

**CHINA'S STRATEGIC ACCESS TO PAKISTAN:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA**

**Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the award of the Degree of  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**RAJEEV RANJAN CHATURVEDY**



**CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST ASIAN  
AND SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI -110067  
INDIA  
2006**



CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST ASIAN & SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**  
NEW DELHI – 110067

Phone : 26704350  
Fax : 91-11-2671 7586  
91-11-2671 7603

## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “CHINA’S STRATEGIC ACCESS TO PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA” submitted by RAJEEV RANJAN CHATURVEDY under my supervision in partial fulfilment of the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY, has not previously submitted for the award of an M. Phil degree in this university or any other university. This is his bonafide work.

This dissertation may be placed before the examiner for the evaluation for the award of the degree of the Master of Philosophy.

PROF. M. P. LAMA  
CHAIRPERSON

CHAIRPERSON  
Centre for South, Central, South East  
Asian and South West Pacific Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110067

PROF. I.N. MUKHERJEE

SUPERVISOR  
Centre for South, Central, South East  
Asian and South West Pacific Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110067

*Dedicated to*  
**MAA & PAPA**

## PREFACE

The scope for this study strongly stems from the fact that the area of strategic access has not been researched strongly by the strategic analysts in India despite the fact that infrastructure projects like the Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port hold high strategic implications for India.

At the dawn of the new millennium, India is qualitatively and quantitatively a different actor on the world stage than the India of just a decade ago. India is developing strategies that extend far beyond the South Asian box. As ancient civilizations, India and China co-existed in peace and harmony for millennia. However, as post colonial modern states, with the exception of a very short period of “honeymoon” in the early 1950s, they have seen dramatic fluctuations and stalemate of many kinds ranging across the South Asian region. The relationship between the two Asian powers has been marked by conflict, mutual suspicion, distrust, estrangement, encirclement, contentment, and rivalry.

All the key issues of India’s foreign policy are intimately tied to the nature of its relationship with China. Handling the ties with Beijing is likely to be the biggest political challenge for Indian foreign policy in the coming decades. How they manage their relationship will have a tremendous impact on the peace and stability in the regional and increasingly, global context. In geopolitical terms, the rapprochement between the world’s two most populous countries could be profound. Thus the question of whether India should try to keep China out of the geopolitics of the region or accommodate its rise in the subcontinent must be answered with care and rigour.

China’s infrastructural development to South Asia is expanding continuously. But, what are the Chinese interests, which are compelling her to expand its strategic access to the region? What are the objectives behind Chinese developmental aid for road and port development? How it will impinge on the improving Sino-Indian relations? These are some interesting questions which have been scrutinized in this study.

The main focus of this study is on Chinese strategic access to Pakistan and its implications for India. The Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port developments and India's response towards them constitute the case model for the study. It is an attempt to analyse the divergent views of various experts and strategists, keeping in mind the geopolitical realities of the region. The study attempts of developing a thorough understanding of the main objectives behind Chinese strategic accesses to Pakistan.

The subject matter of the first chapter starts with the theory related to strategic access. This chapter examines the nature and causes of Chinese strategic access to South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. Chapter two and three are confined to the Karakoram Highway and the Gwadar Port respectively. Detailed analysis of these two projects shows that how China is entering into the core security area of India and expanding her influence in the region through Pakistan. Further, chapter four looks at India's strategy in response to the expanding Chinese influence into the region. It discusses India's effort to mitigate the strategic discord. And finally, the concluding chapter looks at the future prospect of bilateral relations of these two Asian Giants.

Despite the generally benign atmosphere between the two countries, there remain lingering suspicion and mistrust. Their competition for influence in South Asia and neighbouring regions remains a major source of disbelieve in future direction of their relationship. Especially, China's unique relationship with Pakistan has been a major cause of displeasure in India. The expanding political influence of China in the subcontinent, and in particular its strategic relationship with Pakistan has been an important concern for New Delhi.

India mulls the economic and security implications of the modernisation of China's infrastructure along and across the border. Sino-Indian relations have never been as good as they are today. China's road building and port development project is unlikely to lead a military confrontation between the two countries. India can not stop China from developing its own territory across the border. India has limited options. It is more likely that Chinese and Indian involvement in

infrastructural development reflect primarily domestic concerns and a willingness to engage with the region via multilateral and soft means.

While elements of political competition will endure for long, India and China today can cooperate with each other for mutual benefit in the economic transformation of their neighbouring regions and force the pace of regional economic integration and globalization. While China seems more in tune with these imperatives, India needs to catch up. In fact, strategists in both the countries have begun emphasizing the development discourse over the conventional security debate. An economic alliance on the basis of complementary interests between the two Asian giants will be beneficial for both sides.

Here, I must underline that my work on this study is not a purely and individual enterprise. I have obviously indebted to many scholars and institutions without which this work would not have been possible. At first, I sincerely wish to express my deepest gratitude to my esteemed supervisor **Prof. I. N. Mukherjee** for his distinctive contribution in the completion of this dissertation. He examined the draft of each chapter not only with remarkable promptness but also with meticulous care. Without his continuous help, guidance, precious and inspiring advices, constant supervision and encouragement, efforts would not have been fruitful. For all this I am immensely thankful.

I owe my gratitude to all the faculty members of the South Asian Studies Division.

I owe a debt of gratitude to Prof. C. Raja Mohan who inspired me to work on this subject. His critical evaluation of the subject enriched my knowledge and also gave a proper direction.

I convey my thanks to the staffs of the Centre, JNU Central Library, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) Library, Ministry of External Affairs Library, Nehru Memorial Library, and South Asia Foundation Library for their worthy support.

I owe my gratitude to my younger brother Babloo and younger sisters Ratna and Rina for their valuable support, affection and encouragement.


I owe my special thanks to my friends Priyanka and Smita for giving me constant motivation and all other supports essential to work on my dissertation. I also thank to all of my classmates for their help in big and small ways in completion of this study.

The perennial source of inspiration of my parents is beyond my expression of gratitude. It was their eternal support in multiple ways that made this work possible.

Lastly, this is my own work and I would be responsible for all errors.

New Delhi

Date: 18 July, 2006.



**Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy**

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page No.</i>
<i>Preface</i>	<i>i-iv</i>
<i>Contents</i>	<i>v</i>
<i>List of Maps</i>	<i>vi</i>
<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	<i>vii</i>
Chapter I : Introduction: Theoretical Aspects of Strategic Access	1-17
Chapter II : The Karakoram Highway	18-41
Chapter III : The Gwadar Port	42-61
Chapter IV : India's Strategy	62-84
Chapter V : Conclusion: Sino-Indian Rivalry and Cooperation	85-93
BIBLIOGRAPHY	94-110



*List of Maps*

*Page No*

Map 1: The contested mountain borderlands of China, Pakistan, India, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan.	23
Map 2: Chinese roads in the Karakoram-Himalayan Borderlands.	24
Map 3: The Karakoram Highway adapted from a Government of Pakistan drawing.	31
Map 4: The route of the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan, showing distances from Rawalpindi in kilometres.	32
Map 5: Location of Gwadar Port	43
Map 6: National Highway Network of Pakistan	49

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>Page No.</i>
Figure 1: Phase I & II of Gwadar Port	47
Figure 2: Road Networks from Gwadar	48

<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>Page No.</i>
Table 1: Gwadar's trade forecast	54
Table 2: Indian perceptual position on China and their grand strategy	66-67
Table 3: Overseas deployments of Indian Navy in 2005	75-76

## Chapter – 1: Introduction: Theoretical Aspects of Strategic Access

Lying between the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean, South Asia forms an organic security zone- a zone that had historically shaped regional security by spreading the messages of civilization, cooperation and peace. Aware of historical reasoning about the political and psychological causes of war, ancient statesmen had jettisoned the policy of balance of power, self-help and state-centric order in favour of freedom of the movements of people, trade and commerce. The varied and deep economic and social links among the South Asian countries helped to generate a strong political will to build cooperation that disposed the governments to define security on welfare-maximizing terms. South Asia can neither be separated from the global geopolitical contest nor from the main international security, political, economic and technological developments.<sup>1</sup>

When the British left India shortly after the end of the Second World War it was uppermost in their minds and an abiding passion with Mountbatten that the defence of South Asia was unitary. However, from the Kashmir conflict onwards, South Asia was split open. Internal dissent laid the region prey to outside powers in a way which otherwise would not have been possible: for hostility within South Asia immediately meant that the rivals would be seeking outside support, if not alliances. The major world powers that emerged at the end of the war were the Soviet Union and the United States – the two poles of the two geo-strategic regions. But another major regional power also emerged in Asia, with the communist victory in China in 1949.<sup>2</sup>

Two of the most brilliant civilizations yet produced by humanity, those of China and India, lie side by side on the continent of Eurasia. The peoples that have produced these civilizations are both rightly proud of their histories and achievements, and determined that their nations will play a major role in the

---

<sup>1</sup> Dev Raj Dahal and Nishchal Nath Pandey (eds.), *Comprehensive Security in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), pp. 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> Graham P. Chapman, *The Geopolitics of South Asia: From Early Empires to the Nuclear Age* (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 258.

modern world. These two ancient nations emerged from long periods of foreign domination and established new states at about the same time. The power and ambition of these states dwarfed the capabilities of the other states lying along their common flanks. For the next five decades the two powerful states struggled to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation.<sup>3</sup> In the past few years many scholars began to reach the conclusion that China has developed a fairly consistent and coherent grand strategy in the past decade, even though they may disagree somewhat on the nature and content of that grand strategy.<sup>4</sup> The central objective of China's Grand Strategy in the past two decades can be encapsulated in just one sentence- to secure and shape a conducive environment so that China can concentrate on its development.

### **The Conceptual Foundation of Grand Strategy**

Grand Strategy necessarily looks beyond the battlefield and military victory, and it is as much concerned with peace as with war. Paul Kennedy defines grand strategy as “the balancing of ends and means, both in peacetime and in war.”<sup>5</sup> Highlighting the political element in grand strategy he further adds, “Given all the independent variables that come into play, grand strategy can never be exact or fore-ordained. It relies, upon constant and intelligent reassessment of the polity's ends and means; it relies upon wisdom and judgement.”<sup>6</sup> It is important to understand that grand strategy is neither the end-state alone nor just the available means; in fact, it represents the relationship between the two. According to Barry Posen, “a grand strategy is a political-military means-ends

---

<sup>3</sup> John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice”, *China Quarterly*, No. 168, December 2001, pp. 835-864; Evan Mediros and Taylor Fravel, “China's New Diplomacy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 6, Nov./Dec. 2003, pp. 22-35; Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (Santa Monica, C.A.: Rand, 2000).

<sup>5</sup> Paul Kennedy (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

chain, a state's theory about how it can best 'cause' security for itself."<sup>7</sup> In Colin Dueck's terms "'Grand strategy' involves a self-conscious identification and prioritisation of foreign policy goals; an identification of existing and potential resources; and a selection of a plan which uses these resources to meet those goals."<sup>8</sup> Based on these definitions it can be concluded that grand strategy denotes "a country's broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system."<sup>9</sup> So the first step in analysing the state's grand strategy is to discern its national objectives. A nation may pursue many different national objectives.

The state seeks to pursue its national objectives in the international system. "Grand Strategy... exists within international politics but does not coincide with its boundaries."<sup>10</sup> Understanding this international environment "is essential to the formulation of any sensible strategic policy."<sup>11</sup> We need to understand the ends that a state seeks as well as the means it employs to meet these ends. A state's grand strategy provides an understanding of its long-term foreign and security policy goals. China's infrastructural development to South Asia is expanding continuously. Expanding its physical connectivity to South Asia is a part of China's grand strategy.

As long as the concept of a unified world government is an ideal, the essential feature of international politics will remain as the state of anarchy. The theories of "Security Dilemma" and "Balance of Power", which results from that anarchy, are still playing important roles in international politics today. Across the Indian Ocean and South Asian Region, India watches warily as China expands its military and political roles, fearing that it is sliding into a state of "strategic

---

<sup>7</sup> Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Colin Dueck, "Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000-2004", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2004, p. 512.

<sup>9</sup> Robert H. Dorff, "A Primer in Strategy Development", in Joseph R. Cerami and James F Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, P.A., Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> Edward N Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 210.

<sup>11</sup> Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, "Introduction: On Strategy", in Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 5.

encirclement” by China. The concept of a security dilemma casts considerable light on a central dynamic of the complex relationship between China and India – the constant pulling and tugging between those two countries over China’s security ties with countries in South Asian-Indian Ocean region.<sup>12</sup>

### **The Security Dilemma: Making One’s Adversary Less Secure**

A security dilemma arises out of the anarchic nature of the state system. In the anarchic international environment, nation states/regions are fearful of each other because of mutual misunderstandings. Security thus becomes the first priority. All countries try to gain security, obtain military superiority, and improve one’s own security status by increasing military expenditure. Since an arms race is a perpetual concern, one’s military superiority will quickly be surpassed by other’s military building-up efforts; absolute security is therefore impossible. So, all countries are trapped in a dilemma. This kind of phenomenon is called the “Security Dilemma”.<sup>13</sup>

Without a superior power to protect it, each state bears ultimate responsibility for its own security, for its own survival as a member of the state system. Faced with this awesome responsibility, states attempt to expand their power – economically, strategically, and militarily – so as to better defend themselves should the need arise. But by augmenting their own power in this fashion, states make neighbouring states less secure. This compels those neighbours to “prepare for the worst” by taking counter-measures to enhance their own power. A common search for security thus results in a situation in which both powers are less secure.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> John W. Garver, “The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations”, *India Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, October 2002, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 231.

<sup>14</sup> John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1950, pp. 157-180.

In the words of Charles L. Glaser, “Security Dilemma is the key to understanding how in an anarchic international system states with fundamentally compatible goals still end up in competition and war.”<sup>15</sup> Robert Jervis defines the security dilemma as a situation in which “the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others”.<sup>16</sup> It provides the rational foundation for what Jervis termed the “spiral model”, which describes how the interaction between states that are seeking only security can fuel competition and strain political relations.<sup>17</sup> Jervis explains that the magnitude and nature of the security dilemma depend on two variables – the offence-defence balance and offence-defence differentiation.<sup>18</sup> As a result security dilemma can vary across space and time. Jervis identified a number of the factors associated with a security dilemma that hamper state’s ability to work cooperatively towards a mutually desired goal of general security.<sup>19</sup> First, leader of one state fear that current, relatively benign, non-threatening policies of another state might, at some future point, become less benign and more threatening. Second, in order to protect their own territory, states may seek to influence or control areas outside their territory. From the standpoint of another state, this effort to influence events beyond one’s boundaries may look like indications of aggressive intent. Third, states may seek to control, or at least neutralise, areas on their borders – to create buffers. Moreover, maintaining a buffer zone often requires increasing influence over the buffer country, which again looks like aggressive intent and increase vulnerability from the perspective of the state not controlling the buffer zone. Fourth, the military instruments, central to a state’s pursuit for greater security easily and inadvertently constitute threats to other state. Finally, the greater the range of interests perceived as requiring protection, the more likely it is that the national efforts of one state will clash with those of another. These features identified by

---

<sup>15</sup> Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited”, *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997, p. 171.

<sup>16</sup> Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, Vol. 30, January 1978, p. 169.

<sup>17</sup> Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 62-76.

<sup>18</sup> Charles L. Glaser, no. 15, p. 171.

<sup>19</sup> Robert Jervis, no. 16, pp. 167-214.

Jervis will be helpful for analysis of the contemporary vista of China's South Asia policy.

China has consistently striven to maintain a balance of power in South Asia, a region far beyond its major industrial and population centres. Since about 1998, India has launched a similar project in East Asia. India struggles to maintain control over, and China to neutralise Indian control over, strategic frontier zones in the Himalayan lands of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.<sup>20</sup> Each sees the other's action as threatening and its own action as purely defensive.

### **Balance of Power**

The "Balance of Power" and the "Security Dilemma" were born together. The representative figure of New Realism, Prof Kenneth Waltz, once said, "Rational countries living in the state of anarchy and the security dilemma would be suspicious of and hostile to each other because of their tense relations, although that was not their original idea."<sup>21</sup> In such an international environment, it is natural that countries would use the "Balance of Power" to protect their own security. This would then make the "Security Dilemma" a regular phenomenon in international politics. Thus it seems that the "Security Dilemma" is both the root, and outcome, of the "Balance of Power",<sup>22</sup> while the "Balance of Power" is a natural demand by countries in "Security Dilemma".

According to traditional realism, "Balance of Power" is centred in power. Prof Hans J. Morgenthau believed that "Balance of Power" referred to the reality in which power was shared equally by a group of countries.<sup>23</sup> He also pointed out that a group of countries hoping to maintain or break the *status quo* would finally come to the structure of "Balance of Power" and adopt the necessary policies to

---

<sup>20</sup> This aspect has been explicated at length in John W. Garver, *The Protracted Contest: Sino – Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

<sup>21</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Theories of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> Guo Xuetao, "Collective Security vs. Balance of Power – Evolution of International Political System", *China Social Science*, Vol. 2, 2002, p. 167.

<sup>23</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1966), p. 223.



sustain such a structure.<sup>24</sup> New Realism illustrated the necessity of balanced diplomacy from the perspective of the importance of “Balance of Power” to national security. Prof. Waltz warned all countries against both “practical threats” and “potential threats”, because in security dilemma, “...measures taken by one country to increase its own security meant measures decreasing other’s security.”<sup>25</sup>

Beijing views South Asian countries as neighbours with whom it is especially important to have friendly cooperative ties both to increase China’s own economic and political influence and to lessen the ability of potentially hostile powers to injure china’s interest. China views strategic links as a part of the normal repertoire of international cooperation and seeks to expand physical connectivity and strategic ties with South Asian countries.

### **The Politics of Strategic Access**

The politics of access in South Asia had played a principal role in the region’s military affairs, in its political development, in its economic growth, and in its cultural change. The multidimensionality of routes enhances an understanding of the interaction between the two facets of state policy – security and development. A route is both a geographical and a political idea, both an end and a means. Routes create access, and access has been a “central problem” in human history. It lies at the heart of man’s relationship to his environment, and it is a matter as much political as geographical.<sup>26</sup> Access in space has been “organised at all times in history to serve political ends, and one of the major aims of politics is to regulate conditions of access.”<sup>27</sup> Consideration of security often plays a major role in matters of development.

---

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>25</sup> Kenneth Waltz, no. 21, p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: The Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1989), p. 2.

<sup>27</sup> Jean Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973), p. 27.

Routes are the means for the centralisation of the state, for the distribution of resources, and for the conduct of war. Routes are also “the means for the movement of ideas, transmitting what has been called the “iconography” of the state, the dominant culture and ideology of the political centre, to its peripheries.”<sup>28</sup> Routes (land, sea, air) can define the territorial reach and physical capabilities of the state and are integral to the achievement of its political, economic, and military potential. Whatever its form, a route is a function of the characteristics of its environment and of technological advances in the modes of transportation and communication.<sup>29</sup> Ispahani points out the significance of land routes in following words -

“Land routes, in particular, are important and useful for historical analysis in the modern world. They have meaning and function in the vital areas of state life – in the economy, in politics, in the dissemination of ideas and ideologies, in internal security, external defence, and the pursuit of foreign policy goals... Transport infrastructure defines, in a sense, the material conditions for a state’s internal and external capabilities.”<sup>30</sup>

Routes are dual-capable – in all their attributes they function in, and stand at the nexus of, security and development. A route can have both strategic and developmental consequences; it is likely that benefits will ensue for both policy areas. Routes are called a “strategic research site” for virtually all the geopolitics of the region. Routes add up to a “skeleton, or X-ray” of the politics of countries and regions.<sup>31</sup>

Routes help determine the potential of states. “To define themselves – to develop territorial identities – and to differentiate themselves one from another, modern states must delimit territory and control access by outsiders.”<sup>32</sup> Political integration requires the creation of access. In the development of a coherent policy, the infrastructure for movement, for access to the source of power, must exist. Access routes are extremely useful if a state is to expand its political

---

<sup>28</sup> Jean Gottmann, “The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at Analysis”, *World Politics*, Vol. 4, July 1952, p. 515.

<sup>29</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 26, p. 3.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>32</sup> Jean Gottmann, no. 27, p. 9.

potential outward. They permit the establishment of political and diplomatic contacts, of alliances between states with common or complementary interests. In developing states, decisions about the creation of major routes are always made in the political arena.

Developing countries pursue economic strategies which nearly always incorporate both trade and foreign aid. Important in the attempt to obtain optimum economic benefits from trade with other states are control over and expansion of routes. To increase their economic productivity, security, and market size, states may also form integrated regional groupings in which conditions of access are eased for member-states relative to non-members. Such regional integration policies often involve the joint expansion of physical channels of communication and transport. "In decisions on foreign infrastructural aid economic, political, strategic and geographical concerns intersect. The infrastructure of access is also "dual-use": depending on its location and specifications, it can be an instrument of economic development or a tool of internal security or external defence."<sup>33</sup>

Routes provide the state with means for internal control and for the expansion of its external security interests. In developing countries, the concept of security incorporates both the need for internal consolidation and the need for defence against external threats. A state's control of routes to its peripheries must be stronger than the control exercised by a neighbouring state if the former is to exercise real political and administrative control. For successful defence against external threat, forces must be mobile within a state. Good routes have always been vital for the active defence of borders and for troop mobility within the state. The importance of routes is more obvious in warfare than in peace time. Logistical constraints such as modes of transport and communication define and determine the scope of military operations to a far greater extent. Changes in the means of transportation can have a revolutionary impact on strategy. Access has always been essential to the security of global powers.<sup>34</sup> States may be characterised by their "circulation" systems, or systems of transport and

---

<sup>33</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, p. 10.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 11-15.

communication which permit the movement of men, goods, and ideas within the state and between it and other parts of the world.<sup>35</sup>

For the long term security of a state, access to the sea is considered very indispensable. Lack of access to the sea provokes a high-degree of apprehension among the states. In the formation of strategic alliances and security ties, accesses to sea are very significant. The port is the place of contact between land and maritime space, and it provides service to both hinterland and maritime organisation. Port is a knot where ocean and inland transport lines meet and intertwine. Moreover, traffic means life and prosperity not only for the port but also for the country and region around it.<sup>36</sup> The relationship to sea routes has long been a factor in evaluating the importance of land routes for security. Indeed, the control of the sea lanes and points of strategic egress has become increasingly pertinent to the global rivalry.

The control, use, and expansion of routes were a mainstay of earlier geopolitical deliberations. From their theories of the importance of the mastery over sea routes, land routes, or air routes, the geopoliticians developed broad frameworks to explain the past, present and future distribution of international political and military power. "A geographical-historical perspective on global strategy is made possible when matters are regarded from the point of view of human mobility, and of the different modes of mobility."<sup>37</sup> Many geopoliticians view the historical evolution of power relationships from the perspectives of both politics and geography. Such an approach can "When not abused ... direct attention to factors of enduring importance."<sup>38</sup> Geo-political region is defined as a sub-division of the geo-strategic. As Cohen defines "It expresses the unity of geographic features. Because it is derived directly from geographic regions, this can provide a framework for common political and economic actions. Contiguity

---

<sup>35</sup> Richard Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political Geography". *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 40, June 1950, p. 104.

<sup>36</sup> Guido G. Weigend, "Some Elements in the Study of Port Geography", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2, April 1958, p. 185.

<sup>37</sup> Harold J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Holt, 1942), p. 109.

