

# **ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PAKISTAN**

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21 July 2004

### CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the dissertation entitled “**Role of the Military in Pakistan**” submitted by **MonAmi Banerjee** is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree in this University or any other University and is her own work.

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# CONTENT

	<b>Page No.</b>
Map	
Preface	i
Chronology	iv
Introduction	1
<b>Chapter One</b>	
Background to Military Intervention	16
<b>Chapter Two</b>	
The Military Coups	34
<b>Chapter Three</b>	
The Military Regimes	54
Conclusion	107
Epilogue	120
Bibliography	124

## POLITICAL MAP OF PAKISTAN



## Preface

The military is the paramount political actor in Pakistan. Ever since Pakistan was created in 1947, it has lived in the shadows of the army. The generals have been in power for half of its fifty years plus existence. Long spells of direct army rule with occasional shifts towards army-supported civilian governments, have led to reinforcement of authoritarian tendencies and enabled the military to spread out into the government, the economy and the society.

Since independence, men in uniforms have four times administered governments through direct military interventions. Even during the civilian administrations, the military had pursued its interests from the sidelines, indirectly wielding power. As a result of these changing patterns of civil-military relations, the Pakistani state had been fraught with cycles of '**civilianization of the military**' and '**militarization of the civil society**', with democracy taking a back seat most of the time.

Democracy has never been able to entrench itself completely in Pakistan. No civilian government has been able to complete its five-year tenure in office. Whatever semblance of democracy there ever was, it was an army-guided one. A civilian administration, at best, has been a civil-military hybrid. The fact that even after a whole decade of democratic governance the fourth military takeover on 12 October, 1999 by **General Pervez Musharraf** was not denounced by the Pakistani population shows how weak the base of democracy is in Pakistan. The frequent military intervention in politics emphasizes the immaturity of Pakistan's democracy.

The purpose of my study has been to highlight the circumstances, which have led to frequent military interventions in Pakistan, and to fathom the factors leading to all the four military takeovers. My aim has been also to study the trajectory of each of the military regimes to point out the similarities and differences between each of them, and to underline from what sources each of them derived their legitimacy to stay in power. Lastly, I have also dwelled on the prospects of the future of democracy in Pakistani polity.

This dissertation is spread over three chapters, and an introduction and a concluding chapter. It is an attempt to focus discussion on the role of military in Pakistani politics and understand the dynamics of all the military regimes of Pakistan. The study begins with an examination of different theories of military intervention in politics in an introductory chapter, and develops into a case study of Pakistan in which the utility of various theoretical frameworks of military intervention has been tested.

Chapter One gives a portrait of the military as Pakistan's premier institution. It analyzes the role of the military in governance in Pakistan. It seeks to explain how and why the institutional balance of power shifted in favor of military and its junior partner, the bureaucracy. The chapter other than examining the internal dynamics also highlights the external security factors vis-à-vis India.

Chapter Two discusses the factors leading to, and the circumstances under which, each of the four military coups of Pakistan took place. This chapter deals mainly with the events and the situations preceding the military coups that provided the reasons for the eventual takeover by the military. The chapter also presents comparisons as well as differences between the four coups along the broad dimensions of their nature and modality.

Chapter Three is a continuation of the previous chapter, as it discusses the military regimes that were established by the four dictators after the success of their military coups. This chapter analyzes as well as compares and contrasts the military regimes in detail. Comparisons are sought on the basis of type or nature of the military regimes; administrative reforms; economic performance of the regimes; the civilianization or the legitimization process and constitutional politics. The chapter charts the various steps taken by each of the dictators to legitimize their regimes and the various constitutional changes that they brought about to consolidate their own positions in a civilian set up.

Lastly, the Conclusion deals with certain themes that impact upon Pakistani politics and influences the nature and pattern of change in Pakistan. It also presents how each of the four military rulers dealt with these factors that ultimately left a deep imprint as well as altered Pakistan's destiny. The concluding chapter also dwells upon the future of Pakistani polity, especially the prospects for democracy as a viable form of political system.

Thus, the aim of this study has been to mainly examine and analyze the role that the military plays in Pakistan and to underline the factors responsible for its pre-eminent position in the

polity. In addition, the study provides one with an insight to understand how democracy has been so easily subverted in Pakistan.



## CHRONOLOGY

- 1947 Independence of Pakistan.  
Start of the first war in Kashmir.
- 1948 Death of the Founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
- 1952 Language riots in East Pakistan.
- 1953 Anti-Ahmadi riots lead to the imposition of martial law in Lahore.
- 1955 West Pakistan provinces are amalgamated into 'One Unit'.
- 1956 Pakistan's first constitution is passed.
- 1958 General Ayub Khan takes over in the first military coup.
- 1959 The capital moves from Karachi to Islamabad.
- 1962 Ayub gets his own constitution passed and becomes President.
- 1965 Second war with India.
- 1966 Bengali leader Mujibur Rehman publishes his Six Points.
- 1969 General Yahya Khan takes over from Ayub Khan.
- 1970 First ever national elections are held in East and West Pakistan.
- 1971 War in East Pakistan leads to the creation of Bangladesh.  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto comes to power.
- 1972 Bhutto signs the Simla Accord.  
Bhutto calls on Pakistani scientists to make a nuclear bomb.
- 1973 A new constitution for Pakistan comes into being.
- 1977 General Zia-ul-Haq takes over in a coup.
- 1979 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is hanged.  
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- 1986 MQM formally registered as a party.
- 1988 General Zia killed in an air crash.  
Benazir Bhutto begins first administration.  
Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan.
- 1990 Benazir Bhutto's first administration is dismissed.  
Nawaz Sharif begins first administration.

- 1993 Nawaz Sharif's first administration is dismissed.
- 1994 Benazir Bhutto begins second administration.
- 1996 Benazir Bhutto's second administration is dismissed.  
Taliban comes to power in Afghanistan.
- 1997 Nawaz Sharif begins second administration.
- 1998 India and Pakistan conduct nuclear tests.
- 1999 Kargil conflict in Kashmir.  
General Musharraf takes over from Nawaz Sharif in a coup.
- 2001 Musharraf abandons Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
- 2002 **Apr:** Musharraf wins referendum allowing him to stay in power for a further five years.  
**Aug:** Musharraf issues the LFO on 21<sup>st</sup>.  
**Oct:** National elections are held and Islamic party MMA wins 60 seats.  
**Nov:** Pro-Musharraf PML-Q wins by a margin of one vote  
Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali becomes the Prime Minister.
- 2003 **May:** Parliamentary stalemate over the LFO.  
Musharraf strikes a deal with MMA over LFO and promises to step down as Army Chief on 31<sup>st</sup> Dec. 2004.  
**Dec:** Seventeenth Amendment is passed and the modified LFO is incorporated into the constitution.
- 2004 **Jan:** Musharraf secures vote of confidence.  
**Jun:** Jamali hands over his resignation. PML-Q president Shujaat Hussain becomes the interim Prime Minister.

## Introduction

In the post Second World War era, the phenomenon of military intervention in politics in the newly emerging developing and less developed countries acquired an endemic nature. So much so that, large number of sociologists, political scientists and psychologists preoccupied themselves with what came to be known as “**Civil-Military relations in the Third World**”, and applicability of the concept of “**Militarism**”. They acknowledged that in the under developed regions the military might become the critical group in shaping the course of nation building, and that it was a key decision-making element in these countries.

“Militarism” as a concept came to characterize most of the Third World in the post-1945 period. It was seen as a problem of those countries making their transition from pre-industrial to ‘westernized’ industrial pattern of social and political organization, where the military was the only cohesively organized institution capable of facilitating the nation-building process in these new states. Militarism was seen not just as a problem of military influence in politics, but as the prevalence of military spirit and ideals among a people; the tendency to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the state; and the predominance of military forms, thought patterns and objectives in state, politics and society.<sup>1</sup>

Prior to 1945 and before the emergence of the Third World, militarism had a negative connotation. It was seen to obtain wherever and whenever military considerations exerted a decisive influence on civilian government. It was perceived as obstructing the development of representative institutions. It was the opposite of ‘**Civilianism**’. Alfred Vagts sees militarism as covering ‘every system of thinking and valuing and every complex of feelings, which rank military institutions and ways above the ways of civilian life, carrying military mentality and modes of action and decision into the civilian sphere’.<sup>2</sup> It was the permeation of entire society by the self-serving ideology of the officer and the soldier, which suppresses all liberal, democratic

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<sup>1</sup> V.R Berghahn, “Militarism – The History of an International Debate, 1861 – 1979”, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> V. Vagts, “A History of Militarism”, New York Publications, 1937, p. 15.

and representative elements in that society. This was very much the case in the Nazi Germany and Japan prior to 1945.

However, in the post Second World War scenario, in the case of the Third World, there was a considerable reluctance among the political scientists to use the term 'Militarism'. It was preferred to speak of "**civil-military**" in these developing countries, primarily because the military in these societies did not always play a negative role. The military in many of these societies was the only developed, organized and westernized institution, which played a key role in the political development as well as acted as the modernizing agent.

In the Third World, it was realized that no one overriding definition of militarism would suffice as the countries in these regions differed sharply in their social, economic, political and cultural situations. It was seen that there existed two conflicting images of the politician in uniform. One, largely from Latin America and the Balkans, is that of administrative incompetence, inaction and authoritarian values. The second and more recent is that of a dynamic and self-sacrificing military leadership committed to progress

and the task of modernizing traditional societies that has been subverted by the corrupt practices of the politicians.<sup>3</sup> Here the military acts as a guardian of the people and their rights, and thereby cannot be seen completely in a negative light. Therefore, a different approach was required to understand and evaluate the armies of the developing societies. Systematic thought was given to the political sociology of armies and the roles that military institutions play in facilitating the process of industrial and political development.

**Lucian Pye** in his article "**Armies in the Process of Political Modernization**" wrote that the armies in the Third World act as a modernizing force. According to him, the military in these countries are modern institutions, in many ways almost an '**ideal-type industrial and secularized enterprise**', that have been artificially introduced into disorganized transitional societies. Most of these societies were earlier colonies of developed nations, which maintained highly trained indigenous colonial armies for their own purpose. But in comparison, the efforts had been negligible in developing civil administration and political parties. So, the armies

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<sup>3</sup> Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in 'Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries', ed. By J.J. Johnson, Rand Corporation, 1962, p. 70.

formed by colonial rulers and passed on to the newly independent countries have been consistently among the most modernized institutions in their societies.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, he continued, the officer corps was selected according to principles that were very different from those of the traditional society. Thus, the fact that the new armies in pre-industrial societies are modeled after industrial based organizations has implications for their political roles. The specialization that the modern armies demand in scales and functions make the officers more trained in organizational skills than in the civilian economy. Moreover, the revolution in military technology has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically and technologically underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes to their own societies. Unlike the civil bureaucracy, which deals with only domestic problems, the soldier has to look outside and compare his organization with foreign ones. He thus, has a greater awareness of international standards and a greater sensitivity to weaknesses in his own society.

In such a society, the military plays a key role in shaping the attitude towards modernity in other spheres of the society. Army training and rigid discipline perform the basic process of acculturation in traditional societies whereby traditional ways give way to more westernized ideas and practices. This element of viewing the military as a modernizing agent in the developing world was absent in the study of militarism prior to 1945, since the Anglo-Saxon social sciences had a stereotypical understanding of militarism as a foe of liberal values.

As far as the civil-military relations in these societies are concerned, civilian institutions are very few and less developed in comparison with the military, and often need military backing to maintain control over the masses. The pattern of civil-military relations in the Third World differs from society to society. Such factors as the officer's image within the society, the prevailing state of public order, perceived seriousness of foreign threats to national security, and the confidence political leaders have in their hold on power, affect the military's political influence. The military's impact on politics increases if the army profession enjoys high public

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<sup>4</sup> Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in 'Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries', ed. By J.J. Johnson, Rand Corporation, 1962, p. 73-77.

esteem, if public order is threatened by acute unrest, if war seems a strong possibility, or if the incumbent political leaders feel threatened by challenges to their positions. In such a case, the military's political role is not a question of 'whether', but of 'how much' and of 'what kind'.<sup>5</sup>

Those who do move up to positions of greater respect and power through the army may often carry with them hostilities towards those with greater advantages and authority within civilian society. The tendency of military to question whether the civilian elite achieved their station by merit adds conflict to civil-military relations in most underdeveloped countries.

The role of the military in politics ranges from minimal influence by means of recognized channels inherent in its position and responsibilities within the political system, to the other extreme of the total overthrow of the civilian government through overt military coups. Overt military intervention in politics stands in contrast to the influence of the military as a legitimate institutional pressure group. Armies have become a universal and integral part of all modern nation states. Being an integral part of the nation's political system, the armed forces in no nation remain completely cut off from politics. The way they intervene and to the extent they intervene differ though in every state and over different times.

Many comparative politics theorists have put forward their typologies of civil-military patterns of relation. S.E. Finer in his book, "**The Man on the Horseback**", provides a four-fold classification of the levels of military intervention. They are -: **a) influence, b)**

**blackmail, c) displacement and d) supplantment.** According to him, at both the influence and blackmail levels the military works upon and through the civilian government and pulls the strings from behind the curtains. In the third level of displacement, the military intervenes by removing and replacing one set of civilian politicians with another without overthrowing the civilian regime as such. However, the last level, i.e. of supplantment, is the most complete level of intervention, which sweeps away the civilian regime and establishes the military in its place.<sup>6</sup>

Finer also examined the importance of the level of '**Political Culture**' as the social milieu in which the military operated. He distinguished four stages: - **minimal** political culture, **low** political culture, **developed** political culture and **mature** political culture. To him, the western democracies were at the one end of the continuum. He accorded them the 'mature political

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<sup>5</sup> C.E. Welch and Smith, A.K., "Military Role and Rule", Duxbury Press, 1974, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> S.E. Finer, "The Man on the Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, Pall Mall Press, 1962, pg. 86-87.

culture' status, and believed military intervention in politics to be more likely in countries where the political institutions are weak and lacking in legitimacy.

**Morris Janowitz**, on the other hand, proposes the varying levels of military interventions in politics by providing us with two such models – one each for the western nations and the developing countries. He identified three types of civil-military relations in the western nations: - a) **Aristocratic**, b) **Democratic** and c) **Totalitarian**. And for the developing nations he identified five such types:- a) **Authoritarian-personal control**, b) **Authoritarian-mass party control**, c) **Democratic-competitive**, d) **Civil-military coalition** and e) **Military Oligarchy**.<sup>7</sup>

What both **Finer** and **Janowitz** have tried to do is provide us with a general continuum on which different levels of political intervention by the military could be gauged. On the other hand, **Samuel P. Huntington** gives a three-fold categorization of coups already carried out by the military. They are - a) **Palace Coups**, B) **Reform Coups** and c) **Revolutionary Coups**.<sup>8</sup> This typology is based on the criterion of the political objectives of the military coups and not on the extent of the military intervention because to **Huntington**, military interventions in politics occur because of political compulsions and not factors internal to the military.

The relationship between armies and civilian leaders also varies as per circumstances of historic development. According to **Lucian Pye**, three different categories could be discerned which characterize the civil-military relations in developing societies based on different patterns of domestic politics.

First are those patterns of development in which the military stand out because in a disrupted society they represent the only effectively organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policies. Here the military facilitates the development of civilian political institutions from the ashes of the disrupted traditional system. The Middle East provide us which such a case where western influence through oil trading brought a commitment to republican institutions, but left the army as the only effective modern political structure in the entire society.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>M. Janowitz, "The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis", Chicago Press, 1964, pg. 2-8.

<sup>8</sup> S.P. Huntington, "Political Order in Changing Society", New Haven Publications, 1968, pg. 32-33.

<sup>9</sup> Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in 'Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries', ed. By J.J. Johnson, Rand Corporation, 1962, pg. 84-85.

Second are those societies where the military, while formally espousing the development of democracy, actually monopolizes the political arena and forces any emerging civilian elite to concentrate on economic and social activities. The army remains to be the only political master.

The third category is the most common. It consists of the societies in which the organizations and the structures essential to democracy exist but have not been able to function effectively. The process of modernization has been retarded by the ineffective civilian elite, so much so that the army as the most modernized organization in the society has assumed an administrative role and taken over control. In these cases there is a sense of failure in the country, and the military is viewed as the possible savior.

These various patterns of civil-military relations depend upon various sets of factors that exclusively cannot explain the frequent military interventions in politics, but when taken together can explain why in some societies the military is subservient to civilian control, and in some it overthrows the civilian regime. A review of the literature of military role in politics in the post Second World War period suggests five broad factors considered as conditions for military interventions in politics (or absence of it).

- **Internal organization or composition of the military;**
- **Socio-economic development in the country;**
- **Level of political institutionalization;**
- **Professionalism and civilian control of the military;**
- **Foreign influence.**<sup>10</sup>

The organizational format of the military, its skill structure, social origins of the officer corps, professional ideology and cohesion are all vital to an understanding of the political behavior of any military. For Janowitz, certain characteristics of the military organization explain both its capacity to intervene in politics and its ability to govern after such intervention. He suggests that the degree of internal cohesion of the military plays a very significant role in the propensity to intervene. As per him, armies with high internal cohesion have a greater capacity to intervene in domestic politics than armed forces with lesser cohesion. This is because in cases of high cohesion even the rank and file as well as the officer corps backs the coups; also, counter-coups

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<sup>10</sup> V. Kukreja, "Military Intervention in Politics – A Case Study of Pakistan", NBO Publication, 1985, pg. 23.



after the seizure of power are unlikely to occur if the new military regime has high internal cohesion.<sup>11</sup>

Janowitz also suggests that social origins of the officer corps play a role too. If they come from hinterland social background, coupled with petty middle-class bureaucratic, occupational origin, then their feudal tradition has a mitigating effect. It contributes to a lack of integration with other elites, especially political, and so inhibits direct intervention in politics. Therefore, the more modern and westernized the corps is and more dissatisfied it is with the level of performance of the civilian political elite, the more is its probability to intervene.<sup>12</sup>

As far as interventionist motives are concerned, Finer assumes '**corporate interest**' in terms of the demand for large budgets and other material privileges as one of the most important motives. Cases like overthrow of President **Goulart of Brazil** in 1964 and removal of **Nkrumah in Ghana**, suggest that interventionist motives are consistently and sharply activated when the civilian governors fail to provide adequate budgetary support or try to cut it down, interfere with military autonomy in matters of recruitment or promotion, or threaten the prestige of the army or to dissolve it.<sup>13</sup>

However, there are many who do not consider the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officer corps as sufficient to explain military intervention. Huntington espouses such a viewpoint. He says that the question, "what characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation facilitates its involvement in domestic politics?", which was what Janowitz was preoccupied with, is misdirected because the most important cause of military intervention in politics is not military, but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of the society.<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, one has to consider factors external to the military in conjunction with internal characteristics to get a fuller picture since no military works in an environmental vacuum. Here the socio-economic development or underdevelopment of the developing society becomes an

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<sup>11</sup> M. Janowitz, "The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis", Chicago Press, 1964, pg. 68.

<sup>12</sup> M. Janowitz, "The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis", Chicago Press, 1964, pg. 68.

<sup>13</sup> S.E. Finer, "The Man on the Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, Pall Mall Press, 1962, pg. 47-50.

<sup>14</sup> S.P. Huntington, "Political Order in Changing Society", New Haven Publications, 1968, pg. 194.

important factor in explaining coups. Societies with social fabrics marred with cleavages are more prone to coups. **Germani and Silvert** have suggested that the greater the cleavages and the lesser the consensus in a society, the greater is the likelihood of military intervention. Thus the probability of military intervention increases as the intensification of domestic conflict arising out of ethnic or class cleavages threaten

the status and the power of the dominant group. Germani and Silvert have also suggested that military intervention is inhibited by the rise of the middle strata in the social structure. The rise of the middle class in a society facilitates the creation as well as sustainability of stable civilian political institutions.<sup>15</sup> This class increases public involvement in politics and social mobilization, and thereby keeps any regime, whether civilian or military, in check.

As far as the dimension of economic development is concerned, there are many like **Johnson, Gavin Kennedy, Fossum, Needler, Hoadley**, who believe that the likelihood of military intervention rises with a perceived deterioration of economic condition, especially marked by an assumption that the government cannot resolve this deterioration. According to **Fossum**, the frequency of military coups in Latin America in economically bad years on the average was twice that for the years of improvement.<sup>16</sup> **Needler** noted that between 1938 to 1942, a time of increased prosperity in Latin America, only one successful coup was carried out, while six successful coups took place in 1944, an economically bad year.<sup>17</sup> **Hoadley** also says that the coups by military in Asia occurred about twice as frequently in the year following a drop in the total value of exports.

In addition, in the context of the economic dimension, **Finer** has argued that economic development, especially industrialization, diminishes the propensity for military intervention. This stems partly from the increased socio-technical complexity that puts public administration beyond the skills of the armed forces partly because of the civilian opportunities for social mobility, which economic development opens up, and partly because of greater wealth generated

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<sup>15</sup> G. Germani and K. Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America", *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 2, 1961, pg. 65.

<sup>16</sup> E. Fossum, "Factors Influencing Occurrence of Military Coups in Latin America", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 4, no. 4, 1967, pg. 237.

<sup>17</sup> M.C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America", *America Political Science Review*, Vol. LX, No. 3, 1966, pg. 617-18.

by industrialization that allows and encourages stable civilian government.<sup>18</sup> Thus, what can be inferred here is that it is the societies still in the transition phase of transformation to industrial societies from the feudal ones, which are more vulnerable to military coups.

Other than the socio-economic dimension, there is the dimension of political condition of a country which impacts upon the relative influence of the army vis-à-vis the political elites. The level of political development or political institutionalization plays an important part. This is in reference to the political legitimacy that a government enjoys or its crisis. In other words, when legitimacy is reduced, the government is likely to be in danger of being toppled by the military. Where public faith in civilian institution is strong, military coup is rare. Finer calls such a society a '**matured political culture**' – one in which both consensus and mobilization are very high.<sup>19</sup>

The strengths and weaknesses of the civilian political institutions include not just legitimacy as a criterion, but also the level of mass participation, roles of political parties, efficiency of political leadership, functioning or rather effectiveness of the democratic political structures.

Mostly all political scientists agree with the argument that the weak political institutions lead to increased military interventions. However, there is a big debate over the factor of '**Professionalism**' as a determinant of military intervention in politics. Huntington belongs to the group that maintains professionalism to be inversely related to military intervention. To him the modern professional sense of mission, military mind and ethics, and loyalty to the state, all incline the military against political intervention.<sup>20</sup>

Janowitz's model of the professional soldier is also closer to this view. He maintains that the civilians, with the participation of the military, establish standards and evaluate the performance of the profession. He says that the officer would be responsible to civilian control because of law, tradition, professional ethics, and his integration with civil values and institutions.<sup>21</sup>

However, another viewpoint has been put forward by Finer who maintains that the very nature of professionalism often leads to the army's collision with the civil authorities. Empirically too it has been evident that highly professional officer corps have intervened in politics. The **Pakistani**

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<sup>18</sup> S.E. Finer, "The Man on the Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, Pall Mall Press, 1962, pg. 14-16.

<sup>19</sup> S.E. Finer, "The Man on the Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, Pall Mall Press, 1962, pg. 15-16.

<sup>20</sup> S.P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations", Harvard University Press, 1957, pg. 8.

<sup>21</sup> M. Janowitz, "The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait", Free Press, 1960, pg. 417.

**coup of 1958** and the **Nigerian coup of 1963**, both were conducted by officers trained at Sandhurst.

The level of professionalism of the officer corps is so high vis-à-vis the rest of the society that any inefficiency and unprofessional handling of the state's affairs by the civilian government acts as the triggering factor making them take control themselves.

Other than the factors that are internally determined within the boundaries of a country there is the external factor of foreign influence, which impacts upon the military's role as a decision maker. One factor is the threat or the fear of threat to national security by another country. Proximity of a hostile country provides the military with the ready excuse to appropriate most of the country's resources to be prepared for the war. This gives them the leverage over civilian elites. It also gives them the symbolic prestige of defender of the nation, which the civilian leaders lack.

Also, the nature of international order, especially during the 60's and 70's, i.e. the **Cold War** era, had a profound influence on military institutions throughout the underdeveloped areas. There has been a tendency in some quarters to regard the trend towards military rule in the Third World as favorable to American foreign policy interests.<sup>22</sup> Army rule has been welcomed as promising greater political stability and firmer policies against Communism by the West. As **Irving Horowitz** pointed out, without the military nearly every Latin American republic would stand politically to the left of where it is now.<sup>23</sup>

Any one of the above mentioned factors by themselves are not sufficient to provide conditions for a military coup. They together make an impact and that too in varying degrees, thereby leading to different patterns of civil-military relations in the Third World.

Other than these factors, which affect civil-military relations, there is a school of thought that does not consider military as a modernizing agent, but sees militarism as a way of life that invades all spheres of the society. Such societies are called 'Praetorian' societies and the phenomenon is called "**Praetorianism**". This term is taken from the **Praetorian Guards of the Roman Empire** established as a special military unit for the protection of the emperor. Military

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<sup>22</sup> Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in 'Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries', ed. By J.J. Johnson, Rand Corporation, 1962, pg. 86.

<sup>23</sup> V.R Berghahn, "Militarism – The History of an International Debate, 1861 – 1979", Cambridge University Press, 1981, pg. 75.

officers become praetorian soldiers when they use or threaten to use force in order to enter or dominate the political arena by relying upon their power of the gun. They portray themselves as responsible and patriotic officers, and their public-spirited values leaving them with little choice but to protect the people from the unhappy consequences of continued civilian rule. This is the public rationale given behind military leaders taking over.<sup>24</sup>

**Perlmutter** in his book, **“Political Roles and Military Rulers”**, writes that Praetorianism is a word frequently used to characterize a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force.<sup>25</sup>

Samuel Huntington also starts from the basic assumption that the causes, which produce military intervention in politics, lie not in the nature of the military organization or the socio-economic development of the country; rather it is a specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies, i.e. of Praetorianism. He refers to it as the general politicization of social forces and institutions in the absence of autonomy, complexity, coherence and adaptability of political structures.<sup>26</sup> Perlmutter also sees a praetorian society as characterized by a weak state, an interventionist regime, kaleidoscopic changes in authorities, permanent and guaranteed insecurity, an overdeveloped military apparatus and political illegitimacy.

There are mainly three types of praetorians, varying with regard to the level of intervention. First is the **‘moderator-type’**, who exercises a veto power over a varied range of political issues without having taken control of the reins of government. Second is the **‘guardian praetorian’**. Once the officers have become politicized as moderators it is a relatively small step to exercise governmental power themselves. Guardian types, after overthrowing a civilian regime always try to legitimize themselves through the public rationale mentioned earlier, and through the announcement of their intention to hand over power to democratically elected civilians in the near future. The third praetorians are the **‘ruler-type’**, who take up power for an indefinite period and do not even keep the slam of commitments to return the reins to civilians. They take power for their own sakes.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Eric A. Nordlinger, “Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments”, Prentice Hall Inc., 1977, pg. 2-20.

<sup>25</sup> A. Perlmutter, “Political Roles and Military Rulers”, Frank Cass and Co., 1981, pg. 9.

<sup>26</sup> S.P. Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Society”, New Haven Publications, 1968, pg. 194-96.

<sup>27</sup> Eric A. Nordlinger, “Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments”, Prentice Hall Inc., 1977, pg. 21-27.

Praetorian societies are categorized not only on the basis of level of intervention, but also on the patterns of civil-military relations. There are three such categories – Autocratic, Oligarchic and Corporate.<sup>28</sup> The **Autocratic** model is the personality type dominated by a despot-tyrant. The despot arbitrarily dominates the army. The **Oligarchic** model differs from the autocratic one only in terms of numbers. The oligarchy is composed of a combination of military men and civilians; with the difference that here military is autonomous and can anytime overthrow the oligarchy.

The last one is the **Corporate Praetorian** model. In this model there's a military-civilian fusionist rule with military having the upper edge. Political bargaining is conducted between organized groups where the military either arbitrates or dictates policies. The state here becomes the authoritarian "**patron of patrons**", arbitrated by the military. The main intention of the army to take up power is to maintain or enhance its own corporate interests, i.e. such institutional concerns as autonomy, weapons, and budgetary resources. The army then looks like a lobby, which can secure for itself a large proportion of the state's resources.<sup>29</sup>

**Corporatism** is an important element that makes the military intervene in the political sphere to further its own organizational interests. This goes absolutely against what Pye attributes to armies in the Third World, i.e. their modernizing role. Moreover, it is also argued that there's no basis for assuming that military is capable of preserving the positive qualities attributed to it in a non-military context. Janowitz says that the very characteristics that brings military to power, renders it unable to govern effectively. Huntington also says that once military juntas come to power, even a benevolent one is faced with conflict between their impulses to modernization and the needs of political institution building. Therefore, he maintains, the military coups may spur modernization but they cannot produce a stable political order. This precisely is the problem that has plagued the developing societies and rendered them unstable as political systems.

However, by the end of the Twentieth century, the process of re-democratization in the Third World has given it some semblance of stability. But, even then, there remains some aberrations, which after various trials with democratic form of governance have ultimately given in to military rules. At the dawn of the Twenty-First century **Pakistan** remains one such Third World nation. While the rest of the world hews towards democracy, Pakistan, for the Fourth time in its

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<sup>28</sup> A. Perlmutter, "Political Roles and Military Rulers", Frank Cass and Co., 1981, pg. 264.

<sup>29</sup> Miles D. Wolpin, "Militarism and Social Revolution", Allenheld, 1981, pg. 14-15.

short history, is once again ruled by the military. On four occasions the military has overtly intervened and imposed martial law through the country – **Oct. 1958 (Ayub Khan), Mar. 1969 (Yahya Khan), Jul. 1977 (Zia-ul-Haq) and Oct. 1999 (Parvez Musharraf)** – and justified its extreme action on the ground of chaotic conditions prevailing in the country.

The frequent military intervention in politics in Pakistan is the crystallization of the importance it has enjoyed from the beginning. As Lucian Pye had pointed out that in many Third World countries the military played a key role in the political development as well as acted as a modernizing agent since it was the only developed, organized and westernized institution, so was the case with Pakistan. When Pakistan was born as a new independent state, it inherited the Western-style military from its colonial heritage, but lacked the requisite political and civilian institutions necessary for the functioning of a stable democracy. Thus, as **Hamza Alavi** points out, Pakistan inherited an overdeveloped military in a weak state-apparatus. The political leadership also was not capable enough to maintain state power alone.<sup>30</sup>

The Pakistani army had all the third political advantages over civilian organizations that Finer had suggested – a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotional symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms. These made the military a more prestigious and a highly organized corporation than any civilian body. Perlmutter has proposed that the military replaces an existing regime when it is the most cohesive and politically the best-organized group at a given time in a given political system, and when no relatively more powerful opposition exists.<sup>31</sup> In case of Pakistan, this has been very much the case.

Thus, a Western-styled military with its top brass having acquired western education, proved to be too professional and efficient in a traditional feudal set up. As a highly professional officer corps, the Pakistani military couldn't sit idle while the 'venal politicians' mishandled the country's affairs. Pakistan thereby fits into Lucian Pye's third category of states in which organizations and structures for democracy exists but have not been able to function effectively, and so army as the most organized organization assumes administrative control. In such a case, there is a sense of failure with the civilian government and the military is viewed as the possible savior.

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<sup>30</sup>A. Perlmutter, "Political Roles and Military Rulers", Frank Cass and Co., 1981, pg. 21-23.

<sup>31</sup> Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in 'Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries', ed. By J.J. Johnson, Rand Corporation, 1962, pg. 85.

