STATE CAPACITY AND DEVELOPMENT

A Comparative Study of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand

Thesis Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2016

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled '**State Capacity and Development: A Comparative Study of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand**' submitted by me in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for the award of any other degree in this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for eveluation

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Though this thesis is an individual work, a lot of people have contributed to its production. It is difficult to find a word of appreciation to acknowledge their helping hand and the words of encouragement. I owe my gratitude to all those people who have made this thesis possible and because of whom my research experience has been one that I can cherish forever.

First and foremost a very special thanks to my supervisor *Prof. Niraja Gopal Jayal.* I have been amazingly fortunate to have supervisor like her who gave me the freedom to explore on my own and at the same time the guidance to recover when my steps faltered. Her patience and support helped me overcome every situation and finish this Thesis.

I would also like to thank all the faculty members of *Centre for Law and Governance* for their encouragement and cooperation. Special thanks to *Dr. Amit Prakash* for his guidance in getting my research started on the right foot and providing me with the foundation for becoming a good scholar.

I would like to thanks my grandfather *Prof. D.H. Nath who* has always shown me the right direction for my bright future. Thank you nana ji.

My deepest gratitude is to my mother, Archana Sharma, and my father, *Shanker Dutt*, whom I owe everything I am today. Their unwavering faith and confidence in my abilities and in me is what has shaped me to be the person I am today. Thank you Ma-papa for all the love, care, support that always persuaded me to do my best. I am also thankful to my grand ma for her affection and support.

I am also thankful to my sibling *Yamini* and *Varun* and my friend *Sakshi* who were not always there with me physically but who have been the greatest and most constant force of inspiration to me, in every sphere of life.

I owe my special thanks to four sisters, *Poonam Di, Anita Di, Debajanee Di***,** and *Madhu* at hostel, who have not only stood by me throughout but also encouraged me to be optimistic about everything in life. Thank you for all your love and care.

I also express my special thanks to my friends *Nitin, Mushtaq and Mohan* for their support technical as well as moral. Thanks for always being there whenever I need you.

I am also pleased to have friends like *Hussain, Ruknudin, Imran, Mahwash, Ritika, Khushboo, Ashana, Komal, Shweta, Deepa Chandran, Sridevi, Anil, Ratan, Pramod, Sulila, Sharada, Grace, Rahul, Ashish, Pradeep and Raza.* After long hours of work, few moments which I enjoyed with them had always refreshed my mind and gave me a new enthusiasm to start my work again.

I am also indebted to the *Centre for the Study of Law and Governance* and *Indian Council of Social Science Research for funding my field study.*

Last but not the least, I wish to thank God and all those whose names have not been mentioned here, who had helped me during dissertation work.

RUKMANI

Date: 07th September 2016

Location of Area of Field Study in Indian Political Map



Map of Jharkhand

Map of Uttarakhand

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Abbreviations

AJSU	All Jharkhand Student Union
ANMs	*Auxiliary Nurse Midwifery*
APL	Above Poverty Line
ARWSP	Accelerated Rural Water Supply Program
BDO	Block Development Office
BJP	Bhartiya Janta Party
BPL	Below Poverty Line
BSP	Bhujan Samaj Party
CAG	Comptroller and Auditor General
CBI	Central Bureau of Investigation
CBR	Crude Birth Rate
CEA	*Central Electricity Authority* of India
CHCs	Community Health Centre
CMD	Chief Managing Director
CPI	Communist Party of India
CRSP	Central Rural Sanitation Program
CT	Computed Tomography
DISE	District Information System for Education
FRBM	Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFD	Gross Fiscal Deficit
GNP	Gross Net Product
GOI	Government of India
GoUK	Government of Uttarakhand
GRDA	Greater Ranchi Development Authority
GSDP	Gross State Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index

HDR	Human Development Report
HHs	House Holds
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IAS	Indian Administrative Services
IISCO	Indian Iron and Steel Co. Limited
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
JAAC	Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council
JCC	Jharkhand Coordination Commitee
JMM	Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
JPC	Jharkhand Prastuti Committee
JSMDC	Jharkhand State Mineral Development Corporation
JVM	Jharkhand Vikas Morcha
Km	Kilo Meter
KW	Kilo Watt
MCOR	Marxist Coordination Committee
MCTS	*Mother and Child Tracking System*
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MNRE	*Ministry of New and Renewable Energy*
MNREGA	Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
MRI	Magnetic Resonance Imaging
MW	Mega Watt
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NHPC	*National Hydroelectric Power Corporation*
NRHM	National Rural Health Mission
NSSO	National Sample Survey Organization
NTPC	*National Thermal Power Corporation* Limited
OBC	Other Backward Caste
PGCIL	Power Grid Corporation of India Limited,
PHCs	Primary Health Centre

PMGSY	Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRIs	Panchayati Raj Institutions
PWD	Public Works Department
RBI	Reserve Bank of India
RGNDWM	Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission
RJD	Rashtriya Janta Dal
RSBY	Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
RWSS	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation
SAIL	Sail Authority of India Limited
SC	Scheduled Caste
SDP	State Domestic Product
SHCs	Sub Health Centre
SIDCUL	State Industrial Development Corporation of Uttarakhand Limited
SP	Samajwadi party
SPWD	State Public Works Department
ST	Scheduled Tribe
SwDW	Schools with Drinking Water Facility
SwE	Schools with Electricity Facility
SwGT	Schools with Girls Toilet Facility
SwSC	Schools with Scheduled Caste Students
SwST	Schools with Scheduled Tribe Students
SwT	Schools with Toilet Facility
T. Schl	Total number of Schools
TISCO	Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited
TPC	*Tritiya Prastuti Committee*
TSC	Total Sanitation Campaign
U.P	Uttar Pradesh
UKD	Uttarakhand Kranti Dal

UN	United Nation
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UPCL	Uttarakhand Power Corporation Limited
UREDA	Uttarakhand Renewable Energy Development Agency
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

Since the Second World War, India has been able to make its own mark in the midst of the vast diversity of experience across developing countries. After independence from British rule, there was a great sense of expectation that despite high levels of poverty, India had some of the basic elements required for a great leap forward economically. It was expected that with a rich stock of natural resources, an industrial base, a competent bureaucratic and administrative apparatus and a political leadership committed to launch an industrial transformation, India would be able to develop and achieve economic growth.

Sixty-five years later India still stands out, but only as a lesson in disappointment (Chibber, 2003:03). Development planning, which was seen as the significant tool to launch the country onto a path of industrial dynamism, is now considered as an impediment toward that same end.

Similar has been the case with the states like Jharkhand and Uttarakhand which were created as recently as the year 2000. At the time of their creation it was assumed that being the part of bigger parental states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh respectively, these states had remained backward due to several reasons but after getting separate statehood these regions would be able to achieve economic as well as human development.

Jharkhand and Uttarakhand were seen as regions possessing natural resources and human skills that would enable them to achieve industrial development. But the economies of these two states have not been able come up to the desired level of development in spite of a decade of planned development. They are characterized by great disparities in economic and social well being among social groups and geographical regions. The overall result of planning has been impressive in certain areas, but the magnitude of poverty remains undiminished.

It has been established that states must have certain kinds of capacities if they are to be effective in managing tasks of economic and political development. Does the situation of these two states indicate that these recently formed states lack the capacity to succeed in their developmental tasks?

In this light it is important to analyze the level of capacities these states hold to carry out the developmental tasks. What are the factors responsible for such levels of

capacities in both the states? Do the institutions of governance and their functionaries who are the carriers of the governance agenda, play any role in creating such state capacity?

Area of the Study:

For any study on regional development a unit of analysis must be identified. The state cannot directly exercise control; it needs to rely upon representatives to act on their behalf as they implement policies and seek to control and regulate social relations within the territory it claims to govern. In India, the state functions through three tier system, i.e. district, block and panchayat, based on the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. For the purpose of this study, the same units were identified in the states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. However, covering all the districts of the two states, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand was not feasible. So, district selection was done according to stratified sampling based on their comparative size, population, social composition of population, literacy rates, health indicators, number of schools and hospitals, connectivity with the all weather roads and so on and the stratified random sampling method was used to select blocks and panchayats

As far as development profile of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand is concerned, analysis of any unit smaller than the state as a whole is a difficult task. This is because very little data is available at the sub-state and district levels. This is particularly true of the data related to the allocation of development funds. In India, the development planning process is centralized due to which financial allocations are made on the basis of development heads such as agricultural activities, energy, communication, rural development, and science and technology. Therefore, sectoral allocation of funds has not been published for any unit smaller than state.

Similarly, very little data is available at the sub-district, block and panchayat levels about the administrative and infrastructural capacities of the state, especially the bureaucracy, the incidence of corruption, the habitations enjoying all weather roads and power supply. Hence, for these variables, the study has had to rely on the data published at the district level.

Further, on account of this fact, the study adopts a multi-level analysis to evaluate the infrastructural and administrative capacity of the state. Facts and data available at the state and district level were verified through the interviews conducted during the field survey at the block and panchayat level.

The field areas of the study are:

State:	Jharkhand	Uttarakhand
District:	Hazaribagh, Lohardaga	Bageshwar, Rudraprayag
Block:	Katkamsandi, Kisko	Kapkot, Ukhimath
Panchayat:	DhatoKhurd, Kisko	Farsalli-Palli, Kimana

Jharkhand:

Jharkhand is the twenty eighth state of India which was brought into existence by the Bihar Reorganization Act on November 15, 2000. The states geographical area is 79,714 sq km which constitutes 2.42 per cent of the country's total area. According to the Census 2011, the state has a population of 32.97 million which constitute 2.42 per cent of the country's population, out of which twenty-six per cent is tribal population and twelve per cent of the population belong to Schedule Caste. Rural population constitutes 75.95 per cent and urban population constitutes 24.05 per cent. The population density is 414 persons per sq km.

Jharkhand is the leading producer of mineral wealth in the country after Chhattisgarh. It is endowed with a vast variety of minerals like iron ore, coal, copper ore, mica, bauxite, graphite, limestone, and uranium. Jharkhand is also known for its vast forest resources. Twenty nine per cent of its total area consists of forests.

Jharkhand is a region well known for the struggles and movements since colonial period. The Jharkhand movement got its life blood from the predecessor organizations, viz. Chottanagpur Unnati Samaj (1915) and Adivasi Mahasabha (1938). The Samaj submitted a demand for separate Jharkhand state to the Simon Commission in 1928. Non- Christian adivasis were included in the Samaj in 1939 when it was reconstituted. It was thus renamed as Adivasi Mahasabha which was once again renamed Jharkhand Party in a conference at Ranchi, Bihar in 1949 (Basu:

1994). Based on grievances against ethnic backwardness and regional economic deprivation, the movements original demand was for the formation of a separate state with 16 districts, which later became 21 districts. The State Reorganization Commission (1955) rejected the Jharkhand demand on the plea that Jharkhand Party did not obtain a majority in the Chottanagpur and Santhal Parganas area, and tribal population was only one third of the total population and divided moreover into several language groups. But the momentum for separate statehood in the region got impetus from the fear of losing revenues generated by industry in the region as well as the threat of factional competition within the state politics in Bihar to be structured around caste leaders rather than regional leaders (Tillin: 2011).

The state of Jharkhand is divided into twenty four districts. Based on their comparative size, population, social composition of population, literacy rates, health indicators, number of schools and hospitals, and connectivity with the all weather roads, two districts, Hazaribagh and Lohardaga were selected for the field survey.

Hazaribagh: spread over a geographical area of 4302 Sq Km, is the largest district of Jharkhand. The district of Hazaribagh is situated in the north east part of North Chotanagpur division. Hazaribagh is divided into 16 development blocks which contain 257 gram panchayats. The total population of the district is 1,734,005 which comprise 5.26 percent of the population of Jharkhand. Out of which 6.8 percent is tribal population and 17.4 percent of the population belong to the Scheduled Caste.

The reason for selecting the district of Hazaribagh is that it is neither completely urban nor completely rural. The social composition of population in this district is such that it covers all the sections of society, the upper castes, the reserved categories and the minorities. Second, Hazaribagh is surrounded by coal mines. Third, in terms of comparative ranking among 24 districts of Jharkhand, the district of Hazaribagh has moderate level of physical and social infrastructure. To evaluate the reasons behind sluggish development of the region, DhatoKhurd panchayat of Katkamsandi Block was selected and surveyed.

Lohardaga: The district of Lohardaga came into existence after Ranchi was split into 3 districts namely, Ranchi, Lohardaga and Gumla in the year of 1983. Lohardga is the smallest district of Jharkhand, spread over an area of 1491 Sq Km. It is situated in the South Western part of the state. The district is divided into 7 development blocks

which includes 354 villages spread over in 66 gram panchayats. The total population of Lohardaga is 4,61,738.

The reason for selecting the district of Lohardaga is that it is a rural district mainly composed of tribal population. Second, Lohardaga is full of mineral resources such as Bauxite, Iron and Coal. Third, in terms of comparative ranking among 24 districts of Jharkhand, the district of Lohardaga has least access to physical and social infrastructure. To evaluate the reasons behind sluggish development of the region, Kisko panchayat of Kisko Block was selected and surveyed.

Uttarakhand:

Uttarakhand is the twenty seventh state of India which was carved out of Uttar Pradesh on 9th November 2000. The states geographical area is 53,483 sq km which constitutes 1.63 per cent of the country's total area, divided into two regions of Kumaon and Garhwal. 92.57 per cent of its total area is hilly. Uttarakhand is divided into thirteen districts. According to the Census 2011, the state has a population of 10.12 million which constitute 1.63 per cent of the country's population, out of which four per cent is tribal population and nineteen per cent of the population belongs to Schedule Caste. Rural population constitutes 69.45 per cent and urban population constitutes 30.55 per cent. The population density is 189 persons per sq km.

Forests constitute a significant portion of the Uttarakhand. Around 12.60 per cent of the hilly region is cultivated and 64 per cent is forested. It is the third most forested state in India (FSI Report: 2011). Forests are a source of livelihood for rural hilly residents and provide resources such as fodder, fuel, green manure, and construction timber.

This state has a long history of ecological movements but the movement for separate statehood only gained momentum in 1994. A series of protests began in July 1994 in the hills against the new quotas in higher education because they were seen as discriminating against the local population who would effectively lose places in local universities as a result of the new affirmative action for Other Backward Classes (OBCs)[1]. These protests ultimately lead to the demand for separate statehood realized

[1] The region of Uttarakhand has a predominantly upper caste population with only 2-3 percent OBCs and 18 percent Schedule Caste population. Therefore, when the state government of Uttar Pradesh,

by civil society that the needs of the Hill dwellers are different from those of the people of the plains (Kumar: 2011, Tillin: 2011).

Out of 13 districts, Bageshwar and Rudraprayag, two districts representing both the administrative divisions of the state were selected for the field survey.

Bageshwar: The least populous and smallest district of Uttarakhand representing the Kumaon division, in this study. The geographical area of this district is 2246 Sq Km. which is 4.19 percent of total area of Uttarakhand. Bageshwar is divided into 03 development blocks which covers 397 gram panchayats. The total population of the district is 2,59,840, of which 72061, or 27 percent is the population of Scheduled Caste and 69842 or 26.87 percent is tribal population.

The district of Bageshwar is selected for the study as it represents the hilly rural district situated amidst the Shivaliks ranges and the High Himalayas. Second, it has the least access to the physical and social infrastructure. For the purpose of study, based on stratified random sampling, Farsalli –Palli Panchayat of Kapkot block was selected.

Rudraprayag: The least populous and second smallest district of Uttarakhand representing the Garhwal division in this study. The geographical area of this district is 2328 Sq Km. which is 4.35 percent of total area of Uttarakhand. Rudraprayag is divided into 03 development blocks which covers 326 gram panchayats. The total population of the district is 2,36,857. Out of which 17.72 percent is the population of Scheduled Caste and 0.08 percent is tribal population.

The district of Rudraprayag is selected for the study as it represents the hilly rural district of Gharwal division of Uttarakhand. Rudraprayag has the least access to the social infrastructure but has moderate physical infrastructure. For the purpose of

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under the leadership of Mulayam Singh Yadav of Samajvadi Party, and following the Mandal Commission recommendations, issued an order reserving 27 percent seats for OBCs in state government jobs in 1994, it sparked opposition in the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh though the opposition did not last long. On 20 June 1994, the state government once again issued an order providing 27 percent reservation for OBCs in all institutions of higher education. This order provoked a mass agitation. By early July, students in the hills had started to protest against the order because they found it discriminating against the local population structure. As per the order, around 85 percent of the population of the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh would be eligible for only 50 percent of the seats in the educational institutions whereas OBCs, constituting only 2-4 percent of the regional population, would have 27 percent seats. In this case, it was feared that outsiders would flood the region to make up the shortfall in places and the hill youth would be further denied chances of advancement. Therefore, there were mass protests against this order (Mawdsley, 1997:2223).

study, based on stratified random sampling, Kimana Panchayat of Ukhimath block was selected. Another reason for selecting this panchayat is that it s completely washed away during the natural disaster of 2013.

Rationale for Choosing the Area of Field Study:

Out of the twenty-nine states of India, this study has focused on two states – Jharkhand and Uttarakhand – for the following reasons:

First, one of the main elements to measure the state capacity is the duration of statehood. Jharkhand and Uttarakhand have been carved out from their parent states in the same year, i.e., 2000 on grounds of speedier socio-economic development. So both the states have an identical length of statehood and in both the cases the Central Government had agreed to a largely non- linguistic rationale for granting statehood.

Second, both these states are richly endowed with natural resources – minerals, water and forests. Jharkhand accounts for about 30-40 per cent of the country's mineral deposits (Srivastava: 2012) while Uttarakhand accounts for 4.53 per cent of the country's total forest wealth which is 21 per cent of the total area. (Mittal, Tripathi and Seth: 2008)

Third, both these states have been home to prominent social and ecological movements – in the case of Jharkhand, the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, and in the case of Uttarakhand, the Chipko Aandolan – which were formed in the early 1970s. These movements problematized the pattern and consequences for local population of resource extraction and conditions in the extractive industries which had developed in the respective regions (Tillin: 2011).

Fourth, in both states it was partly the competition between social movements and political parties, against the backdrop of the politics of caste based empowerment that was transforming the politics of the rest of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, that led popular movements and political parties to converge around the shared goal of statehood (Tillin: 2011).

Fifth, in both the states the current of protests intersected with identity based movements, among tribal communities in Jharkhand and hill dwellers in Uttarakhand.

Hypothesis:

Access to and control over the abundance of resources cannot be the sole basis of development. It is the quality of governance which matters for the socio-economic development of the region in a positive direction.

Research Questions:

- To what extent are both the states able to deliver public goods and services?
- What role do institutions play in the process of creating state capacity?
- What difference does access to resources make in the lives of citizen?
- Can the pattern of development in Jharkhand and Uttarakhand be explained in terms of the 'natural resource curse theorem,' in any or all of its three dimensions, viz. cognitive, societal or state-centered[2]?
- What are the factors contributing to the persisting under-development of the region – conflict of interest among multiple actors or the lack of capabilities (planning skills, entrepreneurial skills, and technical skills) and opportunities among the local population to exploit resources and utilize them for their own development?

Theoretical Framework:

The state is understood as a set of ongoing institutions for social control and authoritative decision making and implementation[3] (Krasner: 1984). The state is

[2] Cognitive Approach: this approach contends that resource booms produce a type of short sightedness among policy makers. This approach suggests that resource wealth causes a type of myopia among public or private actors. Societal Approach: this approach suggests that resource booms enhance the political leverage of non-state actors who favor growth impeding policies. It contends that resource exports tend to empower sectors, classes or interest groups that favor growth impeding policies. State Centered Approach: this approach contends that resource booms tend to weaken state institutions. This approach is basically a combination of cognitive, societal and institutional arguments to explain how resource rents might damage a state's ability to promote economic growth. According to this approach, when governments gain most of their revenues from external sources, such as resource rents or foreign assistance, they are freed from the need to levy domestic taxes and become less accountable to the societies they govern (Shafer: 1994; Karl: 1997 in Ross: 1999).

[3] Krasner (1984: 240) distinguishes between 'periods of institutional creation and periods of institutional stasis. The kinds of causal factors that explain why a set of state structures is created in the first place may be quite distinct from those that explain its persistence over time. New structures

conceptually distinct from both economy and society, with an inherent interest in expanding its scope for autonomous action, asserting control over economic and social interactions, and structuring economic and social relationships. These interests are derived primarily from the state's concern to set up and support internal and external security, to generate revenue, and to achieve hegemony over alternative forms of social organization. The capacity to attain security, increase returns and claim autonomy and control, however, is subjective to economic conditions and the extent of social mobilization, as well as by the legitimacy and internal cohesion of the state itself. States are therefore, often engaged in contesting the right and capacity to formulate and execute authoritative decisions that structure economic and social interactions.

States assume empirical form through regimes which attempt to negotiate and impose formal and informal rules about how the state will relate to the economy and to the society. Durable and legitimate regimes have greater capacity to achieve these goals than do those that are less institutionalized (Grindle, 1996:03). However, as governance has replaced government as the guiding concept, institutions and policies have increasingly been understood and ultimately crafted around state-society relations as well as around the state. Market incentives among societal actors, effective practices to implement policies, and responsiveness to the concerns of policy stakeholders and citizens now often play as important role as internal bureaucratic considerations in shaping policy within the state (Sellers, 2011:127).

Therefore, in analyzing the ability of the state to provide public goods and services to its citizens and resource governance, a state capacity framework has been adopted. State capacity is defined as the institutional capability of the state to carry out various policies that encourage economic development and provide effective governance for their societies (Grindle: 1996; Besley and Persson: 2011). It captures both the organizational and relational qualities of state.

The type of state capacity that promotes development may vary according to the proposed mechanisms through which the state affects development outcomes: some

originate during periods of crisis…but once institutions are in place they can assume a life of their own…the causal dynamics associated with a crisis of the old order and the creation of a new one are different from those involved in the perpetuation of established state institutions.' Foe many countries 1980s and 1990s were a period of institutional creation.

emphasizing property rights (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001); others pointing to the state involvement in overcoming coordination failures (Bardhan: 2005); or protecting specific economic sectors, supporting technological innovation, providing infrastructure and engaging in human capital formation (Evans, 1995; Savoia and Sen, 2012).

Consequently, the state capacities can be classified according to the functions the state performs. State capacities are categorized into various forms, such as military capacity, administrative capacity, fiscal capacity, infrastructural capacity, technical capacity and so forth. In this study, the focus will be on the administrative and infrastructural capacities of the state, as these two capacities, in particular, are the base capacities on which the rest of the structure stands.

Administrative capacity is usually defined broadly to include the ability of the state to deliver services and enforce contracts. (Hanson and Sigman: 2011) It focuses on the professionalization of the state bureaucracy and its ability to provide legal protection, measured by the risk of confiscation or forced nationalization (Cardenas: 2010). For the purpose of this study, administrative capacity is defined as the ability of the state to perform those tasks that need to be performed by the administration and consist of institutional structures such as departments, agencies, ministries, personnel and budget. What are the institutions that exist in the state? How do they coordinate and carry out their projects and policies? What is the strength of personnel in these institutions? Are they able to allocate and spend the funds judicially?

Infrastructural capacity is by and large characterized as the territorial reach of the state (a concept coined by Michael Mann (1986), the extent to which state organizations are able to penetrate society and carry out their projects throughout the territory (Hau: 2012). For the purpose of this study, it is defined as the ability of the state to provide physical and social infrastructure to its citizens. The focus has been on the physical and social infrastructure because it not only helps in raising the level of well being of citizens but also contributes to and promotes the economic development of the state by increasing the factor productivity in the production process. The main categories of physical and social infrastructure which are assessed in this study are Roads, Power, Water and Sanitation, Education and Health.

To assess these capacities, the following indicators will be used:

- **Sectoral allocation of funds and their spending**: this indicator will analyze the amount of funds allocated to develop and maintain the infrastructure of a particular sector and will also help in analyzing the administrative capacity of the state.
- **Public Sector performance**: this indicator will look into the performance of the state by studying various sectors like education, health care, roads, and power to evaluate the territorial reach of the state.
- **Centralization**: this indicator will evaluate the bureaucratic capacity of the state by looking at the ability of different agents in decision making.
- **Recruitment and Vacancies**: this indicator will look into the process of recruitment and the strength of officials in various state institutions to measure the administrative capacity of the state.
- **Relationship with non-state actors**: this indicator will analyze the capability of the state to reach the masses with the help of capitalists and civil society actors.

Methodology:

The study was conducted using qualitative methods of data collection such as participant observation, field notes, structured interviews, analysis of documents and reports. A wide variety of sources have been used in the collection of material for this study. Apart from secondary sources, data used have been taken from government sources including Census, Plan Documents, Statistical Diaries, and Reports of the reviews of development programs.

The most interesting part of the study was the field work which was carried out during the month of August, 2014 and February, 2015 in the state of Jharkhand and in March, 2015 in the state of Uttarakhand. The focus of the field research, apart from collecting data from the relevant institutions, was to meet and interview as many relevant persons as possible. The purpose of interviews was to bring forth the views of various actors and the general population about the dynamics of development policy of the region. The interviews were framed on the basis of stratified sampling with a combination of snowballing and purposive methods. Purposive sampling method was done to make sure that all significant actors get included in the sample.

The respondents were stratified into three categories: government officials, people representatives, and general population.

Limitation:

This study is a comparative study between two states which are recently carved out of two big states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which were part of the so-called BIMARU states. Lots of problems cropped up regarding the availability of data. In particular, it was difficult to get comparable data on infrastructure and administrative capacity, especially data related to the connectivity of roads and the number of officials and bureaucrats working in these regions, which was not available for both the states. Therefore, only those indicators are used in this study on which data was available for both the states.

Outline of the study:

Having explored the infrastructural and administrative capacity of the states under study, I propose to explore the reasons behind the under-development of these states. The central objective of this study, as stated above, is to explore whether access to resources makes any difference in the lives of its citizen and how it affects the process of development. Keeping this objective in mind, this work is structured into five chapters excluding the introduction and conclusion.

Chapter 1 of the study deals with the definitional aspect of the concepts 'State Capacity' and 'Development'. Reviewing the literature on the subject, the chapter focuses on two aspects of state capacity: first, the infrastructural capacity and second, the administrative capacity. Infrastructural capacity, for the purpose of this study, is defined as the ability of the state to provide physical and social infrastructure to its citizen. Administrative capacity is defined here as the ability of the state to perform those tasks that need to be performed by the administration and consist of institutional structures such as departments, agencies, ministries, personnel and budget.

Chapter 2 of the study is a backgrounder. It evaluates the infrastructural and administrative development of the region which forms the present day Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. It describes how the under-development of these regions led to movements for separate statehood.

Chapter 3 of the study presents the case study of Jharkhand. It describes the infrastructural and administrative capacity of present day Jharkhand. It assesses the level of physical and social infrastructure these states have been able to develop. It also assesses the factors accountable for the lack of development of physical and social infrastructure in the states.

Chapter 4 of the study deals with the case study of Uttarakhand. It describes the infrastructural and administrative capacity of present day Uttarakhand. It assesses the level of physical and social infrastructure these states have been able to develop. It also assesses the factors responsible for the lack of development of physical and social infrastructure in the state.

Chapter 5 is a comparative study of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. While discussing the similarities and the differences between both the states this chapter marks out the factors responsible for the pace of development in the respective states.

The study concludes by reiterating that the phenomenon of 'resource curse' is not new and unique for these states. Institutional weakness and political economy are the major causes behind the resource curse in the states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. The aim of achieving equitable political governance has remained limited. However, the study ends on a positive note that these states have the potential to develop and empower the historically excluded ones. All that is required is a serious commitment on the part of the institutions involved in the implementation.

Chapter 1

State Capacity and Development

The World Bank in its *World Development Report*, 1997 states that "State-dominated development has failed. But so has stateless development" (World Bank, 1997: iii). A minimalist state would do no harm, but neither would it do much good. Development requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of private businesses and individuals.

The 'state' as a term is highly contested. Weber defined the state as "a human community that claims the monopoly of the use of physical force within a given territory (1991: 78)". Hay and Lister define the state as 'an institutional complex claiming sovereignty for itself as the supreme political authority within a defined territory for whose governance it is responsible' (Hay and Lister, 2006: 05). Krasner (1984: 240) understood state as a set of ongoing institutions for social control and authoritative decision making and implementation.

The developmental state literature views the state as incorporating executive, legislative and judicial functions, but also bureaucratic functions and ministries; something beyond merely government but with discernible if blurred boundaries (Gupta: 1995).

The term developmental state has been used to describe countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam, who have experienced rapid economic growth through state-led policies or interventions. The developmental state is essentially a model of a particular type of state first laid out by Chalmers Johnson in his analysis of the Japanese state's role in the economic 'miracle' that it had achieved (Johnson: 1999). Wade in his book *Governing the Market* (1990) focuses on the industrial policies undertaken in Taiwan, utilizing his analysis of political and economic events and practices to refute neo-classical claims that the developmental states of East Asia represented a victory for the market.

In addition to the case study approach, scholars such as Tuong Vu and Peter Evans undertook comparative work to address the key questions about the roots of and the mechanisms of developmental states (Evans: 1995; Vu: 2007). By examining the politico-economic development of countries whose developmental trajectory has differed but which have some commonalities, these comparative works highlight the points of similarity and difference in order to isolate key driving factors behind the

recognition and emergence of the developmental states. In these studies on the emergence of developmental states, Vu generates an argument about the overwhelming significance of the elite- mass relationship while Evans develops the concept of embedded autonomy (Evans: 1995; Vu: 2007).

The academic exploration of the East Asian states and their development experiences has placed a new emphasis on the role of the state in achieving economic growth and poverty reduction. This has also helped in evolving the concept of the developmental state. This model which emphasizes the significant role of the state in successfully achieving economic growth has disagreement with the neo-liberal market model about how to promote development. Rather than seeing the state as the agent which could act to produce growth, the neo-liberal approaches see the state as part of the problem and push to reduce its extent and influence for development to take off.

As far as what should be the role of the state in the process of development is concerned, debates have finally led to an acceptance of the significant role of the state, nevertheless the nature of this role continues to be argued over (Kohli: 1994; White and Wade: 1988). As Peter Evans says in his seminal book 'Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation' the question is not how much state intervention should be or is, but the question is of 'what kind' (Evans, 1995: 10).

On the basis of the literature on developmental state the following attributes can be classified as features of developmental state; though these can be varied and plural:

- An autonomous capable (but embedded) bureaucracy (Evans: 1995).
- Political leadership oriented towards development (Musamba: 2010; Fritz and Menocal: 2007).
- Successful policy interventions by the state which promote growth (Wade: 1990; Beeson: 2004).
- A state with developmental structures (state capacity) which are used to perform developmental roles (Vu: 2007).
- Leadership or state capability to upgrade economic activity from lower value to higher value (Doner, Ritchie and Slater: 2005).

The literature on developmental states has focused on three fundamental questions.

(1) What roles do such states play in the successful industrialization of their countries? Answers to this question have typically stressed on the aggressive nature of the strategy involvement in two policy areas. One relates to industrial policies, including subsidizing inputs, promoting exports, imposing performance standards on industries receiving state support, and creating industrial groups in key dynamic sectors (Amsden: 1989; Haggard: 1990; Evans: 1995). The second relates to limited redistributive social programs ranging from land reforms to investment in basic education (Johnson: 1987; Doner et. Al.: 2005).

(2) Why did developmental states emerge where they did but not elsewhere? Answer to this question shifts the central concern from the roles of these states to their historical origins. History does not serve as mere background to industrial policies, but is endogenized in this question. Atul Kohli (2004) emphasized the fact that colonialism was the most important causal factor. The study by Vu (2007) argues that the centrality of intra-elite and elite-mass interaction is an important factor for the emergence of developmental states.

(3) The third question is about the character of developmental states. What do these states share and what is generalizable about them? Most theories accept a general model of successful developmental states that has the following two components (Johnson: 1987; Evans: 1995; Kohli: 2004). The first component is the developmental structure, including a stable, centralized government, a cohesive bureaucracy and effective coercive institutions. The second component involves translational role - the commitment and technical capacity of state leadership to play developmental roles. The two components – structures and roles – are interdependent factors that together explain successful developmentalism. As Peter Evans summarizes, “Structures create the potential for action; playing out roles translates the potential into real effects.” (1995: 77)

Further the literature emphasizes that states must have certain kinds of capacities if they are to be effective in managing tasks of economic and political development. A capable state is one that exhibits the ability to establish and maintain effective institutional, technical, administrative and political functions. Therefore, in the next few sections, this chapter will elaborate the concept of development, state capacity and the classification of state capacity. The first section describes the idea of development and changing perceptions of it. The second section explains the meaning

and emergence of the concept of state capacity and the third and last section explains the classification of the concept of state capacity on the basis of the functions a state performs.

I. The Idea of Development: Changing Perceptions

Though regarded as a product of modernity (Peet and Hartwick, 2009:01), development is an old normative concept referring to a multidimensional process. There are multiple meanings of development, contingent upon context and ideological orientation. Economists have identified it with economic productivity, sociologists with social change or differentiation, and political scientists with democratization, political capacity and expanded government.

Generally, development is considered as an aspect of mainstream economics, where it denotes the process of economic growth in per capita income and the fundamental changes in the economy to facilitate, generate and sustain that growth. But economic growth is just one essential component of development; it is not the only one, as development is not a purely economic phenomenon. It is a multidimensional process, involving the reorganization and reorientation of both economic and social systems. In addition, to bring improvements in the level of incomes and the output and its distribution, development involves radical changes in institutional, social and administrative structures as well (Singh, 1999: 22).

