

LIBYA- US RELATIONS IN THE 1990s

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Submitted by

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "LIBYA – US RELATIONS IN THE 1990S" submitted by SARTAJ ANWAR in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M. Phil) is his original work and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this or other university.

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TO

MY PARENTS

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PREFACE

Since 1969 the relations between Libya and the United States have been antagonistic. The radical politics the regime of Col. Gaddafi has pursued has made Libya the U.S.'s *bete noire*. The reasons for the U.S. antagonism derived from Libya's radical movements opposed to U.S. interests in the region and its alleged support for terrorism. On the other hand, Libya's hostility towards the United States rests on a perception of the U.S. as a global power intent on maintaining its hegemony and control over Arab and Islamic world or third world.

Since then Libyan views on major issues diverged widely and relations between them remained considerably strained under the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. The Reagan administration identified Libya as the main perpetrator of states-sponsored international terrorism and made efforts to remove Gaddafi from power. Libyans have been resentful of U.S. support of Israel to the detriment of Arabs and Muslims. Libya's resolute opposition to the U.S. especially in the 1980s, resulted in a series of military confrontations, and economic sanctions.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The attempt is to understand the domestic and regional dynamics, which forced Col. Gaddafi to stand against the American hegemony and analyze American policy towards Libya since 1969.

The first chapter is the introduction. This chapter briefly discuss, background of Libyan revolution, the military Coup, American interest and major issues such as terrorism, WMD, Arab Unity, and African Unity are dealt with. Attempt is made to

understand the contemporary Libya's position that gave impetus Gaddafi to take over, and why these issues were irritants between Libya and America?

The second chapter deals with Libya-U.S. relations in the 1980s. Here, attempt has been made to analyze mainly American president Ronald Reagan's period. It was Reagan who had made unsuccessful efforts to remove Col. Gaddafi from Libyan power and tried to provoke Col. Gaddafi several times.

The third chapter is about the Lockerbie bombing and its impact on Libya. It has been tried to analyze briefly the Lockerbie bombing that occurred in 1988, and after the bombing U.S. mobilized its Western allies and lobbied in the United Nations to impose the economic sanctions against Libya.

The fourth chapter deals about the post Lockerbie circumstances. It has been analyzed after the imposed sanctions, and how Libya faced them? It has been also tried to discuss how their relations slowly moved towards normalization.

The fifth chapter is the conclusion. Here, the main points of the dissertation are summed up. On the basis of this study the researcher is of the opinion that incremental normalization would reward constructive Libyan conduct and punish intransigence. However, it may take a couple of years before the Libyan-U.S. diplomatic relations are fully restored.

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CHAPTER-I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LIBYA-US RELATIONS

Since the overthrow of Libyan monarchy by Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi relations between the United States and Libya have been antagonistic. The reasons of antagonism derive from Libya's new regime, which was led by Colonel Gaddafi. The US had enjoyed from 1954 until 1971 through the Wheelus Air Force Base, 'a little America on the sparkling shore of the Mediterranean'. Wheelus constituted a vital link in strategic Air command war plan for using a bomber tanker refueling and recon-fighter base, US oil companies also had extensive operations in the Libyan oil industry. But American fortunes dwindled with the ouster of the monarchy in a bloodless coup on 1st September 1969 led by Colonel Mummer-Al Gaddafi.

Back Ground of the Revolution

The Libyan revolution was named '*Al-faith*', a Koranic term which literally means 'opener' or 'conqueror' and which carries also layers of meaning relating to military, social and spiritual achievement. The Libyan revolution has evolved a continuous period of change lasting more than two decades. The Libyan leadership sought to dissolve all pre-existing forms of political and administrative activities, and sought to create a new political, social, economic and administrative structure. The regimes attempted to change the people's attitude by radical interpretation of Islamic Text and its idioms and by encouraging participation in the decision making process. The Gaddafi assumption of power was to represent a cultural revolution.

On 24th December 1951 Libya became independent under a hereditary monarchy after a long struggle against colonialism started with the Spanish occupation of 1510, then Turkish and Italian rule, and finally the British and French occupation, which ended in 1951.¹ At the time Libya was gaining independence, Gaddafi enrolled at the primary school in Sirlen and took the first tentative steps on the road that would lead to the overthrow of the new Libyan monarch, king Idris.

Gaddafi was quite impressed with the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser. Next to the Koran the most important book for the adolescent Gaddafi was Nasser's *Philosophy of the Revolution*, which describes how he formed the 'army officers club' and overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1951.² Nasser's short book contains the inspiration and the blue print of Gaddafi's revolution.

King Idris was always convinced that his fate and Libya's lay with the British and Americans, who had supported the creation of the Libyan state and who were its principal sources of funds through modest annual subventions. These were, in effect, rent for the military installations they were occupying (The British had an airbase at al-Aadham, near Tobruk, and several small detachments elsewhere in the country, while the US Wheelus Air Force Base was just outside Tripoli.)³ Although the British and American relationship to Libya was widely regarded in the Arab World as tutelary, and Idris always looked to the Americans and British for

¹ Habib Henry, *Libya Past And Present*, (Malta, Aedam Publishing House Ltd, 1979). p.69.

² Simons Geof, *LIBYA: The Struggle For Survival*, (London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996.), p209.

³ Ibid. p. 211

guidance on foreign policy and economic issues. Kingdom was inevitably turned over to a few trusted advisers, who just as inevitably became corrupted by the wealth that began pouring in after the discovery of oil in 1959.

Conditions and causes for revolutions are not of themselves enough to bring about a revolution. This condition indeed existed in Libya throughout the sixties. The regime of King Idris created no workable political system, nor anything like a political ideology. He did not even attempt to create a party system through which he could rule the country. During the period of monarchy the people of Libya saw no doctor, no government officials and the money of people was spent on royal places.

The people lacked hospitals, schools, highways, electricity, water, and arms to defend themselves. In addition, the King signed alliances with the USA and the UK with the small bourgeoisie in Libya; he governed the nation and excluded the majority of the people from any kind of participation. Oil production was completely in the hands of Western powers⁴. The 1967 had demonstrated all the needed condition for revolution. On October 8, 1967, two Libyan airman, Muftah al Sharif and Fethi al Tahar attempted to fly their aircraft to a sympathetic Arab state, and the place it in the service of the battle against Israel. They failed and returned to Libya, were placed on trial, and sentenced to six years in jail. It was desperate act by men who saw the Arab betrayed on all sides.

⁴Habib Henry, *Libya Past And Present*, (Malta, Aedam Publishing House Ltd., 1979). p.77.

However, leadership and organization were lacking. A revolution is different from a coup *d'etat*. It affects and permeates the whole nation and, if the people do not support it, then it cannot succeed. The 1969 revolution was truly a people's revolution supported by the army, and led by a group of young army officers who acted for the people. In the word of Colonel Gaddafi, "the revolution occurred because of national, popular and human consideration."

The Coup

Muammar al- Gaddafi has always distinguished between a revolution and a *coup d'etat*: A coup is usually nothing more than a transfer of power from one dictatorial group to another, though in some cases this may be accompanied by a change of regime that has wider implications. A revolution, by contrast, involves not only a transfer of power but also a total reshaping of society according to a new philosophy. The basic ideals of the Revolution can best be described in the triple slogan of: Freedom, Socialism and Unity. From these three concepts, the revolutionary leaders have set up the premises and ideals of their Revolution.

Those were the ideals, which Colonel Gaddafi and his companions had pondered since 1959, when they first started to think of Revolution. In 1964 Gaddafi and his colleagues decided to organize the revolutionary movement. It was divided into a military section and a civilian section. "The military section became the most important, and it was around this nucleus that the leaders of the Revolutionary made their plans. The army section established a Central Committee,

which were to direct all revolutionary activities. Army officers who supported the Revolution were organized in the Free Unitary Officers. All organizational matters were the responsibility of the Central Committee”.⁵

Libyan revolution was into two phases. The first phase of revolution (a phase dubbed ‘Nasserist’) involved the transformation of the country from a pre-capitalist (feudal) society to a state-controlled system involving a pre-dominant capitalist component. The second stage was the period of the socialist *jamahiriya* or ‘Era of the Masses’ in which the revolution sought to enshrine the concept of a collective political and economic system. The revolutionary leadership, particularly Gaddafi, originally believed that the effective merging of Libya and Egypt would quickly follow the overthrow of the monarchy.

The Early Philosophy of revolution was not the idea of an independent Libya but of the merging of two nations in the interest of a broad Pan-Arabism. In his explanation of the character of revolution Gaddafi has declined to talk about specific beginnings. Revolutions, paradoxically, evolve through time, whereas a coup (*inqilab*) is ‘a casual event occurring at the pleasure of senior officers. A revolution may resemble a military coup but it has a different character growing ‘naturally in the consciousness of the society as a whole’.

The actual planning of the Revolution itself was a slow and careful process. The Free Officers were holding more frequent meetings. These meetings were

⁵ Bianco Mirella, *Gaddafi Voice From the Desert*, (London, Longman Group Ltd, 1975). p. 66

organized mainly on holidays and feast days. Security was essential in setting up the meetings. “At a Benghazi meeting, described in the 5th series of the *story of the Revolution* by Gaddafi, the Colonel writes that it was agreed that each member of the Central Committee would provide a monthly report to the Free Officers on all senior officers who were not in the revolutionary movement. The few months were spent in more preparations and planning”.⁶

At last, on August 13, 1969, a general convention of almost all the army officers was called in Benghazi. Nevertheless, zero hour was finally set for September 1, 1969.

The King Idris had been visiting Greece and Turkey since June 1969 seeking a medical cure. On 1 September 1969, the army unit of free officer were assigned to different parts of the country, and Gaddafi was taken over the Benghazi Radio and Television Station. When the Libyan broadcasting service began its transmission at 6.30 a.m., just as did every day. Libyans already up and about were surprised to hear military music in place of the normal programmes. Because, Gaddafi was taken over the Benghazi Broadcasting Radio and Television stations. After the military music, “Gaddafi himself read the first revolutionary communiqué, and for the first time people of Libya heard the voice of the man who was to be their new leader”⁷. In Tripoli everything was seized, the Army had also moved in Sebha, Tobruk and other distant regions. Virtually the whole country came under the

⁶ Habib Henry, *Libya Past And Present*, (Malta, Aedam Publishing House Ltd, 1979). p. 85

⁷ Blundy David and Lycett Andrew, *Qaddafi And The Libyan Revolution*, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd: 1987). p. 58

control of the Free Officers without any bloodshed. After one week Crown Prince renounced all rights to the throne and gave his support to the Revolution. Foreign observers predicted that the tribes, traditionally loyal to the Sanusis, would become a new Katanga. But the tribes surrendered their arms to the Revolutionaries and were ready to defend the Revolution. It was indeed the revolution of the people. On September 8, 1969, a nine- member government was announced under the prime-minister ship of Dr.Mahmud Suleiman al-Maghrabi.

The true face of new regime was expressed by the RCC (Revolutionary command Council), the RCC derived from the Central Control Committee of Free Officer movement, which was created in 1964 as a provisional authority that would last until the unification of the two states had been achieved. (RCC composed of twelve members, with Gaddafi as chairman). The RCC was designated in the new constitution as 'the highest authority in the Libyan Arab Republic. Measures adopted by the RCC may not be challenged before anybody. The new government was soon recognized by the foreign powers. After a few days recognition was offered by Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union (the regime had been instantly recognized by Iraq, Syria, Egypt and the Sudan).

The first communiqué of the Revolutionary Command Council defined the objective ifs of the new regime.

- a) All legislative councils of the old regime are abolished. They are deprived of all power as from 1 September 1969. All attempts by the old leaders against the revolution will be vigorously suppressed.
- b) The council of the revolution is the only body entitled to administer the affairs of the Libyan Arab Republic. Any contravention will come before the courts.
- c) The council of the Revolution wishes to express to the people its will and its determination to build a revolutionary Libya.
- d) The Council of the Revolution attaches great importance to the unity of the countries of the Third World and to all efforts directed towards the overcoming of social and economic under development.
- e) It believes profoundly in the freedom of religion, and in the moral values contained in the Koran, and it promises to defend these and to uphold them.

The RCC rapidly introduced a number of radical changes were to transform the character of Libyan society. First, it imposed a ban on the political parties and Libya's press was brought under control. In January 1970 the RCC announced that only the official newspapers *Al Thawra* (The Revolution) would receive government advertising. By May 1970 a new labor law had banned all trade unions. People's courts, presided over by a member of the RCC, were established to try supporter of the old regime and suspected dissidents under the new one. The RCC began a series of seminars to spread its Philosophy. On 11th Jun 1971 it announced the formulation the 'Libyan Arab Socialist Union' (ASU). Later Gaddafi changed

the name of the state from 'Libyan Arab Republic' to the 'Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahariya'. The ASU has served as an important focus for national unity.

Gaddafi was actually different and that he was going down a new path. In 1973 he launched a popular, or, cultural, revolution, and began a purge of government officials and bourgeoisie, thereby alienating many of his early supporters, and turning some authority for administration of the country over to "Popular Committee". The philosophy behind this move was explained in Volume 1 of his personal testament, the "Green Book", *the Solution to the problem of Democracy*. This was moved to a view of democracy, as Gaddafi moved to other ideas, through his experience of the revolution. Gaddafi claims to have derived his concept of democracy from a single verse of the Koran, and their affairs are decided through consultation (*shura*) among themselves. Gaddafi has devotedly wrapped itself in the banner of Islam, giving it pre-eminent status among the values of its 'revolution'.⁸

Furthermore, the economic reform was at the heart of the Libyan revolution. Though, Gaddafi's economic philosophy has keep changing from one phase of development to another. The 'Green Revolution', the regime's symbolized the investment in the industrial infrastructure, a radical shift in the management of oil resources, all signaled a departure from pre-revolutionary patterns. It needs to be

⁸ Blundy David and Lycett Andrew, *Qaddafi And The Libyann Revolution*, (London , Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. 1987). p. 105

underlined that the revolutionary leadership took over a nation with only a small industrial base.