Other than the organizational strength of the army, another set of variables that facilitated military interventions in Pakistan is the weaknesses of the civilian political institutions and the legitimacy crisis faced by the political leadership. **Md. Ali Jinnah** and his **Muslim League** achieved Pakistan as an independent country. The political leadership proved to be inadequate after Jinnah's death soon after Pakistan was born and the Muslim League was not able to entrench itself as it had almost no social base in the new state. The League organization was non-existent there because before Pakistan was won from British India, the League had set up its organization bases in (U.P, Bombay and Bihar) areas which were all left behind in India. So, the passing away of Jinnah and his failure to

transfer his charisma to the party eroded its legitimacy. This dearth of competent leadership and mass-based political parties led to a political vacuum that in turn led to the weakening of the civilian political institutions as efficient organizations.

Therefore, initially, the political atmosphere of Pakistan was such that there was no political consensus and democratic institutions were not firmly set up which gave the army the excuse to fill in the political vacuum itself, in order to take it upon itself to set Pakistan straight.

In sum, Pakistan seems to fit into Huntington's model of a praetorian society where military interventions are only one specific manifestation of the broader phenomenon of politicization of social forces and institutions.<sup>32</sup> It was not the organization of the military but the political conditions in which it is in that politicizes the army. Therefore, in the absence of effective political institution and leadership capable of mediating and moderating group political action the army in Pakistan assumed the role of a shadow cabinet.

The socio-economic conditions also had a role to play. In terms of Finer's four-fold classification of political culture<sup>33</sup>, Pakistan falls into the third category of 'low political culture'. Low social mobilization coupled with deteriorating economic conditions contributed to military intervention in Pakistan. Apart from the level of socio-economic development, Pakistan's security environment also had a strong bearing on military interventions in its politics. The conditions of domestic and external security problems under which Pakistan was born, made state survival the primary concern of its rulers. In this the military came to play an important role as it both

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<sup>32</sup> V. Kukreja, "Military Intervention in Politics – A Case Study of Pakistan". NBO Publication, 1985, pg. 57-59.

<sup>33</sup> S.E. Finer, "The Man on the Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, Pall Mall Press, 1962, pg. 57.



maintained domestic law and order in the initial partition days, as well as acted as the defender of sovereignty from a hostile India.

Pakistan's continuous enmity with India and its division into two wings until 1971 separated by thousand miles of hostile Indian Territory made military necessary bulwark against external threat and so, the civilian administrations had to allocate a huge defense budget to the military and involve it in defense and foreign policy decision-making processes.<sup>34</sup>

Pakistan's problems were also compounded by the external factors, especially the Cold War and the USA. Pakistan and Cold War were born almost at the same time and USA during the 50s preferred authoritarian governments in Third World countries as buffers in the face of USSR's Communism. In case of Pakistan, as India tilted towards USSR in the hey days of Cold War, Pakistan was charmed by America to join its block through **SEATO** and **CENTO**.<sup>35</sup> Though USA itself has always harped upon the need for democratization, yet fortunately for the Pakistan army USA's foreign policy interests has always made it support military regimes whenever coups were carried out in Pakistan. Thus, with the US backing it and the civilians unable to keep their house in order, the Pakistani army considered periodic military interventions into politics as regrettable but necessary.

Hence, the organizational strength of the army, weakness of civilian government institutions, low-level of socio-economic development, a hostile security environment and favorable external factors all together provides the military with the upper edge vis-à-vis civilian regimes, as well as gives it the excuse to intervene in politics. The military in Pakistan has always used the reason of political bargaining amongst political leadership as the cause of retarded performance of civilian governments, and so portrays itself as taking over power only to save the citizens and the country from being further mishandled by the politicians.

All these characteristics and factors which facilitates military interventions in politics, makes Pakistan a typical Praetorian society in which the military dominates the political arena through its control over the gun and image of the "**Guardian of the People**".<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Wayne A. Wilcox, "Political Role of Army in Pakistan" in 'Pakistan: Political System in Crisis', ed. by S.P. Verma and V. Narain, Rajasthan University Press, pg. 35.

<sup>35</sup> O.B. Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publication, 2002, pg. Introduction XIV.

<sup>36</sup> A. Faruqi, "Recidivist Militarism in Pakistan", Asian Affairs, Oct. 2001, Vol. XXXII, pg. 260.

## CHAPTER ONE

### BACKGROUND TO MILITARY INTERVENTION

Pakistan, the largest Muslim state with fifth largest population at the time of its birth, was a last-minute creation, having been created by the ‘**stroke of the pen**’. Torn from the edges of a map that was otherwise intact, with one ethno linguistic shred in the east – separated by thousand mile of hostile Indian territory - and many shreds of ethno linguistic differences in the west; created in an atmosphere of bloody communal riots and a huge influx of refugees from India; and with no political infrastructure to carry out the day-to-day governance of the country, the very survival of the new state was a big question mark in 1947.<sup>37</sup> The adverse conditions of domestic turmoil in the aftermath of the partition and the external security pressures vis-à-vis India, made state survival the primary preoccupation of the rulers of Pakistan. The imperative of state security was given precedence by them over the need to create participatory political institutions and processes, and equated state survival with a strong defense posture and high defense expenditure. The military was the biggest beneficiary of such a line of thought as it was seen as both the guarantor of state sovereignty as well as the bulwark against internal collapse.<sup>38</sup> This gave the military the very basis to expand its role gradually and intervene in politics in Pakistan as it was involved not only in the defense of the state, but also in the very process of nation-building. If the military came to hold pre-eminent position in Pakistani politics and society, then it is the manifestation of the importance it has enjoyed from the beginning. The shift away from the civilian primacy to military ascendancy was gradual but decisive, and once the military had entrenched itself as a key determinant in the decision – making process in the initial years after independence, it made sure that no civilian government could usurp its influence and privileges.

The military in Pakistan has always been the paramount political actor .The military option has been invoked so frequently that it has almost become a regular part of Pakistan’s political life.

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<sup>37</sup> Robert W. Stern, “Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan”, *Survival*, vol.40, no.2, summer 1998.

<sup>38</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Military, State and Society in Pakistan”, Macmillan Press, 2000, pg. 1

On four occasions, so far, the military has intervened overtly and imposed martial law throughout the country – in October 1958, March 1969, July 1977 and October 1999 – justifying its extreme actions on grounds of chaotic conditions prevailing in the country. Even during the decade of democracy after the end of the 3<sup>rd</sup> military rule the military pursued its interest from the sidelines being able to touch every facet of the Pakistani society, ranging from fighting insurrections to building roads. The long years of overt and covert military rule have enabled it to spread out into the government, the economy and the society owing to its high discipline and organizational strength. The military has become so all-pervasive that even the civilian rulers at times are not able to serve without the military's aid, and have routinely called upon it to perform tasks that a military generally has no particular competency in.

Thus, governance in Pakistan is a balance between military chiefs and elected civilian leadership with a power-sharing arrangement whereby the military has influence over foreign, security and key domestic issues, and whenever such an arrangement or the military sensibilities have been disregarded by the civilian rulers, the military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can and will influence the nature of political change by assuming direct power.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the fact that the military holds supreme power, rules Pakistan and makes all the important decisions, was once again confirmed by the Fourth Military Coup of Oct. 1999, which brought Pakistan's troubled democratic experiment to an end and established military's hegemony on Pakistan once more.

In order to understand the pivotal position that the army holds in Pakistan, one has to go back to the days when the Pakistani nation was in its infancy, because the pre-eminent position of the military today is a consequence of the socio-political conditions in which the Pakistani state was born. Politics in Pakistan during 1947-58 was marked by non-consensus, embittered further by the wreckage of unsuccessful attempts at institution-building. The National Assembly was led by constantly shifting party coalitions. The supremacy of the Pakistani executive in matters of governance over the legislative wing was similar to the former colonial **Vice-regal System**. Naturally, the image of the National Assembly as a representative body and law-making agency was tarnished. No government in Pakistan was removed by a vote of no-confidence on the floor of the National Assembly, as it generally happens under democratic norms. The long awaited general elections to the National Assembly were postponed under the very constitution that had

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<sup>39</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan", *Survival*, vol.40, no.2, 1998, p.96.

been designed to ensure free elections. For eleven years there were no national elections, and as a consequence there could be no national political parties, no national cohesion and no national interest.<sup>40</sup>

Therefore, the first eleven years of independence were crucial in understanding as well as shaping up Pakistan's political and administrative profiles. Not only a new state structure to be created out of the dislocation and turmoil caused by the partition, but Pakistan's status as a sovereign nation also had to be stabilized in face of challenges which could have led to its collapse. State-building in these circumstances entrenched the centre and military-bureaucratic elite at the expense of the political institutions. Such an administrative and centralized polity stifled the growth of autonomous and effective civilian political institutions and processes.

## PERILS TO STATE FORMATION

The creation of Pakistan was based on the **Two-Nation Theory** providing a separate nation for the Muslims of India, and was brought to fruition by **Qaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, and his party, the **Muslim League**. However, it was a hastily sketched idea and was only won by Jinnah's skilled negotiation with the British and the Congress Party, but even that victory was certain only by Jul. 1947, just before the independence.<sup>41</sup> The very creation of Pakistan was seen as an end in itself by the Muslim League leadership, and campaigning for the formation of a Muslim state virtually sapped them off their energy, so much so that they hadn't clearly decided upon a political blueprint for the new state.

What was to become Pakistan later had no pre-existing territory in which the Pakistani idea of a Muslim homeland had ever existed. It originated and was mobilized for in areas that remained behind with India. The great monuments of the Muslim **Mughal Empire**, the **Taj Mahal** and **Fatehpur Sikri**, as well as the capital of Delhi, were left on the Indian side of the partition border. What was to become West Pakistan has existed in the past as an undifferentiated part of the larger areas such as the Mughal and Afghan empires and British India. It was known in history as the territory crossed by successive armies of invaders to the battle for Delhi. Therefore

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<sup>40</sup> Veena Kukreja, "Civil-Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, pg. 41-45.

<sup>41</sup> Allen McGrath, "The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy", Oxford University Press, 1996, pg. 1.

the areas that became Pakistan later had neither base nor tradition of the idea of '**Pakistan**'.<sup>42</sup> Also, the east wing of the country, East Bengal, separated from West Pakistan by thousand miles of Indian Territory, had been a marginal acquisition of the Mughal Empire and was included in Pakistan only because it had a majority of Muslim population, even though the Bengalis hardly had anything common with the West Pakistanis except religion. West Pakistan was the seat of the government in the new nation, and the eastern wing, though having roughly 55% of the total population of Pakistan, was merely treated by the West Pakistanis as a colonial adjunct. Even the western wing was not a cohesive unit. It was divided into four separate provinces – **North West Frontier Province, Balochistan, Punjab and Sind** – which differed with each other in their ethno linguistic configurations.

So, the conditions in which Pakistan was carved out of British India weren't conducive to the establishment of a stable political system. There were certain other handicaps that the new nation had to deal with which weren't inherited by neighboring India, and which ultimately hindered the process of state formation in Pakistan.

India inherited the colonial state's central government apparatus and an industrial infrastructure, which, even though not all that developed, was better than in the areas constituting Pakistan. So, although India could continue with the institutions established by the British, Pakistan had to start with a completely new state. **Congress'** inheritance of the colonial state's unitary centre and its assumption of British India's international personality, placed Pakistan at a severe disadvantage, cast in the role of a '**seceding state**'.<sup>43</sup> Pakistan had to confirm its independent existence by creating a viable central authority over territories, which apart from being separated by about a thousand miles of hostile Indian Territory, had until Aug. 1947 been governed directly from Delhi. The imperative of constructing a central government from scratch wholly outweighed the resources of the new state. A new government; a new diplomatic corps; and a new military had to be set up. A new currency had to be printed;<sup>44</sup> a new central bank had to be established; a new court system had to be created. All of these were daunting tasks.

The urgent need to set up an effective central government that could save the new state from collapsing had three major implications. First, the central administration took precedence over

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<sup>42</sup> Allen McGrath, "The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy", Oxford University Press, 1996, pg. 2.

<sup>43</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, 1995, pg. 48-49.

<sup>44</sup> For several months in the initial period, Pakistan used the Indian rupee with the word "Pakistan" stamped on it as a legal tender.

provinces. It was based heavily on the British model of strong centre. In order to assert the central power, executive ordinances replaced the process of political bargaining, while coercion substituted consensus in relations between the centre and the provinces.<sup>45</sup> Second, the bureaucracy came to acquire abundant powers to deal with the administrative matters. They were the main instruments for state formation. The steady etiolating of provincial powers did not auger well for the political process. This made the position of an essentially migrant political leadership at the centre even more precarious, forcing it to rely on the bureaucracy to counter the mounting resentments in the provinces. And third, the military was also associated with initial efforts at state formation. The army helped the civil administration to deal with the law and order situation in the border areas. They also assisted refugee migration by managing camps, and undertook rescue, relief and rehabilitation operations in the situation of floods in Punjab within weeks of independence.<sup>46</sup> These problems were made even more daunting in the face of refugee problem. Pakistan received eight million Muslim refugees from India.

The refugees came in two streams. First were those who came from the north-central province of British India and settled in Sind. These were the people who originally mobilized for a Muslim state. They quickly assumed control of most of the modern institutions created after independence, mainly the civil administration, business and such modern professions as banking, law etc., owing to their education that they had received in the hub of British India. However, they had a narrow political base because of their small number, and therefore, were not in a great hurry to establish democratic political institutions that they could not have dominated.<sup>47</sup>

The other stream of refugees came from eastern Punjab, now with India, and settled in Pakistan's Punjab. They took over the land and agricultural business vacated by the departing Hindus and Sikhs, and a large number of them also joined the armed forces. Thus, the migration from India transformed the social scene of West Pakistan. The refugees into Sind took over the modern sectors of economy and dominated the bureaucracy. And the refugees who went to Punjab took over agriculture and penetrated the military in large numbers.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, 1995, pg. 49-50.

<sup>46</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, pg. 57-58.

<sup>47</sup> Shahid J. Burki, "Historical Dictionary of Pakistan", Vision Books, 2003, pg. 16.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

Therefore, it was the others who had come into West Pakistan and not the host population which dominated the bureaucracy, the economy and the military. In the political sphere the fact that most established leadership groups in what was now West Pakistan had not been warm to the idea of Pakistan, created political space for the new arrivals at the top of the political structure. However their numbers and narrow political base among the host population hindered their political ambitions. They realized that if forced with polls they might not be able to scrape through. On top of that the presence of Bengalis as forming the majority political group, made it impossible for them to hold political offices through free and fair elections. Result was a political impasse lasting for almost a decade since Pakistan's creation that retarded the constitution-making process.<sup>49</sup>

### LEADERSHIP CRISES AND PARTY POLITICS


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The first year of independence was marked by heavy dependence on the charismatic personality of Jinnah, the architect of Pakistan, and without whom Pakistan's creation wouldn't have been possible. While he lived, Jinnah was the government of Pakistan. Once independence was achieved, Pakistan seemed to be at a political standstill awaiting direction from its leader. He had brought into existence a new nation and now his people looked to him to tell them what they should do with the fruits of victory. The first major constitutional act of the new nation of Pakistan was the appointment of Governor-General, and Jinnah appointed himself for the office. In the other dominions the Governor-General was by convention expected to be an elder statesman, retired military person, or a member of the aristocracy, and not an active politician. But in Jinnah, Pakistan had a political Governor-General who controlled the Executive, the Cabinet and the Assembly.<sup>50</sup> He overshadowed the administrative process both at the federal and provincial levels, as well as his party, the **Muslim League**.

However, his death in September 1948, thirteen months after the independence did not give him a chance to employ his charisma for establishing and legitimizing constitutional and political arrangements. **Liaquat Ali Khan**, his successor, partially filled the gap, but his assassination in

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., pg 17.

<sup>50</sup> Allen McGrath, "The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy", Oxford University Press, 1996, pg. 41.



Oct. 1951 left the field to the leaders who lacked national stature. These leaders only had their own regional power bases with little or no political standing outside of their native provinces. This made it difficult for them to evolve a consensus on the constitutional issues. All these led to a leadership crises in Pakistan, which weakened the process of constitution-making.

The Muslim League too was unable to transform itself from a nationalist movement into a national party that could put the nation on the road to constitutionalism, democracy and stability. This was different from India where the Congress Party had become a mass party before independence. The Indian National Congress had made an impact on the local structures of politics in the Hindu-majority Congress as it lacked the organizational machinery in the areas, which became part of Pakistan.<sup>51</sup> Also unlike the Congress Party, which served as an umbrella organization for diverse interests, the League maintained its elitist character at least till 1937 and only after the **Lahore Resolution of 1930**, which called for the establishment of a separate homeland for Muslims, did the League function as a mass and popular party.

Established in 1906 by a group of enlightened Muslims to protect the rights of the Indian Muslims, the Muslim League never became a mass party until 1939-40, that too in the provinces of Uttar Pradesh, Bombay and Bihar, which had stayed with India. Controlled by a small group of leaders, its claim as the spokesman of the Muslims of India was often challenged by a number of other Muslim organizations that were fighting for independence but did not support the idea of a separate state for the Muslims. It was only after 1937 that the League made inroads into the Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. A large number of political leaders who occupied important positions in the political system of Pakistan, joined the League during the 1941-47, and so did not have enough time to gain the experience of working together and lacked the norm of disciplined cooperation.<sup>52</sup> Consequently, the League lacked the a viable organization and a group of frontline leaders, like **Gandhi** and **Nehru** were in case of, the Indian National Congress who could evolve a consensus for the blueprint of a workable polity for Pakistan.

The Muslim league was heavily dependent upon Jinnah. After Jinnah had divested himself of the responsibility as the President of Muslim League the party began to lose whatever clout it had in the country.<sup>53</sup> When the main objective of the League, i.e. the establishment of Pakistan, was

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<sup>51</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, 1995, pg. 49.

<sup>52</sup> Veena Kukreja, "Civil-Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, pg. 40.

<sup>53</sup> Kalim Bahadur, 'Democracy in Pakistan-Crises and Conflicts,' Har-Anand Publication, 1998, pg 16.



achieved, and Jinnah and Liaquat were gone, there was no capable leader to keep the Muslim League going strong in the new nation. The senior members of the League who held cabinet positions at the federal level or dominated the party at the national level had no independent base of their own. They came from Muslim minority provinces of India and lacked a popular constituency in Muslim-majority provinces in Pakistan.

They were more comfortable in working with the bureaucracy, most of who also hailed from the same regions as they did, rather than with the leaders hailing from the Pakistani provinces that they viewed as competitions.

The League leadership was fearful of the province-based leaders and kept a firm hold over the party by assigning the key offices to the **Muhajirs** (refugees from India). Criticism within the party was discouraged and was equated with criticism of the state. This strategy did not help faltering fortunes of the Muslim League. The province based leadership created personal cliques at the provincial level and the national leadership did not hesitate to play one faction against another to make its writ effective in the provinces rather than working towards making the party coherent and effective political machine.<sup>54</sup>

If it had weak and narrow base in West Pakistan, then in East Pakistan it had almost no grassroots presence. The league lacked a support base especially between the lower middle class and small farmers who were becoming politically active in East Bengal. The League's leaders failed to appreciate the growing strength of demand for the economic discrimination they claimed was being practiced against them by the West Pakistanis. This dis-recognition caused the League members dearly when the Muslim League lost in East Pakistan in 1954.<sup>55</sup>

Though at independence no Muslim opposition party of any consequence existed, the weakened organizational strength and lack of sound leadership within the League led to factionalism within the party, which in turn led to defections. Thus, soon after Jinnah's death, the Muslim League was divided into many splinter groups, usually clustered around single personalities. Starting with the **Azad Pakistan Party** and **Jinnah Muslim League**,<sup>56</sup> the ex-Muslim Leaguers had founded nine out of total of thirteen parties by 1949.

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<sup>54</sup> Hasan Rizvi Askari, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, pg 69-70.

<sup>55</sup> Allen McGrath, "The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy," Oxford University Press, 1996, pg 53-54.

<sup>56</sup> Later merged into the Awami Muslim League.

While the Muslim League disintegrated into constituent parts along sectoral, regional and factional lines, other parties sprang up from within the Constituent Assembly and the provincial assemblies. Most of them were ex-Leaguers who had clout in their respective native areas of operation, such as **Soharwardy** from **East Pakistan**, **Pir Manki Sharif** from **North Western Frontier Province**, **Nawab Mamdot** from **Punjab**. They together formed the **Jinnah Awami Muslim League** in 1952, but it too got divided along regional lines. The two major parties of Pakistan - the Muslim League and Awami League - had a regional colour, the **Muslim League** being the party of the western wing and the **Awami League** that of the east. The Awami League was the only party which could be called the true opposition party to the Muslim League, but it had a disadvantage of being based in the east which was always seen as just a colonial adjunct by the political elite in the west, the seat of the government.<sup>57</sup>

So, the Awami League gravitated towards East Bengal and joined hands with local parties to form the **United Front**, which finally defeated the Muslim League in the 1954 elections in East Pakistan.<sup>58</sup>

However, even these other political parties, mostly set up by defectors from provincial League organizations, did not offer a credible alternative. These parties suffered from all those weaknesses and deficiencies that undermined the Muslim League: the absence of a clear political economic program, weak or non-existent organization, and personal and factional feuds. The political parties were ephemeral conglomerates of political leaders who engaged in struggle for self-aggrandizement and material gains. The democratic norms, political morality and political consistency were not their concerns. They defected and shifted their support on the basis of what benefited them personally.

The orthodox and conservative Islamic parties, most of which had lost their credibility in the last phase of independence movement due to their refusal to endorse the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan, found the bickering between politicians in the Constituent Assembly suitable to stage a comeback by demanding the establishing of an Islamic state on conservative lines. The League, though mainly liberal in its constitution, was unable to cope with the political situation and gave in to some of their demands to win them over. Unlike the Congress in India, the League

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<sup>57</sup> Veena Kukreja, "Civil-Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, pg. 39.

<sup>58</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, pg. 117.

was unable to guide and direct the Constituent Assembly and was often unable to cope with the debates in the Assembly due to factionalism and political bargaining in its own ranks. This further eroded the League's legitimacy as a national party.

With such a weak base and almost no coherent idea of what viable polity to set up for Pakistan, the League leadership was not in favor of holding elections, especially after the crushing defeat in East Pakistan. As political leaders slowly moved amidst continuously contentious issues of Constitution-making, it was clear that there was little probability of elections being held. The political leaders who were in power were aware that they would not win in the polls, and so dragged the process of Constitution-making further. All this made the civilian political institutions lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the Pakistani people as effective institutions capable of governing the country.

### **TOWARDS A BUREAUCRATIC – MILITARY POLITY**

The state of Pakistan not only inherited areas of low industrial development from the British India, but also inherited the regions of comparatively less constitutional development and more direct bureaucratic rule. In the absence of a mass based national party with strong grassroots, it was the octopus of the bureaucratic organization that securely penetrated the Pakistani society from the province down to the district and tehsil levels.<sup>59</sup>

As pointed out earlier, the bureaucracy was given abundant power to aid the process of state formation in the initial days. The migrant political leaders with weak bases in the provinces also relied on the administrative bureaucracy to deal with the provincial problems. Strained relations with the provinces were hardly conducive for the smooth running of the polity given that the main national party was unable to act as a channel between the centre and the provinces. This is where the reliance on the bureaucracy seemed to be the only option for a central leadership sensing its rapid demise. Therefore, instead of establishing a viable political system and far from seeking to weaken the hold of the bureaucracy, the Muslim League leadership befriended the civil bureaucracy in order to tap its tremendous resources for its own purpose.

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<sup>59</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, pg. 93s.

Even the demographic arithmetic of Pakistan facilitated such an arrangement. While power in Pakistan was concentrated in the west wing, the numerical majority was in the east wing, and in any system of representative democracy the Bengalis would have been in power. This was anathema to the civil and defense officials who mainly hailed from Sind and Punjab.<sup>60</sup>

Thus the migratory elite's lack of the bureaucracy in their efforts towards postponement of elections ad nauseum. Together this alliance of mixed conveniences worked to undermine the role of the Parliament in the evolving structure of the state. No national elections were held. Constitution-making was delayed, leading to a state of affairs in which the country was administered by the civil bureaucracy with the politicians allied to it as junior partners in order to somehow keep the initiative in their hands. Even the official positions of Governor-General, Prime Minister and President were held by bureaucrats.

Once the bureaucrats had entrenched themselves in the power structure of the new state by 1953, the military, which had taken a backseat till then, also started to use the political vacuum created due to the leadership crisis for its own advantage. Powerful bureaucrats like **Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza** and **Choiudhary Mohammad Ali**, helped draw the defense establishment into domestic politics, duly reciprocated by an ambitious army chief, **General Ayub Khan**. These three and the General came to form the "**Gang of Four**"<sup>61</sup> that ruled Pakistan in the absence of competent leadership. Therefore, with the erosion of political authority, both at the central and provincial levels, the non-elective organs of the state came to acquire immense power. Unelected civil bureaucrats and generals assuming elected offices became the order of the day.

The office of the Governor-General went to a senior officer of the British Audit and Accounts Service, Ghulam Mohammad, whereas the operative control went to Iskander Mirza, a Sandhurst Military College graduate who also became the first Defense Secretary and later the first President of Pakistan. Another important member of this power arrangement was General Ayub Khan, also a SANDhurst graduate and the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Army who also held a cabinet position. Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan was

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<sup>60</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 51.

<sup>61</sup> Iftikar H. Malik, "State and Civil Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 1997, p 72.

also a seasoned bureaucrat. Operational power in Pakistan, therefore, passed to the higher echelons of the civil and military bureaucracies.<sup>62</sup>

### MILITARY ASCENDANCY IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

The military has always influenced Pakistan's polity throughout most of its history, and even when not holding state power directly it has been, as **Iftikar Malik** calls it, '**behind the steering wheel**'.<sup>63</sup> The military was integral to state survival and state building from the earliest days of Pakistan. The security problem vis-à-vis India that commenced right after independence translated into support for building strong defense and a powerful military. Both civilian and military leaders were equally convinced that Pakistan's troubled relations with India presented a serious threat to state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which led them to allocate main part of the national resources to the military at the cost of socio-economic development. On an average Pakistan spent 59.5% of its total expenditure during the period 1948-59. In absolute terms, defense expenditure during the period rose by approximately 116%.<sup>64</sup> There was hardly any serious criticism for such high defense allocation and even the media supported the government policy of strong defense. The government came under heavy fire in the National Assembly in 1953 when it introduced certain measures of retrenchment in the armed forces, and had to reverse the policy and stop all retrenchments.

The military enjoyed autonomy in its professional matters. Defense and security policy-making was the exclusive prerogative of the military top brass right from the beginning. The top brass also enjoyed much autonomy in matters of defense expenditure as well as matters of recruitment and promotion within its organization. Pakistan's defense policy was, and is, inseparable from its foreign policy. Its quarrels with India over a wide range of issues ranging from religion to water to territorial disputes in Kashmir, and its division into two separate wings with thousand miles of Indian territory between them, made defense and foreign policies overlap. Military needs had to, therefore, command foreign policy. And because foreign and defense policies are matters of survival for a new state, they seriously affect domestic policy. By this logic, the military top

<sup>62</sup> Bilali, Hashmi, "Dragon Seed: Military in the State", in 'Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship', edited by Gardezi, H. and Rashid, J., Zed Press, 1983, p 156.

<sup>63</sup> Malik, Iftikar H., "State and Civil Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 1997, p 71-72.

<sup>64</sup> Veena Kukreja, "Civil-Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 41-45.

brass in Pakistan were propelled into the center of decision-making, and became first its arbiter and then its monopolist.<sup>65</sup>

The military also enjoyed high esteem in the Pakistani society. It enjoys respect partly due to the **Fauji** (martial) traditions of the Punjab and NWFP, and partly because of the Islamic concept of **Jihad** (Holy War), **Ghazi** (victorious) and **Shaheed** (martyr).<sup>66</sup> Also, since the military was integral to state building as well as state security, it made the officers and soldiers see themselves as the '**guarantors of state survival**'. It was a self-image that later got reinforced over time as the civilian politicians, unable to cope with the problem of governance, increasingly sought the military's support for administering the state.

The Pakistani military's identity with the national identity after the initial years of engagement in Kashmir, took inspiration from the increasingly active assistance it extended to the civilian authorities in social and economic crises on one hand, and political conflicts on the other. In social activities ranged from helping fight locusts and water-logging in West Pakistan to policing of borders and regulating activities like distribution of food in East Pakistan.<sup>67</sup> The Army and the Air Force undertook rescue and relief operations in cyclone and flood hit areas. As far as cooperation in political conflicts for the maintenance of law and order and for the restoration of the authority of the civilian government was concerned, the army had responded positively to the calls of the civilian administration for assistance in such episodes. The military aided the civilian authority in restoring order in case of the riots in **Karachi in 1949** and **Dhaka in 1950**, the language riots in **East Pakistan in 1952**, the Anti-Ahmadiya riots in **Punjab in 1953**, and the labor troubles in **East Pakistan in 1954**.<sup>68</sup>

The Army got the first opportunity to run the civil administration directly with the declaration of **Martial Law in Lahore on 6 March 1953** to control the **Anti-Anmadiya** riots. Several orthodox and conservative Islamic groups started the riots to pressurize the government into declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslims and removing the Foreign Minister, **Zafarullah Khan**, from office, who happened to be an Ahmadi. The army brought the situation under control in a few days. It also launched the '**Cleaner Lahore Campaign**' to improve civic conditions in the

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<sup>65</sup> Veena Kukreja, "Civil-Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 53.

<sup>66</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 5.

<sup>67</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 96-97.

<sup>68</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 78.

city. This episode brought out the role of the army as the guardian of the social fabric of Pakistan. It gave the army its first taste of power and it discovered that it could control seemingly unruly mobs with its power of the gun.<sup>69</sup> The people of Pakistan got their taste of army rule largely in terms of restoration of law and order, followed by performance of municipal functions such as health and sanitation in an efficient manner.

The military's contribution in non-professional field, in a way, brought forward the weaknesses and deficiencies of the political institutions and civilian leaders that they could not satisfactorily carry out their primary function of political and administrative governance. Also, it created a strong impression in the public mind that the military could cope with a difficult situation efficiently even when the political leaders failed. This further enhanced the military's stature and reputation as a professional, disciplined and task-oriented efficient entity with a helpful disposition towards the people.<sup>70</sup>

Therefore, the role of the army in Pakistan has not solely been that of an instrument of coercion. It started off as any other normal military formed in order to protect the territorial integrity of its country, but its involvement in the very process of state-building made it an active political actor in the Pakistani polity. The institutional imbalance between the military and the weak civilian political institutions in the post-independent period further made the military take on more than it was created for. The process of political decay and degeneration owing to the opportunistic politicians weakened the political institutions. With a leadership crisis and absence of a mass-based national party, the political processes suffered from a crisis of legitimacy and could not ensure socio-economic development of the people.

The military on the other hand maintained its organizational strength, professionalism and discipline. It also benefited from defense pacts with other nations, especially with United States of America. The USA was then seeking Cold War partners as it saw the need for enlarging the '**Containment**' doctrine in West Asia against the USSR, and on China's frontiers Pakistan stood ready to be recruited. US military aid provided the Army with extra leverage vis-à-vis civilian organizations. Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, was the chief engineer behind the US connection. Foreign training of its officers also accelerated modernization of the officer corps and made them a highly professional group in an otherwise traditional society. Thus, the

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<sup>69</sup> Md. Asghar Khan, "Generals in Politics : Pakistan – 1958 to 1982", Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p. 4.

