POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN CHAD
(1994 – 2002)

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled **"POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN CHAD (1994-2002)"**, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** is my original work and has not been previously submitted for the award of any other degree of this or any other university.

(Manoj Kumar)

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated
To
Amma & Babu Ji

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(Manoj Kumar)

PREFACE

The third quarter of the 20th century witnessed tremendous social, economic and political upheaval in Chad which has resulted in one of the political, ethnic and religious upsurge in Chad from which Chad is yet to come out successfully. One of the most interesting features of the African political history of the 20th century has been a phenomenon of social, political and ethnic conflict and Chad has been no exception from this. Most of the African countries became independent around 20th century from its various colonial masters with no proper and cohesive integration of its various social and ethnic groups and Chad has been a classic example of this.

In the case of Chad this process got much more complicated due to several factors behind it Some of the chief factors which needs to be mention here are: The social and ethnic composition of Chad has been such that the northern part of the country has a lot of Arabic influence in the social and cultural composition of the people of northern Chad which has happened because of a long drawn historical process as such Islam has played a dominant role in this area. The social and ethnic composition of southern Chad has been exactly opposite of that of northern Chad where Tribalism and Christianity has played a important role in shaping its political history Christianity became a dominant force

in this region after Chad became a colony of France. This resultant difference between the two regions of Chad has been the root cause of its political problem as well as its political instability in Chad. Secondly the situation got further aggravated due to the interference of the neighbors of Chad in its domestic problems which as been a main cause of the long drawn civil war in Chad. Due to its close linkages with France its former colonial master France has been playing a lead role in its domestic politics, which has complicated the situation all the more. This study is an attempt to look into all this factors as well as its causes and try to find out as to whether they can be any solution to overcome this problem.

The main objectivity of the study is to trace and analyze the role and impact of the French Colonial policy on the political instability in Chad and find out its implication on the domestic politics of Chad. The study shall also try to elucidate the ethno- religious diversity in Chad and its implication in the political and social instability in Chad. It shall also try to understand the nature and progress of the process of democratization and the magnitude of military involvement in Chad and try to find the dimensions and the extent of external involvement on the political instability and the spectrum of internal responses in Chad towards it. Finally the study shall try to locate the impact of political instability on the socio-economic development of the country.

If one has to hypothesize the causes of political problems in Chad one can find out that the causes of post-colonial political instability in Chad is traced out in the legacy of the French colonial policy. Politicization of the social structure of the Chadian society has been a significant cause of political instability in Chad. Again the external players have sustained and promoted the political instability in Chad. Slow and dismal socio-economic development is also a contributing factor to the recurring political instability in France. Aggressive and ambitious power grabbing tactics by different factions have hindered the democratization process and political participation thereby slowly promoting political instability.

The whole study will be divided into five chapters. The introductory chapter would try to outline the geographical and the social composition of Chad and find out its linkages with the political instability in Chad. The second chapter shall look into the history of political instability in Chad and try to identify the roots of the problems leading to political instability in the pre- independence period. In the third chapter the internal and external dynamics of the political instability would be looked into the role of the different domestic and external players would be explained including different domestic factions the military intervention of France and neighboring countries etc in its political instability in

Chad. The fourth chapter would look into the socio- economic impact of political instability in Chad and would make an effort to look into the impact of it in the domestic politics of Chad. In the concluding chapter the whole work will be summarized and the relevant suggestions would be made together with the relevant remedial measures to rectify the problems on a long-term basis.

The study is based on both analytical and descriptive approach. Qualitative as well as quantitative methods of data analysis have been adopted to look into it in greater details. Both primary and secondary sources have been used in this study. An effort has been made to get most of the primary sources available, reports of different government and international agencies have been used. Besides secondary sources like books, articles, research papers and information available from the internet has been used extensively in this study.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	--	African National Congress
CDR	--	Conseil Democratic Revolutionnaire
CFA	--	African Financial Community (franc zone)
ECA	--	(UN) Economic Commission for Africa
EDF	--	European Development Fund
EEC	--	European Economic Community
FAN	--	Forces armees du nord
FAP	--	Forces armees populaires
FAT	--	Forces Armies Tchadiennes
FROLINATE	--	Front de Libration National du Tchad
GUNT	--	Gouberment d' union nationalle de transition
IMF	--	International Monetary Fund
INSAH	--	Sahel Institute
INSEE	--	National Institute of Economic and Statistical Studies
OAU	--	Organization of African Unity
OECD	--	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPT	--	Party Progressiste Tchadian
PRB	--	Population Reference Bureau
SMC	--	Supreme Military Council
UDT	--	Union Democratique Tchadien

CONTENTS

Chapter I

Introduction

TCHAD

LIBYE
(Libya)

NIGER

T I B E S T I

Emi Koussi
3 415

Faya

B O D E L E

E N N E D I

Biltine

L. Tchad
Mao
Bol

Ati

Abéché

SOUDAN
(Sudan)

Mongo

N'Djamena

NIGERIA

Chari

Bongor

Am Timan

Laï
Laï

Sahr

Moundou
Doba

CAMEROUN
(Cameroon)

CENTRAFRIQUE
(Cent. Afr. Rep.)

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION

"As it enters its third decade of independence, Africa faces a troubled future. Its troubles are directly related to the growing pains associated with attempts to establish polities, economies, and societies under a second and third generation of leadership... The third decade is a time for diplomacy, with all the art and skill that the calling can carry."

---- *I. William Zartman*

Political instability in Chad is the result of a combination of events that leads to social and political discontent. Among those factors, the political behaviour of the government plays a pivotal role. Very often, discontent is spurred by government decisions against political freedom. As a matter of fact, between 1994 and 2002, political tensions were highly correlated with more repressive political decisions in the countries under study. However, a reverse causation is also plausible if governments themselves decide to harden their policies in response to political dispute.

Preventing conflicts is becoming a widespread objective in Africa as recent international evidence show an increase of crime and violence in developing countries and negative spillovers for neighboring economies are highlighted. Preventing conflict requires a good knowledge of the interaction between the economic sphere and the political one, as well as the dynamic of political decisions. It implies access to indicators that are informative about the risks of running into conflicts and that allow a

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close monitoring of fragile/unstable countries.[1] DAC (Development Assistance Committee) relates those risk indicators to the following aspects:

- Loss of political space for opposition, civil society and media
- Social, economic and political exclusion
- Unemployment, especially among youth
- Impoverishment
- Increasing inequalities
- Human rights violations
- Increasing insecurities
- Migratory flows.[2]

Those indicators allow us to investigate on a quarterly basis the dynamic of political institutions, their adaptation to social and political unrest and the resulting impact on economic performance for African countries over a nine-year period, from (1994 – 2002).[3]

Political instability: based on occurrence of strikes, demonstrations, violence and coup d'Etat. An index of the softening of the political regime derived from information on releases of political prisoners, measures in favour of human rights, decisions promoting democracy, lifting of bans on demonstrations and public debates. A measure of hardening of the political regime based on incarcerations of opponents, measures threatening democracy such as dissolution of political parties, violence perpetuated by police and banning of

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[1] William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States, Reconstructing the State of Chad* (London Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp.15-17.

[2] Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Celine Kauffmann, "Political instability, political regimes and economic performance in African countries" http://www.case.ox.ac.uk /conference, 11 March 2002.

[3] Ibid, p. 3.

demonstrations or public debates. The traditional approach is also partial as it mainly considers causality of political factors on economic performance, more rarely the reverse and even more rarely the correlation between institutional variables.[4]

This dissertation deals with the dynamics of political responses to political instability as well as their consequences for economic growth. We use causality tests to investigate the relationship between instability and the softening / hardening of the regime. Most empirical papers on political environment and economic performance rely on annual and aggregated data as a result of the constraint on macro-economic data. However, in this dissertation the data set allows us to follow the countries on a quarterly basis. It also provides us with more detailed information on political institutions.[5]

There is almost a consensus concerning the impact of political instability on growth, although the concept of instability itself is rather ambiguous. It covers both legal changes of heads of state and governments and violent take-over. Whereas the first one refers to political changeover, the second one is more appropriately related to instability and has a broadly acknowledged negative impact on economic growth. The second concept includes elite instability, as defined by Fosu (1992), as well as less dramatic events linked to social unrest (demonstrations, political violence).[6]

The negative correlation between political instability and growth can be explained through impaired production factors accumulation and

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[4]   Ibid, p. 4.
[5]   John Collier, *Historical Setting in Chad: A Country study* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 4-5.
[6]   Ibid, p. 6.

efficiency, as underlined by Fosu (1992) and Dixit as well as Pindick (1994). Instability prevents political institutions from ensuring property rights, which in turn increases the probability that returns on investment, are expropriated. As a result of higher risk, less investment is undertaken. Fosu (1992) shows that the same applies to human capital accumulation, as political instability might cause brain drain. In extreme cases of instability like revolutions or coups d'état, Fosu (1992) argues that breaks in the production process might occur, reducing directly the level of GDP.[7]

Moreover, the impact on production-factor accumulation can also be accompanied by a negative influence on their productivity. Indeed, the effect of investment and human capital accumulation on growth performance is likely to depend on the institutional context as efficiency of production factors is certainly improved in a stable environment. Another channel through which political instability affects economic performance relates to political economy and consists in the reduction of time horizon that politicians might suffer when instability is high. In a context of high instability, politicians tend to avoid structural reforms and lead wait-and-see policies instead in order to limit disagreement with the population and the other political parties. A government can also choose to pursue the same economic policy in spite of all the evidence, in order to defeat its opponents.[8]

Such schemes have been developed in the political economic literature by Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), Ozler and Tabellini (1991). Following the same perspective, Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1996) consider that short-

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[7] Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Celine Kauffmann, n. 2.

[8] Ibid, p. 9.

term perspectives are not likely to help policy makers keep their commitments, while Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) as well as Terrones (1990) underline that a government threatened by instability may be tempted to use corruption to ensure the loyalty of the bodies that might help it to remain in power like the police, the army and the administration.[9]

Despite the diversity of the datasets as well as the methodologies used, the empirical studies suggest a significant negative correlation between political instability and economic growth.

Guillaumont and Brun (1999) goes even further, showing that political instability combined with trade instability are the main factors behind the poor economic performance and growth of the African countries.[10]

Towards the end of the first millennium A.D, the formation of states began across central Chad in the Sahelian zone between the desert and the Savanna. For almost the next 1,000 years, these states and their relationship with each other and their effects on the people who lived in "stateless" societies along their peripheries dominated Chad's political history. Most states began as kingdoms, in which the king was considered divine and endowed with temporal and spiritual powers. All the states were militaristic (or they did not survive long), but none was able to expand far into southern Chad, where forests and the Tsetse Fly complicated the use of cavalry. Control over the trans-Saharan trade routes that passed through the region formed the economic basis of these kingdoms. Although many states rose and fell, the most important

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[9]   Ibid, p, 11.
[10]   Ibid, p. 13.

Population Pyramid Summary for Chad

Chad: 2000

MALE — FEMALE

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.

Chad: 2025

MALE — FEMALE

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.

and durable of the empires were "Kanem-Borno", "Bagirmi" and "Wadai," according to most written sources by Arab traders and travelers.[11]

The territory now known as Chad possesses some of the richest archeological sites in Africa. During the seventh millennium B.C., the northern half of Chad was part of a broad expanse of land, stretching from the Indus Rivers in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, in which ecological conditions favoured early human settlement. Rock art of the "Round Head" style, found in the Ennedi region, has been dated before the seventh millennium B.C. and, because of the tools with which the rocks were carved and the scenes they depict may represent the oldest evidence in the Sahara of Neolithic industries. Many of the Ennedi date back further than any of those of the Nile Valley to the east. In the Prehistoric period, Chad was much better than it is today, as in rock paintings in the "Tibesti and Borkou" regions. The origins of Chad's people, however, remain unclear.[12]

The Republic of Chad is the Northern most of the states, which emerged from the French Equatorial Africa in 1960. In terms of size, it is the largest of them with an area of 1,284,000 sq km (495,800 sq. miles) and a population of about 3.8 million at mid 2002.[13] It is a land locked country bordered in the north by Libya, in the east by Sudan, in the south by the Central African Republic, in the south - west by Niger. Thus Chad shares borders with six African states.[14] The fifth largest country in Africa, two and a half times the size of France has long suffered from

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[11] "An Era of Empires, A.D.900-1900 " http://www.countrystudies.com

[12] Ibid.

[13] S. C. Saxena, *Political Conflicts and Power in Africa, CHAD: Victim of Interventions* (Delhi: UDH Publishers, 1985), p. 267.

[14] Ibid, p. 268.

severe political, economic and geographic ills, making it one of the unstable countries on the continent.[15]

Chad is one of the poorest and the least developed countries of Africa, nay of the world, as a result of the combination of many factors such as its geographical isolation, rough character of the territory, and its long distance from the seacoast. Crop—farming and nomadic cattle - raising is major occupations of the people of the territory; they account for most of the domestic products of the country. There is considerable scope for development and expansion in the industrial and commercial sectors because the country is quite rich in mineral resources.[16]

In the late 1980s, demographic data for Chad were very incomplete. One of the most important demographic techniques is projection from one set of data to anticipate the evolution of the population, but the lack of a national census in Chad has made applying such a technique difficult. In Chad, domestic conflict, foreign military occupation of parts of its territory, and serious famines, from 1968 through 1973 and in the early 1980s have disrupted the regular change of the population. In 1988 most population estimates continued to be based on projections from partial studies made in 1964 and 1968 by the National Institute of Economic and Statistical Studies (INSEE), in France and by the Chadian government.[17]

These survey data, projected forward were the major reference sources for the Chadian government and for many international agencies and foreign governments. Two organizations, the Sahel Institute (INSAH),

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[15] Mario J. Azevedo, *Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad, Environment and Society* (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1978), p. 2.

[16] Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Celine Kauffmann, n. 2.

[17] "The Population of Chad" http://www.countrystudies.com

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and the Population Reference Bureau (PRB), gave different figures for Chad's population in 1985. The first organization estimated the population at almost 5 million; the second, at 5.2 million. In the late 1980s, cognizant of the need for demographic data for planning, the Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa began planning the first nation census for 1989. Population change is the sum of two sets of subtractions. First there are additions through births. In mid-1987 the Population Reference Bureau (PRB) estimated Chad's birthrate at 43 live births per 1,000 inhabitants annually. The same organization suggested that, on average, Chadian women gave birth to 5.9 children over their reproductive years, a slightly lower number than the 6.3 average for the African women as a whole.[18]

Second, there are additions through immigration. Although ethnic, political, and economic ties connect most states, such links probably have not brought a large number of permanent immigrants. By the late 1980s, Chadians who had fled the civil strife in the southern and central parts of the country during the late 1970s and early 1980s apparently had returned in large numbers. Overall immigration probably has not exceeded emigration. In the mid 1980s the Population Reference Bureau (PRB), estimated Chad's mortality rate at 23 deaths annually per 1000 inhabitants. One of the highest mortality rates in the world. The Population Reference Bureau (PRB) estimated that 44% of the population was younger than 15 in 1987. Only 2% of the population was older than 64. This ratio was not the highest in Africa the level of dependency was difficult for Chadian society to bear, in part because poor health and

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[18] Ibid.

inadequate nutrition already took such a high toll among the working population, and because mechanization had not raised productivity.[19]

In terms of the sex structure of the population, the 1964 Sahel Institute (INSAH), survey calculated that there were 90 males for every 100 females; in urban centers, the male percentage of the population rose slightly, to 96 for every 100 women. A small part of this imbalance may be attributed to higher male mortality rates, but male labour migration is probably a much important factor. The absence of a census or more recent demographic surveys made it impossible to determine if the Chadian civil war had affected the sex ratio.[20]

Chad experiences two major seasons, the rainy, from June to October making the south almost impassable by vehicle for most of the period, and the dry season, from November to May, which makes the north and the center of the country a barren arid zone. Geographers have divided the country into three major climatic zones-the Saharan characterized by an annual rainfall of fewer than 200mm of rain; the Sahelian zone, with rainfall ranging between 250 to 500mm annually; and the humid tropical zone, located in the third tier of the country, which experiences an annual rainfall of between 500 and 1200mm.[21] The country's great geographic differences account for the sharp economic disparities and the meager natural resources of most of its regions. In the true desert area, practically nothing is grown, except a few dates and some grain in the few oases, and the population is sparse, consisting mostly of nomads who herd sheep, goats and camel. This accounts for the fact that 90 percent of Chad's population lives in this tenth portion of the country, roughly the area below N' Djamena, the capital, with major demographic centers in the Mayo-Kebbi and Chari- Bagirmi prefectures.

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Celine Kauffmann, n. 2.

Two major export commodities are grown here, namely cotton and rice, while millet, sorghum, corn, and cassava fulfill local consumption needs. The country has the potential to do better than many other African countries, as long as the tsetse-free central plains continue to provide pasture for an increased number of cattle and the south under takes major agricultural enterprises.[22]

The relief is relatively simple. From 240m in the Lake Chad depression in the Lake Chad depression in the south- west, the land rises northwards through the Guera Massif at 1,800m to the mountainous Saharan region of Tibesti at 3,350m.Eastwards heights of 1,500m are attained in the Ouaddai Massif. In the south the watershed area between the Chari and Congo rivers is of subdued relief and only slight elevation. The only rivers of importance, both for irrigation and seasonal navigation, are the Chari and Logone, which traverse the south-west of country and join at N'Djamena, before flowing into Lake Chad. Extending across more than 16 of latitude, Chad has three well-defined zones of climate, natural vegetation and associated economic activity. The seventh largest Lake in the world and fourth largest in Africa.[23]

The variety and number of languages spoken in Chad related to the country's diversity of social structures. The colonial administration and independent government have attempted to improve a "national" society on the citizenry, but for most Chadians the local or regional society remains the most important reference point outside the immediate family. The diversity of social structure has several dimensions. Chadian social structures also differ in the way they locate people in their physical environment. Despite a sense of territory, even

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[22] Ibid, pp. 5 –6.

[23] David Hilling, *Chad, Africa south of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications, 2004), p. 218.

among such highly mobile people as the Toubou and Daza, the bond between an individual clan and its land is less specific than the link between the inhabitants of a densely settled farming village and its fields.[24]

Diverse social structures foster variety in the relationships among members of a group and between people and their territory. These three diversities scale, relationships with the environment, and social links among group members are highly conditioned by the environment and the way the society exploits it. Accordingly, the three major patterns of social structure correspond closely with the three major geographical regions of the country.[25]

The increasing politicization of Chad's population in the period 1946-1962 was complicated by the awareness of fundamental regional, religious, and ethnic differences. "Rene Lemarchand" argues that in the case of Chad it has been the perception of ethnic or regional persecution that has led to ethno-regional political units.[26]

He contends that religious and social persecution, first by the predominately Islamic states of Bornu, Baguirni and Oueddei, and later economic and political discrimination by the French, tended to coalesce a Sara ideology transcending any tribal differences.[27]

The people of Chad speak more than 110 different languages and divide themselves into 200 ethnic groups. It is important to note, how ever, that language and ethnicity are not the same. Moreover, neither

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[24] "Social Structure in Chad" http://www.socialstructure.com

[25] Ibid.

[26] Michael P. Kelly, *A State in Disarray: Conditions of Chad's Survival* (London: West view Press, 1986), p. 3.

[27] Ibid, p. 4.

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element can be tied to a particular physical type. The commonly held image that Africa is populated by discrete ethnic groups (or "tribes") who live isolated from each other, guarding their languages and customs jealously and intermarrying only with each other, is a stereotype that hinders understanding of the dynamics of African societies. The Chadian government has avoided official recognition of ethnicity. With the exception of a few surveys conducted shortly after independence, little data were available on this important aspect of Chadian society. Ethnic identity was a significant component of life in Chad.[28]

There are some societies in Chad that are classified as separate ethnic groups but that do not have a language of their own and communicate in the language of the dominate or conquering society in which they find themselves living. Chadian languages as Afro-Asiatic, which, with the exception of Hausa, have Sudano–Mediteranean roots, and are spoken between Niger the Wadai plateau; and Nilo-Saharan prevalent along the Niger River from Jenne to Gaya, with the major subgroups comprising Zaghawa, Teda, Daza and Kanembu-Kanuni. Other linguistics, however classify Chad's languages as Sudanic including Sara, Tpuri Banana Moundary, Bagirmi Youlba, and Runga; Nilotic ,comprising Wadai, Kodoi, Malange, Madaba ,Debba, Abissa, Dekker Diema, Massalit, lisi, Bulala, Kuka Midogo, Abusemeu, Mubi, Karbo, Messmedje, Kenga Babalia, Diongor, Saba, Yalna, Tunjur and Torom; Arabic, which includes Hassavna and Dioehina Arabic; and Saharan , made up of Kanembu and Turubu etc.[29]

This list still does not do justice to various other languages spoken in Chad, but there is not much one can do to this stage of our knowledge

[28] "Languages and Ethnic Groups in Chad"
http://www.languagesandethnicgroups.com
[29] Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Celine Kauffmann, n. 2.

of the region's idioms. The Sara, the largest group in Chad is a patrilineal, polygynous society located in the southwest, especially in the Moyen-Chari, Logone Oriental, and parts of the Tandjile prefectures, and account for about one-third of the country's population. The Sara are agriculturalists, the backbone of the Chadian economy. They live in the most productive part of the country. The total Christian population in the country is estimated at less than 20 percent, while some authors even claim that only 7 percent of the entire population of Chad is truly Christian.[30] Estimates made in 1962 suggested that 35 percent of Chadian practiced classical African religions, 55 percent were Muslim. Three religious traditions coexist in Chad—classical African religions, Islam, and Christianity. None is monolithic. The first tradition includes a variety of ancestor and place-oriented religions whose expression is highly specific. Islam, although characterized by an orthodox set of beliefs and observances, also is expressed in diverse ways. Christianity arrived in Chad much more recently with the arrival of Europeans. Its followers are divided into Roman Catholics and Protestants; as with Chadian Islam, Chadian Christianity retains aspects of Pre-Christian religious belief.[31]

The establishment of Protestant Mission in southern Chad in the 1920, followed by Roman Catholic and colonial state establishment in later decades marked the beginning of western education in Chad. From the outset the colonial administration required that all instruction be in French, with the exception of religion classes which could be taught in local languages as early as 1925, the state imposed a standard curriculum on all institution wishing official recognition and government subsidies. The state thus extended in influence to education, even

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[30] S. C. Saxena, n. 13, pp. 10-11.
[31] "Religion in Chad" http://www.chadreligion.com

though the majority of Chadian students attended private mission school before World War-II. Education in Chad has focused on primary instruction. Until 1942 students who desired a secular secondary education had to go to school in Brazzaville, the capital of the AEF.[32]

At independence in 1960, the government establishment a goal of universal primary education, and school attendance was made compulsory till age twelve. Nevertheless, the development of standard curricula was hampered by the limited number of schools, the existence of two– and three- year establishments' analog side the standard five- and seven- year colleges and lycees, and the Muslim preference for quranic education. Even so, by the mid-1960s 17 percent of students between the ages of six and eight were in school. This number represented a substantial increase over the 8 percent attending school in the mid-1950s and the 1.4 percent immediately after World War-II. Although the academic year in Chad parallels the French schedule, running from October to June, it is not particularly appropriate for a country where the hottest part of year is between April and May.[33] Quranic schools throughout the Saharan and Sahelian zones teach students to read Arabic and recite Quranic verse. Although traditional Islamic education at the secondary level has existed since the nineteenth century, students seeking advanced learning generally have studied in northern Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, or the Middle East. In Chad modern Islamic secondary schools have included the Ecole Mohmad Illech, founded in 1918 and modeled after Egyptian educational institutions. Numerous observers believed that although the creation of a French-Islamic Program of study was commendable, the administration's major

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[32] Ibid.

