

Understanding Tibet in India's China Policy, 1988-2012

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “Understanding Tibet in India’s China Policy, 1988-2012” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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DEDICATED

TO

MY

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Abbreviations:

TGE	Tibetan Government in Exiles
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
GOI	Government of India
IB	Intelligence Bureau
ICWA	Indian Council of World Affairs
IDS	Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis
JWG	Joint Working Groups
LAC	Line of Actual Control
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
NAI	National Archives of India
NDA	National Democratic Alliances
NEFA	North-Eastern Frontier Agency
NFP	New Forward Policy
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PM	Prime Minister
PRC	The People's Republic of China
PTI	Press Trust of India
QTR	Qinghai–Tibet Railway
TAR	Tibet Autonomous region
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPA	United Progressive Alliances
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWI	World War First

Chapter One

Introduction:

The concerned thesis is a research effort that has focused on the study of Tibet as an area of conflict between India and China on one side and the other side Tibet itself. In other words here it meant to say that throughout the history Tibet has faced a lot of difficulties to present her own identity as an independent and separate state on the international map. Frequently Tibet has witnessed quite a lot of difficulties that coming up from its neighbours particularly from China. In view of that, more often than not, through this piece of research the thesis has tried to find out that chemistry of conflict all the way through hypotheses, some objectives of study and research questions. In one hand the study has tried to prove that the strategic location of Tibet is guiding the nature of bilateral relationship between India and China. The other hand it says that the frequent claim of an independent Tibet and various political activities upon Indian soil by the Tibetan refugees/supporters has become bone of contention in India-China relations. Anyway whatever may be the issue the only point to raise here is that the subject matter or research problems in relation to Tibet as a part of International Politics is a matter of concern and its need an in-depth study. Accordingly the concerned research work is an attempt towards that and the in progress chapter entitled as 'Introduction' is an introductory part of that attempt.

With the passage of time, in regards to Tibet issue both India and China have upheld see-saw relations at international level. As per the historical records, for a great many years, Tibet was being considered as the buffer state amongst India and China, and because of that there was peace with no geographical anxiety. But after 1950, the equation between India and China started taking different shape, and behind that the only sole reason was the invasion & control of China over Tibet in 1950. In that case here we can denote that it has only been for the last six decades or so both India and China have come to share a common border with inherent issues of border security. For instances, the issues of delineation, demarcation of the border, the movement of people, and flow of trade across it. Indeed, it's very complex task to understand Tibet through India's foreign policies that focus China.

Prior to the mid-20th century, India-China relations were not that much recognizable in international politics. In other words to expose, there was certain overland and seaborne trade, along with a few occasional exchange of pilgrims and scholars (Nehru 1982: 192-200). Consequently, the experience of the Indians and the Chinese of the external world was very different. Sikri told, “India could not keep out overseas influence and ideas from the Eurasian heartland who invaded India over the centuries made a deep and long-term impact on the country. Here they lived in harmony and properly, eventually becoming indistinguishable from, indeed a part of, the local population” (Sikri 2009: 245). Whereas the Chinese experience was not the same, who stayed aloof that they were the “Middle Kingdom” and all others barbarians. Along with that, Panikkar (1955) said that, “after India and China became self-governing in the mid- 20th century China’s outlook toward India was one of an elder brother or uncle who was well established in the world, giving advice to a younger relative struggling to make his way.”

Independence of India was welcome, however China, as the perceived great power in Asia after the Second World War, anticipated that India would know its place. (Panikkar 1955: 26). The Chinese had also a complexity about India. Indiscreetly, numerous Chinese people, including the communist leaders, certain that India was an exceptionally cultured civilisation from which China had acquired much, including Buddhism. According to many Chinese India’s spiritual and philosophical traditions were admired. Mao Zedong himself once, admitted to the Indian ambassador that, in China, there was “an old belief that if a man lived a good life he would be reborn in India” (Ibid: 80). However, the Chinese individuals were sensibly unconscious about mid-twentieth century India, an ideological stance that drove the Chinese communists to view India with suspicion and uncertainty as an capitalist and reactionary nation whose pioneers were a lot under British influence (Ibid: 100).

In the other hand, the assessment of independent India’s leaders about China was somewhat diverse. As according to Maxwell, “Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister who more or less independently guided India’s foreign policy both before and after India’s Independence, harboured a generally benevolent view of China and its intentions in Tibet, despite being aware of the contrary approach of China’s communist leaders towards India and himself personally” (Maxwell 1997: 259-263). However, as a knowledgeable, widely travelled politician and scholar, Nehru had great

understanding, compassion and respect for China. Gopal (1979) while admiring Nehru's approach admitted that, "He harboured passionate, optimistic and somewhat youthful notions of India and China as two great Asian civilizations that, as independent nations, would learn from each other's experience, forging a common destiny and promoting world peace in the 20th century" (Gopal 1979: 139). However, Azad explaining about the bonding of Nehru with Chiang Kai-shek said, "During the Chinese civil war the liberal-minded Nehru's sympathies were clearly with the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek rather than with the communists, something that would have hardly endeared him to China's new communist leaders. There was also mutual admiration, as well as close contacts and correspondence between the two men" (Azad 1988: 41-45). Although Chiang Kai-shek, amid his visit to India in 1942, could not get the leaders of the Indian Congress Party to support the Allied war effort, the position changed as soon as Britain decided to give India its independence. In July 1947, India and United States signed an undisclosed agreement which permitted US to continue, even expand its aerial mission in Tibet to support the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) forces of Chiang Kai-shek against the Mao's Red Army. At Initially, Indo-US agreement was valid just for two years, later it extended for an indistinct period in 1949 (Ali 1999: 190-96).

Nehru's belief and views that "Tibet should be an independent country" deepened Chinese doubt (Nehru 1982: 842). Even as a part of that kind of belief a separate invitation was extended by India to Tibet for the Asian Relations Conference convened by India in New Delhi in March 1947. Nevertheless, further Nehru rejected any suggestion that India should consider establishing a self-governing Tibet. He realized that if the communists were to come to power, they would set up control over Tibet (Gopal 1979: 105). Although this would bring China's borders right up to India, Nehru did not convey any concerns (Arpi 1999: 274). Other Indian leaders, however, held a somewhat darker outlook of China's intentions. While dismissing Anglo-American suggestions to be more dynamic in supporting the Tibetans, Nehru conscientiously affirmed giving a modest quality of arms and ammo to the Tibetans. (Arpi 1999: 272-88). Preoccupied with domestic troubles and tensions with Pakistan, India could not really afford to do more. India was being only pragmatic in not wanting to take for granted all British rights and responsibilities in regard to Tibet arising out of the 1904 Lhasa Convention. Under the agreement, the British secured "rights to establish trade marts at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok", and virtually established a British protectorate

on Tibet (Smith 1997: 161). Nehru therefore accepted “China’s suzerainty over Tibet”. At the same time, he thought that Tibet should remain “autonomous” and that any communist liberation of Tibet should be peaceful. Clearly, Nehru did not want the issue of Tibet to poison relations between India and China. According to above those facts, here its being clear that Nehru as a leader had a progressive and peaceful vision towards Tibet.

1.1 The Interaction of Tibet, China, and British India

The Simla talks of 1913-1914 became a Sino-Indian contest over the Assam Himalaya unresolved border dispute, even though this talks not only took place in Indian soil but also in New Delhi. Three party were signatory in this talks which were: the British-Indian government, the new Chinese government President Yuan Shikai, and the government of Tibet under the 13th Dalai Lama. Owing to all party’s disagreement over Simla agreement, Tibet enjoyed nearly four decades of “de facto independence”. Both countries India and china still maintain different interpretations of what happened at the meetings. From independent Indian government’s perspective, Simla was a diplomatic exercise in which the British colonialists, generally acted rightly for the state they had built on Indian soil, though contrary to their practice in so many realms of Indian life. However, from the Chinese perspective, “Simla was an attempt of British imperialism encroaching on Chinese territory primarily via a British-Tibetan agreement”, that were never indorsed by any Chinese government.

By the Indian definition, result of the agreement was not satisfactory but basically it was an accurate map-line which were demarcated the border of the Assam Himalaya with Tibet, a border along the mountain features that have naturally and historically separated India from territory belonging to Tibet and, by extension, China. The detailed historical arguments and individual bits of evidence which supported the Assam Himalaya claim, were produced by each of the side. The nationalistic assumptions, however, are more significant than the evidence itself, underlie their respective claims. For example, Chinese assumption is very much strong for the Tibetan territory as an integral part of China. The alienation of particular this Tibetan territory via Simla agreement or by other means has never been endorsed by any central Chinese government. Chinese government ponder that, “Tibet did not have right to conclude such an agreement and hence challenged the British Indian methods as illegitimate” (Liu 1994: 54-59). In the Chinese view of point, whatever may have been agreed on by

the Tibetan and Indian delegations at Simla, did not result in the establishment of a formal border. The Indian government nationalist assumption is that “historical evidence of administration, the customary knowledge of local peoples, natural geographic feature (e.g., mountain ridges that separate watersheds), and past treaties define an India that has existed naturally” (Hoffmann 2006). By this logic of argument, the territorial delimitation of India was not just gained through the decisions and policies of British officials. Therefore, the Indian government has regarded as the legitimate British imperial administration’s actions binding the Assam Himalaya to India, both at the time of Simla and later (ibid: 168).

Nonetheless, when we closely examine the British policy making for the Assam Himalaya, it leaves no doubt that there were territorial security calculations in approach. There were a key objective of the British in 1913-1914, which never shared by the post-independence Indian government, was to make Tibet as a “genuine buffer state”, which would in result provide the best “common border protection” between Tibet and India. Lamb said that “Just as the British at one time hoped that Sinkiang would serve to keep Russian territory from direct contact with Kashmir, so they now looked to Tibet to keep China from physical contact with Assam” (Lamb 1964: 143). Thereafter the British policy wanted to retain Tibet in that role. But later, post Indian independence 1947, British desire slightly changed to have the Assam Himalaya, to serve as a buffer between Tibet and the region of Assam. As Melvyn Goldstein points out, “British ambitions required reconciling a theoretical or symbolic Tibetan status of subordination to China with extensive [Tibetan] autonomy, under the watchful eye of Great Britain” (Goldstein 1989: 74). By the viewpoint of British, an agreed boundary between northeaster -India and Tibet was an essential entity. Among other things, which under the formal jurisdiction of the Indian state would be created a “small enclave inhabited mostly by autonomous tribal people”.

A sense of threat inspired these British objectives in a sense, particularly when in central Tibet in 1910-1912, a strong military presence felt in the region. The British concerns then were:

Would the Chinese challenge the influence of the British in Nepal and Bhutan? Would they try to undermine the security of a long Indo-Tibetan border which for most of its length had not been defined and for a considerable stretch followed an alignment which was far from ideal from a military point of view? Between 1910 and 1912 Chinese actions seemed to provide an affirmative answer to both these questions” (Lamb 1989: 9).

The Chinese penetration however, were minor in number but noticeable into the limited portion of the tribal belt on the Tibet-Assam frontier in 1910, along with a sign of Chinese intention also visible to extend its sphere of influence into the frontier portion (The threat perception of British comprised possible Russian interest in Tibet).

The Indian army's General Staff prepare a "memorandum to guide surveyors" with the help of British in 1911 to search for a strategic boundary that would follow mountain crests. Other questions were admitted in the memorandum, such as the "determination of the limits of habitations of tribes", initially under Tibet on the one hand, and independent tribes on the other will largely affect the question of our frontier vis-a-vis China, nevertheless, the aspects of military must be in kept in dominant view. Hoffmann mentioned, "according to the 1911 memorandum, the lower portion of a certain Assam Himalaya area called the Tawang tract, separating Bhutan from the greater proportion of the Assam Himalaya, was to go to India" (2006: 169).

The General Staff in effect proposed in 1912 to include the Assam-Himalayan boundary the upper part of the "Tawang tract" on the Indian side. The justification was given that if tawang tract left in the hand of Tibetan possession, it would constitute a dangerous consequences and might enable the Chinese to exercise their influence of power over Bhutan, which could be more harmful from strategic perspective. The Tawang tract, later in several years, though with a less expansive border comparatively to what the chief of the Indian General Staff had recommended, was incorporated into the Indian territory that some British officials thought they had obtained via the Simla negotiations (Maxwell 1970: 534). Therefore, the record of documentary leaves no suspicion that military-strategic considerations shaped the process whereby both the Tibetan and British governments agreed via an exchange of notes over to a line on a map in 1914. Without prior information/notice given to the Chinese, such kind of event eventuated at the 1914 Simla exercise.

The boundary of 1914 marathon exercise came on the map to be known as the "McMahon Line", which "named after the top British official at the Simla meetings, Henry McMahon" (Hoffmann 2006: 170). There was a second map also, which included a version of line, which dealt with the forthcoming planned management of the China-Tibet frontier as well as with future Sino-Tibetan-British conduct regarding Tibet. During the Simla talks, the Chinese side saw the Assam Himalayan line on the map, but nobody including Chinese, British, and Tibetan delegates discussed this issue

at the conference. Though China did not ratify the convention for the reasons except the Assam Himalaya matter, the British and Tibetan representatives agreed upon some slightly amended version which would be honoured by their respective government. However, calculations of the British military-strategy could and did change after the talks. As the result of the revolution in China, altered the china's military and political position in Tibet which later evident in the form of weakness of Chinese army in the vicinity of Tibet by the 1917, changed all the strategic condition. Hoffmann said, "The British-Indian government apparently did not regard McMahon's Assam Himalaya line as an official boundary worthy of support" (Hoffmann 2006). Now the frontier between china and Tibet and problems pertaining to the Indian northeast frontier seemed minor.

If World War I had not occurred, the territory ceded by the Tibetan side during the Simla episode, could have been under the British Indian administration. Their "political, diplomatic, legal, and bureaucratic complications" and their involvement in WWI compelled the British administration to restrict their expansionist policy. Lamb said that "This was despite continuing interest among certain British officials stationed in India, particularly those directly in charge of India-Tibet relations, in treating Tibet as an entity possessing de facto independence and in treating matters pertaining to the India-Tibet border as bilateral, without making reference to China" (Lamb 1989: 12).

However, after the war and till the leading phase of Indian independence, British India still wanted to have a particular objective policy: namely, to keep China at the distance and having any direct contact of the Assam Himalaya. A desired British policy also survived from Simla meetings to 1947, of having an autonomous Tibet as a buffer zone as a protective wall between India and China. As a matter of fact British policy workout successfully. The vague form of relation of Tibet with china, allow some British diplomatic representation in Tibet but hardly allow any Chinese representation, was supposed to keep away other foreign actors from Tibet. Goldstein argued that, "The policy of recognizing China's theoretical over lordship or 'suzerainty' over Tibet was seen by the British as a device by which they would not have to support the idea of an independent Tibet" (1989: 68).

In 1934, the nationalist Chinese government of Jiang Jieshi sent the Huang "condolence mission" to Tibet after the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933, which produced strong British reaction. Goldstein said that "The mission resulted in a de facto Chinese presence in Tibet and triggered a period of intense international jockeying, as

Britain tried to forestall Chinese control over Tibet” (Goldstein 1989: 223). In 1940, another Chinese Kuomintang envoy visited in Lhasa, to assert the role of republican china in Tibetan administrative affairs. The Indian British government also dispatched its own mission to Lhasa to observe the day of installation of new Dalai Lama in the capital but also to look closely activities of Chinese party, and if possible, to answer them (Lamb 1989: 282). In 1940, a documents was produced by the high-ranking British official in India containing a generalized strategic conception of threat from inner Asia. Its author was “Olaf Caroe”. Caroe served in the important post of foreign secretary of British India, presented a cosmological picture of the entire problem of the defense of northern border of India. He had figured out on some of the idea which found in the Mongolian Peripheral area (Hoffmann 2006: 172). His study covered the “frontier region bordering India to the north” that mostly contained Mongolian population. These regions were: Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim and northern Assam. There were some also other Mongolian territorial curved, which included Tibet and other Chinese control provinces. From here beyond, he lay an ‘outer arc’ containing the Mongolia, Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled territory. Hoffmann illuminated that “Caroe saw influence in the outer arc coming towards china. The Chinese curved, in turn, was exerting an incessant force on Tibet, and Tibet itself was placing pressure upon the ‘Mongolian’ peoples directly along the Indian border” (Hoffmann 2006).

Caroe claimed that Chinese had their eye sight on people of Himalayan as to believe that they come within their ethnic sphere of interest. Caroe’s conception of “the major threat to British India” was concerned less with “minor Tibetan infiltration into parts of the Himalayas” than with “Chinese irredentist ambitions in that region” and behind them, the “looming menace of Communism and the Japanese” (Lamb 1989). Irrespective of how Caroe’s strategic thinking was received at various level, nevertheless he had made deep impact on British India’s policy towards both Tibet and the Assam Himalaya. Caroe was known as the major force behind the revival of the “Simla convention” and the “McMahon Line” which laid the foundations of British policy. He also strongly advocated for the notion of Tibet as autonomous buffer state, under the Chinese suzerainty (Lamb 1989: 289).

No one in British imperial government including Caroe ever dare to expand direct military intervention or heavy expenditure in Tibet and the Assam Himalaya. Until 1937 there were no sustained diplomatic representation in Lhasa. The British

presence in Assam Himalaya trend begun only after late 1940s. In 1943, without consulting the Tibetan government, British Empire decided to establish the “McMahon Line” as the Assam-Himalaya border between India and china. Lamb said that “British-Indian personnel, engaged in movements on the ground, were not supposed to get into armed clashes with the Tibetans” (Lamb 1989: 277).

On so many occasion from 1936 onward, British India did raise the McMahon line matter with the Tibetans. To enhance their diplomatic endeavour, British India enhance their commitment to the Tawang tract and offered Tibetan government to control over the upper zone of Tawang. The foremost purpose of the offer by British India was to secure the Tibetan acceptance of the McMahon Line. Over the 1914 Simla talks the British India was unsuccessful to secure consent of both China and Tibet. Lhasa which regarded as parts of the Assam Himalaya region, especially “Tawang”, as historically Tibetan. The encroachment by British India into Tibetan territory was strongly objected by the Tibetans. British concession concerning Tawang did not lure the Tibetan for many reasons. When the British handed power to new Indian government, Tibetan offer seemingly remain the same (Lamb 1989: 20-21). Possibly the threat from china in 1950 that signalled an intention to takeover Tibet, Indian government annexed the Tawang monastery and town in February 1951.

The impediment that affected the Tibetans most was concerned with the acts of Chinese and Indians. In the pre-1951 Tibetan government had been tried to show some sort of leniency in its proceeding decades just by placing the Assam Himalaya region into diplomatic and strategic circle. During the Shimla affair in 1913–1914, the Tibetans had got help from British to have recognition of steady China-Tibet frontier as part of their own effort. They also tried to make a safe status of its own nation and autonomy that has to be acknowledged by Chinese government. Such effort of Tibetans helps us to map out why the commanding Tibetan representatives (the Lonchen Shatra) during the 1913–1914 proceedings passed a special consideration on Assam Himalaya to the British, including the Tawang. In this case some of the information was known to British and Tibetans as provisional information (Goldstein 1989: 67-77).

Nearly two decades after, British started putting pressure in the matter of the “McMahon Line” on the Tibetan government, an in this condition Lhasa was not at all prepare to avoid the British pressure and also was not in the position to dispose it completely while dealing with the issue with British representatives. The act of

Tibetans was just to balance the Tibet-British relationship considerably. The Tibetans were expecting that the “British would act as a counterbalancing power to the Chinese in both ways diplomatically and militarily” (Goldstein 1989: 302). Thus the apparent position of Tibetan on the McMahon Line from 1935 or 1936 on was that Tibet’s 1914 territorial contribution to the British was a part of the place of balancing the territory disputes and determinations to the futile Shimla convention. In this case the position of Lhasa government was much complicated. The Statements given by the Tibetan officials directly related to the symptoms that if Tibet will receive the help from British in its security-related quid pro quo, then the Assam Himalaya recognition has to be accepted in full swing or half by the new Anglo-Tibetan agreement. In late 1944 or 1945, an important British envoy Basil Gould, was still expecting that “Tibet would accept the McMahon Line”. Even one senior officer of Gould, Olaf Caroe, was not convinced with the above matter but he had still fascinated in pursuing of the matter with the Tibetans and in offering of the little recognition (including the one on Tawang) (Lamb 1989: 440).

As Alastair Lamb writes:

British officials did not leave to their successors in the Indian subcontinent a border in the Assam Himalayas to which the Tibetans had agreed. Indeed right up to the end of the British period the Tibetans were both protesting diplomatically about British aggression in these border tracts and challenging the British position, albeit in a more or less passive manner, on the ground. In other words, there was here a very real Indo-Tibetan boundary dispute. Nonetheless, the larger situation did have a particular ambiguity to it (Lamb 1989: 489).

As for as Chinese policy is concerned after the fall down Manchu government in 1911, the policy of China for Tibet was still within the structure of the Manchu’s conception that the Tibetans were once belong to the minority populations partaking the Chinese state with the Han people. Therefore Tibet cannot be separated from Chinese entity at all (Goldstein 1989: 213). There is no doubt that Chinese always thought of Tibet that it has no political identity, only some sorts of internal Tibetan autonomy existed under a Dalai Lama-centred government. But no Chinese government has accepted it as realty for it; rather Tibet requires China’s consent for its diplomatic and other arrangements made by Tibet with British India (Goldstein 1989). After coming of the Chinese Communists in 1949 in China they openly rejected the boundary lines that were imposed on China via the uneven treaties that were imitation

during an era when China was under imperialist force. Part of the PRC's approach to Tibet has always been seen as harming the pride of Tibet and humiliating as well. In early 1949 September China did not hesitate to accuse Nehru and his government that they were engaged in creating difference among the peoples of China, by destabilizing their harmony, and interfering in China's internal affairs by saying that Tibet was never part of Chinese territory. In another Chinese publication in the same year again accused Nehru by saying that he is following Anglo-American imperialist designs for the annexation of Tibet and of possessing imperialist intentions (Jain 1960: 8).

1.2 Tibet-China-India Interactions: 1949–1962

The scholar Melvyn Goldstein (1989) pointed out that:

The Chinese Communist party's ideology emphasized reunification of China, one of the prime targets of which was the liberation of Tibet and its reintegration with the motherland. The Chinese Communists believed that Tibet's desire to be separate from China was caused by Western imperialist interference in Chinese affairs... The Chinese saw British policy as an attempt either to eliminate or to reduce to token status all Chinese influence in Tibet and saw the elimination of British imperialism (i.e., influence) as critical (Goldstein 1989: 623).

Officials meet in Beijing realised there are many other interests associated to Tibet. The visit of The Dalai Lama and other Tibetan officials to China in 1954 created a panic in China losing their hold from Tibet. Chinese suspected that the involvement of British and ties between India and Tibet will emerge a source of new threat for them in future. Even India has assured from its side that it will not take any action on the terms of the 1914 convention which envisaged British India as an intermediary between China and Tibet, but still Chinese were the Chinese were doubtful about the involvement of the west. On precautionary ground China after annexing Tibet has shut its back door forever. Another Chinese interest was to pursue its economic interests on the expense of Tibet. As it is well known fact that Tibet is well off with all those which are in scarce in China (Avedon 1984: 41).

PRC, like the Tibetan government before has put Himalayan region on the common ground to have bargaining power for strategic reasons, leaving aside no matter of McMahon Line was deemed to be. Communist regime of China in 1960 offered India to "retain the territory in return for India's agreement to drop its claim to Aksai Chin". Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1950s had pointed out to Nehru that insofar as the "McMahon Line" was an established fact and unless the India is having good

relationship with China both India and China will have healthy future (India and Burma) and PRC would accept the McMahon Line as the basis for negotiation (Maxwell 1970: 92-94).

Throughout 1950s the most security interests of China were primarily dependent on the PRC's entry into the Cold War. China was always eager to have friendly relation with India and other neighbouring state in its interests. Chinese leaders were unaware of the fact that how far they are true friend of India, but the question related the border and frontier issues were hopefully taken friendly. And issues of conflict with India were resolved in more pragmatic way (Liu 1994: 81). During 1950s the standpoint of India was not concerned with militarily challenging the PRC's takeover of Tibet in 1950–1951. It seems Prime Minister Nehru in the initial part of its ruling followed the British principle of fostering “Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty”. But on the other side India was reluctant to pursue the idea of buffer state for Tibet (Henderson 1951: 1692).

However India was always hoped for Tibet to have its own autonomy without showing of any military alliance with the U.S., to have China. Apparently from 1947 to 1951 saw a subtle, permissible and operational outline for a relationship that pulled limited military assistance with United States (Ali 1999: 199-200). The Indian government from its side started consolidate its frontier and border location. It was done not only under Nehru but also under the Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhai Patel. Patel too like Nehru, was a big figure during the Indian independence movement and had a concrete impact on the Indian politics. But the process of consolidation could pan for long and faced physical, communicational, and resource difficulties in this process. It is argued in many of the scholars' view that much more could have been done in this regard, but Nehru's disagreement with Patel pulled more attention and a relation that was already damaged by China had been tense relating to Tibet.

During 1950s Nehru became more a figure of an idealistic Statesman, rather than a realist like Patel. In the same year an American political scientist John D. Herz in his analysis said that the element of idealistic statesmanship has an inclination to “concentrate on conditions and solutions which are supposed to overcome the egoistic instincts and attitudes of individuals and groups in favour of considerations beyond mere security and self-interest.” According to Herz (1950), such type of tendencies can be transmitted in certain ways into the political belief, including one or another form of

“humanism, liberalism, pacifism, internationalism, and even anarchism—ideologies” that apparently assist in minimising or removing the power and authority of organized groups who claim their to possession. He further argued that “when idealism is correlated to the idea of the sovereign nation-state, it reflects more about the idea and ideal of a system of equal, free, and self-determining nationalities, each organized into its own state, and all living peacefully side-by-side in harmonious mutual relations. Such feelings of idealism are contrasted with the notion of nationalism which is aggressive, expansionist, exclusive, and imperialistic”; that is, a kind of nationalism he argues and later it represents Political pragmatism in its intense level (Herz 1950: 160).

Nehru assumed that the only way that is left out for him to define a state’s national interests is just taking the international community’s interests in his political agenda. He thus being a great nationalist figure was always in wants of internationalist person too. Therefore he believed that concept of nationalism needs to be liberalized or must be kept in balance with internationalism. He always favoured the interests of nation in his political philosophy at broader level focusing the effects of national policy on other states. According to his political philosophy states are not free from each other rather they are interdependent, and so any welfare work of any state directly or indirectly affects the international community. Nehru in many ways described as “so-called realists or Machiavellians too often viewed his own state as a thing apart, as a distinctly separate fraction of the society of nations” (Range 1961: 42-47). For him, entire 1950s was something to look beyond the Cold War, non-Communist and Communist power blocs, and its dangers, including the danger of nuclear war. He was very keen to transform the his contemporary international system in order to create a base not on power politics but on friendly international cooperation, principles or values such as fairness, justice, tolerance and no war. He was also never in mood accept the authority of the chief Cold War contestants to gather all other nation-states into the two Cold War camps. He involving himself into such politics never wanted to limit the foreign policy of India.

Moreover, he was in favour to create friendly atmosphere for all nations without any lacking. The only obstacle would be if anything creates fear for humanity, including conflict and therefore human beings should throw away the conventional methods used to settle conflicts—dispose of the methods that produce fear for human civilisation. He

thus was in favour that will not create any fear but also help in preventing the fear (Gopal 1984: 32).

This Nehruvian view seems partly acceptable but in reality it was just his idealist side. There is no doubt on his national interests but on the other side had to aware of compromising factors to serve the interests of nation. Of course he was a pragmatic idealist, but he must be known to the facts that “policies having no relationship to idealism are generally impractical” (Gopal 1984: 190). Nehru from 1951 onwards followed a policy toward Tibet that has been viewed based on appeasement of China, a label that is not at all good for national interest. Nehru in his political regime has never denied “China’s sovereignty over Tibet”, but simultaneously he also encouraged the Tibetans to advocate their fight for autonomy. Nehru also encouraged Tibetan morale, for both who were living in exile condition and who were within Tibet itself. Nehru in 1954, while discussing with his intelligence chief, B. N. Mullik that “if Tibetan who are living here as exiled will not be discouraged rather if any obstacle is created by China I would not consider at all so long as the refugees did not act too openly” (Mullik 1971: 85).

In 1958, however, Nehru to maintain the relationship with Chinese did not hesitate to restrain the political activities of Tibetan refugees in India (Gopal 1984: 81). For him one thing is very true that he favoured non-violent resistance, Tibetans for autonomy of their own. Nehru was sure that Tibetans cannot defeat the Chinese by military force, and he was never in favour to provide any kind of military support to Tibetans (Gopal 1984: 90).

Nehru during 1950s seems overestimated the negative impact of Tibetans ability that they will be able to resist Chinese in Tibet. He also believed that weakness of Tibetans on many ground would allow Chinese invasion into the territory of India and that will lead towards a spark of world war like situation. In this situation China would be confronted by powerful enemies. China’s struggle would be existential, and Chinese leaders therefore would not continue to divert their strength to Tibet and across the Himalayas. During this period, at this time of war situation Nehru also believed that “Tibet under Chinese rule was highly likely in light of the terrain and other environmental circumstances involved” (Jain 1981: 43).

His friendship policy for China in 1950 was motivated with many things. Idealism was one strong aspect for him that basis he thought to involve both Tibet and the Indian border in security calculus. He hoped that friendship between India and the PRC would help in maintenance of peace in Asia and create a platform for new world affairs, with Asia giving the lead in a more humane as well as a more sophisticated diplomacy. In his view in this it will be possible to maintain Tibetan autonomy for certain extent via diplomatic means and by limiting tension between China and India. Agreement signed between India and China in 1954 in which India agreed to give up certain special rights in Tibet inherited from the British, and now Nehru believed that with the past ruins of Chinese distrust against India will be removed, China may follow a rational approach and Tibetan autonomy could be safeguarded and India interests may continue determined (Gopal 1984: 139).

Nehru was well aware of the facts about Chinese but still he was hopeful to apply his pragmatic idealism approach while dealing with China. On certain occasions he has used strict terms for China that are only known to his intelligence chief, Mullik, these terms were related to the historical nature of China as a country in 1952. In the meeting with Mullik, Nehru has agreed that China historically had been aggressive and has always tried to expand itself geographically via different means in the Indian Territory. He also expressed his suspicious attitude for China that Chinese don't believe in dealing with other countries as equals. Accordingly, Nehru thus expressed his views on China and their policy to disturb others. He said they will defiantly try to become strong on the expense of others and create conflicts in Asian countries. As Nehru saw it, the largest obstacle in China's path toward supremacy in Asia would be India (Mullik 1971: 178).

Nehru on his observation about Chinese further argued that once the hold of Chinese is enough strong on Tibet, then the PRC would try to extend its power into areas along the India-China border. Taking this view into deep concern he advised to tighten the security in those regions that are vulnerable of attack. Nehru was very practical to his approach as he always tried to keep away from the wars, as they would destabilise the economy. Therefore we need to have at least twenty years of peace to stabilize the Indian economy and put the country "on the road to progress (Mullik 1971: 179). In Nehru's vision Indian-Chinese friendship was on high platform. Many times he is seen in reconciling situation with his Chinese counterparts what he thought will

create contradiction in his outlook by telling Mullik in 1953 that he really wanted to be friendly to China. Mullik in his account has accepted Nehru's suspicion that the "Chinese might misuse that friendship and so we must always be on our guard" (Mullik 1971: 181).

His negative thoughts were public only when the Indian-China relations had deteriorated because of the 1959 Tibetan revolt and due to the disputes over the border issues between two. Nehru's suspicion about the China and various incidents that were taking place between Tibetans and Chinese in early 1950s Nehru advised to tighten the security and strengthen India's administrative and intelligence-gathering capacities along the Tibetan frontier. In this effort India succeeded to have the British-claimed Tawang territory in 1951, lying beyond Se La Pass. The adverse effect of Nehru's security policies involved both Tibet and the northern frontier of India and the Tibetan revolt against Chinese occupation. The base of revolt was independent in Tibet in the 1950s but by the coming of 1959 it came into full swing and it is assumed that it persuasively supported by the recent disclosures about covert operations undertaken in Tibet by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Coboy & Morrison 2002: 26). Thus the Tibetan revolt worked as catalyst of the Sino-Indian border dispute, which itself was rooted in long-standing disagreements connected with Simla and the two countries conflicting claims to Aksai Chin.

PRC's position on border issues became more intense on the basis of Chinese suspicion that aroused during 1959 on the ground of India's involvement in the unrest in Tibet. The Chinese government considered Indian frontier town of Kalimpong as a focal point of the Tibetan revolt due to the some supposition that Tibetan emigrants and agents of the United States, Britain, Taiwan, and India were allegedly conspiring there. In March 1959 the Chinese claimed that in Lhasa the rebellion had been getting training from the 'command center' in Kalimpong. The permission of the stay of Dalai Lama in 1959, in India and other aspects related to the Tibetan issues created momentum to the deterioration of Indian-Chinese ties. The inability of Chinese government to understand the present situation of Tibetans revolt and India's stand in between led towards conflict for both. Chinese views at ideological ground followed the Marxist-Leninist class analysis for both India and Tibet. Chinese leaders suspected that "India is trying to interfering with China's Tibetan affairs in collusion with the United States, in order to create separation Tibet from China" (Liu 1994).

Another issue that increased the border dispute was the way the India-China frontier came to front in March 1959's Tibetan rebellion. This was for sure due to the movement and stationing of Chinese and Indian military. Both nations' security acted in confronting manner and as already we know that jurisdictions and border markings were yet not fixed by the both sides of government. India was more firm on its border issue after a major incident that took place not in the Assam Himalaya but near the Aksai Chin. Thus the conflict continuously departing higher and higher and got pace of its own and finally resulted in the Indian-Chinese border war of October–November 1962.

The border issue in the Chinese government produced elements of rigidity and an ideological commitment to fight against Imperialism and Soviet Revisionism. Chinese government considered that by the time of the 1962 war, India was deeply involved in the struggle against imperialism and Soviet revisionisms, but before the war with China in 1962, the Chinese government established a form of pragmatism by asking the Assam Himalaya border negotiable. In 1960, Zhou Enlai offered some solution to the issue in which the core of the solution was that “both the sides should accept the status quo in both the eastern and the western sectors of the frontier”. Although the alignment of the boundary of the Assam Himalaya with Tibet remained fundamentally as it had been demarcated by that line, the basis of it would have to be a new India-China agreement (Maxwell 1970).

Maxwell in his account argued that the Chinese government has been failed to develop any concrete foundation that would help in avoiding stubborn disputes with its neighbours. The problem with China is seen that wherever coalition established by China's former imperialist neighbours had become the effective boundary, in this situation the only way left out was to accept it as a fait. Another important issue with boundary dispute was that it was never came to stage where it could be sorted out rather Chinese government would be engaged in observing only. And Chinese government has paid less attention to the negotiations rather given more treaties even to sort out minor disputes. The result of a treaty would in general confirm the old alignment rather than giving the right solution to the existing problem.

In the Chinese governments notion there is no treaty for The McMahon Line but the line was linked to a status quo. Further as PRC believed that there is chance of border delimitation taking place on the basis of that status quo and (in effect) and at

broader level the ratification of it might demand for separate treaty. By 1960, China asked India to accept Chinese possession of the Aksai Chin region as the equitable result to Indian control of the Assam Himalaya. In 1999, Maxwell presented an updated version of the obvious Chinese border doctrine. He wrote:

(1) identify and declare such sectors as required definition with the neighbouring government; (2) agree jointly with the neighbour on maintenance of the status quo so that contact between forward patrols, with the risk of conflict and casualties, could be avoided; (3) negotiate to seek agreement on a mutually satisfactory boundary line, taking into account any relevant treaties, current positions, traditional movements and uses, etc.; (4) establish a joint boundary commission to mark out the agreed line on the ground; (5) seal the agreement in a new and comprehensive boundary treaty (Maxwell 1999).

Yet another Chinese principle identified by Maxwell again identifies another concept which was part of a statement issued in the context of China's border doctrine by Zhou Enlai: "China will not agree on any approach related to its border policy, implying that would be dealt with force" (Maxwell 1970: 95). The Chinese have claimed it firmly, and it sounds as if they believe that the antagonist in the Sino-Indian border dispute was always India. This perception has certainly been contested from the Indian side and elsewhere as well.

1.3 The Changing Wave

History is witness for it that Tibet and China has battled with each other for several times. The only reason behind that was that it was one of the first priorities of China's communist leaders to bring Tibet under their control. According to several personalities, "Tibet is like China's backdoor and she has never been in safe". There was a time in the early twentieth century, when China was in a pathetic position and the Manchu empire in decline, and the Britishers' exploit the opportunity successfully to establish their presence in Tibet. Still, at that position China had a very optimistic thought over Tibet and her own political intention. Even, China was highly conscious, that if Tibet stayed outside China's control it would unavoidably drift nearer to India, with which it had "geographical closeness, a deep religious and cultural similarity", and no history of antagonism. By and large, undeniably Guruswamy believed that, "there has been always a two way rigorous religious and cultural communication between India and Tibet. Tibetans look upon India, from where Buddhism originated, as their spiritual mentor and as "Aryabhumi" (the land of the holy). Similarly, Mount Kailash and lake Mansarover in Tibet are the holiest mountain and lake of Hindu folklore and

tradition, as they are regarded as the home of lord Shiva” (Guruswamy and Singh 2009: 39).

The Tibetan variant of “Mahayana Buddhism” spreads all across the high ranges of the Himalayas in India. Noted spiritual leader like Dalai Lama is widely respected in India. In fact, “India has in the past served as a place of shelter for Tibetans- half a century before the present Dalai Lama fled to India, his forerunner, the 13th Dalai Lama, had sought the guard of British India when the Chinese army reached Lhasa in 1910” (Gyatso 1997: 76). This is barely surprising, as the outside world’s access to the Tibet and the latter’s principal economic links with the rest of the world have traditionally been via India, as well as Nepal. Even, according to the present Dalai Lama “India has a superior claim on Tibet than China” (Gyatso 1992: 113). After the 1950 Chinese occupation of Tibet, they began to merge its places into their territory. Therefore, it was essential for china to have more reliable transport that links with Tibet.

The roads from “Szechuan via Kham and from Gansu and Qinghai to Tibet” were completed by 1954 (Smith 1997: 375). In addition, Chinese surveys showed that a relatively easy access route to Tibet was from Xinjiang across the barren and uninhabited Aksai Chin plateau. As this was a region to which India also had a claim, the Chinese government adopted slow and sophist tactics on the border issue to silence India into a sense of complacency, while it simultaneously took steps to establish its position on the ground and made preparations to construct a road “across Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang with Tibet” (Maxwell 1997: 87). India watched with silently as the Chinese imposed 17 point agreement on a young and hapless Dalai Lama in May 1951. Meanwhile, Nehru was taking out protection strategies in case of implication of Chinese control over Tibet. Gopal (1979) said that Nehru was thinking, “China would hardly likely to launch an armed attack against India”. However, he realistically recognized that Chinese troops may well try to infiltrate or occupy disputed areas (Gopal 1979: 176). Thus, the Indian government set about taking steps to establish administrative control over the remote, sparsely populated “Himalayan regions of Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)—the present day state of Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang”. While India never supported openly of the plans to destabilize China’s position in Tibet, propounded by United States and Britain (Shakya 1999: 75).

India had no other option but to diplomatically fix its border dispute with the Chinese authority in order to clear on an acceptable India-Tibet border. Although china's cold reaction and ambiguous response to Indian manoeuvre produced more complexity within the Indian official circle, including Nehru himself, India's approach remained confused and weak. Indian ambassador to china appears to ignoring instructions from India, just as though he was under the influence of Nehru's thinking in the direction of glossing over inconvenient facts and appeasing China (Gopal 1979: 176-81).