<sup>70</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 79.

degeneration and decay of the political institutions and processes were in sharp contrast to the military's professional, task-oriented disposition of a modernized organization with enough technological skill. This further accentuated the institutional imbalance to the disadvantage of the civilian political institutions. The politicians were too weak and divided to assert civilian control over the military whose top brass enjoyed ample freedom in matters of defense expenditure and integral affairs of the military. Therefore, it was the political default and failure on the part of politicians to provide a strong political leadership or institutions to keep the army under civilian control that propelled the army onto the center stage. The net result was that during 1953-58, the prestige of the civilian government reached its lowest ebb, whereas public estimation of the role of the military reached its zenith.<sup>71</sup> Even the civil bureaucracy had to rely on military's support to hold power. The pivotal role of the Army Chief in Pakistan could be gauged by the fact that Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers and eight cabinets during the period from 1947-58, but there was only one Commander-in-Chief of the Army, **General Mohammad Ayub Khan**, appointed for a four year term till 1955 which got extended for another full term till 1959. Ayub Khan even held the office of the Defense Minister himself from Oct. 1954 to Aug. 1955. Ayub Khan carried out the first military coup in Pakistan in 1958 in alliance with the bureaucracy. Like all the other military rulers to follow him, he justified the military's direct assumption of state power as a means of removing corrupt and inefficient politicians from further mishandling the country. As **Lucian Pye** had written about military regimes in the Third World,<sup>72</sup> the Pakistani military took up the role of a modernizing agent on the basis of its organizational strength, which was in direct contrast to the weakened and disarrayed political institutions.

However, **Ayesha Jalal** disagrees with this. According to her, it is unconvincing to endorse the argument of modernization theorists that the weaknesses inherent in the political processes and the military's superior institutional coherence in relation to ill-organized political parties pushed the military into assuming the reins of government in Pakistan because such an interpretation doesn't stand the test of available historical evidence. Far from being the agent of modernization the military as well as the bureaucracy were desperately short of skilled manpower and the requisite institutional infrastructure. The dominance of the non-elected institutions was a result

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<sup>71</sup> Veena Kukreja, "Civil-Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 57.

<sup>72</sup> Lucien W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in 'Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries', ed. By J.J. Johnson, Rand Corporation, 1962, p. 70.



of a concerted strategy by the higher echelons of bureaucracy and the military to exploit rivalries among Pakistani politicians. Its bureaucrats and military generals along with the politicians must share the responsibility for Pakistan's inability to work out a stable democratic political system.<sup>73</sup>

Giving the generals the tag of '**modernizer**' would give them a false benevolent coloring.

The army had not taken the reins of government directly and did so only in 1958 mainly because as long as elections could be postponed with impunity there was no reason to abandon an arrangement in which non-elected officials called the shots and the politicians bore the burnt. But when the constitution was made in 1956, an election in the near future was inescapable. Fearing a major realignment of political forces in the elections scheduled for 1959, the Army high command in combination with select civil bureaucrats decided to take direct control over the state apparatus in Oct. 1958 in order to stall the elections that would have challenged the eminent positions that they had enjoyed without the popular mandate of the people. So, it cannot be argued that the failure of the 'parliamentary system' in Pakistan flowed from the 'power vacuum' created by the politicians with no real bases of popular support.<sup>74</sup>

Thus, it was challenge in the field, i.e. the popular demand for holding elections, which finally paved the way for the demise of the 1956 Constitution. It was chronic fear in the minds of the rulers of Pakistan of losing in the polls which brought about the military coup in 1958, and it was as late as 24 years since Pakistan was created that the first elections took place in 1971, which ultimately became the cause of the civil war between the two wings of the country leading finally to the secession of the Eastern wing into a separate nation.

## **THE MILITARY'S INTERESTS**

The military in Pakistan has been in direct control of state affairs during most of its history. However, it has also shown a tendency to go back to barracks and stay there provided its privileges are not stopped. The military had shown the wish to remain in the sidelines during the decade of democratic governance following the end of the third military regime of **Zia-ul-Haq**. But, with the fourth military takeover of Oct. 1999 it was clear that the civilian rulers had to consider military sensibilities while exercising state authority if they wanted the military to stay

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<sup>73</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 53-54.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

out of the political arena. If the army is able to protect its interest and retain its key positions of decision-making over foreign, security and key domestic issues without overtly taking over the reins of governance, then it will remain behind the curtains. This is what, **Hasan Askari-Rizvi** calls “**soft military intervention**”.<sup>75</sup>

Military in Pakistan directly intervenes in politics overthrowing a civilian regime only when it feels that its professional and corporate interests are threatened by decisions taken by the civilian leadership. The major **professional interests** of the military include defense allocation and material resources for modernization of the military, and enhanced opportunities for improving professional competence. Military autonomy and civilian non-interference in internal organizational matters and service affairs is jealously guarded by the officers. Promotion, transfers and postings are considered to be exclusively falling under their professional domain. Military leaders view their autonomy as crucial in maintaining service discipline and professionalism. It is also opposed to any unilateral cut in defense expenditure by civilian leaders.

The **corporate interests** of military include service conditions, perks and other material rewards or facilities. The senior echelons of the army often take up lucrative assignments in the civilian sector. The perks and privileges accumulated through such jobs in high positions are part of the military’s corporate interests, which they want to be protected even when not in direct power. The military also expects a civilian government to ensure political stability to facilitate economic development, since they too have a stake in the economy. The government’s economic and industrial policies have therefore acquired direct relevance for the military.<sup>76</sup>

The military in Pakistan hands back power to civilians only when its interests are not threatened by such a change. In order to facilitate this, the military ensures that there are sufficient constitutional and political safeguards to sustain their entrenched position in the period after the withdrawal from direct rule. The political situation in Pakistan is also such that the military gains from the lack of consensus among the political leaders as to its role in the political process. The feuding political leaders have not hesitated to call upon the army to dislodge their adversaries from power.

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<sup>75</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan”, *Survival*, vol.40, no.2, 1998, p. 96.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

However, the problem that faces most Praetorian societies is that the military never completely withdraws from politics. It does so on its own terms and first establishes safeguards protecting them and their interests before giving up direct control of state power. In Pakistan too such is the case; the military does not cease to be a political actor after its withdrawal from direct rule. The “soft” military intervention proves to be a dilemma for the civilian leaders. On one hand, the civilian government wants to prove that it is not under the tutelage of the military and can act autonomously and efficiently. On the other, it cannot afford to alienate the military leadership since that will once again bring the military directly into the fray.

These conditions make the task of political management precarious for any civilian government, following in the wake of a military regime, to try to lay the base for democratic governance anew. The military in Pakistan continues to be the strongest political actor capable of vetoing any effort of transition to democracy if the civilian regime upsets the delicate balance of power in any way. The fourth military coup by **General Pervez Musharraf** in Oct. 1999 too was caused due to the upsetting of this balance of power in the polity by the civilian leaders. Thus, it is a vicious circle. Pakistan as a **Praetorian** society cannot afford to ignore the military and its interests, and can function with some semblance of a stable polity only by making the military its partner in governance.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE MILITARY COUPS

All the four military takeovers in Pakistan - Oct. 1958 (Ayub Khan), Mar. 1969 (Yahya Khan), Jul. 1977 (Zia-ul-Haq) and Oct. 1999 (Parvez Musharraf) - have been bloodless and transfer of power took place smoothly, yet decisively. In all the four overt military interventions, the army had intervened in politics under the plea that the providential mission of the soldier was that of a savior of the country. The military claimed that it had taken over direct state power as a last option in order to clean up the political mess, to save the country from the danger of dissolution and chaos caused by interminable quarrels of politicians, and corruption in high offices of the state. The fact that in all four coups the same reason d'etre of prevailing chaotic conditions in the country was given goes to show the persistent “**Praetorian**” nature of the Pakistani society that has been mainly responsible for the cycles of coups in the country.

After taking over, the first task, that each of the four dictators took up was to address the nation on radio and television. Their declarations emphatically made it clear that they had taken over power reluctantly as a last resort for the sake of their nation and its countrymen.

In their declarations, they tried to portray the military as the only organization with a conscience, unlike the political institutions, which had become the arena of power struggle and political bargaining amongst the politicians. Their declarations are as follows - :

*“This is a drastic and extreme step taken with great reluctance but with the deepest conviction that there was no alternative to it except the disintegration and complete ruination of the country.”*

**- Ayub Khan, 8 Oct '58**

*“The armed forces could not remain idle spectators of this state of near anarchy. They have to do their duty and save the country from utter disaster”.*

**- Yahya Khan, 26 Marc '69**

*"I was obliged to step in to fill the vacuum created by the political leaders".*

- Zia-ul-Haq, 5 Jul. '77

*"I wish to inform you that the armed forces have moved in as a last resort to prevent any further destabilization".*

- Parvez Musharraf, 13 Oct. '99 <sup>77</sup>

Since all the four takeovers, military interventions were the result of mainly internal conditions, but were also aided by certain external factors. They were not caused by an upsurge of nationalism in the face of foreign danger. In Janowitz's words, the Pakistani case could be termed as 'reactive militarism' as opposed to 'designed militarism'. According to Janowitz, '**reactive militarism**' was the case where the coup was prompted by "*the weakness of civilian political institutions and the direct pressure of civilian groups that sought to co-opt and enlarge the role of the military establishment.*" '**Designed militarism**' on the other hand meant "*the positive and premeditated intent to intervene in domestic politics and follow expansionist foreign policy.*" <sup>78</sup>

Though failure of the political leaders to steer the country out of crisis was seen as inexcusable for the armed forces to sit as silent spectators, which spurred them on to take matters in their own hands, in practice actual motives turned out to be different. Some elements of ambivalent scheming by the military rulers cannot be ruled out. In order to understand why the army took over power each time and what made their excuse seem to be the genuine reason, it is important to have a look at the circumstances surrounding each of the coups and the events preceding them, which ultimately formed the factors that led to the military takeovers.

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<sup>77</sup> Owen-Bennett Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publication. 2002, p. 270-271.

<sup>78</sup> Morris Janowitz, "Military in the Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis", Chicago University Press, 1964, p. 16.

## AYUB KHAN'S COUP (October 1958)

Pakistan's first attempt at parliamentary democracy came to an end, in the formal legal sense, with the military coup on 7<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1958. On the morning of that faithful day, **General Ayub Khan**, the army's Commander-in-Chief, removed the prime minister and his cabinet, dismissed the National Assembly, abrogated the Constitution, dissolved all the political parties, banned all political activity, and set himself up as the dictator with the title of "**Chief Martial Law Administrator**".<sup>79</sup>

The 1958 coup was actually a two-stage coup. The first phase took place on 7<sup>th</sup> Oct. The abrogation of the 1956 Constitution and the imposition of martial law was a joint decision of **President Iskander Mirza** and of the Commander-in-Chief of the army. Iskander Mirza assumed full powers by dismissing the central and provincial governments, and appointed Ayub Khan as the '**Supreme Commander**' of the armed forces. The second phase started twenty days later when the general staged another coup on 28<sup>th</sup> Oct. in which President Mirza himself was elbowed out. Therefore, it's actually 27<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1958 which marks the beginning of the trend of one-man rule in Pakistan that has been carried forward by subsequent generals.<sup>80</sup>

However, the military's overt intervention and the imposition of martial law was not an act of sudden seizure of power. It was rather a logical inevitability. Ayub's coup did not make a break with the past; rather it crystallized a trend from the past. The Army had played an important role even during the period when the veneer of parliamentary democracy was maintained in Pakistan. Actual power then was in the hands of a coterie of civil servants-turned politicians. This coterie maintained good links with the General Head Quarter (GHQ) and Ayub Khan in order to maintain the then existing power structure. Army had never been completely quiescent in Pakistan, especially since Ayub Khan took over as the C-in-C of the army. It had always had the capacity to make itself heard in the inner councils of the decision-makers even on issues only remotely related to the defense of the country.

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<sup>79</sup> Robert La Porte Jr., "Another Try at Democracy" in 'Contemporary problems of Pakistan', ed. by J. Henry Korson, Westview Press, 1993, p. 174.

<sup>80</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan: A Nation in the Making", Westview Press, 1986, p. 52.

In that sense, the joint venture carried out by the army-bureaucratic coterie on 7<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1958 just crystallized army's position and did not bring about any abrupt fundamental change in the polity with the change of the regime. It was more a formalization of the exiting power structure in Pakistan.

Ayub Khan, ever since his appointment as the C-in-C in Jan.1951, had enjoyed intimate ties with the de facto head of the government. He was one of the “**Gang of Four**”. Also, in 1954-55, for ten months the general also acted as the Defense Minister in **Muhammad Ali Bogra's** Cabinet of ‘**talents**’ formed at the behest of **Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad**. Ayub was also the main force behind Pakistan's decision to enter military pacts with the USA. Moreover, Ayub himself had testified to the fact that he had a blueprint of Pakistan's constitution ready as far back as 1954.<sup>81</sup> This went to show that the army's interest had always been there and that Ayub very much had his fingers in the political pie.

However, in 1954, when Governor-General Ghulam Md. offered power to Ayub, he had refused. This decision of not getting overtly involved in the political arena was a deliberate one on the C-in-C's part. Ayub was aware that any overt involvement in the political process at that time without adequately consolidating his own power within the army might have whetted the younger officers' appetite. Moreover, as long as the Army's financial and corporate autonomy was maintained, and the foreign and defense policies were cleared with the GHQ, the top brass felt reasonably satisfied with the state of affairs.<sup>82</sup> Ayub and other generals also wanted to play it safe. They did not want to be accused of overthrowing the civil government without sufficient justification. Ayub Khan decided to abide his time. Therefore, his decision not to take power in 1954 turned out to be more a postponement, rather than an outright refusal.

It was as late as end of Sep. 1958 when the army top brass entertained the thoughts of dislodging the civilian government, that too not alone but with the bureaucracy as its partners, represented by Iskander Mirza. Both Mirza and Ayub could have assumed complete control of the country's affairs well before 1958.

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<sup>81</sup> Md. Ayoob, “The Military in Pakistan's. Political Development” in ‘Political System in Pakistan, Vol. 5’, ed. by V. Grover and R. Arora, Deep & Deep Publications, 1995, p. 8.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

Iskander Mirza became the First President of Pakistan under the 1956 Constitution. The triggering factor for him was the scheduling of the general elections for Feb. 1959. He was not in good terms with the political forces of the day, particularly the **Muslim League** led by **Qayyum Khan** and the **Awami League** headed by **Suhrawardy**. He could not be sure of the leadership that was likely to emerge from the general elections, especially in East Pakistan. This threatened his own political future as the constitution had stipulated presidential elections soon after the elections to the National Assembly. He knew that party positions in the next parliament would change in such a manner that he could not hope to be re-elected as President.<sup>83</sup>

When no political maneuver of any kind seemed to bring about a favorable solution to his problem, Mirza turned to the army for help. Being Sandhurst trained himself and an ex-defense minister, he had close and good links with the C-in-C. Ayub Khan on his part was fully aware of the degeneration of the political process and the growing alienation of the ordinary people with the political process. This gave the army opportunity to step in to salvage the political situation, and Ayub Khan the justification he needed to take up direct power, though at the invitation of Mirza in the initial phase.

The honeymoon period between Mirza and Ayub after the coup proved to be a short one. Within a week of martial law, strains emerged in their relations. Both were too ambitious to remain tied down to one another. Having been able to rid himself off the politicians, Mirza now tried to curb Ayub's ever-increasing powers. It was becoming clear that President Mirza had only used Ayub and the army to get rid of the politicians and that under the cover of the army he now planned to have a government of his choice<sup>84</sup> and wield the effective power himself.

Having captured effective power the army proceeded to cut its alliance partner, the bureaucracy, to its size. This was mainly in response to Mirza's plans of "sorting Ayub Khan out in a few days".<sup>85</sup> Mirza resented the loss of power after appointing Ayub Khan as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. He started creating an anti-Ayub atmosphere and building up his own circle of loyal senior army officers. While Ayub Khan was on a visit to East Pakistan on 20<sup>th</sup> Oct., Mirza contacted his friends in the army to garner their support. However, this strategy backfired on him as it annoyed the ruling generals,

<sup>83</sup> Md. Asghar Khan, "Generals in Politics: Pakistan – 1958 to 1982", Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p. 6.

<sup>84</sup> K.L. Kamal, "Pakistan: The Garrison State", Intellectual Publishing House, Apr. 1982, p. 56.

<sup>85</sup> Md. Asghar Khan, "Generals in Politics: Pakistan – 1958 to 1982", Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p. 8-9.



who confronted him on this issue. To stop Mirza in his tracks, Ayub sent three of his trusted generals to the President asking for his immediate resignation. Mirza obliged without much ado. This was the second coup of 27<sup>th</sup> Oct. when the military ultimately established its supremacy over political power.

After elbowing out Mirza from power Ayub assumed the presidency, and a cabinet was sworn in on 28<sup>th</sup> Oct. as the presidential cabinet. Ayub Khan surrendered his position as the C-in-C of the army to **General Md. Musa**,<sup>86</sup> and donned the robe of a full-time political figure.

As far as the nature of Pakistan's first military coup is concerned, it was a non-violent and bloodless coup. The transfer of power took place easily and smoothly. Ayub's coup was accepted with relief by a great majority of all sections of the society. It was partly due to the good public image of the army and partly the Muslim tradition of according respect to the 'shaheed'. In addition, before 1958 the military had aided the civilian government in number of operations effectively, ranging from flood-rescue operations to maintaining law and order. This earned it the gratitude of the people.<sup>87</sup>

The 1958 coup was hailed by Ayub and his coterie as a 'revolution', a break with the past and the beginning of a new era. The English daily, **Dawn**, welcomed it as a '**peaceful revolution**'.<sup>88</sup> However, other than Ayub and his loyalists there aren't many takers for that. The coup was not revolutionary in any sense and marked no break from the past. In contrast to a revolution, the coup was carried out by those who were already active participants of the existing political process and possessed institutional bases of power within that system.<sup>89</sup> As **Md. Waseem** pointed out, the coup did not involve a radical break with the past in terms of either authority structure or policy matters.<sup>90</sup>

Hamza Alavi too has pointed out to the same argument. The coup d'état of Oct. 1958 was not a seizure of power. Mirza as President and Ayub as C-in-C already held the reins of effective power. It was more of a disposal of the politicians who had provided the façade of parliamentary

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<sup>86</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 84.

<sup>87</sup> V. Kujreja, "Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan," NBO Publishing, 1985, p. 72.

<sup>88</sup> Dawn, 7 Oct. 1958.

<sup>89</sup> V. Kujreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publishing, 1991, p. 65.

<sup>90</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 143.

government.<sup>91</sup> The military – bureaucratic elite pulled the strings from behind the curtains and all the coup did was to bring over this nexus from the back seat to that with the steering wheel. Therefore, instead of calling it a revolution, it could be seen as a ‘**reform**’ coup. As defined by Samuel Huntington, “*reform coup falls somewhere between the revolution and palace revolution. A combination of military and civilian groups seizes power to make reforms, though they do not instigate a conclusive revolutionary process.*”<sup>92</sup>

Thus, that military coup of 1958 was in no way a real change in the effective power structure, but served to consolidate the position of the military-bureaucratic elite as the dominant political force in Pakistan.

### YAHYA KHAN’S TAKEOVER (March 1969)

Ayub Khan’s rule was succeeded by the imposition of another martial law with one general passing on the baton to another. The imposition of martial law by **General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan** on **25<sup>th</sup> Mar. 1969** brought the military back to power unimpeded by any constitutional or popular check, thereby marking the beginning of Pakistan’s second military regime. Yahya Khan designated himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, abrogated Ayub Khan’s 1962 Constitution, also dissolved the cabinet and the legislatures (both central and provincial), and appointed Zonal Martial Law Administrators as governors for the provinces.

Initially, the office of President was kept vacant, but on 31<sup>st</sup> Mar., Yahya Khan assumed this office as well. Unlike Ayub Khan, Yahya did not quit the command of the Army, combining three offices – that of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, C-in-C of the Army as well as the President – in himself.

Though like Ayub’s coup it was also a bloodless one and the succession was on orderly one, yet Pakistan’s second military takeover was a unique phenomenon in itself. The initiative for the reimposition of martial law in 1969 apparently came from Ayub himself. It was, therefore, not a

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<sup>91</sup> Hamza Alavi, “The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan”, *International Socialist Journal*, vol. III, no. 14, Mar-Apr. 1966, p. 177.

<sup>92</sup> S.P. Huntington (ed.), “Changing Patterns of Military Politics”, The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 1962, p. 32-33.

full-blown military coup; rather it could be called a 'coup by invitation'.<sup>93</sup> The military commander did not take over the reins of the government by force nor did he oust the constitutional president. The only feature of the 1969 'handover', which brackets it with military takeovers was that power changed hands entirely without any legal or constitutional foundation.<sup>94</sup> Yahya Khan's coup, thus, provides a deviant case, as the impetus for action was different in this case than that of Ayub's. The only commonality between the two coups was that in both the cases the army as a preventive strategy pre-empted the politicians from taking over. By intervening directly they maintained the status quo and the military's hegemonic position in the political process. The army in 1969 intervened to protect its own hold on the levers of power, to forestall the civilian leaders from coming to power, just as it did in 1958.<sup>95</sup> Therefore, what appears to be similar in seizures of power in 1948 and 1969 was 'praetorianism'. The coups were against the imminent threat of what may be called a democratic revolution.

The main reason for the military once again taking over direct power was the political deadlock and the mass agitation against Ayub's regime. The reason for Ayub's debacle was partly political and partly economic. The opposition launched an anti-Ayub campaign as early as 1967 following Pakistan's defeat in the 1965 war. The Pakistani people saw the consequent **Tashkent Declaration** of 1966 as a sell-out by the Ayub regime. This was used by the opposition, especially **Z.A. Bhutto**, the defecting Foreign Minister. Bhutto attacked Ayub for having giving in to superior Indian diplomatic skill. Violence erupted even before the Pakistani delegation returned home from Tashkent. A violent student unrest was clamped down by Ayub through police firing.

Coupled with this, the United States' reluctance to resume arms assistance, forced the government to buy French arm with scarce foreign exchange, which led to reduction of social and educational investment, together with higher taxes and price rise.

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<sup>93</sup> V. Kujreja, "Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan," NBO Publishing, 1985, p. 93.

<sup>94</sup> V Kujreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publishing, 1991, p. 62.

<sup>95</sup> Kalim Siddiqui, "Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 1972, p. 130-31.

The economic factors were equally significant. Ayub's '**Decade of Development**' was more or less a decade of decadence for the poor. 66% of Pakistan's industrial assets and 80% of the insurance funds were concentrated in the hands of Pakistan's 22 rich families.<sup>96</sup>

These political and economic factors contributed to disaffection among the people. But the single dominant reason that gave a decisive jolt to Ayub's power was the fast growing suspicion inside the military in Ayub's ability to handle the mass upheaval and the opposition's onslaught against him. The military, irritated over the Tashkent declaration, was beginning to show more than simple concern with the President's inability to acquire more and newer weapons. The military top echelon was also angry with Ayub's cuts in the defense expenditure over the years. The defense expenditure as percentage of the total expenditure used to be as high as 71% in 1948-49, but dropped to 51% in 1958-59 when Ayub Khan took over power and was only 53.59% in 1967-68.<sup>97</sup>

The military considered Ayub to be slipping and giving in more and more to the opposition led by Bhutto, especially after two assassination attempts were made on the General, who was already incapacitated with pulmonary embolism. By Feb. 1969, the mass agitation against Ayub had gathered momentum and he started feeling the pressures of public demand to step down. In order to placate the masses and the opposition he called a round table conference of political leaders in Rawalpindi in early Mar. 1969. The Round Table Conference rang the warning bells for the military leaders who were sure that should political institutions be revived in Pakistan; the military would not have any share in political power. By 1969 the involvement of the army in politics had become deeper and it was difficult for the military to stand aside and see what they regarded as their natural prize, slipping out of their hands.<sup>98</sup>

As 'authority was departing the dying King' the military was again ready to prevent the politicians from wielding power. Ayub also realized that he could no longer wield power personally, and had to step down. Therefore, he chose the known devil to hand over the reins to,

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<sup>96</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 224

<sup>97</sup> K.L. Kamal, "Pakistan: The Garrison State", Intellectual Publishing House, Apr. 1982, p. 72.

<sup>98</sup> Md. Asghar Khan, "Generals in Politics: Pakistan – 1958 to 1982", Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p.14.

and readily invited the Chief of Army Staff, General Yahya Khan, to take control of the state power on 25<sup>th</sup> Mar. 1969. The wheels of fortune had thus turned a full circle.<sup>99</sup>

Thus, more than an overt coup, the Second Military Takeover in Pakistan was actually a matter of succession within a ‘Garrison State’, i.e. an ‘internal’ change of guards among the “**specialists in violence**”, who had themselves initially risen to power after displacing the specialists in civil administration”.<sup>100</sup> It can be, therefore, surmised that Yahya’s coup was largely an internal affair of the military establishment of Pakistan. The army simply solved the problem of succession through the second coup. As **S. Nihal Singh**, a correspondent to the Indian daily, **The Statesman**, wrote in his paper that the answer to the question “**After Ayub who?**” was whoever happens to be the C-in-C of the Pakistan at that time.<sup>101</sup>

Though it is true that Yahya Khan’s martial law was born in the ashes of Ayub’s military regime, yet the Pakistan of 1969 was very different from that of 1958. The problems and challenges facing Yahya Khan after the coup were formidable and complicated which Ayub never had to face when he took over. By 1958, Pakistan’s democratic institutions and leadership had been discredited. On the other hand, in 1969, Yahya Khan never had such an advantage. When he took over as the president there was great resentment against authoritarian rule. This time round, the military regime itself was discredited, and there was agitation in favour of democracy. Yahya Khan, thus, could no longer blame the politicians for the ills of the past, since for the last ten years military had virtually enjoyed a predominant position. So, Yahya Khan did not have the legitimacy that Ayub’s regime enjoyed. This was the reason why Yahya Khan was declared as ‘**usurper**’ and his regime declared as illegal when it underwent judicial review posthumously.<sup>102</sup>

Another difference between the two coups was that the 1969 coup was born out of a general consensus on reverting back to the pre-1958 system. It meant that the new martial law regime started out more or less as a ‘**caretaker**’ government. It was conscious that it represented a

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 15

<sup>100</sup> Robert La Porte, “Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State”, *Asian Survey*, 1969, P. 842-43.

<sup>101</sup> Md. Asghar Khan, “Generals in Politics: Pakistan – 1958 to 1982”, Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p. 14.

<sup>102</sup> V Kukreja, “Civil Military Relations in South Asia”, Sage Publishing, 1991, p. 65.

transitional phase. With the mission of holding elections under a parliamentary system, it started its tenure under the moral pressure to take the nation back to democracy.<sup>103</sup>

As for the nature of the second coup in terms of Janowitz's classification, Yahya's takeover could be interpreted as a case of "reactive militarism". It was very much a defensive maneuver on the part of the military elite to maintain the position, which had been threatened by the mass movement of 1968-69.<sup>104</sup>

In contrast to Ayub's 'reform' coup, the 1969 takeover by Yahya Khan was not motivated by reforms, but rather by the prevailing political character and political deadlock. Initially it came as a temporary measure to solve the political deadlock and therefore, could be seen as 'caretaker' regime<sup>105</sup>. However, later events proved that like Ayub, Yahya too had no intention of relegating the military to the back seat where it would have to play second fiddle to the politicians. He went back on his avowed mission of handing over power to the civilian leader elected by the people and ultimately plunged the country into a civil war.

### **ZIA-UL-HAQ'S COUP (JULY 1977)**

With the third military coup of **5<sup>th</sup> Jul., 1977**, after the first interregnum of democratic governance by Pakistan's first ever elected regime, it became clear that in Pakistan the military had the last say in the matters of country's political destiny. Events in Pakistan came a full circle with the military's return to power as the arbiter of the nation's political future resulting from the chaotic situation that ensued after the Mar. 1977 elections.

Like the first two coups, this coup too was a '**white-glove**' affair.<sup>106</sup> The military takeover was smooth and peaceful. Martial law was imposed and the Chief of the Army Staff, **General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq**, designated himself as the "Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA)." Prime Minister Bhutto, his cabinet colleagues and associates were arrested and kept

<sup>103</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 235-328.

<sup>104</sup> Rounaq Jahan, "Pakistan: Failure in National Integration", Columbia University Press, 1972, pg. 186.

<sup>105</sup> V. Kujreja, "Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan," NBO Publishing, 1985, p. 98.

<sup>106</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in the Twentieth Century", Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 423.

in the “**protective custody**” of the Army until 28<sup>th</sup> Jul.<sup>107</sup> Though President **Fazal Illahi Chaudhary** was allowed to continue as the titular head of state, the executive authority was vested in the CMLA, whose advice and recommendations were binding on the President. Unlike his predecessors, Zia-ul-Haq didn’t abrogate the constitution. The 1973 Constitution was suspended, described as held in abeyance, and it was provided that the country would be run as closely as possible to the suspended constitution, subject to the overriding powers of the CMLA.

The federal and provincial governments were dismissed, and national and provincial assemblies were dissolved. Special and summary military courts were established to deal with the cases under martial law regulations, and their judgements were not to be challenged in the regular courts.

Zia-ul-Haq initially projected himself as a reluctant ruler who had assumed power because the political leaders had failed to resolve the political crisis and that his regime’s agenda included the restoration of law and order, reduction of political tension among the competing groups, holding of free and fair elections and the transfer of power to the elected representative. This was to be a “**Ninety day**” operation, and like Yahya Khan’s takeover, promised to be a caretaker government. But as **Lord Acton’s** political axiom states, “**power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely**”, once in power General Zia did not relinquish his control.<sup>108</sup> As he got a taste of political power he shifted his priorities from a caretaking role to consolidation of power.

Zia cited the inability of any of the political coalitions to manage the country’s affairs, justifying the army’s actions in terms that echoed the past. The coup was preceded by a long agitational movement against the civilian leadership. Zia’s coup was partly a result of the political default on part of the **PPP** and **PNA**, the two important political coalitions of the day, and partly a result of the collective resentment among the soldiers against **Prime Minister Bhutto**. The military top brass suffered collectively from a sense of acute resentment for the way Bhutto put the blame on the military for the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.<sup>109</sup> What added insult to the injury was telecasting the film showing the surrender of the Pakistani army in Dacca in Dec.1971.

<sup>107</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Military, State and Society in Pakistan”, Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 165.

<sup>108</sup> Robert La Porte Jr., “Another Try at Democracy” in ‘Contemporary problems of Pakistan’, ed. by J. Henry Korson, Westview Press, 1993, p. 178.

<sup>109</sup> V Kukreja, “Civil Military Relations in South Asia”, Sage Publishing, 1991, p. 63.

Bhutto's superior attitude pricked the men under uniform. Bhutto's discrediting of the military leaders in his first presidential speech as 'fat and flabby generals', as well as arbitrary dismissal of the Army and Air Force C-in-Cs followed by many other officers to eliminate what he called the "**Bonapartic influences**" from the military, was seen by the military elite as bruising their prestige and interfering in their internal matters.<sup>110</sup>

Bhutto had also rubbed the United States the wrong way; in return US abandoned Bhutto's government. The US blocked the supply of tear gas to Pakistan in Apr. 1977, and shortly afterwards, new economic assistance was suspended. In early Jun., the US withdrew the offer of 110, A-7 aircrafts. This was to be the first major aircraft procurement from the US since the early 60s. The cancellation of this deal irked the military elites. This along with Bhutto's domestic troubles led the military to feel that there was no political or diplomatic cost to his removal from power.<sup>111</sup> The widespread political agitation against Bhutto government carried out by the opposition coalition PNA following the accusations of rigging in the 1977 elections led to a political impasse which gave the military once again an opportunity to assert itself as the guardian of the country.

The problem started when Bhutto's PPP and the opposition parties represented by the PNA failed to agree either on the acceptance of the 1977 election results or on future elections. The main issue was the rigging of the 1977 elections. The PPP won 155 out of 200 seats in the National Assembly elections against 36 seats won by the PNA. The wide margin of the PPP victory created doubts about the credibility of the election. PNA accused the government of engaging in massive rigging of the elections and boycotted the elections to the provincial assemblies. Bhutto denied the rigging charge. The opposition launched a massive agitation against Bhutto in response. It became a crusade of the combined opposition against Bhutto to anyhow oust him from power.<sup>112</sup>

Left with no scope for settlement with the PNA leaders, Bhutto adopted the most repressive measures to suppress the agitation. He attempted to contain the opposition's protest by arresting senior PNA leaders and large number of its activists. This snowballed the agitation as it spread to

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<sup>110</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 352-53.