Historically, the concept of development evolved with the industrialization of Europe after the Industrial Revolution but the term 'development' came into fashion after the World War II. It is believed that the era of development started with the US President Truman. Using the word 'development for the first time, in a speech at the United Nations in 1949, he said,

> We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of the underdeveloped areas.
>
> The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing (Esteva, 1997:8-9).

Many scholars like Bernstein (2005), Shaw (2004) and others argued that the concept of development is an outcome of the process of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, when the newly independent states sought policy prescription to catch up pace with economically industrialized nations of the world (Sumner, 2006:645).

David Moore speaks of two phases of development discourse in the post war era, which coincided with the major eras of the global political economy. According to Moore (1995: 02), the first period was of international Keynesianism and state mediated capitalism and the second phase was of the neo-liberal and de-regulated capitalism which started in 1970s. In between these two phases, he has also mentioned a transitional phase during the 1960s in which the freedom promised by regulated capitalism turned out to be more constrained.

There is no universally accepted theory of development which can explain the existing phenomenon and predict its future course. Development is often seen as a vague and general term which does not have a precise meaning. What we have is a set of hypotheses and propositions that constitute generalizations about the concept of development. The economists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were primarily concerned with the conditions for economic growth. According to these classical economists, economic growth would naturally lead to development as there exists an interrelationship between technology, investment and profit. They argue that the level of technology depends on the level of investment, investment depends on profits and profits depend partly on the level of technology (Singh, 1999:74).

In those days, development was considered largely synonymous with industrialization, in particular the creation of a country's capacity to manufacture finished goods. The eventual goal of development was to raise incomes and in process give people access to the range of goods and services which were then widespread in developed societies. During this time, the universal assumption was that developing countries would become developed over time. This was because of the belief that all countries necessarily moved from the traditional to the modern via economic and technological progress.

In the twentieth century, another factor which provided vigor to this idea of industrialization was the decolonization of countries that had been ruled by the

colonial empires of Europe. By and large, Asian and African countries became independent in this mid-century and were eager to speed up their development as they wanted to convert their newly won nominal political equality with the rich countries into an economic equality that would earn them the respect and sense of dignity which they felt they had been denied under colonialism (Rapley, 2007:2). For these newly independent states, development was all about using the state to lead the process of modernizing the society and raising its incomes. These countries considered the state as an agent of social transformation.

By the early Post World War II period, development theorists became increasingly aware of the imperfections in the market and the world economy, leading them to suggest models that assigned the state a leading role. Initially, these models seemed to deliver what they had promised. With the world economy booming, demand for raw materials, natural resources and cheap labor, etc from the Third World rose. This provided Third World governments with the capital they needed to develop their industry and infrastructure. However, as time passed, the drawbacks and limitations of these approaches became evident. It became clear to the development theorists that many of these third world economies were growing more slowly than required to continue improving the standards of living of their citizens. It became apparent that the industrial development which was taking place had consumed more resources than it has generated (Rapley, 2007:03). This was the time when Dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, Paul A Baran, Andre Gunder Frank and others rejected the notion of a common path towards development. According to these theorists, the existing state was at best an obstacle to development and at worst a key part of the architecture within which the 'Third World' was exploited by the advanced industrial countries (Cardoso and Faletto: 1979; Calvert, 2005:53).

Developmental disappointments in the 1950s and 1960s led to a new developmental concern in the 1970s: a shift to a focus on a 'basic needs' strategy. According to this approach, the focus of development should be to ensure that people, especially the poor and deprived, have basic necessities, including clean water, primary health care and elementary education. It was not a new economic or social theory similar to the Keynesian or Marxist methods of analysis. The basic needs approach was a model directed at a series of priorities for action. Its momentum sprang from discontent with the accomplishments of development efforts so far.

In contrast to other approaches, those who advocated the basic needs approach were likely to give more emphasis to the poor and destitute than to other economic groups, to requirements determined by society as a whole than to the preferences of the individual consumer, to immediate consumption than to investment for the distant future, to the detailed composition of consumption in terms of specific quantities and specific goods and services, than to overall income. Nevertheless, the basic needs approach was not against growth (ODI, 1978:1-2).

In spite of its rapid rise to prominence, the basic needs strategy disappeared from the political scene within a short span of time. Its demise in the early 1980s was the result of a return to economic orthodoxy, which was driven by three factors: the rise of Thatcherism and Reaganism in developed countries; the onset of world recession; and banking policies designed to ensure that developing countries repaid their debts (UN Intellectual History Project: 2009).

By the 1980s, the shortcomings of the state led development became evident. It was around this time that the neo-classical theorists claimed that the main problem in the Third World was the state itself, and the rapid development that these states were seeking could come about only if the state itself was rolled back. Less state, more market was the essential thrust of the strategy known as structural adjustment.

Structural Adjustment Policies are economic policies for developing countries that have been promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund since the early 1980s by the provisions of loans conditional on the adoption of certain policies. These loans are designed to encourage the structural adjustment of an economy by downsizing the developmental role of the state. They manifest an increased faith in the ability of market forces and economic efficiency to bring about the levels of broad based economic growth to deal with the problems of poverty and under-development in the developing countries. Although these policies are designed for individual countries, they have some common guiding principles such as export-led growth, privatization and liberalization, and the assumption of the efficiency of the free market (Haynes, 2005:7).

The idea of structural adjustment had its own positive as well as negative effects but as time passed by its limitations grew more evident. It was felt that it is less effective and is not giving away the results its supporters had claimed it would. Instead in some

places it was actually doing more harm than good because of its priority area, which was the repayment of loans.

The problems encountered by neoclassical thought did not lead back towards state-led development. On the contrary, by the 1990s, a whole new critique emerged which questioned the concept of 'development' itself and tried to redefine it. Development was charged with being unclear about the unequal benefits of prosperity. It was said to be geared toward establishing external control over citizen's lives (Rapley, 2007:3). This shift in development thinking was reflected in the concerns of the 1990 World Development Report which suggested that a basic distinction needs to be made between the means and the ends of development. Human beings are the real end of all the activities, and development must be centered on enhancing their achievements, freedoms and capabilities. It is the life they lead that is of intrinsic importance, not the commodities or income that they happen to possess (Anand and Sen: 1994).

This new shift in thinking known as Human Development puts people back at centre stage. According to this approach, development is no longer limited to the quantification of growing incomes or outputs in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but has been widened by the inclusion of humane dimensions of development such as poverty alleviation, distribution of resources and freedom of choice (Streeten: 1994; Haq: 1999). As per this approach, there are many societies such as the OPEC countries, which despite having an abundance of financial capital, have been unable to develop. The reason being, human capital – human institutions and skills - was missing in most of these nations, and without it their vast windfall gains could not be translated into real development (Haq, 1999:3).

The human development approach, pioneered by scholars such as Amartya Sen, Mahbub Ul Haq, Paul Streeten and Richard Jolly, builds upon a long-standing philosophical tradition represented by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith and J.S. Mill. The idea that social arrangements must be judged by the extent to which they promote "human good" dates back to Aristotle. Aristotle argued that "wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else" (Sen, 1999: 14). Similarly, Adam Smith argued that economic development should enable a person to mix freely with others without being

"ashamed to appear in public" (Haq, 1999:13). Sen provides the essential distinction between social and human capital concerns namely, health, education, nutrition and human capability development which focuses on the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reasons to value most and to enhance the substantive choices they have (Sen, 2003:35). Mahbub Ul Haq considered development as the condition that enlarges people's choice to enjoy a long, healthy and creative life (Haq: 1999).

In short, one can say that over time, the definition of development has taken many twists and turns and, for the purpose of this study, it is considered as the process of improving people's well-being and expanding the range of opportunities and choices open to them while keeping in mind that resources have to be used in a sustainable manner. This change is also reflected in the declaration of Millennium Development Goals by United Nations in September, 2000.

II. The Notion of State Capacity

State capacity is a quality which is easy to observe both in its absence and in its presence but quite difficult to define. It is an important concept which defines the relationship between state, economy and society. State Capacity is centered on what states ought to do to manage dynamic and sustained economic development and what political characteristics ought to define good government (Grindle: 1996). It is broadly understood as the ability of a state to implement policy, enforce legislation and deliver services (Barkey and Parikh: 1991).

State capacity has been defined as the institutional capability of the state to carry out various policies that encourage economic development and provide effective governance for their societies (Grindle: 1996; Besley and Persson: 2011). It captures both the organizational and relational qualities of state. The type of state capacity that promotes development may vary according to the proposed mechanisms through which the state affects development outcomes: some emphasize property rights (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson: 2001); others point to state involvement in overcoming coordination failures (Bardhan: 2005); yet others to the state protecting specific economic sectors, supporting technological innovation, providing

infrastructure and engaging in human capital formation (Evans: 1995; Savoia and Sen: 2012).

Early references to capacity as a concept can be traced in the structural-functionalist literature on political development. In this literature, state capacity is understood in two ways: first, as a core intrinsic trait of a political system to respond to or absorb new demands arising from its social and international environment (Eisenstadt: 1963) and second, as the newly articulated functions taken on by the political system over time to respond to a new range of problems (Almond: 1965).

State capacity appears as a core concept in the state-centered analyses of state building which emerged in the mid-1980s. Unlike earlier Marxist, functionalist and liberal theories of the state, the state-centered analyses were grounded in the premise that "the state cannot be reduced to a reflection of class forces" (Evans and Stephens, 1988: 722). The state is believed to be able to act independently in line with its own interests, and its independence is thought to drive principally from its capacity. Mann (1984: 189?) argues that the autonomous power of the state is comprised of two forms: despotic and infrastructural[4]. He contends that the autonomous power of modern, industrial state derives from the combination of strong infrastructural power, which is vested in the bureaucracy, and weak despotic power.

> These (infrastructural) powers are now immense. The state can assess and tax our income and wealth at source, without our consent or that of our neighbors and kin (which states before about 1850 were never able to do); it stores and can recall immediately a massive amount of information about all of us; it can enforce its will within the day almost anywhere in its domains; its influence on the overall economy is enormous; it even directly provides the subsistence of most of us (in state employment, in pensions, in family allowances, etc.). The state penetrates everyday life more than did any historical state. Its infrastructural power has increased enormously (Mann, 1984:189).

While Mann is concerned with the historical development of the advanced states, Migdal (1988) focuses on developing countries. He states that state capacity is the ability to write the "rules of the game" that hold sway throughout society and supersede any pre-existing rules that are in conflict with its own. These rules, says Migdal

[4] Despotic power consists of series of actions that the state can take without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups and Infrastructural power is the capacity of the state to actually penetrate society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.

> encompass everything from living up to contractual commitments to driving on the right side of the road to paying alimony on time. They involve the entire array of property rights and countless definitions of the boundaries of acceptable behavior for people (1988:14).

According to Migdal, it is the ability of state leaders to use this power of social control, which is closely related to Mann's concept of infrastructural power, to realize their vision distinguishes successful states (Migdal: 1988). In addition to the ability to regulate social behavior, a key aspect of the state's social control is the capacity to extract resources which enable it to operate and achieve its ends. Migdal defines the ability as state capability, which includes "the capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and appropriate or use resources in determined ways". Weiss and Hobson (1995) argue that the kind of state capacity necessary for strong economic performance changes historically, and they specify the nature of the infrastructural capacity that differentiates the performance of industrial states in recent times. Besides penetrative-extractive capacity, these scholars stress the importance of coordinating society's resources and mobilizing elite collaboration in pursuit of developmental goals. They argue that to become competitive in a global economy states must work with rather than against non-state actors. States can vastly expand their infrastructural power by harnessing the power of civil society in pursuit of shared national goals (Polidano, 2000:808). Strong coordinating capacity resides in particular bureaucratic arrangements and their collaborative linkages with dominant organizations of civil society, a kind of capacity observed in the economically successful East Asian Countries. Thus, in state-centered analyses of political and economic development, state capacity is seen as both a source of the autonomy of the state as well as a determinant of development.

Heredia and Schneider (2003) focus on the politics of administrative reform and put administrative capacity at the centre of their analysis. They distinguish between market-oriented reforms and capacity-enhancing reforms. According to them, market-oriented reforms reduce and redefine core state functions and are not concerned with capacity building of state. Capacity- enhancing reforms intends to increase the quality and extent of public good condition. An improvement in capacity comes not from the introduction of reforms but from the institutionalization of reforms and institutionalization depend on changed incentives (Addison, 2009:03).

Doner et al. (2005) argue that there are three interactive structural conditions which create incentives for ruling elite to build the kind of state capacity which is needed to enhance the overall living standards and long term growth. These conditions are: (a)the threat that any deterioration in the living standards of popular sector will lead to unmanageable mass unrest; (b) the need for foreign exchange and war material; and (c) budget constraints due to scarcity of revenue sources (2005:328).

The concept of administrative capacity has also been discussed in the literature on state building and capacity building. This literature equates state building and capacity building with the development of new administrative institutions. It equates the building of modern states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the reconstruction of the state around expanded national administrative capacities (Skowronek: 1982; Carpenter: 2001). They view the building of administrative capacities to be contingent on political struggles that are defined and mediated by the institutional arrangements. In this view, increased capacity is a consequence of the interaction of organizational factors within the bureaucracy, such as strong middle management structures, merit recruitment and career systems, and the establishment of networks with societal organizations.

In sum, capacity has been equated with state development as well as used to describe the emergence of state autonomy, whether as a neutral arbiter of societal demands or as the instrument through which the preferences of state actors, constrained by institutional factors or structural conditions, are expressed.

Elements of State Capacity:

Based on the literature discussed above regarding emerging configurations of the concept of state capacity, its ability to implement policy, deliver services and enforce legislation, three broad elements that emerge are described below.

Despotic Power: Despotic power means the ability to take decisions unrestrained by any special interests. The essential condition for achieving such rationality is that policy agencies should be guided by rules of bureaucratic rationality (Evans, 1995:29-30). The salient feature of a rational bureaucracy is that it prevents both the slide into

individualistic predation as well as the easy colonization of state agencies. It does so by defining conceptual and clearly specified rules, and by making sure those functionaries' decisions are guided by rules, and not by their own private interests (Evans, 1995:48-49).

Coordinating Capacity: Coordinating capacity means the ability to take decisions on the basis of a knowledgeable evaluation of a complete range of information. Bureaucratic rule will not be sufficient because economic agencies within the state such as ministries and lending institutions can often be burdened with responsibilities that are in conflict with one another. Therefore, to provide inter-agency level coordination some kind of nodal agency is required. A nodal agency is one which has real institutionalized authority within the state to coordinate the ministries and policy agencies connected with economic policy
(Chibber: 2004).

Infrastructural Power / Implementation Authority: The state should have the ability to ensure that its decisions are complied with and laws are obeyed. Infrastructural power refers to the degree of coherence, organization and penetration of society that has been achieved by the state apparatus (Sharman, 2003:35). It is limited by the organizational ability of the state institutions to carry out the commands of those at the top. The rise of bureaucracy and modern technology has exponentially increased infrastructural power (Sharman, 2003: 36).

Determinants of State Capacity:

Further reviewing the literature, the major determinants that build, enhance, sustain or cause a degeneration of state capacity are identified below:

Ruling Coalition:

Recent works emphasize the importance of coalitions or political settlements among contending social groups and classes to understand state capacity. Differences in the ability of states to engender economic growth, redistribute resources or provide basic social services are ultimately rooted in the balance of power between different social

forces. Douglass North (2009) argues that state building is an inherently political process. State institutions ultimately operate as a means to manage conflict and violence among powerful social actors. 'Dominant coalitions' and the relationships among the elites embedded in them, structure the state and its performance. As such, even similar state institutions might marshal different capacities, depending on the elite bargains that underlie them. Similarly, David Waldner (1999) argues that 'elite cohesion' was a necessary condition for the expansion of state capacities for development, whereas elite disunity and factionalism produced broad cross class coalitions, which were ultimately not conducive to the building of developmental states.

The main thrust of these arguments is that state capacities to engender growth and engage in social provision are affected by the balance of power in society. Distinct patterns of contention among social groups and classes produce different alliances and alignments, especially among elites, which in turn shape the form and performance of states.

International and Domestic conflicts:

What motivates elites to form alliances with state leaders and support the construction of high capacity states? According to the 'bellicist approach' (Centeno: 2002), modern states were the by-products of military conflicts. War or threat of war induced economic elites to pay taxes and accept other controls on their behavior. Similarly, war pushed rulers to build administrative and extractive machinery capable of mobilizing the resources necessary for the deployment of armies and the acquisition of military technology. But the 'bellicist approach' has come under scrutiny.

The literature explaining the effects of civil wars on the organizational competencies of states argues that a certain level of institutional capacity is required for external threats to induce state building, wars do not make states if there is no state machinery to begin with (Kohli: 2004; Centeno: 2002). Thus the argument that geopolitical conflict was the crucial impetus to state building only applies under certain conditions. A comprehensive framework for the analysis of developmental state capacities would therefore benefit from combining a focus on elite coalitions with close attention to the geopolitical and domestic conflicts in which they are embedded.

Legitimacy:

Leaving the physical and institutional bases of state capacity behind, a growing literature explores the relationship between state capacity and legitimacy – the extent to which people consent to and even support state power (Hau, 2012:14). Legitimacy is considered a crucial determinant of state capacity. The ability of state organizations to change social relations, extract resources and execute policies effectively is related to the beliefs and the opinion about the state held by social actors.

Some scholars like Holsti (1996) and Geertz (1973) even suggest that state capacity should be re-conceptualized as the ability of states to command loyalty – the right to rule – from their citizens. It is the attachments and allegiances to an 'experiential "we" from whose will the activities of government seem spontaneously to flow' (Geertz, 1973:239-40) that shape the extent to which state authorities are able to implement their projects. In this view, high capacity states are those that can build on a strong collective identity and enjoy legitimate authority in the eyes of their citizens (Lemay – Herbert: 2010).

Length of Statehood:

Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) have suggested that the history of the state is one of the important determinants of state capacity. They argue that longer histories of statehood lead to higher quality administration due to 'learning by doing' effects (Savoia and Sen, 2012:18). In their study of 149 countries, they show that the length of statehood or the past of a state is a good instrument for evaluating institutional quality in regression which aims to explain long-run development.

Structure of the Economy:

Some recent literature emphasizes the structure of the economy of a state as determining its capacity. For example, Isham et al (2005:03) argue that countries rich in resources extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base are subject to sharp economic and social division and weakened institutional capacity. They also find that such countries have worse government effectiveness and rule of law, and have grown more slowly.

Similarly, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) and Busse and Gronig (2009) in their studies of aid-dependent economies shows that countries receiving greater amounts of foreign aid tend to have less bureaucratic and administrative capacity, as the elites may have less incentives to reform the state apparatus.

Dimensions of State Capacity:

Keeping in view the elements and determinants of the state capacities, its dimensions are broadly classifiable according to the functions the state performs. Those are categorized into following groups:

Institutional Capacity:

The institutional capacity of states is the ability of states to set and enforce the broad sets of rules that govern economic and political interactions. Of concern here are institutions such as the legal system, norms governing relationships among economic agents, constitutional and administrative rules setting standards for the behavior of public servants and their accountability, constitutional dictums governing relationships among state organizations, and the electoral system. Similarly, important is the ability to ensure the primacy of national policies, legal codes, and norms of social and political behavior over those adhered to by sub-national groupings.

Administrative Capacity:

Administrative capacity refers to the ability of states to deliver goods and services such as public health, education and welfare, provide physical infrastructure, and carry out the normal administrative functions of government, such as revenue collection, necessary economic regulation, and information management. This is a critical capacity for governments because it affects the ability of private economic agents to achieve their goals and the ability of government to satisfy basic needs demanded by civic society (Savoia and Sen: n.d.; Grindle: 1996).

Political Capacity:

Political capacity of a state refers to the ability of states to respond to societal demands, allow for channels to represent societal interests, and incorporate societal

participation in decision making, elections at various levels and conflicts resolution. It refers to the effectiveness of everyday interactions between government and citizens, rather than to the broader rules of the game that compromise institutional capacity.

Technical Capacity:

The technical capacity of the state is the ability to manage macroeconomic policy and analyze economic policy options. Ministries of finance, central banks, and national planning institutes often became more powerful players in setting economic policies and negotiating agreements with multilateral and bilateral agencies and domestic economic groups (Grindle: 1996).

Military Capacity:

Military capacity represents the state's ability to overcome the rebellious actions against its authority with force. This refers to external security and has mainly concerned civil conflict scholars, who argue that an increase in police and military forces can repress insurgent groups (Hendrix: 2010).

Infrastructural capacity:

Infrastructural capacity refers to the territorial reach of the state (a concept coined by Michael Mann in 1986), the extent to which state organizations are able to penetrate society and carry out their projects throughout the territory, i.e., the geographical area within which policies can be enforced (Hau: 2012).

Though all these dimensions of state capacity are of equivalent importance, this study will focus largely on the Administrative and Infrastructural capacities of the state.

Infrastructural Capacity of the State:

World Development Report 1994 published by the World Bank under the title "**Infrastructure for Development"** mentions that "the adequacy of infrastructure helps determine one country's success and another's failure – in diversifying production, expanding trade, coping with population growth, reducing poverty, or improving environmental conditions" (World Bank, 1994: 2). The indispensable role played by infrastructure in promoting economic growth, both direct and indirect, is

also recognized by the pioneers of development economics (Hirschman 1958; Myrdal 1958). Mody (1997: xii) aptly suggests that "in any modern society, infrastructure plays a pivotal role - often decisive role in determining the overall productivity and development of a country's economy, as well as the quality of life of its citizens". According to him, infrastructure can be defined as activities that provide society with the services necessary to conduct daily life and to engage in productive activities. Definitions of infrastructure vary widely from economic and social overhead capital to the general provision of public goods.

Reddy and Reddy (2015) defines infrastructure as the base or the necessary initial foundation on which economic development is built. For him, "infrastructure can be seen as all those activities and services whose contribution to the economy is not the income generated within the sector itself but the sustenance and support that they provide to the income generation in the rest of the economy (2015: 20)". Depending on the nature of input services, infrastructure can be broadly divided into two types: physical and social. The physical infrastructure consists of transport (roads, railways, air, and waterways), electricity, irrigation, telecommunication, housing and water supply. These work as direct intermediate inputs in any geographical location which attract flows of additional resources. Secondly, this also raises the productivity of other factors of production and profitability of the producing units thereby permitting higher levels of output, income, and employment (Ghosh and De:,1998:3039).

On the other hand, social infrastructure broadly includes education, health, nutrition, sanitation, child care, recreation and banking and other forms of financial facilities. Their contribution to productive activity, though indirect in some occasion, is no less important. This human capital perspective is augmented by a direct orientation to the welfare of human resources and its consequences, which is assumed to increase labor productivity (Haynes: 1991; Ghosh and De: 1998; Lall: 1999).

Most of the literature on infrastructure productivity and economic analysis suggest that infrastructure investments have both short and long term effects. The short term effects are in the form of increase in employment (construction) and long term effects include both changes in employment and private output (Lall: 1999). Infrastructure is considered as one of the two legs of any successful modern economy, the other leg being high rates of progress in science and technology (Hamilton, List et al. 1791).

The availability of quality infrastructure is indispensable for sustainable socio-economic development of a country and the improvement of human well-being. However, it must be noted that the relationship between infrastructure and economic growth is not mono-causal. In addition to the causal link between infrastructure and development, there is also a feedback effect from regional development to infrastructure (Lall: 1999).

After reviewing the literature, it has been observed that infrastructure plays a crucial role in the process of development and therefore, for the overall development of a state, it is significant to develop or enhance its infrastructural capacity. Infrastructural capacity of a state is usually defined as the territorial reach of the state, the extent to which state organizations are able to penetrate society and carry out their projects throughout the territory (Hau: 2012). State infrastructural power, as delineated by Michael Mann, refers to the "institutional capacity of a central state… to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions" (Mann, 1983: 113). It is an ability to control outcomes through collective action. It refers to the range of actions that a state is authorized to undertake as a result of routine institutionalized negotiation with organized groupings (Mann: 1986; Hall and Ikenberry: 1989). According to Mann, it has two principal dimensions, penetration and extraction. It implies the capacity both to penetrate society and to extract or mobilize resources for various ends. According to Linda Weiss, the story of infrastructural power does not end at the point when operational autonomy combines with infrastructural autonomy, but can be increased in the modern state by public-private collaboration. She states that the stronger the collaboration between the public and private sectors, the stronger the infrastructural power, and consequently, the greater the capacity for effective coordination of economic change. (Weiss, 1994: 89-90)

According to Mann, infrastructural power is connected to the Weberian tradition of the state as a set of institutions that exercise control over territory and regulate social relations (Mann, 1993:58-59). But scholars like Helmke and Levitsky (2004), Ichino (n.d.), and Sofier (2008) have argued that infrastructural power is the aspect of the state that determines how far its bureaucracy can reach to exert control and regulate social relations. In a country, the state cannot directly exercise control from the center. State need to depend upon representatives to act on their behalf as they implement policies and seek to control and regulate social relations within the territory it claims

to govern. For these scholars, the infrastructural capacity of a state relates to the set of relationships that link the institutions of control to the local communities they penetrate, and to the central state elites.

Infrastructural power represents a collective notion of power. Infrastructural capacity can be analyzed through three different approaches. The first approach captures the capabilities of the central state; the second conceptualizes it in terms of territorial reach and the third focuses on the effects of state on society (Sofier, 2008: 232).

The first, 'National Capabilities approach,' looks at the state's infrastructural capacity as a feature of the central state and emphasizes the extent of resources a state has at its disposal for exercising power through its institutions of control over society (Goldstone, 2006:265; Sofier, 2008:236; Straus, 2006:215; Mann: 1993). These resources can be financial as well as institutional.

The second approach which conceptualizes the infrastructural capacity of the state in terms of its territorial reach is concerned about how states are limited and constructed by non-state actors. Scholars like Migdal (1988, 2001) focus more on how states are shaped by the societies that states claim to regulate and control. Scholars who take this approach focus on how societal power networks and identities are transformed by the interaction with the state, and trace the complicated relationship between the radiating state institutions and the societies they seek to control (Sofier, 2008:239).

Striking a middle way between the two approaches explained above, the third approach to infrastructural capacity of the state focuses on the uneven reach of the state, centered on the varied ability of a state to exercise control within its territory. According to this approach, the capabilities of the state vary sub-nationally. The state cannot be homogenously powerful throughout the national territory; its reach is uneven over territory and over societal actors (Goodwin: 1999; Kalyvas: 2006).

In other words, infrastructural capacity is the one aspect of the state which determines how deep its bureaucracy can reach to exert control and regulate social relation within its territory through collective action of its institutions. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, it is defined as the ability of the state to provide physical and social infrastructure to its citizens. The focus has been on the physical and social infrastructure because it not only helps in raising the level of well-being of citizens

but also contributes and promotes the economic development of the state by increasing the factor productivity in the production process. The main categories of physical and social infrastructure which are assessed in this study are roads, power, water and sanitation, education and health.

Administrative Capacity of the State:

With the increasing size of population, complex property rights and scarce resources, it becomes imperative to know how efficiently the resources can be utilized for the betterment and development of every section of society. Not surprisingly, it becomes significant to study the science of administration. Administration as an activity can be traced to the earliest periods of human history when man started living in organized societies. As a term it is as old as the term 'government'. However, as a concept 'administration' has become significant since the period in which the sovereign is not the absolute ruler but the people, in which people undertake the responsibility to develop administration under new constitutions which have brought them into power.[5]

The word administration is a combination of two Latin terms 'ad' meaning 'towards' and 'minister' meaning 'to attend to the wants and needs of the others' (Houghton Mifflin: 1985). Marx defines it as 'determined action taken in pursuit of a conscious purpose'. For him it is the 'systematic ordering of affairs and the calculated use of resources aimed at making those things happen which one wants to happen'. J.M. Pfiffner defines administration as 'organization and direction of human and material resources to achieve desired ends' (Basu: 2004).

Administration is the most obvious, visible part of government; it is the government in action. The state administration of the modern era is considerably different in its structure and goals from the governmental administration of the earlier times. In earlier times, maintenance of law and order and collection of revenue were its

[5] For details see Woodrow Wilson 'The Study of Administration' (1887) in which he describes the three periods of growth through which every government has passed and has to pass. First period is of absolute rulers and of an administrative system adapted to absolute rule; the second is that in which constitutions are framed to do away with absolute rulers and substitute popular control and in which administration is neglected for these higher concerns; and the third is that in which the sovereign people undertake to develop administration under this new constitution which has brought them into power.

compulsory functions and welfare activities were purely incidental and optional, whereas in the contemporary times along with security and collection of revenue, welfare activities have become compulsory tasks of state administration. In fact, it has been established that for the state to play an effective catalytic role in the process of development, it must possess some minimal level of administrative capacity (Honadle:1981; Bowman and Kearney: 1988; Donahue, Selden and Ingraham: 2000; Jeong: 2007). Verheijen in his work on administrative capacity in the new EU Member States (2007) argues that

> without a strong administrative capacity states will risk not only losing the direct benefits of the structural funds but also neglecting policy agendas in other areas … pose significant risks in the areas that are important to economic and social development. A strongly performing administrative system is an essential ingredient of effective development. (Verheijen, 2007: iv)

Administrative capacity is a highly abstract concept and scholars do not find either a clear definition or a strong model of it. It influences issues of legitimacy, efficacy, effectiveness and performance. Therefore, the concept of administrative capacity has been defined and described in different ways by different scholars. The United Nations Development Program defines administrative capacity as "the ability of individuals and organizations or organizational units to perform functions effectively, efficiently and sustainably" (UNDP, 2006:02). But, Ingraham argues that "Improved performance does not happen on demand. Performance is not likely to occur in the absence of fundamental organizational capacity" (Ingraham, 2007: 06).

For some scholars like Huber, McCarty and Geddes administrative capacity is related to the ability of senior members of a bureaucracy to implement desired actions and for others like Kohli (1984) and Herring (1983), 'regime' plays a central role in explaining the variation in the ability of the state to bring about social change. For Farazmand (2009) administrative capacity entails "running the machinery of a political and economic system and translating political and collective will into actions through management and implementation" (2009: 01). Administrative capacity is a combination of individual capacities of civil servants as it is their abilities that ultimately determine service delivery (Mentz: 1997; North: 1992). Scholars such as Milio (2007), Fukuda Parr et al (2002) and Janicke (2001) define it as the ability to perform functions, solve problems, set goals and achieve objectives. Thus,

administrative capacity consists of, on the one hand, structural and procedural provisions that enable bureaucracies to perform particular functions. On the other hand, administrative capacity also includes the individuals within these bureaucracies that are capable and skillful enough to meet the expectations of their political masters and the wider public (Lodge and Wegrich: 2014).

It has become an established fact that administrative capacity contributes a lot in the socio-economic development and transformation of a state. It plays a significant role in the success or failure of development efforts. The requirement for administrative capacity has been greatly felt to solve complex problems and to implement developmental plans and programs.

The administrative capacity of the state has emerged as an important concept in a range of literature and has shared a core meaning, denoting the abilities the public bureaucracy does or should possess. Bureaucratic capacity and public sector capacity appear often as synonyms for administrative capacity.

Administrative capacity is a core concept in the public administration literature concerned with capacity building. In public administration scholarship, it is considered as a tool of policy implementation. It is the tool through which the capacity of bureaucratic intermediaries to carry out requisite actions and to cooperate in the implementation of policy is enhanced (May: 2003). It is seen as a core instrument to strengthen the capabilities of officials of different, usually lower jurisdictions to manage programs on their own and to fulfill newly assigned responsibilities (Radin: 2003; Burgess: 1975). Bowman and Kearney (1988) looked at administrative capacity as the "ability to respond effectively to change, make decisions effectively, efficiently and responsively, and manage conflict" (1988: 06).

Administrative capacity is also treated as a core variable in the analytical literature on policy implementation. While analyzing the structures, personnel and financial characteristics of agencies, Goggin et al (1990) define administrative capacity as an institution's ability to take purposeful action, and as an intervening variable between political incentives and policy outcomes.

N. Nelissen (2002) while defining administrative capacity as the degree to which the new types of governance are successful in handling societal and administrative

problems for which they have been created, distinguishes between indicated administrative capacity and effective administrative capacity. According to him, in the case of indicated administrative capacity, capacity is understood as potential whereas in case of effective administrative capacity, capacity is understood as performance. Therefore, indicated administrative capacity is the potential of governing bodies which have to execute certain tasks, and effective administrative capacity is the capability of governing bodies to act and the context within which that action occurs.

Therefore, administrative capacity is relative. It is not at the same level of development in all organizations even in the same country. Therefore, to assess the administrative capacity of a state, three approaches have been identified by scholars like Nelissen. These approaches are juridical, economic-business and political – societal.

Juridical Approach to Administrative Capacity:

The juridical approach to the administrative capacity of a state is related to demands such as those of due process, fairness, and equality before law, resulting from the fact that a government operates according to the division of tasks between various bodies of government. The principles of government, such as representation and support, and equitable treatment, influence decision making and procedures as well as the content of decisions. The government's conformity to these principles is supervised by various public bodies such as the judiciary, the ombudsman etc. The juridical opinion of these bodies influences the future interpretation of said values. Hence, government action and thus administrative capacity has to meet the juridical demands of equality, justice, and due process. In context of the juridical approach to administrative capacity, one can think of issues such as the protection of fundamental rights, government's monopoly over the use of violence, the duty to maintain law and order, commitment towards justice and so forth (Nelissen, 2002:13-14).

