expectations they have engendered. Conversely, it has been rightly observed by Christopher Hill, that inter-locking institutions can become inter-blocking if care is not taken to ensure that new members are capable of living up to the obligations entailed in membership. It also partly depends on the time-frame being worked to, and the assumptions being made about the permanence of any ‘solution’.⁵⁰

If the EU does not represent a working peace system in its internal relations, and may be expected to continue as such, its capacity to prevent conflict outside its borders – themselves in flux – remains much more dubious. Nor is the mere existence of democracy a guarantee of a successful or even morally consistent foreign policy outside Europe, whether on behalf of a single state or the EU as a whole. Various contributors to

⁴⁹Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1995). “Democracy and the Future of European Peace”, in Nils Petter Gleditsch and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds) *Democracy and Peace, Special Issue of the European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1(4), p.558.

⁵⁰Hill, *op cit*, p. 326

the democratic peace debate have pointed out that democracies have often behaved in a bellicose, exploitative and authoritarian manner towards other kinds of state, while too much presumption in an 'ethical foreign policy' based on human rights concerns can incite conflict rather than prevent it as has been seen over relations with Malaysia and Indonesia.⁵¹

However, faced with a deteriorating situation the EU has a number of traditional (Community) instruments at its disposal. The Commission can for example dispatch teams of electoral observers (as in Zimbabwe) or provide emergency economic assistance. The Kosovo crisis is a case in point, where financial support was made available at short notice to neighbouring countries facing a massive influx of refugees and displaced persons, in order to prevent destabilisation on a regional scale. Montenegro is another example of the way aid programmes can provide rapid backup for a predetermined political strategy. The Commission is pursuing the actions outlined in its Communication on EU Election Assistance and Observation so as to permit rapid deployment of trained EU election observers. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance may make an indirect yet valuable contribution to conflict prevention by helping stem potentially destabilising floods of refugees or mitigate their destabilising impact on neighbouring countries (e.g. former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,⁵² Albania, Kenya, Tanzania).

The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) approved by the Council in 2001 allows the Commission, in a single legal and financial framework, to carry out a wide range of

⁵¹ Latham, Robert (1993) "Democracy and war-making: Locating the International Liberal Context", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 22(2), p.58

⁵² Early April 1999 saw a systematic effort to deport Kosovo's non-Serbian population to neighbouring states, a move engineered by Milosevic with the aim of destabilising Serbia's neighbours. By 6 April 280,000 refugees had arrived in Albania and 136,000 in FYROM, while another 60,700 people were displaced in Montenegro. The host countries suddenly found themselves having to cope with a humanitarian crisis for which they were quite unprepared. In FYROM for example, the influx of refugees threatened the ethnic balance on which political life was based. There was a great danger that the entire region would be destabilised. On 17 April the Commission granted the governments of FYROM, Montenegro and Albania €100 million for refugee-related costs and €150 million in direct humanitarian aid. That the Commission was able to overcome the constraints imposed by administrative procedures and react rapidly to this politically sensitive and critical situation was a key factor in avoiding a major regional crisis

short-term actions which would otherwise require more cumbersome decision-making procedures. For example, in a crisis situation, the Commission will be able to undertake short-term operations, such as targeted assistance (e.g. the 1999 Energy for Democracy' programme in Serbia), fact-finding missions, mediation or the dispatch of observers. In cases where initial speed is essential, but actions may need to be continued over a longer period, the RRM will allow for quick initiatives in peace-building, reconstruction and development, laying the groundwork for longer-term action to be taken over by traditional Community instruments.

The EU has a variety of political and diplomatic options available to it where the situation in a particular country or region looks like deteriorating sharply. These include the formal statement or the diplomatic *démarches*, the political dialogue procedure, the dispatch of a fact finding mission or a team of EU observers and the appointment of a Special Representative. In this context the political dialogue and the role of Special Representatives merit special attention. As a general consideration, it should be reaffirmed that for the EU to be a credible actor, it has to show its capacity to adopt common political line on sensitive issues. Too often this has not been the case.

The EU engages in a political dialogue of varying degrees of formality with all countries with which it has relations. A long-term dialogue on political issues including human rights and democratisation can have an early warning role by highlighting problems which could in the future lead to violent conflict as well as contributing to their early resolution. It is also particularly important where a tense situation threatens to get out of hand. To be of use in such situations, the political dialogue clearly needs to be more focused, time flexible and more robust than is often the case at present. For this to happen, however, the EU must be capable of reaching a timely agreement on its policy and position upstream taking due account of the situation on the ground, the expectations, fears and likely resolve of each party, and crucially, how determined the EU itself really is to exert its influence. That in turn means the Member States working out if not a common strategy then at least a common political line.

The principles of Article 11 of the Cotonou agreement and the political dialogue of its article 8 offer scope for addressing conflict prevention in ACP countries. The Commission considers that an important objective of the political dialogue is to prevent as far as possible, situations of political difficulty or tension from degenerating into armed conflict. Dialogue would therefore include exchange of views on crises and conflict situations, mediation and negotiation efforts and support to peace processes.

The Commission considers that more systematic use must be made of the political dialogue where a crisis appears imminent. Such dialogue should be based on a strong political line. It should be more focused, time-flexible and robust than in the past.

Economic sanctions have been easier to impose given Article 228a, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, which gives them a specific legal basis and clarifies their link to the political process of CFSP. Insofar as they are a useful substitute for war this adds to the repertoire of conflict prevention tools, although it should also be noted that the history of economic sanctions points to their frequent use as cover for an inability to influence events.⁵³ The sanctions imposed on Serbia from 1991 on are a classic case in point.

The EU Special Representatives can also be useful in defusing potential crises. So far they have generally been deployed in cases of open conflict (in the Great Lakes region, the Middle East or the Horn of Africa), but they could undertake preventive diplomacy. The Council guidelines of 30 March 2000 provides greater clarity for the appointment and management of EU Special Representatives. However in order to be more effective and credible, Special Representatives need to be given the role of full mediators on behalf of the Union and to receive clear mandates from the Council on policy positions to be taken. The Commission considers that the Special Representatives should be used more widely as mediators, that they should be empowered to adopt a firm position on the situation covered by the terms of their mandate, and that they should be available for short-term (e.g. six-month) missions as well.

⁵³ Hufbauer, G.C. (1990), *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

Conditionality has become a regular part of the EU's foreign policy actions, whereby there is now no embarrassment about creating linkages between the granting of aid or privileges and the expectation of better behaviour.⁵⁴ This was bluntly evident in 1997 in Agenda 2000's judgement that Slovakia did not satisfy the political side of the Copenhagen criteria, and indeed it had been clear from 1992, when it was established that all new cooperation and association agreements should contain a clause providing for their suspension in the event of human rights violations. In the Third World from 1990-1998 there were fifteen cases of the EU suspending aid because of coups d'état or other setbacks to democratisation.⁵⁵ These instances are only relevant to conflict prevention because of the assumption discussed above that spreading democracy diminishes conflict ipso facto, but conditionality has also begun to be a factor in peace-building in the Balkans.

The arrival of Joint Actions, Common Positions and now Common Strategies in the CFSP has spawned new initiatives such as the Stability Process in South-East Europe, while the new post of High Representative, together with the right for the Presidency to negotiate agreements, has heightened the element of diplomatic personality.⁵⁶

While conflict prevention is a general strategy of the most comprehensive and long-term kind, it also has limitless particular applications, all of which are likely to be delicate and difficult. Both levels require, as a necessary condition of success, a well-coordinated decision-making system and the capacity for diplomatic finesse. The structural limits of the CFSP as it stands are well-known; a diversity of specific national concerns; dependency on the Presidency for initiatives and information, the lack of an effective defence dimension. Nonetheless, the CFSP system is now more integrated and flexible than its predecessor, and the strategy pursued towards eastern Europe after 1989 shows that economic and political instruments can be used effectively together, even in

⁵⁴ Smith, Karen E. (1998), *The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?*, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2, p. 263.

⁵⁵ Smith, *op cit*, p. 266

⁵⁶ Schröder, Maximilian H (1997), "CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty: Handle with Care!", *CFSP Forum*, 2/97. Institute for European Politics, Bonn

conjunction with outsiders, where (i) a sense of urgency and priority exists on the merits of an issue, and (ii) the nature of the problem is not itself seriously in dispute – as it was, in the crucial years 1991-1992, in Yugoslavia.

It is still, after the limited changes of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, going to be difficult for a conflict prevention strategy to be mounted by the EU using the CFSP and Community instruments, but it is not inherently impossible. The informal elasticity of EPC has been lost since Maastricht, but there have been gains in terms of a clearer intellectual and political structure to the policies undertaken.⁵⁷ Decisions on what is to be done, on what are the EU's external priorities, should now seem more concrete both for decision-makers themselves and for outsiders.

Looking at the EU's conflict prevention instruments as a whole, the picture is not so gloomy. As Michael Smith has remarked, "the EU has the economic capacity to reward and to punish; it has the technical and administrative capacity to support and stabilise; and it has the capacity to negotiate in ways unknown to many of the other participants in European order."⁵⁸

It is true that budgetary constraints, national sensitivities and difficulties over translating resources into instruments all serve to inhibit the use of the EU capabilities, and sometimes to bring the idea of European foreign policy into disrepute. Nonetheless, the EU has an honourable record of having used its diplomacy to address the root causes of international conflict. Although only the long-term can tell whether conflict prevention in this sense is successful, that is no reason for not attempting it in carefully chosen cases. The key to success, indeed, "is in the choice of where to act and where to leave judiciously alone."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ginsberg, Roy (1997). "The EU's CFSP: The Politics of Procedure" in Martin Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: the Record and Reforms*, London: Cassel, p.272

⁵⁸ Smith, Michael (1997). "Doing unto Others..? The European Union and Concepts of Negotiated Order in Europe", Inaugural Lecture delivered on 19 February 1997 at the University of Loughborough

⁵⁹ Hill, op cit, p.329

Chapter 2

The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and Conflict Resolution in Central and East European Countries

Challenges posed by changes in the Central and East European Countries

The end of the Cold War has not brought general peace and prosperity to Europe. Instead, elements of instability, and in some cases even war, have become all too frequent in Central and Eastern Europe after the demise of the communist bloc. The fall of communism has given way to the disintegration of multinational states, a painful process of political and economic transition towards democracy and market economy, and the re-emergence of nationalism as a destabilising factor in the region.

The breakup of the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Federation and Czechoslovakia (although the latter occurred fairly smoothly) reflects the strains created by the transition from communism. The unsolved national questions that emerged virulently in the aftermath of World War I with the collapse of the multinational Austro-Hungarian, Tsarist, and Ottoman empires, were frozen by forty years of communist repression and arbitrariness. Grandiloquent concepts of federalism and national sovereignty were largely subverted by the reality of the communist party's centralised authority, which manipulated the different nationalities to its advantage and largely rendered these rights devoid of any content.¹

However, the Stalinist "nationality policy", which was more or less closely adopted by Tito's Yugoslavia, created the structures which some of these ethnic communities would later use to further their political goals. The titular nations² had state structures to which they could add real substance when the centre collapsed. In short, and beyond the complexities and particularities of the different cases, the fact is that communist rule did

¹ Munuera, Gabriel (1994). "Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience", *Chaillot Papers*. 15/16. p.91

² For clarity, the term "nationality" will be used as an ethnological or anthropological sense (a group of people having a common origin, history, language, and traditions) whereas *nation* will mostly relate to the political manifestation of this ethnic community. Thus the nation will put forward political claims ultimately aimed at building a state -- a nation-state

not solve the national questions.³ On the contrary, it often aggravated the problems by arbitrarily giving privilege to some national groups, and by failing to provide the basis for civilized management of inter-ethnic relations i.e. a sound economy and democratic rules of behaviour based on the rule of law.

With the overthrow of these totalitarian regimes, Central and East European countries found themselves in the middle of a deep economic recession and political unrest. The nationalist card proved, as in the past throughout Europe, a powerful and effective instrument for electoral purposes. The erstwhile communist rhetoric was replaced by nationalism, and was often used by politicians vying for new power bases. Thus, Central and Eastern Europe has in a number of cases witnessed a process of nation-building. In fact, the resurgence of new national identities among the newly independent states, has resulted in many domestic conflicts. These include minority questions to do with ethnic, religious, social and cultural origins and constitutional issues against a background of the relative weakness of pluralist democratic constitutional traditions.

Moreover, the Cold War caused unnatural division of Europe into two hostile blocs and thus the CEECs became Soviet satellites after World War II. Therefore, history is surely an important factor that has influenced prioritization of the CEECs in the enlargement process of the EU as a means of ending unnatural division of Europe. The notions of 'return to Europe' and a 'Common European Home' indicate the identity and history factors in the politics of the EU for the fifth enlargement.⁴

For the CEECs, the 'return to Europe' which would represent the strongest confirmation of their identity, seems to have constituted a solid basis for their membership bid. They have brought history and the European identity into play to legitimize their desire to become members of the EU. Indeed, they consistently put forward the argument that they have traditionally shared the values and the norms of belonging to the West during

³ Munuera. *op cit.* p. 92

⁴ The fifth enlargement was the largest enlargement of the EU till date. 10 countries formally became members of the European Union on May 1st, 2004. They involved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, plus Cyprus and Malta.

the artificial division of the Communist regimes. Therefore, the prospect for EU membership is associated with catching up 'European values' for the CEECs.

However, after the end of the Cold War the combination of economic distress, socio-political unrest and national revival has seen a more unstable situation in the region, and the eruption of wars and ethno-political conflicts in continental Europe. These ethno-political conflicts in the European neighbourhood, whether violent or frozen, thus threatened the stability and security of the European Union due to their proximity and potential spill-over effects. In the light of these realities some actors within the EU member states and institutions have taken a serious interest in many of these conflicts, attempting to contribute to their settlement and gradual resolution.

As a result, the EU came to the reluctant conclusion that the integration of these transitional countries into a European structure would lessen the cost of new security challenges for the EU. Considering the degree of risks and costs associated with the political and economic instability on the periphery of the EU, it has realised that the European security, as a whole, cannot be guaranteed without sustained economic development and the maturing of the democratic institutions in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Mediterranean. The EU has assumed that enlargement would provide the necessary assets to consolidate democracy and enhance stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe. As the Report of the European Commission states:

Enlargement is a challenge which the Community cannot refuse. The other countries of Europe are looking to us for guarantees for stability, peace and prosperity, and for the opportunity to play their part with us in the integration of Europe. For the new democracies, Europe remains a powerful idea, signifying fundamental values and aspirations, which their peoples kept alive during the long years of oppression. To consolidate their new-found liberty, and stabilize their development, is not only in their interests, but ours.⁵

The Commission recommendation has been taken seriously by the EU member states. They considered the stabilization of Europe as the main objective of the fifth enlargement

⁵ For more details on the report, please see European Commission (1992), "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement", Bulletin of the European Communities, p.5

policy, believing that enlargement would provide a solution for ethnic and nationalistic conflict and would effectively neutralize the dangers of authoritarian tendencies among the new democracies of Eastern Europe. For example, the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 set up an enlargement strategy in such a way as to achieve stability and security in Europe through the construction of common European institutions.⁶

Faced with this prospect, the EU increasingly perceived the fifth enlargement toward the CEECs as essential for the lasting stabilization of the new democracies and securing the political stability of the whole European Continent. In fact, the instruments of the EU's enlargement strategy for the CEECs have, to some extent, sought to accommodate the political and economic needs of these countries through the EU's comprehensive pre-accession strategy.⁷ This pre-accession strategy has been strengthened by the new instruments of the accession partnership and the reinforcement of pre-accession aid. These have all been, to some extent, related to the EU's effort to neutralize the new security threats from the CEECs as a means of reinforcing peace, stability and democracy in these countries.

To promote regional cooperation and good neighbourliness among the applicant countries is an important aspect of the EU's attempts to minimize the new security threats from these countries. The prospect of EU membership has clearly been an important element in encouraging better relationships among the applicant countries and the EU members. In fact, establishing good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation between the applicant countries has been one of the main conditions for EU membership. In this context, the goal of membership for the applicant countries has been an effective tool for promoting regional cooperation and has thereby contributed to the finding of resolutions for many bilateral issues between them. This is because they hoped that regional cooperation and establishing good relations among themselves would facilitate their objective of achieving EU membership. For example, expectation of membership was obviously the

⁶ See European Council (1993), *Presidency Conclusions. Copenhagen*, Brussels, General Secretariat of the Council

⁷ See European Council (1994), *Presidency Conclusions. Essen*, Brussels, General Secretariat of the Council

primary impulse behind the dramatic and historic friendship treaties between Hungary and Romania in 1995.⁸

For the applicant countries, membership of the EU is considered a vital instrument for their security needs. This is related to the perceived effect of membership on further stability in their domestic politics, because EU membership has been viewed by the CEECs as a political anchor to stabilize their newly established democracies and political systems. The political and security considerations of the CEECs have also been related to the fact that EU membership provides a useful mechanism for pursuing their foreign security and defence policy. After the end of the Cold War, the CEECs have been searching for anchors for their foreign security and defence policies; in this respect, joining the EU has been regarded as an essential mechanism for their foreign security and defence policy objectives. Moreover, noting that post-Maastricht European integration has extended to the areas of politics, security and defence with the aim of asserting a European identity, “the cost of exclusion from the European political integration has become almost prohibitively high.”⁹

Indeed, the political and security attraction of the EU to the candidate countries has increased since the EU started to make a serious effort to create the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) after the end of the Cold War and the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe. For instance, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty as the second pillar of the EU, has become an essential part of European integration. The Amsterdam Treaty broadened the scope of CFSP to include “all questions related to security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence.”¹⁰

⁸ Ram, Malanie H. (1999), *Transformation Through European Integration: A Comparative Study of the Czech Republic and Romania*, PH.D Thesis, USA: George Washington University

⁹ Croft, Stuart (1999), *The Enlargement of Europe*, Manchester, Manchester University Press

¹⁰ See Treaty of Amsterdam, 19 June 1997.

The Helsinki Summit went further in underlining the creation of an effectively functioning CFSP as an essential element in European security and defence identity with a view to enhancing the political profile of the EU. In this regard, the role of the Western European Union (WEU) in the process of the evolving European Foreign Security and Defence Identity became an important issue.

Democracy and Democratization Processes in the Applicant Countries

The foremost problem is that there is no definition of ‘democracy’ itself. Yet different concepts will imply different policy prescriptions about the way in which the EU might be democratized. The basic features of the liberal democratic model – such as the freedoms of opinion, expression and organization, universal suffrage, a choice of political representatives and the separation of powers – are important elements in any viable conception of democracy.

Most would accept that both liberty and equality are constituent elements of democracy, but also that there are tensions between them. Michael Newman argues, that his position on liberty, accepts the traditional catalogue of liberal civil and political freedoms but rejects neo-liberal definitions of liberty on the grounds that these effectively defend the privileges of those who already possess power and privilege.¹¹ In his view, one of the main functions of public authorities is to use political power to redistribute resources in favour of the disadvantaged. Otherwise they are negating equality, which are both a condition and a goal of democracy. However, if equality is elevated to become the sole principle, it can lead to the elimination of fundamental liberties. It follows that democracy implies some form of balance between the goals of liberty and equality, and that in present circumstances democratization requires a move towards greater equality.