<sup>111</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 164.

<sup>112</sup> K.L. Kamal, "Pakistan: The Garrison State", Intellectual Publishing House. Apr. 1982, p. 81.



all major cities and towns. The 1977 anti-Bhutto agitation was reminiscent of the 1968-69 anti-Ayub movement, but in 1977 it was more widespread as the PNA mobilization network, setup in the wake of the election campaigns, was intact and the populace was already in a state of activism. And, therefore, the agitation gained momentum quickly engulfing the district and tehsils as well.

The turning point came on 21<sup>st</sup> Apr. when Bhutto imposed martial law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore, and the military superseded the civilian administration in these cities. Bhutto also involved the Army commanders in the negotiations with the opposition to show the latter that he enjoyed their support. The army, which had undergone a depoliticization process after the 1971 defeat in the Indo-Pak war, was once again brought out of the barracks and placed right in the midst of the domestic political chaos. Bhutto politicized the army to use it as a weapon against the agitators.

As **Salman Taseer**, author of Bhutto's biography wrote, the imposition of the martial law was a fateful step. It harmed Bhutto in two ways – it provoked the opposition to come out on the streets, and politicized the de-politicized army during his 5-year-old regime. The army had been progressively depoliticized, and for its past involvement in politics, was subjected to an incessant stream of re-educating propaganda. It was now being called upon to come out of the barracks to again act in a political role and serve as Bhutto's lifeline.<sup>113</sup>

Some amount of blame should also be shared by the opposition for paving the way for reassumption of power by the military. Despite the availability of provision of adequate constitutional remedies, the PNA took the issue to the streets. The PNA was not ready for any dialogue and seemed determined to snatch power from Bhutto at any cost. Their action forced the government to bring in the armed forces into a law-order-keeping role. The PNA also failed to realize the consequences of their negative approach, that unleashing of violent street demonstrations against Bhutto regime would further undercut the residual legitimacy of Pakistan's only civilian regime in two decades, and provide the military leaders with a readymade opportunity to intervene in politics.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Salman Taseer, "Bhutto – A Political Biography", 1980, p. 172.

<sup>114</sup> V. Kujreja, "Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan," NBO Publishing, 1985, p. 133.

Given the Pakistani tradition of an active political role for the military, the atmosphere of political stalemate between the two political factions, and deteriorating law and order situation, the only credible organization that could take the country forward was the military. General Zia announced on nationwide television on 5<sup>th</sup> Jul. that he saw no prospects of compromise between PPP and PNA because of their mutual distrust and lack of faith, which ultimately would have thrown the country into chaos.

The deepening political crisis rekindled desire among the senior commanders to assume an active political role. By Jun., they had prepared a contingency plan named **Operation Fairplay** to seize power if the political situation deteriorated, and which was ultimately put into effect by the Chief of Army Staff, Zia-ul-Haq, on 5<sup>th</sup> Jul. 1977.<sup>115</sup>

Though the regime started out initially as a caretaker government for a 90-day period until elections were to be held, yet Zia went back on his words. The main reason was the miscalculation on the part of the military as well as the PNA regarding Bhutto's popularity, which was evident in the massive turnout on Bhutto's first visit to Lahore, Multan and Karachi after being released from the 'protective custody'. Encouraged by resurgent support, Bhutto was sure of getting elected in the coming Oct. 1977 elections. He adopted a defiant posture against Zia and threatened retribution.

Alarmed by this upsurge, Zia decided to stop Bhutto in his tracks and reversed his earlier decision of not taking judicial action against Bhutto.<sup>116</sup> Bhutto's growing popularity convinced the army and PNA that his removal from the political scene was impossible unless he was physically removed.

To remove him from the political scene, Bhutto was charged with murder of his political opponent and accused of massive corruption. Zia postponed the Oct. elections saying that the time was inopportune for new elections, as the country needed more time to repair the damage done by the previous regime.<sup>117</sup> The elections were thus postponed indefinitely and Zia decided to pursue the accountability of the ousted Bhutto regime as the main priority.

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<sup>115</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 162.

<sup>116</sup> Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "The Military in Contemporary Pakistan", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 6, no. 4, summer 1980, pg. 649.

<sup>117</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in the Twentieth Century", Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 436.

Bhutto's trial lasted till Mar. 1979. He was sentenced to death and was executed in the early hours of 4<sup>th</sup> Apr. 1979. With Bhutto out of the way, Zia moved on to cut out the PNA from political power, just the way Ayub had treated Iskander Mirza after using him as the instrument to come to power. Sharp differences developed when the PNA insisted on holding of elections. Zia kept on putting it off as long as he could. Fed up of being threatened, Zia dropped all farce and on 16<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1979 announced the indefinite postponement of the Nov. 1979 elections and said that henceforth "**real martial law**" would operate in the country. Pakistan had once again fallen under a one-man dictatorship.<sup>118</sup>

The way Ayub Khan had taken over in two stages, similarly Zia finished his second stage by banning all political activity, 'disbandment' of political parties, sealing of their offices and freezing of their funds. He also announced press censorship and a ban on statements to the press. Thus, started the most harsh, vigorous and strict military regime Pakistan had ever experienced.

As far as the nature of Zia's coup is concerned, by applying Janowitz's typology of coups, in its initial phase it could be seen as an example of "reactive militarism", as it was result of a political impasse, where military had to take over to act as the umpire. It came as a temporary measure to resolve the deadlock and conduct free and fair elections. However, as Zia entrenched himself and out maneuvered his adversaries, his coup took the hue of "designed militarism", since it was political scheming on the part of the General to continue in power as long as a possible, which kept the military regime at the helm of affairs.

### **MUSHARRAF'S TAKEOVER (OCTOBER 1999)**

With the fourth military takeover of 12<sup>th</sup> October 1999 carried out by the Chief of the Army Staff, **General Pervez Musharraf**, Pakistan's decade long troubled democratic inning come to an end. With this coup the army once again reasserted its primacy in Pakistan's political system. It is Pakistan's 'praetorian' culture that makes the military the final arbitrator of its political destiny. That it is the military which still holds supreme power, rules

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<sup>118</sup> Md. Asghar Khan, "Generals in Politics: Pakistan – 1958 to 1982", Vikas Publishing, 1983, p. 159.

Pakistan, and makes all the important decisions despite having stayed behind the curtains in the period of democracy, was confirmed with Musharraf's coup.<sup>119</sup>

Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not declare martial law, instead he only imposed emergency in the country. Therefore, he didn't take on the mantle of CMLA like the earlier three military rulers, but assumed the newly coined title of the "**Chief Executive**". President **Rafiq Tarar**, installed by the ousted PM **Nawaz Sharif**, continued to hold office, but the Chief Executive's recommendations were binding on him. The federal provincial governments were dismissed and the parliament and provincial assemblies were suspended. The 1973 Constitution was also suspended and put in abeyance. A New **National Security Council** and a federal cabinet headed by Musharraf were appointed. Other than these no major changes were introduced. No restriction was imposed on political parties or their political activities; freedom of press was respected. No military courts were established; regular courts continued to function, but could not question the authority and orders of the Chief Executive.<sup>120</sup> Therefore, it was a typical bloodless coup in the true tradition of the earlier coups.

The origin of the political crisis which ultimately culminated into the military taking over the reins of power could be traced back to the strains that emerged in Oct. 1998 between the PM, Nawaz Sharif, and the then Army Chief, **General Jehangir Karamat**. It was Sharif Government's narrow-based and personalized decision making that led to strains in civil-military relations. The initial manifestation of tension between the army and Sharif occurred when General Karamat made a host of statements regarding the poor performance, sustained corruption and incompetence of the Sharif administration, which amounted to an indictment of the civilian government. He also proposed the establishment of a National Security Council that would give the military a formal role in the political decision-making process.<sup>121</sup>

Sharif expressed his displeasure with such statements which made the General decide to step down three months ahead of his retirement, rather than withdraw his remarks. This was the first indication towards the souring of civil-military relation. Sharif replaced Karamat with Pervez Musharraf, an Urdu-speaking "**Muhajir**", in the hope that a Muhajir army chief Presiding over

<sup>119</sup> Akbar Zaidi, "A Benevolent Dictatorship?", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Oct. 16-23, 1999, p. 2988.

<sup>120</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. Prologue XVII.

<sup>121</sup> Owen-Bennett Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publication, 2002, p. 36.

a predominantly Punjabi-Pakhtun dominated army would be unable to build a secure power base and thus, be more complacent.<sup>122</sup>

The PM did the mistake of misreading Karamat's departure as the army's surrender and absolute weakness in the face of his power. Sure of Musharraf's weakness and therefore his obedience, Sharif made his "megalomaniac bid for power".<sup>123</sup> Sharif violated the well-established norms of civil-military relations, thereby upsetting the delicate balance of power. He interfered with military's autonomy in matters of internal organization and service affairs. The military top brass resented his interference with promotions and transfers of senior officers, including the posting of the Corps Commanders, so that Sharif could plant his stooges inside the military.

Sharif's other act of commission after Karamat's resignation to antagonize the army was the appointment of **Lieutenant General Ziauddin** as the **Director General** of the **ISI**. Normally such a decision would have been taken in consultation with the Army Chief, but much to Musharraf's chagrin, Sharif pushed Ziauddin's promotion without consulting Musharraf. He further annoyed Musharraf by keeping the position of the "Joint Chiefs of Staff" vacant and not appointing Musharraf to the post.

Sharif's relations with Musharraf reached the lowest ebb in the wake of the **Kargil** misadventure. The manner in which Pakistan was forced to withdraw from Kargil after US President's intervention on Sharif's request, infuriated the army. The generals were unhappy with the humiliation of defeat in war that was thrust upon them by the civilian leadership's interference. Sharif made the grave mistake of placing the blame for the Kargil fiasco on the military in an attempt to extricate himself from the mess and create external support for his regime. This annoyed the Army, as the Kargil operation was a joint decision made by civil and military authorities, but by Sep. 1999, the civil government had repudiated its responsibility to save face and denigrated the army instead. Unable to take a frontal attack on its interests and an attempt to malign its image, a surge of discontent arose within the Army. Musharraf now went public and insisted that Sharif was very much a part of the Kargil operation.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> V. Kukreja, "Contemporary Pakistan – Political Processes, Conflicts and Crisis," Sage Publications, 2003, p. 256.

<sup>123</sup> Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan's Coup – Planting the Seeds of Democracy?", *Current History*, Dec. 1999, p. 409-412.

<sup>124</sup> Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan's Coup – Planting the Seeds of Democracy?", *Current History*, Dec. 1999, p. 412

After Kargil, the relationship between the PM and the Army Chief was severely damaged. Unable to take Musharraf's disobedience, Sharif made up his mind to get rid of him and set about trying to divide the army's top command on ethnic lines. However, Sharif's calculations proved wrong because whatever their inner differences, loyalty to the institution was far stronger than ethnic ties in the army. This further tarnished Sharif's image in the eyes of the armed forces and they started seeing him as an incapable, 'power crazed paranoiac'.<sup>125</sup> Encouraged by the qualified backing of the army, Musharraf asked Sharif for the full chairmanship of the Joint Chief of Staff, and to demonstrate his seriousness he put the **III Brigade** on standing. This was an unmistakable sign as the III Brigade had been used for carrying out every previous coup in Pakistan.<sup>126</sup>

Cowed down by the threat, Sharif promoted Musharraf to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a permanent basis. He realized that he could more easily sack Musharraf while he was out of the country, when the army would be caught off balance and left unsure as how to react. Therefore, while Musharraf was airborne for four hours on 12<sup>th</sup> Oct., returning home after attending Sri Lankan Army's 50th anniversary celebration, Sharif sacked Musharraf and succeeded him by his own protégé, General Ziauddin, and ordered the state television to broadcast the news, as well as televise the coverage showing the new Army Chief being decorated with the insignia of full general.<sup>127</sup>

Contradictory to Sharif's judgment, the army's reaction to this was swift. The army was not going to sit idly and see their second chief to be fired within a year by an increasingly autocratic civilian PM.<sup>128</sup> The Chief of General Staff, **General Aziz Khan**, took over the television station to get the news off **PTV**, and ordered the infamous III Brigade to move to Islamabad. Meanwhile, the civilian government had ordered Karachi airport officials to close the airport and make the plane carrying Musharraf land outside of Pakistan where the arrangements for Musharraf's arrest were already made by Sharif.

<sup>125</sup> Owen-Bennett Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publication, 2002, p. 37

<sup>126</sup> This was mainly because the troops were outside the normal chain of command and answerable only to the Army Chief.

<sup>127</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. Prologue XIV.

<sup>128</sup> Mary Anne Weaver, "Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad & Afghanistan", Farras, Strauss & Giroux, 2002, p. 16-17.

However, the Corps Commander, Karachi, moved his troops and dislodged the pro-Sharif police and civilian authorities from the airport, and Musharraf's flight landed safely. By the time he reached the Karachi Corps headquarters, his commanders were in total control of Islamabad. The troops had cordoned off PM's house and arrested, or rather took into **'protective custody'**, PM Sharif, his brother and Punjabi Chief Minister, **Shabbaz Sharif**, and the de jure Army Chief, Ziauddin.<sup>129</sup> The armed forces demonstrated their unity and loyalty by coming to the defense of their Chief quickly and decisively in the coup of 1999.

However, the Oct. 1999 coup was different from the previous military interventions. Unlike the earlier three coups, which have been pro-active, wherein the military grabbed political power, the fourth one amounted to a **'reactive coup'**. The army did not initiate matters, but was clearly compelled to react to the moves of the elected leadership, which were aimed at destroying its institutional existence.<sup>130</sup> In Janowitz's classification of typology of coups too, the fourth coup would fall under the category of "reactive militarism".

This time round the coup was an act of self-defense to maintain the institutional integrity of the army. Had Sharif not attempted to undermine the military's autonomy, and not attempted to divide the senior command, the top brass wouldn't have dislodged the civil government. The Oct. 1999 coup was an institutional response to what senior commanders perceived as a threat to the professional and corporate interests of the Army.<sup>131</sup> In this coup the civilian PM took the initiative against the Army Chief first, rather than the other way round. The military took power only to defend the crown of their Chief.

In that sense, Pakistan's fourth military takeover would not technically fall under the category of a coup, but would rather be a **"counter-coup"**.<sup>132</sup> However, the consequence of this takeover as well as the previous ones has been the same, i.e. vetoing Pakistan's transition to democracy.

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<sup>129</sup> V. Kukreja, "Contemporary Pakistan – Political Processes, Conflicts and Crisis," Sage Publications, 2003, p.259.

<sup>130</sup> B.M. Chengappa, "Pakistan's 4<sup>th</sup> Military Takeover", *Strategic Analysis*, Dec. 1999, p. 1442.

<sup>131</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press, 2000, p. Vii. Preface.

<sup>132</sup> Iftikar H. Malik, "Pakistan in 2000 – Starting Anew or Stalemate?" *Asian Survey*, vol. XLI, no.1, Jan-Feb. 2001, p. 107.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE MILITARY REGIMES

History repeated itself for the fourth time in Pakistan's 52 years of existence when the military once again took over the reins of state power directly through a coup d'état on 12<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1999. Pakistan's new dictator, **General Parvez Musharraf**, essentially told the nation after taking over that he had to destroy democracy temporarily to save it. This was a familiar message in a country where military despots have ruled for 25 years of its life. Today Pakistan is going to enter into the 57<sup>th</sup> year of its existence, and it still has a head of state that simultaneously retains the office of the Chief of the Army Staff. However, this is nothing new or astonishing for the people of Pakistan. Pakistan might have been born with democracy on its agenda, but it has never been able to truly establish itself as a functioning democracy.

Each military ruler, from Ayub Khan to Musharraf, had followed one set pattern. They came with the excuse of righting the wrong and took over power to facilitate 'real' democracy, but ultimately ended up establishing and entrenching their own military regimes. In the early stages of their tenure, for the goal of aggregating their power, they sought legitimacy through the propagation of their self-image as a set of missionary, progressive, neutral and patriotic guardians of the nation. Once they took over, they went to the Supreme Court and got from a pliant court a decree that justified their regimes on the ground of the '**Doctrine of Necessity**', and the carte blanche authority to amend the constitution in order to give some semblance of legitimacy to their unconstitutional regimes.

Like all other ruling groups, it was imperative for them to convert power into authority and legitimacy, only then could they ensure their survival. For this, they sought a creative relationship with the civilian political groups. However, sooner or later, they had to think of civilianizing their rule or evolving a political framework for the future. They attempted to build and impose new political systems, which at best could be called '**Constitutional**



**Autocracies’.**<sup>133</sup>

None of the military regimes has been able to establish democracy in Pakistan, because more than facilitating democratic governance, the rulers have been interested in perpetuating their holds on power by civilianizing their regimes through careful constitutional engineering. Democracy never had a chance to flourish in Pakistan because the fact remains that sovereignty neither belongs to the Parliament, nor to the higher judiciary, nor to the bureaucracy and nor to the Constitution. Sovereignty in Pakistan belongs to the **GHQ**.<sup>134</sup> Since Ayub’s time, when the military first tasted power, it has emerged as a de facto power, while elected governments have only remained as de jure powers. In the process, the military brass hats control the elected leadership and either replace them with other politicians or resume direct military rule when they attempt to act independently. Therefore, every one of the military regimes have first tried to put off the transition to democracy for as long as possible, and have only withdrawn martial law to retain their legitimacy.

Even then, the lifting of martial law does not necessarily signify that the polity has become a democratic one. Rather, the transition involves more of ‘**civilianization**’ than ‘democratization’. All the military rulers have been loathe to give up their personal power, and have therefore, practiced a peculiar variant of democracy suited to their purposes – ‘**Khaki Democracy**’, i.e. of the army, for the army and by the army.<sup>135</sup>

If one goes by the military’s track record, then all the four military regimes of Pakistan have followed the same trajectory and used the same methods to keep the initiative with the military. When they first come to power, the generals promise democracy, but are too impatient to wait for voters (majority of whom are illiterate) to boot out bad elected leaders. Therefore, they short-circuit the slow, painful and flawed democratic process in order to establish their own form of guided democracy which is more suitable to Pakistan’s polity.

However, even though the military regimes seemed to be following a single pattern, yet they differed in their nature and elite linkages. Each military ruler had his own notion of guided democracy and his own ways of legitimizing his regime so, to say that the military regimes were similar could be misleading. They had much in similar, but they also had much that

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<sup>133</sup> Kalim Bahadur, “Prospects of Democracy in Pakistan”, *World Focus*, Apr – May 2002, p. 3.

<sup>134</sup> Roeded Khan, “Partial Democracy in Pakistan?”, *South Asia Politics*, Jul. 2003, vol. II, Issue 3.

<sup>135</sup> B.M. Chengappa, “Musharraf and Democracy” *World Focus*, Apr-May 2002, p. 6.

differed. The circumstances in which they took over and the forces they had to reckon with differed a lot. It is important therefore, to compare and contrast Pakistan's four military regimes in order to understand how each one of them impacted upon and shaped Pakistan's political destiny, and eventually subverted the democratic process.

## **AYUB'S MILITARY REGIME**

The troubled democratic experiment of Pakistan came to an end after a decade of the country's birth, with the military taking over direct power arbitrarily. This military regime for the first time provided the people with the longest period of political stability, something that the political leadership of the new country had failed to do, thereby giving the army the excuse to directly intervene in politics.

**General Ayub Khan** took over power in Oct. 1958 and ruled Pakistan till 1969. His military regime tried to reform the shamble that Pakistan's political and economic systems had become in the hands of the politicians. Ayub promised to bring democracy to Pakistan as soon as he came to power, but his entire regime did was to impose a form of "**tutelage democracy**". In essence, the system of government was a continuation of the British vice-regal system.<sup>136</sup> The quest was to develop on Ayub-centric political system instead of power sharing among diverse Pakistani constituencies.

During the Ayub years, the political, economic and social conflicts between the West and East Pakistans further crystallized. He failed to develop a regime that accommodated the internal pressures for provincial autonomy and democracy. Instead, he sought to develop a corporate model with centralized controls, and power in the hands of army and civilian bureaucracies and the economic elites. Therefore, even a decade long rule of outward stability (compared to the frequent changes in government from 1947 to 1958), the Ayub regime did not develop a viable political or a constitutional system, and failed to establish viable political institutions capable of

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<sup>136</sup> Robert La Porte Jr., "Another Try at Democracy" in 'Contemporary problems of Pakistan', ed. by J. Henry Korson, Westview Press, 1993, p. 175.

settling internal conflicts.<sup>137</sup> All his regime was able to achieve was to convert a military dictator into a civilian ruler through constitutional engineering and political scheming.

### **Nature of the Military regime:**

It has been emphasized by **Henry Bienen** that ‘**military regime**’ is a misnomer as all military regimes have large civilian components.<sup>138</sup> First, because the military leaders want to give a degree of civilian color to the new regime. Secondly, confronted with the practical task of running the government, as military rulers lack political and administrative requisite skills, they are forced to recruit appropriate talent from the civilian sector. In that sense, even the Ayub regime was not essentially military in character. The 1958 coup in Pakistan was a joint endeavor on the part of the military and the civil bureaucracy. The civil bureaucracy continued to be one of the two pillars of government through the military regime’s decade long tenure.

Ayub Khan’s martial law signaled the ascension of bureaucratic rule, since the military itself was part of the bureaucracy, and the state structure itself depended on civil servants from the grassroots to the governorship of the provinces.<sup>139</sup> The military regime relied heavily on the civilian bureaucracy for running the administration. In his first address to the nation, Ayub Khan declared that he would use the civilian agencies to the maximum. **Major General Umrao Khan**, Martial Law Administrator, East Pakistan, said, *‘the martial Law Administration did not contemplate any upsetting of the prevailing civil administrative structure. The only change that the people would find in the course of time would be the toning up of the administrative machinery that had been demoralized and rendered so ineffective.’*<sup>140</sup>

A senior civil servant, **Aziz Ahmed**, was appointed Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator as well as appointed as the Chief Secretary to the Government, and was delegated authority for the day-to-day running of the entire machinery of the administration. The presidential cabinet was also civilian-dominated.

Though the army was deployed in the first few days in the major cities of Pakistan, it was more in the nature of a symbolic show of force, rather than a long-term involvement of the armed forces in the day-to-day running of the country. General Ayub himself retired from active service

<sup>137</sup> Ashok Kapur, “Pakistan In Crisis”, Routledge Inc., 1991, p. 54-55.

<sup>138</sup> Henry Bienen, “Military Rule & Political Process-Nigerian Example”, *Comparative Politics*, vol. X, no. 2, Jan 1978, p. 205.

<sup>139</sup> Iftikar H. Malik, “State and Civil Society in Pakistan”, Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 64.

<sup>140</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Military, State and Society in Pakistan,” Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 85.

and gave up command of the Army to the new C-in-C, **General Md. Musa**, thereby donning a civilian garb. After 1962, when Ayub established himself as the civilian President, the senior civil servants continued to rule the roost under his protective wings. His key advisors, like **Manzur Qadir, Altaf Gauhar, Q.A. Shahab, Shoaib** and **Fida Hassan**, were civilians. Only three out of the fourteen cabinet members – Lt. Generals **K.M. Sheikh, W. A. Burki** and **Azam Khan** – were from the armed forces. Soon, however, the three Generals were asked to resign their commissions in the army if they were to continue in the Cabinet, and they complied with the orders.<sup>141</sup>

The senior commanders knew that they alone could not run the administration and needed the cooperation of the bureaucracy. The heavy reliance of the military regime on bureaucracy shows that military rulers lacked the bargaining skills of politicians, and couldn't therefore run the administration smoothly without compromises with the bureaucracy.<sup>142</sup> The bureaucrats on the other hand realized that it was not advisable to work against the military regime, as the latter was capable of retaliating against them by dismissing them or by taking other punitive actions. In fact, punitive action was taken against a number of civil servants as a part of strategy to tone up the administration and to make it known to the civil servants that similar action could be taken against others. A compromise suited both. The bureaucracy cooperated with military and the latter strengthened their role. Such a marriage of convenience between the bureaucracy and the military was the hallmark of the Ayub regime and served the professional and corporate interests of both.<sup>143</sup>

The civil servants not only monopolized all policy-making jobs in the government, but also gradually took over the different corporations and autonomous bodies that had been set up. Of the 280 members of 33 commissions of enquiry established under Ayub for the purpose of suggesting substantive policy changes, the bulk, i.e. 42.1%, belonged to the civil service with only 6.4% from the military, 5.7% from the judiciary and the rest from the various professional groups. Politicians comprised barely 1.4% of the commissions' membership. Thus, the military regime of Ayub Khan, while providing individual ascendancy to a few generals, actually enhanced the overall corporate security of the civilian bureaucracy within the existing

<sup>141</sup> Md. Ayoob, "Military in Pakistan's Political Development", in 'Political System in Pakistan vol. 5' ed. by V. Grover and R. Arora, Deep and Deep Publications, 1995, p. 9.

<sup>142</sup> V. Kukreja, "Military Intervention in Politics - A Case study of Pakistan", NBO Publications, 1985, p. 75.

<sup>143</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 85.

governmental framework. In other words, the new government freed the bureaucracy from the need to seek a mandate from the masses. Military intervention in politics thus became almost a structural feature of the bureaucratic polity of Pakistan.<sup>144</sup>

The military regime, while it asserted the right of the army to intervene in matters of state, had the net result of civilianizing of few top Generals and including them into important civilian posts. It did not result in the army becoming the state. The remarkable partnership with the civil bureaucracy was however not meant to hide the fact that it was the military that called the shots in the new era. The military commanders did not compromise on their centrality to the martial law administration. The military was the ultimate source of power. However, it did decide to remain in the background, while the civil bureaucracy was very visible.<sup>145</sup>

Therefore, it is not incorrect to infer that Ayub Khan's regime was essentially bureaucratic in nature. Both the military and civilian bureaucracies were cohorts in this regime, and needed each other as legitimizing agents. With the clouts of the politicians diminished, the bureaucracy needed the army as an agent to legitimize its bureaucratic rule, which earlier it had continued under the tutelage of the political leadership. Similarly, the civil bureaucracy was used effectively by Ayub to provide the civilianizing legitimacy to his military regime.

But, ultimately it was the military that remained the main power base of the Ayub regime. Under the 1962 Constitution, which Ayub had personally scripted, the military in Pakistan enjoyed an entrenched position. This was perhaps more clearly reflected in **Article 238** of the constitution which laid down that for a period of 20 years after the commencement of the 1962 constitution, the Ministry of Defense shall be led by a person who had held a rank not lower than that of Lt. General in the Pakistan army or an equivalent rank in other services.<sup>146</sup>

Other than this pronounced military-bureaucratic nature of the regime, it also had an elitist character to it. A new class of economic elite emerged as a powerful group post-1958. The military regime's economic policy of capitalist development through private enterprises helped consolidate the power of this new group of urban entrepreneurial elites who came to control most of the industrial projects and assets during this regime. Thus, the civil and military-bureaucratic elites and the economic elites came together during the Ayub era by forming

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<sup>144</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 144.

<sup>145</sup> Rounaq Jahan, "Failure in National Integration: Pakistan", CUP, 1972, p. 523.

<sup>146</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-69", Syracuse University Press, 1971, p. 12.

transactional links among themselves. The Ayub regime, therefore, institutionalized the non-representative sources of political power that were latent during the 1947-58 period.

The only change that took place from that period was the loss of power by politicians. The axe fell completely on the political leadership. Restrictions were placed on all political activities, political parties were banned and no public meeting or political marches were allowed. The military regime issued two ordinances for excluding the political leaders from the political process. The **Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO)**, issued in Mar. 1959, applied to those who held public office any time since independence. If a person was found guilty of 'misconduct' by an independent tribunal, he could be disqualified from holding a public office for 15 years. The **Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO)**, issued in Aug. 1959 covered even those political leaders who were members of the legislature, but never held a public office. Such a person found guilty of 'misconduct' would be disqualified from holding any elective office until 31<sup>st</sup> Dec. 1966, or could voluntarily retire from public life up to that day.<sup>147</sup>

Through these measures Ayub tried to insulate the emerging political parties from the influences of the former politicians by disqualifying them from holding offices or even from associating with the activities of a political party. In this way he was able to disarm all opposition and dissent. For 44 months Ayub ruled as the absolute dictator with no politics and parties. Even in the 1962 Constitution, **Article 170** continued the ban on political activity. But, the regime was obliged to come to terms with the inclusion of politicians in the cabinet with introduction of the 1962 Constitution. However, even then none of the important cabinet portfolios – defense, finance, planning, home – were given to politicians.

Thus, the Ayub regime was essentially non-political in nature and favored the non-representative civil and military bureaucratic elites, as well as the economic elites. It is this oligarchical nexus of military, bureaucratic and economic elites that dominated Pakistan's first military regime.

#### **Administrative Reforms:**

Ayub's military coup took place on the pretext of saving the nation from the political leadership's mishandling. In that sense, it could be characterized as 'reformist' militarism. So, as

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<sup>147</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 89.

soon as the regime settled down to work on a day-to-day basis, it started bringing forth various reforms. The military regime adopted stringent measures to check hoarding, black marketeering of food items and consumer goods and smuggling of these items across the international border to India and Afghanistan, which was rampant during the 50s. Army personnel and the police raided the suspected hoarders and smugglers, and recovered a large quantity of grains, food items and contraband good.

The estimated value of contraband recovered from various parts of West Pakistan in the first two weeks of martial law was Rs. 15,64,000. Later, traders voluntarily declared their stocks. The prices of good of daily use were fixed by the martial law authorities and were imposed upon the shopkeepers.

The regime moved swiftly to curtail three corrupt practices: illegal possession of foreign exchange, evasion of income tax and other duties, and the sale and purchase of import permits. Foreign exchange voluntarily surrendered locally amounted to Rs. 40.6 million, and the unauthorized foreign exchange held abroad by Pakistani nationals was Rs. 42 million. The regime collected Rs. 240 million as tax on excess income, and undeclared wealth totaling Rs. 1,340 million was brought on record.<sup>148</sup> A ban was imposed on the sale of purchase of import permits, punishable by 10 years rigorous imprisonment.

The military regime took punitive action against 1,662 federal civil servants for corrupt practices like bribery, nepotism misuse of power willful maladministration. Three special bodies: **Administrative Reorganization Committee** (Dec. 1958), **Provincial Administration Commission** (Feb. 1959) and **Provincial Reorganization Committee** (Aug. 1961) were appointed to review the existing administrative procedures and to suggest measures for improving efficiency and performance of the civil servants. A **Pay and Service Commission** headed by **Justice A.R. Cornelius** was appointed in Aug. 1959 to review the structure, recruitment, emoluments etc., of the civil services under the federal government. Some of its recommendations were implemented by the post martial law administration in 1962.

Under Ayub Khan, the planning machinery for development took long strides. Like Nehru, Ayub himself headed the **Planning Commission**. At the top of this machinery was the **National Economic Council (NEC)**, which consisted of the President, provincial governors, Vice-

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<sup>148</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 86.

Chairman of the Planning Commission. It reviewed the overall economic position and approved the five-year plans.<sup>149</sup>

The **Law Reform Commission** was appointed in Sep. 1959 to suggest improvements in the existing legal and judicial system and the structure of the legal profession. Its recommendations were implemented over a number of years.

Another major administrative shift that the regime initiated was the shifting of the national capital from Karachi to the Potwar plateau, near Rawalpindi, the Army GHQ, on the recommendation of a commission appointed in Jan. 1959 for reviewing the suitability of Karachi as the headquarters of the federal government. Rawalpindi was made the interim capital in Oct. 1959. In Feb. 1960, the Presidential cabinet named the capital **Islamabad**. The new capital began to function officially in Oct. 1963 when some federal offices shifted from Rawalpindi to the newly constructed secretariat in Islamabad. This shift was made to accommodate a military head of state to keep in touch with his military constituency. The new capital facilitated closer interaction between Ayub and GHQ.<sup>150</sup> Ayub also made a significant change by clubbing the four provinces of West Pakistan under '**One-Unit**', removing the federal arrangement and making it a composite whole.