<sup>38</sup> Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimland and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane Russak, 1977), p. 5.

of location and complementarity of resources are particularly distinguishing marks of the geopolitical region.”<sup>39</sup>

Roads, railroads, and ports have always been historically important as integrative, political, and strategic forces. “From the beginning governments have strengthened their control over territory by supplementing the natural means of communication and attempting to overcome the barriers posed by topography.”<sup>40</sup> Large states have built routes “for strategic and political reasons long before the economic significance of outlying areas justified such construction.”<sup>41</sup>

The new revolution in transport technology has also the effect of expanding the geographical extent of interest. The processes of generating progress and power in a state are immutably tied to the creation, restriction, or control of access. Development requires the enhancement of physical and political accessibility. It acts upon and broadens the social, economic, and political potential of a state’s territory and a nation’s people. It denotes increase in the physical reach of the state and its capacity for political negotiation with or control of its peripheries. Geopolitical coherence is the essence of internal and external security. It is a significant prerequisite in the pursuit of strategic aspirations.

A state may have many motives for giving or receiving infrastructural aid. It may provide such aid for reasons of geopolitics, for the projection of power, to enhance the security of an ally, for the socioeconomic development of the recipient, to increase trade etc. Routes have many different real or perceived functions for a state through whose territory they run, and for a state (particularly donor state) toward which they run. Foreign development aid is usually coloured by the broader political, military, or economic interests of the donor state. Such development aid projects can readily support the regional or international security requirements of the donor while they address the domestic needs of the recipient state. Scarcities of natural resources within a country may provoke competition and even wars with other countries over the access to alternate supplies of those

---

<sup>39</sup> S. B. Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a Divided World* (London: Methuen, 1963), p. 62.

<sup>40</sup> Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 32, February 1938, pp. 36-37.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

resources. Economically important resources, not typically considered natural resources, can be scarce and capable of generating a clash of interests and even provoking conflicts; specifically, at the chokepoints of the world's maritime trade routes. The clash of interests, primarily, is created by the desire of nations to possess a disproportionate share of the sea access upon which the wealth and strength of countries is dependent.<sup>42</sup> Chinese and Indian infrastructural development in South Asian region supply vivid testimony to the primacy of political and strategic interest in the provision of foreign aid.

An important feature of the Asian balance of power is the end of ideological rivalry with the relative increase in the power of China. The collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the rapid economic advancement of China. Two decades of economic reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping have created perhaps the largest positive transformation in the lives of the largest number of people in the shortest possible time in history. The impressive economic achievements of China have begun to catapult Beijing to the status of the second most important power in the world.<sup>43</sup> South Asian countries are very close neighbours to China. China has land borders of more than three thousand kilometres with South Asian countries. So the development of strategic situation in South Asia has significant consequence on China.

### **Fashioning China's South Asian Strategy**

China is flexing its muscles to enhance its influence in South Asia. Triggered by a roaring economy, propelled by swelling confidence and funded by chequebook diplomacy, Beijing is projecting its new might across the sub-continent through its strategic presence thereby setting off alarm bells in the region's security architecture.

---

<sup>42</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 26, pp. 229-231.

<sup>43</sup> C. Raja Mohan, "The Asian Balance of Power", *Seminar*, No. 487, March 2000.

China had a long historic linkage with South Asia, with travellers from China visiting the South Asian region and writing about their travels. Trade ties can also be traced back to the Tang Dynasty and many Chinese artefacts have been found in South Asian region – from the subcontinent to Sri Lanka and Myanmar.<sup>44</sup> “China (Tibet/Xinjiang) is linked to South Asian states by ‘mountains and rivers’. That expression is not merely a diplomatic platitude; it is a hard geopolitical fact of life.”<sup>45</sup> Given China’s sensitivities about Tibet and Xinjiang, seen by the Chinese as their “soft strategic underbelly”<sup>46</sup> since their confrontation with British India, China’s South Asia policy has always been guided purely by an aim to ensure its territorial integrity as a nation.

Conventional wisdom tells us that boundary disputes have been the most dominant cause of inter-state suspicions and threat perceptions in Asia. Of the seven South Asian states, China shares common borders with four which makes it integral to the region. All these borders had been disputed to begin with and have sparse yet overlapping populations. China’s unresolved boundary with India makes these states critical buffers, thus increasing their strategic significance for both New Delhi and Beijing.<sup>47</sup> A scholar opines “we must not close our eyes to the fact that China, historically, geographically, geo-politically by virtue of being in Tibet and Xinjiang is a South Asian power.”<sup>48</sup> Beijing has continued to modulate its South Asian policy to suit its larger regional and global security perspectives.

China’s initial South Asia policy was based on a superfluous friendship with India. Beijing’s South Asia policy can be described as a reflection of China’s arduous long march from ideology and revolutionary zeal to national interest and pragmatism defining core of China’s national objectives.<sup>49</sup> China’s standing in

---

<sup>44</sup> Maxwell Keegel, “China and South Asia”, *Liberal Times*, Vol. XI, No. 3, 2003.

<sup>45</sup> M. R. Josse, “China in South Asia: An Emerging Dynamic” in Dev Raj Dahal and Nishchal Nath Pandey (eds.), *Comprehensive Security in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p. 221.

<sup>46</sup> Swaran Singh, “The China Connection”, *Seminar*, No. 517, September 2002, p. 53.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Sridhar K. Khatri (ed.), *Regional Security and South Asia* (Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuban University, 1987), p. 242.

<sup>49</sup> Swaran Singh, *China - South Asia: Issue, Equations, Policies* (New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2003), pp. 329-341.

world affairs expanded by leaps and bounds in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The expanding political influence of China in the subcontinent, and in particular its strategic relationship with Pakistan, has been an important concern for New Delhi in the last two decades of the twentieth century.<sup>50</sup> China's relation with the states of South Asia may be understood as story of the search for, and conflict over access. It has created its strongest ties in South Asia with Pakistan. Pakistan's relations with China have developed largely in response to her security needs.<sup>51</sup>

### **China and Pakistan: The Enduring Entente**

China-Pakistan ties can be described as the most critical component of China's South Asia policy. The Sino-Pakistan relationship saw its beginning at Bandung, but it was in the early sixties that the cooperative relationship began evolving in substantive terms. China and Pakistan have had a remarkably enduring friendship. Pakistan constitutes the only exception where China has managed to have stable and friendly equations throughout last five decades. This partnership has consistently been of a truly special character.<sup>52</sup> China's close relation with Pakistan has been very important to Beijing. "Since almost the earliest days, Chinese policy towards Pakistan has been based upon realistic power calculations deriving from extant or potential conflicts between China and India."<sup>53</sup> It is a long standing friendship that has been, as the Chinese and Pakistani like to say, "tested by adversity", which has come in the form of regime change and upheavals in both countries, fundamental realignments in the international system, and war. Pakistan has played a major role in China's long

---

<sup>50</sup> C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Viking, 2003), pp. 149-155.

<sup>51</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 15.

<sup>52</sup> Many experts on the Sino-Pakistan relation accept this view. See J.P.Jain, *China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974); Yaacov Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations, 1960-1980* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

<sup>53</sup> John W. Garver, no. 3, p. 187.



term strategy.<sup>54</sup> S. M. Burke narrates “China’s policy toward Pakistan is an object lesson in how to attain long-term national goals by calm calculation, forbearance, and diplomatic skill.”<sup>55</sup>

The Sino-Pakistani entente can be traced back to the heyday of Sino-Indian amity in the mid-1950s; it deepened during the long period of Sino-Indian hostility and has continued as China and India emulated a level of comity during the 1990s. It is, indeed a remarkably durable relationship. Chinese strategists and statesmen have recognised that they have an interest in keeping Pakistan strong and confident enough to remain independent of Indian domination and willing to challenge Indian moves in South Asia. The commonality of interests of the two countries is in fact the basis of the entente and key to understanding its remarkable durability.

China’s interest in a strong Pakistan is manifested in the remarkable continuity of China’s transfers of conventional arms to Pakistan in spite of the development of Sino-Indian rapprochement since the late 1980s. India sees the Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership as a serious threat. As the 1999-2000 Annual Report of India’s Defence Ministry put it “The defence cooperation between China and Pakistan also continues ... Sino-Pakistan ... defence cooperation ... is yet another area of concern and potential instability.”<sup>56</sup> It is significant to mention that the “two-front threat” posed by Pakistan and China to India exists independently of links between Islamabad and Beijing.

Although China’s broad objective in South Asia seems to expand multi-dimensional cooperative relations with all countries of the region, cooperation in the field of strategic access (transportation) is currently one particularly important form of China’s expanding ties to South Asian Countries. As Chinese economic power spills over boundaries, its integration with neighbouring regions is inevitable. In the past China sought strategic connectivity to the subcontinent by building the Karakoram Highway through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (Pok) and

---

<sup>54</sup> John W. Garver, “Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistani Entente”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 2, 1996, pp. 323-330.

<sup>55</sup> S. M. Burke, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 213.

<sup>56</sup> Ministry of Defence, Government of India, *Annual Report 1999/2000* (New Delhi), pp. 2-4.

the Kodari highway to Nepal. Now the economic imperative has made the access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean an urgent political goal. Beijing wants to build new highways through Nepal into the sub-Himalayan plains. The Tibet railway is at the edge of the subcontinent. On the eastern flank, China is trying to develop the Irrawady corridor that will connect land-locked South Western China to the Bay of Bengal. On the western flank, the Gwadar port in Pakistan could make the Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea an enduring one. China's obsessive search for energy and maritime security has compelled Beijing to raise its maritime profile in the subcontinent. Besides Gwadar, there is growing Chinese activity at Chittagong in Bangladesh, the long western coastline of Myanmar, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka.<sup>57</sup>

Despite warming Sino-Indian relations, Beijing has unveiled major strategic moves that will effectively isolate India in South Asia and further squeeze India's traditional strategic space in the region, keeping New Delhi tied down with multiple sub-continental concerns. After Pakistan and Myanmar, Beijing is skilfully employing economic and military means to draw Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka into China's orbit.<sup>58</sup>

China has been busy making significant inroads into India's backyard through cross-border economic and strategic penetration of Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. "Beijing's main objectives are said to be access to raw materials, commodities, natural resources and access to South Asian markets for Chinese goods and to expand China's influence in the region. However, China's support for India's smaller neighbours suggests that gaining access to markets and natural resources is not the only reason behind Beijing's South Asia policy: Beijing also wants to make a point on the limits of Indian power. In fact, aiding "India-wary" countries in South Asia to "concircle (contain and encircle) India" has long been an integral part of China's strategic calculus."<sup>59</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> C. Raja Mohan, "Sleepy Elephant Hungry Dragon", *The Indian Express*, November 17, 2005.

<sup>58</sup> Mohan Malik, "Delhi and Beijing Tread Warily", at <http://www.atimes.com> accessed on February 13, 2006.

<sup>59</sup> Dr. Mohan Malik, "China's Strategy of Containing India", *PINR Report*, February 06 2006 at <http://www.pinr.com>.

Apprehensions never ceased in the South Asian region regarding the logic of trade across the international borders, but with the development of missile technology, end of cold war regime and launching of globalization programme, a paradigm shift has taken place in the security perceptions, enabling states to forge new strategic partnership. Instead of keeping the border areas sealed and under-developed for security reasons they can be turned into gateways for access to markets of the neighbouring countries.

Handling the ties with Beijing is likely to be the biggest political challenge for Indian foreign policy in the coming decades. Is there a fundamental clash of interests rooted in geopolitics between the two Asian giants? Or, is it a temporary divergence of interests between two rising powers with competing strategic interests and overlapping sphere of influence? How they manage their relationship will have a tremendous impact on the peace and stability in the regional and increasingly, global context. In geopolitical terms, the rapprochement between the world's two most populous countries could be profound. Thus the question of whether India should try to keep China out of the geopolitics of the region or accommodate its rise in the subcontinent must be answered with care and rigour.

This study mulls over on Chinese strategic access to South Asia, and specifically looks at its implications for India. The Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port developments and India's response towards them constitute the case model for the study. It is an attempt to analyse the divergent views of various experts and strategists, keeping in mind the geopolitical realities of the region. The study attempts to understand the main objectives behind these strategic accesses. And finally, the assessment elaborates the future prospect of bilateral relations of these two Asian Giants.

## **Chapter: II – The Karakoram Highway**

Between Central Asia and the plains of Pakistan is a geographical vortex rich in history, cultural diversity and dramatic natural beauty. In this ‘collision zone’ of the Indian and Asian continents, the Pamir, Kunlun, Hindukush, Karakoram and Great Himalaya ranges are knotted together. Here the ground rises higher, over a greater area, than anywhere else on the planet, and China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India all come within 250 km of each other.<sup>1</sup>

In the 1960s and 1970s, Pakistan and China jointly cut a road across these mountains, following a branch of that ancient network of trade routes known as the Silk Road. This Karakoram Highway (KKH) connects the Silk Road oasis of Kashgar with Islamabad, Pakistan’s modern capital, via the 4730 m Khunjerab Pass, the semi mythical Hunza Valley and the trading post of Gilgit. In 1986 the Khunjerab Pass was opened to travellers, completing an Asian ‘high road’ loop taking Pakistan, China, Tibet, Nepal and North India.<sup>2</sup>

This strategic region is dense with the history and artefacts of human endeavour, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC to the intrigues of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Great Game. The Himalaya, the Karakorams and the Pamirs all stretch across the northern rim of the sub-continent, culminating in a quintessential barrier. This massive arc of mountain ranges stretches for over two thousand miles across Asia, rising to heights of twenty thousand feet and more. However these ranges have been penetrated by roads. Major routes through Passes have revolutionized the relationship between the states of the Karakorams and Himalayas and reduced dramatically the historical, political, and geographical distance between China and its southern neighbours. This is not to say that important routes have never traversed the ranges; the Silk Route, that legendary key to beauty, lucre, and glory, functioned as an international commercial and

---

<sup>1</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan & the Karakoram Highway* (London: Lonely Planet, 2004), p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

diplomatic highway in ancient times. Still, when it reached the Himalaya-Karakoram region, the Silk Route became an extraordinarily arduous path. Contacts between Central and South Asia remained limited. Today, however, in the Northern Areas of Pakistan and the south-western borderlands of China, a strand of Silk Route has been revived as the Karakoram Highway.<sup>3</sup>

### **Historical Background**

Although it straddles some of the highest mountains in the world, the KKH region is held together by several historical currents. An ancient caravan route flourished through the steep mountain passages, linking China with India, Syria, Iran, and Rome. The Silk Route began in the modern Chinese province of Xinjiang. The inhabitants of the oasis towns of Xinjiang- formerly known as the “Pivot of Asia”- were once the primary agents in the great commercial traffic between Central, South Asia and Europe.<sup>4</sup> Xinjiang is virtually surrounded by mountains- the Karakoram, the Pamir, the Altun Shan, Kunlun Shan, Tien Shan, and Altay Shan. Only a few routes linked it with lands to the west and south, to modern Afghanistan, northern Pakistan, Kashmir, and Tibet.

The geography of Xinjiang was conducive to the pursuit of commerce across the Silk Route. The old city of Kashgar in Xinjiang was a central link in the commercial chain. It was then, as it is today, a junction of the routes emerging from the South, from Gilgit and from Kashmir. The cultural, ethnic, economic and political links between these northernmost parts of the subcontinent and Chinese Central Asia are of ancient origin. Despite the extravagant impediment posed by geography, they have been revived by Pakistan and China.

In the southwest, only a handful of passes provide entry into Xinjiang. The easternmost is the Karakoram Pass (18,290 feet). To its west lies the Khunjerab Pass (15,600 feet) and the Mintaka Pass (15,400 feet). In the modern history of

---

<sup>3</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: The Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia*, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989), pp. 147-148.

<sup>4</sup> See Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (New York: AMS Press, 1975).

the borderlands, these passes have played a leading role. Before the creation of the Karakoram Highway, commerce across the ranges was always a dangerous affair. Adventurous traders had to pass through terrain that was uninhabited and without fodder. The old Karakoram passageway has been called “the most arduous trade route of importance in the world.”<sup>5</sup> Despite the traders’ travails, the Silk Route flourished. Toward the end of the sixteenth century Xinjiang’s routes ceased to be major arteries of international trade; the entire Central and West Asian region collapsed into political turmoil, leaving the routes cut or sporadically blocked. It is unlikely that the Karakoram Highway will ever recapture for Xinjiang’s towns the economic glory brought by the Silk Route. Still, the high mountain road has resuscitated the historical association between Kashgar and Khotan and Northern Areas of the subcontinent.

This new Silk Route supports new purposes and functions. Although men and goods do traverse the Karakoram Highway, their numbers and volume are not high. “The rationale for construction of these new mountain routes are lodged more in the political and military purposes of the region’s states than in their economic discourse.”<sup>6</sup>

The first link for modern traffic of Northern Pakistan with down country Pakistan was established from the railhead in Havelian via the Kaghan Valley in 1949. The selected route followed a colonial mule track for the support of the British administration and the garrisons in the Gilgit Agency. The road across Babusar Pass remains open for three months in summer only and during the rest of the year air links were transporting valuable supplies at high cost.<sup>7</sup>

After the inception of Pakistan’s first village Aid Five-Year Plan in 1956 development efforts based on public funds reached the mountains. Two thirds of the Annual Village Aid Programme’s budget was spent on transport alone. Lacking accessibility inferred high costs for the allocation of goods from the

---

<sup>5</sup> S. Shahid Hamid, *Karakoram Hunza: The Land of Just Enough* (Karachi: Ma’aref Ltd, 1979), p.28.

<sup>6</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 3, p. 150.

<sup>7</sup> Hermann Kreuzmann, “Accessibility for High Asia: Comparative Perspectives on Northern Pakistan’s Traffic Infrastructure and Linkages with Its Neighbours in the Hindukush-Karakoram-Himalaya”, *Journal of Mountain Science*, Vol. 1, No.3, 2004, p. 198.

lowlands at the places of need in the mountains. In order to reduce transportation costs of basic goods, an Indus Valley Road from Swat was proposed and in 1959 the construction began. As a result of the Pak-China Border Treaty of 1963 bilateral, cooperative efforts led to what has been termed the Pak-China Friendship Highway or Karakoram Highway (KKH).<sup>8</sup>

### The Politics of Routes in Nineteenth Century:

Depending on its location, the infrastructure of access is "dual use". It can be an instrument of economic development or a tool of internal security or external defence. "Pakistan's relations with China have developed largely in response to her security needs."<sup>9</sup> The Karakoram Highway certainly breached the mountain barrier, shifting the balance of geographical politics in the subcontinent.


The Karakoram mountains became a nucleus of concern for the British, Chinese, and Russian empires in the late nineteenth century. For the Chinese the controversies along the mountainous borderlands to the southwest were a less common experience. Xinjiang to the west and Tibet to the South had traditionally been considered China's "Inner Asian Frontiers", as Owen Lattimore calls them, or it's "Inner Protectorates", in the lexis of Alastair Lamb.<sup>10</sup> Beyond these frontier regions lay the "Outer Protectorates", including Ladakh, below the Aksai Chin, and Hunza, which nestles high in the hug of the mountains controlled by contemporary Pakistan. With the expansion of British power into the subcontinent's northernmost reaches arguments inevitably developed between China and Britain over the control of these frontier principalities which guarded access through the Himalayan and Karakoram passes.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p.201.

<sup>9</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, "China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordile", (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 15.

<sup>10</sup> Alastair Lamb, *Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 25-38.

<sup>11</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 3, p. 151.



TH-13014

South and Central Asia have long been a theatre of contests between competing powers for control of the mountain ranges (see map- 1). The nineteenth century witnessed a shifting alignment of frontiers between Chinese, Russian and British empires. In these parts, as Dorothy Woodman suggests, the game was necessarily a triangular one, since the disputed areas - Afghanistan, the Aksai Chin plateau, Kashmir, the northernmost territories of India, Tibet and Nepal- all lay on the fringes of the three empires and were claimed at different times by different players.<sup>12</sup> Russia applied constant pressure on Chinese interests in Xinjiang, and the potential for a Russian advance into India via Kashgar contributed to Britain's interest in the Central Asian squabble.

The pattern of imperial frontier rivalry between Russian, British and Chinese illuminates China's road-building activities in the region nearly a century later (for Chinese roads in the Karakoram-Himalayan borderland see map- 2). Imperial manoeuvres over routes and territory were stimulated - and then abandoned to the region's future rulers - the controversies over route and "antiroute"<sup>13</sup> which came to define the territorial politics of modern Central and South Asia. The revival of the Silk Route was a contemporary response to geopolitical predicaments raised by the imperialists.

The great game itself began when the Russian movement into Central Asia along their rapidly expanding railroads captured the attention of India's British ruler and Xinjiang's Chinese overlords. The earliest British anxieties concerned their North West Frontier, the home of traditional invasion routes into the subcontinent. Yet by the late 1880s the British had become concerned that the Khyber Pass might not be Russia's sole line of approach. The British began to discuss the defence not only of Hindukush but of the Karakorams and the Himalayas, too. The British determined to improve their protective strategy in the borderlands.<sup>14</sup>

---


<sup>12</sup> Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontier: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries* (London: Barrie & Rockliff Cresset Press, 1969), p. 72.

<sup>13</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani has coined the term 'antiroute' in his book *Roads and Rivals*. He writes that Antiroute is opposite to route i.e. natural or artificial constraint on access. Antiroute may serve the same human purposes as routes. But antiroutes create pressure against movement- they limit, restrain, or "channel" it- where routes facilitate broader movement.

<sup>14</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 3, p. 152.




**Map- 1: The contested mountain borderlands of China, Pakistan, India, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan**



(Source: Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals*, p. 147.)

Map-2: Chinese roads in the Karakoram-Himalayan borderlands



(Source: Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivalds*, p. 169)

Of accomplished significance to India's British rulers was the potential access of a hostile power to the north Indian territory of Kashmir. Apparently, even a barrier required a buffer. British policies toward the smaller principalities that lay scattered around Kashmir were intimately tied to the requirements of Kashmir's security. According to the imperial Gazetteer for the region-

"From a strategic point of view, the valley of Kashmir occupied a highly valuable position with reference to the safety of British India, for it could be looked upon as an invasion of the empire from the west, while lying directly on the road of an enemy advancing by the routes from Badakhshan, Kashgar, and Yarkand."<sup>15</sup>

When Lord Lytton became Viceroy of India in 1876, the potential for a Russian advance into Kashmir called for a realistic policy to control access through the mountains. Lytton saw the convergence of the Himalayas, Karakorams, and Hindukush as forming the natural northern boundary of India. He observed that

"If a strong, independent and hostile power were established on the north of these mountains, the passes might become lines of demonstration... which might at least be useful as a diversion to facilitate and support the flank of more serious operations in Afghanistan."<sup>16</sup>

Lytton concluded that British influence must be made firm in the lands lying within the angle of mountains, encompassing strategic zones between the frontier and the mountain routes. Where necessary, influence among the tribal chiefs and direct conquests were to be used to bolster the natural antiroute.<sup>17</sup> Gilgit became the main British concern. The significance of Gilgit stems from its geographical location. It commands the mouth of the Hunza River and the Indus Valley, where strategic needs are primary and becomes the dominant factor. As an Englishman phrased it, the "three greatest Empires of the Earth met - Great Britain, Russia, and China" beside Gilgit; if Kashmir was the "northern bastion of India", then Gilgit was "her farthest outpost."

---

<sup>15</sup> Charles Ellison Bates, *A Gazetteer of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Light & Life, 1980), p. 1

<sup>16</sup> Dorothy Woodman, no. 12, p. 87.

<sup>17</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 3, p. 154.

