

COALITION EXPERIENCE IN JAPANESE POLITICS: 1993-2003

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that this dissertation, **Coalition Experience in Japanese Politics: 1993-2003**, submitted by **Mahendra Prakash** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree Master of Philosophy, is the outcome of research done by him and has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university.

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19 July 2004

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Dedicated
To
My
Beloved
Grandmother
"Maiya"

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PREFACE

The political scenario in Japan experienced multiple changes during the 1990s and the chain reaction confirmed vis-a-vis the coalitions of political parties in governance. Amidst these trends, the decade from 1993 to 2003 has reflected interesting aspects of coalition governments. Thus, the study and this research is on “Coalition Experience in Japanese Politics: 1993-2003”. Moreover, this research study reveals the attempts for power among the various political parties, their factions, occasional fight between certain leaders, passage of both popular and not-so popular legislation and policies in foreign affairs etc.

The post-war years saw the occupation forces and the influence of the US. On the socio-economic front the Japanese made great strides to emerge as the strong contender to the monopoly of the West in industry and allied sector. It was during this era that the leading political party Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) created a sort of history by remaining in power for nearly thirty-eight years, perhaps a record that may not be erased in the near future.

However, in 1993 certain political developments and incidents such as scandals and factional politics created problems for the government. These could be mainly attributed to the emergence of off-shoots in many parties and consequently destabilizing the system of governance that had been literally in the hands of LDP. Economic uncertainty was faced that political analysts have termed as the ‘burst of the bubble’.

So much so these factors were responsible for the decline of a strong party like the LDP and its leaders who are regarded as the authors of the “1955 setup”. Indeed the “1955 set up” collapsed in the general election held in July 1993. In this background of these trends and related developments, this dissertation mainly deals with the politics of coalition in Japan.

This dissertation contains of five chapters. Chapter one highlight the events related to the developments of politics in Japan from Meiji era to World War II. It has projected in the two main portions. One basically relates to the democratic

developments in Japan in the *Meiji* period. The other portion concerns the political setup for the occupying power from the emperor to samurai on the basis of parliamentary practice that was based on Western model. The emergence of political parties in pre-war and post-war Japan has been mentioned in the chapter as a basic introduction.

Chapter two is related to the formation of LDP in 1955. Being in power continuously for thirty-eight years the LDP changed the post-war history of Japan. The political and economic stability during this period, gave a chance to the Japanese to develop themselves after the war.

Emergence of coalition politics in the 1993 after the end of LDP dominance as a single ruling party and unity of seven parties to form the coalition government has been discussed in the third chapter.

The fourth chapter depicts 'coalition decade' from 1993 to 2003 and its achievements. Politics of formation of seven governments during these years has been described in this chapter. Achievements of the various coalition governments are also mentioned in this chapter.

The final and fifth chapter is the Summary and Conclusion that deals with prospects of the coalition governments in the coming years. The emergence and discussions associated with the two party systems after the last general election for the House of Representatives is mentioned in this chapter. Only the major political developments have been discussed that have created an impact over the formation of coalition government.

The Japanese names are given in the context of surname at first. All the political events are described in the chronological order. The important election results that have created impact over the Japanese politics have been shown in respective tables in the chapters. Various election results have been analyzed as per their data source. Names of political parties after the war written in English, though their Japanese name can be read off from the glossary.

English meanings of the Japanese words have been noted in the parenthesis wherever used. The style of the dissertation is based on the guidelines from the School

of International Studies, JNU manual. Styles of the foot notes, bibliography tables and the space between the paragraphs in chapters have been adopted from the manual.

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GLOSSARY- I

JAPANESE TERMS

The important Japanese terms/words used in the dissertation have been mentioned below in alphabetical order:

Japanese Words	Meanings in English
<i>21 sieki</i>	Twenty First Century
<i>Aikokukoto</i>	Public Party of Patriots
<i>Akhata</i>	Red Flag
<i>Byodo</i>	Equality
<i>Chou-Club</i>	Central Club
<i>Daimyo</i>	'Great Name' designation for feudal war-lords
<i>Han</i>	Feudal Domain controlled by daimyo
<i>Hoshu-Kei</i>	Conservative
<i>Hoshushinto</i>	New Conservative Party
<i>Jiyu Minshuto</i>	Liberal Democratic Party
<i>Jiyuto</i>	Liberal Party
<i>Jiyu</i>	Liberty
<i>Jusen</i>	Housing Loan Company
<i>Kaikaku no Kai</i>	Reform Association
<i>Kaishinto</i>	Reform Party
<i>Kakushin Kurabu</i>	Reform Club
<i>Kakushinkei</i>	Progressive

<i>Keiseikai</i>	Association of Businessmen and Politicians
<i>Kenseikai</i>	Constitutionalist Association
<i>Kenseito</i>	Constitutional Party
<i>Koenkai</i>	Support Group
<i>Kokkai</i>	Japanese Diet
<i>Kokutai</i>	Local Level, National Polity
<i>Komeito</i>	Clean Government Party
<i>Koto</i>	Public Party
<i>Minshato</i>	Democratic Socialist Party
<i>Minshu no Kaze</i>	Democratic Breeze
<i>Minshu Shinto</i>	Alliance of Democratic Reformers
<i>Minshuto</i>	Democratic Party of Japan
<i>Minto</i>	Popular Parties
<i>Nihon Kyosanto</i>	Japan Communist Party
<i>Nihon Shinto</i>	Japan New Party
<i>Nippon Shakaito</i>	Social Democratic Party
<i>Rengo</i>	Japanese Trade Union Confederation
<i>Rikken Dsohikai</i>	Constitutional Fellow Thinker's Association
<i>Rikken Kaishinto</i>	Constitutional Reform Party
<i>Ryokufuka</i>	Green Breeze Society
<i>Sangiin Doshikai</i>	House of Councilors Society of Likeminded People
<i>Seiun</i>	Blue Sky
<i>Seiyukai</i>	Constitutional Government Association

<i>Shiminren</i>	United Democratic Socialist Party
<i>Shimpoto</i>	Progressive Party
<i>Shinjiyu Kurabu</i>	New Liberal Club
<i>Shinseito</i>	The Japan Renewal Party
<i>Shinseito</i>	Renewal Party
<i>Shinshintō</i>	New Frontier Party
<i>Shinto</i>	New
<i>Shinto Goken</i>	New Liberal Party to Protect Constitution
<i>Shogunate</i>	Military Deputy
<i>Shunto</i>	Labor Demonstrations
<i>Taisei Yokusankai</i>	Imperial Rule Assistance Association
<i>Taiyoto</i>	The Sun Party
<i>Yuai</i>	Fraternity
<i>Zaibatsu</i>	Big Business Conglomerates
<i>Zengakuren</i>	All-Japan Federation of Student Self Governing Associations
<i>Zoku</i>	Tribes

GLOSSARY -II

ACCRONYMS

ARF	<i>ASEAN Regional Forum</i>
CTBT	<i>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</i>
CP	<i>Co-operative Party</i>
DLP	<i>Democratic Liberal Party</i>
DP	<i>Democratic Party</i>
DPJ	<i>Democratic Party of Japan</i>
DRL	<i>Democratic Reform League</i>
DRP	<i>Democratic Reform Party</i>
DSP	<i>Democratic Socialist Party</i>
GDP	<i>Gross Domestic Product</i>
GNP	<i>Gross National Product</i>
GSDF	<i>Ground Self Defense Forces</i>
JFTC	<i>Japan Fair Trade Commission</i>
JNR	<i>Japan National railway</i>
JNP	<i>Japan New Party</i>
JRP	<i>Japan Renewal Party</i>
JSP	<i>Japan Socialist party</i>
JCP	<i>Japanese Communist Party</i>
JTUC	<i>Japanese Trade Union Confederation</i>
LFP	<i>Labor Farmer Party</i>

LDP	<i>Liberal democratic Party</i>
LP	<i>Liberal Party</i>
ML	<i>Marxism-Leninism</i>
MITI	<i>Minister for International Trade and Industry</i>
METI	<i>Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry</i>
MNC	<i>Multinational Corporations</i>
MNF	<i>Multinational Forces</i>
MSA	<i>Mutual Security Assistance</i>
NCP	<i>New Conservative Party</i>
NFP	<i>New Frontier Party</i>
NLC	<i>New Liberal Club</i>
NTT	<i>Nippon Telephone and Telegraph</i>
NPT	<i>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</i>
OECD	<i>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</i>
OPEC	<i>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</i>
PAC	<i>Patriot Advanced Capability</i>
PRC	<i>Policy Research Council</i>
SDF	<i>Self Defense Forces</i>
SDL	<i>Social Democratic League</i>
SDP	<i>Social Democratic Party</i>
SDPJ	<i>Social Democratic Party of Japan</i>
SP	<i>Socialist Party</i>
SM	<i>Standard Missile</i>

UN	<i>United Nations</i>
UNPKO	<i>United Nations Peace Keeping Operations</i>
UNSC	<i>United Nations Security Council</i>
US	<i>United States</i>

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Japanese political history has examples of coalition experiment even before 1993. The *Meiji*'s restoration toppled the Tokugawa *Shogunate* (military deputy) that was in existence since 1603. This restoration clearly set a stage for Japanese political experiments too as example: constitution, parliament, political parties and elections to the public offices. During Tokugawa period, Japan was under the feudal system. The society was facing problems of high priced commodities. *Bakufu* took even various reform steps, but they were not so effective especially to the agrarian and natural economy of early Tokugawa era. There was a need of Japanese to overthrow the Tokugawa *Bakufu* (feudal government between 1192 and 1868, headed by the *Shogun*), and this was accomplished with the help of anti-Tokugawa elements from the clans of *Sastuma* (today's Kagoshima prefecture) and *Choshu* (today's Yamaguchi prefecture), who had spearheaded the restoration movement.

Many Japanese historians have interpreted the end of more than two hundred and sixty years of Tokugawa rule and the subsequent restoration of imperial rule as a primary and crucial political event, as a product of new social and economic forces that developed during the later part of Tokugawa era.¹ It is true that social and economic problems had begun to trouble the *Bakufus*, however, these had not become serious enough to undermine its political authority. Elements of the ascending social and economic forces, the townsmen and the peasantry were not the only forces that challenged the existing political order.

Basically, the struggle that resulted in the downfall of the *Bakufu* was an old-fashioned power struggle between traditional feudal power blocks. Indeed; it was a struggle between the *Bakufu*, and *Choshu-Satsuma* families in particular. The failure of the former and success of the latter was due the rise and growth of commercial

¹ Mikiso Hane, *Premodern, Japan: A Historical Survey* (Westview Press, USA, 1991), p. 224.

capitalism. The *Meiji* restoration, in which peasant uprising was not politically motivated or even directly involved in the actual overthrow of the Tokugawa government, was achieved due to broad coalition between major clans.

However, the end of Tokugawa rule did not bring about a completely new age and a new society overnight. In course of the *Meiji* era significant transformations took place, but the new changes were built upon the foundations of the old. The attitudes, values, practices and institutions that molded the Japanese mode of thinking and behavior prior to and during the Tokugawa era continued to govern the thought and actions of the people during the *Meiji* era and for a long time thereafter, added to the old. However, there were many new elements. These were not only science and technology, but host of new political, social and cultural ideas imported from the west.

POLITICS IN JAPAN: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The year 1868 was a major landmark in Japanese political development. Bringing with event, the *Meiji* restoration that changed Japan from conservative to modern. Revolutionary leaders drawn from the old samurai class seized power at the center, sweeping aside the *shogun* and eliminating their domains. New leaders created a new structure of political authority that laid the foundation for modern Japan. New governing body was constructed and the Emperor announced the Five Articles oath in April, 1868. These were as follows:

1. An "assembly widely convoked" to discuss matters of state.
2. A unity of all classes to promote the "economy and welfare of the nation."
3. All people "shall be allowed to fulfill their aspirations, so that there may be no discontent among them."
4. "Base customs" would be abandoned and government would be based on "principles of international justice."
5. "Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world and thus shall be strengthened the foundation of the Imperial polity."²

² Quoted from, Louis G. Perez, *The History Of Japan* (Greenwood Press, USA, 1998), p. 94.

This purposefully vague declaration alluded to the prospect for more representative form of government but did not specify what these would be. Consequently, the sweeping political reforms that took place between 1868 and 1889 were essentially imposed on Japan by an oligarchy unchecked by representatives' political institutions and operating largely from constraints of public opinion. New leaders had left Japan for better political system in Japan to Germany. One of the first tasks of *Meiji* government was to dismantle the old order, which it did in gradual steps over a decade. In 1869 the new government prevailed on the *daimyo* ('Great Name' designation for feudal warlords) to abolish the former domains and to reorganize the nation into new administrative units called prefectures. Along with these changes, the new government conducted a land survey that uncovered sizable pieces of untaxed land, registered all cultivated land for tax and legal purpose, and laid the new foundation for the new state's revenue base.³

Political Developments in Meiji Japan (1868-1912):

Meiji period was more liberal than Tokugawa as far as central government was concerned. The *Meiji* leaders were content to work for some 20 years on the basis of temporary *ad hoc* administrative arrangements. Meanwhile, pressures for the wider sharing of political power were building up in some quarters, giving rise to the birth of political parties during the 1870s. A popular rights movement, seeking to preserve Western notions of popular rights into the party, was an important feature of politics.

The *Meiji* constitution of February 1889 was a landmark in Japan's modern political development. In part, it represented a policy of the *Meiji* leaders that Japan should have at least the modern Western-type form of state. Significantly, they were mostly attracted by the constitutional practices of Bismarck's Prussia.⁴

Further, the *Meiji* constitution established a parliament, known in English as the Imperial Diet, consisting of two houses: a House of Peers composed of members of the imperial family, nobles created after the *Meiji* restoration and imperial nominees, and an

³ Gary D. Allinson, *The Columbia Guide to Modern Japanese History* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1999), p. 13.

⁴ J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell publication, USA, 1999), pp. 16-17.

elective House of Representatives.⁵ The House of Representatives was not to be seen as the more effective house, since each had equal powers of initiating legislation and the House of Peers had the right of veto over legislation initiated in the House of Representatives.

Working of *Meiji* constitution in practice did not entirely bear out the expectation of the *Meiji* leaders. The House of Representatives proved anything but docile, and the political parties, which despite their recent origin had already accumulated some experience in regional assemblies, fought hard against the principle of transcendental cabinets. Successive governments applied a variety of instruments constitutional and otherwise, in an attempt to confine the parties to an advisory role.

All these development that related to the major institutional functions was an outcome of *Meiji* restoration that modernized Japanese politics as well as society.

Emergence of Political Parties in Pre-War Japan:

A split in the Samurai oligarchy controlling the new government over issues of power and policy gave rise to the first political association in *Meiji* Japan. Antagonized by *han* (feudal domain controlled by *daimyo*) favoritism and by certain economic and political trends, a dissident minority resigned from their posts determined to rally growing external opposition around them. By 1873, when the first of these defections took place, western political techniques had already made a sufficient consideration upon some of the anti-government leaders to suggest the utility of peaceful opposition with political parties.⁶

Single genuine enthusiasm for certain new concepts embedded in Western liberalism was combined with a shrewd assessment of its value as a technique for obtaining personal power. Western political ideas enabled the opposition to revise earlier vague concepts of *han* assemblies by bringing forth the model of representative government, underwritten by a philosophy of popular rights. Under this banner, the

⁵ See appendix of *Meiji* Constitution (Articles 33-35) in this dissertation, p. 118.

⁶ Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (University of Columbia Press, 1953), p. 40.

political associations led by men of *Tosa* and *Hizen* (the pre-*Meiji* provinces)⁷ sought to enlist a wider support for their cause and break the *Satsuma-Choshu* dominance of power.

The opposition to liberalism and the creed of party government took many forms and were compounded of numerous forces. It was foremost in the indifference of an unprepared society, and it lay strong in the purely traditionalist elements, who viewed any Western creed as an anathema. The immediate political opposition that the liberal parties faced, however, was in the hands of different men, for it was the *Satsuma* and *Choshu* oligarchy that stood crossways in the path of party power. *Sat-Cho*⁸ oligarchs were not purely traditionalists, but men who were themselves supporting in greater or smaller degree the cause of Europeanization and championing its influence in the new Japan- men who were taking up the cudgels for modernization along the lines of the Western industrialized state.

Meiji constitution was the climax of political development in 1889, a fundamental law superbly timed and written to face the oligarchies cause. The constitution was based on Western liberal theory. It was the document largely for the oligarchs, highlighting their own political concepts, they succeeded in riveting upon a nation a status quo, which was more strongly oligarchic than representative and one, which perpetuated and strengthened the myth of imperial absolutism, thus making party control of government extremely difficult. Many political associations developed later vis-a-vis the political trends during the *Meiji* period. The emerging political associations were using their popular rights theories to justify their demands for an elected assembly.

The term “people” was limited for the time being to the peasants, and was not intended even by the liberals to include the obviously unequipped lower classes. Despite the use of terms *Koto* (public party), the *Aikokukoto* (Public Party Of Patriots, established on 14 January 1874) were nothing more than an association of a few samurai, without organizational structure and popular support.

⁷ Please See the Map of pre-*Meiji* provinces in the *appendix* of this dissertation, p. 120.

⁸ *Sat-Cho* is the abbreviation of the *Satsuma* and *Choshu* clans.

In the later progress for functional politics, the formation of political parties began earnest hard on the heels of the imperial rescript of October 1881 proclaiming that a national assembly would be convoked in 1890. The *Jiyuto* (Liberal Party) and *Rikken Kaishinto* (Constitutional Reform Party, founded in 1881 and 1882 respectively) began parliamentary activities as soon as the imperial Diet was established. The first cabinet formed under the *Meiji* constitution, however, was 'transcendental' cabinet put together by members of the powerful clan based cliques that had been instrumental in bringing about the *Meiji* restoration of 1868 and putting in place the institutions of modern government. Political parties had almost no power or prestige.

As far as their ideas were concerned all political party's ideology were based on western model of political rights. Words such as *jiyu* (liberty), *byodo* (equality) and *yuai* (fraternity) proved so popular that all were named for many districts parties.

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE WORLD WAR II

The most important symbol of political development is the mass participation in elections. Under whatever ideological and institutional rubric, such elections have become the foremost method of seeking legitimization on the parts of government and political elites. Citizens use their democratic rights, which provide them options to select the governments by means of elections.

Japan's first general election for members of the House of Representatives was held on July 1890, in accordance with the *Meiji* constitution, promulgated the previous year, which had created the bicameral Imperial Diet consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of Peers.⁹ Right to vote for members of the House of Representatives, meanwhile, was limited to male citizens 25 years of age and over who had paid Yen 15 or more in tax for at least a year. Only male citizens 30 years of age and over could become candidates.

⁹ When the Diet session was opened on 25 November 1890 the two parties were participated in the session, *Jiyuto* was with 130 members and *Kaishinto* was with 41 members. 45 independents also participated in the session few were anti-government. (Foot note from Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (University of California Press, London, 1953, p. 154).

After the election on 25 November 1890, first Diet session was summoned; the two opposing forces confronted each other for the first time in the arena of practical politics. In the elections the liberal parties were in a strong position. The so-called *mino* (popular parties- the *Jiyuto*, the *Kaishinto* and their affiliates) held a combined strength exceeding 170 seats in the 300 members Diet. In addition there were 45 independents, some of those whose votes were certain to be anti-government.

On 15 February 1892, the second general elections were held. It was marked by violence and charges of governmental repression. Japan had little experience in the practice of democratic election. In the elections of 1892 a pro-government party had been created under the name of the *Chuo*-club (central club). More over, a second party, the *Kinki Kakutai*, was considered pro-government as mere most independents, and government support went to the independents. In the second general elections five parties received a sufficient number of elected candidates to be listed separately. Two of these were so-called popular parties, the *Jiyuto* and the *Kaishinto*. This elections experienced multiparty system emergence for parliamentary election, continued throughout the prewar period.

The 1892 elections, however, demonstrated clearly that only one party, the *Jiyuto*, could be considered a truly national party. The *Jiyuto* ran a total of 270 candidates for those of representative in 44 of 45 prefectures and metropolitan districts. The second ranking party, the *Chuo*-club, ran only 94 candidates in 25 prefectures and metropolitan districts, electing 83 and 23 of these, representing approximately one half of the Japanese prefectures. The second "liberal party", the *Kaishinto*, ran 100 candidates in 29 prefectures and metropolitan districts, electing 37 in 17. The *Dokurishu* club ran 34 candidates in 17 prefectures and metropolitan districts, electing 32 in 15. The *Kinki Kakutai* (local level, national polity), as its name suggests, was essentially a local party confined to the Kinki districts running 12 candidates in Osaka and Hyogo prefecture, and electing all 12 candidates.¹⁰

¹⁰ Robert A. Scalapino (Ed. by) Robert E. Ward, *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton University Press, USA, 1973), p. 257.

Jiyuto had secured only 31 percent of the elected candidates; it alone among the parties had run a number of sufficient candidates to contest seriously for a Diet majority. Its percentage of victor candidates to those run was relatively low (35 percent only), reflecting inadequate financing and government interference. The *Chu*-club obtained 28 percent of the elected candidates, scoring a significantly higher percentage of victorious candidates, those run up to 88 percent for 787 seats.

The second popular party, the *Kaishinto*, ran less than half the number of candidates run by the *Jiyuto* and elected only about a third. This party represented 12 percent of the total house membership, with the same ratio of successful to unsuccessful candidates as the *Jiyuto*, 35 percent. One third of the *Kaishinto* candidates came from Kanto, although these represented only 20 percent of the total Diet members.

The Election of 1892 indicated that Japan had only truly national party in that year, namely the *Jiyuto*. The other two parties-*Kinki Kakutai* and *Dokuritsu*-club was either wholly or largely sectional or weak in the Diet representation. The *Kaishinto* while more national in scope was also far behind the *Jiyuto* in full in national representation and in strength. The *C'hou*-Club, close to the *Jiyuto* in elected candidates, had a far greater regional imbalance, obtaining less than 10 percent of its seats in three of the seven great regions of Japan, and this despite the fact that it enjoyed some government support.

After 1892 many elections were held however just a few could make sense in development of political process in Japan. In 1898 elections, *Shimpoto* (progressive party) rooted the *Jiyuto* in most of the rural areas as its rival party. Kyushu was the one area that was not well integrated in national political scene as yet and still represented a conservative stronghold. In the tenth general elections of 1908, the election results were conclusive evidence of the supremacy of *Seiyukai* (constitutional government association, formed in September 1900). The party running 246 in all 46 prefectures and metropolitan districts elected 188 members of the 379 member Diet obtained 50 percent of the seats and electing 76 percent of its candidates.¹¹

¹¹ Op. cit., Robert A. Scalapino, n. 10, pp. 261-65

The most basic reasons for *Seiyukai* dominance lay in the fact that this party alone had that combination of support, critical for any emerging society: the political elite already, ensconced in power, and the bulk of rural elite and significant elements within the urban community.

On 20 January 1913, after heated and prolonged struggles in the Diet, Prime Minister Kastura Taro announced the formation of a new party, the *Rikken Doshikai* (constitutional fellow thinker's association); beginning with some 81 Diet members drawn from a variety of sources, the *Rikken Doshikai* eventually encompassed the great majority of the old *Kenseihonto* members. However, *Rikken Doshikai* dominated *Seiyukai* in 1915 general elections of twelfth House of Representatives (lower house). This electoral change took place due to several reasons. Despite the preponderant electoral strength of *Seiyukai*, the *genro* had shifted the top leadership from Saionji, a *Seiyukai* supporter, to a non-party protege of Kastura Yamagata.

Prior to the 1915 election, Okuma Shigenobu had succeeded Kastura, as prime minister. Despite the new Prime Minister's reputation for liberalism, ~~however~~, his home minister was widely charged with extensive interference on behalf of the *Rikken Doshikai* in the course of the 1915 campaign. Indeed, the twelfth general elections were often labeled as the most corrupt election since 1892.¹² After twenty-five years of parliamentary government, Japanese politics appeared to have established a two party system as a result of a realignment of the critical political forces in the society.

The fifteenth general elections were held on 10 May 1924 under the auspices of a "neutral" government; Prime Minister Kiyoura Keigo was a veteran official without party affiliation. *Seiyukai*, more over had been split into two almost equal factions, one calling itself the *Seiyuhonto* (factions of *Seiyukai*). The break up had developed out of personal and power rivalries, not due to fundamental policy differences. Thus the 1924 election saw three national parties in place of the traditional two parties. It was the first time when the Japanese politics experienced coalition alignment in House of Representatives. The elections result of 1924 has been shown in the table on next page.

¹² Op. cit., Robert A. Scalapino, p. 268.

TABLE 1: LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS RESULT OF 1924

Parties	Candidates Elected	% of Seats
<i>Kenseikai</i>	152	33
<i>Seiyuhonto</i>	112	25
<i>Seiyukai</i>	102	22
<i>Kakushin Club and Small Parties</i>	30	7
Independents	69	13
Total	465	100

(Source: Ed. Robert E. Ward, *Political Development in Modern Japan*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1973, p. 598)

It was the first time when the Japanese politics experienced coalition alignment in House of Representatives. *Seiyuhonto-Seiyukai* seats combined, equaled 47 percent of the total house membership, substantially more than the 33 percent seats held by *Kenseikai* (later become *Minseito*, democratic party). Under these circumstances, the *Kenseikai* (constitutional associations) became the leading party, with 33 percent of seats in the lower house. Second party was the *Seiyuhonto* and the third was the *Seiyukai*. However, *Kakushin Kurabu* and smaller parties achieved 7 percent of votes with 30 seats. Independents bagged 69 seats with 13 percent of votes.

In the 1930 elections held in February, *Minseito* won a majority of 273 members from the 466 members House of Representatives in every prefecture and metropolitan areas. *Seiyukai* was the second largest party in the election. However, *Seiyukai* emerged again as a largest party in 1932 election, despite it failed to achieve majority in 1936 elections, where *Minseito* won the elections as largest party with 205 members and *Seiyukai*'s strength was only of 174 members in the House of Representatives.

After the elections a historical incident occurred in Japan in February 1936 that changed the friction of internal Japanese politics. In the aftermath of this attempted coup, the military took a commanding position in the government. A short-lived Hirota

Koki government capitulated to most military demands and was followed by a Cabinet headed by General Hayashi Senjuro.¹³

With the confrontation by the Diet to General Hayashi, new elections were scheduled in April 1937, *Minseito* and *Seiyukai* were the two parties at the first and second position in the election results. Nevertheless, not much was changed in the Japanese internal politics, bureaucrats, began to head cabinets more often. Political parties were dissolved in 1940, and *Taisei Yokusankai* (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) emerged as alternative to the political parties that turned the Diet into a rubber-stamp assembly.

Finally, in December 1941 a government headed by General Hideki Tojo led Japan into World War II, since then the country's political system was totally geared to aiding the war effort. In the twenty first general elections that were held in 1942, after a one-year extension of House of Representatives member's term of office. In this election, candidates endorsed by the *Taisei Yokusankai*, who enjoyed powerful backing from the government they, won 381 seats with overwhelming majority.

Thus from 1890 till Japan's defeat in World War, 21 House of Representatives elections were held, all the elections involved restrictions of one sort or another, various forms of government interference, and after controls a dubious nature. In short, there were no free and fair elections.

DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES AFTER WORLD WAR II

After World War II, Japan established a political system of parliamentary democracy, which provided political activity under its new constitution. Parties that had been forced to disband in 1940 due to militarist act returned to the political scene for a fresh start. Japan Socialist Party, Japan Liberal Party, The Japan Progressive Party, The Japan Cooperative Party and other political organizations were established in rapid succession in November and December of 1945. The Japanese Communist Party resurfaced and

¹³ Op cit., Ed., Robert A. Scalapino, n. 12, p. 282.

held its first party convention in eighteen years, which had collapsed due to ban by militarist acts of government in 1928-1929.