Second, Newman regards the empowerment of ordinary people as a crucial aim. Unlike some theorists who see the debate between the advocates of “democratic elitism” and

¹¹ Newman, Michael (2000), *Democratizing the European Union: Issues for the Twenty first Century*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p.5

“participatory democracy” as procedural, he believes that greater participation is a substantive value as an aspect of empowerment. This does not mean that ‘direct democracy’ is possible in large and complex societies. He regards representation as indispensable, and political parties as necessary agencies for articulating and implementing policies and providing leadership. However, these must not be viewed as substitutes for active participation at all levels. Protest is also a legitimate political activity, and organizations and channels of mass involvement should be nurtured both because of their effects upon the participants and their impact in bringing about change.

Third, democratization demands a move towards greater inclusiveness. It therefore rejects notions of democracy that stress the interests of the ‘insider’ against those of the outsider, the dominant nation against minority nation, and traditional roles and values against those that challenge stereotypes. Democracy must be as inclusive as possible in relation to ethnicity, religion, gender and sexuality.¹²

Democracy may also be defined as “a political system in which the people choose the formal and actual leaders of the government at regular intervals through competitive elections based on a comprehensive adult franchise, secret ballot and other procedures such as free media, rights and liberties enjoyed by individuals and groups that create real opportunities for electoral competition. Among these attributes of democracy competitive elections constitute, by far, the most authentic precondition for its success because they make other political benefits of a democratic system more real for its citizens. In the case of post-socialist political systems in Eastern Europe, the competitive elections indeed provide a valuable yardstick for analyzing and distinguishing the degree of the success of democratization they have achieved. It is quite logical to ask as to why certain countries have been able to institutionalize reasonable free elections while others have not.”¹³

¹² Newman, *op cit.* p. 6

¹³ Jha, Shashikant (2006), “The European Union and Democratization in Eastern Europe”, paper presented at an International Seminar on India and the European Union, at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 24 March 2006, p. 2

Prof. Shashikant Jha further argues that while clarifying the notion of democracy in the context of East European experiences it is also important to bear in mind some of its limitations. First, stipulation of a wide range of rights and liberties of citizens is considered as an essential element of genuine democracy. It is true that post-communist constitutions in Eastern Europe have listed such rights in a fair measure. But, under certain conditions, it is not unlikely that even a competitively elected government behaves in an authoritarian manner towards a large number of its citizens. This tendency may become more acute in policies adopted particularly towards ethnic or religious minorities in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. One may find such examples of authoritarian behaviour of the governments in contemporary Eastern Europe. Ideally speaking, in “a fully functioning constitutional democracy, the rights of citizens and inhabitants are legally specified and protected by the government, no matter how sweeping a mandate it has received at the polls.”¹⁴

Second, while considering the criterion of elections it needs to be recognized that post-socialist elections have moved far away from the stage-managed elections of the preceding era. But whether they have achieved genuine competitiveness and therefore can be characterized as completely free by strict democratic standards is still a moot question. The electoral scene in all East European countries does not present a uniform picture. There are countries where norms of free democratic choice is increasingly getting accepted by the people and the elite, but elsewhere it is subjected to most reckless manipulation by the ruling elite. It may, however, be argued that as long as the elements of competition and free choice are recognized by the larger part of the society and not reversed they can be considered positive developments in the direction of democratization.

Thirdly, there are also certain difficulties in clarifying the concept of ‘democratization’. The word “democratization” refers to “political changes moving in a democratic direction.”¹⁵ It is important to ask why some political regimes move in a democratic

¹⁴ Jha, *op cit*, p. 3

¹⁵ Jha, *op cit*, p. 4

direction and others don't. Moreover, what does 'moving in a democratic direction' mean and how does one identify actual political regimes as more or less democratic? In the wake of the dramatic series of events pulling down the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, virtually all the post-socialist leaders proclaimed their commitment to democracy. This led scholars to assume that democracy would be the natural culmination of the end of socialism. However, as Bruce Parrot has rightly observed, "when thinking about the evolution of post-communist states it is important to maintain the distinction between transition from communism and transitions to democracy. It may be true that liberal democracy has become the prevailing model of modern politics in much of the world."¹⁶

The perceived effect of EU membership on further democratization processes in the applicant countries seems to have been another important political motivation for the EU's enlargement policy. As the previous enlargements of the EU suggest, the EU played a crucial role in the democratization process in some acceding countries. The Mediterranean enlargements of the EU to include Greece, Spain and Portugal were peculiar cases for the EU which had to support and aid them in consolidating their newly established democracies. Greece, Portugal and Spain applied for EU membership shortly after the collapse of their respective authoritarian regimes; therefore, their applications were driven by the fact that membership would promote their domestic political stability and the process of democratisation. As Preston puts it:

Successive Mediterranean enlargements became a critical test of the capability of the EU model to act as a stabilizing influence in the region and to establish a framework for the development of pluralist political and economic structures and processes.¹⁷

In this respect, the EU drew these countries into the integration of Europe as a promotion of democracy on the part of the EU. Despite the inadequacy of their political systems for EU membership, the EU considered them eligible to join without obliging them to meet

¹⁶ Bruce Parrot cited in Jha *op cit*, p. 4

¹⁷ Preston, Christopher (1997), *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*, London: Routledge, p. 63

firm political conditions in advance. Greece was admitted only seven years after she adopted a democratic constitution; similarly, Spain and Portugal entered the EU a little more than a decade after the collapse of long lasting authoritarian regimes. Thus political consideration of the EU prevailed over the negative economic consequences of these countries' accession to the EU, at least in the short term.¹⁸

As regards the fifth enlargement of the EU, one of the main objectives of the EU's enlargement policy towards the CEECs has been to promote the development of democratisation and human rights in these countries. For example, the Commission's Report in 1992 reflected the long-term vision of European democracy in an enlarged Europe as a means of integrating these new democracies into the European Union. The Commission has made several references to the importance of enlargement "as a political means of consolidating and embedding principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in candidate countries", which can be seen in its Agenda 2000.¹⁹

The same consideration can also be seen in the European Parliament's position on the fifth enlargement. The European Parliament has considered it as a historic opportunity to ensure democracy, respect for human rights and the strengthening of common European values in Europe. As the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs stated:

It is the historic task of our generation to make Europe whole, to remove the vestiges of 50 years of ideological dictatorship and repression in the Central and Eastern European Countries; hence, it is the biggest democracy project ever and if it is successful, then the Union will be the guarantor of democracy.²⁰

¹⁸ Rose, Richard & Haerpfer, Christian (1995). "Democracy and Enlarging the European Union Eastwards". *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 33(3): 155-173

¹⁹ See European Commission (1997b), "Agenda 2000: For Stronger and Wider Union", *Bulletin of the European Union*, Supplement 5/9, Brussels

²⁰ European Parliament (1996), "Opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on the Next Enlargement of the EU towards the CEECs", *Official Journal of the European Communities*, Brussels

As far as the EU member states are concerned, the concern for developments in democratization and respect for human rights in the CEECs has constituted one of the main political motives in their decision to start the fifth enlargement process. For this reason, the EU member states have always believed that this enlargement would anchor the CEECs in a democratic Europe and that this would reinforce the principles of democracy and human rights in these countries. The member states' desire to support and facilitate the CEECs in consolidating their newly established democracies through the enlargement process has been reflected in successive Presidency Conclusions of the EU Council Summits.

The European Union (EU) has been one of the most significant international actors in promoting democracy in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Apart from being a major trading bloc the EU is gradually emerging as a major international actor in the political arena. EU's foreign relations include the promotion of democratization, protection of human rights, pluralism and the rule of law.

These commitments have formed a part of all the European Council declarations since 1991 and other major documents such as Association and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with former Communist states, The Maastricht Treaty, the Lome Convention and in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, defining democratic requirements for EU membership.

In pursuit of these goals the EU has made developmental aid increasingly conditional upon the recipients respect for human rights. New programmes such as PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy) have been created to facilitate EU's support mechanisms for the new democracies in Eastern Europe. Apart from this, the EU has also utilized the "carrot" of membership to encourage political liberalization. Even in such cases where the possibility of membership is remote the EU can still provide significant incentives to encourage political reform

The Copenhagen Criteria

The EU's political conditions of today originated in the Copenhagen criteria (which also cover economic conditions and a country's ability to assume the obligations of EU membership) agreed at the European Council held in that city in 1993. These stated: "membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities".²¹ These political conditions have been elaborated on in the European Commission's avis of 1997 and from 1998 in the annual regular reports on candidate countries. The political conditions have also been tied in with EU programmes of financial assistance, the accession partnerships and the whole pre-accession strategy. It has to be noted that additions have been made to the original criteria (which were in any case vaguely phrased), notably in the inclusion of the fight against corruption, prompted by growing evidence of widespread corruption in most post-communist states.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen political conditions for EU membership, including stability of institutions guaranteeing of democracy and respect for human rights, have reflected the concerns of the EU member states about the importance of the effects of democratization resulting from the EU's enlargement strategy in the applicant countries. The broad criteria of the Copenhagen conditions for EU membership are as follows:

- stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities
- the existence of a functional market economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.
- the ability to take on the obligations of full membership (the *acquis communautaire*) that is the new members must accept the objectives of the European Union, including adhering to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

²¹ European Council (1993), *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen, General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels

- the capacity of the EU to absorb new member states, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, which indicates the fact that membership and incorporation must proceed only in line with the EU's ability to incorporate new member states.

In fact, the Copenhagen conditions imply that new entrants should not bring unmanageable economic, political and security problems into the EU. This seems to have been particularly the case with EU's political criteria. The EU has stressed the importance of minority rights, the principles of democracy and the resolution of bilateral issues involving border and minority questions between the acceding members, as the EU is concerned that unresolved political issues between the acceding states and existing member states, would impair the Union's cohesion and its efforts to create the CFSP. In fact the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership would imply that the countries applying for membership of the EU must first prove that they would not import any political and security problems into the EU in which it might be embroiled.

As far as the applicant countries are concerned, accession into the EU seems to have been regarded as a political shelter that would protect democracies from totalitarian regimes, and provide a useful channel for carrying out necessary reforms in their political systems and legislations on human rights.

However, the part played by the EU in promoting democratization and political transformation in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and other applicants, including Turkey, seems to have been different from its previous Mediterranean enlargements in many aspects. This change of the EU's enlargement policy has, to a large extent, been due to the complexity of the fifth enlargement: there are many more applicant members with more heterogeneous political features and developments than before; the EU is now more integrated and politically advanced. Therefore, the EU has forced the applicant countries to undertake the necessary reforms to their political and human rights systems outside the EU, rather than allowing them to

develop their democracies within the EU mechanism, as was the case for Spain, Greek and Portugal.

Domestic Change through Conditionality

Among notions of international influences in democratization, ‘conditionality’ is one most visible of deliberate efforts to determine the process’s outcome through external pressure. This is achieved by specifying conditions or even preconditions for support, involving either promise of material aid or political opportunities. It is a method increasingly adopted by international and especially European organisations; and it parallels greater international attention in the 1990s to minority rights and human rights in general. A special version is democratic conditionality which emphasizes respect for and the furtherance of democratic rules, procedures and values. While other international organizations make such conditionality demands, it is the EU which most of all has elaborated an extensive though not comprehensive policy of democratic conditionality. It has considerable leverage because the prize for compliance on the part of applicant states is full membership of that organization.

Thus, over the last decade and in the process of the eastern enlargement, the EU developed policies of conditionality as a means to transform the governing structures, the economy and the civil society of the candidate countries. The offer of full membership has been the most powerful form of conditional reward on offer by the Union.

The Union developed two main steps in the process: gate-keeping, bench-marking and monitoring. “Gate-keeping refers to the process whereby depending on the depth and speed of the process of transformation, EU institutions determine when and whether to give the green light either to the different stages along the accession process or to the delivery of additional benefits.”²² The stages which applied to the CEECs were: privileged access to trade and aid, signing and implementing enhanced association

²² Grabbe, H (2001), “How does Europeanization Affect CEEC Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity?”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8(6), p.1020

agreements, opening Accession negotiations, signing the Accession Treaty, ratifying the Accession Treaty and finally entering the EU.

The Union has also extended other benefits to its neighbours that are either complementary or alternative to full accession. Complementary benefits include the Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkan countries, expected to result into a full accession process, or the inclusion of Turkey in the EU customs union. Other benefits are viewed as alternatives to membership. These include the disbursement of financial assistance (in the case of all non-EU Mediterranean partners) or enhanced association agreements (in the case of Israel). EU institutions are also currently in the process of developing a Wider Europe initiative, directed at the EU's new neighbours, which are not foreseen (for the time being) to become full members. The conditional benefits on offer are expected to include participation in the EU single market without institutional representation and decision making power. Also in the delivery of these alternative benefits, the Union is developing stages of negotiation, agreement and ratification in which EU actors could exercise influence.

During the last decade, the Union benchmarked and monitored the progress of the candidate states. The two main instruments were the Accession Partnerships and the Commission Progress Reports. The Accession Partnerships set out a list of short and medium-term recommendations that candidate states were expected to fulfil in order to satisfy the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. The Accession Partnerships were based on and revised annually according to the Commission Progress Reports. The Reports overviewed the developments in the candidates related to the compliance with EU criteria.

But how could EU conditionality affect conflict settlement and resolution efforts? The impact on peace efforts could be direct and indirect. Progress along the stages of accession or additional benefits could be made directly conditional on peace-making. The 1993 Stability Pact promoted by the French Prime Minister Balladur was intended to diffuse minority and border tensions in the CEECs. Unless the candidates settled their most salient disputes, they would be prevented from opening accession negotiations with

the Union.²³ The Pact indeed promoted agreements between Slovakia and Hungary (1995) and later between Romania and Hungary (1996). In other cases, such as Cyprus, direct conditionality on the metropolitan state (the Greek Cypriot side) was lifted, but retained for the breakaway entity (the Turkish Cypriot side), given the continued policy of non-recognition. It was also exerted increasingly on Turkey, particularly since 1999.

Alternatively or in addition, conditionality could have an indirect effect on conflict resolution efforts by affecting policy fields linked to the conflict resolution agenda. As discussed above, ethno-political conflicts can encompass several institutional and policy dimensions such as government structures, constitutional systems, trade, refugee and asylum policies, borders and border regimes and security arrangements. Changes in positions on any of these areas is likely to affect peace efforts by affecting the bargaining positions of the state or entity in question. For example, Commission requirements on trade policy vis-à-vis the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro affected the positions of Serb and Montenegrin authorities towards each other and towards the State Union itself. EU demands on Turkey to extend language rights to its non-Turkish population affects Turkey's Kurdish question.

But how do these policies of conditionality work their way into domestic political dynamics affecting domestic practice? Rational institutionalism argues that actors are rational, goal-oriented and purposeful. They engage in strategic interactions using their resources to maximise their utilities on the basis of ordered preferences. They weigh the costs and benefits of different strategies anticipating the other's behaviour.²⁴ EU conditionality generates 'simple learning': strategies and tactics change, while underlying interests and preferences do not – "institutions are a structure that actors run into, face problems and then recalculate how, in the presence of the structure, to achieve their interests."²⁵

²³ Tocci, *op cit*, p. 12

²⁴ Borzel, T. and T. Risse (2000), "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change", *European Integration Online Papers*, 4(15), Accessed 20 May. 2006 URL <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015.htm>

²⁵ Checkel, J. (1999), "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe". *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1), p.92

EU conditionality can either have a direct effect by prescribing a particular solution or ruling out another, or an indirect effect by altering the domestic opportunity structure. In the former case, EU conditionality can affect the range of feasible solutions in peace negotiations. If the EU categorically rules out the option of secession within a candidate state, the latter may have to concentrate on other solutions such as federation.²⁶ For example, all European institutions explicitly ruled out the separate accession of two states in Cyprus, as well as the accession of northern Cyprus together with Turkey.

Yet given the EU's limited ability to categorically prescribe laws and policies beyond its borders, conditionality alters domestic political opportunities by offering resources and legitimisation to some actors while constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals. The empowerment of some groups over the others may occur indirectly by providing support and legitimacy to the positions advocated by particular groups, or directly by supporting politically or financially the domestic groups themselves. For example, EU funding has been made available to bi-communal groups in Cyprus, the Middle East, the Balkans, Northern Ireland and the Caucasus. Technical, political and financial support has been provided also to the efforts of moderate political forces in conflict situations. In the autumn of 2003 member states expressed their support for the Israeli-Palestinian 'Geneva initiative' led by former Israeli Minister of Interior Yossi Beilin and Palestinian Authority Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo.

The extent to which adaptational pressure generate domestic change depends on the 'goodness of fit' between EU and domestic practices. To what extent is there a connection or overlap between domestic practices and EU standards and conditions? When the overlap is complete or entirely absent, conditionality is least likely to have effect. When instead some groups within the domestic political system are working towards change in a similar direction to that advocated by the Union, conditionality could strengthen these groups and/or modify the direction of policy change. When EU

²⁶ Knill, C & D. Lehmkuhl (1999). "How Europe Matters: Mechanisms of Europeanization" *European Integration Online Papers*, 4(15). Accessed 20 May. 2006 URL <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007.htm>

conditionality legitimises the discourse of particular domestic actors, EU conditions are absorbed or accommodated and become part of domestic political dynamics.²⁷

But the extent to which these conditions actually alter domestic practices may be limited. Domestic positions are reframed through a different discourse, which is strengthened by an EU dimension. Real policy practices or bargaining positions do not necessarily change. Greek Cypriot positions historically advocated the full liberalisation of the three freedoms of movement, settlement and property throughout the island. The need for compliance with the *acquis communautaire* allowed the Greek Cypriot leadership to reframe its unchanged positions through an EU discourse. The ‘three freedoms’ in Cyprus had to be liberalised because they overlapped with the ‘four freedoms’ of the EU *acquis*.²⁸

Democratic Consolidation and Political Conditions: Brussels Perspective

It has long been held by political scientists, especially those working on regime change, that the involvement of new democracies in European integration can only be beneficial to their eventual consolidation. It has also been assumed that this effect is gradual and long term as a result of actual membership. According to Whitehead, full membership of the European Union (EU) in Whitehead’s summary

generates powerful, broad-based and long-term support for the establishment of democratic institutions because it is irreversible, and sets in train a cumulative process of economic and political integration that offers incentives and reassurances to a wide array of social forces.....it sets in motion very complex and profound set of mutual adjustment processes, both within the incipient democracy and in its interactions with the rest of the Community, nearly all of which tend to favour democratic consolidation..... in the long run such democracy by convergence may well prove the most decisive international dimension of democratization, but the EU has yet to prove that case fully.²⁹

²⁷ Risse, T., & M.G. Cowles (2001), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press

²⁸ Tocci, *op cit*, p. 14

²⁹ Whitehead, L. (1996), *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Geoffrey Pridham argues that one should not assume that integration impacts on democratization are only long term. Democratic consolidation normally takes a couple of decades to be achieved. But such integration impacts may be evident much earlier on if not at the start of the process. This is emphasized by the host of political conditions which the accession countries need to satisfy in advance of and in parallel to membership negotiations. Secondly, it cannot be maintained that these impacts are always positive given the considerable pressures deriving from accession.³⁰

Signs have been apparent that the EU engages in strengthening executive and bureaucratic power without active popular support among prospective Member States. This creates a potential for widening the gap between political elites and masses, already a problem in post-communist democracies and hence for creating disillusionment when democratic attitudes have not fully taken root. That would raise questions about Europeanization and democratization pulling in opposite directions. In this context it needs to be asked whether policy-makers have a like minded understanding of democratic consolidation.³¹

It is evident from the above that democratic consolidation is best measured by differentiating between levels of that process. This need is recognized in some of the democratization literature as in Linz and Stepan's five areas of a consolidated democracy: "the rule of law, the state apparatus, and civil, political and economic society."³² But it is crucial in doing so to focus on dynamic interactions between consolidation levels, for this provides us with a manageable link for estimating EU impacts through political conditions.