After 1885, reported Russian pressure on northern Afghanistan and Pamirs determined the British to take charge of the area. The British built roads into Gilgit, and widened and realigned the old trade route that linked it with the southern Kashmiri town of Srinagar.<sup>18</sup> In 1891, the British took Hunza and set up posts to guard the routes to the lower valleys and across the Hindukush. They also improved communication in the area and linked it with Kashmir.<sup>19</sup> The British appointed an "Officer on Special Duty" there, responsible for watching the southern access routes across the mountain passes leading to the three areas. His duties included furnishing "reliable intelligence of the progress of events beyond the Kashmir border."<sup>20</sup>

The stalwart British defence of the northernmost, mountainous reaches of the subcontinent from Kashmir to Burma was the final unified defence of the subcontinent. Aggressive British frontier manoeuvres were possible at the time because China was frail and unable to promote its territorial claims. Russian progress eastward and British activity in their south-western borderlands discomfited the Chinese.

### **The Contemporary Politics of Routes:**

In the postcolonial era the Soviet Union, China, India, and Pakistan faced one another in an environment where new political alignments exacerbated old crises. The boundaries defining the new states were the product of imperial exigencies and barter. Partition of the subcontinent wiped out the colonial concept of a unified defence along a single strategic line up to the Hindukush and the Himalayas. The ideological and political lines of defence created in 1947 split the subcontinent geographically into an Indian centre with the West and East Pakistani peripheries.

---

<sup>18</sup> P. M. K. Bamzai, *Kashmir and Central Asia* (New Delhi: Light & Life, 1980), p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> F. M. Hassnain, *Gilgit: The Northern Gate of India* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1978), p. 85.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Also see Dorothy Woodman, no. 12, p. 53.

China simultaneously began to assert itself as a major regional power, extending its control over Xinjiang and Tibet. Xinjiang, Aksai Chin, and Tibet became a part of China's western and south-western defence against the Soviet Union and India. Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Baltistan, and their environs became important to Pakistan's geopolitical flexibility in the subcontinent, while Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim were incorporated into India's frontier security plans against Pakistan and China. In 1979 the Soviet Union took Afghanistan, terminating the strategic notion of the Asian buffer.

Since 1947 India has been caught up in a situation of this type as a successor state to the British Empire in South Asia. During the early days of her independence "India was preoccupied with problems arising from the subdivision of southern Asia between Pakistan and herself."<sup>21</sup> Pakistan as a successor state to even earlier Muslim empires was regarded as India's main rival for land and power. Mountainous Kashmir, across which the Indus river races east to west, wedged between Pakistan and India, has been the cause of political discord, territorial division, and war between its claimants since 1947. Today the 478.5 miles Line of Actual Control runs from alongside the Karakoram Pass to about 81 miles northeast of Lahore. Pakistan controls about one-third of Kashmir while India controls remaining two-thirds.

The border disputes between China and Russia and between China and India have yet to be resolved, although negotiations proceed. Troops are massed on borders. In the context of these new alignments, the construction of a Chinese road system within Xinjiang and Tibet, across the Aksai Chin, and into Pakistan's northern areas has had a significant impact upon political and military relations in Central and South Asia. "Blocked by American power on the Pacific seaboard and facing immense economic and demographic problems in her eastern provinces China had turned inland once more after a long period of oceanic orientation, seeking to relieve pressures in congested home terrains by diverting military and civil engineers to frontier zones. Immense road-building works were

---

<sup>21</sup> W. Kirk, "The Inner Asian Frontier of Asia", *Transactions and Papers*, (Institute of British Geographers), No. 31, December 1962, p. 132.

undertaken to connect Han China with western frontier provinces such as Tibet and Sinkiang.”<sup>22</sup> China seemed to be much concerned in peripheral affairs of High Asia.

China’s routing policies have been closely linked to its military posture along its western and south-western borders. “Because of China’s earlier anxieties about the security of its inner Asian frontiers, which it could defend only by projecting central control across great distances, modern China’s borderland highway projects address historical problems. In the past, terrain, physical inaccessibility, and inadequate logistics debilitated Chinese military and foreign policy, preventing intercourse with western lands and militating against the establishment of a unified and secure Chinese state.”<sup>23</sup> Since 1949, an insistent Chinese objective has been to alter these imperfections through the creation of access.

China’s relations with South Asia may be understood as a story of the search for, and conflict over access. China has anchored its strongest ties in South Asia with Pakistan. China’s close relation with Pakistan has been very important to Beijing. “It is a long standing friendship that has been “tested by adversity”. Pakistan played a major role in China’s strategy for coping with India.”<sup>24</sup> Sino-Pakistani security and strategic nexus has remained a central issue in India-China relations ever since Beijing and Islamabad signed a historic border agreement in March 1963, ceding a chunk of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China.<sup>25</sup> Realistically enough, the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations following the 1962 war provided a propitious opportunity for Beijing and Islamabad to forge a common strategic understanding with the aim of containing India in their respective national interests. Allen S. Whiting remarks:

“Pakistan’s geopolitical situation has attracted China’s support since the early 1960s. It was a useful counterweight against India, perceived both as a neighbouring threat and a client of

---

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 3, p.159.

<sup>24</sup> John W. Garver, “Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistani Entente”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, no. 2, 1996, p. 323.

<sup>25</sup> B. M. Jain, “India-China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends”, *The Round Table*, Vol. 93, no. 374, April 2004, p.261.

the Soviet Union. In addition, the proximity of Kashmir to the disputed Sino-Indian border area took on strategic importance with a nearby road from Xinjiang through western Tibet serving essential military logistic needs.”<sup>26</sup>

With the partition of Indian subcontinent the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan began. In this conflict situation the communities of the Karakoram immediately opted for Pakistan. The Kashmir war resulted in a cease-fire line which cut the main trade route between Kashmir and Gilgit Agency. “Within a few decades the Anglo-Russian confrontation had been transformed into an Indo-Pakistani stalemate by the unchanged strategic importance of the Northern areas.”<sup>27</sup>

Chinese policies toward the subcontinent today make better sense when we recognize the old concerns about their most distant and largest territories Xinjiang and Tibet. The Chinese fears of encirclement, and of loss of control over their peripheries, sponsored modern routing policy in the borderlands and along the subcontinent. China and Pakistan have maintained an “all-Weather” friendship based on their mutual interests in protecting their borders against, and checking the influence of, their rival neighbour India. The concrete nature of their friendship can be seen in the opening in 1982 of the Karakoram Highway.<sup>28</sup> The Karakoram routes are joined to China’s main strategic roads, which connect Xinjiang and Tibet. Within a broader system of borderland logistics, the Karakoram Highway has provided China with a logistical, political, and diplomatic asset.

Cooperation in land communication was primarily in the field of road building to link China and Pakistan. “In September 1968 the road between Azad Kashmir and Xinjiang (through Mintka Pass) was opened – a road built at the cost of ten million rupees. It considerably shortened the time required to get from

---

<sup>26</sup> Allen S. Whiting, “The Future of Chinese Foreign Policy”, in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), *China and the World: Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p.264

<sup>27</sup> Hermann Kreutzmann, “The Karakoram Highway: The Impact of Road Construction on Mountain Societies”, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, no. 4, p.723.

<sup>28</sup> Ziad Haider, “Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang Uighurs: Politics, Trade, and Islam along the Karakoram Highway”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, no. 4, p.522.

Kashmir to Xinjiang over one of the most important Himalayan Passes.”<sup>29</sup> Another road was opened between Xinjiang and Azad Kashmir in February 1971. It cut through the Karakoram Pass and had taken six months to build.<sup>30</sup> An impressive engineering feat was the completion of the 500-mile long Karakoram Highway through the Khunjerab Pass. “Formally inaugurated in June 1978, and opened to civilian traffic in August 1982, this four-lane route with bridges designed to carry the weight of tanks also has the distinction of being the world’s highest international highway.”<sup>31</sup> The Pakistani end of both roads was constructed with Chinese assistance. Of economic importance as well as strategic value, these roads have given China the potential to move forces and material rapidly through the two important Himalayan Passes and thus outflank Indian forces in the Ladakh region.

#### **Revisiting the Karakoram Highway:**

Following its invasion of Tibet in 1950, China occupied parts of Ladakh, Baltistan and the upper Shimshal Valley in the mid 1950s. All traffic across the border stopped. While the Chinese border with Indian-held Kashmir is still in dispute today, a thaw in China-Pakistan relations in 1964 led to a border agreement, China’s return of 2000 sq km of territory, and talk of linking the two countries by road.<sup>32</sup>

“In 1966 the two countries embarked on one of the biggest engineering projects since the Pyramids - 1200 km road across some of the highest mountains in the world – the Pamir and the Karakoram, from Kashgar in China to Havelian in Pakistan.”<sup>33</sup> The Karakoram Highway has been shown in map- 3 & 4. Pakistan drew up plans for such a highway in 1959 and subsequently built sections of that

---

<sup>29</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1967-1968, p. 23104.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 1971-1972, p. 24523.


<sup>31</sup> Yaakov Vertzberger, “The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations: Trade and Aid 1963-1982”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 1983, p. 643.

<sup>32</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, no. 1, p. 253.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*.




**Map- 3: The Karakoram Highway adapted from a Government of Pakistan Drawing.**



(Source: Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals*, p. 186)

**Map- 4: The Route of the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan, showing distances from Rawalpindi in kilometres.**



**(Source: Keith Miller, *Continents in Collision*, p. 46)**

road with its resources. China agreed in 1964 to assist with construction of the road, and work on it began in 1966. Thousands of PLA soldiers and engineers then entered the Gilgit and Hunza regions of northern Pakistan to push the road through the high mountains and steep valleys of the Karakoram Range. Construction was extremely difficult and costly in both financial and human terms.<sup>34</sup>

Pakistan had already started a road of its own in 1960, the 400 km Indus Valley Road between Swat and Gilgit. This and a road north from Havelian were completed in 1968 and linked by a bridge at Thakot. Between then and 1973, Pakistani crews worked north from the Indus, while the Chinese cut a road over the Khunjerab Pass to Gulmit, as well as north from the Khunjerab to Kashgar. In 1974 Pakistan asked the Chinese back for more work south of Gulmit. All of the nearly 100 bridges from the Khunjerab to Thakot were originally Chinese-built. "The workforce in Pakistan at any one time was about 15,000 Pakistani soldiers and between 9000 and 20,000 Chinese, working separately. Few statistics are available about work on the Chinese side."<sup>35</sup>

"The Karakoram Highway hacked through the majestic Karakoram mountain range is a marvel of modern engineering skill. It also is a lasting tribute to the most challenging and hazardous task of its kind ever undertaken. Cutting through the difficult terrain of Kohistan, Gilgit and Hunza, the Highway reaches the Khunjerab Top beyond which lies the sprawling Sinkiang province of China, connecting that country with Pakistan."<sup>36</sup>

The Karakoram Highway stretches an incredible feat of civil engineering across the roof of the world, linking China with Pakistan. One of the many plaques along this road reads-

"Sometimes in the future, when others will ply the KKH, little will they realise the amount of sweat, courage, dedication, endurance and human sacrifice that has gone into the making of this road, but as you drive along, tarry a little to say a short prayer for those silent brave

---

<sup>34</sup> John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino – Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 205-206.

<sup>35</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, no. 1, p. 253.

<sup>36</sup> S. Shahid Hamid, no. 5, p. 159.

men of the Pakistan Army, who gave their lives to realise a dream now known as 'THE KARAKORAM HIGHWAY'.<sup>37</sup>

The Karakoram Highway winds its way through some of the world's highest mountain ranges, the Karakoram, Hindukush and the great Himalayas, linking the ancient and the orient in one harmonious continuum of natural wonders. Audacious in planning, monumental in construction, perpetually under repair and the cause of hundreds of deaths, the KKH is considered by many to be the eighth wonder of the world. According to one signpost near Besham, it is now possible to drive from Karachi on the Indian Ocean to Beijing, the capital of China, some 7,250 km distant.<sup>38</sup> In the Special Issue of *Beijing Review* commemorating the 55<sup>th</sup> anniversary of China-Pakistan diplomatic relations, Muhammad Iftikhar Raja, Counselor (Press & Culture) of the Pakistani Embassy in China, has described the KKH as-

The Karakoram Highway is about 1,300 km long. Most of the road is overshadowed by towering, barren mountains and a high altitude desert... It hugs the mighty Indus River in its northwest, which flows for over 300 kilometers. Here KKH together with the Indus divides the mountain ranges of Himalaya and Karakoram and winds around the foot of Nanga Parbat, the ninth highest peak in the world. The highway then leaves the Indus for the Gilgit, Hunza and Khunjerab Rivers to take on the Karakoram range... Finally, the road reaches the 4,733 meter Khunjerab Pass... It then crosses the high Central Asian plateau before winding down through the Pamirs to the fabled Chinese city of Kashgar, at the western edge of the Taklamakan desert. The Karakoram Highway follows the eastern branch of the famous Silk Route along the valley of the Indus and passes the towns of Gilgit and Hunza to the China border at Khunjerab Pass.<sup>39</sup>

The story of this astonishing road construction undertaken stretches over two decades during which the Army Engineers plodded their way through hard rock and worked tenaciously in the most harsh conditions and in an extremely inhospitable area braving the vagaries of the climate, facing blinding blizzards here and treading blazing rock there. The KKH makes one marvel at this engineering feat of Chinese and Pakistani who worked to make it into a symbol of eternal friendship between Pakistan and China.

---

<sup>37</sup> See Keith Miller, *Continents in Collision: The International Karakoram Project* (London: George Philip, 1982), p. 45.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Muhammad Iftikhar Raja, "Karakoram Highway- The Friendship Bridge Across the Himalaya", *Beijing Review*, Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), pp. 6-7.

The factors that prompted the undertaking of this project were many-<sup>40</sup> this long sequestered area had to be opened to bring Pakistan closer to China by a land route. There was the need to exploit the vast mineral wealth that had lain out of reach in the mountain recesses and also to develop tourist spots of promise. But the overriding consideration was to bring the inhabitants of the territory, who had for many a century remained isolated from civilisation, into the mainstream of national life. All this has been made possible with the building of the Highway. This new road follows along the track where not even good foot-paths had existed from times immemorial.

Although the new Pakistani state desired the extension of its territorial and economic grasp into the peripheries, it could also justify their integration by political and military necessity. With India standing prepared in Kashmir, Afghanistan next door, and the former Soviet Union only a few score miles away across Wakhan, it was to Pakistan's military advantage to increase the centre's physical connectivity with Northern Areas. The proximate danger from India, Afghanistan, and the former Soviet Union was increased by the distance of the Northern Areas from the Pakistani centre.

The Indus Valley Road, the first major route to strike out toward the highlands, was begun in 1959. It was the forefather of the Karakoram Highway. The road made access to Kohistan possible across the 13,690-foot high Babusar Pass. The 525-mile long all-weather road linked Pakistan's major cities with Gilgit. It met an existing Gilgit-Hunza track, making feasible access across the Karakoram and rough travel into Kashi in Xinjiang. In the highlands the two-lane road replaced a narrow pony track open for only three months in the year.<sup>41</sup> The Pakistan Army Engineers were inducted to build the all-weather road. Later this route would be upgraded and incorporated into the Karakoram Highway.

In a broadcast on Radio Pakistan on 3 March 1964, the state's communication secretary announced that when completed, the Indus valley Road would dramatically advance the economy of the Northern Areas and connect

---

<sup>40</sup> S. Shahid Hamid, no. 5, p. 160.

<sup>41</sup> See J. P. Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974), p. 143.

Rawalpindi with Beijing by land. Rawalpindi was already linked to Karachi by over a thousand miles of road and rail. The new route would improve the centre's communications with its furthest periphery, "revolutionise" the economy in that "remote, sheep breeding" area, and stimulate increase trade with Xinjiang.<sup>42</sup>

As late as 1964, however, Pakistan was officially denying any collaboration between China and Pakistan in road building. The Foreign Office denied a statement made by the minister of works to the press earlier in 1964, "The Pakistani government has at present no plan to build an all-weather road between Pakistan and China."<sup>43</sup> Yet the next stages of road building in the Northern Areas clearly involved Sino-Pakistani cooperation and extensive Chinese infrastructural aid. In 1966 and 1967 Sino-Pakistani accords had already been signed regarding "the assistance and supply of bridging equipment and construction machinery by China."<sup>44</sup> On 21 October 1967 the two governments announced their agreement to build highways.<sup>45</sup> The text of agreement has never been published. But a range of publications did portray the new road system as a reopening of the Silk Route, which would increase border trade and general communication between neighbouring Sino-Pakistani territories.

The Karakoram Highway follows the route from Mor Khun, off the Gilgit-Xinjiang road, and runs across the Khunjerab Pass to form another improved link with Kashi. The highway follows a perilous route, skirting the eastern and southern flanks of Wakhan. It crosses the peaks of Hunza's twelve massive glaciers, including the infamous 35-mile long Batura Glacier. It was routed across the treacherous Khunjerab Pass, rather than the lower Mintaka Pass, because Mintaka is only twenty miles from the eastern tip of Wakhan, dangerously near the Russian border and impassable when closed by winter snows.<sup>46</sup>

Even before the completion of the new Karakoram Highway, China had built a 118-mile long highway from the Khunjerab Pass to Qila Nabi, which lies

---

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>43</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, no. 29, p. 23104.

<sup>44</sup> J. P. Jain, no. 40, p. 143.

<sup>45</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, no. 9, p. 135. Also see S. Shahid Hamid, no. 5, p. 166.

<sup>46</sup> Topping Seymour, "Opening of the High Road to China", *New York Times Magazine*, December 1979, p. 142.

on their main strategic supply route between Xinjiang and Tibet. The road connects the Karakoram Highway with China's own frontier routes, the Western Military Complex. This was a vital link. The route runs approximately perpendicular to the Akasi Chin Road and connects Mor Khun on the Gilgit-Kashi route with Qila Nabi in eastern Xinjiang on the Kashi-Aksai Chin- Lhasa Highway. This particular land link further reduces the distances between China and Pakistan. It also improves China's ability to deter attempts to intercept military equipment and supplies travelling to or from southern Xinjiang.

Karakoram Highway maintenance units function throughout the year. Between the old capital of Hunza and the Sino-Pakistani border the Highway is to remain under the permanent control of the Pakistan Army Engineers. The Highway's construction data are impressive – "China and Pakistan used over 8,000 tons of dynamite to move thirty million cubic yards of earth and rock. Eighty thousand tons of cement, 35,000 tons of coal, and 1,000 trucks were consumed in the endeavour."<sup>47</sup> The difficulties entailed in construction were staggering.

Road building in the Northern Areas did not come to a standstill with the inauguration of the Karakoram Highway. Shortly afterward, work began on a 104-mile road running along the Indus to link the Karakoram Highway with Skardu to the southeast. This all weather road opened up the 10,000-sq mile area of Baltistan, which since 1947 has had no land links with the rest of the world.<sup>48</sup> The secret Sino-Pakistani road building continued to flourish and became an inflamed issue in the politics of South and Central Asia. Chinese access across the mountain divide symbolised a transformation of the historical separation between these Asian regions. The strategic dynamics of the situation cannot be ignored.

In March 1981 Indian sources reported plans for Sino-Pakistani road project to link the Karakoram Highway with forward lines in Kashmir. For example, a bridge was reportedly being built across the river at Pattan via Hazara which would connect the Karakoram Highway with Dara Haipeer and finally with

---

<sup>47</sup> S. Shahid Hamid, no. 5, pp. 169, 173-174.

<sup>48</sup> See "The Skardu Highway", *Strategic Studies*, Vol. 4, Spring 1981, pp. 16-23.

Muzaffarabad. Bridge construction was being supervised by Chinese and Pakistani engineers. The *Times of India* reported that Chinese and Pakistani military leaders have discussed plans to upgrade the Karakoram Highway over a period of years.<sup>49</sup>

### **Assessment Concerning Security and Development:**

The Sino-Pakistani alliance of access across the Karakoram has altered the geopolitics of the area. The mountains that had earlier been the subcontinent's natural barrier to invasion from the north were breached by a route, and the physical distance between China and Pakistan was lessened. The Karakoram Highway permitted an unprecedented ease of movement in a region where passage had been rare and difficult.

Officially, the Karakoram Highway was intended both to improve the economic and social lot of the people in the Northern Areas and to expand tourism and trade with China. It has been called a restoration of the Silk Route, conjuring up visions of intense economic activity and the exchange of precious goods between Central and South Asia. The prospects of trade and economic cooperation were said to motivate this huge investment in men, material, and money. At the time of the highway's construction it was suggested that volume of Pakistan's trade with China would increase and that Chinese trade with the Middle East would expand through Karachi.

China's principal reasons for financing and building the network of Karakoram routes were neither the development of the remote Northern Areas nor the development of Xinjiang.<sup>50</sup> China has never had a significant economic interest in Pakistan. The two countries have not had extensive trade ties. It seems that Chinese effort to expand physical connectivity was motivated by strategic

---

<sup>49</sup> See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 August 1985, p. 32; *Times of India* (Delhi), 9 October 1982, and 22 October 1985.

<sup>50</sup> Latif Ahmed Sherwani, "Review of Sino-Pakistani Relations (1981-1985)", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 39, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 1986, p. 105.



and political and not economic concerns. It appears clear that grander, less immediately lucrative rationale based on regional politics and national security created access in these borderlands. The KKH extends the control of Pakistan's central government into previously inaccessible frontier regions. Pakistani troops now possess greater operational flexibility along the northernmost frontier. Today Pakistani troops stand guard to the north of the Karakoram Highway, watching Wakhan, and to the South, along the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir, watching India.

The Karakoram Highway has interfered in the political and military relationships between Central and South Asia. No single highway has run through such sensitive territory, through an area where the borders of Pakistan, India, China, the former Soviet Union, and Afghanistan come close together. By traversing these lands, the Karakoram Highway and its associated routes have posed threats and presented opportunities to all the states of the region. The Highway has been the geo-centrepiece of Chinese economic and military aid to Pakistan, a massive manifestation of support and commitment completed at a time when the Pakistanis were growing more worried about Soviet activities inside Afghanistan. Pakistani officials attach great significance to the most striking Sino-Pakistani joint-venture, the Karakoram Highway. In 1981 General Zia confirmed that

“Pakistan's relationship with China is the cornerstone of our foreign policy...It is purely based on mutual interest, friendship and understanding that has developed over the past thirty years...China has been with us through thick and thin... they have been very liberal with us, so far, with their military assistance programme.”<sup>51</sup>

China's own broad political and military purposes in South Asia resulted in the development of the Northern Areas. China has used the Karakoram Highway as a form of “aid diplomacy” and simultaneously strengthened ties with the enemy of its enemy. Pakistan and China have used the KKH to send strong messages to their rivals and neighbours. Upon completion of the Highway

---

<sup>51</sup> “Interview with General Zia-ul-Haq”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 16, 1981, p. 46.

China's Deputy Premier, Li Xiannian said publicly that the Karakoram Highway "allow us to give military aid to Pakistan."<sup>52</sup>

In 1971 the Karakoram Highway was reportedly used to ferry military supplies to Pakistan from China. During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan ordered sections of the Karakoram Highway closed to foreigners. This move was regarded as a "gesture which was intended to draw a veil of concealment across the overland route."<sup>53</sup> According to some scholars, the Karakoram Highway, contrary to Chinese and Pakistani claims, has "strategic military implications."<sup>54</sup> Although objectively the Karakoram Highway may not be an ideal logistic route, it has been important to foreign and security policy makers. The nature of conflict and the direction of progress in the Karakoram and Himalayan borderlands will continue to be determined by the amalgamation of politics with geography.