The most important administrative reform in the social sector brought in by the military regime was the introduction of the **Family Laws, 1961**<sup>151</sup>, replacing the traditional/Islamic family laws that had allowed much discretion to men regarding marriage, divorce and other related affairs. Polygamy by men was regulated through this by imposing a condition that approval was needed from the local Union Council for a subsequent marriage. Such permission was to be granted if the 1<sup>st</sup> wife was dead, or a divorce had taken place, or there was no child, or the permission of the 1<sup>st</sup> wife had been secured. A woman could approach the local council to secure maintenance after divorce. The minimum marriageable age for women was raised from 14 to 16 years.

The military regime introduced several changes in the education system on the recommendation of a **National Education Commission** set up in Dec. 1958. Also, a number of polytechnic institutes were established to impart functional skills to the young people after their high school education. Thus, these reforms initiated by the military regime underlined the reformism of the

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<sup>149</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 177.

<sup>150</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 87-88

<sup>151</sup> Ran Talbot, "India and Pakistan", OUP, 2000, p. 201.



Ayub regime. These reforms served to fulfill another ulterior motive of the regime, that, of legitimacy and acceptability. The military portrayed itself as a benevolent regime and this helped in curbing dissent and opposition to the military regime.

### **Economic Measures:**

Ayub Khan sought popular legitimacy through the propagation of the image of an agent of modernization. His economic development and modernization strategy won high praise and his period was labeled as the '**Decade of Development**'<sup>152</sup>. Pakistan under Ayub witnessed an economic growth that was spectacular for Asia. The Ayub regime was a period of exemplary economic growth, averaging around 5.5% annually. Per capital incomes grew at the rate of 3.5% annually during 1958-67 compared with the eight-year period from 1950-58, in which the average increase was just 2.19% per year.<sup>153</sup> Large-scale manufacturing grew at almost 17% annually, and by 1968, 90% of all exports had been freed from administrative control and the government relied only on tariffs to restrict demands.<sup>154</sup>

Pakistan's growth became a reference 'model' for US economists advising the rest of the developing world, and was considered a shining example of free enterprises. Pakistan became one of the few developing countries that openly and officially advocated the capitalist doctrine of 'functional inequality' under which the private entrepreneurs were to receive maximum incentive. The entrepreneurial classes were being pampered, protected, and molly-coddled through various policies such as tax benefits, cheap credits, import permit and availability of foreign exchange. Therefore, the western model of modernization was the framework, and private capital for economic growth was the strategy for economic development. But, it had no dimension of social welfare.<sup>155</sup>

Gross growth rates do not explain the whole picture adequately. Behind this number game lie the stark realities of the socio-economic exploitation of the large masses. The emphasis was on large-scale manufacturing, private-sector-led development. The strategy of functional inequality had its adverse effects. Pakistani peasants were squeezed in order to create industrial tycoons.

<sup>152</sup> V.Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 85.

<sup>153</sup> Mahmood Monshpouri and Amjad Samuel, "Development & Democracy in Pakistan", *Asian Survey*, vol. 35, Nov. 1995, p. 977.

<sup>154</sup> Omar Noman, "Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947", Kegan Paul International Ltd., 1988, p. 26.

<sup>155</sup> Rakesh Gupta "State in India, Pakistan, Russia and Central Asia", Kalpaz Publication, 2004, p. 9.

The economic policies had reduced the peasant and urban workers to a state of dire poverty in spite of record rates of increases in GDP in the 1960s.

The policies of the Ayub regime led to an incredible concentration of wealth in a few hands. **Mahbub-ul-Haq** revealed that by 1968, 22 families controlled 66% of industrial assets, 70% of insurance funds, and 80% of bank assets.<sup>156</sup> In the urban area, the army and bureaucracy had helped to create a 'monstrous millionaire' elite on the basis of intensive and large-scale exploitation. This small entrepreneurial elite comprising of mere two score families followed narrow and nepotistic political and economic practices. Many sons of those families became high-ranking military officers and moved from there into prosperous business, maintaining family connections. To bureaucrats were recruited with the same family and 'old boy' school ties. This business-military-bureaucratic triad concentrated both political and economic powers in their hands by serving each other's interests.<sup>157</sup>

Md. Waseem writes that Ayub enjoyed monopolistic powers over the regulation of access to foreign aid for selected groups and classes.<sup>158</sup> Even Ayesha Jalal says that the military-bureaucratic state of Pakistan had been able to determine whom to include and exclude from the developmental process.<sup>159</sup> Shahid Javed Burki records that "*in terms of net gain only the elite benefited from the 'Decade of Development', which Ayub personally felt to be the hallmark of his regime.*"<sup>160</sup> The theory of development was so totally unrelated to social norms that economic program could not arrest the progress of poverty.

In the rural sector, Ayub Khan in an effort to project his image as that of a grate reformer and a Pakistani **Nasser**, introduced land reforms. The military regime appointed a **Land Reform Commission** for West Pakistan soon after assuming power with a mandate to 'consider problems relating to the ownership and tenancy of agricultural land and to recommend measures for ensuring better production and social justice as well as security of tenure for those engaged in cultivation.'<sup>161</sup> The commission submitted its report on 20<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1959 to Ayub.

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<sup>156</sup> Business Recorder (Karachi), 25 Apr. 1968, p. 1.

<sup>157</sup> V.Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 87.

<sup>158</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 185.

<sup>159</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, p. 156.

<sup>160</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971-72", Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, p. 119.

<sup>161</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 91.

In the **Land Reforms Regulation** of 7<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1959, Ayub announced a land reform program under which no individual could own more than 500 acres of irrigated land or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land. Owners were allowed to maintain an extra 150 acres for orchards for livestock. All jagirs (land grants) were abolished without compensation. The regime's publicists hailed it as a radical measure. Ayub subsequently claimed that this policy had far-reaching effects: "*The disappearance of the class of absentee landlords, who exercised great political influence under the previous landholding system, marked the beginning of a new era in West Pakistan.*"<sup>162</sup>

In reality, however, Ayub's land reforms never worked. In the first place the land ceilings were not stringently enforced. The feudals managed to get around the law, for example, by transferring ownership to close relatives and even farm workers. In some cases, illiterate peasants were told to put their thumbprint on a piece of paper. Technically the land now belonged to them but due to their illiteracy they did not even know it, and the feudal landlord remained the actual owner.<sup>163</sup>

Furthermore, there were enough loopholes to permit land holding above the fixed ceiling. For e.g. there was an option for making gifts or voluntary surrender. Many landlords redistributed land among relatives and friends, and thus avoided exceeding the ceiling while effectively retaining control of the land. 6,000 landowners, representing 0.10% of the total agricultural population in the country, possessed 7.5 million acres of land estimates over 500 acres, i.e. 15% of the private land. On the other hand, more than 2.2 millions owned less than 5 acres and another 5.2 millions were landless peasants, sharecroppers or simply tenants.<sup>164</sup>

Also, only 5% of the land was surrendered to the government. No more than 2.3 million acres were acquired under the land reforms, and of these, 930,000 acres consisted of wasteland, hills and riverbeds. The land reforms, therefore, turned out to be more cosmetic rather than substantive in their impact. The reforms ultimately entrenched those against whom they were initiated. The landed elites never had it going so good as they did under the Ayub regime. Just as in the case of the urban areas where the business elites accrued all economic benefits, similarly in the countryside they had concentrated on promoting the interests of landlords and capitalist farmers at the expense of peasants and landless labors.

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<sup>162</sup> Md. Ayub Khan, "Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography", OUP, 1967, p. 90.

<sup>163</sup> Owen Bennett Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publication, 2002, p. 246.

<sup>164</sup> V. Kukreja, "Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts & Crises", Sage Publication, 2003, P. 81.

Even the Green Revolution of the late 60s impacted upon the different strata of the rural population unevenly. The benefits of improved seeds, fertilizers, and tubewells could help only those who cultivated large landholdings. It was only the landlords who benefited from the mechanization of agriculture. It widened income disparities and wealth among the different strata of rural population.

It had also had the effect of widening the disparities among regions. The benefits were not only confined to the big and medium sized landlords, but the prosperity was further concentrated in Punjab.<sup>165</sup>

Another consequence of Ayub regime's economic strategy was regional economic disparity between West and East Pakistanis. It was not just the rural-urban or masses-elites disparity that underlined Ayub's regime, but the disparity between the Eastern and Western elites was also an important consequence. This made the Bengalis feel left out of both the political and economic fruits of development. Ayub's economic strategy was based simply on a private sector led industrial production in West Pakistan. His regime just emphasized on production and neglected the redistribution aspect completely. This resentment on the part of Bengalis entrenched in Ayub's regime and climaxed in 1971 under the second military regime with the country ultimately breaking up.

Thus, the economic policies pursued, generated a great deal of economic tensions. The cost of economic growth had been too high, as the economic policies of this period had played a significant part in accounting for inter-regional income disparities, which finally led to the break up of the country. Therefore, **Ahmed and Amjad** call Ayub's regime as not the 'Decade of Development', but the '**Controversial Sixties**', because despite high levels of growth, maldistribution of wealth led to the impoverishment of the bulk of the population. The disenchantment arose among people, ultimately exploding into the political unrest of 1968 that led to Ayub's downfall.<sup>166</sup>

Increasing disparities in regional incomes between the provinces, a concentration of industrial economic power, the failure of real wages to increase significantly, and a general belief of increasing income-inequality, all contributed to the rejection of the Ayubian growth philosophy and strategy.

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<sup>165</sup> V.Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 86-87.

<sup>166</sup> Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Amjal, "The Management of Pakistan's Economy, 1947-82", OUP, 1984, p. 77.

### Civilianization and Constitutional Politics:

Legitimacy is important for the political survival of any regime, whether civilian or military. It is more imperative for a military regime to convert power into legitimate authority, as the way it comes to power itself lacks legitimacy. All military rulers in their bid to consolidate power tend to respond to the rising appetite for political participation and feel the need to devise some democratic trappings, like of civilianization and guided democratization.

Ayub Khan too tried to give legitimacy to his regime through a carefully planned civilianization process and disengagement of the military regime. Since he had come to power blaming the political leadership for failing to provide Pakistan with a viable democratic constitution, he proposed to introduce a new political system that would be a **'home-grown plant'**, not an **'imported herb'**, suited to the genus and climate of the country. He had no faith in the parliamentary institutions of the Western type. In his autobiography he wrote, *"Something has to be evolved which is akin to your history, your tradition, and your way of thinking you."*<sup>167</sup>

Kalim Bahadur writes that General Ayub's characteristic view on democracy was that Western type of democracy was against the psyche of the Pakistani people.<sup>168</sup> Ayub blamed the failure of democracy in Pakistan in large measure on the illiteracy and immaturity of the people. Ayub argued that parliamentary politics demanded an educated and relatively secure population, but Pakistan's widespread illiteracy, coupled with an impoverished people, called for a different approach to political democracy.<sup>169</sup> Therefore, in order to allow the average Pakistani citizen to enter the political arena, Ayub Khan moved to spell out the philosophy behind a new political model.

Ayub had certain objectives in introducing this new political system. This political maneuver on his part was designed to expand the support base of his regime beyond his natural constituency of the army and bureaucracy through controlled political participation. He initiated a planned constitutional disengagement of the military regime to entrench his position and continuity as a civilian leader. His personal ambition to hold on to power and to ensure the continuity of his policies after the withdrawal of military rule led him to concoct his own version of a democratic policy which reflected his views and ensured his continuation in power. To this

<sup>167</sup> Md. Ayub Khan, "Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography", OUP, 1967, p. 193.

<sup>168</sup> Kalim Bahadur, "Democracy in Pakistan – Crises and Conflicts", Har-Anand Publications, 1998, p. 17.

<sup>169</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century", OUP, 1977, p. 258.

effect, he made public in 1960 a document he had prepared in 1954 entitled as “**A Short Appreciation of the Present and Future Problems of Pakistan**”. This document reflected Ayub’s strong dissatisfaction with the parliamentary system and proposed a centralized polity with a powerful head of state who had sufficient powers to deal with the affairs of the state at federal and provincial levels. An indirectly elected legislature was assigned a limited role.<sup>170</sup>

Ayub publicly showed his bias for a unitary form of government, with local autonomy for provinces and the power to legislate reserved only for the centre. Therefore, after the ruling military junta had been fairly stabilized during the first year of direct military rule, it proceeded to expand its constituency at the mass level with relative impunity.<sup>171</sup>

Therefore, the military regime, on the first anniversary of its assumption of power, launched the **Basic Democracies (BD)** scheme on 27<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1959, with the objective of building support at the lowest level of society without ceding any power at the highest level. The promulgation of the **Basic Democracies Order, 1959** was the first step towards ‘civilianization’. W.A. Wilcox has written, “*The scheme was a hybrid mixture of Gandhi’s ‘gramraj’ and hierarchical army organisation*”.<sup>172</sup> It soon came to be regarded as the mainstay of the Ayub regime. The BD was supposed to function in a society without politics, and merely enfranchise a part of the traditional rural elite because stability, according to Ayub, required only limited participation. It envisaged an integrative system of operative representative bodies that functioned without resort to political parties.<sup>173</sup>

The BD was designed as a four-tier hierarchical, semi-representative system that began at the village level and went up to the divisional level. 80,000 Basic Democrats were elected in equal numbers in both the western and eastern wings of the country on the basis of direct adult franchise and one-person-one-vote. The first elections for the lowest level of the BD system were held in Dec. 1959 and Jan. 1960 under strict control of military authorities. These Basic Democrats were also to serve as an electoral college in the indirect election of the President of Pakistan. The military regime wanted BD to perform so that it could claim to have successfully established a new system of local self-governance, bringing forward a new popular leadership.

<sup>170</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Military, State and Society in Pakistan,” Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 95,

<sup>171</sup> Md. Waseem, “Politics and the State in Pakistan”, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 146.

<sup>172</sup> W.A. Wilcox, “The Pakistan Coup D’etat of 1958”, *Pacific Affairs*, vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, summer 1965, p. 160.

<sup>173</sup> Lawrence Ziring, “Pakistan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century”, OUP, 1977, p. 254.

The regime's supporters hailed it as a shining political innovation and as plausible alternative to Western Democracy and the Communist system. Ayub also earned the little of a 'Great legislator' and a "**Muslim de Gaulle**".<sup>174</sup>

However, as far as the actual working of the system was concerned, it was overshadowed by the ever-powerful bureaucracy. The representative and elective character was carefully neutralized with the presence of official and non-official nominated members and the assignment of some overriding power to the bureaucracy. This was very much in sync with the bureaucratic view of orderly politics that the regime sought to perpetuate to ultimately pave the way for a planned disengagement.

In sum, the BD was designed to accomplish multiple political objectives of the military regime. First and foremost, the Basic Democrats were supposed to legitimize Ayub as President of Pakistan (which they later did through a referendum) in their role as the presidential Electoral College, and to provide a support base separate from the civil-military bureaucracy. Second, it was a sort of counter-measure against political parties. It was to serve as an instrument around which continuous mass support could be organized, i.e. to perform the interest aggregating function generally performed by political parties. Thirdly, it was an appeasement scheme at its best. Mobilization and participation of the masses were part of it, however, they were to be limited, controlled, and guided so as not to put on unbearable pressure on the new bureaucratically dominated political system. On the one hand, people would be given more vigorous participation than before in their local affairs through the expansion of the local councils' functions, and on the other hand, popular participation in national politics would be limited through granting of electoral rights only to the Basic Documents.<sup>175</sup>

In effect, Ayub's BD was more glitter than substance and democracy was more symbolic than real. It was a scantily veiled measure to perpetuate the power of the regime by mobilizing political support in the rural areas.

After the elections of the Basic Democrats in Jan. 1960, the new representatives were given their first main task of electing a President through a referendum. Single referendums have been used as a cynical device by military rulers to gain legitimacy as well as to manipulate the public and

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<sup>174</sup> V. Kukreja, "Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts & Crises", Sage Publication, 2003, P. 65

<sup>175</sup> Rounaq Jahan, "Pakistan: Failure in National Integration", CUP, 1972, p. 111-112.

provide the trappings of democracy in an essentially authoritarian regime.<sup>176</sup> Ayub was the first military dictator of Pakistan to use the referendum as a tactic of gaining constitutional legitimization, which was later used by all the other dictators following him to legitimize their own unconstitutional rules.

Ayub held the presidential referendum on 14<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1960. The Basic Democrats were asked to indicate whether or not they had confidence in his leadership. They were given ballot papers simply marked 'Yes' or 'No' and asked to put their votes through the device of a white versus black box. Each ballot was numbered and registered against a specific voter so that the government could identify defaulters. Without a choice of candidates, Ayub overwhelmingly won 75,283 of the 78,720 votes i.e. 95.6% of the votes cast.<sup>177</sup> Thus, Ayub had his '**Vote of Confidence**',<sup>178</sup> and on 17<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1960 he was sworn in as the first 'elected' President of Pakistan. Thus, BD changed the rules of the political contest in Pakistan. The indirect method of elections left few serious opportunities for an opposition, and Ayub Khan was assured overwhelming advantage in any future contest. This made further civilianization efforts easy for the military regime.

The next step towards further civilianization of the regime was initiated by Ayub within a few hours of taking the oath of office. He appointed a **Constitution Commission** comprising ten members and a chairman, **Justice Md. Shahabuddin**, a senior judge of the Supreme Court, to formulate proposals for the new constitution. The commission put a heavy premium on the factor of stability, which in its opinion only the presidential system could safeguard. The way the commission functioned was very characteristic of the emergent bureaucratic polity of Pakistan.<sup>179</sup>

The Commission recommended a presidential form of government with a powerful President and a Vice-President. It proposed a federal system, but assigned overriding powers to the centre. A bicameral legislature was proposed with direct elections for the lower house, President and Vice-President. However, it was of the view that the first elections to the central and provincial assemblies could be held through BD members so as to expedite lifting of martial law. It also

<sup>176</sup> V.Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 92

<sup>177</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 98.

<sup>178</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century", OUP, 1977, p. 259

<sup>179</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 147-148.



proposed religion-based separate electorate and that the existing restrictions on the political parties should be withdrawn.

The commission submitted its report in May 1961 that was scrutinized by a sub-committee of the cabinet for revising the recommendations that diverged from the perspective of the military regime, i.e. direct elections, separate electorate, political parties, enforcement of fundamental rights, and the office of Vice-President, etc. After this review report, the Law Ministry was assigned the task of drafting the constitution under **Manzoor Qadir**.<sup>180</sup> The constitution soon took its shape with Ayub Khan providing the outline and Mazoor Qadir filling in the details.

The new constitution was announced by Ayub Khan on 1<sup>st</sup> Mar. 1962. It created a more authoritarian system than the one envisaged in the report and was more in line with Ayub's memorandum of Oct. 1954. It turned out to be an Ayub-centric constitution with the President as the pivot.

The constitution ultimately established a 'constitutional autocracy' and introduced an all-powerful presidential system comparable to the British Vice-regal system where no safeguard against arbitrary government existed. **Herbert Feldman** noted that Ayub's training as a soldier and officer in the British Indian Army had influenced Ayub's behavior and mannerisms.<sup>181</sup> The British, too were more paternalistic than vindictive, but maintained their benevolent rule with a firm grip.

The most outstanding feature of the Constitution was an excessively strong executive with a secure tenure, an extremely weak Parliament, a system of elections that clearly favored the government and restriction of the activities of certain politicians popular and strong enough to challenge the government. The Ayub constitution was designed to remove the obstacles that hampered executive decision-making both at the center and the provinces. The President's powers were enormous and overwhelming mainly at the legislatures expense. Even a two-third majority could not override the President's veto. He could refer the bill in question to a referendum. In the matter of budget, his powers were even more formidable vis-à-vis the National Assembly as it could only control that part of the annual budget statement that represented new expenditure. It had no control over recurring expenditure.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 99

<sup>181</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century", OUP, 1977, p. 271.

<sup>182</sup> V.Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 92-93.

Moreover, the head of state did not have to stand for re-election because **Article 226** of the new constitution stated that the referendum of Feb. 1960 confirming Field Marshal Ayub Khan as the country's first President' ipso facto made him the first President under the new constitution.<sup>183</sup> Ayub's continuance as President, the fact that he was not called to compete in an open election, even in an indirect one, could be interpreted as security for the new constitution. This was to be a pre-condition for the lifting up of the martial law, so that even though the military regime was officially terminated, Ayub's dictatorial powers remained intact shrouded in a civilian grab.

Therefore, the 1962 Constitution revolved around the personality of the President, and under it Ayub enjoyed more powers than either President of USA or the Prime Minister of England.<sup>184</sup> It was a planned disengagement of the military form power and a careful transition to civilian rule by political and constitutional engineering, and aimed at making authoritarianism appear palatable, respectable and legal.

Thus, on 8<sup>th</sup> Jun., the 1962 Constitution was enforced and elected assemblies began to function, bringing an end to Pakistan's first military regime.

## **THE YAHYA KHAN PERIOD**

The Yahya regime represents a crucial point in the political history of Pakistan; essentially it laid bare the limitations of the so-called 'guided democracy' experiment in the country. The regime found it difficult to avoid addressing large-scale problems inherited from the previous regime. Holding the national elections for the first time in the country's history proved to be a significant step.<sup>185</sup> Instead of consolidating democratic governance, it unleashed such forces which the authoritarian political order established by the previous regime was unable to handle, and ultimately ended up in a civil war and the subsequent break-up of the country.

Though short in duration (Mar. 1969-Dec. 1971), the Yahya interlude was a major turning point in Pakistani foreign and military affairs, and in its internal affairs. This era was one of high

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<sup>183</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century", OUP, 1977, p. 265.

<sup>184</sup> Dr. K.L. Kamal, "Pakistan: The Garrison State", Intellectual Publishing House, Apr. 1982, p. 63-64.

<sup>185</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 228.

drama and fast moving events that revealed the hollowness of Pakistani political life, and the bankruptcy of its political and military establishments. It was Yahya Khan's regime that saw the militarization on a national scale of the festering economic, political and cultural conflicts between the Punjab-dominated West Pakistan and the poor but politically conscious and larger grouping of Bengalis in East Pakistan.<sup>186</sup> And it was during his military regime that the army lost its face in the 1971 Indo-Pak war, and had to revert back to the barracks leaving the political sphere to the civilian leaders.

### **Nature of the Military Regime:**

The Yahya regime came to power as a caretaker government with the avowed intention of transferring power to political leaders once the prevailing political deadlock was solved. The regime began on a temporary basis, which was proved by Yahya Khan's announcement in Nov. 1969 of holding general election on the basis of adult franchise in Oct. 1970. However, it is another matter that later on he shifted his priority from returning power to politicians to the consolidation of his own powers and interests<sup>187</sup>, which would be explained later in this section. Though even Yahya's regime maintained a military -bureaucratic coterie, yet this time round the bureaucracy was discredited and relegated to the position of a minor partner. By this time the civil service, because of its direct and very evident participation in the mismanagement of the country's affairs under Ayub, had thoroughly discredited itself. The new regime was conscious that the bureaucracy had been widely condemned for elitism during the anti-Ayub movement.<sup>188</sup> Thus, in 1969, for the first time the GHQ decided that the role of the Army was not merely to act as the main source of support and sustenance for a civilian dominated system, but to become the main arbitrator of the country's destiny.<sup>189</sup>

**Peerzada**, the Principal Staff Officer to the CMLA, said, "*We took the blame last time when everything was done by the civilians. This time we will do everything and take the credit too.*"<sup>190</sup>

In contrast to the Ayub regime, which had been very prompt in having a civilian cabinet, the

<sup>186</sup> Ashok Kapur, "Pakistan in Crisis", Routledge Inc., 1991, p. 92-93.

<sup>187</sup> V.Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 65

<sup>188</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 240.

<sup>189</sup> Md. Ayoob, "Military in Pakistan's Political Development", in 'Political System in Pakistan vol. 5' ed. by V. Grover and R. Arora, Deep and Deep Publications, 1995, p. 14.

<sup>190</sup> Fazal Muqeem Khan, "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership", National Book Foundation, 1973, p. 19.

second military regime decided to have no such partnership. During the Yahya regime the civil service was, to put it euphemistically, put in its place. The Yahya regime tried to benefit from the mistakes of its predecessor. Yahya realized that Ayub's downfall could be somewhat attributed to his over dependence on senior civil servants.

Thus, Yahya's regime began a new era, an era of military hegemony. The civil service became secondary under Yahya.<sup>191</sup> As Md. Ayoob contended, "*with the installation of the second martial law regime on 25 Mar. 1969, the character of the government for the first time, in contrast to Ayub's civilian-dominated regime, became overwhelmingly military.*"<sup>192</sup> Parallel military officers were attached to civilian officers at all levels of the administrative hierarchy, and the headquarters of the CMLA and the two provincial Martial Law Administrators attempted to run the government directly. The navy and air force chiefs were first appointed DCMLA and these Governors of East and West Pakistan, respectively. Participation of the bureaucracy in the higher strata of decision-making was considerably curtailed. The groups of people who now took the vital decisions were all serving generals. A junta was then operating on the ground floor of the presidential establishment. In addition to General Yahya, six senior generals and two civilian officers formed the inner circle of Pakistan's rulers.

However, this doesn't mean that the bureaucracy had no role to play. The Army High Command was certainly dependent upon the bureaucracy to carry on the day-to-day administration, but the effectiveness of the bureaucracy seemed to be limited to routine matters, and it was certainly relegated to the position of the minor partner in the military-bureaucratic combine. It was also made clear that civilians who were admitted into the inner circle were there purely on the sufferance of the Army Generals and could be removed from positions of trust whenever the GHQ so desired. Some strong measures were also taken to put the fear of God into the civil service and to prove to the people that the Army was cleaning up the administrative machinery. By Jan. 1970, the regime terminated the services for 303 civil servants including some top CSP officers.<sup>193</sup>

Even introduction of civilians in the President's cabinet in Jun. 1970 was made to use the civilians as a buffer. The civilian cabinet was no more than a bunch of stooges who were

<sup>191</sup> Ashok Kapur, "Pakistan in Crisis", Routledge Inc., 1991, p. 100.

<sup>192</sup> Md. Ayoob, "Military in Pakistan's Political Development", in 'Political System in Pakistan vol. 5' ed. by V. Grover and R. Arora, Deep and Deep Publications, 1995, p. 23.

<sup>193</sup> V. Kukreja, "Military Intervention in Politics - A Case study of Pakistan", NBO Publications, 1985, p. 101.

supposed to make appropriate statements and speeches at the behest of the military junta, or were placed there for providing a civilian garb to the essentially military character of the regime. Even this was later done away with. Soon after the general elections in Dec. 1970, the civilian cabinet was sent packing.

Thus, the Yahya regime became more truly military in nature than even the regime of Ayub Khan. Not only this, but in contrast to Ayub's one-man regime and standing in the polity, General Yahya Khan was only the first among a group of ruling Generals, although he seemed to have risen in stature by the fact of occupying the Presidential Chair.<sup>194</sup> Another significant feature of Yahya regime was that, unlike Ayub's regime, it was not marked by harmony and lacked consensus among the military officers. Power tussles took place between Yahya Khan and his counterparts in the navy and air force. His regime had much palace intrigues at play.

Another difference between Ayub's and Yahya's regimes was their attitude towards the political leadership. Unlike Ayub who disdained politicians and wanted to stay above politics, Yahya recognized the necessity of both politics and politicians. He decided to play the role of an arbitrator among the conflicting groups. Yahya's regime came at a time when the military itself was under pressure from the politicians, unlike during Ayub's time, and so had to allow some form of effective political participation to assuage the mass agitation that had earlier led to Ayub's downfall. So, Yahya government decided to hold direct elections throughout the country by the end of 1970.

However, the initiative was very much with the military junta. Yahya Khan through his **Legal Framework Order**<sup>195</sup> of 1970 kept the politicians in leash just as it did with the bureaucracy. Therefore, under Pakistan's second military regime, the important decisions were the preserve of the military brass.<sup>196</sup> While up to 1969 it was the bureaucratic element that dominated the complex, since 1969 the roles were reversed. The Army used the bureaucracy as a tool. This beyond doubt affirmed that militarism reigned supreme in Pakistan, as it had never done before 1969.

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<sup>194</sup> Md. Ayoob, "Military in Pakistan's Political Development", in 'Political System in Pakistan vol. 5' ed. by V. Grover and R. Arora, Deep and Deep Publications, 1995, p. 13.

<sup>195</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 125.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid., p. 122.

**Major Administrative and Economic Measures:**

The second military regime of Pakistan came in the wake of a mass movement against the earlier military regime. This made it imperative for the new regime to take steps to counter it so that the mass agitation doesn't start targeting it too. The Yahya regime moved swiftly to address the social and economic grievances in order to assuage the politically active and vocal groups to nullify the threat to itself.

As mentioned earlier, the new regime was aware of the anti-bureaucratic sentiments of the masses. Therefore, the Yahya regime targeted the bureaucracy for disciplinary action to assert its control and to show that it was sensitive to popular resentment against the bureaucracy. In May a three member special committee was appointed to investigate the properties and assets of the senior civil servants and their dependents. A **Service Reorganization Committee**, headed by Justice A.R. Cornelius was established in Nov. to review the existing administrative structure.<sup>197</sup>

The most drastic step, however, was the termination of the services of 303 civil servants including 39 top CSP cadre officers and 17 from the police service, on a number of charges of corruption, misuse of office and possession of property disproportionate to known lawful income, and misconduct.<sup>198</sup>

Also, a number of steps were taken to placate the students and the labor forces that were in the forefront of the anti-Ayub movement. The regime moved fast to appease these two most active groups. Air Marshal Nur Khan, the DCMLA of West Pakistan, announced the framework for a new education policy on 27 Apr. 1969, which emphasized students' participation in academic affairs and institutional autonomy. The policy made a block allocation of Rs. 17 crores to cover various schemes related to technical, higher agricultural education, training and higher emoluments for teachers and curriculum development.<sup>199</sup>

Similarly, the new labor policy, announced in Jul. 1969 accommodated some of the major labor demands on collective bargaining, right to strike and lockout. The number of essential and public utility services where strikes were prohibited under Ayub's regime, was reduced and the right to

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<sup>197</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 123

<sup>198</sup> V. Kukreja, "Military Intervention in Politics - A Case study of Pakistan", NBO Publications, 1985, p. 101.

<sup>199</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 239.

set up unions in the public sector organizations like railway, telephone and telegraph was recognized. Also, a new three-scale minimum wage structure was fixed.<sup>200</sup>

The regime also announced that English would be eliminated as the official languages in six years and that the government employees would be required to know Urdu and Bengali by 1973, so as to lessen their ignorance of popular aspirations. Later, the government ordered an inquiry into the affairs of English-medium Christian missionary schools which were publicly derided for spreading elitism and creating an 'alien' class.<sup>201</sup>

But, the most significant administrative measure was the abolition of the integrated province of West Pakistan (set up in Oct. 1955) and the break-up of the One Unit system that gave way to the re-establishment of West Pakistan into four provinces – Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Balochistan. The status of Balochistan was raised to that of a province to bring it at par with other provinces. The former princely states of Dir, Chitral and Swat were merged with West Pakistan in Jul. 1969 to form the **Malakand Agency** – a step towards greater national integration.<sup>202</sup> Yahya Khan also scrapped the parity between East and West Pakistans regarding seats in the parliament. He gave the provinces representation in the National Assembly on the basis of their population ratio, thereby giving East Pakistan the much-demanded numerical superiority due to its larger population.<sup>203</sup>

As far as the economic sphere was concerned, the military regime took several measures to accommodate the criticisms of Ayub's economic strategy that had neglected the distributive aspect of development. In Feb. 1970, the **Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Ordinance** (Control and prevention) was issued to check undue concentration of economic power, growth of unreasonable monopoly and unreasonably restrictive trade practices. As a balancing act amongst the provinces, a new financial institution, the **Equity Participation Fund**, with HQ in Dhaka, was established for supplementing the capital and resources of small and medium sized enterprises in the private sector in East Pakistan and the less developed areas of West Pakistan. The head office of Industrial Development Bank was shifted to Dhaka. The

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<sup>200</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 123.