US since Revolution

How to deal with revolutionary governments in the Arab World has been a recurring theme for the government of the United States in the past few years? When the revolution accrued in 1969 in Libya, there were hopes that the United States might be able to maintain relations with the new regime. It was hoped that given the American identification with the old order, cooperation with the new one would be possible. Both Republican and Democratic administrations, made serious efforts to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Libya. Not only was there a large economic stake in Libya but also its strategic importance was well understood. But the new regime with revolutionary outlook in Libya was not in the US interest for the following reasons.

- (1) It was unpalatable to the US that he had overthrown the monarchial regime that was openly pro U.S.
- (2) After coming to power, he nationalized the western oil companies.
- (3) He ordered the closure of all American bases in his country. Since Libya is a strategically located country, the closure of these bases was a severe setback to the US interest in heyday of the Cold War.
- (4) Col. Gaddafi has been an uncompromising foe of Israel .He has extended full moral, political and material support to PLO.

- (5) He has been a supporter of the Iranian revolution and the regime established by Ayatollah Khomeini.
- (6) He has been a close ally of the erstwhile Soviet Union.
- (7) Since September 1969, Libya's interest in Arab Affairs has become a major preoccupation for her policy-makers, and Gaddafi himself wanted to play a major role in the Middle East theater. Gaddafi negotiated with Cairo and Khartoum to coordinate their political, economic, and military policies.

Another reason for US antagonism towards Libya is, its alleged support for terrorism and for radical movements opposed to US interests, its staunch opposition to Israel and anti-western rhetoric. Libya's hostility towards the USA rests on a perception of the USA as a global power intent on maintaining its hegemony and control over the Arab and Islamic world. When Gaddafi assumed power in Libya, he moved quickly to attack and he ordered the US to evacuate the military bases, which it quietly acquiesced in. Gaddafi initiated the move to seek higher oil prices for Libyan crude-a demand, which was subsequently taken up by other members of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). Therefore, the US has always been looking for some excuse to bring about the overthrow of Col. Gaddafi. In the addition to the above mentioned reasons; the principals issues involved between the U.S. government and the Gaddafi regimes are as follows: -

Terrorism

'Terrorism' a phenomena that has profoundly shocked consciousness in all countries of the West, even in these that are not threats of terrorism. The U.S. administration accused Gaddafi that he had funded terrorism all over the world, despite the absence of proof and even the lack of evidence. On 26 January 1981, the CIA chief William Cosey visited the White House to give presentation. His theme was worldwide threat of terrorism and how it was being fomented by states like Syria, Iran and Libya. Thus, Libyan alleged support for international terrorism has become such a symbol of terrorism. And, America tried to linked Gaddafi with IRA, German Red Cells and Italy's Red Brigades. Contrary, Col. Gaddafi believes that, he is a revolutionary world leader and compared himself to historical figures such as Chē Guevara to Garibaldi⁹. "Gaddafi had hosted a convention of some 258 extremist political groups, which included even American, Indian and Black Muslim representative".

Moreover, Gaddafi provided support to Palestinian liberation groups that was to be the alleged terrorist groups in U.S. perception is particularly important to his self-image. Gaddafi has openly admitted to funding, arming them and operating training camps for them in Libya¹⁰. Gaddafi viewed his support to groups and movements that are struggling for freedom and independence as legitimate.

⁹. Schumacher Edward: "the United States and Libya", *Foreign Affairs*, pp.330.

¹⁰. Pasha, A. k.: "Sanctions Against Libya: Continuation of war by. Other Means!", *Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. III, May-Aug, 1996,pp.66-67.

On the other hand, he would call U S support to Israel and the latter's usurpation of Palestine as the most blatant form of terrorism. When asked, how do you understand terrorism, Gaddafi said that, "we put the production of nuclear weapons at the top of the list of terrorist activities.... It means.... to terrorized the world; also the development of military bases on other countries territories. This is one reason why the United States is as top terrorist force in the world".

In 1984, the U.S. government alleged that Gaddafi hand was apparent behind unrest in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, and his people's bureaus were fomenting trouble in capitals across the Europe. Reagan new National Security Advisor 'Robert Mc Farlane' was made plans for covert actions against Gaddafi, or anyone else who might have had interests against the United States¹¹. Contrary Gaddafi was proud of his cosmopolitan support for liberation movements throughout the world, irrespective of race, creed or ideology.

Gaddafi had extended Libyan influence into Latin America, partly to attack U.S. interests and partly to increase the Libyan presence in the Third World. Hence, Libya was alleged to use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy along with Syria and Iran. Thus Reagan declared that, most of the terrorists who are kidnapping and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations are being trained, financed and directly or indirectly controlled by the core group. The core groups of governments were Iran, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua and North

¹¹. Simons Geoff, *Libya: The Struggle For Survival*, (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), pp.329.

Korea. In 1986 the capital of Nicaragua, Managua was portrayed by the Reagan administration as a place where Palestinians, Libyans and Iranians plotted against the U S citizens and for the overthrow of the American government. In this way Nicaragua has been characterized as a major base for Libyan operations in the western hemisphere¹².

Weapons of Mass Distraction (WMD)

During the late 1980s, western intelligence agencies held that Libya was engaged in the production of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) development. In this respect, proliferation of CBW in the Middle East became a core concern of United States National Security Policy. Gaddafi's pursuit of CBW capabilities is of concern to the international community because of his often-erratic behavior and the largest CBW production complexes ever constructed in the developing world. Libya's stand on CBW is that it does not have a CBW program and that its chemical production facilities are intended solely for peaceful purpose¹³.

However, according to western and Libyan exile sources, Libya's effort to acquire CBW is attached with an aggressive strategy to acquire ballistic missile. There was great apprehension in the United States that Libya's CBW program may play a critical role in a future Arab-Israel war. Because, when Canadian forces with French support, launched a surprise attack on a military base inside Libya, Gaddafi

¹² Conservation Digest; June. 1986.

¹³ Serge Schmemmann, "Belgian Charged in illicit Shipment for Libyan Plant", *The New York Times*; January 13, 1989, p.A14.

ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iranian-supplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft¹⁴.

Libya's chemical warfare capabilities reportedly include personal protective equipment, Soviet type decontamination units, and a stockpile of chemical agents. Gaddafi focused his nuclear efforts on an organization called the Arab Development Institute, a group of scientists recruited from Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, or other Arab centers of science and learning to work for him¹⁵. Since the late 1980s, Libya has sought to develop an indigenous production manufacture and storage at three primary facilities in isolated parts of the country.

1. **Pharma 150(Rabta):** - The first CBW production facility, known as pharma150, is a large industrial complex at Rabta. Therefore, the Reagan Administration first publicized the existence and purpose of Rabta facility. The Rabta complex consists of a CBW agent production plant a chemical munitions storage building and a steel mill. Since the establishment of Rabta facility, Libya has moved thousands of civilian plant workers to a nearby town. Rabta plant was built with the help of private companies from a dozen nations, including both western and eastern block countries. Germany, Belgium, France and Italy, as well as Japan had provided technology and materials to manufacture chemical weapons to Libya.

¹⁴ . Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington D.C: Office of the Secretary of Defence, April 1996.) pp.26.

¹⁵ John Cooley K, *LIBYAN SANDSTORM*, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson 1982). p. 231.

2. **Pharma200 (Sebha):** - A second Libya's CBW plant, i.e. called pharama200. It is located underground in remote desert location. Construction of pharma200 began in the late 1980s and was completed in 1992. Equipment for the plant was supplied by the German companies, the Swiss firm EMD Engineering and by the Italian techno glass ICM. The U S officials claimed that the Chinese government was selling an estimated 10,000 tones of chemicals that could be used to manufacture CBW agents at pharma200¹⁶.

3. **Tarhunah:** - The third plant of Libyan chemical weapons is Tarhunah. With the operations at Rabta complex severely hampered in 1991, because of its exposure as a CBW plant, Gaddafi resolved to build an entirely new, underground CW production complex near the town of Tarhunah. Former US CIA director John Dentch has called Tarhunah 'the world's largest underground chemical-weapons plant¹⁷'. Because, it was a huge plant and located in the Middle of a long, narrow valley between two mountains peaks, making it difficult for spy-satellites to view the factory or for fighter aircraft to destroy it. In spite of the international opprobrium, Libya has continued to pursue a chemical weapons capability. Unlike its earlier and more successful efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to acquire such weapons. Libya insisted that the plant only made material for pharmaceuticals. However, western intelligence agencies believed and accused that Libya was

¹⁶ B. Gertz, "Chinese Move Seen As Aiding Libyan In Making Poison Gas", *The Washington Times*, 12 July, 1990, p. 6.

¹⁷ Waller, "Libyan Chemical Weapon Raises the issue of Pre-Emption", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (Nov. 1992), p. 523.

constructing it for the purpose of producing chemical weapons. In retaliation for such accusations, Libya accused the U S of hypocrisy on the issue.

Arab Unity

One of the major obstacles between Libya and the United States was Gaddafi's philosophy about pan-Arabism. The isolation and indifferences of previous regime was transformed into active participation in Arab aspirations and goals. Libyan leaders gave themselves a new Arab vocation decided to the realization of Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine. They realized that Arab unity and Palestine were interlocked. With the death of Naseer, Arab became leaderless. However, Gaddafi was soon to show signs that he was the spiritual heir of Naseer. Gaddafi realized the vulnerability of the Arab world unity of purpose. He believes that the way to Palestine was first to free the Arabs regional alliances and domination and to attack the problem of poverty. He maintained that the political and social freedom of the Arab was a prerequisite for Palestine liberation. He strongly believed that if only the Arabs continued one nation, Israel would not be in existence for a month. 1984 and 1967 were possible because the Arabs were cross-purpose. In Libyan view, the Palestinian problem is the most important and dangerous factor in the contemporary life of the Arab nation. On the other hand, the United States stand was pro-Israel; therefore, Libyan hostility towards American was obvious.

Col. Gaddafi; the Arab nationalist par excellence was also the consummate Arab Unionist. In Feb. 1970, at his first press conference, he produced a formula for Arab Unity. His theme was the past failure of Arab Unity, which he attributed to Byzantine philosophies. His solution was a unified movement, which grouped all Arabs together. Gaddafi's philosophy was inspired by Egyptian president Naseer's pan Arabism theory. Naseer had hoped that the Arabs would unite around the Palestinian question.

In this context, Gaddafi called the first meeting in the Nile Hilton Hotel 23, September 1970. A principal reason for the meeting was to end the conflict between units of the Jordanian army and PLO guerrillas in Amman (Jordan). Gaddafi declared that 'Palestine could only be restored by the march of the Arab masses, free of fetters, restrictions and narrow regionalism. We will arrive at Palestine brothers, when we have pulled down the walls, which impede the fusion of Arab people in the battle. We will reach the holy lands only when we have removed our borders and partitions. We shall liberate Palestine when the Arab world has become one solid front'¹⁸. He strongly believed that if only the Arab constituted one nation, Israel would not be in existence for a month.

Gaddafi was the only Arab leader who had not forgotten the 1948 Palestine tragedy. Other leaders spoke of returning to the pre-1967 boundaries and forgetting the whole Palestine question. Gaddafi believed that the way to Palestine was first to

¹⁸. Quoted by David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, *Gaddafi and Libyan Revolution*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981). pp.69.

free the Arabs from foreign alliances and domination and to attack the problem of poverty. He maintained that political and social freedom of the Arab was a prerequisite for Palestinian liberation.

In the first Gulf war period marked with collapse of the Soviet Union and shift in the configuration of power politics from bipolar to unipolar, the United States has been further emboldened to spread its tentacles in Third World countries. The scenario in developing countries is equally disturbing because the Western powers under the aegis of the United States have followed the policy of exerting full control over the financial and raw material resources. It was well known fact that Arab countries have petroleum reserves in plenty. Beside, the Western powers also supported the Israel in not vacating the occupied Arab territories. Libya's Philosophy of Arab Unity to support the Palestinians movement and its vigorous and strong opposition to thwart the sinister designs of the Zionist-imperialist force was an eyesore for the United States.

Africa Unity

Libya's policy towards African unity is also an issue between Libya and the United States. Since, Libya is considered a gateway to Africa, it is a link between Europe and Africa, the Maghreb and Mashrek. Hence, Gaddafi policy was to establish close relations with all of the African states, and had helped to won independence in the late fifties and sixties in the continent. There were number of agreements signed to promote cordial relations among African countries.

Though Libya joined the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, it has been playing an active role in OAU since 1969 (when Gaddafi assumed the power). The question is that, why Libya is a menace for the United States Gaddafi's programme in African Unity?

Actually, there was deep concern in Libya over the Israeli influence in at least thirty-four African States, and Libya's apprehension Israeli economic domination that could turn Africa into a market of its products. It was also considered that Israel was the agent of the U.S. in Africa. Gaddafi rapidly conducted diplomatic activities with the African States.