On 4th October 1945, American occupation authorities ordered the release of all political prisoners, including communists, some of who had been imprisoned for nearly two decades. The party immediately resumed publication of its party newspaper, *Alkhata* (Red Flag), for the first time in eleven years, and in December held its first party convention in eighteen years. Thus, within just a few months of the end of the Second World War, Japan's pre-war politicians had picked up the pieces of the earlier party movement and organized new political parties.¹⁴

During the first decade after the end of the Second World War in August 1945, Japan's political party system was extraordinary fluid. When Japan returned to a democratic parliamentary system in 1946, a period of great confusion in party politics preceded the first post-war elections, which were held in April 1946 for the House of Representatives (often called lower house) and for the House of Councilors (often called upper house) in 1947. The US (American) occupation authorities had mostly purged the Diet member of the great pre-war parties.¹⁵

It is to be noted that in 1945, two major 'conservative' parties Democratic Party (*Minshuto*) and Liberal Party (*Jiyuto*), organized themselves as soon as the war had ended. By the end of 1945, two 'progressive' groups had organized themselves into the Japan Socialist Party and Japan Communist Party.

In the autumn of 1955, observers of Japanese politics anticipated the emergence of a two party system. Most of the 'progressive (*Kakushinkei*)' members of the Diet joined with each other in a reunified Japan Socialist Party (JSP) at its convention on 13 October. A month later their 'conservative' (*Hoshu-Kei*) counterparts collapsed in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as the climax of its convention that was held on 14 November.

¹⁴ Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (Columbia University Press, USA, 1988), pp. 5-6.

¹⁵ Ronald J. Hrebennar, *The Japanese Party System* (Westview Press, US, 1992), p. 3.

Thus, among various political parties were emerged after 1945, some changed themselves with the changing of Japanese political environment and few remained the same with their strong ideas. Consequently many changes took place till 1993, when the coalition period became evident with the end up of single party dominance of thirty-eight years of rule. Here under is an introductory sketch of political parties that were formed after 1945.

1. Liberal Democratic Party (*Jiyu Minshuto*):

Liberal Democratic Party is the biggest political party, as a conservative force. The party regards the protection of liberty, human rights, democracy and the parliamentary system as its fundamental mission. The LDP was formed in November 1955 through the merger of two conservative parties founded after World War II and continued to govern without a break until August 1993.

LDP has seen many ups and down from 1955 to 1993. Ronald J. Hrebenar called it the ruling party of Japan. It garnered 57.8 percent of votes in the House of Representatives elections of 1958, thus securing 287 seats. In the following elections in 1960, the party achieved 296 seats 467 member of House of Representatives. However, both the proportion of the popular votes polled and the number of seats won by the LDP saw an extended period of decline in the 1970s. In June 1976, six LDP's Diet members left the party to form the New Liberal Club (NLC). The oil crisis and the subsequent Lockheed scandal created problem for the "1955 setup" to its core and threatened the comfortable conservative majority.¹⁶

In the House of Representatives elections of December 1976, the LDP won only 48 percent of the popular vote and gained only 249 seats, seven seats less than the 256 required for the majority; it was the first time the party did not achieve a majority in the House of Representatives. In the next election in 1979, the LDP won only 248 seats. In both cases of the LDP was able to achieve a slender majority in the house when several unaffiliated House of Representatives members joined the party. In 1980 the party

¹⁶ The genesis, evolution, program and performance of the LDP have been detailed in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

recovered its majority by winning 284 seats, but it suffered another setback in 1983 when it gained only 250 seats. As a result the second Nakasone Yasuhiro cabinet was formed as a coalition government comprising the LDP and the NLC.

In a major turnaround, the LDP won by a landslide victory in the simultaneous elections for the upper and lower houses held in July 1986; the party took 300 seats in the House of Representatives and mustered 72 seats of 126 seats up for the election in the House of Councilors.¹⁷ Both the figures represented the largest number of seats the party had ever won. In August 1986, the key members of the NLC rejoined the LDP. On the strength of its secure majority in the Diet, the LDP introduced an across-the-board consumption tax in April 1989. However, this tax and so-called recruit scandal, which had surfaced in the summer of 1988, were to be the cause of a major reverse for the party.

In the July 1989 House of Councilors election the LDP won only 36 seats giving the party of total 109 seats, a short of the 127 required for a majority in the upper house. The party did maintain a stable majority in the House of Representatives in the election of February 1990, winning 275 seats. Without a majority in both houses however LDP found difficulty to manage in the Diet. In the July 1992 House of Councilors elections the LDP won 69 seats giving the party of total 108 seats. The party's strength and position between the 1993 and 2003, in the Diet is discussed in other chapters of this dissertation.

2. Social Democratic Party (*Nippon Shakaito*):

The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), which changed its official English name to the Social Democratic Party of Japan in February 1991, was established on 2nd November 1945 as a united front embracing the various pre-war proletarian parties. A socialist led coalition government ruled between May 1947 and March 1948. In the previous general election for the imperial Diet, which was held in April 1946, the JSP won 93 seats. In its party convention held in January 1986 the JSP abandoned the platform,

¹⁷ Please refer *appendix* of this dissertation for election results 1986 of both the chambers, p. 130 and 133.

which were adopted in 1955 and it was influenced by Marxism-Leninism (ML). In its new declaration the party stated that it was changing to a policy line like that of Social Democratic Parties of Western Europe and thus presented to people a “new Socialist Party”.

Yet there was still disagreement within the party over the Japan-US security treaty and nuclear power. However, the JSP has maintained its official foreign policy stance of unarmed neutrality. In April 1947 general elections, the first after the promulgation of the present constitution in 1946, the JSP increased its presence to 143 seats, becoming the strongest party. As a result, the JSP formed a coalition with the conservative Democratic Party (DP) and National Cooperative Party (NCP) the second and third strongest conservative parties respectively under the JSP Chairman Tetsu Katayama. Faced with a rebellion by left-wingers in the JSP, however, Katayama was forced to resign after only nine months in office. The following coalition between JSP and the DP, under the DP's Presidentship of Hitoshi Ashida was short lived.

The LDP woes and the popularity of the JSP chairperson Takako Doi helped the socialists make substantial gains in the Diet in 1989 and 1990. Doi was the first woman in Japanese history to hold the highest post of a major political party and also later became the first female Speaker in the House of Representative. In the House of Councilors elections of July 1989, JSP took 46 seats, 10 more than the LDP, giving the party a total of 66 members in the house. In February 1990 House of Representatives elections, the party gained 53 seats of the total of 136 seats. In between these incidents, the party changed its name from JSP to Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) in February 1991.

However, in House of Representatives elections of 1992, the SDPJ won only 22 seats just enough to maintain its status quo, giving the party 71 seats in total. In July 1993 House of Representatives elections, the SDPJ had only 70 winning candidates, having the number of seats it had held before the election. Nonetheless, the SDPJ was the major party with its highest number of members in the coalition government that ousted the LDP, providing the administration with a number of cabinet ministers. When a new administration was formed in April 1994, policy differences with the other

coalition partners over the tax system, foreign relations and other matters caused the SDPJ to leave the coalition and return to the opposition.

As against these developments a new coalition of the SDPJ, LDP and the *Sakigake* came to power in June 1994 and SDPJ chairman Tomiichi Murayama became Japan's first socialist prime minister after 47 years. In September 1994 the SDPJ extensively overhauled its basic platform, which it decided on new policies, including acceptance of the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), support for the Japan-US security and approved the already operating nuclear power facilities. The SDPJ changed its name to renovate the party and called itself Social Democratic party (SDP) from January 1996.

3. *Komeito* (Clean Government Party):

The *Komeito* was founded on 17 November 1964 as the political arms of the *Soka Gakkai*, a lay organization affiliated to the Nichiren Shoshu, sect of Japanese Buddhism. Its predecessor, the *Komei Seiji Renmei*, which had been founded in November 1961, had fielded nine candidates in the sixth house of Councilors elections in July 1962 and got them all elected. These gains added to uncontested seats, made the league the third largest political force in the upper house, behind the LDP and the JSP. In the first House of Representatives elections held in 1967, *Komeito* was the third largest party with the 25 seats. The party officially announced in 1970 its separation of politics and religion. Its aims included the realization of a welfare society.

In later development, *Komeito* won 45 seats in House of Representatives election of February 1990, resulting in a net loss of 10 seats. In the 1992 House of Councilors elections, however, *Komeito* won 14 seats. In the 1993 House of Representatives elections it regained 6 seats bringing its total of 51. As the third largest party in the first coalition government, *Komeito* held a number of cabinet posts, and it remained part of the second coalition government, established the following year. It returned to the opposition when cabinet resigned in June 1994. *Komeito* merged with New Frontier Party (*Shinshintō*) in December 1994 but it was reborn as the New

Komeito in 1998, following the New Frontier Party's dissolution in late 1997. Since then *Komeito* is performing as the coalition partner of the LDP in the government.

4. Democratic Socialist Party (*Minshato*):

Suchiro Nishio and others, who split from the JSP in October 1959 over the party's stance concerning revision of the Japan-US security treaty, formed the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in January 1960. The DSP had a base of *Domei* that was related with the Japanese Confederation of Labor. However, in the social climate of the 1960s, party's goal of West-European style social democracy failed to win considerable support from the people. At the time of its formation the DSP, was a pragmatic party that sought to seize power by marshalling anti-LDP and anti-JSP forces. The call for the reorganization of the opposition parties by Eiichi Nishimura the second chairman of DSP was an extension of this policy that provided the opportunity for discussion on the formation of a coalition.

In December 1972, DSP suffered a heavy defeat in the 33rd general elections for the lower house. The House of Councilors elections were held in 1974 that consequence the setback for the LDP and created a balance of power between conservatives and reformists. However, the DSP began to learn toward the idea of a coalition with the LDP faded with the LDP's resounding victory in the double elections of 1986, but actually there were almost no differences in the basic policies of the two parties.

The DSP, which lost further ground in national elections in 1989 and 1990, sought to establish its identity by preaching the principles of fairness and justice as the only measures of national and state interest. In 1993, the DSP was in the Hosokawa coalition government with seven parties. The cooperation was temporary; however, the formation of Murayama government placed DSP on opposition sides of political fence. The DSP was dissolved into the *Shinshinto* (NFP) when it was formed in December 1994. It emerged again as *Shinto yuai* (New Party Amity) and with the collapse of that party after four year in April 1998; it merged with the expanded *Minshuto*.

5. Japan Communist Party (*Nihon Kyosanto*):

The JCP is the only one of Japan's political party that has continued in existence since 1920s since its formation on 15 July 1922. Since it was branded as illegal, the party suffered much oppression in its early years in the 1930's and early 1940's. Thus its organization base was completely destroyed. After World War II, the JCP commenced activities as a legal party at its fourth party convention held in December 1945, led mainly by newly released political prisoners.

JCP eventually emerged from the ensuing period of stagnation at its sixth national conference in July 1955, when the party abandoned its policy of violent revolution and began to shift toward accepting parliamentary democracy. At the seventh party convention in July 1958, a proposal was made for a new platform that called for an independent and flexible approach.

After 1961, the JCP gradually recovered its strength as the party of the masses. Stressing its character as a self-reliant and independent party, the JCP engaged in disagreements with both the Russia (former Soviet Union) and Chinese parties and expelled Soviet and Chinese oriented factions. In the 33rd General elections in December 1972 it boosted its strength in the lower house from 14 to 38 seats. After reaching a peak of 39 seats in the 35th general election in October 1979, however, the JCP entered a slump. It was hit especially hard by the suppression of pro-democracy activist in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June 1989, reforms in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991.

The JCP won 16 seats in the lower house elections of February 1990, resulting in a net loss of 11 seats. In the 1992 upper house elections, the JCP won only six additional seats for a net loss of three seats and a total of 11. In the 1993 lower house elections it lost another seat and had only 15 winning candidates. In the July 1995 upper

house elections the JCP won eight seats among 72 candidates in the Proportional Representation and in Prefectural Districts respectively.¹⁸

6. Democratic Party of Japan (*Minshuto*):

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was formed on 28 September 1996, uniting 57 dissenters, 26 were from SDP (predominantly from its right wing), 15 were from *Sakigake* and two were from former Japan New Party (JNP) as Japan's third largest political party. 52 members of House of Representatives and five members Houses of Councilors attended the inaugural convention, making the party the third largest group after the LDP and New Frontier Party (*Shinshintō*). On 12 March 1998, three post-*Shinshintō* parties; Good Governance Party, *Shintō Yuai* (Amity Party) and the Democratic Reform Party (DRP) agreed to merge with DPJ that became the second largest force after the Liberal Democratic Party that was the largest opposition party and it challenged the powerful LDP in 1998 upper house elections. These days DPJ is performing as a responsible opposition after the November 2003 and July 2004 elections that were held for the lower and upper house correspondingly.

7. New Frontier Party (*Shinshintō*):

The New Frontier Party (NFP *Shinshintō*) was formed in December 1994 with the merger of Japan Renewal Party, *Komeito* (Clean Government Party), Japan New Party, the Democratic Socialist Party and other parties (excluding the Japanese Communist Party) outside the three-party ruling coalition of the LDP, SDP and *Sakigake*. Former LDP Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa assumed the leadership of the party in December 1995.

In the July 1995 upper house elections the NFP achieved 40 seats for a total of 56. Together with its 170 seats after the elections of lower house in 1996, made the NFP the second most powerful party after the LDP in both chambers. Following these elections the NFP suffered a series of defections, including the Hata Tsutomu group in December 1996. In the early 1997, the party was gravely embarrassed by investigations

¹⁸ See *appendix* of this dissertation for election results of both the houses for JCP performance, pp. 126-34.

for alleged corruption of one of its former upper house member, Tomobe Tatsu who had apparently been endorsed as a party candidate with scant probing into his background.

8. The Japan Renewal Party (*Shinseito*):

Japan Renewal Party (JRP *Shinseito*) was formed under the leadership of Tsutomu Hata in June 1993, when 44 LDP members, who sought political reforms split the party. In the lower house election held in the following month, the JRP won 55 seats, making it the third largest party in the House of Representatives. It played a central role in the establishment of the coalition government that ended almost four decades of LDP rules, and Hata took office as deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs.

When a new administration was formed after Hosokawa government in April 1994, Hata became prime minister. However, the secession of the SDP from the ruling coalition deprived the Hata administration of a parliamentary majority. In June 1994, faced with the adoption of a non-confidence motion moved by the LDP in a plenary session of the House of Representatives, the Hata cabinet resigned. The party went into opposition with the formation of Murayama cabinet and merged with *Shinshintō* in December 1994. Since then, it disappeared from political scene.

9. New Party *Sakigake* (Harbinger):

The New Party *Sakigake* (Harbinger) was formed two days before the formation of JRP in June 1993 by 10 breakaway LDP lower house members led by Masayoshi Takemura. It won 13 seats in the 1993 lower house elections and joined in the ensuing coalition government, with Takemura given charge as chief cabinet secretary. When the administration subsequently changed hands, *Sakigake* refused a cabinet post, withdrawing to a position of cooperation without cabinet representation.

In June 1994, however, it returned to power as part of a coalition established with the LDP and SDPJ, with Takemura taking office as finance minister. *Sakigake* occupied three seats in the July 1995 upper house elections.

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Unusually for the times, *Sakigake* retained its integrity as a single party in between 1996 to 1998, but was reduced to a mere two lower house seats in the October 1996 elections. Takemura himself had lost popularity as Finance Minister in 1996, taking responsibility for poor performance by the ministry of the failed *jusen* (Housing Loan Company) problems.

10. New Conservative Party (*Hoshushinto*):

The newest party on the block was formed at the end of 2002 by five *Hoshuto* members and nine from *Minshuto* (*Hoshuto* was originally formed as a split from Liberal Party in 2000). In terms of policy, it is close to the LDP and it needs to work closely with coalition partners LDP and New *Komeito* to achieve election success. It lost in the 2001 upper house elections eventually led to the replacement of former Takakurazuka actress Ogi Chikage as party leader.


11. New Liberal Club (*Shinjiyu Kurabu*) and *Shaminren*:

In 1976 and 1977 two minor parties were formed respectively. They were the New Liberal Club (NLC) as a splinter from the LDP and the *Shaminren* from the JSP. Both the parties achieved a few parliamentary seats in the elections and improved their positions in the Diet. The NLC went into a coalition government with the LDP following the 1983 lower house elections but most of its members were absorbed into the LDP in 1986. *Shaminren* lasted until the 1994 when its members joined other parties. The NLC leader Kono Yohei became the LDP leader after the party lost its ruling power in 1993.

Eda Stasuki became Minister for Science from the *Shaminren* in the Hosokawa cabinet in August 1993. Kan Naoto became the Health and Welfare minister in the Hashimoto Ryutaro cabinet, which was formed in January 1996 after the Prime Ministership of Tomiichi Murayama.

12. The Sun Party (*Taiyoto*):

This was the small groups of 13 parliamentarian led by Prime Minister Hata that broke away from the *Shinshinto* in 1996. The party was formed with the disillusion of the



leadership of the Ozawa Ichiro. The Sun Party interacted substantially with other 'progressive' parties notably by the *Minshuto* and the SDP.

13. Japan New Party (JNP *Nihon Shinto*)

The Hosokawa Morihiro in mid-1992 formed the JNP. It was the most unusual in the past ten-year history of Japanese political parties that have been composed of almost political outsiders. The average age of 35 of its members elected to the House of Representatives in the July 1993 elections was only 42. Many of them were graduated from the Matsushita School of Politics and Economics, a private college endowed by the founder of Panasonic in order to train new political leaders. The JNP was in power in 1993 when LDP lost its majority in the lower house. Hosokawa formed the seven party coalition governments in August 1993. Once the Hosokawa cabinet began to get into difficulties and fell from the office in April 1994, the popularity of the JNP rapidly disappeared. Most of its parliamentary members merged in the *Shinseito* and other later joined *Minshuto*.

OTHER PARTIES AND GROUPS

Due to new political changes after the House of Representatives elections in Japan in the year 1993, many new parties and groups emerged. After the LDP defeat in the election and formation of the Hosokawa government, several small groups of about five Diet members each left the LDP and set-up their own organizations. These included the *Kaikaku no Kai* (Reform Association), New Vision Party, Liberal Party and *Koshikai*.

Another ripple involved small groups that broke away from the Japan New Party (JNP) following the resignation of Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and they formed the organizations such as, Group *Seiun* (Blue Sky) and *Minshu no Kaze* (Democratic Breeze). Eventually these groups merged with *Sakigake*. After the JNP decided to join the NFP, a final group led by Banri Kaieda avoided the merger from leaving JNP and formed the *Minshu Shinto Club* (Alliance of Democratic Reformers) that once appeared likely to form a third to compete with the LDP and NFP.

In the House of Councilors, five members led by Hideo Den formed a group with a slightly different make up called, *Shinto Goken* Liberal (The New Liberal Party for Protecting the Constitution). A parliamentary group in the upper house formed *Niin* Club, which has managed 5 seats in the upper house. A small group of *Shinshinto*, formed the Twenty First Century (21 *sieki*) Party in September 1996.

ELECTIONS IN POST-WAR JAPAN

It was only after Japan's defeat in August 1945 that the true universal suffrage was enforced. In October 1945 the head quarters of General Mac Arthur, the supreme commander of the allied powers who headed the occupation of Japan, issued five reform directives the then Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara, who had just formed a cabinet. One of these demands was the unrestraint of Japanese women through enfranchisement. In fulfillment with this order, the cabinet presented to the Diet to revise the House of Representatives Members Election Law. With the passage of this bill, all citizens of both the sexes 20 years of age and above became eligible to vote, and all citizens of both sexes 25 years of age and above were qualified to run for the House of the Representatives.

On 26 November 1945, the 89th Diet session was called and dissolved on December 18 after passing the major legislation as revised House of Representatives Members Election Law and the Labor Union Law. The first general elections were held in April 1946 for the House of Representatives. A total number of 2,770 candidates vied for 466 seats. The Japan Liberal Party that was the biggest winner with 140 seats commanded less than the one third of the seats so that the political situation was extremely fluid. The House of Councilors elections was based on the "learned and experience persons" and representative of professional interest, as divided into 100 to be elected from all over Japan in national constituency, with remaining 150 (152 at present) to be elected from local constituencies on the prefectural level.

In 1982, the election system for the members of the nation at large was radically amended. However, election systems for the members of local constituencies remained unchanged are now officially called "electoral districts". While House of

Representatives elections reflect the will of the voters directly as for as the House of Councilors elections are designed to prevent change, with only half of the seats up for the election every three years. The minimum age for Upper House candidates is set at 30 years, in keeping with the idea that the House of Councilors should function as a “chamber of good sense”.

The first election for the House of Councilors was held on April 20, 1947 after the passage of House of Councilors Election Law. Following the election, independents constituted the largest group in the House with 111 seats, far ahead of the second where Socialist had placed with only 47 seats. From the independents, 92 formed the *Ryokufukai* (Green Breeze Society). This society claimed to stand for “good sense, political neutrality and lack of bias.” When members decreased to 11 in year 1960, the group renamed itself as the *Sangiin Doshikai* (House of Councilors Society of Likeminded People), marking the end of real influence of the independents. After the “1955 setup” the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives election results were in the favor of only LDP.

In the 1970s the support for the LDP declined in both the chamber of the house. New electoral systems for the House of Councilors were adopted in the 1983 elections. This was the first reform of election system under the post-war constitution that was related to the proportional representation system.¹⁹

ANALYZING THE ACTIVITIES OF PRE AND POST-WAR JAPANESE PARTY POLITICS

As all political institutions are products of their historical development, it is necessary to present some generalizations about the pre-war party system. T.J. Pempel has noted that the pre-war party system was inflexible in its retention of ties to rural agricultural and urban commercial bases despite the rise of new social groups. Consequently the parties of the 1930s were “largely irrelevant, either as the vehicles or the reflection of the social changes”. Pempel suggests that contemporary Japanese parties have the same

¹⁹ Election results of upper house after the new electoral law can be read out from the *appendix* of this dissertation, pp. 125-35.

problem of being “locked into past constituencies”. Those past “constituencies” would have been the rural sectors for the LDP and the industrial labor union for the socialists.²⁰

As a matter of the fact, the parties did not have a long history of significant influence in Japanese politics. Following a long emergence period beginning in the decade after the *Meiji* restoration of the 1860s, it was not until the post World War I period that cabinets were formed on the basis of electoral results. Yet by the 1930s, parties were effectively excluded from real political power. Sustained party control of Japanese government can be perceived as having begun only in year since the end of World War II.

Another parallel between the pre and post-war party systems is the dependence of the conservatives of “big business.” Just as the *Jiyuto* and *Seiyukai* were the “financial children” of the *Zaibatsu* (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and others), the post war LDP, NLC, and DSP are the dependents of the Keidanren and other business organizations of Japan.

Differences can also be seen, for example the pre-war party system was characterized by lack of dominant party but after the “1955 setup”, in all elections, LDP was the dominant party till 1993. Post-war system is more ideological than the pre-war system. Excluding the leftist parties, the pre-war party system was totally conservative. Whereas the post-war system has many ideas based parties based on ideology like, LDP as conservative, JSP (now SDP) socialists and the JCP as leftist.

The Liberal Democratic Party monopolized political power in Japan for 38 years after its formation, providing political stability. The principal reason the LDP managed to hold onto power for such a long time during the cold-war era was that the basic issue during that period was the choice of ideology. The LDP was the only party in Japan that clearly advocated liberal democracy.

²⁰ T.J.Pempel, *Political Parties and the Social Change: The Japanese Experience* In L. Maisal and J.Cooper, ed., *Political Party: Development and Decay* (Sage, Beverly Hills, 1978), p. 312.

Chapter 2

EXPLAINING “1955 SETUP” AND ITS COLLAPSE

In November 1945 Japan witnessed the reorganization of the major pre-war conservative, moderate, and progressives and the legalization of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). A parliamentary cabinet system was firmly established under the new constitution that was enforced in 1947. The first decade after the war, characterized by hardship and chaos, saw a succession of both coalition and conservative governments. Later the reunification of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had split since 1951, and the merger of the two conservative parties led to the formation of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the November 1955. Which was called “1955 setup”, dominated by two parties actually “one and half party system” since the LDP had about twice as many Diet seats as the opposition party, JSP. During the early years of the cold war, the two major parties engaged in bitter ideological struggles. Consequently the rapid economic growth that began in the 1960s, however fixed the pattern of the LDP as the ruling party and the JSP as the “permanent opposition” playing a ‘big mouth’ role; and in the 1970s the two parties settled into a unique relationship of confrontation up front and hand cooperation behind the scenes.

Dissatisfaction with the “1955 setup” in the mean time prompted the formation of a number of smaller middle-of-the-road parties. Meanwhile, LDP’s political corruption was most evident in an apparently endless series of financial scandals. This led to ever increasing voter disappointment with the politics and politicians. Things came to head in the summer of 1993. The LDP fragmented by then had lost its lower house majority in the July general elections, bringing to an end of thirty-eight years of dominance in making governments and ruling Japan.¹

¹ Kishimoto Koichi (revised by: Kishimoto Shunsuke), *Politics in Modern Japan* (Japan Echo Inc., Tokyo, 1997), p.117.

The formation of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955, as significant achievement can hardly be exaggerated. It led to more than three and half decades of a single party dominance, a period during which Japan moved from relative poverty to the second-largest economy in the world.² The LDP's long dominance of politics, however, led to the emergence, through the close bonds among the government, bureaucracy and industry, of a political system that favored vested interests. As a result, Japanese politics was infested by internal corruption and at the same time lacked the ability to adapt to changes in the socio-economic structure and Japan's growing international status. Consequently, the issue of political reforms emerged as the major items on Japan's political agenda.

FORMATION OF "1955 SETUP"

In October 1955, the right and left wings of the Japanese Socialist Party merged into one, and this implanted in the following month the merger of two conservative parties—the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, to form the LDP. By 1952, there were three major conservative groups in Japan. One was *Kaishinto*, formed in February 1952 under its president, Shigemitsu Maoru. A second was the mainstream Liberal Party under Prime Minister Yoshida. Third group was anti-Yoshida group of the Liberals, centering on Hatoyama Ichiro. No doubt that this marked the founding of the "LDP setup". The rationale for the merger was the desire for political power and control of the government.³ The Socialist Party cracked over the issue of San Francisco Peace Treaty, increased its Diet strength in the successive elections of 1952, 1953 and 1955. In the February of the 1955 elections, both the wings campaigned on platforms promising a merger in the near future. The Diet strength of the conservatives, however, kept shrinking in succeeding elections, and the Democratic Party, which had organized the Ichiro Hatoyama (prime minister from December 1954 to December 1956) cabinet; fell due to shortage of majority in 1956. The conservatives resolved to merge to form a stable conservative government and to respond to the socialists' merger.

² J. A. A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell Publishers, U.K., 1999), p. 132.

³ Masumi Junnosuke, ed. in Tetsuya Kataoka, *Creating Single Party Democracy* (Hoover Institution Press, US, 1992), p. 34.

The mergers in the two camps, however, were brought about by strong external pressure. Sohyo, the labor federation created by the occupation authority, turned sharply left and became increasingly radical with the coming of the Korean War, directing a large-scale labor campaign against production “rationalization” in many factories. Without Sohyo’s total endorsement, the JSP left wing could not have expanded as it did. Also without Sohyo’s pressure, the JSP would not have come together again.

Having launched a campaign of technology innovation and production rationalization, the business community needed a stable and conservative government to maintain good relationships with US, to prevent the growth of JSP’s, and to cope with the intensifying labor movement. Under this strong business pressure the conservatives resolved to combine into the single conservative party. In short, the “1955 setup” was challenging the system that emerged against the conditions of intense labor-management conflict.⁴ Further, the JSP’s merger sponsors defended the 1947 constitution and wanted to abolish the Japan-US treaty, whereas the conservatives demanded constitutional revision and the continued maintenance of the treaty.