Nehru insisted that the "border was firm, well-known and undisputed and that there was no room for controversy, map or no map" (Ranganathan and Khanna 2000: 28). The decisions taken to publish official maps were 'between' 1953 to 1954, which shows clearly defined boundary between India and Tibet in all sectors. This was putting a gloss on matters. The section of the boundary of western and middle sectors were previously defined by custom, usage and tradition, not by treaty. In the "eastern sector", Nehru insisted that the "McMahon Line" which covered the area from just short of "Laos to Bhutan through Burma", drawn up in the "Simla Accord of 1914" between "Great Britain, India, Tibet and China", delineated the boundary. However, the Chinese authority made it clear that they would not ratify and recognize the validity of the McMahon Line, as they believed, had been imposed by imperialists (Swamy and Singh 2009: 100). There was an important reason for China's stubbornness on this matter. Chinese leaders understood very well that, if they recognised the validity of McMahon Line, it would imply that Tibet was the independent nation hence as a legal entity was authorised to have power of treating-making with any country. Sikri said, "From a political perspective, this was impossible for China to accept, since, unless Tibet was recognized as an inalienable part of China not only in 1951 but historically as well, the Chinese takeover of Tibet lacked legitimacy and would always be considered an imperial conquest" (Sikri 2009: 96).

Having forced the Dalai Lama into submission and initiating road-building projects to improve connectivity with Tibet, shakya said, China then turned its attention toward "weakening Tibet's traditional economic links with India and Nepal, eliminating India's extraterritorial rights in Tibet and securing India's legitimization of China's takeover of Tibet" (Shakya 1999: 133). These objectives were achieved through the "Agreement on Trade and intercourse between India and China" in 1954

and an exchange of notes. Though having in mind of Nehru's "ostrich-like approach", negotiators were being instructed to discuss the border issue with their counterpart. At a time when it had some strategic leverage, this is my thinking that India missed the opportunity to gain a clear and explicit recognition on borders with Tibet from China.

Although this has come to be popularly known as the "Panchsheel Agreement"¹, it is noteworthy that the so-called "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" are mentioned only in the preamble, not in the main text as India had wanted. In fact, Chinese wanted only to be mentioned in mere "joint press statement". It was only Nehru's political ambition, who not only exaggerated the "political significance of the agreement" as heralding a new era in relations between India and China deliberately, but also developed the approach, it would guide the relations of India and China along the relations among other Asian countries with the help of five principles. The Chinese went along with this pretence because it suited them, but it ought to be noted that India had wanted this agreement's validity for almost 25 years, but the Chinese preference was only up to 5 years. Non-renewable of 8 years validity was compromised by both countries (Kaul 1979: 99).

By signing the agreement of 1954, India gave a free hand to the Chinese in Tibet, but Dalai Lama had not lost hope and expected that India will still help the Tibetans. On the 2500th birth anniversary of Gautama Buddha, Dalai Lama paid a visit to India and manage to get clearance at the last moment from the Chinese authority on the special invitation of Nehru. He explored the option to get political asylum in India but Nehru politely refused the request, as he was not fascinated to antagonise the Chinese (Gyatso 1992: 113). At the same time Nehru had also invited "Chinese premier Zhou Enlai" to visit India, which gave him an opportunity to closely observe the activity of Dalai Lama within India. Between the November 1956 and January 1957, there were several round of talks extensively took place between the Dalai Lama, Nehru and Zhou Enlai over the Tibet issue (Gyatso 1992: 113). But all the meetings became futile after the 1959 Lhasa revolt and Tibet felt betrayal and cheated.

¹ These are 1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) Mutual nonaggression; 3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 4) Equality and mutual benefit; and 5) Peaceful coexistence.

1.4 Tensions Rise

The gap of mutual suspicions and distrust widen between India and China in the following years. By the September 1957, the road connecting “Xinjiang with Tibet via Aksai Chin route” was completed. India was concerned and alerted but never show concern and resist protest until the following year (Nehru 1961). However, china’s attitude gradually became unfriendly. There had been an invitation from Dalia lama to Nehru, to visit Tibet which was forwarded by Zhaou Enlai in January 1958, but Chinese later began dragging their feet over Nehru’s visit. Incidents like infiltration by Chinese troops began to take place frequently into the territory claimed by India, and china started publishing maps that claimed on the large section of the “NEFA” (North Eastern Frontier Agency). A distinct deterioration in Sino-Indian relations had set in (Gopal 1979: 78-81).

It was evident that the steps being taken by China to tighten its grip on Tibet led it to occupy and claim territory that India also claimed or controlled. This naturally upset India. Ali said, for its part, “China disliked India’s complicity in U.S. efforts, as well as India’s own actions to support the Tibetan resistance movement in India” (Ali 1999). As the Chinese authority started the process of collectivisation in Tibet, there were large-scale uproar in Amdo and Kham region, where many monasteries were destroyed and thousands of monks killed by them, which lead hundreds of refugees streamed towards central Tibet and many fled to India as well. The steadily deteriorating situation in Tibet culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in March 1959.

In the face of widespread public sympathy and support for the Dalai Lama, the Indian government had no option but to give asylum to the Dalai Lama. This was regarded by China as a grave act of provocation. Abusive propaganda was let loose against India in the Chinese press and relations with India continued to deteriorate (Nehru 1961). A number of serious border incidents and incursions took place shortly thereafter. As “Zhou Enlai” was to later admit, “There was a clear link between these incidents and the revolt in Tibet” (Singh 2009: 100). Kaul said, “Even as China blustered and tried to bully India, Chinese leaders were not unaware of their difficult internal mess arising out of the failure of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ of 1958 and the famine of 1959” (Kaul 2000: 70). As Shakya stated, “They might have been worried about the kind of support that India, in collaboration with the United States, was

suspected of giving the Dalai Lama to try to fan the flames of rebellion in Tibet” (Shakya 1999). Over uncertainty of India’s attitude and fear that might become a launching platform to attack on Tibet, Zhou paid a visit to India in April 1960. It is interesting to note that Zhou’s all discussion with the Indian interlocutors was focussed totally on Tibet. Kaul (2000) stated that, “It would appear that the Indian side got caught up in legal and historical arguments and missed Zhou’s willingness to settle the border problem within a broader political framework that, while finding a solution on the basis of the status quo, would legitimize China’s takeover of Tibet.” However, it is told that Nehru was inclined to work out a compromise deal with china, but his hand was bounded by build-up pressure from his colleagues, senior officials and the intense political pressure he faced in parliament which leave no other option but to take a rigid stand (Kaul 2000: 68-69).

Mao, Zhao and other Chinese leaders had certainly realised that India does not have any intention to send back Dalai Lama to them. Chinese were very much concerned about the activities of Dalai Lama and exile Tibetan in India, which china already had convey its message to India during Zhao Enlai visit to India in 1960, intensified; their fears were not groundless (Sikri 2011). As relations between India and china deteriorated steadily that especially after the border conflict of 1962, India’s support to Dalai Lama and exile Tibetan experienced a dramatic change. Tibetans were allowed to set up “exile government in India” though India never give recognition to this government. Over the last five decades considerable assistance has been given by the Indian government to the Tibetan community in exile, including allocation of “land for the rehabilitation of the refugees and funding for schools and Tibetan cultural establishments”. The official position of India has been that, “The Dalai Lama is regarded and respected by Indians as a spiritual and religious leader who, as an honoured guest, is welcome to stay in India as long as he desires, and that the government of India does not allow Tibetan refugees in India to engage in any anti-China political activity from Indian soil” (Sikri 2011:62).

1.5 Thaws in Relations

The relations between India and china went into freeze after the 1962 border conflict. The relations normalised gradually with the exchange of ambassadors in 1976, the visit of the Chinese foreign minister to India in 1981 and exchanges at the level of senior officials and special envoys, leading up to the visit of Indian prime minister Rajiv

Gandhi to China in December 1988-the “first visit at this level since Nehru’s visit to China in 1955”. Before that, in 1986, the “Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, claimed by China as part of Tibet”, was granted “full statehood by India”, provoking a Chinese protest that India ignored. Aware that the 1954 “Panchsheel Agreement” had lapsed in 1962, China used the occasion of the Indian prime minister’s visit to get India to commit itself to recognizing “Tibet as a part of China” and to rein in the Tibetans living in exile in India. Thus, in the “joint press statement” issued at the end of Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, China “flagged its concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India,” and India “reiterated its long-standing and consistent policy that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil (Guruswamy and Singh 2009: 143).” However, in later years, China and India relations has experienced a normal relations through regular exchanges of high level visits and Tibetan issues between China- India discourses. China itself resumed in September 2002. There has been a serious discussion on Tibet with the representatives of the Dalai Lama. Later, it was further reassured that the Dalai Lama was not looking for the freedom of Tibet but only “Genuine Autonomy”. Perhaps, it improved political environment in Sino-Indian relations also influenced the Chinese decision.

From the Chinese perspective, “the Indian position on Tibet was reassuring, though not entirely satisfactory”. China got a little more comfort from the next shift in India’s Tibet position, which took place during the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to China in 2003. On that occasion, in return for china implicitly recognized “Sikkim as an integral part of India”, India accepted that the “Tibet Autonomous region is part of the territory of People’s Republic of China” (Guruswamy and Singh 2009).” However, China presented its obligation for the Indian position which firmly opposed any effort and act which aimed at disintegrating China and resulting at Tibetan freedom. Both the countries also decided to accelerate boundary dispute talks through adaptation of appointing “special representatives” with exploration from political perspectives of the whole bilateral association on the outline of the border settlement.

The major issue of Sino-Indian mutual relationships was touched during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005. The two countries decided to create an “India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” for Peace and Prosperity. It was grounded on the “principles of Panchsheel” and signed an

arrangement on the political constraints and guiding doctrines for the settlement of India-China border questions. From the perspectives of India, one of the most significant clauses was “article VII”, which says that “in reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interest of the settled populations in the border areas” (Guruswamy and Singh 2009: 164-78). India interpreted this to mean that China had implicitly recognized “Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India” and that only some minor adjustment along the “Line of Actual Control” may be done while finalizing the border (Dutta 2008: 551).

1.6 A New Indian Forward Policy

Nehru had surely read Younghusband, who was clear in stating, “Chinese suzerainty was definitely recognised in the Treaty... It was no part of our policy to replace the Chinese. We had no idea of annexing Tibet or establishing a protectorate over it” (Younghusband 1910: 324). However, like British India, and particularly in the post-colonial era where the new states being born in Asia either inherited or adopted the “Westphalian emphasis” on rigid territorial boundaries and national sovereignty Nehru’s difficulty, to use Younghusband’s words, would, “always be to keep up direct relations with them without interfering with the legitimate and desirable authority which the Chinese should always possess”. Post-Independence, Nehru clearly failed in this attempt at maintaining the balance, as much due to India’s own misguided policies and military weakness as to heightened Chinese suspicions brought about also by the prevailing international context (Jacob 2011).

Nehru’s forward policy is too well-known. Jacob (2011) said that “Going to war to recover lost territory—if ever it was Indian Territory in the first place—is no longer a feasible option. That said, given that some three decades of boundary negotiations with the Chinese have not got anywhere, and if anything has only fed the perception that the Chinese have all the while been strengthening their military position and hardening their claims, India must consider options that will keep the Chinese interested in negotiations and compromise”. Further he elaborated, “With due consideration for changed historical and political circumstances, it must be said that India too finds itself in a position not dissimilar to that of British India with respect to Tibet at the time that Young husband was writing”.

Successive Indian governments have been perceived as squandering leverage in order to build ties with and not antagonise China or blamed for not accepting reality when opportunities for the resolution of the boundary dispute presented themselves. India's acceptance of Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1951, its official policy of treating the Dalai Lama as only a religious leader rather than also as a political leader and its acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over the TAR in 2003, among other things have all been roundly and variously condemned as strategic mistakes, by Tibetans, Indian political parties, and by sections of the Indian government and strategic community. Criticism has also been targeted to some extent at India's refusal to accept the 'package deal' offered by the Chinese. Yet, India cannot now simply reverse its acceptance of "Chinese sovereignty over Tibet", either, for a whole host of reasons (Jacob 2011: 140). What it can do, however, is on the one hand to ask China for cooperation in the renewal of the traditional relationship India has enjoyed with Tibet since time ancient, and on the other hand, offer to cooperate with China in spurring economic development and political stability in Tibet.

For India a new, more positively intended "forward policy" of cooperation with Tibet and China also offers it additional options to address some of the problems of underdevelopment in its own border regions including Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. For instance, given that Chinese manufactured goods (flasks and blankets, for example) are easily (and illegally) available in these regions, it is obvious that there is a demand for goods, including basic necessities that India cannot at the moment fulfil. Further, the problems of lack of development and infrastructure are often contrasted with the visible signs of development across the LAC and are a source of grievance against the government authorities in these regions (Jacob 2007-08). Indian policymakers can today afford to give up the debilitating sense of insecurity vis-à-vis China that has been in vogue since the defeat of 1962 and take the initiative in Sino-Indian bilateral ties. Chinese military modernisation is certainly a concern as is its presence and activities in Tibet but surely, the Indian military is also simultaneously engaged in the modernisation of its forces and capabilities. Moreover, as two rising powers, the two nations are not going to allow only military factors to dictate the direction of their relationship. Jacob (2011) argues that "Whatever, their offensive capability, the Chinese are unlikely to attack India for a number of reasons—their desire to maintain an image of a 'responsible stakeholder,' their wish to maintain a peaceful

neighbourhood conducive to achieving its economic goals, India's own conventional military and nuclear capabilities, and the weakness and instability of their traditional ally, Pakistan, to name a few.”

Jacob (2011) meanwhile asserted the rise of India's economic and political profile—as evident in India's growing strategic relationship with the United States—has engendered greater self-confidence as well as growing acknowledgement that New Delhi cannot always play the victim and that in the relationship with China there is a need for a new outlook. Part of this outlook is the acceptance by all but a fringe minority that status quo on the LAC is the only feasible solution to the boundary dispute.²

1.7 Policy content

According to Samanta, as a growing economic power, “India is capable of participating in the ‘economic growth and development of Tibet’ and must realise that the way ahead lies in converting Tibet's political centrality into an economic centrality in the Sino–Indian bilateral relationship” (Samanta 2007). The new Indian “forward policy” would thus be wholly non-military in nature—economic engagement and partnership with China through Tibet and a return to traditional levels of cultural and religious exchange with Tibet while acknowledging Chinese sovereignty over the region. Where once, the Tibetan economy was far more integrated economically to the Indian plains than other economies to its east, today it survives largely on receiving money from Beijing. And despite greater population movements and infrastructure development encouraged by the Chinese central government, the Tibetan economy's level of integration with the larger Chinese economy is still quite poor (Samanta 2007).

Against this background, it is important for India to engage China in the opening up of Tibet instead of rebuffing Chinese advances for economic cooperation whether in the form of a host of sub-regional organizations or through more open trade and investment policies. Markets to its south provide Tibet with additional options besides the markets that lie eastwards in the Chinese heartland. As evident in the reopening of “Nathu La and now plans to extend the Qinghai–Tibet Railway (QTR) to Nepal”, Tibet's shortest access routes to the outside world also lie due south. India has however, always been a reluctant partner in this endeavour despite the Chinese, and indeed,

² A similar viewpoint exists in India also with respect to the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan.

Tibetan enthusiasm, owing to a sense of hurt and insecurity that were perhaps justified in decades past but no longer. Jacob (2007) states, “India can start its ‘new forward policy’ at Nathu La through which Younghusband entered Tibet and in Ladakh where over 50 years ago Nehru’s version of the ‘forward policy’ met disaster. New Delhi should improve and build up physical infrastructure on its side of the border to facilitate easier access into and out of Tibet. Building up infrastructure at “Nathu La” and putting an end to what is deliberate obstruction at Nathu La is a process that could possibly give the fortunes of Kolkata and a whole host of provincial Indian cities along this partnership a major boost”. Indeed, there are still greater and probably better options in this region than “Nathu La” that can be explored such as the “Jelep La” which is much closer to “Kalimpong” and has historically served as a far more effective and all-weather route for trade with Tibet. Reopening links between Ladakh and Tibet would be another step. Guruswamy argue that, “India could be given renewed access to ‘Yadong (Yatung)’ and ‘Gyangze (Gyantse)’ among others to re-establish trading posts, and also new ones at ‘Rutog (Rudok)’ in Western Tibet, close to the ‘Ladakh’ border and along the highway through ‘Aksai Chin’. Indeed, China and India already have a starting point for exchanges in Tibet in their 1954 Agreement on ‘Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’, which provides a list of trading towns on either side, which could be reopened to each other” (Guruswamy and Singh 2009: 55–57).

In fact, Kalimpong and Siliguri in West Bengal are today known as hubs for the illegal trade with China that supply markets in Northeast India and elsewhere. The fact that informal trade has carried on all along their disputed boundary for decades now, should indicate to India the futility of its restrictions against Chinese goods. Meanwhile, “India should also welcome and cooperate in the extension of the QTR into Nepal as part of this process, and eventually in linking up its provincial economies of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar bordering Nepal to the Tibetan economy” (Jacob 2007). Further, as a means of enhancing mutual trust, India should also do away with the unreasonable and quite often irrational restrictions that it has placed on Chinese enterprises and investments in India and on the entry of Chinese citizens into the country.

Meanwhile, having already acknowledged “Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and the ‘one-China policy’, India should not shy away from making clear its other interests

with respect to Tibet, including over their common rivers and denuclearisation of the Tibetan plateau” (Jacob 2007). Jacob further advances the argument that “these are however, more regional and global issues than strictly Sino–Indian issues”. In the case of sharing of river waters, it must be acknowledged as the Chinese contend, that this is a South Asian issue rather than one between China and India alone and thus must involve in the case of the Brahmaputra for example, Bangladesh too. Denuclearisation of the Tibetan plateau would be a huge “confidence building measure” between the two sides but ultimately this is a function of the larger international context (Singh 2008).

It depends on the level of importance that the relationship with India has in Chinese eyes whether or not this step will eventually come about and this must be seen as a possible consequence of improved Sino–Indian ties rather than as a precondition. Chinese military presence in Tibet, meanwhile, needs to be seen by India in the first instance as a symbol of Chinese sovereignty rather than inherently as a threat to India. In any case, as mentioned above, India is not the same weak military force that it was in 1962 nor can it be a rational objective for the Chinese today to consider attacking India without provocation. Jacob (2011) asserted, “New forward policy could allow New Delhi to both ensure bilateral economic benefit and economic development in its own border regions as well as provide momentum for an eventual resolution of the boundary dispute.”

1.8 Strategic Importance of Tibet

Several strategic analysts, both in the East and the West have commented in the past on the strategic suitability of the Tibetan Plateau for nuclear experimenting and testing. This has unfortunately come true. China’s first attempt at nuclear research was made in 1958 at “Amdo (Haibei) on the Tibetan Plateau” and armed in 1971 when Beijing perceived a serious threat from the Soviet Union and India. By the early 1970s China had brought South Asia and the former Soviet Union within their effective nuclear range and reach. The fact that the Maoist strategists had chosen “Amdo and Kham” (near the Sino-Tibetan border) for their nuclear sites might have other implications and motives, besides geographical suitability and nuclear safety (Singh 2008: 28). By this mighty nuclear act, they might have cemented and concretized their claims over Inner Tibet. During the 1950s and 1960s several observers viewed the “Chinese occupation of Tibet” and subsequent strategic developments there as a threat to South Asia, implying Chinese expansionism. This view, of course, fitted with the Cold War image

of the type of Communist China that most people had at the time. China backed by its great military strength in strategy appeared more interested in competing against India for “spheres of friendship” in the Himalayan states. The Chinese aim seems to have been to transfer “Tibet’s former buffer functions to Nepal and if possible to Bhutan”. The implication is that even if China recognized Tibet as the “natural” and geographical limit of its power, it felt that the Himalayas alone were not enough to guarantee its national security in the modern age, especially given Tibet’s strategic location.

China ideally wants a chain of small friendly neighbours, friendlier to it, on the CIS-Himalayan region separating the two Asian giants. It makes no strategic and military sense to the Chinese to ‘liberate’ the Himalayan states which are geographically within the Indian subcontinent. Such an eventuality would bring china face to face with India. China has thus, “encouraged strong nationalist regimes in the countries that lie between Tibet and India. Such nationalist regimes functioning as buffer zones are in the interest of Chinese national security” (Goldstein 1995). Another aspect of the Tibetan issue is that China supports “Pakistan’s stand in the Kashmir issue”, there is evidence of Chinese involvement in the “Naga insurgency” and the “Naxalite movement”, and the extension of “Chinese influence in Myanmar”, and the only way in which India can play in this game of mutual interference is by taking benefit of the Tibetan issue.

1.9 Implications of a Nuclear Tibet

The “nuclearization” of Tibet and South Asia is sure to increase tensions along the Sino-Indian border. What makes the nuclear arms race in Asia so dangerous is the sheer proximity of the Chinese and the Indian nuclear sites. At present the Chinese nuclear sites in Tibet are roughly “2000 kms from New Delhi”. Singh (2008) imagined, “If India decides to deploy its nuclear weapons along the Himalayan Border, there appears a serious face to face situation. This will allow no peace of mind to either the Chinese or the Indian or the Tibetans” (Singh 2008). It is extremely interconnected, linked and complex situation. Both India and China, today, consider Tibet vital for their national security. To aim for a Tibet which will serve the role of a “buffer zone” as it did before the liberation in 1951 seems far-fetched. No doubt, Tibet is today an integral part of China and to argue or even talk about its complete autonomous status appears to be an impossible and bizarre proposition. Even the Dalai Lama today is negotiating on the grounds of an autonomous Tibet with regards to the “Domestic Matters- religion,

culture and society”. “Defence and the Foreign Relations” will remain in the hands of the Chinese Central Government. In this light, to say that Tibet after it gains autonomy will be able to play active role as a buffer state appears unrealistic.

Today, the Tibetan question in any bilateral Chinese Talks appears only when the relations between China and the other country are going through a bad phase. The example is that of Sino-US relations. Every time there is some problem between the two the issue of Tibet is brought to the forefront. The second question to be answered is that the fact of the presence of nuclear bases in the Tibetan plateau. Will China be ready to close or shift these bases to the Mainland? The answer again is in the negative. The move to establish nuclear bases in Tibet was a result of the strategic security consideration as the Tibetan Plateau appears to be safer for nuclear research. One also needs to look into the question of the viability of a “buffer zone” in the nuclear world. Does the concept of a “buffer zone” work in the above condition? The answer will be a firm no. In the highly nuclearized world today when there are three strong nuclear powers in the same region (India-China-Pakistan), the concept of a buffer state does not appear to be applicable. If we look logically into this there is no “buffer zone between India and Pakistan” – even when both the countries are on unfriendly terms. No doubt that China is trying to help Pakistan, but that appears to be more of an attempt towards maintaining the balance of power politics in the region. Undoubtedly, the de-nuclearization of the region would be favourable to both the sides but it appears to be unlikely, even though the border region has had no major violent uprisings and both the countries are on the road to economic cooperation (Singh 2008: 30). The opening of the “Nathu La Pass” clearly highlights this trend in the relations.

Support for the Tibetan cause is strong in India. Moreover since the “Tibetan Government in exile” and the Dalai Lama are in Dharamsala this emphasis is strengthened. On the other hand, close Buddhist ties also make the Indians support the Tibetan cause. The same holds true even in the case of the American Public opinion. However, “In spite of the fact that the US is the sole super-power of the world today, it is unable to bring the issue to its right conclusion. India though more closely involved, is in no position to solve the problem” (Garver 2006). Chinese have accepted that “Sikkim is a part of the Indian Territory” after the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to China. Though they have asserted their stance on Arunachal Pradesh and have claimed

that it is the part of the Chinese territory. The economic tie between the countries is on a constant rise.

In such a scenario, the realist approach would be to sue the benefits of good relations rather than to be stuck with the Tibetan cause. Singh (2008) asserted that “India have to play a crucial role in the conclusion of the negotiation between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government though this will not be a welcome thing by the latter”. Given its closeness to the issue it is the only country which can play a meaningful role. However, militarily speaking it is incapable of doing so. Thus, we can conclude by saying that no doubt a de-militarized and de-nuclearized Tibet would be a boon for India; it appears to be more of a dream than a reality. Undoubtedly a favourable domestic, regional government in Tibet definitely will be more beneficial than Nepal as we have seen that the latter began to cash upon its acquired strategic importance by playing the two countries against each other to get the maximum benefits it could acquire by doing this. The economic dependence of Tibet on China also ends the question of the independence of the Tibet. Tibet today is more integrated with China than it was in the past. Thus, “to assume that the past status of Tibet can be re-established is an unrealistic dream. The situation is irreversible” (Singh 2008).

1.10 Tibet in India’s China Policy

Tibet effects on Sino–Indian relations more than any of China’s other bilateral relations. As the late Prof. Dawa Norbu observed: “the crux of the Sino–Indian strategic rivalry is this: if the Chinese power elite consider Tibet to be strategically important to China, the Indian counterparts think it is equally vital to Indian national security” (Norbu 2001: 297). Independent India’s Tibet policy was defined by Nehru’s dreams of a Sino-Indian “Anti-imperialist and non-aligned alternative” to the hegemonic Soviet and American superpowers. The 1962 border war with China changed India’s practice, if not its policy, towards the Tibetan refugees. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 brought about a thaw in relations and a return to India’s pre-1962 policy statements on Tibet, although there have been no visible practical fall-outs on the Tibetan exiles. This is, perhaps, in keeping with the new realism in post-Cold War India’s foreign policy, tempering the “idealism in its foreign policy with a strong dose of realism” (Chellaney 2006: 159–62). Mohan writes, “Facing its own acute vulnerabilities in Kashmir, Punjab and the North-East, India was unwilling to confront China on the Tibet issue. At the

same time, India refused to bend by reducing or suspending its support to the Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama in India” (Mohan 2003: 169). Eventually though, as one Indian analyst advised, India will need “a more sophisticated policy that goes beyond simply curbing the Dalai Lama’s activities, remaining in a state of denial, or repeating its acceptance of Tibet as a part of China” (Stobdan 2009). This is because at some point Beijing will demand that India should dissolve the Tibetan government-in-exile. The up-shot is that Tibet remains a key irritant in India–China relations.

In furthermore Norbu has found four major issues that feed the Sino–Indian geo-strategic rivalry that have to do with Tibet: “The status of Tibet, Chinese unease with the activities of Tibetan refugees, including the Dalai Lama, Indian fears over Chinese military presence on the Tibetan plateau and the long-standing border dispute” (Norbu 2001: 283–97). First, India’s position on the status of Tibet has changed from the British policy of recognising the *de facto* independence of Tibet—“completely Autonomous State-under a vague form of Chinese suzerainty (1947–1951) to accepting Tibet as a part of China in 1954” (Shakya 1999: 119). On April 29, 1954, India conceded to the Chinese insistence on referring to Tibet as “Tibet Region of China” (Jain 1981: 77–80). After the 1962 border war, India often merely used Tibet until the 1988 visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when the “Sino–Indian Joint Press Communique” referred to Tibet as “an autonomous region of China” (‘Sino–Indian Joint Press Communique’, 23 December 1988).

In 2003, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed a declaration which recognised that the “Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China” (‘Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India’, 25 June 2003). This position was reiterated in the Joint Statement during the visit of “Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao” to India in 2005 (‘Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China’, 11 April 2005). These formulations led an Indian scholar to observe that, “India’s acceptance of Tibet as a part of China is conditional upon Tibet’s enjoyment of autonomy. China, therefore, demands stronger and more unambiguous statements from New Delhi on China’s sovereignty over Tibet, which India has resisted so far” (Mohan 2003: 168). Second, India’s consistent official policy has been to disallow anti-Chinese activities by Tibetan refugees on Indian soil. In practice, “India has allowed the Tibetans to run a government-in-exile, the Central

Tibetan Administration, given material assistance for the running of various projects under its sponsorship, and facilitated the international political activities of the Dalai Lama. India refuses to bend to Chinese pressure by reducing or suspending its support to Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama in India” (Mohan 2003: 169).

A relevant question is whether India will revise this policy after the demise of the current Dalai Lama. One Indian scholar Chellaney (2007) argues, “India will continue to support Tibetan exiles because it is in India’s national interest”. Another proposes that “India should take upon itself the responsibility to nurture Tibetan language and culture as it faces ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet” (Subrahmanyam 2005: 189). For the foreseeable future, “India’s material assistance and facilitating role for the Tibetan struggle will continue. This is a sore point for China” (Cohen 2001: 259). The Chinese complain that “such open encouragement and support given by the Indian government to the Tibetan rebel bandits in their false activities constitute an interference in China’s internal affairs and harms the progress of Sino–Indian relations” (Jain 1981: 473-74). The Indologist Cohen (2001) argues that “In the minds of the Chinese elite, ‘India’s gravest threat to China resides in Tibet’ because of the sanctuary that India provides to over 100,000 Tibetans and the goal of some Indian elite to resurrect Tibet as a buffer zone between China and India”.

The Chinese scholar Wu Xinbo (1998) agrees, “So long as the exiled community exists, Tibetan separatism will remain a major concern for PRC leaders”. Fears of Indian muddle in Tibet and loss of strategic advantage to India are long-standing (Whiting 1996: 614). Even when there were very few Indians in Tibet, Mao told Khrushchev in 1959: “The Hindus [Indians] acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them” (Mao Zedong 1959). Although, successive Indian governments have been extremely cautious of speedy the Chinese on Tibet and despite the overall improvement in Sino–Indian relations, Beijing continues to suspect India of bad intentions in Tibet. The best measure of Chinese vulnerabilities in Tibet vis-a-vis India, perhaps, is contained in an essay written by Wang Lixiong who is one of the most liberal Chinese intellectuals. He wrote in 1999:

As it involves Chinese–Indian relations, Tibet becomes an extremely important factor... Since its geopolitical position has wedged it between two great powers, it has to be dependent on either China or India, having no other choice.... Tibet has always had a high degree of spiritual identification with India... (Lixiong 1999).

As stated above, when the Tibetan exiles demand Tibetan independence, or the Dalai Lama calls for a high degree of self-rule for Tibet, the scope they are referring to is “greater Tibet”. Topgyal cited that “If the 2.5 million sq. km. of ‘greater Tibet’ were separated from China, China’s western border would shrink towards the interior by up to a thousand km. If it drew two diagonal lines on the Chinese map, they would converge in central China at ‘Tianshui’, ‘Gansu’. If ‘greater Tibet’ was independent, ‘Tianshui’ would be only a little over 100 km from the ‘new border’, which would make the current centre of China our border” (Topgyal 2011: 119). In past Chinese national crises, inland Sichuan was often seen as our ‘greater last area’, for either “partial sovereignty” or as our “provisional capital”. But Sichuan’s capital of Chengdu would be only a little over 100 km from the ‘new border’, making it a front-line border defence post. So once Tibet became independent and was forced to ally itself with India, India would advance thousands of km without firing a shot, with its armed forces marching into central China, and its missiles being able to hit all of China from the Tibetan Plateau. Without the natural Tibetan barrier and the time it would take to cross the Tibetan Plateau, war would be fought in central China, at a certainly high cost to life and property.

So it is obvious that for China to lose such a vast barrier, which would expose our fatal ‘underbelly’, would be unacceptable from a national security perspective. Wang said, “Preparing for a possible future conflict with India is the bottom line as to why the Central Government cannot allow Tibetan independence. The Central Government cannot retreat or compromise on the demands for Tibetan independence or covert independence” (Wang 1999). Third, Indians have their reciprocal fears arising from Chinese military presence on the Tibetan plateau, history and future uncertainties. The true extent of China’s military presence in Tibet cannot be gauged, given the extreme secrecy surrounding information about the PLA, but rough yet differing estimates are available (Margolis 2002: 266). Margolis (2002) notes that “In the early 1990s, China had deployed around 500,000 troops on the Tibetan plateau with some of the best weaponry”. Norbu estimates, however, that “The likely size of the PLA in Tibet is around 150,000 in Eastern Tibet and 40,000 in the border between India and the Tibet Autonomous Region” (Norbu 2001: 239). The presence of Chinese strategic forces on the Tibetan plateau adds another dimension to India’s China threat perception (Norbu 2001: 242–46). There are “Several airbases and tactical airstrips and the network of

roads that China has built, criss-crossing the Tibetan plateau right up to the Indian, Nepalese and Pakistani borders with Tibet and Xinjiang, and the expanding railway network” (Margolis 2002: 266–67). Chellaney believed, “China’s management of water resources emanating from Tibet, which feed the Indian subcontinent, also feature in Indian security conceptions” (Chellaney 2006: 38). The ‘ghosts of 1962’—as one Indian strategic analyst put it to refer to the complex of historical memory and sense of betrayal and humiliation on account of the 1962 war that continues to tear the Indian psyche—casts a long shadow over Indian perceptions of China today (Subrahmanyam 2005: 319–27). In essence, the complex of security concerns relevant to Tibet reinforces the larger strategic rivalry between these two Asian giants. Consequently, the Chinese and Indians have reciprocal security concerns that are relevant to Tibet.

1.11 Research Questions:

- Is the Tibetan exile government in India affecting the India-China relations?
- Why India did change their policy towards Tibet as an independent state after the Panch-Sheel agreement?
- Will India change her policy towards Tibet after the demise of Dalai Lama?
- Why China is insecure with the Tibetans who are living in India?
- Why Tibet issue is still alive despite the Rajeev Gandhi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee approval that Tibet is a part of China?
- Does Tibet issue really a trump card for India to use against China?

1.12 Hypotheses of the study:

- The strategic location of Tibet is guiding the nature of bilateral relationship between India and China.
- Frequent claim of an independent Tibet and various political activities upon Indian soil by the Tibetan refugees/supporters has become bone of contention in India-China relations.

To sum up, the first or the starting segment of the thesis is a sort of introductory of the concerned research work. It contains a historical image of Tibet as a country who is till date struggling to get an undisputable & stable identity of her own. It also has tried to analyze Tibet in details through the policies of India and China that particularly relate to Tibet itself. Along with that the first chapter of the concerned research work

has contained the research questions and hypotheses. Indeed, in general, this chapter gives a clear idea about the research problem and its further study.

Chapter Two

Rajiv Gandhi's Tibet Policy

The Tibetan issue has been of central concern to both India and China since the days of British Raj. It has remained the core issue between Indo-Chinese relation despite booming the economic relation year after years between the two neighbouring states. However, they have enjoyed the long historical, cultural and mythical relationships but after post Indian Independence, with the political asylum granted to Dalai Lama by Indian state, Tibet issue got more complicated for both nations. The past Indian stands on Tibet have different implications for Indo-Chinese relationship and one of the great implications of the peaceful settlement of the Tibet issue is the regional stability with the harmonious relationship between India and China. One new formulation of state ran counter to the past government stand with the promise of repairing the damage done by previous government including the prime ministers Nehru, Rajiv Gandhi, Vajpayee. One granted the political asylum to Dalai Lama, other extended the 'recognition' to accept the Chinese stand on Tibet as an "Autonomous region as the part of the territory of the PRC (People's Republic of China)". The issue is so imperative to India that one government of India forced to urge the government of China to start the process of reconciliation in Tibet and next government had to compromise the mutual recognition of 'One India', 'One China' policy and Indian state throw a unilateral support to 'one China' policy without getting the same response from later. Definitely Indian state made blunders while dealing the Tibet issue paying the cost of deteriorating the harmonious relationship with his neighbor and the current largest trading partner. This chapter will evaluate the deteriorating India China relationship right from the beginning of post Indian independence period up to the period marked by the tenure of the former prime minister of India Rajiv Gandhi. Some backgrounds of Indian leaders' stand on Tibet need to be examined for further deconstruction of the Rajiv Gandhi's Tibet policy in order to evaluate how he was different from his predecessors and what course of action took place between post independence India and in his tenure.

Indian political leaders have extended full moral and political supports on the question of Tibet at many occasions not only in the Parliament but outside of it as well. Starting from post independence time whether it be Jaiprakash Narain, Atal Bihari Vajpayee or the first Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, everyone

extended strong support to Tibet and raised their concern in Parliament. In view of this, it is imperative to put here an example of the letter written by Sardar Patel to Nehru regarding Tibet issue. That letter conveyed his clear message to Nehru that India should stand side by side with the Tibetan people. In a response to the Sardar Patel letter, Nehru wrote back on 18th November 1950 explaining the Indian state stand regarding China and Tibet. This letter was obviously forwarded to Sardar Patel as it answered indirectly some of the matters raised in Patel's letter of 7th November, 1950.³ The exchange of letters between the first prime minister of India Nehru and his deputy clearly reflect the strong concern about Tibet and its implication of building popular perception regarding Indo-Chinese relationship.

2.1 Tibet and the 1962 War: The Chinese perspective

Showing gradual concern over Tibet, mixing the mythology and tradition with the political territorial and administrative matter to undermine the Chinese claim over Tibet by India were some issues for continuous deterioration of Indo-Chinese relationship. Regarding this bilateral relationship which also culminated into the war between India and China in 1962, there is an unanimous agreement among Chinese scholars that the root cause of the the 1962 war was an gradual undermining the Chinese claim over Tibet as a part of People's Republic of China.

The PLA official argues that India sought to turn Tibet into a political "buffer zone" following the British imperial strategy and the creation of such a buffer zone had been the political strategy of Nehru as well which reflects nothing but a 'complete successor' to Britain imperial strategy. Further the Chinese perception in this regard was that Indian government and particularly Nehru had the same imperialistic objective in South Asia. He wanted to create a "great Indian empire" in South Asia "filling the vacuum" left by exit of British colonial power from that region and control over Tibet was, Nehru felt, essential for "mastery over South Asia, and the most economical method for guaranteeing India's security" (Garver 2005).⁴

³ Both leaders' letters have been attached at the end of the notes.

⁴ History of the Sino-India border self-defensive war, Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1994, p. 37-40. This is the official PLA history of the 1962 war. It labors at considerable length to demonstrate that India's aggressive intentions and actions precipitated the 1962 confrontation, and provides copious detail

A study by Xu Yan (1993), professor at the PLA's National Defense University and one of China's foremost military historians, follows the same line of argument: "Nehru aspired and worked consistently throughout the 1950s to turn Tibet into a 'buffer zone' which was, according to Nehru, 'necessary to establish a longer regional stability in South Asia' but imbibing the British imperialist ideology and colonial strategy he believed that "India should dominate neighboring countries". Xu Yan quotes Nehru and other early Congress Party leaders to explain their common intention about the leading role of India to organize the Indian Ocean region. Further he went on saying that the "Indian independence struggle was also marred by an emphasis on 'pure nationalism'- communist-jargon for non-Marxist nationalism not underpinned by a class analysis". As far as Tibet is concern, Nehru aspired to turn that region into a 'buffer zone' between China and India and undermining the Chinese claim on Tibet as the part of People's Republic of China. This was the consistent objective of Nehru throughout the 1950s and finally, Nehru's objective of protecting the Tibetan 'splittist' after the Lhasa rebellion of March 1959 proved as the "decisive factor" for further deterioration of Sino-Indian relations.⁵

Another article by Wang Hongwei (1989) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and one of China's senior India hands, presents the similar view. He is of the opinion that "prior to 1947 British imperialist objective was to bring Tibet within its 'sphere of influence'. Britain sought 'Tibetan independence', and continuously attempted to instigate Tibet to leave China". Further Wang argues that since, "Nehru was also the product of 'British filtration theory' educated in Britain and by assimilation of the mentality of the British ruling class, he was deeply influenced by this British imperialist thinking and the strategy over Tibet". That was the reason, in 1959, the Indian government "supported the Tibetan rebels", permitted them to carry out "anti-China activities" on Indian territory, and even "gave some Tibetan rebels military training". Simultaneously, India advanced claims on Chinese territory (Hongwei: 1989: 1-13). Implicitly but clearly, the purpose of India behind supporting Tibetan claim and

on PLA military operations. Yet it gives very shorts confession to the actual process through which China's leaders decided to resort to war.