Gaddafi had supported Guiana, Uganda and Zambia when these were threatened. It was Gaddafi who came to Uganda's rescue when Anglo-American economic help were ceased. Libya believed that Ethiopia was a facilitator for Israel infiltration into the African continent. It alleged that Ethiopia was imposing their rule over Eritrea and making threats against Somalia. Therefore, at the 10th anniversary of the OAU in 1973, Libya demanded the removal of OAU headquarters from Addis Ababa (capital of Ethiopia) to a more neutral capital.

Libya's other interest was in African unity. Libya conducted intensive diplomatic activities with the African states between 1970 and 1973. Libya wanted to support a natural desire among the Libyans to reintroduce normal and natural relations with African States by eradicating the 1884 imperialistic attempts to


separate and divide Africa¹⁹. Libya also wanted to help liberate Africans who are still dominated by foreign powers or by racist minorities as on Rhodesia and South Africa. Libya pledged on many occasions its financial, moral and military support for all liberation movements on the continent. Colonel Gaddafi stated that he would give them direct military assistance. Gaddafi wanted to remove Israel influence in Africa, because Israeli economic domination which could turn Africa into a market for Israeli products. It was also considered that Israel was the agent of the United States in Africa.

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With the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid decline in the spread of communist or socialist ideology, it would be in the best interests of all Africans if their continent were to unite under one roof as the founding fathers of the OAU had envisioned. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's whims or vision is about African Unity (AU). Hence, he called for the establishment of the United States of Africa. It is hoped that Col. Gaddafi would play a leading role in the "new" AU. President Gaddafi; himself believes in transforming the OAU into the AU. He said that,

I firmly believe that the best basis for transforming the OAU into the AU would be for all emerging democracies in Africa, like, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia, for example, to first come together based solely on practices that they share in common - practices of good-governance, transparency, accountability,

¹⁹ John Mason, "Qadhafi's Revolution and Change in Libyan Oasis Community", *Middle East Journal*, Summer 1982, pp 319-335



freedom of the press, etc. Am I suggesting that these countries don't have problems? Definitely not! All I'm saying here, is that by them choosing democracy over dictatorships, these countries definitely have a better chance of remaining stable and moving forward progressively than under any other known system as recent history has shown us.

The United States has over emphasized the impact of Gaddafi on African politics and regional stability. Such preoccupation with Libya distracted US attentions from more important trends shaping the region including the centrality of Algeria. On the other hand, Libya's efforts at Maghrib Unity, and progress towards economic and political liberalization challenged the American hegemony in the region. Because African continent was a big market for the Western products particularly for the American goods.

Since Gaddafi assumed the power in Libya, he moved quickly to attack what he saw as the nation's colonial inheritance. Gaddafi was snubbing the west by insisting on an improved price for oil, and urging the colonial powers to vacate their military bases in Libya. In September 1970 Gaddafi broke off diplomatic relations with pro-west king Hussein of Jordan because Jordanian troops had attacked Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan. Gaddafi had also nationalized foreign banks and oil industry in the country. However, the United States was prepared to tolerate and even support the new Libyan regime. Even Gaddafi enjoyed some US support, being allowed to purchase western weapons. "But Gaddafi had demonstrated within

a short time that he was far from being a plain puppet of the west, and Libya ordered to vacate one of the most important Air Base for The United States, i.e. 'Wheelus Air Base', which was being used by American Air Force since long back"²⁰. Then the United States was the primary target of the oil boycott that Libya and other Arab states invoked after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In addition to conflicts caused by Libyan oil policies, the United States and Libya have disagreements over Libyan claims to territorial waters. Since 1973 Libya has considered the Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters. Beyond that, Libya claimed another twelve nautical miles (approximately twenty kilometers) of territorial waters. The United States refused to recognize Libya's claim, and this refusal became a recurrent cause for contention between the two countries.

To counter the American hegemony in the Middle East, the Libyan government occluded with tripartite pact among Libya, the People Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Ethiopia signed in August 1981. It was a direct challenge to the United States, and then the United States took action against Libya. The strategies for achieving US objectives regarding Libya are to challenge, Libya's claim to territorial waters beyond twelve nautical mile limits, to confront Libya's state-sponsorship terrorism, and to coerce Libya's development of chemical weapons.²¹

²⁰ Zoubir Yahiya.H, "Libya in U S Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow? *Third World Quarterly*, Feb 2002. P.31.

²¹ Kapur Ashok, "Rogue States And The International Nuclear Order", *International Journal*, summer 1996, P.921

Moreover, Libya's close relationship with the then USSR helped to build a negative perception within the U.S. administration against the Gaddafi regime. The USA was little concerned about the change of regime. Because, it was obvious that for Americans the Wheelus Air Force Base had lost most of its strategic value. In fact, oil had become a much more crucial US interests in Libya. In the 1970s Gaddafi partially nationalize the country's oil resources.

Since US-Libyan views on major world issues diverged widely and relations between them remained considerably strained under the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. The Regan administration accused Libya as the main perpetrator of state-sponsored international terrorism and made the determined efforts to bring down Gaddafi's regime. He has been accused of involvement in terrorist activities as early as from 1972 when he hosted a summit of different organizations including representation from *Black September*, *Fatah*, *IRA*, *Baader Meinhof*, *the Iranian National Front*, and *the Turkish People Liberation Army*.

Thus the U.S. States Department put Libya on the list of states sponsor international terrorism and, Gaddafi was projected as the worst international terrorist. To quote former U.S. Secretary of States, Alexander Haig: "we are increasingly concerned about Gaddafi's lawless activity in a direct military sense and in his support for bloodshed and terrorism worldwide". He told the U.S.-House Foreign Affairs Committee that Gaddafi "has been funding sponsoring, paying and harboring terrorist groups to conduct activities against the lives and well being of

American diplomats and facilities". Gaddafi was dubbed as a 'menace', a 'lunatic' and the most dangerous man of the world.

In 1980 president Carter wrote: 'there are few governments in the world with which we have more sharp and frequent policy differences than Libya. Libya has steadfastly opposed our efforts to reach and carry out the Camp David Accords between Israel, Egypt and the United States, signed in 1978 and 1979. We have strongly differing attitude toward the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). His support to the PLO and other national liberation movements was seen by the United States as an open support to international terrorism.' Before, the Camp David Accord Gaddafi tried seriously to normalize relations with the Jimmy Carter Administration.

However, the Libyan bureau decided to contact President Carter's brother, Billy, in the hope that his opinions would carry weight with the US administration. He was eventually contacted via a circuitous route by the former Libyan ambassador to Italy, Jibril Shalouf, who had worked at cultivating Billy's business partners. Billy accepted an invitation to Libya, and in January 1979 he hosted Libyan dancers in Georgia and established the Libyan Arab Friendship Society. At the same time, by seeming chance, the US administration decided to issue export licenses for the Boeing 727s. But the relations between Libya and the USA went into a steep decline towards the end of the Carter presidency. One key factor was the burning of the US embassy in Tripoli on 2 December 1979.

CHAPTER-II

LIBYA-US RELATIONS IN THE 1980S

The United States disenchantment with Libya did not start with President Reagan. Shortly after the 1969 coup the Nixon administration blocked the sale of 12 C-130 military cargo planes to Libya. Arms, technology and trade embargo were progressively extended by the Ford and Carter administrations too. But, when in January 1981 Ronald Reagan took over the White House relations between Libya and United States reached their pinnacle. Because, when Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter in early 1981 to the American Presidency, the popular mandate for the new president was clearly one of restoring the United State's prestige and status in the international arena. One of Reagan's first tasks was to launch a campaign against Soviet-sponsored terrorism, and at the same time Gaddafi came in for special attention for its alleged role in terrorism¹.

One of the principal points of irritations for Gaddafi was the U.S. refusal to turn over eight Lockheed C-130 military transport aircraft that Libya had paid \$48 million for in 1972. Whereas, for the U.S. the immediate issue was the attack on their embassy in Tripoli on December 2, 1979. as a result the U.S. moved the Sixth Fleet within the disputed Gulf of Sirte: for a period of four days exercise were conducted by two U S aircraft carriers, ten other Ships and several Squadrons of

¹ Simons Geoff *LIBYA: The Struggle for Survival*, (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), p.315.

carrier-borne F-14 aircraft². However, Libyans took care to avoid a military confrontation.

Indeed, Reagan decided to sever relations with the Libyan *Jamahir*, and closed the Libyan people's Bureau and expelled more than two dozens diplomats. The U.S. government ordered the U.S. citizens who were living in Libya to leave the country. The Assistant Secretary of States for American Affairs declared to Congress that the U.S. governments would provide arms for those African countries that were opponents of Libya. The U.S. administration rapidly moved to supply arms to Libya's neighbors, enhancing naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea, encouraging Israel and Egypt in their anti-Libyan activities and holding the joint military exercises with Egypt. Simultaneously, the U.S. Department of States warned U.S. companies, who were operating in Libya to start an orderly withdrawal of their personnel from Libya³. Initial response was very sluggish because Americans working in Libya did not feel in any particular danger. All of these measures separately and cumulatively exerted immense pressure on Gaddafis

The most dramatic manifestation of the new policy was the clash over the Gulf of Sirte on August 19,1981, the American carrier shot down two Libyan aircraft that had opened fire on them⁴. Since Libya had announced on October 11,1973 that the Gulf of Sirte was Libyan territorial water and that foreign vessels

² *Ibid.* 319.

³ Pasha, A. k.: "Sanctions Against Libya: Continuation of war by. Other Means!", *Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. III, May-Aug, 1996,pp.70-71.

⁴ Zoubir Yahiya.H, "Libya in U S Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?" *Third World Quarterly*, Feb 2002,pp.32.

could not enter it without Libyan permission. The US rejected this claim on the ground that since most of the Gulf lies well outside Libya's 12-mile line, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet ignored the Libyan claim on a number of occasions.

On Dec 10, 1981 Reagan's call for all Americans to leave Libya as soon as possible, because they were in "imminent danger," and it was announced that US passports, except those of journalists, were no longer valid for travel to Libya⁵. What further steps the administration might have had in mind were not announced, but it was understood that they inclined a series of steps designed to increase the political and economic pressure on Gaddafi. An unsuccessful effort was made to get the European allies to follow suit with regard to the oil embargo and travel restrictions, which Reagan imposed over Libya in 1982. The US oil companies were encouraged to bring home their personnel working in Libya.

At the same time Reagan also initiated a ban on the export to Libya of a wide range of technological products, a move designed to weaken not only Libya's military capacity but also its capacity for industrial development. It was hoped that these measures would seriously damage the Libyan economy. At the time US had been buying about a third of Libya's crude oil and it was assumed that Libya would be drastically affected by the loss of such a significant market.

Subsequently, Libyan oil ministry was soon recruiting Iranian, Canadian, Arab and European oil technicians to take the place of the deported Americans.

⁵ Ronald Bruce & St. John: (etd.), *Gaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy* (London, Saqi books, 1987), pp.83.

Since the economic measures were clearly having little effect the Reagan administration again looked to the possibility of military action. Reagan has also sought to project Libya's close relations with the Soviet Union particularly in the military field as dangerous to western interests. The Libyan leader was called a "stooge" of the Soviet Union and Libya a surrogate, another Cuba in African continent⁶. The Reagan saw the very possession of a strong military machine built up with Soviet support as a threat to American interests. It concluded that it was with the Soviet weapons that the Libyan leader was able to stimulate trouble for American and therefore, Reagan was eager to neutralize Libyan military capacity.

In 1983 Libya's invasion of Chad was serious armed confrontation between Libya and the United States. Fortunately, the US administration prevailed on the French to assume the Principal burden of deterrence, while the US confined itself to giving material aid to Chad such as Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and carrier-based Surveillance of Libyan activities.

However, in February 1983 the United States of America worked on a major plot to persuade the Libyan leader into a military conflict and destroy the Libyan military machine. Reagan's official version of the plot was that Libya was using its sympathizers in the Sudanese army to assassinate president Numeiry. Reagan responded to president Numeriri's claim to have uncovered a Libyan conspiracy against him by initiating a massive military confrontation with Gaddafi. AWACS

⁶ . Pasha, A.K, *Libya and the United States: Gaddafi's response to Regan's challenge*, (New Delhi, Deterrence, 1984).pp.2.

(American Air Borne Warning and Control Systems) radar surveillance aircraft were immediately dispatched to Cairo west airfield for reconnaissance missions over Libya⁷. The whole operation or exercise, however, ended in a huge disaster. Later on Egypt denied that it has asked for U.S. "AWACS" to deter the Libyan leader from attacking Sudan.⁸

The Regan administration adopted such varied anti Libyan measures as organizing arms sales to Libya's neighbors, enhancing naval presence in the Mediterranean sea, encouraging Israel and Egypt in their anti-Libyan activities, and holding joint military exercises with Egypt⁹. All of these measures separately and cumulatively exerted immense pressure on Gaddafi. And, U.S. conducted naval and air exercise very near to the Libyan coast in the disputed Gulf of Sirte: the four days exercises were conducted by two US aircraft carriers, ten other ship and several squadrons of carrier borne F-14 aircraft. Regan, through collaboration with allies such as Egypt or Israel, made deliberately attempts to provoke Gaddafi.

Psychological pressure was put on Gaddafi. But Gaddafi took care to avoid a military confrontation. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs declared to congress that the US government would provide arms for African opponents of Libya 'to help those who see the problem as we see it'. The US government moved to supply arms to factions across Libya's borders that could be relied upon to

⁷ . Simons Geoff, *Libya: The Struggle For Survival*, (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 321.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Muil, Jim, "US Display against Libya," *Middle East Economic Survey*, February 1983. p. 27

present a military threat to Gaddafi. Thus America announced its willingness to provide Tunisia with fifty-four M-60 tanks, and supplied C-130 transport aircraft for the Algerian Air Force. American strategists also speculated on how the US might take over the Libyan oilfields, observing that it would be preferable to assume control of Gaddafi's oil resources than to take over the oilfields in the gulf. There was also evidence that Washington was encouraging a military confrontation between Egypt and Libya. Sadat was said to favor a military incursion into Libya though some of his senior officers opposed the idea.