The stand-off between the two camps intensified under the Kishi Nobusuke government (Prime Minister from February 1957 to July 1960), who stood for the “new era in Japan-US relationships”, and came to the head over the issue of the security treaty revision in 1960. The Sohyo centered organizations were mobilized and the media launched a campaign to attract an unprecedented mass of demonstrators around the Diet building, encouraging the Socialists and splitting the LDP.

Even though the treaty was ratified, US President M.D. Eisenhower’s trip was canceled and the Kishi cabinet resigned. The Ikeda Hayato (Prime Minister from July 1960 to November 1964) that followed steered away from politics where making economics the priority through the famous policy of income doubling. This led to the start of a full-fledged, high-speed economic growth. Over the years, the switch from politics to economics has taken the wind out of the sails of both the sides.

⁴ Op cit., Masumi Junnosuke, n. 3, p. 35.

Therefore, the year 1955 can be reckoned as a turning point in Japan's economic history. The government's economic white paper for the year proudly proclaimed in its subtitle "the post-war period is over", meaning that the Japan had completely recovered from the economic setback suffered in defeat. It was also in 1955, that the annual nationwide spring rounds known as the *shunto* (labor demonstrations) were launched, establishing the post-war Japanese pattern for determining increase in wages. The year can also be said to mark the beginning of Japan's period of high growth economic development. The "1955 setup", characterized by political and administrative domination by a single conservative party, got off to a start as a political system for sustaining high growth that was to become legendary.⁵

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY SINCE 1955 TO 1993

In one form or another, the Liberal Democratic Party or its predecessors have ruled Japan since the inauguration of the new Constitution in 1947. Through its various factions it has been a lineal descendant of the pre-war *Seiyukai* and *Minseito* parties that-also in various guises trace their histories back to the early 1880s and that over the time gradually came to play an influential although never a dominant, role in pre-war Japanese politics.

Since 1947, there has been only one important exemption to the unbroken record of the Liberal Democratic Party rule. This occurred during a nine-month interim from May 1947 to March 1948 when a socialist, Katayama Tetsu, held the post of prime minister. The illusion of Socialist Party rule created by this development was meaningless, since the government was based upon a very tenuous with a conservative party that effectively cancelled any possibilities of social innovation.⁶

After the "1955 setup", a congenial situation was created for the LDP to rule Japan for continuous thirty-eight years as a dominant political party. This unending panorama of LDP rule makes Japan the world's pre-eminent example of what is often

⁵ About Japan Series, *The Diet, Elections and Political Parties* (Foreign Press Center, Japan, 1995), p. 95.

⁶ Robert E. Ward, *Japan's Political System* (Prentice Hall Publication, 1978), p. 88.

referred to as a pre-dominant or dominant party system. There is a word of difference between functioning of a political system. In which the dominant party confronts a vigorous unified adversaries that embraces an ideology and policy positions opposing to its own and that of a system, in which the oppositions are fragmented among several ideologically diverse parties, some of which advocate policy programs that put them closer to the ruling party than to other parties in the opposition.

Differences between the pre-dominant party systems, moreover, need not only be cross-national differences. As Japanese politics since 1955 shows, it is entirely possible for a pre-dominant party system within a country to undergo a fundamental change both in its format and in the ideological positioning of the parties within it.⁷ In 1955, the LDP faced an opposition that was unified, unalterably opposed to what the LDP stood for, and ready to resort to extra parliamentary tactics of influencing the policy process. By dint of intensity of the opposition's support among a large minority of voters, it was able to prevent the LDP from realizing many of its policy goals and to force it to accomplish others only by resorting to what was widely referred to as a tyranny of the majority.

Indeed, it would be hard to imagine how this situation could have been otherwise, given the rapidity of economic and social changes between 1955 and 1993. These changes greatly weakened the silence of a conservative-progressive cleavage in Japanese politics. They forced the LDP to alter its political program to become responsive to the demands of an increasingly urbanized, pluralistic, rich electorate in order to retain its dominant position. The parties seeking the support of social groups were dissatisfied both with the policies being perused by the LDP and with the alternatives being proposed by the socialists.


Gerald L. Curtis writes about the LDP's performance on the basis of the phases, in which he assigns three phases for the LDP's rule.⁸ In the 1958 general elections, the first House of Representatives elections following the 1955 system party mergers that

⁷ Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988), p. 15

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-37.

created the LDP and reunified JSP, these two parties together polled 91 percent of the popular votes and won 97 percent in the House of Representatives seats.

CHART 1: VOTING PERCENTAGE OBTAINED BY THE LDP AND JSP/SDPJ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS, YEAR 1958-1993



Note: First trend line in above chart represents LDP and second trend line Socialists.

(Data Source: J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, Blackwell Pub, US, 1999, p. 158-61)

The first phase of Japan's predominant party system was characterized by a two party format and by an intense ideological polarization. The communist party received only 2.6 percent of the votes, with the remaining 6 percent or so going to the minor parties and to the independents aligned with the LDP. Relation between the LDP and

JSP during the first phase was characterized by a deep ideological polarization that imparted to Japan an element of “polarized pluralism”. In Japan ideological polarization took the form of a two-bloc competition rather than following Sartori’s model⁹ of multiple parties representing opposing and plural ideological positions. It is true that mass demonstrators brought about an atmosphere of tension and disagreement over the issues of rearmament and constitutional revision. The socialists were resorted the physical force to prevent the LDP from ramming through legislation in the Diet, a student movement in the universities that was dominated by the communist party was launched. It was an ideological cleavage that was so deep between the conservative’s camp and the progressive camp, which seemed perfectly natural to use the language of warfare to describe their relations, was appeared.

First phase of the one party dominance was fairly short lived. The LDP’s determination to retain political power pulled it more and more away from its formal program. At the same time the left wing power in the JSP effectively prevented that party from exploiting any opportunity to move to the political center; instead, it produced a fissure that within four years of the establishment of the 1955 structure led to break in the two party formats, with the formation of the Democratic Socialist Party in the 1960.

In the “golden sixties” of the LDP, successive government under three ex-bureaucrat Prime Ministers: Kishi Nobosuke, Ikeda Hayato, Sato Eisaku seemed to be ushering in an age of “perpetual conservative rule”. The two major emphases of conservative rule were strengthening political and military cooperation with the US and enhancing Japan’s economic potential. Kishi reinforced the former and Ikeda the latter, while Sato worked to enhance both. The breakdown of the high-growth policy that began to be seen towards the end of the Sato administration aggravated environmental, urban, and inflationary problems. Nevertheless, the conservatives started to lose ground in both national and local election.

⁹ Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way Of Politics*, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988), p. 17.

There were several stabilizing forces behind the prolonged period of conservative government. Firstly, the LDP administered its policies flexibly and effectively even though various intra-party problems remained to be settled, as in the case of attempts to amend the constitution. Secondly, the party's basic foreign policy, built around Japan's relation with US, led to the belief that Japan was benefiting from America's economic support and provided a basis on which high growth could be sustained. Thirdly, the power structure of the political-bureaucratic-business complex had built up a colossal apparatus of political domination over local governments and organizations of various kinds through the use of government subsidies. The fourth factor was the abstract anti-LDP arguments offered by the JSP that did not convince the majority of Japanese that the Socialists were actually capable of running the country.

The biggest opposition party, the JSP shrouded its foreign policy in such an abstract term as "universal peace" and "unarmed neutrality" and offered only formal and theoretical criticisms of the nation's high growth economy. Criticism by the JSP had a political significance of its own, but it fell short of impressing the nation as a whole, and this happens to be notable factor.

An important factor behind the long period of conservative rule, however, was the mechanism for carrying out changes of government within one and the same conservative party by taking maximum advantage of the fact that the party was a loose coalition of often disparate factions. LDP governments changed hand as a result of factional power struggles. The shift of power from the bureaucratic faction led by Yoshida to the long-established professional politicians led by Hatoyama Ichiro initiated a "Hatoyama boom." Ikeda Hayato took over from Kishi, whose government fell in the aftermath of the tactics used to forced passage of the bill to ratify a new Japan-US security treaty in the 1960. He adopted a political stance of "tolerance and firmness" and proclaimed the now legendary "income-doubling plan" to divert public attention from political to economic aspects, successfully neutralizing and redirecting the energy hitherto vented in mass demonstrators.

The second phase did begin with the formation of the Democratic Socialist Party that ended the first phase of the LDP dominance. With the formation of *Komeito* in

1964, Japan moved into a period characterized by an increase in the number of relevant parties and a contraction in ideological polarization. Political stability, in this second phase of LDP dominance increasingly came to rest not on the balance created by political forces pulling in opposite directions, but on the competition between multiple parties seeking more and more to occupy the political center. Both the LDP and the JSP steadily lost support through this period. The LDP's share of the popular vote in House of Representatives elections went down from a peak of 57.6 percent in the 1958 election to 41.8 percent in the election held in 1976. Electoral support slid for the JSP from 32.9 to 20.7 percent in the same period.

The LDP's electoral performances in the second phase of Japan's dominant party system disprove the notion that the LDP has been able to remain in power mainly because of the popularity of its high growth economic policies. Its support declined most sharply during the years of rapid growth. Moreover pollution, urban congestion, and other social ills related to rapid industrialization brought in its wake had created by the end of the 1960s an impressive group of urban protest movements and local government leaders backed by the opposition parties.

By the end of 1960s one third of Japanese population were living in the areas of Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka. These crowded urban centers offered fruitful territories in which new parties such as *Komeito* and revitalized communist parties could expand support. They also provided the voters who, supported the New Liberal Club (NLC), an offshoot of the LDP formed in 1975. While politics in rural Japan remained characterized by an essentially one-and-a-half-party system in which only the socialist provided any degree of meaningful competition to the LDP, the urban scenario had by the mid 1970s produced a system in which six parties (the JSP, LDP, DSP, *Komeito*, JCP and NLC) were in active competition.

As competition intensified between these parties, and as the LDP's share of the popular vote and proportion of Diet seat declined, speculation grew that Japan would not only experience conservative-progressive parties but a reversal of the influence of

the progressive and conservatives and the entry of the progressive into the government.¹⁰

In a straight line as the second phase of the LDP dominance was characterized by the scuttling of progressiveness. By most of those supposedly in the progressive camp and by the inability of any of the new challengers; the *Komeito*, Communist Party, DSP and the NLC, to develop into anything more than minor parties, their major role in system terms being to help the LDP retain power by fragmenting the opposition to it.

The high growth policy began to show signs of breaking down around the end of Sato administration in 1972, but the collapse only began to be felt with decisive force at every level of national life with the oil crisis of 1973. The Arab states' embargo on oil supplies following the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli War on 6th October 1973 had a traumatic effect on Japan, which has to import almost all its petroleum needs. The economic confusion that resulted led to panic buying of some daily necessities. The enactment of an emergency anti-hoarding law and others measures taken by the government, aided by the re-establishment of the partial stability in the Middle East, resorted national equilibrium. Nevertheless, this series of events finally made the Japanese public aware of the finite nature of natural resources. It put an end to the high growth period and ushered in a new era of low growth.

Economic change from rapid growth to slow growth also aided to the tensions of the period, but paradoxically helped the LDP by creating the more conservative mood in the electorate that became evident towards the end of the decade. On 4 February 1976 the subcommittee on Multinational Corporations (MNC's) of the US Senate foreign relations committee, headed by Senator Frank Church, brought the Lockheed payoff scandal in to the open.

The high-growth policy that began in 1955, marking the start of the rise of postwar Japanese capitalism, and the final collapse of the policy in the 1970s not only affected politics and economy but brought about revolutionary changes across a wide spectrum, including the nation's social structure and the people's political attitudes.

¹⁰ Op cit., Gerald L. Curtis, n. 9, p. 21.

In the 1970s the third phase begins with the LDP dominance. By the mid 1970s it was becoming increasingly obvious that the fragmented political opposition would not be able to mount an effective challenge to the LDP dominance. However, just as in the late 1950s few observers anticipated the shape of the party system that evolved in the mid 1960s as such few intellectuals in the mid 1970s thought that a decade later the LDP would recover a position of unassailable dominance.

Despite the evidence of its recovery, the LDP made steady progress throughout the decade in regaining control over local governments in Tokyo and other metropolitan areas. Its share of the popular votes in the 1979 House of Representatives elections increased for the first time ever. Its share went even higher in the next elections in 1980. In 1983 its popular votes slide slightly but remained higher than that of 1979.

As the decade of eighties began to unfold, it became increasingly clear that Japanese politics had entered in a new, third phase characterized by a resurgence of LDP support to levels it has enjoyed during its first decade in power. The LDP declined in the ideological basis. The dominance of the LDP in the 1980s itself had become so independent on the support of the diverse social coalition that the need to avoid alienating any significant element within this coalition itself acted as a powerful check on the LDP policies.

In the 1980s, the LDP put a firm brake on public spending increases. Under the slogan of "fiscal consolidation without tax increase", it pursued a policy of retrenchment that within a few years brought to a complete stop the double digit increase in every year of budget expenditures that had earlier characterized government spending through the 1970s. Throughout the 1980s the hallmark of Japanese policy was administrative reform, privatization and a general effort to reduce the role of the government in the economy.

The LDP emerged in the 1970s, however, was less solicitous of farmer demands, because despite rural representation in the Diet-demographic changes made it essential that the party secure the support of other constituencies if it hoped to retain power. That the LDP was able to do so in a manner that not only kept it in power but

also increased its popular support is testimony to the party's adaptability and nullify at mobilizing public support for its policies and its politicians.

Japanese economic policy goals since the end of the World War II have included not only the obvious goal of rapidly catching up with the West in per capita GNP (Gross National Product) and transforming Japan into a major industrial power. Public finance during the high growth years functioned to transfer resources to less developed regions and to backward industries. Rice price supports and agricultural subsidies, public work projects and subsidy programs for small businessmen, financial transfers to local governments, and other income transfers programs, all contributed to reducing regional and personal inequalities in income distribution and to correcting distortions of high growth.

The LDP leaders recognized the threat to the party's hegemony posed by the rise of opposition government in the urban Japan. Due to the spread of the new citizen movements, and by rising public demands for better government services as symbolized by the popularity of the concept of a civil minimum, meaning the state's obligation to insure a minimum of well-being measured not in quantitative GNP terms but in terms of the quality of life. This idea improved LDP performance in the elections to form government.

Public related issues were addressed by the LDP between the years 1955 and 1990s. However, the organizational structure of the LDP cannot be ignored. The evolution of Japanese politics since 1955 has involved changes not only in the dynamics of the party system and in the policy priorities of the ruling party. There has also been an important evolution in the LDP rule has enabled the party to establish clear rules to regulate many of its activities, and it has brought about important changes in the role the party's leaders play in making a public policy. The party is no longer adequately described simply as a coalition of factions. It has evolved a complex organizational life of its own, one in which the factions themselves has developed organizational structures considerably different from what they were in the party's early years.

Through the LDP history, it is evident that faction has provided the primary political community for Japan's political elite, apart from the setting-up of intimacy and common purpose. When the party was formed, factions were very much the personal entourages of powerful leaders. An inner core of men marked factional organization intensely loyal to the factional leader and by strong patron-client relationship in which the factional leader provided political funds and access to government and party posts in return for his faction member's support and more important for their votes in party presidential election.

In the thirty years after the LDP setup, the party has been transformed from a "coalition of factions" to a much more complex and differentiated institutions that have clear rules regulating the recruitment of members and leaders. It has played varied and important roles in drafting and executing public policy. It has also developed a relationship with the bureaucracy that has become increasingly close. Thus the evolution of the LDP and the development of its relationship with the bureaucracy have contributed to a situation in which the JSP and other opposition parties are not a virtual loss for ways to mount an effective challenge to LDP dominance.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF "1955 SETUP" TO THE JAPANESE POLITICS AND ECONOMY

In the mid-1950s, the stage was set for a much clear polarization of party political forces between right and left than had been seen hitherto. In October 1955, the two Socialist parties were reunited after a series of long and difficult negotiations. The party under pressure from business interests, feared further Socialist electoral advances, and a possible Socialist government, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party merged one month later and formed the LDP.

This, in retrospect was a crucial turning point. Despite factional rivalries, Liberal Democrats avoided further defections and eventually consolidated their position as a party in power. Socialist unity, on the other way, was to prove more fragile, and although throughout the 1950s the electorate was moving towards the left, the JSP was unable to maintain the electoral momentum of the mid-1950s. Two-party alternation in power failed to materialize. Kishi Nobusuke succeeded Hatoyama in December 1956

and later by Ishibashi Tanzan, and he in turn, a mere two months by Kishi Nobusuke. Kishi for a number of reasons was a divisive figure, and his period in office culminated in the security treaty revision crisis of 1960s, which led to his fall from office.

The period between the 1952 and 1960 was one of the transitions in party politics; it was also one of acute polarization of opinions. The policies of successive conservative governments were often lumped together under the term 'reverse course'. From the government side the occupation reforms were subjected to critical scrutiny, and attempts were made to dismantle those, which seemed most objectionable. From the opposition fears were expressed that each new piece of government legislation was part of a planned program of reversion to the pre-war system.¹¹

The following main areas were where the reforms were actually implemented by governments: police administration and powers, labor unions, educational administration, defense and security treaty between the year 1950 and 1960.

- Police administration and powers, evoking memories of the pre-war period, in which the police had been an instrument of political control, were a particularly sensitive issue. In 1952 a Subversive Activities Bill, largely directed against the JCP, was passed by the Diet, and in 1954 the Yoshida government also introduced a new Police Law, which effectively decentralized police administration. On the contrary a Police Duties Law Amendment Bill, introduced by the Kishi government in 1958, designed to increase the powers of the police to control demonstrators, was criticized within and outside the Diet, and eventually was allowed to lapse.
- Post occupation governments continued the restrictive policies towards labor unions, which had been initiated during the half of the occupation, especially with the restrictions on the union rights of government workers imposed in 1948 and amendments to the post-war Labor Union Law, which were passed in 1949. The labor unions themselves, after communist attempts to control

¹¹ Op cit., Gerald L. Curtis, n. 9, p. 49.

them during the occupation had largely failed, nevertheless retained much of their radicalism during the 1950s.

- Educational policy was a highly contentious area, in which the conservatives wished in particular to reverse at least some of the policies initiated during the occupation. In 1956 the Hatoyama government introduced a legislation to decentralize educational administration.
- Defense and security treaty were the most prominent among controversial issues. Although the Yoshida Shigeru government successfully resisted John Foster Dulles' demand for massive re-armament by Japan, it authorized the formation of modest military force named as Self Defense Forces (SDF) and in 1954 signed the Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) agreement with the US. His attempt to do so triggered Japan's worst political crisis since the war, leading ultimately to his resignation. Anti-war feeling had increased during the 1950s, and the JSP from 1955 was campaigning on a platform of 'unarmed neutralism'. The security treaty revision crisis of May-June 1960 was the most serious political fracas since the end of the occupation. It resulted in mass demonstrations and riots on an unprecedented scale. During the earlier stages of the movement against revision of the treaty, it was fairly limited in scope and in the number of people involved. The socialist and the communist parties, the *Sohyo*, labor union federation and the student movement, *Zengakuren* (All-Japan Federation of Student Self Governing Associations) were the main participants, with some support from academics and the mass media. It was these elements which broke into the parliament compound on 27 November 1959 and which unsuccessfully attempted to prevent Kishi from leaving Haneda airport on 16 January 1960 in order to sign the revision of the treaty in the Washington.

The economic policy in 1960s-1970s and there after was a great achievement for Japan. The first decade of this high economic growth was a period of recovery from the economic dislocations that brought about Japan's defeat in the World War II. During the war, Japan's maritime transport was cut-off by the allied powers, and it had been

difficult to obtain raw materials. In effect this blockade was continued by post-war restrictions that the American occupying forces imposed on foreign trade, and it was exacerbated by social and economic disorder. Real GNP per-capita in 1946 had declined 55 percent of the 1934-36 level as a result, and it did not recover from that until 1953.¹² In the ten years from 1954 to 1963 Japan's real national product rose by more than 2.2 times, showing an annual growth rate of 9.4 percent. In the light of the fact that during this period the annual average growth rate of real national product was 7.4 percent in West Germany; 6.5 percent in Austria, 6.1 percent in Norway; 6 percent in Italy; 4.9 percent in France. However, the growth rate was considered 2.8 percent in US and 2.5 percent in England. Thus, we observe that the Japan growth rate was of a remarkable order.¹³

Post-war economic reforms and recovery also helped Japan to maintain its position in the economy. The transformation of Japan's post-war economy took place against the background of the democratization reform program promoted by the American occupation forces. Land reforms, dissolution of the *Zaibatsu* and the labor reform were the highlights during this period. As a result of land reforms, Japanese agriculture after the war became the providence of independent farmers. From the outset the American occupation intended to dissolve the *Zaibatsu*.

In October 1945, the occupation authorities decided to dissolve the head offices of the *Zaibatsu* holding companies and in April 1946 established a committee to recognize the holding companies. In April 1947, the enactment of the Anti-monopoly Law, based on the American's Anti-trust Laws established Japan's Fair Trade Commission (JFTC).

The dissolution of the *Zaibatsu* and the abolition of concentration permanently affected the economy. The concentration of the production, which has been reduced by the anti-*Zaibatsu* legislation, was further diluted as a result of high growth. The competition among enterprises became livelier. Industrial firms not affiliated with the

¹² Kozo Yamamura, (ed.), *The Economic Emergence Of Modern Japan* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 152.

¹³ By Y. Miyazaki in Peter Drysdale and Luke Grower (ed.), *The Japanese Economy, Part-1, Vol: II, Post-War Growth* (Rutledge, London), 1998, p. 133.

pre-war *Zaibatsu* expanded into large enterprises because of opportunities for new entry and wider scope.

At the core labor reform was the enactment of three labor laws: the Labor Union Law, Labor Relation Adjustment Law and Labor Standards Law. The Labor Standards Law of April 1947 legislated for improved working conditions of labors.

These reforms and the post-war economic policies helped Japan to achieve economy stability during LDP rules. The post-war leaders were faced with the tasks of creating a new framework of economic policy responsive to the conditions created by defeat. After the defeat in war, Japan was beset by profound inflation. Prices had begun to rise during the war even under wartime price controls, and once the war ended, the inflationary pressures grew. Production stagnated but demand, suppressed during wartime was ready to ignite. Restoring industrial production was a major task. In response to the need to curb inflation as well as to promote Japan's economic recovery and self-sufficiency, many policies were adopted. Increase in the labor force in the industrial sector, savings and capital accumulation, price trends and income distribution at national level, maintained Japan's economic growth during the 1960s and there after.¹⁴

This ranked Japan as the second economic power in the world after the US. It was the period of political stability and other political developments. This era was basically called the "golden sixties" for both the government and the LDP.

The political environment has at times been of even greater importance in Japan than in most other industrialized nations. Japan's rapid national development was guided in its early years by government policies, and post-war high growth has followed at least the general direction provided by indicative economic plans, even though planning by itself was not the main determinant of growth. Indeed both domestic and foreign policies have been extensively supportive of economic growth and trade expansion, although the Japanese economic success has probably been due as much or more to market factors and business leadership than the government initiative.

¹⁴ Op. cit., Kozo Yamamura (ed.), n. 12, p. 167.

Finally the post-war Japan has been stable politically, which is in itself no small factor contributing to business predictability and success. Japan has been governed by thirty-eight years by the same political movement represented by different parties up to 1955. Approximately ten years of conservative dominance in post-war Japan has meant by and large favorable climate for business. Supports for business growth in selected areas were provided as part of the overall economic policy effort, while the general political climate was receptive to business interests. Foreign trade policy in the 1950s and nearly 1960s was clearly oriented toward protection of domestic industry and promotion of business exports.¹⁵

Political stability being an essential ingredient to economic stability and growth, by and large Japan has been stable throughout the post-war era. Domination by one political movement has by itself been an element of stability, even though factional conflicts within the conservative parties have at times suggested that instability at the top could break out at any moment. In the 1960s political development, Ikeda, who followed Kishi as president of the LDP and thus Prime Minister, was also from a bureaucratic background and was a protege of Yoshida.

In the early 1960s, the economy had already moved to the stage of double-digit growth, and Ikeda was able to gain political advantage by issuing a long term economic plan for 'income doubling' over a ten year period. He made genuine efforts to restore the normal working of parliament, the reputation of which had been seriously damaged by the events of the previous months. He obtained for Japan full recognition as an advanced industrial nation. Japan became the member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964. Perhaps as a reflection of these efforts the LDP did well in House of Representatives general elections held in 1960 and in 1963. On the contrary for the opposition it was a bad decade since in the 1950s the JSP's level of support had peaked at about one third of the voters. Party unity, forged with much difficulty in 1955, did not prove durable.

¹⁵ Bradley M. Richardson and Taizo Ueda, *Business and Society in Japan Fundamental For Businessmen* (Praeger Publisher, USA, 1981), pp. 169-72.

In 1959 a right-of-center group led by Nishio Suehiro, a prominent personality in 1947, broke away in protest against the party's drift to the left and formed the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The DSP did not perform particularly well at the polls, but its defection destroyed the ideological balance within the JSP, and for a while made it easier to run that party from the center or right. In the later developments of the LDP politics, Sato (a Nobel Prize awardee for Peace in 1971), who was elected prime minister in 1964, he proceeded over the later stages of the economic 'miracle' by the late 1960s had given Japan a larger GNP than those of England, France and West Germany. However, it was less than those of the US and the then Soviet Union. Japan was becoming a major force on the world scene, though its economic influence was hardly matched by political initiative.¹⁶ At the time of the end of Sato's prime ministership, mood of Japanese voters shifted away from a single-minded pursuit of economic growth towards a concern over environmental pollution, quality of life issue and social welfare issues, as mentioned in the previous pages.

In July 1972, Tanaka Kakuei replaced Sato who was not from a bureaucratic background. He produced a plan for 'reconstruction of the Japanese Archipelago,' which involved relocation of the country's industry and population away from the existing big cities.

The most serious blow to Tanaka's leadership, however, came with the fourfold increase in the price of oil provoked by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in late 1973, following the Arab-Israel war of October. This provided the stimulus to inflationary trends, and brought economic growth to a sudden halt. Following adverse results in the upper house general elections of July 1974¹⁷ and well-publicized revelations about the dubious propriety of Tanaka's financial dealings the prime minister resigned in November 1974. His successor chosen by a process of behind the consultation within the LDP was Miki Takeo. The choice of Miki as Tanaka's successor was no doubt facilitated by a need to choose a 'clean politician' as leader.

¹⁶ J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell publication, USA, 1999), p. 55.

¹⁷ See *appendix* of this dissertation for results of the upper house election of July 1974, p. 132.

Prime Minister Miki's tenure appear to be fragile and transitory, most interesting feature of his regime, however, was that for a few months in 1975 he actually tried to rely on votes from opposition parties in support of the bills opposed by the right wing of the LDP. He had a modest success in watered down revision of the Anti-Monopoly Law, which enabled the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) to peruse cartels with somewhat greater effectiveness than hitherto. He succeeded in bringing about the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), long after his signature in 1970.

Miki resigned after the general elections of the House of Representatives in December 1976, which marked a low mandate for the LDP. Fukuda Takeo was given charge of prime ministership, and he began to feel the effects of the loss of the LDP control over the parliamentary committee when it was forced to incorporate tax reductions into its 1977 budget.

General elections were held in 1979, in which the LDP performed marginally worse than it had in 1976, though it still managed to hang onto its parliamentary majority. One factor, which was widely believed to have contributed to this result, was a statement by the Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi, later quickly retracted following electoral protest, issue that his government planned to introduce new indirect taxation. Consequent political development in November 1982 paved the way for Nakasone Yasuhiro (prime minister during the years 1982-1987), had succeeded Suzuki Zenko as prime minister (who was prime minister during 1980-1982).

