

**DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND MULTI PARTY SYSTEM IN
UZBEKISTAN**

**DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD
OF THE DEGREE OF**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

Submitted by

PRAMOD KUMAR

Prepared under the supervision of

Dr. PHOOL BADAN



**Centre for Russian Central Asian & East European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067.
2005**



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

School of International Studies


New Delhi - 110067

Tel. : 2670 4365
Fax : (+91)-11-26717586
(+91)-11-26717603

Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies

DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled “**DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND MULTI PARTY SYSTEM IN UZBEKISTAN**” submitted by me for the award of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University


Pramod Kumar

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


PROF. AJAY PATNAIK
(CHAIRPERSON)


DR. PHOOL BADAN
(SUPERVISOR)

CONTENTS

	PAGE NUMBER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	i- ii
ABBREVIATION	iii
MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA	iv
Chapter-1	
INTRODUCTION	1-15
Chapter- 2	
UZBEKISTAN: IT'S POLITICAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	16- 32
Chapter- 3	
EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUIONS IN INDEPENDENT UZBEKISTAN	33-66
Chapter - 4	
PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN UZBEKISTAN	67-76
Chapter - 5	
CONCLUSION	77- 81
Bibliography	82- 90

Dedicated
to
My parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to record my appreciation and gratefulness for the help and assistance that I have received from various quarters in the preparation of this dissertation. First of all, I would like to say that it was my privilege work under the guidance of **Dr.Phool Badan**, and wish to express my warmest appreciation and gratitude to him for all the help he gave me, throughout my **M.Phil** study. His inspiring guidance and encouragement helped me to make a better analysis of the major issues taken up in the present study. I have learnt many things under his supervision which would help me a lot in my future academic pursuits (career).

I am also grateful to Professor Ajay Patnaik, chairperson of Centre of Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies of School of international Studies for extending all the help, which I needed in preparing the present dissertation. I would like to express my gratitude to other faculty members and staff members of centre, who gave me moral support, encouragement and cooperation at a time when I needed it most.

I would also like to thank the staff members of Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, Central Reference Library of Delhi University, Library of the Indian Council of World Affairs (Sapru House), Embassy of Uzbekistan, IDSA, Parliamentary Library and Teen Murti Library.


I would like to thank my friends Prahlad Bairwa, Narendera, Smita, all are research scholar at University of Delhi and other friends Dhrubjoyti Bhattachargee, Ashok, Vijay, Bharat, Sitaram, my seniors Dhananjay, and Govind, for their kind help, encouragement and Valuable advice from time to time.

I express my humble gratitude to my family members, especially grand parents and parents Shri Charan Singh, Senior lecturer in Economic at Government College Deeg (Rajasthan) and Smt.Angoori Devi for their love, concern and support at all stages of my education. I also express my sincere gratitude to my uncle and aunty, younger brothers

Brajesh, Sunil, Tinku, and sister Rajani for their love, encouragement and inspiration in completing my M.Phil work. It is due to their proper guidance and assistance that I have been able to complete this work.

PLACE: NEW DELHI.

DATE: 29 JULY, 2005.


(PRAMOD KUMAR)

ABBREVIATION

CIS	-	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPSU	-	Communist Party of Soviet Union
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
IMU	-	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
OSCE	-	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RSFSR	-	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

Central Asia (Political Map)



CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION

With the utterance of the word 'democracy', the first thing that comes in mind is the participation of the masses in the governance of nation for their welfare by themselves. It has been the system of governance for most of the developed nations. It has been developed and given a proper shape by the Western theorists and they have categorized elements that are necessary for the implementation and success of the system.

Those nations that have achieved independence within the last fifty years have adapted various sorts of political systems within which democracy has been the most popular. With the different political setups, democracy too has changed its forms and shapes. It is remolded so much that it becomes hard to recognize the political setup altogether. It gains different characteristics due to the variety of settings that this system is applied to.

However, the fixed notions that have been formulated by western theorists remain to be as rules of measuring the success of democracy in nations. That makes the theorists from the developed nations as monitors of democratic processes in various nations, measuring their success and failure. They judge with the elements of democracy that they have been groomed with. It becomes difficult for them to see the concept from various prisms of development of the process of democratization.

It has been usually witnessed that those nations achieving independence lately, having a withered and fragmented society within the nation, due to ethnic, language, religious or economic cleavages, faces major challenges in adapting to the set political systems of the West. Democracy being the only and last option as a suitable political system has been promoted and tutored to other new political structures by the developed nations.

So if the democratic process of a developing nation is seen through the eyes of the Western developed world, it will always fall short to meet the usual requirements as thought about by the developed world. For that reason, it becomes necessary to test the democratic process of a nation, being a part of the system, to have a better understanding of the foundations of the entire political structure on which democratization takes place. Then only it will be possible to measure the success or failure rate of the democratic process of that nation.

At the last vestiges of the twentieth century there was a major change in the world political order. The end of the Communist era and the disintegration of Soviet Union have given birth to fifteen independent countries in the post-Soviet space. All of these nations have been novice in state craft as they, for the seven decades, had been under the strong protective and authoritarian dictates of Kremlin, the parts of the nation that was basically under 'guided governance'. Such governance was done with the assistance of a coterie of governors that Kremlin could depend on, creating a class of ruling elites. With the disintegration of Soviet Union, the responsibility of the newly independent nations fell in the hands of these governing elites.

But with the attainment of independence, there were some characteristics amidst the Central Asian nations that remained unchanged in their political structures. One was there was no significant change of the ruling elite that existed before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. There has been no initiative on the part of the general masses and have basically allowed the then ruling masses to carry onward the responsibility of governing the nation even when there has been a total change of political setup. As Paul Kubicek has mentioned that "the hierarchical, patriarchal structure of the family unit was traditionally replicated in political life, in which people deferred to their leaders".¹

Another was that the economic condition of these states remained to be in a state of jeopardy, though there remain unexplored and untapped resources in these states. It

¹ Paul Kubicek, "Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1998, p. 30

remain as a strange phenomenon that there has been a general lacuna on the part of indigenous entrepreneurs for tapping the resources that these nations possess. Rather these nations have turned into safe havens for multi national corporations due to the presence of cheap labour, considerable amount of resources that can be transformed into energy.

The governing structure has remained more or less authoritarian having an entirely democratic façade. It is a strange amalgamation of the democratic transition and authoritarianism punched into a single mould. There has been justification that has been put forward for the authoritarian regime. It has been said that “establishing centralized authority, even by authoritarian means to push ahead with needed economic and social reform”.² They would claim that “it is next to impossible to establish a democracy in a multi-ethnic or multi-lingual society, and would therefore justify authoritarianism as a means to ensure that there is no further violence”.³ Authoritarianism for that reason is not challenged as it can be the cause for the sustenance of peace in a volatile region like that of Central Asia.

With the initiation of the democratic process, there has been the birth of multiple parties in these nations. It must be remembered that these nations from the very ages of the Second World War has never got the chance of any representation in any sort of political organization keeping out the Communist party. With the introduction of Gorbachev’s policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the Soviet system, there was a spurge of political voices from every corner of the Central Asian nations. But they have never been any considerable threat to the ruling strata. Rather in various instances it has been found that the ruling elites rather sponsor these parties to function smoothly to ensure trouble free periods of governance.

There were also attempts of establishing some sort of a democratic structure of governance in the Central Asian countries

² Ibid

³ Ibid

. One thing that has been striking amongst these nations is the other governing structures that work in tandem with the ruling elites. The judiciary and the other organisations of the government rather maintain an independent stand but in reality depend more on the ruling elites for their sustenance. That is why, in all these countries, the leadership rather than having any sort of shuffle maintain their *status quo* even in the leadership.

There has also been the upsurge of religious, ethnic and language revival in the region. Most of them have been on the lines on ethnic and sub-ethnic identity revival. But the governing machineries have not actively participated in such revivalism and rather it has remained more or less spontaneous. The Central Asian societies is facing multiple challenges. Anna Matveeva has clearly laid down the challenges in the following manner.

First, with the end of the Soviet authority, the political structures remained as “empty shells”. During the Soviet period, “Local autonomy was suppressed by the authority of an all union economic nomenclature in the republics”.⁴ First challenge was to fill these political structures lying vacant with “real power”.

Secondly, due to the multi-ethnic character of these nations, which was not fully visible during the Soviet era as they were suppressed, has posed a considerable challenge. The minority-majority syndrome loomed over their heads. “Each state incorporates distinct minority groups: European (predominantly Slavic) settlers, diaspora minorities, indigenous to the region and people forcibly deported to the area”. They were haunted of the inter-ethnic violence that had been eminent during the Soviet era and for that reason, “the leaderships kept a tight lid on real or perceived minority grievances”.

Thirdly, there is a serious risk of the society getting fragmented “along regional, tribal or class lines”. The vacuum that was created after the Soviet disintegration as

⁴ Anna Matveeva, “Democratization, Legitimacy, and Political Change in Central Asia”, *International Affairs*, Vol 75. January 1999. p 24.

enlivened the clan and sub-ethnic identities, making a significant obstacle on the path of the creation of a national identity.

Fourthly, independence brought forth economic problems for all these nations. Previously, the economics of these countries were either based on monoculture of cotton or related to various heavy industrial projects mineral wealth was largely underdeveloped, since similar resources were more easily extracted elsewhere in the USSR at places nearer to the markets. For that reason, immediately after independence, the nations became susceptible for economic exploitation.

Fifthly, there was a serious challenge about the shift of power centers and the amount of legitimacy that was required to keep their leadership intact. Though Anna Matveeva has not mentioned this challenge, while analyzing the initial challenges, but it certainly was an important initial challenge in front of the leadership.

Lastly there was an inherent fear of the leadership of being dominated by external actors being newly independent countries. Though initially the fear centered on the known hegemonic tendencies of the Russians but later that fear was also from other state as well as non-state actors.

To have a better understanding of the challenges and the democratic process that was initiated the study has to take assistance of some western theories that has to be interpreted in the prism of the democratic process of these nations. For this study some specific theories have been selected by the researchers. First it needs to be analyzed the elitist theory of democracy.

The Elitist theories of democracy have developed mainly during the twentieth century. It is mainly concerned with the institutions of democracy and realities of the Western liberal democratic political Systems. This theory arose due to the need for the maintenance of stability and equilibrium in capitalist liberal societies. It does not aim at

change in the existing socio-economic situation. Its objective is to suggest a political system which is suited to an existing situation.

The essential theme of this theory is that these are in every society, a minority of the population which takes the major decisions in the society. As these decisions have political importance, the elite use considerable political influence. The important advocates of this theory are Pareto, Mosca, Michels, etc.

The elite theory opposed to mass participation and hot politics on the ground that it leads to increase cleavages and conflicts. It supports elections as a way of powerful resolution of conflicts. The elites are the angles who maintain the necessary democratic balance and equilibrium in society. The political parties must represent all the strata of society. According to Elite theory, the elite must have faith in democratic values and processes they should represent all section of society. They should be experienced and able and the circulation of elites must be possible.

In the Central Asian countries the old nomenclature captured the power with the changing name of thin political parties and the political systems. Theoretically they gave a space for public participation but ruling elites argued in the transition phase that they must bank more on guided democracy rather than having the democratic set up based on free and fair election.

The elite theory explains somewhat the political setup that exists in the Central Asian nations with some permutation and combination. Though they are not eager for the circulation of the elites as suggested by the elite theorists but they have allowed some of the agents of political socialization that remain responsible for the success of the democratization process. The introduction of controlled mass media, political parties who are not directly posing a threat to the ruling elite as well as the holding of referendums might be seen as methods through which the growth of the democratic process can be possible. But how much they have been really responsible for the positive movement of the democratic process remains to be answered. But the ruling elites remain more or less

the angels for the people who find them to be saving the society from breaking apart. The next theory that might assist the study in having a better understanding of the political setup of the Central Asian nations is the pluralist theory of democracy.

The main objective of this theory is to show that the western liberal political systems particularly that of the United States are pluralist and therefore they are democratic as the political systems of former Soviet Union and China are not pluralist.

The pluralist theory of democracy emphasizes the role of multiparty system and pressure groups in a political system. Democracy maintains unity in diversity.

The pluralist maintains that power in society is shared by many groups and it is not enjoyed by any elite. They stand for the political power that should be shared between government and different interest groups which operate in a society. Presthus writes that pluralist democracy is a socio-political system in which the power of the state is shared with a large number of private groups, interest organization and individuals represented by such organizations. Pluralism is a system in which political power is fragmented among the branches of government.

The basis of pluralist theory of democracy is the various organizations, pressure groups, trade unions, political parties and other social and economic associations. Elections are the important part of the system. It emphasizes only for better policies.

Central Asian countries have witnessed an evolution of cultural groups and political and economic associations. These groups started to emerge during 1988 and they influenced the politics of former Soviet Union. After the break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union, they tried to play a major role in the political process. Erk, Birlik and the like tried to participate in elections and they have been playing the role of opposition.

However there has been the birth of a different kind of a pluralist democratic setup in these regions. If the case of Uzbekistan is taken then it will be seen that the

ruling Party-People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU) has allowed parties like the Adolat (Justice), Social Democratic Party, Milliy Tiklanish (National Renaissance), Fidokorlar (Self – Sacrificers), the Liberal Democratic Party, the Vatan Tarakkiyet, The Islamic Revival Party even to compete in the elections, as they in reality do not hold any major threat to the PDPU or its leader Islam Karimov.⁵

Marx and Engles never lost their faith in democratic system. However, they desired to replace the existing pattern of democracy with a new pattern, which they provided a terminology of socialist democracy. They accepted the basic point that the democracy is the rule of the people. Marx observed that liberalism is the philosophy of the capitalist class and liberal democracy serves the interest of that class. In the same way Marxism is the philosophy of the proletariat and dictatorship of the proletariat is the essence of the democracy of such a political system, which would be for the working class.

Marx criticized the bourgeois democracy for its demerits. Like great social political and economic inequalities, the real power is captured by the capitalists and they exploit the poor with that acquired power.

Marx gave the notion of dictatorship of proletariat in which the power is in the hands of the working class. They can manage this power by their associations or Soviets. Only the proletarian state, according to the Marxists, is truly democratic. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a qualitatively new type of democracy. This is the rule of working class.

The Marxian concept of democracy not only touches the political aspect, it lays equal emphasis on its social and economic dimensions. It desires social equality ensuing dignity of labour and worth of the individual.

⁵ John Cherian, "An Experiment with Democracy", *Frontline*, vol. 22, no. 2 January 15-28 2005, p. 52

Lenin implemented the Marxist theory of democracy and reformulated the dictatorship of proletariat into the dictatorship of party. This he did as it suited the then Tsarist Russia that could have been molded into Soviet Russia, without going through the phases as Marx had enumerated.

After the disintegration of USSR, Central Asian states gave up this theory and they changed the name of their political parties and tried to establish liberal democratic in the region. But it also must be understood that the ruling elites that had been rulers during the Soviet regime remain to be rulers in a different guise. That makes it clear that the ruling elite had been groomed into politics during the Communist era, and they to maintain their grip have just changes sides. That is why the present President of Uzbekistan has repeatedly emphasized on “evolution, not revolution”, which shows how he has shed of the mantle of revolution of Marxism to a mantle of slow economic, social, cultural and political evolution.⁶

Democracy is an old concept but liberalism is a recent one. Today liberalism is generally thought to be inseparable from democracy. Liberal democracy is a form of representative democracy. The liberal democratic setup is represented through elections by the whole electorate of a small number of representatives, probably organized into political parties, who form a legislative assembly. These type of political setups have been adapted in countries like United Kingdoms, Canada, Australia, India, etc. where the majority of the representatives in the legislative assembly makes the law, which is mostly based on the Westminster model.

In a liberal democracy, people do not govern themselves; rather they elect politicians to do the job. A liberal democracy subjects the popular will to legal or constitutional limits. This is to protect individual rights. The liberal democracy is a limited government because the power acquired through free and fair elections can only be exercised within a specific area but the real explanation for the success of liberal

⁶ Ibid.

democracy lays in its provision of a framework for the development of the market economy.

A system which protects private property but also enforces the rule of law can provide a fertile ground for commerce. Liberal democracy works on certain principles and certain mechanism. Principles of liberal democracy include:

1. **Government by consent:** Democracy is a government by the consent of people. People have the right of freedom of speech. Discussion is usually held at two levels. The first level is among the representatives of the people in legislative assemblies where members of the opposition have their full say. The second level is at the public level where there is direct communication between the leadership and the people. Mass Media is an effective channel of communication between the leadership and people.
2. **Constitutional government:** Constitutional government means, government by law rather than by men. The constitution is the supreme law in a democratic country. A constitution may be a collection of principles according to which the governance of a nation is defined. It is used to describe the whole system of government of a country, the collection of rules which establish and regulate or govern the government. The presence of liberal political institutions is a main feature of liberal democracy. For a successful democracy freedom of expression, periodic, free fair election, more than one political party freely competing for capturing the political power, political offices not confined to any privileged class, elections based on Adult franchise protection of civil liberties, independence of judiciary, free media, Interest groups, etc.
3. **Majority rule:** Majority rule means that in all the decision making bodies from the electorate to the last committee the issue is to be resolved by voting. Political equality means there is no discrimination on grounds of religion race, caste, sex, place of birth, ownership of property and even educational

qualifications. The principle of majority rule relies on the wisdom of majority. Majority rule does not mean that the subordination of minorities. There are legal safe guards exist in democratic rule. The presence of legal safe guards helps to raise the level of awareness of both majority and minority and it promote a favorable climate for democratic politics. An election is a method of choosing among candidates for same post or office and election have become the only fully respectable method for selecting political leaders and governors throughout the world. Elections give a feeling of choice to voters.

Central Asian states have introduced liberal values in their respective political system. Elections usually have been a common feature amongst the Central Asian nations. If the question of free and fair election comes in then there is a possibility that there might be some questions that can be raised about it. But as per the reports there has been mass participation in the elections that has taken place till date. In that way there has been attempts of walking on the path of liberal democratization of the nations.

The ruling party has also been able to procure consent of the general masses as the people have no other powerful political opponent that they can back for. On top of that, as there has been no change of the political coterie from the Soviet era till date, people have been more comfortable with the same governmental machinery, providing them periodical consent and permanency in the ruling machinery.