Further, Regan move to isolate Libya, declared an oil embargo on the US importation of crude oil from Libya. At the same time he also initiated a ban on the export to Libya of a wide range of technological products, a move designed to weaken not only Libya's military capability but also its capacity for industrial development¹⁰. At the time the United States had been buying about a third of Libya's crude oil and it was assumed that Libya would be adversely affected by the loss of such a significant market. US oil companies were encouraged to bring home their personal working in Libya. Three thousand American workers and technician came home, and Washington was strengthened by the presidential edict. The Libyan Oil Ministry was soon recruiting Iranian, Canadian, Arab and European oil technicians to take the place of the departed Americans. What further steps the administration might have had in mind were not announced, but it was understood that they included a series of steps designed the increase the political and economic

¹⁰ Kapur, Ashok, "Rogue States And The International Nuclear Order," *International Journal*, summer 1996. p. 422.

pressure on Gaddafi, and an unsuccessful effort was made to get the European allies to follow suit with regard to the oil embargo and travel restrictions. Since the economic measures were clearly having little effect the Regan administration again looked to the possibility of military action.

The Reagan administration acted forcefully against the Gaddafi regime and sought to punish Libya harshly. Some U S officials admitted that 'we wanted to provoke Gaddafi into responding so we could stick it to him, and we knew he would oblige us', if Gaddafi 'strikes his head up, we shall clobber him', we are looking for an excuse¹¹. In the spring of 1986 Libya came under increasing pressure as the confrontation with the United States took a decidedly military edge. In the first three month the United States moved parts of the 6th Fleet into the Gulf of Sidra, including three aircraft carriers, twenty-seven accompanying vessels, some two hundred airplanes, nuclear-powered attacks submarines, and almost 25,000 personnel¹². Consequently, Gaddafi had been fall into the traps set by the United States government.

Due to Libya's continuing support for terrorism (as Reagan alleged), the United States adopted additional economic sanctions against Libya in January 1986, including a total ban on direct import and export trade, commercial contracts, and travel-related activities. In addition, Libyan Government assets in the United States were frozen. Because, American servicemen were killed in Berlin discotheque on 2 April 1986, therefore, Reagan alleged Gaddafi, about Libyan involvement in the

¹¹. Quoted in Michael Rubner, "Anti terrorism and the withering of the 1973 war powers resolution", *Political Science Quarterly*, 102, 1987, p. 210

¹². For the developments covered in this paragraph, see Davis, *Gaddafi, Terrorism, and Origins*, pp. 101-110

discotheque disaster. However, the United States responded by launching an aerial bombing attack against targets near Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986. While, mystery was revealed later that Libya might not have been implicated. There were some indications that the incident was in fact the work of a Palestinian group working under the general direction of Syrian intelligence¹³. Since then, the United States has maintained its trade and travel embargoes and has sought to bring diplomatic and economic pressure to bear against Libya.

On April 15, 1986 US warplanes bombed the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. The raid was response “alleged” retaliation for the death of an American soldier in a bomb blast at a Berlin discothèque. The United States had not substantial evidence. It acted on mere ‘suspicion’. In fact a report from Berlin had revealed that the United States had no evidence of Libyan involvement in La Belle (Berlin) discotheque.

The destroyed the home of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and killed at least 30 civilians, including many children. Two hours later (after bombing) President Ronald Reagan justified the unprecedented attack on a sovereign country and its head of state in a national television address. President Reagan warned Libya to change its policies or face further military action¹⁴. The US, Reagan claimed, had "direct, precise and irrefutable" proof that Libya was responsible for a bomb blast in a West Berlin discotheque. The explosion at the disco La Belle (Berlin), a favorite nightspot for US soldiers, had killed three people and injured approximately 200.

¹³. An early report of how the west German evidence on the disco bombing in Berlin differed from the U.S. evidence is found in *Observer*, 27 April 1986

¹⁴. *International Herald Tribune* (Zurich), 24 April 1986.

The Reagan administration has since continued to apply more subtle military and covert pressure in hopes of provoking a Libyan coup. President Reagan said in a news conference that he wanted Gaddafi to “go bed every night wondering what we might do”¹⁵. Essentially, Reagan wanted to bring-down Gaddafi at any cost, therefore he tried his level best. On the other hand Gaddafi was still in power long after the bombing raid. And even though the US hoped that it would help topple Gaddafi’s regime, the result was on the contrary, the strengthening of his power. In the eyes of his people and of many third world nations, Gaddafi emerged as the victim of American bullying and hegemonic power.

World reaction to the raid, especially in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds, was generally hostile. Even strong US allies condemned US air raids on the Libyan cities. Thousands of English protesters protested in England before the United States Embassy against bombing on Libya. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) condemned the attack as a blatant, unprovoked act of aggression; and as a demonstration of support, it sent a delegation to Libya on 20th April 1986.¹⁶ The OPEC member states also condemned the attack but rejected a Libyan demand for an immediate oil embargo against the United States.

Meanwhile president Reagan had made clear, in characteristic fashion, what his support were: he had bombed Libya as a way of ‘contributing to an international environment of peace, freedom and progress within which our democracy-and other

¹⁵ . Edward Schumacher , “THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA”, *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 330.

¹⁶ . St. John, Ronald Bruce, *Gaddafi World Design: Libyan foreign policy, 1969-1987*, (London, Saqi Books 1987), p.84-85.

free nations- can flourish'¹⁷. However, the US administration had not been confident enough of the US public's reaction to the bombing to neglect necessary attention to news management. The 1986 air attack on Libya 'was a brilliantly staged media event, the first bombing in history scheduled for prime-time TV, for the precise moment when the networks open their national news programs'¹⁸. Anchormen were able to switch at once to Tripoli so that the exciting events could be viewed live. Then followed the carefully conceived news conferences and White House statements. It was firmly explained that the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi was 'self-defence against future attack'¹⁹. The media knew that the evidence for Libyan complicity in the discotheque bombing was slight and such an inconsequential detail was suppressed in the general applause for Reagan's decisive action.

The April raids did not have a significant impact on Gaddafi. After a period of isolation, Gaddafi returned to the world stage with radical, rejectionist policies wholly intact. While his support for state-sponsored terrorism might be more circumspect, he remained opposed to the international status quo and determined to employ all of Libya's resources to change it. Soon the Reagan administration, on the other hand, stepped up its programmes of diplomatic, economic and military pressure designed to precipitate the downfall of the Gaddafi regime. Frustrated at their failure to kill Gaddafi, the U.S. government was again considering possible options.

¹⁷ Michel Gordon, *The New York Times*, 31 January 1990.

¹⁸ Chomsky Noam, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies* (London, Pluto Press, 1989) p. 272.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 272

Meetings were held between representatives from CIA, the State Department, the White House, and the Department of Defense to discuss the possible course of action. The State Department acknowledged that the Libyan exile groups were weak and that the US must rely upon its own direct covert action. Further possible actions against Col. Gaddafi were set down. Internal dissidents could be encouraged to act, there could be fresh covert actions, rumors could be spread that the US was about to take further military action, there could be fresh joint military exercises and there could be further 'deception operations'. The 'temporarily quiescent' Gaddafi must be stopped before he moved 'to a more active role'.

However, the US administration claimed in justification to have irrefutable proof of Libyan involvement in terrorist attacks and plots against US targets in Europe and the Middle East. In late 1988 tension between the US and Libya increased after Reagan stated that the US government was considering military action against a factory at Rabat, outside Tripoli, where Libya was allegedly preparing to manufacture chemical weapons.

In 1988, Libya was found to be in the process of constructing a chemical weapons plant at Rabta, a plant that is now the largest such facility in the Third World. Libya is currently constructing another chemical weapons production facility at Tarhunah. Libya's support for terrorism and its past regional aggressions made this development a matter of major concern to the United States. Because the United States doesn't want any parallel 'chemical' or 'nuclear' states which may challenge its 'supremacy' or 'hegemony' on the globe. Therefore, in cooperation with like-minded countries, the United States has since sought to bring a halt to the

foreign technical assistance deemed essential to the completion of this facility. Now their relations were reached panic. In December 1988, there was an explosion, which destroyed a Pan-American World Airways (Pan Am 103) passenger aircraft over Lockabie (Scotland).

CHAPTER-III

LOCKERBIE BOMBING AND ITS IMPACT ON LIBYA-US RELATIONS

Lockerbie Bombing:

At about 7.00 p.m. on 21st December 1988 a Pam American World Airways Jumbo Jet, Flight PA103, was flying six miles high over the Scottish borders. The Boeing 747-121, *Maid of the Seas*, was traveling from London's Heathrow airport to John F. Kennedy airport in New York. The pilot, James Mac Quarrie, and his co-pilot, Raymond Wagner, had switched on the autopilot for what was intended to be a routine overnight flight. At 7.03 p.m. a small terrorist bomb exploded in the Cargo hold, punching a hole in the fuselage, and sending fragments of suitcase, clothing and other debris into the void.

The blast severed the plane's electrical power supply and there was no chance to send even the start of a distress call. The early report, before the bomb explosion had been confirmed, could only note that the Boeing had broken up so suddenly that no message could be sent, and so dramatically that wreckage and human victims were scattered over large areas of Lockerbie and the surrounding countryside. It was secondary shock wave that was to cause the death of Mac Querrie, Wagner, the other crewmembers and the 243 passengers.

This incident had played major role to in the American's hostility against Libya. Though for two years following the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, the suspicions of British and US investigators centered on the

involvement of radical Palestinians linked to Syria and or Iran.¹ The first suspicion was Libyan involvement were made public in early October 1990. The detonator that had exploded the bomb was found to be the same as ten detonators found on two Libyans arrested in Senegal in February 1988. The Lockerbie detonator and the Samsonite Suitcase in which the mechanism had been carried were of the same type used again in the bombing of UTA Flight 772 over Niger.

Lockerbie Investigation:

The investigation started the same evening when Air Traffic Control informed Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) at 7.40pm that Pan-Am 103 had crashed. When the AAIB arrived at the site they found two rows ("Northern Trail" and "Southern Trail") of pieces of the plane that were scattered over up to 130 km to the east coast of England. The wings, including the 4 heavy engines, and other large parts impacted on Lockerbie while major parts of the flight deck fell on the countryside east of the town. The damage in the "Sherwood Crescent" area of Lockerbie was worse enough that 21 homes had to be pulled down and completely rebuilt as well as a number of others had an urgent need for serious repairing caused by the fire which derived from the exploding wings.

Now the primary question is that: What happened to the airplane? Did a technical malfunction of electrical wires set inflammable fluids on fire, which lead

¹ *Sunday Times*, 3 December 1989, and *The Times*, 1 December 1989.

to an explosion? Did the plane simply brake into pieces because of the instability of the oval design of the nose section? Was it a bomb?

The investigators found out that it was indeed a bomb. So, why did somebody blow up a passenger aircraft over Scotland?

The interesting thing with this airplane is that the Pan-American B-747-121 was modified for the transportation of military freight (also known as: Civil Reserve Air Fleet CRAF). It had a large cargo door on the main deck (CRAF door), which allowed to quickly loading the Boeing in times of "national emergency".

So, which terrorist organization or nation-committing terrorist acts fights against the U.S.? The same year a fighter group of the aircraft carrier USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger airplane. This attack killed everyone aboard because the USS Vincennes mistook the B-767 for a group of Iranian F-14 fighters.

Libya could also be blamed for attacking American airplanes; even more if these are military freighters since the U.S. bombed Tripoli in 1986. The sudden air strike was initiated in order to kill Moammar Al Gadhafi as an act of revenge for the bombing of a bar in Berlin where 2 GIs lost their lives.

A few month before it was proven what the bomb was made of, it was the general opinion that the "Syrian-backed Palestinian terrorist Group - the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command" was responsible for the downing.

As you can see the task of finding the responsible person was not easy especially because no one claimed responsibility for this terrorist act.

But here did the investigation help with its reconstruction of the accident. Experts could define the container and even the baggage where the explosive device was in. Chemical analysis and reconstruction of the device showed that the bomb was made of Semtex that was stored in a Toshiba cassette recorder that was “almost exclusively” sold to Libya. The committer hid the device in a Samsonite suitcase and brought it from Malta to Frankfurt where a connection flight of Pan-Am waited.

Further investigation proved that the suitcase traveled unattended with a Pan-Am Boeing 727 from Frankfurt to London where it was transferred, as it is standard procedure without a safety check, to the B-747 that stood next to the transit-flight.

America believed and still believes, based on reports of CIA and FBI, that the perpetrators of this crime were Libyan intelligence agents.

Because, at 8.45 a.m. on 19 September 1989 French DC-10 airliner, UTA 772, left Brazzaville in the Congo; after a brief stopover in Chad, the plane flew north across the Sahara. About- five minutes later, a terrorist bomb exploded, ripping the aircraft a part and killing all the passengers and crew. Parts of the aircraft, fragments of the bomb and the mutilated passengers were spewed over an area of 640 square kilometers in the Niger Tenere desert. It was subsequently found that the bomb had been placed on the aircraft at Brazzaville.

However, French investigating magistrates were said to have found evidence that explosives and the detonator for the UTA bombing were taken into the Congo, from where the plane took off, in late August 1989 in the Libyan diplomatic bag. Now, efforts were being made to convince the world the Libyan government had sole responsibility for the outrage.