<sup>201</sup> The Pakistan Times, 3 Jan. 1970.

<sup>202</sup> K.M. Arif, "Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97", OUP, 2001, p. 105.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid. p. 104.

Fourth Five Year Plan, initiated in Jul. 1970, allocated more than half of the resources for the first time to East Pakistan, i.e. 52.5% as against 36% in the Third Plan.<sup>204</sup>

These sound and far-reaching reforms enjoyed political consensus in the country and showed that Yahya, despite being an unelected ruler, had his fingers on the national pulse. However, he did not get sufficient credit for these acts because they became clouded under the shadow of defeat that the country subsequently faced in the Indo-Pak 1971 War.<sup>205</sup>

### **Civilianization of the Regime and the Political Crisis:**

The second martial law regime started out from the perceived mandate of holding elections under the parliamentary system on the basis of adult franchise. It started its tenure under the moral pressure to take the nation back to democracy. As a way of legitimizing his unconstitutional military take over Yahya emphasized the transient character of his regime and repeatedly underlined his commitment to hold new elections and transfer power to the elected representatives.

To this effect, a new **Chief Election Commissioner, Justice Abdus Sattar** was appointed at the end of Jul. 1969 to make necessary arrangements for the general elections to be held in Oct. 1970, as later announced by Yahya in Nov. 1969. By itself this decision was historic in the process of Pakistan's political development. While there had been presidential referendum and nation wide exercise of polls before that, only the 1970 elections could come to enjoy the distinction of being Pakistan's first free and fair national election on the basis of adult franchise, and that too under a military regime.<sup>206</sup>

The regime however kept the initiative in its hands by adopting a number of mechanisms through which it could have a decisive say in the future constitutional order in Pakistan. First of all, the regime announced a **Legal Framework Order (LFO)**<sup>207</sup> on 30 Mar. 1970 that provided the parameters for the general election and constitutional making. The LFO fixed a time limit of 120 days for the elected National Assembly to frame a new constitution, and Yahya Khan gave himself the power to veto any constitutional document produced by the Assembly. Since the

<sup>204</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 123.

<sup>205</sup> K.M. Arif, "Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97", OUP, 2001, p. 105.

<sup>206</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 243

<sup>207</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 125.



elections were expected to return a multi-party-system and the time limit to frame the constitution was only 120 days, the regime hoped to play a key role in balancing the different parties. Also, even if one party were to obtain an absolute majority, Yahya still retained the power to refuse validation of the constitutional bill if it upset the ruling elite.<sup>208</sup>

This, accordingly to Ayesha Jalal, showed that the military high command clearly had no intention of handing over power to any group, whether from the eastern or western wings, which aimed at restructuring the state and overturning the dominance of the military.<sup>209</sup> Yahya Khan was not interested in giving up power completely; he wanted the reins to be in his hands. Veena Kukreja too wrote, "*Yahya was deeply concerned with giving the impression of 'civilianization' while he hoped for a permanent constitutional role for the armed forces as final arbiter between feuding parties.*"<sup>210</sup>

Yahya's 'civilianization' was to comprise of three phases. First phase was that of the elections. The next was to frame a constitution. The final phase involved the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. The first phase was completed with the general elections held on 2 Dec. 1970. That a military dictator gave an electoral culture to the country that his civilian predecessors had failed to offer, was a feather in the cap Yahya Khan.<sup>211</sup>

In the elections, the Awami League (AL) of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and Bhutto's People's Party (PPP) swept the polls in East and West Pakistan, respectively. The AL captured 160 out of 162 seats from East Pakistan as well as 7 women seats, raising its strength to 167 in a house of 313 seats. Despite its enormous success it remained a regional party because it did not win a single seat in West Pakistan. On the other hand, PPP won 81 of the 138 seats in West Pakistan, though its support base was confined to Punjab and Sind and did not even contest a single seat in East Pakistan.<sup>212</sup>

The ruling generals were surprised at the magnitude of success of these parties. They were upset because these results made it difficult for them to force a political settlement. Yahya had been hoping that no party would emerge with majority thus, enabling him to manipulate things his

<sup>208</sup> Rounaq Jahan, "Pakistan: Failure in National Integration", CUP, 1972, p. 188.

<sup>209</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, p. 61

<sup>210</sup> V.Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 95.

<sup>211</sup> K.M. Arif, "Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97", OUP, 2001, p. 106.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p. 106-107

own way.<sup>213</sup> But, what gave Yahya hope was the fact that though the AL and PPP won the elections in the two wings, their exclusive regional support bases gave him the opening he needed to delay the transfer of power in the hope of extracting terms which could perpetuate the existing state structure and with it the embedded dominance of the military. So, even though Yahya was credited for Pakistan's first ever free and fair elections, it was to his utter discredit that he did not implement its results, which gave Mujibur Rehman a clear political victory and right to form the national government.<sup>214</sup>

The AL owed its victory to its image of a champion of Bengali rights, as envisaged by its **Six Point Program**, which called for greater autonomy for East Pakistan. Mujib took a hard line of confrontation, rather than compromise, with the military and Bhutto combine in West Pakistan. Bhutto too refused to share power with Mujib, which led to a political deadlock.

The hardliners in AL, especially the student leaders, argued for independence. Mujib, even if he wanted, could not have gone back on his six-point formula. The military-Bhutto combine saw this formula as a veiled charter for a confederation that contained the genesis of constitutional secession. Bhutto argued that no single political party could frame a constitution without safeguarding the legitimate interests of all the federating units. He alleged that "*Mujib wanted to establish an independent, fascist and racist regime in East Pakistan as he did not believe in the integrity of the country.*"<sup>215</sup> Mujib, on the other hand, claimed that the people in East Pakistan had spoken on the issue and that he could not change public opinion.

Had Pakistan been a single, compact territorial entity, the electoral outcome – emergence of regional groups – might not have created serious difficulty. However, the physical separation of its wings polarized the country. The regional split was accentuated by the egocentric attitudes of the two charismatic and populist leaders – Mujib and Bhutto – whose irrational and uncompromising attitudes put the country on an irreversible collision course.

The military regime in the political dead lock decided to side with Bhutto because their interests matched. AL's six points were likely to cripple the army's financial autonomy. The proposal that East Pakistan should be allowed complete control over its foreign exchange earnings could have meant that this financial source could no longer be as easily available to the army for

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<sup>213</sup> Md. Asghar Khan, "Generals in Politic: Pakistan – 1958 to 1982", Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p. 23.

<sup>214</sup> Ashok Kapur, "Pakistan in Crisis", Routledge Inc., 1991, p. 94.

<sup>215</sup> Dawn, Karachi, 28 Mar. 1971.

procuring hardware from abroad as in the past. This threat to its corporate interest, especially regarding economic autonomy and the possible reduction of its vast fighting machines to humble proportions, made the army positively hostile towards East Pakistan.<sup>216</sup>

Some of the features of AL's constitutional draft were known, including withdrawal of Pakistan from CENTO and SEATO, which would have been detrimental to the army. During Bhutto-Mujib talks in Jan. 1971, the latter proposed reversing the tide of economic development in favor of East Pakistan, making West Pakistan pay for it, and safeguarding these by virtually turning them into constitutional obligations. The East Pakistanis resented their poor representation in the armed forces which had been controlling power in Pakistan for the last decade, thereby robbing them off any share in the power. The Bengalis had also resented that in the 1965 Indo-Pak war, the two wings were practically cut off from each other for 17 days, which demonstrated that the government lacked adequate arrangements for the defense of the eastern wing which could have been overrun by India.

They, therefore, maintained that the huge defense expenditure was meant only for West Pakistan's defense. The demand for raising a separate East Pakistani Military contained in the six-point charter was virtually a motion of no confidence against the army. The League also accused the military regime of playing up the Kashmir issue to justify high defense expenditure. The AL became vocal in demanding friendly relations with India – a demand that irked the ruling military elite.<sup>217</sup>

Pakistan army's fears vis-à-vis the six points made it join hands with the PPP on the basis of similar interests regarding military strength and foreign policy. Bhutto met Yahya Khan on 19 Feb. 1971 and advised that the government should either postpone the National Assembly session to be held on 3<sup>rd</sup> Mar. 1971, or waive the 120 days time limit for framing the constitution. Later he announced the boycott of the Assembly unless he got Mujib's assurance for accommodation of his party's perspective on constitution framing. Mujib was not ready to budge from his confrontationalist stand against the conspiracy to deny him power.

Yahya on 22 Feb. called a conference of Governors and Martial Law Administrators to review the situation. Yahya felt that it had become important to discipline the Bengali nationalist forces and considered it expedient to dismiss the civilian cabinet. Therefore, on 1<sup>st</sup> Mar. 1971, Yahya

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<sup>216</sup> V. Kukreja, "Military Intervention in Politics - A Case study of Pakistan", NBO Publications, 1985, p. 108.

<sup>217</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 131.

stated that in the polarized political climate it was inappropriate to hold the National Assembly session on 3<sup>rd</sup> Mar.<sup>218</sup> and the session was indefinitely postponed.

Public reaction in East Pakistan was spontaneous and hostile, and the postponement was seen as a conspiracy against the Bengalis. An enraged Mujibur vowed that the postponement would not go unchallenged. He called for a civil disobedience starting from 3<sup>rd</sup> Mar. Dhaka came to a stand still. 3<sup>rd</sup> March was declared a day of mourning with a province-wide strike. The national flag was desecrated. Mujib asked people not to pay taxes until power was transferred to the people's representatives.<sup>219</sup>

East Pakistan was by then in the grip of a popular uprising that made the demand for a separate Bengali nation louder. The Bangladesh flag was unfurled on all governmental buildings in the province. The military personnel were subjected to verbal insults in the streets and the supply of food items and essential goods of daily use was suspended to the cantonments.<sup>220</sup> By mid-Mar. the situation had deteriorated to the point of almost no-return, and a peaceful resolution of the conflict could hardly be expected.

For the ruling military regime the real issue was the regaining of political initiative that it had lost to Mujib by postponing the National Assembly session. Now it had to take tough measures to control the situation. The military commanders had already made up their minds on 23<sup>rd</sup> Mar. to go for the military option as they felt the eastern wing had virtually slipped out of their hands. On the night of 25<sup>th</sup> Mar. 1971, Yahya Khan opted for the option of a military crackdown to discipline the AL and to re-establish the failing writ of his regime. Thus, Yahya took the fateful decision of launching **Operation Searchlight**.

Operational Searchlight was launched on 1 a.m. on the night of 25-26 Mar. 1971. Its immediate military objective was to arrest prominent AL leaders; disarm all Bengali troops; control all naval bases and airfields; ensure security of all towns; and firmly enforce law and order in the province.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> K.M. Arif, "Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97", OUP, 2001, p. 115.

<sup>219</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 276-277.

<sup>220</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 135.

<sup>221</sup> K.M. Arif, "Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97", OUP, 2001, p. 120.

The military action was extremely brutal and caused much loss of life. East Pakistan faced a great human tragedy and the military crackdown led to genocide and weakened Pakistan still further. A bloody civil war ensued in Pakistan, which was further worsened by the involvement of India. India's role was critical in tilting the balance against Pakistan by helping to set up the Bangladesh government in exile.

The huge influx of refugees from East Pakistan prompted India to give Pakistan ultimatum that if the refugee flows continues through her borders she would not sit idle. By Nov. the civil war in Pakistan no longer remained its internal matter and the situation deteriorated to a full-fledged war between India and Pakistan. India attacked East Pakistan with eight divisions on 21<sup>st</sup> Nov. 1971, and on 3<sup>rd</sup> Dec. Pakistan launched an air and ground attack on India in the west to release pressure on its troops in the east.<sup>222</sup>

The Pakistani troops – outnumbered and out maneuvered – couldn't withstand the well-coordinated and massive Indian advance in the east. By 13-14 Dec. Indian troops had reached the outskirts of Dhaka and Pakistan's administration collapsed.

Finally, on 16<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1971 at 4.31 p.m., **Lt. General Niazi**, Commander Eastern Command signed the instrument of surrender at the Ramna Race Course ground in Dhaka. He surrendered his revolver and badges to Lt. General **Jagjit Singh Aurora**, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, Indian Army. The new nation of **Bangladesh** was thus, born out of the ashes of East Pakistan and humiliation of West Pakistan.<sup>223</sup>

The Yahya regime was therefore, the most turbulent period in Pakistan's history. He assumed power as a caretaker ruler with a promise to restore civilian and democratic rule. However, he plunged the country into a bloody civil war. General Yahya Khan bears the stigma for presiding over the break-up of Pakistan. The fall of Dhaka and the ignoble military surrender was a nightmare for the people of Pakistan. It tumbled the Yahya regime out of power and the subdued and beaten military had to finally revert to its barracks giving up the field voluntarily to the civilians.

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<sup>222</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 140

<sup>223</sup> K.M. Arif, "Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97", OUP, 2001, p. 130-131.

## **ZIA-UL-HAQ'S MILITARY REGIME**

The third military regime of Zia-ul-Haq, like the second military regime of Yahya Khan, came as a temporary measure to resolve a political deadlock brought on by the conflicting political parties – the PPP and the PNA – during the spring 1977 elections. When General Zia took over power on 5<sup>th</sup> Jul. 1977, he underlined the caretaker nature of the martial rule in a nationalized address on television, and called his regime a “90-day operation” of restoration to democracy by holding of free and fair elections in Oct. 1977 and transfer of power to the elected representatives.

**Militarism** and **Islam** were the twin pillars of the Zia regime. No other military dictator of Pakistan had used religion as the pivot for mobilizing support of its regime. Both Ayub and Yahya distanced their regimes from the religious aspects. But, during the Zia regime, the religious groups once again became stronger and gained much political clout by supporting the military regime, giving it their religious blessings.

Unlike the two previous martial law regimes which sought to preserve the existing power structure, Zia's military regime tried to rehabilitate the alienated elite sections during the previous civilian regime of Z.A. Butto. Therefore, it came to power with the twin tasks of deconstructions of the politico-economic structures that were built by Bhutto's PPP regime and resurrection of the processes that would strengthen religio-Islamic and military hegemony.<sup>224</sup>

### **Nature of the Regime:**

Gen Zia-ul-Haq's regime was the first truly military regime of Pakistan in the sense that it wholly depended on the military as its constituency and showered patronage on its personnel to offset the absence of any support base in the wider society. Unlike Ayub and Yahya, Zia not only considered the army as the first and fundamental pillar of his regime, but also wanted to assign a pivotal position to the army in the constitution as the final custodian of the country's integrity. Zia initiated a systematic campaign to extend the military's dominance beyond the state structure to all aspects of civil society. Where Ayub had been content to rely on the bureaucratic

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<sup>224</sup> Saeed Shafqat, “Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan”, Westview Press, 1993, p. 191.

instruments of state control, Zia intended his regime to be not only overtly authoritarian, but plainly military in character.<sup>225</sup>

Zia argued for the expansion of the role of the military in the polity by declaring time and again that the military not merely protected the geographical frontiers of the country, but was also the guardian of the 'ideological frontiers'. It was the military's responsibility to ensure that Pakistan's Islamic identity was protected and Pakistani society developed on Islamic lines.<sup>226</sup> It was their duty as the '**soldiers of Islam**' to safeguard its Islamic ideology. The ruling general floated the idea of amending the constitution to enable the military to share decision-making powers with the political elite, and that the military should have the constitutional power and right to ask a government to resign in the event of what is considered to be a crisis. Zia referred to this approach as the "**Turkish solution**".<sup>227</sup>

The regime placed military officers in key positions in a number of ministries to implement its policies as well as to gain access to all the major decision-making layers of the government. Military officers were appointed not only as secretaries in ministries like defense, information, interior, communication and housing and labor, a number of military officers were also appointed at the level of joint and deputy secretaries. A reserved quota system of jobs in ministries and departments was also introduced for serving and ex-servicemen soldiers.

Zia, therefore, brought the military to the core of decision-making process. The Zia-led junta consisted of an inner core of the highest ranking military officers, surrounded by a circle of serving and retired officers who, in turn, were interwoven with a phalanx of civilian specialists. By contrast, Ayub never really governed with a junta, nor did he employ the army command structure in direct governance. During the first two years of his rule, Zia's Council of Advisors constituted of Generals only, but later in 1978 it also included the civilians in it. Yet, although periodic changes occurred within the civilian group, the core military leadership remained relatively stable.<sup>228</sup>

Zia sought to tighten the military's grip on the civil administration by dividing the country into five military zones under the command of five serving military men. Corp Commanders were appointed Zonal Martial Law Administrators in Jul. 1977, and later were also to hold office of

<sup>225</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, p. 103

<sup>226</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 181.

<sup>227</sup> K.B. Sayeed, "Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change", Praeger Publication, 1980, p. 183.

<sup>228</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century", OUP, 1977, p. 453-455.

Governors. A number of serving generals were appointed to the post of 'permanent secretaries', and many were made additional or joint secretaries.<sup>229</sup>

The military under Zia went further than ever before in its pursuit of institutional goals. In the first year of the regime the defense expenditure rose from \$960 million to \$1180 million, most of it being spent on the increase in material well-being of the defense personnel. The regime also provided a 10% quota in administrative jobs and a 33% quota for lower jobs in the industrial sector for military, ex-servicemen. They were also provided with jobs in the Gulf on the basis of rotation.<sup>230</sup> Military rewards of various kind were offered to the military personnel as part of the policy to distribute rewards of power in the military.

The corporate interests of the military also expanded by increasing their role in the industrial public sector and Para-eco institutions. It was no more a question of simply protecting the institutional interest of the military. It also meant an opportunity to advance personal careers and seek attractive jobs in the civilian sector. The real break through came in the form of military officers' appointment to top bureaucratic jobs. In 1980, as many as ¼ of the 35-40 top bureaucratic positions were held by servicemen. During 1981-85 periods, out of a total of 40-66 Ambassadorial posts, about 16-20 were held by retired military (mostly army) officers.<sup>231</sup>

All this did not go well with the bureaucracy, which was made a very junior partner in the regime. The bureaucracy resented this subordinate role and the military officers making major in-roads into the bastions of the bureaucracy. Even top bureaucrats were now dependent on military patrons. There was perceptible tension between the military and bureaucracy on account of career opportunities being denied to the latter as a result of the military junta's policy of militarizing the entire bureaucratic set-up by inducting more retired and servicing members of armed forces than ever before. This implicit rivalry between the two non-elected institutions distinguished Zia's regime from those of Ayub and Yahya.<sup>232</sup>

Another distinguishing feature of Zia's regime was that only a section of the military, primarily drawn from the army, was directly engaged in the martial rule. The air force and navy had no say in the army high command's decision to assume state power, and so, were restricted to watching

<sup>229</sup> Saeed Shafqat, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan", Westview Press, 1993, p. 201.

<sup>230</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 366.

<sup>231</sup> Saeed Shafqat, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan", Westview Press, 1993, p. 201

<sup>232</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, p. 104-105



the spectacle from the sidelines.<sup>233</sup> Zia showed his favoritism towards the army. He selectively gave extensions to a number of generals in the army. But, he did not give any such extensions to the Chiefs of Air force and Navy, and retired them as soon as they completed their tenure.

As far as the political opposition was concerned, neither did he distance himself from them like Ayub nor did he facilitate them by holding elections like Yahya Khan. He selectively applied the formula of political inclusion of one group and political exclusion of another, and manipulated the politicians to serve his own ends.

Zia's handling of the dissenting political parties exemplifies a Machiavellian streak. He began his martial law career with a dual strategy, i.e. by making seeming preparation for the promised elections to keep the PNA on his side, at the same time effecting long-ranging structural changes in the administration to weed out all pro-Bhutto elements.<sup>234</sup> As part of the inclusionary process, the regime began to cultivate PNA leadership to support and become part of the regime. On the other hand, as part of political exclusion, the regime made large-scale arrests of the PPP leaders and workers. Zia arrested Bhutto in Sep. 1977 on a number of charges, mainly for the murder of an opposition political leader.

In Oct. 1977, Zia postponed the elections because of the probability that Bhutto might win, and also because he was guilty of 'high treason' for violating **Article 6** of the Constitution of 1973. He espoused the pretext of first establishing the principle of political accountability in case of the former PM, Bhutto, before any election could be held. The PNA went along with this game since it feared a loss in the election owing to the deposed Bhutto's growing popularity. PNA's main priority and attitude was that trial and accountability of Bhutto should take place first, elections could be held later.<sup>235</sup> In this way, Zia co-opted the PNA leadership and even gave 13 ministries to its various components in his cabinet, mainly with the intention of using the PNA as a civilian cover.

The political exclusion of PNA started after the first two years of the regime. Once Bhutto was executed in Apr. 1979, and with his main threat out of the way, Zia no longer needed the PNA and therefore, indefinitely postponed holding of elections on 16<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1979 and banned all

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<sup>233</sup> Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge University Press, p. 104

<sup>234</sup> V.Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations in South Asia", Sage Publications, 1991, p. 83-84.

<sup>235</sup> Saeed Shafqat, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan", Westview Press, 1993, p. 192-193.

political activities and parties. When the PNA pressurized him, he dismissed the PNA from his cabinet and abandoned whatever civilian touch he had given to his regime.

Pakistan, therefore, under Zia reached the ultimate of military rule. Zia was much more vigorous in pursuing military's hegemony as compared to previous military rulers. He intensified coercion against civilian leaders. No other military rule institutionalized consultation and decision-making through corp commanders as Zia did in his regime. The military centric nature of the regime was most clear in its effort to create a '**partie military**' – an aggregation of interests that would accept military's hegemony and advocate its interests.

### **Economic Performance of the Regime:**

The Zia regime has been accredited with a reasonable economic performance. The economy in statistical terms represented a rosy picture, especially when contrasted with the previous civilian regime of Bhutto. During Zia's 11 years of rule, i.e. from 1977-88, the economy grew impressively by about 6.5% annually, agriculture by 5.4% and industry by 8.2%. Moreover, for the period of 1980-88, Pakistan's GDP growth rate was recognized by the World Bank as the fourth highest in the world.<sup>236</sup> In contrast, the five and half years under Bhutto showed only an average growth of 4.4% p.a. with both agriculture and industry growing by mere 2%. The economy, therefore, clearly started to revitalize after Bhutto was overthrown.<sup>237</sup>

After replacing Bhutto, the military regime tried to counter Bhutto's leftist economic policies. In order to get support from the economic elite, Zia chose to move along a rightist course of action. To reassure the support of the main propertied classes, the regime abandoned all economic, so-called socialist policies pursued by the Bhutto government. Though the regime did not pursue large-scale denationalization, yet it selectively denationalized some industries, like the flour mills and rice-husking mills. It significantly lowered the relative rate of investment in the public sector in an apparent effort to 'redress' the imbalance against the private sector as the Bhutto era was envisaged to have resulted in.<sup>238</sup> Landlords also benefited under the regime as the landed aristocracy were spared from land reforms and exempted from agricultural tax.<sup>239</sup>

<sup>236</sup> V.Kukreja, "Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Crises and Conflicts", Sage Publications, 2003, p. 304.

<sup>237</sup> Mahmood Monshpouri and Amjad Samuel, "Development & Democracy in Pakistan", *Asian Survey*, vol. 35, Nov. 1995, p. 980.

<sup>238</sup> Saeed Shafqat, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan", Westview Press, 1993, p. 207-08

<sup>239</sup> V.Kukreja, "Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Crises and Conflicts", Sage Publications, 2003, p. 98.

The Zia regime's economic policies contributed towards economic growth because the policies were formulated in the broad framework of World Bank /IMF guidelines. These encouraged import liberalization, withdrawal of subsidies and devaluation of exchange rates. Thus, the regime adopted economic policies to appease the industrial and commercial groups. Also, an element of luck was involved. Good climatic conditions during Zia's period led to bumper agricultural crops. With bumper crops of cotton at 5.9 million and 7.1 million bales, and wheat at 11.7 and 13.5 million tonnes in the years 1984-85 and 1985-86, respectively, the growth rate was phenomenal at 12% and 6.5% respectively.<sup>240</sup> Agricultural groups thus remained contented. However, one significant cause for Zia's impressive economic achievements had nothing to do with his economic policies. This was the significant inflow of funds in the form of remittances due to migration of people to West Asia to find jobs. Approximately 10 million people, 11% of the total population, benefited directly from this exodus. According to Shahid Javed Burki, "*From 1975-85, Pakistan received a total of \$25 billion remittances from the workers in the Middle East, a good proportion of which went to the poorer segments of the society.*" The impact of this money on the absolute poor was important as it helped in neutralizing the agitational zeal of the poor and the middle-class against the military regime.<sup>241</sup>

The Gulf bonanza, therefore, provided a useful if temporary safety valve for the military regime. To most, an opportunity of a job in the Gulf states held better prospects for the future than a change of government through street agitation.<sup>242</sup>

Another important cause of economic buoyancy in the Zia period that was of an external nature was the large amount of US aid package coming to Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Dec. 1979. This came as a blessing for Zia's regime. The *Economist* incisively commented, "*An accident of history – Russia's blunder into Afghanistan changed the fortunes of Zia regime. Almost overnight Pakistan became a bulwark against Soviet expansion, and General Zia its sturdy leader.*"<sup>243</sup>

Zia had been virtually isolated in the international system as a dictator who had unconstitutionally executed his political adversary. But, now his decision to oppose Soviet

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<sup>240</sup> Md. Waseem, "Politics and the State in Pakistan", National Institute Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 369.

<sup>241</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan Under Zia: 1977-88", *Asian Survey*, vol. XXVIII, no. 10, Oct. 1988, p. 1093.

<sup>242</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 180.

<sup>243</sup> Saeed Shafiq, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan", Westview Press, 1993, p. 209

adventurism and help his Muslim brothers in Afghanistan made him the blue-eyed boy of the USA. In order to wage a proxy war via Pakistan, the USA propagated Pakistan as a “**frontline state**” and provided Pakistan with a bonanza of economic and military aid package of \$3.2 billion and a lifting of arms embargo, which had been imposed after Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1977. US assistance after 1982 totaled around \$5 billion, making Pakistan the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest recipient of US aid in the 80s.<sup>244</sup>

Zia reaped maximum benefits from US strategic compulsions. The Reagan administration’s assistance internally strengthened the position of military vis-à-vis other political groups. It enhanced the institutional strength of the military, and through it the general political stability under the martial law regime.<sup>245</sup>

However, the price paid for this political advantage was considerable. Millions of Afghani refugees poured into Pakistan putting pressure on her economy, social services, ecology, pasture land and water resources. Many foreign countries established intelligence outposts in Pakistan, in the garb of providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees, by their government agencies.

Zia’s Afghan policy had long-term negative implications. It led to the emergence of the “**Kalashnikov and Heroin**” culture and a parallel black economy that undermined the real economy. The Afghan refugees brought with them any number of small arms inside Pakistan. All this had serious implications for the fragile weave of Pakistan’s social fabric. Also, the over-dependence upon US had its own fallacy that stood exposed in the post-Geneva Accord period when America closed the aid tap, withdrew political support, and left Pakistan to fend for itself.<sup>246</sup> But, by that time Zia had died and the burnt of this fell on the following civilian government.

Thus, the Zia regime saw an impressive rate of economic growth mainly due to factors largely external to it, and had very less to do with the regime’s conscious efforts to enthuse the

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<sup>244</sup> Hafez Malik, “The Afghan Crisis & Its Impact on Pakistan”, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. V, no.3, Spring 1982, p. 40-52.

<sup>245</sup> Md. Waseem, “Politics and the State in Pakistan”, National Institute Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, p. 367

<sup>246</sup> K.M. Arif, “Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97”, OUP, 2001, p. 189.

economy. Therefore, as Veena Kukeraja puts it, the Zia era was an era of ‘**artificial prosperity**’.<sup>247</sup> Purely external factors kept the economy buoyant for a decade.

### **Islamization:**

Zia made Islam the center price of his administration: in his first address to the nation he clearly stated that he would try to create an Islamic state.<sup>248</sup> With Zia, Islam became the dominant theme in Pakistan Politics In marked contrast to earlier military regimes in Pakistan, the Zia regime was “puritanical and aggressive in its championing of the cause of Islam”. However, this religious zeal of Zia was apparently born out of his political motives or compulsions for survival. It was more to consolidate his own power than actually establish a truly just Islamic order.

Though legally his military coup had been justified by the Supreme Court under the “doctrine of necessity”, yet lack of political legitimacy haunted him. His government worked under ‘**Khaki shadows**’,<sup>249</sup> and in order to shut his critics up he used Islam as a possible legitimization strategy for the consolidation of his autocratic military rule.

Soon after taking over, Zia realized that given the military nature of his regime, it was incapable of mobilizing political support for itself through a political party. So, shrewdly he exploited religion to ‘evoke an emotional response’ in support of his regime. Lacking any claim of legitimacy, Zia justified his military rule by a new claim, namely, that it had a mission – to create an Islamic polity and economy in Pakistan. Thus, Islam provided a convenient cover with which the Generals covered their lack of legitimacy, on one had, and on the other, used it as a gambit to woo orthodox and reactionary elements. Also at the international level, the ‘Islamization’ drives linked Zia with the Muslim world witnessing revivalism.

Zia, tried to project his own image as the true ‘Solider of Islam’.<sup>250</sup> He justified his position as the over seer of Pakistan’s Islamic destiny. He tried to justify and combine the two most powerful institutions in Pakistan, the military and Islam. His pleas for the reconstruction of the Pakistani society in accordance with tenets of Islam, where Islam is being interpreted in most ways as it suited the military regime, masked the tremendous potential of Islamic idiom as a

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<sup>247</sup> V. Kukreja, “Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Crises and Conflicts”, Sage Publications, 2003, p. 98.

<sup>248</sup> Owen-Bennett Jones, “Pakistan: Eye of the Storm”, Viking Publication, 2002, p. 16.

<sup>249</sup> K.M. Arif, “Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97”, OUP, 2001, p. 174.

<sup>250</sup> Surendra Nath Kaushik, “Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: A study of Zia Regime”, South Asian Publication, 1993, p. 23.

political resource, which he intended to tap fully. Zia considered the army as the guarantor of Pakistan and defender of Islamic ideology. Thus, he put the military in the forefront of the movement for the creation of an Islamic nation based on Islamic ideology and Islamic law.<sup>251</sup>

However, even though Zia proclaimed his intention of establishing an Islamic polity as soon as he took over, it did not figure prominently in the early days of martial law. This was so, because to start with, the regime had the cover of holding elections as the principal reason for taking over power. But, as the commitment to hold elections wavered, the need for Islamization of politics and society began to figure prominently in the policy statements. Once the elections were pushed to the background and 'accountability' of the ousted regime was initiated, Islamization was employed as the *raison d'être* of the continuation of martial law.<sup>252</sup>

The major focus of Islamization was regulative, punitive and extractive. Zia did not employ Islam with the intention of inculcating positive values, such as peace and honesty, imbibed by Islam. Very little attempt was made to project the positive aspects of Islam, i.e. social and economic egalitarianism and accountability of those in power, and thus the socio-economic structural bases of the exiting power arrangements remained unaltered. Zia's uses of religion was limited to aggregating power within an authoritarian state, through police and army, exercising arbitrary control; and to stifle freedom of expression and association.

Zia, therefore, redirected the discourse of Pakistani politics by using Islamic metaphor with new vigor and with the object of Islamizing the polity, society and economy. He sought to bring Islam into politics in several overt ways. He brought changes in the political structure in such a way that it would establish his version of '**Islami Jamhooriyat**' (Islamic Democracy),<sup>253</sup> a political system in which the "best man" would rule, as Muslims believed in one God, one prophet, and one book, and their tendency was such that they should be ruled by one man.