[33] "Education in Chad" http://www.chadeducation.com

objective was to counter foreign Islamic influence rather than to offer a viable alternative curriculam.[34]

Dispite the government's efforts, overall educational levels remained low at the end of the first decade of independence. In 1971 about 88 percent of man and 99 percent of woman older than the age of fifteen could not read, write, or speak French, at that time the only official language; literacy in Arabic stood at 7.8 percent. In 1982 the overall literacy rate stood at about 15 percent. Major problem, which have hindered the development of Chadian education since independence, is the lack of funds. Financing has been very limited. Public expenditures for education amounted to only 14 percent of the National Budget in 1963. Expenditures increased over the next several years but declined at the end of the decade. [35] In the 1970s and 1980, Chad made considerable progress in dealing with problem of facilities and personal. To improve instruction, review sessions and refresher programs have been instituted for primary school teachers. On the secondary level, increasing number of Chadians has taken their places in the ranks of the faculty. Furthermore, during the 1971-72 school Year, the Universite Du' Tchad opened its doors.[36]

Another problem at independence was that the French curricula of Chadian schools limited their effectiveness. Primary instruction was in French, although most students did not speak that language when they entered school, and the teaching methods and materials were often poorly suited to the rural settings of most schools. In addition, the academic program inherited from the French did not prepare students for employment options in Chad. Beginning in the late 1960s, the

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[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.

government attempted to address these problems. A number of model schools discarded the French-style of a formal, classical education in favour of a new approach that taught children to reinterpret and modify their social and economic environment. Rather than teaching French as it was taught in French Schools to French children, the model schools taught it more appropriately as a foreign language. These new schools also introduced basic skills courses in the fourth year of primary school. Students who would probably not go on to secondary school were given the chance to attend agricultural training centers.[37]

Unfortunately, all of the preceding problems were complicated by a difficulty: the Chadian Civil War, which resulted in a lot of political instability in the country. Little has been written specifically about how this conflict together with the resultant political instability has disrupted education, but several effects can reasonably be summarized. Lack of security in vast parts of the country undoubtedly has made it difficult to send teachers to their posts and to maintain them there, which has been particularly problematic because as government employees, teachers often have been identified with government policies. In additions, the mobility occasioned by the war together with the political turmoil has played havoc with attempts to get children to attend classes regularly. The diversion of resources to the conflict has prevented the government from maintaining the expenditure levels found at independence, much less augmenting available funds. Finally, the violence and political instability has taken its toll among teachers, students, and facilities. One of the more dramatic instances of this was the destruction and looting of primary schools, lycees, and even the national archives attached to the

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[37] Ibid.

Universite Du' Tchad during the battles of N'Djamena in 1979 and 1980.[38]

To its effect the government has made efforts to overcome these problems. In 1983 the Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction reported that the opening of the 1982-83 school years was the most successful since the upheavals of 1979. In 1984 the Universite Du' Tchad, the Ecole Nationale D' Administration, and the Ecole National des Travaux Publics reopened their doors as well. In late 1980s, the Ministry of Education had administrative responsibility for all formal schooling. Because of years of civil strife and political instability, however, local communities had assumed many of the ministry's functions, including the construction and maintenance of schools, and payment of teachers' salaries. In the late 1980s, primary education in Chad consisted of a six-year programme leading to an elementary school certificate. In the south, most students began their studies at the age of six; in the north, they tended to be somewhat older. With the curriculam adhered to the French model. Courses included reading, writing, spelling, grammar, mathematics, history, geography, science, and drawing.[39]

Education is officially compulsory for six years between six and 12 years of age. Primary education begins at the age of six and lasts for six years. Secondary education, from the of 12, lasts for a further seven years, comprising a first cycle of four years and a second cycle of three years. In 2000/01 primary enrolments included 58% of children in the relevant age group. The rate of secondary enrolment in 1999/2000 included only 8% of the appropriate age- group. The Universite Du' Tchad was opened at N'Djamena in 1971. In addition, there are several

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

technical colleges. Some 5,901 students were enrolled at higher education institutions in 1999. Total central government expenditure on education in 1996 was 32,196m.[40]

Chad is a country, which is situated in the western part of sub - Saharan Africa. It was a French colony. It got independence in 1960. An election had taken place in 1959 for the post of prime minister. Mr. Tombalbaye was elected as prime minister from the Party Progressiste Tchadian (PPT). Soon afterwards in 1960 France transferred the power to Tombalbaye, under this president ship. In 1963 the PPT was declared the sole legal party. Increasing discontent with the party's political monopoly, mismanagement and corruption by government officials, precipitated a serious rebellion, and focused mainly in the north, in 1965. The Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad, (FROLINATE), formed in Sudan in 1966, later assumed leadership of the revolt. In August 1968, French troops intervened in support of the government. As a result of the French military intervention, the rebellion was contained, and in 1972 the French reinforcements left Chad. Libya, which maintained a claim to sovereignty over the "Aozou strip" (it is a thin strip of land between the border of Chad and Libya) in northern Chad, continued to provide support to FROLINATE. Following a deterioration in relations between Chad and France, in 1972 Tombalbaye signed a pact of friendship with Libya, which, non-the less annexed the Aozoustrip in 1973. In April 1975 Tombalbaye was killed in a military coup, and Gen. Felix Mollum, former army chief of staff, who had been imprisoned since 1973 on conspiracy charges, assumed power.[41]

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[40] Mario J. Azevedo, n. 15, p. 239.
[41] Bernard Lanne, *Chad: Recent History, In Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications, 2004), pp. 218-219.

FROLINATE remained in opposition to the new government. Divisions subsequently emerged within FROLINATE, whose leader, Hissene Habre, and Goukouni Oueddei replaced opponent of the Libyan annexation of the Aozoustrip. Habre continued however to, lead a faction within FROLINATE. FROLINATE launched renewed offensives during 1977 and 1978, and overran large areas of territory. The government successfully sought French assistance to halt the advance of FROLINATE. In April 1979 a provisional government, Gouberment d'Union Nationalle de Transition, (GUNT) was formed by FROLINATE, the Forces Armees du Nord (FAN) the Moubement Populaire pour la Liberation du Tchad (MPLT) and the Forces Armees Tchadiennes (FAT). The leader of the MPLT Lol Mahamat Choua was appointed president, while Goukouni and Habre took ministerial portfolios. However, a committee, headed by Kamougue, which rejected the authority of the new government, was established at Moundou to govern the south. In April 1980, following renewed conflict between the Forces Armees Populaires (FAP) and Forces Armees du Nord (FAN), Habre was dismissed from the GUNT. In October 1980 Libyan forces intervened in the hostilities, resulting in the defeat of Habre and the retreat of the FAN from N'Djamena. A fifteen thousand strong Libyan contingent subsequently entered Chad. In January 1981, to French disapproval, Goukouni signed a further agreement with Libya, providing for a gradual political union of Chad and Libya. In April Libyan troops intervened in clashes between the FAP and the Conseil Democratic Revolutionnaire (CDR), one of the breakaway factions of FROLINATE, resulting in numerous casualties.[42]

In February 1982 the OAU proposed that a ceasefire be declared with elections to take place, under its supervision, before 30 June.

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[42] Ibid, pp. 219-220.

Goukouni rejected the OAU plan, which effectively comprised a political victory for the FAN, and hostilities intensified. The FAN continued to advance, capturing N'Djamena in early June. Goukouni fled the country, and the coalition of factions that constituted the GUNT began to fragment. In March 1983, in negotiations with the Libyan government, Habre rejected Libyan demands for the recognition of Chad's Islamic character and of the annexation of the "Aozoustrip" by Libya and the signing of a treaty of alliance between Chad and Libya.[43]

During early 1984 it became evident that Habre needed to regain support in the south to consolidate political power. In June Habre replaced the FROLINATE – FAN grouping with a new official party, the Union Nationalle pours Independence et la Revolution (UNIR), in which former FAN officials maintained a prominent role. In a government reshuffle in July one half of the ministerial posts were allocated to southerno. At a meeting of GUNT factions in August 1985 a Council Supreme de la Revolution, comprising seven anti - government grouping, under the leadership of Goukouni, was formed. Later that year however, several former oppositions groups declared support for the Habre regime. In February 1986 GUNT forces initiated Libyan supported attacks on government positions to the south of the 16th parallel. Forces Armees Nationals Tchadiennes (FANT) repelled the offensive, and Habre appealed to France for increased military aid. Shortly afterwards French military aircraft, operating from the Central African Republic (CAR), bombed a Libyan built airstrip northeast of Faya – Largeau. A retaliatory air strike on N'Djamena airport caused minor damages. France subsequently established an air – strike force at N' Djamena to counteract any further Libyan attack (an intervention designated 'Operation Epervier'), while the USA provided supplementary military aid to Habre's forces. FANT forces repelled further incursions across the 'line of interdiction' in March 1989.

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[43] Ibid.

A new constitution was approved by referendum on 10 December 1989, reportedly receiving the support of 99.94% of votes cast.[44]

The new constitution promulgated on 20 December 1989, confirmed Habre as president for a further seven-year term, upheld the principle of a single party state, and provided for the creation of an elected legislature, with a five-year mandate. In March 1990 Idriss Deby and his supporters, the Force Patriotiques du Salute (subsequently known as the Mouvement Patriotiques du Salute (MPS) launched an invasion of eastern Chad from bases in Sudan. On 10 November 1990 forces led by Idriss Deby invaded Chad from Sudan and launched an attack in which the governments of Libya and Sudan denied involvement, on positions held by Chadian government forces on the north - east of Abeche. Following the accession to power of the Mouvement Patriotiques du Salut (MPS), it was announced that aid and co - operation agreements between France and the Habre government would be honored, and that new accords would be formulated. On 1 March 1991 a National Charter, drafted by the executive committee of the MPS, was adopted for a thirty-month transitional period, at the end of which a constitutional referendum was to be held. The charter confirmed Deby's appointment as president, Head of state and chairman of the MPS, and required the government to institute measures to prepare for the implementation of a multiparty system. Under the terms of the charter, a new councils of ministers and a 31 member legislative Council de la Republique were to replace the provisional council of state. On 4 March Deby was formally inaugurated as president. The council of state was dissolved, and the former president of the Assemblee Nationale, Dr. Jean Bawoyeu Alingue, was appointed prime minister in a new government.[45]

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44 Ibid, pp. 220- 224.
45 Ibid. p. 225.

In May 1991 Deby announced that a national conference, scheduled for May 1992, would prepare a new constitution to provide for the introduction of a multiparty system and would be followed by legislative elections. Goukouni, who visited Chad (from Algeria) for the first time in nine years, subsequently met Deby to discuss the proposals for the introduction of a pluralist system. In October the council of ministers adopted a regulation regarding the authorization of political parties. Under the new legislation, each party was required to have a minimum of 30 founder members, three each of from 10 of Chad's 14 prefectures; the formation of parties on an ethnic or regional basis was prohibited. The national conference was finally convened in January 1993, attended by some 800 delegates representing, among others, the institution of state, trade unions, professional associations and 30 political organizations.[46]

From then to 1994 the political instability continued under no formal constitutional framework. But 1994 was an important and turning point in Chad when the new constitution was introduced and its legitimacy was established. The constitutional recommendations were to be submitted for approval at a national referendum in December, with legislative and presidential elections to be held by March 1995. The second round of presidential elections, contested by Deby and Komougue, took place on 3rd July 1996. According to official results, Deby was elected by 69.1% of votes cast. Legislative voting was again delayed, and eventually took place on 5th January and 23rd February 1997. A total of 658 candidates, representing 49 political parties, contested the 125 seats in the Assembelee Nationale. Although voting was reportedly conducted relatively peacefully, a number of opposition

[46] Keesing, *Africa Independent: A Research Report* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 221-222.

activists were arrested for disrupting the electoral process and both the MPS and opposition parties challenged preliminary results in several constituencies. Later in March, the court of appeal announced the final results, according to which the MPS secured an absolute majority, with a total of 63 seats, while the Union pour le Renouveau et la Democratie (URD) won 29 seats, the Union Nationale pour le Development et le Renouveau (UNDR) 15, and the Union pour la Democratie et la Republique (UDR) 4. From late 1988 reports emerged of a rebellion in the Tibesti region of northern Chad by the Mouvment Pour la Democratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT), led by Youssouf Togoimi, who had been dismissed as Minister of Defense in June 1997. In March 1999, amid unconfirmed reports that some 300 people had been killed or injured in Tibesti since October 1998, it was revealed that a three thousand strong elite military force had been deployed to counter the MDJT. In February 2000 the government admitted that its mediation mission to the north, led by Koibla, had proved fruitless.[47]

In July 2000 the Assembly Nationale approved proposals for the creation of a new structure for the Commission Electoral Nationale Independante (CENI), which was to plan a reorganization of constituencies in advance of presidential and legislative elections due to be held in 2001. In February 2001 it was announced that the presidential election would take place on 20 May and that election to the Assemblee Nationale, which had initially been scheduled for April 2001 were to be postponed until March 2002.[48]

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[47] William .F.S Miles, "Decolonization as Disintegration: The Disestablishment of the State in Chad", *Journal of Africa Affairs*, 1995(a), vol. XXX, pp. 42-52.

[48] Williams F.S Milles, "Tragic Tradeoffs: Democracy and Security in Chad", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1995(b), vol. 33, pp. 53-65.

Thus from the above it becomes quite clear that economic under development together with intervention by external forces have resulted not only in the political instability of the country but has also hampered in the development of the Chadian society in general .It has resulted in the lack of proper development of the educational and technical development of the country. The Colonial legacy together with the under development of the country has resulted a situation of political, social and economic chaos in the country as such if one has to analysis the root cause of the political and social turmoil of the Chadian society one cannot negate the historical factor which led to this.

Chapter II

Historicity of the Political Instability

CHAPTER – II

HISTORICITY OF THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Social and economic transformation of any country is a long drawn historical process. Emergence of any country as a modern political nation state has a direct linkage with its historical past in which the socio economic and cultural aspect of the social fabric of that country plays and important role. However, Chad is no exception to this.

Chad was complex society in the pre-colonial times, and still remains so. It was, and is still, inhabited by people with the most divergent cultures, religions, and lifestyles, life styles clashing, uncompromising to each other at times, ranging from traditionalists to Muslims, from pastoralists to agriculturalists, from cattle and camel herders to transshipment date and nut gatherers, and from politically complex to simply organized societies. Although historically violence seems to be a part of every society and state at one point or another, it is most likely that such acephalous societies as the Sara, the Moundang, and the Banana, as well as many other communities in southern Central Sudan, did not experience the degree and kind of violence associated with the emergence of the northern Islamic states and Rabah's short-lived empire that, through warfare and raid, reduced many of them to subservience.[1]

Nevertheless, some southern societies, such as the Sara Madjingaye seemed to have been in the process of becoming states just

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[1] Mario J. Azevedo, *Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad, Environment and Society* (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1978), pp.15 –19.

prior to the French arrival. There were others, in fact, that had a hierarchical, chiefly political structure where the authority, easily identifiable, exacted some tribute from the populace, regulated certain social activities, such as the yondo among the Sara, performed rituals, and determined the beginning of the planting and the harvesting seasons. In such societies, militias did exist, as was the case among the Sara. The existence of this rudimentary force certainly heightened the potential for some form of organized violence. As S.P. Reyna notes, "chiefly militias might be thought of as the first organized means of violence that, when exercised, possess 'constitutive powers. Among the Sara, the goumiers were actually a militia under a designated, experienced leader called padjal. They performed a defensive task against northern incursions and perhaps conducted raids against their neighbors in the procurement of slaves to satisfy the demands of the north and spare their own kin or clan.[2]

Among these acephalous societies, feuding was certainly a common occurrence, particularly in the settling of scores and grievances. Be that as it may, prior to the European arrival, Chad's Deep South seems to have had enough land to accommodate most of its inhabitants, a factor that seems to mitigate against any thesis postulating a state of constant conflict in the region. This changed, however, when the region turned into a "frontier zone" and a field of empires for the northern polities and became the target of French imperial and colonial designs. Ellen Brown's study (1983: 29-31) of the Sara Nar, for example, provides evidence that the arrival of the Barma as slave raiders on the banks of the Mandoul River turned Nar society upside down, fostering a relationship of "permanent hostility among the villages," that resulted in deaths and enslavement, as each village chief attempted to survive under

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[2] Ibid.

the harsh conditions brought about by the Bagirmi state and its slave raids, especially between 1859 and 1884.[3]

What complicated relationships further in Central Sudan in general and Chad in particular was the intrusion of trans-statal and trans-ethnic Islam from the east and the north. The new faith transformed demographically and economically unstratified societies into clearly delineated solidarities based on religion and slavery, reinforcing two violent pulls, Islamic and non-Islamic, free and enslaved or enslavable. Although it provided some spiritual identity and cohesion, most often it did not prevent conflict and violent hegemonic state expansion even among correligionists. Of course, one must add that such an occurrence was not unique in human history. Christianity created similar conditions in medieval as well as modern Europe. An acephalous (literally, headless) society is one that does not have a government whose normal functions include maintenance (through coercive means if needed) of law and order, administration of justice, collection of taxes or tribute, and enforcement of conscription of the young. Acephalous is often used interchangeably with the term stateless, although in French literature, francophone Chadianists have preferred to use the word anarchic. However, the problem with the French use of the word anarchy is that uninformed readers may equate statelessness with chaos and lawlessness, which was not the case in Southern Chad. Depending on size, in stateless societies, decisions are usually made by a selected group of elders or by the entire community. Acephalous societies were common in Southern Chad, while state societies were prevalent in the north.[4]

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[3] John Wright, *Libya Chad and the Central Sahara* (London: Hurst & Company, 1989), pp. 1-9.

[4] Ibid.

There is more agreement among social scientists today about what constitutes a state than there is on the origins of the state itself. Ronald Cohen defines the state as a system designed to "coordinate human efforts to carry out public policy," involving "a ruling class or, in structural terms, a governing bureaucracy." In an established state "The officeholders oversee succession to high office, collect revenues, raise militia, adjudicate disputes, allocate resources, and, as an official hierarchy, join the non-officeholders to the governing regime". In a state society, therefore, there is an individual or a group of individuals (a king, a sultan sometimes assisted by a council of elders, as in Central Sudan prior to colonization, or an oligarchy) that is clearly identifiable as responsible for making binding decisions, and that relies on a bureaucracy to carry out its mandates. Over the centuries, scholars and legal experts have attempted to explain or define violence, a feature that has been part of human history. While some claim that it is simply part of human nature or class-based aggression, others describe it as a "by-product of overcrowding" or as a "spasmodic affair," such as Nazism, analogous to a human infection. Italian psychoanalist Franco Fornari sees violence as emanating from human unconscious nature, equating "swords and spears with genital-sadistic fantasies, firearms with anal sadism, and nuclear weapons with oral sadism." This view understands violence to be aggressive behavior that results in physical and psychological suffering to living beings, especially mankind, and damage to their property and to nature in general. The means through which violence is inflicted vary from society to society and from individual to individual.[5]

Just as is the case for the concept of the state, social scientists have for centuries debated the concept of war. During the middle Ages,

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[5] Ibid.

St. Thomas Aquinas wrote volumes on the subject, making a major distinction between offensive and defensive war and the moral justifications for both. He defined war is a fight waged by a large group of people against an external group with society's explicit authorization to safeguard the common good." Aquinas noted that war differs from "a quarrel that occurs between one individual and another or among small numbers of peoples." Likewise, in his view, war differs from civil war, "waged among citizens of the same republic or city," and from a "duel, which occurs between individuals without a public contract". Brian Ferguson has recently provided a definition that excludes individual violence from the concept of war and emphasizes war's social rather than individual nature. Such a definition seems not to fall into the trap of making actual death and military activities the sine qua non of war. Therefore, "Organized, purposeful group action, directed against another group that may or may not be organized for similar action, involving the actual or potential application of lethal force." The use of violence, including war, as a means of coercion among the non-centralized, acephalous societies in Southern Chad is difficult to assess, as very little is known about the nature of the relationships that prevailed among them prior to the French conquest.[6]

This suggests that people most likely lived and co-existed in relative peace, as violence is an easily noted phenomenon and would have been reported if it had been frequent. Gayo Kogongar, for example, who studied Sara pre-colonial society, and most explorers of Chad and Central Africa say nothing that provides evidence that violence was rampant in this part of the region, except in relation to the northern states that raided annually. The probability of peaceful co-existence is also supported by recent writings of anthropologists who maintain that

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[6]   Ibid.

warfare is a phenomenon of more advanced state societies, just as it was the case of Kanem-Bornu, Bagirmi, and Wadai, vhese where violence constitutes an important part of the social transformation. The consensus seems to be that the violence engaged in by acephalous communities and ethnic groups is usually less organized, and that most often it takes the form of raids on neighbors (mainly for looting purposes) and feuds among members of the same community or family. It would appear, however, that in the south, the appearance of neighboring states that waged war and engaged in slave raids did increase the incidence and degree of violence among certain ethnic groups within Chad.[7]

Unfortunately for our purpose, the collection of data on the issue of war among these acephalous societies is only a recent phenomenon. As R. Brian Ferguson and Neil Whitehead have demonstrated in their study, "the effects of expanding states [on surrounding societies], and particularly of European colonialism, typically precede extensive descriptions of indigenous warfare, so that by far the greater part of our ethnographic information about non-state warfare is post-contact [with Europe and other societies]." The same can be said of Chad's southern acephalous societies prior to the raids of the Sahelian states and French colonialism. However, Ferguson and Whitehead's study also confirms that "very frequently the result of state impingement is to generate warfare and transform its conduct and purpose rather than to suppress" and that "indigenous warfare in proximity to an expanding state is probably related to that intrusion." From this premise one would therefore conclude that the impact of northern warfare and raids in the southern part of Chad, which the two quoted authors call "the tribal zone," increased the incidence of violence and added new causes for further conflict. In Chad, the coming of states seems to have contributed

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[7]   Ibid.

to an increase in the rate of violent incidents stemming from the simple fact that relatively more advanced means of violence and tactics of warfare were introduced. Indeed, here warfare was often preceded or followed by raids and the capture of individuals, which provides more reasons for internal and external conflict.[8]

Chad became the colony of France in 1900. One of the first things that France did in Chad was to establish law and order which was disturbed as a result of incessant warfare among various ethnic groups and between the peoples of the north and the south. However, though France ruled over Chad for over sixty years, it was not successful in establishing in the territory a strong and centralized administration as a result of which the country is suffering even today after independence. Had France provided Chad with such an administration, it 'might have alleviated center-periphery tensions and external counter-pulls, and soothed regionalist sentiments and inter-ethnic animosities'.[9]

Lack of centralized administration was also partly responsible for the absence of well balanced development of the colony with the result that sixty years of French rule failed to produce any appreciable changes in the territory. Samuel Decalo, in this connection, writes: "The contending political poles and their ethnic bases remained virtually intact: the economy-outside the south which became the center of intensive cotton cultivation-remained stagnant; ethnic animosities continued festering even as new regional disparities multiplied." [10]

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8   Ibid.