⁵ Xu Yan, Zhong Yin (1993), *True history of the Sino-Indian border war*", Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., p. 28, 29-30. This is the most important Chinese work thus far on the 1962 war. The work deals at considerable length with China's actual decision making process.

instigating Tibet to 'leave China' was to achieve Tibetan 'independence' so that Indian intension of creating Tibet as a 'Buffer Zone' between India and China could be pursued.

One of the most extensive and nuanced Chinese accounts of events leading up to the 1962 war is by Zhao Weiwen (2000). Long-time South Asian analyst of the Ministry of State Security Zhao's account explains clearly that the "Road to 1962 India-China war also begins with Tibet and attribution of aggressive motives to Indian policy moves". From 1947 to 1952, Zhao writes, "India ardently hoped to continue England's legacy in Tibet" (Weiwen 2000: 103).⁶ The essence of English policy had been to "tamper with China's sovereignty in Tibet to change it to 'suzerainty' thereby throwing off the jurisdiction of China's central government over Tibet under the name of Tibetan autonomy" (Weiwen 2000: 110).⁷

By 1952, however, the PLA's victories in Korea, in "Xikang province", the conclusion of the "17 Point Agreement of May 1951", the PLA's occupation of Tibet, and Beijing's forceful rejection of Indian efforts to check the PLA's move into Tibet, forced Nehru to change course (of action). Nehru now began direct talks with Beijing over Tibet. However, the "right wing forces" in India were against with the particular moves and "refused to abandon the English legacy" in Tibet pressured by Nehru in 1959. Moreover, "Nehru himself 'harbored a sort of dark mentality', the exact nature of which is not specified but which presumably included aggressive designs on Tibet" (Weiwen 2000: 129). These factors led Nehru to demonstrate an 'irresolute attitude' in 1959. On the one hand he said that Tibet was a part of China and that he did not want to interfere in China's internal affairs. On the other hand, he permitted all sorts of 'anti-China activities and words' aimed against China's exercise of "sovereignty over Tibet". Zhao is more sensitive than other Chinese analysts to the domestic political pressures weighing on Nehru in 1959. Yet even she suggests that Nehru's "dark mentality" led him to give free reign to "anti-China forces" in an attempt to cause Tibet to "throw off the jurisdiction of China's central government" (Garver 2005).

⁶ Zhao Weiwen is one of China's authoritative India hands. From 1950 until the mid-1990s she worked for the China Institute for Contemporary International Studies and the organizational predecessors of that body. This was the analytical organ of China's ministry of state security.

⁷Ibid.

2.2 India's China Policy in the 1980s

After Mrs. Gandhi returns to power in January 1980, she maintained political dialogue with China. In May 1980, she availed the opportunity of meeting Chinese Premier Hua Gua Feng in Belgrade. It is said that this meeting was very fruitful for both countries. During that meeting the both leaders recognized their positive role and responsibilities in South Asia and they agreed to follow necessary steps for better Sino-Indian relations that was demand of time to establish peace and stability in Asia and the progress of both the nations. They also underlined the need for mutual consultations and avoidance of confrontation to pave the way for an amicable solution of their multidimensional bilateral problems. In the very next month, the Chinese Vice, Premier Deng Xiaoping announced a Chinese offer of “package deal” on border dispute while interviewing with an Indian newspaper correspondent. This offer was nothing but old wine in a new bottle. It was nothing but in content, by and large, Zhou Enlai’ “Six point formula”, which he proposed to Nehru in 1960, however, the Chinese had succeeded in throwing the ball in India’s court. In response to this Chinese move, next month, the then India’s Foreign Minister, P. V. Narasimha Rao casually reacted to the proposal in the Indian Parliament. In his casual reaction he said that “ways other than the ‘package deal’ solution could prove more effective” (Nehru 1974: 344). While reciprocating China’s desire for improvement in bilateral relations as exercising positive influence on regional and world affairs, Rao made it clear that India had never accepted the premise that China was making any concessions in the eastern sector by giving up territory which, it alleged, had been illegally incorporated into India, but welcomed the settlement of the prospect of the eastern sector without any ‘particular difficulty’ (Bhola 1986: 250-51).

To move forward and to clarify the Chinese intension further in this regard the Chinese Foreign Minister was invited to pay a visit to India and date of visit was also fixed but it was postponed. The obvious reason was that in the meantime India had recognized the “Heng Samirin regime in Kampuchea” that hurt Chinese feelings But India did not over-react at the postponement (Jain 1981: 549-50). In June 1981, before the Chinese Foreign Minister’s visit to India, the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang undertook a tour of South Asia. Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh were on his itinerary. In Pakistan it was the first visit by any Chinese Premier since Zhou Enlai’s in 1965 (ibid). Zhao was not as vocal on Kashmir as Chinese leaders used to be earlier. He also talked of the necessity for peaceful and friendly relations between India and China. He prefer

to chose safer side recognizing the two countries as the “major powers of the region” (Tribune 1981). It was a significant departure from the past Chinese moves. Zhao’s remarks and postures in Pakistan undoubtedly amounted to a feeler to India. But at the same time, he threw unmistakable hints that the past policy of cultivating India’s neighbors might well continue, if the feelers did not result in concrete agreements during Huang Hua’s India visit. One of the hints was the route he took by passing Indian territory while going from Pakistan to Nepal, probably meant to show that a Pakistan Nepal relationship independent of India was possible (Beijing Review 1987: 9). In Nepal, he gave open support to that country’s “peace zone proposal”, which had yet to be fully discussed and decided upon between India and Nepal. Although Zhao’s tour was part of anti-Soviet strategy, it was used to assure Pakistan-Nepal and Bangladesh about China’s continued support even after normalization of relations with India (Bhola 1989: 25).

In the same month, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua paid a visit to India. During his talks with the Indian leaders both sides reiterated their well-known positions. Huang expressed Chinese willingness to work in active co-operation with India to make concerted efforts to oppose aggression and interference from outside and to safeguard peace in Asia and the world in the wake of super power rivalry and expansionism. Indian Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao while expressing concern at the mounting out-side presence in the neighborhood and reiterating need for efforts to eliminate the causes of tension, reaffirmed India’s belief in co-operation with all countries. However, he made it clear that India would never allow itself to be influenced by the changing relations between its friends inter se (FAR 1982: 175).

The principal outcome of the Chinese Foreign Minister’s visit was the decision to hold official level talks regarding both bilateral problems and bilateral exchanges. Apparently, the dialogue was conceived to have two components, viz: (1) the border dispute, which was recognized to be central to the full normalization of relations, and (2) improvements in other areas, without making the border settlement as a precondition. An Even more important problem relating to Chinese attitude towards India’s neighbors, which in the ultimate analysis, boils down to the problem of political co-existence was left unstated and not made as a component of the dialogue. A series of talks began in December, 1981. At the first round of talks “five sub-groups were

formed” to deal with matters concerning “boundary, trade, and economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and science and technology” (Bhola 1989).

2.3 The Joint Working Group

Rajiv Gandhi visit to China in December 1988 proved to be a path-breaking in the sense that he was sufficiently bold enough to drop India’s earlier demand for settlement of the border problem as a prior condition for general improvement in relations with China. He thereby successfully convinced Beijing officials as well as Chinese leaders that India was seriously prepared to negotiate the border dispute, despite the vagueness of China’s various public but nonofficial offers made in 1960, 1979, and 1983 to settle for a package exchange, differently interpreted according to how a commentator assessed Chinese intentions (Mansingh 1994). Here in India the All India Congress Working Committee on November 5, 1988 strengthened hands of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by passing a resolution urging the government to seek a settlement based on mutual interest and acceptable to the peoples of both countries through peaceful negotiations, no matter if it took time (Express 1988). However, it was the clear avoidance of the parliamentary resolution passed by Nehru government in 1962 binding government commitment to “obtain the return of every inch of India’s ‘sacred soil’ claimed or captured by China” but even the main non-Congress parties did not strongly oppose Rajiv Gandhi’s move, perhaps because an earlier initiative had been taken by the Janata Government when Foreign Minister Vajpayee visited China in February 1979. Rajiv’s path, however, was not smooth. Without understanding the importance of Rajiv Gandhi moves or in other term, having seen the country interests China had disclaimed offers of regularizing the status quo and spoke instead of ‘mutual concessions’ (Mansingh 1994: 289). This is why, media projected this extra-ordinary move as most publicized but little understood episodes.

Another incidence of military tension occurred at “Sumdurong Chu on the eastern border” in 1986 and 1987, further complicating the picture at both India and international level. On the one hand, these episodes demonstrated the confidence and capability of the Indian army to hold its ground at the time, on the other hand; it underlined the potential of conflict and the need to avoid the recurrence of flurries with the Chinese army as it launched modernization. Moreover, the much-intensified eight rounds of talks on the border dispute between officials since 1982 had not produced much more than what Deng Xiaoping called “a mound of stale rice buzzing over with

flies”. And finally it revealed that an infusion of political would be clearly necessary to remove the dead hand of past emotionalism to explore the way to logical conclusion of conflicts (ibid 1994).

As a result of Rajiv Gandhi’s path-breaking visit to Beijing, a Joint Working Group headed by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese deputy foreign minister was constituted, and was to meet approximately every six months in alternate capitals. This much expected ‘Joint Working Group’ subsequently included the representatives of the armies and officials of ministries of defense. In this effort there were six meetings of the JWG took place as it was scheduled and it paved the possible way to progress further in the direction of resolving multi-dimensional conflicts between these two Asian giant, despite the necessary secrecy that surrounds their meetings.

It clarified some objectives to ensure “peace and tranquillity” along the border and to reach a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable agreement related to border dispute and other matters of conflict between China and India (ibid 1994). However, there is no detailed chronological analysis is attempted here, a relative slack from 1989 to 1991 is easily explained by the preoccupation of both India and China with bilateral political and non-political problems. The much-awaited process of JWG meeting was resumed only after China had recovered the diplomatic ground lost at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 and the Indian government headed by Indian National Congress returned to power with a bare majority minus the unprecedented political will shown by an assassinated Rajiv Gandhi particularly on the matter of Indo-China relationship. Media reports and deep conversations with officials made it clear that Prime Minister Li Peng’s visit to Delhi in December 1991 gave a stimulus to the process through 1992. Further the much anticipation of Narasimha Rao’s visit to Beijing provided further stimulation for the JWG meeting of June 1993 (Dhar 1993, Katyal 1993). The agreement signed in September 1993 on the conclusion of JWG meeting added a subgroup of military, diplomats, and surveying experts to assist and advise the JWG to reach on the logical conclusion on the matter of bilateral disputes. Further, it reaffirmed the “principle of good faith and mutual confidence” in the “settlement of differences that may arise in that process” (MEA 1993).

A fact that had recently gained public attention was the matter of the line of actual control (LAC) between China and India. It has not suffered any major disruption since the war of 1962 or any serious tension other than an episode of premeditated fight

at “Nathu La” in 1967 and the other episode at “Sumdurong Chu” in 1986-87. However, following the norm of “maintaining peace and tranquillity”, China did not make military intervention on the side of Pakistan during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971 or she threatened to do so in 1990. Nevertheless, continuous deployment of troops on the LAC by India and China did never deny an alarming proximity of conflict to each other at various points. Further, without saying it also goes against the norms of maintaining peace and tranquility because there is no mutual agreement is specified on the matter that where these troops have a legal right to be positioned. The resumed JWG meeting has instituted the confidence building measures to preclude accidental conflicts and ensure continued peace and tranquility on border and between these countries as well (Mansingh 1994: 290). To proceed in this direction further the facilities like Hot lines or direct communication between commanders of border personnel were established in February 1992 to ensure the legality and legitimacy of any conflict occurred over the border line. It was also decided then that meetings at “Bom La (north of Tawang in the eastern sector) and Spangur (near Chushul in the western sector)” would be held in June and October every year. These meetings would be organized and conducted by the military on both sides to establish facts on the ground. Advance notice of proposed military maneuvers related to military exercise, skill and care on one side would be provided to the other side and mechanisms for handling possible air intrusions on either side would be put in place with the prior notice. JWG consultations and verification procedures were reiterated in the Agreement of September 1993 (ibid 1994).

Following the same norms of easing the tension over border line and maintaining the peace and tranquility, India advanced further with suggested steps for the accurate assessment of existing troop strength on which there are differences of opinion occurred, however, a freeze on present levels with the expectation of subsequent reduction was observed. Reliable reports indicate reductions of about “35,000 troops by India” in the “eastern sector” during the last three years. In response to this China argued that its troop levels in Tibet was not relevant to the subject of bilateral confidence building, but former Indian Defence Minister Shawad Pawar was assured by his Chinese hosts in 1992 that China wish to lessen costs of maintaining troops in Tibet (Mansingh 1994: 291). Considering this fact India cannot realistically consider redeployment of its troops to an appreciably greater distance from the LAC

than at present because geography makes it impossible to defend mountain lines against Chinese troops occupying the Tibetan plateau-traversed by four-lane highways and strategic roads-from Indian military bases on the plains. If a future border settlement would accompanied or preceded by a radical reduction of threat to India, and if India's future defense strategy lessens its current reliance on troops physically patrolling the LAC, the matter will surely be reconsidered as a move in the right direction easing the tension over the border (ibid 1994).

For the moment, the JWG as well as local commanders focused on the concrete matter of easing the tension and avoiding clashes in specific locations where weather permitting Indian and Chinese posts and/or patrols are regularly within sight of each other. During this period of time India already reduced its defense budget and is likely to reduce it further while China, in the same period (while increasing its defense budget), engaged in modernizing its armed forces at lower levels of manpower adds credibility to these initial measures of confidence building (Mansingh 1994). Meanwhile, Article II of the September 1993 Agreement says "each side will keep its military forces along the line of actual control to a minimum level compatible with...good neighborly relations....the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed....The reduction of military forces shall be carried out by stages in mutually agreed geographical locations" (ibid 1994).

On the matter regarding to defining the line of actual control (LAC) the JWG has taken a similar concrete and practical approach itself and avoided getting mired in the conceptualization of large territorial claims showing her commitment to the confidence building measures. Whereas this responsibility falls on both sides, both sides have a general idea of what areas they control and have made declarations of their positions from time to time, despite it, there have been differences of perception and opinion on deciding specific points. Article 1 of the 1993 Agreement says "the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line of actual control where they have different views as to its alignment". It is also clarified that "neither side publishes coordinates" and there is no set of detailed maps that are mutually acceptable as exist for most of the line of control between India and Pakistan, through Jammu and Kashmir, agreements reached in the JWG can be welcomed as being based on present ground realities (ibid1994). According to a senior participating official, JWG meetings are free of polemics, candid and realistic. They do not refer to the past (defined as the

border talks of 1960 and the conflict of 1962) and make no reference to possible mistakes or assumed successes of men no longer alive, proud nationalists as they were of both India and China.

Similarly, the reiteration of grand principles such as mutual concessions and mutual accommodation and to moved away from assertions of huge territorial claims in the eastern or western sectors in reference to the border were observed in high-level speeches on the Chinese side. The similar phenomena, as usual, were observed on the Indian side in the reference of historical, legal, and geographical factors on the India in a very simple but appealing call to reach on a 'fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable' conclusion of the bilateral disputes (Mansingh 1994: 292).

Critics in India have not been silent on this perceived abdication of principle from China side. They didn't stop with criticizing abdication of principles only; they also denounced the government's decision to sign protocols with China for the resumption and extension of border trade in December 1991, July 1992, and September 1993 and to proceed with opening trade routes to Tibet without reaching on the logical conclusion having prior agreement on the border dispute. In this process of criticism critics generally recall a similar omission in the 1954 India-China Treaty on Trade with Tibet to admit it a blunder. However, an argument can be made to commend this effort in the way of expanding tangible bilateral ties and allow their usage by movement of goods and persons to consolidate peace and tranquility along the line of actual control (LAC). However, later, the designated trade routes reawaken territorial controversy (ibid 1994).

The first officially sanctioned route for border trade opened in 1991 through Lipulekh in middle sector near Pithorgarh in Uttar Pradesh because it has been the least contentious route. The second trade route was opened in 1993 through the Shipki La, in the middle sector connecting Kinnaur District in Himachal Pradesh with Zada County in Tibet. This route, like Lipulekh, has been known since the ancient time. A third route was to be opened in Nathu La Pass of Sikkim, but at that of time it was in discussion, government was not reached on the conclusion to announced this third trade route. India had suggested an eastern route originating in Sikkim but China avoided it without making any noticeable comment. An alternate route from Kalimpong in Darjeeling District in West Bengal, passing through Sikkim to Yatung in the Chumbi Valley, was in agenda. According to a high-ranking Chinese official, this would mean

“implicit recognition of Sikkim as part of India” (Mansigh 1994). From New Delhi’s perspective, there was no great hurry about obtaining explicit Chinese recognition of the accomplished fact of Sikkim’s integration, and designating Kalimpong as the starting point would have been a gesture toward West Bengal’s Communist Party (CPM) chief minister, Jyoti Basu (ibid 1994).

Having studied the efforts made by JWG, it can be said that “JWG have not been able to fulfill its original mandate of devising a comprehensive border settlement, but it has made a noticeable dent in defining terms of reference and demarcating the LAC”. Its efforts must be appreciated. As Li Peng said, “We all know there is a Line of Actual Control along the Sino-Indian border and we will abide by the understanding reached previously...that pending a final solution to this problem both sides should stick to this...so as to create a peaceful atmosphere and create good conditions for resolving this boundary issue” (Peng 1991). India and China both have reasonably sound and legitimate reasons as well as mutual interests in maintaining peace and tranquility. Article VI of the 1993 Agreement states: “The two sides are agreed that references to the line of actual control in this Agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question” (Mansingh 1994). Both governments have been making efforts to break the ice and shake up the status quo but again, according to my understanding, there are lack of political will to resolve the conflict in the vital interests of the people of both countries. Presently, it seems that neither government is willing to try to legitimize it as a formal border having the vital mutual consent. To develop a broader understanding on the issue let me look an incident related to JWG.

2.4 The Sumdorong Chu Incident

There did not emerge any consensus on even agreed sets of principles for negotiating the border settlement at the first round of talks of joint working group. Considering the legitimacy, reasonability, and what could be the possible commonly agreed approached and premise India put forward a set of six ‘working propositions’ for a speedy, logical and ‘just’ solution for the border dispute. India literally pleaded for ‘sector-to-sector’ approach as against Chinese ‘package’ deal approach. In response of this China proposed a set of five ‘guiding principles’ underlying need for a fair, reasonable and comprehensive solution of the border dispute while maintaining the friendly relation and continuous consultations under the spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation (Lindholm 1987). This is the position of both countries after the

conclusion of third round of JWG meeting. It was in the fourth round held in October 1983, where China finally relented to agree to discuss on 'sector-to-sector' approach proposed by India with the condition that the 'sector-by-sector' approach under the set of 'working proposition' proposed by India would be linked up finally to China's own proposal to develop a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of said bilateral dispute. However, the Chinese view was based on the acceptance of the de facto position on the borders.

The fifth round failed to make any substantive progress in terms of making an advance on procedural principles. The sixth round held in November 1985 that confirmed the existing gap of mutual understanding and divergence in approach. The proposed talk started with the official report on the survey of eastern sector. In a very positive note, the Indian spokesman claimed that the two sides had achieved a clear understanding of each other's position. It was agreed that neither side would disturb the status quo and following the norms of proceeding 'sector-by-sector' it was decided that the western sector would be taken up in the seventh round. But this positive environment didn't last longer due to an abrupt move of Chinese side by raising their claims on the eastern sector (Bhola 1989: 26). The hidden intention of China behind this abrupt move was to divert the attention from their occupation in the western sector and to bring the focus back to the eastern sector. Doing this, Chinese took a low-cost adventure in the Sumdorong Chu valley in the Arunachal in the middle of 1986 after the sixth round of Sino-Indian talks.

Understanding the intension, it was explained that Chinese wanted to disillusion Indian policy makers of their naive belief that the eastern sector was less disputed and it is not as serious as western sector. But unfortunately, they chose to do so without taking up the matter either through diplomatic channels or waiting for the seventh round. With the surprise that was sprang by China on New Delhi with this incident, On June 26 1986, India lodged a protest with China over the incident which China rejected the very next day. While the aura of this talk was still continue in the people perceptions of both countries, it was on July 15 that the Indian Government aired the fact that Chinese force had entered 6-7 km. inside the Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh (Lindholm 1987). In the response, Chinese spokesman declared that Wang-dung was north of the 'traditional customary boundary' as well as the McMahon line. In addition, he alleged that in recent years Indian troops had encroached into the territory that

belonged to China. It was the routine patrol sent there. Soon after this Chinese built a helipad and turned the bamboo huts into a regular military post (Bhola 1989).

Taking this aggressive Chinese attitude over eastern sector, without pondering too much to the unfolding situation, the then Arunachal Union Territory was conferred with the status of a State of Indian Union in December 1986 by the government of India. China reacted strongly calling this act as India “further legalizing its occupation of Chinese territory”. Going beyond, China took this particular Indian move so serious that she distributed leaflets containing this statement in the United Nations (Bhola 1989). On the other hand, India dismissed this charge responding that it was the matter of India’s internal affairs and China had nothing to worry. Further, China had also shown strong concern when India had been conducting in the north as routine matter its military exercise- ‘Operation Chequer Board’. By the spring of 1987, the situation turned so serious that Indian and Chinese troops were positioned face to face. In this regard, US journalist John Avedon’s account of ‘militarization of Tibet’ received wide publicity in the Indian press (Lindholm 1987: 82-84), while the situation was no longer tranquil, both the governments defused the tense situation and showed keenness to play down the tension and to facilitate negotiations.

Despite the tense situation on the Sino-Indian borders, the seventh round did take place in July 1987 in Beijing. The official statement in Beijing summed up the talks thus: the two sides enhanced their mutual understanding but made no headway. China laid claim to 90,000 sq. km. territory in the eastern sector in Arunachal. India reaffirmed its claim to 38,000 sq. km. in the Western sector in Aksai Chin and 2000 sq. km. in the middle sector. The Indian side noted a hardening of the Chinese stand. The Chinese pointed out that India was demanding one side to make concessions (Bhola 1989: 27).

The matter of fact was that, since 1985, Chinese have been interested in speeding up the pace of the normalization of Sino-Indian relations. Regarding the fact, they made two proposals to India. One was to open consulates in Lhasa, Shanghai, Bombay and Calcutta and the other was to upgrade political level of negotiations. But as far as New Delhi is concern, they thought that too fast a pace of normalization process would be in the interest of China only Indian interests would be persuaded only by taking each and every perspectives of matter of disputes and the responses made by China in this regard. Therefore, India’s response was not forthcoming visibly (Malhotra

1987). As a matter of fact, Rajiv Gandhi wanted to visit Beijing after having a thorough brief over the border problem. Before that, he sent Defense Minister K C Pant and Foreign Minister N.D. Tiwari to probe Chinese leaders' mind. Meanwhile, the Sumdorong incident imparted an urgency to take a close and comprehensive look at India's China policy. This made the Prime Minister to release order for the preparation of brief on India-China relationship in all its range and ramifications for the consideration of the Committee on Political Affairs in the parliament of India (Malhotra 1987). This was also necessary to understand the view of the changes that were taking place on the regional as well global planes.

Forcing with the recent development, in the middle of December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi paid a State visit to China and he was responded with a warm welcome in the neighboring country. It attracted huge worldwide media attention with the perception that it was going to start the new phase of historical relationship between India and China. The official announcement made to the media on December 23 stated that a joint working group would be set up to deal with the border related problem (Haibo 1989: 6) The principal outcome of the visit was very fruitful in the direction of resolving the Indo-China bilateral conflicts. The two countries started showing a rejuvenated political will to reach at the logical conclusion keeping their multi-dimensional interests intact and developing a mutual respect and common understanding to maintain peace and tranquility on the borders.

2.5 Lhasa Airport Restricted

The unfriendly environments developed between India and China during the JWG meeting after the Sumdorong Chu incident were continued to turn into a precarious situation. Mann (1987), in his 'Los Angeles times' article, had with the opinion that that the sign of deteriorating relations occurred when the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson repeated recent complaints before world communities that Indian troops have intruded on Chinese territory. In fact, it was not the complaint rather he warned India that if India wants easing the tension along border and to avoid "the possible occurrence of an unpleasant event", she should withdraw its forces immediately from the Chinese territory. (Mann 1987). However, the historical facts were suggesting that the territory over China was talking and claiming about remained always the part of the Indian Territory.

India responded that China's accusations were "baseless and without foundation". In the statement issued by India it was clearly admitted that "India has no intention of seeking a conflict with China". The situations were deteriorated to the extent that for the last two weeks the airport at "Lhasa and Tibet" had been closed to civilian flights. However, very soon, Chinese officials made the statements the airport environment was being improved, but readings of some analysts were telling the story otherwise. They believed that the timing of the closure strategically linked with military developments along the Indian border. It was such a precarious situation that threatened the Asian as well as world communities once. Any outbreak of hostilities between the world's two most populous countries could have affected other countries in Asia. It could have taken unpleasant turn for the world communities because India has defense ties with the "Soviet Union and Vietnam" while China has a close relationship with "Pakistan" and other Asian and Non-Asian countries. Mann believed, "This dispute over the 1,200-mile-long border between these countries had already led to one armed clash. In 1962, Chinese troops attacked and quickly inflicted a series of defeats on Indian forces. After three weeks, China withdrew, maintaining that its troops had taught India a lesson" (Mann 1987).

Further, Mann illustrates that the Tibet issue is vital in two separate areas, however, both remote but strategically important. One is at the point where "India's northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh touches southeastern Tibet". China, since long time reiterates that in the south of the Himalayas area India occupies "34,000 square miles of Chinese territory". The other disputed area lies to the west where the north Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir adjoins western Tibet and China's Xinjiang region. Chinese troops occupied "14,500 square miles" of Indian land that China seized during the 1962 war. Since 1981, China and India have met several times in an effort to settle the dispute, but they never come on a logical conclusion to develop a mutual understanding to sort out the border disputes including the particular border problem in Jammu Kashmir. Some path-breaking efforts made by government of India during Rajeev Gandhi's tenure easing the tension, including to convince world communities that Chinese troops were intruding into Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh. In December 1986, in his leadership the Indian Parliament amended the constitution to upgrade the status of Arunachal Pradesh from "a union territory to a full-fledged state". However, the action drew a series of strong protests from China but India successfully

made the ground to give a very strong message to China and the world communities (Mann 1987).

No doubt, conflicts between the two countries had increased clearly by that time and this was clearly reflected in the issue of Times of India published On April 16 1987. It said that a defense commentary saying that two countries were building up their forces along the border and predicting that China would attack by this summer. In addition, on three separate occasions since mid-April, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had lashed out at India. On April 22, a Chinese spokesman complained that India had “amassed its troops in areas along the Sino-Indian boundary and conducted a large-scale military exercise”. He also made the statement that Indian troops “repeatedly crossed the line of actual control by the two sides, nibbling at Chinese territory, forcibly occupied some places and sent military aircraft to violate China’s airspace from time to time” (Mann 1987). But, India had strongly rebutted these baseless allegations. It was also flashed in the media that “India...has given strict instructions to all its personnel not to cross the international boundary between India and China”.

In this situation when both countries making allegation and counter allegation to each other, India made it clear that “it is not our intention to mass troops or to conduct any antagonistic exercises”. Some analysts believe that, during that particular period, why China was taking a tougher stand toward India had a very sound Chinese strategy. This hidden strategy was directly related with the then USSR/Soviet Union. China was taking tougher stand against India in order to take advantage of Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s recent efforts to court China. It was only anti-campaign, precarious situation and strong tension along the borders between China and India might force Gorbachev to ignore Indian claim and to take the side of China. However, India was a longtime Soviet ally and it was not an easy task to campaign Soviet Union to take the side with China.⁸

2.6 China’s Obsession

China’s paranoia about the Dalai Lama in exile and continued unrest in Tibet after more than 30 years of occupation is evident. Beijing expends considerable effort in precluding invitations to the Dalai Lama from countries with large Buddhist

⁸ Mann, Jim (1987), “China-India Border Dispute Smoldering: Military Confrontation Feared Over 2 Contested Himalayan Regions”, *Los Angeles Times*, 08 May 1987.

populations, such as Bhutan, Taiwan, and Thailand. It reacts strongly when the Dalai Lama is received at the White House or 10 Downing Street, or makes a widely published speech. China effectively, though not formally, vetoed a U.N. invitation to the Dalai Lama to speak at the international human rights conference in Vienna in April 1993; instead, he spoke under private auspices to public acclaim. In meetings with Indians, Chinese invariably raise the subject of Tibet, question expressions of (nonofficial) Indian sympathy for Tibetan aspirations (Jha 1993: 25-33)⁹, and demand reassurance that India has not retreated from its post-1950 position of “recognizing Tibet as an autonomous region of China”, or from its “ban on political activity on Indian soil by the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile” (Mansingh 1994: 299).

The government of India dutifully provides these reassurances and includes the necessary statements on Tibet in joint communiqués. It went to the absurd length of detaining potential Tibetan demonstrators against Li Peng during his visit to Delhi, but did not repeat this during Li Ruihan’s visit two years later. Nor does India have contact with Chinese dissidents and Taiwanese who may wish to foster an independence movement in Tibet. Indian intervention in Tibet is unlikely in the extreme. At the same time, no Indian government can in decency withdraw the asylum first granted to the Dalai Lama and his followers in 1959, much less ask him to return to Tibet unless he himself finds it appropriate to do so (Mansingh 1994). No person, inside or outside government, can ignore the enormous prestige the Dalai Lama enjoys throughout India and all over a violence-ridden world; the Nobel Peace Prize was only a small token of this international regard. When he comments on the Indo-Tibetan border-rather than a Sino-Indian border-or the centuries-long role Tibet filled as a buffer state facilitating peaceful relations between India and China, he merely underlines undeniable geographical and historical facts (Lama 1992).

Facts and people can be manipulated by realpolitik, and Chinese attempts to influence the exile Tibetan community of about 100,000 and its Indian hosts are becoming visible. Some suspect a plan to undermine the authority of the Dalai Lama and jangle his delicate relationship with India’s political leaders. The Chinese embassy in New Delhi distributes considerable literature on Tibet castigating its past ‘slave’

⁹ Prem Shankar Jha view that China will not proceed with a border settlement as long as it feels insecure in Tibet and the Dalai Lama is in India.

society and lauding present conditions there (Mansingh 1994). The weekly China News usually contains items on Tibet, often statements by Tibetan officials on current prosperity. More ominously, the well-knit, successful, and nonviolent Tibetan settlement in Dharmasala is becoming disturbed by violent interchanges between young people born and raised in India and newcomers from Tibet. Impatience with the Dalai Lama's commitment to non-violence has infected some of his followers, not necessarily because of youthful impulsiveness.

Rival claimants as reincarnations of prominent Rinpoches are not a new phenomenon in Vajrayana Buddhism, but controversies such as occurred in Gangtok (Sikkim) may presage political interference in monastic authority worldwide. China is suspected of exerting pressure on behalf of China-born candidates for investiture as reincarnates and taking an active role in the search for a new Panchen Lama (Mansingh 1994: 300). In the words of Holley, "Tibet remains a cancer under China's burden and a curb on smoother India-China relations that is not likely to vanish unless negotiations between Beijing and the Dalai Lama ultimately succeed. His presence there, and the widespread sympathy in India for the cause of Tibetans who oppose Chinese control of their region, has contributed to tensions between India and China" (Holley 1988). Beijing and the Dalai Lama now are exploring the possibility of holding talks on the future status of Tibet and the possible return of the exiled religious leader to China. Rajeev Gandhi had said that India has no involvement in this dialogue.

2.7 Outcome of the Sino-Indian Summit 1988

The inability to achieve any tangible progress towards the resolution of the Border Question during the Beijing Summit would have come as a disappointing shock to the Indian policymakers who had expected some clear breakthroughs given the publicity that the issue had garnered in the official media. According to ML Sodhi (1988) this was down to some severe miscalculations on the part of Rajiv Gandhi and his advisers which resulted in India suffering loss of prestige and setbacks in terms of its negotiating position. While on the one hand, Rajiv Gandhi's evaluation and understanding of India's Himalayan Security Prospects was full of ambiguities, the Chinese side were on the other, persevering in the pursuit of their hegemonic claims. The former's remarks on Tibet, both in terms of content and tenor, according to Sodhi (1988) amounted to an official endorsement of the latter's actions of making Tibet a formidable military base against (in?) South Asia. Rajiv Gandhi's silence appeared as a tacit approval of the

deployment of nuclear weapons in Tibet by China, while his threatened curbs on pro Tibetan political activity could be seen as his approval of the dictatorial and repressive system imposed on Tibet by Beijing. Sodhi (1988) points out that Rajiv Gandhi was guilty of a number of unwarranted, superficial remarks anathemic to the Indian Public. China thus, retained its options in the event of 1962 like situation occurring with their military strategists prepared for a number of contingencies. They were successful in inducing a far more relaxed atmosphere using the charm offensive of Pancha Sheel declaration and Hindi-Chini Bhai bhai that would, in turn, enforce a number of military restraints on India without them even having to go in for any concrete confidence building measures.

Sodhi in his booklet titled “an Analytical Study of the Fatal consequences of Rajiv Gandhi’s Beijing Odyssey and Policy Alternatives in Sino-Indian Relations”, states that Gandhi’s claims of reciprocal restraint (in the face of a formidable military build-up in Tibet) were grossly inaccurate. Gandhi’s endeavours to work towards what he stated was a “mutually accepted solution which is fair and reasonable” instead of in fact, employing a sensible and balanced policy with respect to the deployment of forces on the border, would in Sodhi’s (1988) opinion lead him to ultimately agree to enhanced Chinese offensive capacity on India’s frontiers while at the same time reduce the deployments necessary for India’s own defence preparations. The argument that he was successful in establishing a personal relationship with his Chinese Counterparts would not according to Sodhi (1988) convince an Indian Public who still remembered the rise in Chinese military interests in the Himalayan region. Despite the supposedly cordial relations between Jawaharlal Nehru and Mao and Chou-en-lai. The build of Chinese Military in Tibet was very dangerous for India’s own security interest. Reading into the views as expressed by Chairman Deng Xiaoping, President Yang Shangkun, Prime Minister Li Peng and Vice-Premier Wu Xueqian, one is unable to locate any significant breakthrough in any of the issues that one was expecting in the Sino-India talks. Diplomatic Observers from other nations, Sodhi (1988) writes, would arrive at the conclusion that Rajiv Gandhi’s visit was poorly prepared that was oblivious to the new political and strategic realities both on the international as well as the regional scene.

Sodhi(1988) provides us with the following points which were the subject of discussion with the Chinese Counterparts:

Boundary Question: There shall be skepticism on part of the Indian Public with respect to Rajiv Gandhi's innocent declaration that both China and India have agreed that pending solution to the border question, peace would be maintained in the said areas. Even if there is the possibility of a phase of relaxation it could be of a short time period only. If there is a need for the Chinese to counteract negative developments taking place by provoking a conflict in the Himalayan Region, they would be able to do so at little cost to themselves by advancing down from Tibet towards the Indian Soil. Till the time the Boundary question is resolved, China can easily exhibit its military strength and ability to take risks. The fact that the Chinese have been able to pressurize India into downgrading the crucial issue of India's strategic frontier is to be seen as a masterstroke by China at India's cost.

Tibet as China's internal affair: China has been eager to break free of the deadlock that they find themselves in- this being a result of their violations of the human and political rights of the people of Tibet. Tibetan unrest is no longer a secret. Tibetan Student activists have even held demonstrations in Beijing. Rajiv Gandhi is aware of the fact that there has been gross violation of International Law by China which has committed Genocide in Tibet. For a nation that stands proud of its democratic set up and one which has taken up the cause of the Palestinians, Angolans and the sufferers of the Apartheid regime of South Africa, it is humiliating that its Prime Minister has stated that India will not allow political forces within its borders to engage in activities that are "harmful to China's internal affairs. Such remarks will only lead to the ignition of mass Indian indignation that shall seek to provide an appropriate response to tangibly assist the liberation movement of Tibet.

Back to the Five Principles: Rajiv Gandhi's rhetoric with respect to the Five Principles and the nostalgic revoking of Hindi-Chini Bhai days has intrigued diplomatic observers. The memories he evokes are one of Chinese treachery and deceit which psychologically speaking leads us nowhere towards a peaceful resolution. The Indian Public's opinion of the PanchSheel is one of complete mistrust that has led to open conflict. For a public which still remembers the events of 1962, the evocation of the above as models of resolution of regional conflict can never be accepted. Rajiv Gandhi must stop trying to revive the Five Principles in he wishes to concretely improve Sino-Indian relations.

Foundation for a peaceful, stable and cooperative relationship: The first step towards the foundation of peaceful and stable relations between India and China has to be the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Indian territory along with the removal of the threat that today looms in the form of the heavily militarised set up in Tibet. The question is whether the Chinese leaders have even offered to remove this threat? A thinning out of Chinese forces or a pullback would merely serve as eyewash for they could be sent back into forward areas in no time. There could be stable peace built on the foundation of mutual and balanced security but this has to involve the denuclearisation and de militarisation of Tibet. The mere signing of a few technical agreements does not signal a co-operative stable relationship. To achieve the latter, what is required are constructive bargaining stances on some of the outstanding issues. The Beijing Summit however has given no indication of the growing trust that is necessary for mutual cooperation. The discussions have omitted the Dalai Lama's 5 point plan which could really offer India, China and Tibet a real chance at peace.

New world order and learning from each other's experience: What do India and China really mean when they talk about a commitment to a new world order? Mere lip service to proposals that talk about revamping the global economic order amounts to little. India's stance to economic restructuring is clearly defined. At a time when China is still struggling to free itself from the economic shibboleths of the Maoist era, how can any decision maker in Delhi take seriously any of the proposals coming from Beijing? The outcomes of China's experimentations with the free market mechanism are still not certain. Despite the wishes of Rajiv Gandhi, India cannot at this moment even begin to learn from China until Beijing provides the world with an honest assessment of their version of perestroika. Vague talks on the commitment to world order merely divert attention from the chief concern-how to break the deadlock on the Himalayan military strategic problem?¹⁰

From the above perspective it is clear that the prospects for Indian security have not been enhanced by the 'Beijing summit'. Rajiv Gandhi's appraisal of the prospects of the Summit appears to have been totally unjustified. Sodhi's observation of the Rajiv Gandhi's Tibet policy is very much critical which has at some level transformed India

¹⁰ Sodhi M.L. (1988), *India China summit in Beijing*. It was a press statement by the two nation leaders and Sodhi who was a former Indian diplomat and distinguished scholar of international politics outlined the important points of the summit.

China bilateral relationship. In my concluding remark I presume that Rajiv Gandhi's Tibet policy was neither supportive nor it was rigid in its nature; though with the changing global world order Rajiv Gandhi move forward towards China and dare to acknowledge Tibet as a territorial part of China by any Indian prime minister after the 1962 India-china war hence left the Tibet question in the hand of history to evaluate whether he was right or wrong.