But if the other two parts are tested then it will be seen that, all the Centerl Asian Countries have adopted their own constitution, but due to their flexibility and constant amendments, it has lost some of its effectiveness as a constitution that can act as a guideline for the ruling elites. It rather remains to be a mechanism of providing legitimacy to the ruling elites and their manner of governance. Even on the concept of majority rule, Central Asian nations fall short, as there is no scope for the majority to take any active participation in the governing process. It totally remains concentrated within the hands of the ruling members/elites than that of the constant changing representatives

of the people. But still it remains a mixture of authoritarian and a liberal democratic setup.

Now it becomes necessary to understand the types of political parties that are normally in prevalence and the manner in which the political parties present in the Central Asian nations match the types of political parties that has been thought of by Western theorists.

Political parties are permanent organizations which contest elections usually because they seek to occupy the decisive position of authority within the state. Party politics has become more of a universal phenomenon.

In a liberal democratic country political parties perform their job effectively. The role of parties can be classified as follows:

- The Political parties simplify and stabilize the political process
- They struggle for capturing power. They seek to widen the interests they represent and harmonies these interests with each other.
- They provide a link between the government and the people and act as a major agent of political socialization and mobilization.
- The political parties perform the important function of recruiting political leaders
- Political Parties also perform the job of social welfare.

While studying political parties, one comes across three types of party systems that is found throughout the world political order in various forms and shapes.

One party system or dominant party system – Here one party is constantly in office, either governing alone or in coalition, e.g., in China & Japan

Two Party System – who are ideal for democracy – constitute of two major parties and contest elections to capture the power and generally form a single party government. The practice is prevalent in the UK, the USA etc.

Multi Party System – it's a system where more than two political parties contest the elections and try to capture the power individually or with a coalition with like-minded political parties. This facilitate the presence of a number of minority groups, regional parties etc. leading to a coalition govt. India is the best example of coalition politics.⁷

According to Samuel P. Huntington, that there are three wave of democratization in the history of the modern world. The first “long” wave of democratization began in 1820, with the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States and Continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing into being some 29 democracies

The triumph of the allies in World War II initiated a second wave of democratization that reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically the third wave of democratization has been started after 1970. During this period the United States was a major promoter of democratization. The US contribution to democratizations in the 1980s involved more then the conscious and direct exercise of American power and influence. The withdrawal of Soviet power made possible democratization in Eastern Europe. Democratic development inmost of the soviet republics. The third wave o f democratization brought a significant change where one hundred and twenty democracies in the world included Latin-American central and Eastern Europe the Far East, South Asia, south East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. But still several countries have been facing the problem of military regime and authoritarian rule.

In the Central Asian Republics, the emergence of new political parties and groups has started in the wake of reforms by Gorbachev. But then, the number has sharply increased only after the disintegration of USSR. The first appearances of the new democratic elements in the Central Asian Republics were the alternative groups and movements from mid-1988. The majority of the parties and interest groups do not have a

⁷ Rod Hague, Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 140

very large number of memberships. They coin attractive slogans just to collect funds and enroll members and their main aim is to establish a multi party system. It remains as a check valve for the protection, legitimacy provider and permanency provider for the ruling elites. If the ruling elites in any way are threatened, then they in any possible manner will suppress that political group and its members. According to Paul Kubicek, “opposition parties are technically allowed, but this is done only to create a veneer of democracy...those parties that are allowed to operate...are in fact little more than extensions of the ruling party”.⁸ They would only allow those parties that do not pose any threat to the ruling elite.

But there have been some significant characteristics that are very similar with that of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states. Due to that reason, if the democratic process and the multi party structure of Uzbekistan is studied, then it will not only give a clear picture of Uzbekistan but also of the cluster of nations that constitutes Central Asia.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the first and the foremost problem which emerged in front of the Central Asia state as how to run the government. There was the total confusion in the countries and political vacuum was seen in the entire region. Uzbekistan faces the same problem, this problem was but obvious because during the communist regime all type of political activities was suppressed and there was no experience in front of the citizens and elite. Second chapter focuses on emergence of democratic institutions in Uzbekistan like Political parties, judiciary media rule of law, election etc. And it also focuses the functioning of democratic institutions. Third chapter is important in this view because it cover how the present system spread deep after passing through a total period of confusion, turmoil and unrest on political arena.

Every political system has its own problems and challenges and this also applied to nations of the world. In the case of Uzbekistan the problem and challenges are more than simple because it remained almost for five decade under the strict control of the

⁸ Paul Kubicek, “Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure”, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1998, p. 32

communist regime where no political process was allowed. After it got the independence many problems emerged, things are changing but still a long way to go. Fourth chapter focuses on challenges before the democratic institutions in Uzbekistan. This also raises various issues like Islamic Extremism, regional division, Human rights free and fare election and authoritarian tendency of persistent. This also deals with the future prospect for democracy in Uzbekistan.

The last chapter is the conclusion where all the details of the problems, prospects, hope and despair are covered. Democracy and party system is its initial stage and it will take a lot more time before it will take a final shape and from where we can term it as a perfect democracy.

CHAPTER - 2

UZBEKISTAN: ITS POLITICAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Central Asian nations are situated in one of the most volatile regions of the world. From times immemorial this region has been witnessed to various conquests, wars, establishment and annihilation of empires, religious uprisings, tribal and feudal kingships and later ideological based political setups. There has been a steady and constant shift of leadership and governance, which has been responsible for the unstable and undeveloped political mindset of the masses in the region. The people, today, have a basic urge for having a government that has a stable character, having the principle notion of welfare of the people, guiding it.

Uzbekistan, being in this region is no exception to the above mentioned facets of Central Asian nations. However, it is necessary to delve a bit into the pages of history, to have an insight of the political milieu of the leadership as well as the masses of today's Uzbekistan.

Turkistan Before Tsarist Period

As Phool Badan has pointed out on historical aspect of Turkistan, "prior to the Russian conquest the cultural and political life of the people of the Central Asia did not differ greatly from the settled and nomadic peoples and other parts of the Muslim world. At that time Central Asia was divided into three Khanates of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva. The Khanates were backwards, feudatories which were ruled by Khans and Amirs and Islam was the main source of political legitimization¹".

He further stresses on the political life of Central Asia people and pointed out that, "political power structure of Central Asia was also feudal nature, similar to the

¹ Phool Badan, *Dynamics of Political Development in Central Asia* (Lancers' Books, New Delhi, 2001) p. 22.

one prevalent in medieval Europe. Hereditary ruler has nominal control, but he provincial *beks*, (government) were politically independent and carried on constant wars against their neighbour and their sovereign. The government was tyrannical and oppressive and meted out cruel punishment to its opponents. This government gets the full support from the institutions like *Kazi*. The people of Central Asia have no right to participate in the political process².

Turkistan During Tsarist Period

With the conquest of the region by Tsarist Russia Central Asia was included into the Russian empire through peace treaty. These Peace treaties were concluded in 1868 with Khan Khudayar Khan of Kokand and Emir Muzaffar-Eddin of Bukhara, whereby they relinquished the lands actually conquered by Russia, confirmed their dependent status and gave the Russians highly favourable trade terms³. According to Khalfin, Bukhara and Kokand became a vassal state of Russian empire.⁴ Khiva later was taken over by Tsarist Russia in 1873 and the whole right bank of Amu-Darya went into the hands of the Russians. As Khalfin has pointed out that “the treaty with Khiva was a typical colonial treaty resembling those imposed by the Western powers on China. This treaty, as well as those with Kokand and Bukhara earlier, assured Russia an economic hold over these three Khanates⁵”.

According to Kaushik, having subjected Khiva and Bukhara to its suzerainty, the Tsarist government supported the thrones of their Khan and Emir with its troops and helped the despotic Khans of these feudal states to exploit their toiling masses in various ways.⁶

However, the main intention of bringing the Central Asian republics under Tsarist control was to exploit the natural resources that were available in these regions. The Tsarist government did not have the immediate intention of controlling the governmental structure of these regions. For that reason, though being under the

² Ibid. pp. 30-31.

³ Devendra Kaushik, *Central Asia in Modern Times* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970) p.29.

⁴ Ibid, p. 46

⁵ Ibid, p 25.

⁶ Ibid, p. 65

suzerainty of the Tsarist rule, these republics enjoyed some sort of autonomy amongst themselves.

Central Asia was converted into a raw material supplying base for the metropolitan industries. According to Lenin, the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, similar to Turkestan, though continued to exist independently, were also “something like colonies”.⁷

But having some sort of autonomy in their hands, the governing bodies in these Central Asian republics were being able to maintain their ethnic character which was either based on the basis of language, religion or geographical territory. “Tajik appeared as the language of instruction in 1908 when the first ‘reformed school’ was established and by 1914 there were 10 such schools in Bukhara”.⁸ ‘Uzbek’ rather was seen as a derogative term as it denoted “a whole category of population belonging to different ethnic groups – ‘ignorant malcontents with destructive strength and no affirmative attributes’. As the Uzbek tribes spread and dispersed over a larger area, the term ‘Uzbek’ became a supra-tribal name and not that of one ethnic group”.⁹

The Tsarist government never made the initiative of amalgamating the entire region into one bloc only due to the strong ethnic lineage that was already present in the region. As Patnaik has noted that “Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamic consciousness never held sway among the ordinary people and such ideas were limited to a very few. Ethnic consciousness was more pronounced as was evident from as many as 20 bloody inter-ethnic conflicts in the 19th century in the Kokand Khanate alone and even more in the Khanate of the Khiva”.¹⁰ But the Tsar was an “unlimited autocrat”

⁷ VI Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol. 25 (Moscow: Progress Publishers) p. 27 as cited by Devendra Kaushik, *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from the Early 19th Century*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 66

⁸ Ajay Patnaik, *Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia* (New Delhi and Kolkata: Anamika Publishers and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute, 2003), p. 20

⁹ Edward A Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks* (Stanford, 1990), pp. 42 – 43, as cited by Patnaik, *Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia* (New Delhi and Kolkata: Anamika Publishers and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute, 2003), p. 18

¹⁰ AM Khazanov, “Underdevelopment and Ethnic Relations”, in Beatrice F Manz, ed., *Central Asia in Historical Perspective* (Boulder, 1994), p. 147, as cited by Ajay Patnaik, *Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia* (New Delhi and Kolkata: Anamika Publishers and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute, 2003), p. 22

and he certainly did not want different political movements wrecking the empire.¹¹ The manner, in which the 1905 Revolution was suppressed in Russia, stands as a glaring example of the nature of the Tsarist regime.

The administration of the Central Asian regions was entrusted in the hands of the Governor-General of Turkestan, appointed directly by the Tsar. He appointed the nobility and military officers or the *oblast* and *uyezd* administrative officers. Military and civil, including dispensation of justice were concentrated in their hands. The Tsarist government also introduced a so-called popular elective lower village administration, by creating the post of the *volost* or the lowest administrative unit consisting of a few villages. Nevertheless, the appointments were confirmed by the military governor and the elected officials worked totally under them, having practically no freedom of governability. "The elected local officials joined hands with the Russian colonialists against their own toiling people. All sorts of extortions and misuse of authority against them became a matter of daily occurrence".¹²

Though the Central Asian region was turned into a raw material providing unit for the motherland, which led to the construction of railway lines, ending the isolation of the whole Central Asia that it suffered, but there did not grow a considerable number of industrial proletariat, as the Central Asian bourgeoisie was still very weak to establish and own large industries. "There were before the Revolution only 12,702 Uzbek industrial workers" which was quite a considerable amount in reference to the other Central Asian regions, which was considerably lower.¹³ The percentage of literacy amongst the Central Asian population was dismal too. Gordiyenko has accounted that "The percentage of literacy among the Uzbeks was 2%, Turkmens 0.7%, Tajiks 0.5%, Kirghizs and Kara-Kalpaks 0.2%".¹⁴

But the dismal literate population was able to create a local intelligentsia, under the tutelage of people like AP Fedchenko, PP Semyonov-Tianshansky, and others. Kaushik has pointed out that "contact with representatives of progressive

¹¹ The politics of Russia during the Tsarist regime has been described in Samuel N Harper, *The Government of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1938) p. 11 as cited by Phool Badan, *Dynamics of Political Development in Central Asia* (New Delhi: Lancer's, 2001), p. 80

¹² *Ibid*, n. 3, p. 71

¹³ *Ibid*, n. 3, , p. 73

¹⁴ *Ibid*, n. 3, p. 75

Russian culture stimulated their aspiration for new secular knowledge and there soon arose among them a movement for the pursuit of this".¹⁵ For that reason, with the ushering of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, there was also a significant effect that was made in the Central Asian regions.

During Tsarist colonial rule in Central Asia there were some movements that created minor threats to the authority of the Tsarist regime. Though there had been a tendency for Soviet historians to club all movements and minor rebellions into national struggle from the Tsarist hegemony, but not all such rebellion had popular support and participation. Kaushik has explained these movements in a different manner. According to him, "in the early years of colonial rule many progressive changes took place in the economic and cultural life of the people. After the dark days of the Khan misrule with its despotism and open extortions, the people could not but appreciate the new changes brought about by the Tsarist regime. Hence, when the feudals and religious leaders rose in religious-nationalist movement for the restoration of the Khan under the reactionary slogan of *gazavat* or holy war, the people did not rally behind them".¹⁶ Even John Anderson has commented that even "the revolution of 1905 – 7 left the local population largely untouched, though it played a role in stimulating the activities of reformist intellectuals".¹⁷ It was mostly initiated by a small group that remained concentrated within the professional group of miners and railroad workers. For that reason, the strikes that took place during the revolution hit the functions of the mines and the railways badly.

First such movement was initiated and organized by VD Korniyushin, "who organized the first social-democratic circle in Tashkent in 1902". But after the end of 1905, the strength of the social democrats withered away. According to John Anderson, "central to the spread of new ideas were the activities of the Tatar traders and educators, whose inspiration came from the work of Ismail Bey Gaspirali, better known as Gasprinsky...Gasprinsky and his associates promoted the spread of secular education and the creation of a common Turkic language. Such ideas were disseminated through a series of newspapers, and via the attempts to create so called 'new method' (*usul' jadid*) schools, from whence came the word *jadid* to describe

¹⁵ Ibid, n. 3, p. 77

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 80 – 81

¹⁷ John Anderson, *The International Politics of Central Asia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 16

these reformers".¹⁸ This region was also considered to be a place for banishing those that were considered to be unwanted in European Russia. Pierce has rightly pointed out that "Turkestan and the Kazakh Steppe, like other outlying parts of the empire, were places of exile for 'political undesirables' from European Russia. Revolutionary students and industrial workers were sometimes drafted and assigned to military units in Central Asia, 'undesirable soldiers' were transferred there from units in other regions, and civilian exiles were domiciled in all of the main towns. Inevitable, these people transmitted their ideas to the land-hungry peasants, disgruntled soldiers and workers, and the frustrated members of the intelligentsia around them. The Russian government's efforts to neutralize the revolutionary infection by transferring the carriers to remote, more tranquil regions only served to spread it throughout the empire".¹⁹

During this period only there was a somewhat ragtag party that was formed by the unison of various ideology followers into the United Group of Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries. There was also the establishment of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) under the tutelage of Evgenii Kataev. Only after the 'bloody Sunday' demonstrations in St. Petersburg, did these clusters of political groups find some sort of strength to fight the Tsarist colonialists. Though there were multiple attempts of subduing the movement but on October 19, in Tashkent, things went out of hand when Cossacks fired on assembled demonstrators. Agitation went to such an extreme that the Russian Duma had to take the decision of removing the city commandant; removing as well as putting on trial the military governor; removing Cossacks from Tashkent and abolished military patrols. During this period strikes paralyzed day to day life of the region. In 1906 again, there were fresh mutinies and uprisings especially in the Transcaspian region, which spread on to the entire region.²⁰

The impact of the First World War, which began in 1914, became visible with the direct blow on the economies of the region. Taxes soared and the cost of living

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 19 as well as J. Landau, *The politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organisation* (Oxford 1990) and E. Lazzarini, "Beyond Renewal – The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change in the Modern Age", in Jo-Ann, ed., *Muslims in Central Asia – Expressions of Identity and Change* (Durham, 1992), pp. 151 – 166

¹⁹ Richard A Pierce, *Russian Central Asia – 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley and California: University of California Press, 1960), p. 235

²⁰ Ibid, pp. 234 – 248

TH - 12410



sky rocketed. There was multiple small uprising that took place during this period taking advantage of the weakness of the Russian Army due to their preoccupation in the World War. Especially the Labor Draft that was passed by the Imperial court, “drafting non-Russians for labor in the rear of the fighting forces”.²¹ There were massive rebellions on this issue in the northern part of Syr-Darya oblast, the Semirechie oblast and the Transcaspian region. Rebellion also spread out into the Kazakh Steppe region. It was greatest in the Turgai oblast region. But the rebellion was suppressed ruthlessly, shooting down the native leaders, taking up extreme punitive measures against those who sided with the rebels and even not sparing the administration of the region, for not being able to control the rebellion. As Pierce has pointed out that “by the end of December, 1916, the native uprisings had run their course...Considering the population and state of the economy of the region, the loss of life and property had been heavy”.²² Kuropatkin who was the able military governor of Tashkent, and was responsible in subduing the rebels in the Semirechie oblast region wrote to the tsar on February 1, 1917 saying “that the native resistance was at an end in all blasts...but... because of some of the reasons for the revolt still existed it could be expected to be resumed in the spring, with the appearance of new pasture”.²³

On February 27, 1917, the Tsar abdicated, and this news reached Tashkent on the 28th night. The 1905 rebellion spirit revitalized amongst the people. This time not only the rail workers, miners and mutinied soldiers joined the rebellion but also people from the middle and conservative classes joined the revolution. As Pierce has noted that “there were societies of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other professional people, officials, and even a ‘Society of Sales Clerks’ and a ‘Society of Employee’s in the Governor-General’s office’”.²⁴ Participated in the revolution a provisional government was formed under the aegis of the Executive Committee of the Provisional Government, who would take the task of governing the region until the Provisional government in Petrograd could send a committee to take over control. After the February Revolution, “various Russian political parties became active, particularly the Constitutional Democrats, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the

