


**THE POLITICS OF WAR ON TERROR: THREATS, CHOICES AND
IDEAS IN THE CASES OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ**

Thesis Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

for award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Date: 21 July '16

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**The Politics of War on Terror: Threats, Choices and Ideas in the Cases of Afghanistan and Iraq**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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Dedicated

to my

Mother

For All that I am and Hope to Be

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DPG	Defence Planning Guidance
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NFU	No First Use
NSS	National Security Strategy
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDA	Project on Defense Alternatives
PNAC	Project for New American Century
TNS	Transnational State Structure
UN	United Nations
UNMOVIC	United Nation Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WoT	War on Terror

Chapter One

Introduction

The purpose of the study is to examine the theory and practice of 'war on terror'. War on terror implies the response of the state, unilaterally or collectively, for the purpose of countering terrorism and threats of such kind. The study examines the factors which have led to the war on terror by focusing on its appropriateness and consequences. War on terror is legitimised by the western states on the ground of eliminating threats and maintaining order in international society. The study will evaluate the war on terror with the aid of three variables: threats, choices and ideas. The extent to which the above- mentioned variables influence the war on terror will be analysed by undertaking the case studies of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The phenomenon of war has always attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 led the US to take the lead in waging the 'Global War on Terrorism' (GWOT). The former US President George W. Bush in his address to the joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001 articulated the view which became the basis of US policy pertaining to the war on terrorism. He observed, "from this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded as a hostile regime" (Bush 2001b). This specifies that the United States would not distinguish between those who carry out acts of terror and those who harbour them which further exemplify that either they could support the US stance on terrorism or choose to be with the terrorists.

The United States and its coalition forces designated its counter-terrorism strategy as 'war on terror'. It incorporated the traditional means of warfare but with considerable differences. Unlike the conventional war, which was fought between the states, in a fixed duration and concludes with the victory of one side, the war on terror is not only directed against states which sponsor terrorism but also against individuals and people, which will continue till terrorism is completely eliminated. The National Security Strategy of the United States state thus:

The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents (Bush 2001).

The US and its allies chose Afghanistan as the first target to be responsible for the attack on 11 September 2001 because of Al-Qaeda bases and the safe haven provided to the terrorists by the Taliban government. The next target of the US-led war on terror turned out to be Iraq. It was clearly defined in the speech of the former President George W. Bush on 29 January 2002:

War on terror' is well begun, but it has only begun.... I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons (Bush 2002).

The Bush Doctrine which was enunciated in 2002 prescribed that the United States must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. These words disclosed a new policy of support for the presumed right of the United States to wage a pre-emptive war against both terrorists and the so-called 'rogue states' engaged in the production of nuclear weapons (Hayden et al. 2003). Since the US administration believed that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and had linkages with Al-Qaeda in terms of training in bomb making, it became crucial for them to invade Iraq (Caldwell 2011).

In certain quarters the war on terror is justified and legitimised on the ground that it is the threat emanated by terrorism which is unjust and detrimental for the society. The argument is that it is necessary to intervene in another state and use military force to bring stability and order in the society, which is affected by terror attacks or states sponsoring these terrorist activities. However, the problem is far more complex than what it appears to be. Whether the war against terrorism was really based on countering threats or driven by ideational and strategic factors is not clear. This study seeks to analyse the roots of this problem in greater detail.

The war on terror revives the theory of just war which comprises three principles in measuring war as just or unjust. It is concerned with the justice of conducting a war in the first place (*jus ad bellum*), concerns with the justice in the course of the war (*jus in bello*) and lastly justice involved in post-war settlements (*jus post bellum*) (Walzer 1977). The first principle deals with right authority, just cause, proportionality, right intention, action of last resort and reasonable prospect of success. The second principle features the conduct of the war which refers to the immunity of non-combatants and the dictum of proportionality that the force involved in waging war should not be disproportionate to the end to be achieved (Walzer 1977).

The US led coalition forces in the war on terror considered Afghanistan and Iraq as threats to the world community. Al-Qaeda which was based in Afghanistan is reported to have world-wide networks with global reach. It has a widely dispersed network of affiliates in over sixty countries. One of the key features of the Al-Qaeda movement is that it explicitly makes declaration about mass casualty terrorist attacks (Wilkinson 2005). The attacks on 11 September 2001 involved the hijacking of civilian aircraft, kidnapping of the passengers and massive destruction of civilians and property. It was contended that as Al-Qaeda and its associates were perceived as a threat to the western states, the war on terror became a necessity. In the case of Iraq, the assessment was that the state has been involved in producing Weapons of Destruction (WMD) and the Saddam Hussein regime trained Al-Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons.

‘The US-UK alliance launched a ‘pre-emptive attack’ against Iraq as the Saddam regime was supposed to have violated UN Security Council Resolutions and posed a threat to international peace and security’ (El-Shibiny 2010).

It is plausible that potential threats could have triggered the war but the strategic interests of the US and its allies might have played a significant role under the pretext of the war on terror. The geo-strategic locations of Afghanistan make it a probable transit route of oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea including the construction of pipeline through Afghanistan, which would keep Russia as well as Europe out of these supply routes (Gokay 2004). The oil reserves in Iraq were more easily accessible than those in Central Asia as it has the second largest reserves of oil and strong calculus to occupy Syria which attains a much larger oil reserve than Iraq. The geo-strategic logic was not just driven by the purpose of obtaining oil resources but also to monopolise them by eliminating all the potential competitors (Ahmad 2004). The invasion of both these countries marked the return of the ghost of the nineteenth century imperialist conquest to control key economic resources.

The war on terror also could be perceived as an opportunity for the US and its allies to propagate their ideas and values as universal values. As Gramsci says, the rationale of hegemony is to bring the interests of the leading class in harmony with those of subordinate classes by incorporating these interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms (quoted in Cox 1983). The ideational hegemony could easily be nurtured in the name of war on terror as

the coalition forces justified it by labelling the Afghanistan and Iraqi regimes as brutal and undemocratic. The global rule or control cannot be only determined by military or hard power. It also encompasses economic and financial supremacy and the power of ideational and cultural values. To legitimatise their military aggression, the US and its allies orchestrated the idea of promoting western values and ideas, democracy, human rights and free market economy. The ideational dominance may be driven by the aim of imposing values of liberal democracy and free market on the globe. The speech of the former US President George W. Bush is revealing: it is mentioned that the establishment of democracy in the Middle East would serve as a model for transforming the Arab countries into democratic states (Barbash 2003).

The war on terror is justified on the ground that it will end terrorism and bring peace and order in the society. However, the intentions, actions and course of the war when analysed gives a different picture from what is being claimed by the western powers. The study engages with the drivers or the factors involved in the war on terror by examining the manner in which the war on terror has been rationalised and justified. Further, relevant inferences will be drawn from the empirical record in Afghanistan and Iraq.

‘War on terrorism’ as coined by President Bush after the attack on 11 September 2001 changed the discourse of war in International Relations. It was denoted as a prime threat and the United States pointed that the war on terror begins with the attack on Al-Qaeda and would continue till it is eliminated at the global level. The western states justified the war as just as it is not only for self- defence of the United States but also for the purpose of maintaining order and peace in the international system. Elshtain argues that if the war is waged to liberate the international community from injustice, brutality and to bring about order and justice, it is not to be considered as wrong. She further argues that the ‘war on terror’ led by the US and its allies is just as it was a response to the injustice done by the killing of civilians on 11 September 2001 attack (Elshtain 2003).

She further justifies the action of the US as it was not left with any other alternative but to wage a war as it is the right of every state to defend its territory from any foreign intervention. Her justification about the attack on Iraq is supported by the argument that it was initiated to protect the people of Iraq. She even argues that the war on terror fulfils the criteria of just war theory

(Elshtain 2003). The book indeed depicts only one dimension of the discourse. It overlooks the act of injustice and inhuman treatment of civilians during the war.

O'Driscoll points out that Elshtain has glorified the role of the US too much which narrows down her conception about just war. The latter considers the US as the leader by virtue of its pre-eminence in terms of power and status in international society. Driscoll criticises the justification provided for using military means (O'Driscoll 2007). The concept of just war was visible in the classical and theological philosophy and was explicit in the Christian ethics of Saint Augustine. Augustine proposes that if the war is attributed in the right spirit or right intention, it can be consistent with the Christian duty. War is justifiable if the root cause is to eradicate evil from the society and the state. It is permissible and would not be termed as an act of immorality if it is driven by a moral intention to punish and discipline the evil doer (Augustine 1998).

Walzer elaborates just war traditions along three principles, namely, *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bellum* and *jus post bellum*. In his scholarly work, he explains these principles. The first principle deals with the purposes or the causes of the war. The rationale of the war should not be driven by the goal of furthering imperial interests in the name of self-defence. It is prescribed that the war ought to be conducted by a legitimate authority and must be a last resort and the proportionality of success should be high. The second principle pertains to the conduct of the war. It stresses on the distinction between combatants and non-combatant citizens. *Jus post bellum* refers to the end and the final stage of war. It prescribes that after war termination, the state must seek to regulate the ending of wars, and ease the transition from war to peace (Walzer 1977).

The above-mentioned discourse stipulates the criteria of a war to be determined as just. The arguments put forth by Elshtain are supported by various other scholars like Hayden (2003) who asserts that the attack on Afghanistan is just and the US and its allies waged a war in response to the attack on 11 September 2001. He supported the war as it was for the purpose of self-defence and therefore it could be deemed as just according to the tradition. He argued that the threats sponsored by Al-Qaeda forced the US and its allies to wage war against Afghanistan. The war on terror was led with the legitimate authority as it has support not only from the United Nations but from the NATO, the UK and other countries. He also argues that diplomatic actions would be unsuccessful with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and would unnecessarily delay the defensive military operations. He further elaborates on the humanitarian functions and the likelihood of

success in the mission. In his opinion, the coalition of US and its allies strengthened the success of the war. In addition, on the parameter of proportionality, which has to be met for the war to be considered just, it must also be the case that the harm and damage being committed is proportionate to the ends sought. The ends identified by the Bush administration would see justification to the extent that it seeks to eliminate Al-Qaeda camps and hideouts. The campaigns could be military actions; the intention is the remedy for injustice (Hayden 2003). It seems that Hayden fails to realise the true spirit of just war which is that the war should not only be waged for self-defence but with the intention of seeking justice. It is prescribed that the war must not be guided by any kind of revenge. If the intention was to restore peace and stability in the region, it is yet to be fulfilled. The United States has failed to liberate Afghanistan from terrorism owing to the resurgence of Taliban in certain parts of Afghanistan. Terrorism is neither destroyed nor dismantled but continues to spread in other parts of the world.

In the case of Iraq, scholars such as Fisher and Biggar consider the war as just and acceptable as it was driven by threat perceptions (Fisher and Biggar 2011). Though the US and the UK were apprehensive about WMD weapons, they provided sufficient reasons to attack Iraq. The reluctance of Saddam Hussein to hand over the information with the UN inspectors and the failure of cooperation led to suspicion in the minds of the Western powers. Fisher and Biggar justifies the casualties incurred during the course of the war. He argues that most of these casualties were due to the civil war which occurred in Iraq and not from the military actions of the coalition forces. In his view, the reasons to wage a war are honourable. However, on the whole, he observes that the war did not satisfy the criteria of just war, as it was not guided by the judicious exercise of practical wisdom (Fisher and Biggar 2011).

The interpretations of scholars may differ in judging the 'war on terror' but the United States has termed it as a 'just' war against terror. The US President Barack Obama, while receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, defended the war in Afghanistan as just. He noted, 'negotiations cannot convince Al-Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason' (Obama 2009). He declared that the means which have been used in Afghanistan and Iraq have achieved the success in relation to the proportionate goals they seek to achieve. Biggar lends support to this argument in the case of Iraq and defends it in terms of

legitimate authority wherein it is often criticised that it did not have any legitimate authority to wage a war. He argues that there is no international authority to arrive at a decision on political decisions, which is mostly not clear; they require a political assessment. He agrees with the notion that the authorisation of the UN Security Council was necessary to launch a war against Iraq but merely on the ground of authority, the war could not be termed as an illegal invasion (Fisher and Biggar 2011).

Fisher and Biggar criticises insurgency, which was responsible for the death of civilians. He argues that sometimes moral justification is necessary to maintain law and order in the society. In his opinion, the attack on Iraq is a case of just cause; the regime of Saddam Hussein was atrocious, brutal and unconstructive for the international community. He justified his argument by providing statistics; during 1991-2003, at least three hundred thousand people were victims of state violence. This is sufficient to satisfy the single criterion of just cause. He points out that in Iraq, weapons were surely not found but certainly the plan was to develop nuclear weapons as soon as sanctions were relaxed and hence no last resort was left other than regime change. On the point of just intention, he specifies that coalition powers were effectively engaged in post-war reconstructions for six years at great cost (Fisher and Biggar 2011). The author does not make an attempt to provide justification for the severe human rights violations, as they happened in Abu Gharib. He merely points out that the incident is an error but he forgets that the just war specifically cautions against human rights abuses. As Walzer (1977) points that 'the arguments we make about war are most fully understood as efforts to recognize and respect the rights of individual and associated men and women.' It is clear that Biggar overlooks the criterion of proportionality.

It emerges that the US and its allies ignores the various principles of just war theory to portray the war on terror as just. The parameters of just war have hardly been satisfied. In the case of Iraq, it was argued that the human rights of the individuals were brutally crushed and therefore it was imperative for the United States to respond. However, this was not the initial reason provided by the western powers. The probable reasons were possession of WMD in Iraq and the relations between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. When this proved to be inaccurate, the Bush administration justified its military actions on a humanitarian basis. As Flint and Falah (2004) argue, hegemonic powers use just war to justify their extra-territorial interests. Under the veil of humanity and

stability, they pursue their political motives and territorial interests. The hegemon constructs just war or aggression in such a way that the act of aggression seems to be just. The criticism is on the ground that no one has given the right to the US to violate the sovereignty of any other state. The just war enunciates that moral humanitarian intervention is necessary when the government turns brutal or when the individuals have demanded it, but in the present context, it is the intervention that turns out to be dominant and coercive. The authors argue that the hegemonic power spreads its own version of morality and justice and if any state violates this hegemonic version, it renders itself susceptible to attack.

Burke (2004) makes similar arguments but using different parameters. He argues that western powers use the just war to camouflage their human rights violations. They claim that the war against terror is for the purpose of defending the values of pluralism and freedom and to that extent, they sustain the right to use military actions for moral purposes. Burke argues that the killings of Afghan and Iraq civilians and the destruction of infrastructure were purely unintentional. It is to be pointed out that in Iraq, the number of civilian deaths was extremely high. If the aim of the US attack was to liberate the people from the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein, it is not clear as to why the US action resulted in the death of so many Iraqis. He introduced the concept of 'ethical peace' which eliminates any type of violence to restore peace in international society. The author specifies that just war theory, which specifically emphasises the protection of non-combatants, is ignored by the western powers. The western powers bear no responsibility for the civilian deaths. In fact, they argue that the death of non-combatant deaths is due to the political leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Fierke (2005) argues that on the one hand, US promotes democracy and law at international level, and on the other hand, war on terrorism ignored the practice of democracy, international opinion, international law and human rights whenever it deems necessary to do so. She criticised the US role as a guiding force in determining what countries should do to run their affairs. While US claimed that its efforts were to promote self-determination, freedom and equality, its policies have been formulated to serve its own interests. The US as the leader could not determine the criteria of democracy and human rights but it is the duty of the international community to frame international laws. She is sceptical of the US promoting its own interests in the name of combating terrorism and imposing its own ideas and values on the global level. El-Shibiny

(2010) makes a similar argument by criticising the US projection as the leader of the world to promote democracy in Iraq and Middle East countries. The promotion of democratic ideas and values creates apprehensions in the minds of the Islamic communities. In their view, the democratic ideas should come from within the society and should not be imposed by western notions. They are in no condition to be persuaded to redesign their culture and ideas according to western perceptions. It is hardly acceptable in the Islamic countries to bear the directions given by the western powers in altering their culture and ideas. They are not ready to replicate the western values and that also on gun point. He exemplifies that democracy and ideational values should come from within the people and the effective way required to reform democracy is negotiations with the people on their shared beliefs and ideas (El-Shibiny 2010).

Ahmad (2004) points out that the war on terror was not only to counter the threats sponsored from terrorism but also to fulfil the vested interests of the western powers. He claims that the aim was far beyond from countering threats in Afghanistan and Iraq and the real aim was not only to change the regime but to redraw the geo-strategic and political maps of the world. He clarifies that the imperial project of the US is designed to draw support from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. This design reduces the third world countries to serve the imperial interests of the US.

Cheney (1993) provides the idea of US strategic motives in the post cold war strategy. It was evident that with the disintegration of the USSR, the US emerges as the most powerful state and, therefore it was crucial to preserve this dominance by preventing the emergence of rivals in both economically and geopolitically spheres. These rivals were included from Middle East/ Persian Gulf, Europe and Latin America. His report argues that the US needs a new grand strategy to fulfil its economic and foreign policy interests. The motive is to preserve US global pre-eminence which in turn would disseminate the American values and ideas of freedom and democracy. Therefore, there is a need to identify the threats and set priorities towards attaining military capabilities. US vital interests should be to prevent any another hegemonic state to emerge and in order to contain such possibility, the use of force would be considered viably. The prominent goal was US leadership in the international community (Cheney 1993). With the advent of 11 September 2001 this strategy was integrated with the war on terrorism. Certain states such as Iraq and North Korea etc. need to be contained as it would prevent regional rivals

and will maintain the hegemony of the US. Buzan argues along similar lines but with the different perspective that the end of the Cold War brought a vacuum in international society and created a 'threat deficit'. The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 provided once again a solution to this problem and would help to prove and reassert US legitimacy in the international community which is the prime goal of National Security Strategy of 2002. He accepts that the threats from terrorists do exist but the significance of the war on terror is a political framework which would legitimise US primacy and leadership (Buzan 2006).

Fouskas and Gokay (2005) assert that the attacks on 11 September 2001 created a platform for the US and its allies to pursue its policies in order to enhance their hold on the oil energy resources. The authors firmly contend that the so called formulation of 'rogue states' points at the oil dominated regions. The vision of US is not only restricted in acquiring oil and natural gas resources; it is also to eliminate competitors and monopolise the area politically and militarily by regulating the flow of oil. The US is the world's largest consumer of oil resources and it needs to manipulate the situation to fulfil its needs. The war against Al-Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq have predominantly established US military control over the lands of Eurasia. The two wars have created new military bases which intensified the power and supremacy of the US in the world system. The authors further elaborated that the aim of the western powers is not merely to attain military and political objectives but also to sustain ideational and cultural hegemony. The US had shaped its policy since 1945 to hegemonise the political culture, around a set of ideological values. They emphasised that the ultimate goal of US strategy is to establish a new sphere of influence which would eliminate any obstacles in the way to fulfil its aims and goals. In the name of democratic ideas, values and human rights approach, the US pursues its 'pre-emptive actions' against countries that are not willing to follow, the American notion of values. The attacks on 11 September 2001 opened the door of choices which could accomplish the vision of the US dominance (Fouskas and Gokay 2005). Blakeley (2012) argues on the same lines and criticises that violence incurred by the state in the name of terrorism is one of the 'motors of imperialism'. State terrorism is one of the features in the war on terror with subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. The main aim of the US is to play a 'more permanent role in the Gulf regional security' which includes establishment of a neo-liberal state and control of resources. It would expand the US policy and achieve a substantial 'American forces presence in the Gulf.

Chomsky who is one of the hardest critics of the American policy towards Middle East is extremely critical and skeptical of the merits of spreading democracy (Chomsky 2005). He argued that anti-American feelings are widespread throughout the Arab regions. Promoting democracy means establishing anti-American regime in the region. For this reason the people in the region are not supporting the cause of promoting democracy. Another argument that Chomsky makes is that the Arab people never consider the American way of democracy as the right form of democracy, and thus simply reject this American idea of democracy.

The dominant strand in the literature is that the war on terror is just as it countered the threats that originated from Al-Qaeda network and the possession of WMD from Iraq. In spite of its coercive and aggressive character. Scholars do not seem to recognise that the war on terror hardly adheres to the basic tenets of just war theory. The war on terror is justified on the grounds of self-defence and for eliminating future terror attacks but other variables which drove the war on terror if analysed could designate the war on terror as unjust and illegitimate. The study makes an attempt to fill the void in the literature; its purpose is to analyse the manner in which the war on terror is considered as legitimate and investigate the other purposes of waging the war on terror.

The ostensible purpose that underlies the war on terror, which was waged against Afghanistan and Iraq, is to bring order and stability in those societies. The study seeks to understand the logic of pursuing the war on terror. It will engage with the ethics of war on terror which has been relegated to the periphery in contemporary security studies. The war on terror is generally considered as just because of its objectives to dismantle terrorism but significant choices and ideas pursued in the course of the war are often ignored in the literature. The study fills this gap to the extent possible. It examines the rationale through which the war is legitimised, perceived in discourse and pursued in practice. It analyses the motivations and aspirations involved in waging the war against Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghanistan and Iraq constitute the case studies as these have been the instances wherein the logic of 'war on terror' has been invoked by the United States and its allies. The study self-evidently engages with the normative question but is grounded empirically in case studies. The study uses the following variables for undertaking a rigorous analysis: threats, choices and ideas. The logic is to examine which of these variables

seems to have primarily driven the war on terror in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. In effect, the method is to engage in a variable driven case study.

The study addresses the following research questions:

1. What are the factors which have led to the war on terror being undertaken by the US and its allies?
2. Why did the United States and its allies use just war theory to legitimise the war on terror as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq?
3. What role did threats play in the pursuit of war on terror in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq?
4. What role did choices play in the pursuit of war on terror in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq?
5. What role did ideas play in the pursuit of war on terror in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq?

At the beginning of the study, the following hypotheses were proposed:

1. The initiation of war on terror can be primarily attributed to ideational interests of the US and its allies.
2. The pursuit of 'war on terror' in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq is driven by strategic logic of the US and its allies which has blunted ethical considerations.
3. The war on terror in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq is driven less by threats and more to do with ideas and strategic choices.

Towards the end of the study, the following inferences have been arrived at:

1. The war on terror in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq has been fundamentally driven by the quest for ideational hegemony on the part of the US and its allies.
2. The war on terror in the case of Afghanistan was initiated by the presence of threats; strategic choices which sustained the war played a limited role.

3. The war on terror in the case of Iraq was initiated by strategic choices; threats were conspicuous by their absence and played no significant role.

Research Methods

The study has used the qualitative method. As the study seeks to engage with the philosophy of just war theory, qualitative method will engage with the normative question relating to ethics in the war on terror. The initiation and the pursuit of war on terror constitute the dependent variable. The study considers three independent variables *viz.* threats, choices and ideas and examine their correlation, if any, with the dependent variable of the study. The logic of choosing these variables is simple: threats constitute the ostensible reason, the literature makes a mention of choices as the probable motivation and ideational interests denote a deeper explanatory factor that goes beyond the material domain. Case study technique will be used. The primary sources include US government documents and media reports. The secondary sources include books, journal articles, newspapers, unpublished research documents and other relevant materials. Field visit was undertaken to the UK during March 2015. Interviews have been conducted with academics who have an in-depth knowledge about the war on terror which has been waged against Afghanistan and Iraq.

Organisation of the thesis

Chapter Two: Threats and the war on terror

This chapter analyses whether there were threats that necessitated the war on terror as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. It analyses the role of threats which influenced the US to launch an attack on Afghanistan and Iraq. In other words what role did threats play in the pursuit of war on terror in the cases of both these states?

Chapter Three: Choices in the war on terror

This chapter examines the correlation, if any, between the strategic choices of the intervening states and the war, as it happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is plausible that potential threats

could have triggered the war but the strategic interests of the US and its allies might have played a significant role under the pretext of the war on terror.

Chapter Four: Ideational hegemony and the war on terror

This chapter focuses on the potential link, if any, between the ideational hegemonic vision of the United States and its allies and the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The rationale for this chapter is that war on terror could also be perceived as an opportunity for the US and its allies to propagate their ideas and values as universal values.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

The concluding chapter summarises the findings of the study.

Chapter Two

Threats and the War on Terror

This chapter analyses the first variable: threats. It analyses the role of threats which intimidated the US to launch an attack on Afghanistan and Iraq. In other words what role did threats play in the pursuit of war on terror in the cases of both these states? Threats remain the primary motive for the war on terror. This chapter elaborately examines the threat to the US and its allies analyses to which threats really played a primary motive for waging the war on terror.

‘War on terror’ was first used by George W. Bush, the then US President following the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. It was a counter terrorism strategy to punish the culprits involved in the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. The attacks were horrendous as four commercial jet liners were hijacked and two were crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York and another into Pentagon, outside Washington D.C. The last airline crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. The attacks destroyed both the towers and damaged the Pentagon, killing five thousand people including all people who were on board in the airlines (Hayden et al. 2003). The attacks associated with 11 September 2001 were unprecedented as the number of people killed were as high as number as compared to all deaths in transnational terrorism from 1988 to 2000 (Sandler 2003). 11 September 2001 demonstrated that terrorists did not require a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to inflict a massive carnage (Sandler and Walter 2005).

The attack inflicted a great shock to the people as well as the US government. Soon after the attack, President George W. Bush on 11 September 2001 in a televised address from the White House and stated that he had directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement agencies to find those responsible and to bring them to justice’. He further added, ‘We will make no distinction between the terrorist who committed these acts and those who harboured them. Terrorism against our nation will not stand’ (Bush 2001).

Addressing the country again the next day, President Bush declared: 'The deliberative and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country was more than acts of terror. They were acts of war' (Bush 2001a).