Economic- Business Approach to Administrative Capacity:

The economic-business approach to administrative capacity is related to the effective execution of public tasks. The central concepts in this approach are demand of necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, possibility to implement, maintenance and so on. This approach has been advocated since the times of Thomas Woodrow Wilson and

F.W. Taylor. These scholars argued that government should be run like a business and that everything had to be geared to enhancing productivity. But New Public Management provided it with a new momentum. It resulted, among other things, in a government that is increasingly evaluated for its performance. A variety of instruments are used for this, such as performance indicators, controlling and output measurement. Economic business type measures are thus not only a means, but also sometimes a goal of government. These instruments are used as mechanisms to determine and shape future public action.

Political-Societal Approach to Administrative Capacity:

A political-societal approach recognizes value in the structure of democracy. Though there is no conclusive definition of democracy, there are a few characteristics, such as periodic elections, free press, multi-party system, protection of human rights, and an independent judiciary which are used to define democracy. But the mere presence of such democratic institutions is no guarantee either of democratic government or of good governance. Therefore, to assess the administrative capacity of a state the political-societal approach includes issues such as political representativeness, political accountability, distribution of authority, oversight and control, openness and publicness, and political participation (Nelissen, 2002:15).

In short, one can say that administrative capacity is not an isolated phenomenon, it has to be placed against the background of fundamental societal and scientific debates. Enlarging administrative capacity is part of a broader process of societal and administrative renewal.

For the purposes of this study, administrative capacity is defined as the combination of the capabilities of the bureaucracy and the leadership to perform those tasks that need to be performed by the administration. This study will evaluate the role played by administrative capacity in the development of two Indian states: Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. Administrative capacities of states can be compared according to their (a) Process, (b) Purpose, (c) Structures and Institutions and (d) Environment (Caiden: 1973). Therefore, this study will aim to unpack the issue of administrative capacities of these states by considering four factors: first, the regime or the leadership which governs the state; second, the trends in bureaucracy; third, the incidence of corruption; and fourth, the ability to spend allocated funds.

Conclusion:

To sum up, we can say that development and state capacity are two notions which go hand in hand. Development is a notion which is viewed as a potent factor in defining the relationship between state and society. It is a goal which shapes the relationship between state and society and the deficiency of which can be attributed to poor state capacity. But a region cannot be so easily termed as under-developed or having inadequate infrastructure based on a single indicator. There are various facets of both of them, and a region, while lacking in one, may be well developed in another. Consequently both development and state capacity have been sub divided into constituent components. Development has been presumed to consist of agricultural development, industrial development, and human development and related to the social indicators of literacy, mortality, and so on. For the purpose of analysis in this study, development is defined as improvements in the standard of living of the population. The focus has been on human development because the goal of every development effort is to raise the level of well-being of all the citizens of a country. Another reason for focusing on human development is that it is not the ultimate goal of economic development but that the level of human development also acts as essential inputs for promoting economic growth and development.

In the case of India, which is very diverse in terms of geographic, demographic and economic characteristics, one of the major features of the development experience has been the wide regional disparity in development levels. Though the Indian government has made balanced regional development an integral part of national planning practice and objectives, and has been using the five year plans as a vehicle to address the concern of regional disparities in the country, wide regional inequality is still a hard reality in India. Among the 28 major states of India, the rank position of the composite development index of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand was found to be 19 and 14 respectively, in descending order according to relative deprivation method (India HDR: 2011). The next chapter will therefore evaluate the infrastructural and administrative development of the regions which form present day Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. It describes how the under-development of these regions led to the movement for separate statehood.

Chapter 2

State Capacity and Development of the Regions before Attaining Statehood

India's growth performance in the recent past has been considered impressive leading it to be considered one of the fastest growing economies of the world. However, after more than six decades of independence, India is faced with serious challenges of development. There is alarming inter- and intra-state disparity that poses a challenge to development in India. The acute sense of relative deprivation and the perception of non-development or under-development loom large in different parts of the country.

Since independence, several regions of India have demanded separation from their parent states in the name of cultural distinctness, the history of a separate existence as political entities, economic discrimination, administrative convenience, and development. In the first round of states' reorganization, the states had been created largely on the linguistic principle, and Punjab was the last state formed on a linguistic basis. Other states created thereafter were either created on an ethnic basis or were simply elevated from centrally administered units to fully fledged states such as Goa, Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Mizoram, but with the passage of time the rationale of culture and language has given way to the urge for speedier development (Sarangi and Pai: 2011; Kumar: 2011).

The driving force behind the creation of the three new states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand was a strong sentiment against decades of non-development. It was argued that all three regions asking for separate statehood are richly endowed with natural resources like minerals, water and forests which are exploited consistently for the development of 'nation' or the rest of the region of the parent state rather than for local needs (Tillin: 2011; Singh: 2006; Kumar: 2000; Mawdsley: 1999). The cultural or the ethnic factors were added only as instrumental factors to reinforce their cases.

It was expected that an increase in the access to and control over the resources that a society would have, after attaining separate statehood, would raise its rate of growth and development. Following the passage of a decade after the grant of separate statehood, we find that the phrase "small is beautiful" is proving to be only partially true. The theorem of the "natural resource curse," which states that regions with abundant natural resources do not perform well in comparison to those without (Rodriguez and Sachs: 1999; M.L. Ross: 1999), is also attested in these newly carved out states.

Figures of Human Development Index (HDI) for different states of India, for the years 1999-2000 and 2007-08, show that the ranking of these states in terms of human development has barely changed over the past decade (See table 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). Jharkhand remains on the lower side and Uttarakhand continues to lie somewhere in the middle of the continuum.

Table 2.1: Ranking of the States according to the HDI value

State	HDI 1999-2000	HDI 2007-08	Rank 1999-2000	Rank 2007-08
Jharkhand	0.268	0.376	23	19
Bihar	0.292	0.367	19	21
Uttarakhand	0.339	0.490	16	14
Uttar Pradesh	0.316	0.380	18	18
India	0.387	0.467		

Source: India Human Development Report 2011: 24

Table 2.2: State Profiles

State	Average Annual Growth Rate[6] (in %)	Incidence of Poverty (in %)	Literacy Rate (in %)	Under five Mortality Rate	Proportions of Households with improved source of drinking water (in %)
Jharkhand	4.2	40.3	64.6	93/1000	67.4
Bihar	7.0	41.4	58.1	85/1000	84.8
Uttarakhand	7.3	39.6	76.0	56.8/1000	96.8
Uttar Pradesh	3.6	32.8	66.2	96.4/1000	87.5

Source: India Human Development Report 2011

Table 2.3: Per Capita Revenue Expenditure of Newly Created States

Expenditure Head	Jharkhand	Uttarakhand	Chattisgarh	All India
Development Ex.	1.36	2.99	1.54	1.81
Social Service Ex.	0.91	1.69	0.99	1.14
Education, Sports, Arts and Culture	0.47	0.93	0.39	0.63
Economic Services	0.44	1.30	0.56	0.67
Non-development Ex.	0.87	1.81	0.86	1.36
Total expenditure	2.23	4.91	2.46	3.23

Source: RBI 2008 (in Shovan Ray: 2010)

[6] Average Annual Growth Rate is equal to Per Capita NSDP divided by Per Capita NNP.

To analyze that whether separate statehood has benefited the regions of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand in terms of development, it is necessary to know what the conditions were before attaining statehood. Therefore, this chapter will focus on how these regions have taken shape administratively and what was the state of affairs in terms of infrastructure and administrative capacity before they achieved separate statehood. The first section will describe the region of Jharkhand and the second section will deal with the region of Uttarakhand.

Jharkhand

The River Ganges divides Bihar into two physically distinct regions: the fertile plains of the north, and the south which, being fertile along the Ganges, becomes hillier as one proceeds south into the Chotanagpur Plateau. The Jharkhand region is constituted of hills, mountains and plateau with an altitude from 300 ft. to more than 400 ft. from the sea level. The word Jharkhand is a combination of two words, Jhar meaning forests and Khand meaning land. Since this region is covered with dense forests, it is assumed that the name is geographically attributed to the virgin forests and the hilly tracts of the area (Das, 1992:41; Ekka and Sinha, 2004:2). Jharkhand region receives a substantial amount of rainfall and it has several rivers such as Damodar, North and South Koel, Sankh, Subarnarekha, Karo, Kanchi, Karkai etc. This region is rich in major mineral resources such as iron, coal, copper, bauxite, limestone, and mica. (Ekka and Sinha, 2004: 2).

Before statehood, the Jharkhand region was spread over 22 districts which are now divided among four neighboring states. The districts which come under Jharkhand region are Mednipur, Bankura and Purulia of West Bengal; Sudargarh, Sambalpiur, Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj of Orissa; Surguja and Rajgarh of Madhya Pradesh and Ranchi, Palamu, Hazaribagh, Gumla, Lohardaga, Giridih, Dhanbad, Dumka, Sahebgunj, Godda, Deoghar, East Singhbhum and West Singhbhum of Bihar (Das, 1992:41; Ekka and Sinha, 2004:2).

Jharkhand has been variously called as ‘Khokhra’, ‘Nagdesh’, and ‘Dasaranya’ in different periods of history, and often it has been called as the ‘Rurh of India’ (Das, 1992:41). The history of this region indicates that this region enjoyed complete

independence and autonomy until Mughal invasion. Things began to change after the British came to Jharkhand. They began to exploit the people of region through the local kings and jagirdars. They introduced the zamindari system according to which people had to pay tax for the land they held. The system of land ownership was changed. Land was made private property against the traditional system of holding it collectively. The twin burdens of payment of tax and alienation of land made the people revolt against the British at several times in different places.

Socio-Economic Profile of the Region:

The majority of the Scheduled Tribe population of Bihar (97.7 percent), together with two of the ten million persons registered as Scheduled Castes in the state, resides in the Jharkhand region. This fact is of prime importance for the socio-economic organization of the region as well as for regional political formulations. The Scheduled Tribes and Castes together constitute 42 per cent of Jharkhand's population. Of the region's total Scheduled Tribe population, 75 per cent reside in the districts of Ranchi, Singhbhum and Santhal Praganas (Census of India: 1991). The regional distribution of the major tribal groups can be clearly appreciated, with the Santhals in the north, and the Mundas, Hos, Bhumijs and Oraons in the south of the region.

According to the Census data of 1991, 89 per cent of the Scheduled Tribes and 74 per cent of the Scheduled Caste working population in this region were engaged in agriculture. The total area of agricultural lands in Jharkhand is about 2.57 hectares, which produces a total of 37.85 tonnes of food grains. Among the important crops that form a major part of agriculture in Jharkhand are the following: Paddy, Wheat, Pulses, Oilseeds, Maize, Til, Sugarcane, and Bajra. Since the tribal population constitutes a significant portion of the region's demography, agriculture and forestry are not only the source of livelihood for over 70 % of the region's population but rather a way of life for these people.

A very small percentage of people are engaged in industrial occupations. In 1961 they amounted to 32 per cent of the total work force in mining and quarrying. This percentage was further reduced after the nationalization of coal-mines in 1971, followed by the massive retrenchment of Jharkhandi miners. They were replaced by

Bihari immigrants who received higher wages than the local miners (Sengupta, 1980:667; Devalle, 1992:82).

Jharkhand region has been called 'the Ruhr of India'. The largest mineral deposits are located in this region. 27.77 per cent of total minerals are produced in this region (for detail see table 2.4). In 1980, coal production in Bihar reached 44.35 million tons out of an all-India production of 109.10 million tons. The significant coalfields are located in Jharia, Bokaro, Ramgarh, Santhal Praganas and Giridih. Iron ore is mined in Singhbhum where Gua and Noamundi are the main mining centres. Singhbhum district is also the only producer of copper. Manganese ore deposits are found together with iron ore. Ranchi and Palamu districts produce bauxite, mostly used in making aluminum. Mica is found in north Hazaribagh, chromite in Singhbhum, clay in Ranchi, Singhbhum and Santhal Praganas, fire clay in the Jharia coal fields and in Hazaribagh, Apatite in Singhbhum (JSMDC; Devalle: 1992).

Table 2.4: Production of Minerals in Jharkhand

	Name of Mineral	**Total Production as % of Total Mineral Prod.**	**Percent from Jharkhand**	**Prod. at rest of Bihar**
1	Copper	0.77	100.0	Nil
2	Kyanite	0.54	85.0	Nil
3	Quartzite	0.03	60.5	5.3
4	Mica (crude)	0.41	58.5	Neg.
5	Asbestos	0.04	53.0	Nil
6	Apatite	0.02	48.6	Nil
7	Coal	54.27	44.5	Nil
8	Sand	0.02	37.3	Nil
9	Fireclay	0.09	33.0	Neg.
10	Chinaclay(Processed)	0.17	28.7	Nil
11	Bauxite	0.36	32.4	Nil
12	Iron Ore	7.59	22.4	Nil
13	Limestone	4.75	3.7	7.5
14	Mangnese Ore	1.59	0.6	Nil
15	Pyrite	0.12	Nil	100.0
16	Other Minerals	26.28	4.37	Nil
	Total	100	27.77	0.47
	Source: Jharkhand State Mineral Development Corporation			

Jharkhand region used to receive a fifth of the total public sector investments in industrial pursuits. The TATA Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (TISCO) is one of the most profitable concerns in the private sector, runs some of the mines, including

Naomundi. The majority of the iron ore mines in Singhbhum are worked under the Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd (IISCO) and the Bokaro Steel Plant, subsidiaries of the Steel Authority of India (SAIL). IISCO is responsible for the Gua, Chiria, and Manoharpur mines, and Bokaro for the Kiriburu, and Megahataburu mines. Other important landmarks are the steel plant at Jamshedpur, the Heavy Engineering factory at Ranchi, the Copper plant at Ghatshilla, the mica industry at Giridih and Uranium mining at Jaduguda (Devalle: 1992).

The production of cement, bricks and tiles, glass and glassware is overwhelmingly carried out in this region. Half of the state's factories making heavy machinery and tools, and nearly half of the manufacturing and assembly of non-electrical and general engineering goods are also located in this region (Census Atlas of Bihar: 1968).

In short, one can say that despite being an industrial belt, Jharkhand also provides scope for the cultivation of crops, such as wheat, paddy, pulses and maize within the region. Most of the tribal community in Jharkhand earns its livelihood through agriculture.

Infrastructural and Administrative Capacity of the Region

Physical infrastructure covering transportation, power and communication and Social infrastructure including water supply, sanitation, education, and health have a direct impact on the quality of life. With the rapid growth of the economy in the recent years, the importance and the urgency of removing infrastructural constraints for development have increased and are well recognized. This section examines the progress made in the sectors of power, sanitation, water supply, education and health in those districts of Bihar which constitute present day Jharkhand.

Power:

The goal of rural electrification at the household level is the cornerstone of India's economic growth as it enables basic minimum facilities of lighting and communication. Viable and reliable electricity services result in increased productivity in agriculture and labor, improvement in the delivery of health and

education services, and access to communications. Thus, providing electricity to village households is a means to help meet the aspirations of the population.

The availability of coal in abundance makes Jharkhand an ideal region for setting up Thermal Power Plants at the Coal Pits, though unfortunately the development of electric power generation and supply have somehow not received due attention and priority in this region. In spite of being the second most populous region and being endowed with all natural resources, the region had the distinction of having the least capacity of power consumption. The region had a paltry 1900 MW Installed capacity i.e. a meager 20 watts per capita as against the national average of 100 watts per capita.

During the first five year plan period (1951-1956), a sum of Rs. 827 lacs was spent for electrification in Bihar (GoB: 1960). By 1961, the electricity generating capacity of Bihar was 489460 KW, of which 428230 KW, or 87.49 per cent of total capacity, was generated in the region of Jharkhand (Table 2.5).

Table 2.5: Electricity Generating Capacity in 1961

District	Electricity Generating Capacity (in KW)			
	Hydel	Diesel	Steam	Total
Darbhanga	NA	3,998	2,920	6,918
Muzaffarpur	NA	3,623	1,196	4,819
Gaya	NA	NA	250	250
Saran	NA	2,761	1,483	4,244
Monghyr	NA	2,480	760	3,240
Shahabad	NA	NA	17,000	17,000
Purnea	NA	1,367	2,545	3,912
Champaran	NA	1,722	3,100	4,822
Patna	NA	NA	13,545	13,545
Santal Parganas	NA	616	NA	616
Hazaribagh	4,000	163	237,180	241,343
Ranchi	NA	371	5,500	5,871
Singhbhum	NA	1,185	133,125	134,310
Saharsa	NA	290	NA	290
Bhagalpur	NA	2,115	75	2,190
Palamu	NA	140	12,500	12,640
Dhanbad	NA	450	33,000	33,450
Bihar	4,000	21,281	4,64,179	4,89,460
Source: Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna and Damodar Valley Corporation, Calcutta.				

Though the region of Jharkhand produced more than 80 per cent of the total electricity, only 16 towns with a population of 20,000 and above in the region was electrified by 1961. Census data of later years also shows similar trends in the process of electrification of the households of the region. According to Census of Bihar, 1981 and 1991, however the average percentage of electrified households of Jharkhand region has been more than the average percentage of Bihar but the overall per cent has not even reached 50 per cent (see table 2.6).

Table 2.6: Total Number of Electrified Households in the Region of Jharkhand in 1981 and 1991

S.no	Districts	Census of Bihar, 1981			Census of Bihar, 1991		
		Total Number of Households	Total number of electrified Households	Percentage of Total Households	Total Number of Households	Total number of electrified Households	Percentage of Total Households
1	Santhal Praganas[7]	658805	28325	4.29	---	---	---
2	Hazaribagh	369640	51840	14.02	470250	102430	21.78
3	Ranchi	548100	64220	11.71	397320	100895	25.39
4	Singhbhum[8]	161745	91535	56.59	---	---	---
5	Palamu	316880	14595	4.6	398385	25270	6.34
6	Dhanbad	230895	139580	60.45	510095	235190	46.1
7	Giridih	283780	36210	12.75	361555	72500	20.05
8	Dumka				268925	13470	5
9	Deoghar				147775	21885	14.8
10	Lohardaga				52285	5185	9.91
11	Gumla				214210	8195	3.82
12	W.Singhbhum				348645	51535	14.78
13	E.Singhbhum				294935	121330	41.13
Source: Census of Bihar, 1981 and 1991							

As per the Census of Bihar 1991, the districts of Gumla (3.82) and Dumka (5) were the least electrified districts of the Jharkhand region and Dhanbad (46.1) and East Singhbhum (41.13) were the districts having more than 40 per cent of the electrified households.

Education:

Education is a central component in realizing all the developmental as well as socio-cultural rights of any section of the population in any state. In India, apart from

[7] Santhal Parganas was bifurcated into Dumka and Deoghar district by 1991.
[8] By 1991, Singhbhum was divided into East Singhbhum and West Singhbhum.

considering education as a central component, the right to education has been legislated for all the citizens. According to the legislation which came into effect in 2010, all the children in the age group of six to fourteen years have a fundamental right to acquire free and compulsory education.

Primary education in Jharkhand including that of the ST population has progressed reasonably well over the past decade, there is still vast ground to be covered. The delivery of literacy and primary and secondary education is abysmal. The literacy rate in Jharkhand region, according to the 1991 Census, was 40.26 per cent, far below the national average of 52.21 percent, with a large gap between literacy rates of males and females. The literacy rate among males was 54.40 Per cent and 24.84 per cent among females (see table no. 2.7).

Table no. 2.7 : Literacy Rate in Jharkhand Region[9]

District	Literacy Rate in 1971			Literacy Rate in 1981			Literacy Rate in 1991		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Palamu	18	28.77	6.7	25.55	31.22	9.11	31.1	44.8	16.35
Hazaribagh	19.39	30.80	7.58	29.03	35.61	10.91	38	53.37	21.24
Giridih				29.39	37.48	10.01	35.96	52.89	17.65
Santhal Praganas	18.63	29.22	7.54	47.08	33.49	10.52			
Dhanbad	33.92	46.28	17.7	37.46	52.17	23.18	55.47	69.47	37.88
Ranchi	27.26	38.87	15.27	40.56	42.78	19.62	51.52	65.12	36.57
Singhbhum	29.95	42.82	16.18	34.59	46.93	21.5			
East Singhbhum							59.05	71.18	45.5
West Singhbum							38.92	54.75	22.44
Deoghar							37.92	54.12	19.74
Godda							34.02	48.56	18
Sahibganj							27.03	36.97	16.92
Dumka							34.02	49.29	17.91
Lohardaga							40.79	54.99	26.11
Gumla							39.67	51.7	27.48
Average of the Region	24.52	36.12	11.82	34.80	39.95	14.97	40.26	54.40	24.84
Bihar				26.2	38.11	13.62	38.48	52.49	22.89

Source: Compiled from Census of India, 1971,1981,1991; Part 4: Bihar

Factors such as land alienation, indebtedness, impoverishment and pauperization (Rana, 1997; Roy Choudhary, 1965) have played a major role in restricting the scope for spreading education, particularly among the tribals and other poor communities.

[9] The literacy rates for some of the districts in the year 1971 and 1981 are not mentioned because they were created after 1982.

In 1995, there were 17,304 primary schools including the upper primary and secondary schools with primary sections in the region (Rana and Das, 2004:1172), which given the low density of population (274 persons per sq.km.) and vast geographical area (79,714 sq.km.) is woefully inadequate. Each of the primary schools on average caters to an area of 4.6 sq.km.

The inadequacy in the number of schools along with the poor number of teachers per school adds to the severity of the problem of the primary and secondary education system. Census data over the years shows that the number of teachers per 1000 students at primary and secondary level is far below the state as well as national average in the districts forming the Jharkhand region (for details see table 2.8).

Table no. 2.8: No. of Teachers per 1000 students at Primary and Secondary level schools.

District	1971		1981	
	Primary Schools	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools	Secondary Schools
Palamu	25	34	70	52
Hazaribagh	25	35	71	41
Giridih			76	46
Santhal Praganas	29	35	92	64
Dhanbad	30	34	50	33
Ranchi	29	20	62	48
Singhbhum	28	28	60	42
Source: Census Atlas of India (1971, 1981), Part 4 – Bihar				

Health:

People's health and well-being is considered as one of the major indicators of development. The healthcare services are divided under the State list and the Concurrent list in India. While some heads, such as public health and hospitals, fall under the State list, others such as population control and family welfare, medical education and quality controls of drugs are included in the Concurrent list.

In the region of Jharkhand, the use of this indicator suggests that its level of development leaves much to be desired. The region was confronted with many grave challenges in the health sector. A sizable share of the population remains deprived of basic health care services despite various health initiatives by the government. The region shared a number of characteristics with other backward states of India, such as

high infant mortality, low immunization of children, high mortality and low institutional delivery.

In this region, poverty associated communicable diseases like tuberculosis and malaria, along with maternal mortality and morbidity, comprise a major portion of the disease burden. Malaria is endemic with frequent epidemic outbreaks of Plasmodium falciparum malaria (about 50 per cent). Over 60,000 deaths occur every year due to tuberculosis. Prevalence of leprosy is 10 per 10,000 of population. HIV/AIDS poses another rising threat (Kumar, A., 2008:2988-89). The poor performance of the region in most health indicators are evident from the table given below:

Table no. 2.9: Health Indicators of the Jharkhand Region		
S.no	Indicator	Rate
1	Crude Birth Rate	26.2 %
2	Infant Mortality Rate	49 / 1000 lives
3	Teenage Pregnancies (age 15-19)	27.5 %
4	Neonatal Mortality	48.6 %
5	Death Rate	30.7%
Source: Bulletin of Rural Health Statistics in India		

According to the health statistics of the region, there is a huge gap between the current availability and the requirement of health facilities in the region. The region had 12.90 per cent medical institutions which includes hospitals, dispensaries and Sub-Health Centres per 1000 of census houses. The region had only 3.56 per cent Primary Health Centres on an average (Census Atlas of India 1991, Part 4- Bihar). Table 2.10 shows the status of health infrastructure and staffing in the region during 1991.

Table no. 2.10: Health Infrastructure and Staffing as of 1991[10]				
District	No. of Medical Institutions /1000 Census Houses (in %)	No. of PHCs / 100000 of population (in %)	No. of Hospital Beds / 100000 of population	Registered Medical Practitioners / 100000 of population (in %)
Palamu	15	3.5	16	6.51
Hazaribagh	11	3	65	2
Giridih	8	1.2	19	2.5
Dhanbad	7	1.5	140	7
Ranchi	9	1	237	2.8
East Singhbhum	10	4	205	16.12
West Singhbum	15	6	46	6.51
Deoghar	12	3.5	40	2.5

[10] Data not available for two of the districts because those districts were created later.

Godda				
Sahibganj				
Dumka	19	5	10	11.51
Lohardaga	14	5	45	1.51
Gumla	22	5.5	12	1.40
Average of the Region	12.90	3.56	75.90	5.48
Bihar	11	3	36	10.30
Source: Census of India, 1991; Part -4, Bihar				

The above table very clearly depicts that although the average status of health infrastructure and staffing in the region was higher than the state of Bihar, there was acute disparity within the districts of the Jharkhand region. Districts like East Singhbhum and Dumka stands on the highest side of the continuum, whereas districts like Hazaribagh, Giridih and Lohardaga stands on the lowest side.

The above data also shows that in terms of health infrastructure and staffing, the region has much ground to cover. There arenot only shortfalls in the number of medical institutions but there were limitations also in terms of how the existing infrastructure was managed and maintained.

Water and Sanitation:

Water and Sanitation is a state subject, and the schemes for providing drinking water and sanitation facilities are implemented by the states. In India, the rural water supply and sanitation (RWSS) is financed by public funds. The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act provides in the Eleventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution that Drinking Water and Sanitation are matters that could be devolved to the Panchayats through state legislations (Bapat, Amudha et al: 2007).

The Indian government has made a commitment to providing all the villages with safe drinking water supply all the year round. It has been supplementing the efforts of the state governments through two centrally sponsored programs namely, the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Program (ARWSP) since 1972-3 and the Central Rural Sanitation Program (CRSP) since 1986. ARWSP is currently being implemented through the Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission (RGNDWM), which aims at covering all rural habitations with population of 100 and above.

The CRSP was launched in 1986 and restructured in 1999 to introduce the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC). It aims to provide sanitation facilities in households, schools, anganwadis, and public places while promoting alternative delivery mechanisms for sanitary goods and services through Rural Sanitary Production Centres. Rural sanitation coverage was only 1 per cent in the 1980s. With the launch of the CRSP in 1986, the coverage improved to 4 per cent in 1988.

The table below explains the status of water and sanitation facilities in the region of Jharkhand during 1981 – 1991:

Table 2.11: Availability of Drinking Water and Toilet facilities within the premises during 1981[11]-1991[12].

	1981			1991		
District	Total HH	D. Water	Toilet	Total HH	D. Water	Toilet
Palamu	316880	36770	7660	398385	39380	20155
Hazaribagh	369640	88740	30765	470250	118430	74130
Giridih	285780	64400	22290	361555	79145	47205
Santhal Praganas	658805	80205	20735	---	---	---
Dhanbad	405150	117655	103060	510095	167970	165785
Ranchi	548100	94260	56810	397320	103000	84340
Singhbhum	543400	112905	92805	---	---	---
East Singhbhum				294935	113840	105830
West Singhbum				348645	37090	34125
Deoghar				147775	23800	14690
Godda						
Sahibganj						
Dumka				268925	26565	8950
Lohardaga				52285	8415	3920
Gumla				214210	18110	6565
Average of the Region	446822	84990	47732	314944	66885	51426

Source: Census of India, 1981 and 1991; Part – 4 Bihar

The above table shows that the status of water and sanitation facilities in the region of Jharkhand was in a very poor state in 1991. None of the 13 districts had even 40 per cent of the toilet and drinking water facilities within the premises of census

[11] Data not mentioned for some districts because these districts were formed later.

[12] The number of households includes both rural and urban.

households. According to the 1991 Census of India, less than 10 percent of the houses had drinking water facility in their houses in three districts (namely, Palamu, Dumka and Gumla) out of thirteen. Rural households did not have sanitation system at all.

Though the region of Jharkhand is rich in natural resources which contribute more than 75 per cent of the revenues for the state of Bihar (Das: 1998), the statistics of the infrastructural and administrative capacity of the region clearly show the backward developmental profile of the region. Merely 5 per cent villages were electrified in the region whereas the rest of the state had 40 per cent rural electrification. Further added to this, the *pucca* roads / 1000 KM were only 5 KM in the Jharkhand region as compared to 20 KM in rest of the state. Similarly, the status of social infrastructure such as, education, healthcare, water and sanitation was very poor in the region.

Thus, internal colonialism[13] and under-development aroused mass discontent among the population of the region which resulted into the demand for separate statehood.

Demand for Separate Statehood:

Jharkhand is a region well known for struggles and movements since the colonial period. The movement for a separate tribal homeland in the central tribal belt of India is a one-hundred and fifty year struggle by the tribals of South Bihar to restore their economic, political and cultural hegemony over a region where they, the original clearers of the land, have progressively been displaced by non- tribal outsiders: the hated 'dikus' of North Bihar and Bengal (Corbridge, 1988: 03). The demand has its historical root in the fight of Tilak Manghi (1784); the Ho revolt (1820); the formation of South West Frontier Agency by clubbing all the area of Bihar (18 districts), West Bengal (3 districts), Orissa (4 districts) and Madhya Pradesh (2 districts) with Chhotanagpur as a single unit with the headquarters at Hazaribagh by the British (1833); the Santhal rebellion (1855) and the Birsa movement (1900) (Roy,

[13] Internal Colonialism refers to political and economic inequalities between regions within a single society. It is the practice in which a country's dominant group exploits minority groups for its economic advantage. The dominant group manipulates the social institutions to suppress minorities and deny them full access to the society's benefits. The concept was first introduced by Michael Hechter in his work *Internal Colonialism* in 1975.

2000:3631). The Jharkhand movement got its life blood from its predecessor organizations, viz. Chottanagpur Unnati Samaj (1915) and Adivasi Mahasabha (1938).

The demand for a separate 'administrative unit' in the Chotanagpur region was first placed before the Simon Commission in 1928. The Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj under the leadership of Bishop Van Hocck and Juel Lakra submitted a memorandum to the Commission asking for special privileges for the tribals (Ghosh, 1993:1788). However, the demand for a separate Jharkhand state was raised after independence by the tribals under the leadership of Jaipal Singh, who submitted a memorandum to this effect before the States' Reorganization Committee in 1955 (Roy, 2000: 3631). Based on grievances about ethnic backwardness and regional economic deprivation, the movement's original demand was for the formation of a separate state with 16 districts, which later became 21 districts. The States' Reorganization Commission (1955) rejected the Jharkhand demand on the plea that Jharkhand Party did not obtain a majority in the Chottanagpur and Santal Pragannas area, and tribal population was only one third of the total population and divided into several language groups (Tillin: 2011).

Though violent attacks were organized by Birsa Seva Dal during 1968 on exploitative zamindars and mass demonstrations held in the streets of Ranchi for the creation of a tribal state (Ghosh, 1993:1789), a qualitative change came to the Jharkhand movement with the formation of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha in 1972 under the leadership of Shibu Soren in Dhanbad which added not only non-tribals to the movement but also the working class of the industrial belt (Roy, 2000: 3631).

A second memorandum was given to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1973 by Jharkhand Party leader N.E. Horo (Roy, 2000: 3631). The total area of the proposed state was said to be 1, 87,646 sq. km. with a population of 3, 05, 98, 991 (Ghosh, 1993:1788). By this time the tribal belt in Bihar had come under the influence of the Naxalbari movement. Some of the naxalite factions operating in the Dhanbad region came close to the fighting Jharkhandis. The struggle against the oppressive economic system got a boost when A.K. Roy and Binod Behari Mahato, two Marxist leaders, joined the movement (Ghosh: 1993: 1789).

During the rule of the Janata Party in Bihar (1977-1980), all political parties including Congress and the Janata Party favored the idea of a separate state for the Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana region (Singh, 1982:13). In 1987, the newly formed student union – the All Jharkhand Students' Union (AJSU) in a memorandum to the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi gave an ultimatum to the central government to constitute a separate state by 1988. According to the memorandum, the proposed state was to comprise of 21 districts from 4 states with an area of 1, 87, 646 sq. km. and a population of 4 crores approximately (Ghosh, 1993:1788). Another memorandum was submitted to the President of India under the leadership of B.P. Keshori, leader of Jharkhand Coordination Committee in 1989 (Roy, 2000).

After prolonged negotiations between the Centre, the Bihar Government and the movement leaders, the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC) was formed in August 1995 (Kumar, 2002). It was regarded as a major step towards the creation of Jharkhand. Under pressure from the JMM members, with whose support the Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) had a majority in the state Assembly, the Bihar government on July 22, 1997, adopted a resolution for the creation of a separate state. In 1998, however, RJD leader Mr. Lalu Prasad Yadav reversed his stand on Jharkhand statehood. The JMM reacted sharply, withdrawing its support to the RJD government (Murlidharan: 2000).

To prevent the RJDs dependence on the Congress, after the last Assembly election in the state in 2000 which resulted into hung Assembly, the JMM extended support on the precondition that RJD would not pose a hurdle to the passage of the Bihar Reorganization Bill (Jharkhand Bill). Finally, with support from both RJD and JMM, the ruling coalition at the Centre led by the BJP, which had made statehood its poll plank in the region in successive polls earlier, cleared the Jharkhand Bill in the monsoon session of the Parliament in the year 2000, thus paving the way for the creation of a separate Jharkhand state. The Jharkhand state was formed on 15th November 2000 (Tillin: 2011).