²¹ Ibid, p. 271

²² Ibid, p. 292

²³ Pierce, n. 25, pp. 297 – 298

²⁴ Pierce, n. 25, pp. 299

Menshevik and the Bolshevik wings of the Social Democrats. The underground members of the Bolshevik party came on the surface and started demanding for a complete revolution that would secure a government not by the 'bourgeoisie' but by the 'toilers'.²⁵ On March 31, 1917, Kuropatkin was removed by the decision of the Executive Committee and the Soviets and slowly all the political institutions gave way to the growth of commissars, executive committees, and soviets of the new order. The final triumph has been recorded by Pierce that "the Bolshevik triumph in Tashkent on October 31, 1917, and eventual seizure of control over the Kazakh Steppes and Transcaspia in the course of the Civil War of 1918 - 1920 merely made formal the end of an era".²⁶

Uzbekistan During Soviet Rule

A historian has noted that Uzbekistan is a Soviet political creation.²⁷ The Bolshevik Revolution did not bring in any significant development in the political process as their political and cultural freedoms were further crushed. However, there were attempts of creating an idea of nationality based territorial statehood as formulated by the Bolsheviks after they took over the reigns of power. As Patnaik has pointed out that "it was an exercise undertaken in all the regions and not just in Central Asia".²⁸

But while greeting the formation and consolidation of the Soviet republics in Bukhara, Azerbaijan, and Armenia while addressing the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920, VI Lenin said, "These republics are proof and corroboration of the fact that the ideas and principles of Soviet government are understood and immediately applicable, not only in the industrially developed countries, not only in those, which have a social basis like the proletariat, but also in those which have the peasantry as their basis. The idea of peasant's Soviet has triumphed. The peasants' power has been assured: they own the land and the means of production. The friendly relations between the peasant Soviet Republics and the

²⁵ Ibid, p. 300

²⁶ Ibid, p. 301

²⁷ William Feirman, "Political Development in Uzbekistan? Democratization?" in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (1997), p. 362

²⁸ Ajay Patnaik, *Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia* (New Delhi and Kolkata: Anamika Publishers and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute, 2003), p. 23

Russian Socialist Republic have already been consolidated by the practical results of our policy”.²⁹

Whatever might be the situation, the ground reality was that there was nominal ideological control of the Soviet government over Central Asia. As Anderson has pointed out that “party organisations remained weak, most not having setup formally until the early 1920s, and they often lacked people from the indigenous communities or cadres who understood the peculiarities of the region. In Kazakhstan the party had around 26,000 members in 1922 of whom around a third was Kazakhs, but most of the latter were semi-literate and had little idea about Marxist doctrine”.³⁰

Moscow had a clear approach in dealing with the impending issues that battered the Central Asian provinces of the newly formed nation. The key word that they adopted was *korenizatsiya* (nativisation). According to Anderson, “at successive party congresses resolutions stressed the need to draw in native cadres and to provide for the use of national languages in education, the courts, media and administration. In 1920, the Central Committee sent a letter to the Turkestan Communist Party ordering the removal of all those members tainted by ‘colonizing fever’ or Great Russian nationalism, and called for the drawing in of the best laboring elements in the region”.³¹ However, as BT Olivier has pointed out that “native membership grew slowly in Kazakhstan rising from 8 per cent in 1924 to 38 per cent in 1928, and in Uzbekistan reaching about 40 percent by 1927. In April 1928 the Uzbek Central Committee adopted a resolution on the ‘Uzbekistan’ of the government apparatus, with the objective of making this 100 percent by 1930, but the target achieved was in fact 22.6 per cent”.³²

According to the leaders of Central Asia, who were in the highest administrative echelons. Moscow saw only one way through which Central Asia could usher into the Soviet era from the transitional era. It had to be mostly on the path of “non-capitalist path of development”. Moscow first saw the necessity to go

²⁹ VI Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 31, pp. 490 – 491 as cited by Kaushik, n. 1, p. 192

³⁰ Anderson, n. 23, pp. 31 – 32

³¹ Ibid

³² BT Olivier, “Korenizatsiya”, *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 9, issue 3, 1990, pp. 77 – 98, as cited by Anderson, n. 23, p. 32

ahead with agrarian reforms, which hinged on two important crucibles; first, the Soviet national policy and secondly, the development of worker's and peasant's Soviets.³³ Key agrarian policies included major land-water reforms that got initiated during the period of 1925 – 28. It created a new system of land ownership closely followed by a set of “complementary institutional reforms” in the field of rural cooperation, education, credit, etc.³⁴ The Soviet regime found it imperative to develop the extremely poor developed Eastern regions of Soviet Russia as this region was extremely resource rich.

In 1924, a territorial delimitation on the basis of ethnicity and language took place in the region. According to Anita Sengupta, “this rationalization of this division was made on the basis of language with the prediction that each of these nations would now develop themselves and their national cultures and identities within the frontiers determined by these lines”.³⁵ But these delimitations created more disputes than resolving any. There was a basic amelioration of identities that was kept distinct during the long periods under the regimes of the Khanates. The inclusion of the city of Bukhara into Uzbekistan was an example of such a policy. Tajiks felt deprived by such a decision. “Tajik critiques examining the period of delimitation note that in the results of the Uzbek people questionnaire of 1926, all the inhabitants of Bukhara were counted as Uzbeks apart from a depleted population called *Fars-Tajik*, which was only a small group of Shiite Muslims and did not include all the Tajiks in the city. It was also being pointed out that Bukhara has fallen into the hands of Uzbekistan through political betrayals, blunders and omissions committed by officials who had been influenced by pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism during the final years of the Republic of Bukhara”.³⁶

As Sabol has explained that “the series of compromises that the Bolsheviks agreed with the nationalists in the early years of the Soviet era initially preserved the

³³ RR Sharma, *A Marxist Model of Social Change: Soviet Central Asia: 1917 – 1940* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1979), p. 46

³⁴ Ibid, p. 53

³⁵ Anita Sengupta, *Frontiers into Borders: The Transformation of Identities in Central Asia* ((Gurgaon, London and Kolkata: Hope India, Greenwich Millennium and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute, 2002) p. 58

³⁶ Ibid, p. 69

traditional centres of power in the region, although within redefined political networks”.³⁷

Within this period there was also a significant effort by indigenous Uzbeks to create a separate sustaining economy of their own. This attempt was made when the Soviet efforts of “collectivization was on in full swing and centralization was the order of the day”.³⁸ But this effort was severely crushed by the Soviet regime. Anyone who was even suspected of spreading nationalism in the Central Asia were either arrested or executed. “Even Russian elites in the regions were unsafe, for as early as 1932 Kazakh First Secretary F.I. Goloshchekin had been removed for failures that had ‘fed’ nationalism”.³⁹ “In 1937 – 39 most of the leading nationalists were arrested and executed, alongside the remaining old Communists”.⁴⁰

As Anderson has noted that “within a very short period the native elites of the region had been decimated, and a new generation began to take its place, a younger generation with a technical rather than humanitarian education, schooled to the hard realities of Soviet rule. Nonetheless, to ensure control as well as make well the deficiency caused by the purges and the shortage of educated personnel, Moscow also appointed numerous Russians, whether local or ‘parachuted’ in, to key positions in the region”.⁴¹

There was a colonial relationship with that of motherland Soviet Russia and the rest of the countries in Central Asia. There were some hard and fast methods of ensuring that the regions of Central Asian remained under the aegis of Soviet Russia. The Soviet ideology was superimposed on the people of the region that totally suppressed the indigenous history, tradition and culture of Central Asia. As Carley has noted, “Soviet ideology routinely denigrated Central Asian history, tradition, religion,

³⁷ Steven Sabol, “The creation of Soviet Central Asia: the 1924 National Delimitation”, *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 14, no. 2, 1995, pp. 225 – 41

³⁸ S. Burg, “Central Asian political participation and Soviet political development”, in Y. Roi, ed., *The USSR and the Muslim World* (London, 1984), p. 4, as cited by Anderson, n. 23, p. 34

³⁹ MB Olcott, *Kazakhs* (Stanford, 1987), p. 216

⁴⁰ Anderson, n. 23, p. 34

⁴¹ Ibid

and culture”.⁴² There was a significant attempt of Russification over the entire region. There was an over pervading fear of Islamic or Turkic unity in the region that had to be suppressed. “The alphabets of all the Central Asian languages were changed from the Arabic script used before the Revolution, first to Latin, and then finally to varieties of Cyrillic by 1940”.⁴³

However, it was difficult for Moscow to totally curb the nationalist feelings of the region. The nationalist feeling remained an underlying trend that promoted the growth of groups linking together to form alliances working parallel with the Soviet governmental structure. There was language, religious as well as trade union groups that started aligning with each other. Donald Carlisle has pointed “to the ways in which leadership in Uzbek politics may have swung between a Tashkent-Fergana based elite with a more pro-Moscow position, and a group of leaders whose career backgrounds and loyalties lay with the southern periphery and towns such as Samarkand and Bukhara. Under the latter grouping, led from 1959 – 83 by First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov, Uzbekistan moved increasingly outside of Moscow’s control. Leaders promoted relatives, friends and colleagues, and built alliances (often reinforced by marriage), which in turn conspired to cover up economic failings and persistently withheld information from Moscow”.⁴⁴

There was an attempt to dismantle the traditional institutions in the regions, remaking it into a secular and liberal society. Though this change had a significant impact on the lives of the people but the traditional modes of organisations reappeared time to time in various guises in the Central Asian republics. Preservation of tradition was the only possible path of resistance in Soviet conditions. As Janice Baker has noted, “with the very nation under physical threat...the preservation of tradition became central to the survival of any sense of identity”.⁴⁵

⁴² Patricia M Carley, “The Legacy of the Soviet Political System and the Prospects for Developing Civil Society in Central Asia”, in Vladimir Tismaneau, *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: ME Sharpe, 1995), p. 301

⁴³ Ibid, p. 300

⁴⁴ Donald Carlisle, “The Uzbek power elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938 – 83)”, *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1986, pp. 109 - 118

⁴⁵ Janice Baker, “The position of women in Kazakhstan in the inter-war years”, *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1985, p. 100

“During the post-Stalin years the centre had been increasingly content to allow Republican Party bosses considerable freedom of action so long as they ensured political stability and delivered the planned economic goods”.⁴⁶ But such step motherly attitude gave rise to rampant corruption amongst the political ranks giving air to large scale nepotism. There was a gross degeneration of political culture within these nations during this period. Corruption grew with a distinct identity of its own in the region. It had two characteristics: the persistence of tribalism or other sources of nepotism in Central Asian society and the existence of the cotton monoculture in much of the region’s economic life.⁴⁷

But with the passage of time, the Soviet leadership, especially in “the post Khrushchev period, had abandoned a euphoric over-optimistic approach to the nationalities question in favour of a more realistic approach”.⁴⁸ The Party Programme that was adapted in 1961 under Khrushchev emphasized on “unity and rapprochement (*sblizheniye*) of nations”.⁴⁹ But with the incoming of Brezhnev there was a change in attitude of the Soviet leadership. He said that “The further drawing together of the nations and nationalities of our country is an objective process. The Party is against hastening the process: there is no need for that, since it is determined by the entire course of our Soviet life. At the same time, the Party considers it impermissible to attempt in any way to hold it up, to impede it on some pretext, or to give it emphasis to national distinctiveness, because this would go against the general line of development of our society, the internationalist ideals and the ideology of Communists, the interests of Communists construction”.⁵⁰ Andropov candidly acknowledged that it “is hardly possible as long as nations exist, as long as there are national distinctions, and these will exist for a long time to come, much longer than class distinctions...nothing can be dismissed as insignificant. Everything counts – the attitude to the language, to monuments of the past, the interpretations of historical

⁴⁶ Anderson, n. 23, p. 55

⁴⁷ Patricia M Carley, n. 50, p. 304

⁴⁸ Devendra Kaushik, “The Nationalities Question in the USSR – The Current Phase”, in RR Sharma, ed., *The USSR in Transition: Issues and Themes (1922 – 82)* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1985), p. 200

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 202

⁵⁰ LI Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Collection of Speeches* by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, March 1971 December 1972 (Moscow, 1975), p. 298, as cited by Devendra Kaushik, n. 56, p. 203

events, and the way we transform rural and urban areas and influence living and working conditions”.⁵¹

However, due to the inbuilt suppression in the governmental machinery, there were very few such incidents in the Central Asian republics that made it able to rise against the Soviet Russification. Rather it was more of the power that got centralized in the hands of the members of the republican parties in the region. But there was a major change that was set about with the policies of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* by Gorbachev and that saw the rise of a decade of a paradigm shift in the politics of the Central Asian nations.

Uzbekistan under Gorbachev

The manner in which, the regions of Central Asia, was certainly not at all the liking of the last generation of the Soviet ruling elite. That became clear when Mikhail Gorbachev was extremely critical of the corruption that was associated with the cotton industry as well as the personnel policies which he said were all too often based on nepotism.

Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in March 1985. One of the most important changes brought by Gorbachev was the reform policies of *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* that totally remodeled the Soviet governmental structure not only in Moscow but throughout the vast expanses of the nation the changes created vast ripples. First was the introduction of “*glasnost*”. *Glasnost* had three distinct axes of reforms: the liberalization of the media and of discussion and criticism even outside the media and of discussion and criticism even outside the media; a purging and modernization of the apparatus in all its branches; greater flexibility in the institutions and mechanisms which directly exercise power. The criticism voiced would have been catered to by a ‘court of administrative recourse’ that was established in January 1987. Then came one more blow to the Soviet infrastructure in the form of ‘*Perestroika*’. It is a major utilization of market mechanisms in an economy dominated by central planning (i.e. a socialist market economy), as opposed to

⁵¹ YV Andropov, *Sixtieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* (Moscow, 1983), p. 18, as cited by Devendra Kaushik, n. 56, p. 204

'market socialism' where market regulation is dominant. It also introduced a major reform in the economic structure of the Soviet economic structure.

There was a major shuffle amidst the ruling elites in retaliation with Moscow's anti corruption drive. They felt that the entire effort was directed towards the Central Asian region.

"During the second half of the 1980s, Moscow's attitude gave the Uzbek population the impression that they were living at a historic time. The atmosphere of tolerance assured by *perestroika* favored the emergence of numerous and varied associations and informal groups (including anti-nuclear ones). Publications acted as a stimulus in the growth of Uzbek public opinion".⁵²

In 1988, "Birlik People's Movement" (*Unity Party*) was established under Abdurahim Pulatov and 18 other Uzbek intellectuals. Birlik meant unity. "This was a confederation of secular and nationalist movements whose initial policy was based on the 'protection of Uzbekistan's natural, material and spiritual riches'.⁵³ Later in February 1990, Birlik broke up leading to the creation of "Erk" (freedom), led by Muhammad Salih. Erk means freedom. Erk represented a moderate splinter group that got dissociated with Birlik. Then there was the formation of the Islamic Renaissance Party, which was founded in Astrakhan in Russia in June 1990. This minority faction believes that former Communist traditions and Muslim traditions were politically compatible. The rise of Islamism also saw the birth of the Turkestan Islamic Party, which has Pan-Islamic tendencies and is directed towards all Muslims of Turkestan's historical region.⁵⁴

1989 saw tremendous ethnic violence in Uzbekistan. Two of such ethnic violence needs special mention: "in June 1989 in the Fergana Valley, the Uzbek and Meskhetian communities fought, in which around 99 people got killed. A year later, June 1990, further ethnic conflicts erupted in the Fergana Valley over the apportionment of two ever scarce and precious resources; water and fertile soil. The

⁵² "Uzbekistan", in Giampaolo R. Caspani, *The Handbook of Central Asia: A Comprehensive Survey of the New Republics* (London: IB Tauris, 2000), p. 79

⁵³ Ibid, p. 80

⁵⁴ Ibid

confrontations were between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks who form the majority in the city of Osh”.⁵⁵

There was one more confrontation that started in the Tajik capital Dushanbe. It started “following the spread of rumours that numerous Armenian refugees from the conflict with Azerbaijan over the disputed Caucasian territory of Nagorno-Karabakh were to be given priority for housing at a time when many Tajiks lacked basic housing facilities. With tens of thousands on the street calling for the resignation of the political leadership, events took an ugly turn after troops fired and killed a number of demonstrators”.⁵⁶ Though the agitation was suppressed immediately with brute force but it remained as a major scar in the minds of the Tajiks.

Moscow after witnessing the rise in ethnic violence started taking effective measures to control the amount of violence that was brewing in the Central Asian republics. The center halted all attempts to restore ethnic balance in the leading organs and from around “1989 most of the Central Asian party executives, apparatus and republican Council of Ministers came to be dominated by Central Asians...republican elites (also) began to take up some of the grievances that were being brought to the fore in the press, or to encourage their broad discussion...more scope was given to age old customs such as the new year festival of *Navruz*, with its religious connotations no longer hidden...Islam was treated no longer as an opponent, but rather as a force to be utilized and drawn upon in reforming society and overcoming what was seen as its moral decline”.⁵⁷

As Carley has pointed out, “The easing of the prohibitions on overt religious expression was also an impetus, opening for the first time in decades a discussion of religion’s place in society”.⁵⁸ The demand for a reform in the language policy of Soviet Russia was also demanded from this year. There was a demand for new language laws to be formulated and implemented. “At the same time Central Asian leaders sought to pressurize the centre for greater socio-economic help, both through the traditional means of discrete, behind-the-scenes bargaining but also more openly

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Anderson, n.23, p. 68

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 69 – 70

⁵⁸ Patricia M Carley, n. 50, p. 306

as *perestroika* created new fora for public discussion”.⁵⁹ But there was a significant difference in the approach that was taken by the Central Asian leadership while dealing with Moscow and dealing with resistance at home. They wanted to gain as much leverage with Moscow but were not at all eager to provide that much independence that they were asking for from the leadership in Moscow.

Thus, it has to be understood that only after the introduction of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, in the Soviet system. The birth of political parties, language, religious and cultural aspirations started taking its shape. And after independence, there were more of chaos and instability than stability and peace. The hands of the leadership were more preoccupied in bringing back peace and stability than think about strengthening democratic roots. It was more of keeping the nations together and was more of attempting to survive in the new political order.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 71

CHAPTER-3

Emergence of Democratic Institutions in Independent Uzbekistan

Democracy is a form of governance where the people living in a state enjoys full political voice in either governing themselves (in a direct democracy, which is rarely followed) or through elected representatives (in an indirect democracy, where the political voice is vitalized by various institutions in the civil society). Such democracy thrives on the success of these democratic institutions and the characters of these democracies are made up of the characters of these democratic institutions. The more the freedom enjoyed by these institutions rationally, the more is directly handed over to the people in handling the governance of the state.