9   Samuel Decalo, "Chad: The Roots of Center-Periphery Strife", *African Affairs*, vol. 79 (317), October 1980, p 496.

10   Ibid, pp. 494 –95.

After conquering the territory with lot of difficulty France largely neglected its development. Since most of the territory is either barren or swampy and inhospitable, the best and the most efficient French officers did not accept a posting to Chad; in fact, a posting to Chad was regarded within the French colonial service as a sign of demotion and as the lowest rung for administrative personnel. Under these circumstances those officers who were posted to Chad were, by and large, mediocre. Many posts remained vacant because often even the mediocres in France were not available. Hence, 'under-staffed and with a minimal budget, Chad stagnated during much of the colonial era, its internal cleavages frozen and its artificial unity uneasily maintained by French force of arms.[11]

It was natural that in the absence of enough number of competent and efficient administrative personnel, the French had to lean heavily upon the chiefs and Sultans of the principal pre-colonial entities as 'surrogate rulers.' Samuel Decalo points out that large part of the territory and significant numbers of its population were never effectively governed or administered directly, by the central government of Chad.[12] He points out that BET had only nominally been under French rule, and the taciturn Toubbou people were also largely left alone. Many groups of the eastern wastelands continued defying the central government. Similarly, the sparsely-.populated and isolated areas of Guera Salamat were outside Fort Lamy's control. The' consequence of this state, of affairs was that the 'periphery proved to be much more resilient and powerful than the center in the resultant tug-of-war.'[13]

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] S. C. Saxena, *Political Conflicts and Power in Africa, CHAD: Victim of Interventions* (Delhi: UDH Publishers, 1985), p.270.

The civil war in Chad, at least in its initial stages, certainly had religious and ethnic dimensions. Therefore, it is necessary that we have brief look at the religious and ethnic composition of the population of the country. There are three main, but very different, ethnic groups in Chad:[14]

(a)   The first ethnic group is of the Teda and Daza people. These are black skinned natives of the Sahara: they are very sober, very tough and very independent. The Tourag, the Arabs or the Turks never conquered them. These people inhabit mostly in the desert.

(b)   The second ethnic group consists of Badawi Arabs who came originally from Arabia between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries either through the Sudan or from the north. These people occupy the western region of Chad.

(c)   The third ethnic group consists of the Negroes. Their history is one of war and conflict in which the aggressor is usually the nomad or the Arab. These people also live in the west in the direction of the major rivers.[15] These ethnic groups have had a long tradition of warfare among themselves and also with outside invaders. The Toubbous among them have had much longer experience in warfare than other groups, having fought, turn by turn with the Arabs and the French. In 1965 the Toubbous had revolted against the Fort Lamy government also.[16]

On religious ground the territory and the people, Stand divided the society in Chad into two categories – Dar al-Islam and Dar al Abid. The former means the 'Territory of Islam', that is the area traditionally ruled by Muslim rulers, while the latter means 'Territory of Slaves', that is non-

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[14]   J.F. Froelich, *Tensions in the Chad, Conflicts in Africa* (London: Adelphi papers, 1972), no. 93, p. 42.

[15]   Ibid.

[16]   Le Monde, *Weekly Section,* 6 January 1971. Fort Lamy was the former name of N'djamena, the capital of Chad, p. 43.

Muslims, and refers to the areas where the Muslims traditionally used to go for slave-trading. The northern part of Chad is a Muslim-predominant area whereas Christians and Animists inhabit the southern part. Another difference between the north and the south is that the northerners are nomadic herds-men, whereas the southerners are sedentary farmers. These two groups of people Of Chad were locked in bitter struggle for power before independence. Pan-Islamic influence is, no doubt, strong among Moslems but Pan-Arabism does not exercise an equal degree of influence upon them. It might be noted that the Chadian Arabs, by and large, do not have much solidarity with the Arabs of Libya or Sudan. This is mainly because the Moslem blacks of Chad even today regard the Arabs as their traditional enemy.[17] In spite of this, Islam had acted in the past as a rallying point whenever Muslims felt some sort of threat to their existence from the non-Moslem blacks of the south. The history of the country is full of account of incessant warfare between the Islamized kingdoms of the north and the pagan peoples of the south who, due to their superior physical qualities, were able to hold out against any threat from the north. There is an intense hatred -among the southerners for the people of the north because the latter used to use the former as a source of slave labour in the past. For the same reason the people of the north have developed some sort of superiority complex and, also contempt for the people of the south. Besides this basic cause for hatred between peoples of the north and the south, conflicts between them have been occurring intermittently on account of some minor matters also such as the grazing of the land and the use of water.[18]

European interest in Africa generally grew during the nineteenth century. By 1887 France, motivated by the search for wealth, had driven

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[17] S. C. Saxena, n. 13, p.43.
[18] Ibid, p. 44.

inland from its settlements on central Africa's west coast to claim the territory of Ubangi-Chari (present-day Central African Republic). It claimed this area as a zone of French influence, and within two years it occupied part of what is now southern Chad. In the early 1890s, French military expeditions sent to Chad encountered the forces of Rabih Fadlallah, who had been conducting slave raids in southern Chad throughout the 1890s and had sacked the settlements of Kanem- Borno, Bagirmi, and Wadai. After years of indecisive engagements, French forces finally defeated Rabih Fadlallah at the Battle of Kousseri in 1900.[19]

But, invariably, behind all such conflicts, the, underlying cause has been the mutual hatred between the northerners and southerners. Thus tensions and warfare witnessed in Chad after independence can by no means be regarded as a new development or a new phenomenon; they have always existed there between the nomadic shepherds and the farmer, and between the 'slavers' on the one hand, and the people whom they enslaved, on the other. This state of affairs lasted till the French established order when they colonized the territory in 1900. One of the major developments during the French rule in Chad was that education spread largely in the south where the elites were not only quick to learn the French language but they also showed energy and enterprise in every sphere.[20] On the other hand, the Muslims of the north shunned European education for a long time. The result was that they experienced difficulties of assimilation in a society, which, under the French rule, was strongly influenced by western civilization and culture.[21] Since the people of the south accepted western education and were also easily assimilated into the French culture, they naturally occupied important positions in

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[19] Ibid, pp. 45-46.

[20] Ibid.

[21] David Hilling, *Chad, Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications, 2004), p. 235.

the French colonial administration, while the northerners, due to lack of education, were generally excluded. Consequently, when independence came, the reins of the government were handed over to the southerners who were educated and who had held positions in the administration. For the Arabs of the north the implication was that they passed from the 'light yoke of the French to the rule of the Sara of the south'.[22]

This state of affairs was intolerable to the Arab because they did not want to be ruled by those whom once they used to purchase and sell as slaves. The Arab, therefore, refused to identify them with the Government, which was being run mostly by the Christians of the south. On the other hand, the black people of the south, on receiving the reins of the government, developed a feeling of superiority. They even thought in terms of taking revenge upon the northerners who used to sell them as slaves in the past. The Sara administrations of the south also showed no respect either for the minorities or for Islam. Even the reforms, introduced by them in the existing machinery of the government were too rapid and too brutal. This is why the Arabs rejected the reforms and refused to cooperate in their implementation.[23]

Although France ruled over Chad for nearly sixty years, it was not successful in modifying the behaviour of the traditional chiefs. During its rule the government tried to curb their activities by banning all demonstrations and expressions of tribalism and attempted to unify the country inside the colonial frontiers, yet tribal leaders continued to assert themselves now and then and became a cause headache for the government. Political opposition came mainly from the Arabs who had not been able to capture influential position in the government, since

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[22] Le Monde, n. 16, p. 44.
[23] Ibid, p. 45.

they refused to accept European education introduced by the French. In Chad, several state societies and principalities emerged between the ninth and the seventeenth centuries. Some survived until the arrival of the French during the 1890s.Others lasted a short time, most often engulfed by a stronger neighbor. Among pre-colonial Chad's best-known states were Kanem-Bornu, Bagirmi, and Wadai. All three eventually became Islamic states following the conversion of their rulers and subjects to Islam, engaged in violent slave raids, and constantly attempted to expand and control a nucleus of states or indigenous polities as vassal states or tributary communities.[24]

This resulted in socio-political conditions that led to unprecedented violence and polarization whose impact is still being felt by contemporary Chadians. Because slaving activities were often carried out in the holy name of Allah, they not only contributed to extreme zeal among the raiders but they also targeted in theory and practice the non-Muslim societies that at the time were scattered in what is now Southern Chad. Before discussing the nature of the three major pre -colonial states in Chad it is important to clarify the possible relationships between warfare and the state, between long-distance trade and state formation, and between Islam and centralized government.[25]

The French colonialism in Chad, as elsewhere in Africa, was intrinsically violent, enlisting the army, the police, and all other available means of coercion to impose control and elicit conformity.[26] As a result it created, particularly in the south, conditions of permanent violence such as once existed in pre-colonial Central Sudan. Although the south initially showed less resistance to colonial intrusion, ultimately it was the

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[24] Mario J. Azevedo, n.1, pp. 21-22.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid, pp. 65-66.

southerners who suffered most under French colonial rule. Southern traditions were essentially shattered, and a pattern of murders, assassinations, and rejection of authority developed, accompanied by unprecedented migration and lawlessness, as well as desire for heightened revenge among southerners against their northern fellow colonial subjects. Chad's enormous environmental, logistic, and military problem, the mystery is why the French ever bothered to claim the territory as theirs. To understand French motives, one must look back to the period of the scramble for Africa. Fourteen years before the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the Germans, their emperor captured, defeated the French and the possibility fighting back and winning a war against a unified Germany was remote. As problematic as France's international position, so was its domestic situation. As a result of the defeat, the French people became extremely nationalistic and revanchiste and wished to see their government do something to redress the great humiliation of 1870. As 'a frenzy for colonial territories overseas spread across most of Europe, Jules Ferry, the Premier of France (1880-1881 and 1883-1885), and other like-minded politicians began to assuage French humiliation through the acquisition of colonial territories. Additionally, many circles in Germany, Belgium, Britain, and France chorused for government to find settlement places overseas.[27]

France took desert lands, giving little consideration to the resources they would offer: Chad, Central African Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Britain, following the interests of its business community, preferred East Africa, which seemed potentially richer and more able to safeguard the strategic links with India. Overall, it appears that three main factors explain France's renewed interest in a colonial empire in Africa: nationalistic sentiments, heightened by the

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[27] Harry A.Gailey, Jr., *History of Africa from 1800 to present* (New York: lolt, Rinehart and Winston, INC, 1972), p. 258.

defeat by the Prussians in 1870; demand of the business community for raw materials and markets to feed the industrial revolution; and strategy for the military domination of North-Central Sudan.[28]

Chad is, after all, located in the very heart of Africa, allowing a link between east and west and between the Muslim north (particularly Algeria, for long the pearl of France in Africa), and Central Africa. French military strategists believed that the conquest of Chad would also assure the French access to and perhaps control of Lake Chad and its surroundings, an area that French troops would have to cross in their military campaigns in the region. In addition, especially in the aftermath of the Fashoda incident of 1898, which prevented Jean Baptiste Marchand from securing for France part of the Nile, the French were racing against time to ensure that the British and the Germans would not push them out of Central Africa. Therefore, Chad, no matter how poor, was viewed by the French as integral to their plan to exert influence in North- Central Africa. This explains why Chad became part of French Equatorial Africa along with the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Gabon, to which East Cameroon was added after World War I.[29] Once the conquest had been completed, however, the French virtually ignored the territory, making it the Cinderella of their empire. Until the 1930s, they left it to military administrators and to adventurous colonialists, many of whom were not qualified to serve in any colonial civil service.[30]

The governor general of French Equatorial Africa headquartered in Brazzaville passed his orders to the lieutenant governor and he, in turn,

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[28]   Ibid.

[29]   Mario J. Azevedo, n. 1, pp.66-67

[30]   Mario J. Azevedo, *Sara Demographic Instability as a Consequence of French Colonial policies in Chad* (1890-1940), (Dissertation, Duke University, 1975).

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supervised the various white administrators called the commandants de cercle posted throughout the colony. A commandant de cercle controlled the canton chiefs, and under him were the village chiefs. In their attempt to subjugate the territory, the French faced a greater challenge from the north than from the south because of the stronger political and military organization of the northern sultanates. Following the 1892 Casemir Maistre Mission through Northern Oubangui-Chari and Southern Chad, which secured several treaties with the Africans, including the Chiefdoms of Lai and Kello, the French found it easy to subdue such acephalous societies as the Sara, most of whom saw the newcomers as a lesser threat than their northern neighbors who had been raiding and enslaving them for centuries. Indeed, the expedition's memoirs portray the Sara as more curious to know and assist the French than to fight them. Paul Crampel, to counteract Belgian expansionism in the region, initiated his travels in 1887, and arrived in Chad the following year. Al Sanussi of Dar Kuti massacred him in 1891. Paul Brunache, who retraced, in 1890, the path followed earlier by the Crampel Mission in Southern Chad, speaks of a welcome in Southern Chad, particularly among the Sara. However, he described the Dai Sara as naturally very bellicose and of bad faith.[31] On August 15, 1899, the French army founded Fort-Archambault, now Sarh, which became the strategic entrepot and capital of the Moyen-Chari Prefecture. By 1911, they had also established permanent posts at Moissala and Bediondo, and, by 1917, Koumra had become an important administrative center. In 1890, the mbangs of Mandja-Tezze: along the Chari River, and Lai, as well as Tupuri authorities (who ended up ceding to the French the lands stretching from the Logone river to the Adamawa plateau), reluctantly 'signed' treaties with Maistre, Brunache, and other explorers putting themselves under French protection. Yet easy access to the south did not

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[31] Ibid.

mean that the people there offered no resistance to the French. At Bedaya, the French found a Sara mbangs who refused to accept their authority.[32]

The chief sent gifts but refused to respond to their summons to appear at their future headquarters at Ngodere. Ultimately the French tracked him down near a river in Mayngara. According to available sources, they killed him on March 3, 1901 along with his three bodyguards, Santa, Ngekodmoussidi, and Nguenangimbaye, an episode that many elders still remembered in 1974. To prevent a funeral that could cause a rebellion, the French cut the chief's head off, brought it to the village to exhibit it, and dumped the rest of the body into the river. His most accommodating brother replaced him. Subsequently, the French asserted their authority in the neighboring areas against several other recalcitrant Sara authorities. These, whom the village elders in 1974 were still able to name, were: Chiefs Ngakoundou Guirdi of Balimba, Djanta of Dobo, Dogourenoudji of Mouroungoulaye, and the mbangs of Ma and Mangara.[33]

Interestingly, unlike the north, the south offered more resistance to colonial policies and rule than to the actual act of colonial occupation. The reason was simple: the French applied their harsh colonial policies unevenly in Chad, particularly following the conquest of the north during the 1920, leaving most of the burden of the colonial yoke-taxation, forced labor, obligations to concessionaire companies, and military recruitment-on the shoulders of the southerners, especially the Sara.[34]

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[32] Harry A.Gailey, Jr., n. 27, pp. 68-69.

[33] John Collier, ed., *Historical Setting In Chad: A Country Study* (Washington: U.S. Government printing office, 1990), pp. 4-8.

[34] Ibid, p.11.

The conquest of the north, which cost the French an unusual number of casualties, could not have been successful had they not first defeated Rabah Fadlallah. By 1890, Rabah had become the most powerful person in Central Africa, "Emir of the Faithful," as he called himself after settling at Dikwa. He was so feared by the French that, to eliminate his presence in the region, they assembled three expeditionary forces. Commander Francois Lamy and Fourreau left Algiers accompanied by their Algerian troops, while Captains Voullet and Chanoine departed from Niger, the latter two committing many atrocities as they travelled along the route east of Niger. Leading the third force was Commander Emile Gentil, who departed from the Moyen Congo in 1897, and sailed up the Chari River on the steamboat Leon-Blot onto Lake Chad in pursuit of Rabah's forces. The behavior of the two French officers, Voullet and Chanoine, and the entire Rabah "mission" itself underscore vividly the theme of violence in French colonial history. Sometimes, however, the French government did attempt to control the conduct of its citizens abroad. Upon hearing rumors of the atrocities of the officers in the Niger column, for example, France sent Colonel Klobb from Timbuktu to find the two captains and ascertain the motives for their violent treatment of Africans. Unfortunately, once Klobb reached the expedition at Dankori, on July 14, 1899, the two captains ordered him murdered. Lieutenant Meynier, a member of the investigating team was wounded. A few days later, not to be outdone, the expedition's soldiers killed their two captains-Voullet and Chanoine-and lieutenants Joalland and Meynier took over the mission and reached Kanem with 150 men. Once in Kanem, the French signed a treaty with alifa Djerab on November 25, 1899, following a battle at Dibinentchi. The victory allowed Meynier to continue with a small force to meet Lamy, some 700 km further south at Bessada, in Sara country, near Fort-Archambault, on

January 10, 1900, while Joalland met Lamy at Air. In April 1900, the three expeditionary forces met at Kusseri.[35]

The French were fearful of Rabah, partly because he had decimated a French force at Niellim on July 17, 1899. He had been weakened, however, by Lamy's and Gentil's inconclusive victory of October 29, 1899, at Kouno, where both sides lost about half of their forces in battle, forcing Rabah to flee north. Gaurang of Bagirmi, who had signed a treaty of protection with France in 1897, wanted to see Rabah out of the region to save his sultanate. So he promised to join Lamy's forces against his Muslim brother at Kusseri. The French were determined to fight at Kusseri because they wanted it for a base from which to drive Rabah out of the area. Rabah's army, despite its numerous victories in Central Sudan, was reluctant to engage the French at Kusseri because Rabah knew they were better armed. He, therefore, decided he would attack them only if they left the town in search of him. However, as feared, the French force was well prepared for the encounter. Lamy, the commander of the three combined forces, was assisted by ten officers, 700 well-armed troops, and was accompanied, as well, by one artillery unit manned by an officer named Binoust. Rabah, camped about five kilometers from Kusseri, refused to initiate combat. The French fired the first shot against his army at 7:30 in the morning of April 22, 1900.[36]

To the surprise of the French, the long-awaited battle lasted only a little over three hours, largely due to a brilliant performance by the Algerian troops. Ironically, Lamy, fatally wounded in combat, was taken to Rabah's tent to be treated by four French doctors who tried to revive

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[35] Ibid, pp. 12-15.
[36] Ibid, p. 17.

him but to no avail.[37] He was pronounced dead around 4:00 P.M. One version, attributed to Captair Cointet's troops, claims that Lamy was killed by Bagirmi soldiers which is difficult to believe unless he was shot by friendly fire, since Gaurang was a French ally. Rabah was killed by one of his own former soldiers, Samba Sall Sall, a cannoneer, had defected and joined the French Central African Mission after Rabah had jailed him. When two tirailleurs announced, "Rabah est mort! Rabah est mort!" (Rabah is dead!). Gentil refused to believe them, because so often that same claim had been heard in Central Sudan. Shrugging his shoulders, he told them "Well, if he is dead, bring him to me." Within ten minutes, the soldiers presented Gentil with Rabah's head at the end of a stick. The general still refused to believe what he saw until Samba Sall confirmed that the head was indeed that of his former leader. Gentil ordered that Rabah's body be thrown into the River Chari and that his head be exhibited prominently in the town of Kusseri. By the battle's end, the French counted nineteen dead and fifty-five wounded soldiers, while Rabah seems to have lost 1000 men.[38]

Two French officers, including Meynier, were among the wounded. Rabah's remaining soldiers were captured and placed under Rabah's daughter, Aoua. They were brought to Fort-Lamy and forced to help build the city. His son, also captured, was sent to Bangui. Finally, in 1901, the French succeeded in killing another of Rabah's Sons, Rabah-ibn-Fadlallah, and, in 1911, his general, Mohammed el Sanusssi. Both had continued to offer resistance. Rabah's death made the conquest of the rest of Northern Chad possible if not easy. Borkou and. Faya-Largeau for example, fell to the French forces led by General Emmanuel Largeau on November 27, 1913. Here, the major enemy of the French had been a

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[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid, pp. 25-31.

Libyan Sanussiya commander named Abdallah Touer. Touer was killed on May 23, 1913, at othe battle of Oum el Adam, where he had assaulted the forces of Lieutenant Dufour en route to Ain Galaka for a military rendez-vous with Largeau.[39] There was so much carnage at Ain Galaka that, reportedly, some ninety Sanussiya dead fighters were thrown into the same burial hole along with horses and cattle. Largeau eventually took Ain Galaka, but the operation cost him the lives of Captain Maignam and Lieutenant Berrier Fontaine in a short but nasty battle. Largeau proceeded to take Faya, Ounianga, and Gouro, the Sanussiya Order's headquarters, weakening its grip on Chadian Muslims in the desert.[40]

The Teda of the area, however, assisted by the Turks and the Sanussiya Brotherhood, continued to pose a major threat to French authority until 1920. Fortunately, for France, the Teda threat was diminished by 1914, following Italy's conquest of Libya. This made it difficult for Turkey to play a major role in Northern Chad, particularly in TIbesti, the stronghold of the Sanussiya Order in Chad.[41] The Teda were finally conquered, following the submission of their spiritual leader, the derdei, in 1920. Thus BET was pronounced pacified. Bardai had already been taken in 1915, while the French had occupied Zouar, the headquarters of the derdei, in 1917. TIbesti, Chad's mountainous region, detached from Niger, French West Africa, became part of Chad on November 11, 1929. Consequently, the north no longer posed significant problems for the French army.[42]

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[39] Rita Byrnes, ed., *Government and politics In Chad: A Country Study* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 139 –142.

[40] Ibid, pp. 143-145.

[41] Ibid, p. 150.

[42] Ibid, pp. 155-156.

In the east, the Sultanate of Wadai also offered stiff resistance to France. The human toll on both sides attested to the level of violence accompanying the colonial occupation of the area. To worsen matters, the French became involved in the politics of the Wadaian royal family, supporting the claims of Acyl to the throne. Acyl, cousin of Sultan Dudmurrah (installed in 1902), had fled Abeche, the capital, because the sultan intended to blind him for his attempt to overthrow the regime. Subsequently, however, Acyl annoyed the French with his constant attacks on the Wadaian surroundings leading them to abandon him temporarily in 1908. That year, two major battles between Wadai forces and those of Captain Jerusalemy, accompanied by 200-armed men, took place, one at Dokotchi on May 29 and the other at Djoua on June 16. The June encounter resulted in the deaths of the two prominent Wadaian governors of the provinces of Mahamid and Debaba. The victory allowed Captain Fiegenschuh to enter Abeche with some 180 men and two cannons on June 12, 1909, declaring it a French territory the next day.[43]

Even then, the carnge was not over. After securing assistance from Darfur, Dudmurrah massacred Ficgenschuh and his force at Wadi Kadja in Oar Massalit on January 4, 1910. This incident forced Chad Territory's Commander Maillard, himself, to advance to Massalit with 300 men. On November 8, 1910, however, he was surrounded and defeated by 5,000 of Dudmurrah's cavalry and by the troops of the sultan of Massalit, Tadj ed-Din, at Dorothe. According to French accounts, there were many fatalities on both sides, including those of the French captain and Sultan Taj ed-Din, who reportedly lost all his 600 men Dudmurrah's power was thus restored. Alarmed, the French sent for Colonel Emmanuel Largeau, former Chad Military Commander (1902-

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[43] Samuel Decalo, " Regionalism, Political Decay, and Civil Strife in Chad", *Journal of Modern African Studies,* (1980), 18:52-53.