The clothing that had surrounded the bomb was of Maltese origin, and British and US investigators eventually pieced together an account of how the Suitcase carrying the bomb originated from Malta, was conveyed on flights from Malta to Frankfurt and then Frankfurt to London, before being placed on Pan Am 103. The cloths that enclosed the bomb were traced to a shop in Malta, and the son of shopkeeper claimed to have remembered selling the clothes to two individuals who were later identified as Abdal-Baset Ali Muhammad al- Megrahi (a former head of security of Libyan Arab airline) and Al-Amia Khalif Fhimah (an employee of the airline). And now Washington says Libya sabotaged the plane. However, Libyan official denied its involvement in this carnage and recommended that a neutral body like the United Nations should undertake investigation.

On 27 November the United States, Britain, and France issued a tripartite declaration demanding that Libya hand over the two suspects for trial in Scotland or in the United States and that Libya satisfy the requirements of French justice over the UTA bombing. The declaration also demanded that Libya “take complete responsibility for the actions of the Libyan officials (those who were accused)” and

that it “disclose all it knows about the crime and allow full access to all witnesses, documents and material evidence, including the remaining timers of the type used in the bomb on the Pan Am flight and that it pay compensation.”²

On the other hand the Libyan government rejected to handing over the accused, asserting it would be incompatible with the Libyan sovereignty. Though on 8 December the Libyan secretary for foreign liaison announced that Libyan judicial authorities would undertake their own investigations into the case against the two accused, which had been already taken into custody for this purpose.³ Western judges were invited to discuss the issue with the Libyan judiciary, and Britain and the United States were asked to produce the evidence against the two accused.

On 18 January the Libyan government informed the UN Secretary Council that it was invoking the 1971 Montreal Sabotage Convention in defense of its position.⁴ Article 7 of the convention (Libya, the United States, Britain, and France were signatories) states that “the contracting state in the territory on which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not the extradite him, be obliged, without exception and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”⁵ The Libyan government contended that it had, on this basis, carried out its obligations under

² *The Guardian*, 16 November 1991.

³ *JANA*, Libya Denounces Accusations, 8 December 1991.

⁴ Flores, *Shadows of Lockerbie*, p. 79.

⁵ The text is taken from Montreal Sabotage Convention, 1971: convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, art.7.

international law. Libya also at this stage emphasized its own rejection of international terrorism. In a statements, the secretariat for foreign relations on 15 November 1991 reiterated its “condemnation of all forms of terrorism” and expressed sympathy of the Libyan people for and solidarity with the families if victims caused by the destruction of Pan Am flight 103.”⁶

However, by the end of November 1991, Britain, United States and France intensified their pressure on Libya and demanded that Gaddafi should accept full criminal and financial liability for the Lockerbie and UTA bombing. All three countries urged Libya to “promptly, by concrete actions, prove its renunciation of terrorism”.⁷

UN Sanctions Against Libya:

Meanwhile the Arab League in an emergency meeting on 6 December 1991 supported Libya on the Lockerbie issue. The Arab League secretary General Ismat Abdel Meguid, called on the U.N. to join Libya in investigating the western charges. The British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd lashed out Ismat Abdel Meguid: “I cannot understand how in these circumstances, the Arab League thinks it right to express its solidarity with Libya.”⁸

On the other hand Gaddafi, himself in a conciliatory move on 27 December 1991, declared that UN and US could send independent judges to Libya to handle

⁶ *JANA*, Statement from the Secretariat for Foreign Liaison, 15 December 1991.

⁷ Quoted by Daird Hirst, ‘Reprisal Plan for Lockerbie Divides Arabs,’ *The Guardian*, (London) November 21, 1991.

⁸ “Dismay over support for Libya”, *The Independent*, (London) 7 December 1991.

the case of the two accused men. Even though the Libyan Foreign Minister further declared that Libya was willing to send judges to Washington, London and Paris to discuss the case. But US, Britain and France rejected all offers from Libya. The US insisted: "Libya must surrender for trial all those charged with the crime related to Pan Am 103 and UTA. At the same time Gaddafi expressed his doubts whether the two Libyans would get fair trial abroad.

Notwithstanding Libya's attempts to justify its refusal to hand over the accused, the United States, Britain and France brought the case before the UN Secretary Council. The British Foreign Secretary Mr. Douglas Hurd on 1 January 1992, said:

We are taking the Lockerbie bombing before the UN secretary Council. We cannot have confidence in Libyan promises to try the alleged perpetrators, since they are alleged to be Libyan intelligence officers. We consider it entirely reasonable to insist on our demands that Libya should hand over the accused men for trial, accept responsibility for the attacks on the Pam Am flight and a French airliner, and provide information on all aid provided to terrorist groups.⁹

On 21 January 1992, the Security Council passed unanimously resolution 731, which condemned the destruction of Pan Am and UTA flights and loss of lives. It also strongly deplored "the fact that the Libyan government has not yet responded to the requests to cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for the

⁹ Simons, n. 20, p. 43; see also Jihad al Khazin; "Exploiting Lockerbie" *Al-Hayat*, 25 January 1995 cited in *MEI*, No. 493, 23 February 1995, p. 21-22.

terrorist acts against Pam Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772” and urged the Libyan government “immediately to provide a full and effective response to those requests so as to contribute to the elimination on international terrorism.” The UN Secretary General was asked to seek the cooperation of the Libyan government to provide a full and effective response. Soon after UNSC Resolution 731 was adopted, the US ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickerng, commented: “If further action should be necessary, we are convinced that the council is ready to face up to its responsibilities.”¹⁰

The Libyan government’s initial reaction to Resolution 731 was conveyed to the United Nations at a meeting between the Secretary General’s special envoy, Vasiliy Safronchuk, and President Gaddafi on 26 January.¹¹ At that meeting, Gaddafi stressed Libya’s willingness to cooperate in finding those responsible for the Pan Am and UTA bombings but insisted that the case against the two Libyans be handled by Libyan courts. He suggested that the Secretary General invite judges from the United States, Britain, and France and representatives of relevant international bodies to observe a trial of the accused.

Finally, the United States had succeeded in defining for its own purposes the parameters of the Lockerbie question. There was no longer any debate about who was responsible for the outrage; whether the evidence, as formerly believed over a lengthy period, pointed to Syrian and Iranian as well as Libyan involvement. The

¹⁰ Jane Rosen, “UN Demands Pan Am Suspects”, *The Guardian*, 22 January 1992.

¹¹ United Nations, Report on the Libyan Crisis by UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, S/23574, 11 February 1992.

only issue was how the US-dominated Security Council could be induced to tighten further the noose around Libya. The U.S.'s sole purpose was to force the Libyan government to yield up the two Libyan suspects for the trial in Scotland or in the United States.

However, the Secretary to the Libyan Arab People's Bureau in Paris, Saad Muhber, reported in the Western press and elsewhere, gave reason why Libya could not extradite its own nationals. He commented that the relevant law dated to 1953 and was British-inspired as the then colonial power; that the two accused Libyans could not expect a fair trial in the US or UK as they had already been judged guilty by the media and government authorities. Muhber then proposed that the Montreal Convention of 1971 should be implemented, 'otherwise why did we all adopted it?'¹²

Actually, the suspicion continued to grow that president Bush was considering a fresh military strike against Iraq and Libya to boost his popularity in coming election. It was now increasingly obvious that the projected sanctions resolution would be passed in the Security Council within a matter of days.¹³

On the other hand, the Libyan position also won the support of the Council of the Arab League, which, at a meeting convened on 22 March 1992 specially to consider the issue, welcomed Libya's willingness to cooperate with the UN Secretary General regarding the legal aspects of Resolution 731. The Arab League

¹² Simons Geoff, *LIBYA: The Struggle For Survival*, (London, Macmillan Press Ltd), p. 54.

¹³ Quoted in Patrick Cockburn, 'Naseer's Friend Voices Arab Humiliation', *The Independent* (London), 11 March 1992

urged the UN Secretary Council to avoid adopting any decision to take economic, military, or diplomatic measures that “might increase the complications and have an adverse impact on the region.”¹⁴

By the end March 1992 it was clear that the sanctions resolution would be passed in Security Council. Despite the efforts of Libya and of the Arab League, the Security Council proceeded, on 31 March 1992, to pass a resolution enabling international sanctions to be imposed on Libya. The resolution was passed by a vote of ten in favor with none against and five abstentions (China, Cape Verde, India, Morocco and Zimbabwe). The resolution 748 instructed members of the United Nations to impose a series of measures against Libya beginning 15 April¹⁵. As the UN Security Council moved inexorably towards the imposition of mandatory sanctions, Britain and the United States advised their nationals to leave Libya as soon as possible. The British Foreign Office also set about discouraging people from traveling to Libya. However, the Libyan ambassador, Ahmad al-Houderi, noted that Libya had reaffirmed its readiness to co-operate with the Council in a manner that would not damage Libyan sovereignty or violate international law.

According to the resolution no.748, the UN members were required to cut air links with Libya, except those based on humanitarian needs; to prohibit the supply of parts or servicing to Libyan aircraft; to prohibit the provision of arms-related material, advice, or assistance; to significantly reduce the level of Libyan

¹⁴ League of Arab States, Resolution 5161, 22 March 1992.

¹⁵ United Nations, S/RES/748, 31 March 1992.

diplomatic representation in their countries; to prevent the operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices; and to deny entry to or expel Libyan nationals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.

The Libyan authorities continued to take measures to help the country ride out the sanctions that would be imposed on 15 April 1992. Funds continued to be transferred from West European banks to Geneva and Gulf States. Bankers stated that Libya was spending money stockpiling food and medicine, though there appeared to be little extra traffic through the port of Tripoli. Again it was felt unlikely that Egypt would try to close its lengthy land border with Libya, and more than one observer noted that it would be easier to feed Libya than it had been to feed Iraq. It was also clear that foreign nationals, despite advice from their governments, were not rushing to leave Libya. The South Korean authorities, with some 10,000 workers in Libya, had not even suggested that Koreans return home.

On 4 April 1992, Vladimir Petrovsky arrived in Tripoli to discuss the escalating crisis. It was likely that the Libyan authorities had few illusions about the course of events that the United States had set in train. In early April 1992, Yaseer Arafat, with some advisors, also rushed to Libya to discuss how resistance to the pressure being put on Gaddafi might be organized.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Libya approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 26 March 1992. Libya declared at the ICJ that it would never give in to "illegal and

¹⁶ Simon Tisdall and Deborah Pugh, 'Arafat Comes Out of Own Desert Storm', *The Guardian* (London), 9 April 1992.

arbitrary blackmail by the United States and the United Kingdom and urged the court to rule that US and UK be barred from taking military action against Libya. Libya wanted the US, UK, and France “to supply copies of evidence what they claim to possess.”¹⁷ It was becoming increasingly obvious that whichever way the World Court decide, the US and UK were determined to punish Libya directly or through the UN. The US pointed out in the court that Libya approached ICJ due to “its inability to convince the Security Council that it has ended its support for terrorism”¹⁸.

The ICJ on 14 April 1992 i.e. a day before the UN sanctions became effective ruled against granting Libya a provisional order against UK and US, holding that it had no power to prevent the UNSC enacting sanctions against Libya. Since the UNSC adopted the resolution on 31 March 1992, there was no way the court could have ignored Article 103 of the United Nations Charter. It was obvious, that United States and its ally were in great hurry to get the Resolution 748 being implemented. The main significance of the resolution 748 was that it represented the first stage of what many observers thought would be an escalating process, a planned strategy that was intended to lead to the crippling of the Libyan economy and the toppling of the Libyan leader i.e. Col. Gaddafi.

Eventually, on 15 April 1992, as expected, the mandatory sanctions came into effect. Italian fighter aircraft were scrambled to turn back a Libyan passenger

¹⁷ Sarah Lambert, “Libya” will not bow to blackmail”, *The Independent*, 27 March 1992

¹⁸ Mrthy, C.S.R, “ United Nations Sanctions Against Libya: A Perspective.” *Journal of West Asian Studies*. P. 20.

aircraft, and Tunisia and Egypt refused to grant permission for Libyan planes to land. On the other hand, the US informed the Libyan mission at the United Nations that it would have to reduce its staff from twelve diplomats to nine. France, Japan, Sweden and Belgium announced that they would expel a number of diplomats, and Switzerland declared that it would curb arms sales. Even Russia said that it would withdraw hundreds of its military experts training the Libyan armed forces. Libya immediately threatened to take 'reciprocal measures' against any countries that expelled its diplomats, with Libyan radio attacking the sanctions as 'the continuation of a war by the imperialist states against other peoples and an attempt to force them to submit to hegemony'; Libyans, an official statement declared, would 'kneel to no one but Allah'¹⁹.

A committee of the Security Council was established to oversee the implementation and operation of the sanctions. Among the other tasks, the committee would "decide upon the approval of humanitarian flights, consider information concerning violations of the resolution and recommend appropriate responses to such violations". Article 13 of Resolution 748 stipulates that 'the Security Council shall every 120 days, or sooner should the situation so require, review the measures imposed'.

However, the United States had again decided to target the Libyan regime of Col. Gaddafi. The widely suspected complicity of Syria and Iran in the Lockerbie

¹⁹ Simons, Geoff, *LIBYA: The Struggle For Survival*, (London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), p.66.

case was to be ignored. The attempt was to brand Libya a sole culprit. Therefore, on 16 April 1992 the US States Department declared that the United States would not end sanctions, even if the two accused men were surrendered for trial. It also announced that the US would maintain a worldwide economic offensive against Libya. Now, it was apparent that Washington interested more in targeting Libyan leader Col. Gaddafi than in bringing the two accused men for trial. In fact, the primary goal of US was not only to bring down Gaddafi's regime but also to cripple its economy and weaken its military machine.