In 1981, Zia nominated a '**Majlis-e-Shoora**', Council of Islamic Ideology, to take place of the National Assembly dissolved by the martial law regime.<sup>254</sup> It was to comprise of Muslims chosen on the basis of 'moral character'. New clauses were inserted in the constitution to explicitly recognize Pakistan as not just a Muslim majority state, but also an Islamic state.

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<sup>251</sup> Dr. K.L. Kamal, "Pakistan: The Garrison State", Intellectual Publishing House, Apr. 1982, p. 90.

<sup>252</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 170.

<sup>253</sup> Surendra Nath Kaushik, "Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: A study of Zia Regime", South Asian Publication, 1993, p. 65.

<sup>254</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, "Historical Dictionary of Pakistan", Vision Books, 2003, p. 223.

In Aug. 1983, the advisory Council of Islamic Ideology pronounced that a presidential form of government was the 'nearest to Islam' and later ruled that political parties were un-Islamic.<sup>255</sup> Also, the **August Plan** clearly mooted the idea of an Islamic Referendum and non-party based general elections.

At the structural level, in 1978, **Shariat Benches** were introduced to enforce laws according to Islamic jurisprudence. Ulema and lawyers were appointed as its members, and their task was to ensure that all laws enacted by the legislature were Islamic. One year later, a Federal Shariat Court replaced the benches and was incorporated in the constitution as a separate chapter – 3A.

As far as the Islamization of society was concerned, Zia stressed the need to direct Pakistani life in accordance with the teachings of Quran and Sunnah and to propagate the faith and performance of their spiritual leader. Citing the adoption of Islamic laws, he reiterated time and again the need to strengthen the country's moral fiber.<sup>256</sup> Obligatory prayer breaks during working hours were introduced in government officers; the non-government sector was encouraged to do the same. Government officials were given the task of persuading people to pray 5 times a day. Zia also insisted that the confidential annual assessments of civil servants should include marks for regularly attending prayers and for having a good knowledge of Islam.<sup>257</sup>

Islam was given greater status in education. Textbooks were overhauled to ensure their ideological purity and un-Islamic texts were removed from libraries and schools. A faculty was also established in the Quaid-I-Azam University in Sep. 1979.

Four punitive laws were issued in Feb. 1979, collectively called the **Hudood Ordinances**, to enforce Islamic punishments for crimes like wrongful imputation of illicit sexual relations, sex-related crimes, theft of property and possession of alcohol and prohibited drugs. The punishments ranged from imprisonment, financial punishments, lashing to amputation of the right hand for theft and stoning to death for adultery or rape.<sup>258</sup>

The regime's Islamization process was especially harsh on women. Under the **Zina Ordinance**, rape was to be punished by the public flogging of the man as well as the women. The Law of **Qisas and Diyat** also discriminated against women by fixing compensation for bodily injuries

<sup>255</sup> Ian Talbot, "India & Pakistan", OUP, 2000, p. 210.

<sup>256</sup> Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century", OUP, 1977, p. 444.

<sup>257</sup> Owen-Bennett Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publication, 2002, p. 17

<sup>258</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 171.

or murder as half of what was admissible to men; for proof of murder liable to Qiasa, evidence of at least two males was essential.

Zia also tried to Islamize the economy. An interest-free banking system, described as a **Profit and Loss Systems (PLS)**, was initiated in Jan. 1981. In 1980, a compulsory tax, **Zakat**, was imposed. It provided for a 2.5% annual deduction from the money resting in a person's bank account on the first day of Ramadan. The Zakat Ordinance was to perform welfare functions for the state by obtaining contributions from the wealthy to fulfill the needs of the poor.<sup>259</sup> Another tax, **Ushr**, made operative in 1983, applied to agricultural produce at rate of 10% of the value of produce.

Therefore, Zia, through his Islamization drive, tried to change the fabric of Pakistani life and do away with most of the modern and secular aspects in the society. His use of Islam in this unprecedented manner cultivated and strengthened Islamist elements that later were to become the roots of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. Islam was used by Zia simply as a political tool to perpetuate himself in power, and his 'divine mission' as the defender of state ideology was nothing but a ruse to legitimize a potentially unjust order and to bolster a regime demonstrably without a popular base.

#### **Civilianization and Islamic Democracy:**

Whether it has been Ayub's Basic Democracy, Yahya's legal framework order, or Zia's Islamic Democracy, the military rulers of Pakistan have been very innovative in conceiving grandiose plans of civilianizing their military regimes and consolidating their personal powers.

In view of repeated postponements of elections and arbitrary constitutional amendments which cost the Zia regime in terms of 'political credibility', the martial law government tried to enhance its religious credibility' through sanctimonious appeal and a comprehensive program of Islamization. Yet, this was not enough as the opposition groups vehemently opposed Zia's harsh measures against them and saw through his attempt to close the doors on public representatives.

Zia virtually assailed western form of democracy and exhorted for establishment of Islami Jamhooriyat (Islamic Democracy) in Pakistan based on the fundamentals of Islam. Like the earlier military rulers he preferred a presidential system rather than a parliamentary one. He

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<sup>259</sup> Saeed Shafqat, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan", Westview Press, 1993, p. 200.



believed that the presidential system of governance was closer to the traditional Islamic system as it reflected the thinking and psychology of Muslims, who “*believe in one God, one prophet, and one book, and their tendency is that they should be ruled by one man.*”<sup>260</sup> He asserted that in Islam there was no scope for party based elections that is prevalent in the west.

He maintained that an Islamic country had no need political parties. Political parties were little more than alien importations, hardly relevant to Pakistani political culture. It was Zia’s judgment that irreconcilable competition among the political parties had provoked the civil war in East Pak.<sup>261</sup> In this way he rationalized their permanent banning, and introduced a pre-election screening of candidates on the basis of ‘Islamic’ criteria.

The political parties frustrated by Zia’s stand against them had to search for a suitable strategy for a suitable strategy to force the regime to hold the promised elections. One consequence of Zia’s overall banning of political parties was the alignments between PPP and certain parties of the PNA (the un-religious based ones). They pushed the Bhutto factor aside out of political compulsions and brought the election issue to the forefront. Their efforts led to the formation of the ‘**Movement for the Restoration of Democracy**’ (MRD) on 6<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1981, a conglomerate of 12 political parties with diverse political leanings.<sup>262</sup> During the following two years, the new alliance pooled in their manpower and resources, and evolved a shared set of political objectives and formulated action groups at the local level. It called for a CDM from 1<sup>st</sup> Mar. 1981.

In order to meet the perceived challenge posed by the MRD, the regime armed itself with blatantly repressive powers, introducing a new statute, the **Provisional Constitution Order (PCO)**, on 24<sup>th</sup> Mar. 1981. Under the PCO, habeas corpus proceedings were nullified and civilian courts were denied jurisdiction over cases of preventive detention.<sup>263</sup>

The MRD sponsored a Four-point program: an end to Martial Law, restoration of 1973 Constitution, parliamentary election and transfer of power to public representatives. By 1983, MRD was poised for a dash into agitational politics and announced a plan to start protest rallies in the country on 14<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1983. Zia decided to pre-empt the agitation to seize initiative from the MRD. On 12<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1983, he announced the blue print of an Islamic political order. He

<sup>260</sup> Nisar Osmani, “Presidential System More suitable”, Dawn, 28 Mar. 1978.

<sup>261</sup> Lawrence Ziring, “Pakistan in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century”, OUP, 1977, p. 445-446.

<sup>262</sup> K.M. Arif, “Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97”, OUP, 2001, p. 222.

<sup>263</sup> Surendra Nath Kaushik, “Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: A study of Zia Regime”, South Asian Publication, 1993, p. 69

announced his plans to hold elections to national and provincial legislatures restore constitutional democracy and lift Martial Law by 23<sup>rd</sup> Mar. 1985.

The August Plan was a charter to civilianize the military regime. The 1983 agitation made it extremely difficult for Zia to rescind his commitment to hold elections. The dilemma was how to bring about the desired constitutional and political changes and civilianize military rule in a manner that the change from 'khaki' to 'mufti' could be made without losing political initiative. Zia's answer was to 'constitutionalize' his own position through a referendum, so as to be able to oversee the functioning of the future civilian set up.

On 1<sup>st</sup> Dec. 1984, Zia made the announcement for holding a referendum on 19<sup>th</sup> Dec. The **President's Referendum Order** barred the courts from hearing any complaints about the conduct of referendum, for which only the Election Commission was authorized. Any call for the boycott of referendum was to be considered a cognizable offence. The referendum used a novel way of seeking a vote of confidence for Zia. The referendum proposition sought popular endorsement for Islamization. Electorates were asked to vote 'yes' or 'no' on whether or not they approved of the Islamization program, and whether or not they supported the "Islamic Ideology of Pakistan". A 'yes' vote on this was considered a mandate for Zia to stay on as President for the next 5 years.<sup>264</sup>

Government Officials claimed that '62% of the voters participated, of which 97.7% voted in favor of continuing Islamic policies.'<sup>265</sup> But, independent sources described it as dubious. Eight years later, the CEC who had organized the referendum, admitted that it was rigged.<sup>266</sup>

Once Zia secured his political future, he was ready to go ahead with his civilianization processes and announced elections for the National Assembly on 25<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1985, on a non-party basis and religion based separate electorate. As the general elections were being held after eight years, the ordinary people showed much interest. They responded enthusiastically to the call for elections. 52.9% of the registered voters polled their votes on 25<sup>th</sup> Feb. Three days later elections for the four provincial assemblies were held, also on a non-party basis. The new parliament held its inaugural session on 23<sup>rd</sup> Mar. 1985. **Md. Khan Junejo** became the PM while Zia retained his dual status as the President and the Chief of the Army Staff.

<sup>264</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 184.

<sup>265</sup> Robert LaPorte Jr., "Another Try at Democracy" in 'Contemporary Problems of Pakistan', ed. by J. Henry Korson, Westview Press, 1993, p. 179.

<sup>266</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 185.

The next stage of civilianization took place on 2<sup>nd</sup> Mar. when Zia issued the **Revival of Constitution 1973 Order (RCO)**<sup>267</sup> which amended 57 articles, added 6 articles, deleted 2 articles, substituted one schedule, added one and amended two from the original 1973 Constitution, thereby drastically altering its character. The balance of power was decisively shifted in favor of the President. **Article 58-2-b** gave him the sweeping powers to dissolve the National Assembly at his own discretion. The RCO introduced **Article 270-A** for validation of all martial law regulations and laws framed by the regime. A **National Security Council** was also established, to give the army permanent position in the constitution.

The Constitutional **8<sup>th</sup> Amendment** was passed on 16<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1985, which comprised the provisions of the RCO, as modified by the parliament. RCO stipulation of NSC was omitted but Article 270-A was retained. This extended indemnity of an unprecedented nature to all martial law regulations, acts and orders, which was needed to protect Zia and other generals from the charge of 'high treason' as per Article 6. The amended constitution mentioned Zia in **Article 41(7)** as being entitled to hold the office of president for 5 years, as well as to continue as the Chief of Army Staff.<sup>268</sup>

It was only after the provision of such blanket indemnity in the constitution that Zia felt confident enough to lift the martial law on 30<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1985. Thus, Pakistan's third martial law regime came to an end, but, only after the military had succeeded in establishing a carefully tailored political system which was conspicuous of the continuity of key personnel and policies of the military regime.

## **MUSHARRAF'S MILITARY REGIME**

With the fourth military takeover of 12<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1999, the Pakistani military broke its 11-year-old taboo of directly intervening in national politics by dismissing a civilian elected government. Like the other military rulers, General Pervez Musharraf said that the armed forces had moved in as last resort to prevent any further destabilization, but he did not spell out what kind of government would be installed, except that he wanted to do away with the sham of democracy and prepare the grounds for the introduction of 'real' democracy.

<sup>267</sup> Ramakant, S.N. Kaushik and Shashi Upadhyay, "Contemporary Pakistan: The 8<sup>th</sup> Amendment", P. 67-69.

<sup>268</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan," Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 186-187.

Unlike his military predecessor, Zia, who had announced his intention of holding elections within 90 days when he seized power in 1977, Musharraf did not make any promise on 12<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1999.

On 29<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1999, when Musharraf met a fact-finding team of the visiting Commonwealth Foreign ministers, he told them that he could not give any assurance when democracy would return to the country. However, the regime was under tremendous international pressure regarding the demand for restoration of democracy and was criticized strongly for over-throwing a democratic government. So, like all the other military rulers, Musharraf too had to take steps to civilianize his regime to return the country to 'real' democracy,<sup>269</sup> albeit a quasi-democratic, guided one.

Robert Stern, giving the reason for the military takeover in 1999 after a decade long trial at democracy, said that in 1999 it was no longer possible for the army to use presidential power to unseat a government. Hence, the coup. So, the coup was nothing more than a reassertion by the army of its primacy in Pakistan's coalition of dominant classes.<sup>270</sup> It was a result of the clash between two pillars of the Troika – PM and the Army Chief – whereby the army had to intervene to save itself from the PM's political intrigues.

### **Nature of the Regime:**

Musharraf's military regime was reminiscent of Ayub's in the nature of its elite configurations. Like the military regime of Ayub Khan, the new military government kept army personnel in the background and ran the administration through civilian institutions and officials, described as the civil-military combine by the military rulers. The Military rulers established monitoring cells at different levels to oversee and supervise the working of the civilian institutions. The bureaucracy has as much prominence as it did in Ayub's cabinet, yet the military has the reins of power very much in its hands.

Other than the civil officials, the Musharraf regime also seems to opt for institutionalized technocratic politics. The military has been working on cobbling together a government of technocrats with the primary task of putting the economy back on track, as the disheveled economy was one of the reasons given by the military for taking over. The technocratic-bend of

<sup>269</sup> V. Kukreja, "Musharraf-Style Democracy in Pakistan", *World Focus*, Apr-May, 2002, p. 5.

<sup>270</sup> Robert W. Stern, "Democracy and Dictatorship in South Asia", Praeger Publications, 2001, p. 131-132.

regime was also pronounced by the fact that Musharraf did not take on the title of the CMLA like the other military dictators, but gave himself the title of the “Chief Executive”, i.e. like the head of a corporation that needed restructuring to show a profit on its ledger. Musharraf announced his plans to set up a two-tier system to run the country: a **National Security Council** comprising of the chiefs of the around forces and civilian members of the government which will work as the supreme administration body, assisted by a group of advisors to help in running the country’s day-to-day affairs.<sup>271</sup>

Musharraf’s military government has been perceived as accommodating bureaucrats on one hand, and as being vindictive against popular leaders of the main parties, just like Ayub, but the modus operandi used was that of Zia. Like Zia, he has started the so-called accountability drive under which several prominent leaders have been booked for their alleged acts of omissions and commissions. He also amended the **Political Parties Act** on 9<sup>th</sup> Aug. 2000, barring individuals convicted on charges of corruption from holding party posts. The legislation, in effect, dethroned or nearly eliminated the political structure of two former PMs, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, as leaders of their parties. So, at one go Musharraf was able to decapitate his biggest opponents and their parties, PML (N) and PPP.

However, unlike Zia, who because of his penchant for Islamization had found a constituency in the religio-political groups, Musharraf lacks such support. His crackdown on religious groups like **Lashkar-e-Jhangvi** and **Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan**,<sup>272</sup> as well as the post 9/11 severity against religious fundamentalism, has made him very unpopular amongst the religious parties i.e. the **Islam Pasand**<sup>273</sup> parties like **Jammat-i-Islami** and **Ulema-e-Islam**.

Therefore, Musharraf has isolated himself from both the mainstream political forces as well as the relevant religio-political forces. So, he does not have any real credible political alternative that he can unleash on Pakistan.

### **Reviewing the Economy:**

The Musharraf regime inherited an economy that was about to collapse. Musharraf had given the economy’s state of collapse as one of the key reasons behind the military intervention. The new

<sup>271</sup> Zahid Hussain, “Day of the Generals”, Newline, Oct. 1999.

<sup>272</sup> Owen-Bennett Jones, “Pakistan: Eye of the Storm”, Viking Publication, 2002, p. 24.

<sup>273</sup> B.M. Chengappa, “Musharraf and Democracy”, *World Focus*, Apr-May, 2002, p. 7.

junta therefore, had to face the daunting task of pulling back the economy. The regime followed a two-pronged economic policy, hinging on 'economic revival' and 'poverty alleviation'. In his 12<sup>th</sup> Jan. 2002 speech, General Parvez Musharraf brought in a new concept of jihad by which he meant jihad against poverty, jihad against illiteracy, and jihad against unemployment.

Pakistan's economy was in total chaos when the military regime took over. The country was heavily dependent on foreign loans to meet its deficit repayment obligations, with 56% of the budget going towards debt servicing. The total external borrowing amounted to \$39 billion. Foreign exchange reserves were mere \$1.45 billion. Tax collections had plummeted, while fiscal deficit had risen to 6.45% of GDP in 2000.

Since assuming power in 1999, Musharraf has pursued a policy of economic reform and debt reduction while trying to reduce poverty. His policies include privatization, overhauling the taxation system, restructuring the public enterprise and banking sectors, and addressing the problem of corruption. As part of its populist program for an economic revival, the regime has launched a crackdown on corrupt politicians and intensified efforts to recover unpaid loans owed to state-owned commercial banks, and it has also moved against tax evaders. A major challenge before the new rulers is to force the rich to pay taxes. This massive crackdown also served Musharraf's political end. Among the list of people declared as loan defaulters there are the Sharif brothers, Benazir and her husband, Zarkari and key figures from Sharif and Benazir governments.<sup>274</sup>

Musharraf also succeeded in resolving a long running dispute between power companies, which had over shadowed foreign investment. In Dec. 2001, the IMF praised the general stating: "*Over the last 2 years, Pakistan has established a record of sound micro-economic management and timely implementation of structural reforms.*"<sup>275</sup> Musharraf has promised speedy privatization, broadening of tax base, increasing revenues, reduction of subsidies, reforms in civil services, banking, agriculture and industry, curbs on smuggling to the IMF. Curtailing state expenses, tight monetary and fiscal control, decentralization and devolution of power are also part of the program.

However, it appears that the biggest impediment to this revival is the interests of the military establishment itself. In the budget 2000-01, defense allocation witnessed an increase by 11%

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<sup>274</sup> V. Kukeraja, "Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Crises and Conflicts", Sage Publications, p. 275.

<sup>275</sup> I.N. Mukherje "Economy and Democratization in Pakistan", *World Focus*, Apr-May 2002, p. 26.

from the previous year. This exemplifies that the military regime does not seem ready to revive public investment at its own cost. The other slogan, which the regime has flagged, is of poverty alleviation. But, the earmarked funds constitute roughly 0.6% of the GDP and merely 3% of the total federal government expenditure earmarked for the fiscal year of 2003. At the same time, defense allocation constitutes 5.02% of GDP and 22.8% of total federal government expenditure. It is obvious where the actual priorities of this government lie. Also, the resources from this meager amount of poverty alleviation funds haven't come from a reduction in defense budget. It is actually the social sector expenditures that have been slashed to provide for this fund.

The economic and non-economic interests of the military establishment as well as their ground reality leaves little room for allocating resources and altering policies which are pro-poor and pro-welfare. **Asad Sayeed** aptly puts it, *“unless and until the corporate interests of the military are reigned in, sustainable economic development in Pakistan will remain a mirage.”*<sup>276</sup>

The above-indicated weaknesses notwithstanding, the regime has been able to reduce the fiscal deficit to 5.6% of the GDP compared to the average of 6.1% in the 90s. What needs to be noted here is that as much as 40% of this reduction was achieved by drastic curtailment of public investment. The overall growth in GDP was at 4.4% in 1999-2000, up from the revised figures of 3.15% for the previous year. This growth is singularly attributed to better performance of the agricultural sector. A record wheat crop of 19 million tonnes helped in lowering the import bill and contributed to growth.<sup>277</sup>

Another yardstick used to measure the success of the regime has been an increase in foreign exchange resources and reduction in debt servicing liabilities. The increase in reserves to the level of \$5 billion plus has happened after Sep. 11, 2001. In the wake of post-Sep. scenario, the resumption of Pakistan's military strategic partnership with the US has been a big boon. The Bush administration has rewarded Musharraf with bonanza of economic and military aid for providing critical support to the US-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan. It appears that Pakistan as a 'frontline state' has squeezed financial advantage from US up to over \$1 billion in aid. The Paris Club creditors restructured and rescheduled much of Pakistan's external debt too. Besides, an IMF program of poverty alleviation has been agreed upon. The US and Japan have lifted the economic sanctions imposed against Pakistan since 1998 for its testing of nuclear

<sup>276</sup> Asad Sayeed, "Behind the Façade of Economic Revival", The Herald, Nov. 2000, p. 25.

<sup>277</sup> V. Kukeraja, "Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Crises and Conflicts", Sage Publications, p. 107.

weapons. World Bank has announced a new loan too. The US-alliance has given the country much-needed breathing space.

This gives one a sense of déjà vu when Zia's case is taken into account. The wars in Afghanistan have risen as phoenix to save the military regimes from economic collapse. Through allying with US and getting the status of 'frontline state', the military regimes of Zia and Musharraf not only got the much-needed economic and military aid, but also the stamp of legitimacy that the US bestowed upon their regimes for supporting its policies in Afghanistan.

However, the Afghanistan II also had significant costs for Pakistan. The investor confidence was shaken by fears of political instability and instability due to possible resurgence of Islamic anti-West extremism. Further, insurance and shipping costs increased owing to declaration of Pakistan as a war risk zone.<sup>278</sup> The new wave of Afghani refugees too will have an impact of Pakistan's economy.

Thus, the slip side of Afghanistan in the 1980s should be an eye-opener for Musharraf. Like Zia, Musharraf should not overly depend upon US aid, as it will only lead to artificial prosperity that will go bust the moment US interests in the region are met. The only way out of the economic mess is by putting its house in order, which cannot be provided by foreign donors.

### **Civilianization:**

Even though Musharraf did not announce any time frame for return of democracy, yet like all the earlier dictators he had to bow down to the necessity of civilianizing his military regime to gain legitimacy both in the domestic political arena as well as the international comity of nations.

On 23<sup>rd</sup> Mar. 2000, Musharraf announced holding of local bodies elections later in the year throughout the country as the first step towards the return to 'real' democracy. Later on the Chief Executive, in a special address to the nation on 14<sup>th</sup> Aug. 2000, coinciding with the Independence Day, announced the devolution plan and the scheme of party less elections scheduled to begin in Dec. 2000 and to be completed by May 2001. A second round of local elections at the district level were to be held in Jul. 2001, effectively putting municipal governments back in power. To justify this he maintained, "*Democracy starts here at the district and local governments. From here, we will move up step by step to provincial and federal elections in due course.*"

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<sup>278</sup> I.N. Mukherji, "Economy and Democratization in Pakistan", *World Focus*, Apr-May 2002, p. 26.



But, his plan of local elections was seen by many as a ploy to consolidate his personal power. They saw it cynically as a move to create a new power base for the military regime. The political parties termed the devolution scheme as ‘old wine in a new bottle’ and linked it to the ‘BD’ of Ayub era. The PML and PPP came out strongly against it.<sup>279</sup>

Rakesh Gupta chalks out Musharraf’s civilianization drive, the first step of which was to discard the earlier civilian leadership either as inefficient or as charged with malafide intentions of murder, conspiracy, corruption and subversion. Second, to install himself in the power structure as the President without relinquishing his military office, he held a referendum. Third, he held controlled elections first to local bodies, and then he held party less elections for the National Assembly. Musharraf has borrowed from all the earlier military rulers to discover a civilian legitimacy for himself. He held referendum, like Zia did, held party less elections, again Zia’s legacy, held local elections, like Ayub did, further, like Yahya, he also announced a Legal Framework Order (LFO).<sup>280</sup>

Though, unlike his predecessor, Musharraf started with non-dismissal of the President Rafiq **Tarar**, as a figurehead, but on 20th Jan. 2001 in a masterstroke he assumed the office of the president, ousting Tarar. The self-elevation of Musharraf to presidency was a bid to legitimize his position before the coming the **Agra Summit** with India, as the general required political legitimacy at home before he started negotiating with the Indian PM. By taking up on the mantle of President, Musharraf rehabilitated himself completely in the tradition of the earlier military rulers.

Further, following the military tradition in politics, Musharraf announced single presidential referendum – Referendum Ordinance, Chief Executive’s Order no.12 of 2002 – in Apr. 2002, arguing that he needed more time to complete his political and economic reforms initiated after the 1999 coup which would ultimately guarantee genuine democracy. There were controversies regarding this because such a provision for direct referendum didn’t exist in the suspended constitution. But, Musharraf took advantage of **Article 48 (6)**, which provides that the president can refer certain issues of national importance, at his discretion or on the advice of the

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<sup>279</sup> V. Kukreja, “Musharraf-Style Democracy in Pakistan”, *World Focus*, Apr-May, 2002, p. 15-16.

<sup>280</sup> R. Gupta, “State in India, Pakistan, Russia and Central Asia”, Kalpaz Publication, New Delhi, p. 146 – 150.

PM, to the people for their approval. This should be in the form of a question that is capable of being answered either by 'yes' or 'no'.<sup>281</sup>

The question thus phrased read, "*Do you want to elect President Musharraf for the next 5 years for survival of the local government system, restoration of democracy, continuing and stability of reforms, eradication of extremism and sectarianism and for the accomplishment of Jinnah's concept?*" The question was so cleverly worded that there couldn't have been many 'no's which made Musharraf's election as President fait accompli.

On 30<sup>th</sup> Apr. 2002, Musharraf held the presidential referendum. On 1<sup>st</sup> May, the CEC, **Irshaad Hassan Khan** announced that 71% had cast their vote, i.e. 43.9 million people, of which whopping 97.47% had cast a vote in favor of Musharraf continuing as President for the next 5 years. With the referendum out of his way and assured of 5 years term, he could then well afford to prepare for the National Assembly polls. In an address to the nation on 27<sup>th</sup> May, he announced the dates for the general election to elect members to the National Assembly and provincial assemblies to be held between the 7<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 2002. With this announcement Musharraf had at least stuck to the time frame laid down by the Supreme Court, which had ordered the military regime to create 'democracy' within 3 years of the military coup.<sup>282</sup>

In order to ensure his edge in the Oct. 2002 elections, Musharraf first took steps to nullify the main opposition parties. Fearing the PPP, PML (N) and **Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)** leaders who could overturn his apple cart, Musharraf banned their leaders' entry into the country. He had likewise banned political parties from contesting elections. Those under the scanner of National Accountability Bureau were also disqualified. The PPP, PML and MQM were at a serious disadvantage because of their leaders – Benazir, Sharif and Altaf Hussian – being absent from the country in exile. They were disorganized and leaderless to cope with the political strategy of the military regime. This led to the coming together of former arch rivals, with common cause against the military rule. A 15-party alliance, namely the **Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD)**, was formed under the leadership of **Nasrullah Khan**, which held an All Party Conference (APC) on 6<sup>th</sup> Aug. 2000 in Lahore to present a united front against Musharraf.<sup>283</sup>

<sup>281</sup> Smruti Pattanaik, "General Musharraf's Referendum", *World Focus*, Apr-march 2002, p. 21.

<sup>282</sup> Sushant Sareen, "Will Elections Be Free and Fair", *World Focus*, Apr-May 2002, p. 9.

<sup>283</sup> V. Kukeraja, "Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Crises and Conflicts", Sage Publications, p. 271-72.

On the other hand, Musharraf's crackdown upon Islam Pasand parties prompted the politico-religious parties to come together and occupy the political space vacated by the mainstream political parties. The leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, **Qazi Hussain Ahmed**, embarked upon an agenda to bring the Islamic groups into a separate anti-army alliance. Six religious parties formed their own alliance, the **MMA**; to not only oppose Musharraf but also to fight the next election together on an anti-Musharraf platform. MMA was much in the same situation as the MRD was during Zia's regime.

With most of the political leadership out of its way the army next decreed that the National Assembly would include 25 appointed technocrats and 60 appointed women. At a stroke it had ensured there would be a significant voting block of military-appointed National Assembly members.<sup>284</sup> In Aug. 2002, Musharraf, following in the line of Yahya Khan, single-handedly rewrote the constitution through his **Legal Framework Order (LFO)**. This caused a furor amongst the MMA and ARD; they termed it as unconstitutional, illegal and immoral. Therefore, Musharraf's strategy of referendum, continuation of Articles 53 (b) and ordering a LFO attracted dissent.

The polls ultimately took place on 10<sup>th</sup> Oct. 2002 and a 342-member assembly was elected. The results were surprising as the right-wing Islamists won 60 seats riding on a wave of anti-US sentiments after the Afghanistan II war. This was the 1<sup>st</sup> time in Pakistan's history that Islamic religious parties, which had failed to win even 10% votes in previous elections, had posted such an impressive victory. A vacuum created by the absence of top political leaders was also a reason of MMA's triumph. Therefore, MMA came to hold the balance of power. The pro-Musharraf PML(QA), despite winning 118 seats, needed to win its support to form a strong alliance<sup>285</sup>

Musharraf revived the suspended constitution hours before he took his oath of office as the president, 'except for a few articles', and on 16<sup>th</sup> Nov. 2002, Pakistan's Parliament met for the first time in 3 years, without agreement on a coalition and with its powers limited by a military President. The parties failed to form a government because of haggling over PM's post, and future role for the military and Musharraf. These included Musharraf's constitutional amendments that give him power to dismiss parliament, the role of a National Security Council

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<sup>284</sup> Owen-Bennett Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publication, 2002, p. 274

<sup>285</sup> Times of India, 19 Nov. 2002.

comprising of military chiefs, the appointment of provincial governors, and the general's new 5-year presidential term through the referendum in April.

After much deliberation and bargaining between the Islamists and PML (QA), as well as significant roles played by independents, Pakistan's Parliament elected **Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali** of pro-military PML (QA) party as its PM, by a razor thin majority of one vote,<sup>286</sup> on 21<sup>st</sup> Nov. 2002. Under the laws of Pakistan, the PM has to command the confidence of majority of the assembly. Jamali won by a narrow margin with 182 votes out of 238 votes cast, relying on the help of 20-odd parties and some defectors. There would have been a run-off election had Jamali got one vote less than what he obtained.

Analysts say Jamali has been chosen for the job precisely because he is an establishment figure who is expected to cooperate with the military and rule in the shadow of President Musharraf.<sup>287</sup> Therefore, what Musharraf has been able to do is achieve an army backed quasi-democracy to ensure his and the army's constitutional standing, just as the military rulers before him had done. The opposition wants Musharraf to give up one of the positions of either President or Army Chief. Musharraf has agreed to do so too, yet till date it remains a hollow promise. Pakistan, after 57 years of experimenting with democracy, still has a head of state wearing the uniform.

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<sup>286</sup> Hindu, 22 Nov. 2002.

<sup>287</sup> Times of India, 22 Nov. 2002.

## CONCLUSION

Pakistan's turbulent political life has been a cumulative consequence of its internal political degeneration of democratic ethos, deadlock on the choice of political system and its external security considerations. It took the leaders of the country nine years to formulate its first Constitution. The constitution makers in the Constituent Assembly had the tough task of forging a nation out of dissenting and centrifugal forces. The gigantic responsibility of accommodating the bureaucracy and the army, who had their social basis in landlordism in Punjab, with the interest of business in Sind, tribal arrangements in Pashtun and Baloch regions, and the political ambitions of the Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan, proved to be their undoing. It revealed the inability of the political leadership to govern Pakistan as a Nation.

The leadership crises that Pakistan faced in its first decade paved the way for undemocratic and non-elective institutions, like the bureaucracy and the army, to takeover and put Pakistan 'straight' by removing the bickering politicians from the seat of power.