1904), to come to the rescue of French honor. Meticulously crafting his strategy, Largeau succeeded in forcing Dudmurrah to surrender to commander Hilaire in October 1911. He brought the defeated sultan to Fort-Lamy, and French forces occupied Wadai permanently in 1912. In 1917, rumors of a conspiracy against the French at Abeche resulted in the beheading of twenty-seven faqis and learned men by French troops, a harsh warning, indeed. From Wadai, in 1917, a French column, proceeding to pacify Goz-Beida, Dar Sila capital, assaulted Sultan Bakhit's stronghold. When he Sultan's cavalry tried to ambush the contingent, the French responded by wiping out the entire princely family.[44]

The French victory over Rabah in 1900 and the conquest of Wadai made it possible for France to implement the June 14, 1898 and the May 21, 1899 Franco-British conventions recognizing Bagirmi, Wadai, and parts of Kanem and Bomu as French territory. Elsewhere in the territory, the Hadjerai montagnards offered their own resistance to France. Heroic deeds by young men and women following a long siege by France are still described by elders in the vicinity of the long-abandoned Morgue village of Guera. As a result of the string of French victories by 1920, Chad had, for all practical purposes, been conquered and pacified, but the death toll to the conquering forces was high. Both regular troops and high-ranking military officers, fighting in small contingents, were killed. Dugald Campbell put it this way: "Here lies a Colonel, there a Captain or Lieutenant or an Adjutant, a Sergeant-Major, a   Sergeant or a humble Corporal, buried under the sands of the Sahara to prove that the conquest of the Chad regions has been unusually costly." This was the consequence of their subjugation of a Muslim population that had shown so much contempt for them, calling every Frenchman a "dirty dog" or "a

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[44] Lemarchand Rene, ed., *The Crisis in Chad, In African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 239-256.

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Christian pig." The problem left to the French after conquest was how best to govern the new territory and bring the diverse groups to work together for the benefit of France. Imposing a colonial system, however, would require the continued use of violence by the authorities. Once they had conquered their Central African territory, the French became aware of the hardships they would face in administering it.[45]

First were the geographic disparities in the territory; second, scarce resources; third, poverty, particularly in the north. The lack of viable natural resources on the fringes of the Sahara Desert eventually forced the French to turn south toward the more promising savanna and rainforest region, which they labeled useful Chad. Another major obstacle was the huge size of the landlocked territory, more than 1,000 miles away from either the Atlantic or the Indian Oceans, and its rough topography, rendering communication and travel extremely difficult, particularly during the rainy season. Then there was the discouraging problem of the northern Muslim populations' lively and visible contempt for everything French, even the colonial educational system, which they considered poison to their children. The result of these adverse factors was the neglect of the colony and its relegation to the military and to the adventurous from the "novice colonial administrators to derelict officials" who, left to themselves and attempting to survive, often wielded abusive power all this resulted in a political instability in the country. Chad climate, its terrain and its economic backwardness were such that being posted to the territory was considered a demotion by most civil servants. In the final analysis, Chad turned out to be primarily a labor source for all types' activities in other colonies, especially those in French Equatorial Africa.[46]

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

Two fundamental themes dominated Chad's colonial experience with the French an absence of policies designed to unify the territory and an exceptionally slow pace of modernization. In the French scale of priorities, the colony of Chad ranked near the bottom   it was less important than non-African territories, North Africa, West Africa, or even the other French possessions in Central Africa. The French came to perceive Chad primarily as a source of raw cotton and untrained labor to be used in the more productive colonies to the south. Within Chad there was neither the will nor the resources to do much more than maintain a semblance of law and order. In fact, even this basic function of governance was often neglected throughout the colonial period; large areas of Chad were never governed effectively from N'Djamena.

Chad was linked in 1905 with three French colonies to the south-- Ubangi-Chari, Moyen-Congo (present-day Congo), and Gabon. But Chad did not receive separate colony status or a unified administrative policy until 1920. The four colonies were administered together as French Equatorial Africa under the direction of a governor general stationed in Brazzaville. The governor general had broad administrative control over the federation, including external and internal security, economic and financial affairs, and all communications with the French minister of the colonies. Lieutenant governors, also appointed by the French government, were expected to implement in each colony the orders of the governor general. The central administration in Brazzaville tightly controlled the lieutenant governors despite reformist efforts toward decentralization between 1910 and 1946. Chad's lieutenant governor had

greater autonomy because of the distance from Brazzaville and because of France's much greater interest in the other three colonies.[47]

The lines of control from Brazzaville, feeble as they may have been, were still stronger than those from N'Djamena to its hinterland. In the huge Borkou-Ennedi- Tibesti Prefecture, the handful of French military administrators soon reached a tacit agreement with the inhabitants of the desert; as long as caravan trails remained relatively secure and minimal levels of law and order were met, the military administration usually left to the people alone. In central Chad, French rule was only slightly more substantive. In Ouaddai and Biltine prefectures, endemic resistance continued against the French and, in some cases, against any authority that attempted to suppress banditry and brigandage. France managed to govern effectively only the south, but until 1946 administrative direction came from Bangui in Ubangi-Chari rather than N'Djamena. Unlike northern and central Chad, a French colonial system of direct civilian administration was set up among the Sara, a southern ethnic group, and their neighbors. Also, unlike the rest of Chad, a modest level of economic development occurred in the south because of the introduction in 1929 of large-scale cotton production. Remittances and pensions to southerners who served in the French military also enhanced economic well- being. But even the advantages of more income, schools, and roads failed to win popular support for the French in the south.[48]

In addition to earlier grievances, such as forced porter age and village relocation, southern farmers resented the mandatory quotas for the production of cotton, which France purchased at artificially low

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[47] "Chad- French and Colonial Administration" http://www.frenchand colonialadministrationstudies.com

[48] Ibid.

prices. Government protected chiefs further abused this situation. The chiefs were resented all the more because they were generally the artificial creations of the French in a region of previously stateless societies. This commonality of treatment and the colonial organizational framework began to create during this period a sense of Sara ethnicity among persons whose collective identities had previously been limited to small kinship groups. Although France had put forth considerable effort during the conquest of Chad, the ensuing administration of the territory was half hearted this resulted in a situation of political instability in the country.[49]

Officials in the French colonial service resisted assignments to Chad, so posts often went to novices or to out-of- favor officials. One historian of France's empire has concluded that it was almost impossible to be too demented or depraved to be considered unfit for duty in Chad. Still, major scandals occurred periodically, and many of the posts remained vacant. In 1928, for example, 42 percent of the Chadian subdivisions lacked official administrators. An event occurred in 1935 that was to have far-reaching consequences throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In that year, the French colonial administration negotiated a border adjustment with Italy, Libya's colonial master. The adjustment would have relocated the Libyan-Chad boundary about 100 kilometers south across the Aozou Strip. Although the French legislature never ratified the agreement, the negotiations formed part of the basis of Libya's claim to the area decades later.[50]

In 1940 Chad became internationally prominent when its lieutenant governor, Felix Eboue, led the rest of the AEF federation to

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.

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support Free France under Charles de Gaulle rather than the government of Vichy France. Chad became the base for Colonel Jacques Leclerc's conquest of the Fezzan (1940-43), and the entire episode became the basis of an enduring sentimental bond between the France of de Gaulle's generation and Chad. Born in French Guiana of mixed African and European parentage, Eboue was keenly interested in the problems of cultural dislocation resulting from unchecked modernization in Africa. He worked to return authority to authentic traditional leaders while training them in modem administrative techniques. He recognized a place for African middle-class professionals in cities, but he opposed the migration of workers to cities, supporting instead the creation of integrated rural industries where workers could remain with their families. When Eboue died in 1944, the AEF lost a major source of progressive ideas, and Chad lost a leader with considerable influence in France.[51]

French voters rejected many of the progressive ideas of Eboue and others after the war ended. Nevertheless, the constitution that was approved in 1946 granted Chad and other African colonies the right to elect a territorial assembly with limited powers. The Assembly in turn elected delegates to the French General Council of all the AEF. The position of governor general was re-designated high commissioner, and each territory gained the right to elect representatives to French parliamentary bodies, including the National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, and the Assembly of the French Union. The African peoples became French citizens, and the colonies were designated overseas territories of France. But the real focus of authority remained in Paris, and French personnel continued to dominate the AEF's administration. No formal attempt was made to train Chadian Africans for civil service

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[51] William. F.S. Miles, "Decolonization as Disintegation: The Disestablishment of the State in Chad" *Journal of African Affairs* XXX, 1995, pp. 42-52.

positions before 1955. Until the early 1950s, political forces originating in France dominated the development of politics in Chad. Local elections were won largely by members of the Chadian Democratic Union (UDT), which was associated with a political party in France, the Assembly of French People. The UDT represented French commercial interests and a bloc of traditional leaders composed primarily of Muslim and Ouaddaian nobility. Chad's European community initiated the practice of using the civil service for partisan political ends; African civil servants who were identified with organizations opposed to the UDT soon found themselves dismissed or transferred to distant posts. Franis Tombalbaye (later to become president) lost his job as a teacher and ended up making bricks by hand because of his union activities and his role in the opposition Chadian Progressive Party (PPT).[52]

In 1953 politics were becoming less European dominated, and the PPT was emerging as the major rival of the UDT. The leader of the PPT was Gabriel Lisette, a black colonial administrator born in Panama and posted to Chad in 1946. Elected as a deputy to the French National Assembly, Lisette was later chosen as secretary general of the African Democratic Assembly (RDA), an interterritorial, Marxist-oriented party considered quite radical at the time. The PPT originated as a territorial branch of the RDA and rapidly became the political vehicle of the country's non-Muslim intellectuals. Traditional rulers perceived the PPT to be antithetical to their interests and recognized that the local territorial assembly could adversely affect their revenue and power. These factors persuaded traditional rulers to become more active in the UDT, which, because of internal divisions, had changed its name in the late 1950s to the Chadian Social Action (AST).[53]

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[52] Lemarchand Rene, n. 44, p. 245.
[53] Ibid, p. 247.

Although party names changed frequently and dramatic factional schisms occurred throughout the 1950s, electoral competition was essentially between three political blocs: the UDT, AST, the PPT, and the allies of Ahmed Koulamallah from Chari-Baguirmi and Kanem prefectures. A clever politician and charismatic leader of the Tijaniyya Islamic brotherhood in Chad, Koulamallah campaigned in different times and places as a member of the Bagirmi nobility a radical socialist leader, or a militant Muslim fundamentalist. As a result, politics in the 1950s was a struggle between the south, which mostly supported the PPT, and the Muslim Sahelian belt, which favored the UDT, AST Koulamallah played a generally disruptive role in the middle.[54]

In 1956 the French National Assembly passed the loi cadre, which resulted in greater self-rule for Chad and other African territories. Electoral reforms expanded the pool of eligible voters, and power began to shift from the sparsely settled northern and central Chadian regions toward the more densely populated south. The PPT had become less militant, winning the support of chiefs in the south and members of the French colonial administration, but not that of private French commercial interests. The PPT and allied parties won forty-seven of the sixty-five seats in the 1957 elections, and Lisette formed the first African government in Chad. He maintained a majority for only about a year; however, before factions representing traditional chiefs withdrew their support from his coalition government. In September 1958, voters in all of Africa's French territories took part in a referendum on the Fifth Republic's constitution, drawn up under de Gaulle. For a variety of political and economic reasons, most of Chad's political groups supported the new constitution, and all voted for a resolution calling for

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[54] Ibid.

Chad to become an autonomous republic within the French community. The three other AEF territories voted similarly, and in November 1958 the AEF was officially terminated. Coordination on such issues as customs and currency continued among the four territories through written agreements or on an ad hoc basis. Some Chadian supported the creation of an even stronger French federation, rather than independence. The leading proponent of this proposal was Barthelemy Boganda of Ubangi-Chari, but his death in 1959 and the vigorous opposition of Gabon resulted in political independence on a separate basis for all four republics.[55]

After Lisette's coalition crumbled in early 1959, two other alliances governed briefly. Then in March the PPT returned to power, this time under the leadership of Tombalbaye, a union leader and representative from Moyen-Chari Prefecture. Lisette, whose power was undermined because of his non-African origins, became deputy prime minister in charge of economic coordination and foreign affairs. Tombalbaye soon consolidated enough political support from the south and north to isolate the opposition into a collection of conservative Muslim leaders from central Chad. The latter group formed a political party in January 1960, but its parliamentary representation steadily dropped as Tombalbaye wooed individual members to the PPT. By independence in August 1960, the PPT and the south had clearly achieved dominance, but Tomalbaye's political skills made it possible for observers to talk optimistically about the possibility of building a broad coalition of political forces.[56]

Thus it becomes quite clear from the historical analysis of the socio- economic and political development of the Chadian society both

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[55] Ibid, p. 248.

[56] "Chad-Decolonization Politics" http://www.decolonization politicsstudies.com

from its pre-colonial days together with its colonial past that the root cause of social and political turmoil in the present day Chad does have a long historical angle, which cannot be negated. Super imposition of a colonial order without any long term administrative reforms by its colonial master led to a situation of a social and political crisis which precipated by the advent of the 20th century .By the time Chad attained independence from France it was already in a chaotic situation. With the coming of a fragile new government without enjoying any full pan Chad identity resulted in a situation of political unrest and instability which successive regime in Chad could not overcome and the country even today faces serious crisis due to this which it inherited from its colonial past as well as from its past historical social and cultural development.

Chapter III

Internal and External Dynamics of the Instability

ALGERIA

LIBYA

EGYPT

YAHOO! Travel

N Chad

NIGER

18°

Faya-Largeau

Fada

CHAD

SUDAN

Nokou

NIGERIA

Moussoro

Oum
Hadjer

Ati

Abéché

Bokoro

Mangalmé

N'Djamena

Mongo

Melfi

Am
Timan

10°

Bongor

Pala

Laï

Sarh

CENTRAL

Moundou

AFRICAN

Doba

REPUBLIC

CAMEROON

14°

22°

0   100   200 mi

0   100   200 km

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CHAPTER – III

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS OF
THE INSTABILITY

In the world after the Cold War, not only has the bipolar, interstate system of world order dissolved, but also in many places the state itself has collapsed. Political Instability is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, or riot. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority law, and political order have fallen apart and must adjust in some form, to the old or new emerging situation. On the other hand, it necessarily not has to be anarchy, nor it simply has to be a byproduct of the rising form of ethnic nationalism: it is the collapse of old orders, notably the state that brings about the retreat to ethnic nationalism as. the residual, viable identity. Indeed, one hypothesis that one has to be pursued is that when due to political instability one established power order falls it is upto the local groups who are up for the share and grabs of power. These ups and downs of power then vie with central attempts to reconstitute authority. For a period, the state itself, as a legitimate, functioning order, is gone.[1]

The phenomenons is historic and worldwide but nowhere are there more examples than in contemporary Africa. The African state is a new state, successor to a colonial no sovereign creation, and this newness at sovereignty, coupled with colonialist claims of African unread ness for independence, led to early skepticism about its viability. Against all predictions, so surprisingly that it had to be explained the African state persisted. It overrode lustier proclamations of continental and regional

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[1]   William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States, Reconstructing the State of Chad* (London Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 1-9.

unity, formed a dominant bloc in the United Nations (UN) and other world forum and imposed itself on its citizens' lives. But here and there, it collapsed.[2]

The Political Instability as seen in the modern state phenomenon in Africa and elsewhere is different from the historical phenomenon associated with giant Civilizations of the past and in its difference throw some light on its own nature. [3] Current Political Instability in the Third World, but also in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe-is not a matter of civilization decay. Society carries on, in ways to be discussed below, and while ideology regime, and order change, it is hard to claim that a civilization has been destroyed. Nor is the process merely an organic characteristic of growth and decay, a life cycle in the rise and fall of nations or "a continuous aspect in the life of human societies and not an anomalous response to some sort of irregular or periodic stress". Political Instability is as a current phenomenon, is much more specific, narrow and identifiable, a political cause and effect with social and economy implications, and one that represent a significant anomaly. Indeed discussion of the problem is based on an assumption, characteristic of the current era that territory and population are expected to be divided into political jurisdictions that determine, however unevenly, the identity, order and authority within their confines. Rather than pose the nature of that phenomenon and then proceed to examine its occurrence deductively against a logical construct, this study of Political Instability reverses the procedure and develops an initial analysis inductively from a brief empirical review. It then returns to individual case studies to apply and expand the original analysis, leading to policy-relevant conclusions about the restoration of legitimate authority. This path has been chosen in order to make the most of

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[2]   Ibid.
[3]   Ibid.

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Africa's experience. Our purpose here is not merely to learn about Africa-an exercise of current interest to a Small audience-but to learn from Africa-a project of much wider importance even in its misfortunes and malfunctions. Africa has much to teach the world.[4]

It might be said that contemporary African history began in Political Instability. But it is more remarkable that the Chad was an isolated exception to the otherwise successful transfer of authority from colonial to independent rule throughout the continent. The Chad case was not good for political development. An international intervention to restore law and order, a strongman installed with foreign connivance-these were the means of restoring the state and the elements in its gradual collapse again two or three decades later. State collapse in independent Africa is not a postcolonial phenomenon, but a condition of nationalist, second- or later-generation regimes ruling over established states. The phenomenon has occurred in two waves. One came toward the end of the second decade of independence. When regimes that had replaced the original nationalist generation were overthrown, carrying the whole state structure with them into a vacuum.[5]

Political Instability means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed, as analyzed in various theories of the state. As the decision making center of government, the state is paralyzed and inoperative laws are not made, order is nit preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced. Political instability means the breakdown of good governance, law, and order. The state, as a decision-making, executing, and enforcing institution can no longer take and implement decisions. Societal collapse on the other hand, is the extended

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Daniela Kroslak, *France's Policy towards Africa: Continuity or Change* (London: Routledge Publication, 2004), pp. 75-76.

breakdown of the social coherence: society, as the generator of institutions of cohesion and maintenance, can no longer create, aggregate, and articulate the supports and demands that are the foundations of the state. These are the two aspects of breakdown and between them the links and overlaps of state and society fall away. The normal politics of demands and responses atrophies; the political processes for popular legitimization are discard or prostituted; politics and economics are localized; and the center becomes peripheral to the workings of society. As the longstanding debate over the state as a social contract has brought out, individuals in society, in creating a state, trade in their freedom in exchange for security and constraints. When the state overplays its control its functions, it loses the willing allegiance and legitimizing support of its population. This is the hard state, often confused with the strong state. The events of the early 1990s—the collapse of the ideological tyranny in the Soviet Union and of constitutionalized racism in South Africa—support the hypothesis that authoritarianism is the cause of political instability and the tyranny, in the end, will destroy its own hard state.[6]

Collapse, then, is an extreme case governance problem; or excessive burdens on governing capacity, a matter of degree but not a difference in nature from the normal difficulties of meeting demands and exercising authority. Specific characteristics of Chadian society and political life contributed to the breakdown of state structures and denied the reconstruction task. First is the absence of large-scale solidaristic structures. Chad's 5 million people make up one of the most ethnically diverse social mosaics in Africa. Depending on the criteria used, scholars count between 72 and 110 different language groups in Chad. The largest of these, the Sara, is in turn divided into 12. Furthermore,

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[6]   Ibid, p. 77.

virtually all of these group identities are highly segmentary: it would be unusual for a whole linguistic or ethnic group to mobilize behind a single leader or cause. As Magnant notes, both for Sara and more northern populations: "Traditions report more bloody fights between fractions of the same ethnic group allied to fractions of neighboring ethnic groups than conflicts in which ethnic groups confronted one another as blocs." Religion, ethnicity, personal loyalty, level and place of education, opportunism, and region have all provided reasons for cleavages underlying factions and alliances of factions. Only social class, ideology, and political program seem definitively absent from the list of conventional cleavages. Much attention has focused on the north-south regional dimension of the Chadian conflict, leading some quite erroneously to see Chad's civil wars as contests between Islam and Christianity.[7]

Chad has no natural borders that would clearly delimit the people or their livelihoods from those of its six immediate neighbors. A landlocked country, its goods and peoples have long transited through by many West Africans on their way to and from Mecca. Such lack of natural boundaries has contributed to the ambiguities of the dispute with Libya over the Aouzou Strip the northern border and to the much less virulent dispute with Nigeria over the constantly shifting islands of Lake Chad.[8]

Chad became independent in 1960 with François Tombalbaye as its first president. Being aware of the problems his country had inherited from the colonial period, he felt that, if his country were to make any progress, it would have to shed tribalism and forge perfect

[7]   S. C. Saxena, "The Civil War in Chad: Causes and Dimensions", *Africa Quarterly*, vol. XXI. no. 24, 1981-82, pp. 81-89.

[8]   Ibid.

unity. In 1961 he said: "Our scourge is tribalism and a retrograde intelligentsia."[9]

This was mere rhetoric on his part because the way he actually functioned and behaved towards various religious and ethnic groups other than his own could not, under any circumstances, bring about the coveted unity. His questionable behaviour towards the Muslim majority, far from bridging the gulf between the Muslims and the Christians, actually widened it and threw the country into a state of civil war from which it has yet to free itself. There was already profound resentment among the Muslims on account of the facts that the French, while withdrawing from Chad, had not handed over power to them even though they constituted overwhelming majority. Further, they also feared that under Tombalbaye the interests of Muslims would not be safe. This fear was confirmed by the manner in which Tombalbaye treated them after assuming power. Right from the beginning of his rule he was authoritarian and harsh in his dealings with Muslims because he regarded them as an element of disorder to be closely watched.[10]

The Arabs were increasingly oppressed at the hands of the Christians minority. Muslims occupying important positions in public life were gradually removed and replaced by Christians during Tombalbaye presidency. The Muslims chiefs were relieved of the duty of collecting taxes from the people. The job was then entrusted to the Christian tax collectors who were very harsh and ruthless in exacting taxes from the people. In 1967, the Sultans were also deprived of their traditional judicial powers. The chiefs naturally felt humiliated by these measures, although the motive of the reforms might have been only the

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[9]   J. F. Froelich, *Tensions in the Chad, Conflicts in Africa* (London: Adelphi Papers, 1972), no. 93, p. 45.
[10]   Ibid.

centralization of administration. In addition, the use of Arabic on the radio was also prohibited. This measure also hurt the sentiments of the Arabs.[11]

Some other measures taken by the President Tombalbaye that sowed the seeds of civil war in Chad should also be mentioned. He abrogated the constitution, which he himself had originally enacted for the country and replaced it by a single-party system with all powers concentrated in his hands.[12] In January 1962, he against opposition by dissolving all political groups except his own Parti Progressite Tchadian (PPT). A year later a special PPT Congress was held at Fort Archmbault when the one-party system was formalized. The creation of a single trade union in 1965 completed the transfer of the entire state organization into the hands of Tombalbaye.[13]

Tombalbaye stifled every form of legal opposition and drove opponents underground or into exile. Young and inexperienced members of the elite who showed too free a spirit of criticism, too much ideological zeal and too little deference, were pushed aside and eliminated.[14]

In fairness to Tombalbaye it must be stated that he took several measures to reconcile the dissident sections of the population, having realized that the original grievances of the rebels in the eastern and central provinces were genuine and should be redressed. Hence, his government announced plans to release political prisoners, and to build schools, hospitals, roads and other infra-structural projects in these

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[11] S.C. Saxena, *Political Conflicts and Power in Africa* (Delhi: UDH Publishers, 1985), pp. 273-274.

[12] "Chad's Civil War and France", *The Hindustan Times* (Delhi), 1 December 1969.

[13] David Hilling, *Chad: Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications, 1975), p. 235.