³⁰ Pridham, Geoffrey (2002), "EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-communist States-Formality and Reality", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(3), p. 954

³¹ Bideleux, R. (2001), "Europeanization and the Limits to Democratization in East-Central Europe" in Pridham, G. and Agh, A. (eds) *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe*, Manchester: Manchester University Press

³² Linz, J & Stepan, A. (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press

In general terms, democratic consolidation is not only a much lengthier process than transition to democracy but also one with wider and usually deeper effects. It involves in the first instance the gradual removal of the remaining uncertainties surrounding transition (e.g. constitutional, elite behaviour, resolution of civil-military relations) – known as negative consolidation. The way is then opened for the institutionalization of a new democracy, the internalization of rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values through the activation of civil society and a ‘remaking’ of the political culture – all of which constitute positive consolidation.³³ It is obvious that democratic consolidation – certainly its positive dimension – is essentially about stabilizing and rooting substantive democracy, which goes beyond formal democracy into deeper areas of political life, notably civil society.³⁴

Much depends on achieving consolidation, as well as the time required for this, on the weight of historical inheritances and problems. Furthermore, one may expect post-communist countries to take a long time here, owing to their multiple transformation, for democratization has been taking place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) since 1989 in conjunction with both economic system and transformation and, in many cases, also nation- and state-building. It goes without saying that interactions between all three parallel processes are likely to be significant. In other words, one can ask whether such interactions beneficial or detrimental to democratization? Thus, in order to capture the dynamics of regime change, it is crucial to focus on its different levels, and in particular on how these interact and the intensity and consequences of such interactions. Notionally, different dimensions may develop at different paces and consolidation may be achieved here at different points of time.

Levels of democratic consolidation which incorporate the parallel transformations should include the following: the formal – the institutionalization of rules and procedures; actors and linkages – political but also non-political elite groups and their interrelationships, as well as their adaptation to change and their role in legitimating new democracies;

³³ Pridham, G. (2000), *The Dynamics of Democratization: A Comparative Approach*. London: Continuum

³⁴ Kaldor, M & Vejvoda, I (eds.) (1999) *Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe*, London: Pinter

economic transformation and its interactions with political democratization; civil society and vertical dynamics with elite-society interactions; stateness and national identity problems and how these impact on democratization and vice versa; and international influences on democratization.³⁵ It is important to add, where relevant in these levels and continuing legacy problems from both previous historical experience and the form of authoritarian regime collapse. This approach thus differs from that of Linz and Stepan by considering historical factors, but focusing on parallel transformations and by including international factors which are often neglected in traditional theories of comparative democratizations.

The formulation of democratic conditions (DC, known bureaucratically in Brussels as ‘political conditions’) has undergone considerable evolution over time, expanding to include substantive democratic requirements. But it has also become a more central and proactive part of the overall enlargement process in the case of the CEECs, influenced partly by concern over special problems relating to post communist politics. This more interventionist approach is no longer confined to post-communist applicant states. Member states are now formally subject to a democracy test since the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam provided for suspension of those which infringed the EU’s principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. This provision became a dramatic issue in 2000 with the bilateral sanctions imposed on Austria.³⁶

It is important to bear in mind that while playing its role, directly or indirectly, the European Union should not be seen as the creator of democracy in other states. On the contrary, it would be correct to say the EU basically performs the role of promoter of democracy. The success or failure of the EU’s policies towards democratization may depend upon the combination of factors that may help or hinder the prospects of democratization in a country. One can find both these possibilities in different countries of Eastern Europe. For example, the factors that obstruct the process of democratization

³⁵ Pridham, *op cit*

³⁶ Merlington et al (2001), “The Right and the Righteous?: European Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sanctions Against Austria”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(1), p.70

or democratic consolidation include the lingering legacy of authoritarianism, economic difficulties, weakness of civil society, heterogeneous population and corruption, etc. Countries like Croatia, Romania, Slovakia, not to talk of Turkey and Ukraine were found to be suffering from these challenges as a result of which they were not making sufficient progress towards democratic consolidation.

It is also useful to keep in mind how international actors may shape the process of democratization. Paul Kubicek has identified the following four broad alternative categories – control, contagion, convergence and conditionality.³⁷

Control

According to Kubicek, one way in which it is possible to influence and shape the politics of a country is by taking direct control of its political institutions. There are historical examples of this type like the role of Allied occupation in West Germany and Japan, post-war Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. But it is difficult to claim that such occupations also promote the process of democratization. While as a matter of its external policy the EU does not aspire to enforce democracy in a particular country through occupation and by means of force, it is possible that incorporation as a member of the EU – thereby meaning a certain degree of EU control over state policy – would be important guarantor for democracy. This is also true that by the Copenhagen Criteria any new member would already have to have effective democratic institutions, but there is no direct mechanism through which the EU can impose democracy on any state while it is still struggling to consolidate a new political regime. For states then the notion of control lies at best in the future when they have already gained EU membership.

Contagion

The idea of democratic contagion suggests that events or systems in a country or a group of countries, to the extent that they are seen to be attractive or achievable, can spread

³⁷ Kubicek, Paul J. (2003), *The European Union and Democratization*, London: Routledge

across borders.³⁸ What is known as the democratic wave explains this phenomenon as well as the logic of globalization. A large part of Latin America began the transition to democracy roughly simultaneously. Or more recently, the contagion effect in Eastern Europe saw the democratic wind blowing fast from Budapest and Warsaw to Berlin and Prague and finally to Sophia and Bucharest.

The contagion effect may have more than one dimension. While it can be based on events (transition in one country inspires actors in others), it is also possible to speak of demonstration effect of the wealth security and stability of the outside actors. For example, many have pointed out the Western countries of the EU in particular as a source of inspiration, given their wealth, security and stability. In this process the examples may be emulated and institutions and practices may be copied as they have proven record of success. This is also true that the contagion phenomenon, in order to work more effectively, may conform to a certain geographic logic. That is to say that the states situated in geographical proximity have the greater possibility of influencing each other than otherwise. This is because of the likelihood of “infection” is greater for states that border on democratic states.³⁹ The general supposition about the contagion theory is that the international actor, in this case the EU is primarily passive without any overt policy to influence actors beyond its borders. But considering the role of EU in Eastern European democratization this assumption is far from correct as it has put in rather determined political and economic efforts to achieve the objective.⁴⁰

Convergence

The idea of convergence can be viewed as a refinement on the more simple notions of contagion. It has been defined by Whitehead “as the enlargement of a pre-existing democratic community of democratic states.”⁴¹ Geoffrey Pridham argues that convergence is ‘gradual movement in system conformity based upon established

³⁸ Paul J. Kubicek argues that anti-democratic notions, such as ethnic based, intolerant nationalism, can also be contagious and sweep across national borders

³⁹ Kopstein J. & D. Reilly (2000), “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World”, *World Politics* 53

⁴⁰ Jha, *op cit*, p.7

⁴¹ Whitehead, L. (1996), “Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe”, in Whitehead (ed.) *The International Dimension of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

democracies with power to attract regimes in transition', and that the EU may be the most ambitious example of convergence.⁴² Convergence could be achieved either through incorporation or socialization through the activism of 'transitional networks, involving the EU agencies in political, legal and economic reform efforts, the internalization of democratic norms', etc. The main difference between contagion and convergence lies in the fact that the latter aspires more explicitly to account for the motivation of the change in targeted states. Convergence thus helps to identify the casual mechanisms in the democratization process.

Conditionality

This is said to be the most developed of all approaches relating to international aspects of democratization and can also be considered the most visible and proactive of policies explicitly designed to promote democratic convergence. Conditionality is explained as "the linking of perceived benefits, e.g., economic aid, membership of an organization and political support, etc, to the fulfilment of certain programme, such as the advancement of the democratic principles and institutions in a target state. This is by far the most developed of all approaches related to the international aspects of democratization."⁴³

This also refers to the most visible and proactive policies explicitly designed to promote democratic convergence. Conditionality is most explicitly enshrined in the Copenhagen Criteria for membership. But EU's latter policies have not been restricted to the Copenhagen Criteria alone. One can point out conditionality, particularly the observance of human rights. Conditionality is adopting the desired policy. To the extent that the elites and public at large in targeted states accept the lure of EU membership and good ties with Europe, or economic assistance, it is possible to argue that the EU could utilize a variety of such methods to influence political developments in other states.

As mentioned above the EU has played a role in the resolution of conflict between Slovakia and Hungary (1995) and later between Romania and Hungary (1996). It was

⁴² Pridham, G (2000), *The Dynamics of Democratization*, New York, Continuum

⁴³ Kubicek, *op cit*

also able to exert considerable influence on the tension between Cyprus and Greece. Out of all these the conflict between Slovakia and Hungary is studied in detail, to ascertain the EU's role in the resolution of the conflict.

The conflict between Slovakia and Hungary

The relations between these two countries have been soured by the legacy of the past, i.e. the dispute over the Gabčíkovo-Nagymáros hydroelectric project, which was launched by János Kádár and Gustav Husák in 1977, and the 600,000-strong ethnic Hungarian minority, remnants of the 1,000-year Hungarian presence in what is today known as Slovakia. The disintegration of the Czechoslovak federation, which led to the emergence of an independent Slovakia, further complicated matters, since the ethnic Hungarian minority was deprived of the support it had previously received from the federal authorities in Prague and was faced with rising Slovakian national assertiveness.

The Gabčíkovo-Nagymáros project was planned as the largest hydroelectric complex in Europe. It was agreed by Hungary and the erstwhile Czechoslovakia, and neither gave consideration to either environmental issues or public opinion in the two countries. The more lenient Hungarians finally bowed to mounting public pressure on environmental grounds regarding the project after 1984. This resulted in the Hungarian Prime Minister Németh cancelling the Hungarian part of the project (Nagymáros) in 1989, and the Hungarian parliament passing a bill authorizing the government to renegotiate the treaty, and to annul it should negotiations fail. The process of renegotiation was hampered mostly by Slovakia's drive towards independence in 1990-1991, during which Gabčíkovo became a rallying point of Slovak national identity and a symbol of its cherished sovereignty. Neither was it helpful that Vladimír Mečiar, the standard-bearer of this drive towards independence, was Slovakia's prime minister prior to separation and later federal commissioner in charge of the project. In any case, the Czechoslovak part was two-thirds completed by late 1991 whereas the Hungarians only had built 30% of their part. It therefore came as little surprise that the negotiations stalled.

Following a further resolution passed by the Hungarian parliament in March 1992, along similar lines to that of 1989, the government of Prime Minister József Antall unilaterally annulled the 1977 treaty on 7 May 1992. The federal Czechoslovak, but in particular the Slovak authorities claimed that Hungary had violated an international treaty and went ahead with a variant of the original project, which entailed a minor diversion of the Danube. Hungary argued that the new plans constituted a violation of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty defining the border between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A battle of charges and counter charges, with nationalistic overtones, ensued. Diplomatic shuttling between Prague, Bratislava and Budapest was unable to halt construction, and the Slovaks began diverting the Danube on 24 October 1992. The crisis was defused thanks to the mediation of the European Community, on 28 October, when an agreement of principle was signed during a Visegrad-EC summit in London.

This crisis unfolded against the background of Meciar's victory in Slovakia in the June 1992 elections, which sealed the fate of the Czechoslovak federation, his nationalistic rhetoric, which caused deep concern among the ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia, and Hungary's late attempts to internationalize the conflict after the river diversion plan had become irreversible. After officially requesting the help of the Danube Commission on 14 October 1992, Antall sent letters (which obtained no response) to world leaders, and even wrote to the UN Security Council on 24 October informing it of the situation. Apart from the project's advanced state, the Slovaks defended their position on the grounds of flood prevention and improvement of navigation. A last-minute Slovak proposal for joint use of some of the facilities met with no response from Budapest.

Pressure and efforts to mediate by the European Community proved central in defusing the crisis. The Community had been following the issue with concern, due to the possible implications for the already shaky Hungarian-Slovak relations. In May 1992 proposals by Commissioner Andriessen to set up an independent outside committee of technical experts foundered in view of the parties' reluctance to delegate decision-making to a third

party.⁴⁴ The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, brought up the subject at the EC summit in Birmingham on 19 October 1992, and exerted a great deal of pressure on the parties involved. While an EC-sponsored negotiation in Brussels between Czech, Slovak and Hungarian delegations broke down without agreement, the Community was more successful at the EC-Visegrad summit in London on 28 October 1992, where “the European Community addressed the parties in much stronger terms than before, pointing out that the EC's goodwill could be endangered if the dispute escalated further.”⁴⁵

The London Protocol stated that construction would be stopped at a later date, it was agreed that Czechoslovakia would re-divert 95% of the Danube water to its original course, that the turbines would not be brought into operation, that a group of experts would examine environmental, shipping and hydrological aspects of the project, and that Prague would accept a final ruling from the International court of Justice. The issue of submission of the case to the Court was finally cleared at a meeting between the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Slovakia, Antall and Meciar, chaired by Commissioner Van den Broek on 4 March 1993

In the case of Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian minority, the problem was accentuated by the splitting up of the Czechoslovak federation and the Slovakian drive for independence, led by Vladimir Meciar's nationalist programme, which reflected the underlying fear of losing their identity to strong neighbours displayed by Slovak politicians, who are aware of Slovakia's relatively weak cultural base and national identity.

The comparatively comfortable position of ethnic Hungarians as a small minority in a multinational state, where their relative weight was not perceived as a threat by the two main national groups, and where they were protected by the federal structure, changed when they became a substantial and to some extent alien presence in an otherwise

⁴⁴ Commissioner Frank Andriessen had set three conditions for EU intervention: a letter from both parties requesting EC involvement, a commitment that the final recommendations would be accepted and the promise to refrain from hampering the investigation. Neither party was prepared to accept the second condition, while the third was absolutely unacceptable to Slovakia (which wanted to finish the project by 1 October 1992)

⁴⁵ Munuera, *op cit*, p.5

ethnically homogeneous Slovakia. In this new scenario their rights were being compromised. Several factors have been instrumental in limiting the potential for deterioration in Hungarian-Slovak relations over the Gabčíkovo project and the ethnic minority issue

The first is the moderating influence exerted by some leaders and the ultimately sensible stance adopted by most Hungarian and Slovak politicians in coping with bilateral disputes, which has offset to a large extent their understandable inexperience in managing bilateral relations. Hungarian leaders have been aware of the need not to isolate Slovakia, and of their better chances of defending ethnic Hungarian minorities by appealing to external third parties.

Some Slovak leaders, too, have shown a certain degree of good sense, despite Mečiar's often inflammatory remarks and uncompromising position on minority issues. For example Slovakia's Defence Minister, twice denied claims by Mečiar accusing Budapest of stepping up military activities on the border and of triggering an arms race with its recent purchases. Slovakia's President, Michal Kováč, has also received unanimous praise for his permanent search for dialogue with the ethnic Hungarian minority.

Even Vladimír Mečiar understood the need to show goodwill *vis-à-vis* the international community, and the advantages a third party could offer in terms of face-saving when hard choices had to be made. His government accepted visits by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) missions, and was attentive to their recommendations. He reluctantly accepted European Community mediation in the dispute over Gabčíkovo, and was careful not to be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to negotiation. His position was generally that of showing a willingness to negotiate while delaying the implementation of agreements.

The basic underlying factor imposing a certain measure of restraint on the parties has been their interest in joining the European Union. Having been singled out as part of the first group of Central European candidates for admission, neither Bratislava nor Budapest

could afford to jeopardise its privileged position by failing to resolve minority issues and the dispute over the Gabčíkovo-Nagymáros project. This has given the European Union considerable leverage on the behaviour of the parties, as the crisis of October 1992 over the dam on the Danube illustrated. Furthermore, the parties' interest in joining the European Union has also indirectly enhanced the position of the CSCE, whose approval and membership of which are perceived as prerequisites for the highly coveted admission to the Union. Their role in suggesting ways of protecting the ethnic Hungarian minority and their monitoring of Bratislava's implementation of recommended measures has been and still is fundamental in reducing bilateral tension.

Conclusion

The moot question is can the appeal of membership to the European Union contribute to the prevention of conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe? In principle, it may contribute in two ways: on the one hand by imposing self-restraint on countries that want to show their good intentions and their readiness for membership; on the other hand, this appeal provides the European Union with important external leverage over the behaviour of potential candidates. This effect has perhaps been best illustrated in the case of Slovakia-Hungary: pressure from the European Community was a key factor in brokering the London accord on Gabčíkovo and in encouraging Bratislava to moderate its stance on minorities.

There are certain riders on the effectiveness of this power of attraction, however. First of all, it seems useful if membership appears likely to be granted in the relatively near future. Otherwise, it might produce frustration. It is thus necessary to find ways of providing countries earmarked for membership with gradual but effective integration.

This question is closely linked to the effects of closer integration. For the European Union to have leverage, the population and governments of these countries have to consider EU membership as something worth striving for; if they have to undergo painful restructuring processes but their products are not easily allowed into the European Union,

and if this situation is prolonged, the European Union might find itself facing governments that are less amenable.⁴⁶ Hence, the need to offer some of the substance of integration during the period of transition, which risks being protracted for some Central and East European states. Some degree of market access, technical and financial assistance geared to labour-intensive exports, and perhaps even limited forms of EU membership (closer association with the activities of the CFSP and then membership of the CFSP, for instance) could help preserve the desirability of accession to the European Union.

Another related issue is the geographical limits of membership. The European Union is likely to lose much of its influence in the region if some Central and East European countries feel that they are permanently excluded from the club, especially if they perceive this as an arbitrary decision.

This raises the difficult problem of criteria for membership: should all Central Europeans holding Europe Agreements be integrated at the same time, irrespective of their performance in the economic and political fields? What degree of divergence in performance should be tolerated in the interests of regional stability? These are difficult questions to which no clear answer appears in sight at present, but which will have to be addressed by the Union at some stage.