As one military ruler followed another, the army's vision of Pakistan began to define the Pakistani state. The four military regimes of Pakistan left their marks on, as well as shaped most of the country's destiny. Each one of them had their own vision for Pakistan, and the purpose of this dissertation was to compare and contrast these visions and to see how they brought about changes in Pakistan's polity and society.

After comparing the military rulers on the basis of their coups and regimes, in my concluding chapter I propose to compare them on certain central themes that have defined the Pakistani state. Here I would like to introduce the centrality of, what **Anatol Lieven** calls, the **Three 'A's** – "**Allah, Army and America**".<sup>288</sup> It is important to understand the attitudes of the four dictators towards these themes in order to fathom the lasting changes that their regimes brought about in the nation's destiny.

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<sup>288</sup> Anatol Lieven, "The Pressure on Pakistan", *Foreign Affairs*, Jan-feb, 2002, p. 106.

## ALLAH:

As far as the centrality of the first ‘A’ goes, i.e. “**Allah**”, each of the military rulers believed in Islam but differed in varying degrees as to its relationship with the state. Due to Pakistan’s ostensible identity as an Islamic State and homeland for Indian Muslims, Islam has been a major point of reference in the country’s history. However, from the initial years onwards, because of competing versions of an Islamic state amongst the various sects of Muslims and different wings of Islamists, it became a matter of contention on how the Pakistani State should implement its Islamic identity.<sup>289</sup>

**Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, the Father of the Nation, spoke of a Pakistan that would be democratic, tolerant of religious minorities, progressive socially and modern in the liberal Western sense. Most of Pakistan’s early leaders were Western-educated and strongly supported democracy and constitutionalism. They envisaged Pakistan as a state based on Western parliamentary model with Islam playing a role only in the personal lives of the people. Jinnah wanted a democratic state in which the Muslim people would be able to shape their lives without the fear of Hindu domination, yet be tolerant of other religious minorities. He never meant Pakistan to be a theocratic state and presented his picture of a secular state in his speech to the inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly on 11<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1947. He said:

*“...In course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of the individual, but in the political sense as citizens of one nation.”*<sup>290</sup>

However, this vision of Jinnah’s was contested by the orthodox **Ulema** who were in favor of Islam being a cornerstone of the state edifice. What ensued was a tug of war between the orthodox and liberal elements that ultimately stalled the progress in the Constituent Assembly. But with Jinnah’s early death and the subsequent assassination of Liaquat Ali, his successor, the politicians finally gave way to the Ulema, resulting in the **Objective Resolution** that strove to embody an Islamic concept of a state that would serve as the foundation of Pakistan.

Therefore, the political leaders sold out to the orthodox Islamists, and surprisingly, it was an army man who explicitly reiterated Jinnah’s vision of a liberal, secular, and modern polity.<sup>291</sup>

<sup>289</sup> Stephen Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan”, *The Washington Quarterly*, summer 2002, 25:3, p. 113.

<sup>290</sup> Md, Munir, “From Jinnah to Zia: A Study of Ideological Convulsion”, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980, p. 29-30.

General Ayub Khan, like Jinnah, was no religious Zealot. He opened the political discourse on identity of Islam when he took over and amended the 1956 Constitution to remove the prefix 'Islamic'. Under his 1962 Constitution he changed the name from the 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan' to the "Republic of Pakistan".<sup>292</sup> As a Sandhurst educated soldier he opposed to put Islam at the heart of the state and consistently downplayed the role of Islam in the state. He also denounced the Ulema and the conservative elements for their Islamic orthodoxy that was putting Pakistan backward in the international comity of states.

He attempted to build a modern Muslim society through his 1962 Constitution; e.g., through his **Muslim Family Law, 1962**, it restricted Pakistani men from any undue advantages of multiple marriages without the consent of the first wife. He was, therefore, a modernist, a modern liberal Muslim who believed that the time-honored tenets of Islam could sit easily with a progressive political outlook. In his autobiography, "**Friends Not Masters**", he complained about the 'obscurantist who frustrates all progress under the cover of religion'. He said that many of the Ulema had opposed Jinnah and the creation of Pakistan, and once Pakistan was established they tried to carve out a niche for themselves by denouncing the political leadership and calling for a more orthodox Islamic state. He was, therefore, one of the first to confront the Islamic conservatives, especially the Jamaat-i-Islami.<sup>293</sup> It is noteworthy that Ayub's authoritative hold over the country's affairs kept sectarian controversy at bay. Unlike the League leaders he did not defer to the Ulema and made only minimal concessions to them.<sup>294</sup>

Ayub's successor, General Yahya Khan, ruled for a very short span – during that period, he continued with Ayub's anti-Ulema program but far less aggressively. Though a Muslim, he could hardly be called an ardent follower of Islam as some of his personal habits indicated. However, a default political partnership arose between the orthodox groups and Yahya in 1971. The Ulema supported the army crackdown in East Pakistan as they considered **Mujibur Rehman** to be more secular in orientation and a threat to their aspirations.

But, the Ulema got a boost with the next military regime. The ruler who brought Islam to the forefront and made it the centrepiece of his administration was General Zia-ul-Haq. He started

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<sup>291</sup> Ziaul Haque, "Pakistan and Islamic Ideology" in 'Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship', ed. By Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, Zed Press, 1983, p. 377.

<sup>292</sup> Izzud-din-Pal, "Pakistan – Islam and Economics", Pakistan University Press, 1999, p. 5.

<sup>293</sup> O.B. Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publications, 2002, p. 14.

<sup>294</sup> V. Kukreja, "Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crisis", Sage Publications, 2003, p. 165.

the drive for ‘**Islamization**’ of every walk of Pakistani life. Many conservative Islamists held positions of authority in Zia’s time. The Jamaat-i-Islami was the only party that was not banned from politics by Zia.

Zia was committed to an Islamic Pakistan. He looked at Israel for inspiration as other than Pakistan it was the only state created on religious ground. He found Israel’s religion to be its main source of strength and said that Pakistan had lost sight of its religious moorings. So, he embarked upon a sweeping Islamization program to make Pakistan conform to the teachings of **Quran and Sunnah**.<sup>295</sup>

He came out with a number of ordinances that entrenched Islam as the basis of Pakistani state. **Hudood Ordinance, 1979**, stated that punishments laid down in the Quran and Sunnah was to be operative in Pakistan. Theft was to be punished by amputation of the left hand of a right-handed person and vice-versa. His regime was especially harsh on women. Under the **Zina Ordinance**, rape was to be punished by public flogging of the man as well as the woman. Zia also created a **Federal Sharia Court** to examine if a law was repugnant to the provisions of Islam.<sup>296</sup>

Even the economy wasn’t spared. Zia introduced Islamic fiscal measures like the **Zakat** tax whereby 2.5% was to be annually deducted from a person’s bank account on the first day of Ramadan. He also gave Islam a greater status in the education system, made prayers mandatory for all government officials and allowed separate time for it in the office schedule. As far as the polity goes he called Western democracy un-Islamic. Through his **Eighth Amendment** to the 1973 Constitution he even introduced a separate electorate and representation for the Ulema in the state. Thus, Zia tried to project his own image as the true ‘**Soldier of Allah**’. His support to brother **Mujahideen** in Afghanistan against Soviet invasion brought an exceptionally militant Islam to Pakistan.<sup>297</sup>

The fourth and the current military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, is trying to dismantle Zia’s legacy. His attempt to downplay the role of religion in the state brings him closer to Ayub Khan. Like Ayub, Musharraf is a modernist and a moderate Muslim. He is a product of Christian Missionary schools and an avowed secularist; therefore, he distanced himself from the Conservative

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<sup>295</sup> M. A. Weaver, “Pakistan – In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan”, Farras, Strauss and Giroux, 2002, p. 57-61.

<sup>296</sup> O.B. Jones, “Pakistan: Eye of the Storm”, Viking Publications, 2002, p. 16.

<sup>297</sup> Shahid J. Burki, “Historical Dictionary of Pakistan”, Vision Books, 2003, p. 24.



Islamists. In fact today his biggest political rivals are these very Islamists who even floated a political party – Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), against Musharraf in the 2002 elections. Like Ayub, he too denounced the clerics. In return he has been branded as un-Islamic by them, as a Scotch drinker, a gambler and also because he had appeared for photographs with his dogs (because dogs are considered impure in Islam).

While Zia had used his military might to try to Islamize Pakistan, Musharraf indicated that he wanted to modernize Pakistan. He backed a proposal to reform the **Blasphemy Law**. Earlier under Zia, the Law provided for imprisonment simply on the basis of an accusation from anyone that the person had taken the Prophet's name in vain or desecrated a copy of Quran. Under Musharraf's amendment a case needs to be registered first to investigate the veracity of an accusation before imprisonment.

He is against religious extremism and in Aug.2001 he banned two such outfits – **Lashkar-e-Jhangvi** and **Sipah-e-Muhammad** – both of which have been implicated in attacks on mosques and funerals, and drive-by shootings. He also enacted a tough anti-terrorist law. He has also tried to de-weaponize the country to rein in growing Islamic militants. His stand became firmer in the backdrop of the **Sep. 11** attack on US. He went against the conservatives to support US in the Oct. war on Afghanistan. He made a forceful address to the nation on 12<sup>th</sup> Jan. 2002 condemning Islamic extremism and banned five extremist groups, amongst them the largest was the **Lashkar-e-Toiba**, and ordered some two thousand arrests.<sup>298</sup>

Thus, what was first attempted by Ayub Khan and later aborted by Zia, is today being revived once again by another military ruler, i.e. to downplay the role and effect of radical Islam on the Pakistani state.

### ARMY:

The second theme common to the four dictators is that of the “**Army**”. Each one of the dictators has enhanced the role and eminence of the army in Pakistani politics. They all believed in the supremacy and efficiency of the army over and above the civilian institutions.

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<sup>298</sup> M. A. Weaver, “Pakistan – In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan”, Farrer, Strauss and Giroux, 2002, p. 222.

Ayub wanted the army to be an effective modern military machine. Like the rest of his successors he had a deep distrust of politicians. It was Ayub who catapulted the army into the big league by forging alliance with powerful bureaucrats. He designed the 1962 Constitution in such a way that the army remained very much in the hub.<sup>299</sup> Under the 1962 Constitution, President Ayub was the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. The C-in-C of the Navy was the Defense Minister under it, who was also the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Committee. The C-in-C of the three services exercised considerable degree of autonomy with regard to the supervision and administration of their respective services. **Article 238** laid down that for a period of 20 years after the commencement of the Constitution the Defense Ministry was to be held by a person not lower in rank than that of Lieutenant-General in the army or an equivalent rank in other services.<sup>300</sup>

However, as a Punjabi soldier he had a distrust of the Bengali soldier and this distorted his ability to keep divisive tendencies within the army and the country in check, which later added to the problems with East Pakistan and India.

This problem culminated into a civil war and the eventual breakup of the country under Yahya's regime. Though Yahya came to power as an army man he was the most democratic of all the military rulers. He held the first elections in Pakistan and even allowed political parties to operate freely. However, when the Awami League of East Pakistan emerged as the majority party, the army once again took matters in its hands and President Yahya Khan, as a true military man, ordered the army to crush the resistance movement in East Pakistan.<sup>301</sup> Rest, as we say, is history.

The next army ruler Zia had a different effect on the army. He was the first chief to play on religion to reform the army and to create a more puritanical, devout army. Along with the rest of the society he Islamized the army too. He took religion into account when making appointments. He made prayers mandatory and banned alcohol from the barracks. However, there was one basic difference between the Islamization of the army and the rest of the society that demonstrated the limits to Zia's radicalism. He declared that the Federal Sharia Court could not

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<sup>299</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Military, State and Society in Pakistan", Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 101.

<sup>300</sup> Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan" in 'Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays', ed. By Jacques Van Doorn, Hague: Mouton and Co., 1968, p. 293.

<sup>301</sup> K.L. Kamal, "The Garrison State", Intellectual Publishing House, 1982, p. 75-78.

challenge any Martial Law regulation or order. The army, it seemed, was above the Islamic Law. Zia, therefore, was a soldier first and a devout Muslim later.

Musharraf, though he seems to be attempting to reverse Zia's legacy and set on a cause diametrically opposite to that of Zia, yet he has a striking similarity with Zia in one aspect. None of them were ready to denounce the primacy of the army. Like his military predecessors, Musharraf too seems to be reluctant to give up the army's superior position in Pakistan. His continuation as the President and his extension for another five years through a referendum in 2002, goes on to show that he is not ready to take the Army to the barracks in the near future. Even after the October 2002 elections and pressures from the coalition against, he still dons the army cap.

### AMERICA:

The last of the three 'A's, i.e. "**America**", has had a very lasting effect on Pakistan's polity, and has shaped many of the policies of the military rulers. Because of its sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis India, Pakistan has always been on the look out for big-power friends. Pakistan's inception coincided with the formative years of the Cold War and as India tilted towards USSR, Pakistan was charmed by America to join its block. It was under Ayub Khan that Pakistan joined the **SEATO** and **CENTO**, and in return America supported his authoritarian regime. In fact, Ayub Khan even declared Pakistan to be America's "**most allied ally**".<sup>302</sup>

The '**invisible American hand**' contributed to Ayub's ascendancy in Pakistani politics as well as to his downfall. Pakistan's friendship with US was formalized during Ayub's time, and the first major crack in the alliance also occurred in the Ayub era. With the Sino-India war in 1962, Pakistan found a friend in China as both had a common enemy in India. So, it gravitated towards China. Understandably, US didn't view the growing ties between Pakistan and China with magnanimity.<sup>303</sup> The honeymoon further soured when Ayub claimed that they were 'friends but not masters'. US in return sought to develop ties with India against the Pakistan-China alliance. Also, Ayub's military performance in the 1965 Indo-Pak war, and his dismal diplomatic performance concerning the Tashkent Agreement, as well as his tilt towards non-alignment,

<sup>302</sup> O.B. Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publications, 2002, p. Introduction, xiv.

<sup>303</sup> K. M. Arif, "Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan-1947 to 99", OUP, Karachi, 2001, p.404.

ultimately led US to withdraw its support to Ayub's military regime and contributed to Ayub's downfall in 1969 to a large extent.<sup>304</sup>

The Yahya era once again experienced US benevolence on Pakistan. US befriended Pakistan again to serve its own purpose. With support for restoration of China's legitimate rights in the UNO gathering momentum, US needed to open dialogue with China. To facilitate this US chose Pakistan as a conduit. Yahya, thus, played an important role in providing a communication bridge between two powerful countries and in return earned the gratitude of President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger.<sup>305</sup> When the 1971 war broke out, US made a symbolic move through its naval ships to scare India, but could not openly support Pakistan's war efforts as India had USSR's tacit support and any impetuous move by US would have brought the two super power head on.

The relationship which started with Ayub and waned over the years, became stronger under Zia's regime after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in which Pakistan became a frontline state for USA and acquired an aid package from US of \$3.2 billion. And more than two decades later, it was again a military man, Musharraf, under whose regime Pakistan allied with USA in the war against Afghanistan. Pakistan was once more the most prominent Islamic ally in America's war. There was therefore a sense of 'déjà vu' when Musharraf appeared to be emulating Zia, the General who presided over the Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan Mujahideens, and as a result became indispensable to America.

There are certain similarities between Zia and Musharraf. Both were shunned by the western world initially when they attempted their coups. Their economies were stagnant, and international aid and investment had grounded to a halt. Their governments were expelled from the Commonwealth. But, both rose from their ashes and were reborn because of their direct involvement with USA. International aid flew in and economic sanctions were eased for their alliance with America in its war efforts in Afghanistan.

However, there was one big difference between the two where the American link is concerned. One of the legacies of the earlier Afghan war had been "**children of the Jihad**". They were created by the Americans, CIA and flourished under Zia's Islamization campaign. He agreed to further the cause of the Afghan Mujahideen fighting against the Soviets on the basis of radical Islam under the ISI, funds for which came from the US. Today, it is these very radical Islamic

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<sup>304</sup> Ashok Kapur, "Pakistan in Crisis", Routledge Publications, 1991, p.63.

<sup>305</sup> K. M. Arif, "Under Khaki Shadows: Pakistan-1947 to 99", OUP, Karachi, 2001, p. 409-411.

elements which pose the greatest challenge to Musharraf. In fact, the second Afghan war in the 'post September attack' was against these same extremists who are now conducting Jihad against America. So, in a way, Musharraf is fighting against the forces spawned by Zia's regime, yet both had America's full support for their respective efforts.

Thus, even though both were US allies, they were fighting against diametrically opposite elements. Zia supported the war effort of the then Afghani regime, while Musharraf abandoned the Taliban regime. Yet their reasons for doing so were same, i.e. to get favors from USA and also to stop any possibility of an US-India alliance which would have been detrimental to Pakistan.

Thus America has been a very important factor in the ascendancy of the military in Pakistan, and even today its foreign policies govern the domestic policies of Pakistan. This is very evident in case of the dilemma Musharraf is facing today in his attempt at legitimizing his regime.

### **PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY VIS-À-VIS MUSHARRAF**

If one goes by Pakistan's political history, the military's track record shows that it has always tried to legitimize its position in politics by creating a veneer of democracy through constitutional manipulation. As far as Pakistan's political future is concerned, **Stephen Cohen** presents five contending alternatives for Pakistan. First is the breakup of Pakistan which he says is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Second, the triumph of radical Islam in Pakistan, which is an improbability too. Even though the religious Islamic parties have made a comeback by getting some seats in the Parliament, yet a complete takeover by radical forces is not in the near future. Third is the emergence of a demagogic or a radical political movement, reminiscing one of Bhutto and his brand of socialism. But Bhutto was more powerful than Yahya, whereas Musharraf is in a stronger position than Yahya ever was. The fourth option is full restoration of democracy and the efficient rebuilding of the Pakistani state, which to Cohen, is an impossibility at this stage as an accord between the politicians and military is unlikely. Till the military completely withdraws, Pakistan would hover on the edge of democracy. The last alternative is

the most probable one according to Cohen. The arrangement of a military led or influenced government would prevail.<sup>306</sup>

This military-backed democratic arrangement is all Pakistan has as its immediate future. Musharraf's legitimization process and political manipulations also point towards such a scenario. Musharraf had promised to restore democracy and to fulfill Supreme Court's mandate of elections latest by October 2002. But before he fulfilled his promise, he set the stage for taking over himself as the President. He got his presidency extended for five years through a referendum in Apr. 2002, and issued the **Legal Framework Order (LFO)** on 21 Aug. 2002 as part of a large conspiracy to manipulate the elections of the National Assembly and keep a firm control over the government.<sup>307</sup>

The LFO provided for a package of 29 amendments to the constitution. By decree Musharraf gave himself vastly increased powers. It made the President the final authority to dismiss the prime Minister and dissolve the Assembly if he felt the government was working against the national interest. And, of course, the President was the one who decided what constituted "national interest". It entrenched military's position by providing for a military-dominated **National Security Council (NSC)** with broad powers, and also recognized the President as both the head of the army and head of the state.<sup>308</sup>

The LFO introduced new qualifications for candidates for members of Parliament with the aim of excluding major opposition figures from the electoral process. The other controversial provision was the indemnity given by the LFO to presidential decrees such as those that prohibit provincial assemblies to amend certain laws without the president's approval, and bar forever Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from elections and becoming Prime Minister again.<sup>309</sup>

However, Musharraf's hopes of seeing his LFO smoothly through the Parliament were dashed as the Oct. 2002 elections resulted in a hung Parliament. Musharraf was faced with a situation that none of the previous military regimes had to face. His support to US on terror in Afghanistan put him in a precarious position. Unlike Zia, whose support to US had earned him aid as well as support from inside the country, Musharraf did not have that advantage. He might have won

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<sup>306</sup> Stephen Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan", *The Washington Quarterly*, summer 2002, 25:3, p. 120.

<sup>307</sup> Pioneer, Mar. 2003.

<sup>308</sup> Timeline, 21<sup>st</sup> Feb. 2004.

<sup>309</sup> Dawn, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2003.

friends in the West with his abandonment of the Taliban, but within the country it had earned him many enemies. Thousands of Islamic radicals, swearing loyalty to their brethren in Afghanistan, took to the streets, burning his effigies.<sup>310</sup>

The protests arose to such an extent that the radical Islamic clerics were encouraged to form themselves into a political party – the **MMA** – to contest against Musharraf in the 2002 elections. And for the first time in Pakistan's history Islamic religious groups had an impressive victory in the elections riding on an anti-US sentiment.

The MMA – an alliance of six anti-West, pro-Taliban, and pro-Sharia Islamic parties – had won sixty seats and held the balance of power for the first time in Pakistan. The pro-Musharraf PML-QA ultimately formed the government with **Jamali** as the new Prime Minister, but Musharraf could hardly breathe a sigh of relief as Jamali had won with a razor-thin margin of one vote. Therefore, Musharraf's plans of getting his LFO of Aug. 2002 passed without much ado had to be stalled.

The opposition parties refused to accept the LFO as they found the provisions to be unconstitutional and illegal, and against the sovereignty of the Parliament. Though Musharraf had relinquished the post of Chief Executive, the opposition resented his continuation as the Chief of Army Staff and the Chief of Staff Committee. As a result, the business of Parliament remained in deadlock for a year. The opposition rejected the referendum result and said that the President could be elected only by an electoral college of both houses of the Parliament and the four provincial assemblies. While the MMA was ready to accept Musharraf as a civilian president provided he gave up his position as the Army Chief, the PPP and the PML-N had no such intention.

In Dec. 2003, Musharraf was ultimately able to strike a deal with MMA's **Qazi Hussain Ahmed** to support the LFO in exchange for Musharraf's acceptance of MMA's Islamization package. That package contains 17 points – seven are modifications of the LFO and ten relate to the Islamization of the society.

On 31 Dec. 2003, the Parliament passed the **Seventeenth Amendment Bill** and it received the assent of the President. The act now contains the modified LFO in accordance with the demands of the MMA. Musharraf also agreed that he would step down as military head on 31 Dec. 2004.

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<sup>310</sup> O.B. Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm", Viking Publications, 2002, p. 3.

On 1 Jan. 2004 he secured a vote of confidence in both houses of the Parliament and four provincial assemblies, thereby securing his continuation as the President till late 2007.

This is an entirely new situation. All the previous military rulers were able to steamroll their constitutional changes through the Parliament. But, Musharraf's dependence upon the MMA severely limits his ability to deal with Islamist extremism, which he has to carry out to appease the US for military aid. This puts him in a hard place, as he must also appease the mullahs and the MMA for his regime's survival.

In addition to this, there is another dilemma that Musharraf has to face today. Other than the Opposition parties in the Parliament, Musharraf has to deal with rebellion within his own army. What is clear now is that the Pakistani army is divided over its support to Musharraf.<sup>311</sup> There have been six attempts on Musharraf's life since he took over. The last two attempts in Dec. 2004 were barely eleven days apart. **Ejaz Haider** of *The Daily Times* reported that there was an inside track in these last two attempts. It meant that Musharraf's enemies within his own army were now raising their heads. Musharraf himself has admitted that he does face enemies from within his own ranks. He disclosed in May that people from within the Pakistan Army and Air Force at a junior level were involved in the assassination attempt on him in Dec. last year, and that most of them were in custody.<sup>312</sup>

Mounting US pressure is creating significant problems for Musharraf. His attempts to purge the military of rogue elements that supported Jihadists to placate USA might well have backfired on him. Post 9/11, Musharraf's sacking of two pro-Taliban army men – ISI Chief **Mahmood Ahmed** and Deputy Chief of Staff, **Musaffar Usmani** – and transfer of another key general, **Md. Aziz** from his Lahore military command, riled many within the military. Significantly, these three had supported Musharraf's ousting of Sharif in Oct. 1999.<sup>313</sup>

Elements within the Army are unhappy with three broad policy strands pushed by Musharraf. They are the ones strongly opposed to Musharraf's decision to ditch the Taliban and make common cause with the US against Al Qaida; to his alleged peace overtures towards India that is seen as a sell-out; and to the steps he had taken to sideline some top nuclear scientists who reportedly sold out atomic secrets to Iran and North Korea, again on USA's behest.

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<sup>311</sup> Murlathar Reddy, "End of a democratic experiment", *The Hindu*, Jun. 28, 2004.

<sup>312</sup> *Pakistan Observer*, May 28, 2004.

<sup>313</sup> Vilani Peiris, "Pakistani leader faces an uncertain future as protests continue", [www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org), Oct. 16, 2001.



This further complexity poses a big problem in front of Musharraf, and he can ill-afford to lose the army's backing right in the middle of his 'civilianization' project.

To conclude, today Pakistan is at crossroads. It is in the ambivalent position of having a military that can neither rule on its own nor hand over complete power to civilians. It, therefore, has to contend with a partnership. A complete democratic comeback, whereby the military completely withdraws itself from politics and gives way to civilian leaders, is not in the cards. Pakistan's troubled political history provides us with ample proof that the military in Pakistan is not ready to accept a totally de-politicized role and at best can allow a power sharing arrangement between the civilian and military rulers.

Democracy in Pakistan has gone through much abuse in the hands of its leaders, both elected and military. The result of constant constitutional manipulation by them has been the decline of the state and democratic political institutions. The political instability, a segmented society and weak civilian institutions that Pakistan was born with has undergone further abuse and fragmentation after decades of direct military rule, and each of the military dictators has contributed to it by militarizing the state and retarding the factors challenging the army's dominance. Prospects of democracy are, therefore, bleak in Pakistan. A civil-military hybrid is the only functioning political system that works for Pakistan.

## EPILOGUE

**Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali** resigned from the post of Prime Minister of Pakistan on 26 Jun., 2004 after 19 months in office bringing to closure the rumors floating for a month that he would be required to do so. In an interim arrangement, **Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain** was appointed as his successor until the Finance Minister, **Shaukat Aziz**, a trusted aide of Musharraf, becomes the new Prime Minister.<sup>314</sup> This has provided President Musharraf with the opportunity to further consolidate his hold on power by ejecting the not so complying Jamali out of his office and replacing him with his own man.

Shaukat Aziz is now a member of the Upper House and, therefore, until the military establishment finds him a safe seat from where he can be elected to the National assembly, Musharraf has to make do with the PML-Q president, Hussain. This little political episode has ostensibly reiterated that Pakistan is still hovering at the edge of democracy. **Mariana Baabar** calls it a “**revolving-door democracy**”; whereby Prime Ministers come and go, but it is the President who calls the shots.<sup>315</sup>

Jamali’s resignation left many in the opposition as well as the media baffled. A number of explanations were guessed by many to remove the shroud of mystery surrounding the reasons for Jamali’s resignation. **Shahid Javed Burki** in the newspaper *Dawn* provides us with some of the theories that explained this ouster.<sup>316</sup> He mainly gives the views of the western press. According to **John Lancaster and Kamran Khan** of *The Washington Post*, by removing Jamali, President Musharraf sought to redress the grievances of politicians from Punjab. Both Shujaat Hussain as well as Shaukat Aziz hails from Punjab. However, Burki does not buy seeking of provincial balance at the highest echelon of government as the reason behind replacing Jamali. He agrees with *The New York Times*’ **Salman Masood and Amy Waldman**, who write that having a technocrat Prime Minister may be an attempt to signal the President’s commitment to broadly reforming Pakistani society. Shahid Burki calls it “**Musharraf’s Pakistan Project**” whereby the

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<sup>314</sup> Amit Baruah, “Musharraf Strengthens his Hold”, *The Hindu*, Jun 28, 2004.

<sup>315</sup> Mariana Baabar, “After Me.....”, *Outlook*, Jul, 2004, p. 24.

<sup>316</sup> Burki, Shahid J., “Change the System”, *Dawn*, Jul. 6, 2004.

President is bit-by-bit paving a way for economic progress as well as fighting extremism with the US backing him.

Musharraf was reportedly unhappy with Jamali's inability to deliver and reduce the level of political opposition to him. Jamali had been handpicked by Musharraf as he was thought to be most pliable. However, Jamali had the disadvantage of forming the government with a narrow margin of just one vote. Therefore, he was in a very precarious position and could hardly assert in favor of Musharraf in the Parliament. So, Musharraf decided that he had to go, and this time round he wants to have a Prime Minister who will do his bidding without the political handicap. Musharraf's choice of Aziz symbolizes his deep distrust of the political class. Aziz, a technocrat, Executive Vice – President of Citibank, who lived and worked in Washington with the World Bank for many years, is expected to be detached from the country's democratic aspirations, and so enjoys full confidence of General Musharraf and the Army. The Prime Minister-in-waiting will be more **"his master's voice"** without any kind of political baggage that Jamali was carrying.

As Burki points out, the advantage of choosing Aziz has been the ease with which Musharraf will be able to sell him to Washington and London as the man of 'western values'. However, this ploy of Musharraf's had not gone down well with the opposition parties. The opposition sees it as beginning of the end of General Musharraf's democratic experiment after the Oct. 2002 general election. Pakistan's opposition parties have said that by putting pressure on Jamali, Musharraf has pushed the nation into the **"worst constitutional crisis"**.<sup>317</sup>

**Qazi Hussain Ahmed**, the acting **President of MMA**, which helped Musharraf to get his controversial LFO ratified by the Parliament after he promised to quit the post of Chief of Army by year end, said that Jamali's resignation was a conspiracy against the budding democracy in the country and showed that there was 'one-man rule' in the country, and the elected PM carried no weight. Hussain, who is also the leader of the Jammāt-e-Islami, said nowhere in the world does an outgoing Prime Minister nominates his successor which shows that it is part of a big game where strings are being pulled from somewhere else.

Another factor behind MMA's opposition to Aziz is his proximity to Washington and they are wary that he will do USA's bidding. The **Pakistan's People's Party (PPP)** is also opposed to

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<sup>317</sup> Murlathar Reddy, "End of a democratic experiment", The Hindu, Jun. 28, 2004.

Jamali's ouster. **Amin Fahim**, a senior leader of PPP, said that the dictatorial set-up could not see any political government to continue for more time than two years, so it has destabilized the Jamali government.

The opposition fears that Pakistan will be saddled with not one but two leaders who will be thrust upon the nation by reason of the brute force that General Musharraf enjoys because Aziz will be even more of a party 'loner' and Musharraf's defender in Parliament than Jamali ever was.

The recent changes in the Parliament has not only led to a change in the head of the government, but in the process has devalued Pakistani democracy. Democracy will continue to be undermined as long as no systematic measures are taken to balance the trinity of forces in Pakistan-**Troika**<sup>318</sup>, i.e. the Army, the President and the PM. With Musharraf holding of these posts and controlling the third, democracy is definitely not the priority.

The political structure raised by the military regime was primarily designed to perpetuate dictatorship in Pakistan under the guise of a democratic order. In Pakistan's designed democracy, if a President or Army Chief can change the Prime Minister at will without much resistance and with the ruling party's acquiescence, then the military does not have to remove the government with a military coup. The Army Chief has ultimately restored democracy as it very conveniently facilitates military dictatorship without resorting to more draconian methods of usurping a government.

A permanent role for the military in the democratic set up, whereby the military can look after its interests peacefully, has been the denouement to all past and present restorations to democracy that the generals have carried out in Pakistan. Democracy is an instrument in the Army Chief's hand, and not an end in itself.

For Musharraf, today, his self-orchestrated democratic set-up is the only ace up his sleeve that can keep him in power. The Opposition parties are staking their claims to power and murmurs of dissent within the army are on a rise for his US-pro policies. Musharraf now faces the unenviable task of charting a course between the devil and the deep sea.<sup>319</sup> With the fear of losing the Army's support, his only remaining constituency, to strengthen his hold on power he has to

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<sup>318</sup> Rashid, Ahmed, "Pakistan: Trouble Ahead, Trouble Behind", *Current History*, April 1996, pp.158-164.

<sup>319</sup> M.V. Kamath, "What if Musharraf doesn't last?", *Organizer*, Feb. 8, 2004.

resort to constitutional manipulations from time to time; Jamali's resignation being the latest example.

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
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