The United Kingdom one of the closest allies of the US also criticised the attack as the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking on 14 September 2001 in the House of Commons, vowed to bring those responsible to account. But over the weekend, in an interview with CNN, he too talked of war: 'the fact is that we are at war with terrorism; it is a war, if you like, between the civilised world and fanaticism' (Blair 2001).

Dick Cheney the then Vice President of the US while delivering an address before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on 14 November, 2001 pointed out that

the attackers were not American citizens and were persons 'believed to have engaged in or be participating in terrorist attacks designed to kill Americans, or have provided sanctuary to those who are conducting terrorist operations against Americans.' He further argued "that somebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans, men, women, and children" does not "deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process (Cheney 2001).

The US Senate and Congress both condemned the war collectively. The Senate unanimously approved a resolution condemning terrorism and provided support to the President in seeking out the perpetrators of the attack. On 14 September 2001, the Senate voted to authorise Bush to use all necessary and appropriate force to retaliate against the terrorists. The Congress passed the resolution saying:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organisations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11 2001 or harboured such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations organisation or persons (Bush 2010).

After several weeks of collecting and analysing the evidence, the identity of the nineteen hijackers and their connections to the terrorist group Al-Qaeda headed by Osama Bin Laden became clear. Within few days, the US officials realised that the attacks were planned and executed by Al-Qaeda (Carlisle 2010). 'Investigation revealed that Osama Bin Laden had

channeled between \$400,000 and \$500,000 to the hijackers to finance their training, travel, housing, and other details of the attacks' (Carlisle 2010).

The US counter-terrorism head Richard Clarke concluded that Osama bin Laden's fingerprints were found. While still coordinating the government efforts on 11 September 2001, Richard Clarke realised that Al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack as it had been warning about that the bombing would not be confined to their camps as was done on the embassy in 1998 but the US should be prepared for major attacks in the future (Clarke 2004). Osama Bin Laden was responsible for many earlier attacks against the US targets, including the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and of the *USS Cole* in Yemen in 2000. He had often proclaimed and expressed his deep hatred for the United States and threatened to destroy the US and its allies. From the beginning of 1996, Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network built a large infrastructure and network in Afghanistan with the full support of an Islamist regime of Taliban (Daalder and Lindsay 2003).

Earlier before the attacks happened in April 2001, the US State Department in its report 'Patterns of Global Terrorism' argued that 'terrorism continues to pose a clear and present danger to the international community'. The report cited the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a sponsoring of terrorism while the report specifically mentioned Osama bin Laden (US Department of State Office 2001). Bush and his advisers had raised the prospect of terror attacks before 11 September 2001, but they had never really viewed that the threat were so perilous.

Similarly on 25 January 2001, the US National Security Council's member Richard A. Clarke wrote the first memo for the G.W. Bush administration. It was entitled *Presidential Policy Initiative Review-The Al-Qaeda Network*. It highlighted the increasing influence of Al-Qaeda and described its aims:

Firstly to drive out US presence in the Muslim world and withdrawal of military and economic presence in countries like Indonesia and secondly, to reorder the western states on the lines of Taliban. It was explicit that the US Department of State projected the Taliban as anti democratic, anti western extremist (Malik 2015).

The US received a worldwide support to launch a counter terrorist attack on Afghanistan. The United Nations passed a Resolution 1368 2001 which condemned the terror attacks on 11 September 2001, regarded then as a threat to international peace and security and recognised the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the charter (UNSC 1368 2001).

Immediately after the attacks, the nineteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) voted to treat the attacks on the United States as an attack on each of them if it is proven that the attacks emerged from the foreign source. Under that treaty, they committed to provide military assistance to the attacked country. On 2 October, 2001, the NATO members stated their stance, that the attack was conducted by a foreign source (Carlisle 2010).

This was the first time in the fifty-year history of NATO that it invoked Article V, 'the article that provided for joint military aid that if a member is attacked, it will retaliate collectively. Australia also promised military support under the separate ANZUS treaty on the same grounds, treating the attack on the United States as an act of war against Australia' (Carlisle 2010).

After the passage of the UN resolution President George W. Bush organised a coalition of the willing states to confront the Al-Qaeda. The first coalition was the Pakistani government. It was an intense pressure for Pakistan to turn against Taliban as it was unthinkable for his government and intelligence to go against a Muslim country. However Pakistan lent full support to the US. It sent an ultimatum to the Taliban government of the Afghanistan. It demanded that the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which had been providing a safe haven for Osama Bin Laden and his Al- Qaeda terrorist training camps, should hand over Bin Laden to the United States. The message was delivered by the Pakistani diplomats because Pakistan was one of the very few governments which had diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Pakistan urged that the Taliban should immediately surrender Osama bin Laden and members of his organisation or face devastating repercussions by the United States and its allies. Meanwhile, the then US Secretary of State Colin Powell announced on CNN that 'if the Taliban did not expel bin Laden and turn him over to the United States, they would be held accountable for the help they had provided

him. They would either help “rip up the organisation” or they would ‘suffer the full wrath of the United States and other countries’ (Powell 2001).

In September, 2001, President Bush personally announced the ultimatum to the Taliban leadership, outlining the details of the demand. The Taliban government was told that it had to close every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. It also had to provide access so that the United States could be sure that no camps continued to operate. Further, they had to hand over every member of Al-Qaeda in the country to the US. As the President Bush stated:

Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of Al-Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals including American citizens-you have unjustly imprisoned and protect foreign journalist, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorist or they will share in their fate (Bush 2001b).

It was further discussed in the US Congress that Afghanistan might agree to extradite Osama Bin Laden if the US provides ‘solid and convincing’ evidence for his involvement in the attack. But Bush told Congress ‘there will be no negotiations or discussions and there is no need to discuss if he is innocent or guilty, we know he is guilty’ (Mann 2003). The Taliban ambassador to Pakistan twice repeated the request for evidence. Discussions proceeded between the Taliban government and Pakistan. They finally decided to hand over Osama Bin Laden to Pakistan. The Pakistan court would decide whether to try him or hand him over to the US. However Pakistan vetoed the deal after pressure from the US (US State Department Fact Sheet 2002).

It was difficult on the part of the Taliban to reiterate so quickly at this point as Al-Qaeda had provided to the tune of approximately \$20 million per year to the government. Also, the Taliban *Pashtunwali* code required a host to protect any guest, even if the guest broke the law. Furthermore, Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader apparently realised that if he surrendered Laden to the United States, he would lose credibility among his strongly anti-American and Taliban followers (Carlisle 2003).

In the meantime, the President of the US addressed all nation of the world and outlined the choice before them.

Every nation in every region now has a decision to make; Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.' The reason offered was that, 'This is not just America's fight alone. What is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. The attack may have taken place on American soil, but the whole world had to be mobilized because it was attack on freedom and civilization in the whole world. Any nation not joining the War on America's side was supporting terrorists (Bush 2001c).

The negotiations might have continued if it could be demanded that Bin Laden might be handed over to the neutral country like Switzerland or a moderate Muslim country like Malaysia. There were a number of Taliban offers to negotiate the extradition of Bin Laden. A week after 11 September 2001, the Taliban information minister Qudrutullah Jamal, stated 'Anyone who is responsible for this act, Osama or not, we will not side with him. We told a Pakistani delegation to Afghanistan to give us proof that he did it, because without that how can we give him up?' (Rai 2002). After few days , Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Zaeef, commented: 'We are not ready to hand over Osama Bin laden without evidence' (Rai 2002).

President George W. Bush in response to the Taliban offers stated 'I gave them a fair chance. The reality is that they rejected negotiations and non violent alternatives to war' (Rai 2002). One of the scholars also comments on the way war on terror was waged. She commented that 'the Bush administration's 'war on terror' (WOT) was both a set of policies as well as a powerful security narrative that informed the ways in which threat was understood and constructed post-9/11'(Mustapha 2011).

'The 9/11attack, 2001, altered the strategic landscape of the world. The radical Islamic group, Al-Qaeda, challenged the global hegemon, the United States of America, by striking targets in New York City and Washington D.C., symbolising the hegemon's economic and military power' (Jermalavicius 2003).

The first declaration of war by the President was made on 20 September 2001 before a joint session of the US Congress. He identified Al-Qaeda as the perpetrators of the attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001and accused Afghanistan of harbouring

Al Qaeda leaders, particularly Osama bin Laden. He also blamed that the leadership of Al-Qaeda had great influence in controlling most of that country (Hayden 2003 et al.). He stated 'In Afghanistan we see Al-Qaeda's vision for the world. 'Our Nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack'. He made demands on the Taliban 'to deliver to the US authorities all the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land, close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support structure' (Bush 2001b).

The Bush administration was in full favour of the war against Afghanistan. Two weeks of intense diplomatic pressure failed to persuade the Taliban to meet Bush's demands. The US did not believe in negotiations with the Taliban regime. So finally when the negotiations with Taliban failed to meet the demand, the US attacked Afghanistan in the name of war on terror on 7 October 2001. The operation was named as '*Operation Enduring freedom*'. The United States also began providing military assistance to the Northern Alliance, a group of Anti-Taliban Afghans consisting of several nationalities. Nevertheless in addition to Anti Taliban forces approximately seventeen countries were deployed in and around Afghanistan which US called as global war on terrorism (Papp 2003).

The US led coalition forces in the war on terror considered Afghanistan as a threat to the world community. Al-Qaeda which was based in Afghanistan is reported to have world-wide networks with global reach. Al-Qaeda means the 'base'. It was formed in the 1990s under the leadership of Osama Bin laden and his deputy Ayumun Zawahari which was just not contained to only one state but dispersed into a networks of networks at global level. It is affiliated in over sixty countries making it the most widely scattered non state terrorist network in history (Wilkinson 2005).

It has widely dispersed network of affiliates in over sixty countries. One of the key features of the Al-Qaeda movement is that it explicitly makes declaration about mass casualty terrorist attacks (Wilkinson 2005). As Daniel Byman points out:

it is not just a distinct terrorist organisation: it is a movement that seeks to inspire and coordinate other groups and individuals. Even if Al-Qaeda is taking losses beyond its ability to

recuperate, there is still a much broader Islamist movement that is hostile to the United States, seeks to overthrow U.S. allies and is committed to mass casualty terrorist violence. The conceptual key is this: Al-Qaeda is not a single terrorist group but a global insurgency (Byman 2003).

Another key feature of Al-Qaeda is that its core ideology is to wage a global *jihad* against America and its allies in order to bring about transformation in international politics. The movement has an explicit commitment to mass casualty terrorist attacks. In one of its *fatwa* announced to the world in February 1998, Al-Qaeda declared that whenever need arises it is the foremost duty of the Muslims to kill Americans, including civilians and their allies. In his 1998 *fatwa*, Osama bin Laden had stated that 'The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies civilians and military is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it' (Laden 1998). Al-Qaeda's leaders have been suspected to gain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the past, and it also assumed that it would use these weapons if it had them.

Al-Qaeda aimed to eliminate the presence of the US from every part of the Muslim world (Wilkinson 2005). A former Al-Qaeda press spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, even claimed that 'Al-Qaeda had a right to kill four million Americans, including two million children' (Allison 2004). So Bush declared, 'Al-Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. Its goal is not to make money; but goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical belief on people everywhere' (Bush 2001b).

In the light of this entire situation, it clearly depicts that the US as well as the western powers faced grave threat from the Al-Qaeda network.

The counter terrorism strategy adopted by the Bush administration included police and criminal justice system, the prohibition of financing of terrorism and various steps to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the deployment of military forces is a part of the strategy to suppress Al-Qaeda network (Leonhard 2002).

The counter terrorism strategy against Afghanistan fulfilled two objectives: the first objective was also involved in punishing the Taliban for harbouring and collaborating with Al-Qaeda.

Second the objective was to eliminate the Taliban regime and open up the way for an alternative government that would allow the US direct access to Al-Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. The Taliban failed to cooperate with the US demands which effectively ruled out the first option and the US intended the removal of the regime, which served not only an act of punishment but also served as a deterrent to other states which sponsors terrorism (McInnes 2003).

After 11 September 2001, no country defended Al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters, and nearly all states supported America's strategy of attacking Afghanistan (Daalder and Lindsay 2003). War on terror is legitimised by the western states on the ground of eliminating threats and maintaining order in international society. The attacks on 11 September 2001 should be regarded as an act of 'crimes against humanity which encompasses widespread or systematic murder against any civilian population' (Roberts 2002). No doubt the western society had been strongly affected by the events of 11 September 2001 and the majority of the Americans were also not only spectators to the attack but was part of the suffering itself.

The war on terrorism, in this framework, has elevated terrorism to the number one threat. As Condoleezza Rice stated, 'there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security a threat as great as any faced during the Civil War, World War II and the Cold War' (Rice 2002). It altered the thinking of the US and Al-Qaeda and its allies conceived US as an obstacle to their aim. The strategy to deal with the attacks was a combination of combined US air power and Special Forces? The event of 11 September 2001 undoubtedly recorded the priorities of the US motivating it to fight terror and stabilise the region.

The difference between traditional terrorists groups and the Al-Qaeda movement is that the former have not been involved in conducting a global war. The traditional terrorists used violence mostly on the country or region where they claim to have the right to a separate state. However, the war on terror led by the US and its allies has been fighting Al-Qaeda militants in Afghanistan. It is argued by the scholars that it is a different kind of war, as the enemy is largely unseen, invisible, hiding within the civilian and cities around the world (Hoffman 2001a).

The war would be different from any America had fought in the past. We had to uncover the terrorist's plot. We had to track their movements and disrupt their operations. We had to cut off their money and deprive them of their safe haven. And we had to do it all under

the threat of another attack. The Terrorist had made our home front a battleground. Putting America on a war footing was one of the most important decisions of my presidency (Bush 2010).

The events of 11 September 2001 were different in pattern because they tended to break apart the type of war established by the West in the 1990s. In this decade, war was conducted at a safe distance. But the attack on 11 September 2001 struck at the heart of the West, against the capital of the United States (McInnes 2003). It involved the hijacking of the civilian aircraft, kidnapping of the passengers, massive destruction of civilians and property. It was also contended that the war on terror was just not a war but a necessity and Al-Qaeda and its members were direct threats to the American sovereignty. However scholars such as Stephen Biddle did not term it as a different type of war. According to him 'the nation's key strategic documents have continued to treat threats in the same generic, unspecific, peacetime-like sense that they had done prior to 2001' (Biddle 2005).

Nicholas Wheeler described the war on terror as one of the most shocking events: 'what shocked the world about the event of 11 September 2001 was that the perpetrators of this act deliberately set out to kill innocent civilians' (Wheeler 2002). In an interview, Wheeler explicitly termed threat as one of the major factors that led to the war on terror. According to him, the attack shook the foundations of US sovereignty and it was evident that to tackle the threat inflicted on US soil, the war on terror was initiated (Wheeler 2015).

The US and its allies chose Afghanistan as the first target to be responsible for the attack on 11 September 2001 because of Al-Qaeda bases and the safe haven provided to the terrorists by the Taliban government. The next target of the US-led war on terror turned out to be Iraq. As stated by the US President Bush the US would continue to be steadfast, patient and persistent :

The war, the president declared "begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. Bush explained that America will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. And that every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. This included not only al Qaeda, which was the organization responsible for the 11 September attacks, but also states of an "axis of evil (Bush 2001b).

Further he continued:

First we shall shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plan and bring terrorists to justice. The second objective, however, nothing to do with responding to the September 11 attacks but related to an entirely different kind of terror. We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological and nuclear weapons from threatening the US and the world” . The war on terror he said, will now turn to regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and others with weapons of mass destruction. He named North Korea, Iran and Iraq and said, 'States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil aiming to threaten the peace of the world'. Bush gave a clear warning to 'the axis of evil. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility towards America and to support terror. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world (Bush 2001b).

The US Secretary of Defense also in a formal address to the North Atlantic Council also declared 'Al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist network that threatens us' (Rumsfeld 2001). Similarly, former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated, in remarks to the Conservative Political Action Conference, 'There is no such thing as a good terrorist and a bad terrorist. You cannot condemn Al-Qaeda and hug Hamas' (Rice 2002a)

While the majority of the people supported the Bush administration, including the US Congress and the United Nations, in the pursuit of counterattack against Al-Qaeda, neither the United Nations nor the American public agrees with the United States to widen the war on terror. But after declaring the mission accomplished in December 2001, President George W. Bush swiftly moved on to a larger campaign, condemning the 'axis of evil' that included Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (Irogbe 2011).

The first reason for the American invasion of Iraq was to 'liberate' its people from the 'tyranny' of Saddam Hussein and the despotism of his regime. The second most important reason was to destroy the alleged weapons of mass destruction which accumulated in Iraq by Saddam Hussein. The last reason for the invasion was the alleged Al-Qaeda link with Saddam Hussein. (El-Shibiny 2010). The major assessment was that the state of Iraq has been involved in producing Weapons of Destruction (WMD) and the Saddam Hussein regime trained Al-Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons.

The United States foreign policy under the Bush administration can be better understood by studying the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine is a phrase used to describe various related foreign policy principles of President Bush. It includes components such as preventive war and preemptive strikes and secondly a policy of spreading democracy around the world, especially in the Middle East and thirdly the doctrine served as a strategy for combating terrorism by targeting states that sponsor terrorism (Wright 2007).

The Bush Doctrine defined threat based upon on the combination of ‘radicalism and technology’ especially religious and political extremism joined by the availability of weapons of mass destruction (Record 2003). As it was reflected in the Military Academy at West Point during the speech delivered on 1 June 2002, the US President Bush emphasised terrorism power and peace where he mentioned terrorism fifteen times and power seventeen times in the speech:

We face a threat with no precedent in that the US confronted not only state enemies but also sub-national enemies in the form of terrorist groups. The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons along with ballistic missile technology when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. The war on terrorism cannot be won on defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy. This could be accomplished by transforming the military and being ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives and we are in a conflict between good and evil and America will call evil by its name. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent, or in other words, the US would encourage and promote the spread of democracy throughout the world in a sort of a reversal of the cold war domino theory (Bush 2002).

The Bush doctrine identified three parameters: terrorist organisation with global reach, weak states that harbour and assist such terrorist organisation and ‘rogue states’. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s Afghanistan embody the first two agents and rogue states are declared such as Iraq, North Korea and Iran (Record 2003). Rogue states are defined as states that:

Brutalise their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbours, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject human values and hate the United States and everything it stands for (US Department of State 2002).

The idea of Bush doctrine was not a new initiative launched by the Bush administration but its seeds were laid during the 1990’s. This perspective was highlighted in a document written at the

end of the George H. W. Bush administration by the then US Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney entitled as *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy*. The document outlined a new idea in international relations. In a new post-cold war global strategy, it is argued that with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a new post-cold war strategy is needed to maintain US prominence in world politics. The main argument of the strategy is to curb the emergence of any enemy at, regional or global that would threaten US sovereignty in the world both at economical and geopolitical level.

The Development of Neo-conservatism

It has its origins from the left-wing radicalisation of the 1960s which was primarily a product of the anti-Vietnam War movement (Wright 2007). Neo conservatism (or new conservatives) is rooted in a group of former liberals, began to oppose many of the policies and principles articulated by the US President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programmes. The term 'neoconservative' was initially used in the 1930s to describe American liberals who criticised other liberals for following a path closer to Soviet communism. It evolved as a faction of Cold War anti-communism (Fukuyama 2004).

A key event which rejuvenated the neoconservative intellectuals in this new post-Cold War era was the failure of George H. W. Bush's administration in removing Saddam Hussein after the liberation of Kuwait. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, neoconservatives longed for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and also viewed the United States as a supreme hegemonic power. In the final year of the George H. W. Bush administration, Paul Wolfowitz, the then Under Secretary of Defense, was assigned the task of preparing the Pentagon's first post-Cold War Defense Planning Guidance for 1992 (Tyler 1992).

The aim of the document was to develop a military strategy and prepare the future defence budgets. The person who was really involved in this classified document was Zalmay Khalilzad, the Assistant Deputy under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning in the US. He developed a concise post-Cold War military strategy influenced by the neoconservative ideology (Smith 2009). The first objective was to prevent the re-emergence of a new enemy, through any kind

and if necessary force. In so doing the USA should strive to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would be sufficient to become global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia (Stokes 2005). It outlined unilateral military action in parts of the world considered important to US. However, the 1992 draft was leaked to the press and was criticised heavily both at the domestic and the global level (Rubin 2003).

This policy later led to 'The Project for the New American Century' (PNAC). The PNAC was a Washington think tank, established in 1997 and chaired by William Kristol. The members included several prominent members and former members of the Bush administration, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, Dick Cheney, I. Lewis Libby, William J. Bennett, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Ellen Bork, the wife of Robert Bork. The PNAC clearly reflected hegemonic intentions. It was aimed with plans to create American dominance in land, space, and cyberspace, as well as to establish American prominence in the international politics. The plan, which was laid out in a document entitled 'Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources For A New Century', which the PNAC published in 2000, called for military dominance in the Gulf, including overthrowing of the Saddam Hussein regime, with the aim of consolidating American power in the region and throughout the world. From this it could be deduced that the idea of disposing of the Saddam government was laid out several years before the 11 September 2001 attacks happened (Abrams 2007).

The Project for a New American Century proposed to the President that:

The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy (PNAC 1998).

By 1997 Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives openly began for regime change against Saddam Hussein, and were actively lobbying Congress, through the 'Project for a New American Century', for an official change in Clinton's policy towards Iraq (Abrams 2007). A further area of concern for neoconservatives was the issue of a emergence China as a rising power that could threaten the power of the United States (Wright 2007). It was only with the election of George W. Bush as the US President that many of those considered to be neoconservative intellectuals were able to return to positions of power. This included Donald Rumsfeld as the US Secretary of

Defense, Paul Wolfowitz as his deputy and also Dick Cheney as the Vice President of the US. As the above explanation clearly demonstrates, that it seems appropriate to examine the specific role of neo-conservatism in the Bush administration and how this post-Cold War ideology evolved into a new one which influenced the vision of the war on terror (Caldwell 2011).

This ultimately saw the neoconservative policy towards Iraq being openly adopted as a foreign policy of the Bush administration. The US state projects as an imperial state which could build a global empire and influenced not only the western states but also states where US could intervene in the name of forcible humanitarian interventions, democracy promotion, liberation and the elimination of global terrorism (Caldwell 2011).

In 1998 many of the signatories sent to President Clinton an open letter in which they are argued for the invasion of Iraq. Five years later, they were criticised for launching an attack against Iraq. These people had a clear idea of the direction in which they wanted to take the country and when the 11 September 2001 terror attacks presented an opportunity they fulfilled their interests (Wright 2007).

Richard Haass, the director of policy planning at the US Department of State, and the USA's lead coordinator for post-Taliban Afghanistan, openly called for the re-conceptualisation of the USA as an imperial power within world order. He stated 'building and maintaining such an order would require sustained effort by the world's most powerful actor, the United States. For it to be successful would in turn require that Americans re-conceive their role from one of a traditional nation-state to an imperial power' (Haass 2000).

Perhaps the clearest indication of this new imperial design however, was the Bush administration's Bush Doctrine, which revived the clauses of PNAC, 'the Bush administration committed itself to building up its military forces to deter any potential rival for world supremacy: 'Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in the hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States' (Stokes 2005).

It is argued that the 'neoconservative vision of American foreign policy provided the theoretical and policy content of the Bush Doctrine, which underpinned the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and depose the leadership of Saddam Hussein' (Williams 2008).

The Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine comprised three identifiable pillars which can be summarised as:

First, it is to prevent hostile states from acquiring unconventional weapons unilaterally and if necessary the US could act unilaterally. Second to promote democracy and freedom as it would bring peace in the world and third the most important is to maintain the primacy of the US in the international system. The importance of the features of the Bush Doctrine is that it widened the target list from 'terrorist organizations of global reach' to include 'any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors' (US Department of State 2002). The idea was thus to include countries which are declared by the United States as enemy and who are trying to acquire or building, unconventional weapons. Bush unveiled this change in military strategy at the West Point Military Academy in June 2002 where he stated that, 'our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives' (Bush 2002a).

The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to national security. The pre-emptive strike will counter the threat, to defend the US and where there is uncertainty over the time and the nature of attack. The strategy is to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by, the United States. However the US attacked Iraq in the name of pre-emptive strike but followed the doctrine of preventive war. It is important to recognise that pre-emptive attack is a response in the face of an imminent attack; a preventative war is carried out long before a potential threat occurs implying that deliberate decision to attack because the US has to maintain its balance of power and there is no imminent threat. It is an offensive strategy rather than threat (Record 2003). The attack was carried out in the name of pre-emptive strike as Bush stated:

War on terror' is well begun, but it has only begun.... I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of

America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons (Bush 2002).

Democracy and Freedom Agenda

The second key most important feature of Bush Doctrine was the adoption of the neoconservative position on the promotion of democracy and freedom. Democracy promotion is one of the important pillars of the Bush doctrine. Democracy promotion remains one of the core ideas, in the US foreign policy. It is reflected in the policies from Woodrow Wilson to Bush. In contrast to the previous administrations which saw its promotion as desirable, the Bush Doctrine saw the promotion of liberal democracy as a necessity for foreign policy (Wright 2007).

The key reason why the Bush Doctrine supported democracy promotion with national security was based on the premise that the absence of democracy and freedom actually gave birth to terrorism. Therefore, according to the US in the post 11 September 2001 contexts, the root cause of the terrorist attacks was viewed as the lack of elected democratic government and institutions within the Middle East and elsewhere. With regard to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, it was viewed by the US President Bush as serving dual purposes: first, it allowed the removal of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and the establishment of democratic polity; and second, a democratising Iraq can influence or pressurise the neighbouring authoritarian states to bring democratic reforms within.