### Promoting Connectivity through Karakoram

Soviet disintegration in 1991 and the subsequent emergence of independent Central Asian states broaden the scope of the Karakoram Highway to Central Asia. Pakistan took initiative for promoting trade and commercial relations with China and Central Asian states via Karakoram highway. In the late 1998, Pakistan, China and the two central Asian states Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed an accord and agreed to provide trade and transit facilities via the Karakoram highway to the port of Karachi.<sup>55</sup> The Karakoram Highway provides an important link to Central Asia. From Islamabad in Pakistan or

---

<sup>52</sup> Quoted in Topping Seymour, no. 46.

<sup>53</sup> Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 49, 105.

<sup>54</sup> Yaakov Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations, 1960-1980*, (Washington D.C.: Praeger, 1983), p. 82. Also see William S. Ellis, "Pakistan under Pressure", *National Geographic*, May 1981, p. 695.

<sup>55</sup> Moonis Ahmar, "Communication Linkages between Central and South Asia: A Case Study of Karakoram highway", *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 20, Special Issue, Summer 2001, p. 189.

Kashgar in China, one may traverse this highway to anywhere in Central Asia or South Asia.

Developing better connectivity and promoting cross border trade between China and its neighbouring regions in the subcontinent has now become a major priority for Beijing. Pakistan and China have signed an agreement to open four new passenger and cargo road links. Two of the four roads are for cargo transportation, while the other two are for passengers. “The two cargo routes run from Kashi in southern Xinjiang to Pakistan’s ports of Karachi, Qasim and Gwadar, and the passenger lines run from Kashi and Taxkorgan, also in southern Xinjiang, to Pakistan’s Northern Gilgit and Sost Pass respectively.”<sup>56</sup>

In February 2006, Pakistani President Musharraf visited China and signed 13 agreements. According to Zhang Chunxiang, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, “The two countries stressed the promotion of land trade through the Karakoram Highway, and were willing to take measures to facilitate that trade.”<sup>57</sup> More importantly, Pakistan has offered to China a transit and energy corridor through the Karakoram Highway, Pakistani territory and its ports. With the development of the western regions of China, the Karakoram Highway will become the natural entry and exit point for Chinese imports and exports.

Thus, China has demonstrated greater awareness in promoting trans-border connectivity as part of its grand strategy towards the subcontinent. Chinese designs marks far-sighted policy of link between geography and strategy.

---

<sup>56</sup> “Pakistan, China to open four new road links”, *March 27, 2006*, at <http://www.newkerala.com/news2.php?action=fullnews&id=30848>, “1<sup>st</sup> Pak-China bus from June”, *Daily News & Analysis*, May 21, 2006, at <http://www.dnaindia.com>.

<sup>57</sup> Zhang Chunxiang, “A New Chapter Ahead”, *Beijing Review*, Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), p. 5.

## Chapter - 3: The Gwadar Port

Gwadar is a city of a neglected province Balochistan and is situated at a strategic geographical point.<sup>1</sup> The word 'Gwadar' is a combination of two Baluchi words "Guad" and "Dar" meaning the 'Gate of Wind'. Located at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, Gwadar has 600 KM long coastline. It is one of the most beautiful coastlines of the world with shining blue water and marble white sand. Gwadar stands as the new heart line, a new commercial hub for the world. Gwadar deep sea port enjoys a unique strategic significance. The Government of Pakistan's vision is for Gwadar to be a link between the East and West that will change the national economy as well as the fate of this region.<sup>2</sup>

By virtue of its excellent location (see map- 5), the port emerges as a place of great strategic value, giving tremendous boost to Pakistan's importance in the whole region, extending from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean to South East Asia and the Far East.<sup>3</sup> Gwadar is located on the western end of Balochistan coast, about 460 km from Karachi and just 72 km from the Iranian border. More important is Gwadar's proximity to the Persian Gulf. It is situated near the mouth of this strategic body of water, and about 400 km. from the Strait of Hormuz, a major conduit for global oil supplies.<sup>4</sup>

---


<sup>1</sup> Sheikh Javaid, "Gwadar-The Dream City of South East Asia", [www.pakeconomist.comn/detabase/Inv-Opp/inv-opp31.html](http://www.pakeconomist.comn/detabase/Inv-Opp/inv-opp31.html), accessed on March 06, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> President of Pakistan's Address at the Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Gwadar Deep-Sea Port, March 22, 2002, available at [http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE\\_Address/ce\\_gwadar.html](http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Address/ce_gwadar.html), accessed on March 06, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> [www.strategypage.com/messageboard/message/72-6970.asp](http://www.strategypage.com/messageboard/message/72-6970.asp), accessed on March 05, 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Sudha Ramchandran, "China's Pearl in Pakistan's Water", [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/GC04Df06.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC04Df06.html), accessed on March 08, 2005.

Map-5: Location of the Gwadar Port



Source: Microsoft Encarta, 2006. © 1993-2005 Microsoft Corporation.

### **Historical Perspective:**

Encircled by Dasht and Kolanch valleys, a rich historical background tags Gwadar, ruled by Afrasiab, Khusro and Lahrasip Gwader saw the Advantest of Alexander the Great followed by the rule of Chandara Gupta Moria in 303 B.C.<sup>5</sup> Gwadar was always a part of Mekran. About a century ago the then ruler of Mekran allotted one of the Arab Sheikhs to take refuge in the town because he was a holy man Syed, who are held in great esteem by Muslims.<sup>6</sup> A well-known Portuguese writer, of 16th Century Manual de.f. Sauza wrote in detail of Portuguese attack on Gwadar in his book- *The History of Portuguese Days in East*. But the invaders were defeated by local Kalmat tribe as Mir Hamal fought

<sup>5</sup> "Gwadar Historical Background" at <http://www.visiongwadar.com/historical.htm>, accessed on March 06, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> "Historical Letter" written by Haji Mohammad Iqbal Baloch to Government of Pakistan about importance of Gwadar, no. 5.

bravely. However, he was later captured and taken into custody. The Khan of Kalat Mir Naseer Khan Nori included in his realm in 1777. In 1783 Mir Naseer presented Gwadar to Taimur Sultan the defeated ruler of Muscat. Taimur Sultan, who recaptured Muscat, continued to rule Gwadar after the death of Mir Naseer Khan.

After Independence the Gwadar question was raised again by Haji Muhammad Iqbal Baloch and Khan Liaqat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan. Haji Muhammad Iqbal Baloch advised the government of Pakistan that due to geo-strategic and economic importance, Gwadar must become a part of Pakistan. As a result of a range of bold efforts, Gwadar was repurchased from the Sultan of Oman on 8th September 1957.<sup>7</sup>

Since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the overlooked province of Balochistan was recognised by Western policy makers. Warning of the historic Russian drive for warm water ports, American officials points to Balochistan as the most plausible example of a future Soviet target. President Carter was deliberately vague in his pledge to defend the "Persian Gulf region", but his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has specifically underlined its applicability to Balochistan as a part of a broader U.S. commitment to Pakistan.<sup>8</sup>

A glance at map of Southwest Asia quickly explains why strategically located Balochistan easily became a focal point of super power conflict. Stretching across a vast desert expanse of western Pakistan and eastern Iran bigger than France, the Baluch homeland commands more than 900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline, including the northern shores of the Straits of Hormuz.<sup>9</sup> Control of the Baluch coast would not only give a powerful new springboard for spreading political influence throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia but would also radically alter the military balance in the region.

Pakistan identified Gwadar as a site for port in 1964. Due to its advantageous location, Gwadar was considered as an alternative port in the

---

<sup>7</sup> "Gwadar Historical Background", no. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Selig S. Harrison, "Baluch Nationalism and Super Power Rivalry", *International Security*, Vol. 5, No.3 Winter, 1980-1981, p. 152.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

region, which could handle mother ships and large oil tankers in due course. Keeping that aspect in view as well as the inherent strategic and economic benefits that Gwadar port offered, the transport plan of 8<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan (1993-94) of Pakistan included the development of Gwadar port as an essential element of its aim and objectives.<sup>10</sup>

Pakistan presently has only two commercial ports, Karachi and Bin Qasim, in the Indian Ocean, catering largely to the domestic needs. However, the primary gateway for goods flowing across ocean remains ports. Pakistani Government realised the need for an additional port. The Gwadar port lies at the heart of President Musharraf's vision of prosperity for Pakistan. It is meant to transform Pakistan into a vibrant hub of commercial activity among the energy rich Gulf and Central Asian States, Afghanistan, and China.

The need for an alternate port became apparent soon after the 1971 war when the Karachi port complex came under Indian Missile attack. However, it was apparently the Kargil crisis of 1999 that prompted Pakistan's leaders to forge ahead with it.<sup>11</sup> Pakistan requested the United States to finance a seaport along the Makran Coast in 1973, which was declined. The Department of State indicated that they would not consider financing the port. Lacking a funding source, the idea was then not pursued for over 25 years, till Pakistan's "all weather friend" China came forward not only to provide sources but also to construct the port at Gwadar. The importance of the Gwadar port stems from its advantageous geographical position in the Indian Ocean.

### **Interpreting China's Grand Strategy:**

Gwadar is strategically located on the Indian Ocean at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central Asia. The continued unstable regional environment in the Persian Gulf, coupled with world's growing requirements of alternate energy

---

<sup>10</sup>Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan, "Gwadar", [www.pakboi.gov.pk/News\\_Events/Gwadar.html](http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/News_Events/Gwadar.html), accessed on March 08, 2005.

<sup>11</sup> John W. Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations", *India Review*, Vol. 1(4), October 2002, p. 17.

resources, has captured the attention of Central Asia's natural resources as a strategic alternative. The decision to develop Gwadar in order to reduce the dependence on Karachi and to cater to the external trade of the Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang Province of China was taken by the first Nawaz Sharif Government in 1992. The Gwadar port project was started in 1992 but was held up due to political instability in Pakistan. In 1995, the Nawaz Sharif Government gave the contract for the construction of the deep-water Gwadar Port to the US-based Forbes and Company, which was not only to construct the Port, but also run it after the construction. However, the project remained a non-starter due to post-Chagai economic sanctions.<sup>12</sup>

China gave green signal to participate in the construction and development of the Gwadar port when Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited Pakistan in May 2001. Zhu assured Pakistan's leaders of China's full cooperation and all possible assistance for the project.<sup>13</sup> Intense Sino-Pakistan discussion over Gwadar during the summer of 2001 led to three agreements signed in August when Pakistan's Minister of Communication and Railways, Javed Ashraf Qazi, and Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz visited China.

China agreed to provide the equivalent of \$50 million as an outright grant, another \$50 million in commercial credit, and \$98 million state credit soft loan – a total of \$198 million – in support of Phase I of the project. Foundation of Gwadar Port was laid on March 22, 2002. Chinese Vice Premier Wu Bangguo laid the foundation for Gwadar port and added a golden chapter in “all weather Pakistan-China Friendship”. The development of Gwadar Port is being undertaken in two phases (Figure- 1). Its first phase was completed in a remarkably short duration of three years.<sup>14</sup> The work on the first phase of this mega project, constructed by Chinese Harbour Engineering Company, is already complete. Phase-I includes construction of three berths, with a depth of 12.5 meters, and approach channels. On commissioning, these three berths will be used

---

<sup>12</sup> B. Raman, “Chinese Activities in Balochistan”, *Indian Strategic Review* at <http://members.tripod.com/israindia/isr/june20/china.html> accessed on March 08, 2005.


<sup>13</sup> John W. Garver, no. 11, p.18.

<sup>14</sup> “Gwadar”, no. 10.



for the loading and unloading of general cargo that may come from as far as West China, Europe and the American continents.<sup>15</sup>

**Figure- 1: Phase I & II of Gwadar Port**



**Source:** Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan, “Gwadar”,<sup>16</sup>

Phase-II, estimated at \$600 million, will include the building of nine additional berths, one bulk cargo terminal, one grain terminal, and two oil terminals.<sup>17</sup> It will also be financed by China. In addition to its financial contribution, China has sent about 450 engineers and provided technical expertise for the project.

While the construction work of port is going on, a series of supporting infrastructure facilities are being laid down. The government has already established a Gwadar Development Authority that operates closely with the Gwadar Port Authority and other government agencies to synergize the

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.


<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.


completion of this ambitious project. China is likely to finance a highway-link from Gwadar to the Central Balochistan town of Khuzdar, on the Karachi-Bela-Khuzdar-Kalat-Quetta-Chaman Highway (RCD Highway) connecting Karachi and Quetta. The Makran Coastal Highway linking Gwadar with Karachi via Karachi will open a new and shorter trade route between the two countries (Figure- 2).

Similarly, the upgrading of the existing highway via Loralai and Dera Ghazi Khan is under consideration of Islamabad and Beijing. Under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the two countries, China will build a 90-km. highway link connecting the Chinese side of the Karakoram Highway to the Russian built highway network that already connects all the five Central Asian Republics. This regional highway network (see map- 6) will directly be linking Gwadar to Xingjiang and the landlocked Central Asian Republics.

**Figure – 2: Road Network from Gwadar**



Map- 6: National Highway Network of Pakistan



Source: <http://www.iaphworldports.org/new/KarachiPP/FarrukhJaved-RoadLinkages.ppt>

By underwriting the Gwadar project, China is trying to influence developments far beyond its borders in an effort to maintain a situation it believes conducive to its security. China has marked the turn of the millennium with a significant decision to embark on the development of a strategic infrastructure in its Western regions, particularly Xinjiang and Tibet. These Chinese frontier regions link China in one continuous chain with Eurasia, Central Asian Republics, South Asia and South East Asia. China's development of strategic infrastructure in Xinjiang improves her strategic capabilities in her western most region. This can improve her force -projection capabilities in the region.

#### **Economic Imperatives:**

There is a positive relationship between trade and growth. Trade has a quantitatively significant and positive effect on the income of a nation. The twenty-first century certainly is a century of globalisation, made so by the easy access and exponential trade through the sea.<sup>18</sup> Economic dependence of Pakistan on sea routes for trade and commerce is of cardinal importance for the country's survival as an independent sovereign nation.

For Pakistan, the economic returns from Gwadar port stem from its location near the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40% of the world's oil passes. Gwadar could emerge as a key shipping point, bringing Pakistan much-needed income, and when combined with the surrounding areas could become a trade hub, once road and rail links connect it to the rest of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.<sup>19</sup> More than 95 percent of Pakistan's trade is routed through sea.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Sam J Tangredi (ed.), *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Washington D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2002), p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> Sudha Ramchandran , no. 4.

<sup>20</sup> Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, *Economic Survey 2003-04*, <http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/09-trade.pdf> accessed on March 08, 2005.

According to Pakistani government, the port lies at the heart of President Musharraf's vision of prosperity for Pakistan. In his address during opening ceremony of Gwadar port on 22 March 2002 Musharraf said-

"History is being made in the relationship between Pakistan and China. I think this banner right behind us, which reads Pakistan-China friendship journey from Karakoram to Gwadar depicts very truly the relationship that Pakistan and China enjoy which has led from Karakoram in the north of Pakistan as a symbol of this relationship and has reached all the way through Pakistan on the coastline at Gwadar. This is the journey of our friendship which, I am sure, will reach new heights. With passage of time, it will be maintained and it will grow from strength to strength... If we see whole region, it is like a funnel. The top of the funnel is this wide area of Central Asia and also China's western region. And this funnel gets narrowed on through Afghanistan and Pakistan and the end of this funnel is Gwadar port. So this funnel, futuristically, is the economic funnel of this whole region."<sup>21</sup>

Gwadar has been envisioned by Pakistan officials since the mid-1990s as the terminal point for a new pipeline to carry petroleum from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the sea.<sup>22</sup> The Pakistani government pointed out the economic benefits of the development of Gwadar port as follows<sup>23</sup>:

- Capitalize on opportunities for trade with landlocked Central Asian States and Afghanistan.
- Promote trade and transport with Gulf States.
- Trans-shipment essentially of containerised cargo.
- Unlock the development potential of hinterland.
- Diversion of influx of human resources from up country to Gwadar instead of Karachi.
- Socio economic uplift of the province of Balochistan.
- Establishment of shipping related industries.
- Oil storage, refinery and petrochemicals.
- Export Processing and Industrial Zones.
- Reduce congestion & dependency on existing Ports Complex at Karachi.

---

<sup>21</sup> President of Pakistan's Address at the Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Gwadar Deep-Sea Port, no. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), p.

<sup>23</sup> "Gwadar", no. 10.

- Serve as an alternate port to handle Pakistani trade in case of blockade of existing ports.
- To develop a Regional Hub for major trade and commercial activities.

China is emerging as a super economic power of the world in the recent years. Despite occupying a vast area of world's land, it doesn't have any port of hot waters, which can be used the whole year. The distance of Chinese industrial approach to the Shanghai Port is approximately 16000 km and the sea travel of 2-3 months is additional. This costs them a lot in the form of taxes and duties as well. As compared to this, the Gawadar Port is only on a distance of 2500 km from China<sup>24</sup> and the Port is working for the whole year because of its hot waters. Therefore, the interest of China in the development of the Gawadar Port is in fact in the interest of Chinese economy. This port will also enable China to diversify its crude oil import routes and extends its presence in the Indian Ocean. As one scholar marks aptly-

“Islamabad and Beijing are currently exploring the building of an energy pipeline from Gwadar to western China as a way to reduce the time and distance for transporting oil to China from the Gulf region. Built in parallel to the road-and-rail link to connect Gwadar to China, a similar second pipeline could potentially carry Iranian gas to western China. With its planned petroleum and naval facilities, Gwadar will be a key base in China's strategy to secure greater Gulf energy resources.”<sup>25</sup>

China's use of the Gwadar port for exports originating from the western region will provide her preferred option. Thus, it may be envisaged that the Gwadar port will be an integral part of China's foreign trade route in future. The existing Karakoram Highway already connects western China to Pakistan. With further expansion and upgrading of this traffic line and proposed linkages to Gwadar via planned Ratodero - Khuzdar road, shall make it the shortest and viable route connecting Gwadar to Western China.

---

<sup>24</sup> M. Aftab, “Will Gwadar be a ‘paradise’ for investors”, *Khaleej Times*, April 01, 2002, <http://www.khaleejtimes.co.ae/ktarchive/010402/finance.htm> accessed on March 08 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Brahma Chellaney, “Dragon designs”, *The Hindustan Times*, June 22, 2006.

Tarique Niazi, a specialist in resource-based conflict, points out that the Gwadar Port is intended to serve China's threefold economic objective:<sup>26</sup>

- First, to integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech, labour-absorbing, resource-intensive industrial production to Islamabad, which will transform Pakistan into a giant factory floor for China;
- Second, to seek access to Central Asian markets for energy imports and Chinese exports by developing road networks and rail links through Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia;
- Third, to appease restive parts of western China, especially the Muslim-majority autonomous region of Xinjiang, through a massive infusion of development funds and increased economic links with the Central Asian Islamic nations of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Ziad Haider of Stimson Center, Washington, also expresses the similar view. He writes that the economic significance of the port is two-fold – First, the Gwadar Port will provide a stable and proximate point of access to the Gulf ports. Second, the Port will provide the landlocked Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan, and the Chinese Xinjiang region with access to the Arabian Sea's warm water.<sup>27</sup> The Port will also enable the transfer of Central Asia's vast energy resources to world market, earning Pakistan significant profits in transit fees. The development of Gwadar could bring economic gains to backward Balochistan province as well. Gwadar could also be a potential source of offshore gas and oil exploration.

The development of the Gwadar port will play an incentive role in changing the economic destiny of the country in general, and the Balochistan province in particular. Large volumes of trade are expected after the establishment of industries at Gwadar and the surrounding area. The government has already planned an Export Processing Zone, declaring it as a Tax Free Zone.<sup>28</sup> With the

---

<sup>26</sup> Tarique Niazi, "Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean", *China Brief*, Vol.V, Issue 4, February 15, 2005.

<sup>27</sup> Ziad Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2005, p.97.

<sup>28</sup> *The Dawn*, <http://www.dawn.com/2005/03/19/ebr4.htm> accessed on April 20, 2005.

completion of a coastal highway, a sizable volume of trade from Pakistan's other industrial areas is also likely to flow through the Gwadar port, especially since both existing ports are reaching their capacity to meet the needs of domestic trade. The estimated cargo handling of Gwadar port, based on future prospects, till year 2015 is as shown in table-1 –

**Table- 1: Gwadar's Trade Forecast**

Category	Year		
	2005	2010	2015
Dry Cargo (million tones)	3.96	4.74	5.77
Liquid Cargo (million tones)	16.62	17.54	18.77
Container (1000 TEUs)	200	241	295
Transshipment (1000 TEUs)	200	250	300

**Source:** Board of Investment – Government of Pakistan<sup>29</sup>

Due to close geographical proximity, Gwadar is most viable option available with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Central Asia's plentiful oil and gas reserves have made the region an ever more important area. The flow of natural resources through the Gwadar Port is one of its significant vista. A 500 kilometre long highway connecting Gwadar via Panjgur, Chaghi and Rabat, up to Herat in Eastern Afghanistan is already being planned, which would directly link Gwadar to Central Asia. Once this road link is established, trade as far as from Russia could also find its way through the Gwadar port. Russian analysts predict that delivery time using such a route will be reduced by up to twenty days, and the

---

<sup>29</sup> Board of investment, Government of Pakistan, "China – Country Brief," [http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/Country\\_Brief/China.pdf](http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/Country_Brief/China.pdf), accessed on March 20, 2005.



cost per container will decrease by \$400 to \$500.<sup>30</sup> Russia, prior to disintegration, for a long time had desired expansion towards the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Pakistan and Iran had also long believed that the USSR hoped to gain warm water ports. According to the Chairman of the Gwadar Port Authority, Rear Admiral Sarfraz Khan, “It was a long-standing desire of these states to reach warm waters and now we have ourselves offered this opportunity to them.”<sup>31</sup>

By virtue of its excellent location, The Gwadar Port is envisioned to become a regional hub serving incoming and outgoing commercial traffic of the Middle Eastern and Gulf countries, the Xinjiang province of China, Iran in the west and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in the south and east. “Pakistani President Musharraf recently pointed out that Pakistan would like to serve as China’s energy corridor and as a channel for China to enter the Central Asian market. Here the President refers to Gwadar Port on the beach of the Arabian Sea.”<sup>32</sup>

Under an agreement, Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are committed to developing extensive railroad links from Central Asia and the Chinese province of Sinkiang to the Arabian Sea coast. The completion of this road and communication network will not only facilitate the movement of goods from China and Central Asian Republics to the countries of the Persian Gulf, West Asia, East Africa, the Indian Ocean and beyond through Gwadar, the countries of these regions will also have an easy and short route for access to Central Asia for trade and economic cooperation.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Gordon Feller, “Trade Routes of the Future”, *Journal of Commerce*, May 26, 2003, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> “Pakistan Fishing village Undergoes Transformation into Mega-Port”, *The Bangladesh Observer*, September 15, 2003, <http://www.bangladeshobserveronline.com/new/2003/09/15/economic.htm> accessed on March 06, 2004.

<sup>32</sup> Zhang Lijun, “Balancing Act”, *Beijing Review*, Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), p. 11.

<sup>33</sup> Wilson John, “Gwadar and the China angle”, *The Pioneer*, January 08, 2006.

### Strategic Imperatives:

Pakistan has a strategic location in the Indian Ocean region. On the west is Iran, which has traditionally been a close ally. On the east is India, which is seen as a potential adversary. In the north is China, which has been a close friend, and to the northwest is Afghanistan, which is likely to remain friendly towards Pakistan because of her geo-economic compulsions. On the other hand, Pakistan is also located strategically in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf and acquires a special significance as nearly 17 million barrels of oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily.<sup>34</sup> About ninety percent of Pakistan's trade is sea-borne. Development of a commercial port at Gwadar on the northern extremities is another important factor for Pakistan's interest in the region.