The new state comprised of 18 districts in Santalparganas and Chotanagpur. These districts were: Ranchi, Gumla, Lohardaga, Singhbhum East, Singhbhum West, Palamau, Garhwa, Hazaribagh, Chatra, Koderma, Bokaro, Dhanbad, Giridih, Deoghar, Godda, Dumka, Pakur and Sahibganj.

Uttarakhand

The state of Uttar Pradesh besides covering much of the Gangetic plains also covers a hilly tract at its north-western end. This mountainous tract is referred to as Uttarakhand. In early days, the mountainous Uttar Pradesh was popularly known as the Kumaon hill tract obtaining its name from Kurmanchal. It was only during the sixteenth century A.D. when King Ajaipal integrated and brought fifty-two fortresses under a common banner and thus the area came to be known as 'abode of fortresses' or Garhwal (Chib, 1978: 03).

The region of Uttarakhand consists of the Sub-Himalayan districts of Uttar Pradesh, namely, Chamoli, Uttarkashi, Tehri Garhwal, Pauri Garhwal, and Dehradun in Garhwal and Almora, Nainital, Pithoragarh in Kumaon hill tracts. The region laps in about 1/6th of the area of the Uttar Pradesh state. Uttarakhand is primarily a mountainous region, as the plains constitute only 10 per cent of its total geographic area. The region is a part of the central Himalayas and most of its northern area comprises high ranges and glaciers, while the lower ranges are covered by dense forests (Sekher and Tripathi, 2013:35). This region is spread over an area of 45,485 square kilometers and it extends between 77 34 and 81 02 E longitudes and between 28 43 to 31 27 N latitudes. The topography of Uttarakhand is characterized by deep valleys, high peaks and a wide variety of vegetation. Elevations extend from approximately 300 to 7000 mean sea level. The temperature ranges from 16 C to 40 C, but it drops below freezing points in many parts of high mountain areas of the region during winter (Mehta, 1999:04).

Socio- Economic Profile of the Region:

The region of Uttarakhand has very little variety in the social composition of its population. According to the Census of India, 1991, Hindus make up nearly 90 percent of the population and Muslims making up to 12 percent of the population – mostly in the district of Haridwar. The region also has some population of the Sikh and Christian faiths, but they constitute less than 1 percent of the total population.

The Scheduled Caste population varies from 13 percent to 17 percent with more than 20 percent share found in the district of Uttarkashi, Pithoragarh, Almora and Haridwar. Unlike any other hill states, the share of the Scheduled Tribe population is

very small in this region. It constitutes less than 3 percent of the total population of the state and is concentrated mainly in the districts of Nainital, Chamoli and Dehradun (Census of U.P., 1991).

Uttarakhand is richly endowed with rich natural resources such as minerals, forests, water and land. The economy of Uttarakhand was largely dependent on natural resources: subsistence agriculture, forest resources, mining and cross border trade with Tibet. Prolonged struggles for the control and use of the region's natural resources, particularly forests, influenced the nature and growth of the economy (Chopra, 2014:06; Negi, 1995: 85).

About 74 percent of the population lives in the rural areas and about 90 percent population are directly or indirectly dependent upon agriculture and allied occupations. Agriculture is the predominant economic activity and three quarters of the land holdings belong to sub-marginal or marginal categories of farmers, with an average of 0.37 hectares of land each. Land distribution is relatively equal, cases of land holdings of over 2 hectares are rare and landlessness is low. The area's agro-pastoral economy remains predominantly subsistence based, with roughly fifty percent of the rural households, including the rural elite, highly dependent on the village commons and forest lands (Mukherjee, 2014:100). Forests constitute a significant portion of the land use, covering sixty three percent of the total geographical area of the region. Forests are a source of livelihood for rural residents and provide resources such as fodder, fuel, green manure and construction timber, all of which are critical to the household economy.

The level of urbanization is confined to the plains areas of the region, thus ruling out significant industrial or service activity. In the region, food grains are grown for local consumption except in some parts of the Terai and Dun Valleys, from where the produce may be exported outside the region. Horticulture is rapidly becoming a source of substantial income. In the higher Himalayas, animal husbandry is the main source of livelihood as agricultural yields are very poor in this part of the region (Negi, 1995:92).

Uttarakhand is also rich in mineral resources, particularly building stones, limestone, magnesite and rock phosphate. However, these mineral resources are not being exploited on a very large scale except in some areas due to difficult topography and

adverse climatic conditions (Uddin, 2003: 72). The table below shows the availability of Minerals in different districts of Uttarakhand.

Table 2.12: Availability of Minerals in Uttarakhand		
S.no.	Minerals	Districts of Uttarakhand
1	Limestone	Dehradun, Tehri Garhwal, Almora and Pithoragarh.
2	Magenesite and Sopestone	Almora, Pithoragarh and Chamoli
3	Dolomite	Tehri Garhwal, Dehradun, and Almora
4	Copper	Chamoli, Nainital, Almora, Pauri Garhwal, Tehri Garhwal, and Pithoragarh
5	Rock Phosphate	Dehradun and Pauri Garhwal
6	Marble	Dehradun and Pauri Garhwal
7	Mica	Thalisen in Pauri Garhwal
8	Barytes	Dehradun
9	Asbestos	Chamoli
10	Alum	Nainital and Almora
11	Antimony	Chamoli
12	Arsenic	Pauri Garhwal
13	Graphite	Almora
14	Smithstone	Dehradun
15	Tungsten	Almora and Chamoli
Source: Uddin, N (2003:73)		

In terms of per capita State Domestic Product (SDP) from commodity producing sectors the region of Uttarakhand occupies third place after the western and Bundelkhand regions among the five economic regions of Uttar Pradesh. The value of SDP per capita in 1992-93 for the region was Rs. 2,419. On certain other indicators of physical economy also, Uttarakhand occupies first or second place among the different regions of the state but this is due to its relatively low population (Joshi, 2001:123). Most of the indicators give a misleading picture of the region's economy.

In short, one can say that among all other regions of Uttar Pradesh, the region of Uttarakhand has remained a region which is full of natural resources such as minerals, forests, water, land or human but due to its difficult and different terrain and topography the people of Uttarakhand were not able to extract benefits to develop themselves socio-economically.

Infrastructural and Administrative Capacity of the Region:

Development of basic physical infrastructure is a pre-requisite for socio-economic and industrial development. Lack of proper infrastructural facilities has been a major growth constraint in any program of economic development. The inadequacy of infrastructure or administration restrains the region/ state from taking benefits of its resources. This section examines the progress made in the sector of power, sanitation, water supply, education and health in those districts of Uttar Pradesh which constitute present day Uttarakhand.

Power:

Power is one of the most critical components of infrastructure affecting economic growth and well-being of any state. The existence and development of adequate infrastructure is essential for sustained growth of the state's economy. The provision of electricity to an un-electrified area offers the potential to develop a wholly integrated approach for community development by bringing in issues of environment, resource management, better equipped hospitals and schools, access to information, and greater opportunities for generating income and improving food security (Palit, 2008: 56).

Power development in India was slow and the total installed capacity at the time of independence was 1900 MW. After independence, the central and state governments initiated various programs of development. Major river valley development programs were taken up for multipurpose benefits with power generation as one of their important aspects. The number of villages electrified at the time of independence was very limited – just 3558 – and power consumption for agricultural purposes was about 4 percent of the total sales.

The situation of Uttar Pradesh was even worse. The installed capacity of the state including the private licensees was only about 179MW at the commencement of first five year plan in 1951. By the end of the 1980s, the installed capacity was 4810.85 MW of which 1422.35 MW which is 29.6 per cent was hydro and 3388.50 MW which is 70.4 percent was thermal power. During 1961 only 1 percent of the total villages were electrified and by 1980s this number rose to only 34.3 percent (Bhagat, 1993:98-106).

The Uttar Pradesh power system has one unique feature. Its major thermal power generation is concentrated in the South East region in the proximity of coal fields, while the major hydro- power generation is in the North West region due to concentration of hydro resources in Himalayan region. The river system of the lesser or middle Himalayas through the Duns and the Shivalik provides the maximum potential for hydropower generation in view of the fact that they afford possibilities for the construction of large storage dams for the control and regulation of the flow of these rivers. However, the region of Uttarakhand has lagged behind in power development. Its rate of growth has not been able to keep pace with the potential and capacity of the undivided state to develop. The eight districts of undivided Uttar Pradesh which comprise the region of Uttarakhand had an installed capacity of only 13.922 MW by the end of 1980s.

The Census data for 1981 and 1991 reinforce this story of the poor condition of electrification of the region. According to the Census of Uttar Pradesh, 1981 and 1991, the average percentage of electrified households in the region of Uttarakhand has been 16 and 20 percent respectively, which is more than the average percentage of Uttar Pradesh but the overall percentage of electrified households have not even reached 25 Percent (See table 2.13).

Table 2.13: Number of Electrified Houses in the Region of Uttarakhand

S.no	District	Census of U.P., 1981			Census of U.P., 1991		
		Total Number of Households	Total Number of Electrified Households	Percentage of Total Households	Total Number of Households	Total Number of Electrified Households	Percentage of Total Households
1	Uttarkashi	37280	7215	19.35	47085	8295	17.6
2	Chamoli	74590	9330	12.50	95155	9715	10.20
3	Tehri Garhwal	98790	11195	11.33	117470	11975	10.19
4	Dehradun	136310	60420	44.32	182625	93695	51.30
5	Garhwal	135095	12425	09.19	141530	18915	13.36
6	Pithoragarh	99125	7595	07.66	117605	10505	8.93
7	Almora	152820	8975	05.87	170925	13315	7.78
8	Nainital	199370	35430	17.77	268430	85205	31.74
9	Hardwar				189235	59260	31.31

Source: Compiled from Census of India, 1981 and 1991.

The above table shows the stark difference between the districts which lie in the plains areas and the ones which lie in the hilly areas of the region of Uttarakhand. Districts like Dehradun (51.30), Nainital (31.74) and Hardwar (31.31) which lie in the

plains areas of the region have better access to power. They have a much larger number of households electrified than the average of the region as well as the undivided state of Uttar Pradesh. On the other hand, there are districts like Almora (7.78), Pithoragarh (8.93), Chamoli (10.20) and Tehri Garhwal (10.19) which have least access to power. Whatever minimal amount of access to electricity is provided in these districts, it is mostly to the urban households.

Therefore, it is clear that the condition of the region of Uttarakhand in terms of the access to the power has been very poor despite having high potential for hydroelectric power.

Education:

Education is a doorway to the wider world. Imparting education to human beings means bringing about change or improvement in their cognitive ability, skills and knowledge, productive efficiency and mobility into different occupations and as a consequence, increasing their income levels.

Literacy of population is one of the significant indicators to measure the educational level of any region or state. Uttarakhand has made commendable progress in achieving high literacy rates over the years. The percentage share of literate population in total population had increased almost twice – from 31 per cent in 1971 to 59.67 per cent in 1991, but the major shift has taken place from 39 per cent in 1981 to 59.67 per cent in 1991 (see table 2.14). Literacy rate in the region is higher than the state and national averages by 14.7 and 5.6 per cent points, respectively (Census of India, 1971, 1981 and 1991; Part II B). However, there exist wide inter-regional disparities in the literacy levels. The district of Dehradun recorded highest literacy during all the three census years, while Tehri Garhwal and Uttarkashi remained two districts which had low rates of literacy as compared to the national average.

Similarly, the level of literacy among the Scheduled Caste (42.79) and Scheduled Tribe (51.95) population of the region has remained high in comparison to the average of undivided state of Uttar Pradesh. The average literacy rate among the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled tribe population of Uttar Pradesh was 26.85 and 35.70 per cent respectively.

Table 2.14: Literacy Rates in the Districts of the Region in 1981 and 1991		
Districts	1981	1991
Uttarkashi	46.3	47.2
Chamoli	57.5	49.4
T. Garhwal	48	48.4
Dehradun	61.2	69.5
Garhwal	56.2	66.4
Pithoragarh	58.1	59
Almora	56.7	58.7
Nainital	46.8	67.9
Average of Region	53.9	59.6
Average of State	38.8	41.6

Literacy rates do not give a complete picture of the infrastructural and administrative capacity of the education system of the region. The educational facilities available, their quality, teacher pupil ratio etc. are the variables which say more about state capacity in the field of education. It is evident from the following table that all the districts of Uttarakhand were better placed in the matter of educational facilities than the rest of Uttar Pradesh.

Table 2.15: Educational Facilities per lakh population									
S.no	Districts	Primary School		Secondary School		Higher Secondary School		Colleges	
		1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
1	Uttarkashi	224.14	56	50.8	25	14.14	25	0.52	14.8
2	Chamoli	194.3	39	34.5	26	18.93	23	0.82	14.8
3	T. Garhwal	172.3	38	37.5	23	15.87	24	0.20	9.3
4	Dehradun	99.2	45	29.9	19	11.42	24	0.92	23.9
5	Garhwal	196.6	41	34.8	20	24.1	26	0.63	12.8
6	Pithoragarh	178.4	34	29.84	24	17.70	27	0.82	15.9
7	Almora	162.67	32	27.7	20	18.35	26	0.66	12.5
8	Nainital	99.8	37	22.1	20	9.59	24	0.35	26.4
	Average of State	65.1	42	12.6	17	1.9	23	0.10	12.5
1 = number, 2 = teacher pupil ratio,									
Source: J. C. Aggarwal, S.P. Agrawal and Shanti Swarup Gupta (1995:24)									

During the 1990s, the growth rate of primary and secondary schools was 11.51 and 24.92 per cent respectively in the region. Thus, 1.65 primary school comes per 1000 of population and 0.64 primary school per village which means that the one school per village objective was yet to be achieved (Nautiyal and Nauriyal, 2001: 350). Another unfortunate fact about the educational facilities of the Uttarakhand region

was that most of the schools and colleges have sanctioned positions of teachers but quite a few of them remain vacant.

It can be said that though the region of Uttarakhand was better placed in comparison to the rest of the Uttar Pradesh in the field of education, vast ground remained to be covered in terms of educational facilities.

Health:

Health is an end as well as a means to achieve other goals. It has been recognized that good health promotes economic growth and social stability, while reducing poverty and income inequality. The Indian Constitution guaranteed the 'right to life' as a basic human right to every citizen of India under Article 21. The government's responsibility concerning public health has also been laid down in Article 47 of the Directive Principles of State Policy.

The health sector in Uttarakhand was confronted with a number of challenges. The region not only had a low record in immunization level of children, the incidence of institutional births is also reported to be low. Though Infant Mortality Rates registered for Uttarakhand were much lower at 41 compared to the all India figures of 63, there is a wide gap in the rural (62) and urban (21) rates (Ghosh, Kar, and Sharma, 2008:76-83) thereby indicating the uneven pattern of development in the health sector. Among other major challenges were the issues related to women's health and nutrition, poor accessibility and availability of health infrastructure and services. The performance of the region in most health indicators is evident from the following table 2.16.

Table 2.16: Health Indicators of the Uttarakhand Region

S.no.	Indicators	Rate
1	Sex Ratio	964
2	Crude Birth Rate	26
3	Crude Death Rate	6.50
4	Infant Mortality Rate	52
5	Total Fertility Rate	3.06
6	Couple Protection Rate	43.1
7	Complete Immunized Children	40.09 %
8	Safe Delivery	51.2
9	Institutional Delivery	18.1
10	Unmet Need for Family Planning	21

Source: Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Uttarakhand

Significant emphasis has also been given in the expansion of medical and health facilities in the region during the past five year plans. The amount of outlay proposed for developing and expansion of medical facility was 65 crores during Eighth Five Year Plan. Number of hospitals and dispensaries per lakh population are much higher (11.81) in Uttarakhand than at state level (4.63) (Mehta, 1999:119). The following table 2.17 explains the district-wise situation of health infrastructure.

Table 2.17: Health Infrastructure as of 1991

S.no	District	No. of Medical Institutes / 10,000 occupied residential houses (in %)	No. of PHC /1,00,000 population (in %)	No. of Hospital Beds / 1,00,000 of population
1	Uttarkashi	9	2.51	85
2	Chamoli	7.83	2.6	94
3	T. Garhwal	6.07	2.53	65
4	Dehradun	5.81	1.27	161
5	Garhwal	8.61	2.01	138
6	Pithoragarh	7.72	1.03	128
7	Almora	6.63	4.78	110
8	Nainital	4.94	4.74	112
	Average of Region	7.07	2.68	111.6
	Average of Undivided UP	2.42	2.28	54

Source: Census of India, 1991.

The above table clearly shows that though the average status of health infrastructure in the region was higher than the state of Uttar Pradesh, there was acute disparity between the districts of the Uttarakhand region. Districts like Uttarkashi, Garhwal, Pithoragarh and Almora stand on the highest side of the continuum, whereas districts like Dehradun and Nainital stand on the lowest side.

The above statistics of health services and infrastructure also shows that though the situation of the region was far better than the undivided state of Uttar Pradesh, there was still a huge gap between the current availability and the required numbers. As per the nationally accepted norms of having one PHC per 20,000 people, the facilities existing in the region were inadequate. There was one PHC for about 28,000 people on an average.

The data shows that the region had large ground to cover in the matter of medical facilities. There is a need to improve health positions to make adequate health services available.

Water and Sanitation:

Water supply and sanitation were included in the national agenda during the first five year planning period (1951-56) and increasing investments have been made in subsequent plans. In 1954, the first national water supply program was launched as a part of the government's health plan (while sanitation is mentioned, it simply forms a part of the section on water supply) (GOI, 2002:19). Central and state administration provided equal funding especially for the rural piped water supply schemes, with limited provision for point sources such as well and boreholes. In the early period, the program had limited success due to the lack of a qualified work force to plan and execute projects.

The primary responsibility of providing safe drinking water and sanitation rests with the State governments under the Constitution of India and following the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments, and the state legislature may give the responsibility and powers to the Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies. At present, states usually plan, design and execute water supply schemes through their State Public Health Engineering Departments and Water Boards.

As far as safe drinking water and sanitation facilities in the region of Uttarakhand are concerned, a significant number of villages lacked this facility within or near the premises of their houses. Although efforts were made to overcome the problem of drinking water through the expansion of the piped water supply program, yet this problem is acute in remote and inaccessible mountain areas. The table 2.18 below explains the status of water and sanitation facilities in Uttarakhand during 1981-1991.

Table 2.18: Availability of Drinking Water and Toilet facilities within the premises during 1981-1991.

S.no	District	1981			1991		
		Total HH	D. Water	Toilet	Total HH	D. Water	Toilet
1	Uttarkashi	37280	4300	1960	47085	10575	8980
2	Chamoli	74590	5080	2965	95155	15490	11025
3	Dehradun	136310	56945	48745	182625	113850	96630
4	Tehri Garhwal	98790	9095	3600	117470	15485	13255
5	Nainital	199370	66145	36920	268430	164625	94885
6	Almora	152820	8685	5375	170925	21060	15120
7	Pithoragarh	99125	4920	4130	117605	19275	11660
8	Garhwal	135095	10315	8000	141530	23540	20215
	Average of the Region	116673	20685	13961.9	142603	47987.5	33971.3

Source: Census of India, 1981 and 1991

The above table shows that the condition of water and sanitation facilities had become better during the 1990s in comparison to the previous decade. However, except for one district, Dehradun, none of the districts of the region had even 30 per cent coverage of households. According to the 1991 Census of India, only two districts, Dehradun and Nainital have 50 percent of the houses getting drinking water facilities in their homes. These are the districts which fall in the plains areas of the region. The inaccessible mountainous areas of these districts also lack the facility of drinking water within their premises.

States' efforts to improve the sanitation system were visible in the region and one can notice an increase in the usage of toilet facilities by 41.74 percent from 1981 to 1991, but the situation of the sanitation system is worse in comparison to the water facility. In Almora and Pithoragarh districts, not even 10 percent households have toilet facilities in their houses. The data also shows that there is a huge disparity between the urban and rural as well as plains and hilly areas of the region. Rural households did not have a sanitation system at all in seven out of eight districts of the region.

The study of all the above sectors – power, health, education, drinking water and sanitation – clearly shows the backward developmental profile of Uttarakhand. However, the region is better off in comparison to the undivided state of Uttar Pradesh.

The Demand for Separate Statehood:

Uttarakhand has had a legacy of struggles, some documented while most have entered the realm of legends and folk songs. Internationally recognized movements like Chipko, the Anti-Dam movement at Tehri, and the movement on the issue of liquor trade, among others, trace their geneses to this region only. The form of protest that was resorted to was known as *Dhandak.* Dhandak usually meant non-cooperation with the officials, not providing *'begar'*[14] and often non- payment of taxes (Guha, 1990: 67).

[14] Begar means labour.

The people of Kumaon and Garhwal had been airing their demand for the recognition of their separate identity from the very first day the British colonized the region[15]. A seminal evidence of that aspiration is found in the charter of demands which is believed to have been presented by Harsh Dev Joshi to the British authorities as a condition for his help to them.

In 1916, the Kumaon Parishad protested against the Kumaon being defined as a 'Scheduled District'. It demanded that a distinct identity for the hill region on geographical and socio-economic grounds should be allowed. The British government, however, took no cognizance of that demand. In 1928, the intellectuals of Kumaon prepared a memorandum for the consideration of Simon Commission, in which they sought the status of hill state for the entire hill region of Kumaon and Garhwal except Tehri State. The Simon Commission did not consider that memorandum on the grounds that Kumaon was a 'Treaty State' and as such out of its purview (Handa, 2002: 215-17). After Independence, for the first time, the Communist Party of India took up the cause for granting autonomy to the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh on linguistic and geographical grounds (Rangan, 2000:167).

Until independence, the hill region of Uttar Pradesh was organized into four districts, namely, Almora, Nainital, Pauri Garhwal and Kingdom of Tehri[16], under two commissioners. The District of Dehradun was under the Commissioner of Meerut. After Independence, in order to ensure better administration of the hilly regions, the larger districts were split into smaller ones under a new administrative division named Uttarakhand Mandal. Thus, three new districts, Uttarkashi, Chamoli and Pithoragarh were created on 24th Feb. 1960.

In December 1968, Uttarakhand Mandal was further split up into two separate mandals – the Kumaon Mandal and the Garhwal Mandal. The Kumaon Mandal included the districts of Almora, Pithoragarh and Nainital. The Garhwal Mandal included Uttarkashi, Chamoli, Tehri Garhwal and Pauri Garhwal. The district of

[15] Not all the districts of Uttarakhand were colonized by the Britishers. As a result of the Treaty of Sagauli signed in 1815, Kumaun and Garhwal were annexed by the British. Garhwal was divided into Eastern Garhwal and Western Garhwal. The former was kept by the British government and the latter was handed over to Sudarshan Sah to form the state of Tehri Garhwal.

[16] Until 1949, the district of Tehri Garhwal was not part of United Province and is a separate Kingdom ruled by Maharaja Narendra Shah. It was in 1949, when the last ruling king Manvendra Shah surrendered to the sovereignty of the Union of India, Tehri was merged under the Garhwal Mandal of United Province (later known as Uttar Pradesh).

Dehradun was also transferred to Garhwal Mandal from Meerut Division in the same year. Thus, by the end of 1968, the hill region was organized into eight districts (Handa, 2002:212-13).

However, the reorganization of districts did not bring any relief to the hill people. The hill districts of Uttar Pradesh continued to be treated at par with the rest of the districts in the plains notwithstanding the stark facts of economic disparity and the harsh living conditions of the mountainous terrain.

In the late 1970s, when the Janata Party formed governments in both Delhi and UP from 1977-80, the Janata Party Member of Parliament (MP) Trepan Singh Negi led a campaign for statehood for the region and sought to reach out particularly to the residents of Uttarakhand who were now living outside the hills (Tillin, 2013: 100). After this, many regional parties came and vanished, people held rallies, protest marches and demonstrations for the separate hill state but nothing came of this.

In 1979, the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD) was formed. The party aimed at liberating illegally occupied central Terai land from outsiders. The party representatives met with Indira Gandhi to state their demands. While the demand was not rejected outright, further discussions of the subject were indefinitely postponed by the Congress (I) government in Uttar Pradesh. UKD raised the same demand for separate state in the Assembly elections of UP in 1980 (Kumar, 1998:85; Rangan, 2000:167). The sole concession made by the UP government during the mid 1980s was to create a new state agency called the Hill Development Agency which was to be responsible for planning and providing financial assistance for regional development.

Between 1985 and 1994, almost all the national political parties supported the idea of separate statehood for Uttarakhand by including the creation of Uttarakhand in their manifestos, but only two parties ever went beyond passing resolutions in its favor. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) supported the demand for separate hill state during 1991 and 1993 elections of UP but did little more than changing the name of the Hill Development Agency to Uttaranchal Development Department when it assumed control of the state legislature.

In 1993, a coalition government in UP formed by Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) supported the formation of Uttarakhand and commissioned two reports which examined some of the details and practicalities of statehood for the region. But the coalition government proceeded to alienate itself from regional political groups and alliances when it proposed a 27 per cent increase in the number of government jobs reserved for Other Backward Caste (OBC) across UP (Rangan, 2000:167-69).

The announcement of 27 percent reservation in jobs by the Mulayam Singh government of Uttar Pradesh did not evoke much resentment in the hills. However, the reservation in educational institutions evoked anger and resentment leading to a strong Uttarakhand movement. The anti-reservation movement was started on August 2, 1994 with a fast unto death by seven leaders of UKD in Pauri district. The violence broke out and spread from Pauri to Kumaon and then to the Nainital foothills, when police applied force to end the fast. The OBCs constitute only 2-5 percent population of the UP hills. The percentage of SC, ST and OBC population does not exceed 25 percent in the area whereas the total reserved seats for them in educational institutions according to the new announcement were 50 percent. Thus, there was fear of heavy influx of the students from the plains. The people feared that they would find it difficult to get the educational facilities for their children (Kumar, 1998:85; Tillin, 2013).

The agitation and public resentment gradually gathered momentum and the situation changed drastically after September 1, 1994. On September 1, 1994, the police fired on the peaceful gathering of the people at Khatima, killing seven people. Next day, the police fired on the people who were agitated by the Khatima firing, at Mussoorie. The callous attitude of the UP government and the ominous silence of the Central leadership further fuelled the agitation. The climax of atrocities on the people reached on the night of October 1, 1994, when the police unleashed a reign of terror at Narsan (Hardwar) and Rampur Tiraha (Muzaffar Nagar) by impounding the vehicles carrying demonstrators. Many of them were brutally killed.

Again, at the Shriyantra Island in the Alaknanda near Srinagar (Garhwal), at least three hunger strikers who were on fast unto death for statehood, lost their lives in the

currents of the river on November 10, 1995, when police tried to disperse the hunger strikers (Handa, 2002: 218; Mawdsley, 1996:206).

Soon the political parties infiltrated into the movement and engulfed the whole of it with confusion. The political leaders of different parties, in order to dominate over their rivals, indulged in sabotaging the movement. The BJP and the Socialist party favored statehood for Uttarakhand. The Congress (I) neither opposed it nor favored it. The Congress (I) initially wanted to sell the idea of an Autonomous Council but there were no takers for this, so it later came to favor the status of Union Territory for Uttarakhand (Kumar, 1998:86; Handa, 2002).

In all this, the movement of the people seemed to lose its moorings. Nevertheless, the massacre of Narsan and Rampur Tiraha had created such an overwhelming impact on the governments both at Lucknow and New Delhi that they were left with little choice but to submit to popular mandate. Therefore, the UP government passed a resolution for the creation of a separate hill state. The Lok Sabha passed a bill for the creation of a new hill state out of UP and the Rajya Sabha approved that bill on August 10, 2000. The bill received the assent of the President of India on August 28, 2000. With that the new hill state of Uttarakhand was born (Handa, 2002:220).

Chapter 3

A Case Study of Jharkhand

Jharkhand – the 28th state of India was formed out of Southern Bihar through Bihar Reorganization Act on 15 November 2000. The state shares its borders with the states of Bihar to the north, Uttar Pradesh and Chattisgarh to the west, Odisha to the south and West Bengal to the east. The state is spread over an area of about 79,714 Sq.km. Jharkhand is comprised of 24 districts, namely, Bokaro, Chatra, Deoghar, Dhanbad, Dumka, Garhwa, Gumla, Giridih, Godda, Hazaribagh, Jamtara, Koderma, Khunti, Latehar, Lohardaga, Palamu, Pakur, Purbi Singhbhum, Paschimi Singhbhum, Ramgarh, Ranchi, Simdega, Saraikela-Kharsawan, Sahibganj. These 24 districts are divided into five administrative divisions: South Chotanagpur- Ranchi, Palamu, North Chotanagpur - Hazaribagh, Santhal Parganas, West Singhbhum- Chaibasa. The state has a total of 211 blocks, 32615 villages and 4562 panchayats (Statistical Profile of Jharkhand). Jharkhand has a population of 32.96 million, consisting of 16.93 million males and 16.03 million females. With 3.5 per cent of the population of India, it is the 13th most populated state of the country. The sex ratio is 947 females to 1000 males. The population consists of 28 per cent Scheduled Tribe, 12 per cent Scheduled Caste and 60 per cent others. The density of population per Sq.km. is about 414 which is above the national average by 30 points. The density of population varies from as high as 1167 per sq.km. in the district of Dhanbad to as low as 148 per sq.km. in the district of Gumla (Census of India: 2011).

After separation from the parent state of Bihar, the Jharkhand government followed an integrationist policy with a developmental model premised on industrialization and a rationally organized bureaucracy as the delivery mechanism for public policy. The developmental structure of the state is led by the District Collector, whose office comprises all major departments including police, education, statistics, rural development, panchayati raj, public supply, public information office etc. except health. The health department is located in the district government hospital, headed by a Civil Surgeon. A similar set up with departments being merged into health, education and development is led by the Block Development Officer (BDO) at the block level. The Police Station is usually situated nearby.

However, the real institutions involved in the practice of delivering welfare policies are located at the village level, mostly run by para-statal officials like para-teachers, para-health workers, panchayat sevaks and rozgaar sevaks. These officials are

associated with the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) which carry out the developmental work.

This study is premised on the assumption that administrative and infrastructural capacity can contribute a lot to the socio-economic development and transformation of a state. These capacities play a significant role in the success or failure of development efforts. The requirement for administrative and infrastructural capacity has been felt greater to solve complex problems and to implement developmental plans and programs. Therefore, this chapter will analyze the development profile of Jharkhand state by focusing on the administrative and infrastructural capacities of this state. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will focus on administrative capacity. This section will aim to unpack the issue of administrative capacity of the state by considering four factors: first, the regime or the leadership which governs the state; second, the trends in bureaucracy; third, the incidence of corruption and fourth, the ability to spend allocated funds. The second section of the chapter will describe the infrastructural capacity of Jharkhand. This section will focus on the developmental status of the social and physical infrastructure of the state of Jharkhand in comparison to India and the inter-district picture of infrastructural capacity at the state level. Social infrastructure will include the infrastructure of the education and health sector whereas physical infrastructure will include utilities such as roads, electricity, drinking water and sanitation.

The Administrative Capacity:

Administrative capacities of a state can be assessed according to their (a) Process, (b) Purpose, (c) Structures and Institutions and (d) Environment (Caiden: 1973). As stated before, for the purpose of this study, administrative capacity is defined as a combination of the capabilities of the bureaucracy and the leadership to perform those tasks that need to be performed by the administration. Therefore, this section will evaluate the issue of administrative capacities of Jharkhand state by considering three factors: first, the regime or the leadership which governs the state; second, the trends in bureaucracy; and third, the incidence of corruption.

The Regime / Leadership

Jharkhand has always seen active politics whether in the tribal revolts such as Great Kol insurrection (1831-32), the Santhal rebellion (1855), or the Birsa Munda revolt (1895-1900) against the modern administrative system and new land relations; in articulating a proto Jharkhandi identity against British colonial rule[17] or the establishment of Adivasi Mahasabha[18] in 1938 for separate province of Jharkhand, or indeed the Jharkhand Movement under the leadership of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and Marxist Co-ordination Committee (MCOR) in 1970s[19].

The energetic, even volatile, politics of this region have continued even after its inception as a separate state of India in November 2000. Ever since the state was carved out Bihar, Jharkhand has never been politically stable and has seen ten chief ministers and three terms of President's rule. The leadership of the state has been totally clueless on how to put the state on the path of development.

The electoral system of the state is divided between the assembly and parliamentary constituencies. Jharkhand is represented by 14 seats in the Lok Sabha and 6 seats in the Rajya Sabha. The state Legislative Assembly consists of 82 seats and in each of these many national and regional political parties vie for power. It is quite significant that Jharkhand has a huge number of political parties in comparison to Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, though the state has largely witnessed a battle of power involving the two national parties – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress, as well as the state party, JMM.

[17] The leaders in the tribal areas of Bihar employed a version of local history, glorified the tribal revolts and utilized the uniqueness of tribal heritage to engender a process of such autonomous forms of imagination of community that soon started to desire political recognition. Proto Jharkhandi identity was articulated in the early 1930s in a memorandum to the Simon Commission (Prakash 2001:50).

[18] Adivasi Mahasabha was established to create a pan tribal solidarity to solve tribal problems. The main aim of this organization was to fight the Diku Raj (Rule of Outsiders) in order to improve the socio economic and political conditions of the tribal people and creation of a separate province of Jharkhand. Later, in 1949-50 Jamshedpur Session, organization was renamed as Jharkhand Party and it extended its membership to the non-tribal population of the region as well (Sachchidananda 1972:175; Vidyarthi and Sahay 1976:158).