American Hegemony

The final feature of the Bush Doctrine called for the strengthening of the US hegemony. It is noticeable that this was in keeping with the spirit of the 'Pentagon's Defense Policy Guidance of 1992'. As already highlighted, this called for the maintenance of US primacy by ensuring a qualitative superiority in military capability (Jervis 2005). The military, economic, and cultural superiority would hegemonies US power in global politics. To reaffirm the doctrine and its seriousness, the then US Vice President Cheney in June 2003 stated in a speech: 'If there is anyone in the world today who doubts the seriousness of the Bush Doctrine, 'I would urge that

person to consider. the fate of the Taliban in Afghanistan and of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq' (Cheney 2003).

The first comprehensive policy document presenting the Bush Doctrine was the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS) released by the White House on 17 September 2002 a year after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States by Al-Qaeda. In the National Security Strategy of the United States it is stated:

'The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorist which is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents' (US Department of State 2002).

It further identifies:

Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as rogue states, and declares, "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. And this means, given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. Because our enemies see WMD not as means of last resort, but rather as weapons of choice. . . as tools of intimidation and military aggression, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively (US Department of State 2002).

The document further states:

The United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reach our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively again such terrorists to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country (US Department of State 2002).

The 'National Strategy for Combating Terrorism' is a detailed plan of action to deal with the terror groups. The document defines terrorism as:

premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, and declares: Our goal will be reached when Americans and other civilized people around the world can lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks. It pledges "a strategy of direct and continuous action against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of which will initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations (US Department of State (2003).

Deterrence based on retaliation would not work against the leaders of rogue states or terrorist states as they are more willing to take risks, playing with the lives of the people, and the wealth of the nations. The concept of deterrence will never work against a terrorist enemy whose strategy and tactics is nothing but the destruction and killing of innocent lives. The US administration was left with no choice as it has to deal with the states which sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD. There is time to reassert the role of American military strength which could deal with several challenges and the supreme aim is to defend the United States (Snauwaert 2004).

The Bush doctrine and the National Security Strategy of 2002 clearly envisaged the vision and strategy of the neo-conservatives. It reflected the mission outlined in the 1992 Defense strategy. So the invasion of Iraq did not only happen because it possessed WMD, or had linkages with the Al-Qaeda but was actually crafted decades ago by the policymakers of the US.

The following section analyses the extent to which Iraq really posed danger to the US and the global community. Iraq was invaded on the pretext that it posed a clear and imminent threat.

Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The US administration insisted to the world that the key rationale for the attack on Iraq was to track and destroy weapon of mass destruction (El- Shibiny 2010)

The Bush administration was confident in targeting Iraq by characteristics it as the manufacturer as well as the supplier of WMD to Al-Qaeda. The assumption was that either Iraq had WMD or Iraq is in the process of developing WMD programme. US Defense Department in Pentagon also claimed that there is a grave threat from Iraq's ballistic missile and it not only manufactures but also deploys its long range ballistic missile to the US in the near term (Ritchie and Roger 2007).

Iraq has been secretly building its nuclear programme as demonstrated by several publications. In November 2000 the Iraqi nuclear physicist Khidir Hamza claimed that Iraq is only few months short of developing the WMD. Later, he also specified that fact that Iraq has already constructed two nuclear weapons and is on the way to construct more (Reinckens 2000). The US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was convinced in February 2001 that Iraq was developing WMD, or at least intended to develop them at the first opportunity:

‘There’s no question but that Saddam Hussein and his regime have had an enormous appetite for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons over a sustained period of time. There’s nothing new about this. They have been, in varying degrees, successful in developing those types of capabilities’ (Ritchie and Roger 2007).

According to the dossier published by the British government on 24 September 2002, it mentioned that Iraq had kept left over stocks before the 1991 war, and it was continuing to pursue research and produce chemical and biological weapons. It has rebuilt its previously destroyed production plants and retained its previous employees who were engaged in manufacturing of the nuclear weapons prior to 1991 (Freedman 2004). ‘On the nuclear side, while the previous nuclear programme, based on gas centrifuge technology, were closed down, after the 1998 inspections, there, had been an active effort to acquire the components of this process as dual-use items’ (Freedman 2004).

Colin Powell articulated a more moderate interpretation of the threat from Iraq’s WMD. He too concluded that ‘we have to assume that he has never lost his goal or gone away from his goal of developing such weapons of mass destruction and that we know he is working on weapons of mass destruction, we know he has things squirreled away’ (Powell 2001). He was also convinced that Saddam Hussein was developing WMD, but in the meantime he was also equally convinced that threat from these programmes was not a grave or dangerous. He stated ‘we have no doubt in our mind that the Iraqi regime is pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction chemical, biological and nuclear. I think the best intelligence estimates suggest that they have not been terribly successful. There’s no question that they have some stockpiles of some of these sorts of weapons still under their control, but they have not been able to break out, they have not

been able to come out with the capacity to deliver these kinds of systems or to actually have these kinds of systems that is much beyond where they were 10 years ago' (Powell 2001).

Between the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and December 1998, the United Nations attempted to ensure that Iraq had fully disposed of all its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the capabilities to make those weapons. WMD included chemical weapons, such as poison gas and biological weapons that would carry diseases such as anthrax.

The legal formalities were initiated after the end of the first Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 687. 'The resolution mandated that Iraq destroy its entire biological, chemical and nuclear weapons stockpiles, dismantle all facilities that would allow the government to restart unconventional weapons development, destroy its missiles with range exceeding one hundred fifty kilometer' (UNSC Resolution 687 1991).

After the 1991 war, Iraq agreed to allow UN inspectors to come to Iraq to verify that the country had disposed of any and all WMDs (Carlisle 2003). It was found that inspectors who went for inspection to Iraq in 1991 were facing problems from the Hussein government and continued to hide chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programmes (Ritchie and Rogers 2007). This was one of the major arguments raised by the Bush administration before invading Iraq in 2003. As claimed by Condoleezza Rice that 'there is a reason that Saddam Hussein does not want weapons inspections in Iraq obviously he's got something to hide' (Rice 2002b).

It is important to discuss the facts of the early rounds of arms inspections by the UN. The United Nations hoped to verify the cooperation of Iraq in destroying its WMDs by sending international teams who would inspect Iraqi sites and confirm that Iraq was in the process of destroying the weapons (Georgiev 2011).

Between 1991 and 1998, a UN agency called the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), conducted the inspections, along with representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, although Iraq claimed to accept the inspectors and to cooperate, the Iraqi government attempted to prevent the inspection teams from actually

investigating and visiting its weapons programmes. Although, Iraq agreed to accept the inspection and confirmed its cooperation, in practice, it never followed and confined to the UN resolution. The inspection teams, without any cooperation, tried to track down and locate the existing weapons. Since the inspectors were unarmed and were not allowed to use force, it was feasible for the Iraqis to prevent the inspectors from gaining access to the specific buildings, factories, airfields, storage areas, or other sites that the inspectors believed weapons were manufactured (Georgiev 2011).

Throughout the second half of 1998, Iraq continued to obstruct UNSCOM and decided to suspend cooperation with both the UNSCOM and the IAEA. UNSCOM stated that it had not completed its work and could not give a clean chit to the Iraq. It is still ambiguous that it had fully disarmed its WMD and long-range ballistic missile programmes. As a result Iraq permanently ended the UNSCOM inspections in December 1998. Hence, while Saddam initially complied, in 1998, he expelled UN inspectors before they could inspect the sites and verify that the WMDs are fully destroyed. The US and the UK responded by launching *Operation Desert Fox*, a four day bombing campaign. In the address to the American people the then President of the US Bill Clinton explained his decision to bomb Iraq, ‘The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the wellbeing of his people, the peace of his region, and the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government, a government ready to live in peace with its neighbours, a government that respects the rights of its people’ (Gardner 2009). This was the brief discussion of the Iraq WMD programme and how it was unable to comply with the US, the UK and the UN. The behaviour and reluctance of the Iraqi government to destroy its WMD was one of the most significant reason for its invasion in 2003. The Bush administration has confirmed that the non-compliance of the Hussein government is in the direction of manufacturing weapons.

One year later the UNSC established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and in 2000 Hans Blix was named its head. Blix put together a team and began to prepare to go into Iraq at some point in the future.

On 16 September 2002, Baghdad said it would ‘unconditionally’ allow the return of inspectors, and on 18 November 2002 after nearly four years of absence, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were permitted to resume their inspection efforts. Iraqi officials were found cooperating significantly with the inspectors. Saddam's regime then delivered 12,000 printed pages and related material, such as CDs, on 7 December 2002. One of Saddam's generals declared Iraq to be ‘empty’ of WMDs. Saddam also made a televised apology for his 1990 invasion of Kuwait (Fawn 2007).

Within days of the Iraqi submission, British and the US officials questioned its reliability. US officials charged Iraq by terming its declaration a material breach of Resolution 1441. The Iraqi government responded by saying that the CIA could search Iraq for the alleged WMD). Iraq’s declaration was that it no longer possessed of unconventional weapons and had unilaterally destroyed them (Blix 2004). Hans Blix described the declaration as consisting of ‘reprints of declarations that had been sent to UNSCOM in the years before the inspectors left at the end of 1998’ (Blix 2004).

Saddam Hussein stated: ‘There is only one truth and therefore I tell you as I have said on many occasions before that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever...I would like to tell you directly and also through you to anyone who is interested to know that we have been in no relationship with Al-Qaeda’ (Hussein 2003). But, for the United States, the declaration amounted to a material breach as it did not include declarations on everything it believed to be outstanding. Hans Blix stated that he did not accept the point that the US and the UK’s repeated allegations that the Iraq used the time to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction. ‘It would be inappropriate for me to accept and adopt this position, but it would also be anive of me to conclude that there may be no veracity of course it is possible, I won’t go for as saying probable’ (Rai 2002).

Addressing the UNSC on 19 December 2002, IAEA former director Mohamed El-Baradei reported, ‘We still need much more cooperation from Iraq in terms of substance, in terms of providing evidence to exonerate itself that it is clean of weapons of mass destruction’ (Fawn 2007).

By the end of December 2002, the UN inspectors in Iraq declared that they had found nothing and inspectors had visited 150 sites throughout the country and had made surprise visits to thirteen sites identified by the US intelligence. Nevertheless, the United States did not aim to bring the crisis to a close and allowed the inspections process to continue.

In his State of the Union address on 28 January 2003, the US President Bush noted that the British government had learned that Saddam Hussein ‘recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa a charge that the White House retracted after the war’ (Bush 2003e). This claim was used to justify an attack on Iraq without UN authorisation. With the inspection process continuing, both the United States and the United Kingdom released intelligence dossiers on Iraq’s WMD capabilities in order to enhance domestic support against Iraq. The CIA’s and British Joint Intelligence Committee’s (JIC) dossiers asserted that Iraq was pursuing its unconventional weapon programmes and was in possession of nuclear weapons. The British government’s assessment stated that, based on UNSCOM reports, Iraq had failed to declare the following materials:

Up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare programme, were unique to the production of VX; growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured); over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents (Wright 2007).

On 12 February 2003, the UN weapons inspectors announced that they had found Iraqi Samoud-2 missiles that slightly exceeded the range permitted by the 1991 cease-fire Saddam consented to destroy them. The US and the UK showed no faith on him. By 14 February 2003, Blix could report to the Security Council that there was no serious evidence that Iraq was failing to comply with the inspections, indeed one hundred seventy-seven inspections, which took some three hundred samples from one hundred twenty-five locations, showed consistency with Iraqi declarations (Fawn 2007).

In June 2004, Blix condemned the intelligence dossiers given to weapons inspectors by the United States and Britain, saying it showed no evidence of WMDs. He went further, in accusing

the United States of undermining his attempt to conduct a clear and honest inspection. David Kay, as head of the group surveying Iraq for the evidence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 'gave up the search, declaring 'we were all wrong' (Kay 2004).

Condoleezza Rice repeated the same, stating, 'I think that what we have is evidence that there are differences between what we knew going in and what we found on the ground' (Rice 2004). The 9/11 Commission report of 16 June 2004 reaffirmed that there was 'no credible evidence that Iraq and Al-Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States (National Commission On Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). But by then, of course, the war had not only been waged, but also been considered officially over.

The nexus between Iraq and Al-Qaeda

The next argument presented by the Bush administration was the nexus between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. It was argued that Saddam Hussein might supply WMDs to terrorists. Bush stated 'Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group' (Bush 2002b). The worry is that a few despotic states Iraq in particular, but also Iran and North Korea will develop capabilities to produce weapons of mass destruction and put these weapons in the hands of terrorists. The regimes themselves may be deterred from using such capabilities, but they might pass along these weapons to terrorist networks that are not deterred (Ikenberry 2002). It was feared that the terrorist group acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction from Iraqi stockpiles was the major reason for the 2003 invasion (Hoffman 2001a).

President George W. Bush declared in September 2002:

that you can't distinguish between Al-Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about terrorism. They are both equally as bad and equally as evil and equally as destructive. The danger is that Al-Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam's madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapon of mass destruction around the world (Bush 2002c).

The US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in a formal address to the North Atlantic Council also declared 'Al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist network that threatens us' (Rumsfeld 2001). He subsequently spoke about 'an emergence between terrorist networks, terrorist networks, terrorist states and weapon of mass destruction that can make mighty adversaries of small or

impoverished states and even relatively small group of individuals' (Record 2003). Similarly, the Pentagon persistently asserted that Saddam Hussein was in league with Al-Qaeda, and cast serious doubt on the utility of coordinated action through the UNSC, particularly a new round of weapons inspections.

The CIA was prepared to acknowledge that there could be closer relations between Al-Qaeda and Iraq. But Saddam Hussein would be very unlikely to join hands with Osama Bin Laden. He and Bin Laden are enemies as Bin Laden did not recognise him as a true Muslim but an apostate as he wanted Kuwait oil for his own (Mann 2003).

George W. Bush in his book *Decision Points* mentioned that he received a news that Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi which is an Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist and who had experimented with biological weapons in Afghanistan, was operating a lab in north-eastern Iraq. Suspect facilities in this area may be producing poison and toxins for terrorist use. AL-Zarqawi is an active terrorist planner who has targeted US and Israeli interests: Sensitive reporting from a classified service indicates that Al-Zarqawi has been directing efforts to smuggle an unspecified chemical material originating in northern Iraq into the United States (Bush 2010).

In 2001 Rumsfeld reasserted that Iraq was an enemy of the United States. He criticised Iraq for it of sponsoring and providing safe havens to the terrorists. He had acknowledged Iraq as one of the few countries in the world which is actively pursuing chemical and biological weapons programmes and shared a good amount of relationship with terrorist networks (Rumsfeld 2001a).

Rumsfeld termed:

Iraq a WMD state, firmly linked it to international terrorism (though not at this stage directly to Al-Qaeda). We know that Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy – the United States of America. We know that Iraq and Al-Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some Al-Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior Al-Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America diplomacy, or any other strategy, could force Saddam to change his ways (Rumsfeld 2001a).

Paul Wolfowitz in his testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee clearly carved out the threat perception from Iraq. He stated:

The terrorist movements and totalitarian regimes of the world have a variety of motives and goals. But the same thing unites our enemies today, as it did in the past: a desire to see America driven into retreat and isolation. Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il and other such tyrants all want to see America out of critical regions of the world, constrained from coming to the aid of friends and allies, and unable to project power in the defense of our interests and ideals (Wolfowitz 2001).

He went on to argue, 'It is no coincidence that the states harbouring, financing and otherwise assisting terrorists, are also in many cases the same states that are aggressively working to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them' (Wolfowitz 2001). For Wolfowitz this, threat was equivalent to threat faced during the Cold war.

Both Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld were determined and strived hard to find proof linkages between Iraq and 11 September 2001. Soon after the attacks they sent Defense Policy Board member and former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, to gather evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the attacks on 11 September 2001 develop and articulate plans to investigate Iraq's possible role in the attacks on behalf of the Bush administration. Woolsey argued that Saddam Hussein was involved in the attempted bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. He was also probably behind the postal anthrax attacks from September to November 2001 and that Iraqi intelligence agents met with Al-Qaeda leaders in the months leading up to 11 September 2001 (Ritchie and Roger 2007).

Few days after the attack on 11 September 2001, Woolsey confirmed that the attack was 'sponsored, supported and perhaps even ordered by Saddam Hussein' (Woolsey 2001). He was determined that Iraq should be invaded in the name of war on terrorism. 'First there is a need to bring a regime change in Afghanistan then it would be feasible and accurate to I seriously consider moving toward a regime change in Iraq and overthrowing the regime of Saddam's (Ritchie and Roger 2007).

Khidhir Hamza, an Iraqi nuclear physicist and the President of the Council on Middle Eastern Affairs affirmed that Iraq had an active nuclear and WMD programme which could develop a

weapon by 2005. He added that Bin Laden was a frequent visitor to the Iraqi Embassy in Khartoum during his stay in Sudan until 1996 (Mallik 2012). This was taken as credible evidence to draw a connection between Saddam Hussein and Bin Laden.

The IISS Strategic Dossier, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment*, published in September 2002, provided a detailed account of the perspective before the invasion of Iraq. It was estimated that as the Iraq's government did not cooperate in inspection, it could be assured that there might be growth in biological weapon agents and possibly thousands of anthrax. Iraq was also suspected chemical weapons of few hundred tones of mustard gas and few hundred tones of sarin. It should be possible that the manufacture of both biological and chemical weapons have resumed. On the production of nuclear weapon there is no possibility because it is not feasible to produce fissile materials and these would require ample time and aid from foreign sources. Only if it get obtains fissile material from foreign sources, then only Iraq could produce weapons (IISS Strategic Dossier 2002).

For the US, the evidence of Saddam's involvement would have provided sufficient justification for an immediate attack on Iraq. For Wolfowitz the world had changed after 11 September 2001 and Saddam now categorically had to be overthrown even if he was not found guilty in the terror attack of 11 September 2001. This was the voice that echoed throughout 2002 as the Iraq invasion was not about the threat elimination but the US and its allies constructed Iraq as a threat to the world community.

In his address to the UN on 12 September 2002 George W. Bush claimed that

Al-Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq. He further claimed that Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminium tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon and that Iraq also possess a force of Scud type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 km permitted by the UN. Work at production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long range missiles that could inflict mass death throughout the region. However given an ultimatum to the Iraqi regime, Bush emphasised more on other issues related to justice, humanitarianism and liberty (Bush 2002d).

He further asserted:

We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they [UN inspectors] left?

The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take. Here the President presented Iraq's possession of WMD as a solid fact and rested his argument on two important assumptions: that Baghdad began producing WMD after inspectors left the country in 1998 and that Baghdad would be wholly uncooperative. Valid as these assumptions were, based on the historical record and intelligence assessments, they were still assumptions rather than irrefutable facts (Bush 2002d).

On 7 October 2002 GW Bush reiterated that there was significant nuclear threat cannot from Iraq:

Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists a group he calls his nuclear *mujahideen* his nuclear holy warriors. Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud (Bush 2003).

Addressing the UN Security Council on the US case against Iraq on 5 February 2003, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell said:

But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbours a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants. ...We are not surprised that Iraq is harbouring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decade's long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and Al-Qaeda (Powell 2003).

The above mentioned account makes it clear that it was the Bush administration which firmly argued that Iraq is working closely with Al-Qaeda. Although much of the evidence found was contested or fragmentary, it could not be ignored. If it is taken together it suggests that at least some degree of cooperation was going on between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. It was assumed that at the very least, it appears that Iraq has kept its options open in anticipation of a war with the United States. They might differ but their mutual interests or common enemy in a time of conflict or war suggest the idea that it would create the possibility that Iraq could offer Al-Qaeda financial or logistical support. It will allow Al-Qaeda to use its already extensive network more effectively. Saddam may also believe that by aiding or helping Al-Qaeda, he can distract the United States and prevent the Bush Administration from going to war against him (Byman 2003).

The United Nations Security Council on 8 November 2002 unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, which provided the last opportunity for Iraq to comply with UN demands. The document stated that, first Iraq has been and remains in material breach of relevant resolutions. Second it has provided final opportunity to comply and thirdly Iraq will face serious consequences if it fails to comply (UNSC Resolution 1441 2002)

While threatening with ‘serious consequences,’ Resolution 1441 did not authorise the use of military force or invasion of Iraq and neither did the Security Council follow up with another resolution sanctioning such drastic measures. Thus, the only scenario under which the use of military force would have been justified by international law, if Iraq would have physically initiated a military war and forced the United States to act for its self-defence or in collaboration with other states is collective defence. Since the end of the First Gulf War, this situation never occurred. Thus, as far as international law is concerned, the invasion of Iraq was illegal (Freedman 2004).

One of the Bush administration’s central arguments after the UN speech was that the world had changed after attacks on 11 September 2001 to the extent that containment is not feasible in context of the present situation with regard to Iraq the policy of containment was totally unacceptable.

On 8 October 2002, Bush commented that the world had changed: ‘People are concerned about Saddam, and I understand that’, he said. ‘But a lot of Americans have understood that the dynamics have shifted since 11 years ago, because of what happened on September the 11th. No longer are we secure’ (Bush 2002e).

In the January 2003 State of the Union address, Bush stated that thus:

Iraq could no longer be contained: Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadow terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes (Bush 2003a).

The US government has also implicitly argued that since war has changed so dramatically, we need to expect and accept different ethical, legal, and military standards, such as pre-emptive strikes and military tribunals where suspected terrorists may not even know the evidence against them. Thus, apart from practical issues raised by the attacks on 11 September 2001 and the US military response, the war has transformed (Crawford 2003).

In a testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 26 September 2002 Powell explained that ‘9/11 had changed the security calculus of the administration: ‘a new reality was born’. He commented, ‘We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction could empower a few terrorists with those weapons to threaten millions of innocent people’ (Powell2002). For that very reason this time Iraq had to comply with UN resolutions or face ‘decisive action to compel compliance (Ritchie and Rogers 2007).

The threat posed by this nexus was restated several times and the UN and governments around the world debated the US case for confronting and attacking Iraq.

Saddam is a “man who would use weapons of mass destruction at the drop of a hat, a man who would be willing to team up with terrorist organizations with weapons of mass destruction to threaten America’. ‘The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist organizations. And there are Al-Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. Saddam as ‘addicted’ to weapons of mass destruction. Iraq and al-Qaida have had high-level contacts that go back a decade’, that ‘Iraq has trained al-Qaida members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases’, and that ‘confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror’. Saddam ‘is a man who would like nothing more than to team up with a terrorist network; a man who could use a terrorist network perhaps to use the weapons of mass destruction he’s developed’, and that Saddam ‘would like to use al-Qaida as a forward army’. Iraq had provided al-Qaida with chemical and biological weapons training and was harbouring a terrorist network, headed by a senior al-Qaida terrorist planner (Kozaryn 2002).

Vice President Dick Cheney was eager to link Iraq, WMD and Al-Qaeda:

‘We’ve already found confirmation that the Al-Qaida terrorists are pursuing weapons of mass destruction. At the same time there’s a danger of terror groups joining together with the regimes that have or are seeking to build such weapons. In Iraq, we know that Saddam Hussein is pressing forward with these capabilities. Iraq was ‘producing chemical and biological weapons and aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons programmes while also working to develop long-range missiles” (Cheney 2002).

He repeated this assertion, stating that ‘there was ‘a grave danger that Al-Qaeda or other terrorists will join with outlaw regimes that have these weapons to attack their common enemy, the United States of America. That is why confronting the threat posed by Iraq is not a distraction from the war on terror. It is absolutely crucial to winning the war on terror’. Bush and Cheney were joined by Rice who claimed that there was a concrete relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaeda and that Iraq provided training to Al-Qaeda in chemical weapons development (Freedman 2004).

In a testimony before the House and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Wolfowitz was equally resolute: ‘separating out the issue of Iraq as not part of the war on terrorism is a mistake. They really are part of a piece’ (Wolfowitz 2002). He professed:

It is hard to see how we can expect to be successful in the long run if we leave Iraq as a sanctuary for terrorists and its murderous dictator. Saddam Hussein supports and conspires with our terrorist enemies. He lends them both moral and material support. Disarming Saddam Hussein and fighting the war on terror are not merely related, they are one and the same. If we can defeat a terrorist regime in Iraq it will be a defeat for terrorists globally (Wolfowitz 2004).

Upon analysing the statements by Bush, Cheney and Wolfowitz “the potential nexus between Iraq, WMD and terrorist groups evolved into a concrete nexus between Iraq, WMD and al-Qaida itself, rather than just ‘an al-Qaida-type organization” (Ritchie and Rogers 2007).

In a formal news conference on 6 March, 2003, just days before the invasion of Iraq, the President of the US linked the case for war against Iraq to the attacks on 11 September 2001 attacks, implying that Saddam Hussein would replicate them once he got nuclear weapons.

Saddam is a threat. And we’re not going to wait until he does attack. Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction are a direct threat to this country. If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi regime . . . free nations would assume immense and unacceptable risks. The attacks of September 11, 2001, showed what enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what . . . terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction.” Saddam Hussein is a threat to our nation. September the 11th changed the--the strategic thinking, at least as far as I was concerned, for how to protect the country. We could think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror. September the 11th should say to the

American people that we're now a battlefield that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organisation could be deployed here at home (Bush 2003b).

Thus the reasons for the attack on Iraq could be understood. First, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated UN Security Council Resolutions which was passed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. Second, evidence gathered by the US and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraqi regime possessed and concealed some of the most lethal weapons ever devised, to be used against Iraqi people and Iraq's neighbours. Third, Iraq must unconditionally accept the destruction and removal under international supervision, of all chemical and biological weapons. Fourth, Iraq failed to destroy all the ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. Sixth, Saddam Hussein supports terrorism, and terrorist organisations and should be prevented from operating in Iraq.