[14] J. F. Froelich, n. 9, p. 45.

provinces. A number of former political detainees were elected to the party's Political Bureau. The response of these measures was in general good. Some members of the rebel group, no doubt, surrendered in response to the president's offers but the majority remained dissatisfied by the conciliatory measures.[15]

In August 1973 President Tombalbaye even announced the dissolution of PPT and also its re-birth as the Movement national Pour La Revolution Culturelle et Socialle (MNRCS). This new party was meant to be an instrument for social cohesion, favouring neither north nor south, but unifying the country in the struggle for economic and social development, and against terrorism, imperialism and treason. To promote national identity Tombalbaye even went to the extent of changing his own first name from François to N'Garata, and he ordered all French names to be replaced by Chadian ones. Forty Lamy, the capital, was consequently named as N'djamena.[16]

All these measures failed to satisfy the Muslims. Perhaps at heart they could not reconcile with the fact that, although they were in majority, the ultimate power, at every level, lay with the Christians. Therefore, right from 1960-61 they started opposing President Tombalbaye's regime. The full-fledge civil war, however, broke out in the central as well as northern regions of Chad only in 1965. To lead the struggle first there were only rebel groups scattered in different parts of the country. Later, a political party called 'FRONLINAT' was formed as an umbrella organization of various groups of Chadian fighting against President Tombalbaye forces.[17]

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[15] David Hilling, n. 13, p. 236.
[16] Ibid, p. 237.
[17] S.C. Saxena, n. 11, pp. 273-274.

There were two direct causes for the out-break of the civil war in Chad in 1965: brutality of the Chad army particularly in the BET region, and the corrupt and inefficient administration of black officers. In the central region a number of useful measures or reforms were, no doubt, introduced but, since they were not properly administered, they failed to produce the desired impact upon the population. There were peasant uprisings in the Muslims dominated central region of Chad because of abuse of authority and intolerable defects of the administration such as arrogance of functionaries, inefficiency, humiliation of the population, harassment, ill-timed replacement of villages chiefs, a bar on talking too loudly, an inflexibility in revenue matters.[18] Posts of perfects and sub-perfects were given to civil servants with no training. Such people proved to be incompetent. This led to inefficiency, disorder, and misappropriation of public funds, corruption and exploitation. This hostility towards the administration was naturally increased by the fact that the majority of the important civil servants came from non-Moslem ethnic groups in the south, particularly from the Sara tribe. Similarly, the brutalities of military officers of the Chad Government gave birth to rebellion in various parts of the country. The military commanders imposed irritating laws upon the people and made their violation wearing of turbans, restricting the movement of animals, which upset the nomadic way of life, forbidding the meetings of more than two persons, forced labour, and compulsory cultivation of barren's soil.[19]

Those who indulged in disputes were punished with fifty to one hundred strokes of the whip. Men were struck and women were beaten, stripped and publicly paraded. These were the main reasons, which gave birth to discontent among the Muslim population. First this discontent expressed itself in, the form of small-localized rebellions but by 1965 a

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[18]   J. F. Froelich, n. 9, p. 46.
[19]   S.C. Saxena, n.11, pp. 274 -275.

full-scale civil war had erupted. The organization now as Frolinat claims itself to be a nationalist movement of all Chadian. It was born at Nyala in 1966 with Ibrahim Abatch as its first Secretary-General. When French forces while, taking part in a. commando raid in February 1968 killed Ibrahim Abatch, the political control of the Frolinate devolved upon Dr. Abba Siddick, while control over military passed into the hands of Hissene Habre.[20]

These two arms of the Frolinat existed uneasily together until 1977 when Abba, Siddick, was expelled from the Froclinat. The leadership of the Party then passed into the hands of Hissene Habre. Soon a division arose among the ranks of. Frolinat on the question of the policy that should be adopted towards Libya which had allegedly annexed the mineral bearing Aouzou Strip territory of northern Chad. Libya justified its annexation on the basis of a pact reportedly, signed in 1935 between France, which was then the colonial power of Chad, and Italy, which was then the colonial power of Libya. Hissene Habre wanted that the Frolinat should not compromise: with Libya's occupation of even an inch of Chad's territory even though it might be receiving military aid from that country. Since he could not carry with him the whole of Frolinat on the question of Libya's occupation of Chad's northern territory; he broke away with the party along with several hundred of his supporters, and established himself in the mountains of the Tibesti. The remaining; Frolinat members, though divided into several factions, remained under the overall leadership of Goukounio Oueddei.[21]

Besides these two factions in Frolinat-one led by Hissene Habre,

[20] Andrew Lycett, "Chad's disastrous civil war", *Africa Report*, vol. 23 (5), September/October 1978, p. 5.

[21] Ibid, p. 6.

and the other by Goukouni Oueddei there is a third faction represented by the Third Army of the Frolinat. It is headed by Aboubaker Abdramane who has been denounced by the official Frolinat as a, deserter. This faction represents the Toubous living in the Kanem region. Had all these groups been united under one banner, they would have been more effective in their operations and would have been very near their ultimate goal of the majority rule .in the territory. The lack of unity among the members of the Frolinat defeated or, at least, delayed the achievement of their objective and prolonged the civil war. Unfortunately, there is no cohesive force in the Frolinat to keep all its members together. Its members do not have even common ideological commitment to forge the much-needed unity among them. Libya's assistance has been a source of great embarrassment to the Frolinat because of its alleged occupation of the Aouzou Strip stretching all along the northern border of Chad with Libya. The Government of Chad headed by President.Malloum alleged that the Frolinat, under the leadership of Goukouni Oueddei, was acquiescing in the occupation of Chad's northern strip because it got arms from Libya.[22]

There were other reasons also for the strained relation between Chad Government and external forces. No study of Chad could be complete without considering the role of external forces in history. Mainly focuses on foreign involvement in the affairs of Chad and attempts to ascertain whether or not individual violence among the various protagonists. Reflecting the relative significance of the roles played by interventionist forces, the order of discussion followed below will be: France, Libya, the United States, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sudan, and Egypt, other African states, and the Organization of African Unity. France was Chad's most important foreign donor and patron for the first

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[22] Ibid. p. 7.

three decades following independence in 1960. At the end of the 1980's economic ties was still strong, and France provided development assistance in the form of loans and grants. It was no longer Chad's leading customer for agricultural exports, but it continued to provide substantial military support.[23]

The various regions of Chad had already broken out long before 1965. From 1965 onward the localized rebellions had taken the form of a civil war, a general uprising, aimed at changing the government through revolutionary means but it was not acknowledged as such by the then Chad Government. President Tombalbaye used to dismiss it as mere "banditry" or "acts of pillage". The casualty figurus in the civil war, however, belied this claim of the Chad Government.[24]

Unable to meet the challenge of the rebels with the help of its own resources the government of President Tombalbaye, on 28August 1968, was compelled to appeal to France for help. The French Government promptly responded to the request with a dispatch of parachutists followed by the Foreign Legion and the Marines. Later, in 1970, France also sent to Chad men of the 6th. Regiment International Aerienne Outre-Mer. This was the first intervention by France in the civil war of Chad. The rebels were hardly a match to the well-trained, well-organized and well-equipped French army. The result was that the French forces were able to destroy the greater part of the rebel strength. The rebels, however, re-grouped and re-organized those selves and launched upon another wave of rebellion, this time perhaps on a larger scale than before. The seriousness of the situation in Chad once again compelled President Tombalbaye to appeal to France for more help. The French

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[23]   Robert Buijtenhuijs, *Chad: The Narrow Escape of an African State, 1965-1987* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 49-51.
[24]   Ibid, p. 52.

Government promptly complied with the appeal and sent several hundred paratroopers and foreign legionaries to Chad to quell the second wave of rebellion.[25]

According to the military agreements signed by the Chadian state and France immediately following independence the latter if invited by an established or legitimate government, may intervene in the affairs of its former colony to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But the issue of what constitutes a de facto, that is, a functioning and an internationally recognized government in Chad, and a de jure or legitimate state that must be safeguarded in case of an internal and external threat, became complicated during 1979-1982. France, at the invitation of the various heads of the Chadian state-Francois Tombalbaye, Felix Malloum, Gukuni Wedei, Hissein Habre, and Idris Deby-has maintained almost a permanent military presence in the country.[26]

Tombalbaye requested the continuation of the French troops in BET following independence in 1960, a force that he angrily dismissed in January 1965, as a result of a misunderstanding with the former colonizer and his attempt to assume total control over Chadian territory. Yet, in August 1968, Charles de Gaulle sent a small French contingent to Chad at the request of Tombalbaye to fight FROLINAT's insurgency. By 1972, it appeared that French troops had succeeded in turning the tide of war in favor of the government. Thus, in August 1975 General Felix Malloum ordered French troops out of Chad, only to change his mind three years later.[27] French troops, brought back under General Louis Forest, simply in May 1980, following a chaotic effort to implement

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[25] J. F. Froelich, n. 9, p. 47.
[26] *The Times* (London), 20 March 1970.
[27] Ibid.

the Lagos Accords. Before leaving, however, it had contributed, through its "active neutrality," to the fall of Malloum's government. Thereafter, French policy vacillated between verbal threats to Kadhafi and pressure on N'Djamena to negotiate a political settlement with its northern aggressor, despite the fact that most governments in Africa, particularly the francophone states, knew that the Colonel's intentions went beyond simply propping up a protégé in Chad's capital. At this point, France was clearly intent on punishing Malloum and teaching a lesson to any Chadian leader who did not follow orders from Paris.[28]

Chad remained a member of the African Financial Community (CFA), which linked the value of its currency, the CFA franc, to the French franc. French private and government investors owned a substantial portion of Chad's industrial and financial institutions, and the French treasury backed the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), which served as the central bank for Chad and six other member nations.[29] Chad's dependence on France declined slightly during Habre's tenure as president, in part because other foreign donors and investors returned as the war subsided and also because increased rainfall since 1985 improved food production. French official attitudes toward Chad had changed from the 1970s policies under the leadership of Giscard d'Estaing to those of the Mitterrand era of the 1980s. Economic, political, and strategic goals, which had emphasized maintaining French influence in Africa, exploiting Chad's natural resources, and bolstering francophone Africa's status as a bulwark against the spread of Soviet influence, had been replaced by nominally anticolonialist attitudes. The election in France of the Socialist government in 1981 had coincided with conditions of near-anarchy in Chad, leading France's Socialist Party to reaffirm its ideological stance against high-profile intervention in

[28] *The Times of India* (Delhi), 21 August 1969.
[29] Ibid.

Africa. Hoping to avoid a confrontation with Libya, another important client state in the region, President Mitterrand limited French military involvement to a defense of the region surrounding N'Djamena in 1983 and 1984. Then, gradually increasing its commitment to reinforce Habre's presidency, France once again increased its military activity in Chad.[30]

There were six main reasons for French intervention in Chad. Firstly, the French are quite sentimental about Chad because it was the first of France's territories to rally to De Gaulle's Free French Movement in the last World War.[31] Secondly, the French, intervention, as the then French Foreign Minister, Maurice. Schumann, claimed was for the altruistic purpose of preventing the "Great Powers" from stepping in and enacting another Biafra or Sudan. Thirdly, France, in helping Chad, was stated to be honouring the Franco-Chad Defence Agreement of 1960.[32]

Gen. De Gaulle had signed such agreements with about a dozen former French territories. These formed the basis of France's defence system in Africa, and Fort Lamy, the capital of Chad, lay at the heart of this system. It may be mentioned here that France, even after granting independence to Chad, was maintaining a regular garrison at Fort Lamy which had an important air base, and her defence tele-communication system connecting Senegal, the Ivory Coast Gabon, the Central African Republic and Madagascar all passed through the town.[33]

Fourthly, Chad's principal export market was France; Chad was also linked with France through its membership of the EEC. Fifthly,

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[30] Ibid.
[31] Batuk Gathani, "A Mini-war with a romantic aura", *The Hindu* (Madras), 26 December 1970.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ajit S. Gopal, "War in Chad: Stakes for Super powers", *Indian Express* (Delhi), 4 April 1979.

France supported, Chad in order to reassure her allies in Francophone Africa such as Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Senegal of her resolve to stand up to what they perceived as communist incursions into Africa. These allies of France believed or feared that radical destabilizing influences from Libya might reach them also vid Frolinat.57 Sixthly; France was helping Chad, in order to pay back an old debt, as was admitted by a person no less than Hissene Habre himself. He said that Chadians had in the past shed their blood for France and that when Chad's territorial integrity was in danger of being disrupted and violated, it was France turn to help it.68 He went to the extent of even rejecting the calls by the Frolinat for the withdrawal of French forces from Chad by saying that such a demand was not a "realistic political Position".[34]

From the point of view of the Government of Chad, the assistance given by France was timely as well as effective. Without it, Chad would have been easily over-run by the Frolinat within a short time. France stood like a 'force' or a wall preventing the Frolinat from capturing the reins of the government in Chad. However, it must be conceded that French assistance was also, at the same time a source of embarrassment to the Chad Government became the Frolinat exploited it as an excuse and a justification for its own-armed struggle.[35]

The French assistance was also the cause of considerable discontent in government-controlled areas. This was confirmed by reports of demonstrations in Moussoro, which led the government to close down the schools in that town. 61 A newspaper report also said that the southern town of Moundou had also been the scene of violent demonstrations which began by opposing the government but which

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[34] "Habre defends presence of French troops", *Africa Diary* (Delhi), vol. XVIII (46) 1978, p. 9259.
[35] Ibid.

rapidly turned into being anti-French.[36]

At this stage the Chad Government took some policy decisions, which suggested as if it was making a reversal in its foreign policy. As part of this changed stance in its foreign policy the government of Tombalbaye adopted an anti-colonial stance and established diplomatic relations with Libya. Tombalbaye was hoping to kill two birds with one stone by the policy changes. Firstly, he was hoping to secure the Libyan withdrawal from the northern territory of Chad. Secondly, he was hoping to bring about sizeable reduction in Libyan support to the Frolinat. When these hopes did not materialize, Chad, having remained pro Libyan for some time, once again started swinging back to its earlier pro-French foreign policy. By 1974 relationship between Chad and France was back to its old pedestal.[37]

A poor country like Chad could hardly afford squander away its slender financial resources in meeting the exigencies of the civil war that had lasted too long. This is why the Chad Government was always ready and eager to arrive at some sort of national reconciliation. For various reasons several parties to the dispute were also in favour of national reconciliation. When Gen. Malloum over threw the regime of President Tombalbaye and himself assumed the presidency of Chad, be set before him the primary task of promoting national reconciliation by establishing a government of national unity. He saw before himself his country divided into two parts, with one part under the control of the Frolinat, and the other part under the control of his government with the possible danger that this, sort of informal division of the country might stabilize at the exciting level, resulting in virtual partition of the

[36] M. K. Bentri-Enchill, "France's forgotten war in Chad", *West Africa* (London), no. 3194, 2 October 1978, p. 1946.
[37] *Africa Diary*, vol. XVIII (24), 1978, pp. 9035- 9036.

country. He was aware that the influence of the Frolinat was spreading fast so much so that it had started penetrating into the urban areas as well including the capital, N'djamena where at least half the population consisted of Muslims who were supporters of the Frolinat. In addition, there were other pressures also on the Chad Government for some sort of national reconciliation among various warring faction in the country. France pressurized the Chad Government for a national reconciliation because it feared and believed, though without justification, that radical forces might first capture Chad with the help of Colonel Qadhafi of Libya and then they might move on to the neighboring countries of Niger and the Central African Republic both of which were important sources of uranium for France. Under radical governments, France feared, the supply of uranium to it might be discontinued thereby slowing down its nuclear development programme.[38]

There are a number of reasons for Libya's involvement in the internal affairs of Chad. Chad's relations with Libya, arising out of centuries of ethnic, religious, and commercial ties, were more complex than those with France. Under French and Italian colonial domination, respectively, Chad and Libya had diverged in orientation and development. But even after Chad's independence in 1960, many northerners still identified more closely with people in Libya than with the southern-dominated government in N'Djamena. After seizing power in 1969, Libyan head of state Qadhaafi reasserted Libya's claim to the Aozou Strip, a 100,000-square-kilometer portion of northern Chad that included the small town of Aozou. Libya based its claim on one of several pre-independence agreements regarding colonial boundaries, and it bolstered these claims by stationing troops in the Aozou Strip beginning in 1972. Qadhaafi's desire to annex the Aozou Strip grew out of an array

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[38]   *Africa Diary*, vol. XVIII (24), 1978, p. 9035.

of concerns, including the region's reported mineral wealth. He also hoped to establish a friendly government in Chad and to extend Islamic influence into the Sahel through Chad and Sudan, with the eventual aim of a Central African Islamic empire.[39]

A complex set of symbolic interests also underlay Libya's pursuit of territory and influence in the Sahel. Qadhaafi's anti-colonial and anti imperialist rhetoric vacillated between attacks on the United States and a campaign focused on the postcolonial European presence in Africa. He hoped to weaken Chad's ties with the West and thereby reduce Africa's incorporation into the Western-dominated nation-state system. Forcing the revision of one of the colonially devised boundaries affirmed by the OAU in 1963 was a step in this direction--one that seemed possible in the context of the troubled nation of Chad, which DAU members dubbed the continent's "weakest link." Qadhaafi attempted alliances with a number of antigovernment rebel leaders in Chad during the 1970s, including Goukouni, Siddick, Acyl Ahmat and Kamougue, a southerner. Goukouni and Acyl were most sympathetic to Qadhaafi's regional ambitions, but these two men clashed in 1979, leading Acyl to form the CDR. After Acyl's death in 1982, Libyan support swung strongly to Goukouni's GUNT. By mid-1988 Qadhaafi appeared more willing to come to an agreement with Habre than to continue to support Qadhaafi's fractious allies, who had suffered losses at Habre's hands. Chadian and Libyan foreign ministers met in August 1988, and the two governments agreed to further talks. At the same time, Libyan troops remained in the Aozou Strip, and its future status was uncertain.[40]

We turn our attention now to Libya's impact on Chad's internal order. Libya's involvement in Chad contributed to the militarization of the

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[39] "Chad Relation with Libya" http://www.relationwithlibya.com
[40] Ibid.

north and the south. On the political level, Kadhafi's interference and his shifting support among the rebel leaders had the effect of further fragmenting the more than eleven factions operating almost unhindered in the country.[41] There was pressure from Nigeria also for a national reconciliation in Chad but for a different reason. Nigeria was interested in diffusing the tension in Chad because it feared that tension between Muslims and Christians in that country might spill over into northern Nigeria also.[42]

Nigeria considered France its primary rival in its attempt to chart the course of West Africa's political development. Its generally paternalistic relations with Chad intensified after the coup that ousted President Tombalbaye in 1975. After that, limiting Libyan expansion while avoiding direct clashes with Libyan troops also became important goals. Nigeria sponsored talks among Chad's rival factions in 1979 and promoted a little-known civil servant, Mahmat Shawa Lol, as a compromise head of a coalition government. Lol's perceived status as a Nigerian puppet contributed to mounting opposition during his short term as president in 1979. The two nations forged stronger ties during the 1980s. Hoping to benefit commercially and diplomatically by expanding regional trade relations, Nigeria replaced France as Chad's major source of export revenues. Bilateral trade agreements involved Chadian exports of livestock, dried fish, and chemicals and imports of Nigerian foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Both governments also recognized the potential value of the large informal trade sector Commerce employed several thousand Chadians workers. Chad's relationship with Nigeria was not without its strains, however. Beginning in the late 1970s, clashes occurred around Lake Chad, where both

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[41] Mario J. Azevedo, *Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad, Environment and Society* (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1978), p. 151.
[42] Andrew Lycett, n. 24, p. 7.

countries hoped to exploit oil reserves. Both also sought to defuse these confrontations, first by establishing joint patrols and a commission to demarcate the boundary across the lake more clearly. Then in the early 1980s, the low level of Lake Chad brought a series of tiny islands into view, leading to further disputes and disrupting long-standing informal trade networks. [43]

This relationship was also complicated by Nigeria's own instability in the north, generated by rising Islamic fundamentalism. Thousands of casualties occurred as the result of violent clashes in Nigeria throughout the 1980s. Most religious violence was domestic in origin, but Nigerian police arrested a few Libyans, and Nigerian apprehension of Libyan infiltration through Chad intensified. Nigeria's 1983 economic austerity campaign also produced strains with neighboring states, including Chad. Nigeria expelled several hundred thousand foreign workers, mostly from its oil industry, which faced drastic cuts as a result of declining world oil prices. At least 30,000 of those expelled were Chadian. Despite these strains, however, Nigerians had assisted in the halting process of achieving stability in Chad, and both nations reaffirmed their intention to maintain close ties.[44]

Sudan, Chad's neighbor to the east, responded to Chad's conflict with Libya based on its own regional, ethnic, and cultural tensions. In Sudan, the Islamic northern region had generally dominated the non-Muslim south. Sudan's ties with Libya, although cautious during the 1970s, warmed during the 1980s, strengthening N'Djamena's fears of insurgency from the east. The populations of eastern Chad and western Sudan established social and religious ties long before either nation's

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[43] "Chad Relation with Nigeria and Sudan"
http://www.relationwithnigeriaandsudan.com
[44] Ibid.

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independence, or these remained strong despite disputes between governments. Herdsmen in both countries freely crossed the 950-kilometer border, seeking pastureland and water sources as they had for centuries. Muslims in eastern Chad often traveled through Sudan on the hajj, or annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and many young people from eastern Chad studied at Islamic schools in Sudan. In addition, Sudan's cotton plantations employed an estimated 500,000 Chadian workers in 1978.[45]

At the same time, the basis for political enmity between these two nations was set in the early 1960s, when Chad's southern bias in government offended many Sudanese Muslims. Sudan allowed FROLINAT rebels to organize, train, and establish bases in western Sudan and to conduct raids into Chad from Sudan's Darfur Province. Refugees from both countries fled across their mutual border. Following the coup that ousted Tombalbaye in 1975, relations between presidents Jaafar a Numayri and Malloum were surprisingly cordial, in part because both nations feared Libyan destabilization. Sudan sponsored talks among Chad's rebel army leaders in the late 1970s and urged Malloum to incorporate them into his government These ties were strained in part because of Numayri's warming relations with Libyan leader Qadhaafi. As violence in Chad increased between 1979 and 1982, Sudan faced its own internal rebellion, and relations deteriorated after Numayri was ousted in 1983. In 1988 Habre assailed Sudan for allowing Libyan troops to be stationed along Chad's border and for continuing to allow assaults on Chadian territory from Sudan.[46]

The conservative Arab states were also keen to promote a Settlement in Chad but they were against the installation of a

[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

Government there, which was pro-Libyan. For instance the pro-western state of Sudan feared that its long and open border would enable the opponents of Gen. Numeiri, who had taken shelter in Chad, to cross into its terrilory with the subject of overthrowing his regime.[47] Despite centuries-old cultural ties to Arab North Africa, Chad maintained few significant ties to North African or Middle Eastern states in the 1980s. President Habre hoped to pursue greater solidarity with Arab nations in the future, however, viewing closer relations with Arab states as a potential opportunity to break out of his nation's postcolonial dependence and assert Chad's unwillingness to serve as an arena for superpower rivalries. In addition, as a northern Muslim, Habre represented a constituency that favored Afro-Arab solidarity, and he hoped Islam would provide a basis for national unity in the long term. For these reasons, he was expected to seize opportunities during the 1990s to pursue closer ties with Arab nations. During the 1980s, Several Arab states had supported Libyan claims to the AOZOU strip. Algeria was among the most outspoken of these states and provided training for anti-Habre forces, although most recruits for its training programs were from Nigeria or Cameroon, recruited and flown to Algeria by Libya. By the end of 1987, Algiers and N'Djamena were negotiating to improve relations. Lebanon's Progressive Socialist Party also sent troops to support Qadhafi's efforts against Chad in 1987, but other Arab states and the League of Arab States limited their involvement to expressions of hope that the dispute over the Aozou Strip could be settled peacefully.[48]

Chad maintained generally close ties with its other African neighbors, but the primary base of these ties were Chad's economic and security needs, together with other governments concerns for regional

[47] S.C. Saxena, n.11, p. 282.
[48] "Chad Relation with other African state"
        http://www.relationwithotherafricanstates.com

stability. Overall, African states sought o protect their own interests to isolate or contain Chad's continuing violence without becoming involved militarily. As France was attempting to transfer more responsibility to former colonies and sub regional powers, francophone African leaders urged each other and the former colonial power to increase assistance to Chad. Each side partially succeeded. African states had other reasons for ambivalence toward Chad in addition to their own security concerns. Chad's long- standing unrest, border conflicts, overall instability, and poverty contributed to its image as a relatively unimportant ally. It underwent frequent shifts in government; from 1979 to 1982, it was not always clear who was in charge.[49]

In 1982 Chad's new president, Habre, appeared to some African heads of state to be a Paris educated northerner with aristocratic pretensions, who had not done enough to win their support. Because of Chad's landlocked status and limited air transport service, Cameroon was an important neighbor and ally throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s. Access route and the two nations had concluded a number of agreements regarding trade, transportation, and communication. Chad's President Tombalbaye had clashed with the former president of Central African Republic, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, over the Imports and exports were shipped between Yaounde and N'Djamena by rail and road, as were military and food assistance shipments. Cameroon became an increasingly important trading partner during the 1980s, following unsuccessful attempts in the 1970s to conclude multilateral trade agreements with Congo and Central African Republic. In 1987 Cameroon was Chad's third largest source of imports after France and the United States, and Cameroon purchased Chadian cotton and agricultural

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[49]   Ibid.

product.[50]

The Cameroonian town of Kousseri had been an important supply center and refuge for Chadians during the worst violence of the late 1970s. The population of the town increased from 10,000 to 100,000 in 1979 and 1980. Cameroon's government urged France to increase assistance to stem Libyan advances because officials feared direct confrontation with Libyan troops and the influx of weapons and refugees from Chad. Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko was one of President Habre's most consistent allies in Central Africa. Even before Habre seized power in 1982, Mobutu's desire to lead Africa's pro-Western, anti Qadhaafi efforts and to compete with Nigeria as a sub regional power had led him to provide military training and troops for the IAF in Chad.