It is important to note that the Resolution 748 placed no restrictions on the sale of Libyan oil. Any such move would have met with opposition from those European countries that were most dependent on imports of Libyan oil—Italy, Germany, and Spain²⁰.

However, Libya's policy was to preserve imposition of UN sanctions in 1992, within the framework of proposal Libya had to put forward prior to the sanctions. The government continued to express eagerness to find a framework that would enable a judicial inquiry into the cases against the two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing but stressed that it must be consistent with Libyan and international law. The accused would not be handed over to courts in Britain and the United States. And the willingness to cooperate with the French inquiry into the UTA bombing repeated.

²⁰ Niblock, Tim, *"Pariah Satiates" & Sanctions in the Middle East, Iraq, Libya, Sudan*, (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, 2001), p. 41.

It must be stressed that the US move, far from discrediting Gaddafi's regime has in fact enhanced his legitimacy and helped Gaddafi consolidate his hold on power. To Libyans, US doubled standards and hypocrisy is obvious and this has only fuelled anti-American feelings in the region. This was the circumstance when Bill Clinton assumed the power as president. Even Clinton followed as tough a policy on Libya as did the Bush administration. In fact, during his presidential campaign, Clinton had promised the families of the victims of the Pan Am 103 flight that he would toughen international sanctions on Libya. And, as early as March 1993, the USA sought to impose a worldwide oil embargo on Libya.²¹ The United States managed to convince even states with close economic ties to Libya, such as Italy and Germany, to support the sanctions as a way to force Gaddafi to hand over the bombing suspects.

²¹ Greenberger Robert, "US may press for global boycott of Libyan oil", *Wall Street Journal*, 31 March 1993.

CHAPTER-IV

POST LOCKERBIE RELATIONS IN THE 1990S

US policy towards Libya drastically changed after the bloody incidents of Lockerbie. The US succeeded in imposing sanctions against Libya by the United Nations after the Lockerbie incident. The aim of western sponsored embargo is not only to force Libya to extradite the suspects for trial but also to discredit Gaddafi and his regime by conducting partial trial implicating the two suspects in the bombings. The West thereby tried to show the world that Gaddafi's regime was encouraging the terrorist attacks on the Western targets. Then the West may demand that the sanctions should be continued until Gaddafi resigns and makes a retreat in his opposition to the west. This is the reason why the resolution no. 741 does not spell out when the sanctions will be lifted, if at all Libya agrees to handover the suspects.

However, the imposition of sanctions on Libya, with frequent threats of worse to come, graphically illustrated the character of the post-cold war world. The pressure on Libya was maintained despite accumulating evidence that the US posture was factually flawed and legally indefensible. Apparently, Washington's cavalier pursuit of a favorite *bete noire* had gravely damaged the integrity of the United Nations. In June 1992 the Spanish police arrested a Syrian national, Monzer al- Kassar, suspected of involvement in the Lockerbie bombing-highlighting yet

again the possible complicity of states other than Libya in the 1988 outrage.¹ At the same time the German public prosecutor Volker Rath announced in a statement that received little publicity, that Germany would be suspending its legal proceeding against the two Libyan suspects as there was insufficient evidence of their involvement.²

In fact the Libyan authorities themselves were making efforts, short of suspending the two men. In May 1992 the Libyan news agency Jana stated that links with terrorists groups were being terminated and that any UN committee was free to visit Libya to ascertain that there were no terrorist groups in Libya. On 2 September 1992 Col. Gaddafi appealed to the United States for direct talks to resolve their differences. Washington made no response. However, America declared that unless the Libyan government agreed to handover the suspects, 'there is nothing really to talk about'. The Gaddafi regime would make various suggestions to resolve the dispute, but Washington would not be interested. Now, it was clear that even if the two Libyan suspects were extradited for trial in the west the sanctions would remain in place.

LIBYA: The Rogue State

As the Bush administration struggles to define its foreign policy, with sanctions slipping on Iraq and the prospects of missile defence raising

¹ Kathy Evans and Richard North-Taylor, 'Spain checks Syrian link to Lockerbie', *The Guardian* (London), 6 June 1992.

² 'German Doubts Over Lockerbie', *The Independent* (London), 20 June 1992.

complications around the world, a new question was emerged: How should Washington handle a “rogue”³ states that is gradually abandoning its objectionable practices? What should the United States do when its long-standing policy toward a maverick country such as Libya starts pay off and that country finally begins to cleanup its act?

Although most analysts trace the origin of the ‘rogue states’ doctrine to the Clinton era, it was General Collin Powell, who developed the strategy. Powell proposed a set of guidelines upon which US military strategy would be based. Powell sought to establish a new strategic paradigm that could be used to argue against deep cuts in military spending and at the same time imbue the armed forces with a new sense of purpose. The principal idea was for U.S. forces to develop ample military power and be able to wage war and win to regional conflicts simultaneously.

Thus, ‘the anti-rogue strategy has become the defending paradigm for American security policy’⁴ Primarily, most of the so-called ‘rogue states’ are located in the Middle East, except for Cuba and North Korea, and ‘rogue states’ Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria are all Muslim.

The new threat to US security came from the alleged rogue states, that is, those states which possessed significant military capabilities, threatened collective security, opposed US interests, sponsored international terrorism, sought to develop

³ The term “rogue state” has two uses: a propagandistic use, applied to assorted enemies, and a literal use that applies to states that do not regard themselves as bound by international norms.

⁴ Michael T Klare, “An anachronistic policy”, *Harvard International Review*, 2(2) 2000, pp.46.

weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the Gulf war in 1991 gave additional credence to the rogue states doctrine.

During the Clinton's era of the rogue states doctrine became the canon of US security policy. In 1994, National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake declared that policy. In his view, rogue (or 'backlash') states are those recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family of nations [now committed to the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the promotion of collective security] but also assault its basic values'.⁵ Lake described rogues as states ruled by authoritarian leaders who despise popular participation because such participation represents a threat to their rule. The lack of legitimacy induces them to pursue military programmes, particularly in weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems 'to protect their regimes or advance their purposes abroad'.⁶

Therefore the US expected the rest of world to isolate rogues by severing commercial ties, imposing multilateral sanctions, and hampering the military and technological potential of those states. Before Lake elaborated on the rogue states doctrine, Libya had already been subjugated to arrange of punitive actions prescribed by US officials. In 1986, just two years before Lockerbei incident, president Reagan broke off relations with Libya and imposed economic sanctions in

⁵ Lake Anthony, "Confronting backlash states", *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (2), 1994, p. 45.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 46.

response of allegedly a series of terrorist incident, with sole purpose of toppling the Gaddafi regime.

Consequently, in January and March 1992 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 731 and 748, respectively. The resolutions demanded that Libya handover the two suspects, co-operate with the investigations teams of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772, compensate the victim's families, and cease all support for terrorism.⁷ But, Libya refusal to extradite its two accused citizens tom UK or The United States, where they had to face criminal charges. Thus, on November 1993 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution no. 883, which imposed further sanctions against Libya.⁸

Libya: Under The Sanctions

Libya continued to express, its eagerness to find a frame work that would enable a judicial inquiry into the case against the two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing but stressed that it must be consistent with Libyan and international law. The accused would not be handed over to the United States or the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the United States rejected all these suggestion, which Gaddafi had proposed. Even though, on 26 June 1993 Gaddafi offered to surrender the two suspects to the American politician Jesse Jackson, provided that Jackson promised not to take them to Britain or the United States. 'All the world trusts you. The two people can go with you to anywhere other than America or

⁷ *Security Council Resolution 731*, 21 January 1992.

⁷ *Security Council Resolution 778*, 31 March 1992.

⁸ *United Nations Security Council, S/RES/883*, 11 November 1993.

Britain. However, this proposal was also rejected: Washington would not agree to the two Libyans beings escorted by Jesse Jackson for trail anywhere out side the America or Britain.

Now, Gaddafi was taking various measures to limit the damage inflicted by sanctions. Serbian aircraft technicians were reportedly helping Libya maintain its Boeing aircraft, in a breach of the UN embargoes against both Libya and Serbia.⁹ Gaddfi had apparently succeeded in taking control of the Athens-based Arab Hellenic Bank (AHB)¹⁰ - a move deemed likely to limit the impact of possible financial sanctions in the future. Indeed, in mid-August 1993 the US, Britain and France gave Libya a fresh deadline of 1 October 1993: the suspects would be handed over by that date or Libya would face additional sanctions. In late August 1993 there were hints that the two suspects might be handed over for trail in Scotland: the Libyan were so anxious to explore what from such a trail might take. At the same time Washington intensified its efforts at the UN for a fresh sanctions resolution against the Gaddafi regime.¹¹

On 1 October 1993 the US, Britain and France formally introduced their new sanctions Resolutions to the Security Council. However, the Libyan foreign minister, Omer al-Muntaseer, declared that Libya is committed to surrender of the two accused men, it was 'only a matter of time' but he refused to set a date. The UN Secretary General then reported (6th Oct.) that no progress had been made with

⁹ Alan George, 'UN Pair Flout Embargo to keep Libyan jets in Air', *The Observer*, London, 4 July 1993.

¹⁰ *The Independent* (London), 15 February 1993.

¹¹ *The Observer*, London, 29 August 1993.

Libya on setting a date for surrender of the two Libyans. But the Russian Government had complained that if Libya's financial assets overseas were to be frozen Russia might not be able to recover the \$4 billion that was owed by Libya. Subsequently, President Clinton, British Prime Minister, John Major, and the French Premier, Edouard Balladur, all wrote separately to Boris Yeltsin, urging him not to veto further sanctions on Libya.¹² Finally, the new Resolution 883, was passed on 11 November 1993, a further blow to the Libyan economy.

Implications of the Sanctions

Libya responded to the new Security Council resolution by closing its borders with the Egypt and Tunisia for three days in protest, and by denouncing what it perceived as hostile western policies. The UN sanctions, combined with low oil prices, certainly had a negative impact on the Libyan economy, substantially reducing investments in the oil industry. They have also harmed Libya's impressive advances in health care, education and economic equality.¹³ But, the USA failed to convince its European allies and others to extend the embargo to include the purchase of Libyan oil. This was not surprising for the United States, because, Secretary of States Warren Christopher said on 30 March 1993: 'I think the time has come to stiffen the embargo against Libya and one of the things we want to talk about is an oil embargo'.

¹² Marks Tran, "Moscow Falls in Step Over new Lockerbie Sanctions", *The Guardian* London, 1 December, 1993.

¹³ Kate Clark, 'Sanctions and insurrections', *The Middle East*, December, 1996, p.11..

However, France, Germany and Italy- big importers of Libyan oil- were unwilling to support the new US policy; and even London, normally supine under the US pressure, seemed reluctant to encourage a ban on Libyan oil sales.¹⁴ European argued, despite favorable oil-supplies, that their dependency on Libyan oil prevented them from expanding sanctions to the oil sector.¹⁵ Both French and Italian oil companies planned on making major investments in Libya's oil industry. Apparently, despite the Clinton administration's tough rhetoric, US pressure on Libya remained limited; it failed to secure the handing over of the suspects of Lockerbie tragic. Libya was convinced that the Clinton administration's target was not the indicted men but the regime itself.

However, the United States continued to put pressure not only on Libya but also its allies. Indeed, in December 1995 the US Congress adopted measures that resulted in strains in US- European relations. The Senate decided to impose sanctions on foreign businesses making new, sizeable investments in Libya's hydrocarbon sector. The bill, sponsored by the US Senator Alfonse D' Amato, penalized foreign businesses that intended to invest \$40 million or more in Libya's energy sector. Obviously, European companies that have considerable interests in Libya's oil concerns, were most affected by the new Senate decisions. Actually, this was a secondary embargo with extraterritorial implications for companies investing in Libya (and Iran). The European nation observed that was an internationalization

¹⁴ Simons Geoff, *Libya: The Struggle For Survival*, (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), P. 71

¹⁵ Greenberger Robert "Washington insights: Clinton misses opportunity in oil glut to punish Libya for Pan Am bombing", *Wall Street journal*, 28 February 1994.

of the US foreign policies and questioned the efficacy of such a measure. The Whitehouse understood that such a measure would be damaging to US-European relations and thus sought to resist it. In order to block the bill, the administration exhorted the international community to support the expand of existing UN sanctions on oil-related equipment for Libya.¹⁶

However, US unilateral sanctions against Libya and other countries placed the US at loggerheads with European allies, as well as with other countries that have trade relations with Libya, Iran and Cuba. Not only did the US pass the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996, that same year it also passed the 'Cuban Liberty and democratic Solidarity [Liberated] Act' better known as the Helms – Burton Act (named after Senator Jessie Helms and Rep Dan Burton). President Clinton signed it into law in March 1996.

One of the most onerous elements of US sanctions policy to International Oil Companies has been the advent of extraterritorial sanctions which seek to control third country behavior in the US. The Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) and the Helms-Burton Act are the best-known sanctions bills affecting foreign companies. ILSA was designed to restrict foreign investments in Iran and Libya by threatening action against foreign company assets in the US (the Helms-Burton Act was directed against Cuba). Proponents of these sanctions have argued that

¹⁶ Robert Greenberger & Laurie Lande, "European are irked by Senate move to punish foreign investments in Libya", *Wall Street Journal*, 22 December 1995.

implementation of US sanctions against Iran and Libya has avoided even more damage to US relations with its allies and US interests abroad.