The Congress authorised President Bush of the US to invade Iraq because of a National Intelligence Estimate released in 2002 with regard to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme:

In its summary, it declared, 'We the senior analysts from CIA who prepared the estimate judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes in defiance of the UN resolutions and restrictions. Iraq has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade' (National Intelligence Estimate 2002). The document added, 'Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons efforts, energised its missile programs, and invested in biological weapons; in view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstructing its nuclear program,'. While concluding that 'If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a year' (National Intelligence Estimate 2002).

The US-UK alliance launched a 'pre-emptive attack' against Iraq as the Saddam regime was supposed to have violated UN Security Council Resolutions and posed a threat to international peace and security (El-Shibiny 2010). The operation was named as *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.

Criticism

The Iraqi invasion and the war on terror resulted from a combination of two main reasons. These reasons rested upon two key underlying themes: “American fear, which arose out of an inflated threat assessment of terrorism vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein; and an American sense of responsibility, to protect the world’ (Jervis 2005).

This was the major argument on which the invasion of Iraq took place. However, after the invasion no WMD was found therefore it could be concluded that the main aim was just to maintain American hegemony.

Richard Clarke who headed the counter-terrorism team of the administration Clinton and Bush regimes has written in his memoirs that Defence chief Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz declared well before the attack on 11 September 2001 that Iraqi terrorism was more threatening than Al-Qaeda. He added that immediately after the attack on 11 September 2001 the administration became ‘obsessed’ by Iraq. He stated that only nine days after Bush was in support to attack Iraq and said that as soon as, Afghanistan is dealt, it will turn to Iraq (Mann 2003). Clarke stated that ‘the attacks in Iraq, to Al-Qaeda was like invading Mexico after the Japanese attack at Pearl harbor in 1941’ (Clarke 2004).

In the opinion of Bob Woodward, it was within days of the 11 September 2001 attacks that Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz began advocating military action against Iraq (Woodward 2002).

Iraq had no intention to launch an attack against its neighbours or the UK or the US. There was no intelligence evidence of significant holding of chemical weapons, biological weapon or nuclear weapon. Iraq’s ability to launch a WMD or any form of attack was very limited. The British government exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMD. It was wrong on the part on them that Saddam Hussein could deploy chemical or biological weapon (Bonney 2008).

In his memoir, George Tenet, the then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the writing of the report confessed: ‘Yes, we at CIA had been wrong in believing that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction’ (Tenet 2007). Al-Qaeda, had it possessed a deliverable nuclear weapon, would have used it on 11 September 2001. But the

record for the rogue states are clear as none of them has ever used WMD against an enemy who is capable of inflicting unacceptable retaliatory damage (Tenet 2007).

Finally the US President Bush too regretted on his part for invading Iraq in his book *Decision Points* (Bush 2010). He stated that he was wrong on his part to invade Iraq as no WMD was found:

When Saddam did not use weapon on our troops, I was relieved. When we did not discover the stockpiles soon after the fall of Baghdad, I was surprised. When the whole summer passed without finding an , I was alarmed. The press corps constantly raised the question, “Where are the WMD?. “So Bush Lied, People Died. The charge was illogical entry? If I wanted to mislead the country into war, why would I pick an allegation that was certain to be disproven publicly shortly after we invaded the country? The charge was also dishonest. Members of the previous administration, John Kerry, John Edwards and the vast majority of Congress had all read the same intelligence that I had concluded Iraq had WMD. So had intelligences around the world. Nobody was lying. We were all wrong. The absence of WMD stockpiles did not change the fact that Saddam was a threat. No one was more shocked or angry than I was when we did not find the weapons. I had a sickening feeling every time, I thought about it (Bush 2010).

John Bolton, the former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, also said that the aim in Washington was to topple Saddam Hussein regardless of whether or not he allowed the UN inspectors back in to complete the disarmament process. Bolton maintained: ‘Let there be no mistake, while we also insist on the re-introduction of the weapons inspectors, our policy at the same time insists on regime change in Baghdad and that policy will not be altered whether inspectors go in or not’ (Aruri 2002).

French Judge Jean Louis Bruguerre also was convinced that there is no evidence of links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda and if there would have been any link, it would have been detected. Senior Al-Qaeda leaders who were under charge and was facing trial denied any linkages between Iraq and Al-Qaeda and any possibility of joint operations (Mann 2003). Therefore it is noted that, under the US threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against the US troops in the 1991 Gulf war. The US-led Iraq Survey Group, whose work formally terminated in December 2004, determined that Iraq did not possess active WMD programmes, although it retained the intention and capabilities to reconstitute them (Central Intelligence Agency 2007).

The fact is that Saddam Hussein did use chemical weapons in the 1980s against Kurds and Iranian infantry. However, he did not use it against the US forces or Israel during the Gulf War in 1991. In building linkages with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, the Bush administration unnecessarily widened the GWOT by launching a war against Iraq. It was against a state that was not at war with the United States and that posed no direct or imminent threat to the United States.

Bush too concluded that things went wrong in Iraq. He outlined two reasons

The first is that we did not respond more quickly or aggressively when the security situation started to deteriorate after Saddam's regime fell. In the ten months following the invasion, we cut troops level and the troops focused on training the Iraqi army and police not protecting the Iraqi people. By reducing the troops presence and focusing on training Iraqi's, advertently allowed the insurgency to gain momentum. Then Al-Qaeda fighters flocked to Iraq seeking a new safe haven which made our mission both more difficult and more important. The other error was the intelligence failure on Iraq's WMD. Almost a decade later, it is hard to describe how widespread an assumption it was that Saddam had WMD. Supporters of the war believed it; opponents of the war believed it; even members of Saddam's own regime believed it. We all knew that intelligence is never 100 percent certain; that the nature of the business. But I believed that the intelligence on Iraq's WMD was solid. If Saddam did not have WMD why would not he just prove it to the inspectors? Every psychological profile I had read told me Saddam was a survivor. If he cared so much about staying in power, why would he gamble his regime by pretending to have WMD? (Bush 2010).

The attack on Iraq in 2003 by the US led coalition. It created an uncertain global security climate, especially in the Muslim world. An unintended result of the invasion saw the emergence of Iraq as one of the most important global centres of terrorism, insurgency and extremist activity. Yet another serious consequence was the spread of terrorism to surrounding neighbouring countries of Iraq. The aim of the war was countering threats but the result seems different (Acharya and Katsumata 2011).

The United States had to reframe the original purpose of the war on terror. It was always suggested by certain scholars that the US grand strategy should be focused on creating a global anti-terror regime that involves commitments by the major allies such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia rather than on by overthrowing the government and bringing about regime change in rogue states that may cooperate with terrorists (Boyle 2008). The Bush administration could

have envisaged alternatives approach to deal with terrorism. The approach favoured military men, intelligence agencies. This approach proved to be disastrous for civil liberties ended up as anti-women and lacked any depth of analysis. It actually played into the hands of terrorists and was oppressive towards whole categories of people such as Arabs and Muslims' (Smith 2009).

It is significant to understand who the enemy is and what this so called war is about. The Bush administration did not distinguish between Muslims and Al-Qaeda. Not all Muslims are Al-Qaeda and not all terrorists are from Al-Qaeda. In other words, the strategy is that it should not extend the terrorist threat beyond those who directly threaten the United States. 'There is a need to understand and make these distinctions to differentiate between those who pose a genuine threat and those who pose little or no threat' (Pena 2004).

Conclusion

Afghanistan definitely showed signs of threats. The attack on 11 September 2001 involved the hijacking of the, aircraft, kidnapping of the passengers and massive destruction of civilian and government property. The Al-Qaeda clearly mounted threat to the innocent civilians and above all it violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United States. Afghanistan served as a safe haven for terrorists. The Bush administration of the US was just in eliminating threats.

The attacks on 11 September 2001 proved that the US was threatened by a dangerous and undeterrable enemy with offensive capabilities. Al-Qaeda demonstrated conclusively that it is not only willing but also capable of striking at the heart of major cities and inflicting dangers.

The Bush administration is undoubtedly justified in responding to the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. The threat was Al-Qaeda not Iraq and the attack on Iraq was not called for. Even before 11 September 2001, the political leadership of the US was keen to invade Iraq. The US intelligence community and the neo-conservatives actively looked for links between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, as well as between Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.

Therefore it is clear that Bush administration considered 11 September 2001 as an opportunity to mobilise support for war on terror thereby could realising the aspirations of enhancing military strength. Thus, in order to make war just, the US turned the war on terrorism against Iraq and claimed that Saddam Hussein was linked to Al-Qaeda and was actively developing Weapons of Mass Destruction and hence represented an imminent threat to the United States. Everybody now knew that the depiction of Iraq as a threat to the United States was false. The unwillingness of the Bush administration to listen to the experts who disagreed with the claims of possession of WMD indicates that the war was a mistake just led to fulfill US imperial interests.

Terrorism posed an enormous threat to national security and the country must be protected. The suicide bombers found US unprepared but after the attack appropriate steps have taken place. However, the war on terror did little to stop terrorism; on the other hand it used terror as a pretext for waging a war. The war on terrorism as pursued by the Bush administration cannot be won, because it is based on false hopes. The war on terrorism is more likely to bring a permanent state of war. Terrorists are invisible; they cannot be eliminated. In effect, terrorism and the war on terror has generated a vicious circle of unending violence

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Chapter Two

Choices in the War on Terror

This chapter examines the correlation, if any, between the strategic choices of the intervening states and the war, as it happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. It examines whether the war on terror was to counter the threats sponsored from terrorism or to fulfil the vested interests of the western powers. The purpose of the study is to analyse the manner in which the war on terror is symbolised as legitimate and investigate the other purposes of waging the war on terror. It is plausible that potential threats could have triggered the war but the strategic interests of the US and its allies might have played a significant role under the pretext of the war on terror.

The chapter dwells on whether the aim was far beyond from countering threats in Afghanistan and Iraq or the real aim was not only to change the regime but to redraw the geo-strategic and political maps of the world. The idea of the US strategic motives in the post Cold War strategy was evident with the disintegration of the USSR, when the US emerges as the most powerful state. Therefore it was crucial to preserve this dominance by preventing the emergence of rivals in both economical and geopolitical spheres. These rivals are included from the Middle East/Persian Gulf, Europe and Latin America.

the goal was to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the re-emergence of a global threat to the interests of the United States and the allies. These regions include Europe, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Latin America. The consolidated, nondemocratic control of the resources of such a critical region could generate a significant threat to our security (Cheney 1993).

Since the terror attacks on considerable attention 11 September, 2001 attention and debate has been around the issue of terrorism but a very little discussion has been taken about other aspects which have to be paid due importance. There were other interests which were also fulfilled in the name of war on terror. Afghanistan and Iraq oil and gas reserves are important dimensions which played a significant role in the war on terror. Afghanistan, Iraq both the states serve important strategic locations and it might be the point that threats were not the only reason for the invasion. As in the previous chapter we have already concluded that threats do play a certain role in

Afghanistan but in the case of Iraq threats were constructed. So this chapter analyses the factor of the war on terror with the aid of second variable: Choices

The geo-strategic locations of Afghanistan makes it a probable transit route of oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea including the construction of pipeline through Afghanistan, which would keep Russia as well as Europe out of these supply routes. The oil reserves in Iraq are more easily accessible than those in Central Asia as it has the second largest reserves of oil and strong calculus to occupy Syria which attains a much larger oil reserve than Iraq. The invasion of both these countries marked the return of the era of the nineteenth century imperialist conquest to control key economic resources (Ahmad 2004).

The importance of Central Asia is well articulated by the Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State. Elizabeth Jones who thus stated that the:

United States currently has three sets of security interests in Central Asia: 1) security (antiterrorism, non-proliferation, combating drug trafficking); 2) energy (ensuring reliable and economically viable access to global markets and the use of energy revenues to promote sustainable development); and 3) internal reform (including democratization and market-oriented changes) (Jones 2003).

Central Asia and the Caspian basin, contain the hydrocarbon reserves to be equivalent to roughly ten percent of the total world reserves of oil and gas. Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan contain much of the natural gas reserves. The US depends on Central Asia and the Caspian region for as much as three fourths of its requirements of oil. If the US wanted to secure this oil and gas it has to be transported either through Russia or Azerbaijan or Iran. It would bring no benefit to the western powers. China would also not serve as strategic or economic route for the supply of gas. Therefore Afghanistan serves as the best route for the oil and gas of the Central Asia to reach US (Thakurta 2003).

Afghanistan as the land-locked country lies in the path of any pipeline that seeks to transport these reserves to different parts of the world, including South Asia but itself possesses negligible oil and gas reserves, The northern neighbours of Afghanistan, particularly Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, reportedly possess huge hydrocarbon reserves which could be beneficial to global

oil and gas supplies. Afghanistan and its strategic locations are well vested with the strategic motives of the US.

The invasion of Afghanistan is certainly a counter terrorism strategy against terrorism. But Afghanistan is also a requisite to a regional control and the transport of oil in Central Asia. Afghanistan has some oil and gas of its own, but not enough to ascertain as a major strategic concern. Its northern neighbour states, in fact, contain reserves which could determine future global supply (Ahmad 2004). So the strategy was to use Afghanistan as a strategic locator so that it could provide easy passage to these states.

The US wanted to obtain access to the oil and gas reserves from the oilfields from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to Afghanistan and Pakistan. These oil fields are estimated to contain around two hundred billion barrels of oil and Central Asia has approximately around trillion cubic meters of natural gas yet to be exploited. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are the two major producers. Turkmenistan is even known as a 'gas republic'. It is not only rich in oil and gas but also there is huge reserve of copper, coal, tungsten, zinc, iron, uranium, gold. The only export routes, passes and are through Russia and so most of the strategy consists of building alternative pipelines to Turkey and Western Europe, and to the east toward the Asian markets. 'The oil and gas reserves of Central Asia have been controlled by Russia. The Bush government wanted to change that' (Thakurta 2003).

The next important question is of pipeline which will determine the flow of oil and the states that will benefit from it. Caspian basin has pipeline going through the Russia and the US aims to change the design. The US would never aim that its dominance would be diminished slightly due to the dominance of the Russia. After all, in these regions there is the question of pipelines, which substantially determine which way the oil flows and who immediately benefits from it. The US would like to build pipelines through Afghanistan towards the Arabian Sea, keeping Russia as well as Europe out of these supply routes, but the problem is that Afghanistan is landlocked and the pipelines in this direction must then pass through Iran (the shortest route) or Pakistan neither of which the US currently finds reliable. In the meanwhile, the US prefers the building of a system of oil and gas lines starting through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and then

running under the Caspian Sea to Baku, then through Georgia and Turkey to Mediterranean (Ahmad 2004).

This would keep Russia out but it would bring benefits to Europe. The direction of pipelines plays a very important role as its geopolitical importance should not be ignored. The construction and direction of pipelines brings global dominance as China could also construct pipelines conceivably from the Caspian Basin to the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which China would like to develop industrially. Those same pipelines could probably be extended across China to take oil and gas to its coastal regions and then beyond that to Japan. The construction of such a pipeline would be very expensive but as result, China and Japan could be free of US domination over their supplies. The US would never allow such possibilities because this domination could decrease the US dominance in the East and South East Asia and would lead a vast zone of industrialised countries both by ousting the US from the region (Legett 2005).

Thus owing to its strategic location Afghanistan would serve as an important door to mark an entrance to these states. Its strategic location could not be ignored when analysing the factors as after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the goal lies in to establish the dominance of one superpower, the US. As the author Ahmed Rashid has documented, 'the US oil company Unocal has sought to build oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan and into Pakistani ports on the Arabian Sea since 1995'. The company's programme requisite was a single administration in Afghanistan, which would guarantee safe passage for its goods. Soon after the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996, the *Telegraph* reported that the oil industry stated that strategy of constructing a pipeline across Afghanistan is the main reason why Pakistan, a close political ally of the US was so supportive of the Taliban, and why America is quietly planning its strategy of conquering Afghanistan (Ahmed 2002).

In 1998, Dick Cheney, the then chief executive of a major oil services company who later became the Vice President of the US during the tenure of George W. Bush remarked, 'I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian' (Monbiot 2001). However the oil and gas is useless until it is transported to the desired place. The transportation of the Caspian region fossil fuel through Russia or Azerbaijan would greatly enhance Russia's political and economic control over the Central Asian states, which is surely the western powers, did not want to happen. The pipelines

through Afghanistan would allow the US both to pursue its aim of transporting oil supply' and to step into the world's most expensive markets floating with oil and gas (McCoy 2003).

In February 1998, Unocal's oil company visualised that in regard to the growing demand of energy in Asia and in the context of Iran being gripped with economic sanctions, 'the only other possible route for Caspian oil was through Afghanistan' (Monbiot 2001).

The US policy later changed due to severe criticism from feminists and green organisations. They started campaigning against both Unocal's plans and the government's secret support for oil exploration in Afghanistan. The Unocal company, still hoped to build a thousand mile pipeline, which would carry a million barrels a day. Only in December 1998, four months after the bombings on the embassy in East Africa, the Unocal Company was forced to drop its plans. However, Afghanistan's strategic importance did not diminish.

In September 2001, a few days before the attack on the US and its centres, a report prepared by the American Energy Information Administration stated: 'Afghanistan is significant from an energy point of view due to its geographical position which served as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. This potential includes the possible construction of oil and natural gas export pipelines through Afghanistan' (Lawson 2003). According to Professor Michael T. Klare, through its military operations in Afghanistan, the US wanted to achieve two sets of objectives: 'First, to capture and punish those responsible for the 11 September 2001 attacks, and to prevent further acts of terrorism; and second to consolidate US power in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea area, and to ensure continued flow of oil. While the second set may get far less public attention than the first, this does not mean that is any less important' (Klare 2006).

The US domination over Afghanistan 'is the key to the western domination of Asia and would thwart the growing ambitions of both Russia and China in this regard' (Monbiot 2001). The US government is justified in its attempt to weed out terrorism in Afghanistan by military force but it would be wrong to think that the invasion is only centred on combating terrorism as there are many other strategic interests which the US is fulfilling in the name of war on terror. It is clear from the analysis that the strategic objectives of the US in greater Central Asia are several. It must advance the security linked infrastructure and enable Afghanistan to protect itself and its

neighbours from drug traffickers (Starr 2005). The other aim is to strengthen the institution mechanism of the government so that the region can serve as a politico- economic bridge between the Middle East and southern and eastern Asia. The idea is to develop regional trade and adequate transport and infrastructural facilities. The US must encourage participatory political systems and a democratic regime in Afghanistan so that it can serve as models for other countries especially the Muslim countries.

The attack and occupation of Afghanistan provided a chance to the United States to transform Afghanistan and the entire region into a democratic structure which would share viable market economies, based on secular and plural society, and the most important aspect, maintain friendly relations with the United States. The US motive to promote democratic institutions and practices must be presented in a way which could see the invasion not as a process of fulfilling its strategic choices but also countering threats and an opportunity to redesign the states according to their own set of ideas and values. Central Asia, due to its strategic location creates a dilemma relating to the tradeoff between democracy and security in US foreign policy. The US need for military bases and other forms of security cooperation in the region has drawn it much closer to the dictatorial leaders of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

After the destruction of the Taliban government and elimination of Al-Qaeda leaders from Afghanistan, the US had not only combated terrorism, but also controlled the growing ambitions of both Russia and China. Afghanistan, as ever, is the key to the western domination of Asia.

The attacks on 11 September 2001 benefited powerful vested interests in the US and the West. The US military-industrial complex gained immensely from the enormously increased defence budget that was adopted after the attacks. The US went to war with Afghanistan, toppled the Taliban and restored the drugs trade together and inherited the immense important strategic base. None of this would have been possible without the war on terror. The American people would not have accepted the unnecessarily large defence budget of the Bush administration unless 11 September attack had created the perception of a grave external threat to America. In the name of threat and self defence other strategic interests were also fulfilled.

The viable reason provided for waging the war was countering threats by destroying Taliban and Al-Qaeda and establishing a democratic regime but the picture was not as simple it was portrayed. There were several interests, choices and motives which had to be fulfilled as in the war against terrorism. The strategic locations of Central Asia, Persian Gulf reserves and geopolitics of oil had generated a huge deal of motivation to attack these both states.

Though dispersed, Al-Qaeda network might survive as a threat for security. However, it had lost its strength and its power is greatly decreased. Any future potential and attack emanating from Al-Qaeda could be easily contained. 'From the US perspective, it was an advantage to them because in the name of war on terror and overthrowing the Taliban government, the US is immensely engaged in the establishment of basing facilities in several Central Asian states'(Rogers 2011). The base would provide long-term association with these states and would influence in enhancing the region of fossil fuel reserves which is otherwise liable to be excessively influenced by two potential competitors, China and Russia (Rogers 2011).

Oil as the Energy Source

In earlier days, fuel wood was the primary source of energy, but as technology developed and new innovation introduced the pattern of production, transportation, work, and leisure, coal energy replaced fuel wood as the primary energy source throughout much of the world. It accounted altogether for seventy-five percent of total global energy consumption in the early part of the twentieth century. Oil accounted for less than a third of global energy production in 1950, but no one would have imagined that twenty years later, it rapidly replaced coal as the major commercial energy source. The reasons for the shift from coal to oil were conspicuous. The energy produced from oil is cleaner, more efficient, and less expensive than coal. The coal cost rose rapidly due to labour demands for higher wages and better working conditions. Coal was not environment friendly and to adhere to the use of coal, strict rules to protect the environment had to be followed. Coal also needs the implementation of more costly safety standards aimed at protecting workers in the industry (Rose 2004).

Furthermore, the development of the internal combustion engine in the early part of the twentieth century and the availability of cheap oil on the global market relative to other sources of energy, made oil the primary source of fuel for industrialisation in the North. The United States, with

enormous petroleum resources, led to the development of oil-based technologies, primarily in the automobile, manufacturing, and petrochemical industries (Rose 2004).

Oil has become a major fuel and most probably the most indispensable raw material of contemporary civilisation. It has become so important that it started influencing policies of the states. After the Cold War, oil played a significant role in determining state policies and maintaining relations with the other states (Rose 2004).

Oil as a Strategic Source

In contemporary times, oil started playing a pivotal role in everyday life and work in the developed world by its use in each and every work. So the strategy has been to search for new sources from where oil could be explored. The United States, which is one of the developed regions of the world, had to secure its oil reserves so that it could maintain its preeminence in the world. Control of oil played a vital role in establishing and maintaining US predominance in the international system.

The Gulf region has been a centre of international oil politics. First, the British fought to gain control over the area's petroleum, followed by the French. But in the post-World War II scenario, the US emerged as the dominant power in the region, because its energy security and economic prosperity depended on the flow of the oil supply from this region (Shashikumar 2001). During the World War II oil became a key economic and strategic interest. It provided an essential tool for the conduct of mechanised warfare. After the end of the Second World War, the era of Cold War emerged.

During the Cold War, oil remained important in the postwar era despite the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. At this time the danger from the Soviet threat, prompted the US policymakers and their British and French counterparts to choose oil over coal for fuel for the purpose of rapid reconstruction of Europe's industries and societies. This hard and daunting task involved locating new energy resources so that the growing US demands could be achieved.

Although nuclear-powered warships (mainly aircraft carriers and submarines) were developed in the 1950s, most of the world's warships as well as aircraft, still relied on oil, aircraft, armour, and

mechanised transport, and each new generation of weapons required more than its predecessors. In addition, the US military established territories in overseas bases that allowed it to show its presence and power into almost every region of the world (Painter 2014). In addition to being essential to military power, oil played an increasingly important role in the economies of the industrial countries. Oil became the fuel of choice in land and sea transport as well as the only fuel for air transport, and plays an important role in heating and electricity generation. Oil-powered machinery is essential to modern agriculture, and oil and natural gas became important source for fertilizers and pesticides. The US could not visualise itself as a resource- starved state in front of other countries to secure its oil interests. The scarcity of oil and huge reserves of oil in Iraq led to the invasion of Iraq. The US never publicly announced that Iraq invasion of 2003 was for oil but as the threats which were eventually disappeared, it might occur that the attack was far more to control oil rather than countering threats.

Caspian oil has a special place in the US national security policy because oil is a state property in the Middle East and the US oil corporations can work as contractors. This region is filled with immense wealth and US based private organisations (Ratnesa 2003). Middle East is an inventory; it is exhaustible and non-renewable as well. It is nonetheless a huge inventory and the largest in the world. The oil is also produced at very low costs. It is thus a huge source of enormous profit for those who control it. Finally, the region has been the major potential source of supply (Kubursi 2007).

However, the region also has two major drawbacks. First, the resources are very underdeveloped, and the oil is also very hard to extract. The estimates for developing the oil field need requisite infrastructure and facilities which might become very expensive. Second, it is yet not defined what the share of each of the state is and even more significantly, it is yet to be legally determined (Betts 2004).

Iraq occupies a special place in this calculus of resources. Its known reserves account for sixteen percent second only to Saudi Arabia and vastly greater than the currently known reserves of the Caspian region. Second, the oil industry in Iraq over the past two decades was in a bad condition but still it is currently producing roughly two million barrels a day as compared to eight million in Saudi Arabia. It means that its reserves have been preserved much better as it might be that its

capacity to produce oil has declined (Ahmad 2004). Lastly there are strong conditions that after the occupation of Iraq is done the US will seek to privatise Iraqi oil, either under its own military administration or through the regime which the US would incept (Betts 2004).