Democratic institutions are normally made up of political parties, pressure groups which are not included in the process of governance but instigate a considerable influence on the governing bodies, media, which includes the print as well as electronic media and the people's bodies which acts as check valve for the governing bodies. In the democratic societies, these democratic institutions have taken various size and shapes creating distinct patterns of governance. Each institution moulds and re-moulds itself according to the polity, the political awareness of the masses. If the example of a political party as a democratic institution is taken, then it will be seen that in the various democratic set up political parties have taken various shapes as they grow amidst the democratic structures. The single system, the bi-party system and the multi party system, all portrays the various pattern of governance that is present in the various politics of the world. Within the various parties structure there are forms, which build the character of the political systems. These parties are motivated by strong democratic manifesto, sometimes the charisma or the leadership qualities of a single leader, a usually have deep roots with the political histories of that specific or that reason, to understand the democratic nature of a state, one has to keep in mind the various institutions that work and tandem for the success of such democracy. If any one of the institutions becomes more powerful, hindering the free functions of the other democratic institutions, than invariably it gives birth to a lopsided democratic growth of that nation.

Uzbekistan was created during this phase of transition; a nation settled in the juncture of two major river bodies and in the midst of multiple topographic variations. It has mostly experienced a multitude of governing systems but never had the nation experienced democratic governance. For that reason, the process of democratisation that got initiated had many pitfalls.

One thing that should be kept in mind before analyzing the trends of democratisation in Uzbekistan and the emergence and growth of political institutions in the nation, is that the states of Central Asia have a political history far different from that of Western countries, and there is little that could constitute a “democratic tradition”...Power at all levels is personalized, often based on tribal or clan connections, and this in turn contributes to corruption and limits prospects for the development of inclusive political parties.¹

Democratic Institutions in Uzbekistan

In the Soviet era, Uzbekistan organized its government and its local communist party in conformity with the structure prescribed for all the republics. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) occupied the central position in ruling the country. The party provided both the guidance and the personnel for the government structure. The system was strictly bureaucratic: every level of government and every governmental body found its mirror image in the party. The tool used by the CPSU to control the bureaucracy was the system of *nomenklatura*, a list of sensitive jobs in the government and other important organizations that could be filled only with party approval. The *nomenklatura* defined the Soviet elite, and the people on the list invariably were members of the CPSU.

Following the failure of the coup against the Gorbachev government in Moscow in August 1991, Uzbekistan's Supreme Soviet declared the independence of the republic, henceforth to be known as the Republic of Uzbekistan. At the same time, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan voted to cut its ties with the CPSU; three months

¹ Paul Kubicek, “Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure?”, *Thrid World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1998, Carfax Publications, p. 30.

later, it changed its name to the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU), but the party leadership, under President Islam Karimov, remained in place. Independence brought a series of institutional changes, but the substance of governance in Uzbekistan changed much less dramatically.

On December 21, 1991, together with the leaders of ten other Soviet republics, Karimov agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union and form the Commonwealth of Independent States, of which Uzbekistan became a charter member according to the Alma-Ata Declaration. Shortly thereafter, Karimov was elected president of independent Uzbekistan in the new country's first contested election. Karimov drew 86 percent of the vote against opposition candidate Mohammed Salih, whose showing experts praised in view of charges that the election had been rigged. The major opposition party, Birlik, had been refused registration as an official party in time for the election.

The Parliamentary election, the first held under the new Constitution's guarantee of universal suffrage to all citizens eighteen years of age or older, excluded all parties except the PDPU and the pro-government *Progress of the Fatherland Party*, despite earlier promises that all parties would be free to participate. The new, 250-seat parliament, called the *Oly Majlis* or Supreme Soviet, included only sixty-nine candidates running for the PDPU, but an estimated 120 more deputies were PDPU members technically nominated to represent local councils rather than the PDPU. The result was that Karimov's solid majority continued after the new Parliament went into office.²

In the making of the Constitution, "a draft was published in the summer of 1992, subjected to some discussion in the media and then adopted by parliament in mid-December. Uzbekistan opted for what was in effect a presidential system. This document also promised a wide range of civil freedoms although its adoption

² "Uzbekistan", *Country Profile*, Government, see <http://www.countrystudies.com/uzbekistan/government.html>.

coincided with the arrest of many oppositionists and a parliamentary vote to remove the registration of the Birlik (Unity) Popular Front".³

The Constitution which was ratified a year after independence, on 8th December 1992, clearly spell out Uzbekistan's commitment to the protection of human rights and various individual freedoms, including the right to privacy. Yet-reminiscent of the Soviet era Constitution of the republics – these rights are limited if they infringe on the "rights of societies"⁴. Now these rights will be defined by the ruling elite making them extremely powerful.

For that reason in the initial years of the nineties, there seemed to be a healthy democratic growth within the nation. But after independence there is a spurt of the ethnic nationalism that started speeding like wild fire. To control such threats Karimov initiated the process of suppression and repression of those who tired to put any opposition to his policies and decisions. So, the institutional development of the Uzbekistan done under the pretext of the President Karimov.

In 1993 Karimov's concern about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism spurred Uzbekistan's participation in the multinational CIS peacekeeping force sent to quell the civil war in nearby Tajikistan--a force that remained in place three years later because of continuing hostilities. Meanwhile, in 1993 and 1994 continued repression by the Karimov regime brought strong criticism from international human rights organizations. In March 1995, Karimov took another step in the same direction by securing a 99 percent majority in a referendum on extending his term as president from the prescribed next election in 1997 to 2000. In early 1995, Karimov announced a new policy of toleration for opposition parties and coalitions, apparently in response to the need to improve Uzbekistan's international commercial position. A few new parties were registered in 1995, although the degree of their opposition to the government is doubtful, and imprisonments of some opposition political leaders are continued.

³ John Anderson, "Constitutional Development in Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1997, p. 302.

⁴ Roger D. Kangas "Uzbekistan: Evolving Authoritarianism", *Current History*, Vol. 93 No. 582. April 1994, p.178

To further centralise his authority, Karimov signed a 1993 decree formalising presidential appointment of all regional executive offices and *hokims* (governors).⁵ In addition, Karimov has purged potential rivals from the executive leadership, as evidenced in his treatment of Shukhrullo Mirsaidov.⁶ In this way, a strong central leader, who dominates on all democratic and semi democratic elements and mechanisms of the country have moulded Uzbeki politics.

“Creation of democratic institutions in Uzbekistan can be divided into two phases. (I). The first phase, between 1991 and 1995, can be called the phase of ‘chaotic or naïve democracy’, the most visible feature of which was the overall strengthening of national representative institution, the parliament. This democratic process had a drawback, however. The increase of the overall political role of the parliament without its parallel professionalization resulted in the intensification of spontaneity in the political processes. The overall decrease of the professional level of governance, as a result of attempts at intervention by parliamentary institutions into the competence areas of the executive branch, pushed the executive power to limit the role of these democratic institutions. This phase came to an end by the middle of the 1990s when it became obvious that the state had lost control over social and economic processes in the republic. (II). In the second (and current) phase, beginning from the middle of the 1990s, the tendency to strengthen presidential power, as a reaction to the perceived loss of control over social and economic development, can be observed. This remains an ongoing process in all the states of Central Asia.⁷

Martha Brill Olcott has mentioned that, “three main groups are ...competing for political control everywhere in the region. Representatives of the old Central Asian ‘partocracy’ – in most places break into competing groups – are struggling to remain in control. They are challenged by the new, so-called democratic groups

⁵ Roger D Kangas, “State Building and Civil Society in Central Asia”, in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York and London: ME Sharpe, 1995), p. 276.

⁶ Mirsaidov, a Tashkent-based clan leader, was instrumental in bringing Karimov to power in 1989. However, shortly after independence, Karimov removed Mirsaidov as vice president, abolishing the position itself. Later, Mirsaidov was tried, convicted, and amnestied for crimes against the state; he was effectively removed as a political rival. Cited by Roger D Kangas, n. 1, p. 289

⁷ “Reform on the Silk Road”, *The Quarterly Journal Of The Local Government And Public Service Reform Initiative*, Summer 2001, Open Society Institute, Local Government Brief, www.localgovernmentbrief.reformonthesilkroute_summer2001.pdf, p. 2

dominated by intellectuals who generally played only a peripheral role under the old political order. The 'partocracy' is also opposed by revivalist Islamic groups composed of fundamentalist-style clerics who were trained outside of the official establishment".⁸

As Erica Marat has pointed out that, "The political opposition in Uzbekistan has systematically undermined or forced out of the country. However, with the increasing political and economic involvement of the United States in the region, there are signs that the secular opposition is becoming more assertive, while the government shows initial signs of gradually changing its policies. The convertibility of the Uzbek currency is one example; another is the muted reaction of the Uzbek security structures to Erk's demonstration and congress. While these events clearly point to changing tactics on the part of Karimov's government toward the political opposition, it remains to be seen whether it constitutes a move towards the liberalization of the politics or a move to weaken and divide the opposition".⁹ Uzbekistan began its life as an independent state in 1991 with a seemingly stable economy, an educated population, claims to the Silk Road's culture, and ambitious post-Soviet plans. But the political situation of Uzbekistan remains insecure. It is difficult for the country to survive without Moscow's subsidies, its economy is weaker and its polity is more divided than Uzbeks had assumed. The long central Asia's land bridge between nomadic and settled societies, its fertile crescent – a cotton economy since Soviet times – has nurtured a succession of feudal, Islamic, communist, and nationalist political cultures. President Islam Karimov, the leader of PDPU, the successor party of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, that ceased to exist after the disintegration of Soviet Russia, is a communist-era veteran, who knows how to keep cities clean and roads paved, believes that order is imposed, not grown. For 13 years, he has kept a tight lid on politics, and his Western interlocutors have wavered between accepting and condemning his political views and repressive habits. Karimov is the in-between autocrat in a region dedicated to constancy in rule rather than the vagaries of self-government: He is neither outwardly free-wheeling like Kyrgyzstan's

⁸ Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Post-Empire Politics", *Orbis*, Spring 1992, p. 255

⁹ Erica Marat, "The Erk Protest Sets Out A Precedent For Karimov To Revise Relations With Political Opposition", *Central Asia & Caucasus Analyst*, 5, November 2003, see, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1873

Askar Akaev nor protecting a personality cult as Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov so avidly does.¹⁰

“Since there is no history of democratic rule in these countries, democracy is perceived there as, at the best an ideal for some distant future, not as a best system to resolve Uzbekistan’s problem today. In general, while traditional values in Uzbekistan tend to emphasize fairness and certain other democratic values, result also highlight comporting currents of less than democratic priorities and support for relatively authoritarian system and leaders”¹¹.

Now the question arises what attempts have been taken to establish democracy in Uzbekistan. The establishments of a constitution, the first step towards the democratization from the beginning of his Presidency, Karimov remain committed in words to instituting democratic reforms. The Constitution was adopted in December 1992 divided the entire system in three parts, strong Presidency, the *Oly Majlis* and the Judiciary.

As commander in chief of the armed forces, the president also may declare a state of emergency or of war. The president is empowered to appoint the prime minister and full cabinet of ministers and the judges of the three national courts, subject to the approval of the *Oly Majlis*, and to appoint all members of lower courts. The president also has the power to dissolve the parliament, in effect negating the *Oly Majlis's* veto power over presidential nominations in a power struggle situation.

Deputies to the unicameral *Oly Majlis*, the highest legislative body, are elected to five-year terms. The body may be dismissed by the president with the concurrence of the Constitutional Court; because that court is subject to presidential appointment, the dismissal clause weights the balance of power heavily toward the executive branch. The legislations constituted by *Oly Majlis* may be initiated by several authorities like the president, within the Parliament, by the high courts, by the

¹⁰ Paula R. Newberg, “Uzbekistan's Democratic Smoke Screen”, 20 December 2004, Yale Global, The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, see <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5055>

¹¹ Dr. Kadir Z. Alimov, Prospect for Development of Institutions of Civil Society in Uzbekistan, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, USA See www.cia.jhu.edu/alimov_civilsociety_uzbekistan.pdf

procurator general (highest law enforcement official in the country), or by the government of the Autonomous Province of Karakalpakstan.

As Mirsky has commented that the victory of Karimov in the first Presidential election was more or less easy as being the first former secretary of the Communist party, since a large portion of the population regards him as not so much as ex-communist leaders as local bosses or clan chiefs¹². PDP and Karimov has been instrumental in creating a pattern of one party system, which through has worked significantly for the betterment of Uzbek polity on economic terms but has been able to curb the other democratic voices within the nation.

Political Parties

After the disintegration of Soviet Union, there was the birth of a single largest political party along with multiple other political parties. "Through the early 1990s, the government's stated goal of creating a multiparty democracy in Uzbekistan went unrealized. When independence was gained, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was officially banned, but its successor, the PDP, assumed the personnel, structure, and political domination of its predecessor. Since forcing out a small number of deputies from opposition parties, PDP members have complete control of the Supreme Soviet, and most members of other government bodies also are PDP members. The only other legal party in Uzbekistan, the Progress of the Fatherland Party, was created by a key adviser to President Karimov, ostensibly to give the country a semblance of a multiparty system; but it differs little in substance from the PDP. Similarly is the case of the political parties, such as the *Vatan Tarakkieti* (Progress of the Fatherland), *Fidokorlar* (Self – Sacrificing), *Milli Tiklanish* (National Revival) and the *Peasant's Party*, but they are mostly appendages of PDP. One exception could have been the *Istiklal Yoli*, a party founded in 1994, which termed itself to be an active opposition group to the PDP. The December 1994 election, however, reaffirmed the virtual nonexistence of a party system in Uzbekistan. Though *Birlik* has come back in the political spectrum in a new name of *Khalq Birligi* (People's Unity), it is very difficult for the party member's to breakthrough the strong suppression that PDP has kept the nation under.

¹² George I Mirsky, "Central Asia's Emergence", *Current History*, October 1992, p. 337.

Even *Erk* has tried to regain back its political base in recent years. *Erk* held its first congress in 10 years in Tashkent on June 14 2003. Some 30 members of the party's central committee participated in the congress, criticizing the authorities and promising to be more active in Uzbek politics. The party's leader inside Uzbekistan, Atonazar Arifov, as the party founder, Muhammad Salih lives outside Uzbekistan as he is exiled and politically banished by Karimov, called on party members to be more active in domestic politics.¹³

Several legitimate opposition parties that emerged in Uzbekistan before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, none has been able to meet the official registration requirements that the government created to maintain control and exclude them from the public arena. The first opposition party, *Birlik*, was created in 1988, primarily by intellectuals and writers under the leadership of the writer Abdurakhim Pulatov. The movement attempted to draw attention to the problems, ranging from environmental and social concerns to economic challenges, and to participate in their solution. The main weakness of *Birlik* was that it never was able to present a united front to the government. Soon after the party's establishment, a group of *Birlik* leaders left to the party and set up a separate political party, *Erk* (Freedom), under the leadership of Mohammed Salih. The Uzbek government was able to exploit the disunity of the opposition and eventually to undermine their position. Following the establishment of independent Uzbekistan, the Karimov regime was able to suppress both *Birlik* and *Erk*. Both parties were banned officially; *Erk* was reinstated in 1994.

Other parties include the Movement for Democratic Reforms, *the Islamic Rebirth Party* (banned by the government in 1992), the Humaneness and Charity group, and the Uzbekistan Movement. A former Prime Minister (1990-91) and the former Vice President (1991) of Uzbekistan, Shukrullo Mirsaidov, created a new party, *Adolat* (Justice) in December 1994. Like *Birlik* and *Erk*, the *Adolat* calls for liberal economic reforms, political pluralism, and a secular society, but experts describe its opposition to the government as quite moderate. Nevertheless, *Adolat* has not been able to operate freely.

¹³ Uzbek Opposition Party Holds Congress in Tashkent, *Central Asia & Caucasus Analyst*, 15, June 2003, see http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1525

Manifesto of Various Political Parties in Uzbekistan

In Uzbekistan independent Political associations appeared firstly in 1989. The first political organization of the Uzbek National movement which appeared during the *perestroika* period was *Birlik* (Unity) which was formally established in November 1988. This is constituted by an organizing body of fifty Uzbek intellectuals. Their intention was to create a political party. They declared *Birlik* a popular movement. A central council was constituted with 90 founders members under the chairmanship of Abraham Pulatov doctor of Mathematics and physics.

The main goals of Birlik (Unity) are.

- (i) To reduce the backwardness of Uzbeki people.
- (ii) It will fight against any action that opposes democracy.
- (iii) It stress on national education, cultivation of national language, tradition and culture and respect for one's nationality. To fight against nationalism and chauvinism.
- (iv) To condemn the conflict between ethnic groups. It emphasized to make Uzbek the national language.
- (v) To study the Uzbek cultural heritage in detail and actively seek to gain respect for long standing progressive traditions.
- (vi) It demands the development of cultural relation with other union republics and the foreign nation.
- (vii) Birlik will stress for renewed, multifaceted study of Uzbekistan's history and the teaching of this knowledge in school and for the total elimination of demogogue attitude and Stalinist political views of history.

- (viii) This movement is dedicated to organizing a fund which should use for republic's requirements of historical, cultural and ecological needs.
- (ix) It stresses that Uzbek government. should improve the national economy, living standard and increase consumption of food.
- (x) To take necessary steps to improve the agricultural situation in the country.
- (xi) *Birlik* stresses on reducing the child labour ending the exploitation of women labour and the urgent need to create new jobs in the republic.
- (xii) *Birlik* stresses on the improvement of Medical services and sport activity and the related issues.
- (xiii) *Birlik* stresses the severity of ecological problems existing in the Aral Sea and other regions and called to avoid the use of toxic chemicals in Agriculture.
- (xiv) *Birlik* movement gave special emphasizes on human rights and justice.
- (xv) To raise political and social awareness.

Islamic Renaissance Party of Uzbekistan.

IRP was a result of the liberalization of Political life during the Gorbachev period in 1989. The first constituted conference of the All Union Islamic Renaissance party was held on 9 July 1990, in the city of Astrakhan. The Mufti of Uzbekistan, Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yasuf rejected secular model of development for Uzbekistan. Islamic groups were active in the cities of Fergana valley Namangan, Andijam and Fergana in 1990.

IRP's aims are –

- I. To educate the people and explain the meaning of holy *Quran* and *Hadith* and to create self publishing house.
- II. To strength Islamic brotherhood, to develop relationship with Muslim world and the cooperation with democratic parties and state organizations in all fields.
- III. To create society according to the holy *Quran & Hadith* and establish Islamic principles of economy and region's ecological purity.