In August 1996, responding to the failure of other countries to back the hard line anti-Libyan position, President Clinton signed a law introduced by the Afonse D' Amato which, like the one in December 1995, imposed a secondary boycott on foreign countries and companies. This applied to foreign countries and businesses braking the UN embargo against Libya by selling such prohibited items as weapons, aircraft or aero plane parts. In fact, the D' Amato act went beyond the curbing of terrorism; it provided the potential for exerting US pressure on weaker countries.¹⁷ According to that law, the president can 'determine' that a person, company or government is in violating of the act, and the aggrieved party has no recourse to challenge the president's determination in court or anywhere else.¹⁸ The bill provided for an array of sanctions, including banning the sale of products of guilty firms in the US. The US's strongest allies raised fierce objections to the D' Amato law.¹⁹ While, President Clinton justify that this legalization will heighten the pressures on Libya to extradite the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am flight103.²⁰

However, Libya had already made proposal to hand over of its two suspects citizens to trail in Egypt, Malta, and elsewhere or to the Arab League or The Hague; all these suggestion had been rejected by the United States of America. Proposal

¹⁷ *US Congress, House of Representatives Bill HR 3107*, 18 June 1996, p. H6469.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Clark Kate, "Sanctions and insurrections", *The Middle East*, December 1996, p.11.

were further developed in february1994 when the Libyan delegate to the Arab League Ibrahim al- Bishari, proposed that the two suspects should be tried at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague under Scottish law before a tribunal of Scottish judges.²¹ This proposal was given added weight when the Council of the Arab League, on 27 March 1994, passed a resolution supporting the idea of trail at the ICJ under Scottish law and called on the UN Security Council to “take this new and constructive proposal into consideration with a view to arriving at a peace-full settlement and avoiding any escalating which might exacerbate tension within the region”.²²

Failure to bring about any change in the British or US positions led Libya in October 1997 to turn again to the ICJ. On 13 October 1997, Libyan lawyers at the Hague asked the ICJ to pass judgment on the claim that Libya, under the 1971 Montreal Convention, was not obliged to surrender the two accused for trail in Britain or the United States. The Libyan interpretain of the convention was that crimes of “international terrorism” could be tried in the courts of the country at the accused person’s nationality.²³ Thus, legal advisers for the British and US governments, in response, contended that the ICJ had no jurisdiction on matters that had been determined by the Security Council.²⁴

²¹ BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1994.

²² *Guardian*, 17 January 1994.

²³ *Guardian*, 18 October 1994.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

The first stage in the ICJ's deliberations, therefore, was to reach a judgment as to whether it had jurisdiction enabling it to hear Libya's claim. On 27 February 1998, the ICJ ruled that it did indeed have jurisdiction to hear the Libyan claim. Although, Britain and the United States dismissed this ruling as a technicality, insofar as the substance of the Libyan case was still to be examined, the judgment did raise the possibility that Libya might find itself buttressed by international legitimacy in its struggle with Britain and the United States.²⁵

Eventually, in 1998 a compromise on the hand over of the suspects became possible. Secretary of State Madeline Albright and UK foreign Secretary Robin Cook made an effort to the Libyans to have the trial of the two suspects under Scottish law in a court in the Netherlands. Under this proposal, the suspects, if convicted, would serve time in a British prison.²⁶ The proposals were based on an agreement reached between the British and the US governments in early July, the content of which had been given publicity in the press later that month. Announcement of the initiative was delayed pending the formation of a new government in the Netherlands, whose approval was nodded.²⁷ Albright underscored the fact that this was a 'take-it-or-leave-it' proposition and that the US would push for additional sanctions, including an oil embargo, if Libya declined the proposal.²⁸

²⁵ *The Times*, 28 February 1998.

²⁶ *The Times*, 25 August 1998.

²⁷ *Guardian*, 21 July 1998.

²⁸ *Washington Post*, 25 August, 1998, p. A1, A11

Toward Normalizations

The imminent collapse of the USSR in 1989-90 has changed the world politics. Now, there is only one power remain on the globe which is the United States. There is not a single power that could challenge the American supremacy. Libyan politics was also adversely affected by the collapse of Soviet Union, because Libya was also a close ally of erstwhile Soviet Union and gradually enhancing its wealth in every sector by the support of USSR. Libyan economy is basically based on oil industry. Therefore Gaddafi needs US more because of oil. Gaddafi himself was keen to normalize Libya relations with the United States as well as West (i.e. European Country). On the other hand, there is little political incentive in the United States to moderate the administration's position toward Libya. Clearly, there are few in the United States willing to defend Gaddafi regime.

On 24 August 1998, Britain and the United States put forward new proposal for trying the two Libyans accused of being responsible for bombing the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. The accused would be judged in a specially convened court in the Netherlands, with three Scottish judges sitting in judgment. Although the British and US proposals can be seen as testimony to Libya's achievement, they also constituted a diplomatic achievement for the British government. Just over three months before the British-US proposals were issued, US President Bill Clinton had stated that the United States would never accept a third-country trial for the Lockerbie accused. Intense British diplomatic effort was needed in order for this

position to be changed and this effort was to continue in the period subsequent to the proposals, when the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office had to convince it gave to the Libyan side. Whereas the British Lockerbie families were supportive of a third-country solution, US families were not and they were in support of their government retaining an intransigent stand.

In the months that followed, the two sides engaged in direct contacts geared toward bringing about the trail. The British-US position was that negotiating with Libya was not appropriate: The substance of the proposals was not negotiable, and there could be no question of further concessions. This position was underpinned in practice by the dynamics of the relationship between Britain and the United States and the manner in which they had agreed to the proposals going forward. Effectively Britain had persuaded the United States, against considerable resistance, to permit the new initiative to proceed. The United States had accepted that the British government would take the lead in carrying the matter forward provided that further developments did not go outside the framework. One element was that there should be no direct contacts between the Libyan governments. The main channel for any communications would be the Secretary –General of the United Nations.²⁹ Libya's position was that proposals constituted a significant step forward but that further negotiations were needed. Britain and the United States had at last accepted

²⁹ Niblock Tim, *"Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East*, (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 54-55.

the principal of a third-country trial, and Libya now needed to be assured of the details.

Intense negotiations between the Libyans and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan took place for almost a year. Finally, Libya had decided to extradite its two citizens for trial in Holland in April 1999. Almost simultaneously, the Libyans informed the United Nations officially of their decision to hand over the suspects by April 1999 to be tried in Camp Zeist, a former US military base, near the Dutch city of Utrecht.³⁰

However, Libya sought clarifications and elaborations as to the proposals, and the British government (after consulting with the US government) provided a series of assurances. The Libyan concerns were initially made explicit through a letter to the UN Secretary-General in early September 1998 containing numerous issues that were in need of clarification and elaboration, before the handing over of suspects. The initial British assurances, in response, were conveyed through the UN later that month.³¹ But the Libyan side sought more detail on some of the assurances, further assurances were given. By the end of 1998, assurances had covered five major areas of concern.

a) The first was the place of trial. In mid-September 1998, Britain and the Netherlands had signed an agreement enabling the trial to be held at Camp Zeist. Libyan authorities stated that this raised suspicions that Britain and the United

³⁰ Zubir.H, Yahiya, *The United States in the Maghreb* (University Press of Florida, 1999).

³¹ *Guardian*, 26 October 1998. p.49

States were not genuinely intent on an independent and objective trial. Because, the location was an air base and the US Air Force is still using the base. The British government's response was that this was a misunderstanding. Although the proposed site had indeed constituted part of a NATO air base, the area no longer had a NATO presence. The proposed site, in any case, was situated in buildings that had not been used for military purpose: a school and hospital that were used by the families of service personnel. It was indeed under Dutch government control. Britain and the US would not be able to take action by themselves, as that would infringe Dutch sovereignty.

b) The second area of concern related to the conditions under which the accused would be held. The British government gave assurances that the families of the accused would be able to visit them during the trial and that the defence would be able to summon any witness to give evidence including British and US officials.

c) The third area of concern was the link between the trial and the lifting of UN sanctions against Libya. Libyan authorities wanted assurance that its agreement to the proposals would be followed by the lifting of UN sanctions. The British government's assurances, in keeping with the decision that had already been taken by the UN Security Council, was that sanctions would be suspended immediately after the accused were handed over to Dutch control.

d) The fourth area of concern—perhaps the most crucial of all was that the trial would become political, that it would turn into an attack on the whole Libyan

system. The British government gave assurances that the British and US governments saw the trial simply as a criminal justice trial involving two individuals; that they were not seeking to 'inculcate' or 'blame' anyone other than the two accused; that the prosecution did not "at present" intend to call any witnesses from Libya; that if any witnesses were called from Libya they would be given immunity from arrest for any offenses committed in the past; and that the British and US governments were not pursuing any hidden political agenda through the trial.

e) The fifth area of concern was tied to events should the accused be found guilty. Libya's initial position was that imprisonments take place in Libya, possibly under UN supervision. This was later changed to include an acceptance that imprisonment could be in the Netherlands. For Libya, the arguments against imprisonment in Scotland were the same arguments for not holding the trial in Britain or the United States: the two governments could not be trusted to treat it as an objective matter of justice but would use it to political ends. In the case of imprisonment, the prisoners would become tools in the political campaign waged by the two governments against Libya. To meet these concerns, the British government gave the Libyan side the following assurances: the prisoner would not be interrogated by British security or police forces during their imprisonment; no security or police forces of any other country would be allowed to interrogate them; the place of imprisonment would be made open to inspection by such international

bodies as was desired by the Libyan side. And there would be no extradition of the prisoners to the United States.

Despite these clarifications of British government, Libya remained dissatisfied over Britain's failure to agree to imprisonment in Libya or the Netherlands, but there were indications that this would not impede a final agreement. The problem of mistrust was ultimately overcome through the use of intermediaries who were held in trust by both sides. However, South Africa and Saudi mediation played a critical role in bringing the gap between Libyans, on the one hand, and the United States and Britain, on the other. In fact, it was Nelson Mandela's mediation that finally led to the surrender of the two suspects. After talks in Tripoli, Mandela declared that Libya had decided to extradite its two citizens for trial in Holland by 6 April 1999.³²

On April 5th 1999, Libya surrendered Meghrahi and Fhimah to the UN to face trial in the Netherlands. Kofi Annan announced the UN sanctions against Libya would be suspended, and could be lifted after 90 days, as provided in UNSC resolution. The suspension of UN sanctions, however, did not imply that unilateral US sanctions would also be suspended. While UN sanctions were suspended upon surrender of the two suspects, the USA opposed any permanent lifting of them despite strong endorsement from the Non-Aligned Movement, the OAU (Organization of African Unity), and the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) and Arab countries. The EU (European Union) too suspended the Lockerbie related

³² *Financial Times*, 20-21 March 1999.

sanctions against Libya. And Europe has responded to Libya's overtures with friendly dialogue and greatly increased trade.

Now Gaddafi has also begun to shift the international focus toward Africa. Because, till now Gaddafi pursuing his Pan-Arabism Philosophy, which he had inherited from Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Naseer. Now, Gaddafi realized that his Pan-Arabism Philosophy was a major irritant between Libya and the U.S. to have cordial relations. Therefore, he tried to shift his focus from Arab-Unity to African Unity.

Thus, In March 1999 the Gaddafi has proclaimed his new orientation, announcing, "I have no time to loose talking with Arab...I now talk about Pan-Africanism and African unity. Libya's new African policy has become the first test of Gaddafi's evolving ideology and newfound moderation. Previously, Libya had tried to export revolution through Africa by subsidizing insurgencies and destabilizing local states. Successive US administrations, mainly under Reagan, have overemphasized the impact of Gaddafi on North African politics and regional stability. Such preoccupation with Libya distracted US attentions from more important trends shaping the region, including the centrality of Algeria, efforts at Maghreb unity, and progress towards economic and political liberalization. U S officials discounted the possibility that Maghreb unity, not US hostility, would be far more likely to moderate Libyan conduct. Instead, the United States has actively

discouraged the inclusion of Libya in such co-operation, despite its potentially stabilizing effect.³³

Now, Gaddafi seems to have abandoned his radical heritage. He has focused on mediating crises while claiming a place at the African roundtable. Gaddafi has embarked on a high-profile diplomatic campaign to settle conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Horn of Africa, Sudan, and Sierra Leone. Libya has also signed bilateral trade and cultural pacts with Niger, Senegal, and South Africa, while extending aid to Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Even, Tripoli has hosted an extraordinary OAU meeting to press for the creation of a "United States of Africa" as a means to promote solidarity and economic integration.

Consequently, Gaddafi has begun to offer a new vision for Libya. In a September 2000 speech commemorating the Libyan Revolution, he not only proclaimed an end to his long-standing anti-imperialist struggle but also suggested that it was time for former antagonists to start cooperating with one another. In a series of seminars and speeches, the colonel outlined his new ideas to his restive constituents, declaring, "Now is the era of economy, consumption, markets, and investments. This is what unities people irrespective of language, religion, and nationalities."³⁴

³³ Mortimer Robert, "Maghereb Matters", *Foreign Policy*, fall 1989, pp.160-175.

³⁴ Takeb, Ray, "The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 2001. P. 155

Gaddafi's philosophical evolution and his African endeavors have sparked some interest in the international community. But further changes must occur before rapprochement with the United States will be possible. There are three outstanding issues alleged by US to normalize relations with Libya: these are- Libya's support for terrorism, its attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and its position to the Arab-Israel peace process. However, American administration has stated that they would welcome resumed relations with the Libya if Gaddafi would just abandon his provocative behavior.