Thus attention focused towards the Middle East, which alone possessed the huge oil resources that only solve the problem. Oil was the utmost need to serve as Europe's oil tanker and as America's supplier of last resort. Between 1948 and 1972, world oil consumption grew fivefold, declaring the age to be the age of oil. It appears that higher the initial level of demand, the US consumption only tripled, but elsewhere in the world oil demand increased by as much as eleven times. This range yielded the doubling of oil consumption every six and a half years (Maugeri 2003).

The strategic choice is the rise of the demand of the oil reserves:

In 1990, the United States oil reserves represented approximately three per cent of world oil reserves; whereas Kuwait alone had nine per cent and the Gulf States approximately had sixty three per cent. Ten years later the US reserves had declined to two per cent of the world total whereas the Gulf states now had sixty-six per cent. Then look at oil dependency in 1990, the US imported forty-two per cent of its total oil requirements; ten years later this had risen to sixty per cent (Rogers 2006).

Oil dependency, and the US determination to ensure security of supplies, is therefore the priority of the US strategic presence in the Gulf. This policy is unlikely to change in the wake of new trends in production, consumption and discovery of reserves. The US policy in the Arab and elsewhere in South-west Asia world reflects the form of neo-colonial occupation where a distant great power retains control of a key resource for its own interests (Clark 2004). The US strategic interests and policies necessitated the path to control the resources of other states to fulfil their necessities. The US desire to become a supreme power could be shattered if it is unable to control oil resources to its requirements and secure its future too. However, the United States was not able to keep pace with the demand for the discovery of new reserves. On the other side discovery of reserves in the Gulf region was exceeding production day by day. Iraq, for example, increased its oil reserves in the decade up to 2000 by a figure rather more than half of that of total US reserves in 2000 (Caldwell 2011).

The Bush administration planned an intensive oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, east of the Prudhoe Bay oilfield in northern Alaska. However there were serious doubts that the US was able to find any really large oil reserves. The US was not able to relocate new regions of oil reserve which could serve its interests. Middle East region was the last resort (Harvey 2003).

It is important to recognise from the fact that the most important national security interest of the United States in the region has historically been in ‘an unhindered flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the world market at a stable price’ (Wright 2007). Oil was becoming increasingly important militarily for fueling naval ships, army trucks and other vehicles and airplanes and is viewed as crucial to the future growth of the civilian economy (Fronzo 2010).

The United States relied on oil reserves to supply about forty per-cent of its energy requirements, more than any other source. At one time, it relied almost entirely on domestic oil to supply its needs, but the demand has grown rapidly, and the US oil fields are rapidly being exhausted. Today, the US now relies on imported oil for fifty-five per-cent of its requirements, and this percentage is expected to rise to sixty five per-cent in 2020, and will be higher day by day. Middle Eastern countries surrounding the Persian Gulf have proven oil reserves of sixty per-cent. Due to its high capacity of oil, its strategic importance is unrivalled and undisputed (Fouskas and Gokay 2005).

In charting US oil dependency the National Energy Report, authored in May 2001 by the then US Vice President Dick Cheney predicted that US reliance on foreign oil would continue to increase in the future. The report argued that ‘the share of US oil demand met by net imports is projected to increase from fifty two per cent in 2000 to sixty per cent in 2020’ (National Energy Policy 2001).

By 2020, the report recommended that for the US:

Energy security is a priority of trade and foreign policy. The security of US energy supply is enhanced by several factors characterising our diplomatic relationships. These factors range from geographic proximity and free trade agreements to integrated pipeline networks, reciprocal energy-sector investments, shared security commitments, and, in all cases, long-term reliable supply relationships. Aside from US domestic consumption, however, the report goes on to argue that the US should take the lead in seeking greater 'diversity of world oil production' with greater diversity having 'obvious benefits to all

market participants'. This decrease on a reliance on Middle Eastern sources of oil will lead to an increased reliance on new states and regions, specifically, Atlantic basin sources that encompass the 'Western Hemisphere, the Caspian, and Africa'. The report makes clear that the US must act both for reasons of national and transnational interest with diversification helping to 'lessen the impact of a supply disruption on the US and world economies'. Moreover, US strategy 'in each of these high-priority regions' should focus on institutionalising capitalist social relations and opening up these regions to the penetration of foreign capital so as to improve 'the investment climate. The report thus recommends that the US state should continue to act for both reasons of national and transnational interest through institutionalising and underwriting capitalism in these new oil-rich regions via a strategy of increased market incorporation and strategic presence (National Energy Policy 2001).

With oil as the principal source of commercial energy throughout the world, access to large amounts became a major global priority for the United States and the other western countries as the Persian Gulf War proved. President George H.W. Bush repeatedly stated that oil is a major national security priority for the United States, even though he never openly admitted that it was the main reason for his decision to oppose Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War (Rose 2004).

Similarly, the Carter Doctrine articulated by the former US President Jimmy Carter mentioned very clearly the Middle East oil as a region and its oil is of great importance to the United States. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded and intervened militarily in Afghanistan. It greatly created apprehensions in the minds of the US officials and this was regarded as one of the steps to secure strategic location to harness oil and gas reserves. The intervention caused the Carter Administration to admit openly that the United States is wholly dependent on Middle Eastern oil for its economy. President Carter felt that the Soviets, by being dangerously close to the Middle East oil which is a lifesaving priority to the West could jeopardise the US security interests and the global economy by preventing the flow of crude oil to the West (Rose 2004). During the Cold War era the occupation of Afghanistan fuelled up the US and its later policies were focused on securing its interests in Central Asia and in the Persian Gulf.

In an ultimate response to what came to be known as the Carter Doctrine, President Carter warned the Soviet leadership: 'Let our position be clear, an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the

United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force' (Jentleson 2000). Thus, ensuring access to the region's oil became a national security priority for the United States which remains as one of the major concerns during the invasion of Iraq and still remains the top most priority.

Oil had to do many things with the invasion of Iraq. Both the Gulf War and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein government were somewhere essentially linked to oil. The real motive for war in Iraq is a strategic one, which involves the geo-politics of oil. If anyone understands the reason for justification of WMD, it would be very difficult to understand why the US went to war in Iraq. The war was just not for destroying non-existent WMD, but the Iraq War was arguably intended to achieve a number of related goals linked to the neo-conservative political ideology as discussed before.

The neo-conservatives aimed to make the US as one of the most important powers in the world and eliminating any counter rival which comes in the way of the US ways. This included increasing access to oil, protecting Israel, stabilising the situation in the Middle East, removing a potential rival, warning other potential foes in the region, and other regions and bringing about what is now called as regime change in the places which did not abide by the western rules (Rubin 2003).

There were several reasons as argued by the scholars who articulated the idea that the attack on Iraq was not guided by the fear of threats but more by strategic motives. The attack of 11 September 2001 provided an opportunity to the US and its allies to attack Iraq in the name of countering threats. The most important allegation was the production of WMD and its linkages with terrorism. Both the allegations were proven to be false. Iraq had purchased chemical weapons from Western countries during the war with Iran but these had been destroyed after the Gulf war and the UN sanctions had been imposed then, most probably to prevent Iraq acquiring more WMDs. The coalition forces and the UN inspection team were unable to discover WMDs even after the conquest and occupation. It was obvious before the war that Iraq had no WMDs and even became more obvious after that it becomes necessary to understand the motives of the Bush administration (Rockmore 2006).

If the US and its allies have orchestrated the idea that they had weapons, that means the invasion of Iraq was not about destroying WMD or to liberate Iraq but to achieve something else. In the case of Iraq, everyone knew that it had abundance of oil hidden in its soil. If the US gets over Iraq, it would not only conquer the oil of Iraq but also gain mastery over the oil reserves of other neighbouring countries. The occupation of Iraq's oil would be a great set back to other competitors such as China and Russia.

After the occupation of Iraq, which has the second largest oil resources in the world, it is as an easy passage for the subsequent occupation of Saudi oilfields and other Middle East oil rich oilfields. Saudi Arabia is America's largest supplier of imported oil. It has more oil than any other country about two hundred and fifty billion barrels, or one-fourth of the world's reserves. The US was keen to find an alternative source if access to Saudi Arabia is curtailed for any reason. There were certain apprehensions about the stability in Saudi Arabia and the potential for revolution from within which would hamper its and would indirectly affect the US economy (Morse 2004).

The only country in the world with large enough reserves to compensate for the loss of Saudi Arabia was Iraq, with at least one hundred and twelve billion barrels in proven reserves, and as much as two hundred to three hundred billion barrels of potential reserves. The US conceived the US-allied Iraq as an alternative to Saudi Arabia as the strategic supplier of oil to the United States. It was perceived that the increased Iraqi output would create structurally lower oil prices, placing financial pressure on Saudi Arabia and other oil producing states of the Gulf, to lower their prices of oil. It will also force these states to reform economically and politically to avoid internal revolutions and any attack from outside (Alkadiri and Mohamedi 2003). The logic is that Iraq would serve as the major model for the Gulf region that if any of the country did not abide by the rules framed by the west, it might eventually be targeted.

Saddam Hussein did not maintain friendly relations with the US government. He had begun to trade and invest the most promising oil fields to oil firms in Europe, Russia, and China, with an estimated potential of forty-four billion barrels of oil which is an amount equal to the total reserves of the US, Canada, and Norway combined (Pilote 2003). This created an apprehension in the minds of the US officials and they wanted to get rid of US as soon as possible.

In strategic terms, post Saddam Hussein Iraq would evolve as a close US ally and would be willing to grant military presence for the forthcoming years to come. While this was significant because of Iraq's own energy resources, the more important aspect comprised its strategic regional position. 'The five oil-rich states around the Persian Gulf: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates collectively possess more than sixty per-cent of the world's readily exploitable oil reserves and thirty percent of the world's known natural gas reserves'. In the aftermath the demolition of the Saddam Hussein regime, the US would maintain friendly relations with four of those states and this would give a rightful impediment to the of newly emerging countries such as China (Rogers 2011).

Iraq's oil reserves are the second largest in the world and much more easily accessible than those in Central Asia. A regime installed and established by the Americans would allow American and other Western oil companies' access to the oil on the terms and conditions of the company. The multinational companies could virtually dictate the terms and conditions to the US. Both the US and companies would earn the profits generated from the oil revenue. Oil revenues could also be used to give profitable contracts to American companies. This would be a long term process as the infrastructure of the Iraqi oil industry has been affected after more than a decade of sanctions. It would require huge investments, which in turn would require peace. Thus, the US had to get rid of stubborn dictator who was not in line with him (Renner 2003). The then US Vice-President Dick Cheney was, the President of Halliburton, a company that provides services for the oil industry in Iraq. The US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was between 1991 and 2000 the manager for Chevron.

Saddam Hussein was a dictator who used to run according to his own terms and conditions without paying any heed to the powers such the US. Therefore, when after the first Gulf War, Iraq did not cooperate with the UN inspections team, several rounds of sanctions was imposed on Iraq.

It was virtually propagated that Iraq has been hiding its weapons but the real purpose of the sanctions, which America and Britain stubbornly refused to lift despite appeals from France and Russia, appears to have been to break the Iraqi will to resist and to conserve Iraqi oil for eventual American use. This seems to have been the purpose of the Libyan sanctions as well Iraq which once occupied, could serve as a path for the occupation of Saudi Arabia, which has larger oil

reserves than Iraq, and whose oil installations are functional. If a client regime could be installed there, Iraq would serve the US interests. Oil companies could impose new terms on Saudi Arabia. A client regime would have access to the country's oil revenues and its huge foreign exchange reserves and could even lay claim to the 160 billion dollars or so in bribes that the Saudi royal family has stashed away in foreign accounts. American companies could be given this money for the development of the country (Wishnick 2004).

Even before George W. Bush became President, he was committed to regime change in Iraq as part of an ambitious project later developed the then US Vice-President Dick Cheney as early as 1992, immediately after the end of the first Iraq war. At the request of Cheney, who was the Secretary of Defense in the administration of the President G.H. Bush, I. Lewis Libby and Paul Wolfowitz wrote a report, but later leaked to the press, entitled as 'Draft Defense Policy Guidance' (Smith 2007). This document, which is widely accepted as an early formulation of the neo-conservative post-Cold War agenda, articulated several objectives: The first among them was to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, through military force if necessary. It called for, unilateral military action by the US in parts of the world considered strategically important (Smith 2007). The neo conservatives were highly occupied with the idea that the US had to prevent any other rival to emerge after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The initiative was to counter any attack and hold each and everything in capacity which could enhance the US role in the world. Oil domination and democracy promotion were the ideas floated from the neo-conservatives ideology.

With the advent of George W. Bush, a number of inter-related groups especially right wing neo-conservative intellectuals and oil and military-industrial complexes controlled American foreign policy. The neoconservatives were aspiring for years to attack Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein. They had been advocating the war against Middle Eastern states, and Iraq serves as the first step to secure the world's oil supply, protecting Israel its conquests, reforming the Islam world, bringing democracy and prosperity to the Middle East and so on (Malik 2015).

From the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003, two aspects were clearly stressed by the US administration. The centrality of oil is that it is a key economic resource for powerful states and always plays a pivotal role in politics of war. The critical view is that Iraq war was heavily

dominant by the motivation of acquiring oil and it is surprising that oil itself was not mentioned as a possible motivating factor for the recent US-led war on oil-rich Iraq.

In fact, the US officials not only rarely mentioned oil, but vehemently denied oil as a cause factored in the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. For example, the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld argued that it was 'nonsense to suggest that the US invasion of Iraq had anything to do with oil. He continued that 'there are certain things like that, myths that are floating around . . . it has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil' (Stokes 2007).

The analysis makes it clear that three oil- related motivations for the US intervention in the Middle East may be identified: First to make profits from oil, to consume and to establish control over oil (Bromley 1998). The first refers to claims that Iraq was invaded to generate profits for American oil companies, which are close to the Bush administration as Halliburton company headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. The second claim refers to the invasion occurred so that the US could use Iraq's oil for its own consumption, and fulfil its increasing dependence on foreign oil. The last claim implies that the invasion's objective was to regulate the amount, price and geographical allocation of Iraq's oil to the world economy (Bromley 1998).

Oil politics and the US intervention is well captured by the critics who argued that the invasion of Iraq signifies a more militaristic US foreign policy. It signalled a new form of American policy after the terrible events of 11 September 2001. As Michael Cox points out after the attacks on 11 September 2001:

we should start calling things by their right name, drop the pretence that America is not an Empire, and accept that if the world was going to be a stable place, the US had to act in much the same imperial fashion as the British and Romans had done several centuries before (Cox 2003).

Post-11 September 2001, the US empire and its territorial conquest is said to be predicated and particularly designed to maintain access and control of major oil producing regions so as to guarantee crucial energy supplies for an oil- craving US economy (Yergin 2006).

There is a general feeling that the Iraq war was about weapons of mass destruction or Saddam Hussein's human rights record. Indeed, a vast number of observers have concluded that the Iraq campaign was all about oil despite being branded as a crusade for freedom or elimination of threats by the Bush supporters. To understand the real motives behind the war and why Bush considered an attack on Iraq as an opportunity there is need to shift the focus from threats to the US economic interests. The threats are not only military but economic too. The economic threat is to counter any rival which tries to hegemonies the situation in the Middle East and over the oil market. As, the US oil vulnerability was high it urgently needs a base and region from where it could extract as much oil as it wanted. The US import dependence was rising in an ever-tighter oil market with global production is in peak, hence shifting the balance of power to oil producers (National Energy Policy 2001). It could tilt the balance of power towards the oil producing states and reduce the US hegemony. After the end of the Cold War, the US did not want any counter power to emerge leading to the decimation of unipolarity which is prevailing at present in the international politics.

These conditions could make the US and the world capitalist economy vulnerable to an oil shock incidents. Iraq was a solution to these potential threats for it had the world's second largest oil reserves and very low production costs. However, as long as Saddam Hussein was in power, its oil could not be used for the benefits of the US.

What made developments in the oil market more dangerous for the US however, was the fact that the US hegemony over the Middle East and its oil was under threat by the breakdown of the US hegemony that had been constructed after the Gulf war of 1991. This hegemony rested on several aspects such as the containment of Iran and Iraq, and the Saudi alliance. However all these were increasingly proving futile.

First, Iraq and Iran were gradually liberating from the isolation, the US policy had sought to impose on them. The sanctions on Iraq had increasingly been discredited for the humanitarian damage they caused to the Iraqi people, and were being challenged by the Arab world, while Iraq was selling oil concessions to other countries, notably Russia, China and France. It was believed that the sanctions imposed on Iraq would force Iraq to find for new alternatives and would try to overcome the isolation but the assumption proved to be wrong. Saddam Hussein used it as political advantage (Duffield 2005).

As for the Iran case, even Western Europe was keen to engage with it rather than to isolate it. While US sanctions kept its own companies out of their oil fields and markets, its rivals were using this opportunity and penetrating into both these states. Saudi Arabia was an US ally, always secure with moderate oil prices but due to the excesses demand from the US, its capacity also began to decline. The US was dissatisfied with its dependence on Saudi Arabia and the last but not the least the US was left with no choice but to look for other alternatives (Rubin 2003).

Dollar Currency

The US dollar is the currency of choice for oil transactions, but as the euro has emerged as a competitive currency and its popularity has increased and the euro-denominated oil sales has added a new dimensions to the battle for control over oil-exporting regions. With the Bush administration facing ever-higher deficits to fund tax cuts and military spending for the war in Iraq, the value of the dollar has sunk as low as \$1.30 to the euro the lowest ever against the new currency. This has prompted oil producers to consider more seriously the prospect of converting oil sales to the euro denominated sales. This move will change the whole scenario in the international trade, since dollar-denominated oil sales are an important pillar of the US dollar's position as reserve currency (Zygar 2003). This would certainly curtail the American hegemony with regard to the sale in currency.

The change of dollar to Euro is not a minor phenomenon; it is an act which could destabilise the US position in international politics. The Bush administration's primary goal in invading Iraq was to ensure the maintenance of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency, and thereby maintain US global hegemony (Harvey 2003). Maintaining or sustaining the US dollar hegemony is more important than simply guaranteeing an open flow of oil or free access to the Middle East oil.

Oil has become an essential element of the global economic hegemony of the US dollar and for its financial sector, hegemony is crucial to maintaining economic strength and stability for the US. The other and most immediate, danger for the US is that the European Union (EU) might emerge as a rival bloc. That however can only happen if Europe itself can emerge from under the dominance of the dollar which is currently the primary, virtually exclusive, reserve currency of the entire world. That in turn cannot happen unless the Euro becomes the primary currency for

the world's largest trade, namely oil trade. The first oil producing country to shift from dollar to euro as the currency for trade in oil was Iraq. 'Despite the longstanding practice in OPEC of selling oil for US dollars, Iraq began selling its oil, under the United Nations Oil-for-Food programme, for the new currency of the European Union' (Shipley 2007)

Currently, all OPEC countries (with a few notable exceptions) sell their oil for US dollars only, which provide oil-importing countries a chance to earn huge sums of dollars in reserve. The United States prints money, and any other state that wants to buy oil must first buy these US dollars and then use them to purchase their oil. It is viable that every state needs oil and seeks to buy oil they need in dollars. In this age of oil, 'no state can operate without sufficient quantities of oil and, if a state wants oil, it must buy US dollars. The US government makes huge profits by making it currency production at low costs and selling them at higher costs. Oil is a commodity which every state needs to have access energy for industrial development and for military and public consumption (Simon 2001).

This is how it works: every country is forced to import dollars since the dollar is the world's reserve currency which means that it must sell its goods and services to the United States. The US would make profits from it by continuing to print more and more dollars, thus managing its import at little cost.

Iraq paved the way for other OPEC to convert to Euro as the primary currency for its foreign trade. The other OPEC countries could also break the dollar dominance by shifting to Euro or at least diversifying their reserve currencies. Iraq's decision was a key element in making the Euro a competitive and global currency for the first time. If the other oil producing countries decided to shift accordingly; the US economy would shrink and even collapse (Cirincione 2003). This could be the beginning of decline of the dollar hegemony and gradually towards the decline of the US hegemony.

Oil being the largest single import for most countries, there is a need for an increase in amount of dollars for their purchases. Mostly, oil producing countries accumulate immense amount of dollars which then go back mostly to the US based banks and become what is called as 'petrodollars' (Shipley 2007). If oil trade were to shift to the Euro currency, dollars has to be exchanged for the Euro, at low prices for the dollar. This value-depleted dollar would then have

to be honoured by the US Federal Reserves. The more dollars are encashed, lower will be the value of the dollars.

The US would be unable to run its economy on deficits as it has been doing for decades. The US may well face a crash or an economic crisis. The US should strive hard that the oil producing countries do not shift to the Euro even if that requires occupying certain states and continually threatening the rest. It might be the case that the former President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez makes a similar decision like Saddam Hussein and shifts to the Euro, as also the fact that Venezuela is also a major supplier of oil to the US (Fouskas and Gokay 2005).

This currency war is as much an important factor in the war against Iraq as is the question of capturing its oil resources. Iraq's step might change the whole scenario or bring crisis in the whole dollar dominance which had been established by the capitalist states some fifty years ago. The US would never allow this to happen as the dollar dominance is the foundation of the US hegemony. The decreasing, dollar dominance, shortage of oil resources, demand for more oil reserves, indifferent attitude of the Saddam Hussein government and search for new oil reserves were important components which dominated the US- led war on terror against Iraq. The US government needs to counter Iraq as a growing threat not only the terms of military but in terms of economic dimensions as well. The terror attack on 11September attack 2001 provided an opportunity for the US to get rid of all these emerging problems which could threaten its existence.

US Hegemony

The election of George W. Bush and the neoconservatives in 2000 may prove to be one of the most important turning points in US history, and his re-election in 2004 paved the way for the US global hegemony. The neoconservative vision perceived the strong military as the best way to ensure its national interests abroad. The national interests included strong military power, economic and cultural dominance and regime change where the states did not follow any set of rules laid by the western powers. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 helped in creating hegemony of the US in all these dimensions. As David Harvey suggests that the chief aim of the US was to seize control of Iraqi oil fields (and probably Iranian oil fields as well) in order to put itself in the position of determining how much oil should be sold to its competitors (Harvey 2003). The aim

was to establish the pre-eminence of the US in the Middle East and counter any competitors who could challenge the US.

The prominent goal of the US is leadership in the international community. This policy had been consistent in US foreign policy. With the advent of 11 September 2001, this strategy was integrated with the war on terrorism. The strategy is that certain states such as Iraq and North Korea need to be contained as it would prevent regional rivals and will maintain the hegemony of the US. The end of the Cold War also brought a vacuum in international society and created a 'threat deficit' (Buzan 2006).

The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 provided once again a solution to this problem and would help to prove and reassert the legitimacy of the US in the international community which is the prime goal of National Security Strategy of 2002. The threats from terrorists do exist but the significance of the war on terror is that it is a political framework which would legitimise US primacy and leadership. The attacks on 11 September 2001 created a platform for the US and its allies to pursue its policies in order to enhance their hold on the oil energy resources.

The United States opted for military solution to the economic problems otherwise it faces an economic crisis in the twenty-first century if it cannot maintain control of the world's oil suppliers and Iraq served as the main target. Saddam Hussein controlled between twenty to forty percent of the world's energy resources. The US was in favour of lifting sanctions imposed after the first Gulf War so that this oil could be available in the market but the US wanted to secure its interests over the oil. First it has to be clear that the United States would be able to control the oil that where it would go and how it is explored. Saddam Hussein was also not complying with the US demand. Iraq is the only OPEC nation that has abandoned the dollar completely and it is possible that this trend would continue in Iran and spread to other oil-rich nations, such as Saudi Arabia (Shipley 2007).

It was evident that the US had to do something with Iraq which could serve as a model that any country which wanted to surpass the US hegemony would be taught a lesson. Iraq's reluctant behaviour and oil dependency served as one of the major factors for its invasion. The US interest of the US lies in behaviour any another hegemonic state from emerging which could challenge its superiority.

In 1960, at the initiative of Venezuela, four major oil-producing countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq, created the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with the primary objective of improving their bargaining position *vis-a-vis* the major oil companies. OPEC was founded with the defined purpose of coordinating the petroleum policies of its members and therefore safeguarding their individual and collective interests. However, with the passage of time during the Middle East conflict i.e. in within two weeks of the war, OPEC unilaterally cut production by five per-cent of global oil supply and embargoed supplies to the United States, the Netherlands and other countries that supported Israel in the conflict (Rose 2004).

In 1974, a fourfold increase in oil prices since the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. This occurred without the consent of the oil companies. The hike in oil prices was followed by an economic recession in the western countries while generating billions of dollars in revenues for oil exporting countries that its members could never have imagined (Rose 2004). V.H. Oppenheim observe that ‘the principal consideration behind the indulgent US government attitude toward higher oil prices was the belief that higher prices would produce economic benefits for the United States *vis-à-vis* its industrial competitors, Western Europe and Japan’ (Oppenheim 1976–77).

However the subsequent rise in the oil prices instigated the US to control the oil reserves. Iraq would be the best possible region which could enhance oil reserves of the US and reduce the dependency on the OPEC countries. The oil exporting countries could create a oil hegemony which could shook the foundation of the US prominence. Due to oil reserves, and its prices influenced intended the US to think a way out which could possibly solve this problem. The best solution is to conquer the region where oil flourishes and Iraq served as a rescue for oil interests.

The US intervened in the global South both to ensure the market dominance of the US oil transnational and to secure a stable supply of oil for the American economy. This oil conspiracy was the cornerstone policy of the Bush administration, with senior US officials such as the then US Vice President Dick Cheney mentoring that the American military power will be used to open productive new markets for the US based transnational oil companies. The US intervention in oil-rich regions is designed to ensure that US oil transnational companies dominate world markets. As James Paul succinctly argues, ‘the war was primarily a “war for oil” in which large,

multinational oil companies and their host governments acted in secret concert to gain control of Iraq's fabulous oil reserves and to gain leverage over other national oil producers' (Paul 2003).