Then there is the problem of those countries for which membership is not being considered; this concerns Russia in particular, a country too big to be integrated but which is central to some of the potential conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia is not indifferent to incentives from the West, nor to the attention paid by the West to certain of its neighbours.

In this respect the European Union does have important leverage, directly but mostly indirectly through the granting of association status or membership to particular

⁴⁶ Munuera, Gabriel (1994), "Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience", *Chaillot Papers*, 15/16:91

countries. By drawing the Baltic states closer, the European Union is, in the view of many, already exerting some influence on Moscow's approach to these countries. If this is so, there might be value in earmarking these republics clearly for membership by offering them Europe Agreements immediately.

In conclusion, the power of attraction of the European Union is and may remain an instrument for moderating behaviour, provided membership is forthcoming, perceived as worthwhile and clear as to its geographical coverage.

Chapter 3

The Balkan Imbrolio

Background

The bloody wars of secession in 1991-1995 gave the former Yugoslav republics a reputation in the West for engaging in fratricidal conflict based on ancient ethnic hatreds. The reality was much more complex, as shown by variations within and between the republics and by the clever manipulation of antagonisms and local hardships by opportunistic politicians. Tensions had been present within Yugoslavia since its inception, revolving almost exclusively around questions of identity and the delicate balance between, and autonomy of, its constituent republics and provinces. The Serbs held the balance of power in the post-Treaty of Versailles Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. During the Second World War, the occupation of Yugoslavia by Nazi Germany provided the opportunity for systematic persecution in this region as a whole, with the Ustashe regime in Croatia particularly notorious for atrocities committed against Serbs from 1941 onwards.

In the case of the former Yugoslavia, it was primarily what James Gow has called “the Serbian project for new borders,” which included the use of paramilitaries and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army in the pursuit of a strategy of ethnic cleansing of weakly armed Bosnian, Croat, and Kosovar communities that accounted for most of the horrific violence of the war.¹ Without careful organization, the horrors could not have been so great and ethnic cleansing so successful. In one of the most notorious episodes of the Bosnian war, the fall of Srebrenica, an estimated 7000 Muslim men were rounded up and massacred by Serbian soldiers in a matter of days. Such a “success” would have been impossible without good planning and organization.² The process, moreover, could not simply rely on ethnic hatreds “stretching back thousands of years.” The crimes were not perpetrated in a manner of by all against all but usually only by a carefully selected

¹ Honig, Jan Willem (2000), “New Conflicts: Risks and Challenges”, *European Security*, p. 100

² Honig, *op cit*, p.100

minority of “special forces” and paramilitaries that exceed their operations according to a carefully laid-out scenario.

More than three decades earlier, the ‘Croatian Spring’ of 1971 was an attempt to re-establish Croatian cultural autonomy in the light of the perceived hegemony of a Serbian bureaucracy. The response of Josip Broz Tito, who had ruled the country since the end of the Second World War, was to undertake a series of reforms, culminating in the 1974 Constitution, which devolved substantial autonomy to the six republics³ and to the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This system came to be cynically exploited by Slobodan Milosevic 15 years later, immediately before and indeed during the break-up of Yugoslavia.

The tension between the various national and ethnic populations in this region was inflamed by the economic chaos that characterized the years following Tito’s death in 1980. This period saw spiraling inflation, repeated devaluation of the dinar and increasingly desperate measures to appropriate foreign currency in order to service the burgeoning national debt. With regular shortages of goods and power throughout the country, the authority of central government was challenged more and more often, both by the media and by wide sections of the population, as exemplified in the late 1980s by increasingly regular large-scale demonstrations.⁴

In this scenario, opportunistic leaders such as Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman were able to garner substantial support by appealing to nationalist sentiments, thereby establishing effective personal control over the state apparatus. As nationalist rhetoric became increasingly vociferous the economies of the republics became ever more divergent, and with the federal structure straining under the weight of centrifugal forces, the disintegration of Yugoslavia became only a matter of time.

³ Yugoslavia consisted of six republics which were Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Croatia and two provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina

⁴ Tanner, M. (1997), *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War*, London: Yale University Press.

The first war after the collapse of communism, when the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) invaded Slovenia following its secession from the Federation on 26 June 1991, lasted ten days. The JNA was defeated and the secession was both swift and successful, partly because of the high degree of ethnic homogeneity in that republic.

Croatia, on the other hand, was in no such position, although President Tudjman had planned to secede along with President Kucan, his Slovenian counterpart. The Serb-Croat war resulted from Milosevic's determination not to let Croatia secede while it still contained Croatian Serbs; he was not against secession per se. In fact, in March 1991 Milosevic and Tudjman had met secretly to decide the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was to be carved up between a greater Croatia and a greater Serbia.⁵

The failure of the international community to foresee or manage the transition to independence of Slovenia and Croatia motivated concerted action to prevent bloodshed in Bosnia. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution at the start of 1992 authorizing the deployment of a substantial force, but the force was not given a strong enough mandate to stop the advance of the (now) Serb army into Bosnia. However, by 1995 the military balance of power has shifted dramatically and, after a series of NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions, all parties signed the Dayton accords marking an end to the war.

Tensions within the Serbian province of Kosovo had been kept under control during the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. By 1998, however, forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had entered the province with the aim of disarming local insurgents and reimposing federal authority. Following the collapse of mediated talks at Rambouillet between the Yugoslavs and the Kosovo Liberation Army, further NATO bombings (this time in Serbia itself) resulted in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement. This recognized Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo, allowed for the deployment of a stabilization force (KFOR) and installed a UN mission to oversee the transition to peace and, ultimately, democracy.

⁵ Glenn M. (1999), *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, London: Granta

Why was the Balkans so prone to conflicts? The breakdown of the Yugoslav federation

Although the origins of the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia can be traced to its very inception in 1945, and more specifically to the 'Croatian Spring' in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the resulting 1974 constitution, it was only after Tito's death in 1980 that the foundations of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to crumble decisively. The economic system of self-management, the federal structure's collective executive organs in which all the republics (and autonomous provinces after 1974) were equally represented, and the unifying League of Communists gradually deteriorated. The vacuum left by Tito was filled by a drive towards formal democratization or rather republicanization (for many consider that it was the republics which increased their power vis-à-vis Belgrade, rather than all the citizens of Yugoslavia in a truly democratic manner), but also by rising nationalism and ethnic polarization.⁶

Serbia resented the creation of the federation, when two autonomous republics (Kosovo and Vojvodina) were formed out of its soil, and deepened further after the constitution of 1974 gave them equal status in the collective presidency. In 1981, riots in Kosovo (the cradle of Serbian culture whose population was then 90% Albanian) over the failure of Belgrade's economic policies to raise living standards ignited anti-Albanian passions in Serbia, and provided a rallying theme for Serbian nationalism. In March 1986, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art published a memorandum on the oppression of Serbs in communist Yugoslavia which became a manifesto of Serbian nationalist opposition.

When Slobodan Milosevic seized power in an internal coup in the Serbian socialist party in 1987, he was determined to realize the manifesto's programme. He created a 'Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins', which became a tool for Milosevic's subversion of the political system in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro (considered by Serbia as ethnically Serb). A Belgrade-backed campaign of

⁶ Munuera, *op cit*, p. 49

demonstrations brought down the governments in these regions, replacing them with Milosevic's supporters in 1988-89. The autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo was progressively eroded, and finally terminated in 1990. At the same time, Milosevic behaved in an authoritarian manner towards Serbia and the federation: he defended the monopoly of the Communist Party, the collapsing 'self-management' economic model, and a more centralized federal system.

In addition to the Serbian nationalists and the communist bureaucracy, he had the support of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which was interested in preserving a socialist Yugoslavia and afraid of losing its privileges. As polarization deepened and the drive towards the dismemberment of Yugoslavia continued, the army, the top ranks of which were already dominated by Serbs, became even more Serbian-dominated (the other republics sent fewer and fewer conscripts).

In the meantime, other republics (particularly Slovenia and Croatia) were already moving towards democratization, or at least the replacement of ruling elites through formally democratic procedures, and pressed for further economic and political decentralization. Liberal aims along with anti-centralist/Serbian nationalist themes in the hands of local, anti-communist, politicians. This was especially true in Croatia, with its long history of friction with Belgrade. Croatia and Slovenia were the richest republics and had long complained of having to subsidize the rest of Yugoslavia (Belgrade included). They were growing wary of Milosevic's policies and by 1989 political leaders in Zagreb and Ljubljana had decided that Milosevic had become a threat to the stability of Yugoslavia.

In 1989 the Slovenian Assembly amended the republican constitution and proclaimed the right to secede on the basis of the federal constitution (which upheld the right of nations to secede), and in December of that year the Slovenian Communist Party endorsed a multiparty system. Belgrade reacted with a ban on commercial relations with Slovenia, a move that finally disrupted the already strained Yugoslav economy. Another cornerstone of the Federation, the League of Communists, collapsed when the Slovenian delegates walked out of the Congress in 1990. Moreover, republican elections had brought non-

communist governments to power in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of 1990 (in Macedonia the communists were a minority in a coalition).

There were growing signs of conflict between Serbia, which had the support of the JNA, and its satellites (Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina) on the one side, and Slovenia and Croatia on the other. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were cautiously standing aside, although their sympathy was with the rebellious republics. At stake appeared to be two opposing visions of Yugoslavia's future: democratization and a multiparty system, movement towards a market economy and the European Community and a more decentralized confederation versus communist monopoly, a command economy and a more centralized federal system (some would argue that Milosevic, aware that a Serbian-controlled federation was not feasible, had already chosen to push for a Greater Serbia).

However, it was also considered that the underlying struggle was one between various elites, some democratic and some less so, which was taking place mostly at the republican level, and in which all were using nationalism as the best route to power.⁷ The confrontation was heightened by a trend towards ethnic polarization and the revival of old hatreds and tensions that dated back to the interwar and World War II periods. The fact that Serbs formed substantial minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the limited sensitivity showed by Croatian President Tudjman and the new Croatian constitution in this regard, did not help calm ethnic passions.

When meetings between leaders of the republics in 1991 failed to avert a showdown, and Slovenia and Croatia warned of their intention to secede, the seeds of conflict were sown, since Milosevic was supporting the right of Serbs to live in a single state (a strategy which he employed partially because of his actual nationalistic beliefs, but also to divert attention from Serbia's economic difficulties and silence any opposition). On 26 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, following referendums that were boycotted by the Serbs in Croatia (who had declared that they would seek their own independent republic in Krajina), and the JNA intervened. With practically no Serb

⁷ Tanner, op cit

minority in Slovenia, after being defeated in several skirmishes, the JNA concentrated in Croatia, where it had previously partially emptied the arsenals of the territorial defense units (created by Tito to balance the power of the army), and helped Serb irregulars to seize 30% of Croatia's territory (Krajina, Slavonia and Baranja) by the autumn of 1991.

At first, at least until June-July 1991, the European Community's aim was to preserve the federation (a goal shared by the UN and the United States), for fear of creating a dangerous precedent in an ethnically volatile Europe. When, in June-July, the conflict unraveled, the European Community engaged in a "damage control operation."⁸ A number of ministerial missions (the EC Troika of Foreign Ministers) and other negotiating missions by the Dutch EC presidency attempted to mediate throughout the summer. These efforts resulted in the Brioni declaration of 7 July, which suspended the implementation of the two seceding republics' independence for three months, helped to bring about a cease-fire in Slovenia and led to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army from that republic by mid-October 1991. The European Community attempted to steer a course between Croatia's demands for EC forces to be interposed, and reluctance by Belgrade (for the federal presidency had *de facto* collapsed) to accept foreign interference on internal matters.

On 29 July, the EC Council of Ministers stressed the inviolability of internal frontiers and set up a mission in Zagreb to oversee the implementation of the Brioni Agreements; this was extended to the Serbian areas of Croatia in September. The WEU declined to play any role at that stage, and the CSCE, hampered by Belgrade's power of veto, could do no more than decide to support EC efforts. Starting on 7 September, the EC-sponsored Conference on Yugoslavia (The Hague Conference), chaired by Lord Carrington, attempted to find a comprehensive negotiated solution to the underlying problems of former Yugoslavia. Lord Carrington was appointed chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, with three elements to his mandate: That the Conference would not start till a cease-fire was reached. "That there would be no changes in borders except by mutual

⁸ Lak, Maarten W. J. (1992), "EC and CSCE involvement in the Yugoslav crisis in 1991", *Helsinki Monitor*, 3(1), no. 1, p. 120

agreement. That none of the six republics would be recognized as a sovereign and independent, until a final comprehensive settlement was reached.”⁹

Furthermore, his plan proposed “a free association of independent states, asserted the inviolability of internal frontiers and provided for regions with a special statute.”¹⁰ Closer relations with the European Community would depend on the degree of cooperation shown by the republics, and diplomatic recognition would be linked to a general arrangement.

The Conference was adjourned on 8 November 1991, amid Milosevic's opposition to the principle of inviolability of borders between republics, the continuation of warfare and Serbian atrocities (of which Vukovar provided clear evidence), as well as Germany's pressure over recognition.

By December 1991, the internal balance in the European Community had tilted in favor of recognition. On 16 December, the European Community, against the advice of the UN Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance (the UNSG's personal representative in Yugoslavia since October 1991) and Lord Carrington, decided to recognize the independence of all republics that wished it (the deadline for applications was fixed for 23 December), provided they abided by international and CSCE standards, in particular concerning human rights, minority protection and the non-violent change of borders.

While the Badinter Commission, a body created at the same time as the conference to provide technical advice on mostly legal issues, was in favor of the immediate recognition of Macedonia and Slovenia, the European Community decided instead to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Meanwhile, Milosevic had suggested a UN peacekeeping force to Cyrus Vance. This became the Vance plan for the creation of the UN Protected

⁹ Danchev, Alex (1996), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, London, Macmillan Press Ltd

¹⁰ This statute would apply to the regions of Croatia with an ethnic Serb majority, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Sandjak. These statutes would provide for double nationality, the use of national emblems and anthems, and autonomous educational, legislative, administrative and judicial structures. The composition of police forces there would reflect the ethnic composition of the population. Finally, the implementation would be overseen by international institutions

Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. The plan was approved by the UNSC on 15 December, a cease-fire came into force on 2 January 1992, and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia was created in February. Its deployment began in April. One war had momentarily ended, and another was about to start.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was populated by Muslims Slavs (44%), Serbs (31%), and Croats (12%), who were to a large extent geographically intermingled. The Croats lived primarily in western Herzegovina, the Muslims were usually in a majority in the towns and the Serbs, living mainly in rural areas, concentrated in northern and north-eastern Bosnia.

By the autumn of 1991, the Muslim Slav Alija Izetbegovic presided over a coalition of Muslims, Serbs and Croats. He pursued a cautious policy of support for further democratization and decentralization, but at the same time tried to avoid alienating either the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Belgrade, in view of events in Croatia. Thus the Bosnian government attempted to negotiate a confederation that would provide further autonomy for the republics without separation from the Yugoslav state.

The fact that some understanding of the dimensions and seriousness of the emerging situation did exist is far outweighed by the apparent lack of understanding or the unwillingness to act, among many Western Governments. Lord Carrington had apparently stated in a letter (dated 2 December 1991) to Hans van den Broek, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (at that time President of the European Community Council of Ministers):

There is a real danger, perhaps even a probability, that BiH would also ask for independence and recognition, which would be wholly unacceptable to the Serbs in that Republic in which there are something like 100,000 JNA troops, some of which have withdrawn from Croatia. Milosevic has hinted that military action

would take place there if Croatia and Slovenia were recognized. That might well be the spark that sets BiH alight.¹¹

Similarly, Perez de Cuellar wrote to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany on 14 December 1991:

I trust also that you will have learnt of the deep concern that has been expressed by the Presidents of BiH and Macedonia, as well as by many others, that early selective recognition could result in a widening of the present conflict to those sensitive areas. Such a development could have grave consequences for the Balkan region as a whole.....¹²

The incomprehension about Yugoslav situation in much international, including trans-Atlantic debate, at that time was staggering. Jacques Delors, the then President of the European Commission, is reported to have remarked in the summer of 1991, when fighting broke out in Yugoslavia, “We do not interfere in American affairs. We hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours.”¹³ US Secretary of State, James Baker’s message when he visited Belgrade in June 1991, was apparently that the USA was opposed to the break-up of Yugoslavia, and opposed to the use of force to hold it together; much too subtle for anyone, least of all the belligerents in the Balkans, to understand. Whatever veneer of unity and pretence of being able to come to grips with the problem, in so far as the Europeans were concerned, fell away altogether with Germany’s extraordinary and unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. When the rest of the European Community, and ultimately the USA, decided there was no way back from that German decision, the die was cast. The world was officially committed to Tito’s internal administrative borders as state boundaries, even though they were still being disputed on the ground by rival armies of the Serbs, Muslims and Croats.

There are many analysts who believe that Germany, Austria and Hungary, and also possibly Italy, (some say even the Vatican), encouraged nationalistic and secessionist

¹¹ Cited in Nambiar, Satish (2006), “The European Community and the Conflict in the Balkans”, Lecture delivered on 23 March 2006 at the International Seminar on India and the European Union, at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University: New Delhi, p.4

¹² Cited in Nambiar, *op cit*, p. 5

¹³ Cited Nambiar, *op cit*, p.6

forces in Slovenia and Croatia; the rest of the developments were an inevitable fallout. Equally inevitable was the Serb view that what they were being subjected to was a German plot to subjugate them once again. It could be debated whether even these countries anticipated the savagery of the conflict their actions brought about. If they did not anticipate it in the context of events of unbelievable viciousness barely five decades before, to which the generation now running the republics were witness, and whose scars had still not disappeared, it was indeed gross incompetence or utter callousness. If they did anticipate it and even so proceeded as they did, they have much to answer for. Either way, the European Community and the USA share much of the blame for the carnage that took place in the former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s. It was not therefore surprising, that this guilt complex led to the governments of these countries, deflecting blame and responsibility on to the Serbs alone.¹⁴ The fact that the Serbs had a case, both in Croatia (as recognized in the Security Council resolution setting up UNPROFOR in February 1992), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (as evident even in the Dayton Agreement) was submerged in the rhetoric and symbolism indulged in by the West, and by the Serbs' own heavy-handedness and stubbornness.

It was only at the end of 1991, when it became clear that the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was irrevocable, and that the European Community would ultimately recognize them, that both the government and parliament declared Bosnia-Herzegovina's sovereignty and asked for recognition by the European Community in December 1991.¹⁵ This move had been matched by the republic's Serbs in a plebiscite on sovereignty held on 9-10 November 1991.