China and Pakistan have a long history of collaboration in the military realm and international politics, stemming from a shared view of an adversarial India. Despite improving Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Pakistani development projects have continued with the Gwadar as well as a host of associated projects such as railroad links, industrial complexes etc. In addition to the economic benefits, the Gwadar project is strategically important in several ways.

Speaking at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad on November 15, 2001, General Musharraf said, "Pakistani security interests lie in maintaining a regional balance... and in this it would desire on an active Chinese role. This role will remain vital especially in the changing geo-strategic realities."<sup>35</sup> G. Parthasarathy, a former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan, says that the port is of strategic importance, not only because of it being more distant from India than existing naval facilities at Karachi, but also because access to the facilities in Gwadar will provide the capabilities for control of access to the strategic Persian Gulf.<sup>36</sup>

In Islamabad on May 15, 2001, in response to a question posed by the editor of the Urdu daily *Ausaf*, Musharraf told that the main objective of letting

---

<sup>34</sup> Dr. Moonis Ahmer, "Indian Ocean: Maritime Security and Confidence Building," *Indian Ocean Security and Stability in the Post-Cold War Era* (1995), p. 264.

<sup>35</sup> <http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/may/23gp.html> accessed on March 08, 2005.

<sup>36</sup> *The Pioneer*, New Delhi, May 24, 2001.

the Chinese develop Gwadar port was that “as and when needed the Chinese navy would be in Gwadar to give befitting reply to anyone”. Pakistan was interested in the project to seek strategic depth further to the southwest from its major naval base in Karachi that has long been vulnerable to the Indian Navy. The Government of Pakistan has designated the Port area as a “sensitive defence zone”.

The Gwadar Port project will bring the two countries closer in maritime defence. Pakistan’s Navy Chief has described the Gwadar Port as the country’s third naval base after Karachi and Ormara. He sees the development as an improvement in Pakistan’s deep-sea water defence.<sup>37</sup> The Gwadar Port will provide Pakistan with crucial strategic depth along its coastline. “Of course, the real reason for the port may be the Pakistan’s Navy’s desire to prevent giving the Indian Navy an encore performance of the 1971 war with India, in which it found itself blockaded in the port of Karachi”.<sup>38</sup>

John W. Garver has discussed the strategic importance of Gwadar project in detail.<sup>39</sup> He writes, the Gwadar complex would substantially diminish India’s ability to blockade Pakistan in wartime. It would also substantially increase the capability of China to supply Pakistan by sea and by land in wartime. New highways, railways, pipelines, cargo terminals and freight handling facilities of all sorts would have the capacity to expedite movement of military as well as civilian cargoes. Its existence would also diminish India’s ability to isolate Pakistan from outside support in the event of a future India-Pakistan conflict. The Gwadar project fits with longstanding Pakistani ambitions of establishing Pakistan as the main corridor for trade and transport between the newly independent Central Asian republics and the outside world. Gwadar had long been envisaged as the coastal terminus for those new pipelines. Garver sees Chinese support in sustaining and strengthening Pakistan as maintaining the balance of power in

---

<sup>37</sup> “Navy to Build Base in Gwadar”,  
<http://www.pakistanidefence.com/news/MonthlyNewsArchive/2004/May2004.htm> accessed on May 20, 2005.

<sup>38</sup> Ahmad Faruqi, “Gwadar’s role in Musharraf’s Strategy”, *Daily Times*, June 25, 2006, at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/>.

<sup>39</sup> John W. Garver, no. 11, pp. 20-21.

South Asia. Gwadar port is important for China from both economic and security point of view.

Ziad Haider points out that a Chinese presence at Gwadar allows China to ensure the security of its energy-related shipments along existing routes. It could also monitor U.S. naval activity in the Persian gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea, and future U.S.-India maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.<sup>40</sup> For China, South Asia, West Asia, Africa and even Europe through the Indian Ocean is closer than West coast across the Pacific.<sup>41</sup> At present, China is not in a position to meddle effectively in the Indian Ocean, yet owing to her growing navy and her interests she can exercise considerable influence in the region. The Chinese are well aware of the geo-strategic realities and have been engaged in diplomatic, economic and military activities to build a maritime infrastructure to safeguard their maritime interests.<sup>42</sup>

Present Chinese eagerness to expand infrastructure is significant as it is probably the start of long-term Chinese objective in the Indian Ocean. The same is also evident from her assistance for construction of the Gwadar Port. It would not be long before the Chinese Navy would make its presence felt in the Indian Ocean in support of its economic and maritime interests. China has already consolidated its access to the Indian Ocean through the Karakoram Highway and Karachi and Gwadar ports, through the China-Burma road to Burmese ports, and through the Malacca Straits. China's growing military strength vis-à-vis her central geographic location and her desire to become a pre-eminent power in the region suggest that China has to play an important role in the future conflicts of the region. As Brahma Chellaney writes-

Beijing is reinforcing the strategic significance of the naval base-cum-port it is completing at Gwadar, Pakistan, by linking it up with the Karakoram Highway to western China through the Chinese-aided Gwadar-Dalbandin railway, which extends up to Rawalpindi. In addition, the Chinese-supported Makran coastal highway is to link Gwadar with Karachi. Gwadar, already home to a Chinese electronic-listening post, is a critical link in the emerging chain of Chinese forward-operating facilities that stretch from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal and

---

<sup>40</sup> Ziad Haider, n. 27, p. 98.

<sup>41</sup> M. Anwar, *Roles of Smaller Navies* (Rawalpindi: The Army Press Club, 1999), p. 33.

<sup>42</sup> S. N. Kohli, *A Maritime Strategy for India, Sea Powers and the Indian Ocean* (New Delhi, 1978), p. 123.

then to the Gulf of Siam. Protracted by cliffs from three sides, Gwadar will not only arm Pakistan with critical strategic depth against a 1971 – style Indian attempt to bottle up its navy but it will also open the way to the arrival of Chinese submarines in India’s backyard... A Karakoram Highway-Gwadar link-up is bound to create a strategic-multiplier effect.<sup>43</sup>

### **Concerns of Regional and Extra Regional Powers:**

In the aftermath of the Gulf War and the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan new political trends are emerging and the United States, China, and India are flexing their muscles to enhance their influence in the area. A high-stake geopolitical game is sweeping Asia. Triggered by a roaring economy, propelled by swelling confidence and funded by chequebook diplomacy, Beijing is projecting its new might across the continent – and setting off alarm bells from Washington to Tokyo.<sup>44</sup>

According to Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, “There is a cauldron of anxiety about China.”<sup>45</sup> The United States desire a strategic alternative of Middle Eastern oil, and natural resources of central Asian Republics are bound to become a strategic alternate of the U.S. oil supply. Pakistan’s Gwadar Port is one of the probable sites to provide an outlet to Central Asian Republics natural resources, via Afghanistan. Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas are likely to remain the priority of United States policy makers for the foreseeable future.

Two key regional players, Iran and India, have warily watched the construction of the Gwadar Port in their backyard. Iran is concerned with her economic interests associated with the Indian Ocean. Iran’s response to the Gwadar Port has been to construct its own Chabahar Port and tacitly compete with Pakistan in capturing access routes and energy related trade from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For India, China-Pakistan collaboration at Gwadar and Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea heightens its

---

<sup>43</sup> Brahma Chellaney, no. 25.

<sup>44</sup> Declan Walsh, “US uneasy as Beijing develops a strategic string of pearls”, *The Guardian*, November 10, 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,7369,1638845,00.html> accessed on November 14, 2005.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

feeling of encirclement by China from all sides.<sup>46</sup> One can not ignore recent developments like the announcement of General Pervez Musharraf about China being provided facilities by Pakistan to base its navy at the Gwadar port.<sup>47</sup> Indian Navy Chief Admiral Madhavendra Singh pointed out that India was closely observing Chinese activity on the Makran coast, along which Gwadar is located, and expressed concern about the Chinese Navy's close interaction with "a few neighbouring countries" that could "seriously endanger vital Indian shipping routes in the Gulf."<sup>48</sup> India's new naval doctrine specifically seeks to address India's need to secure energy routes and encounter the Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea.

In addition to these countries, Japan will be the most worried nation with increased presence of the Chinese at the helm of the routes to her vital energy resources. It would not be wrong to state that the Indian Ocean is a lifeline of Japan. The need to protect her economic interest may one day invoke deeper involvement of her "Self Defence Maritime Forces."<sup>49</sup>

However, a survey of regional views of the Gwadar Port suggests that the Port's importance lies in its ability to connect vital Central Asian and Middle Eastern energy sources to world markets, to facilitate trade, and to project naval power in the Indian Ocean. The substantial economic and military potential of the port has propelled regional players to manoeuvre around each other by establishing trade links and engaging in development projects with other states, upgrading their own internal infrastructure, and expanding their naval capabilities.

The strategic competition surrounding the Gwadar Port and the transit routes need not be viewed solely through a confrontational lens. The inter-port rivalry may in fact prove to be beneficial by stimulating even greater trade in the region. The competition and cooperation over the Gwadar Port thus demonstrates the increasingly important and fluid linkage between countries in the Middle East and Central, South, and East Asia as economic ties are created and new security

---

<sup>46</sup> Sudha Ramchandran, no. 4.

<sup>47</sup> <http://meaindia.nic.in/opinion/2001/08/1/pio.html>, accessed on March 05, 2005.

<sup>48</sup> "Indian Navy Concerned over China's Expanding Reach", *The Times of India*, May 21, 2003.

<sup>49</sup> M. Anwar, n. 41, p. 34.

relationships are formulated. The Gwadar Port offers Pakistan an invaluable opportunity to strengthen its position in the region.

## Chapter – IV: India’s Strategy

A full recapitulation of the historical evolution of the India-China relations is not necessary here. Whole volumes have been written to elucidate the complex relations between these two Asian neighbours. However, this chapter focuses on India’s strategy in response to the expanding Chinese strategic access to Pakistan. What are India’s security concerns and how India is planning to mitigate the Chinese strategic advancement? Moreover, a brief overview of the earlier background is needed to clarify the India’s geo-strategic progress in response to Chinese strategy.

### **Background**

On the surface, relations between India and China are optimistic. Both the countries have declared 2006 as a “Sino-Indian Friendship Year”. However, neither power is at ease with the rise of the other. Each perceives the other as pursuing regional hegemony and entertaining geographical expansion. Each puts forward its own proposals for multilateral cooperation that exclude the other. Both vie for influence in Central, South and Southeast Asia, and for leadership positions in global and regional organizations. “The expanding political influence of China in the subcontinent, and in particular strategic relationship with Pakistan, has been an important concern for New Delhi in the last two decades of the twentieth century.”<sup>1</sup>

Geography influences the political environment of a country and may steer its foreign policy and national interests. The Himalayan Mountains to the north, the Arabian Sea to the west, the Indian Ocean to the south, and the Bay of Bengal to the east have created a largely enclosed, natural geographical unit often referred to as Indian subcontinent. The mountains and seas have long been perceived as protective barriers and have given Indians a sense of security. Many analysts consider South Asia, stretching from the Himalaya to the adjoining zones

---

<sup>1</sup> C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Viking, 2003), p. 155.



of the Indian Ocean, as India's natural security zone.<sup>2</sup> Rising Chinese profile in the subcontinent is a great concern for India. Some Indian strategists like Jasjit Singh hold that "the appropriate and logical point of reference to define India's strategies would be in relation to Communist China."<sup>3</sup> For India South Asia is a strategic entity. Its outer boundary forms India's own natural defence perimeters. New Delhi sees South Asian region as its sphere of influence. China connection is of immense importance for Indian foreign policy. India always regarded China as "the biggest challenge in the region and threat to its security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century."<sup>4</sup>

K. M. Panikkar writes, "Indian historical thinking was necessarily confined to a large extent to the growth and decline of local dynasties with the result that the overall factors which shaped our life seldom entered into our calculations. But a nation can neglect geography only at its peril."<sup>5</sup> India and Pakistan stand up to each other along a frontier which goes from the heights of Karakoram to the Indian Ocean. This simple geographical fact does bear a great significance. Due to their demographic and geographic characteristics, their economic weight, their military might, India and Pakistan are greatly affecting the dynamics of South Asia.

"In a period of rapid and continuing change, foreign policy must be capable of responding optimally to new challenges and opportunities. It has to be an integral part of the larger effort of building the nation's capabilities through economic development, strengthening social fabric and wellbeing of the people and protecting India's sovereignty and territorial integrity. India's foreign policy is a forward-looking engagement with the rest of the world, based on a rigorous, realistic and contemporary assessment of the bilateral, regional and global geopolitical and economic milieu."<sup>6</sup> The logic of geography is unrelenting and proximity is the most difficult and testing among diplomatic challenges a country faces. China's time-tested friendship with Pakistan has been seen as precluding a

---

<sup>2</sup> A. Z. Hilali, "India's Strategic Thinking and Its National Security Policy", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 5, September/October 2001, p. 741.

<sup>3</sup> Jasjit Singh, "Indian Security: A Framework for National Strategy", *Strategic Analysis*, November 1987, p. 898.

<sup>4</sup> Liang Jiejun, "India's Trans-Century National Security Strategy", *Contemporary International Relations*, 1995, No. 5, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in W. Kirk, "The Inner Asian Frontier of India", *Transactions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers)*, No. 31, December 1962, p. 131

<sup>6</sup> *Ministry of External Affairs Annual Reports 2004-2005* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs), p. i.

truly close India-China relationship. China has been seen as trying to counterbalance India in the subcontinent by using Pakistan.<sup>7</sup> Some strategists in India have viewed that China does not constitute a clear-cut, direct military threat to India in the near term, but the longer term is uncertain.

In the mid-1950s China reached a strategic understanding with Pakistan founded on their convergent interests vis-à-vis India. Successive Chinese and Pakistani regimes have maintained and deepened this strategic entente, much to India's dismay. Across the Indian Ocean and South Asian region, India watches warily as China expands its military and political roles, fearing that it is sliding into a state of "strategic encirclement" by China.<sup>8</sup> An Indian analyst writes-

While China professes a policy of peace and friendliness toward India, its deeds clearly indicate that concentrated efforts are under way aimed at strategic encirclement of India. For the last several decades, China has been engaged in efforts to create a string of anti-Indian influence around India through military and economic assistance programs to neighbourly countries, combined with complementary diplomacy. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have been assiduously and cleverly cultivated toward this end... China's foreign and defense policies are quite obviously designed to marginalize India in the long term and reduce India to the status of a sub-regional power by increasing Chinese influence and leverage in the South Asian region.<sup>9</sup>

Indian analysts are apprehensive of China's security relations with India's South Asian neighbors. According to Sujit Dutta, "Beijing has over the years . . . developed some of its closest external relationships in the region built on defense and intelligence ties, military transfers, and political support. Unlike China's ties in East Asia, where they are essentially economic, in South Asia ties are primarily political-military in content."<sup>10</sup> Adding to this he highlights that there has been little movement on removing Indian insecurities regarding China's strategic

---

<sup>7</sup> Steven A. Hoffmann, "Perception and China Policy in India" in Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (eds.), *The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 41.

<sup>8</sup> John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 5-6.

<sup>9</sup> Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal, "China's Long March to World Power Status: strategic Challenges for India", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 22, No. 2, February 1999, pp. 1713-28.

<sup>10</sup> Sujit Dutta, "China's Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia" in Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (eds.), *In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), pp. 91-114.

postures and defense ties in the region.<sup>11</sup> Brahma Chellaney has encapsulated the Chinese designs (new regional links and capabilities) antithetical to Indian interests. As he writes-

With its new wealth, China has been inventively building trade and transportation links to further its larger interests. Such links around India's periphery are already bringing this country under strategic pressure on three separate flanks. China is fashioning two north-south strategic corridors on either side of India- the Trans-Karakoram Corridor stretching right up to Gwadar, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz; and the Irrawaddy Corridor involving road, river and rail links from Yunnan right up to the Burmese ports. In addition, it is shoring up an east-west strategic corridor in Tibet across India's northern frontiers.<sup>12</sup>

Steven A. Hoffmann has looked into details on the Indian strategic community's diverse perspectives on China. Several positions on China outlined by Hoffmann are constructs, or models, formulated for analytical purposes, and in each of them a number of Indian perceptions are clustered together. Each perspective contains individual ideas offered by many people.<sup>13</sup> The various Indian positions on China elaborated by Hoffmann have been shown in table- 2.

### **India's Strategy: From Enmity to Amity**

There is nothing especially odd about a strategic perspective grounded in enmity with one's neighbour. Throughout history, most wars have been fought between geographic neighbours. "The crescent-shaped Himalaya-Karakoram mountain chain has from time immemorial dominated the history and culture of India."<sup>14</sup> India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in his speech in *Lok Sabha* (Indian Parliament) on November 25, 1959 said:

"There is one aspect of the question which I wish the Chinese government and indeed other countries would try to understand. The Himalayas are high mountains, of course, but they are something much more to us and more intimately tied up with India's history, tradition, faith,

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Brahma Chellaney, "Dragon designs", *The Hindustan Times*, June 22, 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Steven A. Hoffmann, no. 7, p. 39.

<sup>14</sup> Deba Prosad Choudhury, *Trade and Politics in the Himalaya-Karakoram Borderlands* (Mumbai: Orient Longman, 1996), p. ix.

religion, beliefs, literature, and culture, than, to my knowledge, any other mountain anywhere. The Himalayas are something much more than mountains to us: they are part of ourselves.”<sup>15</sup>

**Table- 2: Indian Perceptual Position on China and Their Grand Strategy and Domestic Political Correlates<sup>16</sup>**

<p><b>Mainstream Position</b> Basics: No short term China threat, but long term uncertain. In future, economically and militarily powerful China potentially a threat or challenge to Indian security. Chinese worldview similar to India's, but certain Chinese strategic interest calculations (regarding Pakistan and border) different and problematical. China is perhaps unwilling to acquiesce to rise of India as world power. India-China diplomacy can possibly avert major future problems.</p>	<p><b>China-Is-Not-Hostile Position</b> Basics: China not hostile to India, basically pragmatic and rational, desirous of good relations over the long term. The 1962 war a result of both Indian and Chinese mistakes. One version of this position: Sino-Pakistani collusion is special case of atypical but still non-malevolent-minded Chinese behaviour, although China does favour having a Pakistan “card” to play against India. China is caught in a strategic dilemma between its ties with Pakistan and its desire for better relations with India.</p>	<p><b>China-Is-Hostile Position</b> Basics: A hostile China is already a Cold War-style rival of India and a short- and long-term threat. Chinese are definitely practicing strategic encirclement of India. China is seeking top power and status position in Asia. China merits open diplomatic assertiveness by India, backed by the requisite military power, and not genuflection or obsequiousness.</p>
<p><b>Correlated Indian Grand-Strategic Ideas</b> Basics: India and China can become major powers. Whether they will be cooperative or conflictual powers is yet to be determined. Multipolar or polycentric world order can emerge naturally, and structuring of it, or of regional arrangements, to place limits on China would not be unwelcome to India. No Indian rivalry with U.S. is needed, while China may well become a rival to U.S. Having polarizing actors in Asia, e.g., possibly China and possibly the U.S., not desirable.</p>	<p><b>Correlated Grand-Strategic Ideas</b> Basics: India should play moral, non-aligned, mediating role in world affairs. India should foster progressivism and equality in the world. The American-led world order and U.S. international hegemony should be resisted, and China and India hold similar views on this matter.</p>	<p><b>Correlated Grand-Strategic Ideas</b> Basics: India should forcefully assert its right to be a recognised great power. International relations, for India, is basically a matter of conflict management among power-pursuing states. India needs highly robust nuclear arsenal. India should be willing to make anti-China security arrangements with other countries.</p>

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in Shanti Prasad Verma, *Struggle For The Himalayas: A Study In Sino-Indian Relations* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1965), p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Source: Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (eds.), *The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement* (New Delhi: OUP, 2004), p. 51.

<p><b>Correlated Indian Domestic Political Ideas</b>  Basics: Best to relate Indian foreign policy to goal of accelerating growth of Indian economy via foreign investment and trade. Socialist governmental regulation of Indian economy should be erased. Close ties with the great powers important for furthering Indian economic development.</p>	<p><b>Correlated Domestic Political Ideas</b>  Basics: Commitment to egalitarianism and other progressive values applicable domestically too. Economic development in India should be socially just, equitable, and self-reliant.</p>	<p><b>Correlated Domestic Political Ideas</b>  Basics: Order and stability in both external and internal affairs to be maintained via governmental strength. Hindu nationalism is opposed to its own interpretation of the "soft state" concept. Acquisition of military power for India should be a prime internal political and economic objective.</p>
--	---	---

India was aware of Sino-Pakistan nexus before the construction of Karakoram highway. The Sino-Pakistan security and strategic nexus has remained a central issue in India-China relations ever since Beijing and Islamabad signed a historic border agreement in March 1963, ceding a chunk of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) to China. The deterioration in Sino-Indian relations following the 1962 war provided a favorable opportunity for Beijing and Islamabad to forge a common strategic understanding with aim of containing India in their respective national interests. Allen S. Whiting observes-

"Pakistan's geopolitical situation has attracted China's support since the early 1960s. It was a useful counterweight against India, perceived both as a neighbouring threat and a client of the Soviet Union. In addition, the proximity of Kashmir to the disputed Sino-Indian border area took on strategic importance with a nearby road from Xinjiang through western Tibet serving essential military logistic needs."<sup>17</sup>

The Chinese decision to expand their physical connectivity into Pakistan's Northern Areas followed the 1962 war with India. "Routes were at the centre of the Sino-Indian dispute: specifically, the Aksai Chin sector of the Western Military Road Complex that linked Xinjiang with Lhasa. China completed the 750 miles long Aksai Chin sector of their road in 1957, apparently without India's knowledge."<sup>18</sup> After discovering the road, India claimed that 112 miles road ran through Indian territory which resulted into war. The war "can be explained almost exclusively in terms of China's determination not to give up the Aksai

<sup>17</sup> Allen S. Whiting, "The Future of Chinese Foreign Policy" in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 264.

<sup>18</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: The Politics Of Access In The Borderlands Of Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1989), p. 168.

Chin and the strategic highway so vital for controlling the difficult provinces of Tibet and Sinkiang.”<sup>19</sup>

The belated Indian discovery of the Aksai Chin road amplified competing Chinese and Indian claims to the area through which it ran. Since the invasion of Tibet, the Indian government had concentrated on a possible Chinese advance along the McMahon Line in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). However, before being altered to the presence of the Chinese road, India had paid little attention even to Ladakh. It first drew the attention of the Indian government during the 1948 Kashmir conflict with Pakistan. When the Pakistanis captured Kargil, and cut off the 200 mile mule track that connected Srinagar with Leh across the 11,580 feet high Zoji La Pass, the Indian Army was forced to improvise an airstrip at Leh from Manali in the East Punjab.<sup>20</sup> Ladakh came under renewed Indian control when Kargil was recaptured in November 1948.

However, Indian policy makers were still ignoring Aksai Chin. New Delhi considered it a very difficult area of access. The Aksai Chin was “much more difficult to reach, through the Karakorams or the Ladakh mountains, and more importantly, it leads nowhere.”<sup>21</sup> This region was not in Indian strategic priority. India realised the strategic significance of this region only after loosing in war. The creation of better borderland routes near the Aksai Chin, in Ladakh, and in NEFA became priority of Indian strategists.