Chad's relations with Central African Republic were not cordial, but the two nations were generally on good terms. Central African Republic controlled another important establishment of a central African customs union in the late 1960s, however, leading Tombalbaye to close their common border. After this occurrence, Central African Republic remained fairly aloof from Chad's economic and security problems. Some Chadian refugees crossed into Central African Republic during the 1980s, but Bangui's major concern was preventing Chad's ongoing turmoil from spreading across its southern border.[51]

Islamic empire. Both nations also shared the dual heritage of Muslim and Christian influences and regional economic inequities, and both found themselves overshadowed by Nigeria's wealth and large population. Chad had become one of Africa's intractable dilemmas in the 1970s, confounding leaders who sought peace and prosperity for the

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

continent as a whole. Chad's conflict with Libya became symbolic of the OAU's frustrated attempts to impose a coherent framework on Africa, and it defied the OAU resolution to uphold colonially imposed boundaries and settle inter-African disputes peacefully. The OAU formed a series of ad-hoc committees to mediate the Chad Libya dispute, and in 1988 the six-committee Niger and Chad shared a number of common features of post independence political development, but these two landlocked, poor nations were unable to contribute noticeably to each other's progress. The inhabitants of their northern provinces-primarily Tuareg in Niger and Toubou groups in Chad-were both referred to by Libyan leader Qadhaafi as his ethnic constituents, and both nations complained of Libyan insurgence in these mineral rich areas. At the same time, important segments of both societies supported Qadhaafi goal of establishing a Central African members-Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Senegal-succeeded in bringing together foreign ministers from Chad and Libya to pursue diplomatic recognition and peace talks. The committee also requested written documentation of each side's claims to the Aozou Strip in the hope of finding a legal channel for curbing violence there.[52]

The U.S. intervention is an important feature of the present situation in Chad is the direct involvement of the US also. So far the U.S. had not directly intervened in Chad. Now, joining hands with France, the U.S. government has despatched massive military aid to Habre.[53] The U.S. has set up in Khartoum, capital of Sudan, headquarters to co. ordinate its military actions in Chad where two AWAC planes, eight F-15 fighters, two KC.IO tanker aircrafts, and a number of RC-135 strategic reconnaissance planes were sent to help Habre. In addition, the U.S. sent a large number of anti-aircraft weapons to Chad. Over 550 US officers

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[52]   Ibid.
[53]   S.C. Saxena, n. 11, pp. 312- 314.

and men were also sent to Chad. All this shows a stepped up U.S. willingness to commit military forces to trouble spots anywhere in the world. As part of the same process the US moved its nuclear-powered carrier "Eisenhower" and the conventionally-powered "Coral Sea" closer to the Libyan territorial waters in order to deter Libya from providing any military assistance to Oueddei.[54]

An American researcher, Jay Peterzell, after interviewing Scores of current and former U.S. administration officials as well as Congressional sources and African diplomats, has revealed that the overthrow of Oueddei and the installation of Habre in his place were masterminded by the CIA. Peterzell, in his report, has stated that by the spring of 1981 the newly elected Reagan government had decided to supply Habre with money, arms and ammunition, vehicles, gasoline and other equipment and that this operation was coordinated with both Egypt and Sudan which furnished Habre's forces with equipment from their own stockpiles in exchange of U.S. replacements.[55] His report further reveals that by the end of 1981 the US commitment to Habre had totalled about $ 10 million up to half of which was used to cover transportation costs, the rest going for aid and material. It might be recalled that the western countries were raising lot of hue and cry when the Libyan troops in Chad were providing protection to Oueddei's government but they are silent now when French and Zairean troops are doing the same thing for Habre. Peterzell's report reveals that even after the Libyan troops withdrawal from Chad at the request of Oueddei and the introduction of the African Pease-keeping Force in the country, the CIA support for Habre continued.[56]

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[54] Ibid.
[55] *The Times of India* (Delhi), 25 January 1884.
[56] Ibid.

There are many reasons why the US has helped Habre to come to power in Chad after overthrowing the Government of National Unity. Firstly, as Peterzell says, the US wants to check Libya, which is providing help to Oueddei. The U.S hostility towards Libya is too well known to need any confirmation. Washington appears to be ready and willing to do anything to remove Col. Qadhafi from power. The U.S. has its own political and economic interests in Africa. It wants to guard and expand them. These objectives can be achieved only when stooges like Habre are in power in African countries. Habre joins the galaxy of African leaders who are ready to sacrifice the interests of Africa to appease the West-Gen. Mobutu of Zaire, President Houphet Boigneyof Ivory Coast, King Hassan of Morocco, President Bourguiba of Tunisia, President Mubarak of Egypt, Gen. Numeiri of Sudan and President Syed Barre of Somalia. An important thing in connection with the U.S. intervention in Chad is that it gave aid amounting to S 10 million and arms to Habre who was then in Sudan and the Chadian Government was headed by Oueddei.[57]

Oueddei was friendly to France, had sent. Libyan soldiers back to - their own country, and had freed unharmed Francoise Claustre, the French ethnologist, whom Habre had held captive for almost three years. And yet the US did all that it could to bring about the overthrow of Oueddei by helping Habre. It was this action of the, United States that had prompted Col. Qadhafi to come to the help of Oueddei again. In the present phase of foreign interventions the U.S. has been exercising utmost pressure upon France in order to make it escalate its intervention of Libya as an opportunity to bring about the fall of Cal. Qadhafi's regime. However, though, France has intervened in Chad in a big way, it does not seem to be inclined, at present at least, to escalate

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[57] S. C. Saxena, "Gaddafi and the West" (Delhi), *The Hindustan Times,* 26 July 1983.

its intervention to the level the US wants it to do. It seems to be willing to do up to that much so that it can protect Habre's regime but it is not inclined to have military confrontation with Libya. It has drawn a "red line" beyond which it would not send its forces either to defeat Oueddej's forces or to drive away the Libyan forces if there are any ill in the northern part of Chad.[58]

The performance of the OAU in Chad was disappointing, given the gravity of the crisis. Indeed, Libya's incorporation of Chad territory—the first time that a member state had done so to another sovereign member state—was in contempt of the OAU charter yet, for the most part, the OAU avoided the conflict. It finally decided to consider the matter only after Malloum threatened in 1977 to take the case of Libya's interference and seeking UN intervention would have exposed the ineffectiveness of the organization. Malloum followed through on his threat, forcing the Security Council to meet on February 17, 1977. In response, France exerted enough pressure on Chad that bit withdrew its complaint in favor of an international conference. Thereafter, the UN remained virtually uninvolved in the Chadian conflict throughout its duration. Fear of embarrassment finally forced the OAU to appoint a Conciliation Committee made up of Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Gabon and Mozambique. The major OAU operation was the failed mission of the 1981 Inter-African Force (IAF). Regrettably, the IAF was badly financed. It relied on some $12 million pledged by the United States to fulfill its unclear mission in Chad and it was short on troops while Togo, Niger, and Guinea revoked their decision to participate in the proposed multinational force. Even worse, once the contingent from Zaire, Senegal, and Nigeria was in place in N'Djamena, its Nigerian Commander-in-Chief, General Geoffrey Ejiga, understood his mission to

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[58]   Ibid.

be the prevention of factions from fighting each other, while the GUNT thought the force was there to defend the "legitimate" regime, as the departing Libyans had done. [59]

Thus, when Habre and Gukuni's troops began fighting in June 1982, the IAF simply looked on. As one recalls, Reagan had not only exerted pressure on France to intervene decisively but had also assisted Habre financially and militarily. Perhaps the OAU deserves credit for making things extremely uncomfortable for Colonel Kadhafi after the 1981 merger announcement. It refused to seat any Chadian delegation at its summits until 1983 collectively it condemned the Colonel's idea of a merger with Chad according to most observers, the OAU forced him to withdraw unexpectedly and hurriedly from Chad in November 1981 it denied the Colonel the chairmanship of the OAU in 1982 and 1983 and, until mid-1982, it provided moral support to the GUNT. Denial of the chairmanship of the OAU seems to have had a greater impact on the Colonel than most observers expected.[60]

On balance, the OAU -action or inaction on Chad remained more of a failure than a success throughout the conflict. Indeed, the Organization procrastinated in its handling of the conflict, gave unclear instructions to its Commissions, and was generally paralyzed by its fear of Colonel Kadhafi. As Zartman again notes, "In the end, one weakness leading to another, even defaulted on its obligations to uphold colonially inherited borders and to denounce military invasion by a neighboring country." Finally we could not end this without mention of the role the former Soviet Union may, or may not, have played in Chad's conflicts. The Soviet Union, then a superpower, seems to have been only indirectly involved in Chadian affairs as a major supplier of arms to Kadhafi's

[59] Mario J. Azevedo, n. 41, pp. 155-165.
[60] Ibid.

regime in exchange for oil. But the Soviets never considered Libya an important ally and were not convinced that it could match French power or control Chad for a sustained period. Furthermore, analysts point out that the Soviets reasoned that Kadhafi would be eased out of office by a combination of economic crises and American pressure. When the United States crossed the so- called "line of death" demarcated on the sea and bombed Libya in April 1986, the Soviet Union did nothing but present a pro forma protest and refused the request of Libya's General Jaloud that the northern African country be accepted as a member of the Warsaw pact.[61]

Instead, the soviet were annoyed that Kadhafi's inexperienced officers used soviet SAM-5 missiles during the sirte incursions against the United States, allowing the rival superpower to measure the effectiveness of the missiles. One can therefore conclude that the Soviet Union only remotely contributed to the conflict and violence in Chad and that during the post-Cold War era, beginning in 1988, whatever was left of the Soviet-Libyan relationship had little effect on the war in Chad.

Between 1959 and 1988, Chad's constitution was revised six times and altered by several major amendments. The preindependence constitution adopted by the territorial assembly in March 1959 was modified at independence in 1960. The new document established a parliamentary system of government with an executive prime minister. Further revisions in 1962 strengthened the executive, and the 1965 constitution eliminated all rivals to the ruling party, the PPT. In 1973 President Tombalbaye codified in the constitution his version of the authenticity movement to reaffirm indigenous values. This movement required civil servants to undergo initiation rites common to some ethnic

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[61] Ibid.

constituencies of the south. Following a military coup in 1975, in which Tombalbaye was killed, and the general deterioration of state institutions, lengthy negotiations in 1978 led to a new constitution that established an unsuccessful coalition among Chad's warring factions.[62]

In June 1982, when Habre seized control of N'Djamena, he dissolved the existing government and in October promulgated the Fundamental Law, a document that served as an interim constitution through 1988. In July 1988, Habre appointed a constitutional committee to draft a new document to be presented to the government in 1989. The Fundamental Law of 1982 declared Chad a secular, indivisible republic, with ultimate power deriving from the people. Both French and Arabic were adopted as official languages, and "Unity-Work-Progress" was adopted as the nation's motto. The constitution authorized the office of president, Council of Ministers (cabinet), National Advisory Council (Conseil National Consultatif--CNC, an interim legislature), and National Army. It placed overriding authority for controlling all of these in the office of the president. During its first nearly three decades of independence, Chad had a strong president and weak state institutions, but it also enjoyed some benefits of the weakness of the state. It had been spared much of the flamboyant political posturing that was evident in a few more peaceful and prosperous nations. Habre had not squandered public resources on grandiose monuments to himself, nor had he encouraged a sycophantic cult of personality. Public office was not yet synonymous with extraordinary wealth, and, as a result, public cynicism toward government in the 1980s was surprisingly low. [63]

[62]   H.M.L.Beri, "Civil War in Chad" (New Delhi) *Democratic world,* vol. X11 (37), Sept 1983, pp. 46-47
[63]   Ibid.

Chad's political shifts in the early 1980s resulted from international fears of Libyan intervention through influence in Goukouni's regime; France's revised African policy following the Socialist Party's election victory in 1981, and military gains by Habre. Habre had served in governments led by Tombalbaye, Malloum, and Goukouni, and he had led insurgencies against all. Finally in 1982, with loyal northern forces and French and United States support, Habré ousted Goukouni and proclaimed himself president of Chad. Habre's patrimonial state was another authoritarian regime. A written constitution empowered him to appoint almost all high officials and reduced the legislative branch to a token assembly. He determined the pace and direction of activity in all branches of government. At the same time, Habré gained popular support by stabilizing Chad and working to establish peace. He also began to reintroduce social services to a population for whom warfare had been the most noticeable sign of government activity. In 1988 factional dynamics in Chad still resembled precolonial politics. Habre was a master strategist in this arena, and he succeeded in winning over numerous former opponents through combined military and political means. Nevertheless, the threats of new rifts among allies and of future alliances among enemies still existed, in keeping with the model of the segmentary political systems that had dominated the region for centuries. To strengthen existing ties among former opponents and to mobilize grass-roots support for his government, Habre proclaimed his intention in 1988 to transform the ruling party, UNIR, into a people's vanguard party. Many people in outlying areas were still skeptical of the need for an increased governmental presence, however, and many southerners still considered national government a northern imposition. Both problems underlined the political challenge that faced Chad as the 1990s approached.

Chad is a poor, landlocked country independent from France since 1960. It faces ethnic and religious cleavages broadly dividing an Islamic north from the primarily Christian south. This country of 7.5 million inhabitants is emerging from decades of civil war and foreign intervention. Northern President DEBY, in power since 1990 via a military coup, is trying to legitimise his power through a flawed democratic process. The last presidential elections, on 20 May 2001, were in fact marked by serious irregularities. Nevertheless President DEBY is expected to reinforce his position during the next few years, after oil revenue begins to accumulate in late 2003.[64]

The seizure of power by General F.Bozize in the Central African Republic (CAR) – an action supported by Chadian forces – has greatly diminished the threat of insecurity in the southern oil-producing region. CAR rebels led by Gen. Bozize, along with Chad mercenaries, occupied Bangui after short clashes. Chadian troops were invited to take part in the CEMAC observation force during the CEMAC Summit on 21 March 2003 in Brazzaville. Further weakening of the northern rebel group, Mouvement pour la Democratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT), owing to internal divisions and defections, has de facto reinforced Mr. Deby's position. The government of Chad signed a peace agreement with one of the main rebel groups, the National Resistance Army (ANR) on 10 January 2003. The agreement, signed in Gabon, provides for an immediate ceasefire and an amnesty for all ANR fighters and supporters active in eastern Chad, near the border with Sudan and the CAR. Nonetheless in June 2003 an alliance between different Chadian rebel groups (ANR and MDJT) was formed in Benin with Libyan support, jeopardising the previous peace agreements.[65]

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[64] Robert Buijtenhuijs, *Chad: The narrow escape of an African state, 1965-1987* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 49-58.
[65] Ibid.

Relations with Libya remain uncertain, despite a visit in July to Chad by the Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, who affirmed his support to President Deby, following rumors about the Chadian President's health. Relations with Sudan may continue to be complicated by the emergence of Sudanese rebels with ethnic ties to Mr.Deby. Chad appears to have no interest in supporting this rebellion, but Mr. Deby may find it difficult to influence his Zaghawa clansmen across the border. [66]

As the opposition parties are likely to remain marginalized, competition for political influence shifted to within the ruling Movement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) where reformist and conservative factions engaged in bitter infighting. However as Mr. Deby is widely expected to modify the constitution and seek a third term, these disputes may instead be relegated to the reformers' desire to wield the patronage power of the MPS more expansively beyond the party's conservative base. The government is still expected to use its patronage power and control over the electoral process to ensure that the MPS dominates at the polls. Opposition parties may attempt to compete in the southern regions, where they have strong support, but several parties will probably boycott further elections scheduled for 2005- if effective monitoring mechanisms are not set up. The conservative faction of the ruling MPS reasserted its control of the party in a cabinet reshuffle on June 25, 2003. The highest profile casualty was the prime minister, Haroun Kabadi, who was replaced by Moussa Faki, a nephew and close associate of the president, I.Deby. The appointment of Mr.Faki breaches an unspoken rule that reserves the prime minister's office for a southerner while the presidency and real political power is held by the northerners Speculation over the president's condition – Mr. Deby was hospitalised in Paris on 12 July, 2003 – has also been fuelled by reports that the National Assembly has

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[66] Ibid.

drafted legislation that would authorise the prime minister to govern temporarily in Mr. Deby's absence.

Chad is a member of an important number of regional organizations in Central Africa. The most significant is CEMAC, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (25 million inhabitants). Despite 40 years of economic co-operation, trade inside the region barely reaches 3% of total trade of the 6 countries. In 1997, Chad was also a founding member of the COMESSA / CEN - SAD, a community of the Sahel and Saharan states financed mainly by Libya. During the 3 June 2003 Extraordinary CEMAC summit, CEMAC leaders recognized the new Central African government and reaffirmed the regional decision to reinforce the CEMAC contingent. (350 men: 150 from Gabon, 100 from Chad (officially) - 100 from Congo), an insufficient deterrent force, able only to secure the capital, Bangui. In fact the six Heads of State of the Region made a decision to use CEMAC as a vehicle for their intervention forces supporting the peace process in CAR, despite the lack of mandate for CEMAC for co-ordinating or supervising national forces from CEMAC member states. [67]

In general, relations with European Union are good, but they were affected following the allegations of fraud during the last presidential elections, organized on 20 May 2001. Following the 15 March 2003 Central African Republic military coup, Commissioner Nielson stressed the need for a co-ordinated, multi-pronged regional approach starting with discussions under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. In this way, the Commission is trying to combine article 96 for CAR with article 8 for Chad, making the necessary link to the illegal extraction of natural resources that is fuelling the instability in the region. The June 2003

[67] Ibid.

Kimberly mission in Central African Republic is a positive example of an initiative supported by the EC to tackle these illegal flows. Heavily dependent on Western donors and multilateral agencies, Chad has been tightening its relations with non-democratic neighbours such as Libya and Sudan. Arab influence is particularly widespread in the Islamic north and most Islamic Funds are present in the country. Chad recently renewed its relations with Taiwan, which committed over 100 million US$ to finance development projects. This led to the departure of the People's Republic of China as a source of aid. The USA maintains an Embassy in N'Djamena, although co-operation is based on NGO financing and American companies (Exxon, Chevron) who lead the consortium in charge of future oil extraction. The IMF and the World Bank play an important role, as they are largely responsible for major structural reforms and monitoring public finance. The World Bank is also a key actor for the financing of the oil project. [68]

Social and Political tension and problems in Chad has been because of a long drawn historical process which has got both a external and internal dimensions in it. Territorial interest of the neighboring countries on Chad specially of Libya and Sudan due to the interest of those countries in the natural wealth of the disputed areas and the claims and counter claims of it is a root cause of instability in Chad .The social demography of Chad based on the basis on difference of religious identity   has helped the countries like Libya and Sudan to interfere into the internal political conflicts of Chad.

France on the other hand being the former colonial master of Chad has played a pivotal role in the social, economic and political process of Chad. Chad being its former colony, France has always felt that it has a moral obligation to protect the strategic, economic and political interest

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[68]   Ibid.

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of Chad against any external threats or any internal conflict. The political obligation of France towards Chad due to its strategic and defense treaties with Chad also brought in France in its regional and internal conflicts. Most of the Regimes in Chad have been puppet regimes of France as France has a political and strategic interest to maintain its sphere of influence and strategic balance in the northern and central Africa.

The religious conflict in Chad between Its northern and southern section due to the conflict of majority Islam and with the minority Christian population for the control of social and economic space coupled with the tug of war for the control of the central regime in Chad aggravated the problem further and it added fuel to the fire for the control of national space in Chad with a resultant interest of its neighbors for meddling into the internal affairs of Chad which further aggravated the political and social instability in Chad and the country even today is yet to come out of this process .This has led a perpetual process of Political decay in Chad with a permanent simmering social and religious conflict in Chad.

Chapter IV

Socio-Economic Impact
of
Political Instability

CHAPTER – IV

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
POLITICAL INSTABILITY

For any Nation the socio-economic background plays a major role in the politics of any country. The socio-economic structure of a country is very vital for the political stability of a country. The internal dynamics of a nation state in terms of its socio-economic and cultural components play a very vital role in the economic development of a nation as well as in its political process .The political stability or instability of a nation state is to a great extent based on this vital component as it helps tremendously in the nation building process of any country. The political instability of Chad is mainly due to the nature of the socio-economic impact of the country in its nation –building process.