These aims were adopted on 16 December. 1990.

Social Progress Party

This party is basically made by scientists, Intellectuals and enterprises. The chairperson of party is Faizullr Iskhakov who is supporter of the policies of president Islam Karimov. The first constituent congress of the party was held in first half of 1992.

The social progress party of Uzbekistan (PSP) believes that it is a time to formulate a new strategy and a new political course for implementing reforms. For this the model should be dynamically progressive and rational.

The objectives of this party are as follows:

- I. Do nationalization of property and privatization growth of wages
- II. To improve production and facilities with mutual agreements.
- III. Agricultural and land reforms.-To build a nation state in multi ethnic Uzbekistan.
- IV. There should be a clear cut division of legislative and executive and judicial powers with in the rule of law.

Peoples Democratic Party

This party was established on 1 November 1991, and soon it became the Ruling party. Islam Karimov is chairman of PDPU. The PDPU ensured Multi Party

democracy, supported, privatization, and free market economy. The PDPU published two newspapers *Uzbekistan* (in Uzbek) and *Golos Uzbekistan* (In Russian).

The main aims of PDPU are as follows:

- I. PDPU defined its guiding principle in philanthropy and democracy. Protection of Human Rights and the interests of the working people.
- II. To establish a society, which is based on political and economic freedom and democratic equality.
- III. To establish a society which ensure employment and minimum standard of living are guaranteed and there would be no dominant ideology.
- IV. To strengthen Republic of Uzbekistan as a state and securing it a worthy place in the world community.
- V. To strengthen the economy and its monetary and reduce social poverty.
- VI. To wish to be a member of UNO
- VII. To create a civil democratic society where the people can exercise their constitutional rights and freedom and the state policy is always directed at civil and ethnic harmony.
- VIII. To create economic and social policy oriented towards the individual .
- IX. Market relations and taking into account the specific conditions and traditions of Uzbekistan.
- X. PDPU holds that there can be no political independence without economic independence. The state should control over the basic industries like air and rail roads transport and major means of communications.

It opposes cotton mono culture and favour folk handicrafts and art for the spiritual and moral rebirth of society.

The party stands for democratic transformation in the mass media for illuminating variety of points of view and options.

ERK (Freedom)

ERK came into the existence after split in Birlik in February, 1990. It elected Muhammad Solih one of the founders of Birlik as party chairperson. *Erk* was composed of urban intellectuals and students. The party was registered in September 1991. Solih contested for the post of Republican's president in December, 1991.

I. *Erk* stressed on equality of all citizens before law, freedom of consciences, freedom of assembly, speech and press, etc.

II. *Erk* emphasize on consideration and coordination of the interests of all citizens, social security, political and civil rights and universal human values over class and other interests?

III. *Erk* demanded democratic institutions, political and economic de-monopolization and decentralization which actively counter the dictatorship and extremism in politics.

IV. *Erk* stands for abolishing the nomenclatural and project the spiritual and cultural development of society.

V. *Erk* demands for separation of power among the executive, legislative and judiciary through constitution and direct election by secret ballot in every level of government.

VI. *Erk* stresses on economic front also. It implies abolishing monopoly and state ownership and to create direct relation between suppliers and consumers. Privatization and a real market policy should be implemented.

The party's rules and Programme was adopted at Erk's second congress held in Tashkent on 3 Feb. 1991.

Watan Tarqqiyoti Party (Homeland Progress WTP)

Party's first congress was held in Jan 1993. The party defined its orientation as left centrist its supporters are educated Uzbeks. Usmon Azim is founder of party earlier he was a famous *Birlik* leader. WTP strongly supported president Karimov's

economic policies. Its programme and goals are similar as PDPU. The party published weekly '*Watan*'.

Main goals of WTP are as follows:

- I. To rational utilization of natural and intellectual resources for the well being of peoples of Uzbekistan.
- II. To complete development of Democracy with the implementation of progressive reforms and cooperation with the movements and other parties
- III. Separation of powers with in the legislative executive and judicial institutions.
- IV. To make strong foreign policy equal relation between the all the members of CIS, and good relation with Asia pacific countries/ region.
- IV. To oppose internal and external elements which try to seize political Power through dishonest and unlawful means?¹⁴

Functioning of Democratic Institutions

1. *Political Parties*: - The political movements began to arise in Uzbekistan during 1989 onwards. This phenomenon was the consequence of Gorbachev's reform policies. But after the disintegration of USSR these parties have sharply increased. These parties and interest groups have no large membership.

As Dr. Phool Badan has pointed out that the emergence of political parties was the first exercise of democratic political participation in the Heart of Central Asia (Uzbekistan),¹⁵ He has categorized the political parties in to three groups, which are as following.

- A. **Ruling Parities**: Which have their strong hold over government and its policies. In Uzbekistan the 'People democratic party' is a ruling party which was earlier a communist party. PDPU has changed its name.

¹⁴ see details Valdimir Babak, Demian Vaisnmain and Aryeh Wasserman, Political Organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. (Frankcass Publishers, London, 2004) pp 357-411.

¹⁵ Phool Badan, Dynamics of Political Development in Central Asia (New Delhi: Lancer's Book, 2001), p. 130.

- B. **Pro-government political parties:** These are supporting the ruling parties. They have faith in the ruling parties agenda and its policies. In Uzbekistan *Vatan Tarkkiyeti Party* is a progovernment party that supports the Karimov policies.
- C. **Independent Political Parties:** They are working as opposition parties. In Uzbekistan there are five political parties in this category. These are as following. *Islamic Revival Party, Birlik, Erk, National Revival Democratic Party and Communist Party*. In Uzbekistan there is a multi party system exists in theory but in practice the parties are not functioning as a multi party system. The opposition political parties are bounded and their activities has been clamp down and proved illegal.¹⁶

Paul Kubek has mentioned that opposition parties are technically allowed, but this is done only to create a veneer of democracy. Those parties that are allowed to function such as the *Mother Land Party* or the *Peasants' Party*, all openly support the PDP and these parties are in fact little more than extension of ruling party.¹⁷

Recently Karimov has created additional puppet parties. The true opposition parties and groups are hampered by government restrictions. In the case of *Erk* and *Birlik* shows that government used its power at any level of government.¹⁸

Giampaolo R Capisani has mentioned, "On 18 and 19 Jan. 1993 after the hasty trial in camera, of some the party for three months on the ground that it had unjustly criticized the President. The suspension of *Birlik* activities was total and shortly afterwards *Erk* met with the same fate. In August 1993, six of the *Erk's* members were sentenced to between five to six years for 'incitement to subversion. On 25 Oct. 1994 in Tashkent, the trial took place to prosecute seven 'Clandestine Erk militants amongst whom the poetess Diloran Iskhakova, for conspiracy against the state. On March 1995, six dissidents were sentenced to up 12 years for 'conspiracy with intent to seize

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 121- 124.

¹⁷ Paul Kubicek, n. 1, p. 32.

¹⁸ Ibid.

power." ¹⁹ Leader of Tajik organization Samarqand and has been imprisoned for undisclosed reasons.

The *Islamic Renaissance party* and '*Adolat*' (Justice) have also been denied registration and the reason was given that these parties are the source of Islamic fundamentalism. But in the views of Paul Kubicek, these parties represent an alternative to the existing political system in Uzbekistan²⁰

N I Petrov has pointed out that the first repressive measure were in August 1992 under which the Tajik people's forum (an expression of views on minority in Uzbekistan) was dissolved. During that same summer a political 'campaign against repression' organized by *Erk* and *Birlik* increasingly becoming the targets of restrictions and this measure was unable to mobilize the population. And the process was ended a few months later with the banning of both parties.²¹

The Govt. of Uzbekistan is determining to totally suppress the threats that were coming from the opposition parties or organized on governments.

Judiciary - Judiciary is an important pillar of democracy. The judiciary is branch of government that is empowered to decide legal disputes. The central functions of judges to adjudicate on the meaning of law, in the service that they are interpret or construct law. The significance of this role is different from state to state and from system to system. It is important in states with codified constitutions where judiciary extends its power to interpretation of the constitution itself and allows judges to arbitrate is disputes between major institutions of govt. and between state and individual. The judiciary is also responsible for safe guarding the rights of people against encroachment by other individual, institutions, and the state itself.

Courts of law in Post-Soviet countries are generally associated with the rights and freedoms of individual citizens. Court of Law is the institutions that guarantee

¹⁹ Giampaolo R Capisani, *The Handbook of Central Asia*, (London: I B Tauris Publishers, 2000), p. 82.

²⁰ Paul Kubicek, n. 1, p. 32.

²¹ N I Petrov, "Political Stability in the Conditions off the Command-Administrative Regime", in Alexi Vassiliev (ed.), *Central Asia: Political & Economic Challenges in the Post Soviet era* (London: Saqi Books, 2001), p. 86.

freedoms in society. 'The construction of Uzbek provides for the equality of all branches of power, legislative administrative and judicial'.²²

Leonid Levitin has pointed out that 'this equality seems to exist only in the constitution and in various laws. "But the real picture is reverse. Court of law in Uzbekistan is largely unprepared to fulfill their new functions as the third branch of government. The courts are just as poor and dependent on the administrative branch of government today as they were in soviet times."²³ It seems that after all not only the people but also the professional jurists do not really understand the significance of their new constitutional rights.

In Uzbekistan the power of judiciary has not been established in true since. People are not familiar with it. The common man can not afford to pay money to advocates for his judicial need.

Leonid Levitin explained that the participation of Judges is not effective in Courts of law. In Uzbekistan an excellent law was passed on 27 Dec. 1996, 'On advocacy' and another on 25 Dec. 1998, 'On the 'guarantee of advocate activities. But in reality the general social conditions and after the poverty of segments of the population create unfair conditions with regard to the access of citizens to legal counsel. He also warned that the infections of courts of law in public life and in relation to government activity seriously damage progressive development in Uzbekistan."²⁴

As N I Petrov as pointed out regarding judiciary that court prosecution is also quite common, although according to the official line there are no political cases in Uzbekistan. Human rights activists are tried as criminal on charges such as the humiliation of the presidents honor and dignity' as was the case with Abdumannob Pulatov and Vasila Inoyatova. The most trouble some people such as the co-chairman of *Birlik*, Abdurahim pulatov, were brutally beaten by unknown assailants.²⁵

Thus the picture is clear that judiciary is very ineffective in Uzbekistan and it is unable to play its important role in establishing democracy.

²² Leonid Levitin, *Uzbekistan: On A Historical Threshold* (Cambridge: Granta Editions, 2001), p. 256.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 257-259.

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 258-259.

²⁵ N I Petrov, n. 21, p. 86.

Media

In recent era the Media is becoming more powerful to raise the issues of common people. Media is playing a role of fourth pillar of democracy. This is a very strong expression of freedom of speech. Uzbekistan's media are subject to government control and manipulation and many sources of information are circumscribed or excluded entirely. Govt. control over the media continues to be a strong presence in the lives of journalists and reporters.

The ruling elite also saw to it there was a covert press censorship in Uzbekistan. The following are the government owned dailies in Uzbekistan, who mostly abstain from criticizing governmental policies and act mostly as the voice of the government in the masses.

- *Khalq Sozi*: government-owned daily
- *Narodnoye Slovo*: government-owned, Russian-language daily
- *Pravda Vostoka*: government-owned, Russian-language daily
- *Hurriyat*: published two to three times a week
- *Toshkent Haqiqati*: Tashkent regional newspaper, published twice a week,
- *Ishonch*: trade union newspaper, published twice every two days.²⁶

It has been evident that even those newspapers, which are directly not owned by the ruling elite, are under severe scrutiny of whatever they publish and distribute. There are strict repressive measures in place against those who think of airing grievance against the government in Uzbekistan. Even in the other agents of democratization like television, radio and news agencies, there has been a significant curtail of the freedom of speech and expression, in way curtailing the growth of democratic institutions.

Television

- Uzbek State Television and Radio Company: state-owned
- Yoshlar Youth Radio and TV channel: state-owned
- MTRK: independent, covers Andijan

²⁶ Uzbekistan, BBC Country Profile, 4 June 2001, see <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/53/097.html>

- Bagdad-TV: independent TV covering Fergana Region
- Muloqot: independent, covers Fergana Region,
- Bekabad TV: independent, covering Tashkent Region
- Aloqa-AK: independent, covers Syrdarya Region
- Samarkand: independent

Radio

- Uzbek State Television and Radio Company: state-owned
- Yoshlar Youth Radio and TV channel: state-owned, broadcasts to the whole country
- Ekho Doliny FM: private, broadcasts to the Fergana Valley, Tashkent, and Tashkent and Syr Darya regions
- Radio Sezam FM: private, broadcasts to Tashkent and Tashkent and Syr Darya Regions
- Uzbegim Taronasi: private, broadcasts to broadcasts to Tashkent and Tashkent region
- Radio Grand FM: private, broadcasts to Tashkent and Tashkent region.

News agencies

- UzA: government news agency
- Jahon news agency: run by the Foreign Ministry
- Turkiston-press news agency: describes itself as independent.²⁷

As N.I.Petrov has commented on Uzbekistan's Media that *Izvestiya*, published in Moscow, was banned in the republic for a long time because it 'Compromised itself by publishing Libel laws Materials about Uzbekistan.' Some journalists working for Russian News Paper and sent to Uzbekistan were deported.

The local Media is facing rigid censorship it can publish only positive and supportive material on the political situation in the republic.²⁸ Karimov answering to the censorship on Media and claim that the Uzbek people are building their own national

²⁷ Uzbekistan, n. 19

²⁸ N.I.Petrov, n. 21, p. 86.

democracy and have no need to imitate western patterns. There is no independent press in Uzbekistan the Moscow papers printed in Tashkent are censored for Example in 1993 an apparently innocent cartoon depicting Yeltsin, Karimov and Nazarbayev wearing Asian robes and drinking tea on a carpet featuring an image of a Russian 5000 ruble note in the *Argumenty* weekly, was replaced with an advertisement.

Paul Kubek, commented, "In March 1995 when Karimov extended his term to year 2000 in a referendum which he won in Soviet style with 98% of vote. Before the votes were officially counted, Uzbek radio claimed that the entire nation had unanimously voted in favour of the president²⁹." David Lewis has pointed out that "the situation of Media and information in Uzbekistan. The Internet is becoming one of the key tools in countering government censorship, and many Uzbek sites are emerging. The government still blocks opposition sites. Internet access will remain unavailable to much of the population, and there is still a need for much more open media, in print, radio and television. NGO's are working in this area to promote free media but these attempts are not very successful. CIMERA runs training programme for print journalists, but it faces the problem of limited outlets for their works³⁰."

Uzbekistan is a severely restrictive political environment for the media. Although a degree of the Uzbek govt. officially eliminated state censorship in May 2002. But in practice public criticism of the govt. remains limited under the country's highly bureaucratic annual deregistration process all media organizations are regarded to register with the government. In 2003, the government refused to renew the registration of the institute for war and peace reporting (IWPR) a London based NGO dedicated to the training and protection of journalists. The govt. explained that the IWPR was engaged in journalism, not training.

The Uzbek government prohibits live television programming, all shows prepared on tape. The News paper distribution system is also under govt's control. Thus the picture is clear regarding the functioning of Media. Media is highly

²⁹ Paul Kubek, n.1, p. 32.

³⁰ David Lewis, 'Uzbekistan: Authoritarianism and Conflict' in Monique Mekenka, Paul Van Tongeren and Han Van De V (Eds) *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia* (Lynne Rienner Publications, London, 2003) pp.201-202.

state controlled, and this is not fair to develop a democracy in a country. These are the symbols of authoritarianism.

Constitution and President

Constitution of a country lays down the basic structure of political system under which its people are to be governed. The constitution of country may also be described as fundamental law which established the main organs of the state, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, The constitution defines their powers, demarcates their responsibilities and it regulates their relationships with each other and the people.

Every constitution represents the vision and values of its founding fathers and is based on the social political and economic ethos and also faith or aspirations of the people. Uzbekistan adopted the constitution in 8 Dec. 1992. It guaranteed a democratic multi party system, freedom of expression and the observance of Human Rights. This constitution emphasize on secularism. There was particular concern that the constitution appeared to place the president above the constitution.

As Leonid Levitine has a comment on the constitution that there were no debates on constitution in Uzbekistan. The constitution was to be completed and enacted as quickly as possibly³¹."

In Uzbekistan constitution describes the division of government into legislative, executive and judicial branches. The constitution describes as a secular, democratic state in which the people are the soul source of state power' and in which the highest organ of power is the legislature. However in practice the actual functioning of government is better described as a unitary, presidential system.

The Constitution also provides numerous rights, guarantees including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion gender and ethnic equality and property rights. However these rights are frequently violated in practice. Human rights activist and free journalists are treated as culprits.

³¹Leonid Levitin n.22 p.174.

'The main problem of Uzbek Constitution is how to resolve the conflict between western Constitutionalism and the traditional life style of Uzbek society with its centuries-old Islamic traditions'. This is the view which has given by Leonid Levin.

Uzbek society is a traditional society; we can not implement the western norms country like Uzbekistan. As the president Karimov has already explained that they are developing their own model of democracy which is suitable to their country Uzbekistan. Traditions are the corner store of the society instructions, Model of behavior and values have been passed down to generation to generation.

As Leonid levitin has pointed out about traditional values which are related to democratic process he out side the Constitution there are number democratic traditions that the Uzbek people have the Institution of *Mahallah* is a good example³². Democratic institutions must be appropriate to the society. This is the feature of public life such as shared values, things that are forbidden, patterns of labour and every day standard. The *Mahallah* is an example of a democratic system. In the absence of such institutions the democracy exists only on paper.

Elections

Free, fair and periodic elections are the fundamentals of democracy. People can elect their representatives through the elections. Competitive elections are a necessary condition for democracy. Elections are necessary for making government, providing representative of people, influence the policy making, educate the voter s and build legitimacy in democracy.

Uzbekistan became an independent country on 30 August 1991 and the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan became the successor of *Communist Party of Uzbekistan*. First presidential election of the country held in December 1991. During that period three political parties in the field of election. But *Birlik* Party was not able to register itself due to the lack of collect the required number of members necessary for getting nomination for its candidate as president. However, Muhammad Salih the leader of *Erk* Party which was a faction of *Birlik*, contested the presidential

³² Leonid Levitin n.22 p.180.

elections. When result came out president Karimov got 86% of vote while Opponent Salin secured 12 % of vote³³.