Nakasone was undoubtly attracted to a presidential style of government and several years earlier had proposed introducing such a system Japan, with direct election of the president. As prime minister, Nakasone set-up the various task forces and commissions to report on important policies. The most important among them were privatization, defense, relations with the US, taxation and education. In embarking on measures on privatization, Nakasone was turning into a current fashion for market liberalization and the small state, which was much in evidence in the US and Western Europe in the mid-1980s.

The privatization of JNR (Japan National Railways) and the NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) was made to overcome deficit. During the late 1980s Japan was a time of economic boom. In November 1987, Nakasone finally stepped down as prime minister and was replaced by Takeshita Noboru, a factionalist within the LDP. He was defeated in the July 1989 in the upper house elections, in which the LDP somehow managed to maintain its majority.¹⁸ Whereas the LDP was narrowly ahead of the JSP in terms of vote cast for each party in the prefectural constituencies, the JSP was ahead in the proportional representation constituencies. In this period the Japanese economy started showing the low performance due to bubble economy. Besides, in the political field LDP also performed low in every election after 1989.¹⁹

COLLAPSE OF “1955 SETUP”

Scandals, factional politics within the LDP and voter's attitudes towards it had led to the distraction of the LDP dominance since 1955 until 1993. In 1993, the coalition form of government began due to the collapse of a single party dominance. Only on limited occasions have the opponents gained a substantial number of Diet seats in elections and come close to taking control of government. It happened in July 1989 elections. Following are some of the key factors that covered the collapse of the LDP:

1. In the summer of 1988, reports started appearing in media about a company named Recruit (founded in 1960), which was allegedly distributing shares of a newly floated subsidiary, Recruit Cosmos, in an illegal fashion to large number of politicians and others. The most important business operation of the Recruit Co. Ltd. was that of matching job opportunities with job seekers, particularly with students in their final year from the university. There was evidence that the company had exercised influence in order to obtain some examinations results before they were officially announced, with the purpose of informing companies about the qualification of the job seekers ahead of the competition. Apart from this, the gift of unlisted shares of Recruit Cosmos Ltd, to politicians, who would the value of these shares rise substantially once they were floated on the stock

¹⁸ See election results in *appendix* of this dissertation, p. 133.

¹⁹ Ronald J. Hrebemar, *The Japanese Party System* (Westview Press, US, 1992), pp. 238-39.

exchange, constituted a technical breach of the law.²⁰ The Recruit Cosmos Company distributed large amount of its stock to particular Diet members, including such conservative leaders. Unlike Lockheed scandal, which only affected a handful of LDP politicians, the Recruit scandal affected a large proportion of the political class as a whole. The ruling party in particular was affected, though some opposition politicians had also received the shares.

2. It is rather difficult to discuss the LDP and its dynamics without a through examination of its functional nature. Essentially, the LDP is an alliance of factions in which the greater part of the party affairs is conducted by the factions. Most important, the factions play a crucial role in the resolution of party personal matters: the selection of the party president, the appointment of the cabinet ministers and naming of the important party officials. In the face of factional nature of the LDP, the abilities of individuals, no matter how capable they may be, have little, if any, influence over whether they will receive key political positions. Each faction maintains its own office and hold meetings at regular intervals. These faction, are in essence, parties within the party. In the 1990s, as in the previous decade major players on the stage of Japanese politics were the LDP faction leaders. Although the LDP had over time a complex organizational structure with regard to policy formulation that was not entirely faction based, faction remained dominant when it came to the assignment of cabinet and key party posts and other matter related to the distribution of power. However, factional organization and the faction system itself had changed over time, however. There were fewer factions in the 1990s than in the 1960s, and they were larger and more complex organization that they had been in earlier years. They were no longer dominated by one leader, as typically was the case when they first were formed. No faction exhibits these complexities than the Takeshita faction, the largest and powerful faction in the LDP.²¹ These factional politics

²⁰ Peter J. Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo Democracy* (Japan Library, Kent, 1993), pp. 175-88.

²¹ Gerald Curtis, *The Logic Of Japanese Politics* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1999), pp. 84-85.

harmed the LDP because the leaders within the LDP were very ambitious and they used the party for vested interests.

3. Voting behavior of the Japanese voters also played a role for the collapse of LDP dominance. Among the nations where voting is not compulsory, Japan has a very high rate of electoral participation. In the case of Japan, however, on the basis of nationwide poll data, it is difficult to recognize clearly any relationship between income group and party choice.²² The decline of the conservative tapered of somewhat by the mid-1970s despite a number of significant demographic changes occurring that were inimical to the LDP's political fortunes. The reason for this reduced decline ought to be found in the fact that the LDP has been strong in the rural sector of the country, and the rural Japan benefited the most from the rapid economic growth of the 1970s. Certainly the urban resident benefited from the Japanese economic expansion, but they faced problem like pollution and urban congestion. The urban residents have often expressed their doubts about the LDP's high economic growth policies by supporting opposition parties in national and local elections. In marked contrast, the rural residents remained largely untouched by ill effects of the economic development. In the 1980s, the LDP appeared to begin to restore its popularity among voters. Except for the elections in 1983, the conservatives won more than 50 percent of vote in the 1980, 1986 and in the 1990 elections. This growth of the LDP support is generally attributed to a rise of neo-conservatism among the Japanese electorate. However, the LDP declined in 1993 election because the voter turnout was very low that cause the downfall of the LDP and collapse of the "1955 setup".

These are the responsible factors that led to the collapsed the "1955 setup" in the 1990s with the end up of the one dominant party rule for thirty years. The politics of the 1990s played role for the downfall of the LDP. The Gulf crisis in the 1991 created the criteria for the loss of LDP in the 1993. The political and bureaucratic performance of the Kiasu government became the target of much international and domestic criticism, even though Japan provided the huge amount of \$ 13 billion in the Gulf Operation. It failed

²² Joji Watanuke, *Politics in post war Japanese Society* (University of Tokyo Press, 1967), p. 78.

in its attempt to provide a real physical contribution in terms of personnel on the ground. However, at the same time it went some way towards nullifying the LDP loss of its House of Councilors majority by bringing the *Komeito* rather provisionally into the camp of its allies. This alliance, however, had sown the seeds of the LDP split which was to lead to its downfall in August 1993. The beginning of the coalition form of government in 1993 was a result of the above atmospheres, which were present in Japanese politics since 1955.²³ However, the coalition politics has its history but the real beginning of coalition politics in the year 1993 is important to consider, this 'coalition' is still present in the Japanese politics. Next chapter deals with beginning of the 'coalition politics' in Japan in 1993.

²³ J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, (Blackwell Publication, USA, 1999), p. 77

Chapter 3

EMERGENCE AND SUSTENANCE OF COALITION GOVERNMENT

Coalition government is that form of political practices and reality in which the political parties unite for a temporary period. In any general election, if any political party fails to achieve even simple majority of seats in the house as required by the constitution, then various parties come together to fulfill the majority number in the house and work on the basis of an agreed common agenda.

In Japan, the coalition politics had its beginning in early 1920s, when the Japanese politics had engulfed most people, ideologies and parties had almost emerged. Party leaders, were well established in their constitutionally authorized, weak position in the House of Representatives and claimed to speak for "the people", fought back determinedly and with progressively increasing success in this period. They were able to demonstrate that the *Meiji* system of government could not operate smoothly within considerable period of time without the positive support of a working majority in the House of Representatives. By 1924, they began to speak of 'true Parliamentary Government' as having almost been achieved in Japan.¹ The year 1924 is still referred to as a climax to the long struggle between authoritarian forces that had been launched even earlier than the *Meiji* constitution.

The slow emergence of a more broadly based system of government through the rise of political parties was certainly one of most notable developments between 1890 and 1932. It would be a serious error to regard it as a triumph of "liberalism". The program and performance of the parties that achieved brief victory in the late twenties were not very liberal but were ideologically conservative.

¹ Robert E. Ward, *Japan's Political System* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1978), p. 16.

The general elections of 1924 for the House of Representatives were the first instance where two political parties were united to form the government. *Seiyuhonto-Seiyukai* was combined and they gained 47 percent of seats in the House. In the earlier elections of 1920, the *Seiyukai* was the dominant party in the House of Representatives with 60 percent of seats. In 1924 the party combined due the factional politics inside and this resulted in the formation of the *Seiyuhonto*. In this election, the second largest party was *Kenseikai* with 37 percent of seats in the lower house. Takaaki Kato formed his first cabinet through a coalition of three parties; the *Kenseikai* (Constitutionalist Association), the *Seiyukai* and the *Kakushin Kurabu* (Reform Club), were generated in June 1924 by a constitutionalist movement opposed to government by the military and privileged classes. It was the first coalition form of government in the Japanese political history. Political developments between 1920 and 1937 have already been discussed in chapter one of this dissertation.

After World War II, the Japanese politics began with parliamentary democracy that provided freedom of political activity under its new constitution. Political parties started their activities by participating in the general elections of April 1946, when Liberal Party emerged as the largest party in the House of Representatives with the 140 seats. Nevertheless, it failed to repeat the same in the April 1947 general elections.

These were the first elections under the new constitution. The left wing of Japan Socialist Party managed 143 seats in the house of 466 members in the 1947 general election. This provided chance to the JSP that formed the coalition government with Tetsu Katayama, leader of the JSP's right wing, as prime minister. He managed to lead a coalition government that was dominated by the conservatives. These situations compelled the socialists to accept conservative policy positions or risk the government collapse. This, combined with the fact that Katayama was a weak and vacillating leader, had a lot to do with the government's dismal performance during its nearly ten months rule in the office. It fell in February 1948, brought down in the end by the JSP's own left wing when Suzuki Mosaburo, the leader of the party's major left faction and the chairman of the lower house Budget Committee, led his supporters in that committee to vote with the communists in defeating the government's proposed budget.

After a short period of nine months, another coalition government that included the socialists but led by Ashida Hitoshi of conservative group succeeded the Katayama government. Nishio Suehiro, who became vice-premier, represented the JSP's right wing. Kato Kanju, an important leader on the left party, served in the cabinet as the labor minister.

This government came into power at a time when the occupation was shifting its importance from political reform to economic reconstruction. The government was responsible for the implementing a severe anti-inflation policy, loosening some of the anti-monopoly restrictions that had been adopted earlier in the occupation, and of particular agony to the socialists, depriving workers in the public corporations of the right to collective bargain and to strike.

The government was brought down in October 1948 by post-war Japan's first major scandal, involving alleged political payoffs by the Showa Denko Company. The fall of the Ashida government marked the end of the socialists participation in governments. In the subsequent elections for House of Representatives held in January 1949, the Socialists representation was reduced from 143 to 48 seats. This election was followed by a "reconstruction congress" that became the setting for a fierce ideological debate between right wing leader and former Education Minister Morito Tatsuo and the left's Inamura Junzo.² Yoshida's Democratic Liberal Party registered a stunning victory in the January 1949 lower house elections. He invited Democratic Party to join his cabinet.

In 1949 many political events occurred. The JSP split in January and again reunified in April 1950. However, it was not the major change for the JSP since it again split into right and left wings in 1951. Yoshida cabinet resigned in 1953 when it faced the no-confidence motion in the lower house.

As it is known that the famous "1955 setup" took place in November 1955, with the merger of conservative forces that led to the formation of the LDP. The formation of

² Gerald Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988), p. 11.

the LDP changed Japanese politics in the 1950s. Since it ruled Japan continuously for almost thirty-eight years. In between, on many occasions the opposition parties came together against LDP but they could not make it to power till 1993.

Since 1970 and up to 1983, in every House of Representatives elections the opposition parties received more vote than the LDP, and the time was ripe for electoral pacts between all the like-minded opposition parties with the sole purpose of gathering the extra seats in the elections. Within the Diet, opportunities abounded for the opposition parties whenever they worked together, to affect the passage of legislation, influence the budget and even bring down the government.

The DSP declared in 1970 that it is ready to cooperate with the JSP in order to lead it back from the electoral abyss into which it stared. The possibility was even raised that the two parties might merge. This approach was so unexpected that the JSP secretary general Eda Saburo, later the architect of coalition plans for the non-communist opposition advised it as impossible by expressing some displeasure at the overconfidence of DSP.

The DSP, nevertheless, preserved with its above plan intact in order to encourage closer cooperation between the opposition parties, leading to the announcement on 15 June 1970 by the DSP chairman, Nishimura Eiichi, of his idea to build a new democratic progressive party comprising the DSP, JSP and *Komeito*. Nishimura scheduled the merger plans to be completed by 1972 and a new 'progressive joint government' to be in place three year later. Shortly afterwards Eda gave his first positive response to these plans by suggesting that the DSP and *Komeito* of Minobe Ryokichi to the governorship of the Tokyo metropolitan regions.

The DSP's plan was not new, in 1968 Nishimura already had initiated a proposal for the 'People's Coalition Government' for the House of Councilors elections.³ Even the JSP that had joined hands with the communists in 1971 in local elections shifted its electoral strategy later to work with the DSP and *Komeito* in the House of Councilors elections in June 1971. Interestingly, it was now JSP's turn to take the initiative in

³ Stephen Johnson, *Opposition Politics in Japan* (Routledge, London, 2000), p. 67.

calling the JSP-*Komeito*-DSP cooperation, and the electoral alliance with the JCP was confined to talks rather than actualization.


In the period between January 1973 and July 1974, the opposition caught sight of their first real opportunities to threaten the LDP's control of the Diet. While the leaders of all opposition parties of Japan promised a 'conservative reverse', the communists continued to suffer from the same chronic electoral and organizational maladies as before. Moreover behind the slogans, the JSP, *Komeito* and the DSP seemed uneasy with the JCP's electoral gains than heartened by the problems of LDP.

A highlight in the 1976 House of Representatives election was that the conservative government came dangerously close to its saturation.⁴ Naturally this altered the whole compass of political assumptions in Japan and with that; the coalition idea had to be recast. The LDP's majority in the House of Representatives was reduced to the smallest of totals, amounting short by four for a simple majority even after recruiting 12 independents from the lower house.⁵ Consequently, all but the most insensitive of assessment had to conclude that a momentous transformation was under way.

The ramifications of the 1976 lower house election were mixed for the opposition but all these parties could at least take heart from the disaster suffered by the LDP. The House of Councilors elections, scheduled half a year after the lower house ballot, offered another chance to humiliate the ruling party and wrest control of at least one chamber of the house from the conservatives. The practicalities of the House of Councilors elections drew the opposition parties together in talks about electoral cooperation from mid-January. The JSP dealt with *Komeito* by discussing a joint platform and electoral cooperation. The relative party strength of the 1976 elections is presented in Chart 2 on next page.

⁴ The election result in details may be readout from the *appendix* of this dissertation, p 129.
⁵ Op. cit., Stephen Jhonson, n. 3, p. 101.

CHART 2: RESULTS OF 1976 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION



(Data Source: J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan*, Blackwell Pub. Ltd, US, 1999)

Later, the JSP secretary general, Ishibashi Masashi, also met with his communist counterpart in March and on this occasion it was agreed that a new accord would be concluded between the two parties. They penned their agreement in June and in the same month there was a series of meetings between the JSP and the *Komeito* as well as the JSP and the communists, while the *Komeito* also held discussions with the DSP. All the activities were directed towards encouraging cooperation in the House of Councilors elections. Since some of the parties were unwilling to deal directly with each other, the *Komeito* and the JSP undertook to act as go between.⁶

The levels of electoral support that subsequently took place gave an interesting clue as to how the relationship between the JSP and *Komeito* had changed. In contrast to

⁶ Op. cit., Stephen Johnson, n. 3, p. 103.

the situation three years earlier when the two parties had cooperated in four upper house constituencies, these parties could only agree to work together in two campaigns in 1977. However, *Komeito* regenerated its relationship with the DSP and collaborated with it in six constituencies. Possibly the greatest achievement of opposition cooperation during this period, was not on the campaign trail but inside the Diet. In March, these parties were able to force substantial concession from the LDP, which had to change its taxation and pension plans in order to pass the budget. This was the first such revision since 1955.

As a result of 1979 lower house elections, the divisions among the opposition parties were clearly marked. In February, *Komeito* hinted its willingness to support Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's proposals for a 'partial coalition' when it approved the LDP's budget for the first time in its history. In October 1979, at the very moment when *Komeito*'s separation from the JSP seemed complete, both parties suddenly renewed their relationship in series of negotiations leading to a policy accord and electoral alliance which went far beyond any agreement concluded hitherto. The collaboration impacted the LDP, in the lower house, where cooperation took place most often between *Komeito* and the DSP; the effect of coalitions was successful in 1979 elections, for example, joint campaigns for the 32 seats resulted in 23 of the elected seats. This achievement was hailed since the figure included 7 new candidates, and in 13 of the constituencies the efforts of the *Komeito* and DSP managed to displace LDP candidates from the electoral areas.

This was not to be the only unprecedented political event of 1980. In June, the nation went to the polls in its first double elections to the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors. In retrospect, the elections provided a backdrop to the fullest expression ever of opposition cooperation in a political system dominated by the LDP. It was the last occasion where collaboration was attempted so ambitiously.

However, in the upper house elections the record was less impressive. The 26 member constituencies of the upper house provided the opposition with their most obvious stage for cooperation. The record before 1980 was not encouraging; even so, between 1971 and 1977 there were five instances of joint campaigns having defeated

the LDP candidates. Thus, the opposition cooperation was comparatively most effective in the House of Representatives elections.

In the year 1983, elections for the House of Councilors and House of Representatives were held in June and December respectively. The House of Councilors elections went in the favor of LDP where it scored 68 seats. The support for the JSP was relatively half to the LDP and it came close to losing its relevance of being the main opposition force. However, the LDP failed to get majority in the upper house for the formation of the government. Then LDP approached the New Liberal Club (NLC) for alliance and managed 267 seats to achieve the majority in the house and the JSP improved its tally from the previous elections, achieving 112 seats as the main opposition. This was the first time that the LDP had drawn up a formal policy accord with another party and entered into an actual coalition since the party's founding in 1955.

The LDP won a landslide victory in the 1986 House of Representatives elections. The party's position was highest with the 300 seats in contrast to the JSP and DSP. They suffered defeat in these elections and their scheme of forming coalition against the LDP vanished. The main reason for the LDP's victory lay in the aggressive political style of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. He promoted the various dynamic policies as administrative reforms aimed at utilizing the vitality of the private sector and making government as small as possible, educational reform to promote individuality and reform policies for the Japan National Railway (JNR) regarding its privatization.

In April 1989 when the Recruit scandal was shaking the politics of Japan and the public was losing confidence in the LDP and the Takeshita administration, the leaders of the opposition parties; DSP, *Komeito*, *Shaminren* and the JSP held a meeting regarding the forming the alliance to counter the LDP. In the House of Councilors elections of July 1989, the JSP was the only opposition party that achieved some seats. As a result, *Komeito* and the DSP feared that they would be overwhelmed by the LDP. Later in September and October of 1989, the DSP, JSP and *Komeito* announced the basic position of their policy regarding coalition. A gap was maintained between the JSP and with the *Komeito* and the DSP over many policies.

The situation was complicated by the unification of the labor movement that had provided the traditional base of support for the opposition parties. In November 1989, the public and private sector unions combined together under the *Rengo* (Japanese Trade Union Confederation JTUC) that attempted to play a coordinating role in the formation of a coalition of opposition parties. Before the general elections of 1990, there was a talk about the formation of a coalition government among the opposition parties.

All the talks and promises of forming coalition were ruined with the LDP victory with the 275 seats and the defeat of the opposition in the elections. However, the JSP increased its strength from the previous elections by winning 136 seats. Kaifu Toshiki was elected as the prime minister for the second term. He was elected as the party president of the LDP after the House of Councilors elections that were held in 1989.

The *Komeito* and the DSP decided to distance themselves from the JSP. In the post election party convention both the *Komeito* and the DSP announced that the coalition idea against the LDP had been dropped. After the new party emergence before the elections in July 1993, the plan for opposition unity emerged again and it was successful for a short while after the elections.

COALITION IN 1993: OPPOSITIONS ASPIRED THE POWER

Election results of the lower house in 1993 provided once again an opportunity to the oppositions to come together in August. In the elections the LDP failed to secure its majority, bringing the curtain down on thirty-eight years of one party rule. The new government formed, was the coalition of eight political parties (one tiny party *Minkairen* in the House of Councilors) led by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro of Japan New Party (JNP).⁷

Among the advanced democracies, no party has managed to stay in the power as long as the LDP dominated the scene. The LDP has many reasons for its longevity as

⁷ J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell Publication, USA, 1999), p. 81.

well as many reasons for its collapse. Corruptions, factional politics inside the LDP and rigorous campaign of the opposition that was not so effective but affected the LDP, were the main reasons that led to the collapse of LDP as the single dominant party from 1955 to 1993 in Japanese politics.⁸ The elections were held on Sunday July 18, when equivocating voters could easily be enticed into participating in social activities rather than heading to the polling stations.

TABLE 2: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION RESULTS, 1993

Parties	Seats	% of Votes
LDP	223	36.6
JSP	70	15.4
DSP	15	3.5
JCP	15	7.7
<i>Komeito</i>	51	8.1
<i>Shinseito</i>	55	10.1
<i>Nihon Shinto</i>	35	8.1
<i>Sakigake</i>	13	2.6
Independents and Minor Parties	34	7.8
Total	511	99.9

(Data Source: Gerald L. Curtis, *Logic of Japanese Politics*, CUP, New York, 1999)

In the lead of the elections the television program had focused on the possibility of non-LDP government to the extent that they were criticized for displaying bias. The new parties JNP, *Shinseito* and *Sakigake* were gaining popularity before the elections were held. Voter alienation from the politics resulted at the low turnout at the 1993

⁸ See reasons for the collapse of "1955 setup" are discussed in chapter two of this dissertation.

election.⁹ The election results were not in favor of the LDP and other newborn parties managed to acquire maximum number of seats that helped them to form coalition government.

This result was a new experience to the Japanese to familiar with non-LDP government in 1993. However, the LDP later headed in 1994 to form the coalition government and since then experience of coalition politics in Japan continues.

REASONS FOR THE LONGEVITY AND DOWNFALL OF LDP

The LDP won the hearts of the people by reconstructing war-ravaged country and turning it into the world's second largest economic power. Judged in terms of party organization, probably the LDP's greatest strength was a corporate style structure that divided the members and leaders alike into competing factions and rewarded them according to the length of their service as measured by the number of times they were reelected. The LDP made skillful use of knowledge to formulate effective policies. It benefited greatly from its Policy Research Council (PRC). The committees placed under this council were composed of the legislators who could pickup expertise in areas like agriculture, transport and commerce etc. The members of each committee banded together into the *zoku* (tribes), connected to each industry. In each electoral district, simultaneously a vote gathering machine known as the *koenkai* (support group) was assembled to keep the local LDP politicians in the office and maintained continuous contact with constituencies and voters.

Nevertheless, this political turf became a fertile breeding ground for corruption because of great sums of money for managing *koenkai*. A succession of scandals involving politicians came to light, starting from the Lockheed payoffs case of the 1975 and continuing through the Recruit and Sagawa *Kyubin* affairs, and the question of the clean-up loomed large on the political agenda.

However, the biggest opposition party enclosed its foreign policy in such a term as "universal peace" and "unarmed neutrality" and only formalistic and theoretical

⁹ Masumi Ishikawa (Ed. In Purnendra Jain and Takashi Inoguchi), *Japanese Politics Today* (Macmillan Education Australia Pvt. Ltd., Melbourne, 1997), p. 32.

criticism of the nation's high growth economy. Criticism by the JSP had a political significance of its own, but it fell short of impressing the Japanese as a whole. This helped LDP to counter by its policies to the oppositions and win the heart of Japanese people.

The LDP could not manage its longevity beyond 1993. The stage for the ruling party's dethronement was set by a rebellion in its ranks. On 21 June 1993 shortly after the no-confidence vote, 10 Diet member led by the Takemura Masayoshi were the first to walk out. Fed up with the corruption in the LDP, they launched a so-called 'New Party *Sakigake*', the 'Harbinger' of political change. At a news conference Hata Tsutomu indicated that the party would set aside various policy differences with opposition forces to form a coalition government to carry out political reform. It was the most serious split in the LDP since "1955 setup".¹⁰

In the autumn of 1992, this faction had been the focus of fierce power struggle resulting in the downfall of its chairman, Kanemaru Shin, who was under fire for suspected tax evasion. In December 1992, it had split into the Obuchi Keizo and Hata Tsutomu factions. After that the Hata group left the faction and formed the Japan Renewal Party (JRP *Shinseito*). Before these developments, on 22 May 1992, the veteran politician Hosokawa Morihiro had launched a brand new party by the name: Japan New Party.

Even shortly before the elections the Japan Renewal Party's Ozawa Ichiro confidently predicted an end to 38 years of one party rule by the LDP. By then it was clear that LDP would not win a majority of the 511 seats in the lower house and it was also clear that it would easily outperform all the other parties giving a chance to hang on the reign of power.¹¹

These developments emerged earlier than the House of Representatives election in July 1993 that affected the LDP badly. As it gained 223 seats only, it was the first

¹⁰ *Japan Times*, (Japan Times Ltd. Tokyo), 24 June 1993.

¹¹ Akasaka Taro, "The Making of a Non-LDP Administration", *Japan Echo*, (Japan Echo Inc., Tokyo), Volume XX, No. 4, Winter 1993, p. 8.

experience of the LDP to be out of power. In this background, several major changes had taken place in the environment surrounding Japanese politics.

POLITICS OF FORMING A NON-LDP COALITION GOVERNMENT IN 1993

In spite of facing an internal strife occasionally and power struggle with the opposition on others, the LDP had managed to hold on to power since 1955 and pave the way for Japanese prosperity. In August 1993, however, a non-LDP coalition government led by Prime Minister Hosokawa was installed and the LDP joined the rank of the opposition for the first time in the Japanese history. Ironically, the epicenter of the first change of ruling party in Japan in thirty-eight years laid not in the opposition parties that had been in continuous conflict with the LDP but within the LDP itself. The starting point of the situation that was to unfold came in October 1992 with a split in the *Keiseikai* (Association of Businessmen and Politicians), the LDP faction that had dominated the party.

Former Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru formed the *Keiseikai*. Its chairman and deputy chairman were Kanemaru Shin and Ozawa Ichiro respectively. In August 1992, it was revealed that Kanemaru had received Yen 500 million in illicit contribution from the Tokyo Sagawa *Kyubin* truck company. Kanemaru was forced to step down from his post of vice-president of the LDP and in October 1992 he tendered his resignation as a member of the Diet. In the wake of this scandal, there was an eruption of criticism of Ozawa, who was dependent on Kanemaru and the man who pulled the strings in the party. A fierce internal battle between Ozawa supporters and opponents took place over the selection of Kanemaru's successor. After the anti-Ozawa forces succeeded in getting Keizo Obuchi appointed the next chairman of the *Keiseikai*, the pro-Ozawa forces, including Ozawa himself and Hata, who had been their candidate for the post, split from the *Keiseikai* and formed a group called Reform Forum 21.


Calling themselves reformists, members of Reform Forum 21 pressurized Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi to realize the political reforms. When the Miyazawa administration failed to achieve this goal, members voted for a resolution of non-confidence in the cabinet moved by the opposition in June 1993. Miyazawa resigned

when the house passed the motion. As already mentioned, just before the subsequent general election, 36 members of the lower house and 8 members of the upper house resigned from the LDP and formed the new party called Japan Renewal Party on 23 June 1993. This rendered the LDP helpless in the lower house.