In 1962 war, China revealed the flexibility and utility of a sophisticated road network in mountainous terrain. Without aircrafts the Chinese were able to maintain efficient supply routes. Despite long supply lines, Chinese forces did not suffer shortages in equipments or supplies. Dorothy Woodman remarks, “Communications were far more developed by Chinese than Indians, with roads much nearer the Chinese forward posts giving them greater mobility and regroupment facilities.”<sup>22</sup> India drew a broad strategic lesson from the war. Jawaharlal Nehru remarked, “The Himalayan barrier has proved to be vulnerable. If it is breached, the way to the Indian plains and the ocean beyond would be exposed.”<sup>23</sup> The Indian policy makers became more sentient about the danger to plains and oceans after the Chinese embarked on their road-building activities

---

<sup>19</sup> C. N. Satyapalan, “The Sino-Indian Border Conflict”, *Orbis*, Vol. 8, Summer 1964, p. 389.

<sup>20</sup> See Lorne J. Kavic, *India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 50-51.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>22</sup> Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese Indian and Russian Rivalry* (London: Barrie & Rockliff Cresset Press, 1969), p. 293.

<sup>23</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, “Changing India”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, April 1963, pp. 458-459.

inside Pakistani territory. The Sino-Indian war markedly changed India's regional security environment. It resulted a shift in India's strategic way of thinking.

The 1963 Sino-Pakistani border treaty permitted both signatories increased accessibility to the other's mountain borderland. Immediately, India alleged Pakistan to hand over territory to China. New Delhi "challenged the legality of the treaty and attacked Pakistan for not trying to settle their dispute. China's entry into the Kashmir dispute was an injurious setback for India. It protested Chinese interference with Indian sovereignty over all the lands of Kashmir."<sup>24</sup> India underlined Kashmir as its inalienable part and maintained that there could be no common border between China and Pakistan. It questioned the legal standing of the Sino-Pakistani border treaty. For India, control of Kashmir valley became indispensable for the security of remote Ladakh, next to the Chinese borderlands.

Of greatest concern to India during this period was Chinese-Pakistani agreement to build a road linking Pakistani Kashmir with the highways of western Xinjiang. However, India was aware of Sino-Pakistan nexus before the construction of the Karakoram Highway. When the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 broke out in Kashmir, the Indians first occupied the two Pakistani military positions near Kargil and prevented any collaboration between Chinese and Pakistani forces near the Karakoram Pass and secured the Ladakh-China border.<sup>25</sup> When the Karakoram Highway network completed in the northern areas, India felt more threatened than earlier. It lodged numerous protests with both Pakistan and China. The Indian government explained it as "military expansionism"<sup>26</sup> declaring that the "construction of this road demonstrates China's collusion with Pakistan to undermine the sovereignty of India." New Delhi repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the areas through which the routes ran.

Indian government protested to the construction of the Karakoram Highway in a territory lawfully belonging to India. On June 25, 1969 India accused China of supporting Pakistan's illegal occupation of Kashmir, thereby "wilfully complicating Indo-Pakistani relations", and of threatening the "peace and tranquillity in the region" by building routes as part of a "calculated and

---

<sup>24</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 18, p. 183.

<sup>25</sup> Dorothy Woodman, no. 22, p. 311.

<sup>26</sup> J. P. Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Radiant Publication, 1974), p. 146.

coordinated plan.” Indian leaders were dismayed by the road. In a statement to the Lok Sabha in July 1969, India’s Minister of External Affairs pointed out that -

The entire alignment of the road runs in Indian territory which is presently under the illegal and forcible occupation of Pakistan. The road would give easier access to Chinese troops... into the Gilgit area in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir...The military significance of this road is, therefore self evident. Construction of the road was a threat to the peace and tranquillity of the region and showed that Pakistan’s intentions and ambitions in Kashmir equally serve Chinese designs in the area. Emphatic protests to this effect had been delivered to Pakistan and China. The Indian government was fully alive to the danger posed to our security by these roads and was taking necessary steps to safeguard our interests.<sup>27</sup>

The Karakoram Highway was seen by India as another step in China’s forward movement into the subcontinent. India observed it as Chinese effort to encircle India via cooperation with Pakistan. “Allegations about secret Sino-Pakistani road building also continued to flourish...The Indian news tabloid *Blitz* also reported that China was “stepping up the construction of a new road that will duplicate the existing strategic Karakoram Highway” and will then link up with the warm-water port of Karachi.”<sup>28</sup> India was also concerned about Chinese plan to upgrade parts of the Karakoram Highway and to link it with forward lines in Kashmir.

Protesting the construction of a road in a territory lawfully belonging to India, Indian government strongly submitted its displeasure to Pakistan. The Indian note to Pakistan stated –

Pakistan can not be unaware that this road will help to extend the Chinese road network in the Tibet-Sinkiang areas into northern Kashmir. Indeed, this new road will give easier access to Chinese troops from the areas which they have illegally occupied in north-east Kashmir and from Tibet to the Gilgit area in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, which lies immediately to the north of the cease-fire line dividing the armed forces of India and Pakistan in Kashmir.<sup>29</sup>

“By 1984 the environs of the Karakoram highway were witnessing sporadic skirmishes, tempted by their location. Indo-Pakistani hostilities broke out around the Siachin glacier. Situated to the north of the Indo-Pakistani Line of Actual Control in Kashmir, the Siachin Glacier rests near the Aksai Chin and the Sino-Pakistani border. It also controls passage into Ladakh... India’s move into the region reflected its objection to Karakoram highway, about 155 miles away: its interest in the glacier stems from its high environs, which provide superior posts from which to observe Chinese and Pakistani activities along a section of the route.”<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> *Foreign Affairs Record*, Vol. 15, No. 7, July 1969, p. 142.

<sup>28</sup> Quoted in Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals*, p. 192

<sup>29</sup> *Asian Recorder*, August 27 - September 2, 1978, p. 14479.

<sup>30</sup> Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, no. 18, pp. 209-210.



However, some Indian strategists decline the importance of the highway as a factor in the Siachin war.<sup>31</sup> The Indian defence experts are concerned about the vast logistical network developed by China impinging on the country's security in the western sector through Aksai Chin and PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir). But they are not taking too gloomy a view of this development in India's security environment, because a good bit of Karakoram Highway passing through glaciers and river valleys can be blocked in times of war by interdiction bombing attacks at some selected points. India improved its logistical capabilities in the mountains as an effort to balance Chinese advantage of 1962. Moreover, in the changing strategic environment the Indian government has come out of the post 1962 mindset that improved road infrastructure in states bordering China could be used against India in the event of future hostilities.

For India, China-Pakistan collaboration at Gwadar and Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea heightens its feeling of encirclement by China from all sides.<sup>32</sup> India is perhaps the only country on the Indian Ocean that has the economic potential, military strength and the political will to dominate this vast expanse of water.<sup>33</sup> K. M. Pannikar argued aptly that "while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected."<sup>34</sup>

This was also underlined in the *Annual Report* of India's Defence Ministry, which noted that "India is strategically located vis-à-vis both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean Region."<sup>35</sup> The latest *Annual Report* of Ministry of Defence of India points out –

---

<sup>31</sup> Jasjit Singh, "No Pak Claim to Siachin", *The Times of India*, May 19, 1988.

<sup>32</sup> Sudha Ramachandran, "China's Pearl in Pakistan's Water", [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/GC04Df06.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC04Df06.html), accessed on 8 March 05.

<sup>33</sup> S. N. Kohli, *A Maritime Strategy for India, Sea Power and the Indian Ocean* (New Delhi: 1978), p. 10.

<sup>34</sup> K. M. Pannikar, *India and the Indian Ocean* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1945), p. 84.

<sup>35</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India), p. 6.

The Indian Ocean region has assumed enormous importance considering our energy requirements. The oil flow in this region is estimated at 15.5 million barrels per day through the Persian Gulf, 10.3 million barrel per day through Malacca Straits and 3.3 million barrel per day through the Babel-Mandab (Gulf of Aden). This traffic raises security as well as environmental concerns. The Ministry of defence has contributed to India's overall reaction to these growing challenges by keeping its armed forces at the highest levels of defence preparedness and the ability to react with swift counter measures.<sup>36</sup>

The Gwadar Port project "set off alarm bells in India which already feels encircled by China from three sides: Myanmar, Tibet, and Pakistan."<sup>37</sup> India's former ambassador to Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy writes, "One can not ignore recent developments like the announcement of General Pervez Musharraf about China being provided facilities by Pakistan to base its navy at the Gwadar port."<sup>38</sup> Further, Parthasarathy says-

China remains the most destabilising factor for Indian national security. It has consistently sought to undermine India's influence in Asia and indeed across the world... There are disturbing signs that China is seeking naval and monitoring facilities across the Indian Ocean from Myanmar to Pakistan. General Pervez Musharraf has stated that in moments of crisis he would not hesitate to provide base facilities to the Chinese navy in the Gwadar Port... A Chinese naval presence in Gwadar can challenge the security of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to India.<sup>39</sup>

"The Indian Navy maintained its personnel and equipment in a high state of combat preparedness due to continued presence of multinational maritime forces in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) resulting in a fast pace of activities in the area."<sup>40</sup> Expressing his concerns over China's close interaction with some neighbouring countries former Indian Naval Chief Admiral Madhavendra Singh stated that "Chinese navy's close interaction with a few neighbouring countries could seriously endanger vital Indian shipping routes in the Gulf."<sup>41</sup> Indian

---

<sup>36</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report 2005-06* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India), p. 2

<sup>37</sup> Tarique Niazi, "Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean", *China Brief*, Vol. V, Issue 4, February 15, 2005.

<sup>38</sup> G. Parthasarathy, "Move Away From Musharraf Mania", *The Pioneer*, August 1, 2001.

<sup>39</sup> G. Parthasarathi, "Strategic Partner or Threat?", *The Pioneer* at <http://www.dailypioneer.com>, "In the dragon's cross hairs", *Daily News and Analysis*, June 26, 2006, at <http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1037846>, accessed on June 26, 2006.

<sup>40</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report 2005-06*, no. 36, p. 46.

<sup>41</sup> "Indian Navy Concerned over China's Expanding Reach", *Times of India*, May 21, 2003.

strategic community feels that extension of Chinese interests to South Asian portion of the Indian Ocean is potentially harmful to India.<sup>42</sup>

India's new naval doctrine specifically seeks to address India's need to secure energy routes and counter the Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea. The doctrine calls for building a nuclear ballistic missile submarine as part of India's envisioned triad of nuclear forces—the ability to launch land-, air-, and sea-based nuclear weapons—and developing a blue-water fleet that can project power into the Arabian Sea and beyond. Indian Navy long-range planning officers have stated that as the depletion of the world oil reserves will bring more regional powers to the Indian Ocean, India needs to bolster its striking power and command-and-control, surveillance, and intelligence capabilities.<sup>43</sup>

New Delhi is seeking to increase India's profile almost omnidirectionally from India's shores. These efforts are intended to advance broad economic or security interests, including the security of the various gates to the Indian Ocean, and to cultivate ties with the nations adjacent to these choke points. Certain Indian strategic and diplomatic initiatives also are aimed at gaining partners or client states once having strong ties with colonial or pre-colonial India. The Indians have become so alarmed over the Chinese participation in the construction of Gwadar port that their policy makers and strategic planners have strongly urged their government to immediately take measures for the modernisation and up gradation of the Indian navy.<sup>44</sup> New Delhi has concentrated on its western maritime front by developing its four main naval bases intended to quickly deploy India's military vessels in the Arabian Sea in the event of a conflict with its arch-rival, Pakistan. India has also established its Far Eastern Naval Command in Andaman which will serve as a base for India's blue water strategy. The new command also consists of winning over Asian countries by turning it into a strategic anchorage point between the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedy, "Common Security? Geopolitics, Development, South Asia and the Indian Ocean", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1998, p. 716.

<sup>43</sup> Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India's New Naval Ambitions", *Defence News*, June 7, 2004, pp. 1,8.

<sup>44</sup> [www.strategypage.com/messageboard/message/72-6970.asp](http://www.strategypage.com/messageboard/message/72-6970.asp) accessed on March 05, 2005.

<sup>45</sup> "Far Eastern Naval Command on the Anvil", *The Hindu*, December 26, 2000.

India is also expanding its strategic engagement with the neighbours to the east- by signing new defence agreements such as those with Singapore. These arrangements are designed to expand the reach of Indian armed forces. India is also undertaking broader tasks to police the sea-lanes of the eastern Indian Ocean, for example in the Malacca straits. In phase two of the “Look East” policy, India is seeking direct physical connectivity with the nations of the ASEAN. India is building roads across Myanmar into Thailand and beyond. India has underlined its commitment to build a rail line from New Delhi to Hanoi.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, India is trying to expand its naval presence beyond the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and is keen on keeping an eye on the mouth of the strategic Malacca Straits.

India is also advancing its strategic agenda through “military diplomacy”. India quickly extended help to Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Indonesia in response to the December 2004 tsunami disaster. India’s navy and air force played a crucial role in relief operations. Apart from that other instances of Indian military diplomacy include a continuing program of coordinated patrols with Indonesia in the Malacca Strait, naval surveillance of the Mauritius exclusive economic zone since mid-2003, and patrols off the African coast. The Indian military also has been very active in pursuing combined exercises with a variety of Indian Ocean region partners. These maneuvers underscore the new flexibility and reach of Indian military forces. The Indian Navy conducted combined exercises with Singapore in the South China Sea and with France in the Arabian Sea in late February and early March 2005. This was followed immediately by a multi-service, combined planning exercise with the United Kingdom in Hyderabad; a naval exercise with South Africa and a port call by warships in Vietnam in June; and the deployment of a large flotilla to Southeast Asian waters in July. The agenda for late 2005 included naval maneuvers with the United States in the Arabian Sea in September, with Russia in the Bay of Bengal in October, and with France in the Gulf of Aden in November. In addition, New Delhi partnered with Russia in a combined air-land exercise near the Pakistan border in October and with the United States in November. New Delhi, moreover, is expecting the

---

<sup>46</sup> C. Raja Mohan, “A star in the east”, *The Indian Express*, November 21, 2004.

advent of combined exercises with Japan's navy in the Sea of Japan and the Bay of Bengal in the not-too-distant future.<sup>47</sup>

Indian Navy has institutionalized conduct of bilateral exercises with USA, Russia, France, Oman and Singapore, and joint patrols with Indonesia and Thailand. Overseas deployments are carried out by Indian Navy in support of countries foreign policy.<sup>48</sup> As C. Raja Mohan writes in his book *Crossing the Rubicon-*

“India's great power diplomacy since the Pokharan tests has positioned the country in an advantageous situation in Asia for the first time since the 1950s. Its expanding engagement with the United States and its ability to retain a partnership with Russia has given it significant strategic space...An expanding Indo-US relationship has been accompanied by a higher Indian profile in South-East Asia, where many nations see New Delhi as a natural partner in maintaining the balance of power in the region. Although India remains concerned about China's expanding influence in the subcontinent, New Delhi is rediscovering its potential to develop a strategic profile in China's backyard.”<sup>49</sup>

The details of few overseas deployments undertaken during the year 2005 have been shown in the following table –

**Table- 3: Overseas Deployments of Indian Navy in 2005**

<u>Ships</u>	<u>Region/Period</u>	<u>Ports Visited</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Brahmputra, Vinash	Persian Gulf/ February 2005	Abu Dhabi (UAE)	International Defence Exhibition 2005 (IDEX)
		Wudam Naval Base and Muscat (Oman)	Bilateral Exercise 'Thammer al Tayyib'
Subhadra	South Indian Ocean/ Feb-Mar 2005	Port Victoria Seychelles	Towed ex- Tarmugli to Seychelles for Transfer
Rajput, Ranvijay,	South China Sea/ Feb-	Singapore and	Joint Indian

<sup>47</sup> Donald L. Berlin, "India in the Indian Ocean", *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 59, No. 2, Spring 2006,

<sup>48</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report 2005-06*, no. 34, p. 35.

<sup>49</sup> C. Raja Mohan, no. 1, pp. 161-162.

Gomati, Kora, Karmuk and Jyoti	Mar 2005	Kuantan (Malaysia)	Navy and Republic of Singapore Navy Exercise SIMBEX 05.
Krishna, Tarangini	Sri Lanka, Sujata, Maldives/ March 2005	Colombo, Trincomalle and Male	OSD for Cadet Training. 105 Srilankan Cadets were also embarked onboard Tarangini.
Vela IN LCU-34	East/SE Asia/ April-May 2005	Phuket, Thailand and Yangon, Myanmar	INS Vela embarked 08 Myanmar Naval Officers for one day for giving a sea experience in the submarine.
Sharda	South Indian Ocean/ April-May 2005	Port Louis, Mauritius	For Towing Mauritius Coast Guard Ship Guardian from Port Louis to Mumbai for refit.
Mumbai	Red Sea, Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean/ June-July 2005	Safaga (Egypt), Toulon (France), Portsmouth (UK), Taranto (Italy), Port Said (Egypt)	Participated in International Fleet Review (IFR) at Portsmouth (UK).
Magar	SE Asia/ June 2005	Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam	
Virat, Rajput, Ranjit, Shakti and Khukri	SE Asia/ July-August 2005	Singapore, Port Kelang (Malaysia), Jakarta (Indonesia)	Eastern Fleet Deployment to South East Asia
Delhi, Trishul, Ganga and Aditya	South Indian Ocean/ May-June 2005	Moroni (Comoros), Durban, Cape Town (South Africa), Port Victoria (Seychelles), Port Louis (Mauritius), Reunion (France)	Western Fleet Deployment to South Indian Ocean.

**Source:** Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report 2005-06*, (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India), p. 36.

Distinguished scholar John W. Garver writes, “A clearer Indian response to China’s growing activity in the Indian Ocean was a push to expand India’s security relations with China’s neighbours in the Pacific Ocean.”<sup>50</sup> Garver points out that New Delhi may have used its improved relations with the United States to pressure China regarding its involvement in the Gwadar project. India is expanding its cooperative security ties with the countries Southeast and East Asia. Strategic Analyst C. Raja Mohan discusses Indian strategy at length –

“As a new Chinese naval diplomacy unfolds in the region, India has not been sitting on its hands. Much like Beijing, New Delhi has increased its military engagement in the region. India now conducts naval and military exercises with great powers, including the US, Japan, and China, as well as neighbours in Asia. It has signed a defence agreement with Singapore and has cooperative arrangements with many nations stretching from Seychelles to Vietnam. It has participated in mechanisms to protect maritime traffic passing through the strategic Malacca Straits. More recently, India has signed agreements with Indonesia and Thailand to jointly patrol the Andaman seas.”<sup>51</sup>

For India, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf constitute a vast strategic buffer. Indeed, the Gulf figures prominently in India’s strategic canvas. Indian strategists share a consensus that dwells on an expanded concept of India’s national interests encompassing Asia from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca. This expanded strategic concept comprises not only classic military and geo-strategic perspectives, but also a broader definition of security and security interests. According to the Ministry of Defence *Annual Report-*

“India’s size, strategic location, trade interests and a security environment that extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to near the equator in the south, underpins India’s security response. In view of this strategic spread, it is essential for the country to maintain a credible land, air and maritime force to safeguard its security interests.”<sup>52</sup>

In late 2003, signifying its self-perception as a rising Asian power, Vajpayee’s government opted for a 20-year program to become a world power whose influence is felt across the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and all of

---

<sup>50</sup> John W. Garver, “The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations”, *India Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, October 2002, p. 25.

<sup>51</sup> C. Raja Mohan, “there’s a new game in Asia”, *The Indian Express*, May 31, 2005.

<sup>52</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report 2002-03* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India), p. 2.

■ payee directed planners to craft defense strategies that extend beyond South Asia and transcend past sub-regional mindsets. He claimed that India's expanded security perspectives require fresh thinking about projecting power and influence, as well as security in all these directions. India will seek more defense cooperation with states in the Gulf, Southeast, and Central Asia, presumably going beyond intelligence-sharing about terrorist activities. This cooperation will proceed to more bilateral exchanges and exercises and greater sharing of defence advice with friendly nations.<sup>54</sup>

While India formally opposes offensive military projections to intervene unilaterally in other countries, it formally announced its air base in Tajikistan, and hopes to undertake the following military programs through 2013:

- Improve military logistics in Iran, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan.
- Increase military interaction with Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.
- Increase naval interaction with South Africa, other African states, Iran, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other Gulf nations.
- Extend infrastructure, logistic, and material support to Myanmar to contain Chinese activities there.<sup>55</sup>

1990s onwards, India is making a determined effort to reconnect with its extended neighbourhood in South East Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia, and the Middle East. India's "Look East" policy has produced gains with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India became a sectoral partner in 1991, a full dialogue partner in 1995, and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996. In late 2004 India and ten ASEAN countries signed a historic pact for peace, progress, and shared prosperity. They also pledged to

---

<sup>53</sup> Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Aims to Project Power Across Asia", *Defence News*, November 10, 2003, p. 10.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.



cooperate in fighting international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The four-page accord and nine-page action plan envisage cooperation in multilateral fora, particularly the World Trade Organization; in addressing the challenges of economic, food, human, and energy security; and in boosting trade, investment, tourism, culture, sports, and people-to-people contacts. The pact commits India to creating a free trade area by 2011 with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, and by 2016 with the rest of ASEAN—the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, and Vietnam.

India's new economic and foreign policies have given India a real opportunity to realize the vision of Indian leadership in the region. India is now an active participant in various regional organizations from the East Asia Summit to the African Union. India has also supported the participation of China, Japan and the U.S. as observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). However, China obtained observer status in SAARC at the Dhaka summit in January 2006. President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf remarked that China's observer status at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation will strengthen the grouping and provide more "peace and security" in the region.<sup>56</sup> However, India is also observer of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) along with Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia. China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are full member of the SCO.

To counter Sino-Pak collaboration, India has brought Afghanistan and Iran into an economic and strategic alliance. India has enhanced its involvement in Afghanistan. New Delhi currently spends around \$100 million on various projects and \$70 million on the reconstruction of a 213-kilometer road from Zaranj to Delaram in Afghanistan. This 'new silk route' road is the result of a project between India, Iran and Afghanistan to develop trade with Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The route will utilize the Chah Bahar Port in Iran to send goods to Afghanistan and to Central Asian

---

<sup>56</sup> Nirupama Subramanian, "Musharraf hails China's SAARC status", *The Hindu*, June 16, 2006.

countries.<sup>57</sup> Zaranj-Delaram link, the largest in Afghanistan that India is sponsoring, is a strategic investment by India because Pakistan denies transit rights for Indian personnel and goods. Apart from this, Indian “Border Roads Organisation (BRO) is engaged in rebuilding the runway for an airbase in Tajikistan, a development that has led to speculation over the possible posting of Indian military assets in Central Asia.”<sup>58</sup>

For India, the establishment of a strong relationship with Iran is part of a wider effort to pursue Indian interests pragmatically and patiently with all significant states and especially with those in India’s neighbourhood. New Delhi regards the Iranian connection as serving a variety of tangible and specific Indian interests. Relations between India and Iran have been deepening with respect to most issues, especially security, energy, and the North-South Transportation Corridor.<sup>59</sup> In January 2003 both the countries signed a number of agreements including a “Memorandum of Understanding on the Road Map to Strategic Cooperation”. The memo states that India and Iran will explore opportunities for cooperation in defence in agreed areas, including training and exchange of visits.<sup>60</sup> India and Iran agreed to step up work on transport projects that link the subcontinent with the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Europe. “Ever since the partition in 1947, Pakistan had blocked India’s access to Afghanistan and beyond. The new transport corridor through Iran could liberate India from the geographic constraints imposed by division of the subcontinent.”<sup>61</sup>

India-Iran ties are also seen as facilitating Indian efforts to contain and encircle Pakistan. In March 2003, India and Iran conducted their first combined naval exercise. Indian engineers also are working to upgrade and develop the Iranian port of Chah Bahar. This is seen as response to Chinese grand strategy at Gwadar. However, deteriorating security conditions in Iran has put a question

---

<sup>57</sup> Sheela Bhatt, “The Afghan Initiative”, August 01, 2003 at <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/aug/01spec.htm>.