Chapter Three

Vajpayee's Tibet Policy

Among well-known Indian political figures, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was one who was very vocal and energetic at his young age to speak something over national and international issues. With the same spirit he was used to speak something in parliament over Tibet issue, and for that he was well known at international level. That means he was one among those who was very much concern about Tibet issues. There was a time when his commendable understanding over foreign policy prompted even Nehru to come forward with the bunch of appraisal for Mr Vajpayee. When tension was building up between India & china in the phase of 1950s and unrest of disorder started in Tibet, Vajpayee came forth first in the defence of Tibetan people. Even Vajpayee criticises Nehru's Tibet policy for his doldrums response against Chinese expansionist policy. In that perspective, Vajpayee's 1959 Lok Sabha speech that was on Tibet issues is memorable and notable on humanitarian ground at international level. In other words, on 8th of May, 1959 Vajpayee spoke openly in support of Tibet in Lok Sabha. Accordingly, he said "one cannot deny the fact that due to the events in Tibet, a tension has been created in the relations between India and China. But the responsibility for this tension is not India's" (Vajpayee 1959).

Vajpayee said that india was always stand with china at every moment for the recognition of china in international sphere, push its membership for UN security council, however,Vajpayee dispointed with chinese act to attack on tibet. Vajpayee asked nehru in parliament: "from what it is that Tibet is liberated?". If india had ever tried to annexed tibet it could have been but it didn't. Vajpayee spoke that china had not respected the autonomy of the Tibetan people in the respect of their bilateral agreement and in this connection said "following the agreement of 1950, China should have respected the autonomy of Tibet, but China has interfered in the internal affairs of Tibet. Lakhs of Chinese from China have been brought to Tibet so that the Tibetans may become a minority in their own country and so that in the future Tibet may become an inseparable part of China." Vajpayee this fear of making Tibetan minority in their own place comes true in future. Vajpayee said that "when we accepted the sovereignty of China on Tibet we made a big mistake. That was a very unfortunate day."

He reminded that by the virtue of “Panchsheel agreement”, china was bound to respect the “autonomy of the Tibet” and refrain themselves to interference in internal matter. Vajpayee spoke, though china has violated the norms, it is now India’s obligation to revise its Tibet policy. When one of the Member of Parliament said that no one government in the world supported idea of free Tibet Vajpayee beg to disagree, and said though his party is in small number, they support the idea of independent Tibet. He was expecting from Indian prime minister to apologise to the nation for India’s misdeeds against Tibet. He was doubtful that Tibet able to be enjoy autonomy under Chinese rule. He reminded one of Mao Zedong statement of 1930s that: “we have made the constitution in such a way that if somebody wants to go out, he can.” But Tibetans never demanded separation from china albeit autonomy. Vajpayee demanded separate seat given to Tibet in UN along with china line. He endorses his idea with the example of Ukraine which was part of the Soviet Union and had also a separate seat in UN.

He said, Chinese are not trustful because they have captured two Indian places in Uttar Pradesh hence need a stronger policy to fight back. He supported Dalai Lama’s cause to fight against china from Indian territory and welcome him to India. He further said, if Indian freedom fighters can support and fight for their motherland from foreign countries, why cannot Dalai Lama fight from India for his motherland. He said, “In the history of the past, we fought against the imperialism of the white people but now on the roof of the world appears the imperialism of the yellow people.”¹¹

In the next session of parliament on 21 August (1959), in the Lok Sabha Vajpayee yet again raised the Tibet issue and wanted that Indian government must put the Tibetan issue in the UN. In the forthcoming UN general assembly meeting in September 1959, Indian government had decided to raise the question of inclusion of china in the United Nations, henceforth Vajpayee asked the Indian government to raise Tibetan issue in the United Nations general assembly meeting so that the world knows the plight of Tibetan people struggles. Vajpayee was the supporter of ‘peaceful dialogue’ of all the disagreement must be solved through the talks. When the Tibet was invasion by china in 1950, Tibet delegation raise issue in the UN general Assembly. By the support of representative of El Salvador it was demanded to look into the matter, in the meantime Indian representative asked the general committee to cancel the whole

¹¹ Vajpayee, Atal Bihari (1959), Parliament speech in Lok Sabha on 8 May 1959.

issue and gave assurance that the advancing Chinese armies had stopped and there was no need for the Committee to deliberate on these issues.

Vajpayee said, on Indian assurance, the Dalai Lama made an agreement, the 17 Point Agreement with China. He blamed that there has been a violation of the 1951 agreement between India and China. The Dalai Lama was obliged to leave his country and take refuge in India. Vajpayee felt for the future of the Tibet and asked question; will the distinct existence of Tibet continue or will the people of Tibet be annihilated? To make stronger his argument, he theorised: “China have already installed there 50 lakhs Chinese and are in the process of settling 40 lakhs more. The whole intention of China is to make the Tibetans a minority in their own country; in this way, the Tibetan individuality will be destroyed. This is a new scene; this is a new kind of imperialism.” Vajpayee compared Tibet with some other colonised country whose history and fate was not alike Tibet. He said, “France has colonised Algeria but the French government respect the distinct individuality of Algeria. But it seems that the people of Tibet will have to go the way of Inner Mongolia. The exterior Mongolia, although not completely free, has something her own, but China has absorbed Inner Mongolia in itself and its existence as a free entity has ended (Vajpayee 1959).”

This is what is happening in Tibet. China has taken part in the Bandung meeting in which the declaration of the human rights has been accepted and is amongst the countries who signed this declaration, but these same human rights are being violated in Tibet. Vajpayee (1959) later gave more evidence and said, “According to the International Commission of Jurists, the right of the people of Tibet to freedom, the right to life and safety have being violated and are still being violated. The Tibetans are made to work by force. They are treated in a cruel and inhuman way. The right to home and privacy is being violated, right to property is being arbitrarily violated, and the liberty of worship is murdered in a planned manner. If the human rights are violated in this manner by a country which wants to be included in the United Nations, the world, and specially our country, cannot and should not remain a silent spectator.”

This is a question of human rights. By advancing his argument he asked question: “will the small countries survive in this world or not? India has a moral responsibility towards the people of Tibet.” There is the aspect of the security of India. Some journalist had given data to Vajpayee about the propaganda of china against India that from April 23 to April 30 1959, “In seven days, in the governmental newspapers,

press-conferences and through the radio, 77 articles commentaries and editorials, in all 44000 words against India, using a much uncontrolled language, have been published, distributed and spread. In Lhasa the police are still there in front of our embassy. The Indian currency has been declared illegal. The attack on an area of 30000 square miles of India by means of maps continues. No answer was given to our letter in which we had objected.”¹² Vajpayee wanted that India raise the Tibet issue in the coming UN general assembly meeting and also support the Chinese membership in the UN despite their propaganda against India. Indeed, Vajpayee as a true human being and a strong supporter of human rights has a strong attachment with the Tibetans and their problems, and because of that he has never hesitated to criticise the Chinese government behave towards Tibet. It also reflects from his 1959 Lok Sabha speech.

3.1 Vajpayee’s China visit in 1979

Because of Indo-China war since 1962 to 1976-77 for around 15 years the diplomatic relations between India and China was not that much friendly and sound. But after a gap of 15 years since the 1962 war when Indira Gandhi formed the central government the diplomatic relationship between India and China re-established. Subsequently, in 1976, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to exchange ambassadors with China. As an outcome of that in February 1979, on India’s initiative, Foreign Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. That visit of Vajpayee to China as the Foreign Minister was the first high level bilateral visit since “Zhou Enlai’s visit to India” in April 1960. For the Indian government the issue of boundary disputes was in priority and to oppose the Chinese view that it could simply be frozen as an inflexible problem “left over from history”. As a part of the meeting the only idea proposed by the Indian side was the option of a partial settlement of the boundary in segments where there was no dispute. It was quickly abandoned; oddly leaving behind a legacy of confusion regarding the so-called “sector-by-sector approach” (The popular notion being that India sought a piecemeal settlement of the border). This approach was not in support of the Chinese government and because of that they out-rightly dismissed the approach.

Further they suggested an alternate approach and plans instead sector by sector approach. As a result of that the Deng Xiaoping’ pioneer of the Chinese package

¹² Vajpayee, Atal Bihari (1959), Parliament speech in Lok Sabha on 21 august 1959.

proposal approach became the suggested alternate approach from the Chinese government side. But the intriguing fact is that as the Indian side had no prior knowledge of Deng's "package offer" it was natural for Vajpayee to compel to improvise in his reply and he did that. Vajpayee said that Deng's formula was similar to Zhou Enlai's offer that he had given in 1960. At that time it had entailed obvious difficulties as the situation on each sector of the long boundary had its own peculiar characteristics. Hence, it should be possible to deal with areas of little or no difference first and then move on to others where there was greater divergence between the two sides and, therefore, a "sector-by-sector approach" could be adopted. Deng ruled out a "piecemeal approach", then using the expression "package solution", to describe his proposal, one that would settle the entirety of the boundary in one go. Singh said, "It could be conjectured that an opportunity for establishing a principle, if not the essence of a solution, was lost" (Singh 2011: 85). The "package solution" could have been retained by the Indian side, thereby forming the basis for further negotiations. For instance, Singh believed, "India could have left open a channel for further communication claiming Deng's idea needed further study, that it would need to be fleshed out and could be supplemented in due course by rival or parallel ideas. However, the surprise of the offer and perhaps an acute sensitivity to domestic politics circumscribed the Indian response" (Singh 2011).

During the same visit, Vajpayee also held talks with Chinese Foreign Minister "Huang Hua". On the boundary question, Huang proposed, and the Indian side accepted, the following formula or 3-point Agreement:

- 1) "Recognising its importance, the two sides would undertake the efforts necessary for an early solution of the dispute.
- 2) While the process was underway, both sides would ensure that peace and tranquillity was maintained in the border areas.
- 3) There should be no impediment to the development of bilateral relations in various fields."

By and large these three points principle became the base of several decision take jointly by the two governments, India and China. In other words to denote, subsequent diplomacy has developed under the aegis of this formula. For instances, the important agreements reached in the 1990s and the 2000s can be seen to have emanated from the principles derived from the 1979 "three-point Agreement". With that the bilateral

relations between India and China started peaking up smoothly. As Huang Hua's return visit to New Delhi, the first by a Chinese Foreign Minister to India occurred in June 1981. Even, on India's initiative, an annual dialogue at the level of Vice Ministers was established. However, it was a difficult task for both the sides to find out a perfect way or solution. As when the first round of talks commenced in Beijing in December 1981, both sides faced the awkward task of defining a procedure and a methodology. However, as the first side the Indian delegation put forward three alternatives: as follows;

- 1) "Review of the historical evidence, technical matters and the geographical features of the boundary regions.
- 2) Implementation of the Colombo proposals of 1962 as a starting point for full territorial review, the contribution of impartial third parties through the diplomatic modalities of a special conference providing a dependable and neutral formula.
- 3) An exercise to locate and define the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LoAC)."

The aforementioned potential frameworks can be characterised as proceeding from a maximalist position (that is, Chinese withdrawal from "Aksai Chin" as a precondition to negotiations), to the pre-October 1962 LoAC reversing Chinese territorial profits during the war, to identifying the actual status quo positions on the ground at the time. The Chinese, however, rejected all three, casting doubt on their seriousness to pursue a solution. By reviving the "Colombo proposals", India was actually paring down its territorial claims.¹³

In that way "eight rounds of talks" were held between 1981 and 1988 at the ministry level. In the first round, in December 1981, India was not in a frame of mind to accept China's package framework", and proposed sector-wise examination of the dispute. However with the passage of several talks, finally in the fourth round of border talks, in October 1983, "China accepted India's insistence to discuss the disagreement on a sectoral basis". A Chinese official at the time stated, "it is in favour of a

¹³ The Colombo Proposals (Dec, 1962) was an effort by six Afro-Asian countries led by Sri Lanka to seek a compromise on the border conflict that could bring the two Asian powers to the negotiating table. The essence of the proposal was that 'there must not be any territorial gain on account of military operations'.

comprehensive settlement, but does not oppose separate discussions on the eastern, middle and western sectors of the boundary if this may lead to overall settlement” (Mishra 2004: 60). From above those discussions, here it became clear that India’s approach was based on the logic of addressing the dispute in a chronological way, as such as flowing from easier areas to more disputed ones. Consequently, India assumed that since “the eastern sector was relatively solvable, it could be addressed first. This would then create a positive atmosphere for discussions on the western sector” (Elkin and Fredericks 1983: 1128–39). The Chinese side probably rejected this principle of sequencing as it would have implied that the eastern sector is easier to solve than the western sector, thus undermining their bargaining position.

Indeed, after the fourth round talks things started taking different course. As in the sixth round in November 1985, Chinese negotiators pressed claims in the eastern sector south of the “McMahon Line”. According to Garver, “the eastern sector was the biggest dispute between India and China, and key to the overall situation” (Garver 2001: 104). Such kind of statement was given by the then China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Liu Shuqing through an interview to an Indian journalists in June 1986. Thus, more often than not tensions in the eastern sector during 1986–87 overshadowed the final rounds of talks. In the meantime, in one side “India extended full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh” in December 1986, and the other side “Beijing began to emphasise the eastern sector as the larger part of the boundary dispute”.

According to the above given map, here it’s clear that there was a perceptual gap between India and China on the essence of an “east–west swap”. Singh argues, the popular Indian position may be stated as follows: “It is argued by accepting a swap, India would be making a major concession by ‘the legal surrender’ of a part of ‘Aksai Chin’, which it believes, rightfully belongs to it. China, on the other hand, would gain *de jure* recognition of territory under its control in the western sector, which includes territory acquired through use of force in 1962, while giving up nothing, except an unjustifiable claim to Arunachal Pradesh” (Singh 2011: 88).

“India-China Disputed territory”



Figure 3.1: “India claims that China is illegally occupying over 43,000 square km of Jammu and Kashmir, including 5,180 square km ceded to Beijing by Islamabad in a 1963 agreement. China disputes India’s sovereignty over 90,000 square km of its territory, mostly in Arunachal Pradesh.”

3.2 Vajpayee intervention in Rajya Sabha

Vajpayee’s 28th April, 1989 parliamentary speech that was on the changing paradigm shift in India china bilateral relationship reveals that while Vajpayee was on china tour in 1979, “his visit was meaningful” but during that time china attacked Vietnam and that spoiled the whole trip. That means the concerned trip of 1989 was not productive. Still Vajpayee was happy about that, as at least that was initiative or effort from the government side. According to Vajpayee, when the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi went to China, the leaders of China “raised the question of Tibet and that moment had given us an opportunity to do something for Tibet”. Later, Vajpayee quoted, “he is an admirer of Nehru but in accepting that Tibet is a part of China, he made a Himalayan blunder.” For Vajpayee it was not a matter of bothering to go into detail “why Nehru made that mistake”, and because of that he did not had that intention to proceed or make an enquiry on that. In his speech, Vajpayee even had told that “Tibet has also the right to

be free, China had recognised Tibet as an 'autonomous region', and today where is the autonomy? There is violation of human rights, martial law has been proclaimed, there is repression on a big scale and there is terror." Further he said, "Now the leaders of China raising the question of Tibet themselves had given us an opportunity to raise the issue of human rights, to draw the attention of the Chinese leaders on this, and to talk in an atmosphere of friendship." However, "we did not seize this opportunity. There has been a change in the point of view of the Dalai Lama. Peking should have welcomed this change". He further explained in parliament in 1989 that "the Tibetans fight for their recognition, for their honour; There is an effort to rectify the mistakes that were committed during the days of the Cultural Revolution - the mistakes that were done in the internal affairs." He questioned also the Chinese Cultural Revolution and said "China should also rectify the mistakes that were committed in the foreign affair, we should encourage them on this, but if we remain silent about Tibet, we will neither do justice to Tibet nor to ourselves."¹⁴ Indeed, Vajpayee has raised a lot of facts about the Tibet issue through his parliamentary speeches as a strong supporter of Tibet who was struggling to get her own identity as an autonomous and independent country.

As a progress on Indo-China initiatives, in the subsequent year India-china leadership decided to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG). The primary objectives of that JWG was to build a "fair and reasonable solution to the border issue" and to accelerate negotiation between the two countries. According to the provisions the JWG was to be chaired by the Foreign Secretary on the Indian side and the Vice-Foreign Minister from the Chinese side. In addition, "the JWG was also vested with the task of dispelling tensions along the border and initiating Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) designed to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border areas" (Mishra 2004: 162). After all, during 1989-2005, fifteen rounds of talks had been taken place, out of which, ten JWG meeting were held from 1989-1997 except 1992. Remaining five was held after a brief breakdown in the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement in the year 1998 due to India's nuclear test (Rahman 2007: 157). By and large, all these were the efforts made by both India and China in order to resolve the boundary dilemma.

¹⁴ Vajpayee, Atal Bihari (1989), Parliament speech in Rajya Sabha on April 28, 1989.

As a part of those fifteen rounds of talk Chinese Premier, Li Peng paid an official visit to India from December 11-16, 1991 and that was the first visit to India by a Chinese Prime Minister in 31 years. In return the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had made a trip to China in December 1988. During the first round of talks, mostly international and regional issues were discussed and they were marked by convergence of views on the need to meet the challenges of the post-cold war era. India used this opportunity to convey to China its concern at 'external inputs' to Pakistan's nuclear weapons capacity and missile technology. The Chinese side expressed concern about the continued activities in India by some Tibetans against their motherland and reiterated that Tibet was an inalienable part of Chinese territory. The Indian side again categorically stated its long-standing and consistent position that "Tibet was an autonomous region of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India".¹⁵

On December 20, 1991, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao gave a long statement in Lok Sabha, on the visit of Prime Minister of People's Republic of China and stated: "that the visit gained added significance because it had taken place in the context of the ongoing rapid changes in international relations involving a fundamental transformation" (Rao 1991). This was clear that both sides had taken positive steps to move forward, toward the solution of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. From Indian perspectives, India had suggested a step-by-step approach to resolve the boundary question. The first step was the stabilization of the situation on the Line of Actual Control and to delineate it more precisely in those sectors where differences of opinion existed between India and China. The second step was to come to a mutual agreement to maintain peace and tranquillity on the Line of Actual Control. The third step was to put in place expanding mutual confidence-building measures which would create an atmosphere of normalcy and peace on the Line of Actual Control, after which both sides could proceed to address the substance of the Sino-Indian boundary question. This approach was mutually agreed upon (Dixit 1998: 219-220).

¹⁵ *Beijing Review*, Beijing, No. 52, December 30, 1991, pp. 10-12.

3.3 Narasimha Rao's China Call

Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao like Vajpayee had also paid a four-day visit to China from September 6-9, 1993 at the invitation of Chinese Premier, Li Peng. The visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to China in September 1993 was a major step forward as that had helped in consolidating the process of negotiation in settlement of Sino-Indian boundary dispute (Rahman 2007: 169). Consequently, both leaders signed an "Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-Indian border area" in 1993 for the promotions of goodwill and betterment for both countries. Thus, the agreement of 1993 was shape up in accordance with the "five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits and peaceful coexistence" (TOI 1993). The concerned agreements were comprises with 9 articles that can refer at the end of notes as appendix.

In short, the important features of 1993 Agreement were: "troop reduction, conflict avoidance as well as notification measures and composition of the Expert Group." The agreement was first concrete achievement of the JWG. In some circles the agreement on the LAC was considered as the "first step towards a final settlement" of the border dispute between both Asian giants (Mishra 2004: 164). India and China expressed satisfaction at the prevailing peace situation along the line of actual control. As a result of that the two countries agreed to open trade via the Shipkila route on the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border later in July. It was also decided that the two nations would carry out a joint study on enhancing the existing facilities for pilgrims to Kailash and Mansarover and the opening of additional routes for them (Rahman 2007).

3.4 Jiang Zemin's reciprocity

The Chinese President Jiang Zemin comes to India on November 28, 1996, along with a high level delegation. That official delegated team was led by the Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Minister for Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Minister for Civil Affairs and the Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region's Government. In the Chinese history foreign visits Jiang Zemin was the first de facto and de jure head of the Chinese government to visit India. The outcome of that trip was that both sides discussed bilateral issues and reached common understanding on many international issues (Deepak 2005: 351). According to Mishra, President Jiang

urged both sides to solve the boundary issue in a peaceful manner, and suggested that India should approach the problem “in a forgiving and understanding manner so as to arrive at fair and reasonable solution”(Mishra 2004: 160). Along with that during Jiang visit, another important step similar to 1993 Agreement was taken and both nations signed important agreements. About the agreement on “Confidence building measures in the military field along the Line of actual Control in the India-China border Areas”, Jiang said that “it was a major step towards building mutual trust and setting the atmosphere for resolving the border problem.” The 1996 Agreement comprises twelve articles that can be referred at the end of notes. These 1993 and 1996 agreements are far reaching and important, but yet they have never been seriously implemented. For example clause 2 of the 1993 agreement accepted that there should be ceilings on forces on either side, that the two sides would reduce their forces along the LAC and that the “extent, depth, timing, and nature of reduction of military forces” would be determined through mutual consultations. Article 3 of the 1996 agreement specified that “the major category of armaments such as tanks, infantry combat vehicles artillery guns, heavy mortars, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles would be reduced with the ceilings to be decided through mutual agreement” (Joshi 2013).

However, to implement such an agreement required one key step spelt out in Article 10 of the 1996 agreement — that “the two sides would work out a common understanding of the alignment of the LAC.” However Joshi (2013) argue, the Chinese have baulked at working this out and so the key clauses of the agreements remain in a limbo. On the other hand various Tibetan organisations wanted Dalai Lama to meet the Chinese president but he disapprove their demand by saying that “though he has a strong desire to meet President Jiang Zemin while he is in India, it is obvious that in view of the new wave of repression and the ongoing campaign to denounce him inside Tibet, the prospect of such a meeting is unrealistic” (Lama 1996). In NDA regime where George Fernandez was defence minister of India once said, “He considered China as threat for India instead Pakistan.” When a Tibetan delegation came to meet he pronounces, “Tibet is a free nation and Indians will stand with you” (Fernandez 1996).

3.5 Vajpayee’s 2003 China visit with changing dogma on Tibet

From 22nd to 27th June, 2003 the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had been to China for an official visit at the “invitation of Premier of People’s Republic of China Wen

Jiabao”. During that visit, Prime Minister Vajpayee had a conversation with the Premier Wen Jiabao. As a productive outcome of that chat both leaders agreed on the “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China for strengthening relationship.” As a note of advancement, both countries leader noted and express their satisfaction on the progress made in bilateral relationships in recent few years. The two sides recalled the “historical depth of their friendly contacts”. The whole world also knows that at the contemporary level India and China are the “two largest developing countries of the world with centuries-old civilization”, “unique history” and similar objectives.

Both nations noted their role and contribution in the field of economy as well in social development, which representing one third of the humanity and ensuring “peace, stability and prosperity” not only in the Asia region but also in the whole world. Both sides had agreed on common agenda to “have a mutual desire for good neighbourly relations and have broad common interests”. Even both India and China have mutually agreed upon to fully make use of the considerable potential and opportunities for “deepening mutually beneficial cooperation”. To defence the above mentioned statements the details of 2003 agreement between them have been mentioned at the end of the notes. To pay regards to Jiabo’s invitation “Prime Minister Vajpayee” in return invited “Premier Wen Jiabao to visit India” at a mutually convenient time, and along with that he conveyed to “President Hu Jintao” an invitation from “President Abdul Kalam” to visit India. Subsequently, giving quick response with respect the Chinese side accepted the invitations with pleasure. At the end, on behalf of the Government and the people of India, H.E “Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had thanked the Government and the people of China for the warm welcome received by him and his delegation”. Indeed, this kind of exchange of official visits and words between the two countries shows that the year of 2003 was a productive one for both of them.

Describing the “memorandum of understanding on border trade” through the “Nathu La pass” in Sikkim as significant, the Prime Minister said: “With this memorandum, we have also started the process by which Sikkim will cease to be an issue in India-China relations”. While the reopening of the Nathu La pass had been well received, Mr Vajpayee had come under criticism from some quarters for having made some concessions regarding Tibet. This was sought to be projected by pointing that the joint declaration that resulted out of the summit meeting, recognised that the Tibet

Autonomous Region (TAR) was a part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. Mr Vajpayee, however, maintained that there was no change in the decade old policy on Tibet and accepting TAR as a part of the People's Republic of China was not new. "We have said nothing new about the presence of his Holiness Dalai Lama or of Tibetan refugees in India (Vajpayee 2003)." When asked about the Vajpayee china visit to Tibetan exiled government, it reiterated, "more the relation between China and India prospers better it will be for Tibet." The exile head of the Kashag (2003), comparing "India, China and Tibet" with three men with similar disease, said that the "three had to be treated together and that without India's involvement, the issue of Tibet is inevitably difficult to solve". On asked if the Kashag had any contacts with the Indian government before or after Shri Vajpayee's China visit, the Kalon Tripa said, "How can there be any contacts when the Tibetan exile administration itself is not recognised by New Delhi?" Tibetans were not very eager to comment on this visit however, Indian scholars discussed all the pros and cons outcome of this important visit.

According to Brahma Chellaney, "It is India's first open acknowledgment of the invasion of Tibet by communist China, our earlier governments also made concessions, but it is for the first time that India has stooped so low (Chellaney 2003)." Further Chellaney explained, "The Tibet Autonomous Region is a small part of Tibet, where only a third of the Tibetan population lives. This area has been officially recognised by China as Tibet, while four Chinese provinces have annexed large parts of Tibet. So by using the term "Tibet Autonomous Region" for the first time in a legal document, India has accepted China's position". Chellaney (2003) explanation that, permitting to that 1954 agreement India has become, and agreed upon the Chinese stand that Tibet was an autonomous 'region' of China. "All successive governments have reiterated this stand", he said. "But now we have totally changed our views on the issue, our policy makers don't understand history and have not learnt from the past." Chellaney, who was involved in Track II diplomacy with China from 1993 to 1999, said the "problem of Sikkim was a non-issue and it was made an issue simply to make concessions on Tibet. They [the India government] linked the Tibet issue with Sikkim, made concessions on Tibet, and returned empty-handed" (Chellaney 2003).

According to Vijay Kranti¹⁶, “both India and China are trying to decide the fate of a third country”, but they do not have such right to do so. Even, mentally all people have accepted that the Indo-Tibet border is in fact the Indo-China border, and that is what the Chinese want (Kranti 2003). Through such kind of statement here Kranti has tried to express his own concern over the “decreasing Tibetan population in the Tibetan areas” that have been incorporated into mainland China. According to different official data, “If you go to a place like Lhasa, you will find just one Tibetan among 10 Chinese.” In another argument Sheshadri Chari¹⁷ choose to differ with them and said, “China is changing and we need to facilitate more people-to-people contact.” He replied “For the first time, China has recognised Sikkim as part of India. Is that not a victory? And as far as Tibet is concerned, we have always maintained that Tibet was part of China. There has been no change in our policy” (Chari 2003).

Communist party of India CPI-M endorse the India’s policy on Tibet. CPI-M like political parties also expresses their stand on human rights violation in Tibet and they said that India should not interfere internal matter of any sovereign nation and Tibet issue is internal matter of china. In that perception, the CPI-M backed its unqualified support for China against the long-standing demand for Tibetan freedom by citing possible domestic repercussions. According to the CPI (M) general secretary Prakash Karat, “Certain western powers seem to believe that sovereign rights can be curtailed in the name of human rights. In our country too, some people joined the chorus. They are doing a disservice to the nation. Will they also raise their voice in support of a free Nagaland or a free Jammu and Kashmir?” Karat also hailed “India’s stand that it did not recognise Taiwan as a separate state and maintained Tibet as an autonomous region of the China” (Karat 2008). According to noted political personalities like of Karat, the problems in Tibet have to be solved only through negotiations between the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government, none other than these two should interfere.

According to Chawla, before Vajpayee’s official visit to China, Indian officials had started work on a draft. Prabhu Chawla had narrated a story prior completion this

¹⁶ Vijay Kranti is a Tibetologist and editor of the magazine Tibbat Desh and very vocal supporter of the Tibetan movement.

¹⁷ Sheshadri Chari is an editor of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) magazine Organiser.

visit. In connection to that “Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha summoned Indian ambassador to China Shiv Shankar Menon at May-end and at a meeting at his home attended by Mishra, it was decided to ignore both Sikkim and Tibet and concentrate on economics and border clarification. This was discussed at a Cabinet Committee on Security meeting before the document was despatched to the Chinese” (Chawla 2003). Beijing was not happy with the content or the style. Nalin Surie, additional secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), flew to Beijing in early June to sort things out. He and Menon spent four 16-hour days in the Chinese Foreign Ministry going through every word of the document. Neither Menon nor Surie were about to make any concessions on Tibet, while the Chinese agreed to sign all the other agreements on education, renewable energy and culture, and refused to commit on Sikkim. Surie flew back with a few unresolved clauses.

When Vajpayee landed in Beijing on June 22, the Chinese immediately sought an appointment with the Indian officials to discuss the draft on the eve of the prime ministers’ summit. The Chinese insisted “India should recognise Tibet as an inalienable part of the country”. India said it would be consistent with its stand that only the “Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was part of the People’s Republic of China”. Chawla said, “Although Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had recognised the entire Tibet region as China’s territory, the Chinese consider Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin and Karakoram Pass as part of Tibet region while these are actually part of India. Both Aksai Chin and Karakoram Pass are administered from Beijing, not Lhasa. When the document was finally signed, India had remained firm on TAR, a major victory for Vajpayee” (Chawla 2003). The above paragraph of the concerned research work based on few facts that are related to the minister level talks between India and China.

Along with the Tibet issue the issues that is related to Sikkim was also a contention and that was being considered by analyst as the second one. Subsequently, in the final Protocol on Border Trade, China agreed to call Sikkim a state and the Nathu La pass a border point. It had been reluctant to do this because of its 1975 position when it refused to recognise Sikkim as part of India. Now it has effectively admitted that Sikkim is an Indian state and a border point for promoting trade. Officials say the Chinese will redraw their maps to reflect the new ground realities. Prabhu Chawla had extensively covered Vajpayee’s China visit, and recognized it as a historical day in

India-China relationship. According to Rahman, “the biggest political outcome from the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China was that both India and China decided to explore the political scope for evolving the frame work of a boundary settlement” (Rahman 2007). For this purpose, in a new zone of realism, both sides agreed to appoint a “Special Representative” each to explore, from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship, the framework of a boundary settlement.

3.6 Observation

The major arguments against Vajpayee visit was that

- (1) India made unilateral concessions on Sikkim-Tibet trade
- (2) India failed to made any progress on the border dispute
- (3) There is no change in the mechanism for border talks
- (4) No assurance on cessation of nuclear and military collaboration with Pakistan.
- (5) India has also not raised core issue such as Chinese aided Pakistani nuclear and military programme, WMD transfers and naval posts in Myanmar.

However, whatever may be the pros and cons of Vajpayee’s official trip, for all of all the issues the territorial issue to be resolved through bilateral negotiations was in first priority. Along with that most of the other issues such as China’s role in Pakistan nuclear and missile programmes, its relation with Myanmar are to be dealt with diplomatically. These issues have been raised and addressed since the Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s visit to India in 1996. Since a long time China has been adjusting its policies towards both India and Pakistan, and that was evident at the time of the Kargil War. Further, according to Chellaney, “India’s enhanced conventional and nuclear capability as well as its confidence to deal with China has undermined the Chinese ‘Middle Kingdom’ concept” (Chellaney 2003)¹⁸. Some of these problems have been

¹⁸ Bartering concrete concessions for fond hopes Vajpayee gave away die trade card on Sikkim India’s only bargaining power - and put India’s imprimatur on China's annexation of TAR the Chinese name for central Tibetan plateau since 1965. Dropping the key word autonomous and switching from reiterates to recognize Vajpayee shifts India's stand in the eyes of international law to The Indian side recognizes that he Tibet autonomous region is part of the territory the people's republic of China and reiterates that it doesn't allow Tibetans to engage in anti-china political activities in India. This is the first explicit Indian recognition of TAR's absorption by China. Also by narrowing Tibet just to TAR. Also by narrowing Tibet to just TAR the plateau where less than half of the ethnic Tibetans live is India implicitly conceding

allayed through discussion with China. Both have reiterated it time and again so that neither poses as a threat to the other. The Indo-Pak relations are signalled for improvement with the opening of land route. Reportedly Pakistani President has announced not to insist on the UN resolution on Kashmir in future negotiations with India. The new Chinese leadership has appreciated Dalai Lama's offer of talks on Tibet. For about last one year the Dalai Lama has been preparing to make a deal with China by sending his envoys. He is willing to return to China if it allows him to go back without preconditions. This statement followed the visit of Dalai Lama to the America in 2003, According to Dixit, "the release of several Tibetan political prisoners indicates that China is responding positively" (Dixit 2003, Panda 2003: 54). But the intriguing fact is that the Dalai Lama's demand for self-rule for Tibet is not favourably responded by China.

Nevertheless, after Vajpayee's visit the discussion on the disputed boundary will be in real not the notional territorial issue encompassing thousands of kilometres of territory seized, occupied or claimed by the other. Both the countries have claimed that solutions to the boundary dispute are to be sorted out through JWG meetings and specifically appointed political personnel to look into the matter. Chinese official pronouncements have indicated their willingness to improve relationship with India as well as not to threaten each other's security. There are also indications to discuss important aspects of the boundary dispute and resolve the issue on the basis of "equality, mutual understanding, mutual accommodation and mutual adjustment" (Panda 2003: 54).

The boundary problem has been continuing since the failure of Nehru- Zhou enlai talks in 1960. In successive stages the differences have been sorted out. The opening of the Nathu la pass may be the outcome of the long talks for the last fifteen years. The approach has divided the long border into three separate segments, each to be discussed and settled individually. Dixit said, "Some scholars would like the whole border to be treated as one without which this could not be really solved but certain compromises have to be made to satisfy both sides" (Dixit 2003). India has changed its stance by agreeing to border trade across Nathu la of Sikkim because of the strategic

the forcible incorporation of Tibet's large outer territories in the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Siachin, Gansu, and Yunan.

position of Sikkim and with a view that this will cease to be an issue in China India relations. The De facto situation on the Boundary issue seems to be made acceptable by both sides until a final boundary agreement is reached. India has the McMahon Line and China has the Xingxiang -Tibet Road that crosses the Aksai Chin in Ladakh. A compromise formula has to be reached for which both the parties have to cultivate national consensus. In addition incursions must stop which lead to reduce troop deployment at a heavy cost.

The negative fallout of Vajpayee visit is the recognition of Tibet as an autonomous region of China. The Indian Government has defended its stand by stating that there is no change in India's official position as defined in the 1954 agreement. But this stand has created lot of confusion as the earlier agreements referred to "trade and cultural cooperation between Tibet region of China and India" whereas the 2003 declaration refers to "Tibet Autonomous Region". The treaty was valid for eight years. In the eighth year that is in 1962, the war broke out. Whether the treaty has since been renewed or not is unclear. If the Indian Government denies of any change in India's official position it may be presumed that the treaty is still valid. But China has refused to accept India's sample map of the western sector, which included Pakistani occupied Kashmir. China still sticks to exclude the areas of the Karakoram pass from discussion with India (Panda 2003: 55). As the border relates to the LoAC the map presented by India created an issue of prestige for both. China has serious reservations about the LoAC. Hence India should not expect that the incursions would end even after the boundary accord will be reached on western, eastern and middle sectors. The big question is whether China recognizes India as non-NPT nuclear power, which has not been addressed by China. The confidence building measure can be further strengthened if China will back India for a veto-empowered member of the Security Council.

A new perception about relation among nations is emerging since the nineties. There is growing convergence of interests but nations are playing both sides. India and China have been drawing closer because of the changed world scenario and the real politic approach in their diplomacy. Panda believed, "The ethical and normative characteristics like the ancient civilization which flourished in both the countries, the exchange of scholarship, that Buddha was born in India or that both love their tradition and civilization is not a major component in their relationship. Even the common suffering due to colonization was buried when in 1962 both had fought a war on a

disputed boundary issue. The events following thereafter largely conform the view that China guided its foreign policy in realistic manner” (Panda 2003: 56). The present scenario and efforts for co -operation are guided by the changes in the international sphere and the emergence of India as nuclear power. Both are now confronting Islamic fundamentalism though India is far more vulnerable than China, now both are scared by the growing influence of the United States which will not allow the emergence of an independent power center in Asia. But both are trying to be closer to the U.S. The growing relationship between China and India will not be liked by countries, which have been benefited by their strained relations in the past. Obviously Pakistan will not like Sino- India ties and the European Union will not appreciate trade ties between China and India. Even U.S will disapprove Sino -Indian relation, which might foil its dominance in the Asia- Pacific. But India has to manage its diplomacy keeping in view the probable challenges. It has to balance its domestic priorities with its strategic ties and capture opportunities to further its interests. China will not ignore India for its strategic interests. But India should interact with it as a potential partner without compromising its much-valued national interest (Panda 2003: 55-56).

Therefore, in order to have a peaceful solution to the problems with China, India has to explore several channels like better relations with major powers of the world, increase its credibility in the South Asian region, sustain its diplomatic efforts to keep Pakistan engaged Simultaneously it has to strive to improve its economy and defence so that its concerns will be taken care by the potential nations of the world.

To conclude, indeed the concerned chapter has contain a lot of facts that has been gather from various ministry level talks, particularly from the then Prime Minister of India Vajpayee’s official visit to China. It seems that Tibet issue has become secondary by new changing economic paradigm which leading them to see their economic interest first. This chapter reveals that China had a mix reaction over Tibet and that is not substantial. Indeed, whatever may be the issues or outcome the official visits of Vajpayee to China is a notable one in the history of India’s diplomacy.

Chapter Four

Manmohan Singh's Tibet Policy

The regime of NDA government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee came to end in 2004 and after that Dr. Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister of India representing the UPA government. As a consequence, with the replacement of NDA alliance by the UPA at the centre, the Chinese government came up with a white paper publication that was on "Regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet". The intriguing fact is that it was not the first time in the history that Beijing had tried to convince its critics of the good the Chinese regime has brought to the Tibetans. According to Claude Arpi's argument, "the prime motive behind Chinese government's such white paper initiative certainly intended to convince the new Indian government by expressing that everything is fine on the Tibetan plateau" (Arpi 2004). The Tibetan people who once lived in a stage of bondage now have a prosperous, peace, and independent life. In other words to denote, now the Tibetan people have the power of autonomy and they are the owner of their own destiny. According to Venkateswaran (2003), because of India's importance over emotional understanding and its acceptance as that Tibet is a part of China, India has gained nothing from China instead she has lost many things to them. In return, China as a smart international player has played the diplomatic games with India, maximum of time. For an instance, when India request to support for the UN Security Council permanent seat, Chinese official position smartly hold that in simple language, saying as; China understands and supports India's aspirations to play an active role in the UN and international affairs. Further, as an advancement on that when Manmohan Singh meet his Chinese counterpart reiterated that India accepted Tibet autonomous region (TAR) as a part of China and wouldn't allow Tibetan in India to act against the interest of china. Thus with the backdrop of above those statements this chapter will try to examine; how much the Indo-China bilateral relationship has been influenced by the Tibetan factor particularly in UPA regime. Along with that this chapter has also given importance over the issues like the dispute of the Tibetan water, and the 2008 Olympic torch relay episode that had caused uneasiness between these two Asian giants, India and China.

4.1 Wen Jiabao's India visit:

Mr. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, paid a state visit to India from April 9-12, 2005 (Baruah 2005). The four-day visit by Mr. Wen Jiabao, was the fourth by a Chinese Premier, after Chou En-Lai in 1954 and Li Peng in 1991, and Zhu Rongji in 2002 in 55 years of diplomatic interaction to visit India (ICWA 2005: 07). The leaders of the two countries had an in depth exchange of views and reached broad consensus on "bilateral relations and international and regional issues of common concern" (Acharya 2005: 1421). China put an end to the 30-year old controversy between the two countries, by presenting the Indian Government with the newly printed "official map", which showed the "State of Sikkim as part of Indian Union". Sikkim now formally ceases to be a cause of friction between the two countries. New Delhi, on its part had recognised before the Chinese leader's visit the "Tibetan Autonomous Region as part of Chinese territory" (Cherian 2005: 5). The process of exchanging maps indicted their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the LAC on the basis of already agreed parameters with the objective of "arriving at a common understanding" of the alignment as soon as possible (Data India 2005: 326). To mark the 55th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and China in 2005, the two countries decided to organise a series of "commemorative activities". Two sides declared 2006 as the "year of Sino-Indian friendship". During the visit, the leaders of the two countries have therefore, agreed to establish an "India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity" based on the principles of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other's concerns and aspirations and equality (Rahman 2007: 218).