In relation to the US oil interventions, Robinson argues that the contemporary age of globalisation the US no longer acts as the protector of the US in interests but instead also seeks to 'maintain, defend, and advance the emergent hegemony of a global bourgeoisie and its project of constructing a new global capitalist historical bloc' (Robinson 2004). He contends that the world is witnessing an emerging transnational state structure (TNS) where the invasion of Iraq and the Bush Administration's plan was in fact a 'blueprint for the transnational agenda in the region' by opening up Iraq as a productive (and oil-rich) circuit for global capital investment' (Robinson 2004). As such, the intervention was a US imperialist plan to hegemonise itself over French, German, and Russian competition' through monopolising Iraq's natural resources including its crucial oil reserves.

The US state acted on behalf of a newly emergent transnational capitalist class. This feature fully captures the nature of the American interventions to fulfil its requirements for oil. It is profitable to view that the US in order to gain primacy over the oil rich regions served dual interests. On one hand the conquest of oil regions fulfilled its national interests and on the other hand it also served the interests of the US transnational companies. It clearly defined the agenda of the US hegemony and its strategic linkages to the oil dominated regions. In short, 'the American state derives enormous structural power because it guarantees and underwrites capitalist social relations in oil-rich regions that in turn serves the interests of other core states' (Robinson 2004).

The US hegemony in the Middle East rested on its unique ability to balance special relationships with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, but this balance was being destabilised after the relation started straining off with Saudi Arabia. In conquering Iraq, the US would acquire a strong and capable partner which could end the dependence on Saudi Arabia (Simon 2001).

The vision of US was not only restricted in acquiring oil and natural gas resources but it was also to eliminate competitors and monopolise the area politically and militarily by regulating the flow of oil. The US is the world's largest consumer of oil resources and it needs to manipulate the situation to fulfil its needs. The war against Al-Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq have predominantly established the US military control over the lands of Eurasia. The two wars have

created new military bases which intensified the power and supremacy of the US in the world system (Daalder and Lindsay 2003).

This analysis of the economic imperative underlying the Iraq war also helps to demonstrate the factors which led to the war. It could be analysed why the US was so determined to invade Iraq even if the mission was opposed and criticised by the global coalition of the anti war forces. The Labour Prime Minister in Britain too supported the war due to the structural intimacy between the dollar and the sterling, pound which explains the personal intimacy between Blair and Bush. The war was all about money which could be generated after the capture of oil dominated Iraq and later its surrounding region.

It is obvious that Iraq's undeniable attraction as a source of immense oil wealth was the major factor for the unilateral attack on the country. As a matter of fact, when Paul Wolfowitz, a neoconservative top official of the Bush administration, was asked why Iraq, which had no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was invaded instead of North Korea, which does (or claims) to have WMD, he bluntly stated that: 'Let's look at this simply. The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically we had no choice in Iraq' (Gowans 1999).

The attack would have been justified if the US and its allies would have decided to withdraw the region after the successful completion of the war. The indefinite occupation of the region under the pretext to control terrorism and maintain peace was being used largely as a camouflage to achieve wider US strategic geopolitical objectives. The pursuit of this objective was equally and closely linked with the activity to preserve and enhance control over global oil resources as the Muslim world controls ninety-five percent of the global oil export capacity (Cirincione 2003). If the idea was to destroy WMD, it was evident that if no WMD was found the US must withdraw from Iraq. But this was not what happened after the Iraq, instead the picture was entirely different.

While Bush claimed that Iraq's oil revenues were being utilised for the Iraqi people, it was observed that the invasion might have happened in the name of war on terror but it had several impacts upon the oil executives. Everyone was wondering how and when the country with one

hundred and twelve billion barrels of known reserves might be opened for foreign participation (Malik 2015).

So what was preached was never followed and even Saddam Hussein of Iraq had claimed that:

The consecutive American administration was led down a path of hostility against the people of this region, including our own nation and we are part of it. Those people and others have been telling the various administrations, especially the current one, that if you want to control the world you need to control the oil. Therefore the destruction of Iraq is a pre-requisite to controlling oil. That means the destruction of the Iraqi national identity, since the Iraqis are committed to their principles and rights according to international law and the UN charter (Hussein 2003).

Saddam Hussein was clear about the fact that the whole orchestration of war was due to a single reason which is oil. If Iraq does not possess oil then it would have been never noticed by the US.

The terror attack on 11 September 2001 was the crucial catalyst, since it serves its strategic interests. The Al-Qaeda had recruited so many of its leading operatives from Saudi Arabia, by creating resentments against the US bases. By invading Iraq and overthrowing Saddam Hussein, the US would be able to shift its military base within the region, and remove its unwelcome troop presence from Saudi Arabia. These were the arguments for war. Many civil servants in the US military, at the US State Department, and in the CIA, were by all accounts sceptical of these arguments. They were suspicious about the claims that the costs of war would not outweigh the benefits (Dueck 2004).

Conclusion

So, the threats which the US faced were neither so imminent that it had to act immediately nor immune to solutions that stopped far short of an invasion of Iraq. Hence the US national interests cannot wholly explain the war and why these risks were tackled by the invasion of Iraq. Yet another aspect is the special interests of the US-UK alliance to invade Iraq. It is also a case that a different administration in the US and the UK would arguably not have gone to war with Iraq and would have pursued other less risky ways of addressing threats such as reconsidering the peace process and exploring other ways to counter threats from Iraq. After all, Iraq posed no threat to the US and its allies; the war on Iraq was the agenda of the Bush administration. The

oil and the arms lobbies had more particular interests that they thought a war might serve their interests.

The Bush administration of the US is unable to defend the war as a legitimate war as it did not threaten the US. The issue of WMDs was one of the serious allegations which the US reasoned not to lead the 'war on terrorism' against Iraq. President Bush of the US also claimed that Saddam Hussein was linked to Al-Qaeda and actively developing weapons of mass destruction which he might turn over to terrorists or use on their behalf, and hence Iraq represented an imminent threat to the US. These claims have not only been discredited but, additionally, there is strong evidence that the US and the UK deliberated exaggeratedly unreliable claims which further proved to be false. At any rate, the threat was never as serious as proclaimed by the US and the UK.

The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 created a platform for the US and its allies to pursue its policies in order to enhance their hold on oil energy resources. The so called formulation of 'rogue states' pointed at the oil dominated regions. The vision of the US is not only restricted in acquiring oil and natural gas resources but also to eliminate competitors and monopolise the area politically and militarily by regulating the flow of oil. The US is the world's largest consumer of oil resources and it needs to manipulate the situation to fulfil its needs.

The war against Al-Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq have predominantly established the US military control over the land of Eurasia. The two wars have created new military bases which intensified the power and supremacy of the US in the world system. The aim of the western powers was not merely to attain military and political objectives but also to sustain economic and strategic choices. At least the Bush administration would gain substantially, from any expansion of the US control over the world's oil resources is in the Middle East.

The invasion of Iraq received widespread condemnations both at domestic and the international level. The former South African President Nelson Mandela criticised the United States in the strongest term while speaking to International Women's Forum. He stated 'If there is a country that has committed unspeakable atrocities in the world, it is the USA. Iraq produces oil and Bush wants to get hold of that oil' (Mandela 2003).

Chapter Four

Ideational hegemony and the War on Terror

We support the advance of freedom in the Middle East, because it is our founding principle, and because it is in our national interest. The hateful ideology of terrorism is shaped and nurtured and protected by oppressive regimes. Free nations, in contrast, encourage creativity and tolerance and enterprise. And in those free nations, the appeal of extremism withers away. Free governments do not build weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of mass terror. Over time, the expansion of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee of security throughout the world. Freedom is the way to peace (Bush 2003 c).

The chapter analyses the factors, apart from threats and choices, which led US to launch an attack on Afghanistan and Iraq. The idea is to probe whether there were any intentions to hegemonies these states on the bases of western ideas and values. This chapter focuses on the potential link, if any, between the ideational hegemonic vision of the United States and its allies and the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The war on terror could be perceived as an opportunity for the US and its allies to propagate their ideas and values as universal. In this chapter, two competing perspectives have been evaluated: firstly, the intentions of the war on terror was not only to eliminate terrorism but also to create an ideational hegemony by means of democracy promotion in Islamic countries; secondly, war-on-terror was based on a principled desire to spread American values, beliefs, and ideologies to non western countries, which could clearly support its national interests.

Ideational hegemony implies the establishment of western ideas such as democracy, human rights and notion of progress in states which are hostile to these values or do not believe in western ideas. It is promoted as universal, but, in essence, is their particularistic belief which they intend to impose on other states and restructure the world order which suits their security, and prosperity. As Gramsci says, the rationale of hegemony is to bring the interests of the leading class in harmony with those of subordinate classes by incorporating these interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms (Cox 1983). The ideational hegemony could easily be nurtured in the name of war on terror: the coalition forces justified the attacks by labelling the Afghanistan and Iraqi regimes as brutal and undemocratic. The global rule or control is not determined only by military or hard power. It also encompasses economic and financial

supremacy and the power of ideational and cultural values. To legitimise their military aggression, the US and its allies orchestrated the idea of promoting western values and ideas of democracy, human rights and free market economy. The ideational dominance may be driven by the aim of imposing values of liberal democracy and free market on the globe.

The preliminary aim of the war on terror on Afghanistan was counter-terrorism which was followed by the invasion of Iraq. Once these conquests were achieved, the difficult political part of achieving peace followed. President George W. Bush's administration planned to consolidate its military victories by democratising the two countries and, as a consequence of these successful missions, spreading the model of 'free market democracies' to the Muslim world. These ideas were structured into a coherent policy for action called the Bush Doctrine.

The adoption of the new National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002 is often referred as 'the Bush Doctrine'. With its emphasis on unilateral US military action and pre-emptive action, 'the Bush Doctrine' immediately became a subject of criticism and controversy, both within the US and around the world. The NSS also pointed towards a new political project for the US, which was to bring democracy to the Muslim world (Katulis 2010). As already discussed in the previous chapter, the Bush Doctrine specified promoting democracy promotion as one of the most important aspect.

The war on Afghanistan, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 attack in the US, was explained in terms of threats: the attack on Afghanistan was interpreted as counter-terrorism and self-defence by the US. The U.S. was attacked by Al-Qaeda, a militant group situated at the time in Afghanistan, where it was supported by the ruling Taliban government. In reaction to this terrorist attack, the US and its allies responded by attacking not just that group, but the party in power and that state in general. The war in Afghanistan met the need to act as the world's only remaining superpower, after disintegration of Soviet Union, by doing something decisive very quickly in the face of a massive attack on its soil. The initial war was justified on political grounds as it was obviously important for the government to show its ability to counter attack of any kind. The justification to destroy Afghanistan depends on whether one believes it was an appropriate way to get back at Al-Qaeda, which was responsible for the terror attacks in the US (Rockmore 2006).

However, the same cannot be said with respect to the invasion of Iraq. It was asserted by the US, that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, or that he might act in association with Al-Qaeda. There, however, lies a highly ideological cause namely the imposition of American primacy in world affairs by bringing not simply Iraq but the whole Middle East under Washington's control by means of democracy promotion.

Iraq depicts a very different situation as the US and its allies attacked a country that had not waged war on the US and, according to all informed sources, was not preparing to attack either the US or its allies. So, what was the cause for attacking Iraq? The attacks could have been for capturing oil resources; but US never accepted that the war was meant for strategic ambitions. The reason given by the US and its allies, however, was the establishment of freedom and democracy based on American ideas.

In the war in Afghanistan, it was politically important for the American government to be seen as defending the U.S. against foreign attack. A similar justification was also at stake in the war in Iraq, but a key difference is that neither Iraq nor a group situated there had attacked the US.

So the war was not meant for territorial gains but for setting up an ideological ground. The ideology is classical liberalism as the US founding fathers did not use the word democracy in the Constitution. They sought to limit the state and guarantee individuals' rights limited by the Constitution. Once rights were secure, voting would follow. This system, therefore, consists of constitutional states, not dictatorships and illiberal democracies (Odom 2007). The war was not seen merely as fulfilling military and economic interests but it was also driven by ideological bias. The idea was to create an ideational hegemony based on western ideas and values right from the start.

In his address to the Congress after the attacks, Bush (2001b) posed the question: 'Why do they hate us?', and replied:

In Afghanistan, we see Al-Qaeda's vision for the world. Afghanistan's people have been brutalized, many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote

and assemble and disagree with each other. We are not deceived by their pretences to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions – by abandoning every value except the will to power they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.... This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom' (Bush 2001b).

The speech by President Bush clearly demonstrated that the aim of the WoT is not only aimed at eliminating threats but also at spreading ideas where it is not prevalent. It was fundamentally a war between good and evil.

President Bush has been consistently forceful in his belief that the US is the 'beacon' for freedom in the world and that he has a responsibility to promote freedom (Woodward 2004).

Initially the war was waged in the name of countering threat and deterring future attacks on American soil, possibly involving weapons of mass destruction. Not long after 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration pointed to the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein as a likely sponsor and harbourer of terrorists who presented a grave danger to the people and launched an invasion of Iraq in order to liberate the Iraqi people and establishing a democratic regime in an important Arab country.

Democracy promotion and disseminating its ideas in Iraq would bring peace in Iraq which would then become a model, and perhaps even a base, for the spread of 'democracy to other countries in the Middle East, particularly Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia' (Boyer 2004). After the falsification of western arguments of emanating threats, the promise of democratisation remained the only justification for the war in Iraq.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was launched to fulfil a very clear ideological agenda. Tony Blair, in attempt to justify the war to his own party on 11 February 2003, argued 'that there were bigger truths in Iraq and that ridding the world of Saddam would be an act of humanity. It is leaving him there that is in truth inhumane' (Blair 2003). George W. Bush, later, claimed: 'A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions' (Bush 2003 d).

Both the UK Prime Minister and the US President anticipated that the removal of Saddam Hussein would be a relatively positive agenda for promoting freedom. In the aftermath of the war, the Iraqi state would be subject to a thorough-going reform programme. For Blair and Bush, the justification for breaching Iraq's sovereignty and its territory was the liberation of the Iraqi population. In the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's removal, the fruits of this liberation would be guaranteed by the reform of the Iraqi state. It would transform the state and would play a positive role in both Iraqi society and the economy. Thus both the invasion and the reconstruction of Iraq were shaped by well defined ideological vision (Dodge 2010).

National Security Advisor in the US, Condoleezza Rice, signalled the beginning of a resolution to the debate just a week after the attacks. She said, 'Our values matter to us abroad. We are not going to stop talking about the things that matter to us— human rights, religious freedom and so forth and so on. We're going to continue to press those things' (Rice 2001).

The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, later added, 'We have a vision of a region where respect for the sanctity of the individual, the rule of law, and the politics of participation grow stronger day by day' (Powell 2001). Other administrative officials also emphasised the importance of human rights and democracy in US diplomacy in general and with regard to the Middle East in particular. So after the 11 September 2001 terror attack, the US increasingly focused on promoting democracy in West Asia with force.

There are both ideological and practical reasons for this. Accordingly, the policy consensus in Bush Administration was based on the belief that fostering democracy in West Asia would reduce the number of terrorist organisations which are recruited to wage a 'global struggle' against the US. It would also contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region because 'democracies do not go to war with one another' (Delacoura 2005). It could be more than promoting values: the real intention is to create an ideational hegemony in which ideas of democracy, human rights and peace are disseminated in the Middle East.

US Policy of Democracy Promotion: An Overview

The US leaders always had a strong interest in promoting democracy, especially as their country emerged as increasingly important in the world stage at the beginning of the 20th

century. Most of the American leaders have emphasised upon the promotion of democracy abroad as a key element of America's international role in protecting international society (Carothers 2004).

Democracy promotion is one of the corner stone of the US foreign policy. After 11 September 2001 attacks, however, it became a primary objective under the Bush administration. The efforts to spread democracy in Iraq and other Muslim countries have been viewed as a tool to end dictatorship and fight terrorism, as the way to promote stability in non democratic regions and as a mechanism to increase peace and prosperity in developing and underdeveloped countries.

It is based on a principled desire to spread American values, beliefs, and ideologies to other countries. The desire is to advance US political and economic interests abroad which would be in its interests. While other countries have also sought to export democracy abroad, the US is arguably more active in this regard than any other state (McFaul 2004).

President Woodrow Wilson former US President proclaimed that America was fighting World War-I to make the world safer for democracy. According to President Woodrow Wilson, democracy promotion is one of the fundamental principles of the US foreign policy because it is at the core of the American ideal and engraved in the principles on which the US was founded. As Wilson explained after the end of World War I, 'We set this nation up to make men free and we did not confine our conception and purpose to America' (Wilson 1919). In the 1920s and 1930s, the US politicians went through the various military interventions in the Caribbean and Central America . Democracy promotion is not a new agenda in the US foreign policy. It is actually one of the oldest policies of the US.

In World War-II, America fought against fascist leaders in the name of protecting freedom and democracy (Freidel 1999). In the 1950s, the US leaders, who involved in containing the spread of communism often spoke of protecting democracy, and liberalism (Carothers 2005). The Cold War, was a struggle to preserve freedom in the world. In the early 1960s, the former President John Kennedy advocated the idea of fostering democracy in the developing countries (Epstein et al. 2007).

President Ronald Reagan continued the theme by projecting his anti-Soviet policy as a struggle for democracy (Jervis 2005). Since the mid-1980s, especially, democracy assistance became a significant element of the US foreign aid and foreign policy. By the end of the 1990s, the US Government was spending over \$700 million a year on democracy aid in approximately over hundred countries - primarily through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) but also through the National Endowment For Democracy (NED), the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Asia Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation' (Burnell and Calvert 2005).

The United States since the end of the Cold War has followed a strategy of primacy which influenced the spread of ideational values. The strategy pursued actively maintained America's political and military predominance in the world, while deterring any challenges and threat to the US created international order. Primacists, consisting of Kagan, Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, Richard Perle, Joshua Muravchik, Zalmay Khalilzad, Elliot Abrams and Paul Wolfowitz, were idealists rather than being realists (Tyler 1992). They genuinely believed that America's democratic and free market values can be promoted successfully at global level and that this is not only in the interests of the United States but also of the international community as a whole (Nau 2002).

In the weeks and months after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the Bush administration followed the same strategy. Certain policies dated from before 11 September 2001, such as the belief in the continuing relevance of military power; and scepticism regarding multilateral institutions. But other principles underwent a drastic change. The administration's new strategy emphasised American supremacy, rather than any equilibrium among the great powers. It called for the worldwide promotion of democracy, by force if necessary (Dueck 2004).

In the 1990s, the US President George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton asserted that democracy promotion was a key determinant of the US foreign policy after the cold war (Cox 2000). Madeline Albright, the former US Secretary of State, emphasised the need of democratisation in the Arab region. She says, 'For years Arab populations have received a distorted message from Washington. The US stands for democracy, freedom and human rights everywhere, except

in the West Asia and for everyone except the Arabs. Time has come to erase that perception and their reality that too often lies behind it' (Davis 2004). The words of Albright focused not only on reforms in Iraq but also the entire Arab world including the authoritarian states in the region, which are close allies of the US. As far as Iraq is concerned, Albright observes, 'Democratisation is the most intriguing part of the administration game in Iraq. The creation of stable and united Iraq with a democratic regime would be a tremendous accomplishment with beneficial repercussions in other Arab societies' (Albright 2003). Here Albright emphasised on two points: first, the unity, democratisation and stability of Iraq; second, the spread of democracy to other Arab countries. By insisting on the US authority to supervise every aspect of Iraq's post war reconstruction, the US re-emphasises its plan for the future of West Asia. The unity and stability of the country is the major concern of the US throughout their campaign against Iraq (Albright 2003).

Thus, there is a long history of democracy promotion by the US around the world. However, there was much difference between what was preached and practiced. Security and economic interests have often outweighed or diluted democracy promotion. On one hand, it promoted democracy, while on the other, throughout the 20th Century, the US maintained friendly relations with several dictatorial and non democratic regimes and intervened in other countries for reasons other than promotion of democracy (Gardner 2005). Nevertheless, democracy promotion was viewed as an important part of USA's international policy by successive governments (Gvosdev 2003). 'The recent intervention in Iraq is the most extensive, intensive and controversial the US has ever undertaken to foster democracy around the world' (Carothers 2005).

Bush's Foreign Policy

Before the 2000 elections, Condoleeza Rice (then a close confidant of President Bush and his chief foreign policy mentor), outlined a defensive realist policy for the new administration. It focused on strengthening the US military and great-power politics which could manage the US relations and competition with other powers such as China and Russia. Rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism were given less priority.

Moreover, Rice explicitly attacked ‘the echoes of “Wilsonian thought” in the Clinton administration and expressed a strenuous objection to humanitarian interventions’ (Kaplan & Kristol 2003).

The September 2001 incident was a major landmark in the history of the US foreign policy. To the surprise of almost everyone, President Bush abandoned realism and adopted a new approach which was brought forward in his ‘Bush Doctrine’ (Maszka 2008) The doctrine especially focused on ‘pre-emptive war’ and emphasised on the spread of democracy, thus, making a radical break from the past (Flynn 2008).

The strategic assumption of the Bush administration was the idea that a regime change in Iraq was the key to stabilising and transforming the region. This also complicated the efforts of democracy promotion in Iraq. The officials believed that eliminating Iraq as a military threat would not only reshuffle the strategic map, but a democratic government in Iraq would also provide the needed domino effect to catalyse change throughout the Muslim world (Dunne 2004).

Construction of an ideational hegemony

The central focus of American foreign policy since 2001 has been the reordering of the Muslim world. The 11 September 2001 attacks detonated a series of US military and political actions that greatly transformed America’s role at international level.

The first part of the implementation of the new US policy was the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001. That war was widely discussed, justified and criticised at the same time, both within the US and around the world. But even after much assurance about democracy promotion, Afghanistan is still encroached in political disorder, a significant insurgency, and major drug trafficking.

The second part was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was a pre-emptive attack. It could, therefore, have a very clear strategic and ideological agenda. In terms of ideological agenda, both the US and the UK defended their invasion in the name of liberation of the Iraqi population. The neo-liberal ideological vision would help in bringing reforms in both Iraqi society and

economy. Only military victory was not enough. Both the US and the UK intended to reorder Iraq's political system and civil society. This would enable the formation of market democracies and contribute in making peace with the US.

One of President George W. Bush's stated reasons for starting the war in Iraq was to bring democracy to that country: 'We are committed to a strategic goal of a free Iraq that is democratic, that can govern itself, defend itself and sustain itself' (Cox and Doug Stokes 2012). The Bush administration continued to stress democracy promotion as a key element in its foreign policy when the US Secretary of State, Rice, announced her 'transformational diplomacy' plan in January 2006. The Secretary's objective of transformational diplomacy was to work with many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system (Epstein et al. 2007).

The US National Security Strategy doctrine has identified the path of action or the use of military power as the only road to global peace and security. In his speech at the West Point in June 2002, President Bush disclosed the long-term goals of the US foreign policy in the new context and the strategy to achieve them. The most important aspect of this was the positioning of the US as the protector and preserver of global peace, security, democracy and human freedom in international politics (Kaufman 2006).

Bush's National Security Strategy in September 2002 justifies the war on terror in terms of the necessity of spreading freedom throughout the globe. As NSS states:

These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages .The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise....We seek instead to create a balance of power that favours human freedom....We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants.... We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent (The National Security Strategy 2002).

The various speeches and statements of President Bush and National Security Strategy state that the freedom agenda and democracy promotion was one of the strategies of creating a world which reflects their values. The major motive was to hegemonise the world by inculcating their ideas, values and culture where it is not otherwise accepted. As already discussed the idea of

democracy promotion was not a new idea of the US foreign policy, but after 11 September 2001 it held greater importance than before. It could be said that attacks provided an opportunity to fulfil the agenda which was left by the former President Bill Clinton. The agenda clearly removed Saddam Hussein's regime in the name of liberty and human rights violations and promised to install a democratic regime based on the lines of the West. The whole idea was to hegemonise the world not only on military and strategic ground but also at the ideational level.

Ideological Base

The Bush Administration's democratisation policy is the product of a grand coalition of two of America's major ideological groupings: the Neoliberals and the Neoconservatives (Harvey 2005). The central interest of the neo-liberals is America's role in the global economy and society. They wanted the US, with its supreme power and influence, to establish a global order characterised by liberal democracies, free markets, open societies, and 'democratic Peace' (Lennon 2009).

The neoliberals followed the Wilsonian tradition of 'making the world safe for democracy'. Neoliberals do not seem to be as much prominent during the Bush Administration as they were in the Clinton Administration (e.g., Madeleine Albright and Richard Holbrooke). Conversely, the 'neo-conservatives' laid emphasis on America's role in global security (Gause III 2005). They wanted the US, with its unlimited power and influence, to eliminate threats to the security of America and its allies, including Israel. The neoconservatives also carried out the Wilsonian tradition of making the world safe for democracy (Kalaitzidis and Streich 2011). However, the neoconservatives differ from Wilsonian idealists because 'their promotion of democracy is not for the sake of democracy and human rights promotion. Rather, democracy promotion is meant to encourage America's security and pre-eminence' in the world (Nau 2002). Bush's neo-conservatives made the principle of democracy as the driving force of the US foreign policy. The promotion of democracy across the globe was one of the core part of the global US mission and would assist in securing its primary position in the world. For neo-conservatives, the world, especially the disordered and disturbed West Asia, must be reshaped accordingly the US image. 'Democracy was a panacea and its pursuit was tantamount to serving an exalted US interest' (Dalacoura 2005).