<sup>58</sup> “Afghan road security recast”, *The Telegraph*, May 04, 2006.

<sup>59</sup> Donald L. Berlin, “India-Iran Relations: A Deepening Entente”, *Asia’s Bilateral Relations Special Assessment*, June 2004 at <http://www.apcss.org>.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> C. Raja Mohan, “India, Iran unveil road diplomacy”, *The Hindu*, January 26, 2003.

mark on India's cooperation in Chah Bahar port project. The increasing close ties between India and United States have also complicated the Indo-Iranian relations. Strategic Pundits acknowledge that India is moving forward with a clear strategy to protect its vital interests. Overlapping sphere of influence and lack of strategic congruence between India and China is fuelling their rivalry. However, several possibilities exist in which the quietly competitive relationship moves toward cooperation. Accepting the strategic realities, India is intensifying its physical connectivity and improving its relation with both Pakistan and China.

India is accelerating popular contacts, trade and transportation links with Pakistan under the ongoing peace process. The starting of the historic Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and another bus link connecting Amritsar and Nankana Sahib; the launch of a cross-border train connecting Munabao in Rajasthan with Khokhrapar in Pakistan; and the opening of a truck route to boost trade between the two halves of Jammu and Kashmir were definitely significant developments. Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan Shiv Shankar Menon remarked that both the governments had re-established trade and travel links and were trying to build the infrastructure for trade.<sup>62</sup> He asked Islamabad to provide transit facility for trade with Afghanistan.

It is coming too late, but India is finally kicking off a massive programme to build roads and airstrips along its entire border with China after decades of neglect. Reversing an old policy of not rapidly developing areas bordering China, New Delhi has approved construction of several strategic roads by the BRO.<sup>63</sup> With the approval of construction of a new set of roads in border areas, the Indian government has come out of the post 1962 mindset that improved road infrastructure in states bordering China could be used against India in the event of future hostilities. This strategic conduct in the Himalayan borderland by India i.e. to improve its internal connectivity right up to the disputed border with China is a belated reversal of old policy, which shows a new sense of self confidence in

---

<sup>62</sup> "New Delhi seeks transit facility: India-Pakistan-Afghanistan trade urged", *The Dawn*, April 23, 2006 at <http://www.dawn.com>.

<sup>63</sup> Shishir Gupta, "China next door, Arunachal to get upgrade", *The Indian Express*, May 18, 2006, Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, "New Roads in Arunachal: Politics of Routes in India", article no. 2018, May 25, 2006, at <http://www.ipcs.org>.

Indian policy makers. Notably, after several rounds of negotiations, India and China have signed a historic agreement to resume border trade through the strategic Nathu La from July 6, 2006, after four decades of closure.<sup>64</sup> Nathu La Pass was once part of the flourishing Silk Route, connecting ancient China with India. The agreement to reopen the ancient Silk Route marks a new thaw in India-China relations. By reopening Nathu La, the two countries will be shaking off the diplomatic mistrust that has hindered the development of China's south-west and India's north-east. The renewing of Silk Route is a major addition to the confidence building measures between both countries and the resumption of trade along the borderlands prompts intelligent shifts in foreign policy.<sup>65</sup>

According to media reports, the BRO personnel are set to begin a detailed survey of India's road network along the Chinese border, kicking off the ambitious programme to improve connectivity along the largely peaceful, but unresolved border. The survey would mark the beginning of the project, estimated to cost almost Rs 2000 crores. Besides 36 roads, it would also see the government reviving at least three airstrips along the China border that were built during World War II and have been defunct ever since. The entire effort by the government would reverse several decades of neglect for the China border.<sup>66</sup>

Coming out of "defensive mindset", the Indian government on June 29, 2006, cleared the construction of 608 km of roads, stretches from Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir to Diphu La in Arunachal Pradesh, along the Sino-Indian border at a cost of Rs. 992 crores. The decision was taken at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The CCS also directed the Border Roads Organisation to complete the monumental task in six years.<sup>67</sup> The BRO had initiated the exercise with a survey

---

<sup>64</sup> "Building of roads along Sino-Indian border cleared", *The Hindu*, June 30, 2006.

<sup>65</sup> Saibal Dasgupta, "Nathu La reopening: Sino-Indian ties on a new high", *The Times of India*, June 20, 2006, "Indo-China trade through Nathu La pass to resume", *The Hindustan Times*, June 19, 2006, Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, "Nathu La: Renewing India-China Silk Route", article no. 2046, June 23, 2006, at <http://www.ipcs.org>.

<sup>66</sup> Josy Joseph, "Coming soon: roads along Chinese border", *Daily News and Analysis*, May 09, 2006 at <http://www.dnaindia.com>.

<sup>67</sup> Rajeev Sharma, "Nod to road network along China border", *The Tribune*, June 30, 2006, Alope Tikku, "Better roads along China", *The Hindustan Times*, June 29, 2006.

of the roads network along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in view of the low density of roads in border regions as compared with the all India road density. This constructive approach of Indian government will plug connectivity gaps on the Sino-Indian border.

Sino-Indian relations are gathering momentum “across a wide range of areas”. Accelerating the process of building trust and understanding, India and China signed Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation on May 29, 2006. Commenting on the historic defence cooperation Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee asserted that it provides the framework for military-to-military cooperation, joint exercise and also exchange of visits both at the defence ministerial-level and at the military level. Adding to this Mukherjee pointed out that the MoU would also facilitate the institutionalisation of cooperation between the two ministries and also the two armed forces.<sup>68</sup> According to the Indian defence ministry officials, the MoU singles out the following fields<sup>69</sup> -

- Holding of joint military exercises and training programmes in the field of search and rescue, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism and other areas of mutual interest. Each side will invite senior military officers of the other side to witness designated military exercises.
- Frequent exchanges between the leaders and high-level functionaries of the defence ministries and the armed forces of the two countries. Both sides will work out an annual programme of exchanges.
- An annual Defence Dialogue, hosted alternatively by the two sides, to review progress in the defence exchanges, make suggestions for the future and to exchange views on international, security and strategic issues.

---

<sup>68</sup>“China visit “highly successful”: Pranab”, *The Hindu*, June 3, 2006. Also see, “India, China do not consider each other a threat: Pranab”, *The Hindu*, June 14, 2006.

<sup>69</sup>“India, China to intensify military ties”, May 29, 2006, at <http://www.india-defence.com/reports/2010>.

- Establish a mechanism of study tours for each other's senior- and middle-level officials in order to facilitate better understanding of the foreign, defence and national development policies of the host side.
- Participation in seminars and discussions on themes to be mutually agreed upon.
- Exchanges in other mutually agreed fields to be decided through consultation.

Indian Defence Minister underlined that India's ongoing exercise in "defence diplomacy" had evoked "quite encouraging" responses from major powers. At the sidelines of an Asian Security Summit at Singapore, Mukherjee met the defence ministers of eight other countries, including Indonesia and Australia. He stressed that China and Japan had "warmly responded to our initiatives".<sup>70</sup> It is really significant for Indian strategy.

Simultaneous economic development at high speed of India and China has been a major bright spot in the world economy in recent years. The economic growth at a high speed of both China and India has not only provided favourable conditions for both countries to strengthen their economic and trade cooperation, but also opportunities for other countries to learn from each other. India and China are creating webs of interdependence- financial, trade and economic. China is now India's second largest trading partner and for some months last year (2005) it was also the biggest buyer of Indian goods, surpassing U.S. imports from India.<sup>71</sup>

The significant shift in India's strategic thinking is based on genuine strategic calculation. When the three countries (India-Pakistan-China) are committed to a peaceful resolution of their problems, it is no longer outrageous to suggest regional economic cooperation beneficial to all three. It seems that India and China share a new sense of pragmatism, emphasising the development discourse over the conventional security debate.

---

<sup>70</sup> P. S. Suryanarayana, "Encouraging response to defence diplomacy: Pranab", *The Hindu*, June 5, 2006.

<sup>71</sup> Mohan Guruswamy, "The Problem", *Seminar* 562, June 2006, p. 14.

## **Chapter 5: Conclusion: Sino-Indian Rivalry and Cooperation**

At the dawn of the new millennium, India is qualitatively and quantitatively a different actor on the world stage than the India of just a decade ago. India is developing strategies that extend far beyond the South Asian box. India possesses the economic strength, military power, political will, and strategic weight to be an increasingly important actor beyond South Asia. Further, India has become an increasingly active and welcome player and a constructive actor in the rapidly changing world. Giving India's size, stature and activism, it has been without doubt the most decisive player in determining China's perceptions, policies and equations vis-à-vis South Asia.

It is established both by Indian and Chinese historical records that interface between India and China had always been a two-way traffic. India and China have loomed large in each other's consciousness from well before the first millennium and beyond. The earliest contacts between the Chinese and South Asians have occurred along the branches of world famous Silk Route network sometimes since ancient times. However, spread of Buddhism strengthened the traditions of learning about each other and also sustained mutual interest and knowledge about each other. As Prof. Amartya Sen points out, "If China was enriching the material world of India two thousand years ago, India was busy, it appears, exporting Buddhism to China."<sup>1</sup> Prof Sen has discussed in detail about India-China ancient ties. He observes-

"Intellectual links between China and India, stretching over much of the first millennium and beyond, were important in the history of the two countries... this is important for a fuller appreciation not only of the history of a third of world's population, but also for the continuing relevance of these connections, linked as they are with contemporary political and social concerns... The extensive contacts that were generated between India and China through Buddhist connections were not confined to the subject matter of Buddhism only... Indian traders were engaged in importing goods from China for re-export to Central Asia more than two thousands years ago... Indian intermediation in trade between China and the west of Asia continued over centuries, though the commodity pattern went on changing."<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity* (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 164-166.

As ancient civilizations, India and China co-existed in peace and harmony for millennia. However, as post colonial modern states, with the exception of a very short period of “honeymoon” in the early 1950s, they have seen dramatic fluctuations and stalemate of many kinds ranging across the South Asian region. The relationship between the two Asian powers has been marked by conflict, mutual suspicion, distrust, estrangement, encirclement, contentment, and rivalry. Prof. Sen remarks aptly, “Suspicion of foreigners has been a continuing factor in parts of Indian thinking.”<sup>3</sup>

The India-China relations are generally analyzed in terms of power politics. Broadly there are two different approaches to understand India-China relations. The first entails looking at the post Cold War world as providing a new world of opportunities for cooperation in a number of fields. The competition between them takes on somewhat benign contours and far greater possibilities are visualized for the two countries to work in tandem to refashion the new emerging world order along more multipolar, democratic and equitable lines. The other strand views the two countries as locked in a “balance of power” politics, their relationship characterized by rivalry for regional dominance and their long term strategies predicated on their objective of playing an influential role in the emerging world order.<sup>4</sup>

The end of Cold War heralded realignment in global relations. India engaged new friends, maintained steadfast contact with old friends, and an ever watchful eye over enemies. India established economic and diplomatic relations with all the major powers. The post Cold War era reduced the confinements of the past. The gathering momentum of the relations with China since the early 1990s has been one of the biggest achievements of India’s new foreign policy. The once wary relationship with China has now blossomed into a strategic partnership for peace and development. China and India have recently laid down clear sign signalling a closer relationship. It appears that the past notion of China and India supporting each other as emerging Asian powers lies very much at the core of

---

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>4</sup> See Alka Acharya, “A Measured Tread to the Future”, *Seminar*, No. 487, March 2000.



new strategic thinking in New Delhi and Beijing that transcends the 1962 war and envisages the former rivals building a broad political and economic partnership.

While the two countries are on good terms for now and, indeed, their domestic priorities - economic development and prosperity - provide strong incentives for them to avoid conflict, obstacles remain and the road ahead seems bumpy. Despite the generally benign atmosphere between the two countries, there remain lingering suspicion and mistrust. Their competition for influence in South Asia and neighbouring regions remains a major source of disbelief in future direction of their relationship. Especially, China's unique relationship with Pakistan has been a major cause of displeasure in India. The expanding political influence of China in the subcontinent, and in particular its strategic relationship with Pakistan has been an important concern for New Delhi. As one scholar observes, "Despite warming Sino-Indian relations, Beijing has unveiled major strategic moves that will effectively isolate India in South Asia and further squeeze India's traditional strategic space in the region, keeping New Delhi tied down with multiple sub-continental concerns."<sup>5</sup>

Indian analysts differ in their interpretations of Chinese strategic access to South Asia. Some attribute to Beijing a strategy of creeping "strategic encirclement" of India, with Beijing deliberately engineering important strategic advances in relation to India. One Indian scholar writes-

While China professes a policy of peace and friendliness toward India, its deeds clearly indicate that concentrated efforts are under way aimed at strategic encirclement of India. For the last several decades, China has been engaged in efforts to create a string of anti-Indian influence around India through military and economic assistance programs to neighbourly countries, combined with complementary diplomacy. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have been assiduously and cleverly cultivated toward this end... China's foreign and defense policies are quite obviously designed to marginalize India in the long term and reduce India to the status of a sub-regional power by increasing Chinese influence and leverage in the South Asian region.<sup>6</sup>

Other Indian analysts hold less sceptical views on China, and are less willing to impute hostile motivations. However, these analysts argue for India to

---

<sup>5</sup> Mohan Malik, "Delhi and Beijing Tread Warily", at <http://www.atimes.com> accessed on February 13, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal, "China's Long March to World Power Status: strategic Challenges for India", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 22, No. 2, February 1999, pp. 1713-28.

resolutely uphold its advantages in South Asia and neighbouring countries. China expanding physical connectivity beyond its border, has altered the security architecture of the region. Further, India has traditionally viewed South Asia as its natural security zone and sphere of civilizational influence. The growth of Chinese presence and influence in South Asia is presenting new set of challenges before India. India sees Sino-Pakistan strategic cooperation as a serious threat to its security. However, this study is an endeavour to scan the objectives behind Chinese developmental aid for road and port development (the Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port) to Pakistan.

While, the Karakoram Highway facilitates physical access and development of the borderlands of Pakistan, the most important benefit for Pakistan is its effective control over strategically vulnerable territories. China and Pakistan germinated their grand strategy against their common rival, India through the KKH. The Karakoram Highway has made a concrete statement about the strength and intended longevity of Sino-Pakistani friendship. The KKH has provided a powerful visible centrepiece for the Sino-Pakistani partnership.

It is crystal clear that security considerations were dominant feature for China's strategic access to Pakistan. The impetus for construction of the Karakoram Highway was less influenced by the demand of economic advancement, rather, it was coloured by military manoeuvre. China's geo-political calculations were stemmed from its far-sighted strategic calculations- the proximity of the Indian subcontinent to Sinkiang and Tibet, Pakistan's location in the subcontinent and the affinity existing between the Muslims of Sinkiang and Pakistan.

Explaining the construction of the Karakoram Highway as "military expansionism", Indian government lodged numerous protests to both Pakistan and China. Protesting the construction of the Highway Indian government strongly submitted its displeasure to Pakistan. However, Indian strategists do not see the Karakoram Highway as major threat to Indian security, because a good bit of the Highway can be blocked in times of war by bombing attacks at some selected points. While India improved its logistical capabilities in the mountainous region

as an effort to balance China, the government was apprehensive that improved road infrastructure in states bordering China could be used against India in the event of future hostilities.

For India, China-Pakistan collaboration at Gwadar and Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea heightens its feeling of encirclement by China from all sides. The involvement in Gwadar project manifests China's attempt to influence developments far beyond its borders so as to sustain its security interests and enhance her force-projection capabilities in the region. There are other strategic manifestations also to China's presence in the Gwadar port, with security implications for India. It was always clear that Pakistan viewed this project as a means to seek strategic depth to the southwest from its major naval base in Karachi that has long been vulnerable to the Indian Navy. This significance about Gwadar is clearly proven by the Pakistan government's recent designation of the Port area as a "sensitive defence zone".

The Gwadar complex would substantially diminish India's ability to blockade Pakistan in wartime. It would also substantially increase the capability of China to supply Pakistan by sea and by land during a conflict. New highways, railways, pipelines, cargo terminals and freight handling facilities of all sorts would have the capacity to expedite movement of military as well as civilian cargoes. Its existence would also diminish India's ability to isolate Pakistan from outside support in the event of a conflict. Simply so, the Gwadar project fits with its longstanding ambitions of establishing Pakistan as the main corridor for trade and transport between the newly independent Central Asian republics and the outside world.

Gwadar also fits into China's long-term security strategy for the Indian Ocean. Through this port, Beijing can aspire to exercise considerable influence in the region, and also monitor U.S. naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea, and future U.S.-India maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese are well aware of the geo-strategic realities and have off-late engaged in diplomatic, economic and military activities to build a maritime infrastructure to safeguard its maritime interests.

The Indians have become so alarmed over the Chinese participation in the construction of Gwadar port that their policy makers and strategic planners have strongly urged Indian government to immediately take measures for the modernisation and up gradation of the Indian navy. India's new naval doctrine specifically seeks to address India's concerns to Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea. New Delhi is seeking to increase India's profile almost in all directions from India's shore. India is making a determined effort to reconnect with its extended neighbourhood in South East Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia, and the Middle East. Indian Navy has institutionalized conduct of bilateral exercises with all major powers. New Delhi is rediscovering its potential to develop a strategic profile in China's backyard. India has brought Afghanistan and Iran into economic and strategic alliance. A member of India's *National Security Advisory Board* and renowned scholar C. Raja Mohan remarks-

“New Delhi has made concrete efforts to reshape its immediate neighbourhood, find a modus vivendi with China and Pakistan (its two regional rivals), and reclaim its standing in the “near abroad”: parts of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region. At the same time, it has expanded relations with the existing great powers- especially the United States.”<sup>7</sup>

India mulls the economic and security implications of the modernisation of China's infrastructure along and across the border. Sino-Indian relations have never been as good as they are today. China's road building and port development project is unlikely to lead a military confrontation between the two countries. India can not stop China from developing its own territory across the border. India has limited options. It is more likely that Chinese and Indian involvement in infrastructural development reflect primarily domestic concerns and a willingness to engage with the region via multilateral and soft means.

The doyen of Indian strategic thinking, K Subrahmanyam points out that unlike the Soviet Union, which the US dealt with through containment, China is to be dealt with through the strategy of engagement.<sup>8</sup> He believes that India will

---

<sup>7</sup> C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power”, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006.

<sup>8</sup> K Subrahmanyam, “Hidden strings and free lunches”, *The Indian Express*, May 18, 2005.

represent a high stake in the balance of power game. India is not as weak today as it was in the past. Subrahmanyam emphasises that a polycentric balance of power system will give India far more flexibility and room for manoeuvre than the bipolar system did. To place India at the heart of the new Asian order, New Delhi is attempting to balance Beijing's power. Now Indian government has come out of the post-1962 mindset. India is finally kicking off a massive programme of road and airstrip building along its entire border with China after decades of neglect. This displays a new sense of self-confidence in Indian strategic thinking.

India is moving forward with a clear strategy to protect its vital interests. Despite the considerable advances, China's relationships remain less than threatening. Rapidly changing international security architecture and the politics of strategic access has compelled India to engage China in healthy commercial competition without generating political antagonism. To cope with a rising China on India's borders, New Delhi needs a forward policy that is as aggressive as Beijing's. It must effectively combine commerce, border region development and trans-frontier infrastructure. More importantly, India must discover the political will much like Curzon and Younghusband to play the game north of the Himalayas.

The aptness in India's foreign policy strategy since the early 1990s has resulted in the happy situation of simultaneous expansion of relations with all the major powers, growing weight in Asia and the Indian Ocean regions, and the prospect of improved relations with important neighbours. Since 1991, "India has moved from its past emphasis on the power of the argument to a new stress on the argument of power."<sup>9</sup>

China's strategic access to Pakistan is presenting challenges to Indian security. But, India itself has changed significantly in recent years. India must preserve and expand the strategic space created for its foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. While exploring the options to skirt around Pakistan, New Delhi is also urging Islamabad to consider the opportunities for cooperation and the

---

<sup>9</sup> C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Viking, 2003), p. xxii.

prospect that Pakistan could serve as bridge state between India and its western neighbourhood. Present Chinese eagerness to expand ties with Pakistan is significant as it is probably the start of long-term Chinese objective in the sub-continent.

However, the strategic access to Pakistan (the Karakoram Highway & Gwadar Port) and the other transit routes need not be viewed solely through a confrontational lens. The inter-port rivalry may in fact prove to be beneficial by stimulating even greater trade in the region. The competition and cooperation over the Gwadar Port demonstrates the increasingly important and fluid linkage between countries in the Middle East and Central, South, and East Asia as economic ties are created and new security relationships are formulated. The priorities of China and Pakistan are also shifting on the Karakoram Highway from military dimension to trade and tourism. Developing better connectivity and promoting cross border trade between China and its neighbouring regions in the subcontinent has now become a major priority for Beijing. China has always had a better sense than India of the link between geography and strategy.

While elements of political competition will endure for long, India and China today can cooperate with each other for mutual benefit in the economic transformation of their neighbouring regions and force the pace of regional economic integration and globalization. While China seems more in tune with these imperatives, India needs to catch up.

What India needs is not a containment of China but a realistic engagement strategy that takes the interests of all countries into account. That would involve enmeshing China in trade, investment, and multilateral security ties. As China's military capabilities expand, India will need a dynamic strategy that is capable of taking advantage of the new opportunities and limiting the impact of negative developments.

India needs to focus on modernising its own border infrastructure and creating capabilities for trans-border economic influence. Borders should become meeting points of ideas, people and goods, rather than dividing lines. Handling China's growing influence in its neighbourhood is likely to be the biggest political

challenge for Indian foreign policy in the coming decades. China should not be treated with hostility, lest Thucydides be proved right when he said that when one thinks of the other as an enemy, the other becomes an enemy in reality. India should consider China as a partner instead of a potential rival. In fact, strategists in both the countries have begun emphasizing the development discourse over the conventional security debate. An economic alliance on the basis of complementary interests between the two Asian giants will be beneficial for both sides.

## Selected Bibliography

### Primary Sources

“Gwadar Master Plan”,

<http://www.gwadarnews.com/gwadarphotos/gwadarmasterplan.jpg>.

China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept, 31 July, 2002,

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/t15319.htm>

Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the People’s republic of China and the republic of India, June 25, 2003,

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t22852.htm>.

Government of Pakistan, “Ports in Pakistan,”

<http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/BFacts/ports.html>

Ministry of Defence of India, *Annual Reports*, 1999-2006.

Ministry of External Affairs of India, *Annual Reports*, 1999-2006.

President of Pakistan Address at the Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Gwadar Deep-Sea Port, [http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE\\_Addresses/ce\\_gwadar.htm](http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Addresses/ce_gwadar.htm).

### Secondary Sources

#### Books

Anwar, M., *Roles of Smaller Navies* (Rawalpindi: The Army Press Club, 1999).

Bajpai, Kanti and Mattoo, Amitabh, *The Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2000).

Bamzai, P. M. K., *Kashmir and Central Asia* (New Delhi: Light & Life, 1980).

Bates, Charles Ellison, *A Gazetteer of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Light & Life, 1980).

Bellows, Michael D. (ed.), *Asia in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Evolving strategic Priorities* (Washington DC: NDU, 1994).