In the changing political scenario, on 1st July 1993, the JNP leader Morihiro Hosokawa announced that the JNP would join the *Shinto Sakigake* (New Party *Sakigake*) after the July 1993 election.¹² The JNP joined with other parties on 2nd July 1993 when LDP lost its majority, to build an alliance with SDPJ, *Komeito* and DSP.¹³ The alignment of ruling coalition and opposition has been mentioned in the chart 3.

CHART 3: COALITION PARTNERS: PERCENTAGE SHARINGS IN THE LOWER HOUSE: AUGUST 1993

Percentage of Coalition partners and the LDP in the Lower House in August 1993



(Note: Chart prepared on the basis of data collected from Japan Times, 7 August 1993)

¹² *Japan Times*, 1 July 1993.

¹³ *Ibid*, 3 July 1993.

Riding on the wave of New Party boom, the JRP, *Sakigake* and the JNP increased their strength in the Diet in July 1993 general elections in lower house. Although it made slight gains, the LDP failed to recover its lower house majority. After the elections, Prime Minister Miyazawa took the responsibility for the defeat and resigned. On the following the day, the JNP and *Sakigake* had agreed to establish a joint parliamentary group in the House of Representatives.

Within the LDP, moves to choose a successor to Miyazawa as president of the party focused on two individuals; Watanabe Michio, leader of the Watanabe faction, who was keen to assume the post and Gotoda Masaharu, deputy prime minister in the Miyazawa administration. Since Gotoda was a senior proponent of political reforms within the LDP and had friendly relations with *Sakigake*'s Takemura, it was widely hoped that with Gotoda as party the president of the LDP would be able to form a coalition with *Sakigake* and the JNP.

However, Gotoda firmly refused to run the party because of his advanced age and Yohei Kono was selected as LDP president in competition with the Watanabe. Since it was certain that the LDP would have to join the ranks of the opposition, the party wanted to give the impression of being fresh and reborn.¹⁴

The new parties gained considerable number of seats in the Lower House elections. The strength of LDP was very low for the first time since its formation. Yet the LDP maintained itself as a major party in both the chambers of the house far ahead with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and other political parties.

In contrast to these trends the LDP maintained its strength in the both the chambers of the house, because the election of 1993 for the lower house held after one year of the upper house elections, which was held in 1992. In 1992 LDP was ruling the government and SDPJ and other parties were fulfilling the responsibility of opposition.

The good number of seats in both the chamber helped the LDP to come back to the power after the ouster of Prime Minister Murayama. Of course the LDP had played

¹⁴ *Japan Times*, 31 July 1993.

role in appointing the Murayama as prime minister. Later in January 1996, Hashimoto was appointed as the prime minister from the LDP with the coalition of SDPJ and *Sakigake*.

The Diet groupings of political parties in the August 1993 were dominated by the ruling coalition only in the lower house. However, the LDP as opposition was strong in the upper house relatively to the other parties. The position of political parties of both the chambers of Diet is presented in the table 4.

TABLE 3: DIET GROUPINGS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1993¹⁵

Parties	Upper House	Lower House
LDP	99	228
SDPJ	73	77
<i>Shinseito</i>	8	60
<i>Komeito</i>	24	52
<i>Sakigake-JNP</i>	4	52
DSP	11	19
JCP	11	15
DRP	11	—
<i>Niin Club</i>	5	—
Independents	6	8
Total	252	511

(Source: Japan Times, 7 August 1993)

After the inauguration of the Hosokawa administration, the LDP declared that it would act as a 'responsible opposition party' but it also had experienced of being relegated to the opposition. Nevertheless, LDP failed to keep its promise. Since the fall

¹⁵ *Japan Times*, 7 August 1993.

of Hosokawa and Hata Tsutomu governments, the LDP participated in the coalition formation immediately under Murayama Tomiichi leadership.

MINIMUM PROGRAM AND CONDITIONS FOR THE COALITION PARTNERS

On 23 July 1993, the coalition partners decided a 'minimum program'¹⁶ on which the government would perform. The highlights of the programs were:

1. Introduce an electoral system comprising 250 single-seat electoral districts and 250 proportional representation seats in the House of Representatives.
2. Give state subsidies to parties for use as campaign funds in return for a ban on donations from corporations and other bodies.
3. Abolish behind-the-scenes negotiations by the party bosses on the passage of bills.
4. Revoke the election of Diet member if associates commit election fraud.
5. Constitutional revision.
6. Maintain the prevailing government policy of sending troops to United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO).
7. Japan-US relation would be more cooperative.

Hosokawa announced some of the 'reform program' after his designation as prime minister and they were:

- Foreign policy would be more impressive.
- Japan would be open for all market and economic recovery.
- Making Japan a consumer oriented society.
- Securing a permanent seat in United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
- Quickly enact measures for the boost of business confidence in Japan.

¹⁶ *Japan Times*, 23 July 1993.

In November 1993, when the electoral bill was introduced in the Diet, the LDP submitted alternative bills which proposed, a new lower house electoral system that would allow 300 seats to single-seat constituencies, 171 seats to proportional representation in prefectural constituencies and would have a single ballot.

The government's proposal faced a strong resistance from the LDP in the debate that was followed in the Diet over the political reforms bill. In same month, before the government bills were put to a vote in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Hosokawa and the LDP president Yohei Kono held a meeting. Although they failed to reach an agreement, the ruling parties eventually gained the approval from the lower house after revising the bills in accordance with a proposal that Hosokawa had made during the meeting as a compromise with the LDP. It pertained to the allocation of 274 seats to single-seat constituencies and 226 seats to proportional representation.

However, resistance for the political reforms bill was stronger and also in the House of Councilors it became impossible for Hosokawa to fulfill his pledge of realizing political reforms by end of the year. The Diet session was extended till January 1994 for the purpose to enact political reforms legislation. Finally the bill was rejected by a plenary session of the upper house because, in addition to opposition from the LDP and the JCP, 17 members of the SDPJ voted against them and three SDPJ members absented on the voting.¹⁷

Supposition was prevalent that the cabinet would resign or the prime minister would dissolve the lower house for another election. A joint committee of both the houses was convened but they failed to reach on any agreement. Then the law was reintroduced in the lower house. The Speaker of the House of Representatives Doi Takao arranged another meeting between Hosokawa and Kono. Then, the both sides reached an agreement when Hosokawa yielded to major concessions.

The new electoral system that was finally approved by the Diet gave 300 seats to single-seat constituencies and 200 seats to proportional representation in 11 blocs.

¹⁷ *Japan Times*, 19 November 1993.

Ironically the system was almost identical to the plan originally recommended by the Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in April 1990 by the election system council.

Later, the Hosokawa administration arranged a commission to recommend the boundaries for the single seat constituencies so that the electoral system could take effect. The commission submitted its report to the cabinet of Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi in August 1994 and the legislation was passed in November in the same year.

Since one of the objectives of the 1993-94 electoral system reforms was to shift the emphasis from candidates to parties, some provision needed to be made to establish party financing on a firm footing. The Hosokawa government therefore embarked upon the controversial path of public funding of elections and this came to be embodied in the revised legal structure. The amount of money needed to finance public funding of elections was calculated on the basis of Yen 250 per head of population per annum and in 1994 funding slightly exceeded to Yen 30 Billion.

The debate on the question of eligibility to grants from the funds and in particular on the definition of 'eligible party' was defined in the following way:

1. Party containing not less than five members of Diet.
2. Party has to receive two percent of the total valid votes in any recent election of lower or upper house in any of the constituencies either; in single-member or proportional representation constituency.

In order to avoid the increase of minor parties excessively reliant on public funding, it was further provided that the amount calculated for a party should not amount to more than two thirds of its total income. In order to be eligible for the public funding, a party also had to be registered as a legal one.

Other bills related to the campaigning practices, casting of votes and donations to the political parties were introduced in the lower house by the Hosokawa cabinet in 1993-94. The tenure of the Prime Minister Hosokawa that was only for less than ten

months was full of many reform programs. The achievements of the Hosokawa government have been discussed in detail in next chapter of this dissertation.

POWER SHARINGS BY THE COALITION PARTNERS IN AUGUST 1993

On 25 July 1993, seven parties came closer to form the government. SDPJ, *Komeito*, DSP, *Shinseito*, United Democratic Socialist Party (*Shiminren*) and the two conservatives groups New Party *Sakigake* and JNP united to form the government as the alternatives of the LDP. Distribution of cabinet portfolio is presented in the table 5.

TABLE 4: CABINET POSTS HELD BY THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT IN AUGUST 1993

Parties	Number of Cabinet Posts
SDPJ	6
<i>Shinseito</i>	5
<i>Komeito</i>	4
DSP	1
JNP	1
<i>Sakigake</i>	1
<i>Shaminren</i>	1
Non-Politician	2
Total	21

(Data Source: Japan Times, 11 August 1993)

Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan New Party (JNP) distributed ministerial posts in the seven party coalition governments on 9th August 1993.¹⁸ *Shiseito* (JRP), being the largest political party after SDPJ, many important cabinet posts was allocated to it. One or two cabinet posts were represented to the other political parties.

¹⁸ *Japan Times*, 10 August 1993.

Nevertheless, this cabinet lasted for few months but was full of ambitious leaders who challenged the Prime Minister Hosokawa and fulfilled their desire with the formation of new cabinet in June 1994 under the leadership of Hata Tsutomu.

The main ministerial posts were allocated on the party basis, were as follows:

Ministerial Posts	Heads of Ministry	Political Party
Trade Minister	Hiroshi Kumagai	<i>Shinseito</i>
Finance Minister	Hiroshisa Fujii	<i>Shinseito</i>
Deputy Prime Minister & Foreign Minister	Tsutomu Hata	<i>Shinseito</i>
Health and Welfare Minister	Keijo Obuchi	DSP
Home Affairs Minister	Kanju Sato	SDPJ

Handwritten notes:
 English Rendition (next to Shinseito)
 Japanese (next to DSP)

Two days after the designation of cabinet posts on 11 August, new Prime Minister Hosokawa replied some of the answers asked by journalists in the news conference. He said that bilateral relation with the US would be smoother than before. On the Russian issue, which is the main issue between two countries related to the Northern territory since 1956, he responded that there would be full-scale settlement over the Russian held Hokkaido Island. On the domestic issue he said, "The income tax would not be cut without its revision".¹⁹

One of the problems the Hosokawa cabinet was expected to encounter was how to deal with a bureaucracy, which had for decade existed in a virtually symbiotic relationship with the LDP politicians and which had policy preferences of its own on some issues, notably administrative reforms. Although Ozawa Ichiro had been at the political center as the LDP secretary general and Hata had been minister of finance, most of new cabinet members had virtually no experience of national government, and an opinion survey results of bureaucrats indicated in majority that the balance of power had shifted towards them with the formation of Hosokawa administration.²⁰

¹⁹ *Japan Times*, 11 August 1993.

²⁰ F. Schwartz, *Advice and Consent: The Politics of Consultation in Japan* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 25.

Probably, the general public rejoiced over the advent of Hosokawa government because they felt fresh air was drawn in to Japanese politics. However, Hosokawa could not survive for long. A fierce verbal attack was made from his opponents on the issue of bribery in which he was supposed to be involved in the year 1986-87, when he was the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture. After that Hosokawa resigned as prime minister in April 1994 due to instability within the government.²¹

SUSTENANCE OF 1993 COALITION GOVERNMENT

After victory of the opposition parties in the July 1993 elections, a new seven party coalition government was formed in August, excluding the Communists and the LDP. However, LDP decided to choose the opposition. The seven parties led coalition government never fulfilled the stability that was provided by the LDP and as a result they lost their power within nine months. On the various issues, confrontation emerged within the seven-party coalition. These circumstances provided sustenance to the coalition governments, which began from 1993.

Within eight months many ups and downs were experienced inside the coalition. On 14 August 1993 the support for the Prime Minister Hosokawa went up to 76 percent. This popularity rating for Hosokawa alerted other ambitious politicians who turned against the prime minister and demanded the resignation on his involvement in the corruption when he was governor the of Kumamoto prefecture during 1983-91. They waited for the appropriate time to demand resignation from the prime minister. On 8 April 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa announced that he would step down over the Diet paralysis caused by allegation about his past financial deals.²² Same day the *Komeito* and *Shinseito* suggested to SDPJ that the coalition should draw a fresh policy agreement, which was denied by the SDPJ.

A new development emerged inside the LDP. The party president Watanabe said that he would quit the party with 20 supporters and offer himself for the post of prime minister. He gave up his idea, finding that he could not obtain as much support as he

²¹ *Japan Times*, 26 April 1994.

²² *Ibid.*, 08 April 1994.

had expected in the Diet. However, the ruling coalition put forward the candidature of Hata, leader of the JRP. Then the JRP, the JNP, the DSP and some small groups in the Diet formed a joint parliamentary group called *Kaishinto* (Reformation).

The SDPJ considered this move as an act of betrayal aimed at undermining its position as the biggest party in the ruling coalition. After it had supported Hata government for quite sometime, SDPJ decided to leave the coalition. The Hata administration was inaugurated as a minority government in April 1994. After the Diet's approval of the long-delayed budget for fiscal year 1994 in June 1994, the LDP submitted a resolution of non-confidence in the house. The outcome of the votes depended on the support of SDPJ. While SDPJ's right wing aimed for a return to the coalition, the left wing opposed the very move. Some LDP Diet members had already begun secretly to make proposal to the SDPJ's left wing about the possibility of an LDP-SDPJ alliance. This resulted in the tie up between the LDP and the SDPJ, which had been on opposite sides of the fence under the "1955 setup". This was certainly unexpected. However, from the LDP's point of view, the top priority was to return to the ruling power by any means whatsoever.

Hoping for the return of the SDPJ to the ruling coalition, Hata, who was prime minister for only two months, handed the resignation of his cabinet. And later the ruling parties began policy talks with the SDPJ. As these talks ran into difficulties, however, the LDP president Kono held meetings with the SDPJ chairman Murayama Tomiichi and announced that his party wanted to recommend Murayama as the next prime minister. *Sakigake*, which had been advancing its ties with the SDPJ, also supported Murayama. On the final day of the Diet session on 29 June 1994, the policy talks between the ruling parties and the SDPJ were broke down. Murayama resolved to run for prime ministership and after the general meeting of the LDP Diet members of both houses, Kono announced that "bearing the unbearable, we have decided to designate Murayama, the chairman of the second largest party, as our candidate for prime minister in order to fulfill our responsibilities as the largest party".²³

²³ About Japan Series, *The Diet, Elections and Political Parties* (Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1995), p. 122

By contrast the ruling parties agreed to cast their votes for former Prime Minister Kaifu, who was pushed by some of the LDP Diet members opposing to an LDP-SDPJ administration. In a run-off ballot at a plenary session of the House of Representatives, Murayama was elected prime minister. A few members of both the LDP and SDPJ voted against him, but not as many as the ruling party expected it. Then Kaifu, being frustrated, resigned from the LDP membership along with other members of the House. Subsequently the politics of the coalition in the 1994 had shifted towards the LDP.

The LDP played a long-term politics in selecting the Murayama as prime minister. The birth of the LDP-*Sakigake*-SDPJ administration led by the Murayama evoked complicated emotions among the Japanese people as they had become comfortable to the LDP and the SDPJ being under the "1955 setup". The essence of matter, however, was that the LDP had achieved its goal of returning to power by taking the advantage of the split in the coalition and making the surprise move of recommending the chairman of the SDPJ, formerly the LDP's main challenger, as prime minister. The LDP had always rotated the post of prime minister among its own factions. In addition, just as the coalition government of the Prime Minister Hosokawa had consisted of non-LDP forces, so the Murayama coalition significantly was made up of forces that were present in the previous coalition. To fulfill the desire of the leaders in the coalition, Murayama allotted 13 cabinet posts to the LDP, 5 to the SDPJ and 2 posts to the *Sakigake*. LDP president Kono was appointed deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and *Sakigake* leader Takemura became finance minister.

Thus, the sustenance of the coalition that was formed on the unity of the opposition forces against the LDP lost the power due to factional, shifting political alliances among the political leaders and ambitious politicians inside the parties. The LDP entered in the governing politics once again by supporting the Murayama as prime minister. Since then, the coalition government is in the hands of the LDP.

Chapter 4

COALITION DECADE: 1993-2003 ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

Recommencing of political activities in post-war Japan, veterans of pre-war days returned to lead political parties. New political parties were established. Electoral systems were changed from its old form to the new. In the 1947 general elections the Socialists showed surprising advances by receiving a plurality that resulted in seating the short lived Katayama Tetsu and the interim Ashida Hitoshi cabinets. Two years later, in 1949, the Socialists lost many of their seats to the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and scored virtually ten percent of the total number of seats in the House of Representatives. Yoshida Shigeru of Japan Liberal Party formed his cabinet with the help of Democratic Party after winning the elections. When Japan emerged from occupation in April 1952, the prospect of political stability seemed far away. In November 1955 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was formed out of various competing conservative parties. By and large this is considered as a turning point in the history of Japan marking the establishment of what has often been called Japan's "1955 setup" that survived until the LDP lost office in July 1993. This long period of the LDP rule provided stability to Japanese politics and economy.

Japan's annual economic growth during the years 1958 to 1973 averaged over 10 percent, which meant that the surplus for distribution through wage increase and the use of tax revenues was continuously increasing without the need to increase tax rates. Following the first oil crisis of 1973-74, the Japanese economy entered in the period of much slower growth. When another oil crisis hit in the late 1970s, Japan was better prepared to deal with it given the experience of handling 1973 crisis. Nonetheless, several years of readjustment followed before the boom of the 1980s. Based on excessive speculation, the boom ended around 1990, when Japan descended into a reversionary condition from which it could not escape.¹ The experiences of economic

¹ Gary D. Allinson, *The Columbia guide to Modern Japanese History* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1999), p. 111.

recession caused the Japanese politics to reform and reorient its program during the coalition decade of 1993-2003.

General elections for the House of Representatives were held in 1990. The outcome of the elections was in essence a return to the "1955 setup". In a favorable situation, the LDP managed to secure a stable majority in the lower house by winning 275 seats that increased to 286 when conservative independents were also added. The JSP also performed well, increasing its strength by 53 seats to total of 136. The other opposition parties suffered losses; however, the *Komeito* secured only 45 seats, the JCP 16 and the DSP 14 seats. The JCP and the DSP fared especially worst, losing about 40 percent of their seats.


Later political developments occurred when the LDP's presidential election was held in October 1991. With the support of the powerful Takeshita faction, Miyazawa secured a majority on the first round of the ballot and assumed office. In November he was designated as prime minister and launched a new government. In the ordinary session of the Diet convened in January 1992, Miyazawa gave top priority on passing legislation to permit the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to participate in the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (UNPKO). With the help of the *Komeito* and the DSP, the government pushed the bill on the UNPKO through the Diet despite rigid resistance from the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ).

The new PKO law emerged as the key issue in House of Councilors elections held in July 1992. Although the LDP improved on its dismal 1989 performance by 32 seats, by capturing 68 out of the 127 seats in the elections, it still finished 20 short of the 127 seats needed for a majority. The other parties that had backed the PKO bill also improved their 1989 results, the *Komeito* by 4 and the DSP by 1. In contrast, the SDPJ won only 22 seats, less than half the number it had secured in the previous elections.² An important development of the July 1992 upper house elections was the first appearance of the Japan New Party (JNP) that was established in May 1992 by former Kumamoto Governor Morihiro Hosokawa as an alternative for voters alienated by the

² See the House of Councilors Election results in the *appendix* of this dissertation, p. 132.

existing framework of party politics, the JNP by capturing four seats in the first participated elections.

CHART 4: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE LOWER HOUSE, YEAR 1990 AND 1993 AND 1993



Note: Bars in the above chart indicate seats held by political parties, the black bar in chart indicates the result of 1990 elections and grey bar indicates the 1993 election results, where JRP, JNP and Sakigake participated only in 1993 election. (Data Source: Changing Japanese Politics, About Japan Series, Foreign Press Center, Japan, 1999, p. 69)

In the early 1990s, basic ideological differences between the parties were no longer being taken for granted, and the question of aligning Japan in a world divided in to two antagonistic camps was no longer relevant. Factional power struggles dominated the political process as they had in the past, but the political environment within which they operated was characterized by a greater public interest in political reform than ever before. Scandals involving political leaders changed the voter's attitude towards LDP and its politicians. The Japanese people desired to change the political environment and they changed it through the 1993 House of Representatives elections.³

In June 1993, the LDP faced its worst crisis since its formation in 1955. Many reform minded members left the party after the House of Representatives was dissolved in June 1993 following the approval of an opposition sponsored vote of no-confidence against Prime Minister Miyazawa. However, many LDP factions supported the motion.

Political reforms have been a topic of discussion in the Diet for long but the fundamental issue of political corruption and campaign funding actually received very little attention. The Japanese people expected the Diet to discuss measures to break the vicious link between money and politics, but the debate primarily centered on the system of elections. Moreover, political reform was to create an electoral system based on single-seat districts.

The succession of Hata group and other LDP members was not merely a protest. The one party rule by the LDP was coming to an end and moves towards political reorganization were being initiated. Business leaders were talking about the need to reconsider political contributions to the LDP. The factional grip within the LDP had been weakened.⁴

The year 1993 was a major turning point in the Japanese politics. After the elections the LDP, which enjoyed approximately four decade of unbroken rule since 1955, lost its majority in the House and the Socialists were united to form the

³ Gerald Curtis, *Logic of Japanese Politics* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1999), p. 97.

⁴ H.S. Prabhakar, *Japanese Politics: Change and Fluidity* (China Report 29:4, Sage Publication, New Delhi, 1993), p. 378.

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italics

government with seven parties. The LDP being in the opposition took interest in the government making in July 1994. From 1996 the LDP as a major party in the Diet formed the government with its allies and it is continuous till date.

ELECTIONS AND POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN THE COALITION DECADE: 1993-2003

Japan has experienced 21 House of Representatives elections after the war till 2003. The issues that were debated in previous elections were those concerning the Japanese socio-political developments after the occupation period, which ended in 1947. Elections after the “1955 setup” were mainly between the conservatives and socialists, where LDP headed in every election till 1990 as the largest party in the Lower House.⁵

The 1993 elections which were held on 18 July, created the path for opposition parties to unite and form the coalition government consequent to the LDP’s defeat in the Lower House. In 1947-48, the Socialists were united and created the coalition government, but it failed due to coordination among the parties. This happened again in the year 1993, when seven parties were united and formed the coalition government. They failed to sustain on account of factional politics inside the parties and individual desire in the politics to reach high.

The LDP after the Hata resignation, changed its view and supported the Murayama, and became active in the government formation procedure. After 1996 general election for the House of Representatives, the LDP managed 239 seats 16 more than the previous elections. Since then LDP emerged as the top party it headed every coalition government after the 1996.

The 1993 elections and government formation has already been detailed in the 3rd Chapter of this dissertation.⁶ However, an explanation in short is necessary. The important factor behind the collapse of LDP seems to have been the complacency of the Miyazawa government, perhaps due to its long years in the office. There appears to

⁵ See the election results from 1946-2003 of the lower house in *appendix* in details in this dissertation, pp. 126-31.

⁶ Readers, please turn the Chapter 3rd of this dissertation for details of 1993 politics in Japan.

have been an assumption that even if groups defected from the party, it would still be possible to persuade them to enter in a coalition government of which the LDP would be the leading party. The LDP desperately attempted to form such coalition in the days following the election but could not make it.⁷ After the elections, Hosokawa coalition government was formed, this lasted for only nine months till April 1994. The Hosokawa government was succeeded by a minority administration led by the head of the *Shinseito* (Japan Renewal Party JRP), Hata Tsutomu. It was initially supposed to consist of same parties that formed the Hosokawa administration, but the SDPJ quickly pulled out and the *Sakigake* refused to co-operate. The reason for the withdrawal of the SDPJ was that Ozawa had devised a scheme to unify JRP, JNP and DSP without Socialists, into a single party to be called *Kaishin*.

The consequences of this political drama surprised most of the observers and political analysts by surprise. During the nine weeks (April-June 1994) the Hata government was permitted exist by the Socialists and the *Sakigake* essentially for the purpose of passing the budget, which had been stalled during the last weeks of Hosokawa government. Once the budget was through the parliament, the coalition leaders engaged in intensive negotiations with leaders of the two parties that had defected in an attempt to persuade them back into the coalition and restore the majority of the government. However, that was in vain since the two parties were simultaneously negotiating with the leadership of the LDP, the JSP and *Sakigake*. Although the LDP was the largest party in the new coalition, the JSP chairman Murayama Tomiichi, became prime minister and the Finance Ministry was given to *Sakigake's* leader, Takemura Masayoshi.

Later political situation emerged with the formation of New Frontier Party (NFP). The previous coalition backed former Prime Minister Kaifu, who was defeated in the Diet vote to designate a new prime minister in June 1994 after resignation of Hata. Then the party leaders of the earlier coalition government including former Prime Ministers Hosokawa and Hata, as well as the LDP's Kaifu who resigned from it, held a series of meetings in which they strengthen their solidarity by establishing a joint

⁷ J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell publication, USA, 1999) p. 81

parliamentary group and confirmed their policy of forming a new party. On 10 December 1994, New Frontier Party (*Shinshintō*) was formed. The year 1995 had seen electoral advances by the *Shinshintō* in the House of Councilors elections, its challenges to the LDP, lost momentum in 1996, and there were signs that the coalition of parties and very disparate leaders, which it contained, were beginning to unravel. In the later months of 1995, both the main parties LDP and *Shinshintō*, changed their leaders.

In September 1995, Kono Yohei, who had become LDP Chairman in the aftermath of the collapse of the Miyazawa Government in 1993, withdrew from the scheduled party leadership contest when it became clear that the Minister for International Trade and Industry (MITI, reorganized in 2001 as METI, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), Hashimoto Ryutaro, would inevitably beat him. Hashimoto was widely seen as a more traditional conservative than the centrist Kono and he easily fought off a challenge from the much younger Junichiro Koizumi, to get elected. In December, an election was held for the leadership of the *Shinshintō* and Ozawa Ichiro was victorious.

On 11 January 1996, Murayama stepped down as Prime Minister and was replaced by Hashimoto Ryutaro. Later in October 1996 the first lower house election were held under the new electoral system. The LDP gained nearly 30 seats, and yet fell short of a majority in its own right. *Shinshintō* fell slightly short of its pre-election strength, the SDP, once again chaired by Doi Takako suffered its worst ever defeat and *Sakigake* came close to being wiped out. Meanwhile the JCP, which had long refused to join any political grouping or coalition, came close to doubling its representation. In November 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto formed a new cabinet consisting entirely of members of his own LDP. This government continued to be based on a loose alliance with the Social Democratic Party (DSP) and New Party *Sakigake* (Harbinger), the LDP's former coalition partners.

A few weeks after the elections, in December, *Shinshintō* suffered the defection of Hata Tosutomu and a few of his followers. Since the leadership contest a year earlier, relations between Hata and Ozawa had become difficult to manage on both personal

and ideological levels. On 26 December 1996, former Prime Minister Hata and 12 Diet members resigned from *Shinshinto* and announced the formation of their own political party, *Taiyoto* (The Sun Party) that later merged with DPJ in March 1998. Another small group of *Shinshinto* defectors founded a party called 21 *Seiki* (21st Century). It seemed plain that the process of party reshuffling was not an ultimate answer, but in the early months of 1997 the LDP strongly attempted to restore a majority on its own right by persuading either individuals or groups of parliamentarians to join it. This was achieved in early September.

In the middle of 1997, signs emerged of a new and ironic twist to the political scene. A series of announcements and proposed measures of Hashimoto government appeared to be adopting the main points of the reformist agenda put forward by the Hosokawa government earlier in the decade. Meanwhile, Ozawa and others in the disintegrated *Shinshinto*, worked hard for a fully conservative coalition though LDP resisted all such efforts. Hosokawa defected from *Shinshinto* and remained an independent for the time being. Hashimoto was re-elected as the president of the LDP in early September.⁸

The LDP regained simple majority in the house in the same month. It agreed to allow *Shinshinto* members to return to the party raise its strength 239 to 251 in 500 members in the House of Representatives.⁹ It was not the end of the coalition arrangement of the LDP, SDP and *Sakigake*, it became clear that the LDP still need the support of its two small parties in the House of Councilors.