The ideational hegemony of the US is clearly reflected in the policy of neo conservatives under the Bush administration. In the name of democracy promotion and safeguarding human rights, the US was all set to impose its ideas of democracy and peace. The policy of neo conservatives could be analysed in two broad categories.

The first is unilateralism. Since the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the neo-conservative foreign policy experts were apprehensive about the utility of multilateral institutions. Under this apprehension, the United Nations was attacked for its inability to act coherently (Smith 2007). The second aspect of neo-conservative thinking on foreign policy that shaped or at least reflected Bush's concerns was a commitment to democracy. The policy emphasised, a commitment to the promotion of democracy abroad which could assert American supremacy (Robinson 1996).

The idea of the neoconservatives was that a defeated Iraq could be democratised, which could subsequently act as a kind of trigger for democratic changes throughout the region. Donald Rumsfeld even said '11 September 2001 created the "kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion the world". The advantage of a vague yet sweeping "war on terror" was precisely that it would allow for the pursuit of a broad new national security agenda, even in areas essentially unrelated to the initial terrorist attacks' (Rumsfeld 2001).

The United States was forced to cooperate with authoritarian regimes to fight Islamist militants and safeguarding oil markets. President Bush profoundly raised the visibility of the democracy issue, both by casting the war in Iraq as a democratising mission, as well as rooting the war on terrorism in a global 'freedom agenda' (Bush 2010). In this situation, democracy promotion became an unavoidable part of any serious foreign policy during his Presidency.

However, Drolet has convincingly argued that a very specific model of democracy was to be promoted. He argued that a 'set of institutions and electoral mechanisms designed to transform the "deficient" political culture of the targeted states and manufacture consent from above for an externally imposed neoliberal political- economic infrastructure' (Drolet 2010).

This meant that democracy was not promoted to reconstruct or reform the society but it was implemented to spread western ideas and values. If it was meant for peace and prosperity then it would have been in reconciliation with the Muslim world and not implemented forcefully from outside. The ideational hegemony was one of the basic tenets on which the neo-conservatives

carved its policies and during the Bush administration, they actively followed what they preached in their doctrines.

If we analyse Bush's policy we can find that it has done little to promote democracy in other countries of the Arab region. It relied heavily on the autocratic leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and a few other countries to help to protect vital US interests in the region. The Bush Administration, however, came to see 'democratisation,' as one of the significant means to fight terrorism, and subsequently Arab authoritarianism could no longer be viewed as a source of stability. It was, instead, perceived as a root cause of terrorism.

Bush's Policy of Democracy Promotion

In this section, speeches and statements of President Bush and other officials are discussed to observe the manner in which the US defined its policy of democracy promotion. President Bush had clearly articulated his aim of changing the Iraqi society on western ideas. The statements were given at intervals and not at the same time. The first clear public sign of Bush's embrace of liberalism, in the classical sense, came in the assertion at West Point on 1 June, 2002, that, 'we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent' (Bush 2002).

The 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property, and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance.... When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes (Bush 2002a).

The President's vision, first stated publicly in June 2002, was followed in his address to the UN General Assembly on 14 September 2002. He pointed out a long list of human rights violations of the Saddam Hussein regime and asked for an end to the 'silent captivity' of the Iraqi people:

Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder.... The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world (Bush 2002d).

Here, Bush clearly offered an interlinked promise: that the region could be democratised for the betterment of the Iraqi people, and that with democracy in the Middle East the zone of peace would be expanded ultimately for the well-being of the international community including the US. This vision was also reflected in his speech of February 26, 2003. He said:

The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread disorder to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq (Bush 2003d).

The message and vision of President Bush does not change till 2006— three years after the invasion as reflected in his State of the Union address on January 31, 2006 which clearly stated that:

we've been called to leadership in a period of consequence. We've entered a great ideological conflict we did nothing to invite.... Lincoln could have accepted peace at the cost of disunity and continued slavery".... Today, having come far in our own historical journey, we must decide: Will we turn back or will we finish well? As for the struggle itself, "Abroad, our nation is committed to an historic, long-term goal—we seek the end of tyranny in our world...the future security of America depends on it.... Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer—so we will act boldly in freedom's cause. A next target? Perhaps Iran, "a nation now held hostage by a small clerical elite...our nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran" (Bush 2006).

The above statements specified that during and after the invasion of Iraq, the promotion of democracy remains the foremost objective of the US foreign policy. The idea was to liberate Iraqi people and bring freedom in their lives; the western states did not understand that freedom may have a different connotation in Iraq. Freedom could be located in the rule of law, democracy and cultural values. The war against Iraq is projected by Western powers, especially the US, as the beginning of the end of authoritarianism in the Arab World (Clawson 2006). After a few months of the unilateral invasion of Iraq, the Arab Islamic nations were surprised at the wider aim of the United States to democratise not only Iraq but also other Arab countries. Addressing the UN General Assembly on 23 September, 2003, Bush asserted:

Success of a free Iraq will be watched and noted throughout the region. Millions will see that freedom, equality and material progress are possible at the heart of the Middle East. Leaders in the region will face the clearest evidence that free institutions and open societies are the only path to long-term national success and dignity. And a transformed

Middle East would benefit the entire world by undermining the ideologies that export violence to other lands. Iraq, as a dictatorship, had great power to destabilize the Middle East. Iraq, as a democracy, will have great power to inspire the Middle East (Bush 2003).

This ambition was, however, not appraised by the Arab people. The idea of establishing democracy in the Middle East, as envisaged by the US, was without any previous mutual understanding, dialogue, or exchange of opinion. The Islamic community expressed their view that the initiation of democracy should come from within the people and in the context of their culture, social values, and institutions. People in the Islamic communities realised that they can be better democrats if they remain faithful to their religion. In addition, the Arab society had no intention to restructure their Islamic culture according to the ‘notions of Western civilisation’ (El Shibiny 2010). Islam could have its own form of democracy that may differ from Western democracy. Nevertheless, Bush’s speech clearly demonstrated that democracy promotion in Iraq was the first stage and its dissemination into the Middle East was the second stage. In the context of war, the idea of democracy and freedom agenda was on its top agenda.

Dr Martin Kramer, a Middle East expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argued that all Islamists are fundamentalists who are inherently anti-democratic and anti-Western. In his essay, ‘Islam versus Democracy’, Kramer writes:

Democracy, diversity, accommodation-- the fundamentalists have repudiated them all. In appealing to the masses that fill their mosques, they promise, instead, to institute a regime of Islamic law, make common cause with like-minded “brethren” everywhere, and struggle against the hegemony of the West and the existence of Israel. Fundamentalists have held to these principles through long periods of oppression, and will not abandon them now, at the moment of their greatest popular resonance (Kramer 1993).

In January 2005, former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, declared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee three top priorities for her administration’s diplomacy:

‘First, we will unite the community of democracies in building an international system that is based on shared values and the rule of law. Second, we will strengthen the community of democracies to fight the threats to our common security and alleviate the hopelessness that feeds terror. And third, we will spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe. That is

the mission that President Bush has set for America in the world and is the great mission of American diplomacy today '(quoted in Epstein et al. 2007).

The core idea of this approach is to uproot the roots of Islamic terrorism by getting serious about promoting democracy in the Arab world with full fervour and force. The United States policy of regime change in Iraq could help it transform into a democracy. The establishment of two successful models of Arab democracy will have a powerful effect, 'inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world' (Crother 2003). As Bush argued:

We support the advance of freedom in the Middle East, because it is our founding principle, and because it is in our national interest. The hateful ideology of terrorism is shaped and nurtured and protected by oppressive regimes. Free nations, in contrast, encourage creativity and tolerance and enterprise. And in those free nations, the appeal of extremism withers away. Free governments do not build weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of mass terror. Over time, the expansion of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee of security throughout the world. Freedom is the way to peace (Bush 2003c).

The Arabs Muslims were apprehensive of Iraq's occupation and the vision of western ideas spreading across Muslim states. They were not ready to change their system or engage themselves to become truly democratic in accordance with western standards. There was no reason for implementing democracy at gun point. It must develop from within the country and their cultural values. The first requirement for democracy is to initiate negotiations with the people. Western analyst conceives democracy as universal value but it does not mean that democratisation of Middle East would lead to westernisation. Democracy is laden with global ethical values, social principles, human rights standard and cultural understanding among nations regardless of religion, belief or faith and their cultural values. The Sunni Al-Qaeda insurgents in Iraq emphatically rejected democracy on the ground that it calls for Western values. Democracy fosters peace, security, and understanding among nations and civilisations. A common perception of liberal democracy is that it has a 'universal value' (Sen 1999). The industrially advanced and established liberal democracies, along with the United States, are self-appointed vanguard of global democratic movement. More broadly, democracy promotion has become an important way of legitimising intervention in other states.

President Bush defended his decision to go for war in Iraq, even while rejecting the concept of ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington 1997), as a way of promoting democracy. He stressed:

When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilisations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation and their governments should listen to their hopes (Bush 2002a).

For President Bush, democracy promotion was based on the idea that democratic country would rarely go to war with each other and that an increase in the number of democratic states would therefore result and encourage a more secure and peaceful world.

The US government initiated different reforms and reconstruction programme to attract the Middle East people. In December 2002 the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was created to supplement the US democratisation agenda. Former Secretary of State in the US, Colin Powell, explained, ‘any approach to the Middle East that ignores its political, economic, and educational underdevelopment will be built upon sand’ (Powell 2002). MEPI sought to influence the change by funding pilot projects, such as an election assistance program to monitor Yemeni parliamentary elections. The willingness of governments to allow such funding in their countries revealed the evolution of democratic governance. It is claimed by some commentators that the US government focused on electoral as opposed to liberal democracy. MEPI’s list of grantees reflects an emphasis on civil society, judicial and media reform, and enfranchisement of women. The largest portion of MEPI’s budget was spent on political programs of strengthening democratic processes, creating or expanding public space for critical debates and analyses, expanding the role of free media, and promoting the rule of law and ensuring accountability (Mallik 2012).

The Bush Administration made the promotion of democracy in the Middle East a national security issue. It articulated its priority by stating that greater political freedom could undermine Islamic radicalism and indoctrination. Former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, argued that:

Elections are the beginning of every democracy, but of course they are not the end. Effective institutions are essential to the success of all liberal democracies. And by institutions I mean pluralistic parties, transparent and accountable legislatures,

independent judiciaries, free press, active civil society, market economies and, of course, a monopoly for the state on the means of violence (Rice 2006).

The whole process failed because democracy requires the consent of the governed. Democracy cannot be forced upon an unwilling population. The US promoted democracy during its military interventions in order to gain legitimacy before the US population, the international community and the conquered people. Therefore democracy promotion and security cooperation remained a central objective of American foreign policy in Asia because those elements magnify American power and facilitate US goals.

In Afghanistan, the Bush administration embraced democracy promotion in order to legitimise the intervention before the international community. The initial purpose was never democracy promotion. In the case of Iraq, regime change in Iraq remained the initial purpose because policy-makers believed that the promotion of democracy would be the best strategy for transforming Iraq into a strong and stable ally.

In the months prior to the war, the agenda was dismantling terrorism and overthrowing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Later on, the Bush administration stressed that the US-led military action would yield benefits beyond the destruction of WMD including liberation from a dictatorship government and enhancement of the prospects for peace and democracy throughout West Asia. This was called '*Operation Iraqi Freedom*'. Huge challenges emerged as a result of the invasion, the subsequent regime change, and the political reconstruction in Iraq (Cameron 2005). The dethroning of Saddam Hussein from power was comparatively an easier task than the construction of a political order post-Saddam.

The US faced a tougher challenge during the occupation of Iraq than the military invasion itself, primarily because its pre-war calculations failed to appreciate the likely post war realities. While overthrowing of Saddam Hussein was very popular among most segments of the Iraqi society, the process of reconstruction and democratisation drove Iraq towards civil war in the absence of a broad consensus among the *Sunni* and *Shia* in power sharing arrangement (Dalacoura 2010).

In Iraq a democratic government elected by the people came to power after the US occupation. Free elections took place after the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein and this was indeed a historic feat in Iraq. This was ultimately a step towards democratic reform and a stable nation. Iraq seems to be changing politically, economically, and culturally despite the Al-Qaeda Sunni insurgence and Shiite militia aggression. A new democratic world order seemed to be emerging in the Middle East (Elshibiny 2010).

US democracy promotion is also motivated by an acute sense of American pride and a desire to make it an unchallenged power and pursue its policy regardless of the concern for the interests, needs, or desires of people in other countries (Jentleson and Weber 2010). US hegemony was not only a consequence of economic, political, and military domination, but also a reflection of the diffusion of cultural and ideological values that advanced the role of the United States as a controlling power in the world (Smith 2003). In order to spread its vision of democracy, it declared a 'war on terror' (Al- Chalabi 2016).

The criticism could come from various perspectives. President Bush, however, in his memoirs after years of invasion mentioned that the intention of the war on Iraq was its liberation. The removal of Saddam Hussein was a just decision as US is now safe from a dictator who possessed WMD. Iraq serves as an inspiration for democracy in the Middle East since the Iraqi are well off without a dictator who engaged in human rights violation and torture, instead of delivering them justice (Bush 2010).

Whatever the reason to invade Iraq, it could not be denied that the liberation of Iraq and democratisation of the Middle East was the utmost national security agenda of the US. The whole focus of the US at that time was the reconstruction of Islamic faith and culture. The reason provided was liberation of the people; the larger motive was to create an ideational hegemony across the world. The vision was to ascertain its supremacy at every level, whether strategic or ideational.

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Reflection of Islamic values

Several discourses revolve around democracy promotion in Iraq. Iraq is predominantly a Muslim country, and therefore there can be no democratic political culture such as that enjoyed by many Western countries and non-Muslim, non-Western countries. This is because Islam purportedly does not allow for the separation of the church and the state. Western scholars also argue that there is no culture of a democratic political discourse in Islam. They are perplexed that the post-war democratisation in Iraq has not been able to move in a more positive direction. The widespread hostility towards the United States' occupation of Iraq greatly disturbs them (Davis 2005).

However, the Iraqis viewed the invasion and occupation of their country not as an establishment for democracy and progressive change, but as a mechanism for domination of Iraq by the United States and its allies. Many Iraqis think that 'democracy' has been used as a code word for remaking Middle East (Davis 2004). They fear that through this 'domino democracy', the United States actually sought to enhance its strategic interests in the Middle East, by means of putting pressure on the neighbouring states such as Syria and Iran, to enhance Israel's power in the region and to control Iraq's oil reserves (Davis 2005).

The most important problem related to democratisation in Iraq is that everyone assumes a uniform definition of the term 'democracy'. The definitions of democracy as applied to Iraq have largely been derived from the neoconservative understanding of the term which argues that the state's role is only limited to protecting civil liberties and the rule of law (Mallik 2012).

The term 'democracy' means self-determination (i.e., no foreign domination of Iraq), social justice, and anti-sectarianism (social tolerance). Elections and representative institutions are not the critical issues that first come to mind when democracy is mentioned. In Iraq, what is really meant by democracy is 'social democracy'— a form of democracy that implies much greater state involvement in a society's political economy than the neoconservative model would allow. It also emphasises a desire to promote processes and institutions that fight, rather than promote, sectarianism (Davis 2005).

Therefore, the western concept of democracy does not comply with the sizeable segment of the Iraqi population.

Bush's stated objective was to democratise Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. If the original expectation was that Iraq would become a model of democracy and stability as a result of the US invasion, today's reality is entirely different. No one in the top positions of the Bush administration understood that democracy cannot be imposed through military intervention. The US undoubtedly wanted to establish a Western-style secular democracy in Iraq, regardless of whether that was the real preference of the Iraqis. Democracy did come to Iraq. However, it had little resemblance to what President Bush had in mind.

Iraq needed an Islamic democracy- a political arrangement under which Islam was to remain a primary objective. Iraqis elected Islamic politicians whose major focus was to ensure that Islam had a central place in Iraqi life. President Bush could have never imagined that development. The United States wanted to believe that Islam could be modified to replicate Christianity, and that adopt perspectives on government and politics that are currently part of the Western tradition. As elaborated, the foremost American preference is the separation of religion and politics in a reformed Muslim country. Its second preference is the implementation of secularism. Both these ideas are hugely controversial (Ahrari 2008). It was entirely up to the Iraqis to decide what role they would want religion to play in politics.

In a general sense, the war between the United States and Al-Qaeda has become more than a war of ideas; it is emerging as a war between a dominant power that wishes to shape the world in the image of its own cultural and political values and a self-styled representative of the downtrodden Muslims who refuse to become part of the Western and Christian world (Ahrari 2008).

Soros argues that democracy and open society are very difficult to set up even if it is driven by good intentions. According to him, Iraq is the last place for setting up democracy because it does not have any such prior experience. The country is divided into ethnic factions: after the disintegration of Ottoman Empire, Iraq was formed with the composition of Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis. In the context of ethnic and religious divisions, the introduction of democracy could easily lead to the disintegration of the country (Soros 2004).

Freedom and democracy do not hold the same meaning in Islamic culture as they do in the Western culture. In Islamic culture, freedom and democracy encompasses cultural memory. Islam specifically demands the submission of the individual to the almighty. It

promises peace in exchange for the surrender of individualism in order to build an egalitarian community. Therefore, the Islamic philosophy is not based on individualism. The United States' idea of individualism and secularism is entirely inconsistent with them.

At the global level, some 1.3 billion people believe in Islam. The fundamental of the Islamic faith is the belief that Islam is superior to all other religions. God has chosen and provided Muslims with divine guidance for mankind. The believers see Islam as one of the true religions of the world. They believe that Islam should be disseminated by force to bring peace to the world (Dobrot 2007).

Since the Muslims have been unable to establish a pan-Islamic government ruled under the divine law of *sharia*, they tend to believe that the West wants to unconditionally control, oppress, and exploit their people and resources (Dobrot 2007).

At a press conference on 13 September 2006, White House Press Secretary, Tony Snow, stated:

yes, you [the United States] want to fight the efforts of bin Laden and others to establish a caliphate. The history of the caliphate was that you had centralized leadership at that time. It had control over the impressive landmass that was controlled by Muslims during that period. And they want to establish that sort of thing. So the President's notion is absolutely right, you want to preempt that (Dobrot 2007).

According to Wiktorowicz (2004),

Islamic activism is rooted in the symbolism, language, and cultural history of Muslim society and as a result has successfully resonated with increasingly disillusioned populations suffering from political exclusion, economic deprivation, and a sense of growing impotence at the expense of outside powers and a faceless process of globalization.

The elected party, it is expected by the US, should abide by it. A democratic election must produce a government that is acceptable to the White House— this vision, thus, identifies the aim of the United States to install a puppet regime in the name of peace and democracy. The GWOT is, thus, an ideological battle.

Afghanistan is perhaps the most prominent example of this challenge. The initial post-September action by the United States was not of promoting democracy ; but it took a sudden step forward after the overthrow of the Taliban regime. The conduct of the US

military operations after the occupation had undermined the Afghanistan administration's deep commitment to democratic and humanitarian reconstruction.

After the invasion of Afghanistan, a democratic regime had been envisioned. Despite the UN backed election and the occupation of the US and the NATO troops, it did not prove feasible to protect democracy in Afghanistan. The state is still in fear of violence and repression (Vanaik 2007).

There are two recommendations proposed to help shape the future in these countries: First, 'the United States must be seen as "just" to re-establish its credibility and legitimacy in the Islamic world. Second, the United States must communicate and promote democracy in terms that the Islamic world understands and respects' (Carother 2003). Democracy may still emerge in the Middle East. For this to happen, however there needs to be an internal push for democracy. America needs to increase its credibility as a promoter of freedom and democracy while it continues to support repressive regimes like Saudi Arabia.

The Bush administration's stated aim to make Iraq a model of democracy in the Middle East did not succeed for two reasons. First, building democracy was not a vital goal of the US government. It was a mere instrument to initiate political change in the region. Second, democracy was imposed from the outside by force.

The feelings of anti-Americanism continue to rise in the world of Islam. One major theme resonating in the United States is that it must 'win the war of ideas' in order to win the hearts and minds of Muslims. Under the Bush administration, the United States has become aggressive in its priorities and preferences, or such is the perception in the world of Islam (Ritter 2003). As according to Naom Chomsky:

It would be a good idea to spread the values of liberal democracy. But that's not what the US and Britain is trying to do, it's not what they've done in the past... They don't spread liberal democracy. What they spread is dependence and subordination (Chomsky 2004).

The culture and history of Islam are very important for establishing a global environment that could provide accommodation to these groups. A clear understanding of this culture and history is essential for the long-term strategy to shape the future of U.S. with Muslim governments. After 11 September 2001 attacks, the Bush administration concluded that decades of the US

support for non - democratic leaders in the West Asia did not lead to stability but rather contributed to terrorism. While the US Government's support to democracy promotion is not new, such sustained attention and allocation of resources marks a new emphasis on democratisation.

The central focus of American foreign policy since 2001 has been the Muslim world. The 11 September 2001 attacks denoted a series of US military and political actions that by now have greatly transformed America's international role (Cox and Stokes 2012). The US - led war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001 and Iraq is widely discussed and criticised, both within the US and around the world. Even today, Afghanistan and Iraq are entrapped in political disorder, a significant insurgency, and major drug trafficking.

The following section will briefly discuss the justification of war on terror. This discussion was intensified due to the US justification for the war: to weed out terrorism war on terror should be initiated.

Just War

After explaining and discussing three variables, it is evident that the counter-terrorism strategy was not about threats only. The debates continue whether war on terror was just or unjust? The following discussion will examine the extent war on terror was justified in fulfilling its objectives.

'War on terrorism' as coined by President Bush, after the attack on 11 September 2000, changed the discourse of war in international relations. It was denoted as a prime threat and the United States pointed out that the war on terror has begun with the attack on Al-Qaeda and would continue till it is eliminated from the world. The western states justified the war as it is meant not only for self-defence of the United States but also for the purpose of maintaining order and peace in the international system. Elshtain argues that if the war is waged to liberate the international community from injustice, brutality and to bring about order and justice, it is not to be considered as wrong. She further argues that the 'war on terror' led by the US and its allies is

just as it was a response to the injustice done by the killing of civilians on 11 September 2001 (Elshtain 2003).

According to 'just war' doctrine, it is right to perform immoral acts to save morality and create peace and prosperity. The 'just war' concept represents an 'anomalous instance in moral discourse, namely a glaring exception to an otherwise accepted prohibition of acts of human brutality' (Wells 1969). The concept of just war was visible in classical and theological philosophy and was explicit in the Christian ethics of Saint Augustine. Augustine proposes that if the war is attributed in the right spirit or right intention, it can be consistent with the Christian duty. War is justifiable if the root cause is to eradicate evil from the society and the state. It is permissible and would not be termed as an act of immorality if it is driven by a moral intention to punish and discipline the evil doer (Augustine 1998).

The war on terror revives the theory of just war which comprises of three principles in measuring war as just or unjust. It is concerned with the justice of conducting a war in the first place (*jus ad bellum*), concerns with justice in the course of the war (*jus in bello*) and lastly justice involved in post-war settlements (*jus post bellum*) (Walzer 1977). The first principle deals with right authority, just cause, proportionality, right intention, action of last resort and reasonable prospect of success. In determining the justness of the rationale for waging war, the longstanding concept of '*jus ad bellum*' is central to the discussion. The term can be loosely translated as 'war justly motivated' (Weeks 2010). The second principle features the conduct of the war which refers to the immunity of non-combatants and the dictum of proportionality that the force involved in waging war should not be disproportionate to the end to be achieved (Walzer 1977).

Jus post bellum refers to the end and the final stage of war. It prescribes that after war termination, the state must seek to regulate the ending of wars, and ease the transition from war to peace (Walzer 1977).

So in brief the variants of just war are as follows. Firstly, just war must be publicly declared. Secondly, a war justly waged must have a reasonable prospect for success. Thirdly, the cause of a just war must be proportional, *i.e.*, sufficiently grave to warrant the extreme measure of war.

Fourthly, a war is justly waged as a last resort. Fifthly, a just war must be waged for a just cause. Sixthly, a just war must be waged by a legitimate authority. The above-mentioned *jus in bello* requirements implies that a 'war justly fought must deploy only means proportional to the cause in which, non-combatants are immune from attack and prisoners of war are treated as non-combatants' (Calhoun 2001).

The interpretations of scholars may differ in judging the 'war on terror' but the United States has termed it as a 'just' war against terror. The US President Barack Obama, while receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, defended the war in Afghanistan as just. He noted, 'negotiations cannot convince Al-Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism, it is recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason' (Obama 2009). He declared that the means which have been used in Afghanistan and Iraq have achieved the success in relation to the proportionate goals they seek to achieve.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 presented the Bush administration with their just cause, intention and also abide by rest of the principles. The US and western powers labelled this as an 'act of war'. But the war on terror was not only perceived as an act of self-defence, but also as a crusade for freedom, in defence of liberty and for delivering justice (Dexter 2008).

In modern interpretations of just war theory, there are two legitimate reasons for launching a war: self defence against an aggressor and humanitarian intervention against a sovereign state in response to acts that shake the foundation of humankind. A military response to the deadly attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 could be justified in terms of self defence. A global network of terrorism that was responsible for the attacks could strike again. The right intention is to eliminate the threat emerging from international terrorism which led to action against Al-Qaeda. The United States argued that, to completely uproot the threat, it is necessary to remove the Taliban and the Iraqi government (Leaning 2002).

Significantly, the 'war on terror' has been constructed as a war of last resort, since no peaceful or diplomatic options were available. As argued, 'the Bush administration, meant that the "war on

terror” was not just a sound security policy, nor merely a just, or justifiable war; it was a divine calling a ‘good war’ (Dexter 2008).