First competitive election to the newly established supreme legislative Parliament established after the enactment of the Constitution in December 1991, took place in December 1994. All political parties, got registered till 22 November 1994, when the law on election to the new legislature *Oly Majlis* was passed were allowed to contest the elections. But only two political parties got the opportunity to contest the elections which were the *Peoples Democratic Party* (PDP) and the *Vatan Tarakkiyati* (Progress of Fatherland Party). Other parties could not fulfillment the essential requirement for the presidential elections. In this election 69 deputies were elected from the PDP, 14 from the progress of fatherland party and 167 deputies were nominated from the local councils. However, 124 members from the "non-affiliated" regional blocs were also members of the PDP's, thus giving the party a higher de-facto majority of 193 seats out of 250 seats in *Oly Majlis*. Again president Karimov re-elected for the above post.³⁴

The new parliament which met on 24 February 1995, decided to hold a referendum to extend president Karimov's term until 2000. it was due to expire in 1997.³⁵ Referendum was held due to the constitutional provision under article 90 which provides that a person cannot contest election for more than two terms. In the referendum 99.4% electorate approved the proposal of extending the term of the office of president Islam Karimov.³⁶

The next election for the *Oly majlis* was held in December 2000. The PDP secured the largest representation with 48 seats. Non party local councils nominees however gained 110 seats. The *Fidokrlar National Democratic Party* was the Second largest party with 34 seats. With *Watan Tarakkiyati Party*. *Adolat Social Democratic Party* and *Millie Tiklimish Democratic Party* also achieved 2,11 and 10 seats respectively. President Karimov won 94 overwhelming victory in Presidential

³³ Nalin K. Mohapatra, "Dynamics of Democratization and Political Process in Uzbekistan", *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, vol.9, no.1-2, Jan-June 2005,pp.46-92.

³⁴ Ibid,pp.47-48.

³⁵ Devendra Kaushik, "The Central Asian Republics", *The Balance Sheet of a Decade of 'Ozodi'*, *Eurasian Studies*, 20, Special Issue, Summer 2005,p.8.

³⁶ Nalin Kumar Mohapatra, op.cit,p.48.

elections held in January 2000. He got 91.9% of the total votes casts. His opponent secured 4.2% of votes. In all 95% of the total electorate participated in the poll.³⁷

Another referendum took place in January 2002 to extend the term of president and establishing a bi-cameral legislature. It was approved by overwhelmingly majority, with 93.65% of the electorate approving the creation of a bicameral parliament and 91.78% of the electorate approving the extension of President's term from five to seven years.

The recent election to Uzbekistan's *Oly Majlis* took place in December 2004. however, it need to be mentioned here that in contrast to earlier elections which were held for 250 constituencies, the December 2004 election was held for 120 constitution as per the report of the Central Election Commissions of Uzbekistan 489 candidates took parts in the election out of which 54 were independent in this election five political parties contested namely Adolat (Justice), *Fidolkrarlar* (Self Sacrificers), *Liberal Democratic Party*, *Milliy Tiklanish* (National Revival) and the PDP. According g to CEC report *Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan* got largest number of seat with (34.2) of deputies), followed by national democratic party with 23.3% of deputies. 18 deputies from *Fidokarlar*, 11 from *Miliy Tiklanish* and 10 from *Adolat* were elected.³⁸

“The present Uzbek state is a largely artificial creation, containing large numbers of ethnic minorities, and with ill-defined borders in many regions”.³⁹
“In the first decade of independence, Karimov intensified his control over all aspects of political life. On the surface, the political situation has been largely stable, and the government has sought strong relations with the West and foreign investment. However, a combination of inept economic policy, social problems, and political repression has provoked radical opposition to the regime, undermined international relations, and made any succession to Karimov fraught with danger”.⁴⁰

³⁷ Devendra Kaushik, n.35, p.9.

³⁸ See Details, Nalin Kumar Mohapatra, n.33, pp.46-53

³⁹ David Lewis, n. 3 p 199.

⁴⁰ Ibid

The government is highly centralized and personalized around President Karimov. Policies are developed largely in an informal circle of close allies of the president, rather than through the formal government and parliamentary structures. The regime is extremely authoritarian and suppresses all forms of dissent and opposition.⁴¹ Under this system, there is very little opportunity for dissent to be voiced. The media is strictly controlled by pre-publication censorship, and by arrests and harassment of independent journalists. The press is no more open than it was under Soviet rule. Formal political mechanisms, such as elections, have little impact on the actual policy making process. Most political disputes are conducted away from the public eye, in behind-the-scenes informal environments”.⁴²

“Elections have been held both to the presidency and to parliament, but none have met international standards of free and fair elections. The first elections, held in December 1991, were relatively open, with a contest between Karimov and Erk Party leader Mohammed Salih. In March 1995 Karimov cancelled the presidential elections due in 1996, and instead called a referendum to extend his term in office until 2000. In January 2000 Karimov won Presidential elections with 92 percent of the vote. Even his sole opponent admitted that he had voted for Karimov. In January 2002 Karimov extended his term in office from 2005 to 2007 through a referendum.

There are virtually no legal channels for any protest against the government. The two main opposition parties that were formed in the early 1990s, Erk and Birlik, are banned, and their leaders remain in exile. There are a few Birlik members still active, and they are mainly engaged in collecting information regarding human-rights abuses. They are often members of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, which maintains a rivalry with the International Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, which is affiliated with *Erk*. Tense relations between the two main opposition groupings have merely facilitated the regime's control over political life.⁴³

Parliament is little more than a rubber stamp on the activities of the executive, and even a bicameral legislature is not to bring forth any more opposition

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Ibid

to the regime than its predecessor. Most parliamentary deputies are elected indirectly or from party lists. The ruling PDPU and a number of affiliated “official” parties dominate parliament, but the parties have little or no role in political life. In this environment there is an obvious danger of festering discontent being channeled into illegal and violent political activity.

The last Presidential elections brought in bicameral legislature in the Uzbek Parliament. The people of Uzbekistan exercised their right to elect a Bicameral House of Representatives with upper and lower houses of the *Oly Majlis* (Parliament). The Constitutional changes regarding the distribution of political power between the executive and legislative bodies and between the offices of President and Prime Minister were coupled with a nationwide public awareness campaign to educate the nation about the newly introduced structural reforms, the rights and duties of citizens as well as the role mass media plays in modernizing societies. The government of Uzbekistan appeared for the first time earnest in responding to international apprehensions about political transition by striving for broad-based public participation and improvements toward fair elections.⁴⁴

“There is no scope for public involvement in political decision-making through formal, constitutional means. Even traditional community leaderships, such as the *mahallah* (community) chairmen, have been increasingly taken under the control of the state, and appointed rather than elected by local people. This all-embracing authoritarianism has provoked the growing memberships of groups such as Hizb-e Tahrir, as one of the few channels for the expression of dissatisfaction with the regime”.⁴⁵ The lack of openness has also badly affected the efficiency of governance. With no opposition or critical media, there is little incentive for officials to do much except use their positions for self-advancement and self-enrichment.

The two radical organisations in Uzbekistan can be considered to be the *Hizb-ut Tahrir* and IMU. *Hizb-ut Tahrir* wants a peaceful *jihad* that will be spread by explanation and conversion not by war. From Uzbekistan it has spread to Tajikistan

⁴⁴ Aftab Kazi, “Parliamentary Reform And Elections In Uzbekistan” , Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, September 22, 2004, see http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2708

⁴⁵ David Lewis, n. 3 p.194.

and Kyrgyzstan. The aims of *Hizb-ut Tahrir* and IMU are for the Caliphate in Central Asia, but the ways to achieve a Caliphate are different just as one doctor might use surgery while another uses herbs. The IMU says it is fighting only to overthrow (President) Karimov and bring Islam to Uzbekistan but that is only the first part of their plan. They have other aims for the whole of Central Asia. The leaders of IMU like Yuldeshev and Namangani are very well known and very popular in Central Asia. But the leaders of *Hizb-ut Tahrir* remain underground so nobody knows their names. In the Ferghana Valley there is also a very secretive *Wahhabi* movement, the *Hezbollah* who get a lot of money from Saudi Arabia.⁴⁶

However, after the death of Juma Namangani, the radical leader of the IMU, it was thought that there would be a significant curb of power of the IMU. On top of that, the principal fundraisers for IMU, the Taliban and Al Qaeda, have also either been destroyed or functioning in a dilapidated state, which might have further decreased IMU's strength.⁴⁷ However, In late 2001, this organization renamed itself the *Islamic Movement of Turkestan* (IMT), thus openly proclaiming its purposes of controlling the entire Central Asian region, disregarding the five existing nation-states and their boundaries. The Kyrgyz newspaper "*Vecherniy Bishkek*" reported on July 23, 2002 that bomb explosions in the "Oberon" market in the Bishkek on December 27, 2002 and in a branch of "Bakay bank" in the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh on May 8, 2002 were directly linked to the Islamic Movement of Turkestan. This notion received further confirmation by in an interview with the former first deputy Interior Minister of Uzbekistan Bakhadir Matliubov to "*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*" on July 29, 2003. He argued that the Osh bomb was assembled and detonated by members of the IMT, Ilkhom Izzatullaev of Kokand and Azimbek Karimov of Andijan. Both cities are located in Uzbekistan's portion of the Ferghana valley. Matliubov stated that "after the defeat of Taliban, followers of radical Islamist organizations spread into all countries of Central Asia". Furthermore, reports have emerged that residents of remote districts of Uzbekistan's southern Surkhandarya region noted the appearance of armed men in

⁴⁶ Ahmed Rashid, Interview With Leader Of Hizb-E Tahrir, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, November 22, 2000, see http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=114

⁴⁷ Ariel Cohen, "Central Asia Beyond Namangani", Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, November, 21, 2001, see http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=60

mountain areas, supposedly members of the IMT, and that influx of foreign funds to the IMU has also occurred".⁴⁸

Since 1992, the government has led a campaign against independent Islamic and Islamist groups, while providing support for loyal Islamic structures. The government strictly controls the Muslim Board, which represents the official Muslim hierarchy, and has disbanded all other Islamic groups. A number of independent Islamist movements emerged in 1990–1991, advocating the introduction of an Islamic state including the imposition of Sharia law. The groups were crushed by a campaign against independent Islamic groups, particularly those with political aims, in 1992. Many members of such groups fled the country, and formed the basis for radical groupings in exile such as the IMU.

It is difficult to ascertain the real level of support for radical Islamist groups. The government has been active in pursuing alleged Islamic radicals; many of those implicated by the security forces have been largely innocent of any attachment to radical groups, further increasing dissatisfaction with the government. There is some minority support for more radical Islamist ideas, particularly in areas of the Ferghana Valley. In the present political context, there is no outlet for these ideas, but there is the potential for rapid emergence of new radical groups in the case of conflict, or indeed of liberalization of the political environment. "Two major groups opposed to the regime have been active since 1997–1998. These are the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir".⁴⁹

From the very initial stages of independence, each of the Central Asian leaders has chosen to try to strengthen his authority and increase his popularity by espousing a secular model of leadership. Islam Karimov painted himself as a just ruler forced by circumstances to employ authoritarian measures.⁵⁰ But he has himself in various phases changed his stand; sometimes as an atheist being a former Communist; and sometimes, who covertly as well as overtly showed his allegiance to the cause of Islam.

⁴⁸ James Purcell Smith, "The IMU: Alive And Kicking?", *Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst*, September, 24, 2003, see http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1761

⁴⁹ David Lewis, n. 3 p.195.

⁵⁰ Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Islamic Awakening", *Current History*, April 1994, pp. 150 - 154

Religion today is turning into a significant hinge point on which the political events of Uzbekistan are being moulded into. In the 80s it was more or less concerned with education and social work. Its social base has been strengthening and beginning now in the 90s the movement is stepping on the political scene. As of now they have not been employing any political violence, although their efforts have been subject to the usual intimidation by the political authorities. Unless they are co-opted, or somehow given access to the political game, that situation is bound to change in the next 5 to 10 years.

Dr. Reuel Hanks has pointed out that “since independence in 1991, the regime of Islam Karimov has maintained a steadfast campaign against political opponents, particularly those seeking legitimacy or consensus via Islam. Even before complete Soviet collapse, the organizational meeting of the Islamic Revival Party in early 1990 was broken up by government forces, and throughout the last decade, the threat of an alleged ‘*Wahhabist*’ movement in the Fergana Valley has provided the rationale for a consistent campaign of intimidation and arrest. Rather than secure religious freedom, a new statute on religion passed in 1998 gave the government sweeping powers to crush any ‘unsanctioned’ religious activity”.⁵¹ He has also said that “for the insurgents, such actions serve to remind potential supporters in Uzbekistan of two essential aspects of their struggle. First, they have now proven that they possess the ability to harass the Uzbek regime and force it to commit sizable military resources against them, ultimately perhaps pushing Karimov to grant at least limited political pluralism. The Uzbek government’s failure to enact democratic and economic reforms, as well as its continued authoritarian approach towards opponents, particularly those organized around Islam, has radicalized the opposition. As those excluded from the political process turn to increasingly desperate and violent actions in an effort to force the government’s hand, they inadvertently provide the regime with the rationale for further crackdowns and militarization of the region.

However, with the rise of radical Islamic tendencies in the region, especially in the Kazakh and the Tajik territories, there has been a significant enhancement of

⁵¹ Dr. Reuel Hanks, “The “Fundamentalist” Threat To Uzbekistan: Crisis Or Chimera?”, *Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst*, August 30, 2000, see http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=138

the threat of such radical elements playing a major role in Uzbeki domestic politics. However weak the democratic institutions might seem to be there has been some significant economic reforms brought in by the ruling elite. Especially during the initial years of independence, due to the strict code that was maintained by the government, Uzbekistan was the least struck economy during the recession that dilapidated mostly all the erstwhile Soviet Union economies during the early nineties.⁵² The amalgamation of privatisation with state ownership has brought in some sort of stability in the Uzbek economy. Ruble was taken over by the national currency of Uzbekistan in July 1994 and the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan was established in 1993. "Uzbekistan has only a small share in the total area of cultivated CIS land – about 2.1%. However, in the Central Asian region, it is among the countries with the most developed agriculture...but there remains a significant imbalance between industry and agriculture, where industries has not been able to keep pace with the needs of an increased population."⁵³

The ruling elite of Uzbekistan lauds Karimov as the "initiator and leader of historic transformations" in Uzbekistan, contributing to the development of a model of economic development that is based on the following principles: "de-ideologization of the economy, supremacy of laws, step-by-step reform, state regulation during the transition period and strong social polity".⁵⁴

Despite the trappings of institutional change, the first years of independence saw more resistance than acceptance of the institutional changes required for democratic reform to take hold. Whatever initial movement toward democracy existed in Uzbekistan in the early days of independence seems to have been overcome by the inertia of the remaining Soviet-style strong centralized leadership.

Karimov has used the country's strategic importance to establish a dictatorship and to resist successfully domestic and foreign pressures for democratic and market reforms. Uzbekistan has been and continues to be perceived as too great a prize for

⁵² For more explanation see, MS Gafarly and VF Rass, "The Preservations of the State's Dominant Position in the Economy", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 100 - 127

⁵³ MS Gafarly and VF Rass, "The Preservations of the State's Dominant Position in the Economy", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 100 - 127

⁵⁴ Press Service, "Biography of LA Karimov", see http://www.press-service.uz/eng/president_eng.htm

interested powers to risk destabilizing Karimov's regime, which, through its repressive practices, has awakened widespread public discontent and armed opposition, some of which subscribes to Islamic revolution. With 26.5 million people, Uzbekistan has the largest population among Central Asian states and the strongest military. The country is the second largest cotton exporter in the world and is also a major exporter of gold and oil. Its largest export partners are Russia and China, and its largest import partners are Russia and the U.S. The country's economy remains dominated by state controls, which has caused foreign investment to lag, and by the crony capitalism that has become familiar in the successor states of the Soviet Union. Governing a country with several regional centers, Karimov gains his support from an alliance of dispersed political elites that profit from the state and crony economy, and are jealous of their spheres of influence. Called "clans" in local parlance, those elites are united only in their respective self interest and have no unified policy. They have found it expedient to back Karimov and he has used their coalition of convenience to perform the role of arbiter and to centralize his power. Yet the clans do not always agree and do not have great personal loyalty to Karimov, who performs a balancing act to keep the political system coordinated.⁵⁵

Karimov's tactics of maintaining his rule and the dominance of the state-related 'clan' networks has included rigid press controls, prison killings and torture, a captive judiciary, police intimidation, travel restrictions, import controls, suppression of Non-Governmental Organizations and the exclusion of all peaceful opposition parties from the ballot.⁵⁶ However, Karimov has propounded an argument to legitimate his retention of power while guiding Uzbekistan in its social transformation. He has written extensively on the need to develop a democratic state, a free market economy and a civil society that support the political values of liberal societies. He maintains, "Human values, universally recognized norms of genuine democracy, freedom and human rights' are rapidly filling the vacuum left by the delegitimation of Soviet ideology".⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, "Uzbekistan and the Great Powers: courting instability", 01/04/2005, Pravda.Ru, see http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/92/373/14783_Uzbekistan.html

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Uzbekistan, 1998, p. 108, as cited by John R Pottenger, "Civil Society, Religious Freedom and Islam Karimov: Uzbekistan's Struggle for a Decent Society", *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 23, no. 1, March 2004, p. 61

He rejects adherence to a single ideology, instead advocating the importance of and respect for ideological diversity based on principles of morality and humanism.⁵⁸ However, various human rights organisations working within Uzbekistan has recorded one of the worst records of human rights violation by the ruling elite under Karimov's government. It might be in reference to the silencing of the opposition or voices that might stand out to be a threat of considerable force to the position of the ruling elite and especially of the President. Due to that reason any significant opposition is stifled with strong hands.

The pro government critics have analysed that President Islam Karimov has made it quite clear, in numerous elaborations of his government's domestic and foreign policy, that Uzbekistan faces considerable security challenges that limit the degree and pace of liberalization his government can afford to pursue. Civil wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan have generated and strengthened destabilizing forces, as the influx of refugees, drug traffickers and militant political Islamic groups has been bolstered by such conflicts. With the exception of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan has faced the gravest threat of militant Islamic insurgency of any of the Central Asian republics. In the face of these challenges, the Karimov government has retained and centralized a great deal of power. Numerous analysts decry the repressive control of the government. Yet the pro Karimov forces agree that it is facile and even cynical to assume that Karimov is solely or even primarily concerned with the maintenance of his own ascendant position. The actions of the regime indicate a much more complicated interplay of influences and actions, both pro and anti-liberalization.⁵⁹

The above mentioned analysis, hence forward tries to analyse, the manner in which the ruling elite with the assistance of the President has been active in the degeneration of democratic institutions and has strengthened their position in Uzbeki political setup.