Political instability affects economic performance relates to political economy and consists in the reduction of time horizon that politicians might suffer when instability is high. In a context of high instability, politicians tend to avoid structural reforms and lead wait-and-see policies instead in order to limit disagreement with the population and the other political parties. A government can also choose to pursue the same economic policy in spite of all the evidence, in order to defeat its opponents.[1]

Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world, rating 167th in the Human Development Index with a GDP of 200 € per capita. An

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[1]   Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Celine Kauffmann, "Political instability, political regimes and economic performance in African countries", published by *African Development Bank and OECD Development Center*, 2002, pp. 6-8.

estimated 80% of its population lives on less than one dollar a day. There is no single cause for this extreme level of poverty. Much of Chad's modern history has been marred by a combination of many of the factors associated with poor economic and social performance: political instability, inadequate economic policies, rapid population growth (close to 3% per year) and an unfavorable physical environment. The energy sector has continued to be hampered by problems of limited capacity, fuel shortages and related power outages. Chad will face a crucial economic transition in the next two years when the construction phase of the Doba oil project is completed and oil revenue begins to come on stream in late 2003. As the oil revenue is expected to double fiscal revenue in 2004, the government will be hard pressed to absorb this income efficiently and invest it effectively to promote further growth and reduce poverty.[2]

Economic policy will therefore concentrate on developing institutional capacity for the management of oil revenue. The government's intention is to continue to implement policy reforms to reach completion point under the IMF-WB's heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative. After numerous delays, Chad has finalized its poverty reduction strategy paper in July 2003. Assuming policies remain on track, Chad is likely to reach HIPC completion point by mid-2004. Pressure on consumer prices will remain high (6%) during the 2003, owing to the strong domestic demand created by the Doba oil project and the coming of stream of oil revenue in late 2003. There will be additional inflationary pressure owing to the poor food harvest in 2002.[3]

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[2] "Economic situation in Chad" http://www.europadevelopmentcountriesstudies.com
[3] Ibid.

Chad is a landlocked country with a long history of civil war, continued political and socio-economic instability, a weak judicial system, widespread corruption and an all-encompassing institutional capacity problem. This is an extremely challenging environment in which to attempt to turn oil revenues into benefits for the poor. And the stakes are high if Chad's oil money is mismanaged, it could mean increased hardships and conflict for the nearly seven million people in Chad living on less than $1 per day. Since independence in 1960, Chad has known more years of war than of peace, and rising tensions in the region mean that violence is never far off. A coup attempt in May 2004 reminded observers of the fragile political environment, and tensions have increased over the attempt by President Idriss Deby ruling party to change the constitution to allow him to run for a third term in 2006. The Chadian oil experiment depends largely on the political will of the government to respect the rule of law where there is little history of doing so, to develop accountability institutions, and to encourage democracy. In an environment where the government faces internal and external threats, such political will appears to be in short supply. After decades of on-again, off-again exploration and negotiations, in July 2003 Chadian oil began to flow through the 1,050-kilometer pipeline, produced by a consortium comprised of ExxonMobil, Chevron Texaco and Petronas, the Malaysian state oil company. Production from the three active fields in the Doba basin reached its current peak capacity of 225,000 barrels per day in late 2004 and more than 60 tanker shipments have been exported to date. Beyond the 1 billion barrel estimated reserves in these three fields, the presence of the pipeline infrastructure is spurring new oil production and exploration in Chad. ExxonMobil plans to add five new "satellite" fields to its existing production in 2005-2006 and, together with other companies like Canada's EnCana, is exploring other parts of Chad. With these ongoing activities and the government's efforts to

attract more investment in the sector, Chad's oil windfall is likely to be much larger than originally predicted.[4]

There is scepticism on behalf of the international community about Chad (and Cameroon's) capacity to face environmental and social constraints caused by the oil project. The use of part of the "oil bonus" (advanced by the petrol companies) to purchase arms increased donors' doubts about the willingness of the government to ensure transparency in the use of oil revenues. The monitoring reports and the WB independent evaluation report (12 September 2002) clearly show that the project is now shifting away from its initial poverty reduction objectives to risk management objectives. Transparency International recently ranked Chad the most corrupt of 21 African countries in a survey on good governance criteria. The IMF in June 2003 said economic performance was broadly satisfactory, but noted an erosion of external competitiveness owing to inflation, and cautioned against over dependence on oil revenue. Governance is unlikely to improve significantly without a fundamental change of the political power, still concentrated among members of the inner circle of the President. Capacity building and the training to ensure the effective management, monitoring and control of the project are the most critical component and one of the areas that are still weak.[5]

The most concrete long-term goal of the Jamahiriya is in the economic sphere. Due to the continued violence throughout Chad and the limited access to the extremes of the territory, mineral and resource exploration has been severely hampered. Reported claims of uranium

[4]   David Hilling, *Chad, Africa south of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications, 2004), pp. 218-219.

[5]   "Growth and Structure of the Economy in Chad" http://www.europadevelopmentcountriesstudies.com

finds near Aouzou and other areas of the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region remains unsubstantiated. However, the existence of valuable minerals is plausible given the similarity in land and rock formation with the Arlit Massif in Northeastern Niger. Petroleum exploration has been restricted due to insecurity throughout the territory. A report issued in October 1983 stated that Chadian oil self-sufficiency is feasible. This prediction was based on research conducted by the Continental Oil Company (CONOCO), which spearheaded the search for oil when it obtained an exploration concession in 1969.[6]

A group comprising the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Exxon Corporation, and Chevron later joined it. Drilling commenced in 1973 when fourteen wells were sunk in the Chari basin, regarded as the most promising, and seven in the Lake Chad basin. CONOCO made its best find in late 1975 in this basin northwest of N'Djamena. It was predicted then that, by 1978, a 1,500-barrel-per-day refinery could be built capable of meeting domestic needs apart from aviation fuels and lubricating oils. Unfortunately, all plans were aborted because existing military activity was dangerous. Libya's economic interest in Chad Is-secondary to the more intangible, ideological, political and cultural goals of the Jamahiriya. Although Chad's resource potential appears promising, it has not been greatly explored.[7]

Consequently, Libyan long-term interests in Chad, while taking into account the possible resource wealth of the territory, are more concerned with spreading the ideology of the Jamahiriya, creating a larger political community, and as a result, frustrating. West particularly French, influence with the states of trans-Saharan Africa. Chad's

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[6]   Ibid.

[7]   A.Alesina, S.Ozler, N.Roubini and P.Swagel, "Political Instability and Economic Growth", *Journal of Economic growth,* 1 June 1996, pp. 189-211.

remoteness, its inadequate infrastructure, its recent history of war, drought, and famine, and its dependency on a single cash crop-cotton-- for export earnings made it one of the poorest nations of the world. In the mid-1980s, Chad's gross national product per capita was only US$160, which clearly reflected the extent of the nation's impoverishment. In the mid-1980s, Chad ranked among the five poorest nations of the world according to World Bank statistics.[8]

Chad's economy was based almost entirely on agriculture and pastoralism. In 1986 the World Bank estimated that approximately 83 percent of the country's economically active population worked in agriculture, 5 percent worked in industry, and 12 percent were engaged in services, including government employment, trade, and other service activities. Cotton processing, which includes ginning raw cotton into fiber for export, some spinning and weaving, and producing edible oil from cottonseed for local consumption, dominated the industry. Figures for the gross domestic product (GDP) also reflected agriculture's importance. In 1986 the World Bank estimated that 46.3 percent of Chad's GDP came from agriculture and pastoralism. Industry and manufacturing accounted for only 17.9 percent of GDP, while services represented 35.7 percent of GDP. Geography and climate played an influential role in Chad's economy.[9]

The country is divided into three major climatic zones-- Saharan, Sahelian, and Sudanian--that are distinguished by the level of annual average rainfall. There are only two productive zones--the *soudanian* cotton-producing zone of the south, sometimes called Le Tchad Utile (Useful Chad), and the central Sahelian cattle-herding region. The

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[8]   Ibid.

[9]   A.K.Fosu, "Political Instability and Economy growth: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa", *Economic Development and Cultural change* 40 (4), 1992, pp. 829-830.

northern Saharan region produces little. In 1987 Chad's economy was dependent on a single cash crop-- cotton. Like most other single-crop economies in the Third World, when world commodity prices were high, conditions improved. When those prices fell, conditions worsened. Despite several important swings, during the 1970s and particularly in the early 1980s, cotton prices were good. Chad's cotton revenues peaked in 1983 and 1984, but in 1985 world cotton prices fell steeply, nearly crippling the cotton industry.[10]

This decline forced a major economic restructuring under the auspices of the World Bank and foreign donors. To revive the cotton industry, a 1986 restructuring program curtailed all cotton-derived revenues to the government until world prices rebounded. This program forced cutbacks on the production of raw cotton and limited the level of government support to producers for improved cropping methods, ginning, and other related industrial operations. Cattle and beef exports followed cotton in economic importance. Estimates of the value of these exports varied greatly because large numbers of livestock left the country "on the hoof," totally outside the control of customs officials. Nevertheless, cattle and beef exports accounted for 30 to 60 percent of all exports from 1975 through 1985, depending on the value of the cotton crop in a given year. Approximately 29 percent of Chadian's depended almost entirely on livestock for their livelihood in the early 1980s, and livestock and their by-products represented around 26 percent of GNP.[11]

Chad's lack of resources limited the exploitation of mineral deposits. There were known deposits of bauxite in the southern regions, and reports indicated deposits of uranium and some other minerals in

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid, pp. 832-835.

the Tibesti Mountains and Aozou Strip. Even in late 1987, however, no bauxite was being mined, and because of hostilities in the northern zones, claims of mineral deposits there had not been verified. Chad's only mining industry was the traditional exploitation of sodium carbonate in dried beds around Lake Chad. Oil offered one of the few reasons for economic optimism. In 1974 a consortium of companies led by Conoco discovered oil near Rig Rig, north of Lake Chad. Plans to exploit these reserves, estimated at 438 million barrels, and to build a small refinery to serve Chad's domestic needs were delayed in the late 1970s and early 1980s because of The Chadian Civil War. In 1986 the government--with World Bank support--revived the idea, and plans called for operations to begin in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, these deposits would ensure only Chad's domestic needs, and no oil would be exported. In 1985 Exxon, which had become the leader of the exploratory consortium, discovered oil in southern Chad, near Doba.[12]

The size of the reserves was not known, although it was believed to be large. Exxon, however, suspended drilling in 1986 when world oil prices fell. Remoteness and distance are prime features of economic life in Chad. Transportation and communications are difficult, both internally and externally. Douala, Cameroon, the nearest port from N'Djamena, is 1,700 kilometers away. By the mid-1980s, the only paved roads linking the capital to the interior, some 250 kilometers of hardtop, had disappeared because of insufficient maintenance. Of the estimated 31,000 kilometers of dirt roads and tracks, only 1,260 kilometers were all-weather roads. The remainder became impassable during the rainy season. There were no railroads in Chad. Since independence, Chad has

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[12] S.Dessus, J-D.Lafay, and C.Morrison, "A Politico-economic Model for Stabilisation in Africa", *Journal of African Economies,* vol. 7, 1, 1994, pp. 91-95.

relied on outside donors and regional institutions for economic survival and development.[13]

Chad's principal sponsor has been France, which has subsidized the budget. Through the mechanisms of the Lome Convention between the member of the European Economics Community (EEC) and their farmer colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), France has also subsidized Chad's cotton production and exports. French companies have dominated trade, and French banks have controlled Chad's finances. Information on Chadian government finances was fragmentary and inconsistent. The political instability from 1976 to 1982 left large sections of the country beyond any form of central control, and during this period the state had very few finances. After 1982, however, fragmentary estimates indicated a growing importance of donor finances and a decline in internally generated revenues. In addition, during the 1980s military spending was high. Although the proportion of real government expenditures for defense was difficult to assess, it could have represented as much as 70 percent of government spending. Despite a measure of political stability after 1982, the situation worsened in 1985 with the collapse of cotton revenues. In 1986 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) joined in efforts by other donors, including France, the EEC, and the United States, to stabilize Chad's financial and budget difficulties.[14]

Dispite the diversity of the datasets as well as the methodologies used, the empirical studies suggest a significant negative correlation between political instability and economic growth. Guillaumont and Brun (1999) goes even further, showing that political instability combined with

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[13] Ibid, pp. 96-97.
[14] Ibid, pp. 98-100.

trade instability are the main factors behind the poor economic performance of African countries on 1994-2002.[15]

Concerning the channels, there is debate whether institutions affect economic performance directly or more indirectly, through production-factor efficiency and the establishment of an environment conducive for business. The inconclusive impact of democracy on growth points towards an indirect influence, as underlined by Tavares and Wacziarg. The authors then turn towards more complex models than the traditional "Barro" one equation specification to justify the inter-link between the economic and the political spheres. To that purpose, they systematically investigate nine channels through which they assume democracy might affect growth, using a simultaneous equations model. Two channels emerge as highly influential through human capital accumulation and through political stability.[16]

Fosu insists on the role of human capital accumulation as the channel through which political instability affects growth. He proves his point using multiplied (interactive) variables in the specification. However, Guillaumont, Guillaumont and Brun question these results in the case of African countries and show that political instability, defined as a combination of coups d'etat and foreign/civil wars, directly affects the residuals of the growth equation. The channels are not the only issues at stake in the debate about political institutions and economic performance. Causality is also a major concern. Limongi and Przeworki justify the unclear impact of democracy on economic performance through methodological problems.[17]

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15 Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Celine Kauffmann, n. 1.
16 Ibid.
17 A. K. Fosu, n. 9.

They argue that it is impossible to compare the incidence of democracy and dictatorship holding everything else constant providing that dictatorships develop more easily when the economic situation is difficult. But because most studies limit the analysis to the impact of political factors on economic performance, completely overlooking one side of the relationship, they face simultaneity and endogeneity problems. By contrast, Limongi and Przeworki suggest that the economic context has a significant influence on the development of the institutions and might help justifying the settling of democracy. The economic determinants of the political context have been little investigated in the economic literature. After Lipset economic development has been seen as an important factor in promoting political stability and democracy according to the argument that in wealthy societies, redistribution conflicts are defused. By contrast, the correlation between economic growth and political context remains unclear. While weak economic performance is likely to spark redistribution conflicts, a strong growth might destabilize the economy.[18]

Among the political determinants of the institutional environment, democracy is considered to help strengthen political stability. Democracy involves rules and opposition force that reduce the risk of arbitrary decisions. Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson underline that a democratic system is more likely to ensure the respect of property rights and the enforcement of contracts. Going back to Weber (1922), one can also argue that turnovers under democracies are less likely to bring political unrest since they are regulated by a legal framework. However, if democracy strengthens political stability, political stability is symmetrically more likely to help democracy settle. Few empirical studies tackle the interaction between the economic and the political spheres at

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[18] *Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Cameroon, CAR, Chad* (London), 4th Quarter, 1994, p. 37.

a global level, taking into account the correlation between political factors. Among those frameworks, Tavarès and Wacziarg (1997) and Poirson (1998) confirm the negative correlation between democracy and political instability.[19]

In order to both follow through the political developments in the countries under study in the African Economic Outlook (2002), recently published by the African Development Bank and the OECD, and to assess the interaction between the institutional context and economic performance, three political indicators were computed. It is in particular tempting to test whether economic variables affect political instability. This is what is attempted in this section, again based on the data collected by the African Development Bank and the OECD for producing the African Economic Outlook. In doing so, we face an inevitable limitation, which is the lack of quarterly economic data.[20]

As seen earlier, political instability is partly driven by the hardening of the regime. It is worth noting that the lagged value of political instability does not have a significant impact on its current level when included in the regression, while it was significant on a quarterly basis. This suggests that there is only a short period of persistence of political instability. In addition, the econometric test suggests that political factors are not only affected by political shocks but also by economic performance since growth displays a significant impact on political instability. Faster growing countries are less likely to experience political instability. While the literature on the subject does not provide any clear results. Softened troubles instead of exacerbating them over the last 9 years. How, the relevant ever-economic performance estimator

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[19] Bernard Lanne, *Chad: Recent History, In Africa: South of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications, 2004), pp. 219-220.

[20] Ibid.

is not the GDP growth in volume, but an indicator of growth in value, underlying the importance of shocks on revenues in explaining the discontent of the population.[21]

The impact of volume growth is much less significant. Political instability has a direct negative impact on the accumulation of private investment. This effect does not hold for public investment highlighting the fact that the two types of investment respond to different incentives. Private investment is highly sensitive to the institutional environment and the performance of the economy, hence justifying that both growth and instability are highly significant in the regression. On the contrary, public investment is a tool in the hands of the government to compensate for the lack of private investment and as such may have counter-cyclical behaviour.

Political instability affects growth by hindering physical capital accumulation. It may also affect growth indirectly through the returns of investment, or directly through total factor productivity. Although political instability has no linear impact on growth a simple Chow test shows that the structural parameters of the growth equation are highly dependent on the level of troubles experienced by the countries. The break in the coefficients was tested in a systematic way by using all levels of political instability. As a result, the strongest difference was found between countries with and without instability, rather than between countries with different levels of trouble.[22]

France's primary concern in Chad is to contain the problem of disorder. The former colonial power has attempted to maintain and

[21]   R.J.Barro, "Democracy and Growth", *Journal of Economic Growth* (1) 1 March 1996, pp. 1-12.

[22]   Ibid, pp. 13-20.

reconstitute the institutional patterns of the state by relying on the built-in structures of French aid and cooperation as well as its intervention capabilities. France has played three roles in its capacity as Chad's primary patron: guardian, caretaker, and catalyst. The first two roles, that of guardian and caretaker, emphasize the dependent nature of Chad on France for safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as the continued functioning of key state sectors. In its role as catalyst, France has attempted to break free of the severe dependence of Chad on it and to reconstitute an independent, sovereign, functioning state. France, in its role as guardian, has sought to protect Chadian sovereignty and territorial integrity and to safeguard its own interests in Chad and throughout the region. In addition, France, although not particularly desiring the role has been the guardian of Western interests in Chad and in trans-Saharan Africa. Ultimately in Chad, failing the efforts of economic and technical cooperation to create a stable, functioning Chadian state, France has relied on the forces d' intervention in its capacity as guardian.[23]

It has been a mixture of economic, technical and military policies that have attempted to guard the Chadian state from internal disintegration and external threat, to protect French interests in the region and to safeguard the Western presence in trans-Saharan Africa. Besides guarding Chad in the face of internal disorder and external threat, the military interventions have served to protect French interests, who have included access to important minerals and energy needs, maintaining its ability for independent action, protecting personnel in Chad, and safeguarding strategic interest. Clearly, vital economic calculations of France have guided its political and security policy in Chad and throughout trans-Saharan Africa. Chad's mineral wealth

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[23] Michael P. Kelley, *A State in Disarray conditions of Chad's Survival* (USA: West view press 1986), pp. 53-59.

remains largely unexplored. But due to its geographical position, not only does it seem likely that Chad may contain mineral deposits, but it is placed in the middle of French economic interests in the region. Bassey Eyo Ate notes that more than two-thirds of the uranium currently used in French nuclear reactors is extracted from Niger and Gabon and about eighteen percent of its energy needs are supplied by its nuclear industry. French military interventions have not been unconnected to its desire to protect access to these critical resources. Equally important for France is the importance of flows of oil for national needs. Its oil needs are indirectly linked with France's military industrial complex.[24]

This in turn, has had much to say for the conduct of Franco-Libyan relations since the mid-1970s. Arms transfers have played an important part in offsetting costly oil imports. In the three years succeeding the 1973 oil crisis, arms sales covered less than one-fifth of France's oil imports. According to unofficial French estimates, arms deliveries met one-third of France's oil import costs in 1977. During the first half of 1982, eighty-three percent of arms sales were destined for the Middle East and North Africa and seventy three percent of these sales were in the aeronautical sector. France has needed to sell more military weaponry to meet oil-importing costs. This reality has considerably affected Franco-Chadian relations' vis-à-vis Libya.

France's oil connections with Libya have been given as the reason for its permissive attitude throughout the autumn of 1980 prior to the Libyan intervention in Chad in December of that year. Despite the Libyan military intervention and official French government denials, the delivery of arms to Libya continued. Charles Rousseau cites the testimony of a French pilot of the UTA Company who received disciplinary sanction for

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[24] Ibid, pp. 83-87.

refusing to deliver helicopter blades to Libya at the end of December 1980. On 13 May 1981, the government demissionnaire, Raymond Barre, announced he was going to suspend military deliveries to Libya even under existing contracts. However, it was later revealed that arms deliveries continued. Two contracts for the maintenance of military materials signed 27 December 1976 and 19 October 1978, continued to be implemented. Despite the Libyan military presence in Chad, Franco-Libyan military and economic relations did not drastically suffer. When the Socialists came to power in France in May 1981, many speculated that President Mitterrand would take a harder line regarding new military contracts with Libya.[25]

However, in July, the Minister for Cooperation and Development, Jean Pierre Cot, indicated France would honor all contracts with Libya in all domains. By adopting a conciliatory line, the Mitterrand government hoped to take the offensive in coaxing Libya to withdraw from Chad. By guaranteeing French contracts, not only did President Mitterrand display a willingness to cooperate with Libya, but also it gave him a trump card to use at a later date in case Libya proved reluctant to disengage. This card was subsequently played in October 1981. It continued to fulfill its armaments contracts with Libya because of its "aggressive" politics. Only after the Libyan disengagement in November 1981 did France deliver the first of ten patrol boats promised under existing contracts.[26]

France depends on countries like Libya to meet its national oil needs. But this dependence has often placed French policy in an uncomfortably vulnerable position. However, due to its continuing influence in the region, France has been able to use its complicated

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[25] Ibid, pp. 111-114.

[26] UN Document: S/15011, 29 April 1962.

bilateral relationship with Libya to maintain its interests in the areas of economics and strategic minerals. Obstacles to financial intermediation for the poor in African countries south of the Sahara range from macroeconomic and political to micro factors, such as regulation and institutional arrangements. The poor have diverse credit and saving needs and are willing to pay market interest rates, but the regulatory environment is typically not conducive to intersectoral linkages to allow institutions to respond more flexibly to the needs of the poor. What is clear is that financial intermediation for the poor requires dedication, innovation, and ongoing research to identify the services that best respond to the needs of the poor while benefiting the institutions that serve them. Formal, semi-formal and informal sectors all have a role to play. An enabling and flexible regulatory environment will foster stronger linkages amongst the sectors. Incentive structures and new technologies are also important in the design of sustainable and efficient financial intermediation to meet the needs of the poor. Despite the huge economic differences between South Africa and its Sub-Saharan counterparts, the broader challenges faced are very similar. Although the dimensions and contexts differ, the fundamentals of the financial intermediation challenge remain the same across Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, it may not be too bold to assert that further studies may also find huge similarities between Sub-Saharan Africa's financial intermediation handicaps and challenges and those of the rest of the developing world.[27]

The World Bank-financed attempt to transform oil revenues into poverty reduction in Chad - a country marked by corruption, instability and human rights abuses - is hanging by a thread after the first year of oil exports. With the United States expected to receive as much as 25 percent of its petroleum imports from Africa within the next ten years,

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[27] *The New York Times*, 15 March 1981, p. 4.

Chad's experience as the continent's newest and arguably most precarious petro-state is of particular interest not only to Chadians and to the World Bank, but to prospective consumers of the continent's growing supply of "black gold." The CRS/BIC report reveals that, despite the support received from the World Bank and other donors, the country remains unprepared to manage the complexities of an economy increasingly dominated by oil, adding to concerns about the stability of African oil-exporting countries.[28]

"We and our local partners in Chad want this project to succeed. The several billion dollars in oil revenues that the Chadian government will be receiving represent an important opportunity to reduce grinding poverty in Chad." But with billions of dollars falling outside the revenue transparency safeguards, limited government capacity to spend the money effectively and ongoing problems with human rights and the rule of law, we are concerned that poverty reduction objectives may not be achieved.[29]

In Chad's Oil Miracle or Mirage Following the Money in Africa's Newest Petro State, co-authors Gary and Nikki Reisch, BIC Africa program coordinator, identify major weaknesses and loopholes in the management of petroleum revenues. According to the report, one of the most serious loopholes in Chad's oil revenue management system is the failure to apply requirements regarding transparency, accountability and pro-poor expenditures to all oil developments in the country. The pipeline from Chad to the export terminal in Cameroon has spurred the rapid growth of the country's petroleum sector, but regulations regarding oversight of oil activities and revenues do not apply to developments

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[28] Michael P. Kelley, n. 23, pp. 122-123.