When his calls for the preventive deployment of UN troops went unheeded,¹⁶ and it became clear that the seceding republics would be recognized by the European

¹⁴ Nambiar, op cit, p. 6

¹⁵ Sudetic, Chuck (1992), "Deaths Cast Shadow on Vote in Yugoslav", *The New York Times*, New York, 15.03.1992

¹⁶ He was turned down twice, first by the EC and then by Vance. In July, Izetbegovic had already requested the sending of EC observers to Bosnia-Herzegovina; the EC ministers refused, since the European Community had to focus on Croatia. Some EC observers were finally sent in October, but then a preventive deployment of UN troops was rejected by Vance, who was perhaps fearful of upsetting Milosevic, who opposed any deployment of troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and whose support he needed in Croatia

Community in January 1992, Izetbegovic had no other viable option but to seek independence. The alternative would have been to remain in a rump Yugoslavia under the aegis of Milosevic and his authoritarian and nationalist policies. As was to be expected, this move alienated the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, a fiery nationalist who had the support of Milosevic and the JNA (which had 100,000 troops and important arms factories in Bosnia-Herzegovina), more and more a Serbian army following the collapse of the federation. They were determined not to abandon the federation and had the goal of a Greater Serbia to aim for. Serb immigrants and JNA troops withdrawn from Croatia had consequently been welcomed by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this added to the instability of the republic.

Meanwhile, the European Community's efforts to avoid conflict in former Yugoslavia had continued. Keeping in mind the strong Serbian opposition, the European Community considered it paramount that Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence be ratified by referendum, and that the constitutional organization of the new state be agreed upon before recognizing the independence of the republic.¹⁷ On 6 January Lord Carrington proposed the opening of negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina within the Conference on Yugoslavia. Several meetings with delegations from the government and representatives of the ethnic Serbian and ethnic Croatian communities (led by Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban, respectively) took place in Lisbon throughout the first quarter of 1992.

An agreement on the constitutional organization of the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina was apparently reached in principle on March 18 in Lisbon. The declaration of principles asserted the inviolability of the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was formed by three constitutive units that would be established on national principles and taking into account economic, geographical and other criteria. The accord would preserve the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina while at the same time providing the Serbs with self-rule, thus increasing the incentive for them to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

¹⁷ Dauchev, *op cit*, p. 61

abandon the idea of joining a greater Serbia.¹⁸ The preliminary draft of the future Bosnia-Herzegovina reportedly allocated the Serb and Muslim communities 44% of the territory each, and the remaining 12% to the Croats. Due to the intricate ethnic distribution of the population, 50% of the Serbs and 59% of the Croats were left outside their 'cantons'. However, this draft was considered merely a starting point subject to further negotiation. While the ethnic Serbians' understanding of the accord allowed for the creation of three distinct and coherent geographic entities, the government argued that the republic's ethnic intermingling made such a solution impossible.

Meanwhile incidents were increasing following the referendum of 29 February-1 March, which approved Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence, and which Bosnian Serbs had boycotted. Sporadic skirmishes and shelling were reported throughout the republic, as well as instances of ethnic cleansing. Serb irregulars acting in connivance with the JNA appeared to bear most of the responsibility for the violence. The situation was becoming increasingly polarized and explosive.

In early March, the European Community coordinated recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the United States for the beginning of April, perhaps in the hope that an agreement would have been reached in Lisbon by then. An accord was indeed reached, but as the situation deteriorated on the ground, the Muslim side progressively backed out and President Izetbegovic finally denounced the agreement at the end of March.

On April 6 the European Community officially recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States followed on April 7, and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was proclaimed by the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Serb Parliament on the same day. By then the country was already immersed in real war.

¹⁸ Dyker, David A. (1996), *Yugoslavia and After - A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth*, London: Longman

Causes for the failure of prevention of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Several factors may account for the failure to prevent the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first of these is the uncompromising stance of some of the parties involved. There is ample evidence of the bad faith displayed by Tudjman and Milosevic regarding the preservation of the territorial integrity of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina; “both most probably nurtured hopes of partitioning the republic.”¹⁹ They also had effective ways of influencing their ethnic brethren in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milosevic in particular. At the Conference on Yugoslavia, “Milosevic had stressed the need for a consensus on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina among the three ethnic communities.”²⁰

A consensus seemed unattainable, given the highly conflicting interests (to remain in or to escape from a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia), the growing polarization caused by the war in Croatia and by nationalist propaganda, and the imbalance of power between the Serb side and the rest. With Serbia's strong support, Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina had no incentive to soften their position of remaining within the Yugoslav federation or insuring an ethnic Serbian constitutive unit. The government in Sarajevo, which represented to some extent the views of Muslims and Croats (both wished to avoid a Serbian-controlled rump Yugoslavia), attempted to steer a cautious policy in 1991. However, the European Community's opening of the door to recognition and mixed signals from the international community made a compromise, given all other considerations, almost unachievable.

Meanwhile the International Community was not ready for the arduous task of preventing a conflict from breaking out in Yugoslavia. By 1991, the CSCE had not fully developed its conflict prevention mechanisms. The European Community was in the middle of negotiations on the Treaty on European Union, in which the instruments were to be created for a more active, comprehensive European presence in international affairs. WEU had not fully developed its operational capabilities, and NATO had just started to re-think its role in the post-Cold War world.

¹⁹ See Rosenthal, A.M (1994), “Answers That Could Help Contain the War in Bosnia”, *International Herald Tribune*, 23.02.1994.

²⁰ Rosenthal, *op cit*

The UN was overstretched and reluctant to interfere in states' internal affairs, and the United States was in the middle of a presidential campaign that focused on domestic issues. Washington was thus eager to let an enthusiastic European Community deal with a problem on its doorstep. Moreover, Moscow, was too busy dealing with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, a psychological factor should be taken into account: "after 40 years of cold peace in Europe imposed by the East-West confrontation, all countries were only too eager to reap the undoubted benefits of a 'warm peace' which appeared within reach. Despite the substantial evidence provided by diplomats and academics that a conflict in Yugoslavia was likely, decision-makers were not ready to make the necessary effort to prevent war in Europe."²¹

As regards Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, there were more specific elements in the behaviour of third parties that undermined the already difficult task of preventing an armed conflict there. In the case of the European Community, these included:

- Its haste in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia, without having fully reflected on the consequences, which pushed Izetbegovic towards independence and undermined his policy of moderation regarding the Serbs. It also deprived Lord Carrington of almost the only levers he had to press the parties toward a negotiated solution. The European Community's promise of recognition conditional upon the holding of a referendum further alienated the Serbs. Its subsequent pressure on Izetbegovic to accept what Muslims considered an unfair plan undermined the stability of the agreement and gave the Serbs' claims some legitimacy.

- Its internal dissension, which was translated into mixed signals and a lack of will to commit the necessary means (whatever it would have taken in terms of troops, economic sanctions or promises) to find a negotiated workable solution and implement it. This was perceived as a sign of weakness and/or lack of interest by the parties, and it therefore undermined the credibility of the European

²¹ Munuera, *op cit*, p.69

Community's efforts to provide strong incentives for the parties to reach an agreement and comply with it. The Serbs never believed in the possibility of a military intervention, not even a preventive deployment. The Muslims, however, desperate as they were, "may have harbored hopes that Germany's influence in the European Community and in the international arena would trigger military intervention by NATO or the UN."²²

- As regards the negotiating process itself, the discontinuity of the talks and the lack of full-time, high-level EC mediators strongly backed by the European Community (the negotiating team consisted of Lord Carrington, part-time, and an Ambassador from Portugal), which detracted from EC efforts to put pressure on the parties.

- Finally, the fact that the European Community was not perceived as a neutral mediator by the parties, nor as one which could deliver (as the United States had done in the Middle East peace process), but as one that looked after its own interests. "The Serbs considered that the European Community was biased against them as a result of German influence, whereas the Muslim side grew wary of the European Community's intention to obtain a quick solution at any cost."²³

The abstention of Russia and the United States from the conflict, and the UN's limited role, may have further undermined the EC's efforts by reducing its credibility as a third party. The actors which had some of the means to provide incentives lacked the interest or the will to do so, while the party involved in the mediation did not have a credible commitment to enforce a settlement. There was a general lack of coordination regarding the signaling of intentions, which added to the confusion and further hindered negotiations.

²² Riding, Alan (1992), "Europe Nods to Bosnia, not Macedonia", *The New York Times*, New York, 6.4.1992

²³ Riding, *op cit*

The UN Secretary-General and his personal representative, Cyrus Vance, voiced their disagreement with the hastiness of the European Community's recognition of the new states, as did the United States, which reportedly gave President Izetbegovic guarantees regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's territorial integrity. Izetbegovic apparently misinterpreted the extent of these assurances (armed intervention, or at least arms deliveries, if the Serbs tried to carve up the republic).

Like Bosnia, Kosovo showed that the Europeans lacked both political leadership and military capability. Politically the Europeans were not able to set the agenda of any possible peace settlement. As Eyal points out, at the Rambouillet talks in February 1999, "the British and French preference was that consideration of Kosovo's constitutional position would be postponed. But without any prior consultation, the US promised the Kosovar Albanians a referendum on independence"²⁴

While noting that individual Europeans played some role in the diplomacy ending the conflict, Buchan also emphasizes the lack of the EU's political presence when he says that it "was solved by classical concert diplomacy involving the US and Russia."²⁵ Even within the EU consensus was not always apparent. Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain all expressed concern about the legality of NATO's actions.²⁶ Austria went even further and denied NATO access to its airspace because of the lack of a specific UN Security Council resolution. Germany and Italy were prepared to break ranks on the issue of continuing the bombing campaign, and there were some physical attacks against NATO targets in Greece.²⁷

Tensions were also reported between Germany and Britain and France on the question of refugees and for most of the conflict Britain remained largely isolated on the question of ground troops. But perhaps most damning are those criticisms that the EU was scared to lead either because it feared that "without the US it would not be taken seriously or

²⁴ Eyal, J.(2000), "Kosovo: Killing the myths after the killing has subsided", *RUSI Journal*, 45(1):21

²⁵ Buchan D. (1999), "A tethered super-power", *Financial Times*, London, 21.07.1999

²⁶ Guicherd, C. (1999), "International Law and the War in Kosovo", *Survival*, 41(2):26

²⁷ Smith, H (1999), "War in Europe, Angry Greeks Hit NATO", *Guardian*, London, 30.04.1999

because it feared a repeat of the Bosnian experience.”²⁸ Building the confidence to exercise strong political leadership will be a protracted process for the EU. One of the major factors limiting the EU’s ability to exercise political leadership is not only its lack of autonomous military capabilities but also the shape of those capabilities that it does have. Expanding military options and types of operations considered to be security related is another feature of post-Cold War Europe. Indeed, Kosovo is an example of such a security operation. But it has also revealed how poorly thought out and resourced such expansions have been to date.

Towards a framework for conflict prevention in the Balkans: policies and implementation

When the conflict broke out in the Balkans, The European Union recognized that it has an important role to play in conflict prevention within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). On the one hand there were many reasons why stability in South-East Europe was in the European Union's interests. Any conflict in the region would have a direct and indirect impact on the security of countries in the West, even if it presented no a priori threat to their vital interests (territorial integrity, economic and social stability).²⁹ The proximity of the area of potential destabilization, the possibility that the conflict could spread and the difficulty in controlling its nature, intensity and extension once it was a primary reason.

Some members of the European Union, such as Greece and Italy, were more directly affected by population movements, waves of refugees or negative economic consequences. The involvement of Greece and Turkey in, or in the margins of a conflict, if only to contain it, would risk transferring Greek-Turkish tensions to another area to the

²⁸ Rielly, J (1999), “Lessons of Kosovo”, *Financial Times*. London, 25.03.1999

²⁹ Rummel Reinhardt (1996), 'Common Foreign and Security Policy and Conflict Prevention', *International Alert*, May, p. 169

detriment of European Union and Alliance cohesion, at the very moment when efforts were being made to bring about a *rapprochement* between these two countries.³⁰

An escalation of tensions in Kosovo and spillover into other regions such as Vojvodina and Sandjak, and neighbouring countries such as the FYR of Macedonia and Bosnia, would present the Union with new challenges. Thus, any destabilization would have a negative effect on the European integration process and security, as the conflict in Bosnia demonstrated. Moreover, economic, social and political difficulties (migration and refugees, Mafias, arms transfers and other essentially transnational risks) in this part of Europe would affect the rest of the continent.³¹

In addition to interests, the European Union also had a series of comparative advantages that made it one of the most appropriate bodies for implementing 'soft' preventive measures. The Union's power of attraction was one of the main tools at its disposal. The period of transition and the wish of Central and East European countries to join existing political and security structures presented a unique opportunity for the European Union to participate directly in the process in order to stamp its own European identity on it.³² In this, the Union used a series of instruments: political (Association Agreements, membership, CFSP mechanisms), economic (aid in the framework of the PHARE and TACIS programmes, and customs union) and security (Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, by which the EU could request WEU to undertake peacekeeping operations, preventive deployment and crisis management). The momentum of integration, with its associated political and economic implications, made it possible to initiate a policy of convergence in the framework of CFSP.

The European Union thus had the opportunity to improve its image and affirm its credibility in both Europe and the United States, particularly since the difficulties encountered in Yugoslavia allowed the Americans and NATO to reap the political

³⁰ Zucconi, Mario (1996), "The European Union in the Former Yugoslavia" in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), *Preventing conflict in the Post-Communist World – Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, p. 240

³¹ Rummel, *op cit*, p. 170

³² Zucconi, *op cit*, p. 243

dividends. Moreover, setting a common objective could contribute to consolidation of the CFSP and lead to progress beyond the general proposals contained in the Treaty on European Union and in the direction of a more practical conflict prevention framework.

Finally, as there is no general conflict prevention mechanism, it is difficult to determine appropriate models in advance. The complexity of internal disputes and the obstacles that are inherent in any collective action (the definition of short-term and long-term aims, divergent interests and perceptions of the correct type and extent of involvement and the right to intervene) are the main difficulties in evaluating the preventive measures to adopt, which necessarily vary from case to case. The time factor is an essential element in conflict prevention.³³

The use of means that are unsuited to the nature of a conflict (for instance, short-term measures applied to long-term issues, or 'soft' measures applied to urgent problems) can lead to a distortion or aggravation of the situation on the ground, and the parties in conflict may divert measures whose impact is in any case relative, not to mention the loss of external actors' credibility.

Expectations on the EU to act

There are four main sources of expectations on the EU to use its foreign and security competencies. First, the CFSP treaty provisions which establish the range and scope of EU potential responses. The presence of these policy tools within the EU's competencies provides a supply-side pressure on action. Second, the expectations created by European Council Statements and Declarations. These documents show the positioning of member governments and provide the operational side of CFSP. They are distinct from the separate positions of individual member governments, which are held outside the framework of the Council.

³³ Zucconi, *op cit*, p. 244

Third, the supranational institutions of the EU, primarily the European Parliament (EP) and European Commission (EC). The European Parliament provides an important scrutinizing role on CFSP with Members of the European Parliament (MEP's) regularly tabling questions to the Presidency of the Union. The impact of these institutions to the formulation of European foreign policy, albeit in a scrutinizing role, adds a further level of analysis to the effectiveness of the EU. Fourth, the expectations placed on the EU by its own national governments, external governments, international organizations and civil society. The expectations of the EU's member governments are very important in the initial stages of CFSP formulation as the Maastricht Treaty makes clear that the CFSP should concentrate on areas of common importance to member governments.³⁴

Moreover, because the EU is not truly federal, each member government is free to pursue its foreign policy interests outside of the CFSP framework, thus creating opportunities for conflict between the foreign policies of governments and the EU. These four broad sources of expectations capture a very wide range of institutions and actors against which to measure the performance of the EU.

The Role of the EU: Under or Over Protecting Democracy in the Balkans?

Democracy has been widely and increasingly advocated as the system most suited to the management of internal conflict.³⁵ Sceptics however forward a variety of arguments: that democracy often risks unleashing historical hatreds. That majority rule can tend towards a harsher suppression of minority rights and that imposing from outside new institutions that are not "context sensitive" risks weakening local structures that already enjoy some legitimacy.³⁶ European policy has in a number of cases been built around the development of power-sharing forms of democracy. Indeed, some policy documents have explicitly suggested that in conflict cases the crafting of "power sharing democracy" should take precedence over general support for potentially destabilizing civil society

³⁴ See The Maastricht Treaty, Article 2.

³⁵ Lund, Michael (1996), *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press

³⁶ Cousens, Elizabeth (2001), *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, Boulder Colorado, Lynne Rienner

dynamics.³⁷ In other contexts, the EU has more cautiously supported elite-controlled processes of partial political liberalization. A focus on political liberalization has not been completely absent, but has co-existed uneasily with strategies emphasizing stability, mediation and the role of leaders.

The most prominent example of EU pressure for power-sharing democracy has been seen in Bosnia since the Dayton Accords. Prior to 1995, the EU did not focus on political reform, prioritizing its direct mediation on issues of inter-ethnic relations across the Balkans. Dayton's power-sharing arrangements derived not purely from a belief in democracy's benefits, but also from a fear of further succession unleashing greater instability. Indeed, this concern over external consequences conditioned policy more strongly than the increasingly vociferous criticisms that the Dayton arrangements, with no nationwide representative offices in Bosnia, had merely intensified ethnically defined differences.³⁸ Support for entrenching minority rights was evident rather earlier in Macedonia. After the eruption of violence in 2001 in Macedonia, the EU specified in a firmer and more detailed fashion the constitutional changes that would be required prior to any strengthening of contractual relations with the EU.

In Kosovo, the West did try to impose a power-sharing democracy at Rambouillet, giving the Serb community disproportionate representation and veto powers to protect key rights: the Kosovan delegation, not Belgrade, rejected this.³⁹ Subsequently, European strategy in Kosovo has been more imprecise in its deviation from straight majoritarian principles, the EU rejecting any formal 'contonization' to give autonomy to the small Serb communities scattered throughout Kosovo.⁴⁰ Moreover, the EU's ambiguity over Kosovo's eventual status has complicated institution-building work. By 2002, it was widely agreed that violence was prevented only by the international community's military presence in Kosovo: with Serbs still boycotting elections, the province's

³⁷ Youngs, Richard (2004). "Democratic Institution-Building and Conflict Resolution: Emerging EU Approaches." *International Peacekeeping*, 11(3), p. 526

³⁸ Youngs, *op cit.*, p. 527

³⁹ Judah, Tim (2000), *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

⁴⁰ Yannis, Alexandros (2001). *Kosovo Under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict*, Athens: Greek Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

developing autonomous democratic institutions had not gained any significantly positive role in conflict resolution.

Notwithstanding the development of this general approach, European initiatives in conflict situations have also included a more notable top down institutional focus than elsewhere.⁴¹ In contrast to work in other contexts, EU work on democracy building within peace support operations has not overwhelmingly or solely prioritized the strengthening of civil society dynamism but has also demonstrated concern for specific conflict related outcomes. Indeed, one member state official insisted that “conflict resolution challenges were overwhelmingly a state problem.”⁴² This approach has included support for moderate leaders, state institutions, security apparatuses and pro-peace parties.