Indicating a new flexibility on both sides, the two sides exchanged views on the Sino-Indian boundary question and reiterated their readiness to seek a "fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution", through "equal and friendly consultations" and proceeding from the overall interest of bilateral relations. They expressed satisfaction over the progress made in the discussions between the "Special Representatives of the two countries" and welcomed the conclusion of the "11-point Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the settlement of the boundary question" (Rahman 2007). They expressed their commitment to the mechanism of "Special Representatives" for seeking a "political settlement of the boundary question"

in the context of their long-term interests and the overall bilateral relationship (Cherian 2005: 4).

This embodies a transitional shift from the “legal historical approach to a political approach” and puts the negotiations of the border on a new plane. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing described it as “the first political document in the past 20 years for resolving the boundary issue (Prakash 2005: 36).” Pending a final resolution, the two sides decided to continue to make “joint efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas in accordance with the agreements of 1993 and 1996” and also agreed that while continuing the discussions between the Special Representatives, it was also pertinent that the “Joint Working Group” Continued its work to seek an early clarification and confirmation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Progress made so far on the clarification of the LAC in the Sino-Indian border areas was noted. Both the countries agreed to complete the process of exchanging maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the LAC on the basis of already agreed parameters, with the objective of arriving at a common understanding of the alignment, as soon as possible (ICWA 2005: 23-26). However, on the other hand the visiting Premier did not categorically support “India’s candidature for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council”. Some of the important provision of the 2005 agreement are:

Article III of the Protocol envisages the following provisions: (Chellaney 2010: 322-327)

- “In the event of an alleged air intrusion of its controlled air space by the military aircraft of the other side, either side may seek a Flag Meeting within 48 hours of the alleged air intrusion in order to seek a clarification. The investigation shall be completed by the other side and its results communicated through a Flag Meeting within a period of four weeks.
- If a military aircraft of either side is required to fly across the Line of Actual Control or to overfly the airspace of the other side, prior permission shall be sought from the other side according to procedures and formats to be mutually agreed upon.
- If a military or civilian aircraft of either side is required to fly across the Line of Actual Control or to land on the other side of the Line of the Line of Actual

Control in an emergency situation, the two sides will ensure flight safety in such situations by adhering to procedures to be mutually agreed upon (Chellaney 2010).”

Article V provides the following:

- “Both sides shall hold two additional border meetings each year at Spanggur Gap in the Western Sector, Nathula Pass in the Sikkim Sector and Bum La in the Eastern Sector respectively in celebration of the National Day or Army Day of either side. Specific arrangements shall be decided through consultation between the border forces of the two sides.
- Both sides are, in principle, to expand the mechanism of border meeting points to include Kibithu-Damai in the Eastern Sector and Lipulekh Pass/Qiang La in the Middle Sector. The precise locations of these border meeting points will be decided through mutual consultations.
- Both sides shall conduct exchanges between the relevant Military Regions of China and Army Commands of India. Specific arrangements shall be decided upon through mutual consultations between the relevant agencies under the Ministries of Defence of the two sides.
- Both sides shall strengthen exchanges between institutions of training of the two armed forces, and conduct exchanges between institutions of sports and culture of the two armed forces. Specific arrangements shall be decided upon through mutual consultations between the relevant agencies under the Ministries of Defence of the two sides (Chellaney 2010).”

Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Sharan describe, the visit was path breaking as the two neighbours signed a number of agreements, besides evolving a set of 11 “political parameters and Guiding Principles” to resolve the vexed 43 years old boundary dispute (Shukla 2005: 48). Besides, Manmohan Singh the Prime Minister of India on June 11, 2005 stated that efforts will be made to open trade routes with Aksai Chin area. He also stated that a conversation would be made with China for opening up the route to “Kailash Mansarover” through “Ladakh”, so that the time of pilgrimage to one of the most sacred religious place could be reduced (Asia News Digest 2005).

Chinese president’s visits during his tenure in the upcoming years to develop the relation with India remain continued. In the international relation with China and India

it was the first such important visit of a Chinese head. The visit of Chinese head got its drive during the tenure of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in June 2003 and vice versa. The next prime minister of China Wen Jiabao visited India in 2005. The visits of Chinese head to India is seen with doubt due to the double speak of China's behaviour. Before the Chinese president's visit to India, Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi announced that whole Arunachal Pradesh falls under the Chinese territory. In another incident in 2010 before the visit of Chinese president Wen Jiaobao, the Northern Army Commander was denied his visa to Beijing, but started providing stapled visas to the residents of Jammu & Kashmir. After all at last china also passed out military incursion near Daulet Beg Oldie in the Depsang Plains in Aksai chin in 2013 before the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India. The military engagement and CBMs along the LAC border have aided to diffuse tension across the border, but the border incursions incidents are reported from time to time.

However, the boundary disputes and conflicts are moderated with the interventions of "Confidence Building Measures" (CBMs) and engagement of military from both sides in a positive direction. So, these measures helped in reducing tensions which were generated from incursion issues at border land. But, each month, Chinese military involvement and patrolling were reported by the Indo-Tibetan border police at border zone. This is the usual cases. More than 12 times of Chinese intervention and patrolling are observed in the disputed border areas in a month. This incident is also increasing. The border security forces generally do not encounter directly to the Chinese military section. But they locate certain evidences of their presence in the region. They observe collection of stones, cans, Packets of cigarettes etc. Occasionally, Indian military forces reported Chinese incursion in a different ways. Many Chinese military officials entered in to the Indian territorial masses in the civilian dresses and means of transports along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In Ladakh, around Lake Pangong small sized bouts of China is reported many times in a week (Holslag: 2009: 817). Recently, number of troops of China and patrolling as well as military exercises has been increased. Indian government took notice about it. This produce uneasiness in India. The aggressive mode of Chinese military forces also caused an apprehension at the border.

In the beginning of September 2010, the border land of Ladakh, in the zone of LAC, a tense environment between the security forces of both the countries has

heightened. This tension was caused by the bringing of a bulldozer by Chinese forces in the disputed area for road construction. Due to objection from India, China has delayed the withdrawal of machine and took four days to extract from there. There were recorded about 100 percent increase in number of stand-offs in 2010 summer, and usually these peaceful stand-offs recorded from “Depsang, Demchok and Pangong Tso areas of the Ladakh” (Das 2010: 119-120; TOI 2010).

Former Defence Minister A.K. Antony told Rajya Sabha on December 21, 2011 that “on July 13, a PLA patrol attempted to cross a 200 feet long wall of loose stones constructed 250 m on our side of the LAC in Yantse area of Tawang, which was prevented by our troops.” Further he told also in parliament, “the stone wall was partially damaged by the PLA and as per the established mechanism with China a strong protest was lodged with the Chinese side in a Flag Meeting of the two armies.” The Wall has been erected to cut chilly winds and further to prevent any animal to encroach into the Chinese land. In responding to the question of Samajwadi party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav that China planning to attack on India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh refuted the argument, and made statement in Lok Sabha in 2011 with the acknowledgment that “There are some times intrusions according to us. But the Chinese perception of LAC sometimes differs. Therefore, I think some confusion is created. These matters are sorted out between the area commanders on both the sides (Lok Sabha 2011).”


4.2 Tibet Water blizzard

Shortage of water in major countries of Asian continent has become a major challenge for economic modernity. It is the initial threatening processes for economic crisis. It also causes for upstream river bodies management and diversion as well as dam construction. Water is the central subject of geopolitical conflict among riparian countries. It provides a space of cooperation or competition between sharing countries. There is no nation which can effect these situations because most of the river in Himalayan Asia originated from Tibetan plateau. China controls the upper stream flow and direction of river regime.

High altitude and vast glacier of Tibetan Plateau provide the perennial source of water to river bodies originated from this location. The glacier is the life line of continuing flow of water. China as well as India are fed by the rivers originated from Tibetan plateau. Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, Cambodia, Pakistan, Laos,

Thailand and Vietnam are the other countries flourished with water resources from Tibetan rivers. These countries represents about more than 47% of population of world.

“Map of Tibet, Western China and South Asia rivers”



(Source: Internet, www.mapsworld.com) Figure 4.1

Asia, however, cannot be called as water lacking continent in absolute sense. It has less fresh water resources about 3920 cubic meters per person. It is just similar to continent of Antarctica randomly. The snow of Himalaya sustained great river bodies of Asian continent. However, it also experiences damages due to increase of greenhouse gasses and global warming.

However, the State of Asia, South East, South, as well as East Asia experiences the water sharing disputes as well as river boundary issues. These river-water resources are the major sources of geopolitical conflict. So, the regional concern arises from Chinese construction of dam or redirection of southward flow of river from the Tibetan plateau. Tibetan plateau is the zone where major rivers originate such as Indus, Mekong, Yangtze, Yellow, Salween, Brahmaputra, Karnali and the Sutlej etc. among major river of Asian continent, only the Ganges origin from the Indian Himalayas.

As water resources are effected and much utilized in the northern portion of China, and environmentally unsustainable mechanism of intensive farming has degenerate the land. China has oriented its concentration to the plentiful water reserves

of Tibetan plateau. It has constructed dam on these rivers, not only to produce hydroelectricity. But also to channelize the river waters for irrigation and other purpose. Currently, it is engaging with huge river-basin and Water relocate projects. However, many Chinese river projects in west-central Tibet are on those rivers water which flow into Indian Territory, but Beijing is unwilling to contribute to sharing of information. (Chellaney 2007).

However, in the condition of flash floods of India's Himachal Pradesh, China has approved to provide India data on any irregular rise or fall in the upstream rank of the Sutlej River. On this river, China has built a barrage. There were also some discussions happened to share the flood management information throughout the monsoon season on the two Brahmaputra river tributaries, Lohit and YarlongTsangpo. Since 2002, the Brahmaputra River experiences it where few dams are there at sites of upper stream (Chellaney 2007).

However, there are ten major watersheds constructed in the Himalayas and Tibetan upland which is spread out as river waters in Asian continent. However, China controls the 2.5 million square km Tibetan plateau region. It provides China a remarkable weight. Further, it also experiences vast natural resources. Its mainland river is much contaminated due to rapid industrialization. So, it is now threatened with ecological practicability of river flows related to South and South East Asia for growing water and energy needs.


Presently, Tibet occupies nearly 1/4th portion of Chinese geographical areas. It touches the boundary of India, Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal since 1950s. It consisted with the central plateau region, after annexing Amdo and Kam. Tibet, China separated "Amdo" (the birthplace of present Dalai Lama) as the "new Qinghai province", made the "central plateau and eastern Kham" the "Tibet Autonomous Region", and merged the remaining parts of Tibet into the Chinese provinces of "Sichuan", "Yunnan" and "Gansu". The traditional Tibet is not just a distinct cultural entity but also a natural plateau, the future of whose water reserves is tied to ecological conservation.

There are large hydro projects in Tibetan territorial boundaries. The minerals and other natural resources are rapidly and non-judiciously utilized. The ecological balance of world's highest plateau has been disturbed much with these economic extraction and technological appropriation of plateau. Water resources are seen as gift

without calculation and return. Unreasonable utilization of these resources affected the human activities in pure and natural locations; China has built a road having 108km length. It leads towards Mount Everest. The location of this road is along the Tibet-Nepal frontier. It was constructed in a strategy and Chinese scheme to strengthen its claim for Tibet. This strategy is also shown in the Olympic torch march towards Mount Everest during 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (Chellaney 2007).

However, the implication of Chinese developmental projects or river diversion projects is directly linked to the India. It is India which has been greater influenced by the China in its development paradigm in Tibet. The newly initiated \$6.2 billion Gormo-Lhasa railway construction can be shown as rapidly rising military capability of China around India- China border. Military deployment in the region has caused deep mistrust between these two countries. It also represents the assertive nature of China against India for territorial disputes.

“Qinghai-Tibet Railway network”



(Source: www.mapworld.com)

Figure-4.2

However, it seems that China is in aggression to pursue its missions and scheme at regional level. It utilizes water as weapon. The China wishes to channelize the waters of Brahmaputra River and it tried to parch Yellow River. Because Beijing needed huge waters for its buildings and dams. In this region, there are three Dams project valued at

25 billion dollar. There are about 1.2 million populations who have been displaced with these development projects.

The river, Brahmaputra is known as Yarlong Tsangpo in Tibetan language. It originates near Mount Kailash. In Chinese portion, it flows in eastward from source in Tibet and covers 2,200 km. The height of plateau at this river flows is about of 4,000 meters. It is known as world's important river located at this height. Many tributaries of Brahmaputra such as Lohit, Dihang, and Padma etc. mixed with it and enlarge its size. (Chellaney 2007).

At first stage, China created tunnels and channels at Tibetan Plateau. It has built a 300 Km tunnels in the project of linking South-North China. The Jinsha, Yalong and Dadu rivers are interconnected with each other. Their location is at the eastern margin of Tibetan plateau. At second phase, the river Brahmaputra and its waters were oriented towards northward. At, Beijing, river bends and Brahmaputra River construct the one of the longest canyon. When this river enters in India it has been untapped in Chinese territory due to huge water demands in the region.

There have been some hesitations in Beijing perspective on economic efficiency over the Tibetan water resource channelization in the north word directions. The diversion of river water of Brahmaputra causes to generate surplus water in the Chinese territorial main land. In terms of economic feasibility currently, there are about 1.2 trillion foreign exchange reserves in terms of capital accumulation. However, this route diversion and changes in Brahmaputra river basin constructed hostile relations on water sharing at lower sides most importantly between the relations of India and Bangladesh.

In April 2010, during a visit by Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna to Beijing, a Chinese official first identified by name the site on the Brahmaputra where initial dam construction would take place: Zangmu, in Tibet. Chinese officials assured India that the projects would be run-of-the-river and would create no water shortages downstream. (The term "run-of the-river" is used to describe hydroelectric power plants that incorporate little or no storage of dammed water, leaving them subject to seasonal water flows and unable to regulate generation in response to peak power.) In response to India's subsequent requests for additional information about the plans, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said, "China adopts a responsible attitude towards the development of cross border water resources. We adopt a policy that

protection goes together with development, and take into full consideration the interests of downstream countries (Economic Times 2011).”

Further information about the dam building plan was released as part of China’s current five-year energy plan, promulgated in January 2013. The plan includes proposals for three medium-sized dams on the Yarlung Zangbo. In a move that raised tension between the two countries, India was not consulted prior to the release of the plan and only learned about the projects from the Chinese press. This led the Indian government to protest strongly, reminding Beijing that India remains “a lower riparian State with considerable established user rights to the waters of the river (Indian Express 2013).”

At present, the issue remains at the top of India’s bilateral agenda with China. In March 2013, at the first meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and China’s new leader Xi Jinping, which took place on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit, Prime Minister Singh proposed the creation of a joint mechanism to study Chinese activity on the Brahmaputra. He spoke to the Indian media about the conversation: “I also took the opportunity to raise the issue of trans-border river systems and I requested the Chinese Government to provide a joint mechanism to enable us to assess the type of construction activity that is going on in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The President of China assured me that they were quite conscious of their responsibilities and the interest of the lower riparian countries. As regards the specific mechanism that I had suggested, he said that they would have it further looked into (PTI 2013).”The following month, China rejected out of hand the creation of a new water negotiation mechanism with India (Hindu 2013).

In assessing his meeting with President Xi, Prime Minister Singh expressed sanguine confidence regarding China’s intentions: “As of now, our assessment is that whatever activity are taking place on the Brahmaputra region in Tibet, they are essentially the run-of-the-river projects and therefore there is no cause for worry on our part (PTI 2013).” The Prime Minister’s confidence notwithstanding, the pattern of China’s dam construction to date suggests that its downstream neighbors may have cause for concern (Christopher 2013: 18).

China has already established a template for dam construction on both cross-border and domestic rivers. The country has historically begun with small, upstream

dams before moving on to larger construction projects further downstream, culminating in massive engineering works such as the Three Gorges Dam. Indian water security expert Brahma Chellaney spoke with the *Washington Post* about this dynamic after the 2013 Five Year Plan was released (Denyer 2013):

From the Yangtze to the Mekong and now the Brahmaputra, Chinese dam building follows a well-established pattern.... There are 12 small dams on the Brahmaputra's upper reaches and tributaries and one medium-size dam under construction on the river ... the next step will be larger dams in spots where the river picks up huge amounts of water and momentum nearer the Indian border. Those dams could not only affect water flows but also remove nutrient-rich silt that helps nourish agriculture downstream.

As just what Chellaney had pointed out; If China moves ahead with its dam building, the result will be control by Beijing over an ever larger percentage of a constantly shrinking river. It is this possibility that suggests why Beijing and New Delhi may be on a collision course over the Brahmaputra.

For Beijing, however, keeping Tibet a part of China goes beyond the already important strategic objective of maintaining the PRC's territorial integrity. Tibet is the hydrological lynchpin of the region. Control of the Tibetan Plateau allows China to remain a water independent country whose major rivers all originate within its own borders, and allows it to exercise hegemonic hydrological leverage over its neighbors, including India, its only potential peer competitor in the region. And the future construction of ever-larger dams on those rivers will offer China the capability to choke off those neighbors' freshwater supplies or threaten to do so.

Any understanding of Tibet's importance to China must include an understanding of the related water issues. It also presents India a potential option for leverage. Since fleeing China in 1959, the Dalai Lama has made his home and government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India. India's relationship with China's Tibetan population remains strong as a result. India has long acceded to China's control over Tibet, but should New Delhi decide it is worth incurring the wrath of Beijing to press for greater water usage rights, the issue of Beijing's treatment of Tibet and relationship with the Dalai Lama presents one possible avenue to pursue. It is a potentially risky move in that it would certainly be met with opposition from China in the strongest possible terms. However, if the PRC continues with aggressive dam building and access to water becomes an existential concern for India, the status of Tibet may become a more important factor in Sino Indian relations (Christopher 2013: 25).

The ways that China goes about its dam building clearly matter a great deal in determining how dire a situation India faces. On the one hand, if Beijing holds true to its word that all Brahmaputra projects are to be small and run-of-the-river, India will have little to fear. On the other hand, as the old saying goes, hope is not a strategy, and Beijing has a track record of insisting that all will be well and then turning around and unveiling a less attractive alternative scenario already under development as a fait accompli (Christopher 2013: 26).

How much of a threat China's actions poses to India is a question that only New Delhi can answer, but if history is any guide, China can be expected to press ahead with increasingly larger dam projects. It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recently expressed confidence in China's intentions represents a widely held consensus among members of the Indian government or simply rhetoric designed to mollify China without diminishing India's already limited options. India's downstream status means that it starts out somewhat at China's mercy. It has been dealt a weak hand geographically, and the cards it has, it has not played well. New Delhi has failed to negotiate aggressively with Beijing for greater water rights and has willingly conceded that Tibet is part of the PRC. These accommodationist tendencies have likely helped to smooth tensions and improve relations with China, but if the price eventually proves to be forfeiture of India's hydrological independence, the relationship will have been dearly bought.

Dr. Jabin Jacob of the Institute for Chinese Studies in New Delhi accurately notes, "China and India see themselves as responsible regional and global powers, and a war of any kind between them will not only set back bilateral relations but also damage their reputations internationally. At the moment, this is not a cost that either side is willing to pay" (Jacob 2011). Nonetheless, it is worth exploring what options India could choose to pursue should it determine in the future that it needs to act more assertively on the subject of the Brahmaputra (Neelakandan 2013).

4.3 Delhi's Diplomatic Dilemma

There was constant debate over the issue of not allowing Tibetan protesters to carry out their demonstrations in New Delhi before the Indian leg of the torch relay. However, the communist led front of West Bengal and Kerala had strong view about such protests and also convinced that such protests would show a remarkable significance in future.

Left government of West Bengal had asked very frequently to ban such protests of Tibetans at the forefront of the “torch’s arrival in India” (Thakur 2008). In this way, it indicates only to support the stand of Chinese Communist Party on the issues of Tibet by the left governments in India. It was the time of coalition government in India and in the government, left had a strong role in number calculation. Some time, it posed the questions on Indian government actions. So, a threat for government was characterised. Therefore, they had been in position to reduce the power of ruling government by imposing such demands but, on the other side the protest of Tibetans in India had diplomatic effects on ongoing border disputes with China. At the same time, India would not allow for disagreement with ally governments in the centre and also advocated a close strategic engagement with China (Majumdar and Mehta 2012: 749).

The ruling party of Congress tried its best to fill the differences in all possible ways. Congress government in Arunachal Pradesh supported its Left counterparts in West Bengal to ban “Tibetan protests” in “Tawang”. Tawang is the most disputed district on the issue of border conflict with China, which was once invaded by Chinese army in the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Superintendent of Police on the advice of Central Government had issued notice to not have any kind of protests under the punitive Section 144 of the Indian Penal code in Tawang. Such notice was issued after four day when police personnel fired tear gas shells at 2,000-protesters in Twang, home to a fifteenth-century monastery, the oldest and the most revered outside Tibet. This incident was led strong protests by lamas at the monastery and, news aired to ban on further demonstrations. A local lama of Tawang was quoted as saying, “If this is true, it is a blow in general to the people of the Himalayan region and elsewhere” (Thakur 2008).

The aired news of Tawang protests and violence created unrest among thousands of Tibetans who were living an exile life since their birth In India. These exiled protesters were emerged as a serious concern for internal security for officials in New Delhi. This situation of Tibetans unrest was seen more violent outside the Chinese embassy in New Delhi and demanded urgent need of heavy security. Government awakened to avoid such protests and therefore impose ban on the protests in a remote settlements of India, and in capital of the country as well which would play host to the Olympic torch. On the other side, it is also seen that government was in fact more concerned to the strategic conclusions that Beijing would draw from New Delhi’s

handling of the Tibetan protests (Indian Express 2008).¹⁹ Hence, government decided two different approaches. One, if the protests would go on in any other part of country police cannot create harsh ban on the protests. Secondly, Olympic torch procession area would be free from any protests by Tibetan refugees. Here, government presented its international diplomatic face to be safe, clear and positive among the world society (Majumdar and Mehta 2010: 94).

Protests in the capital of country or any other place within the nation helped to establish a restrained mechanism for them who were protesting against the million square metres of Chinese capture in the disputed Aksai Chin region. However, there has been report of China's illegal intrusions into Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim as well. New Delhi was cautious against the Chinese decision of hate and decided to inform Indian Ambassador, Nirupama Rao, in Beijing making her aware of the dire consequences over India's failure to check alleged Tibetan attacks on the Chinese embassy in New Delhi (ibid 2010). For India, it was great matter of concern to balance the present situation; it should not stop the Tibetans from their fundamental rights to protest for their nation and it was also vigilant for peaceful arrangements for the success of Torch in the capital. So, the government's strategy to make everyone happy in this conflict would not resulted happiness for those who advocated a hard-line Indian response to China on the border talks. From their point of view any compromise with China will create an outcome of loss. The Indian Express summed up the views of New Delhi's foreign policy and hawks a day after the unprecedented security arrangements for the torch relay:

A day after the might of the Indian Republic was applied to ensure the safe passage of the Olympic torch through New Delhi, it is time for sober reflection. This over-reaction was incongruous with India's democratic credentials, and it has also put on India a striking handicap in bilateral relations.... Of late, China has been moving the goalposts on border issues that had been taken to be settled The repercussions will be felt in foreign policy. In these weeks, China has seen the ease with which it could have the Indian vice president's long scheduled meeting with the Dalai Lama cancelled – or compel India's envoy in Beijing to show up at the foreign office in the middle of the night. Tenor in foreign policy creates its own momentum. India will have to reckon with it (*Indian Express* 2008).

¹⁹ The protest ban in Arunachal and the heavy security was scathingly critiqued as a sign of Indian weakness before Beijing by many media publications.

When the Olympic game 2008 was going to be held in Beijing, Tibetans have planned for the massive protest to show the world how they are suppressed by the Chinese authority. As a result two event caught international attention, one is Beijing Olympic game and another one was Tibetan protest. Some of the European countries like Britain were not willing to send their Olympic team and seek clarification from china “that there would be no human rights violation against Tibetans.” Another cause of this Tibetan unrest was the concern over continuing settlement of the Han Chinese in Tibet. Dalai Lama faces the ire of Chinese media which blamed him for closing the door of talks on Tibet’s future. China continues to denounce the Dalai Lama for instigating Tibetan unrest, and even after the Chinese government succeeded in putting the unrest down following the 3.14 Riots²⁰ (Stobdan 2009).

India’s Tibet policy has not changed fundamentally despite 2008 Tibetan unrest. Foreign ministry expressed its distress over the reports of the violence in Lhasa and the deaths of the innocent people, and called for the crisis to be resolved through dialogue and non-violence means. India’s response to 2008 Tibetan unrest based on several factors. Firstly India remain firm in its principled stand that Tibet is a part of China and problem between them must be resolved through peaceful dialogue. Second India considered it unwise to damage its relations with china because it’s economic and trade ties were growing strongly. India consider morally it is not correct to stop the Olympic torch hence it preferred to stay away from the western campaign supporting Tibetan protests (Stobdan 2009). Furthermore, Tibet did not even figure in the official documents or speeches during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s China visit in January 2008. As S.D. Munni (2008) has underlined “China was happy with India’s reiteration of ‘one China policy’.” New Delhi finds it prudent to avoid irritating the Chinese with the Tibetan question. But Tibet remains the perennial as also most critical issue in determining the tenor of India-China relations.

²⁰ 2008 Tibetan Olympic protest and uprising known as the 3.14 Riots.

Chapter Five

China's Response to India's Tibet Policy

Sino-Indian relations and the associated thorny issues between the duo Asian-giants invariably invoke Tibet as a vibrant entry point of discussion. Many of the strategic analysts hold to a view that India committed a grave mistake when she echoed the “One China Policy” and identified Tibet as an integral part of China. Nevertheless, decades have lapsed into the memory of the two States since Tibet was sacrificed to maintain the Sino-Indian relations. First Prime Minister of India, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, a champion of amicable resolution of Sino-Indian problem, stood against all odds to prevent a Chinese military occupation of Tibet, but eventually yielded to the enormous pressure to maintain a cordial Sino-Indian relationship (Norbu 2001: 284). Unfortunately, the sacrifice of Tibet could not be beneficial for India and both India and China seem to lock horn with each other without ceasing.

Another aspect of Sino-Indo relations can be seen by mapping out the trends of India's policy towards Tibet. During initial phase when China had not occupied Tibet, India seconded Tibet's claim as an Independent country. But when Tibetan government-in-exile relocated to Dharamshala of India, India became soft on his stand over Tibet. When Nehru preferred to call Tibet as a part of China instead of an independent country, the PRC did not take time to announce the autonomous legal claims over Tibet. Later on, invoking the Treaty of 1954, China took an official stand over the claim of territory along the Indo-Tibetan border (Norbu 2001: 286). Discussion till now, raises one question to disentangle the historical understanding and that question is— “Had Tibet not been under China's control, there would not be a boundary question between India and China.” It seems that till China was harping on her so-called “peaceful liberation” of Tibet, there was no need for India to invest so heavily on defence infrastructure along the northern and north-eastern borders of India. Nonetheless, India has no option now but to devote a humongous amount of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence.

The unresolved question of boundary grants to China made it to reach the desired leverage, hence the situation would pose threat to Indian territory have received wider attentions in discourse of international scholarship. Surprisingly, china has settled her border disputes with every country except India. The roots of this dispute

can be traced to the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950. (Malone and Mukherjee 2010: 137-158). It is a fact that India had a common border after Tibet's occupation by China. Exhilarated by the location of Tibet as a launching pad for Chinese political and economic growth, China was motivated to restore its dominion over the so-called "lost territories". It is pointed out that China uses this location against India as per the need of the time. Moreover, Hasmi claim that "China not only commands authority over Tibet but has also been laying claim over the Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim provinces of India, it is deemed that occupation of Tibet was one of the main steps to open the gates for China to enter India, Bhutan, Nepal, the Indian Ocean and Central Asia" (Hasmi 2012). With the establishment of PRC in 1949, Mao Zedong declared that Tibet is like the palm of China and North-Eastern frontier agency-NEFA (now known as Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh), Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Ladakh are like fingers of this palm. By comparing all these regions to palm and its fingers, he wanted to materialize the expansionist policies of China.

Ginsburg and Mathos (1964: 210), in their book "Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years" put it very succinctly that—

"He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont, threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent, may well have all of South Asia within his reach, and with it, all of Asia."

This study explains that these this kind of expansionist view would not only affect the north-eastern border of India but also the northern borders. India has witnesses the decisive impacts of the control of Chinese expansionist policies the Aksai Chin region. It has resulted in a fresh dispute in Ladakh region (which is a part of Jammu and Kashmir region) where India has already been in tension with Pakistan in regard to the border issue. Now India is supposed to be dealing with the two troublesome countries in her neighbourhood. Contemporary Sino-Pakistan alliance at military and developmental fronts has added to the worries of India which are already of grave nature (Hasmi 2012:116). Once the ceasefire came into effect in 1947, Pakistan betrayed India by gifting 5,180 sq. km. of land in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) to China. It was a strategic gain to China's move to wage a wanton war against India. China's military and economic support to Pakistan fortified China's position against India.

The aspects of infrastructural development in Tibet projected as major concern for India in this Era of competing edge of dealing with the issue of border disputes. China tend to deploy the infrastructural facilities in an effective way along with the bordering areas of India, it poses an inconvenience confrontation to existing policy of India towards Tibet. It can be ascertained by observing the fact that the infrastructural facilities for smooth movement along the borders are much more developed as compared to Indian side border story. Owing to the fact, fourteen airbases have been constructed by China; they have laid down an oil pipeline from Golmud to Lhasa in Tibet. Seventeen radar centres which are beyond common man's eyes. Have been put in place. Eight Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) stations have also been established. Seventy medium and twenty short-range missile sites also have been developed. All these can encompass India, Bhutan and Nepal in their ambit without any difficulty (Kaushik 2012: 48-51). Tiwari (2012: 30-33) also added some surprising fact that China has deployed around a quarter of its missile force along the Tibet at Nagchuka. They are established at Nyingtri, Kongpo and Powo Tramo. If one goes by the official records, there are around 5000 soldiers on Tibetan plateau deployed by China. And, half of them are stationed at bases on the Sino- Indian border.

The strategic act of Chinese regime to make Tibet as their military base has far-reaching impacts. Eco-system of Tibet becomes very vulnerable keeping in view the military development of China in this region. Moreover, Tibet serves as the water tower for whole of Asia and a large chunk of population (around two billions) depend on the eco-system of Tibet. It is richer in water resources which constitutes of 11 major rivers. However, nuclearisation of Tibet is posing a problem of pollution in using the water resources, which affects the countries of South Asia and Southeast Asia. The claims of china towards Tibet policy, uphold that whatever projects, infrastructural or otherwise in Tibet are meant to give Tibet a touch of modernity; they maintain that it will result in the prosperity of the Tibetans. But, interestingly, Tibetans do not share this story of development and modernization. China makes a seemingly conspicuous claim that projects and infrastructural development initiated by her are not in any way going to destroy the roots of the Tibetan culture. They also add to it that it is neither for the containment of India on its north-eastern frontier. All this indicate to one thing that vicinity of China to India is precarious and have the potential to wreak havoc instead

of reaping any benefits out of the immediate location. While on the other hand, India stands for a neighbourhood which is peaceful and amicable.

Situation becomes worse when one comes across with reports which makes a claim that China supporting various extremist groups, for example, the Nagas by the ensuring the provision of arms and ammunition for them. Moreover, China take care of their financial needs for all the weaponry. And very interestingly, it is all executed through Tibet (Hasmi 2012: 118). There is common myth that China is not comfortable with India's economic growth and its close association with all the major power bloc of the world, hence it want to destabilize the commonly stable economy of India by proxy measures of the maintenance of border disputes, environmental interference and most importantly by supporting Pakistan, a country portrayed as arch-rival to India. All this is done through its Tibet card. However, this surely develops a perspective that China is moving ahead with her is real expansionist agenda and is determined to push India at its back foot.. The story of control over Tibet by Chinese government is summed up figuratively by P. C. Chakravarti who said, "Any strong expansionist power, entrenched in Tibet, holds in its hands a loaded pistol pointed at the heart of India (Chakravarti 1961)."

5.1 Chinese Strategic Perception of Tibet

Most often the Indian elite tend to consider Tibet in terms of military strategy. Same view is shared by the Chinese counterpart with added zeal. The fact of the matter is that this arises out of different historical experiences. Mehra (1968: 140-155) emphasis, for the British, Tibet can be considered to be consequential effect of imperial strategy, along with the conspiracy of Russian policy on border issue. But this view is not substantially supported by the History as it assumes that the British take Tibet as a buffer state lying amidst the competing rival imperial powers. Chinese communists interpret it an imperialist conspiracy to treat Tibet as separate entity from China.

It is assumed that if backdoor to China is open, it will leave the Chinese economy in a very vulnerable situation. Foreign interferences and interventions are assumed to replete the Chinese economy to penetrate to its core. But the history belies the truth as there has been no determined attack on Chinese regime using Tibet as a strategic location. Though East India Company had tried to get an access to Chinese economy via trade trough Tibet. This view opines that British Raj's influence was not

seen with greater suspicion. China did not only think that the British would militarily create problem but also it has a deep seated fear that they will interfere in the internal affairs of the country and then imperially encircle China to freeze Chinese economy and culture. This leads to conclusion that the Republican China claims that if china were to achieve its national security then Tibet perceived as its backdoor which must be shut (Norbu 2008: 688). Rebao believed, “Once the backdoor region was occupied by the Communist, China began to perceive Tibet as national security, especially during the 1970s, as China’s south-west demonstrated signs against imperialism, revisionism and reaction (Rebao 1975).”

It is easy to discern from above discussion that one of the main reasons for the Communist takeover of Tibet is strategic, and however, Chinese predicament claims it to be historical or ideological. In the context of empire narrative of historical details, it is witnessed that Tibet’s tribute-paying systemic relation to China is very similar to Korea’s or Mongolia’s relations with the Middle Kingdom. A traced historical event uncovers the evidences which emphasise the frequency of Chinese military intervention in Lhasa in the regimes of “Yuan” and “Ching dynasties”. This is very similar to the Chinese intervention in the Vietnamese affairs for centuries. This context demands an explanation, “If we continue to believe in the historical claims of China over Tibet then it has to discern the patterns why other similar dependencies like Korea or Vietnam were not liberated on the same historical grounds (Norbu 2008: 688)”.

In parallel pathway, Chinese Communists, who had acquired the excellency in strategy formulation through their usual war strategy of lifelong “guerrilla warfare”, made to be realized early, to deploy the plan for considering the strategic importance of Tibet and which unleashed to shut China’s backdoor in 1950. The historical moorings proved the process of deepening Tibet as appreciable effort of Chinese strategic decisions. The two historical moments can be cited here which strengthened the Chinese belief that Tibet was imperative for the strategic issues. These two historical events are—The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and the Sino-Indian border war. It was concretized by sending PLA troops to enter eastern Tibet, as soon as they were able to construct roads. It has been more than two decades that this strategic development had gained a currency. It could be marked as spectacular aspects of the overall development and strategic were much focus to expand the military base. However, this does not amount to the neglect of economic aspect. The truth of the

matter is that strategic development eclipses the rest dimensions of the exported revolution in Tibet. It made to be considered as secondary aspects Chinese policy towards, though, to point out a simple fact, this often ignored and concealed. The Chinese claims to spend on Tibet's economic assistance tended to be actualised or garnered in the domain of strategic military operation of constructing roads. It would not be a surprise to know that China devotes around "10-11 per cent of its GNP" on national defence and security on the border which is facing Soviet Union. It shows that how Tibet is valued probably to be one of the most strategic and vulnerable regions in the whole of China (Norbu 2008).

China's expenditure on the strategic development projects in Tibet can easily be ascertained. Available evidences can be put together to get a broader picture. During the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) when China pumped millions of silver dollars into Tibet, roughly "Beijing spent \$4,232 million exclusively on transportation and communication"; which supposedly had to be spent for the whole of the country's growth and development. This amount constituted "11.7 per cent of the total development expenditure" (Remer 1959: 49). It can be easily proved to bring the evidence, which emphasis; total amount went for road-building projects in Tibet. In his book on national minorities, Chang Chih-I, deputy director of the United Front Work Department of the CCP, wrote:

With respect to communication and transportation, the greater part of the new highway construction throughout the country since Liberation has been located in the frontier regions of the motherland and in areas inhabited by national minorities...The highway routes involving major engineering were, among others, the following: Kangting-Tibet, Tsinghai-Tibet, Tsinghai-Sinkiang, Chengtu-Apa, Lanchow-Langmuszu, Kunming-Talo, Lhasa-Shigatse, Shigatse-Gyantse, and Phari-Yatung (Moselev 1966: 107).

It is mandatory to highlight that the majority of the highways, mentioned above are located in Tibet proper and others run along the "Sinkiang-Tibet border regions". Chinese communist tend to perceive liberation as tenuous aspects of social and economic development, military strategy plays crucial role in defining the notion of liberation. The Chinese attempts, both Imperial and republican, to gain control over Tibet, poses a hindrances due lack of communications and transport roadways, which frustrates unleashed activities of Chinese regime prior to 1950. However, there were notable attempts made by "Manchu dynasty", at the turn of the century, to build "roads in Khann (Eastern Tibet)" though did not make much progress (Norbu 2008: 685-702).

In this context, the historical-consciousness of Chinese Communists made to be realized, right from the beginning, that without the modern modes of communications, any attempt at liberating Tibet meaningless, enormous physical barriers would curb the process of liberations which it tended to anticipate. For the first time in history of south Asia, once Tibet conquest had been witnessed in 1951, the Chinese started the project of constructing highways linking Tibet with China. This strategic move of Chinese in Tibet played a crucial role for the military preparation of PLA in 1962 border war.

At the end of 1965, Tibet was linked with interior China through two highways. With immediate effect of this, by 1975 China had completed “91 highways totalling 15,800 km with 300 permanent bridges in Outer Tibet alone”, by which “97 per cent of the region’s counties” were connected by motorable roads (Radio Lhasa 1975; Norbu 2008). Hence, it is believed that China had put in place all her strategic development in Tibet by 1975. This acted as indicator which emphasise strategic accomplishment of ninety seven per cent of military manoeuvres in that year. Right from the beginning of October 1975, China introduced a scheme for foreign travellers to visit Tibet. And by 1980, the tourists had an open access to the region of Tibet. This was an indicator of the growing confidence of Chinese which was rooted in the extensive strategic build-up in a region where PRC had invested heavily since it was founded in 1949. Norbu said that, “Nearly, up to 25 years China focused on the aspects of strategic development in Tibet, which overshadows and side-lined any other enterprise including social reform or economic development” (Norbu 2008). Norbu has argued three kind of a particular objectives that revolves around the modality military oriented development:

(1) the perceived notion of strategic vulnerability of Tibet, where erupted due to the fact that China confronted India and the Soviet Union who had been, in Maoist eyes, allied since the early 1960s in their shared hostility towards China; (2) The resistance from Tibetan, though it may not pose any real danger to the well-entrenched PLA in itself, but it always welcomes the dangerous potential of foreign intervention in the strategic region that could be possibly transform it into another ‘Vietnam’; and (3) The unending aspects of the silent but continuing arms race between India and China anticipated the tendency to determine a military-oriented development in Tibet (Norbu 2008: 690).