[19] At the end of 1960s and in early 1970s Left politics entered on to the stage of Jharkhandi politics. Under the leadership of Binod Bihari Mahto a social reform organization called Shivaji Samaj forged an alliance with the Santhal population of the area which came to be known as the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. In neighboring West Bengal, the influence of the Left parties had grown and A.K.Roy and I.H.Khan wanted the communities of the Jharkhand region to join the struggle. The Marxist Co-ordination Committee (MCOR) headed by A.K.Roy also supported the JMM. Hence, the Jharkhand Movement became successful under the leadership of JMM and MCOR (Singh 1977:329).

Assembly Elections were not held in the state after its creation. By virtue of its majority in the new assembly, the alliance of BJP and Samata Party was asked to form a government. Therefore, the BJP led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) under the leadership of Babulal Marandi formed the first government in Jharkhand[20]. Marandi is believed to have initiated several developmental projects in the state like constructing buildings and strengthening the road network but his tenure does not last long. In the year 2003, the erstwhile Samata Party and Vananchal Congress rebelled against Babulal Marandi. The Samata Party's Lalchand Mahto wanted Chief Minister Marandi to remove the then Power Board chairman Rajib Ranjan (Dasi: 2013). Because of these minnows, the BJP leadership had to replace Marandi with another tribal leader Arjun Munda (Parvatiyar: 2014). Arjun Munda remained in the office for almost two years (18 March 2003 – 02 March 2005) as the second chief minister of the state. During his regime, Jharkhand got its first Lokayukta in the year 2004. He introduced various welfare schemes and new power plants.

The real challenge for the BJP came with the 2004 Lok Sabha Elections when only Babulal Marandi managed to win one seat for BJP from Kodarma. The rationale behind this fallout was the formidable alliance formed between the JMM, the Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD), the CPI and the Congress. This alliance had Shibu Soren as leader, who is very popular because people of Jharkhand give credit for formation of state to him and the JMM. Second, the support base of BJP appears to have gone down drastically because the BJP has been in power for the last four years but people seemed unhappy with the performance of the state government as there had been deterioration in the supply of basic services. Also, there was a split in the NDA support base because people were in a unique dilemma of leadership between Babulal Marandi and Arjun Munda (Kumar 2005: 346-349).

The same alliance of JMM and Congress challenged the alliance of BJP and JD (U) in the Assembly elections of 2005, though the first Assembly elections of Jharkhand resulted in a hung assembly. Hung assemblies are not unusual in the country but even

[20] When Jharkhand was part of Bihar, BJP had emerged as one of the most powerful political force in the region. The BJP had been winning a majority of the Lok Sabha seats in this region. During the 1996 Lok Sabha Elections, it won 12 of the 14 seats and polled 34 per cent votes; in 1998 though it again won 12 seats, it managed to increase its vote share by 11.5 per cent. The dominance of the BJP in the region continued even in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. The reason behind this dominance was that BJP was the only national party that had promised the state of Jharkhand in its manifesto (Kumar 2005:346; Prakash 2001: 324-327; Election Manifesto of BJP 1991: 3).

a hung assembly normally has one or more political blocs controlling one-third or more of the votes. In the 2005 Assembly elections of Jharkhand, none of the alliances secured even 30 per cent of the vote. The BJP – JD (U) alliance managed a combined vote share of 27.4 per cent and the JMM and Congress alliance received only 26.3 per cent of total vote share. No single party got even one quarter of the votes cast in the state (Yadav and Kumar: 2005).

JMM chief Shibu Soren formed the government and became the third chief minister of Jharkhand. However, it was brief 9 day tenure for him as he was not able to prove his majority on the floor of 81 member assembly. After this Arjun Munda got back to the helm for his second stint. But this tenure of Munda was not as long as the previous one. The BJP's failure to allot a ticket to party leader Madhu Koda despite his being a minister in the previous Marandi and Munda governments became the trigger for another bout of political instability. Koda had contested and won the 2005 assembly polls as an independent. To form a government, the BJP had roped Madhu Koda into Munda's cabinet. However, in 2006, just when things appeared to be smooth, Koda pulled down the Munda government after the latter had not been attentive to his demand for repairing the Haat Ghamaria Road in West Singbhum under his constituency (Dasi: 2013).

Thus, an independent MLA, Madhu Koda, backed by the Congress formed the government and became the fifth Chief Minister of the state. He ruled the state for 23 months and five days but resigned after refusing to take a floor test. In fact, Koda's rule from September 14, 2006 to August 23, 2008 is considered the worst period for the state till date as his regime was only known for the blatant loot of the state. Koda and five of his ministers were charged in corruption cases and sent to jail (Verma: 2014).

Soren took over as chief minister for the second time on August 27, 2008 but his term was again cut short as he had to resign on January 12, 2009 after failing to get membership ofthe assembly following his defeat in the Tamar assembly by-poll. This led to the imposition of President's rule on January 19, 2009. The President's rule remained in force till December 29, 2009.

In the meantime, the state of Jharkhand faced its second Assembly elections – the Assembly elections of 2009. This time also the people of Jharkhand gave a fractured

mandate and a coalition government was formed. But the striking point to be noticed in this election was that arch rivals JMM and BJP- JD (U) along with AJSU formed an alliance against an alliance formed between Congress and Jharkhand Vikas Morcha[21]. Despite a call for boycott by the Maoists in the state, the voter turnout was as high as 57 per cent. Although the BJP was able to form the government, its tally of seats had gone down. The alliance with JD (U) had hardly helped. The poll result was a shock for the BJP – JD (U) alliance as they could manage only a quarter of the state assembly's 81 seats.

The JMM emerged as a formidable force and finally turned out to be kingmaker in this election. But the result indicated that there were issues of concern for the party too. Its limited support base in some districts and the distribution of party's victories suggest a complicated picture. Out of 17 seats it retained only 6, though it added 12 new ones to its pocket. So, the failure of the party to hold on to its previous seats should worry the party leadership.

Shibu Soren, along with BJP, AJSU and Bandhu Tirkey, an independent candidate staked a claim to form the government and submitted letters of support from 42 MLAs to the Governor K. Sankaranarayanan. So he became Chief Minister of the state for the third time and headed the seventh government in Jharkhand in nine years.

However, Soren, who has the distinction of never being a member of the Legislative Assembly but becoming Chief Minister thrice, once again lost power after voting along Congress on April 27, 2010 in a trust vote in the Lok Sabha despite heading a government in which BJP was a major ally.

President's rule was once again imposed in Jharkhand after the BJP predictably withdrew support to Soren. President's rule remained in force till the BJP decided to once again form the government with the same partners, JMM and AJSU, under the leadership of Arjun Munda.

The third tenure of Arjun Munda which started on 11 September 2010 was a very enthusiastic tenure. During this tenure, Jharkhand witnessed considerable development. For the first time, Jharkhand participated in the Panchayat elections. The state assembly conducted the 34th National Games. Many welfare schemes such

[21] JVM is a party formed by Babulal Marandi in 2009 when he disassociated himself from BJP.

as Kanyadaan Yojna, Mukhya Mantri Ladli Laxmi Yojna, Aapka CM, and the Mukhya Mantri Dal Bhaat Yojna[22] were introduced. With a view to bringing transparency and increasing efficiency, his government introduced the e-tender system for government contracts. Many initiatives for setting up new power plants were taken up.

However, he was accused by Opposition parties of being involved in a string of scams especially in giving away projects to companies without following the proper procedure of passing tenders. He was also accused of granting special favors to the Abhijeet Group through which the coal scam tainted company was able to set up a 25 million tonne per annum integrated steel plant at Kharsawa-Saraikela district of Jharkhand.

Munda's third tenure came to an end when the BJP's ruling coalition partner JMM withdrew its support to the 28 month old government pushing it into a minority. JMM decided to withdraw support in the backdrop of conflicting claims about an accord on rotational leadership amongst the members of the coalition (*Economic Times*: 7 Jan. 2013).

The state came under President's rule yet again till the JMM took the support of Congress and RJD to form the government under the leadership of Hemant Soren. Hemant Soren became the ninth Chief Minister of Jharkhand. During this government, many initiatives for the development of various sections of the society were taken; one of them was giving jobs to prominent sports persons hailing from the state. This government lasted till the next elections.

[22] **Kanyadaan Yojna**: Under this scheme one time grant of Rs. 15,000 is given to the girl child of the BPL family at the time of her wedding.
Mukhya Mantri Ladli Laxmi Yojna: As per the scheme, the State government will deposit Rs 6,000 every year into a post office saving account in the name of newly born girl child up to time she is grown to five years. When she enters Class 6, she will get a onetime payment of Rs 2,000; in Class 9 she will get Rs 4,000 and Rs 7,500 in Class 11. The state will provide Rs 200 per month as stipend when she is in Class 12. Besides, the government will provide Rs 60,000 at the time of her marriage. Upon maturity of the scheme, the girl is entitled to get over Rs 1.08 lakh at the age of 21 years. However, there are certain conditions to avail the scheme. The beneficiary family should have only two children, the girl should not get married before she turns 18 or suffer a break in studies till she passes out of school, families annual income should be less than Rs. 72,000.
Mukhya Mantri Dal Bhaat Yojna: Under this scheme, BPL families get dal, bhat and sabji at the rate of Rs 5 per plate at railway stations, bus stands, hospitals and public places.
Aapka CM: Under this scheme the Grievance Management System was established to enable people to communicate directly with their CM and voice their grievances to the State leadership for prompt consideration and redressal.

The third assembly elections for the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly took place in the year 2014. This time, a decisive mandate from the people came to a state which hasd already seen nine governments and three stints of President's rule within 14 years of its formation. Unlike the fractured mandates of the past, the BJP- AJSU alliance secured an absolute majority in the 81member assembly by winning 37 and 5 seats each (*Financial Express*: 23 Dec. 2014). The BJP secured 31.3 per cent of the vote while AJSU got 3.7 per cent. Both in terms of votes polled and seats won, this was the BJPs best performance in the state. The BJP had of course hoped to win many more seats, because it had led in as many as 56 out of 81 segments in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections (Prabhat Khabar: 2014).

However, according to election analysts and the respondents of the field survey, this victory of the BJP in the assembly elections of 2014 was not because of its performance in the state in the last 14 years. According to them, the BJP stood victorious because of several reasons such as absence of united opposition, collapse of Congress and its partners, the JMM ceding ground in Santhal Parganas and large scale defections of JVM legislators. One of the respondents at Katkamsandi Panchayat in Hazaribagh said that, 'had JMM and Congress fought together, the BJPs tally would have been much less. BJP won this election because JMM and Congress alliance did not put up a united front'[23].

This election was disastrous for former chief ministers and tribal candidates of the BJP such as Arjun Munda, Madhu Koda and Babulal Marandi as they all lost the seats they contested. For the first time, a non-tribal person Raghubar Das was made Chief Minister of the state. Since December 28, 2014 he has been the Chief Minister, and under his leadership many developmental initiatives, such as Restructured Accelerated Power Development and Reforms Program, Single Window System for farmers, Babasaheb Ambedkar Awas Yojna, etc. have been proposed and launched.

The analysis of the sixteen year long political journey of Jharkhand indicates certain trends about the political scenario and the administrative capacity of the state due to which the state of Jharkhand is unable to progress and develop the way it was imagined during the movement for separate statehood. First, though the BJPs government's current tenure is yet to come to an end, the experience of past

[23] In a group discussion at a tea stall on 20 February 2015.

governments shows that fractured mandates or coalition governments have been a curse for the development of the Jharkhand. Second, even the major parties like BJP, Congress and JMM cannot rule out fringe players including independent candidates. To be in power these major parties have to consider and value independent candidates and small regional parties MLAs. Third, although all chief ministers, except the present incumbent, Raghubar Das, have always been tribals, the dominance of any regional party consisting of tribals in a majority has never been able to form a government on its own. In addition, none of the tribal leaders has done much for the land they belong to or fought for. Finally, there has been a manifest lack of a strong regional leader who have pan state appeal. Leaders like Shibhu Soren or Babulal Marandi have lost their charm after failing to deliver.

Trends in Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy, that is government officials in their collectivity, constitutes an integral part of any state. In any state, bureaucracy symbolizes the urge for maintenance and continuity of that state and society, and is therefore regarded as an indispensable part of administration. The degree of professionalization of the bureaucracy has been identified as a necessary condition for a state to be developmental and to successfully achieve economic growth (Evans: 1995; Rauch and Evans: 2000). However, in the case of India and its states, the degree of professionalization of bureaucracy is on the declining trend. The impartiality, integrity and dedication of civil services have been impinged (Verma, 1973:66) and involvement of bureaucracy has been politicized.

The nexus between bureaucrats and politicians has jeopardized the impartiality of bureaucrats and it has lost its neutral and anonymous characters. There is also a growing inclination among civil servants to develop unhealthy loyalties around individual ministers with a view to secure suitable placements or advancements in their career (Puri, 2007:241). In case of Jharkhand, the analysis of news dailies and observation of the field surveys show that there is a huge nexus not only between the bureaucrats and politicians but there is a nexus between bureaucrats, politicians, Naxalite[24] outfits, contractors and the representatives of PRIs.

[24]Though quite often people uses the terms Naxalite and Maoist interchangeably, in this study the term Naxalite has been consciously used instead of Maoist because Maoism is a big umbrella of which Naxalism is just a part. Naxalites are left-wing radicals who follow the political ideology of Mao. Naxalites do have an armed wing but they do not use this indiscriminately, while the existence of the

During fieldwork in the district of Lohardaga[25], a school teacher explains the relationship between the politicians, bureaucrats, Naxalite outfits and PRIs, and the situation of the state of Jharkhand as "Draupadi" who the five husbands take turns to use for their pleasure.

One of the respondents at the District Office of Hazaribagh further explains the nexus between the bureaucrats, contractors/ businessman and politicians by quoting examples of raids done by Central Bureau of Investigation and Income Tax Department at the residence of two senior government officials and a contractor on the basis of a complaint that both officials had property disproportionate to their known sources of income, in the year 2009. He stated that "the raids done by CBI at the residences of IAS officers Avinash Kumar and Rajesh Kumar, and a Ranchi based contractor Sanjiv Singh, exposes the extent of wheeling-dealing between the politicians, businessmen and the bureaucrats because these are the Officers who were brought in by the Governor Razi as Officer on Special Duty and Private Secretary. During these raids, CBI unearthed valuables and property deeds worth several crores". He also said that "the Income Tax department had seized fixed deposit receipts of about 14 crores from the Ranchi residence of Manoj Kumar Singh, Private Secretary of former Jharkhand minister Chandra Prakash Chaudhary"[26].

Observations made during fieldwork also indicate that the developmental funds which are being pumped into the districts are channelized at the grassroots level through a complex network of politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats and Naxalite organisations. The respondents from the districts agreed and attested to the fact that Naxalite levies run parallel with bureaucratic bribes in drawing and diverting the developmental funds that are being pumped into the system. One of the respondents, an ordinary villager in Katkamsandi Block, Hazaribagh pointed out that, "Naxalite outfits seek levies only from those contracts in which even senior government officials have asked

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Maoists primarily depends on their armed militia (Srivastav: 2008). Second, though both Maoists and Naxalites support the annihilation of class, Naxalites are sometimes also driven by caste related tensions (Bhatia: 2005). In the case of Jharkhand, the study finds the presence of Naxalites who resort to armed action, but also believe in participating in parliamentary processes of governance and are driven by the caste factor.

[25] In a group discussion conducted during field survey in February 2015.

[26] Personal interview conducted in February 2015. These examples were also verified through news daily's like Business Standard, India Today etc.

for bribes[27]". The other respondents from Kisko block, Lohardaga too argued that "there is not even a single contract of construction in which levy has not been paid[28]".

At the same time with the rise of multiple Naxalite factions, there is a rise in competing demands for levies; which have increased the cost of operation for contractors. As a result, there are a lot of tenders, especially for roads, that have been called for several times by government but nobody is interested due to the ongoing turf war in the region. At the same time, once the Naxalites received their levies and bureaucrats their bribes, they relieve the contractor of all burdens of accountability vis-a-vis the quality of the project undertaken, or in terms of the specifications and materials used.

A respondent told us that "funds under various schemes do not reach the village level because the funds for the projects are eaten up by the bureaucrats at the district and block level and by the members of the panchayats. When the inquiry committee comes, its members are also given their share from those funds so that a positive report should be sent. For example, a project of Rs. 5 crore and 40 lacs under MNREGA to grow plants was approved for a village in Dhotwa Panchayat, Hazaribagh but not even a single plant was grown at the site though the fund got completely used up."[29]

Bureaucracy in the state of Jharkhand is thus by and large politicized. There is constant interplay of various pulls and pressures from the social and political forces due to which bureaucracy in Jharkhand has not remained impartial and committed.

The decline of bureaucracy in Jharkhand has also been aggravated due to frequent transfers of bureaucrats. Transfers at the top positions are the most effective method used by politicians in power to deal with inconvenient officers and to replace them with their own supporters. The average tenure of a District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner, Superintendent of Police and other higher officers is rarely more than a few months. On the one hand, the presence of Naxalite outfits became the pretext for the already understaffed bureaucracy in these areas to establish absenteeism as a norm. On the other hand, transfers of top managers of bureaucracy as per the

[27] Interview conducted during Fieldwork in 2015.
[28]Interview conducted during fieldwork in 2015.
[29] In a group discussion conducted in February 2013.

requirements of big industrialists or business houses have also become the norm. One of the respondents informed us that if a senior bureaucrat, especially the District Collector, tries to raise his/her voice in the favor of people and against the business houses; s/he gets transferred from one place to another, particularly to the area more affected by Naxalite. He said, "Nobody can dare to raise their voice against HINDALCO. Those who try to raise their voice get transferred for sure[30]".

A news item in the *Business Standard* in December 2008 reported that the Jharkhand government transferred over 200 IAS officers and engineers since JMM chief Shibu Soren became Chief Minister in August 2008. The same news reported that three IAS officers "N.N.Sinha, A.P.Singh and Puja Singhal were shifted from senior duty posts several times within days and months".(Ref?) Another news daily reported that in the one and half month of President's rule, at least 32 IAS officers have been transferred. The Deputy Commissioners of seven districts have also been changed. More than 42 Deputy Superintendents of Police and over 130 grade B services officers have been transferred during President's rule in 2010 (IANS: 2010).

Along with frequent transfers the under-staffed bureaucracy creates more obstacles in the path of development for Jharkhand. The top bureaucrats are over-burdened because they have to handle more than one key department. Certain departments do not have full time directors and officials are holding additional charge for the cabinet, planning and finance, power, environment, water resources, IT departments, etc.

One of the respondents informed that although the number of government departments has been reduced from 45 to 31, there are examples like Sukhdeo Singh, a bureaucrat with Principal Secretary rank, who is responsible for key departments like Water resources and Forests and Environment, but is given an additional charge of being the Managing Director of Greater Ranchi Development Authority (GRDA). He said there are many officers like him who are over burdened with work which affects the smooth functioning of the administration[31].

In other words, not only does the nexus between bureaucrats, politicians and other forces hamper the development of Jharkhand, but the frequent transfers of bureaucrats

[30] In an Interview conducted during fieldwork in the year 2015 on a request that his and district's name shall not be disclosed .
[31] Interview conducted at Ranchi in February 2015.

and lack of human resource in the bureaucracy are also major causes for the sluggish development of Jharkhand and administrative incapacity.

The Incidence of Corruption:

Corruption is one of the greatest obstacles in the process of economic and social development around the world. It is the term used to refer to the use of public office for private gain, where an official entrusted with carrying out a task by the public engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal (Bardhan: 1997). According to the UNDP, $1 trillion are paid in bribes every year while an estimated $2.6 trillion are stolen annually through corruption – a sum equivalent to more than 5 % of global GDP.

Corruption leads to weak governance which in turn can fuel organized criminal networks and promote crimes (UNODC, n.d.:01). Corruption has adverse effects not just on efficiency but also on investment and growth of a state. The payment of bribes to get benefits from a welfare policy reduces the incentive supposed to be gained by the policy.

During the field survey, most people from the state asserted that with the formation of the separate state of Jharkhand, the incidence of corruption has increased. They argued that with the access to more resources and revenues, the incidence of corruption is no longer confined to big ministers and higher officials but has become a norm even in the newly institutionalized PRIs.

A few respondents discussed the scams in coal and mining scam[32] for which they held ministers responsible. One of them told us about how the politicians openly asked for money for appointing CMDs of public sector undertakings and how certain members of parliament had become "extortionists and black-mailers". He told us about the incident in which ex-ministers Shibu Soren and Dasari Narayan Rao , wanted an

[32] Coal and Mining scam took place in the year 2009 in which the investigative agencies alleged that Madhu Koda took huge bribes for illegally allotting iron ore and coal mining contracts in Jharkhand when he was the Chief Minister of the state. As per their estimates, Koda and his associates collected over Rs. 4000 crores by allotting mines to business houses. For details see, PTI, "Coal Scam: Court orders framing of charges against Madhu Koda, 8 Others", July 14; ET Bureau, "Madhu Koda arrested", December1, 2009; PTI, "Madhu Koda money laundering case: ED attaches assets of ex-min", march 30, 2015.

acting chairman -cum-managing director of Coal India, Shashi Kumar, to pay Rs 50 lakh for his appointment as a regular CMD and Rs 10 lakh as a monthly pay-out[33].

Others, however, expressed their worry about the corruption taking place in the institutions of Panchayati Raj. One of the respondents said that the rates have been fixed by the head of the Panchayats for providing citizens with the benefits of the welfare policies. He said, "every benefit has its value… from registering one's name in the BPL list to getting work in the MNREGA or to avail house under IAY. There is a fixed percentage that one has to pay depending upon how big and valuable the scheme is. If one does not agree to pay the fixed amount, one's form will not be stamped by the Mukhiya which means it will not be processed further at block level"[34]. Other respondents also confirmed the fact.

As per a news report, the arrests of government officials made in 2015 (till July) were the highest in the history of the state. In 2014, 26 government officials were arrested for bribery while 22 were arrested in 2013, when the state was under President's rule (Mishra: 2015).

While explaining the severity of the situation, one of the respondents who is a businessman in Ranchi, said that corruption is most rampant around land issues. Due to restrictions on the transfer of tribal land, Jharkhand has limited supply of free-hold land. This, coupled with a lack of clarity in land records, makes things gloomy and land deals risky. He said that "recently he came face-to-face with 11 owners for the same piece of land in Ranchi".

In short, the fieldwork shows that corruption represents a major hindrance to the government's ability to meet the basic needs of its citizens.

The Ability to Spend Allocated Funds:

The relevance of administrative capacity as a determinant variable for development is based on the positive relationship between the resources utilized, programmes implemented and the outcomes. The administrative capacity of an organization or an institution can be assessed by one's ability to implement the resources to generate

[33] This was confirmed with the newspaper reports published in various dailies. ET Bureau, "Ex- Coal Minister asked for money for CMD post: PC Parakh, former coal secretary", April 15, 2014.
[34] In interview conducted during field survey in the year 2013.

desired results. Implementation is defined as the 'operational process needed to produce expected outcomes' (Milio, 2007: 430). The implementation capability can be assessed in two ways: First, quantitative implementation which means the ability to spend the allocated resources within the due time period. Second is qualitative implementation which means the ability to invest resources in 'good' projects.

This section will focus on the first aspect, i.e., quantitative implementation because resources not spent are lost and can have an adverse impact on society, which sees it as failure of government. Secondly, the future allocation of funds is determined, among other factors, on the basis of spending capacity. A state that does not spend its allocation risks losing funding and opportunities to foster regional development. The fiscal situation of the state has been studied to evaluate the administrative capacity.

The overall fiscal scenario of the state of Jharkhand has improved in recent years. The Gross Fiscal Deficit (GFD[35]) has come down from its peak level of Rs. 5,603 crores in 2005-06 to Rs. 3406.44 crores in 2012-13. However, between 2006-07 and 2011-12, it was at the lowest level of Rs. 910.53 crores and Rs. 1,925.17 crores respectively. As a proportion of the state's Gross State Domestic Product, the fiscal deficit[36] decreased from a peak of 9.2 percent in 2005-06 to 2.10 percent in 2012- 13. The revenue deficit[37] has also improved from a deficit of 0.53 percent in 2004 -05 to reach a surplus of 0.84 percent in 2012 -13.

[35] GFD is the difference between the government's expenditure and its revenues excluding the borrowings, over a time period.

[36] Fiscal Deficit is the difference between the government's expenditure and its revenues excluding the borrowings.

[37] Revenue Deficit is when the net amount received falls short of the projected net amount to be received. This occurs when the actual amount of revenue received and the actual amount of expenditures do not correspond with predicted revenue and expenditure figures.

The overall fiscal trends for the state of Jharkhand are shown in the following table:

Table 3.1: Fiscal Trends for the state of Jharkhand from 2004 – 2013									
Heads	2004- 2005	2005-2006	2006 - 2007	2007 - 2008	2008 - 2009	2009 - 2010	2010 - 2011	2011 - 2012	2012 - 2013
Total Revenue Receipts	6660.51	8463.88	10009.82	12026.55	13212.88	15118.46	18781.12	22419.45	24769.56
Total Expenditure	8886.13	14076.69	10936.09	14013.18	16346.37	18151.26	20916.60	24368.05	28219.11
Revenue Deficit	-315.40	-26.94	945.88	1194.58	335.99	-9.77	836.39	1427.87	1369.69
As % of GSDP	-0.53	-0.04	1.41	1.42	0.38	-0.01	0.66	1.00	0.84
Fiscal Deficit	-2218.04	-5603.00	-910.52	-1942.41	-3114.58	-3011.00	-2111.36	-1925.18	-3406.44
As % of GSDP	-3.71	-9.20	-1.36	-2.31	-3.55	-2.99	-1.66	-1.35	-2.10
GSDP (at current prices)	59757.72	60900.54	66934.75	83949.59	87793.93	10062069	127281.05	142164.58	162557
Source:	Planning Commission								

The above table indicates that the fiscal situation of the state has improved since 2008-09. The total expenditure has remained more than the total income. But an examination of sectoral outlays for different time periods shows that the funds allocated for a particular sector have been not utilized completely. The improper utilization of funds indicates a deficit in the administrative capacity of the state. The table 3.2 below shows the trends of failure in utilization of funds:

Table 3.2: Sectoral Outlays for different Time Periods								
Sectors	2002		2005		2008		2011	
	A.O.	A.E.	A.O.	A.E.	A.O.	A.E.	A.O.	A.E.
Agriculture and Allied Activities	15280	13101.65	22790	20333.64	37600	28349.34	58450.54	64938
Rural Development	62892	141896.40	76423.31	95540.52	90500	1028820.39	170145	173645
Special Area Program	0	0	26429	30075	33050	52200.86	102555	109745
Irrigation and Flood Control	36000	23472.71	45000	36455.35	60000	40230.53	155500	70500
Energy	15000	14232	41500	41250.99	70000	29985.78	160000	40000
Industry and Mineral	11475	1075	10000	10355.78	20000	9742.14	19400	17400
Transport	22204	17500	45000	33407.91	91000	67604	221500	147500
Communication	0	671.87	5000	0	0	0	0	0
Science and Technology	6000	2429	3000		22140	15488.38	17400.16	14400-16
General Economic Services	3572	2309	9142	10415	3486	23656.70	86080.30	126235.84
Social Services	83336	56017.61	148273.69	111381.91	305695	295997.73	518644	434841
General Services	9435	6960	18454	11533.22		20540.76	22600	24070
Total	265194	279665	451012	407913.22		686616.61	1532275	1223275
Source: Planning Commission								

The data in the above table shows that in none of the time periods have the funds allocated for the respective sectors been utilized completely. In most of the sectors, the funds are underutilized. For some sectors such as energy, science and technology, irrigation and flood control, not even 50 percent of the funds allocated have been utilized. This clearly shows the lack of implementational capabilities in the administration of Jharkhand.

Infrastructural Capacity

Infrastructural capacity is one aspect of the state which determines how deep its bureaucracy can reach to exert control and regulate social relations within its territory through collective action of its institutions. For purposes of this study, it is defined as the ability of the state to provide physical and social infrastructure to its citizens. The focus has been on physical and social infrastructure because this not only helps in raising the level of well-being of citizens, but also contributes and promotes the economic development of the state by increasing the factor productivity in the production process. The main categories of physical and social infrastructure which are assessed in this study are Roads, Power, Water and Sanitation, Education and Health.

Social Infrastructure:

Education:

Education increases the capacity of people to realize their vision of society into operational reality, enabling them to become self-motivating agents for social change and serving the best interests of the community (Pailwar and Mahajan: 2005). Therefore, education is considered a primary agent of transformation towards development. In the state of Jharkhand, the credit for the progress of education goes to the missionaries, as the early history of the educational movement in Chota Nagpur and Santhal Parganas was launched by Christian Missionaries.

Literacy is one of the most basic parameters for the success of the democratic system of governance. But, in Jharkhand, education statistics depict a very poor situation, particularly in terms of primary education. The literacy rate of the state is 67.73 per

cent in comparison to the national average of 74 per cent. There exist huge disparities with respect to gender inequality (male – 76.84%, female – 52.04%), caste inequality (SCs – 37.5%, STs – 40.6% and Minority – 43.8%) and spatial inequality (Godda, Pakur, Sahibganj, Paschimi Singhbhum are districts with less than 50 per cent literacy rate) being the most distressing (Census of India: 2011).

The data compiled by DISE (2013-14) shows that there are 27,747 primary schools in Jharkhand, which is just 1.9 % of the total number of primary schools at all-India level and serves only 85.84 per cent of villages of Jharkhand. There are 1,448,712 primary schools at the all-India level. There are still 14 per cent of villages in Jharkhand which do not have access to primary education.

The quality of existing facilities in schools is in a dire state. Out of 27, 747 primary schools in the state only 82.38 percent schools are running in *pucca* buildings, and 35 per cent of these are in a dilapidated state, with 1.3 percent schools having only a single classroom, 13 per cent being without toilet facility, 18 per cent without a girls' toilet, 12 percent schools without drinking water facility and only 4.9 per cent schools electrified.

Availability of teachers has remained a key issue with teacher absenteeism at 25 percent in the state. In many districts, the share of single teacher schools is as high as 40 per cent. Also the share of female teachers in the total teacher workforce is just 30.02 percent which has severely impacted the female literacy figures in the state.

The following table 3.3 shows the inter-district picture of infrastructural facility in the education sector in the state of Jharkhand.

Table 3.3: District wise Educational Infrastructure in Jharkhand
(at Primary Level as on 31 March 2013)

S.no	District	Lit R*	T. Schl	SwSC (in %)	SwST (in %)	SwT (in %)	SwGT (in %)	SwDW (in %)	SwE (in %)
1	Bokaro	73.5	1347	0.7	13.6	73.1	81.7	94.7	8.1
2	Chatra	62.1	1227	0.4	11.7	79.1	80.7	92	2.5
3	Deoghar	66.3	1496	0.1	20.9	60.5	65.9	90.8	4.5
4	Dhanbad	75.7	1309	1.6	18.8	99.5	99.3	85.6	10.5
5	Dumka	62.5	1759	1.6	25.1	90.1	90.2	92	3.2
6	Garhwa	62.2	1089	0.1	30.9	98	99.3	100	1.5
7	Giridih	65.1	2241	0.4	13.3	88.4	85.8	92.9	3.5

8	Godda	57.7	1134	2.5	31.1	82.5	91.4	75.7	2.3
9	Gumla	66.9	1259	1.9	21.4	92.2	92.4	86.8	3.3
10	Hazaribagh	70.5	1044	0	7.6	61.1	60	90	5.3
11	Jamtara	63.7	766	0.1	21.4	99.9	99.9	99	11.4
12	Khunti	64.5	730	1.1	33.7	81.4	82.3	81.5	3.4
13	Kodarma	68.4	465	0	15.5	76.9	83.2	84.9	2.4
14	Latehar	61.2	877	0.1	23.4	98.3	98.6	84.6	2.4
15	Lohardaga	68.3	458	0	19.9	95.2	98.7	85.6	2.4
16	Pakur	50	641	4.8	19.3	99.7	100	85.5	5.1
17	Palamu	66.5	1395	0.9	19.6	72.2	81.9	87.8	2.6
18	Paschimi Singhbhum	59.5	1669	1.4	40.1	61.6	61.2	82.4	3
19	Purbi Singhbhum	76.1	1473	2.1	22.7	87.4	89.5	91.4	8.4
20	Ramgarh	73.9	498	0.8	18.3	73.1	70.8	92.6	11.6
21	Ranchi	77.1	1907	3.1	29.8	96.9	96.7	91.8	8.9
22	Sahibganj	53.7	1041	1.3	33.3	78.2	77.2	77.5	2.8
23	Saraikela	68.9	1167	3.3	29.1	98.9	99	89.1	4.7
24	Simdega	67.6	755	0.7	25.7	75	68.5	81.7	2.6
Source: District Report Card 2013-14, DISE									
*For details of the Heads of Column, see the list of Abbreviations.									

The analysis of the above data reveals that the development picture of the infrastructure in education sector among the districts of Jharkhand is uneven and highly imbalanced. There are certain districts like Bokaro (216.90%) and Dhanbad (116.77%) where hundred percent villages have access to primary schools, as opposed to districts like Dumka (47.06%) and Garhwa (22.02%) where primary schools have less than fifty percent coverage. Similarly, the institutions offering education are concentrated in one or two cities like Bokaro, Giridih, Ranchi, Paschimi and Purbi Singhbhum.