- Bhattacharjea, Mira Sinha, *China, the World and India* (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2001).
- Bhola, P. L., *Pakistan China Relations: Search for Politico-Strategic Relationship* (Jaipur: R. B. S. A. Publishers, 1986).
- Bhushan, Shashi, *Karakoram Road* (New Delhi: Secretariat of the Congress Socialist Forum, 1978).
- Bhutani, Sudarshan, *A Clash of Political Cultures, Sino-Indian Relations, 1957-62* (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2004).
- Brands, William J., *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, (New York: Praeger, 1972).
- Burke, S. M., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).
- Chapman, Graham P., *The Geopolitics of South Asia: From Early Empires to the Nuclear Age* (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003).
- Chauhan, Bhim Singh, *Political Relations between China and Indian Subcontinent* (Jodhpur: Books Treasure, 2000).
- Chellaney, Brahma. (ed.), *Securing India's Future in the new Millennium* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999).
- Chengappa, Bidanda M, *India-China Relations: Post Conflict Phase to Post Cold War Period* (New Delhi: APH Publishers, 2004).
- Chitnis, S. G., *Proceedings of Seminar on the Emerging China: Political, Economic and Military Implications for India 22-23 November* (Pune: Centre for advanced Strategic Studies, 1994).
- Choudhury, Deba Prosad, *Trade and Politics in the Himalaya-Karakoram Borderlands* (Mumbai: Orient Longman, 1996).
- Cohen, S. B., *Geography and Politics in a Dived World* (London: Methuen, 1963).
- Dahal, Dev Raj and Pandey, Nishchal Nath (eds.), *Comprehensive Security in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006).
- Deepak, B. R., *India-China Relations in the First Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century* (New Delhi: APH Publishers, 2001).

- Deshpande, G. P. and Acharya, Alka, *50 Years of India & China: Crossing a Bridge of Dreams* (New Delhi: Tulika, 2001).
- Dixit, J. N., *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998).
- Dixit, J. N., *India and its Neighbours* (New Delhi: Gyan, 2001).
- Dorff, Robert H., "A Primer in Strategy Development", in Cerami, Joseph R. and Holcomb, James F. Jr. (eds.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, P.A., Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).
- Dorothy, Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian & Russian Rivalries* (London: Barrie & Rockliff The Cresset Press, 1969).
- Dutt, V. P., *India's Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1999).
- Dutta, Sujit, "China's Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia" in Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (eds.), *In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998).
- Frankel, Francine R., and Harding, Harry (ed.), *India-China relationship: Rivalry and Engagement* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004).
- Garver, John, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- Gilles, Bouuerat and Fredric, Grare (ed.), *India-China-Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2004).
- Gordon, Sandy, *India's Rise to Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and Beyond* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1995).
- Gottmann, Jean, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973).
- Gray, Colin S., *The Geopolitics of Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimland and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane Russak, 1977).
- Hamid, S. Sahid, *Karakoram Hunza: The Land of Just Enough* (Karachi: Ma'aref Ltd., 1979).

- Harshe, Rajen and Seethi, K. M., *Engaging with the World: Critical Reflections on India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005).
- Hassnain, F. M., *Gilgit: The Northern Gate of India* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1978).
- Herz, John H., *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1959).
- Jackson, Robert, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New York: Praeger, 1975).
- Jain, J. P., *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974).
- Jervis, Robert, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
- Kapur, Ashok and Jayratnam, Wilson A. (ed.), *Foreign Policies of India and Her Neighbours* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
- Kaul, T. N., *A Diplomat's Diary (1947-1999): China, India and USA, the Tantalizing Triangle* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2000).
- Kavic, Lorne J., *India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
- Kennedy, Paul (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
- Khatri, Sridhar K. (ed.), *Regional Security and South Asia* (Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuban University, 1987).
- Kohli, S. N., *A Maritime Strategy for India, Sea Power and the Indian Ocean* (New Delhi: 1978).
- Kumaraswamy, P. R. (ed.), *Security Beyond Survival: Essays for K. Subrahmanyam* (New Delhi: Sage, 2004).
- Lamb, Alastair, *Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem* (New York: Praeger, 1968).
- Lattimore, Owen, *Pivot of Asia* (New York: AMS Press, 1975).
- Luttwak, Edward N., *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).
- Mackinder, Harold J., *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Holt, 1942).

- Mansingh, Surjit (ed.), *Indian and Chinese Foreign Policies in Comparative Perspective* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1998).
- Mehrotra, L. L., *Strategy Challenge to India and Pakistan in the aftermath of Cold War* (Tiruputi: Sri Venka Keshwara University, 1996).
- Miller, Keith, *Continents in Collision: The International Karakoram Project* (London: George Philip, 1982).
- Mohan, C. Raja, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Viking, 2003).
- Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1966).
- Murray, Williamson and Grimsley, Mark, "Introduction: On Strategy", in Murray, Williamson, Knox, Macgregor and Bernstein, Alvin, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- Nolan, Janne E. (ed.), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Washington DC: The Brooking Institution, 1994).
- Owen, Bennet Jones, *Pakistan and the Karakoram Highway* (Lonely Planet, 2004).
- Pannikar, K. M., *India and the Indian Ocean* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1945).
- Patil, V. T. and Jha, Nalini Kant (ed.), *India in a Turbulent World: Perspectives in Foreign and Security Policies* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2003).
- Posen, Barry R., *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
- Raghavan, V. R., *India's Need for Strategic Balance: Security in the Post Cold War World* (New Delhi: Policy Group).
- Ramakant (ed.), *China & South Asia: South Asia Series 18* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1998).
- Ramesh, Jairam, *Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India* (New Delhi: India research Press, 2005).
- Ranganathan, C. V. and Khanna, Vinod, *India and China: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2004).

- Rashid, Ahmad, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
- Sen, Amartya, *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity* (London: Penguin, 2005).
- Singh, Swaran, *China-South Asia: Issues, Equations, Policies* (New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 2003).
- Spykman, Nicholas J., "Geography and Foreign Policy", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 32, February 1938.
- Stuart, Harris, *China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St. Martins, 1995).
- Sutter, Robert G., *China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils* (Lanham: Rowman & Lilliefield, 2005).
- Swaine, Michael and Tellis, Ashley, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (Santa Monica, C.A.: Rand, 2000).
- Syed, Anwar Hussain, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordile* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
- Tangredi, Sam J. (ed.), *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Washington D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2002).
- Vergheese, B. G., *Reorienting India: The New Geo-Politics of Asia* (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2001).
- Verma, Shanti Prasad, *Struggle For The Himalayas: A Study In Sino-Indian Relations* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1965).
- Vertzberger, Yaakov, *China's South Asian Strategy: Encirclement and Counter-Encirclement* (New York: Praeger, 1985).
- Vertzberger, Yaakov, *The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations, 1960-1980*, (Washington D.C.: Praeger, 1983).
- Waltz, Kenneth, *Theories of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).
- Whiting, Allen S., "The Future of Chinese Foreign Policy" in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

## Articles

- “1<sup>st</sup> Pak-China bus from June”, *Daily News & Analysis*, May 21, 2006, at <http://www.dnaindia.com>.
- “Afghan road security recast”, *The Telegraph*, May 04, 2006.
- “Building of roads along Sino-Indian border cleared”, *The Hindu*, June 30, 2006.
- “China visit “highly successful”: Pranab”, *The Hindu*, June 3, 2006.
- “Far Eastern Naval Command on the Anvil”, *The Hindu*, December 26, 2000.
- “Gwadar Historical Background” at <http://www.visiongwadar.com/historical.htm>, accessed on March 06, 2005.
- “India, China do not consider each other a threat: Pranab”, *The Hindu*, June 14, 2006.
- “India, China to intensify military ties”, May 29, 2006, at <http://www.india-defence.com/reports/2010>.
- “Indian Navy Concerned over China’s Expanding Reach”, *The Times of India*, May 21, 2003.
- “Indian Navy Concerned over China’s Expanding Reach”, *Times of India*, May 21, 2003.
- “Interview with General Zia-ul-Haq”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 16, 1981.
- “Navy to Build Base in Gwadar”, at <http://www.pakistanidefence.com/news/MonthlyNewsArchive/2004/May2004.htm> accessed on May 20, 2005.
- “New Delhi seeks transit facility: India-Pakistan-Afghanistan trade urged”, *The Dawn*, April 23, 2006 at <http://www.dawn.com>.
- “Pakistan Fishing village Undergoes Transformation into Mega-Port”, *The Bangladesh Observer*, September 15, 2003, <http://www.bangladeshobserver.com/news/2003/09/15/economic.htm>, accessed on March 06, 2004.
- “Pakistan, China to open four new road links”, *March 27, 2006*, at <http://www.newkerala.com/news2.php?action=fullnews&id=30848>.

- “The Skardu Highway”, *Strategic Studies*, Vol. 4, Spring, 1981, pp. 16-23.
- Acharya, Alka, “A Measured Tread to the Future”, *Seminar*, No. 487, March 2000.
- Aftab, M., “Will Gwadar be a ‘paradise’ for investors”, *Khaleej Times*, April 01, 2002, <http://www.khaleejtimes.co.ae/ktarchive/010402/finance.htm> accessed on March 08 2005.
- Ahmar, Moonis, “Communication Linkage between Central & south Asia: A Case Study of Karakoram Highway”, *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 20, Special Issue, Summer 2001.
- Ahmed Abu Taher, Salahuddin, “Sino-Indian Relations: Problems, Progress and Prospects”, *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 4, October. 1994, pp. 355-390.
- Al Rfouh, and Faisal, O., “Sino-Indian Relations: From Confrontation to Accommodation (1988-2002)”, *China Report*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2003, pp. 21-28.
- Banerjee, Dipanker, “India-China Relations”, *Asia Defence Journal*, No.8, Aug. 1997, pp.18-21.
- Bashir, Salman, “Close Neighbors, Good Friends and Partners”, *Beijing Review*, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006.
- Bedi, Rahul. “India and China Vie for Regional Supremacy”, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, Vol. 29, no. 9, September 01, 2000, pp. 37-40.
- Berlin, Donald L., “India in the Indian Ocean”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 59, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 58-89.
- Berlin, Donald L., “India-Iran Relations: A Deepening Entente”, *Asia’s Bilateral Relations Special Assessment*, June 2004 at <http://www.apcss.org>.
- Bhatt, Sheela, “The Afghan Initiative”, August 01, 2003 at <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/aug/01spec.htm>.
- Bhatty, M. A., “China and South Asia”, *Strategic Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 90-123.
- Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan, “Gwadar”, at [www.pakboi.gov.pk/News\\_Events/Gwadar.html](http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/News_Events/Gwadar.html), accessed on March 08, 2005.

- Bogert, Carol, "Letter from the Karakoram Highway", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 133, September 25, 1986.
- Brahma Chellaney, "Dragon designs", *The Hindustan Times*, June 22, 2006.
- Brands, William J., "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst Discontinuity", *China Quarterly*, No. 63, September 1975, pp. 463-489.
- Budania, Rajpal, "The Emerging International security System: Threats, Challenges and Opportunities for India", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003.
- Burns, John F., "Karakoram Highway Links Two Worlds", *International Herald Tribune*, June 2, 1986.
- C. N. Satyapalan, "The Sino-Indian Border Conflict", *Orbis*, Vol. 8, Summer 1964, pp. 374-390.
- Chaturvedi, Sanjay, "Common Security? Geopolitics, Development, South Asia and the Indian Ocean," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1998.
- Chaudhri, Ashen Mohammed, "Strategic and Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 39, No. 4, 1986.
- Chaturvedy, Rajeev Ranjan, "Interpreting China's Grand Strategy at Gwadar", Article no. 1939, February 14, 2006, at <http://www.ipcs.org>.
- Chaturvedy, Rajeev Ranjan, "Nathu La: Renewing India-China Silk Route", Article no. 2046, June 23, 2006, at <http://www.ipcs.org>.
- Chaturvedy, Rajeev Ranjan, "New Roads in Arunachal: Politics of Routes in India", Article no. 2018, May 25, 2006, at <http://www.ipcs.org>.
- Chengli, Fu, "China and India: No Threat to each Other", *Indian Defence Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Oct-Dec 2000, pp. 29-35.
- Choudhury, G. W., "China's policy Towards Pakistan", *Current History*, April 1979.
- Chunxiang, Zhang, "A New Chapter Ahead", *Beijing Review*, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006.
- Collins, Alaf, "State-induced Security Dilemma: Maintaining the Tragedy", *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2004, pp. 27-44.



- Daftari, Maryam, "Sino-Indian Relations and 'Encounters': Challenges and Opportunities in the 1990s", *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No.1, Spring 1995, pp. 156-170.
- Deshpande, G. P., "Possible Future", *Seminar*, No. 562, June 2006, pp. 51-53.
- Dueck, Colin, "Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000-2004", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2004.
- Dutta, Sujit, "India's Evolving Relations with China", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 18, No. 4, July 1995, pp. 476-502.
- Ellis, William S., "Pakistan under Pressure", *National Geographic*, May 1981.
- Faruqui, Ahmad, "Gwadar's role in Musharraf's Strategy", *Daily Times*, June 25, 2006, at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/>.
- Feller, Gordon, "Trade Routes of the Future", *Journal of Commerce*, May 26, 2003.
- Garrett, Banning, "The Need for Strategic Reassurance in the 21st century," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 31, No. 2, Mar 2001, pp. 9-15.
- Garver, John W., "Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 2, 1996, pp. 323-47.
- Garver, John W., "The China-India-US. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era", *National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis*. No. 13(5), October 2002.
- Garver, John W., "The Security Dilemma in Sino-India Relations", *India Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, October 2002, pp. 1-38.
- Garver, John, "Interpreting China's Grand Strategy", *China Brief*, Vol. 5, No. 15, July 05, 2005.
- Glaser, Charles L., "The Security Dilemma Revisited", *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997, pp. 171-201.
- Goldstein, Avery, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice", *China Quarterly*, No. 168, December 2001, pp. 835-864.
- Gottmann, Jean, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at Analysis", *World Politics*, Vol. 4, July 1952.

- Guihong, Zhang, "China's Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations", *China Report*, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 159-171.
- Gupta, Shishir, "China next door, Arunachal to get upgrade", *The Indian Express*, May 18, 2006.
- Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Problem", *Seminar*, No. 562, June 2006, pp. 12-14.
- Hagerty, Devin T. "India's Regional Security Doctrine," *Asian Survey*, April 1991, pp. 351-63.
- Haider, Ziad, "Baluchis, Beijing and Pakistan's Gwadar Port", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Winter/Spring, 2005.
- Haider, Ziad, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang's Uighurs: Politics, Trade, and Islam along the Karakoram Highway", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 522-45.
- Harrison, Selig S., "Baluch Nationalism and Super Power Rivalry", *International Security*, Vol. 5, No.3 Winter, 1980-1981, pp.
- Hartshorne, Richard, "The Functional Approach in Political Geography". *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 40, June 1950.
- Herz, John H., "Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1950, pp. 157-180.
- Herz, John H., "The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present Problems", *International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, pp. 411-416.
- Hilali, A. Z., "India's Strategic Thinking and Its National Security Policy", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 5, 2001, pp. 737-64.
- Jain, B. M., "India-China Relations: Issues & Emerging Trends", *The Round Table*, Vol. 93, No. 374, April 2004, pp. 253-269.
- Jasjit Singh, "Indian Security: A Framework for National Strategy", *Strategic Analysis*, November 1987.
- Javaid, Sheikh, "Gwadar-The Dream City of South East Asia", [www.pakeconomist.comn/database/Inv-Opp/inv-opp31.html](http://www.pakeconomist.comn/database/Inv-Opp/inv-opp31.html), accessed on March 06, 2005.
- Jervis, Robert, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 1, January 1978, pp. 167-214.

- John, Wilson, "Gwadar and the China angle", *The Pioneer*, January 08, 2006.
- Joseph, Josy, "Coming soon: roads along Chinese border", *Daily News and Analysis*, May 09, 2006 at <http://www.dnaindia.com>.
- Kanwal, Gurmeet, "China's Long March to World Power Status: strategic Challenges for India", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 22, No. 2, February 1999, pp. 1713-28.
- Kanwal, Gurmeet, "Countering China's Strategic Encirclement of India", *Indian Defence Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, July-Sept 2000.
- Khan, Jamshed Ayaz & Ali, M. Ramzan, "Sino-Pakistani Relations in a Changing World", *Beijing Review*, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006.
- Kreutzmann, Hermann, "Accessibility for High Asia: Comparative Perspectives on Northern Pakistan's Traffic Infrastructure and Linkages with its Neighbours in the Hindukush-Karakoram-Himalaya", *Journal of Mountain Science*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2004, pp. 193-210.
- Kreutzmann, Hermann, "The Karakoram Highway: The Impact of Road Construction on Mountain Societies", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1991, pp. 711-36.
- Liang Jiejun, "India's Trans-Century National Security Strategy", *Contemporary International Relations*, No. 5, 1995.
- Lijun, Zhang, "Balancing Act", *Beijing Review*, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006.
- Ma, Jiali, "Striving to Establish a Constructive and Cooperative Partnership between India and China", *China Report*, Vol. 36, No. 3, July-Sept. 2000, pp. 375-81.
- Malik, Mohan, "China's Strategy of Containing India", *PINR Report*, February 06 2006 at <http://www.pinr.com>.
- Malik, Mohan, "Delhi and Beijing Tread Warily", at <http://www.atimes.com> accessed on February 13, 2006.
- Malik, Mohan, "The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict", *Parameters*, Spring 2003, pp. 35-50.

- Mansingh, Surjit, "India-China Relations in the Post Cold War Era", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1994.
- Martin, Lionel, "Mistrust and Cooperation: Analyzing Sino-Indian Relations", *China Brief*, Vol. 4, No. 21, October 28, 2004.
- Mediros, Evan and Fravel, Taylor, "China's New Diplomacy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 6, November/December 2003, pp. 22-35.
- Miller, K. J., "The International Karakoram Project, 1980: A First Report", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.147, No.2, July 1981.
- Mitra, K. K., "China in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century-Implications for India", *USI Journal*, Vol. 126, No. 524, April-June 1996, pp. 202-209.
- Mitra, Kalyan K., "China Factor in India's Security", *Dialogue*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Jan-Mar. 2003, pp. 151-159.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "A star in the east", *The Indian Express*, November 21, 2004.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "Delhi Durbar: Indo-Pak ties and the 'China model'", *Daily Times*, April 04, 2005, at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/>.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "Delhi Durbar: Musharraf in India- the second coming", *The Daily Times*, March 14, 2005, at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/>.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "India and the Balance of Power", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "India, Iran unveil road diplomacy", *The Hindu*, January 26, 2003.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "Lost horizon", *The Indian Express*, June 19, 2005.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "Sleepy Elephant Hungry Dragon", *The Indian Express*, November 17, 2005.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "The Asian Balance of Power", *Seminar*, No. 487, March 2000.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "There's a new game in Asia", *The Indian Express*, May 31, 2005.
- Nayyar, K.K., "New World Order: An Agenda for China and India", *USI Journal*, Vol. 122, No. 510, Oct-Dec 1992, pp. 445-449.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, "Changing India", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, April 1963.

- Niazi, Tarique, "China's March on South Asia", *China Brief*, Vol. 5, No. 9, April 26, 2005.
- Niazi, Tarique, "Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean", *China Brief*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Feb 15, 2005.
- Parthasarathi, G., "In the dragon's cross hairs", *Daily News and Analysis*, June 26, 2006, at <http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1037846>, accessed on June 26, 2006.
- Parthasarathi, G., "Strategic Partner or Threat?", *The Pioneer* at <http://www.dailypioneer.com>.
- Parthasarathy, G., "Move Away From Musharraf Mania", *The Pioneer*, August 1, 2001.
- President of Pakistan's Address at the Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Gwadar Deep-Sea Port, March 22, 2002, at [http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE\\_Address/ce\\_gwadar.html](http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Address/ce_gwadar.html), accessed on March 06, 2005.
- Raghuvanshi, Vivek, "India Aims to Project Power Across Asia", *Defence News*, November 10, 2003.
- Raghuvanshi, Vivek, "India's New Naval Ambitions", *Defence News*, June 7, 2004.
- Raja, Muhammad Iftikhar, "Karakoram Highway- The Friendship Bridge Across the Himalaya", *Beijing Review*, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006.
- Ramachandran, Sudha "China's Pearl in Pakistan's Water", [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/GC04Df06.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC04Df06.html), accessed on March 8, 2005.
- Raman, B., "Chinese Activities in Balochistan", *Indian Strategic Review*, at <http://members.tripod.com/israindia/isr/june20/china.html> accessed on March 08, 2005.
- Ranganathan, C. V., "India China Relations: Problems and Perspectives", *World affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 2, April-June 1998, pp. 104-21.
- Ranganathan, C. V., "India in China's Foreign Policy", *Seminar*, No. 562, June 2006, pp. 15-20.

- Ruisheng, Cheng, "Transforming Historical Sino-Indian Relations", *World Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Oct-Dec. 2001, pp. 18-26.
- Ruixiang, Zheng, "A Friendship That Spans Generations", *Beijing Review*, Special Issue (Sino-Pakistan Ties- 55 Years), Vol. 49, No. 23, June 08, 2006.
- Sahgal, Arun, "China's Search for Power and Its Impact on India", *Korean Journal of Defence Analysis*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp.155-182.
- Seymour, Topping, "Opening of the High Road to China", *New York Times Magazine*, December 1979.
- Sharma, Rajeev, "Nod to road network along China border", *The Tribune*, June 30, 2006.
- Sherwani, Latif Ahmed, "Review of Sino-Pakistani Relations (1981-1985)", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 39, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 1986, pp. 92-106.
- Singh, Jasjit, "No Pak Claim to Siachin", *The Times of India*, May 19, 1988.
- Singh, Swaran, "The China Connection", *Seminar*, No. 517, September 2002, pp. 52-55.
- Sinha, Satyabrat, "The Strategic Triangle: India-China-Pakistan", *China Report*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2004, pp. 221-225.
- Subrahmanyam, K., "Hidden strings and free lunches", *The Indian Express*, May 18, 2005.
- Subramanian, Nirupama, "Musharraf hails China's SAARC status", *The Hindu*, June 16, 2006.
- Suryanarayana, P. S., "Encouraging response to defence diplomacy: Pranab", *The Hindu*, June 5, 2006.
- Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "China's Objective in South Asia: "Anti Hegemony" vs. "Collective Security"", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 10, October 1978, pp. 996-1012.
- Tanham, George, "Indian Strategic Culture," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1992, pp. 129-42.
- Tikku, Aloke, "Better roads along China", *The Hindustan Times*, June 29, 2006.
- Vatikiotis, Michael, "China, India and the land between", at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC04Ad01.html>.

- Vertzberger, Yaakov, "China's Diplomacy and Strategy towards South Asia: From Benign Neglect to prominence", *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8, June 1986, pp. 100-141.
- Vertzberger, Yaakov, "The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations: Trade and Aid 1963- 1982", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 1983, pp. 637-652.
- W. Kirk, "The Inner Asian Frontier of Asia", *Transactions and Papers*, (Institute of British Geographers), No. 31, December 1962, pp. 131-168.
- Walsh, Declan, "US uneasy as Beijing develops a strategic string of pearls", *The Guardian*, November 10, 2005, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,7369,1638845,00.html> accessed on November 14, 2005.
- Weigend, Guido G., "Some Elements in the Study of Port Geography", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2, April 1958, pp. 185-200.
- Xuetang, Guo, "Collective Security Vs. Balance of Power – Evolution of International Political System", *China Social Science*, Vol. 2, 2002.

## Websites

<http://meaindia.nic.in>

<http://mod.nic.in>

<http://www.apcss.org>

<http://www.atimes.com>

<http://www.balochistan.org/>

<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/home/index.html>

<http://www.dailytimes.co..pk/>

<http://www.dawn.com/>

<http://www.english.people.com.cn>

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn>

<http://www.gwadarnews.com>

<http://www.nbr.org>

<http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/English>

<http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/>

<http://www.visiongwadar.com/>