The directions of roadways tend to open up the various dimensions of border issues. Some highways connect China with Tibet. Norbu reported:

The Szechuan-Tibet Highway (South Military Road) is 1,413 miles long. With an average height of 13,000 feet, the highway crosses 14 high mountain ranges and 12 major rivers. It crossed across the most important places in Eastern Tibet and finally

reaches Lhasa. From this template, there the highway—under a new name, the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway— moves through most strategic places in the Western Tibet. The third trunk road, starts from Sining, called as the Chinghai Tibet Highway (the Northern Military Road) and passes through Amdo and Naghukha and reaches Lhasa. The fourth highway is known as the Yunnan-Tibet Highway which goes through Chamdo and connects with the Szechuan-Tibet Highway at Lhasa (Norbu 2008).

Tibet is connected to the Chinese provinces mainly through these four highways. Surprisingly, there are many other networks of highways which are more complex and strategic and all of them somehow connect all the points at international border along Himalayas and sensitive enough militarily. A highway known as The “Szechuan-Tibet Highway” has had various path lanes which connect south and the south-western Tibet region. This is the region which faces the eastern part of the Sino-Indian borders. This highway also has got some more path lanes which connect the central and western part of the Himalayan range boundary. Sinkiang and Tibet are connected by its other extra branch and another branch reaches to the “Sikkim- Tibet borders”. The Szechuan-Tibet Highway’s third offshoot reaches to the Nepal-Tibet borders. In Overall snippet of views of this roadways highlights, the four highways not only connect Tibet with China, in particular, the Northern Road and the Western Road complexes cut across the continental Tibetan plateau, running almost parallel to the Himalayan borderland, at an average distance of 35 miles from the international borders in the eastern, middle, and western sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary (Norbu 2008: 685-702).

In organizational terms of military strategies, the basic line of communications are framed as roads and technological advances by the Chinese Air Force. In the present age aircraft facility is mainly used for the movement of military personnel and supplies. It becomes all the more important as Tibet provides important landing facilities when it takes nearly two weeks by road to go from Beijing to Lhasa. Norbu feels it is necessary to figure out the details of airfield strategy of communications.

The first airfield was built in 1955–1956. By 1963, 12 airfields were completed, most of which were laid near the frontiers of India, Nepal, and Bhutan. There are now 23 airfields, located mostly near military and administrative quarters. They are at the following places: Kartse, Kantse, North Koko Nor, Lithang Jekondo, Tachienlu, Nakchukha, Cham do, Drachi-Dranang, Nyathang in the Eastern Tibet; Lhoka, Lhasa, Oyantse, Stigatse, Ghonkhor Dzong in the Central Tibet; in Phari, Chusul, Tram, Gartok, Kassu, and Thingri in the Western Tibet. It is worth noting that most of the airfields in the Central and the Western Tibet are close to the Sino-Indian borders (Norbu 2008).

This frame of reference and articulations tend to anticipate the capacity of Chinese military preparations for the past 25 years have been quite overwhelming, some may raise the doubt to test it: what is the strength of the PLA in Tibet? To answer this, it is imperative to look into the Chinese spending on defence and security. According to Tibetan sources there are around “three lakh soldiers present in the administration of Tibet”. However, Indian defence minister’s annual reports record the same figures in the “range of 130,000–180,000”. Irrespective of the size of the Chinese Army, it should be borne in mind that the administration of Tibet is highly dominated by PLA. Until the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1968, anywhere else in China, the PLA shared, and practically dominated, local power and politics in Tibet. The PLA rule in Tibet can be understood largely with regard to the region’s strategic importance and China’s experience with the Tibetan resistance movement throughout the 1950s. However, The Cultural Revolution, which erupted so much chaos in such a sensitive region, drove home the truth of the matter: of all the nascent Chinese institutions in Tibet, it is assumed that PLA remained intact and firm, capable of maintaining law and order in the chaotic situation (Norbu 2008: 691).

It carves out the story which describes the trends in which PLA had been ruled the Tibet regime since 1951-1966. It played a crucial role in fulfilling the strategic requirements in “Inner Asia” in the first 25 years. These years can serve as an indicator to the models and strategies of the way in which Tibet was viewed by the Chinese i.e. as a national security issue. In general it is accepted truth that prior to 1979 political practices of China, the difference between the ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ is rather fuzzy. “It had been too prominent and too consistent to miss the point that this is not a simple case of military usurpation of civilian authority; it is structural design of Chinese regime to secure a quasi-martial law in Tibet. This tendency prevailed at least “from 1959 to 1966”. Since 1951, and especially after 1959, “Chang Kuo-hua” was the commander of Tibet Military Region and concurrently “first secretary” of the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet, generally the army general who rule the regime until he was transferred to Szechuan in 1967. “Tan Kuan-san”, was another powerful personality in Tibetan politics for many years, political commissioner of the Tibet Military Region and also secretary of the Secretariat of the CCP Tibet Region Committee, until he was transferred to Beijing and appointed vice president of the Supreme People’s Court in July 1967 (Norbu 2008).

PLA has heavily dominated the political domain of the Tibet since after the Cultural Revolution. Beijing tend to put the PLA generals of power in Lhasa during the first 25 years (1950–1976), it is so to say, not only to simply rule the region, operationalized as major instrument to oversee its armed preparations all through “Inner and Outer Tibet”. In the context of strong military forces of regime, China was able to ensure that national security which received priority in Tibet. As per Chinese perspectives, “this preponderant priority on strategic development, was essential owing to two foremost reasons i.e. it brought into our analysis earlier by stating the aspects of modern communications and potential threat of foreign intervention in the domain of national security” (Norbu 2008: 691-92).

5.2 Implications of China’s Tibet Policy for India

The 1962 Sino-Indian war and its unsettled border dispute always invoke the issue of military strategy, adopted by India’s foreign policy on Tibet and China and as well, China’s Tibet policy as frontal anchoring point of discussions. It is necessary to recall the event. It started with Indian government’s objection to the Chinese incursion of Tibet on October 21, 1950. This tendency was later critically viewed as “India interfering in matters relating to domestic affairs of Chinese regime”. During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to China in 1954, he raised the pertinent question which addresses the issue of inaccurate border alignment in some Chinese maps. Chinese Premier “Zhou Enlai” generated a very lukewarm response. He informed the Indian counterpart that “maps showing inaccurate border alignment were very old maps (reproductions of the old Guomindang maps) and Chinese Government could not spare any time to revise them”. Ironically, these two historical events tend to lose its relevance, due to undercurrent of the *Hindi–Chini Bhai Bhai* era when India signed the agreement with China on trade and inter-course between India and Tibet on April 29, 1954 (Bhattacharya 2007: 237-266).

As per the protocol of an agreement, legal sanctions of India on Tibet, it was maintained that extra-territorial rights and privileges which were given to Tibet should be terminated and thus, recognised Tibet as a part of China. It is noteworthy to bring out the details of official statements. “The first official Chinese statement on the Sino-Indian border dispute came on January 23, 1959, when replying to Nehru’s letter of December 14, 1958. In which Zhou Enlai said that ‘Sino-Indian border was never delimited and that China had never recognised the McMahon Line’ (Appadorai 1982)”.

It proposes the way for China to have claim on Indian territory. Tibet policy of China which resulted in an altered nature of border dispute between India and China has remained inflexible till date. It is true that the reminder of the fact that claim of China over Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) which is based on old Tibetan religious and monastic links rekindles the border dispute. The Tibetan issue seems to be far from over. In fact, the meeting ended up inconclusively, the ninth round of special representatives deliberations in January 2007 partly because of the Tawang issue (Bhattacharya 2007: 257).

The debate on Chinese Tibet policy renders several issues which may be the concern theme for India's foreign policy. However the border issue of Nepal and Bhutan further accentuates dispute between china and India in terms configuration of global power. Tibet used to work as a "buffer zone" between India and China but with the conquest of Tibet by the Chinese both the countries now stand face to face. This was the only reason behind the 1962 war. This also steered many successive tensions and scuffles between the two countries—one in 1967 at "Nathu La" and another one at "Samdurong Chu" in 1987. At this juncture, scholars however have concluded that Tibet policy of China has provided her a wider access in south Asia.

As Surjit Dutta demonstrates that, this is the momentum where china occupied Tibet and it "became an important political and security factor in the Southern Asian geopolitical and strategic syndrome" (Dutta 2006). It can be easily ascertained that Tibet is no more a buffer zone and it has been replaced by Nepal. And now Nepal has gained a prominence in the foreign policy of China. The geographical settings of roadways can highlight the significant features of this debate. There is a long border measuring around "870-mile" which Tibet shares with Nepal. Keeping the importance of this long border Chinese government is consolidating its relationship with Nepal. As per official records, "an agreement has been signed between the Chinese government and King Gyanendra which says that Nepal will not involve herself in any anti-China activity". With respect to this agreement, in Nepal was directed to close down the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office in Kathmandu in January 2005.

In following the amicable resolution, in May 2005, the two countries had an agreement to open bus transport service between Kathmandu and Lhasa. "The 1,000-km (625 miles) journey" between the two cities takes about three days and "costs \$70" (Bhattacharya 2007). Along this line of border strategy, another road named

“Syaprubesi–Rasuwa” Road (18 km) will be completed by China. After completion of this road this would be counted as the second most important road link between Nepal and China. Norbu (2001: 248) argues that the “removal of Tibet as the buffer zone has enhanced Nepal’s strategic importance and which enabled to exploit Sino-Indian differences in china’s favour and it would facilitate the game between the two giants against each other. This fact is easily verified by looking into the reports of arms supply to Nepal by China when Indian government made an attempt to freeze military assistance to the Royal Nepalese Army in the wake of the royal coup in 2005”.

It is imperative for us to look into programmatic thrust of China’s WDS, a product of its national consolidation project, has security consequences for India. It brings out the repeated argument, however, indicates that china tend to gaining strategic capability by expanding their control over borders and least concern with removing of economic backwardness. It is targeted at consolidating China’s power over Tibet by introducing the persistent strategy of persistent “Hanisation policy”. Construction of the “Qinghai–Tibet railway” project would further promote this initiative. This can be seen as China’s reciprocity against the strategic capability of India. It is observable fact that through Tibet-Qinghai railway line China will have an added privilege to its Strategic capability as through this very railway line it can augment its military deployment near the Tibet-India border region within no time. The infrastructure and road construction shows that the “rail link reduces travel time from Gormo to Lhasa from 72 hours to 16 hours” (Gupta 2001). It is reported that the Chinese military arsenal on the larger Tibetan plateau, including areas outside TAR dominate in large number (Gupta 2001). This enhanced and advanced military; however, does not only amount to a direct security alarm for India but it gives leverage for enabling Chinese to achieve a position of greater strength to approach border dispute with India.

This part of our concern has made inroads to crucial repercussion of China’s Tibet policy- Tibetan refugee population in India. Let us look into details of Tibetan refugee’s issues and how it poses serious concern for India’s border issues as well. Kharat (2003) emphasises that “there are about 120,000 Tibetan refugees spread across 35 settlements in India. The growing number of Tibetan community as refugees, gives rise to the formation of complex organisation, namely, TGIE headquartered at Dharmasala (northern India)”. The structures of this organisation tend to follow the rules of democratic polity. The recent elections were conducted in 2001 by the TGIE,

for the election of the Prime Minister. In addition to this TGIE has “legislative, executive and judicial organs” to take care of the various governmental functions in for the welfare of the “Tibetan community in exile”. There are facilities for schools and health services. Economic development and cultural activities for the Tibetan people are also taken care by the TGIE. Poignantly, it brought out the political tone for the Tibetan movement. “A study has been carried out to characterise the political organisation and strategic program of the TGIE as ‘latent state’ is significant (Frechette 2006: 127)”. The recognition from Dalai Lama’s, TGIE as significant political site, declaring it as unofficial diplomatic activity, promotes and legitimises the religious sanctions of Tibet. However, it could be assumed that latent state would also pose a challenge to India. The event of “Manali riots” 1999, in Himachal Pradesh tend to caution the tendency of, “growing presence of the Tibetans and their association at times with illegal trade and business, which would lead them to be in collision with local population” (Tribune 1999)²¹.

In the political context, the scenario where second line of Tibetan leadership is in yet to unfold, the future of Tibet, particularly in the post-Dalai Lama era, is tend to be uncertain in absence of second line leadership. Probably, this uncertainty could have its impact on “India-China relations”, as Tibet remains providing fuel for border disputes. From this study, we can anticipate future course of action, which would unleash different possibilities. Several trends may emerge among Tibetans in the post-Dalai Lama era:

- “A vacuum in leadership after the Dalai Lama may lead to a power struggle between the TGIE and the 17th Karmapa, while the whereabouts of Panchen Lama are uncertain.
- Infighting among various Tibetan monastic organisations may arise.
- The TYC may go radical and launch a more open political and even armed struggle.
- India could recognise the democratically elected TGIE, if relations with China deteriorate, and some other states may follow suit.

²¹ Security Tightened in Riot-Hit Manali, at <http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99jul07/himachal.htm>, (Accessed 21 July 2013).

- The Tibetan community in India may pose a problem if conflict of interest grows with locals and the Indian Government could then ask them to return to China.
- The Tibetan Diaspora could complicate negotiations on the border problem between the two countries.
- The TGIE may fall into disarray with no leadership and the Tibetan movement fizzles out.
- China may prop up its own Dalai Lama and the pro-PRC Tibetans may rally behind the Chinese-appointed Dalai Lama (Bhattacharya 2007).”

This depends on what course India–China relations take in the future, as well, the ability of the Tibetans to conduct a unified and peaceful national struggle and the approach of the reformist forces in China.

5.3 China Claim on Arunachal

The two specific arguments which Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh is as follows. One, it is noted that Tibet had in the past exercised influence and “collected taxes in parts of Arunachal, including Tawang”, where there is an important monastery. Second, the “1914 Simla Agreement” that approves a boundary along the Himalayan watershed “dividing Arunachal from Tibet” is not valid since Tibet did not hold any statutory membership, which had no authority to sign it, and the conference was a design of “British attempt to separate Tibet from China” (Dutta 2008: 549-81). Those interested reader to know the details, can read the Chinese official statements for further clarifications and elaboration at the end of the notes.

Thus, China’s principal arguments and its position regarding claim on Arunachal as drafted in Zhou’s letter of September 1959 and subsequently orchestrated and elaborated at the Officials Talks in 1960. It may be summarized as follows:

- “Tibet had no right to sign any international agreement, and hence the 1914 Simla Agreement between British India and Tibet settling the boundary in the eastern sector (as well as north Burma) is not legal. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement clearly mentions that Tibet does not have such a right.
- The March 1914 bilateral Agreement settling the Indo-Tibetan border in the east was secretive and not shown to the Chinese for approval.

- While China had participated in the Simla Talks and its Plenipotentiary Ivan Chen had even signed the July 1914 Convention, it had not been ratified by the central government in Beijing.
- The traditional boundary lies along the foothills of the Himalayas and not at the Himalayan watershed as claimed by India and as indicated in the McMahon Line.
- Tawang is an area of religious significance to Tibet, which collected taxes there until 1951.
- Tibet was unhappy about the Agreement and had objected to the 1914 Agreement in 1947 (Dutta 2008).”

5.4 Claim of Jurisdiction

The argument of defence had risen from India’s concerns to point out, during the 1960 official talks that the “Tibetan ties were religious and monastic in Tawang”—as it had with other monasteries in the trans-Himalayan region—and hence it cannot be as considered as the basis for any sovereignty claims. Further, such claims as have been advanced by China since 1959—and though not by the Tibetans or the Chinese Central Government before that date—the sanctions of sovereignty claim are tantamount to the Vatican, basis of its cleric ties with the Catholic churches all over the world. Moreover, during the 17th century, the ties “Tibetans had with the Monbas”, living in the trans-Himalayan villages, were excavated or emerged and it restricted to a few small pockets. They tends not to undermine the jurisdiction of the tribal groups that inhabited the area or that of other Indian kingdoms like “Ahom rulers of Assam” (Dutta 2008).

The strategical judicious use of re-conciliation proposal and use of armed force, by the Ahom rulers makes the issue of the border of Indian kingdoms, which tribal areas located in the east and were kept in peace. The same method of rule were in action since the regime of British promulgates its dictum of law, after 1826 also, this system as prevailed and placed the areas under the jurisdiction either of the political Agents or of the Deputy Commissioner of the adjoining districts. The legal pact of inner line in 1873, otherwise called as “Regulation 1873”, drafted the protocol which prevents “traders from the rest of the country entering the areas for exploitation of resources in the tribal areas and also prohibits the tribal from carrying out raids in the lower plains”.

There is a claim which states that “Tibet was collecting taxes from Tawang monastery until 1951” when full-fledged Indian administration was extended into the area. However, the region of “Monba” were never been part of Tibetan juridical purview of Tax collection. In fact, records and documents stating the evidence, “Tawang monastery collecting religious dues from the villages in the Tawang²² and Sherchokpa areas, and Moreover, Tawang monastery sent part of its income to ‘Drepung monastery’ in Lhasa to which it was affiliated”. It is brought into evidence that there were also some “private Tibetan estates” owned by the monastery in the area. The abundance of official records and evidence had brought into the frame of reference to prove the Monastery presence of priestly jurisdiction. However, it cannot be equated with political jurisdiction of Tibet and no such jurisdiction has been shown by China. Dutta illustrated that, it can be easily verified that the Chinese evidence regarding its claims, presented during the 1960 talks, concentrating only on three small pockets of the Buddhist influence which close to the traditional border—“Monyul”, “Layul”, and “Lower Zayul”. There are monasteries which had close ties with the Monbas of the area who are Buddhists, mostly the evidence shows that of religious domain of Tawang (Dutta 2008: 563).

China had an ample source of evidence which supports the claim of Arunachal yet it claims “90,000 km of the area” south of the Himalayan watershed up to the foothills. The claimed region of china has adduced covered four pockets: the “Tawang valley”, the “Mechuka valley”, the “Brahmaputra/Tsangpo-Siang loop”, and parts of the “Lohit valley or the Walong circle”. Specifically, the pockets are “Khenzeman in the India-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction”, “Tawang tract (both in Tawang district)”, “Longju in Subansiri district”, and “Rima in the Walong sector”. It has to be stated, in 1962 the PLA invaded all these areas. It had sent forces into “Longju”, leading to armed clashes even earlier in 1959, and the PLA entered both “Longju and Taksing” in 1962. As per the North of the McMahon Line, China has not provided much evidence of the Tibetan or the Chinese administration but maintains both these areas as part of it (Dutta 2008: 564). It also claims that “Thagla ridge”, “Teygala” at the India-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction, and “Bumla” are north of the McMahon Line without showing indicating signals where the line should lie and on what basis (ibid 2008).

²² There were 11 villages in all in the Tawang area—8 in the western Tawang and 3 in the eastern—in 1951 when Tibet was occupied by China.

5.5 Geography and Watershed principle

In another context China tend to claim the repeated point of watershed principles, there were evidential proof of occurrence of the watershed principles, has had always found expressed in agreements propounded by the “Qing (China) dynasty” with Russia in 1864 (Central Asia), with France in 1895 (Vietnam), and with British India in 1890 (Sikkim). Moreover, this principle is clearly recognized and have tendency to become the bone of contentious issue, it can be manifests in its border agreements with Burma and Nepal in 1960 and 1961, It was forced to acknowledge which run along the watershed formed by the same continuing mountain system, in both the cases of boundary dispute (MEA 1961: 283)²³. It is clearly stated fact that The Chinese agreements with Burma/Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan (occupied Ladakh) all follow the “watershed principle” along the Himalayas and are consistent with the topographical flow of the agreed boundary in Sikkim and the McMahon Line in Arunachal. It is noted that the Chinese argument that in Arunachal alone this flow is broken, and the traditional boundary runs along the foothills, is inexplicable except for reasons of territorial expansion and politico-diplomatic goals specific to India (Dutta 2008: 569).

There is a point of contention, while calculating the boundary line. India has argued that the “traditional boundary in the eastern sector lies along the Himalayan watershed as in the other sectors”, in contrary to this; the Chinese side has claimed that “it lies along the southern foothills of the Himalayas in Arunachal”. This is curious, given facts, the southern boundary of Tibet lies along the watershed of the Himalayas in the Central Sector with India and with Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan; the same continuing watershed of the Himalayas forms the boundary between Burma and China. It is worth mentioning, The McMahon Line drawn, on the basis of the “watershed principle” from the Arunachal sector to the northern Myanmar. However, on the east and the west of Arunachal sector, it lies along the main watershed range of the area but only in this sector does the alignment claimed by China suddenly drops down to the southern foothill of the Himalayas (ibid 2008). In following this argument, Dutta (2008: 570) highlighted, “China tend to lost its credibility, by failed to provide valid

²³ Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People’s Republic of China on the Boundary Question, 1961, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, p. 283.

explanation as to why in this sector alone their claim departs from the Himalayan watershed and other question - why what is valid in the case of the other Himalayan neighbours, and especially Burma/Myanmar, is not valid for India". It claims that the borderline of India with Bhutan and Nepal is ingenuous which is akin to the claimed-line of China, along the Himalayan foothills. Because all the three are trans-Himalayan states with borders with Tibet, and it is considered to be the principle of dividing the Tibetan border from India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar that is at kernel of the issue.

The source of information appears to be not clear, related to India's expanding program of its administration into NEFA in 1951, as well irrelevant. Tibet and china tended to accept the declaration of India, on January 26, 1950, which considered NEFA a part of its Constitution without protest from any country. It is noteworthy to remember official treaty which happened in 1951 that proposes the view that China had militarily occupied Tibet and imposed the "17-point agreement" on the Tibetans. It is assumed that If that act of expanding Chinese sovereignty forcibly over another nation that had been since the collapse of the Qing empire in 1911 been independent is legitimate according to China and foreseen the possibilities of a question- "why should the introduction of normal administration of the new, independent, democratic India in an entirely peaceful manner on an area that had been a part of various Indian kingdoms and states for many centuries, and whose territorial status till that point was not under dispute, illegitimate?" (Dutta 2008).

In added to this border dispute, the new awakening to Tawang and the consequent territorial claims, however, when none had been made by China earlier till 1959 and It created the problems in both bilateral relations and in creating a sense of insecurity in Arunachal that has been repeatedly expressed by its elected representatives. It keeps on recurring when the people of the area—all equal citizens of democratic India—have never sought any allegiance with China. It is only defence strategy of China, to taking up the role of preserving the religious sentiments of the Tibetans. However, it is a ironical since the most revered religious leader of Tibet the Dalai Lama and his over 250,000 followers remain in exile in India since 1959, and in the same way, the Chinese government has continuously persecuted Tibetan lamas and controlled the monasteries in order, so to ensure that they do not willing to oppose Chinese rule (Dutta 2008: 571).

Moreover, It has been pointed out earlier, it was Tibet that signed the “1914 Simla Agreement” delineating the boundary in “NEFA” that agreed to have deal for keep “Tawang” on the Indian side, and, had experience of frustration with the British for having failed to get Chinese acquiescence to the Tibet–China boundary and the Simla Convention. However, Tibet briefly raised it in the late 1940s; meanwhile, it soon accepted that the issue had been settled. In the same way, the argument that Tibet was collecting taxes till 1951 in Tawang is somewhat misleading tendency as indicated earlier. It is acclaimed protocol; the “birth of the 6th Dalai Lama in Tawang cannot be the basis for any sovereignty claim” (Dutta 2008). It presupposes the question and response, as “Samdhong Rimpoche”, Prime Minister of the Tibetan government in exile, has pointed out, “if he had been born in any of the Southeast Asian Buddhist states would China have claimed it as well?”, Rimpoche said:

We have continued the legitimate government of the Dalai Lama, which is now 367 years old. It is the kernel basis of augmentation that government has agreed to McMahan line and Tawang and other issues were agreed on basis of the watershed principles. The watershed principle proposes the judicial remarks that whatever water comes to this side belongs to India. Though, it was very clear demarcation.... Why should there be any tension on the Tawang issue between India and China? India should stand up and say that you (China) have no business to talk about it. Tawang belongs to India. Why is this issue lingering on? If Chinese say that because the sixth Dalai Lama was born in Tawang, it belongs to Tibet then if one Dalai Lama was born in Mongolia can I say Mongolia is a part of Tibet? (Rimpoche 2008)²⁴.

This model expands the debate in unending interpretation of alleged national interest.

It is imperative to grapple on the question of demography and ethnicity. It reveals that there are distinct tribes that straddled each of the river valleys in this spreading, largely forested hilly region, discovery of examination of the ethnography of Arunachal Pradesh, known as the “Northeast Frontier Agency” up to the early 1970s. It is anthropological claim that the tribesmen in the north—“Monbas”, “Akas”, “Daflas”, “Miris”, “Abors”, and “Mishimis”—were all ethnically different from the Tibetans. China cannot, therefore, claim the area on the basis of ethnicity or religion. However, the religion and language of these tribes have been influenced by Tibet and the people of the Assam valley and adjoining areas—as is true of any border region—but each tribe has its indigenous culture. ((Dutta 2008: 454). It is hard to find out those

²⁴ Samdhong Rimpoche’s interview to Rediff.com ‘If India wants, it can sacrifice Tibet issue’, March 19, 2008.

tribes and peoples of Arunachal have ever sought merger with China; instead, it is assumed that they have increasingly and actively participated in the democratic process in India. It is established fact, while there are Buddhist pockets among the “Monbas”, the people are not Tibetans.

5.6 The Question of Tawang

It is interesting to know the dictum of The PRC, collecting taxes in the area and maintains that Tibet continued to be in possession of the Tawang monastery until 1951. One of the Former Ambassador to India, Zhou Gang insists that:

During my tenure as Chinese ambassador to India, I made it clear on many occasions to the Indian public — Tawang belongs to China, it is the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama and the Dalai Lama is ‘China’s Dalai Lama’, who cannot be ‘India’s Dalai Lama’... I think if the Indian side can make substantial adjustment in the East sector according to the principles of mutual understanding, mutual accommodation and mutual adjustment, the Chinese side will make its adjustment in the Western sector accordingly” (Gang 2007)²⁵.

Strikingly, the evidence shows that it was the “Drepung monastery in Lhasa”, and not the Tibetan Government, that concerned itself with the Tawang monastery. It tends to be considered that No Chinese official ever visited Tawang until the 1962 invasion. Tawang, part of the former “Kameng district”, is now a district in its own right. Moreover, different groups of Monpa tribals inhabit the Tawang area in the north, the “Dirang valley” in the central area, and the “Kalaktang valley” in the south. In the cartography of religious idioms, the three groups belong to the “Gelukpa sect” of Buddhists. Interestingly, Historical records show that “Monpas were never the citizens of Tibet”, nor was the area ever administered by Tibet, although the adjoining area in the north, under the Tsona district of Tibet, was ruled by the “Dzongpon Tibetans” (Dutta 2008).

In fact major Tibetan monasteries had religious ties with a string of monasteries in the trans-Himalayan region and they have not led to sovereignty claims. It may also be noted that when the border between Bhutan and the Tawang tract was surveyed and finalized by a “joint Bhutan-Indian commission between 1936 and 1938”, there was no protest either from Tibet or from China, nor was any protest when the Northeast

²⁵ Zhou Gang (2007), a Senior Adviser to China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing spoke to PTI in Beijing, PTI report ‘*Chinese Envoy calls for Tawang’s return*’, 31 October 2007.

Frontier Agency was mentioned as part of India and a Union Territory under the Constitution in 1950 (Dutta 2008). As T.S. Murty, who participated in the 1960 talks with the PRC delegation, says, “The Chinese did not provide any evidence to show that Tawang monastery was in the ‘possession’ of the Tibetan government and not merely affiliated for some purposes to a Tibetan monastery” (Murty 1983: 174). Even the Prime Minister of Tibet had recognized in 1914 that the only Tibetan interests were private estates and monastic contributions (MEA 1961: 280).

5.7 China’s Role in Ladakh

China’s role in Ladakh is also linked to the Tibet question. Unlike the McMahon line, which formalized the border between India and China in Arunachal Pradesh, India’s Tibetan borders in Ladakh were never clearly demarcated. Both countries continue to lay claims on Ladakh. The present border is the Line of Actual Control, the military position to which the Chinese military withdrew at the end of the 1962 war. The dispute in this region can also be traced to the period of British rule over India, when the British exercised indirect control over Ladakh. The ruler of the region was Gulab Singh, who also ruled over Jammu and Kashmir (Singh 2012: 151). Purshotam Mehra has described Raja Singh’s relationship to the British and the region of Ladakh as follows:

Its frontiers touched Tibet, and China’s far flung domains in Kashgar and Yarkand. The British entered into a treaty with Raja Gulab Singh, and decided to lay down the exact limits of his territory. Numerous boundary commissions were dispatched to the region between 1846 and 1880. These boundary commissions played an important role in demarcating the exact boundaries of Tibet and Raja Gulab Singh’s empire. Since Tibet was under the suzerainty of the Imperial Court of China, the British emissaries in Hong Kong requested the permission of the Chinese court to formalize the boundary. However, the work of these commissions and their requests for boundary demarcation were rejected by the Imperial Chinese government (Mehra 2007: 36-39).

This ambiguity regarding the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet continued until 1947, when India became independent. During the 1947 conflict between India and Pakistan, Pakistan captured certain areas of Ladakh, and later, in 1963, “gifted” the strategic region of Shaksgam Valley to China. At the end of the war, the issue of demarcation of the boundary in Ladakh was raised in Parliament. Nehru assured parliamentarians that, “the frontier from Ladakh to Nepal is defined chiefly by long

usage and custom (Nehru 1950: 155-56).”²⁶ He also stated that some portions of the boundary were not clearly demarcated and, hence, not recognized at all in some places by the Tibetan government. Subsequently, during the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, the Chinese delegation refused to discuss the matter (Gupta 1974: 15-17).

In an attempt to force China to discuss the boundary issue, the Government of India printed a new map of India in July 1954, containing a well-defined Northern boundary, which laid claim to the whole of Aksai Chin and areas in Ladakh stretching to the region east of the Karakoram pass (Rao 1991: 74-76). During the Chinese premier Zhou En Lai’s visit in 1954, Nehru attempted to use these new maps as the basis of formalizing the Sino-Indian boundary in Ladakh. In conversations with the Chinese Premier, Nehru pointed out that the Chinese maps showed Indian territories as part of China. He was told by Zhou En Lai that the new Chinese maps were copied from old Kuomintang (KMT) maps, and did not signify a definitive border alignment (Morley 1959). In 1959, Zhou En Lai changed this stance and argued that the Chinese maps were correct—a position which the current leadership in China maintains. China continues to assert that as the boundary has never been delimited, India cannot lay claim to territories that were a part of China (Gupta 1974; Sandhu 2008: 11).

Although relative calm prevailed on the issue between 1962 and 1990, in recent years, the Chinese government has aggressively developed military outposts, and continues to deny India’s claims over the region. “Based on official records, revenue data, travelers’ accounts—India’s claims to those parts where the Chinese have built their highway network, rests on firm ground. Nor is it a secret that new roads have been constructed, parallel to the original highway with branches to Chinese military outposts. Uncomfortably for New Delhi, and close observers of the scene, China’s LAC has, over the years, steadily inched forward! (Mehra 2007: 29)”

China also uses the strategy of aggressive patrolling in the region, similar to its policy in Arunachal Pradesh. “Every month, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police report around a dozen unannounced Chinese military patrols in the disputed border area, and this number has not decreased over the last decade. Nearly on a weekly basis, small

²⁶ Answer by Jawaharlal Nehru to a Question in Parliament Whether India had Any Well-Defined Boundary with Tibet. Parliamentary Debates. Official Report, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1950), pp. 155–56.

Chinese boats tour around on Pangong Tso Lake in Ladakh (Holslag 2010: 123).” In 2003, an Indian army report suggested that vehicle mounted patrols were becoming more frequent, instead of foot patrols, as was previously observed in the area of Trig heights in Ladakh (Asia News Agency 2003). The number of Chinese incursions in Ladakh also increased from “140 in 2007, to 280 in 2008” (Arnoldy 2009). In October 2009, a Chinese patrol intruded deep into Indian territory and assaulted Indian herders for grazing their animals on pastures that they claimed was on the Chinese side of the LAC. In December 2009, the PLA conducted its biggest ever exercise in Ladakh involving four military commands and 50,000 troops (Sen 2009; Gangadharan 2009).

In addition to aggressive military posturing, China also pressured the Indian government to stop infrastructural development in the region. Peter Wonacott has written that “a few years ago, when villagers were constructing a canal in Ladakh, Chinese soldiers attempted to stop them. Indian residents of the area also point out that Chinese soldiers have painted Chinese characters on rocks in territory that India claims as its own (Wonacott 2009).” In 2009, China objected to the construction of a road in Demchok village, which is within the Indian administered region of Ladakh (India Today 2009). In December 2010, Chinese patrols again prevented Indian workers from constructing a “passenger shed” for buses in the same region (PTI 2011). In reaction, the Indian government has ceased undertaking any infrastructural activities in the region. The armed forces have also been cautioned against adopting aggressive posturing. This reactive policy of maintaining status quo implies that India has played into China’s hand. A report filed by the government of Jammu and Kashmir in 2010 stated that in the absence of infrastructure and security, the local population is deserting their villages. This is giving the Chinese military an opportunity to push nomads from Chinese administered regions into Indian territory and thus laying claim to it (PTI 2010; Rediff News 2010).

However, the Indian diplomatic response to these incidents has been to downplay the incidents and to deny that a boundary dispute exists. Foreign Minister of that time S. M. Krishna said that the India-China border in Ladakh, “is one of the most peaceful boundaries. We have no dispute with China in this area. There is an in-built mechanism to deal with such issues (The Indian Express 2009; Asia Times 2009).” The Indian Army Chief, General V. K. Singh, also suggested that reports of incursions at the border were baseless. He remarked, “There is a perceptual difference about the

Line of Actual Control between us and China. Obviously somebody (with a) perception that the border passes through a particular area is going to come and stop, like we would do if it was our perception (Outlook 2011).”

The Chinese government has also adopted the policy of denying visas to Indian citizens living in Jammu and Kashmir. As Ladakh is a part of this state, the Chinese government considers the entire state a disputed territory. Since 2008, the Chinese foreign ministry has started issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens residing in Jammu and Kashmir (The Indian Express 2009). These visas are not considered valid documents by the Indian government. Although Prime Minister Manmohan Singh raised this issue during his meeting with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in October 2010, the Chinese government refused to reconsider its stance. Ma Zhaoxu, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, said at his bi-weekly briefing that “as for the Indian Kashmir visa, our policy is consistent and has stayed unchanged (Deccan Herald 2010).” In August 2010, the Chinese government also denied visa to a senior Indian General on the grounds that he was in charge of troops in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, that is, Ladakh (Times of India 2010). The primary objective of the aforementioned strategies is to ensure that boundary disputes continue to fester. India’s response however, has been extremely weak. In response to the denial of visa to the Indian General, the only reaction was the cancellation of the visit by the entire military delegation to China. No further steps were taken to effectively engage with China. Even during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s’ meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao in October 2010, the topic of discussion was the visa issue, not the boundary dispute which is the root cause of the problem (Singh 2012: 154).

5.8 China’ support to North-Eastern insurgent

In subsequent china’s policy tools against India, north-eastern insurgency rebellion get supports from china. Furthermore, it is always posed as threat from the neighbouring Countries surrounding India, which considered being active in exploiting the volatile and fragile situation witnessed by the turmoil in the northeast. It is not only articulated countries such as China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, but also emerging smaller powers such as Bhutan and Nepal have been involved in the region and supports the tendency of profuse insurgency (Datta 2000). It can be viewed as these countries contributes to the ongoing violence in this region by indulging in mode of activities like “political backing, economic assistance, logistic support, and military training or arms

supplies”. Let us look into the various ethnic and cultural traits of North-eastern India for seeking clarification and elaborations, to grapple with the question of Border disputes. It is considered to be inhabited by Mongoloid tribes who have close ethnic and cultural ties with the tribes in China, Tibet and Burma. It is anthropological artefacts of claims which asserts that barring “Khasis and Jaintias of Meghalaya”, almost all hill tribes belong to the Tibetan-Chinese fold and to the Tibetan-Burmese family (Sarin 1980: 10). This is the claim which comes from anthropocentric Indian elite that some of the tribal groups tend to turn towards their own stock rather than towards the country they resided in, asserts that, it was this feeling of affinity towards the border people of erstwhile East Pakistan and Burma. The strategic alliance of “China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal”, coupled with material and moral support of foreign intelligence agencies to access of the disaffected groups, which tend to proclaim that it facilitated insurgency in the northeast region (Datta 2000: 1496).

Based on the above claims, one can uncover the details, among these, the Chinese support to insurgents in the northeast nearly beginnings of 1960s and it continued till the 1970s. The following event emphasizes the significant aspects of strategic plan which Chinese regime kept its positions in defence and perpetuates the insurgency. In May 1966, Peoples’ Republic China have received a memorandum from “Nagas”, sought for possible assistance from China. In sequence of this, “Issac Muivah”, leader of Naga National Council, with a band of 300 men reached Yunan province in January 1967, after the difficult journey of three months through Arunachal Pradesh and the difficult terrain of Burma. Some of Naga fighters had trained in knowledge of arms and guerrilla tactics, it was in Yunan that they also taught Maoism (Sarin 1980: 105). The above events show that the tactical position of Chinese regime in support of Naga insurgency. Later, it became stronger and more intense with better tactics and modern weapons. Keeping aside the story of Nagas episode, the Chinese also extended moral and material support to the “Mizo and Meiti insurgents” by providing for their training in “guerilla warfare” and subversion in training centres in Yunan province of mainland China and Lhasa in Tibet (ibid 1980: 11). Peoples Liberation Army leader Biseshwar and his group of 16 visited Lhasa in Tibet, during late 1970’s, to secure Chinese support for their cause (ibid: 122).

It is the popular view exists among Indian counterparts, over the years; the Chinese have attempted to build bridges with India’s neighbours in order to curb the

trade benefits and supports the regulative market in favour of them. It seems that they have helped build Pakistan as a counterbalance to India. Not leaving aside, also tried to use Myanmar as a strategic observatory laboratory and have attempted to gain a control over the foothold in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Moreover, China's three largest arms clients are India's neighbours-Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh. The recent claim that the Chinese have also signalled the willingness to settle the border issue with Bhutan (Datta 2000: 1496).

An amicable relation has emerged between the Burmese and the Indian armies, due to the Chinese hidden support to the Naga insurgents, during the 1960s late and early 1970s. In continuation of these moments, China-bound rebels found it difficult to find a smooth passage without encountering the Burmese military, after the visit of General Ne Win in 1968 to meet Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. However, After the Junta's coming into power, Myanmar-China relations have gained momentum of improvised, from late 1980's onwards and this had been growing worry for India. India's defence-preparedness had been affected, due to the growing Chinese influence in Myanmar and in the Indian Ocean. In order to prevent it from becoming an "Indian Ocean", A General of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences had spoken of the Chinese Navy extending its naval operations into the Indian Ocean. (Bhaskar 1995)". This process has done it through the passage of Myanmar coastal line. It attempted to seek strategic outpost on Myanmarese islands which is closer to India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands. As part of this strategic allegiance, Beijing is also engaged in building strategic road links from its border towns to railheads and sea-ports of Myanmar. Moreover, it claims that they helping Myanmar in developing these ports (Satish 1995).