The data also shows that though the state claims that the region has progressed a lot after the attainment of separate statehood, it still has vast ground to cover in terms of infrastructure. There is not even a single district out of the 24 districts of Jharkhand in which school buildings have cent percent access to toilet facility, drinking water and electricity. There are districts such as Hazaribagh and Deoghar where the rate of schools without toilets is as high as 40 per cent. None of the districts have more than 13 percent schools with access to electricity.

Health:

Primary health care is defined as 'essential health care universally accessible to all citizens and at a cost that the community and country can afford' (WHO: 1978). The delivery of primary health care is the foundation of the rural health care system and forms an integral part of the national health system. Although 70 per cent of the rural population is aware of the existence of PHCs and SHCs, only a third of them utilize the same and are in any case dissatisfied with the quality of inputs and services (Bhargava and Sahu: 2013). Health infrastructure is an important indicator to understand the healthcare delivery provisions and mechanisms in a state. Health infrastructure includes details of allopathic hospitals, hospital beds, SHCs, PHCs, CHCs, blood banks, eye banks, mental hospitals and cancer hospitals.

To provide healthcare services to the people, the government in Jharkhand has launched various health schemes, projects and programs such as Janani Suraksha Yojana[38], Jannani Shishu Suraksha Karyakarm[39], Mukhya Mantri Janani Swasth Suraksha[40], and Mamta Vahan Scheme[41] to make healthcare amenities and medical facilities available to its population. Yet it has not been able to come at par with the national average on health indicators, which is clearly depicted in the following table.

Table 3.4: Comparison between health indicators of Jharkhand and India

S. no	Health Indicator	Jharkhand	India
1	Crude Birth Rate	24.6%	21%
2	Infant Mortality Rate	41	47
3	Maternal Mortality Rate	261	212
4	Total Fertility Rate	3%	2.4%

Source: Jharkhand Factsheet 2014

[38] Janani Suraksha Yojana is a scheme implemented under the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), for the pregnant women living in villages as well as in urban areas. The main objective of this scheme is to reduce the maternal and neonatal mortality rate, by promoting institutional delivery. Women in urban areas are given Rs. 1000, while those in rural areas are given Rs. 1400 if they go for institutional delivery.

[39] Jannani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram is a scheme which provides medical checkups, diet care, treatment, travelling facilities from home to hospital and back and also free of cost delivery to the Pregnant women.

[40] Mukhya Mantri Janani Swasth Suraksha is a scheme which provides economic assistance to expectant mothers at the time of giving birth. This program is launched by the district administration in collaboration with several private hospitals, clinics and nursing homes in the state. This scheme has helped improve significantly the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) in rural areas of Jharkhand.

[41] Mamta Vahan Scheme was launched to decrease mortality rate of women and new born babies. In this scheme arrangements are made to refer them and bring them to health centres free of cost. This scheme is run under PPP (Public Private Partnership) mode.

Malnutrition and vaccination are two key indicators which show the degree to which health awareness and preventive measures have been successful. Based on these indicators, a comparison of Jharkhand with other states and the national average shows the sorry state of Jharkhand. 50% of children under 3 years of age in Jharkhand are underweight, the 2nd highest in India. 70% of women in the state are anemic, highest among all states in India. The national average is 56%. The percentage of children aged between 1-2 years who have been fully immunized in Jharkhand is 34% i.e. among the lowest in country (Census of India, 2011).

Apart from a lack of awareness of healthy practices, the availability of healthcare facilities in the state is worse in comparison to national average. Jharkhand currently has 3958 SHCs, 330 PHCs, and 188 CHCs against 151684 SHCs, 24448 PHCs and 5187 CHCs in India. The numbers of SHCs, CHCs are comparable to other states in India but the number of PHCs is markedly low.

The following table 3.5 shows the inter-district condition of healthcare infrastructure in Jharkhand.

Table 3.5: District Wise Health Infrastructure of Jharkhand (as on 31 March 2014)

S.no	District	SHCs	PHCs	CHCs	Sub-Divisional Hospitals	District Hospitals
1	Bokaro	116	16	08	03	1
2	Chatra	93	11	06	0	1
3	Deoghar	181	5	07	01	1
4	Dhanbad	141	28	08	0	1
5	Dumka	258	36	10	0	1
6	Garhwa	132	12	07	01	1
7	Giridih	181	15	12	0	1
8	Godda	185	10	07	0	1
9	Gumla	242	13	11	0	1
10	Hazaribagh	146	14	10	0	1
11	Jamtara	132	15	04	0	1
12	Khunti	108	04	06	0	1
13	Kodarma	65	06	04	0	1
14	Latehar	97	10	07	0	1
15	Lohardaga	73	10	05	0	1
16	Pakur	121	09	06	0	1
17	Palamu	171	21	08	02	1
18	Paschimi Singhbhum	342	15	15	01	1

19	Purbi Singhbhum	244	18	9	0	1
20	Ramgarh	54	05	04	0	1
21	Ranchi	365	28	13	01	1
22	Sahibganj	155	10	06	01	1
23	Saraikela	194	12	08	0	1
24	Simdega	162	07	07	0	1
	Total	3958	330	188	10	24
Source: Rural Health Statistics, 2014						

The data above clearly shows the shortfall, the rural-urban divide and spatial inequality in the positioning of health centers within the districts of the state.

With population norm for setting up of PHCs as 30,000 people per PHC, the state required 1098 PHCs in 2013 as against the existing 330, a shortfall of 70 percent. Similarly, there is a shortfall of CHCs (only 19.41 percent exists and short of around 80 percent) and SHCs (60 percent are in position, which is a shortfall of 40 percent).

There are districts like Dumka, Godda, Gumla, Lohardaga, Paschimi Singhbhum where the health infrastructure is in more than the required numbers but, on the other hand, in districts like Giridih, Bokaro, Dhanbad, Hazaribagh, Palamu, Purbi Singhbhum, Ranchi, Simdega, there is a scarcity of these facilities.

Another problem in the health sector is that only 57.5 percent health centers are located in government buildings. A large majority of health centers lack the basic infrastructure of electricity, water and toilets. According to the survey, only 87 percent CHCs have functional Operation Theaters.

Inadequacy and lack of functional infrastructure was also identified by a respondent during field survey in the Kisko Block, Lohardaga district when, pointing towards a building structure he said, “have a look at this building, this is the health centre of our area. In the last five years, we have not seen any doctor or ANM coming to this centre. None of us have been able to get treatment from this health centre. What we have got to witness here is the construction and deconstruction of this building. For treatment of even minor illnesses we have to rush to the district hospital. This is what

we have received from separate statehood. This is what we have achieved in the name of the development."[42]

Roads:

Road connectivity and access to important social and economic centers is considered to be a key component of rural development. 'Rural roads act as ambassadors between the villages and towns' (Arasu, 2008:164). Road infrastructure provides a fundamental foundation to the performance of national economies; therefore, its importance cannot be belittled.

The road network in Jharkhand is inadequate, both in rural as well as in urban areas. In a state with a total area of 79,714 Sq. Km, the total length of connectivity of roads is just 26,277 Sq. Km. The State Public Works Department (SPWD) has been working towards upgrading light vehicle roads to all-weather motor roads, providing connectivity to all villages and towns. National Highways account for 8.25 percent of total road length in Jharkhand as against 1.57 percent share at all India level. Similar to this, the state highways, major district roads and project roads also have higher percentage shares in the total road network in Jharkhand. The state highways and major district roads constitute 7.17 percent and project roads constitute 33.56 percent share of total road network.

Contrary to highways and project roads, the rural and urban roads have a lower percentage share in the total road network as the against national average. The rural roads account for 27.72 percent in Jharkhand in comparison to national share of 58.33 percent and urban roads account for mere 2.55 percent share in total roads network.

While this larger picture of the road network in Jharkhand seems quite comparable with the national figures, the inter-district picture shows the scantiness of roads. The study of ten different phases of road construction since 2000 under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) shows that the proposed task of covering certain number of habitation has not been fulfilled in even a single phase.

One of the respondents, an officer in the District Rural Development Agencies, Hazaribagh, Jharkhand said that "after the attainment of separate statehood we have

[42] In a personal interview conducted during fieldwork on Feburary 15, 2015.

developed a lot in terms of road connectivity but were not able to cover even sixty percent of habitations because of the presence of Naxalites. Many projects have been obstructed or stopped midway by the contractors because they have failed to pay the share of bribe to the variant organizations of Naxalites; for example, the road between Hazaribagh and the Shiela Panchayat"[43].

The fact that one of the obstacles in the development of roads is the presence of extremist organizations was further confirmed by another respondent from Katkamsandi Block, Hazaribagh, Jharkhand. He said, "hill dwellers do not let the contractors construct the roads as they fear that the construction of roads will increase the reach of police towards them"[44].

The following table shows the inter-district picture of the network of roads in Jharkhand

Table 3.6: District wise Length of Roads constructed under PMGSY and Habitation benefitted by them in Jharkhand (as of 31 March 2014)

S.no	District	Total number of Habitations	Habitation benefitted	Length (in Km.) completed
1	Bokaro	2266	412	709.317
2	Chatra	2268	214	309.295
3	Deoghar	2582	270	358.272
4	Dhanbad	2172	106	228.730
5	Dumka	4260	523	1021.138
6	Garhwa	2541	260	519.805
7	Giridih	3560	609	814.045
8	Godda	2227	164	287.432
9	Gumla	3349	259	367.550
10	Hazaribagh	2207	300	668.890
11	Jamtara	2153	410	516.088
12	Khunti	1797	209	407.418
13	Kodarma	786	139	236.950

[43] In a personal Interview on 11 February 2015. The road from hazaribag to Shiela has an interesting story to tell. JPC and TPC are the two dominant Naxalite parties of Chatra. The areas of clear domination of either parties through which this road crosses, of JPC from Sultana to Ichak, and then of TPC from Simariya to Serandaag, the condition of the road is relatively good. But their zone of contest is between Simariya and Shila, as both claim influence. In such situation the cost of business within a levy economy is high as well as the roads are in deplorable condition as no contractors is willing of work in this area.

[44] पहाड़ी में रहने वाले लोग ठेकेदारों सड़कों के निर्माण के लिए अनुमति नहीं देते हैं क्योंकि वे जानते हैं कि सड़कों के निर्माण के साथ उनके प्रति पुलिस की पहुंच में वृद्धि होगी In a Personal Interview conducted during fieldwork on 13 February 2015.

14	Latehar	1376	140	261.751
15	Lohardaga	930	54	101.251
16	Pakur	2251	212	359.540
17	Palamu	3927	415	693.110
18	Paschimi Singhbhum	4032	487	676.106
19	Purbi Singhbhum	2982	615	856.849
20	Ramgarh	964	108	245.390
21	Ranchi	3448	274	443.293
22	Sahibganj	2610	83	217
23	Saraikela	2110	138	263.448
24	Simdega	3133	131	246.618
	Total	59931	6532	10809.286
Source: Compiled from the data of PMGSY 2013-2014 and 8th All India School Education Survey.				

The above table shows the scantiness of roads in the districts of Jharkhand. PMGSY covers around 11 percent of the habitations of Jharkhand and shares 40 percent of the roads constructed by various agencies in Jharkhand but one can easily notice the gaps in the coverage area between various districts. There are districts like Bokaro (18.18), Giridih (17.10), Jamtara (19), Khunti (26.59), Purbi Singhbhum(20.50) where the network of roads constructed under PMGSY covers more than 15 percent habitations whereas in districts like Dhanbad (4.8), Lohardaga (5), Sahibganj (3.1) and Simdega (4.1) the network of roads constructed under PMGSY covers less than 5 percent of habitations.

In short, one can say that the progress made by Jharkhand in developing the network of roads has been considerable but still it has to go a long way in comparison to other states like Assam, West Bengal, and Orissa etc.

Power:

The importance of Power as a prime mover of growth has been well acknowledged in India and a range of agencies and corporations were created in order to boost the development of power system, including the State Electricity Boards, National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) Limited, National Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC) Limited, and the Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL. A great deal of emphasis is laid on setting up policies and procedures in place to encourage setting up of power generating units.

As the heartland of coalfields, uranium and other minerals, Jharkhand has enormous potential for generating power. The state has a total installed capacity of 2625.91MW which is 0.96 percentage of India's total installed capacity (CEA: 2015). The state capacity to consume power per capita is 552 units which is much lower than the national average of 720 units.

The state government is putting considerable effort into accomplishing the target of cent percent rural electrification through Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana, yet it has been able to achieve only 26.03 percent as against 44 percent, which is the national average. Only 40.02 percent households have access to electricity in comparison to 67.9 percent of India. (State Annual Plan: 2012-13).

The government officials of Jharkhand State Electricity Board claims that "they have reached even the remote corners of the state in terms of providing electricity connections and where they have not, the reason behind that is either the delay in clearance or non-clearance by the Department of Forest and Environment and the law and order problem because of the presence of extremist organizations"[45]. However, the residents of the state have quite another story to tell regarding the supply of power in their villages. One respondent informed that 'one can notice the electric poles in front of our homes, in our blocks but we hardly receive the supply of power. In fact, some of the villages have never seen a lighted bulb though the poles exist'[46].

The following table shows the status of Household electrification in the districts of Jharkhand:

Table 3.7: Status of Household electrification in the districts of Jharkhand

District	Total no. of HH	Electricity	Kerosene	Solar Energy	Other Oil	Electrified Households	
						No.	%
Garhwa	241,497	21,027	218,094	1,951	290	22,978	10
Chatra	170,239	19,196	148,659	1,745	492	20,941	12
Kodarma	90,207	41,961	47,338	326	330	42,287	47
Giridih	356,247	95,872	256,334	2,763	959	98,635	28
Deoghar	214,896	89,935	123,780	717	234	90,652	42
Godda	239,500	34,249	202,756	1,334	685	35,583	15

[45] Interview conducted during fieldwork on 17 February 2015 at Ranchi.

[46] हमारे ब्लॉक में , हमारे घरों के सामने बिजली के खंभे नोटिस कर सकते हैं लेकिन हम शायद ही बिजली की आपूर्ति प्राप्त करते हैं। डंडे मौजूद है, हालांकि वास्तव में, गांवों में से कुछ एक जला बल्ब कभी नहीं देखा है Interview during field work in August, 2014.

Sahibganj	193,809	16,515	175,523	972	553	17,487	09
Pakur	167,362	22,444	144,011	545	234	22,989	14
Dhanbad	207,157	153,837	51,985	627	428	154,464	75
Bokaro	204,021	110,216	90,896	1,802	970	112,018	55
Lohardaga	80,295	20,009	59,659	234	336	20,243	25
Purbi Singhbhum	215,676	146,987	68,012	361	125	147,348	68
Palamu	316,135	41,155	272,061	1,485	944	42,640	13
Latehar	122,902	31,449	88,211	2,480	455	33,929	28
Hazaribagh	251,871	132,695	118,263	907	648	133,602	53
Ramgarh	97,889	75,611	21,781	241	183	75,852	77
Dumka	255,926	48,227	205,543	1,022	664	49,249	19
Jamtara	135,540	37,315	97,563	301	122	37,616	28
Ranchi	322,679	139,416	180,372	1,336	983	140,752	44
Khunti	93,762	22,098	67,194	4,117	294	26,215	28
Gumla	176,770	22,226	152,763	934	753	23,160	13
Simdega	108,683	11,520	96,333	692	72	12,212	11
Pashchimi Singhbhum	256,019	87,673	156,904	10,843	352	98,516	38
Saraikella-Kharsawan	165,883	92,417	62,244	3,988	152	96,405	58
Total	4,685,965	1,514,050	3,113,279	41,723	11,258	1,555,773	33
Source: Census 2011							

The above table from Census of India, 2011 indicates that close to 67 percent rural households of Jharkhand are still un-electrified and use sources such as kerosene, solar energy for lighting their houses. The table also demonstrate the inter-district disparities in the process of electrification. There are certain districts such as Saraikella- Kharsawan (58), Ramgarh (77), Hazaribagh (53), Purbi Singhbhum (68), Bokaro (55), Dhanbad (75) where more than 50 percentage of households are electrified. On the other hand, districts like Simdega (11), Gumla (13), Palamu (13), Pakur (14), Sahibganj (09), Godda (15), Chatra (12), Garhwa (10) have less than 15 percentage of households which are electrified.

The table also shows the electrification disparity between the districts which are in and around the state capital and those which are in remote locations; and the difference between the districts lying in the high and low industrial belt.

Drinking Water and Sanitation:

Safe drinking water and basic sanitation is crucial to ensure good human health. Extending access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation and hygiene is one of the

major developmental concerns for India. As of October 2011, there were about 1.2 lakh water quality affected rural habitations in the country (Biswas: 2012).

To a large extent, the supply of drinking water in rural areas is dependent on groundwater. According to the 69th round of National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) Report on 'Key Indicators of Drinking Water, Sanitation, Hygiene, and Housing Conditions in India' (2013), 88.5 percent households have improved source of drinking water in rural India while the figure is 95.3 percent for urban India. In terms of sanitation, the picture is worse. 38 and 82 percent of total households in rural and urban India respectively have sanitation facilities.

The status of drinking water and sanitation facilities in Jharkhand is also one of the lowest among all the states of India. As per the Census of India 2011and the NSSO report 2013, Jharkhand stands nowhere near the national averages in terms of providing safe drinking water and improved sanitation, although most of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes and State Government Funded Schemes were implemented in the state. Similar trends were noticed during field work also. One can find huge banners and wall painted notices such as "Shochalaya banwaeinge, Safai ko Apnaeinge", "Safai mein hai bhalai, Ab toh Samjho Mere Bhai" under Sampurna Swachta Abhiyan[47], explaining the importance of cleanliness, toilet and sanitation facilities and hygiene throughout the state, especially outside the district offices but will not find either cleanliness or proper sewage and sanitation system anywhere in the state. Even the toilets of government buildings were very ill-maintained. In fact, in most of the government buildings women's toilet facilities were found to be either locked or used as store rooms.

While the proportion of households getting drinking water from the improved sources is 80 percent or more in most of the bigger states, it is below 65 percent in Jharkhand. Another important aspect of drinking water is sufficiency; in this regard also Jharkhand stands among the lowest with only 70.3 percent of households having sufficient drinking water throughout the year, which is 15-20 points less than the national average. In India, 46.1 percent rural households got drinking water within

[47] Adopt Cleanliness by constructing toilets, Please understand my brother that cleanliness is good slogans used under Total Cleanliness Campaign in the state.

their premises in comparison to 76.8 urban households. However, this number in Jharkhand is 18.6 and 65.6 percent for rural and urban households respectively.

The following table 3.8 shows the status of drinking water facility in the districts of Jharkhand.

Table 3.8: Percentage of Sources of Drinking Water in the Districts of Jharkhand

District	Treated Tap Water	Covered Well	Hand pump	Tube Well	Spring	Within Premises	Near Premises	Away
Bokaro	22.3	1.2	32	3.1	0.6	35.6	36.2	28.1
Chatra	2.6	2.6	46.8	0.5	0.2	16.1	52.5	31.5
Deoghar	2.5	1.8	50.3	3.7	0.1	19.7	53	27.3
Dhanbad	30.2	1.7	26.2	4.6	0.2	32.8	35.9	31.3
Dumka	2.3	1.4	61.7	3.6	1.4	8.5	53.7	37.7
Garhwa	2.2	0.6	70.1	0.9	0.1	16.7	47.5	35.8
Giridih	3.2	3	22	0.8	0.3	16.4	52.4	31.2
Godda	2	1.5	66.1	1.2	1	14.5	53.8	31.8
Gumla	2.3	1.3	27.5	0.5	1.4	10.7	44.5	44.9
Hazaribagh	4.9	4.6	22.4	2.4	0.3	26.1	48.6	25.3
Jamtara	1.1	1.6	64.7	4.3	0.3	13.7	54.6	31.7
Khunti	2.5	1.5	30.4	0.5	1.2	8.8	43.6	47.6
Kodarma	3.4	6.7	30.4	1.8	0	23.2	48.4	28.4
Latehar	1.6	1	52.8	0.6	1.4	10.2	50.4	39.3
Lohardaga	2.1	1.6	43.8	0.5	1	11.6	52.3	36.2
Pakur	1	1.2	73.3	4	3.2	6.5	63.4	30.1
Palamu	2.6	1.5	66.2	1.1	0.2	26.2	43.8	30
Paschimi Singhbhum	7.4	0.8	58.6	2.4	3.1	10	45	45
Purbi Singhbhum	26.2	1.2	40	9.1	0.9	45.2	33.5	21.3
Ramgarh	21.9	2.3	20.9	2.4	0.5	34.1	37.5	28.4
Ranchi	15.2	3.1	30.1	7.9	0.4	35.8	32.8	31.4
Sahibganj	2.6	1.6	62.4	3.6	1.8	19.6	52.3	28.1
Saraikela	8.5	1.1	57.2	6.7	1.2	20.5	46.4	33.1
Simdega	1.7	1	36.9	0.5	0.8	7.8	50.5	41.6

Source: Census of India, 2011

The above table shows the disparity within Jharkhand. There are districts like Pakur, Khunti, Simdega, Dumka where the proportion of household having access to drinking water within their premises is less than 10 percent. There is only one district of Purbi Singhbhum which has nearly 50 percent households with drinking water facilities within their premises.

Jharkhand has the highest proportion of households without any bathroom (89.4 percent) and latrine (90.5 percent) facility; much higher than the all India proportion (59.4 percent). With similar trends, the state stands at the bottom for proportions of households having exclusive use of toilet (7.5 percent) and having access to improved source of latrine (8.9 percent). Inter- district situation is shown in the following table:

Table 3.9: Status of Sanitation Facilities in the districts of Jharkhand (in %)

District	HHs having latrine facility	Flush/pour flush latrine connected to 1)Piped Sewer System 2)Septic Tank 3)Other System			Alternative source 1)Public Latrine 2)Open		HHs having Bathing Facility 1)Bathroom 2)Enclosure w/o roofs		Waste water outlet connected to 1)Closed drainage 2)Open drainage 3)No drainage		
		1	2	3	1	2	1	2	1	2	3
Bokaro	7.1	0.7	4.7	0.5	0.4	92.5	4.1	10.6	2.8	16.4	80.8
Chatra	10.1	0.4	7.2	0.6	1.1	88.8	6	11.3	3	22.1	75
Deoghar	16.5	1.1	13.5	1	0.8	82.7	11.2	13.3	4.8	29	66.2
Dhanbad	10.8	0.6	8.5	0.6	0.7	88.5	7.3	9.4	3.6	21	75.4
Dumka	16.4	1.1	13.2	0.9	0.8	82.8	11.8	8.1	3.9	19.5	76.6
Garhwa	10.5	0.4	7.9	1	0.8	88.7	6	8.3	2.1	17.7	80.2
Giridih	15.3	0.5	10.3	2.1	0.6	84.1	7.4	8.3	2.4	14.4	83.2
Godda	10.2	0.3	6.7	1	0.9	88.9	5.1	3.6	1.1	14.3	84.6
Gumla	39.8	4.4	32.5	1.1	1.4	58.9	31	14	10.5	44.2	45.3
Hazaribagh	33.5	12.5	18.9	0.9	0.9	65.6	27.7	10.4	16.9	27.2	55.9
Jamtara	14.9	0.6	11.6	1	0.5	84.5	9.3	8.6	2.6	16.7	80.8
Khunti	49.9	17.9	27.9	1.2	1.5	48.6	42.7	6.8	24.1	26.7	49.2
Kodarma	13.1	1	9.6	1.1	0.4	86.5	7.8	15.3	4.7	25.3	70
Latehar	10.8	0.5	7.1	0.8	0.4	88.9	5.4	7	2.1	10.5	87.4
Lohardaga	19.6	1	16.5	0.7	0.7	79.7	14	12.5	5.7	28.5	65.9
Pakur	32.9	5	26.3	0.7	1.3	65.8	27	11	7.8	33.9	58.4
Palamu	9.8	0.5	6.3	1	0.8	89.4	5.9	4.6	1.7	17.7	80.6
Pashchimi Singhbhum	9.8	0.3	8.1	0.4	0.6	89.6	7.2	4.7	1.5	15.6	82.9
Purbi Singhbhum	40.9	5.7	31	1.5	1.9	57.1	32.2	10.3	13.2	26.6	60.2
Ramgarh	8.4	0.4	6.7	0.6	0.8	90.8	5	4.8	0.8	6.5	92.7
Ranchi	10.3	0.6	6.9	1.1	0.9	88.8	5.6	4.5	1.7	10.2	88.2
Sahibganj	8.2	0.4	6	0.7	0.7	91.2	4.4	3.5	0.9	5.4	93.7
Saraikela-Kharsawan	11.8	1.9	8.3	0.6	1	87.2	8.7	2.9	2.1	9.4	88.5
Simdega	20.3	3	15.4	0.8	0.9	78.7	15.4	5.8	6.7	13.8	79.5

Source: Census of India, 2011

The above table indicates the awful condition of sanitation facilities in the districts of Jharkhand. The percentage of households without a proper sewage system is as high

as 93.7 percent in districts like Sahibganj. In fact, in the state capital of Ranchi as well, only 10.3 percent households have access to latrine facility within their premises. Around 92 percent households use alternative sources of sanitation, especially open defecation.

In short, one can say that in terms of infrastructure which is a must for the development of the state as well as its people, Jharkhand has a long way to go. Whether it is social or physical infrastructure, even after 15 years of separate statehood, the condition of Jharkhand has not improved much.

Conclusion:

To sum up, one can say that when Jharkhand was formed as a separate state fifteen years ago, there was euphoria that the economically backward region, with a high tribal population, would finally see prosperity. But the present condition of the state is very poignant. The state is looking back at a trail of broken promises, political instability and deep-rooted corruption. The findings of the study state that development picture of the social and physical infrastructure in the state of Jharkhand is elusive and highly imbalanced. There are certain districts like Dhanbad and Bokaro who have access to most of the infrastructure and there are districts like Dumka and Garhwa which have least access. The fractured mandates or the coalition governments, the high incidence of corruption and the lack of human resources in bureaucracy are the major hindrances to the state's ability to meet the basic needs of its citizen.

The analysis reveals that despite the passage of a planned decade, the aim of achieving equitable political governance and high levels of development has remained limited in the state of Jharkhand, though it has the potential to develop and empower those historically excluded.

Chapter 4

A Case Study of Uttarakhand

Uttarakhand, named as Uttaranchal at the time of creation in November, 2000 but renamed Uttarakhand in January 2007, is the twenty seventh state of India. It is situated in the Northern part of India and shares international boundaries with China in the north east and Nepal in the south east, with Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh as neighboring states. Uttarakhand is spread over an area of 53,483 Sq.Km, it is the 18th largest state in India in terms of geographical area. Physiographically, the state is divided into three zones namely, the Himalayas, the Shivaliks and the Terrai region (India State of Forest Report: 2009) but administratively, the state is divided into two regions of Kumaon and Gharwal, which have in total 13 districts. The Kumaon division comprises 6 districts, namely, Almora, Bageshwar, Champawat, Nainital, Udham Singh Nagar and Pithoragarh and the Garhwal division is comprised of 7 districts, namely, Chamoli, Dehradun, Hardwar, Pauri Garhwal, Rudraprayag, Tehri Garhwal, and Uttarkashi. There are 78 tehsils and 95 developmental blocks in the state. The state has a total of 16,826 villages of which 15761 are inhabited, including forest settlements as per the Census of India 2011. Due to its geographic and strategic location, it has been given 'Special Category Status[48]' by the Union of India.

Uttarakhand has a population of 10.11 million, consisting of 5.15 million males and 4.96 million females, with 69.45 per cent of the population living in the rural areas. With 0.84 per cent of the population of India, it is the 20th most populated state of the country. The sex ratio is 963 females to 1000 males. 3 per cent of the population belongs to the Scheduled Tribes, 18.70 per cent to the Scheduled Castes and 79 per cent others. The density of population per Sq.km. is about 189 which is far below the national average of 382 per sq.km. The density of population varies from as high as 801 per sq.km. in the district of Haridwar to as low as 41 per sq.km. in the district of Uttarkashi (Census of India: 2011).

[48] Special Category Status is given to certain states due to their inherent features like hilly and difficult terrain, low population density, size,able share of tribal population, strategic location along with borders with neighbouring countries, economic and infrastructural backwardness, non-viable nature of state finances, etc. The concept of a Special Category State was first introduced in India in 1969 by the Fifth Finance Commission when it decided to provide certain disadvantaged states with preferential treatment in the form of central assistance and tax breaks. Assam, Nagaland and Jammu & Kashmir were the first three states who were granted the special status. In India the decision to grant special category status lies with the National Development Council and the members of the Planning Commission (*The Indian Express*: 19 August 2015).

Since its formation, Uttarakhand is one of the fastest growing states in terms of economic development. The Economic Survey of 2005 indicates that the state has performed better than the all India average in terms of growth of employment as well as growth of enterprises. The performance of the state has helped it in bridging the gap with the national average. Yet there are several issues related to infrastructure development in Uttarakhand. Poverty and regional disparities remain a serious concern particularly in the rural areas.

Following the legacy of the parent state of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand also pursued a decentralized form of governance. Uttarakhand has adopted relevant acts of Uttar Pradesh with necessary amendments vide Act no. 8 of 2002 called Uttarakhand Tristariya Panchayat Raj Act, 2002 to amend the UP Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 and UP Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961. Given its specific character and composition, in Uttarakhand, the rural panchayats consist of Zila Panchayats (13), Kshetra Panchayats (95), and Gram Panchayats (7227); while the urban panchayats comprise Nagar Nigam (1), Nagarpalika Parishads (31) and Nagar Panchayats (31). The Panchayat Raj Act provides for Nyay Panchayats (670) with judicial responsibilities (Uttarakhand Development Report, 2009:151).

Similar to the state of Jharkhand, in Uttarakhand also the developmental role of the state is led by the District Collector, whose office comprises all major departments including police, education, statistics, rural development, panchayati raj, public supply, public information office, except health. The health department is located in the district government hospital, headed by a Civil Surgeon. A similar set up with departments being merged into health, education and development is led by the Block Development Officer (BDO) at the block level.

The primary institution to carry out development work is ‘Gram Panchayat’ at the village level. Gram panchayats are headed by the elected representatives who play a significant role of mediating between the people and the government. The panchayats are involved in various activities such as, prioritizing the projects under the welfare schemes sponsored by central or state government, choosing sites for development activities, and so on.

Other than Gram Panchayats, the other important institution of governance in Uttarakhand is the Van Panchayats. Van Panchayats are the elected bodies for

discussing, designing and modifying specific rules which govern the forests and forest products. There are 12,089 van panchayats in Uttarakhand.

The role played by administration and infrastructure in the socio-economic development and transformation of a state is considerable. The administrative and infrastructural capacities play a significant role in the success or failure of development efforts. Therefore, this chapter attempts to analyze the development profile of the state by focusing on the administrative and infrastructural capacities of the state of Uttarakhand. This chapter, like the previous one on Jharkhand, is divided into two sections. The first section will focus on administrative capacity. This section seeks to unpack the issue of administrative capacity of the state by considering three factors: first, the regime or the leadership which governs the state; second, the trends in bureaucracy and third, the incidence of corruption. The second section of the chapter will describe the infrastructural capacity of Uttarakhand. This section will focus at the development status of social and physical infrastructure in the state of Uttarakhand in comparison to India and the inter-district picture of infrastructural capacity at the state level. Social infrastructure will include the infrastructure of the education and health sector whereas physical infrastructure will include the utilities such as roads, electricity, drinking water and sanitation.

Administrative Capacity:

As stated before, for purposes of this study, administrative capacity is defined as the combination of the capabilities of the bureaucracy and the leadership to perform those tasks that need to be performed by the administration. Therefore, this section will analyze the issue of administrative capacities of Uttarakhand state by considering four factors: first, the regime or the leadership which governs the state; second, the trends in bureaucracy; third, the incidence of corruption; and fourth, the ability to spend the allocated funds.

The Regime / Leadership

Since the state was carved out of the parent state of Uttar Pradesh in November 2000, Uttarakhand has been politically stable unlike Jharkhand which was also created in

the same year. Despite the fact that the state has seen eight chief ministers, the state has largely witnessed a battle of power involving only two national parties – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress. Recently in 2016 it has also witnessed a very brief stint of President's rule for the first time.

Uttarakhand is represented by 5 seats in the Lok Sabha and 3 seats in the Rajya Sabha. One of the Lok Sabha seats is reserved for a Scheduled Caste member. The unicameral legislature of Uttarakhand has 71 Members of the Legislative Assembly. 70 of these seats are unreserved and 1 seat is reserved for a member of Anglo-Indian community.

After the formation of the new state in the year 2000, Assembly elections were not held, as the BJP, as the political party enjoying a majority in the assembly was asked to form government. Therefore, the first government was formed by the BJP under the leadership of Nityanand Swami[49]. Nityanand Swami was elevated to the position of Chief Minister because of his non-controversial nature, the rapport he shared with the two important communities of the region – Thakurs and Brahmins – and the confidence of the then PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee in his political experience and administrative capabilities, but his selection as chief minister of Uttarakhand was marked by scenes which spelt indifference and dissidence. The Chief Minister had proposed to induct 12 Ministers, but only nine turned up for the swearing-in ceremony. The other three Ministers-designate were State BJP president Bhagath Singh Koshiyari, former Minister in the Uttar Pradesh government Ramesh Pokhriyal Nishank, and Narain Ram Das. Koshiyari and Nishank were strong contenders for the position of chief minister, and by all indications they wanted to send a message across to the central leadership that they were unhappy with the selection of a "non-hill person" as Chief Minister (Ramakrishnan, 2000:01).