However, at the end of December Ozawa announced the dissolution of *Shinshinto* that split into more than six tiny-parties.¹⁰ He spent the next few months in an attempt to form a new possible party of opposition to the LDP. In March-April 1998, several *Shinshinto*-successor parties and other minor groups merged with the DPJ (*Minshuto*). Soka Gakkai backed various groups, who kept themselves out from DPJ and a small group of supporters to Ichiro Ozawa formed Liberal Party (*Jiyuto*), who

⁸ *Japan Times*, 9 September 1997.

⁹ *Ibid*, 6 September 1997.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 27 December 1997.

demanded resignation from Prime Minister Hashimoto alleging that he should resign due to lack of ability to govern Japan.¹¹

Japanese politics from later half of 1997 was overshadowed by a series of financial crisis affecting several East and South East Asian nations, collectively known as the Asian Economic Crisis. Japan itself was in the severe economic difficulties. Hashimoto Government acted cautiously, though various deregulation plans were initiated.

In July 1998, the LDP suffered a severe setback in the House of Councilors elections. LDP needed to win just 60 seats of the 126 contested to maintain its pre-election strength; the party retained only 44 seats, faring particularly bad in the big cities.¹² The LDP lost because it had failed to take effective measures to thwart recession in what is probably the worst economic slump Japan has suffered since the end of World War II. In April 1997, Hashimoto complying with the ministry of finance desire to trim the national deficit raised the consumption tax to five percent from three percent and terminated a special income and residential tax cut amounting to Yen 2 trillion that had been in force since 1994. The heavier burden on the consumer spending was instantly reflected in economic reports. So far, Hashimoto did nothing to alter his administration's course and the recession deepened. Voters in this election were angry on the Hashimoto misguided economic policies that resulted in the loss of seats by the LDP. Hashimoto announced his resignation as the prime minister by taking the sole responsibility of LDP's defeat.

The main beneficiaries in the elections were Kan Naoto's Democratic Party of Japan, the JCP and independents leading to comparison with the LDP defeat in the Upper House election of 1989. Voting turn out was 14 percent higher than the previous 1995 elections. On 24 July 1998, the LDP held its presidential election among three candidates; Kajiyama Seiroku, Koizumi Junichiro and Obuchi Keizo. Obuchi emerged

¹¹ *Japan Times*, 23 March 1998.

¹² Hoshi Hiroshi, "Precarious Prospect for the Obuchi Cabinet", *Japan Quarterly* (Asahi Shinbun, Tokyo), October- December 1998, p. 4.

victorious and on July 30 and he was designated as prime minister.¹³ Learning a lesson from upper house elections, Obuchi himself labeled his administration as the economic resuscitation cabinet. Obuchi confined the faction-based distribution to 16 posts. He used his own discretion to select the remaining four. For the post of finance ministry, he picked Miyazawa, the former prime minister considering his economic expertise. Another cabinet member Taichi Sakaiya was appointed from Economic Planning Agency. Education ministry was allocated to Akito Arima who was the president of Tokyo University. Seiko Noda, a vivacious young woman was given the charge of posts and telecommunication ministry.

After winning as the party president of LDP in September 1999, Obuchi launched the three party coalitions comprising of LDP, New Komeito and Liberal Party and launched a new cabinet in October. According to the opinion polls surveys, the coalition was very unpopular; people had been disappointed by the seemingly unprincipled move on the part of the New Komeito to fall behind Obuchi after having opposed his initial election as prime minister in July 1998.¹⁴ Liberal Party entered in November as the coalition partner in his cabinet.

On 21 September 1999, the LDP held its biennial presidential election; with each LDP member having one vote and candidates credited an additional electoral vote for each 10,000 ballots in their favor from the party rank and file. Obuchi was re-elected with 350 votes; while runner up Kato Koichi received 113 and Yamasaki Taku received only 51 votes. Obuchi's strong presence was due to his strategic design for the-three party coalition.

As the Diet session of early year 2000 continued, the LDP appeared to be in stronger position than could reasonably have been expected in 1993. Although the LDP's support was significantly lower than it had been in the earlier decades. In April 2000 the LDP's support was only 30.3 percent. The Liberal Party (LP) had suffered a setback in early April, when about half of its Diet members defected to form the New

¹³ Mauzoe Yoichi, "The Obuchi Administration", *Japan Echo* (Japan Echo Inc., Tokyo), Vol. 27, No. 2, April 2000, p.25

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 26.

Conservative Party (*Hoshuto*) rather than join their leader, Ozawa Ichiro, in withdrawing from the governing coalition. In between on April 3rd and 4th, Mikio Aoki, Chief Cabinet Secretary served as the acting prime minister when Obuchi was hospitalized and unable to run the government. After that on the same day Mori Yoshiro, a faction leader and also secretary general of the LDP, was appointed as the new prime minister and the Obuchi's entire cabinet was retained until the new election for the House of Representatives, which was held in June 2000.

TABLE 5: RESULTS OF THE LOWER HOUSE ELECTION: JUNE 2000

Parties	Single Seat Districts	Proportional Representation	Total Seats in Combined
LDP	177	52	229
DPJ	80	44	124
New <i>Komeito</i>	7	21	28
JCP	0	18	18
New Conservative Party	7	0	7
Liberal Party	4	17	21
SDP	4	13	17
Minor Parties	6	0	6
Independents	15	0	15
Total	300	165	465

(Source: Japan Times, 26 June 2000)

The results of election to the House of Representatives held on 25 June 2000 were declared on the same day. The outcome was favorable to the coalition partners; New *Komeito* and New Conservative Party achieved a stable majority. Mori Yoshiro was elected as new prime minister on 4th July 2000, despite the LDP setback and DPJ

gains.¹⁵ A day after launching his cabinet, Mori stressed his determination to create a 'reborn Japan' by improving the economy and promoting the developments of the Information Technology (IT).¹⁶

When the LDP presidential election was scheduled Mori's popularity was very low while nonconformist Junichiro Koizumi prevented him from the running. In April 2001, Koizumi was elected by the Electoral College consisting not only of parliamentary party members but also a considerable number of electors representing small section of the party. Later, on 26 April 2001 Koizumi was appointed as new prime minister, replacing Mori. New *Komeito* and New Conservative Party were in the coalition with the LDP in the Koizumi's administration. The new government led by Koizumi gained popularity by winning many seats in the upper house election which was held in July just after three months of his appointment as the new prime minister.

TABLE 6: RESULTS OF THE UPPER HOUSE ELECTIONS: JULY 2001

Parties	Electoral Districts	Proportional Representation	Total Seats in Combined	Uncontested
LDP	45	20	65	46
DPJ	18	8	26	3
New <i>Komeito</i>	5	8	13	10
JCP	1	4	5	15
SDP	0	3	3	5
Liberal Party	2	4	6	2
NCP	0	1	1	4
Others	2	0	2	111
Total	73	48	121	126

(Source: Japan Times, 30 July 2001)

¹⁵ *Japan Times*, 26 June 2000.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 06 July 2000.

In July 2001 election to the upper house happened to be a major feat of success in nine years for the LDP. The upper house victory was considered a mandate for Koizumi to initiate reforms.¹⁷ Yet the outcome of the election was not so much of a revival of LDP politics. However, it indicated that the voters were so eager to change the political environment that was present till the last decade that they supported Koizumi one more chance to break down the LDP political framework of vested interest and favoritism.

The Media helped him to get majority in the upper house despite his weak organizational power base in the party itself. He made three pronged use of media in the three ways, by appearing on TV news programs and debate, effective use of Internet and through frequent photo features in women's magazines.¹⁸

With no major national elections and no surprise party realignments, the year 2002 was the least eventful in Japanese politics since 1993 when the LDP had lost its unchallenged hold on political power. The three party coalition led by Koizumi remained firmly in control since his LDP and its two junior partners, New *Komeito* and New Conservative Party enjoyed, a stable majority in both the chambers of the Diet. In September, Koizumi reshuffled his cabinet for the first time after his inauguration as prime minister in April 2001. He retained almost the cabinet but for sacking Finance Minister Hakuo Yanagisawa and few others. Passing a few bills like; the state run postal services and revising medial insurance system, the year 2002 was eventually a peaceful one without political instability.


The year 2003 could be viewed as a year of several political events. In last week of September, keeping the ensuing elections in mind the Liberal Party (LP) merged with Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to contest election jointly to challenge the LDP. The general elections for the Lower House were held on November 9 after one and half month when Koizumi was re-elected as the LDP's president.

¹⁷ *Japan Times*, 30 July 2001.

¹⁸ Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Upper House Election of 29 July 2001", *Government and Opposition* (London School of Economics, London), Vol. 37, Number 1, Winter 2002, pp. 42-43

Despite the loss of seats, the LDP led coalition managed a comfortable majority of 252 seats, which enables the bloc to name its chairman in the entire chamber's standing committee and hold a majority in all panels. At this juncture, smaller parties in both the ruling and opposition camps suffered in the shadows of the LDP-DPJ competition.¹⁹ Where the NCP merged with the LDP due to critical setback in the elections, a deal were signed by the NCP's secretary-general Toshihiro Nikai with the LDP's president and Prime Minister Koizumi. On November 19, Koizumi was appointed prime minister for the subsequent term. He is managing LDP's policies in the government with the collective efforts by the coalition partners.

CHART 5: RESULTS OF LOWER HOUSE ELECTION, NOVEMBER 2003



(Data Source: Japan Times, 10 November 2003)

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¹⁹ *Japan Times*, 10 November 2003.

The results of the elections were very different to the previous elections, where small parties had lost their seats due to competition between the LDP and the DPJ. Other parties like the JCP and the NCP were far behind the *Komeito* that managed 34 seats while their seats were 9 and 4 respectively. However, it was the success for the LDP, which formed the government with coalition partners New *Komeito* and NCP. The DPJ announced to perform a responsible opposition in the Diet. In December 2003, the Koizumi government passed the bills regarding the approval of a plan for missile defense and the fiscal budget for the year 2004. The previous months of 2004 were unbeaten for the Koizumi government, which successfully pushed the SDF troops to reconstruction in Iraq in January without the oppositions' support.²⁰

ACHIEVEMENTS OF COALITION GOVERNMENT: 1993-2003

The "1955 setup" did collapse due to the failure of the LDP to win a majority in the House of Representatives elections in July 1993. It was more due to voter dissatisfaction, similar to the 1990 lower house election that provided an opportunity to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) for its impressive turnout following the introduction of the vastly unpopular consumption tax plan by Takeshita Noboru government in April 1989. The change of political setup began with the no-confidence motion against Miyazawa cabinet submitted to the lower house in June 1993 led by Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and its partners except communists.²¹ As a result the no-confidence resolution was passed forcing Miyazawa to dissolve the house for fresh general election.

Poor performance by the LDP opened the way for a fundamental shake up of the government for the first time in four decades. To provide a stable government, seven smaller parties formed an alliance of ^{convenience} convince and on August 6th a coalition of conservatives and reformist forces selected Hosokawa to be the prime minister that removed the LDP from governing power. The Hosokawa administration that was the

²⁰ Editor Notes, "Sending troops to Iraq", *Japan Echo* (Japan Echo Inc., Tokyo), Vol. 31, No 1, February 2004, p. 2.

²¹ J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell publication, USA, 1999), p. 80.

first non-LDP cabinet in thirty-eight years began with great support from the public. The top priority of the Hosokawa cabinet was the realization of political reforms that had not been achieved under the LDP governments. However, the LDP managed to occupy the governing power again in 1994 by supporting the candidature of Murayama as prime minister.

Several coalition governments were formed between 1993 and 2003, and every government remained committed to work to satisfy the Japanese people and had a series of reform program. At the beginning of coalition in 1993 the socialists formed the government and they brought forward the reform program was on which they united after the election results. Due to certain new political developments in the favor of LDP, it managed to enter in power structure in 1994 and remain in coalition governments till date, which is already discussed in previous pages.

The achievements of coalition governments between 1993 and 2003 are discussed on the basis of sequential order and they are as follows:

In the year 1993, Hosokawa coalition government was formed with seven parties. The government passed many bills in the Diet related to their agenda on which the coalition was formed.

1. The new electoral law was passed on 18 November 1993 in the Lower House. Some left wing SDPJ members were against the passing of the bill, as they anticipated that SDPJ seats would lose many seats they were holding onto. The main opposition party LDP supported the bill. The salient features of the new law which was accompanied by a number of changes in legislation governing 'election campaign and financing', were as follows:
 - Despite the tendency to refer to the new system as a single-seat system, only 300 of the 500 seats of the lower house (reduced from 511 seats) were in this category. 200 seats were earmarked for the proportional representation system. Finally a unique provision permitted dual candidates in both a single-seat districts and on the proportional list. Depending on the electoral strategies of each party, a sort of safety net could be provided for candidates facing

close races. The position of a candidate on the proportional list is entirely the choice of the party; it is possible, for example, to rank several candidates equally on a list, in which case the candidate's vote in the single-seat districts as a percentage of the vote of the winning candidate is the determining factor.²²

- Major political parties would receive subsidies from the state equaling Yen 250 per Japanese citizen based on the voting population and total subsidies for the party comes to about Yen 30.9 billion.
 - Donations to individual politicians were banned.
 - Sources of donations exceeding Yen 50,000 a year should be disclosed.
 - Each voter would be able to cast two votes, one for individual candidate in a single seat districts and one for a political party in the nationwide proportional representation system.
 - Door-to-door campaigning by candidates would be permitted from 8 am to 8 pm.
2. Electoral law was revised on 28 January 1994, according to which each individual lawmaker could be allowed to designate one fund raising body to receive donations from business enterprises and groups.
 3. The Prime Minister Hosokawa announced the new tax plans and financial plans on 2nd February, which was approved on 8th February after a long debate in the Diet for the financial year 1994. The bill was previously opposed by some of the members of the ruling coalition partner SDPJ.²³ The provisions of bill were:
 - Cuts of Income and other taxes would be total of Yen 5.85 trillion for the financial year 1994.
 - Expansion of public works and other projects under the financial plan would be of Yen 7.2 trillion.
 - For public works projects facilitation of land transaction would be total of Yen 2.78 trillion.

²² See *appendix* of this dissertation for the use of electoral law in 1996 lower house elections, pp. 136-37.

²³ *Japan Times*, Selective News from 19 November 1993 to 9 February 1994.

- Measures to support restructuring of the agriculture sector, including additional public works spending and expansion of low-interest loans would be total of Yen 10 billion.
- Expenditure of measures securing employment would be of Yen 10 billion.

Hata Tsutomu's government was formed after the Hosokawa's resignation in April 1994, as the minority coalition government that lasted for only two months in which the lower house passed the fiscal budget of 1994 that comprised of income tax cut to range between of Yen 5.74 and 8.98 billion. The amount for the general expenditure was decided to be of yen 40.85 trillion.

On 30 June 1994, the new government was designated under the leadership of Murayama, after the Hata resignation from the prime minister's office. Murayama was the second socialist prime minister after Katayama Tetsu in 1947-48.²⁴ The achievements made by him were very limited. His achievements were:

1. Murayama cabinet approved budget for the fiscal year 1995 of Yen 70.99 trillion in December 1994. Which were as follows:
 - The defense budget was increased from 1994 and was set on the spending of 0.855 percent of GNP.
 - Yen 6.0 trillion was planned to spend in the six years starting from the fiscal year 1995.
 - Yen 37 million was set for the schools to counter bullying.
 - Yen 12.5 billion was announced for day-care contents for infants and included Yen 4.15 billion for increasing the number of nurses at center operating long hours.
2. A bill introduced by the LDP on 'Religious Corporate Body Law' that was passed by the Diet in October 1995.

²⁴ *Japan Times*, 1 July 1994.

In January 1996, the new party president of the LDP Hashimoto Ryutaro replaced Murayama Tomiichi as new prime minister. He played major role in two years of his tenure as prime minister of Japan. His achievements were:

1. On 17 April 1996 the Prime Minister Hashimoto and American president Bill Clinton signed Japan-US security declaration.²⁵ The April 1996 joint declaration on security outlined in general terms need for the two countries to work “jointly and individually to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.” The main points of declaration were:
 - Cooperation with the People’s Republic of China with the aim of encouraging China to “play a positive and constructive role” in the region.
 - Encouragement of and cooperation with Russia’s ongoing progress of reforms and reaffirmation of full normalization of Japan-Russia relations as important to regional peace and stability.
 - Continuation of efforts regarding stability on the Korean peninsula in cooperation with the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
 - Development of multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanism such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and eventually security dialogues regarding North East Asia.
 - In addition to regional issues, two countries agreed to work together on other security matters including UN Peace Keeping and Humanitarian Operations, acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiation process, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the Middle East peace process and the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.
 - The Prime Minister Hashimoto and the President Bill Clinton agreed to initiate the review of the 1978 guidelines for Japan-US defense cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the US.

²⁵ Gleen D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, *Japan’s International Relations* (Routledge, New York, 2001), pp. 477-80.

2. In September 1996, the Tokyo-US defense guidelines were signed. It consisted of reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services between the SDF and the US armed force. The guidelines urge cooperation in dealing with refugees as necessary and the guidelines should be reviewed in time and appropriate manner if deemed necessary when changes in situation relevant to the Japan-US security relationship occur.
3. After reelected as prime minister in November 1996 and the general elections, Hashimoto announced that his administration would implement various reforms. They were as follows:
 - Administrative Reforms for reorganizing of government ministries.
 - Economic structural reform to deal with the economic regulations.
 - Financial system reform to deal with the non-performing loans of financial institutions and deregulation of financial system.
 - Social security reform for the establishment of a public nursing insurance system and pension insurance reform.
 - Fiscal structure reform for eliminating the government's huge debts.
 - Educational reforms for the befitting times.

These plans of reforms were the first to be achieved. Further, a substantial liberalization of the Tokyo financial market was added in the reforms program so that it could compete on an equal footing with rest developed nations. In a series of announcement and proposed measures, the Hashimoto Government appeared to be adopting the main points of the reformist agenda put forward by the Hosokawa Cabinet earlier in the decade. For the administrative reforms, Hashimoto created Administrative Reform Council headed by him and included the various eminent personalities of Japan in April 1997.

In September 1997, the Administrative Reform Council issued an interim report that included the proposals for strengthening the authority of the prime minister and reorganize government ministries and agencies that would consist of the Prime Minister's office and 21 ministries and agencies into the Cabinet Office and that they

would be 12 ministries and agencies from 2001. The council submitted its final report in December in the same year. On the basis of this report, the basic law on the Administrative Reform of the Central Government, which stipulated the basic framework of reform, was enacted in the ordinary session of the Diet in 1998. The opposition parties criticized the Administrative Reform proposals. Regarding the details of the new ministries and agencies, legislative measures concerning such matters as the enactment of the laws to establish ministries and agencies were scheduled to be discussed in the ordinary session of the Diet in 1999.

4. In the December 1997, the Diet approved the Nursing Care Bill. The bill were supported by the LDP, SDP and New Party *Sakigake*, while *Shinshinto* opposed the bill and boycotted the House. JCP voted against the bill contending that it would create shortage of nurses and became a financial burden. Implementation of long-term care insurance was expected first of all to make it possible for all those who require care to receive services in line with the degree of their need. Until then the prime consideration in determining the level services to be provided to those requiring nursing or other non-medical care under public welfare programs was the extent to which people's own families are able to look after them. The main features of the bill were:
 - All those living in Japan aged 40 and over must initially pay about Yen 2,500 per-month, which would start in April 2000.
 - Workers would be despatched to households with ailing elderly people to provide care and help with household responsibilities.
 - Nurses would be despatched to the house to see the old people.
 - Elderly people would be given rehabilitation assistance at care centers.
 - Daytime and short-term stays would be offered at care facilities.
5. On 19 March 1998, Hashimoto Government announced to finish the monopoly on electric power sales and allow airlines to boost the number of flight

as part of its fiscal 1998-2000 deregulation program.²⁶ The main plans of Hosokawa Government were:

- Lifting ban on sales of electricity by non-power firms.
 - Halving the times taken by the government to issue business licenses and permits.
 - Removing limits on the number of airlines serving one route.
 - Reviewing the ban on discount sales of newspaper, books and magazine.
 - Allowing students to join college in the fall, rather than only in the spring including the integration of middle school and high school education and the relaxation of entrance age for the universities.
 - Releasing the successful bid prices for public works tenders.
 - Easing restrictions on foreign ownership of satellite broadcast firms.
 - Reform of public sector corporations.
6. Proposed financial reform consisted of two factors. The first was concerning the solution to the problem of non-performing loans that became the most serious structural problem of the Japanese economy after the collapse of the bubble economy. Second factor was related to the promotion of the so called Japanese version of financial 'Big Bang', centered on the deregulation, so as it would revive the Japanese financial market as an international financial market. After the inauguration of the second cabinet, Hashimoto instructed the finance ministry to draft the reform proposals. In June 1997 the finance ministry formulated a Financial System Reform Plan based on the principle of 'free, fair and global', which it gradually started putting into effect. However, the reform further exacerbated the business environment of Japan's financial institutions that were choking under the bad loans. The disposal of all the bad loans, which was key to the Japanese recovery, could not make much progress as it was expected.
7. Japanese economy was facing the stagnation in the February 1991. Then the government had launched large-scale pump-priming measures on several occasions. The Hosokawa administration had included an income tax cut of Yen

²⁶ *Japan Times*, 20 March 1998.

5.85 trillion in an economic package totaling Yen 15.25 trillion formulated in February 1994. Due to intense criticism from the nation it was forced to abandon the idea of establishing a national welfare tax. Instead it had to introduce a time-limited special tax cut financed by deficit covering bonds. The debate about the special tax cut and the consumption tax rate was carried on in the Murayama cabinet that decided on a policy of making just half of the special tax cut permanent and hiking the consumption tax rate from 3 percent to 5 percent from April 1997. Hashimoto administration went with the already decided policy, cutting what had been a special tax cut by half, raising the consumption tax rate and also increasing the health insurance burden of the payer from April 1997. The first Hashimoto administration had been optimistic about the economic outlook. In December 1996, Hashimoto setup for the Fiscal Structure Reform Council, comprising leading members of the government and the LDP, former prime minister and former finance minister of the ruling parties. Hashimoto himself chaired the council that issued the final report in June 1997. As fiscal rehabilitation goals, the report stated that by fiscal 2003 the single fiscal year deficits of the central and the local governments should be cut to less than 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and new issue of deficit-covering should reduced to zero. Opposition parties called for a change of policy to emphasize economic-stimulus measures and the recompilation of the budget. At the end of the fiscal year in 1998 the government's outstanding debt amounted to Yen 279 trillion for reform policy.

New coalition government was formed under the leadership of Keizo Obuchi on July 30 1998. Obuchi who had performed credibly as foreign minister in the Hashimoto cabinet, gained some public applause for his firmness that Japan sign a treaty banning land mines despite apparent opposition from-foreign-ministry officials. As the new prime minister his achievements were notable. He implemented many reforms during his tenure, the highlighting of reforms were:

1. Obuchi managed to pass the finance reform laws in the upper house in October. A 'Financial Rescue Committee' was created to handle the failed banks as well

as to prevent public institutions to buy bad loans from them. His cabinet and LDP proposed the 'Bank Re-capitalization Bill,' which replaced the current plan of injecting up to Yen 13 trillion in public funds in to the banks to boost their capital bases.

2. On 15 October, the Diet approved the Japan National Railway (JNR) repayment plan. The ruling LDP and Liberal Party voted in favor of this bill, whereas JCP and DPJ opposed it. Under the new bill, huge debts would be disposed of over 60 years, mostly by using taxpayer money and by requiring Japan Railway Group firms to shoulder part of the burden. The measures also included special tobacco tax of Yen 1 per cigarette purchased.
3. In May 1999, the Japan-US defense bill was enacted by the Diet. According to the bill Japan would cooperate with US in the SDF during emergencies in 'unspecified areas surrounding Japan.' The bill also allowed the central government to ask the local governments and the private sector to provide cooperation such as; use of ports, airports and the transport supplies.
4. On 1st July 1999, the government announced that the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Corporation, one of Japan three major public corporations, was privatized. The NTT formed in 1985 was the nation's largest company was divided into three carriers. One for long distance and international services and two for regional services, under the control of a stock company. NTT entered into internal phone market in December 1996. The NTT firm said that they will continue to treat domestic and foreign supplies equally in their permanent practices, just as the former NTT was obliged under a 1981 Japan-US agreement.²⁷
5. The Diet enacted the controversial legislation that largely recognizes the 'Hinomaru' as Japan's national flag and 'Kimagayo' as its anthem.

On 5 April 2000, Mori Yoshiro was designated as the new prime minister replacing Obuchi, who was unfit to run the government. His achievements in the coalition

²⁷ *Japan Times*, 2 July 1999.

government were very less as compared to others. He implemented a few programs, which were as follows:

1. He reviewed the national educational system.
2. In the bilateral relation with Russia, a peace treaty with Moscow was signed regarding to the sovereignty of Islands Hokkaido.
3. Under his leadership the Group 8 (G-8) meeting was held in Japan at Okinawa in July.
4. His cabinet approved in August 2000, an outlay of Yen 9.4 trillion for public works in new budget of 2000 with the total expenditure of Yen 48.09.

On 10 March 2001, Prime Minister Mori ordered for LDP presidential election and on 24 April 2001 former health and welfare Minister Junichiro Koizumi was elected as the 20th president of the LDP. On 26 April 2001 Koizumi was appointed as the 87th prime minister of Japan.

Koizumi introduced many reform programs before the general elections for the House of Representatives, which was held on 9 November 2003. His achievements were as follows:

1. In June 2001, the cabinet approved the basic policy of carrying out economic and fiscal policy measures.
2. On 26 June the government introduced a plan to improve the weak insurance structures.²⁸
3. The Diet passed the law to hike the medical expenses for salaried workers.
4. In October, the Diet passed the bill enabling the SDF to lend non-combat support to the US strike on Afghanistan.
5. In December, the cabinet adopted the plan to stream line the state-backed institutions. The program was the major part of Koizumi's structural program reform process.

²⁸ *Japan Times*, 27 June 2001.

6. His government decided in December that it would not raise the taxes on cigarette and on low malt' Happoshu' in fiscal year 2002. However, in April 2002, the tax on per cigarettes was increased from Yen 7 to 9.
7. In February 2002 the government released a package of anti-deflation measures including steps to tighten regulations on short selling of stocks.
8. Coalition partners agreed to implement tax cuts for the fiscal year 2003 retroactive to the fiscal year ending March 2003 as part of a second anti-deflation package. The cabinet endorsed a new economic and fiscal policy package intended to revitalize Japan's economy and comprehensively reform its tax system in June.
9. The cabinet approved the bill to replace the old currency notes on 2nd August.
10. On 17 September 2002, Koizumi made historic visit to Pyongyang and held a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. He signed a joint declaration on improving ties with Korea.
11. On 17 May 2003, the government decided to inject public funds into a capital short Resona Bank at the first meeting of its financial system management council, a move that would put the bank under state control.
12. The Diet approved Japanese first-contingency legislation on 6th June 2003.

After the general elections for the Lower House, the LDP led coalition partners won the majority and Koizumi was re-elected on November 19 once again as Prime Minister of Japan. In December²⁹ he initiated many reform measures to improve Japanese economy and adopted policies to rebuild Japan as a strong nation. His rest achievements for the year 2003 were as follows:

1. On 9th December 2003 the cabinet approved the dispatch of Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq. The major out line of the law is:
 - Japan would prioritize humanitarian and reconstruction aid over security assistance.
 - SDF activities would be carried out primarily in non-combat zones.