For last two decades, especially since 1993 in spite of the fact that New Delhi made an attempt to have treaty of peace with China (Chellaney 1996)²⁷. This attempt made it as barren field since the Chinese side has not reciprocated by relaxing its posture on the northeast. However they have come out with a promise to gradually scale down

²⁷ The 1993 border peace agreement was based on principles that Beijing had long advocated to lend legitimacy to its annexation of Indian territories: Keep the frontier dispute aside and normalise relations. The two nations have pledged to "maintain peace and tranquillity" along the line of actual control (LAC) - but without fully delineating the LAC, which remains laced with ambiguities. A string of border-related measures have followed the 1993 accord to anoint and underpin the *status quo*. (*The Pioneer*, October 10, 1996, Brahma Chellany)

their support to the Nagas and the Mizos (Pioneer 1999)²⁸. Poignantly, the 90,000 square kilometres claimed by China as its territory, are located in the far eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, in response to this, the Indian defence minister had reportedly alleged “border incursions” by the Chinese army (News 1998; Datta 2000: 1497). Till the insurgent groups like, the liberation of Bangladesh, gangs of Naga and Mizo made inroads to Dhaka to seek support in terms of financial assistance and military aid. Apart from these unhidden activities of insurgency, Pakistan went out of its way to construct and plan to maintain the schooling, of the extremists from Nagaland, Mizoram as well as Manipur, where gives training in subversion techniques at exclusive centres in Chittagong Hill tracts close to the Mizoram border (Sarin 1980: 12). In prior to setting up a joint working group in 1988, India and China have held ten rounds of border talks. However there was no significant progress. By the day passes on, both sides of the regime tend to be agreed for cutting the troops and armaments on their common frontier. Even though, critical differences still remain.

A new official document of Arunachal government, noted fact, which sent to the army headquarters on 17 April 2000, highlights that “2000 Chinese personnel have been spotted laying the road track opposite Asaphila area in the Tawang district”. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seemed busy in building an unmetalled road track heading towards the Line of Actual Control (LAC) across Arunachal Pradesh. Even as the joint working group was trying to thrash out solutions to the lingering border dispute. It is derived from Government sources, states that, army units stationed in the area began collecting intelligence and were “quite shocked” to identify that the unmetalled track was “barely six to seven km from the LAC” where Indian troops are as usual keep holding positions. The road goes along the “Yune Chu River” across the LAC and, as per the information from army intelligence reports, is between eight to 10 feet wide. Intelligence reports indicate that it is necessary to emphasis the recent processual moments which alarmingly echoes the signals of danger, the construction work has approached a place called the “Yune Chu-Tadang Siko junction”, and to build the track road operational, the Chinese army now has to only build a bridge over the river at “Tadang Siko”. In which, it is obvious to ask, “Will not be very difficult for the

²⁸ In high level exchanges during the Vajpayee government China promised not to assist Naga and Mizo insurgencies (*The Pioneer*, January 14, 1999, p.10).

PLA to construct, specifically since they are operating within their own territory.” This unfolds the alarming situation once the Chinese get close to the LAC, the sources added (Telegraph 2000; Datta 2000)²⁹. To normalise relations with India, China have been assuring New Delhi that they have stopped all aid to the insurgents in the northeast in the perspectives of Chinese endeavour. This makes inroads to amicable solutions that it has been discouraging insurgent groups from trekking to China for receiving instruction in guerilla tactics (Sarin 1980: 12; Datta 2000).

It is evidence from day to day experience, However, the insurgency and ambush attack on Indian soldiers and civilians still happening, apart from all these assurances from Chinese authority; therefore, have not shown any positive sign to stop it. It was a shocking fact that, last year on 4 June 2015, India witnessed one of the most severe attacks on their soldiers in the North-eastern India (NE). It is yet notable incident, The “National Socialist Council of Nagaland- Khaplang (NSCN-K)” along with the “Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)” and the “Meitei Kanglei Yawol Kunna (KYKL)” ambushed an Indian army convoy, it killed 18 soldiers and injuring a few more, in the Chandel district of Manipur (Roy 2015). In response to this, the “covert operation” conducted by Indian Para-commandos “inside Myanmar” during the early hours of 9 June 2015, which inflicted severe damage to the NSCN-K and the KYKL, it has been considered by some as a “revenge operation”. In congruence of this, statement made by the Indian Army, stated that the strike was a “necessary response” in view of an “imminent threat” (PIB 2015).

The considerable parts of northern region of Myanmar and NE India have been a witness to several conflicts and it making the region among the most volatile and fragile parts of Asia. An article published in 2007 carries the significant fact; the current National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval stated that, “during mid-1980s, the

²⁹ Over the past two years, there has been an increase in construction activity in Chinese-held territory close to the LAC in other sectors as well. A network of metalled roads and mule tracks has been laid by the PLA for bringing in military and communication hardware and rations. Indian army officials read ominous signs in the hectic activity and regular supplies to the Chinese posts all along the LAC. Even in the western sector, in Ladakh’s disputed Aksai Chin area, the PLA has intruded into Indian territory and built a network of metalled roads and bunkers within a 25 sq km area just behind a strategic point called ‘K’ Hill northeast of Tri-junction near the Chip Chap river. The Telegraph (Calcutta) had reported on February 1 that these roads from the LAC lead up to grid references 5459 and 5495 within which the piece of land had been "occupied". The roads were built between June and August 1999, at the height of the Kargil war (The Telegraph, May 17, 2000).

Chinese support for the Indian rebels also experienced a dull and mundane fall down”. However, there was of late, increasing evidence of China’s revival of its “covert offensive” operations in the region. Chinese intelligence representatives was allegedly given the opportunity to NSCN-IM “purchase surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)”, by time of Shimray was arrested in 2010 (Morris 2011). It is alleged that, other rebel groups of NE India such as the “Mizo, Meitei, Kuki, Assamese insurgents and the Nagas”, Doval points out also have certain connection with the Chinese (Doval 2007). The “United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)” rebels were chased out till the Sino-Bhutanese border and the ULFA chief requested the Chinese to allow them passage into China (Sharma 2014), in follow up of, “Operation All Clear” conducted by the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) in December 2003 in Bhutan (Tsering 2014). Although the Chinese apparently refused them then, Doval emphasis that ULFA’s anti-talks faction Chief Paresh Baruah in 2010 led a group of 80 strong cadres to China, which received training and weapons in Yunnan (Doval 2007).

“Chinese Arms supply in North-Eastern India”



(Source: www.mapsworld.com)

Figure-5.1

As per “Wang Dehua” Director of the South Asian Studies Centre, Tongji University, with regard to the accusation of the insurgents communicating with the Chinese officials and their use of Chinese weapons, emphasis that “the calls could have been fake ones and that there was no proof of any link between the insurgents and

China”. Moreover, Chinese weapons, he made a remarkable comment, “were all available at the international market, thus, the insurgents could have very easily smuggled them” (Pradhan 2015). The Chinese scholars have shot back the blamed and accused India for the NE issue. Zhao of Chinese scholar pointed out that “the people there did not follow Hinduism and were quite distinct from the rest of India, NE India was highly underdeveloped. It could be joined factors were responsible for these insurgencies”. Some analysts according to the piece in Huanqiu Shibao blamed the Indian Government’s policies such as “Armed Forces Special Powers Acts (AFSPA)” towards the NE states as being responsible for the conflict (Huanqiu Shibao 2015). The repeated notion of Indian suspicions or recurring themes of Chinese involvement in the NE conflict have existed for nearly half a century now, in discourse of international studies. The alleged support for the insurgencies began in the 1960s as a Chinese policy of supporting revolutions across its borders. India is yet to be convinced about Chinese intentions (Pradhan 2015: 5).

In concluding remark, one can observe that, China purposely claiming on Indian Territory, from Arunachal Pradesh to Ladakh of Kashmir with unwillingness to resolve boundary dispute. Chinese PLA troops encroached within Indian Territory with frequently, likewise; in 2013 Chinese army entered into Daulat Beg Oldi camp of Ladakh, then recently in Arunachal Pradesh their army entered into Indian Territory. It appears that Tibetans presence on Indian Territory and their activism abroad India incite China to support insurgent of north-eastern India with the help of arm supply and stand always with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Being a democratic state it would be difficult for India to curtail freedom of expression of Tibetans and their movement, hence it is difficult to say that China’s deterrence against India’s Tibet policy in certain near future can be transformed.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

For sixty years, Tibet has shadowed the Indo- China relations. Chinese terms the 1962 war as teaching India a lesson. It is fair to say that like China has never forgotten the Japanese occupation and Nanjing Massacre, India too could not left aside this humiliating defeat. Ganguly (2004: 115) rightly observed that “the Indians have never properly recovered from the shock and humiliation of that defeat”. For the Beijing, The war was strategic move by China to secure its occupation of Tibet. The 1962 war pushed Sino–Indian relations into stagnations, including border negotiations, without any diplomatic relations until 1976. Although, China has annexed and controlled Tibet but status of Dalai Lama and Tibetan government in-exile continue to haunt Beijing. For China, India-China boundary disputes acts as leverage to contain India on one hand and prevent Tibet to get further intense and bold support from India. Subramanyam draws similarities between the 1962 war and the 1987 Sumdorong Chu incident in terms of the political situations in India and China, but there also seemed to be a connection between developments on the boundary dispute and the Tibetan struggle just as there were in 1962.

First, the breakdown in Sino–Indian border negotiations in 1986 amidst mutual suspicions of troop concentrations along the border coincided with the breakdown of the Sino–Tibetan dialogue that has been going on since 1979. Second, in 1987 for the first time, India allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Western countries for the express mission of seeking political support for the Tibetan cause—internationalisation of the Tibet issue as it believed in Tibetan studies circles (Goldstein 1997). Close observers of Tibetan affairs will know that the Dalai Lama’s activities in Capitol Hill partly contributed to the series of pro-independence protests that rocked the Tibetan capital city, Lhasa, from September 1987 to 1993 (Schwartz 1994).

Nevertheless, succeeding Prime Ministers of India has sought to normalise the relationship with China. For instance, Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 temporarily relieved the tensions, and a number of Confidence Building Measures agreed subsequently upon boundary talks. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in 2003 further injected the fresh impetus, and expectation of a solution as Vajpayee’s

declaration of the Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of China was reciprocated with what seemed to be Chinese acceptance of Sikkim as a part of India.

However, Sino-India relationship is not a smooth but a bumpy one. Indian media reported on Chinese incursions, in 2009, and shooting at Indian border patrols and criticised Indian government for hiding these incidents just as Nehru and his associates “kept the Indian public in the dark about Chinese incursions and road-building on Indian soil prior to the clash in 1962 (Smith 2009).” In counter attack, Chinese media too responded with charges of military movements on the Indian side and warned the Indians to “consider whether or not it could afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China (Global Times 2009).” All this happened only a year after China endured in 2008 the most widespread and violent Tibetan challenge to its rule on the Tibetan uprising.

But a million dollar question arises, why China does not want to solve the boundary problem? Indian scholar, Malik opines that “until Tibet has been totally pacified and ‘sinicised as Inner Mongolia’, China would prefer an undefined border as a bargaining chip because of its suspicions that India prefers an independent Tibet and aids Tibetan separatists (Malik 2007).” Chellaney observed that, “a genuine China–India rapprochement fundamentally demands a resolution of the Tibet issue through a process of reconciliation and healing initiated by Beijing with its Tibetan minority.” Norbu argues that “Tibet has shaped the informal and invisible dynamics of Sino–Indian relations and politics from 1950 to the present... Tibet is the legal foundation on which both India’s and China’s border claims rest (Norbu 2001: 296).”

Therefore, for reasons discussed above, India is reluctant to allow Chellaney’s advice to condition any final border delineation between China and India to an agreement between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. On the other hand, some Chinese scholars also advised Beijing in 2001 that resolving the Tibet issue with the Dalai Lama would “reduce China’s strategic risks in the volatile region of the Indian sub-continent (Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 29).” Hard-liners in China undercut their advice, and nothing came of it as the current difficulty in the Tibetan–Chinese dialogue process shows.

Primarily, India has indicated that any concrete response on Chinese satisfaction remain distant as long as China also does not reciprocate in same way on India’s core

issues. Indian external affairs minister S. M. Krishna conveyed to his Chinese counterpart that “just as India had been sensitive to China’s concerns over Tibet and Taiwan, China too should be mindful of Indian sensitivities on Jammu and Kashmir”, in November 2010. This was the first time India made such a linkage (Varadarajan 2010). This position was formally reiterated in a policy speech by the Indian foreign secretary in December 2010, wherein it was clearly spelled out that China’s role in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, China’s Jammu and Kashmir policy, and the China-Pakistan security and nuclear relationship are for India core issues that impinge on India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also mentioned were India’s concerns about “China’s plan to dam rivers rising in Tibet, which would adversely affect India as a lower riparian (Rao 2010).” The joint communiqué issued at the end of Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao’s December 2010 visit to India also talks about “mutual respect and sensitivity for each other’s concerns and aspirations (MEA 2010).”

Beijing is of view that presence of Dalai Lama in India enables him to keep in touch with the Tibetan community inside or outside Tibet, and thereby exert influence and ignite independence movement in Tibet. There is also perception that India’s ethos and laws have provided opportunity for Tibetan community to preserve their distinct language, culture, history and traditions and thereby Chinese believes that Tibet is still holding independence flag. Further, Chinese scholars and leaders also believe that political activity that the Tibetan groups conduct around the world is possible only because they have a secure base in India. Therefore, for Beijing, India is the only cause of concern and hold that without India, Tibet issue will fade away and cannot be kept alive as an international issue. It is also pertinent to highlights that given the fact that India support open and democratic system and have a long tradition of giving refuge to victimized peoples, India finds it “politically impossible to meet China’s expectations on the Tibet question”.

The failure of the ninth round of talks between the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government, held in January 2010, any prospects for a negotiated and early settlement of the Tibetan issue are distant. For Tibetans, the core issue is “genuine autonomy” to all Tibetans living in China, as well as the “preservation and promotion of the distinct identity and culture of the Tibetan people (Gyari 2010).” Although the Chinese government may be hoping that they are likely to be able to solve the Tibet issue to their satisfaction in the post-Dalai Lama phase, this is unlikely. In

fact, “the problem is likely to become even more intractable (Sikri 2009).” Even though the Dalai Lama remains by far the most respected personality for the Tibetans, he does not exercise complete control and is conscious of the limits of his power and influence. The younger generation of Tibetans, who were born and had grown up outside Tibet, has increasingly begun to question the efficacy of his middle path of seeking only genuine autonomy and keeping the resistance non-violent.

After the demise of present Dalai Lama, situation may be got tricky as the present Dalai Lama is a refugee living outside Tibet, therefore there is chances that that “his successor should be born outside Tibet to carry forward the unfinished work during his previous incarnation (Gyatso 1992).” In this case, there is also high probability that his successor will be reincarnated in India and also that Chinese might choose its own Dalai Lama.

Many scholars, both Indian and foreigners think that India needs to revise its policies towards Tibet, as the Tibet issue has a direct link with India’s problems with China. Indian officials have, on many occasions, emphasised that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans should remember that they are honoured guests and should remain here as guests. Whereas, Dalai Lama usually describes India’s position on Tibet as “over-cautious” and in his view, “New Delhi seemingly wants to play the Tibet card to please Beijing in the hope of warming up ties between the two countries (Sehgal 2010).” Therefore, it’s not easy for India to sail through easily.

Moreover, Chinese map shows Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Southern Tibet’ and vehemently assert their claims to deter India challenging China. This is not the only instance where Chinese exert assertiveness. It further refuses to grant visas to officials of the Arunachal Pradesh, as it claims that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of China and the people of that region do not require visas to travel to their own country. Moreover, China had repeatedly issued stapled visas to the citizens of J&K. According to the Chinese, J&K is disputed territory. It is important not to forget the statement made by the Chinese Ambassador to India, H.E. Zhang Yan, in New Delhi prior to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s last visit to India in 2010 that “China-India ties are “fragile” and need special care,” indicating the cautious Chinese attitude towards issues dividing India and China (Rajan 2012). Therefore, India needs to adopt tit-for-tat policy towards India more boldly.

From the time of Pandit Nehru, “India’s policy has been to shut its eyes to what is happening in Tibet, to what the Chinese are doing in Tibet, to what the Chinese are doing towards India; and, in particular, to the military and infrastructure build-up in Tibet (Shourie 2009).” India lost Tibet as a buffer in the 1950s which resulted in the confrontation of Indo-China border. India’s policies and approach must adhere to realpolitik and based on self-interest and not on idealistic per se. It should buttress the exiled community economically and culturally and let them decide what course of action they want vis-à-vis China. One more point to be kept in mind is that most Tibetans of the younger generation were born in India, and this gives them the rights of free speech and expression. Hence, India should deal with the Tibetans-in-exile with greater compassion as they have every right to hold peaceful demonstrations, but not putting peace and security of India in danger. India needs to devise an effective long-term policy so that the Tibetan movement does not affect Sino-India relations negatively.

This is pertinent for India, to diplomatically pressurise China, refrain from mentioning Tibet as integral part of China in the joint statements until China accepts and mentions Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. This is strategically and diplomatically important because while India recognises Tibet as an autonomous region of China, the Chinese continues to claim on Arunachal Pradesh, which is an integral part of India—a state of the Union of India. Indian political leaders and diplomats also need to be adhering to realpolitik and quid-pro while dealing with China.

It can be summed up that it is not only the Beijing-Dharamshala issue not heading anywhere, but the Sino-Indian border talks also are not showing any progress. It can be inferred that Beijing-Dharmshala and Sino-Indian border disputes are linked with each other. Progress on one front necessarily will have impact on the other front. In this regard, India’s policies need a serious review. Firstly, it will be a better option if India and the civil society take a more serious note of it. It is not only our moral responsibility to highlight the Sino-Tibetan issue, but it is in our vested interest to eliminate the persisting problems between the Chinese and Tibetans. Easing the tension in Tibet is a requirement for better and stabilised Sino-India relations. Secondly, India needs to include the Tibet issue in talks with China as it is bound to be affected by any cataclysm in Tibet. Thirdly, India should urge China to resume talks with the Tibetan delegations, and Sino-Tibetan dialogue must go on as the best time to engage in negotiations is when

the current Dalai Lama is present and alive. Finally, to avoid a situation like the “1962 War”, India needs to build and invest heavily in infrastructure near border areas. It would be suicidal for India to ignore the Chinese strategy in Tibet, which is, by and large, pointing towards India. Topgyal (2011) has summed up Tibet in India’s China policy in these words: “Tibet was a victim of India’s moralistic idealism in the 1950s; in the post-Cold World War era, Tibet may become a victim of India’s new realism.”

List of Appendix:

Appendix-I

Letter from Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to PM Jawaharlal Nehru in 1950:

My dear Jawaharlal,

1. Ever since my return from Ahmadabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend practically at 15 minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of the Tibet and thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.
2. I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the external affairs ministry our ambassador (KM Panikkar) in Peking and through him the Chinese government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favorably to our ambassador and the Chinese government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they manage to instill into our ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The rival action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they choose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall be not being able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our ambassador has been at great pain to find an explanation or justification for the Chinese policy and actions. As the external affairs ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there "as a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese government on our behalf. It impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so called threat to china from Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as friends of china, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the communist mentality of 'whoever is not with them being against them,' this is a significant pointer of which we have to take due note. During the last several months outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend us legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with American and Britain and in the UN. In spite of this, china is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continue to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of skepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince china of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we

have an ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

3. In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of the Tibet, as we know it and the expansion of china almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about north-east frontier. The Himalayans have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about our frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlement with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally no different from Tibetans or mongoloids. The undefined states of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between china and us. Recent and bitter history also tells us that communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communist are as good or as bad imperialist as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only covered the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defense has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defense measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist china in the north and in the north-east, communist china which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.
4. Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be

fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smoldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgment, the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

5. Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked (HVR) Iyengar to send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc. from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telengana and Warangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defense strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.
6. It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them

- 1) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.
- 2) An examination of military position and such redistribution of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
- 3) An appraisal of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new threat. A long-term consideration of our defense needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defense perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.
- 4) The question of Chinese entry into the UNO, In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet; I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean War. We must determine our attitude on this question also.
- 5) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border, i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.
- 6) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
- 7) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
- 8) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyantse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
- 9) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.

These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention.

I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.³⁰

³⁰ Sardar Patel letter to Nehru (1950), GOI Documents, 7 November 1950.

Appendix-II**Jawaharlal Nehru letter to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel:**

1. The Chinese Government having replied to our last note, we have to consider what further steps we should take in this matter. There is no immediate hurry about sending a reply to the Chinese Government. But we have to send immediate instructions to Shri B.N. Rau as to what he should do in the event of Tibet's appeal being brought up before the Security Council or the General Assembly.
2. The content of the Chinese reply is much the same as their previous notes, but there does appear to be a toning down and an attempt at some kind of a friendly approach.
3. It is interesting to note that they have not referred specifically to our mission at Lhasa or to our trade agents or military escort at Yangtse, etc. We had mentioned these especially in our last note. There is an indirect reference, however, in China's note. At the end, this note says that "as long as our two sides adhere strictly to the principle of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, we are convinced that the friendship between China and India should be developed in a normal way, and that problems relating to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our mutual benefit through normal diplomatic channels." This clearly refers to our trade agents and others in Tibet. We had expected a demand from them for the withdrawal of these agents, etc. The fact that they have not done so has some significance.
4. Stress is laid in China's note on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, which, we are reminded, we have acknowledged, on Tibet being an integral part of China's territory and therefore a domestic problem. It is however again repeated that outside influences have been at play obstructing China's mission in Tibet; In fact, it is stated that liberation of Changtu proves that foreign forces and influences were inciting Tibetan troops to resist. It is again repeated that no foreign intervention will be permitted and that the Chinese Army will proceed.
5. All this is much the same as has been said before, but it is said in somewhat different way and there are repeated references in the note to China desiring the friendship of India.
6. It is true that in one of our messages to the Chinese Government we used 'sovereignty' of China in relation to Tibet. In our last message we used the word, 'suzerainty'. After receipt of China's last note, we have pointed out to our Ambassador that suzerainty was the right word and that "sovereignty" had been used by error.
7. It is easy to draft a reply to the Chinese note, pressing our viewpoint and countering some of the arguments raised in the Chinese note. But, before we do so, we should be clear in our own mind as to what we are aiming at, not only in the immediate future but from a long-term view. It is important that we keep both these viewpoints before us. In all probability China, that is, present-day China is going to be our close neighbor for a long time to come. We are going

to have a tremendously long common frontier. It is unlikely, and it would be unwise to expect that the present Chinese Government will collapse, giving place to another. Therefore, it is important to pursue a policy which will be in keeping with this long-term view.

8. I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood whatever of Tibet being able to resist this or stop it. It is equally unlikely that any foreign Power can prevent it. We cannot do so. If so, what can we do to help in the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy and at the same time avoiding continuous tension and apprehension on our frontiers?
9. The Chinese note has repeated that they wish the Tibetan people to have, what they call, "regional autonomy and religious freedom". This autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so. But it is reasonable to assume from the very nature of Tibetan geography, refrain and climate, that a large measure of autonomy is almost inevitable. It may of course be that this autonomous Tibet is controlled by communist elements in Tibet. I imagine however that it is, on the whole, more likely that what will be attempted will be a procommunist China administration rather than a communist one.
10. If world war comes, then all kinds of difficult and intricate problems arise and each one of these problems will be inter-related with others. Even the question of defense of India assumes a different shape and cannot be isolated from other world factors. I think that it is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military invasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the foreseeable future. I base this conclusion on a consideration of various world factors. In peace, such an invasion would undoubtedly lead to world war. China, though internally big, is in a way amorphous and easily capable of being attacked, on its sea coasts and by air. In such a war, China would have its main front in the south and east and it will be fighting for its very existence against powerful enemies. It is inconceivable that it should divert its forces and its strength across the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and undertake a wild adventure across the Himalayas. Any such attempt will greatly weaken its capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts. Thus I rule out any major attack on India by China. I think these considerations should be borne in mind, because there is far too much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning India. If we lose our sense of perspective and world strategy and give way to unreasoning fears, then any policy that we might have is likely to fail.
11. While there is, in my opinion, practically no chance of a major attack on India by China, there are certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our border and possibly of entering and taking possession of disputed territory, if there is no obstruction to this happening. We must therefore take all necessary precautions to prevent this. But, again, we must differentiate between these precautions and those that might be necessary to meet a real attack.
12. If we really feared an attack and had to make full provision for it, this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial and otherwise, and it would weaken our general defense position. There are limits beyond which we cannot go at least for some years, and a spreading out of our army in distant frontiers would be bad from every military or strategic point of view.
13. In spite of our desire to settle any points at issue between us and Pakistan, and developing peaceful relations with it, the fact remains that our major possible

enemy is Pakistan. This has compelled us to think of our defense mainly in terms of Pakistan's aggression. If we begin to think of and prepare for China's aggression in the same way, we would weaken considerably on the Pakistan side. We might well be got in a pincer movement. It is interesting to note that Pakistan is taking a great deal of interest, from this Point of view in developments In Tibet. Indeed it has been discussed in the Pakistan press that the new danger from Tibet to India might help them to settle the Kashmir problem according to their wishes. Pakistan has absolutely nothing in common with China or Tibet. But if we fall out completely with China, Pakistan will undoubtedly try to take advantage of this, politically or otherwise. The position of India thus will be bad from a defense point of view. We cannot have all the - time two possible enemies on either side of India. This danger will not be got over, even if we increase our defense forces or even if other foreign countries help us in arming. The measure of safety that one gets by increasing the defense apparatus is limited by many factors. But whatever that measure of safety might be, strategically we would be in an unsound position and the burden of this will be very great on us. As it is, we are facing enormous difficulties, financial, economic, etc.

14. The idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or, to -; put it more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards India, is rather naive. It may mean that in certain circumstances. Those circumstances would depend upon many factors, which I need not go into here. The danger really is not from military invasion but from infiltration of men and ideas. The ideas are there already -and can only be countered by other ideas. Communism is an important element in the situation. But, by our attaching too great importance to it in this context, we are likely to misjudge of the situation from other and more important angles.
15. In a long-term view, India and China are two of the biggest countries of Asia bordering on each other and both with certain expansive tendencies, because of their vitality. If their relations are bad, this will have a serious effect not only on both of them but on Asia as a whole. It would affect our future for a long time. If a position arises in which China and India are inveterately hostile to each other, like France and Germany, then there will be repeated I It is interesting to note that both the U.K. and the U.S.A. appear to be anxious to add to the unfriendliness of India and China towards each other. It is also interesting to find that the USSR does not view with favor any friendly relations between India and China these are long-term reactions which one can fully understand because India and China at peace with each other would make a vast difference to the whole setup and balance of the world. Much of course depends upon the development of both country and how far communism in China will mould the Chinese people. Even so, these processes are long-range ones and in the long run it is fairly safe to assume that hundreds of millions of people will not change their essential characteristics.
16. These arguments lead to the conclusion that while we should be prepared, to the best of our ability, for all contingencies, the real protection that we should seek is some kind of understanding of China. If we have not got that, then both our present and our future are imperiled and no distant Power can save us. I think on the whole that China desires this too for obvious reasons. If this is so, then we should fashion our present policy accordingly.

17. We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible, however, that we might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy. That would be good for Tibet and good for India. As far as I can see, this can only be done on the diplomatic level and by avoidance of making the present tension between India and China worse.
18. What then should be our instructions to B.N. Rau? From the messages he has sent us, it appears that no member of the Security Council shows any inclination to sponsor Tibet's appeal and that there is little likelihood of the matter being considered by the Council. We have said that we are not going to sponsor this appeal, but if it comes up, we shall state our viewpoint. This viewpoint cannot be one of full support of the Tibetan appeal, because that goes far and claims full independence. We may say that whatever might have been acknowledged in the past about China's sovereignty or suzerainty, recent events have deprived China of the right to claim that. There may be some moral basis for this argument. But it will not take us or Tibet very far. It will only hasten the downfall of Tibet. No outsider will be able to help her and China, suspicious and apprehensive of these tactics, will make sure of much speedier and fuller possession of Tibet than she might otherwise have done. We shall thus not only fail in our endeavor but at the same time have really a hostile China on our doorstep.
19. I think that in no event should we sponsor Tibet's appeal. I would personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal is not heard in the Security Council or the General Assembly. If it is considered there, there is bound to be a great deal of bitter speaking and accusation, which will worsen the situation as regards Tibet, as well as the possibility of widespread war, without helping it in the least. It must be remembered that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A., nor indeed any other Power, is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that country. What they are interested in is embarrassing China. Our interest, on the other hand, is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest, we fail.
20. Therefore, it will be better not to discuss Tibet's appeal in the UN. Suppose, however, that it comes up for discussion, in spite of our not wishing this, what then? I would suggest that our representative should state our case as moderately as possible and ask the Security Council or the Assembly to give expression to their desire that the Sino-Tibetan question should be settled peacefully and that Tibet's autonomy should be respected and maintained. Any particular reference to an Article of the Charter of the UN might tie us up in difficulties and lead to certain consequences later which may prove highly embarrassing for us. Or a resolution of the UN might just be a dead letter, which also will be bad.
21. If my general argument is approved then we can frame our reply to China's note accordingly.³¹

18 November 1950

Jawaharlal Nehru

³¹ Jawaharlal Nehru letter to Sardar Patel (1950), GOI Documents, 18 November 1950.

Appendix-III

Narsinha rao china visit agreement:

1. The two sides are of the view that the India-China boundary question shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the line of actual control between the two sides. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control. In case personnel of one side cross the line of actual control, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side of the line of actual control. When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line of actual control where they have different views as to its alignment.
2. Each side will keep its military forces in the areas along the line of actual control to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries. The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the line of actual control in conformity with the requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed. The extent, depth, timing, and nature of reduction of military forces along the line of actual control shall be determined through mutual consultations between the two countries. The reduction of military forces shall be carried out by stages in mutually agreed geographical locations sector-wise within the areas along the line of actual control.
3. Both sides shall work out through consultations effective confidence building measures in the areas along the line of actual control. Neither side will undertake specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones. Each side shall give the other prior notification of military exercises of specified levels near the line of actual control permitted under this Agreement.
4. In case of contingencies or other problems arising in the areas along the line of actual control, the two sides shall deal with them through meetings and friendly consultations between border personnel of the two countries. The form of such meetings and channels of communications between the border personnel shall be mutually agreed upon by the two sides.
5. The two sides agree to take adequate measures to ensure that air intrusions across the line of actual control do not take place and shall undertake mutual consultations should intrusions occur. Both sides shall also consult on possible restrictions on air exercises in areas to be mutually agreed near the line of actual control.
6. The two sides agree that references to the line of actual control in this Agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question.
7. The two sides shall agree through consultations on the form, method, scale and content of effective verification measures and supervision required for the reduction of military forces and the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the areas along the line of actual control under this Agreement.
8. Each side of the India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary question shall appoint diplomatic and military experts to formulate, through mutual consultations, implementation measures for the present Agreement. The experts shall advise the Joint Working Group on the resolution of differences between

the two sides on the alignment of the line of actual control and address issues relating to redeployment with a view to reduction of military forces in the areas along the line of actual control. The experts shall also assist the Joint Working Group in supervision of the implementation of the Agreement, and settlement of differences that may arise in that process, based on the principle of good faith and mutual confidence.

9. The present Agreement shall come into effect as of the date of signature and is subject to amendment and addition by agreement of the two sides.³²

Appendix IV

Xian zemin India visit agreement:

Confidence building measures in the military field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border Areas

ARTICLE I

Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side. No armed forces deployed by either side in the border areas along the line of actual control as part of their respective military strength shall be used to attack the other side, or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace, tranquillity and stability in the India-China border areas.

ARTICLE II

The two sides reiterate their determination to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question, the two sides reaffirm their commitment to strictly respect and observe the line-of actual control in the India-China border areas. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.

ARTICLE III

The two sides agree to take the following measures to reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas:

1. The two sides reaffirm that they shall reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas to minimum levels compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries and consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security.
2. The two sides shall reduce or limit the number of field army, border defence forces, paramilitary forces and any other mutually agreed category of armed force deployed in mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control to ceilings to be mutually agreed upon. The major categories of armaments to be reduced, or limited are as follows: combat tanks, infantry

³² Ministry of External Affairs (1993), Official documents, 7 Dec, 1993, GOI.

combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and any other weapon system mutually agreed upon.

3. The two sides shall exchange data on the military forces and armaments to be reduced or limited and decide on ceilings on military forces and armaments to be kept by each side within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas. The ceilings shall be determined in conformity with the requirement of the principle of mutual and equal security, with due consideration being given to parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communication and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments.

ARTICLE IV

In order to maintain peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas and to prevent any tension in the border areas due to misreading by either side of the other side's intentions:

1. Both sides shall avoid holding large scale military exercises involving more than one Division (approximately 15,000 troops) in close proximity of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas. However, if such exercises are to be conducted, the strategic direction of the main force involved shall not be towards the other side.
2. If either side conducts a major military exercise involving more than one Brigade Group (approximately 5,000 troops) in close proximity of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, it shall give the other side prior notification with regard to type, level, planned duration and area of exercise as well as the number and type of units or formations participating in the exercise.
3. The date of completion of the exercise and de-induction of troops from the area of exercise shall be intimated to the other side within five days of completion or de-induction.
4. Each side shall be entitled to obtain timely clarification from the side undertaking the exercise in respect of data specified in Paragraph 2 of the present Article.

ARTICLE V

With a view to preventing air intrusions across the line of actual control in the India-China border areas and facilitating overflights and landings by military aircraft:

1. Both sides shall take adequate measures to ensure that air intrusions across the line of actual control do not take place. However, if an intrusion does take place, it should cease as soon as detected and the incident shall be promptly investigated by the side operating the aircraft. The results of the investigation shall be immediately communicated, through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings, to the other side.
2. Subject to Paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Article, combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft) shall not fly within ten kilometers of the line of actual control.
3. If either side is required to undertake flights of combat aircraft within ten kilometers from the line of actual control, it shall give the following information in advance to the other side, through diplomatic channels:

4. Unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft and helicopters shall be permitted to fly up to the line of actual control.
5. No military aircraft of either side shall fly across the line of actual control, except by prior permission. Military aircraft of either side may fly across the line of actual control or overfly the other side's airspace or land on the other side only after obtaining the latter's prior permission after providing the latter with detailed information on the flight in accordance with the international practice in this regard. Notwithstanding the above stipulation, each side has the sovereign right to specify additional conditions, including at short notice, for flights or landings of military aircraft of the other side on its side of the line of actual control or through its airspace.
6. In order to ensure flight safety in emergency situations, the authorities designated by the two sides may contact each other by the quickest means of communications available.

ARTICLE VI

With a view to preventing dangerous military activities along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, the two sides agree as follows:

1. Neither side shall open fire, cause bio-degradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometers from the line of actual control. This prohibition shall not apply to routine firing activities in small arms firing ranges.
2. If there is a need to conduct blast operations within two kilometers of the line of actual control as part of developmental activities, the other side shall be informed through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance.
3. While conducting exercises with live ammunition in areas close to the line of actual control, precaution shall be taken to ensure that a bullet or a missile does not accidentally fall on the other side across the line of actual control and causes harm to the personnel or property of the other side.
4. If the border personnel of the two sides come in a face-to-face situation due to differences on the alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent any escalation of tension.

ARTICLE VII

In order to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between the military personnel and establishments in the border areas along the line of actual control, the two sides agree:

1. To maintain and expand the regime of scheduled and flag meetings between their border representatives at designated places along the line of actual control;
2. To maintain and expand telecommunication links between the border meeting points at designated places along the line of actual control;
3. To establish step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities of the two sides.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Should the personnel of one side cross the line of actual control and enter the other side because of unavoidable circumstances like natural disasters, the other side shall extend all possible assistance to them and inform their side, as soon as possible regarding the forced or inadvertent entry across the line of actual control. The modalities of return of the concerned personnel to their own side shall be settled through mutual consultations.
2. The two sides shall provide each other, at the earliest possible, with information pertaining to natural disasters and epidemic diseases in contiguous border areas which might affect the other side. The exchange of information shall take place either through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings.

ARTICLE IX

In case a doubtful situation develops in the border region, or in case one of the sides has some questions or doubts regarding the manner in which the other side is observing this Agreement, either side has the right to seek a clarification from the other side. The clarifications sought and replies to them shall be conveyed through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE X

1. Recognizing that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present Agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, the two sides agree to speed up the process clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control. As an initial step in this process, they are clarifying the alignment of the line of actual control in those segments where they have different perceptions. They also agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible.
2. Pending the completion of the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control, the two sides shall work out modalities for implementing confidence building measures envisaged under this Agreement on an interim basis, without prejudice to their respective positions on the alignment of the line of actual control as well as on the boundary question.

ARTICLE XI

Detailed implementation measures required under Article I to Article X of this Agreement shall be decided through mutual consultations in the India-China Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question. The India-China Diplomatic and Military Expert Group shall assist the India-China Joint

ARTICLE XII

This Agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. It shall remain in effect until either side decides to terminate it after giving six months' notice in writing. It shall become invalid six months after the notification. This Agreement is subject to amendment and addition by mutual agreement in writing between the two sides.³³

³³ Ministry of External Affairs (1996), Govt. documents, 29 Nov, 1996, GOI.

Appendix-V

Vajpayee china visit 2003 agreement:

Friendship and cooperation between the two countries meets the need to:

1. promote the socio-economic development and prosperity of both India and China;
2. maintain peace and stability regionally and globally;
3. strengthen multipolarity at the international level; and
4. enhance the positive factors of globalization.

Both sides affirmed that they would abide by the following principles, promote a long-term constructive and cooperative partnership and, on this basis, build a qualitatively new relationship:

1. Both sides are committed to developing their long-term constructive and cooperative partnership on the basis of the principles of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other's concerns and equality;
2. As two major developing countries, India and China have a broad mutual interest in the maintenance of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world, and a mutual desire in developing wider and closer cooperation and understanding in regional and international affairs;
3. The common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other; and
4. Both sides agree to qualitatively enhancing the bilateral relationship at all levels and in all areas while addressing differences through peaceful means in a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable manner. The differences should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.

Both sides agreed to hold regular high-level exchanges between the two countries. This will greatly enhance mutual understanding and expand bilateral relations. With a view to deepening their coordination and dialogues on bilateral, regional and international issues, both sides agreed on the need for annual meetings between Foreign Ministers of the two countries. They also agreed that personnel exchanges and friendly contacts between ministries, parliaments and political parties of the two countries should be further enhanced.

The two sides welcomed the positive momentum of bilateral trade and economic cooperation in recent years and shared the belief that continued expansion and intensification of India-China economic cooperation is essential for strengthening bilateral relations.

Both sides shared the view that existing complementarities between their two economies provide an important foundation and offer broad prospects for further enhancing their economic relations. In order to promote trade and economic cooperation, both sides will take necessary measures consistent with their national laws and rules and international obligations to remove impediments to bilateral trade and investment. They reaffirmed the importance of the ministerial meeting of the Joint Economic Group (JEG) and agreed to hold the next (seventh) JEG meeting within the year.

The two sides will set up a compact Joint Study Group (JSG) composed of officials and economists to examine the potential complementarities between the two countries in expanded trade and economic cooperation. The JSG would also draw up a programme for the development of India-China trade and economic cooperation for the next five years, aimed at encouraging greater cooperation between the business communities of both sides. The Group should present a study report and recommendations to the two Governments on measures for comprehensive trade and economic cooperation by the end of June 2004.

The two countries will launch a financial dialogue and cooperation mechanism to strengthen their dialogue and coordination in this sector. The two sides agreed to enhance cooperation at the World Trade Organization, which is not only to mutual benefit but also in the broader interest of developing countries. The two sides will hold dialogues on a regular basis in this regard.