This range of work has been particularly evident in the Balkans. In the former Yugoslavia, more systematic links with Serbian moderate opposition parties were built up in the late 1990s, and through the ‘Energy for Democracy’ initiative a direct incentive given to local governments to resist Belgrade. The list of Commission projects funded in the Balkans during the latter part of the decade showed that, while much work was still oriented towards human rights training, there was an increasing emphasis on parliaments and trade union networks. Large projects have been introduced aiming at developing consultations between state bodies and parliaments. Commission projects in the Balkans during 2001 included: cross-border cooperation on local-level decision-making; a parliamentary track for the Stability Pact; the strengthening of parliaments; parliamentary – civil society links and exchanges, especially through Local Consultative Committees to build links with parliaments; training related to media coverage of ethnic issues; trade union rights; and the creation of local government links through a network with EU cities. With local judges and lawyers politically and ethnically partial, European countries have sent large numbers of their own legal experts to the Balkans.

⁴¹ Judah, *op cit*

⁴² Yannis, *op cit*

There has also been a higher level of funding for security forces in conflict states. Under the EU's new Police Action Plan, the first EU civilian intervention was a police mission introduced in Macedonia at the beginning of 2002. Police training has been the key component of EU policy in Kosovo, assisting in transforming the Kosovo Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection Force – most would say without complete success, as the new Kosovo Protection Force (KPF) has continued to intimidate the Serb minority. The Commission has identified as a priority the further development of work on security-sector issues and military reform (the latter hitherto formally the preserve of member states). Notwithstanding this, “differences remain over the form of policing to be encouraged by the EU, some states unhappy with any move towards a gendarmerie style.”⁴³

To the extent that conflict has arisen as a result of ‘state weakness’, the strengthening of public administrations has attracted increasing attention with extended peace support strategies. Much of such work has been funded from mainstream good governance budgets, far larger than democracy or conflict resolution budgets. A single, new Commission-managed institution-building initiative in the Balkans (CARDS) has replaced the two separate funds operated during the 1990s – Obnova for post-conflict work, PHARE for reconstruction and institution building – precisely so as better to merge these areas of work.

This new programme is built around support for state institutions to harmonize standards to EU norms including through twinning arrangements similar to those operated in Eastern Europe. The EU's main influence has through such initiatives, often been through relatively technical economic and trade issues, in relation to which it has been able to get different ethnic groups to engage in regularized forums of cooperation. It is through this prism that EU programmes have directed a significant share of their funds at the strengthening of decentralized administrative competences.

⁴³ Youngs, *op cit*, p. 538

The EU in the Approach to the Civil War

The EU's response to the crisis in the Balkans was not just as a response to armed conflict but also to the initial signs of instability and hostility between opposing political and ethnic groups to try and stabilize the region.⁴⁴ These attempts, along with the latter ones, called heavily on the economic strength of the Union as a projection of its foreign policy. The EU's initial interventions centered on efforts through the Council of Ministers, to persuade all the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia against aggression towards each other. Prior to the crisis Yugoslavia held a privileged position with Western Europe because of its strategic importance between the Soviet bloc and the West.

Investment in the Balkans was therefore an established means by which the governments of the EU tried to contribute to the stability and development of the region. This suggests that the EU's use of economics was a substitute for other forms of action based on an inability to produce the political agreements necessary to sustain other foreign policy initiatives or the enforcement of diplomatic solutions by military means.⁴⁵ At this, as at each later stage, the expectation was against using military force and instead focusing on political maneuvering, diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions that would prevent the spread of violence throughout Yugoslavia.⁴⁶ The absence of a 'military' expectation does not necessarily correlate with low expectations – a military solution was not the only feasible or credible option. Indeed, a functioning EU military identity did not exist between 1992 and 1995 and only became closer to a reality for the Union between 1998 and 2001, particularly with the support for the Helsinki Headline Goals in 1999.⁴⁷

The EU also accepted that the Bosnian civil war presented different challenges and issues compared to the conflict between Slovenia and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army

⁴⁴ Albeit having been an important trigger point for the conflict through Germany's recognition of Croatia and the subsequent EU recognition of Slovenia and Bosnia.

⁴⁵ Dyker, op cit

⁴⁶ Glennv, Misha (1996), *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin Publishing.

⁴⁷ Dover, Robert (2005) "The Europeanization of British Defence Policy: An Intergovernmentalist Reading", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 6(4): 508-25.

(JNA).⁴⁸ The Presidency's statement argued strongly that support should be secured for a general cease-fire and a peace conference, and argued that pressure should be levered on Serbia through securing political and economic support for the rest of the former Yugoslavia. In this respect it is clear why the Carrington Conference, which aimed to achieve all these objectives, was the EU's preferred route and, similarly, why when hostilities broke out the warring sides agreed to successive cease-fires whilst actively flouting them.

The EU monitoring missions did not consider an armed peace support or enforcement presence as a viable prospect. They further resolved that monitoring missions would only take place with full cease-fires in place. At this stage, the EU was still operating under the EPC mechanisms, which did not contain military or security provisions. However, before the CFSP came into force there was an emerging culture between EU governments, often using EU for a, to discuss common approaches to such issues as monitoring missions.

The Maastricht Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) in 1991 saw the Yugoslav conflict becoming increasingly important to European governments. The IGC looked at the Yugoslavian conflict as a challenge and an opportunity to show the Union as an international actor able to execute a unified foreign policy.⁴⁹

In the immediate approach to the Bosnian conflict there was a lack of continuity from Cold War cohesion regarding Yugoslavia to a new international position on how to deal with the impending civil war. A perception within European governments that the US would intervene in the crisis removed some of the pressure on these administrations to formulate a sufficient response to the crisis. Moreover, the presence of near exclusively economic foreign policy tools for the EU hampered its ability to formulate a wider range of policy responses. The perception of the US, as a competent rival foreign policy actor,

⁴⁸ Djukic, Slavoljub (1994), *Between Glory and Anathema: A Political Biography of Slobodan Milosevic* Belgrade: Filip Visnic

⁴⁹ Laurenson F.N. & Sophie Van Hoonacker (1992), *The International Conference on Political Union*, Amsterdam: European Institute of Public Administration

coupled with the continuing debates within the EU of what the CFSP would contain, prevented the EU from even holding a discussion about whether to try and formulate a military response. Achieving pan-EU agreement, even without a perception that the US would intervene, was highly problematic because of the historically based and continuing allegiances of EU governments with Serbia and Croatia and the impact this had on their willingness to declare either side as aggressors in the conflict.⁵⁰

In summary, the expectations on the EU to act in the early stages of the crisis were broadly in line with the capabilities the EU had available to it. Without the CFSP being in force, independent military capabilities being available and in the context of the EU being, at that time, primarily a civilian superpower, economic and diplomatic responses were its only realistic options.

Conclusion

Why does the West, nonetheless, find it so difficult to intervene effectively in conflicts such as in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and even Kosovo? First, an incorrect understanding, which claims that these conflicts are irresolvable, plays a part. Second, the imperfections of an applicable legal framework, such as exists for interstate conflict, create problems. This can lead to serious disputes as to what responses are appropriate and lawful. The 1999 Kosovo intervention is a case in point. An earlier example was the European Community's (EC) initial response to the break-up of Yugoslavia. The EC foreign ministers set up the Badinter Commission in 1991 and asked it to advise how the entities emerging from Yugoslavia should be approached under international law and thus, implicitly, what sort of responses were appropriate.

A third factor is that some of the combatants make it deliberately difficult for outsiders to judge what is going on. The Serbs, for example, worked hard on creating opportunities for plausible excuses in Bosnia and pursued a strategy of ambiguity. Key ingredients were the claim that the Bosnian Serbs acted independently from Belgrade and that the

⁵⁰ Dover, R (2005), *The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992-95*, *European Security*, 14(3), p. 310

worst atrocities were committed by yet another, completely uncontrollable, criminal actor – the overly nationalistic paramilitaries. Because the nature of the links between Belgrade and Pale and between Belgrade and the paramilitaries was not immediately obvious, and because the proof required the painstaking collection of masses of circumstantial evidence, the Serbs succeeded in creating confusion as to what was going on and who was ultimately responsible. As a result, they made a targeted and effective response more difficult.

In Kosovo they attempted to use the same strategy, though with less success. Belgrade could not easily deny responsibility, as the affair this time clearly took place within its own territory. The claim that NATO bombing caused the Kosovars to flee was a shallow reason given the scale and immediacy of the exodus. Nonetheless, the Serbian propaganda machine succeeded at least in sowing some doubts. The surprisingly small number of NATO bombs that killed civilians was tirelessly exploited to feed into the deep Western concern about civilian casualties. Strategies of ambiguity are to be expected in cruel conflicts where those responsible for war crimes usually know they are engaged in morally repugnant, even criminal behaviour. They will naturally try to cover their tracks and make punishment more difficult.⁵¹

“Western politicians are also innately cautious and hesitant about using force. War is a risky business, and many a politician has seen his career stumble as a result of a war gone wrong. Politicians also worry about the fickleness of public opinion. Sure, the people say they want to send in armed forces, but are they really willing to see the body bags come home?”⁵² Humanitarian interventions also set a very demanding agenda. If high moral principle and accept a morally imperfect outcome to the conflict. Yet unless one is willing to expend vast resources and impose one’s will completely, most conflicts will end in compromise. The question thus quickly arises as to what extent one can compromise with evil. Faced with such a situation, politicians will quickly display the common failing in being uncompromising in rhetoric.

⁵¹ Smith, Martin A. (2003), *The Kosovo Crisis and the evolution of post Cold-War European Security*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 165

⁵² Smith, *op cit* p. 166

Most importantly, the West did not have a clear policy or response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Indeed the USA and Western Europe have at various times been divided by it, notwithstanding the façade of coordination in NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Economic progress and political opening were supposed to follow the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe; that was to be the logical consequence for what the West saw as victory over totalitarianism.

Instead, the Caucasus erupted, and Yugoslavia witnessed a reversion to intense nationalism. "Against this madness, grand Wilsonian principles like self-determination of peoples, and grand institutions like the UN and NATO proved no insurance. The obvious helplessness became evident not only because of the scale of fighting that took place, but also because of the way NATO, the European Union, and the UN were revealed as cumbersome and divided before the ethnic conflicts of post-Communist Europe."⁵³

The lack of a common stance, coordinated action, determination and the commitment of means on the part of the international community, together with the lack of a continuing process of negotiation brokered by high-ranking, full-time mediators with appropriate authority and a broad mandate, resulted in mixed signals and an absence of incentives for the parties to agree to a workable plan and comply with its implementation. The international community failed to show the determination and transparency needed to assure the parties and their backers that there was no other way out but to agree on a fair plan (not one based on ethnic cantonization) and to comply with its closely monitored implementation (perhaps by the preventive deployment of UN or NATO forces).

This crisis has shown that only "strong incentives or disincentives, close scrutiny and constant pressure can bring highly reluctant and suspicious parties to the negotiating table and make them stick to agreements: in the Yugoslav crisis, one of the main problems to date has been not so much reaching agreements as implementing them. In this case, the

⁵³ Nambiar, *op cit*, p. 5

international community, in particular the European Community, was unable to meet the challenge of 'emergency' or 'hard' conflict prevention."⁵⁴

Were there any missed opportunities? Some argue that perhaps the perspective of integration into the European Community might have made the parties more responsive; yet in 1991 the Soviet Union was still in place, and there was no prospect of integration of former socialist Central European countries.

Given the uncompromising stance adopted by most parties, the determination of most leaders to attain their goals by force, and the polarization caused by the war in Croatia, it is somewhat unlikely that the mere withholding of recognition would by itself have averted a conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Withholding recognition might have been a necessary condition for the work of the conference, but not sufficient to grant success. Perhaps determined action by the European Community, in close coordination with the UN, and with the full support of the United States and USSR/Russia, might have provided the incentives for the parties to agree on the preventive deployment of troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Meanwhile, a continuous negotiation process, co-chaired by high-ranking officials from the European Community (such as Lord Carrington working full time or a former prime minister like Margaret Thatcher), the UN (Cyrus Vance, Pérez de Cuéllar) and maybe also from the United States (former Presidents Carter or Reagan) and the USSR (Mikhail Gorbachev, after his resignation) might have persuaded the parties to agree on a draft constitution that preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina, without dividing it ethnically but also without permitting domination by any ethnic group.⁵⁵ Closely monitored implementation of the accords and economic cooperation (especially from the European Community) might have then led to a referendum on independence, based on such a constitution, and to international recognition.

⁵⁴ Leurdjik, Dick (2001), *Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis*. Hampshire: Ashgate, p. 159

⁵⁵ Munuera, *op cit*, p.66

Chapter 4

Conclusion

This chapter examines the possible limits of the EU's role in conflict resolution. When does the European Union have no impact or perverse effects in conflict zones? When does the role of the Union lead to retrenchment rather than positive transformation? When does it generate secessionist tendencies instead of exporting notions of shared sovereignty, porous borders and the respect for human and minority rights? Finally, can the EU be taken as a serious international actor in conflict resolution?

Limits in the EU Framework as an Alternative Context for conflict Resolution

The main problem of the EU framework as an alternative context for conflict resolution is that it is most effective when all of the conflict parties are included in it. "In other words, all principal parties must be member states, or part of a member state. This is naturally not to say that if all parties are included in the Union, the latter acts as a panacea for conflict settlement and resolution. The persisting problems of Northern Ireland, the Basque country are but two reminders of the limits of the Union to induce intra-state conflict resolution."¹

Nevertheless, if the Union is to act as a framework that allows for a different interpretation of sovereignty, borders, citizenship and of security, it is most likely to do so when all of the parties are in the EU. Only the protection of human rights and the rule of law is not necessarily confined to full EU members. Disseminating these alternative notions either through the accession process or through the export of the EU model (by encouraging sub-regional integration) is possible.

But attempting to diffuse the EU framework and the options for conflict resolution which arise within it, may fail to yield positive results. It may also lead to retrenchment when

¹ Meehan, E. (2000), "Britain's Irish Question: Britain's European Question? British-Irish Relations in the Context of European Union and the Belfast Agreement", *Review of International Studies*, p. 88

some of the conflict parties are in the EU (or close to accession) while other direct or indirect parties to the conflict remain outside it. A classic example of this problem is the effect on borders. When conflicting parties are included in the EU, they might endorse an alternative conception of territorial borders. Stripping much of the significance of territorial borders may in turn facilitate conflict resolution. Yet when one party is on the inside and another is on the outside the opposite is often true.²

There are many convincing arguments as to how and why the Union cannot and should not impose new hard borders on its enlarged frontiers. However, to date the Union has required from the candidate countries the adoption of the Schengen *acquis*, “that establishes hard borders between the inside and the outside and contrasts sharply with the soft (and almost non-existent borders) within the Union. From the outside this system is viewed as a form of inequality, discrimination and exclusion, in contradiction with the values the Union professes to uphold and export. In turn, if conflicting parties find themselves on opposite sides of the EU divide, the prospects for conflict resolution may well reduce.”³

One final problematic aspect of the EU framework concerns the legitimacy of particular norms, laws and rules. When particular features in the EU framework are consensually shared, defined and applied across the member states they may indeed provide an important value added to conflict resolution efforts. Yet on several issues this is far from being the case. A key example is that of minority rights. In principle minority rights are part of the Copenhagen criteria for accession. Yet in reality the EU framework does not have the adequate instruments to assure the protection of these rights. On the contrary, the emphasis in EU law is on individual human rights, which in some instances may contrast with the protection of minorities. Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the EU, mentions the principles on which the Union is founded (and thus presumably the conditions for entering it) only mentions the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. It excludes the protection of minorities,

² Meehan, *op cit*, p.90

³ Zielonka, J. (2001), “How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(3), p. 515

included instead in the Copenhagen political criteria. Within EU law there is neither an attempt to define minority rights, nor a concrete mechanism to ensure their protection.⁴ Legally, the problem is not exclusive to the EU. It is part of the general problem in international law of defining group rights as distinct from individual rights. The practice within EU member states varies widely and minority problems within the EU persist. For example the minority rights of the Turks in Western Thrace have not been protected in view of Greece's EU membership. The violation of these rights is often flagged by Turkish officials and politicians as evidence of EU double standards. However, the major problems of the Union do not relate to its structure, but rather to its capacity to act beyond its borders. When analysing EU conditionality several potential problems need to be borne in mind.

First is the value of the carrot relative to the costs of compliance with EU conditions. Domestic change induced by conditionality calls for a sufficiently valuable EU carrot. When full membership is an option, the EU's potential leverage is higher than in cases where relations are based on association. This leads to the question of whether the EU can significantly influence third states that it cannot or does not wish to fully integrate.⁵

The EU's successful involvement in Eastern Europe is a case which holds out hope for the future, although it can be hoped that the "power of attraction" does not prove to be two-edged, with the enlargement policy both creating new problems for the EU and alienating those who will, inevitably, be left outside. There is no doubt that at many levels and with a range of partners, the EU has engaged fundamentally with the project of stabilising Central and Eastern Europe.⁶ Indeed, in the aftermath of the eastern enlargement, the question of the final borders of the Union has become a key strategic issue on the EU agenda. It has become increasingly clear that despite the success of enlargement, the Union cannot indefinitely rely on the same instrument as a means to positively induce transformation beyond its borders. Future enlargements are likely to see

⁴ Hughes, J. & G. Sasse (2003), *Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement, Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs*, Schiffbrücke, Germany: European Centre for Minority Issues.

⁵ Zielonka, *op cit*, p. 519

⁶ Hill, *op cit*, p. 330

the accession of Turkey and the western Balkan countries. However, the Union's relations with the post-Soviet states (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia itself) as well as with the entire southern Mediterranean and the Middle East will probably require alternative EU instruments. Hence, the first tentative steps towards the development of a Wider Europe initiative, directed at the EU's new neighbours that are not likely to become future members. The thinking within EU institutions is to offer additional benefits in order to add credibility to the EU economic and political conditionalities. It remains an open question whether the future packages on offer will be sufficiently valuable to induce (what are often domestically viewed as difficult) reforms within third states.⁷

Which carrots are on offer is determined also by the degree of proximity of the third country to the Union. The closer is the EU to a conflict, the greater its potential interest in a conflict, and the more likely is the Union to engage itself in attempts at resolution through the offer of different forms of inclusion. Hence, the relative EU engagement in the western Balkans since the 1999 Kosovo War compared to the relative EU neglect of the south Caucasus over the last decade. "Thus, the EU has much more scope for preventing and resolving conflicts on its own continent than elsewhere. Even though the challenges in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia have been, they have been more accessible than those in Somalia, Rwanda or even Chechnya. This is not to say that the EU should not or cannot intervene in far-away places. Morality is not measured in kilometres. But the EU should be duly cautious about claiming a primary role in regions where its knowledge and instruments are thinly stretched. It will also need to distinguish between the kind of conflicts which it might be able to damp down and those which it might be safer to leave alone, wherever they might be located."⁸

Equally important is the value of EU instrument as perceived by the recipient. The more a third country identifies with 'Europe' or the more dependent it is upon the Union, and the greater is the EU's expected potential influence. Yet different domestic actors within a

⁷ Hill, *op cit*, p.331

⁸ Hill, *op cit*, p.332

third country may value EU benefits differently. Domestic actors have different aims, strategies and tactics, drive by different historical, economic, and political interests and understandings.⁹As such their assessment of the Union differs. Although full membership is the most powerful foreign policy instrument at the EU's disposal, it may be of little value to a nationalist aiming first and foremost to assert absolute sovereignty within a predefined territory for example. To the extent that these forces enjoy the upper hand within a third state's political system, EU conditions are unlikely to induce positive domestic change. Depending on the relative balance of different domestic forces and their interaction, the overall effects of EU conditionality can be positive, negative or nil.¹⁰

Problems may arise also when domestic actors value EU accession over and above conflict resolution. After years and often decades of failed attempts at stitching a state back together, the metropolitan state (or indeed the secessionist entity) may opt to abandon the search for a complex federal-confederal constitutional system and focus all attention on unilateral EU membership. Tendencies of this sort are present in Serbia and Montenegro, in the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus and recently in Moldova as well. Some of these domestic actors may simply abandon the search for a constitutional solution and argue that by doing so they could progress faster to full EU membership (as in the case of some domestic actors in Serbia). Others may feel that entering the EU would strengthen their bargaining position allowing them to secure a more favourable deal in the future.