²⁹ *Japan Times*, (Japan Times Ltd., Japan, selective news from 10 to 21 December 2003).

- Up to 600 Ground SDF (GSDF) troops would work to provide medical services and supply water in South Eastern Iraq.
 - The Maritime SDF would provide upto two amphibious ships and two destroyers to transport the GSDF equipment.
 - Up to eight air SDF planes, including C-130 Cargo planes would help the GSDF.
2. On 19 December cabinet approved the plans for Missile Defense. The security debate outcome deals that Japan would go ahead with the US plans of developed Ballistic Missile Defense System to protect Japan from North Korea. The main provisions of proposals were:
- As a first line of defense, all the four Maritime SDF warships equipped with the protection defense system would be armed with SM-3s (Standard Missile 3), which are designed to knock out short and medium range ballistic missiles.
 - As a second line of defense- PAC -3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3) missiles. the latest version of Patriot surface-to-Air-System developed to counter the short ballistic missiles would be introduced against missiles closing on their targets.
 - Under Japan's aegis (protection) warships and 27 existing PAC-2, launchers would be upgraded to accommodate the new system.
2. In December the coalition government finalized the budget for 2004. Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki submitted the draft for fiscal year 2004 on expenditure of Yen 82.11 trillion. In the proposal Tax cut and additional funding, the following were proposed:
- Tax grant to local governments are projected to fall 5.2 percent to yen 16.49 trillion.
 - Educational grants to public schools and university are slated to drop 8 percent to Yen 4.82 trillion.

- Fund to intervene in currency markets would increase from an initial budget of Yen 79 trillion to Yen 1000 trillion in a supplementary budget for the year 2003.
- The state would earmark Yen 106.8 billion to help pay for planned ballistic missile defense system.
- For the aging population, the care bill increased the outlay by 4.2 percent to Yen 19.79 trillion.

The achievements by the Prime Minister Koizumi is continue in 2004 with several plans including SDF to join Multi National Forces (MNF) in Iraq for reconstruction program, pension-reforms policies and fiscal budget for 2004. Few of them are yet to be finalized by the new Diet session, which will be convened around in August after the July upper house elections.

LIMITATIONS OF COALITION GOVERNMENT: 1993-2003

It is a fact that from 1993 the Japanese politics has been in a state of drift, when the thirty-eight years domination by the LDP came to an end. Since then Japan had witnessed seven administrations. Mostly of them short lived and all were based on coalitions. Without any exception, each one of these administrations had announced commitments to "structural reform," promising to bring about the fundamental reform of Japan's economy and society as a catalyst to the establishment of a new development process. Yet, virtually no progress has been made in realizing or implementing these grand-sounding plans. In the ten years, politicians did nothing but talked much of the so-called 'structural reform'.

In past ten years, there have been as many structural reform plans put together as there have been administrations, but nothing was achieved. Every administration since 1993 has been a coalition, formed with the sole purpose of uniting together enough Diet members to make a majority. The administration led by Murayama Tomiichi, for example, was the three party coalitions along with the LDP and the SDPJ. Two of these parties had fundamentally opposed on ideological grounds ever since they were

established in 1955. The third partner was New Party *Sakigake*. This was the partnership formed purely to secure the reins of government.

Another characteristic of all these coalition governments is that they have been short-lived. The administration of Hata Tsutomu lasted for only two months, and the current administration of Junichiro Koizumi, launched in April 2001, is regarded as long lasting by recent standards by virtue of its entry into third year. Long lasting or not, the fact remains that one of the LDP's coalition partner, the New *Komeito*, is a party with a very different political ideology, and even within the LDP there are widely divergent opinions that cause forming a coherent policy strategy difficult.

The momentary appearances of one administration after another and the absence of any action to turn policies and reforms into reality caused the obstruction that stifled Japan during its 'Coalition Decade', eroded the public expectations, and caused voter turnout in elections to turn down. Until now the elections have been the juncture from which parties have issued empty promises.

The promises have remained unfulfilled for two main reasons. One is that the type of policies issued by parties that have been highly theoretical and lacking in the kind of specific measures that could be carried out straight after the election. The second is that, individual candidates also make promises, but these tend to be mere wish lists that avoid mentioning what resources would be needed or what specific course of action would be taken to make the wishes genuine. They often lack consistency with policies of the candidate's party and are soon forgotten once the elections are over.

Thus the limitations of 'coalition government' have many factors. Coalition government can rarely achieve its promise as long as government exists on the low majority with many partners. The demands of the coalition partners within the government too create challenges for the government. Whenever the government will serve the interest of individuals and party, it can never achieve its promises, which it has announced for the voters.

POLITICAL EXPERIENCES IN COALITION DECADE: 1993-2003

The collapse of “1955 setup” came as the major change to Japanese politics in the year 1993. The LDP failed to regain its majority in the ‘powerful lower house’ after the elections. The long rule by the LDP provided political stability in the 1960s and there after. After 1993 two short-lived governments were formed under the prime ministership of Hosokawa and Hata. In June 1994 the LDP returned to government making procedure. From 1996 the LDP headed the coalition till 2003 with many of its coalition partners. This was the unique experience for the LDP to be out of power for nine months and also for the opposition parties who experienced power only in 1947-1948 and again in 1993-1994.

The results of elections for the House of Representatives and for the House of Councilors were seen as the emergence of two party systems in Japan in November 2003 and July 2004. The elections results were a leap forward for the DPJ and a sharp blow for LDP. The LDP-led ruling coalition retained a majority but in future Koizumi could face a rocky road ahead with his structural reform drive because the DPJ could threaten his government in the foreseeable future.³⁰

The trend in Japanese politics changed in 2003 due to voters, who tried to give a majority to the LDP for stable government. They also voted for a strong opposition to check the working of government on policy reforms. This could be attributed as little effort from few voters but the merger of Liberal Party just before the election in the DPJ, helped it to improve its seats from 137 to 177. The LDP supporters voted for its allies to form a stable government.

Between the year 1993 and 2003, Japan observed many changes in the politics of forming coalition government, as mentioned in the previous pages, opposition parties, who never experienced power due to dominance of the LDP for thirty-eight year in government, united in 1993 due to the defeat of LDP in elections. However, unity

³⁰ *Japan Times*, (Japan Times Ltd. Japan, 10 November 2003 and 13 July 2004)

was no longer maintained due to their ambitious and factional politics inside their parties.

When Hata was appointed as prime minister in 1994 after Hosokawa's resignation, those parties who formed coalition in August 1993 on the candidature of Hosokawa, were not unified on his candidature. This provided a chance to the LDP to come ahead and to lead the government. Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama was designated from the LDP and it was a new change in the politics, which started in 1993.

Formation and merger of political parties in 'coalition decade' created a path for coalition politics. In decade, the merger of political parties strengthened the oppositions against LDP and formation of political parties due to factional politics within the oppositions, provided chance to the LDP to maintain its governing politics. In the 1996 House of Representatives elections, LDP achieved more seats than the 1993 due to the opposition fragmentation after their unity in 1994. Yet it maintained about 237 seats in 2003 as equal to 1996 but more than in the year 2000. Chances for the opposition parties to challenge the LDP are no more in future because the main opposition parties after 2003 election, the DPJ have 177 seats and other opposition parties merely 51 seats. New political developments after 2003 lower house elections have been discussed in the next chapter: Summary and Conclusion.

Chapter 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

By the year 2003 coalition politics in Japan completed a decade. During this coalition decade, Japan had many experiences ranging from the seven parties coalition in 1993 that transferred the power from seven parties towards the LDP's return in political prominence being in opposition. In June 1994, LDP played a major compromising role among the different political parties for appointing Murayama, a socialist, as prime minister. Since then LDP remained in the coalition leading governments.

Following the 2003 general elections for the lower house, the political system in Japan underwent a changed pattern giving encouraging political environment favorable for two party systems. In these elections, LDP and DPJ, the two main parties almost bagged 416 seats in the house of 480 members, with 239 and 177 seats respectively. The LDP under the leadership of Koizumi formed the government with its coalition partner New *Komeito*.¹

These coalition practices in Japan are not entirely new for the nation. The *Meiji* era is known for political modernization that transferred the nation from feudal to democratic and from agricultural to industrial. These Meiji political reforms produced sweeping changes throughout Japan. Revolutionary leaders drawn from the old samurai groups seized power at the center, broadly removing the *Shogun* and then eliminating the *daimyo* and their domains. The *Meiji* period created new structures of political authority that laid the foundation for a modern centralized nation-state.²

The year 1889 saw a major development in Japan when *Meiji* constitution was promulgated. All the executive powers of the *Meiji* constitution were vested in the emperor and he was the head of the state. He could accept the proceedings of the

¹ After November 2003 election NCP merged with the LDP due to bad performance. Now LDP is ruling with only New *Komeito* as coalition partner.

² Gary D. Allinson, *The Columbia Guide to Modern Japanese History* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1999), pp. 9-10.

legislature and he was the chief of the army. In theory his power remained supreme, which could not be much of day-to-day practiced utility. The former samurais who really controlled the reins of power consistently relegated the emperor into the background, where he exercised only symbolic authority and some powers of coordination and persuasion. Holding the post of prime minister, all cabinet posts and excluding the emperor from cabinet meetings, these former samurais served effectively as real state leader. Although they disagreed about the roles and powers of the legislature, they were generally content to limit its authority. They also managed the nation's diplomatic affairs by keeping the emperor at arm's length whenever wars were declared and when treaties were negotiated. The *Meiji* oligarchs used the emperor adroitly as a public figure and carefully exploited the 'emperor will' to reinforce their policies.³

However, the political parties were already in existence since 1870s and 1880s. The *Meiji* constitution that was based on Western liberal democratic norms provided chance to the political parties to contest elections in the July 1890. The first coalition government appeared in May 1924 after the fifteenth general election for the lower house in *Taisho* era. In this election, three parties were in race in the place of customary two.⁴ In June 1924 Kato Takaaki formed his first coalition cabinet with the help of the parties.

These political developments continued till 1942, when the 21st House of Representatives elections were held under the militarist forces. After the World War II, beginning with the unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945, Japan entered into a period of political, economic and social drastic reorganization. Defeat and wartime privations had discredited Japan's military regime. Many political parties were established in November and December of 1945 and political activities after the war took off with the election of 1946. A parliamentary cabinet system was established under the new constitution alongside the Mac Arthur Peace Constitution that came into

³ Op. cit., Gary D. Allinson, n. 3, pp. 15-16.

⁴ Details of the elections are already mentioned in page 9 and 10 of chapter one of this dissertation.

force in 1947.⁵ The first ten years after the war brought many changes in the Japanese party politics. Fresh elections for the lower house were held in 1947 when General Mac Arthur of the US occupation force desired a change of administration and ordered Prime Minister Yoshida to dissolve the house. The elections of 1947 were held under a revised system of electoral law that survived in essence until 1994.⁶ The key position that the *Kokkai* (Japanese Diet) was expected to occupy in the whole system of politics and governance, was forcefully presented in the article 41 of 1947 Constitution. Lower House became the decisive house to affect the politics of the nation whenever elections for this house were conducted.

The outcome of the 1947 elections was in favor of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) that formed a coalition government with the Democratic Party (DP) and National Cooperative Party (NCP) and this lasted from May 1947 to March 1948. It was the first coalition government after the war. Later political developments were marked the merger of the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in November 1955, better known as the “1955 setup”.

Ever since the formation of the LDP, it dominated Japanese politics till the year 1993. Despite numerous political changes taking place between 1958 and 1993 the LDP remained at the helm of offices except in the 1970s when the opposition tried to form coalition against it. The LDP struggled in the 1970s when the oil crisis was at the political stage of Japan. In the general elections of December 1976 that followed the expiration of the term of the lower house, the pro-Miki (then Prime Minister Takeo Miki) and anti-Miki factions campaigned separately. After the elections the LDP won only 249 seats less than the required 256 for a simple majority. By enrolling eight independents, the party managed to regain a bare majority to run government under the Prime Ministership of Fukuda Takeo.

⁵ Louis G. Perez, *The History Of Japan* (Greenwood Press, USA, 1998), p. 155.

⁶ Lower House membership rose from 464 at the time of 1946 general election to 512 in the late 1980s, stood 511 at the time that the system of elections was radically changed in 1994 and was reduced to 500 seats. In the Lower House election of June 2000 the seats for the House reduced to 480 and it was continued in November 2003 general election.

The outcome of elections of December 1983 was a setback for the LDP. On 12 October 1983 the Tokyo district court that was trying for seven years the former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei on charges of accepting bribes in the Lockheed affair found him guilty and handed down a sentence of four year imprisonment. This judgment still considered as a major shock for the Nakasone Yasuhiro government. The opposition demanded Tanaka's resignation from the Diet after the court verdict. Nakasone refused to concede the opposition demand and after opposition walkout, he dissolved the house in favor of fresh elections. This was a test of public confidence in the Nakasone administration.⁷

However, campaigning by the opposition on the 'Tanaka problem' and issue of political ethics negatively influenced the LDP vote since it obtained only 250 seats. Its previous strength was the total 286 seats. The LDP's failure to regain majority in the lower house ushered in the second period of near equilibrium between the ruling party and the combined opposition parties. With the help of few independents and forming an unexpected alliance with the New Liberal Club (NLC), Nakasone government managed to put together a working majority of 267 seats.⁸ It was the first incident when the LDP had drawn up a formal policy accord with another party and entered into a coalition setup since the party was founded in 1955.

Factional politics, scandals and ambitious individual politicians within the LDP led to its defeat in the 1993 House of Representatives election. Formation of many small groups before the election and the unity of opposition parties created a big change in the Japanese politics. The election results were in favor to the oppositions; however the LDP managed good seats but it failed to regain its majority. A coalition government was with the help of seven small parties and the LDP decided that it would act as a responsible opposition.

The LDP has reoccupied its traditional ruling capacity in June 1994 when the party entered into the government making procedure. Japan is continuously experiencing the coalition governments and the LDP has been leading the ruling

⁷ J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell Publishers, U.K., 1999), p. 62.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 154.

coalitions after the general elections for the lower house that was held in year 2003. Among these political developments, the public and media debate focusing on the emergence of a two party systems started after the election 2003. It was observed that the LDP and the DPJ have managed many seats, whereas the lesser known parties almost disappeared in these elections with the total of 17 members except New *Komeito*, which is an ally of the LDP in the government had 34 seats. During the 2000 general elections for the lower house political observers also discussed two-party emergence.⁹ They explained that the new electoral laws that provided 480 (300 for single-member electoral districts and 180 for proportional representation) seats for the lower house on which elections were held, was the main factor behind the emergence of two party system. Election outcome had setup the two party system; the LDP and the DPJ achieved 229 and 124 seats respectively. The increase of weight in the single-member seats provided an opportunity for the LDP that managed more seats than the opposition party DPJ due to party popularity.¹⁰ However, this factor more or less was also present in the 2003 elections. There are other factors too that were conducive for emergence of two-party system in Japan.

There are many aspects behind the LDP dominance for almost forty years as well as the factors related to the decline of LDP domination and continuation of coalition governments since the year 1993. In spite of these trends the opposition was unable to maintain its rule for a long period due to disarray and differences between them. The factors are as follows:¹¹

1. The organizational setup of the LDP was strong in comparison to other parties. Like any party long accustomed to ruling the state in a democratic system, the LDP has been skilled at adopting itself to new circumstances and appealing to new sources of electoral support.¹² Since formation in 1955, LDP faced different problem in 1970s. The 1970s were a conspicuous period of example of the

⁹ *General Election 2000*, (Vol., 27, No. 5), www.japanecho.co.jp

¹⁰ Working of New electoral system is mentioned in the *appendix* of this dissertation, pp. 136-37

¹¹ Few factors are already mentioned in the Chapter 2 and 3 of this Dissertation.

¹² T. J. Pempel (ed.), *Uncommon Democracies; The one Party Dominant Regime* (Cornell University press, London, 1990), Quoted from, J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell Publishers, U.K., 1999), p. 145.

party's ability to adjust to an electorate that was rapidly changing in composition following the economic growth that continued from the late 1950s right up to the first oil shock of 1973-74. The proportion of the electorate voting for the LDP was in continuous decline during that period and a further projection of existing trends would have seen the party either out of office or having to share power if imaginative initiatives were not taken to stem the tide. In the 1970s, Tanaka Kakuei made a timely contribution for his party's survival by bringing in policies to improve welfare provision, tighten up environmental standards and maintaining quality of life. During the 1980s, in consequence, the LDP government was able to embark on fairly stringent policies of financial retrenchment. secure into knowledge that its base of support was both firm and widely spread in many different segments of the society. In the 1990s LDP experienced decline in the 1993 election since then it has not been able to form the government on its own strength.

2. The "1955 setup" collapsed due to the under mentioned external and internal problems within the LDP.
 - Factional trouble always challenged the LDP's continuous rule. In 1974, six Diet members formed the NLC under the leadership of Kono due to certain monetary politics within the party. This led to defeat of the LDP in the lower house election in 1976. Fukuda, who was elected prime minister after Miki, managed enlisting support of Ohira and Tanaka factions with the aim of restoring a stable LDP rule. In 1979 and 1980, the LDP faced severe factional internal politics. The house passed non-confidence motion against the second Ohira cabinet, moved by the JSP because of anti-mainstream faction abstaining from voting in May 1980. In 1987, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru managed the LDP factions led by Takeshita himself and Susumu Nikaido, which was formed after the Tanaka faction, by carefully allotting the ministerial posts to them. He also promoted a generational change by appointing relatively young ministers and distributed posts in such a way that all the factions were drawn into the mainstream. Subsequently, each faction

created the new posts of secretary general. Meetings of the secretaries general of factions came to play an important role in management of politics. Tax reform is a good example; a proposal by the Prime Minister Nakasone on sales tax had failed to see the light of the day because it had come up against stiff resistance not only from the opposition parties but also from the members of the LDP. By winning the support of the factions of the party, he managed consensus over the proposed consumption tax. In 1993, the party lost due to factional strife. Party members, who had resigned from the LDP against the Prime Minister's Miyazawa's plan for not taking up the issue of political reform in the Diet session of June 1993, formed the new small parties; JRP led by Finance Minister Hata and *Sakigake* was under the leadership of Takemura Masayoshi. In September 1995, the LDP faced another factional shock from its members. Kono, who was appointed the party president in 1993 and 1994, planned to contest again. However, the LDP Policy Research Council chairman Koichi Kato, who was Kono's rival in the Miyazawa faction supported the candidature of Hashimoto and thus he was elected the party president. Obuchi was elected party president in July 1998 while facing problems of factional politics. Mori and Koizumi also faced the similar problem during their election as LDP presidents in April 2000 and April 2001 respectively. Prime Minister Koizumi was reelected the party president in September 2003 and got an overwhelming majority in the lower house elections on November 9. The elections result was in favor of Koizumi because the former Prime Minister Hashimoto and factional leader Shizuke Kamei lost his seats. It was a favorable situation for the LDP that Koizumi and the party secretary general belonged to Mori faction.¹³

- Scandals in the Japanese politics always threw up problems for the LDP. In the years 1976 and 1988, the Lockheed and Recruit scandals rocked the party fortune and it reached at bottom. Therefore in the 1976 elections the party lost considerable seats due to Lockheed payoff scandal. So much so the December

¹³ *Asahi Shimbun*, 12 November 2003.

1976 elections were termed as 'Lockheed elections' since they were held amid public uproar over this scandal. In the campaign, the Liberal Democrats split into two opposing groups. Some were in favor while others were against the Prime Minister Miki. The voters gave the party its worst treatment till date, electing only 249 LDP candidates. This was the first time since the conservative merger of 1955 that the party fell in short of majority. After the revelation of Recruit scandal of 1988, the LDP's Vice-president Kanemaru Shin, in August 1992, did confess that he had received the money and not informed was under the mandatory political funds-regulation law. The LDP lost in the 1993 elections due to these corruption revelations that angered the electorate who voted against the LDP. New scandals related to former Prime Minister Hashimoto was revealed over a payment of Yen 100 million from the Japan Dental Association on 15 July 2004, after the results were announced for the upper house. The payment was allegedly made to Hashimoto prior to the 2001 upper house elections; it appears as the political donation for his faction. However, it was not disclosed by the Home Affairs Ministry, as required by electoral laws. Thus, it may affect the course LDP politics in future as it attempts to counter the main opposition party, the DPJ.¹⁴

- The formation of NLC in 1974 was a set back for the LDP. In this year, opposition united to form a coalition against the LDP. In June 1993, it happened once again when factional activists of the LDP formed such parties like the JRP and *Sakigake*. These parties were mainly responsible for the defeat of LDP. The LDP increased its tally by one seat of the total it held just prior to the election, lending credence to the view that it was the split in its ranks that caused its downfall, rather than its desertion by the electorate. Given the strength of local political mechanism, many voters continued to vote for the same candidates, whether they had remained within the LDP or had affiliated with the JRP or *Sakigake*. This was evident in the July 1993 elections voters had no choice to elect new leaders since all were old leaders

¹⁴ <http://asia.news.yahoo.com/040715/kyodo/>.

from the LDP and thus the voters elected the same leaders though from the different parties and who had left the LDP in the June 1993.

3. Showa Denko was the first of the large corruption cases in the immediate post-war year of 1948 that brought about the resignation of Ashida Hitoshi cabinet, a coalition government that was formed after Katayama.¹⁵ Since then, socialists never found reasonable chance to challenge conservative forces. In the 1970s, they united however; due to lack of unity among the JSP, the DSP and *Komeito* they failed to fulfill their agenda. *Komeito*'s plan to support Prime Minister Ohira's budget had created problems for the opposition partners in 1979. In the 1980s, the opposition unity fragmented after the 1989 House of Councilors elections. They united again in 1993 and formed the government in August that lasted for only nine months this could be termed as the meager success of the opposition parties. It also failed due to lack of unity and break-up of the parties of the ruling government over various issues. The LDP utilized these opportunities and joined the coalition of Murayama government by getting five cabinet posts.
4. Merger of smaller opposition parties into the LDP always helped the party to get into power. The ruling combination NLC too merged with the LDP in 1976 after the election that strengthened the party.
5. The opposition parties have rarely been led by strong leaders who could control them from disbanding and collapsing. The NFP that was formed in 1994, collapsed in December 1997 in the absence of any strong leader. Opposition parties always faced the deficit of tough party ideology and hence, often the left wing and the socialist sided or merged with the conservative forces. These frequent political shifts always helped the LDP to achieve its majority in the elections.

¹⁵ Peter J. Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo Democracy* (Japan Library, Kent, 1993), p. 152.

Thus, these are the factors that have been congenial for the formation of coalition governments particularly between the years 1993 and 2003. Several other factors like, campaign style and personality factors were also affected the elections results.

The formation of coalition in 1993 completed its ten years in 2003 and entered in the eleventh year under the Prime Ministership of Koizumi. However, it experienced seven coalition governments, three from the different parties (one each from JNP, JRP and SDPJ) and four from the LDP. Koizumi is a strong and providential leader who is managing coalition governments since April 2001. In April 2004 he completed successfully his three-year tenure as prime minister, the second largest term after Nakasone Yasuhiro led coalition government in the 1980s.

Relying on the Koizumi's personal popularity and his program of reforms, the LDP was able to join the bandwagon and greatly increased its number of seats in the upper house election of July 2001. These elections were held under his leadership as party president the post to which he was appointed in April 2001. Koizumi successfully undermined the reformist credentials of all other parties. The largest opposition party the DPJ, with an agenda of the most reformist platform in the previous 2000 general elections, put forward candidates who campaigned with slogan 'join Koizumi to achieve reform'. This was to the discomfiture for the DPJ leadership that saw a decrease in its seats.¹⁶ This also happened to be the first achievement under Koizumi leadership. Koizumi administration had its share of ups and downs. For instance his 'no pain no gain' reform initiative came under heavy fire as the Nikkei stock average tumbled to its lowest level in more than a decade amid soaring business failures and unemployment rates. The LDP's anti-reform forces, in a bid to overthrow him from the power, called for a drastic policy change. However, Prime Minister Koizumi survived from all these pressure and challenges. In September 2003, he was re-elected by an overwhelming majority as the party president. He was thankful to the potential economic recovery that saw a big business turnaround.¹⁷ The November 2003 lower house election was the second trial for the prime minister, which he managed effectively by getting good

¹⁶ Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Upper House Election of 29 July 2001", *Government and Opposition* (London School of Economics, London), Vol. 37, Number 1, Winter 2002, p. 42.

¹⁷ *Japan Times*, 27 April 2004.

number of seats. Later, in the by-elections for the remaining three seats held on 25 April 2004, the LDP won all the three seats taking in total tally to 240 in the lower house.¹⁸

Since January 2004, Koizumi has been managing administration competently. Besides economic affairs, the most significant achievement of his domestic policy achievement has been the enactment of the security legislation. This includes the laws governing the anti-terrorism measures, military contingencies directly involving Japan in December 2003 and troop deployments in Iraq in January 2004.

In these three years of his term, Koizumi has radically changed the image of the Japanese prime minister. To remain in power he has not become victim of corruption unlike his predecessors testified by the numerous opinions in the media. This does not provoke much suspicion of any possible scandal about himself. In contrast to Koizumi, other LDP major players appear to be just old veterans. That is why the other leading members of the LDP have not challenged Koizumi's prime ministership. The prevailing mood in the LDP is to accept the fact that Koizumi is the only leader at the moment who can take the wheel of the country ahead. It could be opined that Koizumi has been greatly helped to a great extent by the favorable fortune. The economy has begun to turn around after years of slump, thanks to a boom in the US and China. The SDF troops have conducted their work in relative safety and five Japanese hostages were released from Iraqi militarist forces.

Koizumi successfully managed to pass the pension reform bill in the lower house on 11 May 2004. The government-sponsored bill would see the rate of corporate employees' pension premium rise gradually to 18.3 percent of their salaries from current 13.58 percent over the next fourteen years. Meanwhile the benefit would be slashed to 50.2 percent of income from 59.3 percent.¹⁹ The main opposition party DPJ supported the bill. The position of various parties including DPJ regarding pension issue is still not clear. The pension debate, for all its sound and fury, has failed to address public concerns about the defective pension system.

¹⁸ *Japan Times*, 27 April 2004.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 12 May 2004.

However, the ruling coalition and opposition parties are divided over Prime Minister Koizumi's announcement of Japan's intention to allow SDF troops to take part in a Multinational Force (MNF) under new UN Security Council resolutions; 1483, 1500 and 1511 for reconstruction in Iraq. Opposition parties have raised an outcry against the government policy. Nevertheless, the DPJ was concerned that it was seen to be siding with the JCP and the SDP and also that they were staunchly against the SDF's participation in the MNF. A coalition partner of the government, New *Komeito* has discussed this issue within its party. The DPJ's shadow cabinet formally adopted a statement and demanded that SDF troops from Iraq should temporarily withdraw before the transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis on 28 June 2004. Encouraged by its increased strength in the upper house due to July 2004 elections, this demand of the DPJ became intense.

The talks for the multi-party system, which came into view after the July 1993 elections, do not interest many parties anymore. The 2003 general election for the lower house and July 2004 elections for the upper house changed the outlook of Japanese politics. At least in the short term, it can safely be said that LDP will most likely to remain in power by leading the coalition. The DPJ will likely continue only as a largest opposition party attempting towards advancing its strength in realizing the two-party system in Japan.