Historical and cultural links between India and China will be strengthened, inter-alia, through the promotion of exchanges in culture, education, science and technology, media, youth and people-to-people relations. They agreed to set up Cultural Centers in each other's capitals and facilitate their establishment. Both sides will work towards the enhancement of direct air and shipping links, tourism, exchange hydrological data in flood season on common rivers as agreed, cooperation in agriculture, dairy, food processing, health and other sectors.

They agreed on the need to broaden and deepen defence exchanges between the two countries, which will help enhance and deepen the mutual understanding and trust between the two armed forces. They confirmed that the exchange of visits by their Defence Ministers and of military officials at various levels should be strengthened. The two sides exchanged views on the India-China boundary question and expounded their respective positions. They reiterated their readiness to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution through consultations on an equal footing. The two sides agreed that pending an ultimate solution, they should work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas, and reiterated their commitment to continue implementation of the agreements signed for this purpose, including the clarification of the Line of Actual Control.

The two sides agreed to each appoint a Special Representative to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement. The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing about "independence of Tibet". The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation of the Indian position.

India and China recognized the primacy of maintaining international peace. This is a prerequisite for the socio-economic development of all developing countries, including India and China. The world is marked by diversity. Every country has the right to choose its own political system and path to development. As two major developing countries, India and China acknowledged the importance of their respective roles in the shaping of a new international political and economic order. The international

community must help the developing countries to eliminate poverty and narrow the gap between the North and the South through dialogue and cooperation so as to achieve common prosperity.

The two sides acknowledged the vital importance of the role of the United Nations in world peace, stability and development. They are determined to continue their efforts in strengthening the UN system. They reaffirmed their readiness to work together to promote reform of the UN. In reform of the UN Security Council, priority should be given to enhancing representation of the developing countries.

Both sides stood for continued multilateral arms control and disarmament process, undiminished and equal security for all at progressively lower levels of armament and for multilateral negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. They are firmly opposed to introduction of weapons in outer space, use or threat of force against space-based objects and support cooperation in development of space technology for peaceful purposes. The two sides recognised the threat posed by terrorism to them and to global peace and security. They resolutely condemned terrorism in any form. The struggle between the international community and global terrorism is a comprehensive and sustained one, with the ultimate objective of eradication of terrorism in all regions. This requires strengthening the global legal framework against terrorism. Both sides shall also promote cooperation on counter-terrorism through their bilateral dialogue mechanism.

India and China face special and similar challenges in their efforts to protect the environment while simultaneously forging ahead with rapid social and economic development of their countries. In this context, the two sides agreed to work together in a practical manner to cooperate on preserving the environment and ensuring sustainable development and to coordinate positions on climate change, biodiversity and other issues in relevant multilateral fora. The two sides supported multilateral cooperation in Asia, believing that such cooperation promotes mutually beneficial exchanges, economic growth as well as greater cohesion among Asian countries. The two sides viewed positively each other's participation in regional and sub-regional multilateral cooperation processes in Asia.

The two sides stated that the improvement and development of India-China relations is not targeted at any third country and does not affect either country's existing friendly relations and cooperation with other countries. The two sides agreed that the official visit of the Prime Minister of India to the People's Republic of China has been a success, has contributed to enhancing mutual understanding and trust between the Governments, leaders and peoples of the two countries, and marks a new step forward in strengthening the all-round cooperation between India and China in the new century.³⁴

³⁴ Ministry of External Affairs (1996), Govt. documents, 23 June, 2003, GOI.

Appendix VI

Seventeen Point Agreement:

The Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet

May 23, 1951

The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of the great motherland. But over the last hundred years and more, imperialist forces penetrated into China, and in consequence, also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the KMT (Guomindang) reactionary government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The Local Government of Tibet did not oppose imperialist deception and provocations, but adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great motherland. Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering. In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities - KMT reactionary government - was overthrown; and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities - the aggressive imperialist forces - was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the People's Republic of China and of the Central People's Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's Government declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal, and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People's Republic of China may become one big family of fraternity and cooperation, composed of all its nationalities. Within this big family of nationalities of the People's Republic of China, national regional autonomy is to be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated, and all national minorities are to have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, and religious beliefs, and the Central People's Government will assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country, with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the direct leadership of the higher levels of People's Governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional autonomy. In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet may be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people may be freed and return to the big family of the People's Republic of China to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational result of the talks is that both parties have agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into effect.

1. The Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; that the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland - the People's Republic of China.
2. The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences.
3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.
4. The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.
5. The established status, functions, and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained.
6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni is meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.
7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference will be protected. The Central Authorities will not effect any change in the income of the monasteries.
8. The Tibetan troops will be reorganised step by step into the People's Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defence forces of the Central People's Government.
9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality will be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.
10. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.
11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.
12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.
13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will abide by the above-mentioned policies and will also be fair in all buying and selling and will not arbitrarily take even a needle or a thread from the people.
14. The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring work. The Central People's Government, when it ordered the People's Liberation Army to march into

Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the Central Authorities to hold talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. At the latter part of April, 1951, the delegates with full powers from the Local Government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The Central People's Government appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with the delegates of the Local Government of Tibet. The countries and the establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government will set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government it will absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the Local Government of Tibet, various district and various principal monasteries; the namelist is to be prepared after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central People's Government and various quarters concerned, and is to be submitted to the Central People's Government for approval.

16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will be provided by the Central People's Government. The Local Government of Tibet should assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchases and transportation of food, fodder, and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by:

Delegates of the Central People's Government with full powers:

Chief Delegate: Li Wei-han (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs)

Delegates: Chang Ching-wu, Chang Kuo-hua, Sun Chih-yuan

Delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet:

Chief Delegate: Kalon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme (Ngabo Shape)

Delegates: Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, Khentrung Thuptan, Tenthar, Khenchung Thupten Lekmuun Rimshi, Samposey Tenzin Thundup

Appendix-VII

Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet:

His Holiness the Dalai Lama
Address to Members of the United States Congress
Washington, D.C.
September 21, 1987

The world is increasingly interdependent, so that lasting peace - national, regional and global - can only be achieved if we think in terms of broader interest rather than parochial needs. At this time, it is crucial that all of us, the strong and the weak, contribute in our own way. I speak to you today as the leader of the Tibetan people and as a Buddhist monk devoted to the principles of a religion based on love and compassion. Above all, I am here as a human being who is destined to share this planet with you and all others as brothers and sisters. As the world grows smaller, we need each other more than in the past. This is true in all parts of the world, including the continent I come from.

At present in Asia, as elsewhere, tensions are high. There are open conflicts in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and in my own country, Tibet. To a large extent, these problems are symptoms of the underlying tensions that exist among the area's great powers. In order to resolve regional conflicts, an approach is required that takes into account the interests of all relevant countries and peoples, large and small. Unless comprehensive solutions are formulated that take into account the aspirations of the people most directly concerned, piecemeal or merely expedient measures will only create new problems.

The Tibetan people are eager to contribute to regional and world peace, and I believe they are in a unique position to do so. Traditionally, Tibetans are a peace loving and non-violent people. Since Buddhism was introduced to Tibet over one thousand years ago, Tibetans have practiced non-violence with respect to all forms of life. This attitude has also been extended to our country's international relations. Tibet's highly strategic position in the heart of Asia, separating the continent's great powers - India, China and the USSR - has throughout history endowed it with an essential role in the maintenance of peace and stability. This is precisely why, in the past, Asia's empires went to great lengths to keep one another out of Tibet. Tibet's value as an independent buffer state was integral to the region's stability.

When the newly formed People's Republic of China invaded Tibet in 1949/50, it created a new source of conflict. This was highlighted when, following the Tibetan national uprising against the Chinese and my flight to India in 1959, tensions between China and India escalated into the border war in 1962. Today large numbers of troops are again massed on both sides of the Himalayan border and tension is once more dangerously high.

The real issue, of course, is not the Indo-Tibetan border demarcation. It is China's

illegal occupation of Tibet, which has given it direct access to the Indian sub-continent. The Chinese authorities have attempted to confuse the issue by claiming that Tibet has always been a part of China. This is untrue. Tibet was a fully independent state when the People's Liberation Army invaded the country in 1949/50.

Since Tibetan emperors unified Tibet, over a thousand years ago, our country was able to maintain its independence until the middle of this century. At times Tibet extended its influence over neighbouring countries and peoples and, in other periods, came itself under the influence of powerful foreign rulers - the Mongol Khans, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu Emperors and the British in India.

It is, of course, not uncommon for states to be subjected to foreign influence or interference. Although so-called satellite relationships are perhaps the clearest examples of this, most major powers exert influence over less powerful allies or neighbours. As the most authoritative legal studies have shown, in Tibet's case, the country's occasional subjection to foreign influence never entailed a loss of independence. And there can be no doubt that when Peking's communist armies entered Tibet, Tibet was in all respects an independent state.

China's aggression, condemned by virtually all nations of the free world, was a flagrant violation of international law. As China's military occupation of Tibet continues, the world should remember that though Tibetans have lost their freedom, under international law Tibet today is still an independent state under illegal occupation. It is not my purpose to enter into a political/legal discussion here concerning Tibet's status. I just wish to emphasise the obvious and undisputed fact that we Tibetans are a distinct people with our own culture, language, religion and history. But for China's occupation, Tibet would still, today, fulfill its natural role as a buffer state maintaining and promoting peace in Asia.

It is my sincere desire, as well as that of the Tibetan people, to restore to Tibet her invaluable role, by converting the entire country - comprising the three provinces of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo - once more into a place of stability, peace and harmony. In the best of Buddhist tradition, Tibet would extend its services and hospitality to all who further the cause of world peace and the well-being of mankind and the natural environment we share.

Despite the holocaust inflicted upon our people in the past decades of occupation, I have always strived to find a solution through direct and honest discussions with the Chinese. In 1982, following the change of leadership in China and the establishment of direct contacts with the government in Peking, I sent my representatives to Peking to open talks concerning the future of my country and people.

We entered the dialogue with the sincere and positive attitude and with the willingness to take into account the legitimate needs of the People's Republic of China. I hoped that this attitude would be reciprocated and that a solution could eventually be found which would satisfy and safeguard the aspirations and interests of both parties. Unfortunately, China has consistently responded to our efforts in a defensive manner, as though our detailing of Tibet's very real difficulties was criticism for its own sake. To our even greater dismay, the Chinese government misused the opportunity for a genuine dialogue. Instead of addressing the real issues facing the six million Tibetan people, China has attempted to reduce the question of Tibet to a discussion of my own personal status.

It is against this background and in response to the tremendous support and encouragement I have been given by you and other persons I have met during this trip that I wish today to clarify the principal issues and to propose, in a spirit of openness

and conciliation, a first step towards a lasting solution. I hope this may contribute to a future of friendship and cooperation with all of our neighbours, including the Chinese people.

This peace plan contains five basic components:

1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace;
2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetan's as a people;
3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste;
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

Let me explain these five components.

1. *I propose that the whole of Tibet, including the eastern provinces of Kham and Amdo, be transformed into a zone of "Ahimsa", a Hindi term used to mean a state of peace and non-violence.*

The establishment of such a peace zone would be in keeping with Tibet's historical role as a peaceful and neutral Buddhist nation and buffer state separating the continent's great powers. It would also be in keeping with Nepal's proposal to proclaim Nepal a peace zone and with China's declared support for such a proclamation. The peace zone proposed by Nepal would have a much greater impact if it were to include Tibet and neighboring areas. The establishing of a peace zone in Tibet would require withdrawal of Chinese troops and military installations from the country, which would enable India also to withdraw troops and military installations from the Himalayan regions bordering Tibet. This would be achieved under an international agreement which would satisfy China's legitimate security needs and build trust among the Tibetan, Indian, Chinese and other peoples of the region. This is in everyone's best interest particularly that of China and India, as it would enhance their security, while reducing the economic burden of maintaining high troop concentrations on the disputed Himalayan border. Historically, relations between China and India were never strained. It was only when Chinese armies marched into Tibet, creating for the first time a common border that tensions arose between these two powers, ultimately leading to the 1962 war. Since then numerous dangerous incidents have continued to occur. A restoration of good relations between the world's two most populous countries would be greatly facilitated if they were separated - as they were throughout history - by a large and friendly buffer region. To improve relations between the Tibetan people and the Chinese, the first requirement is the creation of trust. After the holocaust of the last decades in which over one million Tibetans - one sixth of the population - lost their lives and at least as many lingered in prison camps because of their religious beliefs and love of freedom, only a withdrawal of Chinese troops could start a genuine process of reconciliation. The vast occupation force in Tibet is a daily reminder to the Tibetans of the oppression and suffering they have all experienced. A troop withdrawal would be an

essential signal that in the future a meaningful relationship might be established with the Chinese, based on friendship and trust.

2. *The population transfer of Chinese into Tibet, which the government in Peking pursues in order to force a "final solution" to the Tibetan problem by reducing the Tibetan population to an insignificant and disenfranchised minority in Tibet itself, must be stopped.*

The massive transfer of Chinese civilians into Tibet in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a distinct people. In the eastern parts of our country, the Chinese now greatly outnumber Tibetans. In the Amdo province, for example, where I was born, there are, according to Chinese statistics, 2.5 million Chinese and only 750,000 Tibetans. Even in so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (i.e., central and western Tibet), Chinese government sources now confirm that Chinese outnumber Tibetans. The Chinese population transfer policy is not new. It has been systematically applied to other areas before. Earlier in this century, the Manchus were a distinct race with their own culture and traditions. Today only two to three million Manchurians are left in Manchuria, where 75 million Chinese have settled. In Eastern Turkestan, which the Chinese now call Sinkiang, the Chinese population has grown from 200,000 in 1949 to 7 million, more than half of the total population of 13 million. In the wake of the Chinese colonization of Inner Mongolia, Chinese number 8.5 million, Mongols 2.5 million. Today, in the whole of Tibet 7.5 million Chinese settlers have already been sent, outnumbering the Tibetan population of 6 million. In central and western Tibet, now referred to by the Chinese as the "Tibet Autonomous Region", Chinese sources admit the 1.9 million Tibetans already constitute a minority of the region's population. These numbers do not take the estimated 300,000 - 500,000 troops in Tibet into account - 250,000 of them in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region. For the Tibetans to survive as a people, it is imperative that the population transfer is stopped and Chinese settlers return to China. Otherwise, Tibetans will soon be no more than a tourist attraction and relic of a noble past.

3. *Fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms must be respected in Tibet. The Tibetan people must once again be free to develop culturally, intellectually, economically and spiritually and to exercise basic democratic freedoms.*

Human rights violations in Tibet are among the most serious in the world. Discrimination is practiced in Tibet under a policy of "apartheid" which the Chinese call "segregation and assimilation". Tibetans are, at best, second class citizens in their own country. Deprived of all basic democratic rights and freedoms, they exist under a colonial administration in which all real power is wielded by Chinese officials of the Communist Party and the army. Although the Chinese government allows Tibetan to rebuild some Buddhist monasteries and to worship in them, it still forbids serious study and teaching of religion. Only a small number of people, approved by the Communist Party, are permitted to join the monasteries. While Tibetans in exile exercise their democratic rights under a constitution promulgated by me in 1963, thousands of our countrymen suffer in prisons and labor camps in Tibet for their religious or political convictions.

4. *Serious efforts must be made to restore the natural environment in Tibet. Tibet should not be used for the production of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear waste.*

Tibetans have a great respect for all forms of life. This inherent feeling is enhanced by the Buddhist faith, which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal. Prior to the Chinese invasion, Tibet was an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment. Sadly, in the past decades the wildlife and the forests of Tibet have been almost totally destroyed by the Chinese. The effects on Tibet's delicate environment have been devastating. What little is left in Tibet must be protected and efforts must be made to restore the environment to its balanced state. China uses Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and may also have started dumping nuclear waste in Tibet. Not only does China plan to dispose of its own nuclear waste but also that of other countries, who have already agreed to pay Peking to dispose of their toxic materials. The dangers this presents are obvious. Not only living generations, but future generations are threatened by China's lack of concern for Tibet's unique and delicate environment.

5. *Negotiations on the future status of Tibet and the relationship between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples should be started in earnest.*

We wish to approach this subject in a reasonable and realistic way, in a spirit of frankness and conciliation and with a view to finding a solution that in the long term interest of all: the Tibetans, the Chinese, and all other peoples concerned. Tibetans and Chinese are distinct peoples, each with their own country, history, culture, language and way of life. Differences among peoples must be recognized and respected. They need not, however, form obstacles to genuine cooperation where this is in the mutual benefit of both peoples. It is my sincere belief that if the concerned parties were to meet and discuss their future with an open mind and a sincere desire to find a satisfactory and just solution, a breakthrough could be achieved. We must all exert ourselves to be reasonable and wise, and to meet in a spirit of frankness and understanding.

Appendix VIII

Strasbourg Proposal (1988):

Address to Members of the European Parliament by His Holiness the Dalai Lama
Strasbourg, June 15, 1988

We are living today in a very interdependent world. One nation's problem can no longer be solved by itself. Without a sense of universal responsibility our very survival is in danger. I have, therefore, always believed in the need for better understanding, closer co-operation, and greater respect among the various nations of the world. The European Parliament is an inspiring example. Out of the chaos of war, those who were once enemies have, in a single generation, learned to co-exist and to co-operate. I am, therefore, particularly pleased and honoured to address this gathering at the European Parliament.

As you know, my own country - Tibet - is undergoing a very difficult period. The Tibetans - particularly those who live under Chinese occupation - yearn for freedom and justice and a self-determined future, so that they are able to fully preserve their unique

identity and live in peace with their neighbours. For over a thousand years, we Tibetans have adhered to spiritual and environmental values in order to maintain the delicate balance of life across the high plateau on which we live, inspired by Buddha's message of non-violence and compassion and protected by our mountains, we sought to respect every form of life and to abandon war as an instrument of national policy. Our history, dating back more than two thousand years, has been one of independence. At no time, since the founding of our nation in 127 B.C., have we Tibetans conceded our sovereignty to a foreign power. As with all nations, Tibet experienced periods in which our neighbours -Mongol, Manchu, Chinese, British and the Gorkhas of Nepal - sought to establish influence over us. These eras have been brief and the Tibetan people have never accepted them as constituting a loss of national sovereignty. In fact, there have been occasions when Tibetan rulers conquered vast areas of China and other neighbouring states. This, however, does not mean that we Tibetans can lay claim to these territories.

In 1949 the People's Republic of China forcibly invaded Tibet. Since that time, Tibet has endured the darkest period in its history. More than a million of our people have died as a result of the occupation. Thousand of monasteries were reduced to ruins. A generation has grown up deprived of education, economic opportunities and a sense of its on national character. Though the current Chinese leadership has implemented certain reforms it is also promoting a massive population transfer onto the Tibetan plateau. This policy has already reduced the six million Tibetans to a minority. Speaking for all Tibetans, I must sadly inform you, our tragedy continues. I have always urged my people not to resort to violence in their efforts to redress their sufferings. Yet I believe all people have a moral right to fully protest injustice. Unfortunately, the demonstrations in Tibet have been violently suppressed by the Chinese police and military. I will continue to counsel for non-violence, but unless China forsakes the brutal methods it employs, the Tibetans cannot be responsible for a further deterioration in the situation.

Every Tibetan hopes and prays for the full restoration of our nation's independence. Thousands of our people have sacrificed their lives and our whole nation has suffered in this struggle. Even in recent months, Tibetans have bravely sacrificed their lives to achieve this precious goal. On the other hand, the Chinese totally fail to recognize the Tibetan people's aspirations and continue to pursue a policy of brutal suppression.

I have thought for a long time on how to achieve a realistic solution to my nation's plight. My cabinet and I solicited the opinions of many friends and concerned persons. As a result, on September 21, 1987, at the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington, D.C., I announced a Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet. In it I called for a conversion of Tibet into a zone of peace, a sanctuary in which humanity and nature can live together in harmony. I also called for respect of human rights, democratic ideals, environmental protection, and a halt to the Chinese population transfer into Tibet.

The fifth point of the peace plan called for earnest negotiations between the Tibetans and the Chinese. We, have therefore, taken the initiative to formulate some thoughts which, we hope, may serve as a basis for resolving the issue of Tibet. I would like to take this opportunity to inform the distinguished gathering here on the main points of our thinking. The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo)

should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China.

The Government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy. The Government of Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its own foreign affairs bureau, in the field of commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international organizations concerned with such activities. The Government of Tibet should be founded on a constitution or basic law. The basic law should provide for a democratic system of government entrusted with the task of ensuring economic equality, social justice, and protection of the environment. This means that the Government of Tibet will have the rights to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and the Tibetans.

As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society's development, the Government of Tibet would seek to ensure this freedom by full adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly and religion. Because religion constitutes the source of Tibet's national identity and spiritual values lie at the very heart of Tibet's rich culture, it would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its practice. The Government should be comprised of a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral legislative branch, and an independent judicial system. Its seat should be in Lhasa. The social and economic system of Tibet should be determined in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people, bearing in mind especially the need to raise the standard of living of the entire population.

The Government of Tibet would pass strict laws to protect wildlife and plantlife. The exploitation of natural resources would be carefully regulated. The manufacture, testing, stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other armaments must be prohibited, as well as use of nuclear power and other technologies which produce hazardous waste. It would be the Government of Tibet's goal to transform Tibet into our planet's largest natural preserve.

A regional peace conference should be called to ensure that Tibet becomes a genuine sanctuary of peace through demilitarization. Until such a peace conference can be convened and demilitarization and neutralization achieved, China could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet. These must be solely for defence purposes. In order to create an atmosphere of trust conducive to fruitful negotiations, the Chinese Government should cease its human rights violations in Tibet and abandon its policy of transferring Chinese to Tibet.

These are thoughts we have in mind. I am aware that many Tibetans will be disappointed by the moderate stand they represent. Undoubtedly, there will be much discussion in the coming months within our own community, both in Tibet and in exile. This, however, is an essential and invaluable part of any process of change. I believe these thoughts represent the most realistic means by which to re-establish Tibet's separate identity and restore the fundamental rights of Tibetan people while accommodating China's own interest. I would like to emphasize, however, that whatever the outcome of the negotiations with the Chinese may be, the Tibetan people

themselves must be the ultimate deciding authority. Therefore, any proposal will contain a comprehensive procedural plan to ascertain the wishes of the Tibetan people in a nationwide referendum.

I would like to take this opportunity to state that I do not wish to take active part in the Government of Tibet. Nevertheless, I will continue to work as much as I can for the well-being and happiness of the Tibetan people as long as it is necessary. We are ready to present a proposal to the Government of the People's Republic of China based on the thoughts I have presented. A negotiating team representing the Tibetan Government has been selected. We are prepared to meet with the Chinese to discuss details of such a proposal aimed at achieving an equitable solution.

We are encouraged by the keen interest being shown in our situation by a growing number of governments and political leaders, including former President Jimmy Carter of the United States. We are encouraged by the recent changes in China which have brought about a new group of leadership, more pragmatic and liberal. We urge the Chinese Government and leadership to give serious and substantive consideration to the ideas I have described. Only dialogue and a willingness to look with honesty and clarity at the reality of Tibet can lead to a viable solution. We wish to conduct discussion with the Chinese Government bearing in mind the larger interests of humanity. Our proposal will therefore be made in a spirit of conciliation and we hope that the Chinese will respond accordingly.

My country's unique history and profound spiritual heritage render it ideally suited for fulfilling the role of a sanctuary of peace at the heart of Asia. Its historic status as a neutral buffer state, contributing to the stability of the entire continent, can be restored. Peace and security for Asia as well as for the world at large can be enhanced. In the future, Tibet need no longer be an occupied land, oppressed by force, unproductive and scarred by suffering. It can become a free haven where humanity and nature live in harmonious balance; a creative model for the resolution of tensions afflicting many areas throughout the world.

The Chinese leadership need to realize that colonial rule over occupied territories is today anachronistic. A large genuine union of association can only come about voluntarily, when there is satisfactory benefit to all the parties concerned. The European Community is a clear example of this. On the other hand, even one country or community can break into two or more entities where there is lack of trust or benefit, and when force is used as the principal means of rule.

I would like to end by making a special appeal to the honourable members of the European Parliament and through them to their respective constituencies to extend their support to our efforts. A resolution of the Tibetan problem within the framework that we proposed will not only be for the mutual benefit of the Tibetans and Chinese people but will contribute to regional and global peace and stability. I thank you for providing the opportunity to share my thoughts with you.

Thank you.

Appendix IX

His Holiness's Middle Way Approach For Resolving the Issue of Tibet:

The Middle-Way Approach is proposed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to peacefully resolve the issue of Tibet and to bring about stability and co-existence between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples based on equality and mutual co-operation. It is also a policy adopted democratically by the Central Tibetan Administration and the Tibetan people through a series of discussions held over a long time. This brief introduction to the Middle-Way policy and its history is intended for the Tibetan people inside and outside Tibet - and all those interested - to have a better understanding of the issues involved.

A. Meaning of the Middle-Way Approach

The Tibetan people do not accept the present status of Tibet under the People's Republic of China. At the same time, they do not seek independence for Tibet, which is a historical fact. Treading a middle path in between these two lies the policy and means to achieve a genuine autonomy for all Tibetans living in the three traditional provinces of Tibet within the framework of the People's Republic of China. This is called the Middle-Way Approach, a non-partisan and moderate position that safeguards the vital interests of all concerned parties-for Tibetans: the protection and preservation of their culture, religion and national identity; for the Chinese: the security and territorial integrity of the motherland; and for neighbours and other third parties: peaceful borders and international relations.

B. History of the Middle-Way Approach

Although the 17-Point Agreement between the Tibetan government and the People's Republic of China was not reached on an equal footing or through mutual consent, His Holiness the Dalai Lama-for the sake of the mutual benefit of the Tibetan and Chinese peoples-made all possible efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement with the Chinese government for eight years since 1951. Even after His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Kashag arrived in the Lokha region from Lhasa in 1959, he continued his efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement with the Chinese military officials. His attempts to abide by the terms of the 17-Point Agreement are analogous to the Middle-Way Approach. Unfortunately, the Chinese army unleashed a harsh military crackdown in Lhasa, Tibet's capital, and this convinced His Holiness the Dalai Lama that his hope for co-existence with the Chinese government was no longer possible. Under the circumstances, he had no other option but to seek refuge in India and work in exile for the freedom and happiness of all the Tibetan people.

Soon after his arrival in Tezpur, India, His Holiness the Dalai Lama issued a statement on 18 April 1959, explaining that the 17-Point Agreement was signed under duress and that the Chinese government had deliberately violated the terms of the Agreement. Thus from that day onwards, he declared that the agreement would be considered null and void, and he would strive for the restoration of Tibet's independence. Since then until 1979, the Central Tibetan Administration and the Tibetan people adopted a policy of seeking independence for Tibet. However, the world in general has become increasingly interdependent politically, militarily and economically. Consequently, great changes have been taking place in the independent status of countries and nationalities. In China also, changes will certainly take place and a time will come for

both sides to engage in actual negotiations. Therefore, His Holiness the Dalai Lama has believed for a long time that in order to resolve the Tibetan issue through negotiations, it is more beneficial to change the policy of restoring Tibetan independence to an approach that offers mutual benefits to China as well as to Tibet.

C. The Middle-Way Approach was not Formulated Suddenly

Although this approach occurred to His Holiness the Dalai Lama a long time ago, he did not decide it arbitrarily or thrust it upon others. Since the early 1970s, he held a series of discussions on this issue with, and solicited suggestions from, the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, the Kashag and many scholarly and experienced people. Particularly in 1979, the late Chinese paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping's proposal to His Holiness the Dalai Lama that "except independence, all other issues can be resolved through negotiations", was very much in agreement with His Holiness the Dalai Lama's long-held belief of finding a mutually-beneficial solution. Immediately, His Holiness the Dalai Lama gave a favourable response by agreeing to undertake negotiations and decided to change the policy of restoring Tibet's independence to that of the Middle-Way Approach. This decision was again taken after a due process of consultations with the then Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, the Kashag and many scholarly and experienced people. Therefore, this Approach is not something that has emerged all of a sudden; it has a definite history of evolution.

D. The Middle-Way Approach was Adopted Democratically

Since the decision to pursue the Middle-Way Approach, and before His Holiness the Dalai Lama issued a statement in the European parliament in Strasbourg on 15 June 1988-which formed the basis of our negotiations as to what kind of autonomy was needed by the Tibetan people-a four-day special conference was organised in Dharamsala from 6 June 1988. This conference was attended by the members of the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies and the Kashag, public servants, all the Tibetan settlement officers and the members of the local Tibetan Assemblies, representatives from the Tibetan NGOs, newly-arrived Tibetans and special invitees. They held extensive discussions on the text of the proposal and finally endorsed it unanimously.

Since the Chinese government did not respond positively to the proposal, His Holiness the Dalai Lama again proposed in 1996 and 1997 that the Tibetan people should decide on the best possible way of realizing the cause of Tibet through a referendum. Accordingly, a preliminary opinion poll was conducted in which more than 64% of the total opinion letters received expressed that there was no need to hold a referendum, and that they would support the Middle-Way Approach, or whatever decisions His Holiness the Dalai Lama takes from time to time, in accordance with the changing political situation in China and the world at large. To this effect, the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies adopted a unanimous resolution on 18 September 1997 and informed His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Responding to this, His Holiness the Dalai Lama said in his 10 March statement of 1998: "...Last year, we conducted an opinion poll of the Tibetans in exile and collected suggestions from Tibet wherever possible on the proposed referendum, by which the Tibetan people were to determine the future course of our freedom struggle to their full satisfaction. Based on the outcome of this poll and suggestions from Tibet, the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, our parliament in exile, passed a resolution empowering me to continue to use my discretion on the matter without seeking recourse to a referendum. I wish to thank the people of

Tibet for the tremendous trust, confidence and hope they place in me. I continue to believe that my "Middle-Way Approach" is the most realistic and pragmatic course to resolve the issue of Tibet peacefully. This approach meets the vital needs of the Tibetan people while ensuring the unity and stability of the People's Republic of China. I will, therefore, continue to pursue this course of approach with full commitment and make earnest efforts to reach out to the Chinese leadership..." This policy was, hence, adopted taking into account the opinion of the Tibetan people and a unanimous resolution passed by the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies.

E. Important Components of the Middle-Way Approach

Without seeking independence for Tibet, the Central Tibetan Administration strives for the creation of a political entity comprising the three traditional provinces of Tibet; Such an entity should enjoy a status of genuine national regional autonomy; This autonomy should be governed by the popularly-elected legislature and executive through a democratic process and should have an independent judicial system; As soon as the above status is agreed upon by the Chinese government, Tibet would not seek separation from, and remain within, the People's Republic of China; Until the time Tibet is transformed into a zone of peace and non-violence, the Chinese government can keep a limited number of armed forces in Tibet for its protection; The Central Government of the People's Republic of China has the responsibility for the political aspects of Tibet's international relations and defense, whereas the Tibetan people should manage all other affairs pertaining to Tibet, such as religion and culture, education, economy, health, ecological and environmental protection; The Chinese government should stop its policy of human rights violations in Tibet and the transfer of Chinese population into Tibetan areas; To resolve the issue of Tibet, His Holiness the Dalai Lama shall take the main responsibility of sincerely pursuing negotiations and reconciliation with the Chinese government.

F. Special Characteristics of the Middle-Way Approach

Considering the fact that the unity and co-existence between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples is more important than the political requirements of the Tibetan people, His Holiness the Dalai Lama has pursued a mutually-beneficial Middle-Way policy, which is a great political step forward. Irrespective of population size, economy or military strength, the equality of nationalities means that all nationalities can co-exist on an equal footing, without any discrimination based on one nationality being superior or better than the other. As such, it is an indispensable criterion for ensuring unity among the nationalities. If the Tibetan and Chinese peoples can co-exist on an equal footing, this will serve as the basis for guaranteeing the unity of nationalities, social stability and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China, which are of paramount importance to China. Therefore, the special characteristic of the Middle-Way Approach is that it can achieve peace through non-violence, mutual benefit, unity of nationalities and social stability.³⁵

³⁵ This middle way approach is available at official website of His Holiness Dalai Lama.

Appendix-X

An Appeal to the Chinese People by Holiness Dalai Lama:

March 28, 2008

Today, I extend heartfelt greetings to my Chinese brothers and sisters around the world, particularly to those in the People's Republic of China. In the light of the recent developments in Tibet, I would like to share with you my thoughts concerning relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples, and make a personal appeal to all of you.

I am deeply saddened by the loss of life in the recent tragic events in Tibet. I am aware that some Chinese have also died. I feel for the victims and their families and pray for them. The recent unrest has clearly demonstrated the gravity of the situation in Tibet and the urgent need to seek a peaceful and mutually beneficial solution through dialogue. Even at this juncture I have expressed my willingness to the Chinese authorities to work together to bring about peace and stability.

Chinese brothers and sisters, I assure you I have no desire to seek Tibet's separation. Nor do I have any wish to drive a wedge between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. On the contrary my commitment has always been to find a genuine solution to the problem of Tibet that ensures the long-term interests of both Chinese and Tibetans. My primary concern, as I have repeated time and again, is to ensure the survival of the Tibetan people's distinctive culture, language and identity. As a simple monk who strives to live his daily life according to Buddhist precepts, I assure you of the sincerity of my personal motivation.

I have appealed to the leadership of the PRC to clearly understand my position and work to resolve these problems by "seeking truth from facts". I urge the Chinese leadership to exercise wisdom and to initiate a meaningful dialogue with the Tibetan people. I also appeal to them to make sincere efforts to contribute to the stability and harmony of the PRC and avoid creating rifts between the nationalities. The state media's portrayal of the recent events in Tibet, using deceit and distorted images, could sow the seeds of racial tension with unpredictable long-term consequences. This is of grave concern to me. Similarly, despite my repeated support for the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese authorities, with the intention of creating a rift between the Chinese people and myself, the Chinese authorities assert that I am trying to sabotage the games. I am encouraged, however, that several Chinese intellectuals and scholars have also expressed their strong concern about the Chinese leadership's actions and the potential for adverse long-term consequences, particularly on relations among different nationalities.

Since ancient times, Tibetan and Chinese peoples have lived as neighbors. In the two thousand year old recorded history of our peoples, we have at times developed friendly relations, even entering into matrimonial alliances, while at others we fought each other. However, since Buddhism flourished in China first before it arrived in Tibet from India, we Tibetans have historically accorded the Chinese people the respect and affection due to elder Dharma brothers and sisters. This is something well known to members of the Chinese community living outside China, some of whom have attended

my Buddhist lectures, as well as pilgrims from mainland China, whom I have had the privilege to meet. I take heart from these meetings and feel they may contribute to a better understanding between our two peoples.

The twentieth century witnessed enormous changes in many parts of the world and Tibet too was caught up in this turbulence. Soon after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the People's Liberation Army entered Tibet finally resulting in the 17-point Agreement concluded between China and Tibet in May 1951. When I was in Beijing in 1954/55, attending the National People's Congress, I had the opportunity to meet and develop a personal friendship with many senior leaders, including Chairman Mao himself. In fact, Chairman Mao gave me advice on numerous issues, as well as personal assurances with regard to the future of Tibet. Encouraged by these assurances, and inspired by the dedication of many of China's revolutionary leaders of the time, I returned to Tibet full of confidence and optimism. Some Tibetan members of the Chinese Communist Party also had such a hope. After my return to Lhasa, I made every possible effort to seek genuine regional autonomy for Tibet within the family of the People's Republic of China (PRC). I believed that this would best serve the long-term interests of both the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

Unfortunately, tensions, which began to escalate in Tibet from around 1956, eventually led to the peaceful uprising of March 10, 1959, in Lhasa and my eventual escape into exile. Although many positive developments have taken place in Tibet under the PRC's rule, these developments, as the previous Panchen Lama pointed out in January 1989, were overshadowed by immense suffering and extensive destruction. Tibetans were compelled to live in a state of constant fear, while the Chinese government remained suspicious of them. However, instead of cultivating enmity towards the Chinese leaders responsible for the ruthless suppression of the Tibetan people, I prayed for them to become friends, which I expressed in the following lines in a prayer I composed in 1960, a year after I arrived in India: "May they attain the wisdom eye discerning right and wrong, And may they abide in the glory of friendship and love." Many Tibetans, school children among them, recite these lines in their daily prayers.

In 1974, following serious discussions with my Kashag (cabinet), as well as the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the then Assembly of the Tibetan People's Deputies, we decided to find a Middle Way that would seek not to separate Tibet from China, but would facilitate the peaceful development of Tibet. Although we had no contact at the time with the PRC - which was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution - we had already recognized that, sooner or later, we would have to resolve the question of Tibet through negotiations. We also acknowledged that, at least with regard to modernization and economic development, it would greatly benefit Tibet if it remained within the PRC. Although Tibet has a rich and ancient cultural heritage, it is materially undeveloped.

Situated on the roof of the world, Tibet is the source of many of Asia's major rivers; therefore, protection of the environment on the Tibetan plateau is of supreme importance. Since our utmost concern is to safeguard Tibetan Buddhist culture - rooted as it is in the values of universal compassion - as well as the Tibetan language and the unique Tibetan identity, we have worked whole-heartedly towards achieving meaningful self-rule for all Tibetans. The PRC's constitution provides the right for nationalities such as the Tibetans to do this.

In 1979, the then Chinese paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping assured my personal emissary that "except for the independence of Tibet, all other questions can be negotiated." Since we had already formulated our approach to seeking a solution to the Tibetan issue within the constitution of the PRC, we found ourselves well placed to respond to this new opportunity. My representatives met many times with officials of the PRC. Since renewing our contacts in 2002, we have had six rounds of talks. However, on the fundamental issue, there has been no concrete result at all. Nevertheless, as I have declared many times, I remain firmly committed to the Middle Way approach and reiterate here my willingness to continue to pursue the process of dialogue.

This year, the Chinese people are proudly and eagerly awaiting the opening of the Olympic Games. I have, from the start, supported Beijing's being awarded the opportunity to host the Games. My position remains unchanged. China has the world's largest population, a long history and an extremely rich civilization. Today, due to her impressive economic progress, she is emerging as a great power. This is certainly to be welcomed. But China also needs to earn the respect and esteem of the global community through the establishment of an open and harmonious society based on the principles of transparency, freedom, and the rule of law. For example, to this day victims of the Tiananmen Square tragedy that adversely affected the lives of so many Chinese citizens have received neither just redress nor any official response. Similarly, when thousands of ordinary Chinese in rural areas suffer injustice at the hands of exploitative and corrupt local officials, their legitimate complaints are either ignored or met with aggression. I express these concerns both as a fellow human being and as someone who is prepared to consider himself a member of the large family that is the People's Republic of China. In this respect, I appreciate and support President Hu Jintao's policy of creating a "harmonious society", but this can only arise on the basis of mutual trust and an atmosphere of freedom, including freedom of speech and the rule of law. I strongly believe that if these values are embraced, many important problems relating to minority nationalities can be resolved, such as the issue of Tibet, as well as Eastern Turkistan, and Inner Mongolia, where the native people now constitute only 20% of a total population of 24 million.

I had hoped President Hu Jintao's recent statement that the stability and safety of Tibet concerns the stability and safety of the country might herald the dawning of a new era for the resolution of the problem of Tibet. It is unfortunate that despite my sincere efforts not to separate Tibet from China, the leaders of the PRC continue to accuse me of being a 'separatist'. Similarly, when Tibetans in Lhasa and many other areas spontaneously protested to express their deep-rooted resentment, the Chinese authorities immediately accused me of having orchestrated their demonstrations. I have called for a thorough investigation by a respected body to look into this allegation.

Chinese brothers and sisters - wherever you may be - with deep concern I appeal to you to help dispel the misunderstandings between our two communities. Moreover, I appeal to you to help us find a peaceful, lasting solution to the problem of Tibet through dialogue in the spirit of understanding and accommodation.

With my prayers,

The Dalai Lama

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