These tendencies may exist under different scenarios. In the case of Serbia-Montenegro, the High Representative for CFSP succeeded in brokering a loose common state agreement. Yet the substance of the agreement was contested by many actors in Belgrade and Podgorica.

Idiosyncrasies within the Union exacerbate these trends. While the Council of Ministers and the European Council make rhetorical statements in favour of conflict resolution and

⁹ Dorussen, H. (2001), "Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives", *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(2): 251-262

¹⁰ Tocci, *op cit*, p. 19

European integration, the Commission focussing on the latter may reinforce secessionist trends. Integrating a unitary state is often easier than integrating a complex federation. Yet the solutions to the most ethnopolitical conflicts tend to require finely tuned federal and confederal feature. Particularly in the short to medium term, these solutions may not necessarily go hand-in-hand with the objectives of establishing efficient states, capable of assuming the obligations of membership. As such, the requirements dictated by the Commission often generate disincentives against conflict resolution. Secessionist voices can legitimate their positions by using the very discourse of European integration. The starkest example of this is in the case of Serbia-Montenegro, where while the High Representative mediated the loose common state agreement, the Commission focussing on the Stabilisation and Association Process pushes for greater centralisation. This in turn is feeding into secessionist trends both in Belgrade and Podgorica.

Equally problematic are scenarios in which the costs of compliance with EU conditions are considered too high by the third party in question. If the perceived costs of compliance are higher than the reward, then the third country will reject the conditions. This is frequently the case in conflict situations when EU conditions may touch upon the most critical existential questions of a state or community. For example, a Turkish nationalist will reject EU conditions relating to Kurdish minority rights not only because of the insufficient value accorded to the goal of EU membership, but also because of the perceived costs of such a reform. Compliance will occur either if EU benefits increase or are perceived to be more valuable, or if the domestic costs of compliance reduce. This in turn would necessitate either a change in perceptions, or the empowerment of domestic actors with different attitudes towards compliance.

A second problem of EU conditionality, identified by Grabbe¹¹ is the bluntness of “gate-keeping as a means of influence. EU institutions determine when and whether to grant a particular benefit to a third party. Yet gate-keeping is often to blunt a measure to be used as an instrument for domestic transformation. It cannot induce precise changes at precise

¹¹ Grabbe, H. (2001), “How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity”. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8(6), p. 1020

moments in time.” It was used successfully in 1997, when the Union prevented Slovakia from beginning accession negotiations due to its human rights record. Currently it appears to be successful in inducing political reforms in Turkey and a settlement in Cyprus. But the instrument cannot be used repeatedly. Furthermore, once a benefit is granted, it is legally and politically more complicated to withdraw it.

An effective policy of conditionality would necessitate the automatic entitlement to rights when obligations are fulfilled and the automatic withdrawal of benefits when they are not. Yet such automaticity is never present in practice. Beyond the contract lie the political imperatives of EU actors. Both the granting and the withdrawal of a benefit would require a consensus within the Union. For an association agreement or an accession treaty to come into force, there must be unanimity of the member governments and the ratification of national parliaments and of the European Parliament. Such a consensus clearly depends on the fulfilment of the contractual obligations of the third state. But it depends also on other factors motivated by some underlying political or economic imperatives. The eastern enlargement occurred despite the fact that some conditions were not fulfilled. The importance of the fifth enlargement went way beyond the minutia of compliance with the *aquis communautaire*. The same is true for the withdrawal of a benefit. Suspending the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership association agreements would eliminate the contractual links between the EU and these countries, and thus reduce the EU’s potential source of influence on them.

Some degree of political discretion in determining when and whether conditions are met is inevitable. However, when blatant violations are not punished or when benefits are not granted despite the general fulfilment of contractual obligations, then the EU’s credibility is harmed.¹² When other conditions unspecified in the contract govern the Union’s relations with third states, then EU conditionality loses its effectiveness.

In the case of Israel, EU actors are aware of, yet fail to rectify Israel’s material breach of its association agreement by exporting goods to EU markets that are produced wholly or

¹² Zielonka, *op cit.* p. 520

partly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, under Israeli certificates of origin. Furthermore, the Union is considering amending the agreement to allow Israel's participation in the system of pan-European cumulation of the rules of origin. Israel is also set to enhance its relations with the Union through its participation in the Wider Europe initiative (that would ultimately lead to a new agreement). If the misapplication of the EU's association agreement with Israel is accepted both de facto and de jure by the Union by amending and extending the existing contractual relations), the credibility of the Union to act in any future Middle East peace process would reduce further.

Political discretion is also explained by the vagueness of certain conditions. Human rights violations and features of undemocratic practice, racism, xenophobia exist within the EU as well as outside it. The meeting of criteria is rarely clear-cut and often a question of degree. In addition, the Union does not have ready-made benchmarks to monitor the implementation of reforms, and it has no specific models to offer giving a precise idea of an expected reform.

A third problem of EU conditionality is that of time inconsistency. Particularly within the accession process, expected reforms are demanded in the short and medium run but the actual delivery of the benefit (membership) occurs in the long run. This generates two sets of problems. Long-term benefits are valued less than short-term ones.¹³ The unpredictability of the long term reduces the value of the carrot and in turn the potential incentives for reform. Time inconsistency may also induce domestic policy-makers to delay the reforms until the delivery of the benefit is closer.

This may be particularly true in conflict situations. The settlement of an ethno-political conflict is viewed as a means to hedge against risk, due to the security guarantees embedded in EU accession. As such, principle parties may be reluctant to reach an agreement until the prospects of membership are closer and surer. This dilemma appears to characterise the Turkish position vis-à-vis both the Cyprus conflict and the Kurdish question.

¹³ Grabbe, *op cit.* p.1027

Finally, in the overall picture, the EU framework offers alternative options for conflict settlement and resolution. In addition, the mechanisms of domestic change triggered by the Union could aid the diffusion of these options beyond its borders. But in order to be effective and generate positive transformation, potential problems need to be circumvented. The more observable mechanism of change occurs through conditionality. However, the arguments above point to the need for greater clarity in the nature of the EU contract and for greater EU awareness of the domestic dynamics within the third countries it attempts to influence. Otherwise, conditionality may either fail to influence positively or yield perverse effects. Alternatively, when positive effects arise, these may be coincidental. Effective EU conditionality necessitates a transparent and rule-based engagement. This would need both more developed monitoring mechanisms and increasingly clear and automatic entitlement to rights when the obligations are fulfilled (and vice versa for blatant and repeated violations).

Effective and conditionality also calls for a more diversified set of political measures tailored to the diverse actors within the third country in question. Yet this in turn would require greater internal consistency in EU policy-making. It would necessitate both a sense of urgency within the Union regarding the need for immediate action. Most critically, it would require a concurrent assessment within the EU about the nature of the conflict in question, a concurrence which often fails to materialise.

In the end the best form of conflict prevention is the spread of the belief that “violent conflict is counter-productive and that other priorities and values are more important. The EU can legitimately hope to help promote this belief in the long term, and by a variety of means which may be direct or indirect. In the short and medium term the issues are more pressing and the dilemmas much sharper. If however the EU and the Member States maintain a sense of priorities, then they possess an unusual capacity to “make a difference.”¹⁴

¹⁴ Hill, *op cit*, p. 332

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Blair, Tony (2002); "A Clear Course for Europe", November 11, 2002, [Online: web] Accessed 26 Feb. 2006 ?URL: <http://number-10.gov.uk/output/page1739.asp>

Conflict Prevention: Commission Initiative to Improve the EU's Civilian Intervention Capacities, Brussels, April, 2001,

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/ip_01_560_en.htm

Conclusions of the EU Western Balkans Summit' in Thessalonika, 30 April, 2002 on the European Integration of the Western Balkans

Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM (211), Brussels April 11, 2001.

Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki, 11 December 1999, on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

European Commission (1997b), "Agenda 2000: For Stronger and Wider Union", *Bulletin of the European Union*, Supplement 5/9, Brussels.

European Commission (1992), "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement", *Bulletin of the European Communities*.

European Council (1993), *Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen*, Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council.

Ferrero-Waldner, Benita (2006); Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner on the Palestinian Elections, January 26, 2006, [Online: web] Accessed 25 May 2006 URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/news/bfw_260.htm

Franco-British Summit (1998), "Joint Declaration on European Defence", St Malo, December 4, 1998.

Paten, Chris (2004), "Kosovo", Speech given by the former External Relations Commissioner at the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, March 30, 2004, [Online: web] Accessed 10 May 2006 URL:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp_04_166.htm

Solana, Javier (2003), "A Secure Europe for a Better World: European Security Strategy", December 12, 2003, Brussels.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/development_old/prevention/definition.htm

Schröder, Maximilian H, (1997), "CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty: Handle with Care!", *CFSP Forum*, 2/97.

Secondary Sources

Books

- Agiomirgianakis, G. et al. (2003), *European Integration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
- Almond, Gabriel A. (2002), *European Politics Today*. Harlow: Longman.
- Andenas, Mads (2003), *The Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Enlargement and Constitutional Reform*, Oregon: Hart Publishing.
- Anderson, Svein S. (2000), *Making Policy in Europe*. London: Sage Publications.
- Anderson, Malcolm (2003), *Changing Conceptions of Security and their Implications for EU Justice and Home Affairs*, Brussels: CEPS.
- _____ (2003), *Striking Balance Between Freedom, Security and Justice*, Brussels: CEPS.
- Anderson, Peter J. (2000), *New Europe in Transition*. London: Continuum.
- Apap, Joana (2003), *Maintaining Security within Borders: Towards a Permanent State Emergency in the EU*, Brussels: CEPS.
- Archer, Clive (2000), *The European Union: Structure and Process*, London: Continuum
- Auerbach, Jerold S. (1983), *Justice Without Law? Resolving Disputes Without Lawyers*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Azar, Edward E. (1990), *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Pub. Co.
- Azar, Edward E. and Burton, John W. (eds.) (1986). *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
- Bachtler, John (2000), *Transition, Cohesion and Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bainbridge, Timothy (2002), *The Penguin companion to the European Union*, London: Penguin.
- Bark, Dennis L. (1997), *Reflections on Europe*, USA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Barton, D. and M. Bond (2002), *Europe's Wider Loyalties: Global Responsibilities for the New Europe*, London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research.
- Baun, M.J., *A Wider Europe*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher.
- Bellamy, Richard (2001), *Citizenship and Governance in the European Union*, London: Continuum.

Bercowitch, Jacob (1984), *Social Conflicts and Third Parties*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Bermant G. et al. (1978), *The Ethics of Social Intervention*, New York: Halsted Press.

Bieler, Andreas (2001), *Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan Press.

Bildt, Carl Alexande (2003), *Pre-Emptive Military Action and the Legitimate Use of Force: ESF Working Paper Series # 11*, Brussels: CEPS.

Blalock, Hubert M. (1989), *Power and Conflict: Towards a General Theory*, Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

Bolton, Rohan (2002), *Guide to the EU Institutions*, London: Federal Trust for Education and Research.

Bomberg, Elizabeth (2003), *The European Union: How does it work?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bono, Giovanna (2003), *NATO's "Peace-Enforcement" Tasks and Policy Communities 1990-1999*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Booker, Christopher (2003), *The Great Deception: A Secret History of the European Union*, London: Continuum.

Boulding, Kenneth (1989), *Three Faces of Power*, Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

Brimmer, Esther (2001), *Redefining European Security? Insights from United States, European Union and German Assistance to the Russian Federation 1991-2000; AICGS/DAAD Working Papers Series # 1*, Washington DC: AICGS.

Bromley, Simon (2001), *Governing Europe: Governing the European Union*, London: Sage Publications.

Buckley, Mary (2001), *Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath*, London: Continuum.

Bunker, B. and J. Rubin (1995), *Conflict, Cooperation and Justice: Essays Inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch*, San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Burgess, Michale (2000); *Federalism and the European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950-2000*, London: Routledge.

Burton, John (1990), *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*, London: Macmillan.

_____ (1990), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

- _____ (1984), *Deviance, Terrorism and War*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Cameron, Fraser (2003), *The Future of Europe: Enlargement and Integration*, London: Routledge.
- _____ (2003), *Enlargement, CFSP and the Convention; EPIN Working Papers Series #5*, Brussels: CEPS.
- Carr, Fergus (2000), *Managing Conflict in the New Europe: The Role of International Institution*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
- Christiansen, Thomas (2003), *Rethinking EU Foreign Policy*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Chrysochoou, Dimitris. N (2001), *Theorizing European Integration*, London: Sage Publications.
- Chrysochoou, Dimitris. N (2003), *Theory and Reform in the European Union*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Church, Clive H. (2002), *The Penguin Guide to the European Treaties: From Rome to Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond*, Penguin.
- Clegg, Stewart R. (1989), *Frameworks of Power*, Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.
- Collins, Randall (1975), *Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science*, New York: Academic Press.
- Corbett, Richard (1998), *The European Parliament's Role in Closer EU Integration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
- Coser, Lewis A. (1956), *The Functions of Social Conflict*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Cosgrove-Sachs, Carol (2001), *Europe, Diplomacy and Development: New Issues in EU Relations with Developing Countries*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
- Cottey, Andrew (2002), *New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe's East*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cousens, Elizabeth (2001), *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
- Cowles, Maria Green (2000), *The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival Vol. 5*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Crocker, C.A. et al. (1996), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

- Croft, Stuart (1999), *The Enlargement of Europe*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cross, Peter (1999), *Conflict Prevention Policy of the European Union: Recent Enlargements, Future Instruments*, Baden: Nomos Verlag Baden.
- Curle, Adam (1971), *Making Peace*, London: Tavistock Press.
- Daftary, Farimah (2003), *Radical Ethnic Movements in Contemporary Europe*, Berghahn Books.
- Dannreuther, Roland (2003), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, London: Routledge.
- Dashwood, Alan (2000), *The General Law of E.C. External Relations*, London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.
- Denitch, Bogdan (1994), *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deutsch, M. and P.T. Coleman, (2000), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publications.
- Deutsch, Morton (1972), *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Dinan, Desmond (1999), *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
- _____ (2003), *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Djukic, Slavoljub (1994), *Between Glory and Anathema: A Political Biography of Slobodan Milosevic*, Belgrade: Filip Visnic.
- Duignan, Peter J. (2000), *NATO: Its Past, Present and Future*, USA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Duke, Simon (2002), *The EU and Crisis Management: Development and Prospects*, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration.
- Eekelen, William Van (1998), *Debating European Security, 1948-1998* Brussels: The Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Emerson, Michael (2001), *The Elephant and the Bear: The European Union, Russia and their Near Abroads*, Brussels: CEPS.
- Engelbrekt, Kjell (2002), *Security Policy Reorientation in Peripheral Europe: A Comparative-Perspectivist Approach*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Eriksen, E.O. and J.E. Fossum (2000), *Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?* London: Routledge.
- Everts, Stephen (2002), *Shaping A Credible EU Foreign Policy*, Institute of European Affairs.
- Falk, Richard and Tamas, Szentes (1997), *A New Europe in the Changing Global System*, Brookings Institute.
- Farrell, M. et al. (2002), *European Integration in the Twenty-First Century: Unity in Diversity?*
- Featherstone, K. and C.M. Radaelli (2003), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Feldman, Lily Gardner (2001), *Cooperation or Competition? American, European Union and German in the Balkans Policies*, Washington DC: AICGS.
- Fisher, R.J. (1996), *Interactive Conflict Resolution: Pioneers, Potential and Prospects*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Folger, J.P. et al. (2001), *Designing Mediation: Approaches to Training and Practice within a Transformative Framework*, New York: The Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation.
- Folger, J.P. and T. Jones (1994), *New Directions in Mediation: Communication Research and Perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
- Follett, Mary Parker (1924), *Creative Experience*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co.
- Follett, Mary Parker (1942), *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett*, New York: Harper.
- Follett, Mary Parker (1918), *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government*, Longmans, Green and Co.: New York.
- Foucher, Michel (2002), *The European Republic*, Delhi: Manohar.
- Friedrich, Wolfgang-Uwe (2000), *The Legacy of Kosovo: German Politics and Policies in the Balkans*, Washington DC: AICGS.
- French, J.R.P. and B.H. Raven (1963), *Current Perspectives in Social Psychology*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fukuda, K. and H. Akiba (2003), *European Governance After Nice*, Curzon: Routledge.

- Gartner, H. et al. (2001), *Europe's New Security Challenges*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Gasteyger, Curt (1997), *An Ambiguous Power: The European Union in a Changing World*, Bertelsmann Foundation Press.
- George, S. and I. Bache (2001), *Politics in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ghebali, V. and D. Warner (2001), *The Operational Role of the OSCE in the South-Eastern Europe: Contributing to the Regional Stability in the Balkans*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Gilligan, C. and J. Tonge (1997), *Peace or War? Understanding the Peace Process in Northern Ireland*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Gillingham, John (2003), *European Integration 1950-2002*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Glenny M. (1999), *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, London: Granta.
- _____ (1996), *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin Publishing.
- Gnesotto, N. et al. (2002); *European Security and Defence Policy: Taking Stock; ESF Working Papers Series # 8*, Brussels: CEPS.
- Goddard, V. et al. (1996); *The Anthropology of Europe: Identities and Boundaries in Conflict*, Oxford: Berg.
- Goetz, K.H. and S. Hix (2000), *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems*, London: Frank Cass.
- Goldman, Kjell (2001), *Transforming the European Nation State*, London: Sage Publications.
- Gow, James (1997), *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Graham, Pauline (1996), *Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management: A Celebration of Writings from the 1920s*, Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press.
- Green, P. and R. Collins (2003), *Embracing Cyprus: The Path to Unity in the New Europe*, Washington DC, AICGS.