⁵⁸ Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan: The Road to Independence and Progress* (Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1998), p. 4 as cited by John R Pottenger, "Civil Society, Religious Freedom and Islam Karimov: Uzbekistan's Struggle for a Decent Society", *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 23, no. 1, March 2004, p. 61

⁵⁹ Andrew Buchman, "The 'Uzbek Model' Of Development: Slow, Stable And Showing Success", *Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst*, January 28, 2004, see http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2065

The consolidation of power throughout Central Asia in the presidential branch, rather than decentralized through a system of checks and balances, is a worrying trend. Any government relying on one person rather than self-sustaining institutions that ensure the peaceful transfer of power is inherently unstable. In tightening their grip on power, the Central Asian leaders run the danger of inadvertently causing their reins to snap, with consequences hard to predict.

CHAPTER-4

Prospects for Democracy in Uzbekistan

Democracy is a system of the government, with popular participation of people in decision making bodies, rule of law, elected government, constitutional system and free and fair election. In Uzbekistan, since independence, democratic system of government has not been functioning properly due to the lack of multi-party system and others factors like such as: Media, Judiciary, Election, etc. The last Parliamentary election has won by Mr. Karimov, who is playing an authoritarian role since independence.

In Uzbekistan, there has been a problem of people's participation in politics, free and fair elections. There are limited functions of the judicial system and rules and regulations are running under the guidance of President Karimov. He has imposed censorship on media. There is a problem of violation of human rights.

Anna Matveeva has focused on the initial challenges before the Central Asian Republics. "After the break up of Soviet Union Independence was forced on Central Asian states rather than won by them. This phenomenon created a power vacuum within the Republics. The leadership of the region were presented with a challenge of state building in societies with no prior experience of existence as a nation state."¹

First- New power relations had to be constructed and this was not an easy task. The immediate necessity was to secure the channels through which power could be exercised from top to bottom. This uncertainly brought about the challenge of nation building.

Secondly- A lack of clarity about what nationhood essentially consisted of was complicated by the presence of minorities. The state leadership were faced with a tension between ethnic groups. The existences of concentrated areas densely populated by diverse groups such as the Fergana Valley, these created a danger of inter ethnic violence.

The third and major challenge was fragmentation along regional tribal or clan links. Some times regional affiliations can even cross ethnic lines.

¹ Anna Matveeva, "Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia", *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No, 1, January 1999, pp. 24-26.

The fourth was economic challenge. The Central Asian states have to take strong measures regarding readjustment of economy which was uncertain at that time. In Uzbekistan there was a cotton mono culture and there were no heavy industrialization took place during Soviet period. Through the Soviet authorities established some industries in the region but they were confined with the cotton processing and metallurgy etc.

Finally, according to Matveeva, "Russian domination partly explained the attitude to Russian minorities, besides these the other foreign countries were trying to create their influence in the region e.g. Turkey, Iran etc."²

In these circumstances the democratic process was very slow during the initial period, after independence of Uzbekistan. To develop a democratic norm in a country is a very difficult task and it becomes more difficult when a nation have no democratic history. Islam Karimov is in a situation where he has to decide the future of nation. Research would try to discuss some problems which Karimov is facing even today. The problems of democratization are as following.

Islamic Extremism- (Radical Islam)

Bolshevik Revolution took place in October, 1917. After Revolution Islam became the target of the Soviet authorities. Thus, Islam was suppressed by the Soviet Government. Due to suppression of the political opposition and radical movement during the Soviet regime, Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in March, 1985. After coming into power he introduced two policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in Soviet system and the policy of atheism was diluted. In other words we can say that some extent in Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular. This religious freedom provided an opportunity to the native people to organize under the banner of Islam and they form

² Ibid. p. 1-2.

group and social movements in the region. The rise of radical Islam was faster in the Fergana Valley than other parts of the region.³

David Lewis has written that in 1980's and early 1990's. Foreign Islamic groups funded the building of mosques, provided Islamic education, and funded education for young people in Islamic school abroad. Radical Islamic ideas gained support from young people and particular in areas such as Fergana valley and rural part of southern Uzbekistan, such as the Sukhan Darya region⁴.

Since 1992, the government has led to a campaign against Independent Islamic and radical Islamist groups. The government tried to make strict control over the Muslim Board which was represent the official Muslim Board hierarchy. These Islamist movements were advocating for the establishment of a Islamic state based on *Shariah*.

The Islamic Renaissance party came into existence in the Soviet Union during Perestroika⁵. The number of functioning mosques in the republic also arose during this period. "After break up of the Soviet Union the need for an ideological anchor was keenly felt. It was necessary for the Central Asian Republics to build up an identity that was different from the former Soviet Union and the search for an identity led Central Asian States to look for old values, traditions and culture that was deeply rooted in their religion and history. The Constitution of Uzbekistan proclaimed that the state-building process would be based on secular ideals. The religious freedom has been granted by the constitution which consequently led to rise of militant Islamic groups which is based on Islamic fundamentalist ideology.⁶ As part of Islamic revivalism several new mosques were constructed and copies of *Quran* were freely distributed among the people and the Madrassah imparting religious education became action of the day. Here there are two organizations; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tehrir are highly active in spreading radical Islam in region. These groups are also associated with affiliated militant activities."

³ Nirmala Joshi, (ed.), *Central Asia: The Game Replayed: An Indian Perspective* (New Delhi: New Century, Publications, 2003), pp. 71-73.

⁴ David Lewis, *Uzbekistan: Authoritarianism and Conflict*, in Mekenkamp, Van Tongeren and Van De Veen, (ed.), *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 123.

⁵ Nirmala Joshi, n. 3, p. 74.

⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 72-73.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

IMU originated in Fergana Valley, particularly in Namangam region. Juma Namangami and Tohir Yuldash are the founder member of IMU. Uzbek President Islam Karimov banned IMU in 1991 itself and its affiliated parties. These were Adolat (Justice), Birlik (Unity) and Esk (freedom). The Birlik and Esk parties focusing on Uzbek culture and reforms.

As Nirmala Joshi has mentioned that with the capture of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1996, radical Islam in Uzbekistan received a new impetus and support. The Taliban were a real threat to Uzbekistan both in military and ideological terms. She quoted Karimov's statement "we have found ourselves exposed to a powerful ideological expansion". To a large extent president's apprehension proved correct. It is believed that Adolat (justice) party reappeared as the IMU.⁷ The objective of IMU is to overthrow President Karimov and to set up an Islamic state based on *Shariah* in Uzbekistan. The IMU has received encouragement and economic support from Taliban and it has proved that IMU has closed links with Taliban.

David Lewis has focused the militant activities of IMU. He has mentioned some incidents which are given below: "In 1997 the IMU members were involved in criminal activities in particularly in narcotics smuggling. On February 16, 1999, when seven bomb explosions were reported in Tashkent. At least 16 people were died and 150 were injured. Fifty Administrative and residential building were damaged. The two initial car bombs may have been part of an attempt to assassinate Karimov, the President of the republic.

During the 1999 some other serious criminal activities were reported. In 2000 there was a sudden attack by small group of IMU Fighters in Uzbekistan. Fighting was reported near Tashkent in the hill areas. In 2001 IMU's activities were repeatedly reported."⁸ In March, 2004 there were a serial of bomb blasts occurred in Bukhara & Fergana Valley.

⁷ Ibid, p. 74.

⁸ David Lewis, n. 4, p. 194.

Hizb-ut-Tehrir - This is one of the fastest growing radical Islamic political groups in Uzbekistan. This is a clandestine organization. Hizb-ut-Tehrir has a very different ideology from the IMU. As David Lewis has pointed out that it is based on a particular interpretation of Islamic history that is opposed in principle to the division of Islamic people into nation state. Instead it advocates the re-creation of Islamic Caliphate throughout the region. Hizb-ut-Tehrir would be largely a fringe party in any normally functionally democracy⁹.

In its propaganda it opposed the IMU's strategy of overt armed struggle. It probably has more to gain by building up a wide support base and attempting to infiltrate the regime from within. Thus in Uzbekistan Islamic extremist has posed a major threat to government and this also a huge obstacle to develop democracy in country.

Regional Divisions

David Lewis has focused on regional division in Uzbekistan. He mentioned that clan network and regional grouping play an important role in politics of Uzbekistan. Although, the exact nature of clan networks is much disputed in Scholars. There are four important clan which are based on particular region. These are Samarqand - Bukhara clan the Tashkent clan, the Fergana region clan and Kashkadar clan. Karimov came to power in 1989 as a result of a compromise among different clan leaders. Karimov has attempted to achieve a certain balance among the rival groupings. He has given the important posts to the important clans.

Karimov seems intent on reducing the influence of clan in politics. He rotates personal with considerable frequency both in the central government and regional administration. The main purpose of this rotation is to avoid any regional leader, building up their own power bases and networks that could challenge its central authority. This process is very risky but necessary. There is a danger that clan who feels excluded from political and economic power will attempt to regain political influence by other means. This is the most problematic scenario where an unholy alliance of excluded regional leaders and radical forces outside the state can pose a session's threat to state¹⁰.

⁹ Ibid, p. 196

¹⁰ see details in Ibid, p. 195.

Human Right- Human Right abuses are very common in Uzbekistan. The groups which are trying to legitimize themselves as an alternative of Karimov's government have been suppressed by Karimov's regime. Anybody who is posing a threat to Karimov, are either in exile or jails. For example the leaders of Birlik and Erk have been beaten or suppressed and forced to exile. There is considerable evidences of wide spread abuse of human rights by the security forces. According to the information collected by local and international human rights groups like OSIC and Human Right watch, there are about seven thousand political prisoners in Uzbekistan¹¹.

Elections Problems- Free and fair elections are the core foundation of Democracy. "Uzbekistan electoral system is more accurately described as 'centralist'. Because it limits the right to nominate candidates to contest the elections from only one electoral district, for each officially registered political party and regional level legislature and concentrates the supervision of all electoral appointed Central Election Commission (CEC). Uzbekistan's electoral law has the most in common with its Soviet predecessor.¹² So the system is very problematic which does not suit the democratic norms and right of vote because the people have no choice to elect the candidate.

Besides this, there is a controversy among the regional leaders and central leaders. "Central leaders want electoral laws that would give them more move over the composition of the new Parliament and the conduct of its deputies, while regional leaders want electoral laws that would guarantee them a seat in the new Parliament as well as greater independence from the centre. All these acts creates an asymmetrical power relation in terms of distribution of authority and decision making influence between regional level and Central level government¹³.

Authoritarian Nature of President

The role of president is very important in this context. The constitution of Uzbekistan proclaimed free and fair election, freedom of speech, organization, political participation etc. But in practice these freedoms and democratic norms are only on

¹¹ Ibid, p. 196.

¹² Pauine Jones Luong, *International Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 6.

¹³ Ibid, p. 8.

papers. The pro government political parties are permitted to participate in elections. There is a lack of true opposition parties, because these parties have been suppressed by the government.

Media has no freedom because it was controlled by government. There is rigid censorship over independent media. Media can only publish positive and pro-government materials. If some groups violate this rule, they have been banned and will not be registered. The political transition in Uzbekistan can be summarized as a rapid and deliberate process of Centralizing and concentrating authority in the presidential apart¹⁴.

After the Election of Presidency in December 1991 Karimov won the election. He immediately took the effective steps in his newly create office. "The adoption of new constitution in December 1992 was the first major step toward institutionalization."¹⁵

According to this constitution the President gained exclusive powers.

1. Appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and his Deputies, the prosecutor general the cabinet of minister, administrative heads at all levels and the entire judicial branch.
2. Declare a state emergency and implement extra ordinary Presidential powers and will dissolve Parliament, etc.

He perused a strategy of weakening of regional leaders influence. As well as the Central government and building direct links with the local leaders. These measures which have been taken by Karimov have created a centralization of powers in one hand. Karimov took measures to strengthen hold the local level politics. The local hokimiats were reduced in size (from sixteen departments to three) reportedly in order to reduce confusion among the people and increase efficiency among their leaders. These were a tighter control and supervision over the local leaders' activities.

Karimov played a very important role to direct control over Mahallah. To use Mahallah as both organizational and popular support base. Karimov select all the local and regional level officials. President Karimov has proclaimed that they are developing

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 123.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 122-125.

their own model of democracy. It can be explained that Uzbekistan's economic activities are directly supervised by central government. Uzbekistan's central leadership have strong preference to remain in the 'ruble zone'. The central government resisted privatisation and have more conservative approach towards economy. In economic sphere the big industries are under government control. There is very little scope for market oriented economy.

“Uzbekistan has failed to develop a serious reform programme to achieve the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. It is clear that more than ten year later the economic policy is no longer sustainable and is contributing directly to instability.”¹⁶

Prospects

Present political scenario in Uzbekistan is not favourable to democracy. Due to the authoritarian nature of government the democracy is not working smoothly. Democratic institutions which have recently emerged, have not been fulfilling their goals. After all, there are some hopes that can be very helpful for developing democracy in Uzbekistan.

As David Lewis has pointed out that, “scenario for political conflict is largely on two levels. At the highest political level, the most likely sources of conflict will be concerned with future succession to President Karimov and role of regional groupings that have been largely excluded from power. These latter may be manageable if the economy is sufficiently successful to provide all regional leaders with some rewards from economic activity, and if this is not be closed it can loosen the situation and will create new tensions between rival groupings.”¹⁷

Uzbekistan has significant precious metal resources including gold and platinum. It also has substantial oil and gas reserves. Uzbekistan is tenth largest gas exporter in the world. This feature can promote the government to make self sufficient in energy sector and has strategic importance. Uzbekistan can use these resources to stabilise its economy.

¹⁶ David Lewis, n. 4, pp. 196-197.

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 203-204.

The role of NGO's or Non-state actors in Uzbekistan is very important because they aware people in many spheres like socio-political rights. Due to the authoritarian nature of government the NGO's have not been functioning in a very efficient manner but still there is hope to achieve the goals.

“There are about 2500 Non Government Organizations in Uzbekistan, which in recent years have been playing a crucial role in articulating the needs and aspiration of the people. Earlier in may 2003 the Uzbek government had allowed registration of a human right organization Ezgulik.”¹⁸ Thus, the government is allowing the registration these groups. Some of these groups are critical in their nature.

In Judicial system the present scenario is not very satisfactory. The present situation in Judiciary is not favourable for democracy because the judges of courts don't know how to play a significant role to restore democracy in such an authoritarian state. Because judicial system is controlled by the President of the republic. So there is a need for reforming judicial system. It is essential for the judges to intervene in the policies or government decisions to maintain the significance of their existence. The judiciary must hold their work of examining the constitutional provisions for welfare of people.

In Uzbekistan the other democratic institutions are also not working smoothly due to the authoritarian nature of government political pluralism, human rights activity, including support for independent media is a very difficult area in which to work, but it is vital for future conflict prevention. Prof. Nirmala Joshi has pointed out that “in actual practice democracy and democratic institutions have to evolve over a period of time. Western democracies have taken centuries to reach in today's situation. In Central Asia, democracies have been imposed from the above as a conscious decision of the state. In such a situation aberrations are bound to occur. What is important to change the mind set inculcate a new attitude of nurturing democratic institutions. These will require general change.”¹⁹

In Uzbekistan the authoritarian natures of government have evolved. After the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, a power vacuum had emerged, which was filled

¹⁸ Nalin Kumar Mohapatra, “Dynamics of Democratization and Political Process in Uzbekistan,” *Himalayan Central Asian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, January-June 2005.

¹⁹ Nirmala Joshi, n. 3, p. 94.

by the old *nomenclature*. After the independence the Uzbek democracy is facing some initial challenges like the worst situation of economy, problem of stability in the Republic, ethnic and other problem. The new leadership had to face these challenges and there was a responsibility to stabilize the republic. Unstable nature of republic, due to these unstable circumstances the government jobs became tough. And the powers have been centralized in few hands. Thus the authoritarian region evolved.

On the other hand the people of Uzbekistan have no democratic history. They are not familiar with democratic norms. So the power vacuum was filled by the authoritarian regime. But in the recent elections of 26 December, 2004 creates the possibilities in terms of democratic process of the republic. Around 200 International observers from 35 countries visited the republic and observed the election process.

CHAPTER-5

CONCLUSION

Democracy is a system of governance for most of the developed nations. This concept has been given by the western theorists and they have categorised the main elements that are necessary for the implementation and success of the democratic system. Democracy is a notion which means different things to different people. A very common meaning of democracy contains free, fair and periodic elections, rule of law, separation of powers between the elements of government, freedom and accountability etc. The present notion of democracy has evolved in a very long time. ✓

The first wave of democratization in the world began with the French Revolution but in United States of America it started in 1820, with the widening of suffrage for a large proportion of male population in United States and this continued till 1926. The Second phase of democratization began after the Second World War and decolonization of the Afro-Asian and Latin American nations. It reached on the highest stage in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically. The third wave of democratization has been started in early 1970, but it has reached on the highest stage with the end of cold war and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. In other words we can say that third wave of democratization begins with the collapse of the communist system in the Soviet Union and East European countries. ✓

The disintegration of Soviet Union was a major phenomenon which created the fifteen independent states. Central Asian Countries had no democratic history before independence. There was a feudal nature of political power in the region. The government was tyrannical and oppressive in their nature and there was a strong punishment to opponents. The participation of people in politics was not allowed. People were not allowed to take part in the political process of the region.

During the Soviet period Central Asia was dominated by the Russian hegemony. There was a single party system and all the major decisions were taken by the Central

Government. People participation and civil and political liberties were very strictly controlled. After Gorbachev's policies of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* social and political movements begin to emerge. *Birlik* was one of them which arise in 1988 in Uzbekistan.