[49] The Uttar Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2000 says, "Every sitting member of the House of the People representing a constituency which, on the appointed day by virtue of the provisions of Section 10, stands allotted, with or without alteration of boundaries, to the successor State of Uttar Pradesh or Uttaranchal, shall be deemed to have been elected to the house of the people by that constituency as so allotted."
This means, all those constituencies, which had a BJP MLA in UP, that became a constituency in Uttaranchal remained with the BJP until elections are held again. Therefore, that BJP had the majority in Uttaranchal by virtue of its MLAs in those UP constituencies that became a part of Uttaranchal. Hence, they got to decide who would be the CM.

Due to the confrontationist attitude towards his selection as chief minister by other legislators, he served in office for a very short time from November 9, 2000 to October 29, 2001. He resigned voluntarily in favor of Bhagat Singh Koshiyari when asked by the BJP central leadership. However, Koshiyari's tenure as chief minister of the state was also for only a few months, till the first assembly elections took place in 2002.

In the year 2002, Uttarakhand witnessed the first assembly elections. In this election, the Congress emerged as the winner by winning 36 seats out of 70 and formed a government under the leadership of Narayan Dutt Tiwari. According to Sanjay Kumar (2002) and Raja Bahuguna (2005), the Congress Party was able to obtain a majority of seats because BJP rule in the initial two years was marked by repression of people's movements; a spiraling crime graph and dedication of the Kumaon and Garhwal Development Authorities towards the liquor business. According to Bahuguna (2005:01), by passing the 'Uttaranchal Panchayati Forest Rules 2001' and 'the Forest Ordinance 2001-02' BJP snatched away any existing rights of people over forests and land, due to which people gave BJP a fitting reply by giving their votes to Congress.

The noteworthy fact of this first assembly election result of Uttarakhand was that there was a razor thin margin in the percentage of votes polled by the Congress and the BJP which indicates that the contest was much keener than it looks. The Congress party had won a majority in the house with only 26.9 per cent of votes whereas the BJP won 19 seats but these accounted for a vote share that was only 1.7 per cent less than that of the Congress.

Similarly, if one divides Uttarakhand into three geographical regions – Garhwal, Kumaon and Maidan, one finds that these three different regions present three different political pictures. In Maidan region, which accounts for 23 seats out of 70, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has a strong presence. The party won all the seven seats in this region and polled 18.1 per cent votes which were nearly 9 per cent more than the votes polled for the party throughout the state. In Garhwal, the Congress Party is relatively stronger. Out of its 36 seats, 16 were won from this region only. In Kumaon region, the contest was keenest between Congress and BJP. The difference of vote share between the two parties was just 0.5 per cent. However, out of 22

assembly seats Congress won 13 and BJP was able to manage only 5 (Kumar, 2002:1880).

Uttarakhand witnessed economic development to a certain extent under the Congress rule. The credit for promoting industry by setting up the State Industrial Development Corporation of Uttarakhand Limited (SIDCUL) in 2002 which attracted companies like TATA, Ashok Leyland, Vedanta, RSB Transmission and Bajaj Motors to set up manufacturing units, goes to the leadership of N.D. Tiwari. The 2003 Industrial Policy with generous tax benefits for investors was approved and lakhs of jobs were created during his tenure (Economic Times, 29 Jan. 2012).

During fieldwork, many people appreciated the efforts of N.D. Tiwari for introducing industrial development by establishing SIDCUL in the state as it allowed them to get employment within the state, but many also argued that Uttarakhand has faced the worst phase of leadership under N.D.Tiwari because the State had been turned into a profitable grazing ground for the land mafia, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Be it the Patwari Recruitment Scam, Police Constable Recruitment Scam, or State-wide Medicines Scam, there is a long and ever growing list of scams that are enough to earn the title of 'Scam Rule' for Tiwari's regime, said one of the respondents.

In the meantime, the 14th Lok Sabha Elections also took place in the year 2004. In this Lok Sabha election also Uttarakhand witnessed a close contest between the two major parties – the Congress and the BJP. Though BJP won 3 seats out of 5, the victory margin between the winning party and the losing party was less than 2 per cent points. In this election, the Congress and the Samajwadi Party won one seat each. Compared with the 1999 Lok Sabha election, both the parties increased their vote share marginally but the BJP lost one seat (Kumar and Nautiyal, 2009:272).

In the year 2007, in the second assembly elections in Uttarakhand, though BJP emerged as the winner with 34 seats out of 70 assembly seats, it was not able to form a government without the support of the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD) and three independent MLAs. A coalition government was formed in Uttarakhand under the leadership of BJP leader B.C. Khanduri.

This election results were interesting as the vote share of both the parties – Congress and BJP – went up and the vote difference was also narrow, but one party lost seats

while the other gained them. The vote share of the Congress went up by 2.68 point to 29.59 per cent, but it lost 15 seats and fell short of BJP by 13 seats, whereas the vote share of BJP went up by 6.45 points which gave it 15 more seats in comparison to the 2002 assembly elections (Joshi and Verma, 2009:10).

During this tenure of the BJP led government, B.C. Khanduri was Chief Minister of the state but was replaced by Ramesh Pokhriyal from June 2009 – September 2011. Throughout the period he held office, his efforts were to develop policies which could lead to the sustainable development of the state. It is believed that he asked his state administration, policy makers and stake holders to draft a proper sustainable development model with reference to Uttarakhand so that the life of the masses should not get disrupted, but help them to grow in every aspect of life, be it economic development, ecological development or management of natural resources (*Mera Pahad*: 28 May 2009). The rolling out of Tata Nano from Uttarakhand's Pantnagar plant was also credited to his government. Khanduri was also successful in cutting expenses by reducing his own security as well as of politicians and administrative officials; cutting on their allowance for foreign trips and restricting the use of the CM's discretionary fund for the projects approved by District Magistrates (*DNA Webdesk*:6 May2014).

Despite his developmental efforts, Khanduri was forced to quit office in 2009. Following the party's (BJP) defeat on all the five seats in the Lok Sabha election of 2009 the former chief minister and senior leader of BJP, Bhagat Singh Koshiyari campaigned against Khanduri and forced him to withdraw from the position (*Business Standard*, 23 June 2009; *Times of India*, 11 September 2011).

In the 2009 Lok Sabha election, there was a clean sweep in favor of the Congress party. Although the Congress, BJP, BSP, UKD, Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), SP, CPI, CPI (M), NCP contested for five seats, the major contest was between the Congress, the BJP and the BSP. Together these parties polled 92.18 per cent of the votes cast. The vote share of the BSP jumped up by 15.24 points, due to which BSP stood third after Congress and BJP. The gain of BSP was matched by the loss of BJP. The BJP's vote share declined to 33.80 per cent whereas Congress vote share increased to 43.14 per cent which enabled it to capture all five seats in the state.

Ramesh Pokhriyal 'Nishank' replaced B.C. Khanduri when he withdrew after taking the responsibility for party's drubbing in the Lok Sabha election. Nishank also had a short tenure as he was asked to quit by the senior BJP leadership at Centre because of his sagging image due to alleged corruption charges against him and BJP did not want to lose in the upcoming assembly election. Like N.D.Tiwari of the Congress, Nishank's tenure was also full of scams. He was allegedly involved in a land scam, the Maha Kumbh Mela scam, and Hydro Power projects scams, among others.

So, once again B.C. Khanduri was back in power as chief minister of the state till the next assembly elections. In 2012, the third assembly election took place in Uttarakhand. The main contest was between the incumbent BJP and the Congress. Following the pattern of the Lok Sabha election 2009, Congress emerged as the single largest party with 32 seats and the BJP finished as a close second with 31 seats. While the Congress gained 11 seats compared to 2007, the BJP lost 4 seats. Notably, the incumbent B.C. Khanduri also lost his seat. However, in terms of vote share both the parties ended up adding votes.

Significant changes in the pattern of voting were observed in two of the three regions of the state. In the Garhwal and Kumaon region, Congress emerged as the winner with more seats than BJP, whereas in the region of Maidan, BJP retained its dominance of 2007. The loss of seats to BSP also benefitted more to BJP than Congress in this region (Anonymous: 2009).

Although the Congress emerged as a winner it did not have a sufficient number of seats to form the government, and therefore took the support of BSP, UKD and independent MLAs. In this election, Congress was led by Harak Singh Rawat but no CM candidate was proposed. Therefore, the selection of Vijay Bahugana as the candidate for CM position after the election results were declared was much criticized by his fellow members of the State Congress. 24 out of 32 MLAs boycotted the swearing–in ceremony of Vijay Bahuguna in support of the Rajput candidate Harish Rawat.

Vijay Bahuguna became the seventh chief minister of the state. He served the position till January 2014 and resigned after he was accused of Flood Relief Scam during flash floods in the state in the year 2013. As the Congress party wanted to go to the Lok

Sabha polls due in 2014 with a strong leader, the then Union Minister Harish Rawat was asked to replace Bahuguna.

Harish Rawat joined office on Feburary1, 2014. During his tenure various welfare schemes such as Palna, Nai Zindagi, Mera Per Mera Dhan, Mere Bujurg mere Teerth etc have been initiated. The Congress party contested the Lok Sabha election of 2014 in the state under his leadership. But because he was inducted only three months before the elections, his popular image also could not save the Congress which lost all the five seats to BJP. Another reason for the defeat of Congress in the Lok Sabha election was the defection of its MP from the Pauri seat, Satpal Maharaj, to the BJP in March 2014 (*The Hindu*: 16 May 2014). With its three former CMs contesting the polls, the BJP already had an upper hand. Therefore, the contest concluded with the victory of BJP over all the five Lok Sabha seats from Uttarakhand.

The worst phase for the Congress party in the state began in 2016 when on March 18, while the state budget was being passed, 9 rebel MLAs of the Congress joined hand with the opposition and asked for a division of vote. If the budget failed to pass, the Harish Rawat government would have fallen because it was a money bill. But the speaker of the house refused the demand of division of vote and passed the budget by voice vote. The rebels went to the Governor and sought the dismissal of Rawat's government. After much political turmoil, on March 27, 2016 on the advice of Union cabinet President's rule was imposed for the first time in Uttarakhand (*The Hindu*: 30 March 2016). But the Uttarakhand High Court intervened in the matter and Congress government was revived in the state. However, in April 2016 the Supreme Court stayed the judgment of Uttarakhand High Court and President's rule continued.

Harish Rawat resumed charge after winning the trust vote on May 10, 2016. The Congress won the trust vote clinching 33 votes while the BJP could manage only 28 in the 71-member Assembly whose effective strength was reduced to 62 after the Supreme Court barred nine Congress MLAs from taking part in the motion of confidence (*Indian Express*:16 May 2016).

In conclusion, an analysis of the 16 year long political journey of Uttarakhand reflects certain trends about the political scenario and the administrative capacity of the state due to which the state is unable to progress and develop the way it was imagined during the separate statehood movement. First, the trend shows that though the major

contest has always been between Congress and BJP, the other parties like BSP and UKD cannot be ignored. They along with independent MLAs play a significant role in the formation of the government. Second, the trend shows that if Uttarakhand has to develop at a faster pace than it has to come up with strong anti-corruption policies. Except B.C. Khanduri and Harish Rawat, all other chief ministers were forced to quit the position of Chief Minister because of their involvement in one or another case of embezzlement.

Trends in Bureaucracy:

Bureaucracy is an indispensable part of administration. It is known for its impartiality, neutrality, anonymity and competence. However, the concepts of neutrality and impartiality worked for about two decades in the beginning after independence. After that, these features of bureaucracy came under great strain. In the present set up, trivial instances of bribery in places like the police station, block or district collector's office, municipal offices, revenue and tax collectors offices or officials concerned with the disbursement of funds to the public have been accepted as normal by the public. This deterioration in the administration has given rise to the culture of touts and lobbyists who specialize in facilitating the nexus between the bureaucrats, politicians, businessman and industrialists (Jha, 2014:94). In the case of Uttarakhand, the observations from the field and analysis of news reports shows that there is indeed a huge nexus between the bureaucrats, politicians, contractors and the representatives of PRIs.

One of the respondents, who owns a tea stall near Alaknanda river in Rudraprayag district of Uttarakhand, while citing the example of illegal sand mining said, "people have not learnt a single lesson despite huge losses. They are still playing with nature and life of other living beings and all this is only possible because of the nexus between bureaucracy, government and businessman". He said, "Despite the High Court directives one can notice at least two dozens of trucks carrying sand every day from the banks of this river. One can see four to five JCBs (earthmovers) crushing stones and others loading sand into the trucks"[50].

The fact that a nexus of bureaucrats, industrialists and politicians has always existed was further verified through a news report published in a news magazine *Down to*

[50] In a discussion over tea at Rudraprayag during fieldwork survey in February 2015.

Earth in 2011 titled 'A Swami and Sand Mafia'. According to this report, mining stopped whenever an environmental activist sat on fast, but each time HSCPL's influential owners get the mining resumed. The HSCPL is owned by Bhumesh Kumar who is the son of Hazarilal Agarwal, an active member of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, an organization closely associated with the state's ruling party BJP (Shrivastav, 2011:01).

> In December 2009, a two-member committee of the Union environment ministry visited the site on the complaints of environmental activists. It found that mining was taking place without any lease from the government or environmental clearance from the Centre. But the ministry did not take any action against the errant miners. The issue became serious in February 2010. With the mounting protests, the state gove rnment again issued an order in December stopping mining and crushing activities in the area but HSCPL approached the High Court and Justice Tarun Agarwal stayed the government order[51] (Shrivastav: 2011).

It is not only in the misuse of natural resources that the nexus of bureaucrats, industrialists and politicians is seen; one can also observe the intricate relation between bureaucrats and politicians in the process of recruitment due to which scams like Patwari Recruitment scam[52], and the Sub-Inspector recruitment scam have taken place.

> In 2002, the State Government had conducted Sub-Inspector recruitment test for 251 posts of sub-inspector (civil police, provincial armed constabulary and intelligence) for the first time after formation of the new state. The written test was held through IIT Roorkee. The then ADGP Rakesh Mittal, had led a five-member board and was given responsibility for completing the SI recruitment process in the state. It was alleged that to favor some candidates, these police officers had decreased marks of those candidates who had secured marks higher than the cut off marks for the written test (The Pioneer: 30 August 2014).

Therefore, a case was registered against these police officers in December 2003. But the nexus between politicians and bureaucrats was so strong that due to government's

[51] For details see Shrivastav: 2011; Vashishtha: 2012; Banerjee: 2014.

[52] Patwari Recruitment Scam took place in May 2002 during the rule of Congress in Uttarakhand. In this scam several senior officials along with S.K. Lamba the then District Magistrate of Pauri Garhwal and Kunwar Rajkumar, a PCS officer were found guilty of having flouted all norms in the recruitment process of Patwari. According to the enquires done by the Divisional Commissioner, S.K.Lamba and senior leaders of ruling party have taken huge bribes while recruiting Patwaris in Pauri district of Uttarakhand in May 2002. For details see The Hindu: 26 September 2004, 'IAS Official's dismissal recommended'.

apathy CBI was not able to file a chare-sheet against these officers until the Supreme Court and Nainital High Court intervened[53].

In short once can say that the nexus between the bureaucrats and politicians has jeopardized the impartial trait of bureaucrats and it has lost its neutral and anonymous character. But this nexus is not the only factor responsible for the decline of bureaucracy in the state. It has also been aggravated by frequent transfers of the top officials. Despite the Supreme Court directive that there shall be fixed minimum tenure for civil servants which will help them in functioning as an effective instrument in public policy and also in achieving their professional targets, bureaucrats' transfers and postings are made frequently at the whims and fancies of political executive, particularly in the state governments[54]. The average tenure of a District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner, Superintendent of Police and other higher officers is rarely more than a few months.

It has been observed during field work that, in the state of Uttarakhand, an officer serves in an office for maximum fifteen days and then gets transferred to some other department, block or district. The table below shows an example of that how frequently these bureaucrats get transferred.

Table 4.1: Tenure of Chief Development Officer, Rudraprayag.

S.no	Name	From Date	Till Date
1	Babu Lal Meena (I.A.S.)	18/8/97	21/9/98
2	R.P. Arora (P.C.S.)	22/9/98	10/11/98
3	S.K. Dwivedi (P.C.S.)	11/11/98	27/11/99
4	Ramashanker Singh (I.A.S.)	28/11/99	27/03/2000
5	S.P. Anjor (P.C.S.)	28/03/2000	25/09/2000
6	S.K.Yadav (P.C.S.)	26/09/2000	02/02/01
7	S.K. Lamba (I.A.S.)	03/02/01	31/08/01
8	B.S. Rawat (P.D.S.)	01/09/01	25/10/05
9	R. P. Arya (P.D.S.)	26/10/05	22/12/06
10	M.S. Kutiyal (P.D.S.)	23/12/06	31/05/09
11	N.S. Rawat (P.D.S.)	01/06/09	03/07/09
12	D.C. Arya (P.D.S.)	04/07/09	31/07/09
13	N.S. Rawat (P.D.S.)	01/08/09	19/01/11
14	N.P.S. Chauhan (P.D.S.)	20/01/11	31/05/12

[53] For details see Kautilya Singh: 2014; The Pioneer: 30 August 2014, 'Charge-sheet filed against two retired IPS officers'.

[54] In November 2013, the Bench of Justices K.S. Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose while disposing the public interest writ petition directed the Centre and state governments to set up a Civil Service Board for the management of transfers and postings, inquires, process of promotion, reward, punishment and disciplinary actions. In this they also suggested fixed tenure for civil servants.

15	Ajay Kumar	01/06/12	16/09/12
16	P.C. Tiwari	17/09/12	31/03/13
17	V.K. Mittal	01/04/13	03/06/13
18	Dr. R. S. Pokhriyal	04/06/13	12/11/13
19	M. S. Rana (P.D.S.)	13/11/13	31/07/14
20	Sunil Kumar (P.D.S.)	01/08/14	25/08/14
21	H. B. Thapliyal (P.C.S.)	26/08/14	Till the date fieldwork was done.
Source: Field Survey 2015			

The above table clearly shows that except the two officers BS Rawat and MS Kutiyal, no other officer has served the office for more than six months. These were the only two officers who had served the office for more than two years.

During the field work it was informed that most of the time these transfers are done under political pressure instead of being routine transfers. Most of the time, well performing officials are transferred to please the sulking leaders of the ruling party. One of the officers in the Bageshwar district said, "There are so many expectations from us and we do have development plans also for the region but we do not have magic wands. Time is required for the execution of any plan. By the time we prepare the field for the implementation of any development plan, we get transfer orders. How can you expect an officer to develop a region in a time period of three-four months?"

Another officer said, "along with frequent transfers, the over burden of work creates more obstacles in the path of development of any region and the same is the case with Uttarakhand." The top bureaucrats are over burdened with responsibilities of handling more than one key department. Certain departments do not have full time directors and bureaucrats are holding additional charge for the cabinet, planning and finance, power, environment, water resources, IT departments etc. He said, "Officers like Shailesh Bagauli are looking after more than two key departments. He is Additional Secretary of technical education; Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises; Additional Chief Executive Director of Khadi and Gramodyog; Education and Director of Training, Industry and Mining. He is just one example. Almost every one of us is looking after more than one department due to lack of staff."

To sum up one can say that other than the nexus between bureaucracy and politicians, the major factor for the decline in the bureaucracy of Uttarakhand is the constant

transfers of the higher officials under political pressure by Party Head Quarters. The officers in the higher rankings are invariably transferred and while doing this the requirement and efficiency of administration are not considered which brings instability in the administration of the state.

The Incidence of Corruption:

Corruption which has become a global phenomenon is an ancient problem. It has been there in different forms in different places at different times. Kautilya in *Arthasastra* argued that there are minimum forty ways of embezzlement. Though it has been defined variously by different scholars usually it is defined as "the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit — through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement" (UNDP, 2008:07). Corruption is a major challenge to the development process. According to Rotberg (2001), corruption is a dominant factor in driving countries to state failure as corruption contributes to the instability, poverty and the eruption of civil wars over resources.

Following the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Act 1965, the state of Uttarakhand after its separation from Uttar Pradesh established the department of Vigilance Establishment through the Uttarakhand Adaptation and Amendment Order 2002 to prevent corruption in government departments and offices; butduring the field survey, it was reiterated by most of the people from the state that with the formation of separate state of Uttarakhand, the incidence of corruption has increased. They argued that with the access to more resources and revenues, the incidence of corruption had increased exponentially.

According to a report in a local newspaper, "in 2012 a list of 22 encroachments was handed over by the Municipal Corporation to the State Vigilant Department but no action has been taken till date". Many drives have been launched to remove encroachments but the encroachers have only re-settled because of the political patronage of local politicians (*Hill Post*, February 13, 2015).

An interesting fact observed during fieldwork in Uttarakhand was that, while responding to the question of corruption, people clearly pointed out that corruption takes place at two levels. In the first case, policies and laws are either framed or

twisted to help businessmen and industrialists; and in the second case, money is involved in form of bribes to people's representatives and bureaucrats. One of the respondents said that, "the policy makers perceive common masses as fools. They think that the common man does not understand that rules are twisted in favor of businessman so that they earn profits".

When asked about the incidence of corruption in the state, most of the respondents referred to the scams taking place in the process of distribution of land[55] and in the process of recruitment. Some of them also discussed the functioning of sand and timber mafias in the state as examples of corruption.

A few respondents also referred to the cases of financial irregularities taken place during Maha Kumbh Mela in 2010 under the leadership of Ramesh Pokhriyal 'Nishank' and the floods of 2013. The case of financial misappropriation during Kumbh Mela was also reported by various national dailies. According to the CAG report, Rs 223 crore was misused by the Uttarakhand government in the Maha Kumbh Mela. It stated that 54 works with an approved cost of Rs 180.07 crore remained incomplete during the fair and 43 additional works were executed without prior sanction and five works were sanctioned in an unauthorized manner (*The Hindu*: 25 April 2011).

Another recent incidence of corruption which is very recent and which was mentioned by most respondents is the flood relief scam of 2013. It was reported that most of the funds allocated by the state and union government for the relief operations during flash floods in 2013 was misused and inflated and forged bill were submitted by the officers in-charge (*Times of India*: 30 May 2015; *Indian Express*: 30 May 2015).

[55] Since the state has formed many land scams has taken place involving ministers like N. D. Tiwari and Ramesh Pokhriyal. But the biggest land scam which has taken place in the state involves Yoga Guru Ramdev. According to various reports 81 cases of violation of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (ZALR) Act and the Indian Stamps Act were registered against Swamy Ramdev's. Huge tracts of lands were purchased in the Shantershah village, Badehi Rajputana and Bongla which falls between Roorkee and Haridwar.
As per the research done by Tehelka Magzine (19 March 2012), Ramdev owns more than 1000 beegha of land in this area but in the records only 360 beegha is shown as owned by Ramdev trusts and associates. Out of this Ramdev has declared 20 hectares of land as non-agricultural land. According to their report, Ramdev and his associates have also invested massively in the benami land of the village.
Ramesh Pokhriyal, the Ex- CM of the state is involved in the Sturdia Land Scam. He is accused of changing the land use of a 15 acre industrial plot in Rishikesh worth Rs 400 crore and handing it over to a real estate developer close to the ruling BJP for a paltry Rs. 13 crore (India Today, June 2010; Tehelka, November 2010; Hill Post, April 2012) .

To conclude, corruption appears to be the major obstacle in the path of development of Uttarakhand. It is principally a governance issue and a challenge to the democratic functioning of a state. It is a failure of both institutions as well as the larger framework of social, political, economic and judicial checks and balances required to govern the state effectively.

The Ability to Spend Allocated Funds:

The significance of administrative capacity as a determining variable for development is based on its relationship between the resources utilized, programmes implemented and the outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 3, the administrative capacity of an organization or an institution can be evaluated by one's ability to execute the resources to produce desired results. Implementation is defined as the 'operational process needed to produce expected outcomes' (Milio, 2007: 430). Milio in her study has argued that "every regional government has a set of capacities and the degree to which they exist determines output. In order to improve output, existing capacity need to be strengthened. Consequently, once the resources are implemented they should produce a result (institutional outcomes) measured in terms of GDP growth (2007: 431)."

This section will focus on the quantitative implementation of resources because resources not spent are lost and can have a negative impact on society, which sees it as failure of government. Secondly, the future allocation of funds is determined, among other factors, on the basis of spending capacity. A state that does not spend its allocation risks losing funds and the opportunities to foster regional development. Therefore, the fiscal situation of Uttarakhand, has been studied to evaluate its administrative capacity.

Uttarakhand is one of the fastest growing states of India. The state's economy grew at an annual growth rate of over 10 percent during the last decade. In terms of economic growth, the state's performance has been above the national average from 2002-03 to 2010–11. However, the fiscal position of the state indicates that it was only after the enactment of Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2005 that the state was able to maintain deficit parameters within limits.

The deficit indicators showed a rising trend till the year 2004-05, when GFD touched the level of 8.8 percent of GSDP and the revenue deficit stood at 3.8 percent of GSDP. In 2006- 07, there was a sharp decline in the deficit indicators and since then, relative stability has come in its fiscal position. The fiscal deficit as percentage of GSDP came down from a peak of 9.15 percent in 2004-05 to 3.18 percent in 2011 -12 (GoUK, 2011:36). The overall fiscal trends for the state are shown in the following table:

Table 4.2: Fiscal Trends for the State of Uttarakhand from 2006 – 2011.					
Heads	2006 - 2007	2007 - 2008	2008 – 2009	2009 - 2010	2010 -2011
Total Receipt	9297.07	9868.85	10908.13	12623.35	16695.21
Total Expenditure	9192.01	10486.56	11564.65	14196.96	16914.75
Revenue Deficit	896.37	636.53	239.53	-1171.34	162.10
As % of GSDP	2.86	1.77	0.60	-2.50	0.32
Fiscal Deficit	-885.77	-1742.40	-1844.96	-2783.31	-1747.15
As % of GSDP	2.82	4.83	4.59	5.94	3.41
GSDP (at current price)	31380	36045	40238	46872	51279
Source: Report by Third State Finance Commission available at www.uk.gov.in					

The above table indicates that even after the enactment of Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 2005, the fiscal deficit was at its peak in the year 2009. The Government of Uttarakhand claimed that it was partly due to the implementation of Sixth Pay Commission recommendations. The total expenditure has remained much higher than the total income. But the study of sectoral outlays for different time periods shows that the funds allocated for a particular sector have not been utilized efficiently. The under-utilization of funds points to the lack of administrative capacity of the state. The table 4.3 below shows the trends of failure in utilization of funds. The data shows the unevenness in the utilization of funds allocated for the respective sectors. In sectors like agriculture, rural development, social services, the funds used exceeded the allocations. For some sectors such as energy, science and technology, irrigation and flood control, general services etc. funds were utilized but not completely. This shows the lack of efficiency in implementing capabilities in the administration of Uttarakhand.

Table 4.3: Sectoral Outlays for different Time Periods								
Sectors	2002		2005		2008		2011	
	A.O.	A.E.	A.O.	A.E.	A.O.	A.E.	A.O.	A.E.
Agriculture and Allied Activities	18311	22687.31	24273.12	32489.10	32260.64	31267.77	52148.09	52148.09
Rural Development	8958	12017.04	14953	16522.98	32087.75	18883.51	56874.03	56874.03
Special Area Program	416	242.45	457	104.10	1895	0	0	0
Irrigation and Flood Control	7681	5824.02	7757.50	18812.50	61367.98	51165.10	53596.66	53596.66
Energy	31886	22537.67	47507.58	43293.29	50742.53	23256.49	40395.68	40395.68
Industry and Minerals	5273	7073.88	25807.02	12369.58	2127.39	1827.18	2827.72	2827.72
Transport	17260	23635.08	39966	58327.52	60788.53	77236.05	116313.62	116313.62
Communications	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
Science and Technology	761	1.45	600	77.50	24367.39	15685.74	18698.50	18698.50
General Economic Services	9386	6470.07	8065.05	6223.02	7659	7586.05	14506.41	14506.41
Social Services	36213	37895.66	93213.73	105054.04	194757.79	129231.49	269693.62	269693.62
General Services	16718	6559.75	7400	5270.27	9446	9217.40	154945.61	154945.61
Total	153313	144944.38	270000	302581.04	477500	365356.78	780000	780000
Source: Planning Commission								

Infrastructural Capacity

Infrastructural capacity is a significant aspect of the state. It is defined as the ability of institutions to exercise control over territory and regulate social relations. For the purpose of this study, it is defined as the ability of the state to provide physical and social infrastructure to its citizen. The focus has been on the physical and social infrastructure because it not only helps in raising the level of well-being of citizens but also contributes to and promotes the economic development of the state by increasing the factor productivity in the production process. The main categories of physical and social infrastructure which are assessed in this study are Roads, Power, Water and Sanitation, Education and Health.

Social Infrastructure:

Education:

The decade of the 1990s is noted for some landmark initiatives with regard to the economy and society in India and not least among them was the goal of extending primary, elementary and other school education to the people, especially in the rural regions. The National Education Policy and the UNDPs inclusion of education as a component of human development provided an impetus to the spread of education in India.

Literacy is a minimum measure of the educational attainments of a society. Despite the constraints imposed by geography, Uttarakhand enjoys a higher literacy rate (79.6 percent), relative to many other states and all India average (74 percent). However, the aggregate figure of 79.6 per cent literacy is highly illusory for the state in comparison to the national average as there are huge disparities of gender inequality (male – 88.30%, female – 70.70%) and spatial inequality. Relatively developed districts like Dehradun, Nainital and hilly districts like Chamoli, Pithroagarh, Almora record high literacy rates, while developed district like Hardwar and Udham Singh Nagar have low literacy rates (Census of India: 2011).

The data compiled by DISE (2013-14) shows that there are 15,680 primary schools in Uttarakhand, which is 1.08 % of the total number of primary schools at all-India level and serves 93.18 per cent of villages of Uttarakhand. There are 1,448,712 primary

schools at the all-India level. Still there are around 6 per cent of villages of Uttarakhand which do not have access to primary education.

The data reveals that the condition of infrastructure in primary education institutions of Uttarakhand is much better than in many other states of India, especially Jharkhand. Out of 15,680 primary schools in the state, around 95 percent schools are running in *pucca* buildings, only 2 percent schools have single classroom, while the remaining have more than one classroom; almost every school has toilet facility, only 0.02 per cent are without toilet facility, around 08 per cent are without girl's toilet. Drinking water facility is also available in around 96 percent schools.

What remains to be accomplished in terms of infrastructure is electrification of school buildings. Only57.2 per cent schools are electrified.

Another key issue which require attention is availability of teachers. In Uttarakhand state, on an average 2.5 teachers are teaching in primary school. Most of the primary schools have only two teachers looking after five classes, which has a direct impact on the quality of education they impart to the students. It is interesting to note that, on an average, urban schools have more teachers irrespective of type of management. 5 teachers in primary school were posted in urban areas as compared to 2.2 teachers in rural areas (7th All India School Education Survey).

The following table 4.4 shows the inter-district picture of infrastructural facility in education sector in the state of Uttarakhand.

Table 4.4: District wise Educational Infrastructure in Uttarakhand
(at Primary Level as on 31 March 2013)

S. no	District	Lit R*	T. Schl	SwSC	SwST	SwT	SwGT	SwDW	SwE
1	Almora	81.1	1621	3.1	14.3	100	100	93.6	43.3
2	Bageshwar	80.7	707	0	33.8	97.9	98.7	97.6	85.3
3	Chamoli	83.5	1103	0.9	11.2	96.2	100	98.1	20.1
4	Champawat	80.7	614	1.3	8	100	94.8	95	43.5
5	Dehradun	85.2	1381	1.5	5.1	92.3	99.9	99.8	87.8
6	Hardwar	74.6	1170	2.1	8	81.6	99.5	97.9	77.8
7	Nainital	84.9	1230	4.5	2.9	93.1	91.2	96.5	68
8	Pauri Garhwal	82.6	1830	3	9.2	99.9	100	94.2	40.4
9	Pithoragarh	82.9	1408	2.1	16	91.4	77.5	93.3	32.8
10	Rudraprayag	82.1	682	0.9	24.3	100	100	98.1	53.2
11	Tehri Garhwal	75.1	1729	1.6	9	88.2	96.9	93.6	56.2
12	Udham S. Nagar	74.4	1284	0.4	4.8	93.9	93.3	99.1	89.5
13	Uttarkashi	76	921	2.8	16.6	93.8	88.8	92.3	58.3

Source: District Report Card 2013 – 14, DISE

*For details of head of columns, see list of Abbreviations.

An analysis of the above data suggests a highly imbalanced picture of education sector in the districts of Uttarakhand. Districts in the plain terrain have more primary schools than districts located in the hilly terrain. There are districts like Dehradun (179.11%), Hardwar (108.96%) and Udham Singh Nagar (114.12%) where the villages have access to more than hundred percent primary schools, contrary to the districts like Pauri Garhwal (52.54%) where primary schools are less than sixty percent. Similarly, the institutions offering education are concentrated in one or two other cities like Dehradun, Hardwar, Nainital, Udham Singh Nagar, and Uttarkashi.

Analysis of the above table also shows that though Uttarakhand is doing well in terms of sanitation and building infrastructure, much greater effort is required in the area of supplying drinking water and electricity in the educational institutions. There is not even a single district where all primary schools have access to drinking water. The availability of electricity is very poor in rural primary schools, especially in the hilly districts like Chamoli, Champawat and Pithoragarh. In these districts, less than 50 percent schools are electrified.