- Guttman, Robert J. (2001), *Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
- Hampson, Fen Osler (1996), *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Harrington, Christine B. (1985), *Shadow Justice: The Ideology and Institutionalization of Alternatives to Court*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Heisbourg, Irena (2004), *What Strategy for the Greater Middle East?: ESF Working Papers Series # 15*, Brussels: CEPS.
- Hentz, J.J. and M. Boas (2003), *New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hitchcock, William I. (2002), *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945-2002*, Doubleday.
- Hofrichter, Richard. (1987), *Neighbourhood Justice in Capitalist Society: The Expansion of the Informal State*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press
- Horowitz, Donald (1985), *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkely CA: University of California Press.
- Hoskyns, C. and M. Newmann (2000), *Democratizing the European Union: Issues for the Twenty-First Century*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Hudson, Kate (2003), *Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*, Pluto Books.
- Hudson, Ray (1999), *Divided Europe: Society and Territory*, London: Sage Publications.
- Hufbauer, G.C. (1990), *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Ifestos, Panayiotis (1987); *European Political Cooperation*, Aldershot: Avebury.
- Ingham, H. and M. Ingham (2002), *EU Expansion to the East: Prospects and Problems*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Jay, Ram N. (1996), *Social Conflict*, Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Jeong, Ho-Won, (1999), *Conflict Resolution: Process, Dynamics and Structure*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing.
- Judah, Tim (2000), *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Kaldor, M. and I. Vejvoda (1999) *Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe*, London: Pinter.
- Kanet, Roger E. (1998), *Resolving Regional Conflicts*, University of Illinois Press.
- Kaplan, Robert D. (1993), *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, New York: Random House.
- Keating, Michael (2004), *Regions and Regionalism in Europe*, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Keens-Soper, Maurice (1998), *Europe in the World: The Persistence of Power Politics*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Kelman, Herbert C. (1997), *Social- Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict*, New York: St Martin's Press.
- Kelstrup, M. and M.C. Williams (2000), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, London: Routledge.
- Kempe, Iris (2001), *Beyond EU Enlargement Vol. 1: The Agenda of Direct Neighbourhood for Eastern Europe*, Bertelsmann Foundation Press.
- Knodt, M. and S. Princen (2003), *Understanding European Union's External Relations*, London: Routledge.
- Kressel, K. and D.G. Pruitt (1989), *Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention*, San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Kriesberg, Louis (1982), *Social Conflicts*, Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Kubicek, Paul J. (2003), *The European Union and Democratization*, London: Routledge.
- Lake, D.A. and D. Rothchild, (1998), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear Diffusion, and Escalation*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Latawaski, P. and M.A. Smith (2003), *The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Laurenson, F.N. and S. Hoonacker (1992), *The International Conference on Political Union*, Amsterdam: European Institute of Public Administration.
- LeBaron, Michelle (2002), *Bridging Troubled Waters: Conflict Resolution From the Heart*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publications.
- Lederach, John Paul (1997), *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Lieven A. and D. Trenin (2003), *Ambivalent Neighbours: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

- Linz, J. and A. Stepan (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Long, William J. (2003), *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in conflict Resolution*, Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Lund, Michael (1996), *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press
- Mahncke, D. (2001), *Old Frontiers – New Frontiers: The Challenge of Kosovo and its Implications for the European Union [with a Foreword by Javier Solana Madariaga]*, Peter Lang.
- Mandelbaum, M., *The Dawn of Peace in Europe*, Brookings Institute.
- Meinhof, Ulrike H. (2002), *Living (with) Borders: Identity Discourses on East-West Borders in Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Miall, Hugh (2003), *Preventors of War: Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
- Mitsilegas, Valsamis, *The European Union and Internal Security: Guardian of the People?*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lederach, John Paul (1997), *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1978), *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Moore, C. (1996), *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, London.
- Nader, Laura (1991), 'Harmony Models and the Construction of Law', *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Nelson, B.F. and A.C.G. Stubb (1998), *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
- Newman, Michael (2000), *Democratizing the European Union: Issues for the Twenty first Century*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- O'Neill, W.G. (2001), *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Papadimitriou, Dimitris (2002), *Negotiating the New Europe: The European Union and Eastern Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Pettai, V. and J. Zielonka (2003). *The Road to European Union: Vol. 2 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Petersen, Roger D. (2002), *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pollack, D. et al. (2003), *Political Culture in Post Communist Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Preston, Christopher (1997), *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*, London: Routledge.
- Pridham, G. (2000), *The Dynamics of Democratization: A Comparative Approach*, London: Continuum.
- Rahim, Afzalur (1990), *Theory and Research in Conflict Management*. New York: Praeger.
- Rapoport, Anatol (1974), *Fights, Games and Debates*, University of Michigan Press.
- Rapoport, Anatol (1989), *The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict*, New York: Paragon House.
- Ries, Tomas (2002), *The Role of Europe in the Middle East, ESF Working Paper Series # 7*, Brussels: CEPS.
- Risse, T. and M.G. Cowles (2001), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Ross, M.H. (1993), *The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Ross, Marc Howard (2004), *The Management of Conflict: Interpretation and Interests in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Rubin, J.Z. et al. (1994), *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement*, New York: McGraw Hill.
- Rupesinghe, Kumar (1995), *Conflict Transformation*, New York: St Martin's Press.
- Rupnik, J. and J. Zielonka (2003), *The Road to the European Union: Vol.1 The Czech and Slovak Republics*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Saideman, Stephen M. (2001), *The Ties that Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sandole, J.D. and Kelman, H.C. (1993), *Conflict Resolution and Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Sandole, J.D. and H. Merwe (1993), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Sansitio, Carlos (2002), *The Reform of European Union Development Policy: Improving Strategies for Conflict Resolution, Democracy and Governance Conditionality*, Working Papers Series # 182, Brussels: CEPS.
- Saunders, Harold H. (1999), *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Schellenberg, James A. (1996), *Conflict resolution: Theory, Research and Practice*, New York: State University of New York Press.
- Schirato, Tony and Yell, Susan (2000), *Communication and Cultural Literacy: An Introduction*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Seidelmann, Reimund (2002), *EU, NATO and the Relationship Between Transformation and External Behaviour in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe: The Cases of Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine*, Nomos Verlag.
- Smith, J. and C. Jenkins (2002), *Through The Paper Curtain: Insiders and Outsiders in the New Europe*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Stedmen, S.J. (2002) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Steunenbergh, B. (2002), *Widening the European Union: the Politics of Institutional Change and Reform*, London: Routledge.
- Tanner, M. (1997), *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War*, London: Yale University Press.
- Tidwell, A.C. (1998), *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*, New York: Pinter.
- Toft, Monica Duffy (2003), *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Var Ham, P. and Medvedev, S. (2002), *Mapping European Security after Kosovo*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Väyrynen, Raimo (1991), *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.
- Veremis, Thanos (2002), *Action without Foresight: Western Involvement in Yugoslavia*, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.

- Veremis, T. and E. Kofos (1998), *Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War*, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.
- Volpe, M.R. and Maida, P.R. (1992), *Sociological Practice: Conflict Processing*, East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press.
- Wallensteen, Peter (2002), *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*. London: Sage Publications.
- Waller M. (2002). *Kosovo, The Politics of Delusion*, London: Frank Cass.
- Walter, B.F. (2002), *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Walton, R.E. and R.B. McKersie (1965), *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiation: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System*, New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Wehr, P. (1979), *Conflict Regulation*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview.
- Whitehead, L. (1996), *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yannis, Alexandros (2001), *Kosovo Under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict*, Athens: Greek Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.
- Young, Iris Marion (1996), 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- _____ (1997), 'Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought', *Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy, and Policy*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Youngs R. (2002), *European Union and the Protection of Democracy: Europe's Mediterranean and Asian Policies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zartman, I.W. and J.L. Rasmussen (1997), *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Zielonka, Jan (2002), *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union*. London: Routledge.

Articles

Ackermann, Alice (1994). "Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process in Postwar Europe: The Franco-German Case", *Peace and Change*, 19(3): 229-250.

Adler, Peter (1993), "The Future of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Reflections on ADR as a Social Movement", *Possibilities of Popular Justice*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Andreas, Peter (2004). "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia", *International Studies Quarterly*, 48: 29-51.

Avruch, K. and P. Black (1987), "A Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Critique", *Negotiation Journal*, January: 87-96.

Ayoob, Mohammed (2003), "The War Against Iraq: Normative and Strategic Implications", *Middle East Policy*, 10(2): 29-39.

Batt, Judy (2005). "The Question of Serbia", *Chaillot Papers*, 81: 1-30.

Bayne, Sarah (2003), "Conflict Prevention and the EU: From Rhetoric to Reality", *International Alert and Saferworld*, 19-29.

Bercovitch, Jacob (2004), "The Western Balkans: Moving On", *Chaillot Papers* 70: 1-40.

Burton, John W. (1985), "About Winning", *International Relations*, 12: 71-91.

Burton, J.W. and D.J.D. Sandole (1987), "Expanding the Debate on Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Response to a Critique", *Negotiation Journal*, January: 87-100.

_____ (1986), "Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution", *Negotiation Journal*, 2: 333-344.

Checkel, J. (1999), "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe", *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1): 83-114.

Clemant, Sophia (1998), "The Issue Raised by Bosnia and the Transatlantic Debate", *Chaillot Papers* 32: 1-40.

_____ (1997), "Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia", *Chaillot Papers* 30:1-21.

Dahrendorf, Ralf (1958), "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2:170-83.

- Delpech, Therese (2002), "International Terrorism and Europe", *Chaillot Papers* 56: 1-34.
- Donais, Timothy (2005), "A Tale of Two Towns: Human Security and the Limits of Post-War Normalization in Bosnia-Herzegovina", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 17(1): 19-33.
- Dover, Robert (2005). "The Europeanization of British Defence Policy: An Intergovernmentalist Reading". *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 6(4): 508-25.
- Dover, R (2005), "The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992-95", *European Security*, 14(3): 297-318.
- Duffy, G. and N. Lindstrom (2002). "Conflicting Identities: Solidary Incentives in the Serb-Croatian War", *Journal of Peace Research* 39(1): 69-90.
- Emerson, Michael (2003), "Roadmaps and Final Destinations for Israel and Palestine", *Middle East and Euro-Med Working Paper* 12: 1-26.
- European Parliament (1996), "Opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on the Next Enlargement of the EU towards the CEECs", *Official Journal of the European Communities*, Brussels.
- Eyal, J. (2000), "Kosovo: Killing the myths after the killing has subsided", *RUSI Journal*, 45(1):21.
- Felstiner, William L.F. (1974), "Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing", *Law and Society Review*, 8: 63-94.
- Felstiner, W.L.F. et al. (1980-81). "The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming...". *Law and Society Review*, pp.631-54.
- Fisher, R. (1994), "Generic Principles for Resolving Intergroup Conflict", *Journal of Social Issues*, pp.50-47.
- Gagnon, V.P. (1995), "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia" *International Security* 19(3): 130-166.
- Gnesotto, Nicole (1994), "Lessons of Yugoslavia", *Chaillot Papers* 14: 1-30.
- _____ (1993), "War and Peace: European Conflict Prevention", 11: 1-35.
- Gleditsch, Nils Pter (1995), "Democracy and the Future of European Peace", *European Journal of International Relations*, 1(4): 539-571.
- Gokcek, Gulriz Gigi (2003), "Lessons Learned: Cooperation of EU Member States in limiting Ethnic Conflict", *European Union Studies Association- Biennial Conference*, 49.

- Grabbe, H (2001), "How does Europeanization Affect CEEC Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity?", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8(6): 1013-1031.
- Guicherd, C. (1999), "International Law and the War in Kosovo", *Survival*, 41(2):26.
- Gutman, Amy (1999), "How Not To Resolve Moral Conflicts in Politics", *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution*, 15: 1-18.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1995), "Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks to John Rawls's Political Liberalism", *Journal of Philosophy*, 92(3): 132-180.
- Haddadi, Said (1999), "The Western Mediterranean as a Security Complex: A liaison between the European Union and the Middle East?". *JMWP*, 24.99: 13-29.
- Hill, Christopher (2004), "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(1): 143-63.
- _____ (2001), "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 6: 315-333.
- Honig, Jan Willem (2000), "New Conflicts: Risks and Challenges", *European Security*, 91-106.
- Jones, Deniol Lloyd (2000), "Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical theory", *Review of International Studies*, 26: 647-662.
- Jopp, Mathias (1994), "The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations", *Chaillot Papers* 17: 1-30.
- Kaufmann, Chaim (1996), "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars", *International Security* 20(4): 136-175.
- Kaufman, Stuart J. (2006), "Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic Wars", *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(2): 201-208.
- Kopstein J. & D. Reilly (2000), "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World", *World Politics*, 53.
- Korhonen, Outi (2001), "International Governance in Post- Conflict Situations", *Leider Journal of International Law*, 495-529.
- Lak, Maarten W. J. (1992), "EC and CSCE involvement in the Yugoslav crisis in 1991", *Helsinki Monitor*, 3(1): 115-129.

- Latham, Robert (1993), "Democracy and war-making: Locating the International Liberal Context", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 22(2).
- Licklider, Roy (1995), "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993", *American Political Science Review*, 85(3): 681-690.
- Lindstorm, Gustav (2005), "EU-US burdensharing, who does what?", *Chaillot Papers* 82: 1-30.
- _____ (2004), "One year on: Lessons from Iraq", *Chaillot Papers*, 68: 1-40.
- Macmillan, John (1996), "Democracies don't Fight: A Case of the Wrong Research Agenda?", *Review of International Studies*, 22(3): 1-23.
- Mcguire, Michael (2000), "Why did we bomb Belgrade?", *International Affairs*, 76: 1-23.
- Merlington et al (2001), "The Right and the Righteous? European Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sanctions Against Austria", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(1): 59-77.
- Missiroli, Antonio (2002), "Enlargement and European Defense after 11 September", *Chaillot Papers*, 53: 1-28.
- Munuera, Gabriel (1994), "Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience", *Chaillot Papers*, 15/16:91.
- Nader, Laura (1993), "Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology", *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution*, 9(1): 1-25.
- Newman, Saul (1991), "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict", *World Politics*, 43(3): 451-478.
- Ortega, Martin (2003), "The European Union and the Crisis in the Middle East", *Chaillot Papers*, 62: 1-43.
- Paffenholz, Thania (2005), "Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in International Cooperation: An Introductory Overview", *International Politics and Society*, IPG, 63-82.
- Posch, Walter (2005), "Looking into Iraq", *Chaillot Papers* 79: 1-30.
- Pridham, Geoffrey (2002), "EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-communist States-Formality and Reality", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(3): 953-73.

- Quenivet, Noelle (2005), "The World after September 11: Has it Really Changed?", *The European Journal of International Law*, 16(3): 561-577.
- Ralf Dahrendorf (1958), "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2: 170-83.
- Rawls, John (1987), "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", *Oxford Journal for Legal Studies*, 7(1): 1-25.
- Rawls, John (1995), "Reply to Habermas", *Journal of Philosophy*, 92(3): 109.
- Reitan, Ruth (2000), "Strategic Non-violent conflict in Kosovo", *Peace and Change*, 25(1): 71-102.
- Rose, R. and C. Haerpfer (1995), "Democracy and Enlarging the European Union Eastwards", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 33(3): 155-173.
- Rummel Reinhardt (1996), "Common Foreign and Security Policy and Conflict Prevention", *International Alert*, May: 155-173.
- Rummel, Reinhardt (1996), "Conflict Prevention: The Need for a CFSP Strategy", *Conflict Prevention: A Challenge for the European Union*, 24-54.
- Smith, Karen E. (2005), "The Outsiders: the European Neighborhood Policy", *International Affairs*, 81: 757-773.
- _____ (1998), "The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy", *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, 48-65.
- _____ (1998), "The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2: 253-274.
- Snyder, Francis G. (1981), "Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Critical Introduction", *British Journal of Law & Society*, 8(2), 141-179.
- Snyder, J. and K. Ballentine (1996), "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas", *International Security*, 21(2): 5-40.
- Steinberg, Gerald M. (1999), "The European Union and the Middle East Peace Process", *Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs*, 418: 1-10.
- Tanner, Fred (2005), "Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU's Neighborhood", *Chaillot Papers*, 80: 1-39.
- Tocci, Nathalie (2004), "Conflict Resolution in the European Neighborhood: The Role of the EU as a Framework and as an Actor", *European University Institute*, 2004/29: 1-24.

Tovias, Alfred (2003), "Mapping Israel's Policy Options Regarding its Future: Institutionalized Relations with the European Union", *Middle East and Euro-Med Working Paper*, 3:1-31.

Trachtenberg, Marc (2004) "The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance: An American View", *EUI Working Papers*, 2004/27: 1-18.

Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios (2001) "What status for Kosovo?", *Chaillot Papers*, 50: 1-39.

_____ (2001), "The Southern Balkans: Perspectives from the Region", *Chaillot Papers*, 46: 1-29.

Wilkinson, Paul (2005), "International terrorism: the changing threat and the EU's response", *Chaillot Papers* 84: 1-57.

Young, Iris Marion (1997), "Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought", *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory*, 3(3): 340-63.

Youngs, Richard (2004), "Democratic Institution-Building and Conflict Resolution: Emerging EU Approaches", *International Peacekeeping*, 11(3): 526-543.

Zupan, Natascha (2005), "Development Assistance and Peace Building Projects in Conflict Areas: Background, Tools, Lessons Learned, and Challenges Ahead", *International Politics and Society*, IPG, 49-61.

Article, chapter, or work in an edited volume

Bar-Tal, D. and G.H. Bennink (2004), "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process", in Yakov Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.) *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bercovitch, Jacob (1997), "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice", in Zartman, I.W. and L. Rasmussen (eds.) *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Bideleux, R. (2001), "Europeanization and the Limits to Democratization in East-Central Europe" in Pridham, G. and A. Agh (eds.) *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gardner, Ellen (2001), "The Role of Media in Conflicts", in Reychler L. and T. Paffenholz (eds.), *Peacebuilding: A Fieldguide*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Ginsberg, Roy (1997), "The EU's CFSP: The Politics of Procedure" in Martin Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: the Record and Reforms*, London: Cassel.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1995), "Democracy and the Future of European Peace", in Nils Petter Gleditsch and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.) *Democracy and Peace, Special Issue of the European Journal of International Relations*, 1(4): 539-571.

Lenzi, Guido (1998), "Defining the European Security Policy" in Jan Zielonka (ed.), *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, Amsterdam: Kluwer.

Lund, Michael (2001), "A Toolbox for Responding to Conflicts and Building Peace", in Reychler L. and T. Paffenholz, (eds.) *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Mitchell, C. (1994), "Conflict Research" in A.J.R. Groom and L. Light (eds.), *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*, London: Pinter Publishers.

Pinder, John (1996) "Community against Conflict: The European Community's Contribution to Ethno-national Peace in Europe". in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), *Preventive conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organisations*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Ross, M.H. (2004), "Ritual and the Politics of Reconciliation", in Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.) *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stedman, Stephen John (1996), "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict", in Michael E. Brown (ed.) *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sunstein, Cass R. (1995); "Incompletely Theorized Agreements", *Harvard Law Review*, 108: 1733-72.

Whitehead, L. (1996), "Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe", in Whitehead (ed.) *The International Dimension of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