Thus, officials insisted that Libya had to fulfill other conditions: to cooperate with the investigation and trial; to pay appropriate compensation to relatives of the victims Lockerbie bombing.

a) Terrorism: - Although Libya has a long history of supporting outlawed organization such as Italy's Red Brigades and the Irish Republican Army, Gaddafi has recently severed his links with terrorist clients, thus abandoning terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. In 1999 Libya expelled the Abu Nidal organizations from its territory and broke its ties to other radical Palestinian groups such as the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine and Islamic Jihad. In accordance with an Arab league agreement, Libya has extradited Islamist militants as suspected terrorists to Egypt, Yaman and Jordan. Once-notorious training camps have been closed down, and terror groups have been told to find other sources of arms and supplies.

b) **WMD:** - Apart from terrorism, US policy makers have also been concerned by Libya's attempts to acquire WMD. Since April 1999 suspension of UN arms embargo, Libya has sought to modernize its decrepit armed forces by acquiring advanced weapons from North Korea and Russia. CIA recently announced, "Tripoli has not given up its goal of establishing its own offensive [Chemical Weapons] programme." Although Libya progressed towards acquiring chemical weapons, it has not yet managed to become a nuclear threat. As the Pentagon describes it, Libya's nuclear project "lacks well-developed plans, expertise, consistent financial support, and adequate foreign suppliers." Thus Washington should recognize the Tripoli's attempts to acquire WMD make a certain kind of sense. Little wonder, then, that Tripoli has chosen to build up its air power, missile force, and chemical weapons in order to deter potential adversaries with larger armies. On the other hand, after all Libya is richer than its neighbors but is sparsely populated and has long, unsettled borders. The country's lucrative oil fields have, at various, been coveted by neighbors such as Algeria. US diplomacy should persuade Libya that its WMD projects would only precipitate a regional arms race that will exacerbate rather than alleviate its vulnerability.

c) **Peace process:** - The third major obstacle in US-Libyan relations has been Gaddafi's ferocious rejection of efforts to settle the conflict between Israel and its neighbours. But here again Libya seems to have undergone a conversion in the past few years. Although the Colonel Gaddafi still makes shrill calls for the 'battle of the century' to end the 'Zionist occupation', on a practical level Libya has yielded to

American demands by terminating its support for rejectionist Palestinian groups and accepting the Palestinian authority's right to negotiate with Israel. In the past, the kind of violence now occurring in the West bank and Gaza would have led to the dispatch of Libyan arms and aid to Palestinian militants. This time, Gaddafi has limited himself to sporadic rhetorical fulmination and avoided tangible measures that would add further strain to an already tense situation. Gaddafi may never cross the existential barrier that some other Arabs leaders have traversed by recognizing Israel. But, in practice, Gaddafi has already isolated Libya from Arab-Israel confrontations. In fact Gaddafi has already begun to shift the international focus toward Africa. As March 1999 the Gaddafi has proclaimed his new orientation, announcing, "I have no time to loose talking with Arab...I now talk about Pan-Africanism and African unity. Libya's new African policy has become the first test of Gaddafi's evolving ideology and newfound moderation.

The USA would perhaps agree to lift of the sanction. US officials admitted publicly that Libya has actually withdrawn from terrorism business. Assistant secretary of state Martin Indyk declared that 'we are aware ... that many Security Council members anxious to close the chapter of Libya sanctions. Further more, the US government made it clear that US unilateral sanctions against Libya would continue. The only exceptions to the sanctions were commercial sells of food, medicines and medical equipment, which government announce in may 1999 as a result of the sanctions reforms. However, US oil companies lobbied to the US government hard to lift sanctions on Libya. This lobbying was fairly successful, for

in February 2000 government allowed four US oil companies, i.e. Conoco, Occidental, Marthon and Amereda Hess.

On the other hand Libya's on going reintegration into the world community has already started to pay off, and the rewards it has won from reclaimed trade partnership have generated desire within the country to come to terms with America as well. Libya is eager to open a diplomatic dialogue. Abuzed Dorada, Libya's UN envoy has said, "I expect that we will sit down with the Americans and put the past behind us." Even Gaddafi, in his own eccentric manner, has made overtures to the new American president, stressing, "I believe that George W. Bush will be nice. As a person he is not malicious or imperialist. I believe that he attaches importance to the United States and does not have world ambitions."

Eventually, a modest level of trade has already quietly developed between the two states. In 2000, Libya took advantage of the newly eased sanctions on food and medicine to purchase 50,500 tons of wheat and 26,100 tons of corn from the United States. In a further, subtle signal to the United States, in November 2000, Libyan General Secretary Mubarak al- Shamikh dismissed reports that US oil companies assets in Libya have been nationalized and pledged that American investments are "protected and waiting for them to return." The current administration should aim simply to establish a framework that can be used for the gradual resumption of US-Libyan ties.

The day after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Col. Gaddafi condemned the actions publicly as “horrifying, destruction”. Top US and Libyan officials have held several unpublicized meetings in England and Switzerland to discuss improving ties. The Libyan leader himself has been taking steps and sending signals that suggest he may want to get out of the terrorism business, US Official said. US diplomats who have been in recent contact with Gaddafi said that in the aftermath of the Sep. 11 terrorist attacks he has accelerated his efforts to improve his standing in the West. Because, Col. Gaddafi publicly stated that the United States had a right to pursue the perpetrators. British Foreign Office Minister Mike O’Brien declared that Libya could be a key ally in the global war against terrorism, specifically the Al-Qaeda.

However, it seems that the animosity between them will continue. The verdict of the Lockerbie trial (15 March 2002), is far from ending the conflict between the two countries. On the eve of the verdict, Secretary of States, Colin Powell, made it clear that ‘regardless of the outcome that will be announced... there are other things that the Libyan Government will be expected to do with respect to the other elements of the U N sanctions’. Libyans believed that the end of the Lockerbie trial would lead to normalization with the US as happened with France over the UTA 772 case. They called for a complete lifting of UN sanctions and made it clear that they sought normal relations with the United States.³⁵ In April 2002, concerns, about US security compelled the US to review sanctions on Libya.

³⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, 1 February 2001.

Some members of the Bush administration, aware of the need for energy investments in Libya and Iran, were convinced of the ineffectiveness of sanctions and sought to influence Congress not to renew the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) for another five years. Even US oil companies, lobbied the administration and Congress to allow them to renew their activities in Libya. Thus, President Bush sought a two-year extension of the ILSA, on 26 July.

On the other hand, in August 2002 Mike O' Brien, a minister of the British foreign and Commonwealth office, visited Libya for talks with Col. Gaddafi; this was the first visit by a British government minister for the last 20 years. After the meeting O' Brien revealed that Libya accepted 'general responsibility' for the Lockerbie bombing, while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs declared that Libya was ready 'in principle' to take steps to compensate the relatives of Lockerbie victims. The Libyan leader had also expressed his willingness to co-operate with the international community on issues such as 'weapons of mass destructions' and the 'war against terrorism'.

CHAPTER-V

CONCLUSION

When Gaddafi assumed power in Libya, he moved quickly to attack and he ordered the U.S. to evacuate the Wheelus Air Force Base. Moreover, Gaddafi played an instrumental role in raising the oil prices and sought Libyan participation in the oil companies. He also stridently opposed all U.S. attempts to bring about partial agreements on the Arab-Israel conflict. Since then US-Libyan views on major world issues diverged widely. Two Libyan intelligence agents were charged in the United States with the Lockerbie bombing; Gaddafi had refused initially to surrender the alleged men for trial.

Therefore, the United States has always been looking for some excuse to bring about over throw of Col. Gaddafi, since the inception of his regime. Even some U.S. officials admitted that we tried to provoke Col. Gaddafi. Hence, from time to time, the U.S. has taken unfriendly and provocative actions, against Libya with a view to destabilize the country and remove Gaddafi. Ultimately, Gaddafi did fall into the traps set by the United States, especially in 1986. Actually, the U.S. response to questionable Libyan acts was quit disproportionate and resulted in the death of many civilians on 15 April 1986. The United States hoped that that it would help topple the Gaddafi's regime, the result was on the contrary, the strengthening of his power. He became hero in the eyes of his people and many of third world nations. In fact, Gaddafi emerged as the victim of American 'arrogancy' and 'hegemonic' power.

However, the United States again tried to punish Gaddafi, and forced to accept the American hegemony. When Lockerbie incident occurred, The United States somehow managed in the United Nations to impose sanctions against Libya. Contrary, Col. Gaddafi had long believed that Libya's oil wealth and commercial appeal would undermine any cohesive opposition. Then, U.S. managed to convince even states with close economic ties to Libya, such as Italy and Germany to support the sanctions as a way to force Gaddafi to hand over the bombing suspects.

On the other hand, Libya was found to be in the process of constructing a chemical weapons plant at Rabta, a plant, which is now the largest, such facility in the Third World. Libya is currently constructing another chemical weapons production facility at Tarhunah. Libya's support for terrorism and its past regional aggressions made this development a matter of major concern to the United States. In cooperation with like-minded countries, the United States has since sought to bring a halt to the foreign technical assistance deemed essential to the completion of this facility.

The main issue in the imbroglio was not extradition and terrorism which were only incidental, but the so-called disciplining of regime not acceptable to the West especially the United States. The aim of the Western sponsored embargo was not only to force Libya to extradite the suspects allegedly involved in the Lockerbie bombing for trial but also to discredit Gaddafi and his regime by conducting partial trial implicating the two accused in the bombing. The West thereby tried to show

the world that Gaddafi's regime was encouraging the terrorist attacks on the Western targets. Actually, on the basis of these allegations the United States wanted to remove Col. Gaddafi and install a regime favorable to it.

Therefore, the U.S. was using the UN mechanism to legitimize its unilateral actions and thereby politicizing the world body, which was supposed to function as an apolitical body. The threat of imposing sanctions with the approval of the world body on regimes which were inimical to interest or which did not toe the line results in the losing confidence in the world body's role in newly emerging world order.

As for promoting values and conditions that create a more stable international environment, there is no evidence that sanctions did so. The regime has not been significantly weakened, and it had not been pushed towards greater respect for human and democratic rights.

As a consequence, Gaddafi is considered by the United States as the most important factor of destabilization in that part of the world. The whole exercise of associating Gaddafi with international terrorism has no other objective than to discredit some one who doesn't share the American views and ambition in that part of the world.

Though Gaddafi helped his country to acquire or to maintain its independence, he obviously created problems for those who would like to keep the same country in its sphere of political and economic influence. Therefore, he constituted a danger since he is shielding the country from outside control.

Although, further change must be before rapprochement with the United States would be possible. There were three main problems in the normalization of relations between Libya and the United States: Libya's alleged support for terrorism, its attempts to acquire weapons of mass destructions, and its opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process. While American administrations have stated that they would welcome resumed relations with Libya if Gaddafi would just abandon his provocative behavior. However, Gaddafi claimed that now he did not have any link with any extremist organizations. Even though, Gaddafi expelled Abu Nidal organization from its territory and broke its ties to other radical Palestinian groups such as the Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine—General Command and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Apart from terrorism, US policymakers also alleged the Libya's attempts to acquire WMD. However, Pentagon itself describe that Libya has made progress toward acquiring chemical weapons, it has not yet managed to become a nuclear threat. Actually, Washington should recognize that Tripoli's attempts to acquire WMD make a certain kind of sense. Anyway, Libya's primitive facilities and poor technological infrastructure ensure that the country will never become a nuclear threat.

Libya's position towards Israel was another hurdle between them. But here again Gaddafi seems to have undergone a conversion in the past few years. Now,

Gaddafi is accepting about bilateral talk between Palestinians and Israel and sought to withdraw military aid from Palestine liberation groups. Gaddafi has limited himself to sporadic rhetorical fulmination and avoided tangible measures that would add further strain to an already tense situation.

While Washington acknowledged change in Libya's action but still labeled Libya as a sponsor of terrorism. Most of the U.S.'s official claimed that the sanctions had worked and that is why Libya surrendered its two accused. Libya's endeavored to improve its political image internationally. It also provided incentives for foreign business to return in Libya. Even the U.S. oil companies lobbied the U.S. government hard to lift sanctions on Libya. This lobbying was fairly successful, and the government finally allowed four U.S. oil companies to rerun Libya.

The challenge that Libya poses for the Bush administration is how to acknowledge Gaddafi's partial rehabilitation while continuing to press for further changes. Until now, the United States has relied on a range of unilateral and coercive measures to contain Libya. Actually, the central demand made by the United States was for the extradition of the two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing for trail out side of Libya, and this was finally achieved. Aftermath of the Lockerbie trail, with UN sanctions have been suspended, the United States can hardly isolate Libya on its own.

Unlike the United States, Europe has responded to Libya's overtures with uncritical dialogue and greatly increased trade. But whereas US policy may be too unyielding, the European model goes too far in the other direction. One way of helping to convince investors that Libya is a serious prospect would be to rejoin the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. This partnership would promote regional stability and prosperity, and would help bring international acceptability, hastening reintegration into the international community. Libya's relations with Europe would also improve.

Therefore, the American policy furthermore, should not try to directly alter Libya's international orientation. Instead, it should provide various inducements and pressures designed to help Libya move along its own path of moderation. This incremental normalization would reward constructive Libyan conduct and punish intransigence. It would also have the advantage of reconstituting international, particularly European cooperation. It may take a couple of years before the Libyan-US diplomatic relations are fully restored.

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