The tactful leadership of Koizumi, who always reshuffled his cabinet only after the LDP's presidential elections in September every two year from 2001, ensured his stay in power for this longer. Possible September reshuffling of his cabinet might set new trends in motion like awarding only those who increasingly help him hereafter in quickening the pace of reforms. However, in the upper house election results of 12 July 2004, the LDP managed its majority by getting only 49 seats. This accounted 139 seats with help of coalition partner *Komeito* (won 11 seats) of the 242 seats in the upper house. The post elections strength position of LDP weakened the popularity and strength Koizumi within his own party. Nevertheless, the leaders of the coalition agreed to keep Koizumi as the prime minister through his tenure as president of the LDP.²⁰ The

²⁰ *Japan Times*, 13 July 2004.

continuation of the combination will be determined by the way on which the coalition government handles the issue of the SDF's dispatch to Iraq through passage of bill in the Diet and recovery of Japanese economy in coming days.

Given the slow advance of all reforms and its expected outcome, Japanese politics is likely to remain murkier as ever notwithstanding the LDP being led by Koizumi or someone else. Only that a combination of domestic and external factors especially relations with the US will continue to influence voting pattern and thus decide the political fortune in the short run at least.

Thus, in a nutshell it could be summed up from the foregoing analysis that coalition experiments in Japan over the decade 1993-2003 and thereafter despite certain odd and fluid situations, reveals the fact that the LDP has come to stay as a decisive political party in Japan. Nevertheless, trends towards the emergence of two-party system remain stronger than before. Yet in future factions and their influence can not be completely ignored in the power play of the Japanese politics.

APPENDIX- I

MEIJI AND THE 1947 CONSTITUTION*

The *Meiji* constitution that was formed in 1889, on the western model provided opportunity to parties to use the democratic rights by contesting elections for the Diet. The constitution was written by small group of high ranking of government leaders under the direction of Ito Hirobumi and did not need to be ratified by a broad, popular assembly of any kind. The constitution grants sweeping power to the emperor and sharply limits the rights of the people. The preamble of the constitution says:

“ Having by virtue of the glories of our ancestors ascended the throne of the lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favored with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors.The imperial diet shall first be convoked for the twenty-third year of *Meiji* and the time of its opening shall be the date when the present constitution came into force.”

Major articles that were related to the functioning of the Diet were:

Article 5- ‘The emperor exercises the legislative powers with the consent of Imperial Diet’.

Article 33- ‘The Imperial Diet shall consist of two houses, A House of Peers and a House of Representatives’.

Article 34- ‘The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, be composed of the Imperial family, of the orders of nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated thereto by the emperor’.

Article 35- ‘The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the law of election

* Gary D. Allinson, *The Columbia Guide to Modern Japanese History* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1999)

However, the 1947 constitution is totally different from the *Meiji* in many obvious ways, especially in the substance of the language. The preamble says:

“We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the national Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people

Chapter four of the constitution is related to the Diet. That mentions:


Article 41- ‘The diet shall be the highest organ of state power and shall be the sole lawmaking organ of the state’.

Article 42- ‘The Diet shall consist of two houses, namely, House of Representatives and the House of Councilors’.

Article 43- ‘Both house shall consist of elected members, representatives of the people’. The number of members of each house shall be fixed by law

APPENDIX-III†


ORIGIN OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN PRE-WAR PERIOD



† Kishimoto Koichi (revised by: Kishimoto Shunsuke), *Politics in Modern Japan* (Japan Echo Inc., Tokyo, 1997)

APPENDIX-IV[†]

ORIGIN OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN POST-WAR PERIOD



† Kishimoto Koichi (revised by: Kishimoto Shunsuke), *Politics in Modern Japan* (Japan Echo Inc., Tokyo, 1997)

APPENDIX-V[§]

SELECT ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PRE AND POST-WAR PERIODS

**TABLE 7 (A): PRE-WAR ELECTIONS RESULT HAS BEEN SHOWN BELOW
IN THE TABLE:**

Political Parties	July 1890*		
	Candidates	Elected	% of Seats
<i>Jiyuto</i>		130	
<i>Kaishinto</i>		41	
Independents		45	
Total		216	
	February 1892		
<i>Jiyuto</i>	270	94	31
<i>Chuo club</i>	94	83	28
<i>Dakuritsu club</i>	106	37	12
<i>Kinki Kakutai</i>	12	12	4
Independents	271	42	14
Total	787	300	100
	March 1898		
<i>Jiyuto</i>	233	105	35
<i>Shimpoto</i>	174	103	34
<i>Kokumin Kyokai</i>	52	29	10
<i>Yamashita club</i>	28	26	9
Independents	118	37	12
Total	605	300	100
	May 1908		
<i>Seiyukai</i>	246	188	50
<i>Kenseihonto</i>	92	70	18
<i>Daido club</i>	42	29	8
<i>Yukokai</i>	39	29	8
Independents	102	63	16
Total	521	379	100

[§] Robert A. Scalapino (Ed. by) Robert E. Ward, *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton University Press, USA, 1973)

* Total data for the 1890 election is not available.

March 1915			
Political Parties	Candidates	Elected	% of Seats
<i>Seiyukai</i>	201	108	28
<i>Kokuminto</i>	40	27	7
<i>Rikken Doshikai</i>	200	153	40
<i>Chuseikai</i>	44	33	9
Count <i>Okuma</i>	21	12	3
Independents	109	48	13
Total	615	381	100
May 1920			
<i>Seiyukai</i>	418	278	60
<i>Kenseikai</i>	240	110	24
<i>Kokuminto</i>	46	29	6
Independents	135	47	10
Total	839	464	100
May 1924			
<i>Kenseikai</i>	265	152	33
<i>Seiyuhonto</i>	242	112	25
<i>Seiyukai</i>	218	102	22
<i>Kakushin club</i>	53	30	7
Minor Parties & Ind.	194	69	13
Total	972	465	100
February 1928			
<i>Seiyukai</i>	342	217	46
<i>Minseito</i>	340	216	46
<i>Jitsugyo Doshikai</i>	31	4	1
<i>Kakushinto</i>	15	3	1
<i>Musan Seito</i>	77	8	2
Independents	159	17	4
Total	964	465	100
February 1930			
<i>Minseito</i>	341	273	59
<i>Seiyukai</i>	304	174	37
<i>Kokumin Doshikai</i>	12	6	1
<i>Musanto</i>	98	5	1
Minor Parties & Ind.	77	5	1
Total	838	466	100

	February 1932		
Political Parties	Candidates	Elected	% of Seats
<i>Seiyukai</i>	348	301	65
<i>Minseito</i>	279	146	31
<i>Kakushinio</i>	3	2	5
<i>Musanto</i>	29	5	1
Minor Parties & Ind.	47	12	3
Total	706	466	100
	February 1936		
<i>Minseito</i>	298	205	44
<i>Seiyukai</i>	340	174	37
<i>Showakai</i>	49	20	4
<i>Kokumin Domei</i>	32	15	3
<i>Shakai Taishuto</i>	36	22	5
Independents	122	30	7
Total	877	46	100
	April 1937		
<i>Minseito</i>	267	179	38
<i>Seiyukai</i>	263	175	38
<i>S. Taishuto</i>	66	37	8
<i>Showakai</i>	36	19	4
<i>Kokumin Domei</i>	20	11	2
<i>Tohokai</i>	20	11	2
<i>Nihin usanto</i>	7	3	1
Independents	141	31	7
Total	820	466	100

TABLE 7 (B): POST-WAR ELECTION RESULTS FROM 1946-1952 ARE LISTED BELOW:**

Political Party	10 Apr 1946	25 Apr 1947	23 Jan 1949	1 st Oct 1952
Progressive Party	94 (18.1)			
Democratic Party		121 (25.1)	69 (15.7)	
Reformist Party				85 (18.2)
Liberal Party	140 (24.4)	131 (26.9)		240 (47.9)
DLP			264 (49.3)	
Hatoyama LP				
Yoshida LP				
LDP				
NLC				
CP	14 (3.2)			
People's CP		29 (7.0)	14 (3.4)	
JSP	92 (17.8)	143 (26.2)	48 (13.5)	
SDP				
Left SP				54 (9.6)
Right SP				57 (11.6)
LFP			7 (2.0)	4 (0.7)
DSP				
<i>Komei</i> Party				
JCP	5 (3.8)	4 (3.7)	35 (9.7)	0 (2.6)
SDL				
JRP				
<i>Sakigake</i>				
JNP				
NFP				
DP				
DRL				
Independents	81 (20.40)	132 (5.8)	12 (6.6)	19 (6.7)
Others	38 (11.7)	25 (5.4)	17 (5.2)	7 (2.7)
Total	464	466	466	466

** J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell Publishers, U.K., 1999)

TABLE 7 (C): POST-WAR ELECTION RESULTS FROM 1953-1960 ARE LISTED BELOW:

Political Party	19 Apr 1953	27 Feb 1955	22 May 1958	20 Nov 1960
Progressive Party				
Democratic Party		185 (36.6)		
Reformist Party	76 (17.9)			
Liberal Party		112 (26.6)		
DLP				
Hatoyama LP	35 (8.8)			
Yoshida LP	199 (39.0)			
LDP			287 (61.5)	296 (57.6)
NLC				
CP				
People's CP				
JSP			166 (32.9)	145 (27.6)
SDP				
Left SP	72 (13.1)	89 (15.3)		
Right SP	66 (11.6)	67 (13.9)		
LFP	5 (1.0)	4 (1.0)		
DSP				17 (8.8)
<i>Komei Party</i>				
JCP	1 (0.2)	2 (0.4)	1 (2.6)	3 (2.9)
SDL				
JRP				
<i>Sakigake</i>				
JNP				
NFP				
DP				
DRL				
Independents	11 (4.4)	6 (3.3)	12 (6.0)	5 (2.8)
Others	1 (0.4)	2 (1.3)	1 (0.7)	1 (0.30)
Total	466	467	467	467

TABLE 7 (D): POST-WAR ELECTION RESULTS FROM 1963-1972 ARE LISTED BELOW

Political Party	21 Nov 1963	29 Jan 1967	27 Dec 1969	10 Dec 1972
Progressive Party				
Democratic Party				
Reformist Party				
Liberal Party				
DLP				
Hatoyama LP				
Yoshida LP				
LDP	288 (47.6)	277 (57.0)	288 (47.4)	271 (46.8)
NLC				
CP				
People's CP				
JSP	144 (29.0)	140 (27.9)	90 (21.4)	118 (21.9)
SDP				
Left SP				
Right SP				
LFP				
DSP	23 (7.4)	30 (7.4)	31 (7.7)	19 (7.0)
<i>Komei</i> Party		25 (5.4)	47 (10.9)	29 (8.5)
JCP	5 (4.0)	5 (4.8)	14 (6.8)	38 (10.5)
SDL				
JRP				
<i>Sakigake</i>				
JNP				
NFP				
DP				
DRL				
Independents	12 (4.8)	9 (5.5)	16 (5.3)	14 (5.1)
Others	0 (0.1)	0 (0.2)	0 (0.2)	2 (0.3)
Total	467	486	486	491

TABLE 7 (E): POST-WAR ELECTION RESULTS FROM 1976-1983 ARE LISTED BELOW:

Political Party	5 Dec 1976	7 Oct 1979	22 Jun 1980	18 Dec 1983
Progressive Party				
Democratic Party				
Reformist Party				
Liberal Party				
DLP				
Hatoyama LP				
Yoshida LP				
LDP	249 (41.8)	248 (44.6)	284 (47.9)	250 (45.8)
NLC	17 (4.2)	4 (3.0)	12 (3.0)	8 (2.4)
CP				
People's CP				
JSP	123 (20.7)	107 (19.7)	107 (19.3)	112 (19.5)
SDP				
Left SP				
Right SP				
LFP				
DSP	29 (6.3)	35 (6.8)	32 (6.6)	38 (7.3)
<i>Komei</i> Party	55 (10.9)	57 (9.8)	33 (9.0)	58 (10.1)
JCP	17 (10.4)	39 (10.4)	29 (9.8)	26 (9.3)
SDL		2 (0.7)	3 (0.7)	3 (0.7)
JRP				
<i>Sakigake</i>				
JNP				
NFP				
DP				
DRL				
Independents	21 (5.7)	19 (4.9)	11 (3.5)	16 (4.9)
Others	0 (0.1)	0 (0.1)	0 (0.2)	0 (0.1)
Total	511	511	511	511

TABLE 7 (F): POST-WAR ELECTION RESULTS FROM 1986-1996 ARE LISTED BELOW:

Political Party	6 Jul 1986	18 Feb 1990	18 Jul 1993	20 Oct 1996
Progressive Party				
Democratic Party				
Reformist Party				
Liberal Party				
DLP				
Hatoyama LP				
Yoshida LP				
LDP	300 (49.4)	275 (46.1)	223 (36.6)	239 (38.6)
NLC	6 (1.8)			
CP				
People's CP				
JSP	85 (17.2)	136 (24.4)	70 (15.4)	
SDP				15 (2.2)
Left SP				
Right SP				
LFP				
DSP	26 (6.4)	14 (4.8)	15 (3.5)	
<i>Komei</i> Party	56 (9.4)	45 (8.0)	51 (8.1)	
JCP	26 (8.8)	16 (8.0)	15 (7.7)	15 (12.9)
SDL	4 (0.8)	4 (0.9)	4 (0.7)	
JRP			55 (10.8)	
<i>Sakigake</i>			13 (2.6)	2 (1.3)
JNP			35 (8.0)	
NFP				156 (28.0)
DP				52 (10.6)
DRL				1 (0.3)
Independents	9 (5.8)	21 (7.3)		9 (4.4)
Others	0 (0.2)	0 (0.1)		0 (2.1)
Total	512	512	511	500

TABLE 7 (G): POST-WAR ELECTION RESULTS FROM 2000-2003 ARE LISTED BELOW:

Political Party	25 Jun 2000	9 Nov 2003
LDP	229 (49.25)	237 (49.38)
NLC		
CP		
People's CP		
JSP		
SDP	17 (3.66)	6 (1.25)
NCP	7 (1.51)	4 (0.83)
Left SP		
Right SP		
LFP		
DSP		
New <i>Komeito</i>	28 (6.02)	34 (7.08)
JCP	18 (3.87)	9 (1.88)
SDL		
JRP		
<i>Sakigake</i>		
JNP		
NFP		
DP		
LP	21 (4.52)	
DRL		
DPJ	124 (26.67)	177 (36.88)
Independents	16 (3.44)	11 (2.29)
Others	6 (1.29)	2 (0.42)
Total	465	480

APPENDIX-VI

ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE HOUSE OF COUNCILORS
AFTER LDP'S SET-UP^{**}

TABLE 8 (A): ELECTION RESULTS FROM THE YEAR 1956 TO 1974

Year	Const.	LDP	SDPJ*	<i>Kome ito</i>	JCP	DSP	NLC	Small Parties	Indepe ndents	Total
8 July 1956	National	19 (39.7)	21 (29.9)		1 (2.1)			6 (12.8)	5 (15.5)	52
	Prefectural	42 (48.4)	28 (37.6)		1 (3.9)			0 (3.0)	4 (7.1)	75
	Total	61	49		2			6	9	127
2 July 1959	National	22 (41.2)	17 (26.5)		1 (1.9)			5 (10.6)	7 (19.8)	52
	Prefectural	49 (52.0)	21 (34.1)		0 (3.3)			2 (2.9)	3 (7.7)	75
	Total	71	38		1			7	10	127
1 July 1962	National	21 (46.4)	15 (24.3)	7 (11.5)	2 (3.1)	3 (5.3)		2 (5.5)	1 (3.9)	51
	Prefectural	48 (47.1)	22 (32.8)	9	1 (4.8)	1 (7.3)		0 (0.6)	2 (4.8)	76
	Total	69	37		3	4		2	3	127
4 July 1965	National	25 (47.2)	12 (23.4)	9 (13.7)	2 (4.4)	2 (5.9)		0 (0.8)	2 (4.6)	52
	Prefectural	46 (44.2)	24 (32.8)	11	1 (6.9)	1 (6.1)		0 (0.5)	1 (4.4)	75
	Total	71	36		3	3		0	3	127
7 July 1968	National	21 (46.7)	12 (19.8)	9 (15.4)	3 (5.0)	4 (6.0)		0 (0.4)	2 (6.7)	51
	Prefectural	48 (44.9)	16 (29.2)	13	1 (8.3)	3 (6.9)		0 (0.2)	3 (4.4)	75
	Total	69	28		4	7		0	5	126
27 June 1971	National	21 (44.5)	11 (21.3)	8 (14.1)	5 (8.0)	4 (6.1)		0 (0.1)	1 (5.9)	50
	Prefectural	42 (43.9)	28 (31.2)	10	1 (12.0)	2 (4.8)		0 (0.2)	1 (4.3)	76
	Total	63	39		6	6		0	2	126
7 July 1974	National	19 (44.3)	10 (15.2)	9 (12.1)	8 (9.4)	4 (5.9)		0 (0.1)	4 (12.6)	54
	Prefectural	43 (39.5)	18 (26.0)	14	5 (12.0)	1 (4.4)		1 (0.6)	3 (4.9)	76
	Total	62	28		13	5		1	7	130

^{**} About Japan Series, (Foreign Press Center, Japan, 1999)
JSP changed its name as SDPJ in 1991.

TABLE 8 (B): ELECTION RESULTS FROM THE YEAR 1977-1980

10 July 1977	National	18 (35.8)	10 (17.4)	9 (14.2) 5 (6.2)	3 (8.4)	4 (6.7)	1 (3.9)	2 (6.2) 1 (3.5)	3 (7.4) 2 (4.8)	50 76
	Prefectural	45 (39.5)	17 (25.9)	14	2 (9.9)	2 (4.5)	2 (5.7)	3	5	126
	Total	63	27		5	6	3			
22 June 1980	National	21 (42.7)	9 (13.1) 13	9 (11.9) 3 (5.0)	3 (7.3)	4 (6.0)	0 (0.6)	1 (4.0)	3 (14.4)	50 76
	Prefectural	48 (43.3)	(22.4) 22	12	4 (11.7)	2 (5.1)	0 (0.6)	1 (1.1)	5 (10.7)	76
	Total	69			7	6	0	2	8	126

TABLE 8 (C): ELECTION RESULTS FROM THE YEAR 1983-1998 ON THE BASIS OF NEW ELECTORAL LAWS

Year	Const.	LDP	SDPJ	Komeito	JCP	DSP	JNP	NLC	Rengo Sangin	Small Parties	Ind.	Total
26 June 1983	PR	19 (35.3)	9 (16.3)	8 (15.7)	5 (8.9)	4 (8.4) 2 (5.7)		1 (2.7)		4 (12.7)		50
	ED	49 (43.2)	13 (24.3)	6 (7.8)	2 (10.7)	6		1 (1.2)		2 (3.4)	1 (3.8)	76
	Total	68	22	14	7			2		6	1	126
6 July 1986	PR	22 (38.6)	9 (17.2)	7 (13.0)	5 (9.5)	3 (6.9)		1 (2.4)		3 (12.4)		50
	ED	50 (45.1)	11 (21.5)	3 (4.4)	4 (11.4)	2 (4.6)				0 (2.7)	6 (10.4)	76
	Total	72	20	10	9	5		1		3	6	126
23 July 1989	PR	15 (27.3)	20 (35.1)	6 (10.9)	4 (7.0)	2 (4.9)				3 (14.9)		50
	ED	21 (30.7)	26 (26.4)	4 (5.1)	1 (8.8)	1 (3.6)			11 (6.8)	2 (5.6)	10 (12.9)	76
	Total	36	46	10	5	3			11	5	10	126
26 July 1992	PR	19 (33.3)	10 (17.8)	8 (14.3)	4 (7.9)	3 (5.0)	4 (8.0)			2 (13.8)		50
	ED	49 (43.4)	12 (12.9)	6 (7.8)	2 (10.6)	1 2.3v			0 (9.7)	2 (3.5)	5 (9.8)	77
	Total	68	22	14	6	4	4		0	4	5	127
23 July 1995	PR	15 (27.3)	18 (30.8)	9 (16.9)	5 (9.5)	2 (3.6)				1 (11.9)		50
	ED	34 (25.4)	22 (26.5)	7 (11.9)	3 (10.4)	1 (2.6)	2 (4.5)			1 (4.0)	6 (14.7)	76
	Total	49	40	16	8	3	2			2	6	126

* SDPJ changed its name to SDP in January 1996.

Year	Const.	LDP	DPJ	LP	JCP	New <i>Komeito</i>	SDP	<i>Sakig ake</i>		Small Parties	Ind.	Total
12	PR	14	12	5	8	7	7	0		0		50
June		(25.2)	(21.7)	(9.3)	(14.6)	(13.8)	(7.8)	(1.4)		(6.1)		
1998	ED	31	15	1	7	2	1			0	19	76
		(30.8)	(16.2)	(1.8)	(15.7)	(3.3)	(4.3)			(5.3)	(22.6)	
	Total	45	27	6	15	9	8	0		0	19	126

TABLE 8 (D): ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE YEAR 2001 AND 2004 ON THE BASIS OF NEW ELECTORAL LAWS^{§§}

Year	Const.	LDP	DPJ	LP	JCP	New <i>Komeito</i>	SDP	<i>Sakig ake</i>	NCP	Small Parties	Ind.	Total
29	PR	20	8	4	4	8	3		1	0		48
July												
2001	ED	45	18	2	1	5	0		0	2		73
	Total	65	26	6	5	13	3		1	2		121 ^{§§}
Year	Const.	LDP	DPJ	LP	JCP	New <i>Komeito</i>	SDP	<i>Sakig ake</i>	NCP	Small Parties	Ind.	Total
11	PR		19									48
July												
2004	ED		31									73
	Total	49	50		4	11	2					121

^{§§} Total data was not available at the time of binding the dissertation.
^{§§} Two seats were made vacant by the law at the time of elections.

APPENDIX-VII

LIST OF JAPANESE PRIME MINISTERS FROM 1885 TO 2004***

NAME OF PRIME MINISTERS	PERIOD
Ito Hirobumi	1885-1888
Kuroda Kiyotaka	1888-1889
Yamagata Aritomo ¹	1889-1891
Matsukata Masayoshi	1891-1892
Ito Hirobumi	1892-1896
Matsukata Masayoshi	1896-1898
Ito Hirobumi	1898
Okuma Shigenobu	1898
Yamagata Aritomo	1898-1900
Ito Hirobumi	1900-1901
Katsura Taro	1901-1906
Saionji Kinmochi	1906-1908
Katsura Taro	1908-1911
Saionji Kinmochi	1911-1912
Katsura Taro	1912-1913
Yamamoto Gonnohyoei	1913-1914
Okuma Shigenobu	1914-1916
Terauchi Masatake	1916-1918
Hara Kei (Takashi)	1918-1921
Takahashi Korekiyo	1921-1922
Kato Tomosaburo	1922-1923
Yamamoto Gonnohyoei	1923-1924
Kiyoura Keigo	1924
Kato Takaaki ²	1924-1926
Wakatsuki Reijiro	1926-1927
Tanaka Giichi	1927-1929
Hamaguchi Osachi	1929-1931
Wakatsuki Reijiro	1931
Inukai Tsuyoshi	1931-1932
Saito Makoto	1932-1934
Okada Keisuke	1934-1936
Hirota Koki	1936-1937
Hayashi Senjuro	1937
Konoe Fumimaro	1937-1939
Hiranuma Kiichio	1939
Abe Nobuyuki	1939-1940

*** Gary D. Allinson, *The Columbia Guide to Modern Japanese History* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1999)

¹ After The Inauguration of *Meiji* Constitution, First Election Took Place in 1890.

² First Coalition Government in the Japanese Political History.

Yonai Mitsumasa	1940
Konoe Fumimaro	1940-1941
Tojo Hideki	1941-1944
Kaiso Kuniaki	1944-1945
Suzuki Kantaro	1945
Prince Haruhiko Higashikuni	1945
Shidehara Kijuro	1945-1946
Yoshida Shigeru	1946-1947
Katayama Tetsu ³	1947-1948
Ashida Hitoshi	1948
Yoshida Shigeru	1948-1954
Hatoyama Ichiro	1954-1956
Ishibashi Tanzan	1956-1957
Kishi Nobusuke	1957-1960
Ikeda Hayato	1960-1964
Sato Eisaku	1964-1972
Tanaka Kakuei	1972-1974
Miki Takeo	1974-1976
Fukuda Takeo	1976-1978
Ohira Masayoshi	1978-1980
Suzuki Zenko	1980-1982
Nakasone Yasuhiro	1982-1987
Takeshita Noboru	1987-1989
Uno Sosuke	1989
Kaifu Toshiki	1989-1991
Miyazawa Kiichi	1991-1993
Hosokawa Morihiro ⁴	1993-1994
Hata Tsutomu	1994
Murayama Tomiichi	1994-1996
Hashimoto Ryotaro ⁵	1996-1998
Obuchi Keizo	1998-2000
Yoshiro Mori	2000-2001
Junichiro Koizumi	2001-till date

³ Socialist's coalition after war.

⁴ Seven party coalition after LDP's defeat.

⁵ LDP managed to retain its power; however it could not make it as single party ruling government.

APPENDIX-VIII

VOTING PATTERN AFTER THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW ADOPTION IN 1994^{***}

New electoral law for the lower house was adopted in 1994. It was first implemented in the 1996 election on the basis of Single-Member Districts and Proportional Representation Districts. The method of the election is as follows:

**TABLE 9 (A): PATTERNS OF THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW OF 1996 LOWER
HOUSE ELECTIONS FOR SINGLE- MEMBER DISTRICTS**

CONSTITUENCY	CANDIDATES	TIMES ELECTED	PARTY	VOTES
<i>Chiba No. 1</i>				
Elected	H. Usui	6	LDP	77,679*
Not elected	Murai		<i>Shinshinto</i>	40,094
(+ one from DP, one JCP and two minor party candidates)				
<i>Chiba No.2</i>				
Elected	K.Eguchi	3	LDP	75,939*
Not elected	Nakamura		<i>Shinshinto</i>	60,401
(+ one from DP, one JCP and one minor party candidate)				
<i>Chiba no.3</i>				
Elected	M.Okajima	4	<i>Shinshinto</i>	84,846
Not elected	Murano		LDP	72,254*
(+ one from JCP, one DP and one minor party candidate)				

^{***} J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan* (Blackwell Publishers, U.K., 1999)
* These Candidates Were Also Standing in Proportional Representation Constituency.

TABLE 9 (B): PATTERNS OF THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW IN 1996 LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS FOR THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION DISTRICTS IN SHIKOKU BLOCK

RESULT	CANDIDATES	TIMES ELECTED	ORDER	MARGIN ^{***}
LDP- three candidates were elected with 783,589 votes (% of votes 41.6)				
Elected	Ochi	10	1	
Elected	Nishida	7	2	
Elected	Morita	6	3	
Not elected	Shichijo		4	
Not elected	Sanseki		5	
Not elected	S.Miki		6	94.36 %
Not elected	T.Miki		6	87.41 %

In addition, 10 LDP candidates who stood for the Shikoku block also stood for and were elected in single-member districts in Shikoku. All were ordered as 6.

Shinshinto-two candidates were elected with 455,269 votes (% of votes 24.2)

Elected	Endo	5	1	
Elected	Nishimura	6	2	
Not elected	Mizuta		3	

DP- one candidate was elected with 245,323 votes (%13.0 votes)

Elected	Goto	3	1	93.64 %
Not elected	Manabe		1	87.41 %
Not elected	Asami		4	
Not elected	Utsunomiya		5	

In addition one DP candidate was elected for single-member districts in Shikoku. He was listed as 1.

JCP-one was elected with 227,014 votes (% of votes 12.1)

Elected	Haruna	1	2	26.79 %
Not elected	Matsubara		3	

In addition one JCP candidate was elected in single-member districts in Shikoku and was listed as 1.

SDP-no one elected. Only 132,868 votes with 7.1 % of vote share

Four candidates were listed as 1 in Shikoku block. All stood in single-member districts where their margin of defeats were respectively 47.85 %, 22.74 %, 20.17 % and 16.30 %.

*** Margin: Percentage Margin of Defeat in a Single Member Districts.

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
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