The invasion of Afghanistan was justified because it was considered the base of Al-Qaeda. The ‘war on terror’ has never just been a counter-terrorist policy. The attackers killed thousands of people and carried out severe human rights violations which deprived many innocents of their life and liberty. It had received the permission of UN, NATO and Congress and was, therefore, a legitimate authority. The waging of war was also the last resort because the Taliban government was not ready to comply with the demands of the US and it was still providing safe haven to the Al-Qaeda terrorists (Hayden et al. 2003). *Operation Enduring Freedom* was engaged in counter-terrorism as well as humanitarian relief operations and the war could be considered successful because the US and its allies located and killed Osama Bin Laden and also set up a democratic government in Afghanistan.

The principle of proportionality was also followed as the harm and damage caused was proportional to the ends sought. Overall cause and intention was just because it not only eliminated threats but also provided humanitarian relief by dropping medicine and food in Afghanistan (Hayden et al. 2003). From the beginning, it was presented by the US administration as a classic ‘good war’ that adhered to ‘just war principles’ (Jackson 2005).

On the other hand, it seems that the US and its allies ignored the various principles of just war to portray the war on terror as just. The parameters of just war have hardly been fulfilled. In the case of Iraq, it was argued that the rights of the individuals were brutally crushed and therefore it was imperative for the United States to respond against the Saddam regime. However, this was not the initial reason provided by the western powers. The probable reasons were possession of WMD in Iraq and the relations between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. When this proved to be inaccurate, the Bush administration justified its military actions on a humanitarian basis. The military operation in Iraq extended the causes of just war as a dissemination of democratic values to oppressed people.

Thus the hegemonic powers use just war to justify their extra-territorial interests. Under the veil of humanity and stability, they pursue their political motives and territorial interests (Burke 2004). The hegemon constructs just war or aggression in such a way that the act of aggression seems to be just. The criticism is on grounds of violation of the sovereignty of a state by the US.

The invasion of Iraq by the United States probably will be treated as one of the greatest lies in international politics (Keane and Hamilton 2004). After the reports of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks were published, it was evident that there was neither an alliance between Al-Qaeda and Iraq nor did Iraq possess any weapons of mass destruction. Further Saddam Hussein had no involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But Bush was reluctant to accept it:

The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and Al-Qaeda is because there was a relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. The administration never said that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated between Saddam and Al-Qaeda. We did say there were numerous contacts between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda” Even when he was confronted with the truth, Bush was reluctant to accept it (Bush 2004).

For the British, the decision to follow the Bush Administration in attacking Iraq was very much a result of friendly relations with the US and its belief that the attack was morally just and necessary (Wallace and Oliver 2005). British security policy shared a prolonged strong and close relationship with the US (Dunne 2004).

The major motive to wage a war against Iraq was that it had weapons of mass destruction, but in due course of time it turned out to be false. The secondary justification was that Saddam Hussein had links with the 9/11 attacks or to Al-Qaeda, but this also turned out to be false. Therefore, if the causes were not just then how the war could be termed as just? There is apprehension that if the stated reasons for waging the war fails, then the rationale of the war also collapses.

Elshtain argues that a war can be justified as defending a third party, namely the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. In both the countries, dictatorship was overthrown (Elshtain 2003). However the war was not waged for bringing jobs and women’s schools to Afghanistan. The

reason was to stop terrorism. So if this was not the intention of the administration then how the war could be justified remains a significant question.

The war failed to meet any of the just war criteria. They claim that the war against terror is for the purpose of defending the values of pluralism and freedom and to that extent, they sustain the right to use military actions for moral purposes. Burke argues that the killings of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq and the destruction of infrastructure were purely unintentional. It is to be pointed out that in Iraq the number of civilian deaths was extremely high. If the aim of the US attack was to liberate the people from the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein, it is not clear as to why the US action resulted in the death of so many Iraqis. The concept of ethical peace eliminates any type of violence to restore peace in international society (Burke 2004). The author argues that the just war theory's emphasis on the protection of non-combatants is ignored by the western powers. The western powers bear no responsibility for the civilian deaths. In fact, they argue that the death of non-combatant deaths is due to the political leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq (Burke 2004). The global war on terror has cost the lives of close to thirty thousand civilians in Iraq, injured ten thousand and deaths counting into many thousands in Afghanistan (Iraq Body Count 2005). As of 6 October 2005, estimation was up to twenty nine thousand eight hundred seventy three civilian deaths since the outbreak of the conflict (Roberts 2002).

The invasion and occupation of Iraq was based on the principles of Bush Doctrine. Iraq was conceived as both a terrorist threat and a key rival for the world. The US administration's showed impatience with the inspection members and could have waited longer for the inspection team to complete its work. As the subsequent lack of evidence of weapons of mass destruction indicates the situation was not one of imminent danger. Diplomacy and full-fledged inspections from the inspection team could have solved the crisis and rule out war (Snauwaert 2004).

In the 11 September 2001 attack, terrorists deliberately targeted and killed thousands of innocent people in the US. The attacks were seen as particularly 'heinous and evil' and immediately termed as unjustified aggression. The United States framed its counter- terrorism efforts in just war terms by making a positive legal and moral assertion of the right to self-defence. Moreover,

in arguing that terrorism is a different kind of war, the administration consistently defined 'pre-emption' as self-defence. As the then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argued:

The only way to deal with the terrorists that has all the advantage of offense is to take the battle to them, and find them, and root them out. And that is self-defense. And there is no question but that any nation on Earth has the right of self-defense. And we do. And what we are doing is going after those people, and those organizations, and those capabilities wherever we're going to find them in the world, and stop them from killing Americans (Rumsfeld 2001).

A major US justification for ending Hussein's repressive dictatorship was to 'protect human rights and alleviate Iraqis' suffering'. Bush reportedly mentioned about human-rights abuses in Iraq and in his speech made his act as a sort of moral clarity that was necessary to make the decision to invade (Lieberfeld 2005). However, as argued no large-scale human rights violations were found at the time of the invasion, and the US administration also did not show any concern for human-rights violations initially. It was only when WMDs were not found that it was declared that the primary goal of the US was the introduction of democracy and self-government in Iraq.

Fisher and Biggar criticised insurgency, which was responsible for the death of civilians. He argues that sometimes moral justification is necessary to maintain law and order in the society. In his opinion, the attack on Iraq is a case of just cause; the regime of Saddam Hussein was atrocious, brutal and unconstructive for the international community. He justified his argument by providing statistics; during 1991-2003, at least three hundred thousand people were victims of state violence. This is sufficient to satisfy the single criterion of just cause. He pointed out that in Iraq, weapons were surely not found but certainly the plan was to develop nuclear weapons as soon as sanctions were relaxed and hence no last resort was left other than regime change. On the point of just intention, he specified that the coalition powers were effectively engaged in post-war reconstructions in both these states at a great cost (Fisher and Biggar 2011).

The just war enunciates that moral humanitarian intervention is necessary when the government turns brutal or when the individuals have demanded it, but in the present context, it is the intervention that turns out to be dominant and coercive. The authors argue that the hegemonic

power spreads its own version of morality and justice and if any state violates this hegemonic version, it renders itself susceptible to attack (Flint and Falah 2004).

While the US claims to have liberated Iraq, American actions have been under scanner.

The pictures of Iraqi prisoners sexually humiliated by female American soldiers in the Abu Ghraib prison have contributed to a perception that the Iraqi invasion was about the destruction of Islam rather than its liberation. The abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners by American forces had demolished the Bush administration's belated moral argument in support of occupation (Saikal 2004).

The war in Afghanistan was an international armed conflict. So guarantees were given only to 'protected persons'. The Taliban are assuredly not protected persons because they do not meet the organisational criteria of the Geneva Conventions and because Afghanistan is also a 'failed state' (Brower 2005).

It is also argued that Al-Qaeda should have been pursued in Afghanistan by means other than war.

Therefore given these conflicting views, in order to fully explore whether this decision truly was justified or not it is necessary to look at the way in which the war in Afghanistan has been and is now taking place in terms of just war theory (Davis 2010).

Although the United States had intentions of this being a just war, it failed to make sufficient commitment to political and economic reconstruction within Afghanistan: thereby making it an unjust war (Walzer 2009).

On analysing the just war principle of legitimate authority, the US government proclaimed that it has the right of self-defence. However instead of launching a war quickly in response to imminent danger, President Bush appealed to the United Nations Security Council. It was claimed that Iraq had been ignoring or violating the clauses of Security Council and therefore should be severely punished. The Bush administration followed a diplomatic procedure which required international authority, the UN Security Council, to make a decision about invading Iraq. In the absence of a competent authority such as the UNSC, there was no need for approval from any authority outside the US. The fact that he did appeal to the UN Security Council, meant that the authority for military action by the US and its allies was ambiguous right from the start.

This is one reason why the US has not been able to collect sufficient international support for invasion and post war reconstruction in Iraq.

In other words, the American inability to fulfil its current responsibility for security and defence in Iraq is due in part to unsuccessful diplomatic efforts that have been further weakened because of the way the United States went to war (Burke 2004).

Just cause and last resort elements specified that there is no resort other than war; but in case of Iraq it was an entirely different scenario:

The most obvious cause would have been that Saddam Hussein was in a position to launch a devastating attack on Kuwait, Jordan, or Israel, or that it was about to launch nuclear or biological weapons against the U.S. But no evidence of such danger was produced at the time. The Bush administration did argue that Hussein intended to develop his nuclear weapons programs and might be ready to do real damage in a year or two. That, however, did not meet the “last resort” criterion. Other causes might have included evidence gathered by intelligence agencies that Hussein was about to orchestrate the delivery of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups whose movements could not have been stopped by any other means than war (Pine 2002).

In other words, only by a sudden military attack to destroy Iraq, would the U.S. be able to succeed in stopping a terrorist attack. There was no evidence, however, of such immediate danger or of Saddam Hussein maintaining any relations with the Al-Qaeda (Fisher and Biggar 2011).

The U.S. was obligated on just-war grounds to use proportionate means to win the war and establish peace in Iraq. But it is clear in this context that the U.S. was unprepared at the beginning as well as in the present to use means necessary to establish stability in Iraq. The easy part was to destroy Saddam Hussein’s regime, but that does not satisfy the criteria of just war (Hurka 2005). The US support for democratic regimes has left Iraqi people disillusioned with the parameters of Western style government and economic reforms. The intervention of Iraq and Afghanistan had brought great apprehensions in the minds of the Arab people (Heazle and Islam 2006).

The war in Afghanistan and Iraq raises crucial questions for just war theory, including whether just war criteria can be used to change course in a war that is already more than eight years long. The US war was driven more by the global strategy than by the principles of just war theory. The

choice of the use of force in Iraq, the military invasion, was not a last resort. According to Jervis, 'US must assert its primacy and hegemony in world politics, whereby American security, world stability, and the spread of liberalism require the US to act in ways others cannot and must not' (Jervis 2005a).

Even though the Taliban lost the battle and were dethroned, they had not lost the war. The continuing occupation of Afghanistan by the United States provided them the opportunity to reclaim their country. Similarly many lawyers argue that the treatment of prisoners seized in Afghanistan contravenes international law on the treatment of prisoners also breaches international law (Rabkin 2002).

The U.S. government has also implicitly argued that since war has changed so dramatically, there is a need to expect and accept different ethical, legal, and military standards, such as preemptive strikes and military tribunals where suspected terrorists may not even know the evidence against them. Thus, apart from practical issues raised by the September 11 attacks and the U.S. military response, the transformation of war raises questions for just war theory and about the justice of the U.S. counter terror war. The basic tenet remains consistent and could not be altered. War is just if the cause and intention are just. War should be a last resort and should be undertaken by competent authorities only if there is a possibility of success. War must also be conducted justly as unnecessary violence should be avoided, and non-combatants should not be deliberately targeted (Crawford 2003).

The war failed fully to meet any of the just war criteria. There were doubts whether the operation was undertaken with agreement from competent authority and as a last resort. These doubts, in turn, fuelled the concerns that there was not sufficient cause for just war. Though the UN was a competent authority but the US-UK alliance did not abide by the authority. The failure to secure support from the UNSC was itself evidence of lack of international consensus. In the name of proportionate means, no adequate assessment was undertaken before military action was authorised to ensure that the harm likely to result would not outweigh the good achieved. Neither were there definite plans for how to establish a self-government after the initial military

campaign was concluded nor was there adequate efforts of post war reconstructions (Fisher and Biggar 2011).

The justification for war failed and, moreover, it has cost thousands of innocent lives and creating a situation in which people of both these states are not free of terror. The study conducted on *Operation Enduring Freedom* by the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA), for example, conclusively refuted claims that the US fought with care to avoid harming civilians. After analysing the figures, Carl Conetta concluded that:

Despite the US navy and air force flying sixty four per cent fewer over Afghanistan than in the Kosovo war, it caused two to three times more direct civilian deaths approximately between four thousand seven hundred in Afghanistan (Conetta 2002).

While it looks as if the war was morally justifiable as a security response to terrorism and, therefore just, the intervention was laden with a power-driven, hegemonic foreign policy strategy which undermined the moral credibility of the doctrine. The international moral and legal order that constitutes the best and most sustainable strategy against terrorism should have been taken up.

Conclusion

The Bush administration made democracy a tool for the war on terror and the liberation of failed states which harbour terrorists or sponsor them. When democracy promotion was initiated in Afghanistan and Iraq, it attracted a great deal of support both inside and outside the US. Although large sections of American society supported the invasion in Iraq in its initial stages, convinced that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction which is threat to the society, it soon became clear that the allegations were false. So, the popular support for this war declined.

Western powers use just war to defend human rights violations. They claim that the war against terror is for the purpose of defending the values of pluralism and freedom and to that extent, they sustain the right to use military actions for moral purposes. The killings of Afghani and Iraqi civilians and the destruction of infrastructure were purely unintentional. It is to be pointed out that in Iraq the number of civilian deaths was extremely high. If the aim of the US attack was to liberate the people from the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein, it is not clear as to why the US

action resulted in the death of so many Iraqis. The concept of ethical peace was introduced to eliminate any type of violence and restore peace in international society. In fact, they argue that the death of non-combatants is due to the political leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq.

On the one hand, US promote democracy and law at international level, and on the other hand, war on terrorism ignored the practice of democracy, international law and human rights whenever it deemed necessary to do so. The US role as a liberating force is criticised on grounds of determining what countries should do to run their affairs. While the US claimed that its efforts were to promote self-determination, freedom and equality, its policies have been formulated to serve its own interests. The US as the leader could not determine the criteria of democracy and human rights but it is the duty of the international community to frame international laws.

The US is promoting its own interests in the name of combating terrorism and imposing its own ideas and values. The US projection as the leader of the world to promote democracy in Iraq and Middle East countries could not disguise its imperial interests. The promotion of democratic ideas and values creates apprehensions in the minds of the Islamic communities. In their view, the democratic ideas should come from within the society and should not be imposed by western notions. The effective way of reforming democracy is negotiations with the people on their shared beliefs and ideas. They are in no condition to be persuaded to redesign their culture and ideas according to western perceptions. It is hardly acceptable in the Islamic countries to bear the directions given by the western powers in altering their culture and ideas. They are not ready to replicate the western values and that also on gun point. The failure to challenge the U.S.-led Western discourse on global terrorism continues to undermine the hopes, dreams, and aspirations of those who struggle for liberation from hegemony and injustice.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

This chapter summarises the findings and inferences drawn from the study. The study is primarily driven towards understanding the factors that led to the war on terror with the aid of three variables: threats, choices and ideas in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. The central question of the study revolves around investigating which of these factors led to the war on terror. It is a variable driven study where each of these variables is tested to examine to the extent to which these variables played a role in waging the war on terror. War on terror is a counterterrorism strategy to eliminate terrorism initially from Afghanistan and later expanded to other countries which harbour terrorism. The reasons for taking these variables are explicitly defined in the preceding chapters. Threat was chosen as the first variable because the war on terror was initiated in the name of countering threats. The second variable is strategic choices as threats might be the primary reason but there were strategic interests and motives which were carried out in the name of war on terror. The last variable constitutes ideas. The war on terror on a large scale was just not about countering threats and fulfilling strategic choices but also about imposing ideas in the non-democratic world.

The study examines the war on terror by testing each of these variables specifically. The hypotheses proposed at the beginning of the study are as follows:

- a) War on terror has less to do with the threats and more to do with strategic and ideational aspects.
- b) The war on terror is driven by strategic logic of the US and its allies which has blunted ethical considerations.
- c) The war on terror in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq is driven less by threats and more to do with ideas and strategic choices.

After explaining and investigating each of these three variables following inferences were drawn. The first variable threat does play a certain role in the case study of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden were provided a safe haven in Afghanistan. When the Taliban

government of Afghanistan did not abide to hand over Al-Qaeda members to the US, the attack on Afghanistan became evident. Al-Qaeda was a grave threat not only to the US but to the international community. It had openly declared a war against the US and established its bases and network at the global level. Al-Qaeda inflicted a massive damage on its land and people. For countering the attack, by the Al-Qaeda network and inflicting punishment on the perpetrators, the war on terror was initiated. The threat factor was grave because no one had ever dared to attack the US and its main headquarters. The threat had to be countered invariably and as Afghanistan was the place where the terrorists were provided a safe location, it was attacked as the US first target. It was the legitimate target of attack in the context of threats. The military means must be used to counter the threat but the operation should cause minimal damage to the people. It was later justified on the ground of eliminating terrorism and also on the ground of humanitarian intervention.

The rationale for the war on terrorism in the case of Iraq was the liberation of Iraq, the alleged possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the linkages between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. These were the three arguments given for the war on terror. None of these allegations proved to be reliable until, Iraq was invaded. It was argued that it might be the point that Saddam Hussein did not possess WMD weapons but he might try to. After the first Gulf War, the UN had imposed sanctions on Iraq. It is plausible that after the sanctions are withdrawn, Iraq would use its oil revenue to make weapons. The threat from Iraq was not imminent but anticipated and made on false assumptions. Even if threats were, there must be several other possibilities to counter threats. The Peaceful negotiations could have been adopted if the US might have known that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destruction it would have never attacked Iraq in the first place. They would have left the matter to the inspectors for as long as necessary. The US knew that Iraq did not have any WMD as it was proven by the UN inspectors. In the case of Iraq, the threat factor was constructed in the name of war on terror. The possession of the WMD and the nexus with Al-Qaeda was proved false.

The war on terror was justified in the name of threat in the case of Afghanistan but in the case of Iraq it proved to be false. Therefore the finding is that the first variable threat played a decisive role in the context of war on terror in the case of Afghanistan but in the second case study, Iraq threat did not play any role. Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the US.

If the threats were not the preliminary cause what exactly led to the war on terror? Here, the second variable played a decisive role: choices. Iraq possessed a huge amount of oil reserves and the possession of that resources would have been a determining factor for the war on terror. The invasion of Iraq simultaneously provided access to the resources in the Gulf region based in Central Asia and elimination of threats for Israel. If the Middle East did not have the major energy resources of the world, it would have been the case that it never suffered an attack. It was not only that the US wanted the oil reserve but it was also the fact that it wanted to eliminate industrial rivals from the region. The US-led war on terror could not be understood in military terms alone. The hegemonic position of the United States internationally rests on its ability to control the resources and transport routes for crucial energy and other strategic material supplies needed by other leading industrial states. Thus, the strategic interests and access to affordable energy has always been a primary interest of the US administration so as to secure a dominant position in the control of oil and gain access to the resources of Eurasia.

The US was really concerned about the emergence of the multi-polar world especially the rise of EU. The war on terror was a platform from where the US fulfilled its many objectives by capturing the oil rich region and eliminating rivals from there. The occupation of Iraq provided a huge decisive leverage over its competitors and rivals such as China and Russia. These strategic demands cannot be publicly declared as it creates unpopularity of the US and its allies among the world community. Therefore, under the pretext of threats, strategic motives were fulfilled.

The war against Al-Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq have predominantly established the US military control over the lands of the Middle East. The two wars have created new military bases which intensified the power and supremacy of the US in the international system. The aim of the western powers was not merely to attain military and political objectives but also to sustain economic and strategic choices. At least, the Bush administration would gain substantially from any expansion of the US control over the world's oil resources in the Middle East. The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 provided an opportunity to the US administration to initiate hawkish policies to increase its grip on the region as well as to assert its supremacy in international politics.

The US war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Iraq are the latest interventions to fulfil its strategic interests. In the case of Afghanistan, strategic choice was not the primary factor but still

played a dominant role. The geo-political and geo-economic interests suggest that an important motive for the US operations in Afghanistan is related to its interests in the resources of Central Asia. The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 did create a threat for the US and its allies but also provided an incentive for using Afghanistan as a convenient target to remind the world of America's capacity for military destruction. If the strategic interests would not have played a significant role, the US government would not have developed policies related to oil and gas pipelines. The war on terror was aimed to disguise and justify empire building and to legitimise the imperialist desire of the US. The ultimate goal of the US strategy is to establish new spheres of influence and hence achieve an environment of security and control that can eliminate any obstacles in its dominance. The strategic choices played an important factor in the war on terror in the case of Iraq.

The inferences drawn here imply that in the case of Iraq, no threats were detected. However, the demand and vulnerability of oil reserves, the compulsion to counter international competitors, and the need to maintain the hegemony meant that strategic choices had played a vital role. In the case of Afghanistan, the variable, 'choice' was not the initiating factor but the US was aware of the strategic location of the region. Thus, strategic choice played a limited role in the case of Afghanistan. The desired objectives were fulfilled in the name of war on terror.

The third variable, 'ideas' play a dominant role in the war on terror. From the vantage point of the intervening states, in this case primarily the US and the UK, ideational interests were present in both the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, war on terror was waged in the name of eliminating terrorism and humanitarian intervention. The aim was not only targeting terrorists but also reforming the society of Afghanistan through the so-called liberal western worldview. However, the inception of ideas did not constitute the initial justification. The initial agenda was countering threats and inflicting punishment on the culprits. The US and its allies even claimed that humanitarian intervention is necessary to liberate the Afghan people from misery and deprivation. It was ostensibly aimed at liberating Afghan women and democratising the country. The emphasis on humanitarian intervention was conspicuous after the terror attacks on 11 September 2001. Prior to these attacks there was no explicit concern from the western states regarding the appalling human rights situation in Afghanistan rights due to the Taliban regime. As soon as the attacks occurred on 11 September 2001, there was hue and cry from the western

states that the Taliban government is arbitrary and non-democratic. The promotion of democracy and installation of a democratic regime constituted the subsequent steps taken by the US and the UK after eliminating Al-Qaeda and dismantling the Taliban government.

In the case of Iraq, the agenda of democracy promotion was one of the primary justifications given by the US. The dictatorship of the Iraqi government and its brutality with severe human rights violations constituted a major justification for the attack. The premise that underlies the rationale for the attack on Iraq is simple: Islamic states owing to non-democratic regimes are more brutal and inhuman. The argument that follows is that in order to liberate the Iraqi people, it is necessary to overthrow the Saddam Hussein government and install a democratic government based on western ideas and rule of law. It needs to be pointed out the premise is faulty and the argument, fundamentally flawed.

The Bush administration of the United States stressed on democracy promotion in the context of the war on terror. Furthermore, it was reiterated that failed states which harbour terrorists or sponsor them need to be liberated. Ideas of democracy, western values, human rights and culture were promoted in the name of war on terror. The basic argument was that the authoritarian governments were sponsoring terrorism and therefore it is plausible that non-democratic regimes could be changed to democratic regimes. The war on terror was ostensibly pursued to liberate the Iraqi people and bring peace in the state. The argument proceeds that subsequently democracy promotion will be disseminated in the entire Middle East region. So the war on terror was not only to achieve military and strategic motives but also to fulfil ideational interests. By making an assumption that the regime must be changed because it is non-democratic, the US and its allies aimed to impose their ideas and values on states which are not abiding by the terms and conditions set by the West. The war on terror was designed to fulfil military objectives, strategic choices and ideational interests.

The US-led war on terror had an opportunity to democratise the states in the name of war on terror as they are supposedly breeding terrorism and creating disharmony in the world. Democracy promotion will create a world which would abide by the western notion of values and preferences. In sum, the interest is to create an ideational hegemony where the ideas of western states, especially those of the US and the UK, are supported and propagated in every part

of the world. The Middle East is one of the regions which is yet to follow the western notion of governance and progress. Thus, the region was forced to bear the brunt of war on terror.

In Afghanistan, democracy promotion was initiated after the Al-Qaeda leaders were removed. Thereafter, a democratic government was established but it failed to bring peace in the state and society. The Taliban had begun to resurface as guerrilla fighters. The idea of peace and democracy, which was promised by the US and its allies failed to materialise in the state.

The war on terror was aimed to disguise and justify empire building by promoting and legitimising the imperialist desires of the US. The discourse was to reform the Middle East but the western powers often fail to understand that democracy cannot be implemented by force. The United States and its allies have focused their attention on a regime change through democracy promotion which is nothing but coercive. The US and its allies show less openness *vis-a-vis* the 'other' who belongs to a different culture. Thus, the third variable, 'ideas' constituted a significant factor in terms of initiating and sustaining the war on terror. The fulfilment of ideational hegemony was a primary goal which was aimed at and practised under the disguise of war on terror.

In sum, it could be inferred that 'threats' as a factor initiated the war on terror in Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, threats were clearly absent; rather, 'strategic choices' tilted the scale in favour of intervention. As mentioned earlier, strategic choices played a limited role in the case of Afghanistan. Most importantly, the variable, 'ideas' and the quest for ideational hegemony fundamentally drove the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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