The break up of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum which was filled by the old *Nomenclatura*. The communist party of Uzbekistan changed its name after three months later and became *Peoples Democratic Party of Uzbekistan*, but the party leadership, under President Islam Karimov, remained in place. The constitution of Uzbekistan was adopted in 8 December 1992. This was the first step towards democratization. The first Presidential election was held in December 1991 and Karimov became the first President with securing 86 percent of vote of majority. After gaining the power he tried to establish a stronghold over politics of Uzbekistan because he claimed that without a strong leadership socio-economic and political development could not be achieved in transition period and this will ensure the unity and integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan. And it will fulfill the needs of aspiration of the people. Karimov denied the western model of democracies and claimed that Uzbekistan has its own history culture and traditions; we are developing our own model of democracy.

After enactment of the constitution in 1992, the first competitive elections were held in December 1994 and all the registered parties were allowed to contest the elections. PDPU again became the leading force of the country. The parliamentary session of newly elected legislature was held on 24 February 1995 and it was decided to pass a referendum to extend the tenure of President Karimov, till 2000 because according to the article 90 of the constitution which proclaims that a person cannot contest for the presidential elections more than two terms. Finally the referendum was passed with 99.4 percent of majority in March 1995.

The next Presidential elections which were held in January 2000, central election commission authorized five political parties to participate in the elections. Karimov again won the majority with 91.4 percent of votes. The establishment of bi-cameral legislature is a landmark even in the democratic development of Uzbekistan after its independence.

This has been done through a referendum, which won the overwhelming majority of 93.65 percent in 2002. It ensured the democratizing and development of the country.

The recent elections in Uzbekistan which had been took place in December 2004 for remaining 120 constituencies and 250 constituencies were held in 2002. The CIS observers have observed the election procedure and made a clear statement that election was free and fair. But OSCEE is not satisfied with it. Apart form the elections President Karimov occupied the authority through the constitution amendments, appointment and removal of regional governors became president the central authority and the controller of the affairs of the state.

Opposition parties in Uzbekistan had denied registering on a political party and during all the elections they were not permitted to contest the elections. Opposition movements have been suppressed time to time. The leaders of opposition parties have been beaten or forced to exile. Karimov himself created a party (Vatan Tarakkiyati) to promote multiparty system in the country. Other political parties are supporting Karimov's policies because they are pro-government parties. Thus the picture is clear that there is a multi party system exists in Uzbekistan but in reality it is not functioning because opposition parties have been banned or not given free hand to run in the republic.

As far as media is conserved, the process of renewal of registration is a key measure in the hands of government to control of media. Media is not free. There is a tight control over media and press. They can publish the supportive and positive pro-government news. Most of the news agencies, media is not fulfilling its goal of fourth pillar of democracy. Judiciary is not very much stronger. Judges are not aware of their role in the contemporary situation. The judicial process is so complicated and expensive that a common people can not afford it. Judiciary is not fulfilling its goal to promote democratization of the country. It has been used as a rubber stamp.

The amending procedure of constitution favour the President's power. President is above the constitution, so amendment is not a very difficult task for him. In the

Parliament, majority of the representatives belongs to the ruling party and rest of the representatives is the supporter of ruling party. In parliament there is a lack of strong opposition and it has become the rubber stamp for the President.

The Human rights record in Uzbekistan is in worse condition as some international human rights agencies has pointed out this situation. Human rights violation is very common in Uzbekistan. The leaders of opposition were beaten or tortured. They are either in exile or in jails. Human rights activists and some independent media persons treated as criminals. These activities harass the individual to take initiative. There are some domestic and international problems which are poisoning a threat to democratization process which is Islamic extremism. Hizb-UI-Tehrir and Islamic movement of Uzbekistan are involved in terrorist activities. They are willing to create Uzbekistan as an Islamic state based on *Shariah*. These groups want to remove President Karimov. IMU has links with Taliban. Therefore, IMU is an Islamic threat not only for Uzbekistan but also whole Central Asia.


The trafficking of narcotics, small arms and weapons in Central Asia is creating a major threat. Terrorist groups have the direct link with these activities. There are some domestic problems also which are creating difficulties for President Karimov. Regional grouping is very common. Regional elites willing to stay in power and whenever they feel some threat from Central Government they become active in illegal activities to capture the power. Karimov is facing a major challenge but he is successfully satisfying the regional elites.

The overall discussion has a clear picture about Post-Soviet Uzbekistan. First few years after independence Karimov justify or legitimized the centralization of power due to the transition of the system i.e., from centrally command and system to democratic system and the worst situation of economy. He claimed that in the transitional period democracy can not prevail in the country and it could be create instability which is dangerous for the establishment of democratic system and democratic institutions in the republic.

After becoming the President of the republic he started to concentrate power in his hands, which can be seen in the elections and referendums. He acquired the exclusive powers through the constitution. The power of appointment of Prime Minister, regional leaders, and local level officials made him authoritarian.

Opposition political parties are technically allowed to participate, but in practice they are not allowed to participate in the elections. Censorship on media (print and electronic) human rights violation and poor functioning of democratic institutions show that Uzbekistan has an authoritarian regime.

But one thing we must keep in mind that Uzbekistan had no democratic history, its society is not familiar with democratic norms because it has a traditional society. The present form of democracy has evolved after centuries. The western democracies have evolved over centuries. In Uzbekistan the democratic process started after its independence in 1991. One and half decade is a very short period for the establishment of democracy in a country. Democracy in Uzbekistan is in 'infant' stage and it will take some more time and will require generational change.



Bibliography

Primary Sources

Basic facts about United Nations, (New York; United Nation, 2000).

The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, (Tashkent, 1992).

“Failures of Reforms in Uzbekistan: Ways forward for the International Community”, *Asia Report*, (Brussels), May 2004.

Ghali, Boutros Boutros, *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York; United Nations, 1996).

Human Rights Overview Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch, January 2004.

Karimov, Islam, *Uzbekistan on the threshold on the twenty first century: Threat to security, conditions of stability and guarantees for progress*(Tashkent; 1997).

UNDP Report, (New Delhi; Oxford University Press, 1992-2003).

“Uzbekistan at ten – Repression and instability”, *Asia Report*, no.21, (Brussels), 2001.

Uzbekistan, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000, Washington, D.C; The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 23 February 2001.

“*Uzbekistan: Progress on Paper Only*”, Human Rights Watch (Washington, D.C) 3 June 2003.

Uzbekistan Human Development Report (UNDP Report, Bishkek, 1995).

Uzbekistan: O.S.C.E. observers criticize parliamentary elections, *Interfax News Agency*, 13 March 2000, *Summary of World Broadcast*, 15March, 2000. PSU/3789G/1

Secondary Sources

Books

Ansari, M.E, *The New Great Game of Muslim Central Asia* (Washington D.C; Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).

Akiner, Shirin (ed), *Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia* (London; British Academic Press, 1994).

Anderson, John, *International Politics of Central Asia* (Manchester; University Press, 1997).

Andrey, Fadir. Victor, Serjeev and Urity; Kulchik (eds.), *Central Asia after the Empire* (New York; CSA Publication, 1959).

Atabaki, Turay and John O. Kane, *Post Soviet Central Asia* (London; Tauris Academic Studies, 1998).

Babak Valdimir, Demian Vaisman, Aryeh Wasserman (eds) *Political Organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004)

Badan, Phool, *Dynamics of Political Development in Central Asia* (New Delhi; Lancer Books, 2001).

Banuazizi, Ali, Weiner, Myron (ed.), *New Geopolitics of Central Asia and It's Border Lands* (London; IB Tauris and Company, 1994).

Bruce, Parrot and Dawisha Karen (eds), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and New States of Eurasia* (New York and London; ME Sharpe, 1995).

Capisani, Giampaolo R, *Handbook of Central Asia: A Comprehensive Survey of the New Republics* (London; IB Tauris, 2002).

Dannreuther, Ronald, *Creating New States in Central Asia* (London; Brassey's, 1994).

Duverges, M. *Political Parties* (London; Methuen, 1964).

Eric, W. Sievers, *The Post Soviet Decline of Central Asia: Sustainable Development and Comprehensive Capital* (London; Routledge Curzon, 2003).

Everett – Health, Tom (ed), *Central Asia: Aspect of Transition* (London; Routledge, Curzon, 2003).

Garnett, Sherman W, Rahr, Alexander, Watanabe, Koji, *New Central Asia in Search of Stability*: (New York; The Trilateral Commission, 2000).

Gerdinand, Peter (ed), *New Central Asia and its Neighbours* (London; Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).

Glenn, John, *Soviet Legacy in Central Asia* (London; Macmillian, 1999).

Gold Blatt David, Potter, David Kiloh Margret and Lewis, Paul (eds), *Democratization* (Cambridge; Policy Press, 1997).

Gopal, Surendra, *India and Central Asia Cultural Economics and Politics Links* (Maulana Abdul Kalam Acad Institute of Asian Studies, Calcutta; Shipra 2001).

Gupta, Rakesh, *State in India, Pakistan, Russia and Central Asia* (Delhi; 2004)

Haghayeghi, Mehrdad, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia* (London; Macmillian, 1995).

Hiro, Dilip, *Between Marx and Muhammad: the Changing face of Central Asia* (London; Harper and Collius Publications, 1994).

Joshi, Nirmala (ed), *Central Asia: The Great Game Replayed: An Indian Perspective* (Delhi; New Century Publication, 2003).

Kaushik, Devendra, *Central Asia in Modern Times* (Moscow; Progress Publishers, 1970).

Kadir, Kazi A, Husain Javed (eds), *Central Asia History Politics and Culture* (Karachi; Institute of Central and West Asian Studies, University of Karachi, 1999).

Kohli, Atul, Migdal Joel S and Shue Vivienne (eds), *Dominance and Transformation in the Third World* (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Levitin Leonid, *Uzbekistan on a Historical Threshold: Critical Observation of President Karimov* (Cambridge: Granta Edition, 2001)

Luong, Pauline Jones, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post Soviet Central Asia Power Perception and Pacts* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Maclver, R.M., *The Modern State* (London; Oxford University Press, 1966).

Macpherson, CB, *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (London; Oxford University Press, 1976).

Malik, Hafeez (ed), *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects* (MacMillian, 1994).

Majeed, Gulhsan, Mir. M. Afjal *Studies in Central Asia* (Shrinagar; University of Kashmir, 1997).

Mandel Baun, Michael (ed), *Central Asia and the World : Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan* (New York; Council of foreign Relation Pre, 1994

Mekenka Monique, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de V, *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2003)

Norbu Dawa & Warikoo K. *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia* (New Delhi; South Asian Publishers,1992).

Paksoy, HB (ed), *Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History* (New York; ME Sharpe ,1994).

Patnaik, Ajay, *Nations Minorities and States in Central Asia* (Kolkata; Anamika Publishers and Distributors, 2003).

Patnaik, Ajay, *Central Asia Between Modernity and Tradition* (Delhi; Konark Publishers, 1996).

Pierce, Richard D, *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917* (Berkeley and Los Angles; University of California Press, 1960).

Rashid, Ahmad, *Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?* (Karachi; Oxford University Press, 1994).

Ro'I Yaacov (ed), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1995)

Roy, Oliver, *New Central Asia: The Creation of Nation* (London; I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000).

Runer, Boris (ed), *Central Asia in Transition, Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development* (New York; M.E. Sharpe 1996).

Rumer Boris and Stanislav Zhukov (eds), *Central Asia: Challenges of Independence* (New York; ME Sharpe, 1998).

Rumer, Boris (ed), *Central Asia: a Gathering Storm* (Armonk; ME Sharpe, 2004).

Schumpeter, JA, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London; George Allen and Unwin, 1969).

Sengupt, Amita, *Frontiers into borders: The Transformation of Identities in Central Asia* (Gurgaon; Hope India Publication, 2002).

Shams-ud-dn, *Secularisation in the USSR* (Delhi; Vikas Publishing House, 1982).

Shrieen, T Hunter, *Central Asia Since Independence* (WestPort; Praeger, 1996).

Smith, B.C, *Understanding Third World Politics Theories of Political Change and Development* (Palgrave; Macmillian,2003).

Tismaneanu Valdimir, *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: ME Shrap Publication, 1995).

Tom Evertt. Health (ed), *Central Asia Aspect of Transmission* (London; Routledge Curzon Taylor and Franscis Group, 2003).

Vassiliev, Alexi (ed), *Central Asia: Political and Economic Challenges in Post Soviet Era* (London; Saqi Books, 2001).

Vohra, N.N. *Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia and India* (Delhi; Shipra Publication 1999).

Warikoo, K, *Central Asia* (New Delhi; Har Anand Publication, 1995).

Warikoo, K; Norbu, Dawa, *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia* (New Delhi; South Asian Publication, 1992).

Wheeler, Geoffery, *Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (London; Weidenfeld and Micolson, 1964).

Wheeler, Geofferey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia* (London; Bodlery Head, 1966).

Articles

Akbarzadeh, Shahrn, "Political Shape of Central Asia" *Central Asian Survey* (Oxford), vol. 16, no. 4, Dec. 1947, pp. 517-42.

Anderson, John, "Constitutional Development in Central Asia" *Central Asian Survey* (Oxford), vol. 16, no. 3, Sept, 1997, pp. 1378-83.

- Anderson, John "Authoritarian Political Development in Central Asia: A Case Study of Turkmenistan" *Central Asian Survey* vol. 14 no.4, 1995, pp. 529-28.
- Ataov, Turkkaya, "Central Asia on the threshold of the 21st century" *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies* (New Delhi), vol.1, no.3, Oct.-Dec. 1997 pp. 66-75.
- Badan, Phool, "Emerging Political System in Central Asia in the Post Soviet Period" *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), July-Sept 2001. pp. 97-118.
- Badan Phool, "Modernization in Central Asia in the Post Soviet Period", *Journal of Central Asian Studies (Shrinagar)*, vol. X, no.1, 1999, pp. 9-32.
- Bakshi, Jyotsana, "Uzbekistan Chalkout its own course' *Strategic Analysis*, (New Delhi), vol. 21, no. 12, March-1998, pp. 1845-58.
- Bakshi, Jyotsana, "Russian Policy Towards Central Asia ", *Strategic Analysis*, (New Delhi), January 1999.
- Chenoy, Anuradha M, "Political and Economic Process in the Central Asian Republics". *International Studies* (New Delhi), vol. 34, no.3, July-Sept. 1997, pp. 301-12.
- Coppieters, Bruno and Others "Central Asian Region in a New International Environment", *NATO Review* (London), vol. 44, no. 51, Sept. 1996 pp. 26-31.
- Hyman Anthony, "Central Asian Republics, Independence and after' *Round Table (Oxon)*, vol. 341, Jan 1997, pp 67-79.
- Islam Korimov Is Ready To Fight:- Until 2007. (By Yury Chernogayev. Kommersant, Dec. 7, 2001, p. 3. Condensed text:) *Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol.53, no.49, 2001, p.19.
- Karimov, Islam "Uzbekistan on the Threshold of 21 Century: Threats to Security and Stability", *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies* (New Delhi), vol. 1, no.3, Oct-Dec 1997. pp 39-65.
- Kaushik, Devendra, "India and Central Asia : Past and present realities and future hopes", *Contemporary Central Asia*, vol. 1, no.1, 1997, pp. 63-71.
- Khidayatov, G, "Uzbekistan between the Past and Future" *Contemporary Central Asia*, vol. 1, no.1, 1997, pp. 33-43.
- Kirimli, Meryem, "Uzbekistan in the New World Order", *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 16, no.1, March, 1997, pp. 53-64.

Kubicek, Paul, "Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure? *Third World Quarterly*, 1998, vol. 19, no.1, pp-29-43.

Luong, Nick "After the Breakup: Institutional Design in Transitional States', *Contemporary Political Studies* (London), vol 33, no.5, June 2000, pp 563-92.

Luong Jones Pauline "The Future of Central Asian Statehood", *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 1, 1999.

Mohapatra Nalin K., "Dynamics of Democratization and Political Process in Uzbekistan", *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, vol.9, no.1-2, Jan-June 2005

Matveena, Anna, "Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia", *Iranian Journal of International Affairs* (Tehran) vol. 7, no.4, Winter 1996, pp. 834-53.

"Not A Step Without Censorship: - For the press in Tashkent, the Soviet Era Isn't Over", *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, Aug. 10, 2001, p. 5; *Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol.53, no.33, 2001, p.18.

Palat, Madhavan K. "Emergence of Central Asia", *Indian Historical Review* (New Delhi) vol. 18, nos-1-2, July 1991, pp. 76-92.

Ruoner, Boris, "Power in Central Asia." *Survival*, Autumn, vol. 44, no.3, 2002, pp. 57-68.

Sadri, Houman A, "Integration in Central Asia: From theory to policy" *Central Asia Survey*, vol. 16, no. 4, Dec. 1997, pp. 543-72.

Sengupta, Anita "Minorities and Nationalizing States in Central Asia', *International Studies* (New Delhi), vol. 34, no. 3, July-Sept. 1997, pp. 269-300.

Shams-uddin, "New Great Game in Central Asia" *International Studies*, (New Delhi) , vol. 34, no.3, July-Sept 1997, pp. 329-41.

Shri Prakash, "India Uzbekistan Relation during the 1990's and Future Prospects" *Contemporary Central Asia* vol. 5, no.1, April 2001, pp. 58-64.

Starr, S Frederick, "Making Eurasia stable", *Foreign Affairs* vol 75, no 1, Jan-Feb. 1996, pp 80-91

Walker, Edward W, "Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia", *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003.

“What The Uzbek Media Don’t Talk About”, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, May 14, 1999, p.5, *Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol.51, no.19, 1999, p.19.

Newspaper and Periodicals

Asian Affairs (London)

BBC Summary World Broadcast (London)

Central Asian Newsletter (Oxford)

Contemporary Central Asia (New Delhi)

Central Asian Survey (London)

Current Digest of Pos- Soviet Press (Columbus)

Europe-Asia Studies (Glasgow)

FBIS: Central Eurasia (U.S.A.)

Foreign Affairs (New Delhi)

Frontline

Post –Soviet Affairs (Columbia)

The Hindu

The Times of India

WEBSITES:

www.countrystudies.com/uzbekistan/government

www.cia.jhu.edu/alimov_civilsociety_uzbekistan.pdf

www.hartford-hwp.com

www.cacianalyst.org

www.press-service.uz/eng/president

www.birlik.net

www.crsisweb.org

www.eurasia.net

www.fewer.org

www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org

www.internews.uz

www.mercycorps.org

www.osce.org

www.preventconflict.org/portal/centralasia

www.rfel.org

www.soros.org/osi

www.undp.uz

www.usaid.gov/country/ee/uz

www.uzbekistanerk.org

www.uznews.com

www.worldbank.org