[29] Mario J. Azevedo, *Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad, Environment and Society* (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1978), pp. 174-175.

outside the first three fields in southern Chad, operated by a consortium of Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco and Petronas. Exploration is ongoing with growing interest from foreign oil companies, and Exxon Mobil plans to produce from new fields by the end of 2005 or early 2006.[30]

Revenues from these new fields, combined with forthcoming taxes on oil production which also fall outside the revenue management system, may soon dwarf those that are covered by the country's transparency rules and monitored by the innovative government-civil society petroleum revenue oversight committee. For all the attention given to the pipeline project's transparency innovations, much remains hidden concerning the oil sector and revenues generated from production. Confidentiality clauses continue to shield key contracts between oil companies and the government, which are negotiated in secret by a handful of select officials. While Chad has achieved a degree of transparency over oil revenues not seen in some other oil-rich countries, in order for the petroleum revenue oversight committee, the independent press and civil society groups to play an effective watchdog role over the use of the money, reports of mismanagement or corruption must be followed-up by government action. "Everything in the Chad model rests on the enforcement of laws and sanctions for violators in a country with a history of neither." The project depends heavily on the political will of the government to respect the rule of law, develop accountable institutions and encourage democracy. While transparency is essential for oversight, it alone does not lead to accountability.[31]

The World Bank bears significant responsibility for the fate of the project, given its catalytic role in the project's funding and

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30 "Recent events of the Economy in Chad"
http://www.europadevelopmentcountriesstudies.com

31 Edith Hodgkinson , "Economic Reforms in Chad" http://www.europaworld.com

implementation. Although it is too early to declare Chad's oil project a failure or a success, the experience to date confirms the danger of investing in the extractive industries before a country is shown to meet minimum conditions of respect for human rights, fiscal transparency, and demonstrated government capacity to implement pro-poor programs. World Bank-financed programs to increase the capacity of the Chadian government have lagged far behind the pace of the oil export project. At a time of heightened awareness of the pitfalls of dependence on petroleum exports, the World Bank has justified its involvement on the ability of the project to transform Chad's economy and benefit the country's poor. The very propriety of World Bank support for the extractive industries is largely riding on the outcome of this experiment.[32]

Unless urgent attention is given to close loopholes in the revenue management system, to support active public involvement in tracking oil spending, and to increase external pressure for adherence to the rule of law and democratic freedoms, there is little hope that Chad will escape the corruption, conflict and poverty of its oil-rich African neighbors. Gary and Reisch conducted research between September 2002 and November 2004, including four trips to Chad and ongoing exchanges with civil society organizations in the country. CRS and BIC are committed to helping to ensure that Africa's oil boom improves the lives of the poor through increased investment in education, health, water and other vital necessities.[33]

The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, transporting oil from landlocked southern Chad to the Atlantic coast of Cameroon for export, represents the foremost test case of the extent to

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Chad Introductory Survey, *Europa World Year Book,* 2005, pp. 1033-1035.

which oil revenues can be used to alleviate poverty in a challenging developing country context. The most innovative feature of the project is the establishment of a legal framework that earmarks money for poverty reduction expenditures and creates an oversight committee to ensure the transparent management of the country's oil wealth. Touting the promise of petrodollars for Chad's poor over public concerns that new revenues would be lost to corruption and mismanagement, the World Bank provided financing that catalyzed the ExxonMobil-led oil development.

Given the dismal track record of oil-producing countries around the world and the high stakes in a country as unstable as Chad, this experiment has come into the international limelight. The fate of the $4 billion-plus project is not only of vital importance to the people of Chad, who hope to reap its benefits but risk bearing enormous costs if oil production leads to corruption, conflict and the further concentration of power in the hands of a few. It is also of great interest to other countries facing the challenge of transforming their oil wealth into benefits for their people; to donors attempting to solve the problem of the "resource curse" and to energy-hungry industrialized countries searching for new and stable sources of oil.[34]

The unprecedented measures put in place to safeguard against misappropriation of oil revenues are now being put to the test. In late 2003, ExxonMobil made its first royalty payment into the government of Chad's escrow account at Citibank in London, and Chad was likely to receive $140-150 million in oil revenues during 2004 and over $200 million in 2005. Over their 25-year production span, the first three oil

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[34] Ibid, pp. 1036-1038.

fields in southern Chad may earn the government more than $5 billion in oil revenues.[35]

In response to pressure from civil society organizations concerned that the benefits of oil development would not reach the poor, the World Bank conditioned its financing for the pipeline project on the establishment of a revenue management plan. Chad's innovative petroleum revenue management law stipulates that the majority of direct revenues from oil production royalties and dividends be earmarked and spent on "priority sectors" targeting poverty reduction. In addition, a joint government-civil society petroleum revenue oversight committee has been established to play a "watchdog" role, approving projects and monitoring the quality of their implementation.[36]

While some information on Chad's oil revenues is made public, details regarding the calculation of revenues and many key agreements between the oil companies and the government remain secret. Furthermore, legal safeguards contain notable loopholes. For example, all indirect revenues including income taxes on the oil companies will go directly into general government coffers. These indirect revenues may amount to more than $3 billion over the next 25 years. In addition, the revenue management law does not cover any revenues from oil produced outside the three original Doba fields. These and other weakness mean that it is difficult for citizens to verify the accuracy of revenue information disclosed and that much oil revenue will fall outside of the jurisdiction of the law and the control of the College.[37]

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[35] Ibid.

[36] F.Limongi, A.Przeworski, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7(3), pp. 51-69.

[37] Ibid.

On the government side, there is a profound lack of capacity to master the technical aspects of monitoring oil production and determining oil revenues. More than one year into Chad's life as an oil producer, many basic aspects regarding the calculation of oil revenues remains a subject of dispute between the government and the ExxonMobil-led consortium.[38]

In a country lacking an effective system of checks and balances, the joint government-civil society revenue oversight committee created by Law 001 is a unique institution, critical to the effort to hold the government accountable for the use of oil money. Experience to date has shown that the College has made promising strides to establish itself and exert its authority. At the same time it needs increased access to information, an improved ability to investigate expenditures and the cooperation of government to prosecute any wrongdoing identified. The College lacks an independent and steady source of funding, and without support from Chadian civil society will be unable to effectively carry out oversight in a country as large as Chad.[39]

For a $4 billion-plus investment, the oil industry enclave in Chad is creating precious few jobs, making the generation of non-oil employment and the careful management and spending of oil revenue paramount. The ultimate success of the Chad experiment will be judged not on barrels of oil produced or revenues generated, but on the successful investment of these revenues in Chad's people through a well-planned and executed budget system. [40]

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[38] R. J. Barro, "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106(2), 1991.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

Chad has little record of effectively budgeting and spending government resources, and has a history of corruption and mismanagement in bidding and procurement procedures. The experience of the 2004 budget the first containing oil revenues and plans for 2005 show that there are many obstacles standing between transparent budgeting of oil revenues and spending those moneys in a way that reduces poverty. With increased scrutiny of revenue flows at the macro-level, problems with corruption and mismanagement will likely migrate downstream where they are more hidden from public view. As in other oil rich countries, systems of patronage may develop through the non-transparent awarding of government contracts funded by oil revenues. These tendencies, together with limited government capacity to absorb increased levels of funding, have grave implications for the poverty reduction objectives of a project dependent on the effective use of massive new government revenues. World Bank projects designed to increase capacities in these areas prior to the arrival of first oil have failed to meet their objectives. Despite World Bank promises, the result has been a "two-speed" project whereby the pipeline was completed a year ahead of schedule but the government remains largely unprepared to manage its oil windfall.[41]

Ensuring that Chad's oil boom benefits the poor requires not only building government capacity, but altering policies and, ultimately, changing politics. The experience to date reveals both the limits of external actors' ability to influence these changes and the urgent need for those actors to use what leverage they do have to support adherence to the rule of law and compliance with the revenue management safeguards. In Chad, where citizens have limited influence on their

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[41] A. Alesina and G. Tabellini, "External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk", *Journal of International Economics*, 27(3-4), 1989, pp. 199-200.

government, external actors such as the World Bank, IMF, and the U.S. and French governments can be important sources of pressure for greater transparency and accountability. The rapid accumulation of petrodollars in Chad confronts the World Bank, IMF and other donors with a choice between using their known leverage today and relying on their uncertain leverage in the future.[42]

Chad's experience shows that transparency is but one essential ingredient in a system of oversight, accountability and sanction. Transparent information can be used for both formal and informal enforcement of the law, but the tools to use it have to be in place. Investigative and judicial arms of the government must be independent and capable of prosecuting wrongdoing. Elections must be free and fair and Chadians must have the ability to change their government through the ballot box if they think it has not managed the oil wealth well. Informal enforcement through monitoring by civil society and publicizing information on the radio and via other media must be part of a system of accountability. Transparency is only meaningful if information is understood by the government and the public, and if the findings of oversight bodies lead to action. It is too early to declare the Chad experiment a failure or a success. Whether or not Chad manages to escape the "paradox of plenty" may not be known for years. There are, though, clear lessons that can be drawn from Chad's experience to date, which can serve as signposts to correct pressing problems in Chad and to guide efforts to assist other developing countries in managing resource wealth. And one of the most fundamental lessons that Chad offers today is the importance of ensuring that minimum conditions of respect for human rights, fiscal transparency, and demonstrated government

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[42]   R. J. Barro, n. 21.

capacity to implement pro-poor programs are in place prior to promoting investment in the extractive industries.[43]

Thus from the above analysis we can conclude that the social, economic and cultural dynamics of the Chadian society have played a vital role in the under development as well as the permanent political instability in the country. The roles of the various social groups as well as the various social differences between the various social strata of the Chadian society have played a vital role in the overall political instability of the country. Besides this internal contradiction within the Chadian society followed with the involvement of the external powers have also contributed to the root causes of social and political instability in the Chadian society. The recent discoveries of various mineral resources in Chad specially of Oil have led to the generation of special interest by various neighboring powers specially like Libya, Nigeria and so on coupled with the special interest shown by France its former Colonial master in oil exploration in Chad have further aggravated the situation creating a situation of political and social chaos resulting in various coups and take over of the governments and the installation of puppet regimes directly in control of powers like France ,Libya and so on .All this have speedened up the process of political instability in Chad . This situation of chaos have resulted in the process of social and economic upheaval in the country resulting in a situation of political disaster and social blood shed in the whole country.

[43] J. De-Haan, C-L. Siermann, "Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Political Instability in Developing Countries", *Journal of Policy Reform*, 1(2), 1996, pp. 135-47.

Chapter V

Conclusion

CHAPTER – V

CONCLUSION

Anarchic tendencies in Chad serve as a cautionary example of what the on-going reconfiguration of Africa may entail. Interim institutions of government set up by a Sovereign National Conference, which was convened two years after the downfall of the despotic regime of Hissene Habre in December 1990, have generated deep disappointment. Democratization has proceeded fitfully. The economy remains stagnant. Strikes in the public sector reflect the social crisis. Worst of all, the security situation has deteriorated substantially and the state is suffering from a severe lack of authority. Early proponents of democracy in the Western world faced the criticism that such a system of government paves the way for disorder. The disestablishment of the Soviet Union, whose one-party state itself served as model for many an African state, shows that security dissipates faster than dictatorship. In the Chadian context, disorder precedes democratization. The pitfalls and potential dangers that African 'ransitions to democratization' may entail.

Democratising tendencies in contemporary Chad must be under stood in the context of post-cold war change throughout Africa. The disappearance of one of the superpowers, and the concomitant strategic disengagement of the other, has set in motion a series of political convulsions challenging the status quo. The pre-existing state of affairs could be characterized by the prevalence of monopolistic, and often predatory, authoritarian governments constituted by either one-party or military rule, and often some combination of the two. Economic policy, to varying degrees of exception, was principally statist, limiting competition

domestically and distorting commodity price structures by the over-reliance on parastatal production corporations and agricultural marketing boards. Inefficiency characterized the economic realm as disenfranchisement did the political one. Regime stability depended largely on two factors: (i) the extent to which elites and key interest groups were satisfied with their share of limited national resources, and (ii) the power and charisma of the head of state/government. Popularity among the masses, however, was always subordinate to loyalty of the military. Power was wielded not only by overt military forces, but also often by secret police and special' political' units of the armed forces.

The extent to which a given leader enjoyed the patronage of an external, cold war player also counted much for regime stability. Such factors largely transcended declared ideological tone and color, which more superficially distinguished types of government and administration. The Republic of Chad basically fits this pattern of sub-Saharan politics and political economy, apart from the fact that ethnic, sub-ethnic, regional, linguistic, and-religious differences-which have compromised equity and unity in many an African state-fed a frenzy of factionalism which degenerated into civil wars of varying magnitudes throughout virtually all of Chad's independence. External, regional powers (both Sudan and Libya) have laid claim to various sections of Chadian territory, and have exacerbated the internal differences alluded to above. Development has thus taken a back seat to both external and internal security in the calculations of successive Chadian regimes.

Democracy has trailed even further behind. After nearly two decades of intermittent civil war and three decades of dictatorial ruler ship, the people of Chad experienced from 15 January to 7 April 1993 an event of epic political proportions: the holding of a Conference nationale souveraine (CNS). Under the watchful eye of President Idriss Deby, who

had overthrown Habre three years before, over 800 delegates, representing virtually every aspect of Chadian social life, assembled to chart a new political future for the nation. Participants and onlookers alike shared the hope that, as a result of the CNS, democracy and development would replace dictatorship and civil war. Not even reports of continuing human rights violations by the army dispelled the hope that this important conference represented the beginning of a genuine break with the past. Hopes for an authentic democratic transformation in Chad have since given way to disillusion and pessimism. Elections have been repeatedly postponed and were not being held before 1995.

Despite a plethora of officially recognized Political parties, only a few exercise significant freedom 0f movement and expression throughout the country. From the outset the CST was compromised by the uneven caliber of its membership. Political parties did not appoint their best or most influential cadres to this transitional body, preferring to reserve positions within the regime itself for their top leaders. Independent observers claim that, as of early 1994, fewer than ten of the 57 members of the CST still promoted the 'general will' above personal interests and beyond presidential politltal pressures.

It is true that, in terms of freedom of expression, political life in Chad improved after Deby replaced Habre. Chadians could openly criticise their Head of State if so inclined, in print as well as orally. Abuses by the security services were at least subject to open criticism. Large-scale, politically motivated disappearances were no longer ordered by the central government. But whether the MPS could take unilateral credit for this positive change is debatable. The greatest impediment to democratization in Chad is the widespread insecurity, which renders meaningless the formal exercise of political freedom. Though the military seems pervasive, it is fragmented, unorganized, undisciplined, and

uncontrollable. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to speak of a military. A much-vaunted program to 'downsize' it has gone awry, with demobilized soldiers reportedly joining rebel forces and newly recruited ones deserting on account of irregular pay. Men in uniform with impunity commit crimes. Irregular armies control parts of the national territory. Herders are armed and disputes with agriculturalists often turn violent. Insecurity undermines democratization in both general and specific ways. In general, the free movement of persons and property without risk or fear of molestation is a precondition for all other expressions of democracy, and did not exist in the period following the Conference nationale souveraine. Specifically, the existence of no-go zones for opposition parties made a mockery of multi-party democracy. The President of the Republic is the titular commander-in-chief of the Chadian army. However, notwithstanding the legitimacy conferred by the CNS, Deby remained beholden to Fant, and particularly his Zaghawa supporters, for his capture of power from the mainly Gorane and Anakaza Habre regime. Across-the-board Zaghawa support for Deby dissipated following the killing of the ex-minister and rebel leader Abbas Koty, however, and the core of ethnic loyalty to the President became concentrated within his Bideyat clan. In short, Deby was unwilling or unable to exercise discipline over the regular army certainly a sine qua non for the establishment of the rule of law and democracy.

Often behind the cloak of political or democratic rhetoric, armed bands exercised power in various parts of the country. Their proximity to neighboring states, in which they often took refuge, turned these domestic rebellions into international entanglements. In the Lake Chad region, the Mouvement pour la democratie et le developpement (MDD), under the anti-Habreist Goukouni Guet, has nibbled away at the sovereignty of the regime in N'Djamena, and has used Nigeria as a base-in-exile. Fighters from the pro-Habre wing of the Mouvement (MDD-

Fant), led by Mahmat Saleh Fadil, periodically retreat into eastern Niger for relief, while. Habre himself has stayed in exile in Senegal. Military actions by the above groups have led to undiscriminating counter-attacks and atrocities by the 'regular' army. It is phantasmagorical to speak of democracy in those areas of the country controlled or threatened by them. Habre's struggle with Libya over the Aouzou strip, in comparison, was a relatively straightforward security challenge to the Chadian President. At the very least, none of his opponents confronted Habre on the basis of his defective democratic record. Success by the Comite national pour la reconciliation - a 12-member body established in May 1994 to reconcile the ruling regime and all rebel movements - would be critical if security and democracy were to emerge in the short term. As a paradoxical backdrop to the breakdown in security and abuses of human rights, legal partisan politics were flourishing. At the beginning of 1994 there were as many as 45 officially recognized political parties in Chad. But although a sign of a democratically robust body politic, most were little more than the inflated expectations of their founders and only existed in the capital. Applying the standards of visibility, popularity, and viability, probably only ten of these parties were of serious import.

With the exception of the MPS, most of these parties were slow to develop organizational networks and to refine their objective imple-mentation strategies. There is remarkable similarity in their officially stated political objectives. The prospects for a unification of the 'opposition' were boosted when the RDP, UDR, and UN created an informal coalition, Entente pour une alternance dimocratique au Tchad (Enat), in July 1994. Still, the leaders of those parties in Chad that represent personalities rather than policies are ill-inclined to surrender their own political ambitions for the sake of ousting the MPS. Chad's vulnerability to outside forces and processes is a key factor as regards its limited ability to promote democracy and security. Given its geography,

economy, and fragility, the country is extremely dependent on both its immediate neighbors and on larger powers. These external forces limit the Chadian state's margin of maneuverability.

Libya has substantially reduced its profile in Chad, at least in military terms, following the outcome of the February 1994 decision on the Aouzou strip by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Yet overt conquest has already begun to take a new form: economic annexation. The dumping of Libyan products in the Aouzou has loosened commercial ties with Chadian traders. The aim of Muammar Qadhafi's regime may now be to solidify its hold in the far north through economic bonding rather than military conquest. The reestablishment of de facto sovereignty - a precondition for the emergence of democratic structures - may prove more difficult for President Deby than gaining recognition of de jure sovereignty over Aouzou. The Sudan remains host to a number of dissident politico-military factions opposing the regime in N'Djamena.

It also serves as support base for fundamentalist Islamic groups attempting to gain a foothold in Chad. Many of Deby's most loyal defenders in the military, believed to number 7,000, actually hail from Sudanese territory. The holding of 11 Chadian villages near the border between the two countries illustrates Sudanese territorial designs on Chad. France continues to exercise significant influence in Chad, as in most of francophone West and Central Mrica. Budgetary aid for insolvent governmental ministries in N'Djamena comes largely from Paris, notably salary support for the military, albeit tied to a program of downsizing FF200 million to help reduce the size of the army to 25,000 from 45,000. Yet France's commitment to assist the Chadian state, and particularly its treasury, is waning under the regime headed by Edouard Balladur; its January 1994 devaluation of the Chadian franc, and its despair at reforming the corrupt customs service, are emblematic of the shift.

France's pro-democratization program is focused almost exclusively on the holding of elections. French economic interests will increasingly concentrate on petroleum exploitation through the parastatal company Elf and, in the case of conflict between them, will arguably outweigh the pro-democratization pressures previously articulated by President Francois Mitterrand at the June 1990 Franco American summit held at La Baule, France. The United States has an on going but relatively minor involvement in the economy of Chad, mainly through that part of the private sector led by Esso and Shell. The promotion of Chadian agricultural exports is useful but hardly of great significance for the American market. Militant Islam, as promoted by the Sudan under Hassan al- Turabi, explains some continued American interest in Chad, as does the not completely allayed concern of a renewed threat emanating from Libya. But with a problematic start-up to the democratization process, let alone good governance there, the United States is prepared to maintain formal rather than cordial relations. Indeed, the US Agency for International Development is closing its mission in Chad. In short, foreign actors appear little inclined to help resolve the immediate tradeoff between democracy and security.

Four years after a self-described patriotic movement promising 'salvation' took power from a ruthless but respected dictator, the Chadian state remains truncated and fragile. A government, which came to power with promises of democracy and national renewal, has turned inwards, preoccupied with retaining power. Its ability to improve the security environment has declined. Progress has been minimal in all five areas delineated by the 1993 Cahier de charges as being critical: liberty and democracy, tribalism and regionalism, human rights, the army, and the economy. At the same time, the MPS has been successful in consolidating power within the restricted national space left open to it. Although committed to holding presidential and parliamentary elections,

President Deby is above all proceeding, particularly through strategic administrative appointments, so as to ensure victory at the polls and thereby avoid the necessity of more drastic measures to retain power. There is thus the reproduction of a familiar process occurring in the realm of state-society relations throughout Africa: while the governing regime, as holder of formal power, is strong, its connection with the population as a whole becomes more and more tenuous. In Chad, this divorce between state and society is particularly wide on account of the legacy of civil war, the interference of neighboring countries, and the neglected condition of developmental infrastructure. Ironically, and tragically, as the external threat to national security (from Libya) has waned, the personal insecurity of ordinary Chadians throughout the nation has risen; and this, under a regime which, at least formally, does proclaim itself as an advocate of human rights and multi-party democracy. From both conceptual and operational viewpoints, there are areas, which retain a modicum of functional and logistical links with the central government, and those, which do not. This second Chad can be further divided into regions falling under informal foreign sovereignty (e.g. Unless the sovereignty of the Republic is re-established over the whole of Chad, interventions to promote democratization may have to consider a problematic option: operating outside the restricted territory still bound to the N'Djamena regime. The disengagement of external donors is likely to have a destabilizing impact on the Chadian polity. As assistance and concerted diplomatic intervention wane, the 'second Chad' will grow at the expense of the first. The question then facing those who still wish to help is to which Chad can, or should, residual assistance be targeted. Despite the oft-repeated claim that democratization is irreversible there is no inevitability regarding the future of democracy throughout Mrica. When security collapses entirely, as demonstrated by Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda, democratic reform takes on surrealistic proportions. As in the former Soviet bloc, whose

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collapse indirectly explains Chad's own transformation from strong-arm dictatorship, many African nations are in a post-revolutionary, pre-consolidation phase. As with structural adjustment, there is a painful phase, which must be endured before benefits are realized even if they are never guaranteed.

Chad today is in a country, which is in a threshold of transformation and transition. A volatile and turmoil full colonial legacy the Chad which is yet to recover from the various external invasions since its independence coupled with a volatile social and political internal instability the country is trying to coup up with haunting realities which surrounds it .it is gradually trying to adjust to the new problems and challenges which the country is now faced with. Hopefully the face of chaos and bloodshed the country has probably overcome and the people and the Chadian government is now trying to start the overall rebuilding process in a slow but gradual manner which itself is a upheaval and daunting task but with a hope which is still a distant dream but a hope based on a desire for a brighter Chad: A new Chad where there is no political chaos, no social upheaval, no threats or domination from outside. A country based on the hope of a brighter tomorrow.

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