During fieldwork in the districts of Rudraprayag and Bageshwar, it was noted that most of the primary schools are functional in *pucca* buildings but many primary schools lack the basic infrastructure such as blackboard, mat/desk and benches, and proper source of light. One of the respondent from Bageshwar district said that the primary reason for the decrease in the enrollment of student in government schools is the lack of basic infrastructure and unavailability of the teachers. This is also the cause of constant increase in the number of private schools as here one get every kind of facility required to attain the education[56].

Another respondent, Bhupesh Goswami, supported this argument when he said, "in most of the government schools, there is only one teacher. S/he has to manage all the things – administrative work as well as teaching. Therefore, it hardly matters to them whether students follow discipline or not, whether they study or not. Whereas in private schools, take note of all these factors. They emphasize not only on studies but

[56] In a personal Interview conducted during field work on 09th March 2015.

also on extracurricular activities. Therefore, parents prefer to send their children to the private schools".[57]

Health:

Living a healthy life is a basic right of the people. Health is a key aspect of development, and available health facilities, both preventive and curative are also a crucial determinant of the quality of life that people enjoy. The health indicators of Uttarakhand are better than many Indian states. However, the health system in the state faces several challenges in providing sufficient, appropriate and quality health service delivery. This includes a scattered population widely dispersed over difficult terrain, inadequate infrastructural facilities and lack of both human and financial resources.

The government in Uttarakhand is making efforts to provide healthcare services to the people. Various health schemes, projects and programs such as U Health Card[58], Mother and Child Tracking System (MCTS)[59], Khushiyon ki Sawari[60], School Health Card[61], etc. are being launched to make healthcare amenities and medical facilities available to its population. Uttarakhand is found to have performed significantly better than the parent state of Uttar Pradesh on most health indicators. In comparison

[57] In a personal interview conducted during fieldwork on 09 March 2015.

[58] U- Health Card is a scheme implemented by Uttarakhand Government in the year 2010 for Uttarakhand Government Employees & Pensioners. Under this scheme cashless medical facility is provided to Uttarakhand Government Employees/ Pensioners and their dependents on admission in Empanelled Private Hospitals.

[59] MCTS is an IT enabled application, which facilitate monitoring of universal access to maternal and child health services by all pregnant women and children. The system is developed jointly by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and National Informatics Centre and it was launched by the Government of India in December 2009 in collaboration with States/UTs. MCTS is designed to capture and track all pregnant women right from conception up to 42 days post partum and all new born up to five years of age to ensure that the pregnant woman and children receive 'full' set of medical services thereby contributing to the reduction of maternal, infant and child mortality.

[60] Khusiyon Ki Sawari was launched on September 19, 2011 with rented transports to provide pregnant women better health care services and ensure that the mother's and the infant's health are taken best care of. The State Government on March 30, 2013 had included as many as 90 new small ambulances for Khushiyon Ki Sawari scheme. The life-saving ambulances were equipped with the latest medical equipment and helped provide immediate medical relief to the villagers, living on the fringes of the State.

[61] School Health Program is being implemented in the State from the financial year 2010-11. This program is being run in the state in convergence with education department. There are 38 school health teams functional in the state for health examination of the school children. Each Primary and Upper Primary Govt. school targeted for health examination activity. For treatment of the serious diseases in children Rs. 1000000/- is proposed by the state for the year 2012-13. Treatment will be done under the RSBY empanelled Hospitals, and as per the RSBY rates.

to all India figures also, its performance is better, which is clearly depicted in the following table.

Table 4.5: Comparison between health indicators of Uttarakhand and India			
S. no	Health Indicator	Uttarakhand	India
1	Crude Birth Rate	18.6%	22.1%
2	Crude Death Rate	6.6%	7.2%
3	Infant Mortality Rate	38	47
4	Maternal Mortality Rate	188	212
5	Total Fertility Rate	2.5%	2.4%
6	Institutional Delivery Rate	36%	40.08%
Source: Compilation from SRS 2011 and Uttarakhand Annual Health Survey 2011			

Apart from awareness of healthy practices, the availability of healthcare facilities in the state is worse in comparison to national average. Uttarakhand currently has 1848 SHCs, 257 PHCs, and 59 CHCs against 151684 SHCs, 24448 PHCs and 5187 CHCs in India. The numbers of SHCs, CHCs are comparable to other states in India but the number of PHCs is markedly low.

The following table 4.6 shows the inter-district condition of healthcare infrastructure in Uttarakhand.

Table 4.6: District Wise Health Infrastructure of Uttarakhand (as on 31 March 2013)						
S. no	District	SHCs	PHCs	CHCs	Sub-Divisional Hospitals	District Hospitals
1	Almora	206	28	04	02	02
2	Bageshwar	84	12	02	00	01
3	Chamoli	110	13	05	00	01
4	Champawat	28	06	02	01	01
5	Dehradun	175	23	07	04	02
6	Hardwar	160	28	06	01	02
7	Nainital	143	19	07	04	02
8	Pauri Garhwal	239	32	05	03	02
9	Pithoragarh	156	18	04	00	02
10	Rudraprayag	68	13	02	00	01
11	Tehri Garhwal	204	28	06	01	01
12	Udham S. Nagar	153	27	06	01	01
13	Uttarkashi	82	10	03	00	01
	Total	1848	257	59	17	19
Source: Rural Health Statistics, 2014						

The data above clearly shows the shortfall, and spatial inequality in the positioning of health centers within the districts of the state.

With population norm for setting up of PHCs as 20,000 people per PHC, the state required 504 PHCs in 2013 as against an existing 257, which is a shortfall of 49 percent. Similarly, there is shortfall of CHCs (only 46 percent exists, short of 54 percent) and SHCs (54 percent are in position, a shortfall of 46 percent).

The above table shows that though there is an overall shortfall in the infrastructural capacity of the health sector in the state, certain districts such as Hardwar, Dehradun, Udham Singh Nagar, Nainital and Champawat face severe shortages. Only two districts, Almora and Tehri Garhwal have infrastructure as per their requirements.

The proportion of hospitals with their own buildings is below 24 percent in all the districts. The percentage of health centers reporting source of water varies from the lowest in Rudraprayag at 4.4 percent to the highest in Udham Singh Nagar at 71.4 percent. Similarly, the highest proportion of health centers with electricity facility was reported in Haridwar at 47 percent and lowest in Rudraprayag at 9 percent. Hospitals having toilet facility and sewage connected to municipal sewage varies between 17 to 41 percent across districts excepting Bageshwar where none of the health center reported having toilet facility. Overall, condition of hospitals in terms of basic infrastructure facilities is extremely poor (GOI: 2009).

Another obstacle in the development of health sector, as pointed out by the Chief Medical Officer of Rudraprayag, is the lack of medical practitioners. He said, "Whatsoever we have in terms of latest technology to treat our people in a better way is going waste as we lack the experts to operate those machines. We do have machines for MRI and CT scan here at district hospital but we do not have staff to operate them". He also pointed out that there is acute shortage of doctors also. He said, "In my district the total Sanctioned Position for doctors is 94 whereas only 23 are in position. The reason for this is that no one wants to be recruited to work in a rural area; everyone wants to join in an urban area. Secondly, we do not have medical colleges from where we can recruit our own people. People from the plains do not want to live a difficult life in the hills."[62]

[62] In a personal interview conducted during field survey in March, 2015.

While Uttarakhand has progressed as per the health indicators, its infrastructural capacity leaves much to be desired.

Roads:

Roads play a major role in the economic development of a country. They are an integral part of the transport network of the nation. Uttarakhand is predominantly a hilly terrain state with altitudes varying between 100 meters and 7,800 meters. Rail network is minimal and confined to the plains.

The road network in Uttarakhand is inadequate, both in rural as well as in urban areas. In a state with total area of 53,483 Sq. Km, the total length of connectivity of roads is just 52,628 Km. The State Public Works Department (SPWD) has been working towards upgrading light vehicle roads as all-weather motor roads, providing connectivity to all villages and towns. National Highways account for 3.88 percent of total road length in Uttarakhand as against 1.57 percent share at all India level. Similar to this, the state highways, major district roads and project roads also have higher percentage shares in total roads network in Uttarakhand. The state highways and major district roads constitute 7.19 percent, project roads constitute 31.62 percent and Other PWD roads constitute 41.11 percent share of total road network.

Contrary to highways and project roads, the rural and urban roads have lower percentage shares in the total roads network as against national average. The rural roads account for mere 7.69 percent in Uttarakhand in comparison to the national share of 58.33 percent, and urban roads account for 8.48 percent share in the total roads network.

The contribution of the state government in building the road network does not match the efforts put in by the central government in view of the fact that inadequacies continue to prevail in provisioning of inter-district and rural connectivity. As of March 2005, Uttarakhand had 45.26 km of roads in every 100 Sq. Km of geographical area, which is less than 50 percent as compared to the all India average of 103 Km road length for every 100 Sq. Km of area (GOI: 2009).

The inter-district picture suggests the same scantiness of road connectivity which is visible in the larger picture of the state. The study of ten different phases of road construction since 2000 under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) shows

that the proposed task of covering certain number of habitation has not been fulfilled in even a single phase. Two reasons were offered for the failure to accomplish this task. The first is the lack of approvals by the forest department, and the second is the difficult terrain due to which the the cost of constructing roads is almost double the cost of constructing roads in the plains areas. However, under the PMGSY, which is the main scheme designed to provide roads in rural areas, around 4404 km of roads were constructed during tenth phase of the scheme.

The following table 4.7 shows the inter-district picture of the network of roads in Uttarakhand.

Table 4.7: District wise Length of Roads and Habitation benefitted by them in Uttarakhand

S.no.	District	Total Number of Habitation	Habitation benefitted	Length completed (in Km.)
1	Almora	2172	139	530.187
2	Bageshwar	883	77	359.100
3	Chamoli	1166	96	395.420
4	Champawat	656	60	282.680
5	Dehradun	738	46	353.670
6	Hardwar	510	48	85.640
7	Nainital	1091	73	417.090
8	Pauri Garhwal	3151	117	571.740
9	Pithoragarh	1579	59	255.805
10	Rudraprayag	658	98	325.132
11	Tehri Garhwal	1801	129	566.175
12	Udham S. Nagar	674	33	87.360
13	Uttarkashi	682	34	174.440
	Total		1009	4404.439

Source: PMGSY 2013-2014

The above table shows the insufficiency of road connectivity in the districts of Uttarakhand. PMGSY covers around 7.80 percent of the habitations of Uttarakhand and shares 8.36 percent of the roads constructed by various agencies in Uttarakhand but one can easily identify the gaps in the coverage area between various districts. There are districts like Rudraprayag (14.89), Hardwar (9.41) and Champawat (9.14) where the network of roads constructed under PMGSY covers around 10 percent or more habitations, whereas in districts like Pauri Garhwal (3.71), Udham Singh Nagar (4.89) and Uttarkashi (4.98) the network of roads constructed under PMGSY covers

less than 5 percent of habitations. In Pithoragarh ,the percentage of habitations benefitted by PMGSY is less than two percent.

This data also indicates that state government schemes are aimed mainly towards reconstruction and improvement of existing roads rather than the construction of new roads. In short, one can say that the Uttarakhand has to go a long way in comparison to other states like Assam, West Bengal, and Orissa in terms of developing a good network of roads.

Power:

Electrification is one of the most vital requirements for the socio-economic development of a state. The linkages between energy, livelihood and socio-economic development are well recognized. Uttarakhand, well endowed with natural resources, has huge potential for generating power. The state has a total installed capacity of 2809.04 MW which is 1.03 percentage of India's total installed capacity. The state capacity to consume power per capita is 930 units which are much higher than the national average of 720 units (Central Electricity Authority: 2015).

As part of the interstate settlement on bifurcation, Government of India had allocated 353.3 MW out of the undivided Uttar Pradesh's share of 3399.9 MW in the central sector generating stations of the Northern region to Uttarakhand. Five years later, in 2006, this share was 466.7 MW. Uttarakhand's share of Central Generating Stations is around 3 to 4 percent of plant capacity. In the case of plants located in the state, the state is also entitled to 'free power' of 12 percent of generation (GOI, 2009: 65).

Uttarakhand realized the potential of generating power through renewable resources and has commissioned large numbers of Micro Hydro Projects (MHPs) in remote areas of the state where National or State grid cannot be extended. Till 2013, 44 such projects with a total capacity of 4.29 MW have been installed in the remote areas of the state and another 19 MHPs with a total capacity 2.315 MW are under implementation (Department of Renewable Energy).

Himanshu Joshi, Chief Development Officer of Bageshwar, Uttarakhand told that "out of 44 MHPs, 21 MHPs were carried out in the district of Bageshwar with the

total capacity of 1495 KW; which helped in electrifying 58 villages and 96 hamlets of the district"[63].

The state government is putting a great deal of effort into accomplishing the target of cent percent rural electrification. Around 96 % of the villages in Uttarakhand are provided with electricity by Uttarakhand Power Corporation Limited (UPCL), Uttarakhand Renewable Energy Development Agency (UREDA), Micro Hydel and Kuteer Jyoti connections. Under the village electrification program of MNRE through solar energy, UREDA has electrified 530 remote villages and 98 hamlets in the state. However, the maximum number of those villages and hamlets belong to the districts of Pauri Garhwal and Pithoragarh (Government of Uttarakhand).

The following table 4.8 presents the status of electrified villages in the districts of Uttarakhand.

Table 4.8: Status of Households electrification in the districts of Uttarakhand

District	Total no. of HH	Electricity	Kerosene	Solar Energy	Other Oil	Electrified Households	
						No.	%
Almora	2156	78.9	18.1	2.5	0.2	2156	100
Bageshwar	847	81.6	15.7	1.8	0.3	841	99.29
Chamoli	1133	83.4	11	4.8	0.2	1127	99.47
Champawat	651	72.1	22.8	4.4	0.2	641	98.46
Dehradun	717	96.3	3.1	0.1	0.1	717	100
Hardwar	511	85.8	13.1	0.1	0.2	511	100
Nainital	1065	90.3	8.1	1	0.1	1065	100
Pauri Garhwal	3114	89	9.1	1.4	0.1	3114	100
Pithoragarh	1566	85.5	11.6	2.5	0.1	1537	98.14
Rudraprayag	644	91.9	7.1	0.5	0.1	644	100
Tehri Garhwal	1764	87.8	9.4	2.2	0.2	1758	99.65
Udham S. Nagar	652	84.9	14	0.2	0.2	652	100
Uttarkashi	672	79.1	17.8	2.5	0.2	672	100
Source: Census of India 2011							

The above data indicates that Uttarakhand has almost reached its target of cent percent electrification through its various agencies. It also shows the substantive use of kerosene and solar energy for the process of electrification. For example, districts

[63] Interview conducted during field survey in 2015.

like Udham Singh Nagar and Uttarkashi are fully electrified but the use of Kerosene plays a substantial role in it. Similarly, solar energy plays a significant role in the districts of Chamoli and Champawat.

Drinking Water and Sanitation:

According to the State Water Policy of Uttarakhand, only 3 percent of annual rainfall in the state will suffice to meet the state's total water needs for all purposes. Yet, with growing population and rising standards of living, a shortage of water is felt in both the regions – Kumaon and Garhwal.

The quality of drinking water and sanitation play a significant role in maintaining the good health of the population. Many households attempt to improve the quality of water they drink and the cleanliness around them by adopting various methods. As per to the 69th round of National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) Report on 'Key Indicators of Drinking Water, Sanitation, Hygiene, and Housing Conditions in India' (2013), 92.8 percent households have access to improved source of drinking water in rural Uttarakhand while the figure is 99.9 percent for urban Uttarakhand. However, the proportion of households having access to drinking water within their premises is low and there is also a rural-urban gap. In the rural region, only 54 percent households have drinking water facility within premises as against 85.8 percent households of urban regions of Uttarakhand. The level of sufficiency of drinking water throughout the year is also decreasing year by year in the state. The proportion of households having access to sufficient drinking water throughout the year in the rural areas of Uttarakhand for the year 2012 was 87.7 percent and 90 percent for the urban area (NSSO, 2013).

The following table 4.9 shows the inter-district picture of the proportion of households having access to drinking water from various sources.

Table 4.9: District Wise proportion of Households having access to drinking water from various sources.

District	Treated Tap Water	Covered Well	Hand pump	Tube Well	Spring	Within Premises	Near Premises	Away
Almora	58.8	2.1	4.2	0	1.1	26.1	47.2	26.7
Bageshwar	54.7	2.5	3.2	0.1	1.1	24.8	47.6	27.6
Chamoli	63.4	0.7	1.1	0	2.3	37.1	38	24.9
Champawat	49.6	1.9	16.7	1.2	0.9	36.6	37.4	26
Dehradun	77.1	0.2	11.1	2	0.2	81	12.1	6.9

Hardwar	34.7	0.1	54	3.8	0	75.8	16.9	7.3
Nainital	65.5	0.4	8.4	4.2	0.3	62.9	22.5	14.7
Pauri Garhwal	61	0.7	2.9	1.2	1.5	36.2	44.6	19.2
Pithoragarh	56	1.9	4.6	0	1	41.8	36.2	22
Rudraprayag	64.2	0.8	2.2	0	1.2	30.2	40.7	29.1
Tehri Garhwal	58.9	1.1	5.6	0	6.3	32.2	37.8	30
Udham S. Nagar	27.7	0.2	58.5	3.3	0	81	15.3	3.7
Uttarkashi	62.5	0.7	1.9	0	4.1	42.9	28.7	28.4
Uttarakhand	53.9	0.7	22	2	1.1	58.3	26.6	15.2
Source: Census of India, 2011								

The above table indicates that a difference between the hilly and plains districts in terms of accessibility to safe drinking water from an improved source of water. The accessibility of drinking water is 90 percent in the plain terrain districts in comparison to the districts in the hilly terrain (67 percent). Similarly, the proportion of households having access to water within their premises is higher in the urban and plains areas in comparison to the hilly and rural areas.

Uttarakhand has the highest proportion of households with bathroom (79.5 percent) and latrine (80 percent) facility; much higher than the all India proportion (40.06 percent). With similar trends, the state has fair enough proportions of households having exclusive use of toilet (64.4 percent) and having access to improved source of latrine (85 percent) in comparison to the national averages (NSSO:2013). Inter-district situation is shown in the following table:

Table 4.10: Status of Sanitation Facilities in the districts of Uttarakhand (in %)

District	HHs having latrine facility	Flush latrine connected to 1)Piped Sewer System 2)Septic Tank 3)Other System			Alternative source 1)Public Latrine 2)Open		HHs having Bathing Facility 1)Bathroom 2)Enclosure w/o roofs		Waste water outlet connected to 1)Closed drainage 2)Open drainage 3)No drainage		
		1	2	3	1	2	1	2	1	2	3
Almora	55.3	3.9	33.9	2	1.7	43	50.4	5	11.2	25.4	63.4
Bageshwar	54.8	3.7	30.7	2.2	1.3	43.9	44.4	4.5	7.5	27.9	64.6
Chamoli	53.1	4	25.5	1.1	1.5	45.3	50.5	3.8	7.3	32.2	60.5
Champawat	46.4	1.9	36.3	1.4	1	52.6	39.1	6.2	6.8	32.6	60.6
Dehradun	86.4	23.3	52.2	1.1	1.4	12.1	83.9	4.1	41.4	35.6	22.9
Hardwar	66.6	20.4	29	1.4	1	32.3	61.8	19.8	18.4	69.7	11.8
Nainital	79.5	13.4	57.5	1	1.1	19.4	72.7	4.8	30.6	37.1	32.3

Pauri Garhwal	55.3	6.2	32.2	1.2	1	43.7	59.2	53	12.1	30	57.8
Pithoragarh	55.2	5.3	30.6	1.8	1.1	43.7	47.2	4.9	12.1	30.2	57.6
Rudraprayag	52.9	4.2	21.2	1.8	0.8	46.4	51.1	4.9	9.8	31.8	58.4
Tehri Garhwal	55.8	8.5	34.4	0.8	0.7	43.5	53.8	5.1	17.6	23.2	59.3
Udham Singh Nagar	69.3	8.2	52.2	1.9	1	29.7	54.5	14.7	9.3	61.6	29.1
Uttarkashi	43.7	3.8	33.6	0.8	1	55.2	44.5	9.7	14.3	27.6	58.1
Uttarakhand	65.8	11.8	40	1.4	1.1	33.1	60.5	8.8	19	42.1	38.9
Source: Census of India, 2011.											

The above table shows the poor picture of sanitation facilities in the state. While on an average 60 percent of the households have access to latrine facility, there is a substantial number of households who still use the method of open defecation. Similarly, the drainage system needs much more attention as in most of the districts more than 50 percent households do not have drainage or closed drainages. The data not only nullify the claim of good sanitation system in the state but also shows that most of the cleanliness campaigns exist on paper.

Conclusion:

The concept of development is much broader than that of economic growth. The idea of development of a country or state should not be defined only in terms of per capita income, but also in terms of adequate access to facilities that gives well-being and capability to the people. These include basic social services like education, health, sanitation and economic opportunities for everyone.

The growth rate of Uttarakhand was 4.4 percent in the 1990s. After attaining separate statehood, this growth rate has increased to 9.31 percent in the year 2010-11, which means that the growth performance of the state, given its specific conditions, has been impressive. However, the state is still faced with serious challenges of human development. There is an alarming intra-state disparity which poses a challenge to its development.

The findings of the study show that to enhance its administrative capacity, the state of Uttarakhand has to tackle corruption seriously. Most of the Chief Ministers of the

state were forced to quit because of their involvements in one or other case of embezzlement. Secondly, the state has to overcome the problem of lack of efficient human resources. We find that in terms of health infrastructure, the state has tried to provide the best equipment to its population but there is absence of efficient experts to operate these equipments.

In terms of infrastructural capacity, the state of Uttarakhand has been able to reach its people but there are wide gender and spatial inequalities. The rural-urban divide, gender gap, and the spatial inequality among the districts of the state indicate that, in order to provide the people with better prospects of development, the state has a long way to go. It also indicates that without the right institutions and good governance, economic growth does not necessarily transform into welfare for all.

Chapter 5

A Comparative Study of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand

Socio-economic backwardness and lack of development became powerful bases for the formation of new smaller states in India, unlike earlier times when states were carved out on the basis of language and culture. However, a glance at the growth journey of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand tells us that the mere formation of a smaller state is no guarantee for a better life for the populations for whom these states have been created.

Jharkhand appears to be the poorer performing between the two. With no agenda of development, the state of Jharkhand has turned into a mining hell of "predatory growth", eventually resulting in a series of scams and criminal proceedings being initiated against the ministers of the state. On the other hand, in Uttarakhand, the focus of the state government is solely on how to make it more tourist friendly rather than planning for the rehabilitation of displaced residents. There is abject callousness in dealing with natural disasters such as floods, landslides, cloud bursts, and so forth. There is little concern demonstrated for the "local" people in whose name the state was created (*The Hindu*: 12 March 2014).

The development strategy adopted by both states resulted in an over-exploitation of raw materials such as mining of minerals, instead of the creation of industries; unjustifiable land deals; and the conversion of fertile agricultural land into real estate business.

To perform the tasks of development and growth, a state requires infrastructural and administrative capacities as its base, but in the case of Jharkhand as well as Uttarakhand, one observes that both these capacities are insufficient. This chapter will present a comparative picture of both the states and will seek to analyze the factors responsible for the insufficient and inadequate capacity of the states to develop – socially, economically and politically. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section compares the growth journey of the two states. The second section discusses the common factors responsible for the inadequate and insufficient administrative and infrastructural capacities of both the states. The third section describes the factors accountable for the under-development of the state of Jharkhand. These factors are unique to the state of Jharkhand. The fourth section deals with the factors which are distinctively responsible for the slow growth of the state of Uttarakhand.

A Comparative Study of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand

Though at first glance one may conclude that the separation of these two regions from their parent states have resulted in positive outcomes, adeeper look into the process and end results of development, in both the regions (now states) tells a different story. The comparison between new states and their parent states shows that there has been some improvement in the lives of people and economic growth (See Table 1) but the comparison between Jharkhand and Uttarakhand shows the difference between their state capacity to develop (See table 2). The difference between the levels of growth attained by these two states also indicates the importance of state capacity.

Table 1: Comparison between the states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand with their Parent States in terms of development

Description	2000-01				2015-16			
	Bihar	Jharkhand	U.P.	U.K.	Bihar	Jharkhand	U.P.	U.K.
Gross State Domestic Product	4.9	3.6	4	4.6	11.4	6.3	6.8	12.3
Per Capita Income	6,554	9,980	9,721	14,932	13,632	21,734	17,349	44,723
Poverty Rate	54.4%	45.3%	40.9%	32.7%	53.5%	39.1%	37.7%	18.0%
Literacy Rate	47%	53.5%	56.2%	71.6%	63.8%	67.6%	69.7%	79.6%
Infant Mortality Rate	60	49	71	43	38	30	44	25
Source:	Planning Commission of India							

The above table clearly comprehends that these smaller states have fared well in comparison to their big parent states. The performance of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand has remained at par with the performance of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, in the last fifteen years. In terms of GSDP, though Jharkhand was not able to grow as fast as Bihar, it has been able to improve its condition as a region after separation. Similarly, on other fronts also, Jharkhand has managed to do well in comparison to the period before separate statehood. Uttarakhand has performed very well in comparison to its parent state, as after attaining separate statehood it has managed to perform three

times better than before. The GSDP of Uttarakhand region till 2000 was 4.6 whereas in last fifteen years it has managed to bring it to 12.3 per cent.

However, the comparison between the performance of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand clearly shows the difference between the state capacities of both the states. Both the states started their journey in the year 2000 with a wealth of natural resources and human resources on their side. However, while one was able to make its mark somewhere in the middle of the continuum of governance and the other lies at its lowest end.

Table 2: Comparison between Jharkhand and Uttarakhand						
Description	Jharkhand			Uttarakhand		
	2000-01	2015-16	Percentage of Improvement/ Reduction	2000-01	2015-16	Percentage of Improvement/ Reduction
Gross State Domestic Product	3.6	6.3	2.7	4.6	12.3	7.7
Per Capita Income	9,980	21,734	2.1	14,932	44,723	3.0
Poverty Rate	45.3%	39.1%	6.2	32.7%	18.0%	14.7
Literacy Rate	53.5%	67.6%	14.1	71.6%	79.6%	8
Infant Mortality Rate	49	30	19	43	25	18
Source:	Planning Commission of India					

The above table clearly shows the difference in the performance of both the states in the same period of time. In comparison to Uttarakhand, Jharkhand has been unable to manage resources in a way that can earn profit for it. In a span of fifteen years, where Uttarakhand was able to triple the per capita income of its people, Jharkhand was able to just double it despite having much more by way of natural resources. Similarly, if we take into account the actual number of poor people in the state, then also the performance of Uttarakhand is far better than Jharkhand. Jharkhand was able to reduce the number of poor people in the state by 1 million (from 12 million to 11 million) whereas Uttarakhand reduced this number by 12 million (from 29 million to 17 million).

On almost all development parameters, Uttarakhand has performed better than Jharkhand, which clearly shows that more than the access to natural resources and the size of a state, the role played by the process of governance, the policies and the administrators who implement those policies, is significant in achieving development. Therefore, the following sections of this chapter will discuss the factors responsible for inadequacies in the capacity of both the states and identify certain factors which are particular to respective states.

Common Factors Responsible for Low State Capacity in the States of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand

The present scenario of development in the states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand shows that the phenomenon of 'resource curse' is not new or unique for these states. The analysis of the way in which the infrastructural and administrative capacities of these states have developed in the last decade indicates that the phrase 'small is beautiful' is proving to be only partially true for Jharkhand and Uttarakhand.

According to the secondary data and the field survey, the factors responsible for the slow development of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand are: corruption, the increased control of bureaucracy, and less participation by women.

Corruption:

Corruption is one of the greatest obstacles in the process of economic and social development around the world. It is the term used to refer to the use of public office for private gain, where an official entrusted with carrying out a task by the public engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal (Bardhan, 1997:1321). Corruption does not just steal money from where it is required the most but it also leads to weak governance which in turn can fuel organized criminal networks and promote crimes (UNODC, n.d.:01)

During the field visits to all the four gram panchayats (DhatoKhurd, Kisko Farsalli-Palli, and Kimana) of two states, it was asserted by most people that, with the formation of a separate state, the incidence of corruption has increased. They argued that with access to more resources and revenues, the incidence of corruption has not

been confined to big ministers and higher officials but has now become a norm in the newly institutionalized PRIs also. In both the states, respondents discussed how the number of bribe takers has increased with the attainment of statehood and how the increasing incidence of corruption is creating obstacles in the process of development of the state.

Increased Control of Bureaucracy

Another important factor responsible for the insufficient state capacity of the states is the increased control of bureaucracy. It has been noted in all the panchayats of both the states during field survey that over time the control of bureaucracy over the use of resources has increased. If one evaluates the pattern of interaction among the institutions of governance, it is observed that though both the states – Jharkhand and Uttarakhand- claim to follow decentralization 'the bottom-up approach', in practice it is very much a top down approach that is followed. Villagers have to look to the officials of district administration for approval of their each and every move.

Though it has been asserted by the state governments that the policy formulation process has moved away from the domain of bureaucracy and experts to consultations with many stakeholders from the public and private sectors and civil society, in reality it is observed that at the grassroots level the domain of bureaucracy has increased. For example, in the state of Jharkhand, during field survey, it was observed that, though PRIs have increased the inclusivity of the policies with effective and transparent verification of the beneficiaries, they have not had autonomy in terms of the choice of projects and the manner in which they are to be implemented. A protest called by the heads of panchayats across the state and its mobilization was also witnessed in the district of Hazaribagh. This protest was mobilized to demand the full rights of the panchayats.

Similarly, in the state of Uttarakhand also, it was observed that even the micro plans, which are the basic plans for the management of the panchayat, are formulated with consensus of the villagers, but require consultations with the BDO. The Executive Committee has been provided with the power to formulate bye-laws for managing the panchayat but those laws can be implemented only when the consent of District Magistrate has been given.

Less Participation by Women

Women constitute half the population and more than forty percent of the workforce, but the presence of women in the institutions of governance has been negligible. The study of four districts (Hazaribagh, Lohardaga, Bageshwar and Rudraprayag) reveals that women's participation in formal structures of governance has remained a mere illusion. It was also found that all the women members have not contested voluntarily. They were frequently persuaded to contest elections because the seats were reserved for women and because their male relatives wanted to retain political power and status within the family. In many cases, women members are treated as mere proxies or surrogates for their husbands. For example, the pramukh of Farsalli-Palli and Kimana panchayats were mere proxies and contested elections for their husband and son respectively. Similar was the case in the Dhatokhurd Panchayat of Katkamsandi Block, Hazaribagh where all the decisions and works related to panchayat were done by the husband of Pramukh except the signing of documents.

Factors Responsible for the Under-Development of the State of Jharkhand

The present situation of Jharkhand indicates that all the political processes in the state revolve around the idea of distribution of resources and implementing the idea of development. A wide range of policies were reinforced with additional funds while new ones were simultaneously formulated to ensure the holistic development of the region. Despite all the efforts the state has been unable to develop.

The field survey conducted during the study indicated that there are three major factors responsible for the slow development of the state like Jharkhand. They are: political instability; the role played by caste and the presence of left wing extremism. The fieldwork conducted in 2 districts (Hazaribagh and Lohardaga) in Jharkhand indicates that the major security threat in these areas has been violence perpetuated by left wing extremists. Many development projects, such as roads, electricity and health centres, have been approved but were either not constructed or not in functioning mode. This is due to two reasons: (a) either funds for the projects are eaten up by the

bureaucrats at the district and block level and by the members of the panchayats, or (b) obstructed/stopped constructions midway by the contractors because they have failed to pay the share of bribe to the various Naxal organizations.

Though, in order to combat the situation, the state has launched a dual strategy of modernising and increasing the physical strength of the security apparatus and increasing developmental funds, evidence from the Naxal-affected districts shows how these increased funds have actually allowed the extremists to sustain themselves through a levy economy[64].

Political Instability

Political stability and economic development are deeply interconnected. It has been established in the literature that the states which have been able to achieve high growth rates are stable. Here stability means a predictable political environment, which in turn attracts investment both internally and externally. Political stability in the context of development means the rule of law, strong institutions rather than the powerful individuals, a responsive and efficient bureaucracy, and low corruption (Sheperd 2010:09).

Since its inception in November, 2000, government formation has been a game in the state of Jharkhand. In the last 14 years, it has seen 10 governments and two stints of President's rule. The longest serving government last two and half years and the shortest for eleven days (The Times of India, 8 Jan. 2013). If one leaves out the first Chief Minister Babulal Marandi, power has shuffled mainly between Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) president Shibu Soren and BJPs Arjun Munda.

Unstable governments have turned out to be a stumbling block in Jharkhand's growth. Supported by another respondent, who said that "while statehood was won by tribal movements in combined Bihar, no state level leader have grown here[65]"; the Former Deputy Chief Minister and AJSU Party president Sudesh Mahto, said that the lack of leadership is the reason behind Jharkhand's under-development. The former chief minister Madhu Koda blamed the pulls and pressures from regional parties making up

[64] In interviews conducted during fieldwork in Hazaribag district, Jharkhand in 04/11/12 and 06/11/12; in Lohadaga district, Jharkhand on 12/11/ 12.
[65] In an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2015.

a coalition government for the unstable governance in the state (*The Economic Times*, 28 Nov. 2014).

Respondents also stated that the biggest contributory factor for instability in the state is the absence of institutional development. In the district office, they argued that "To implement state, district or panchayat plans, a policy is required and to put a policy into effect institutional development is must, but Jharkhand being a recently formed state is too young to allow it to happen[66]".

In short, the state of Jharkhand, in its fifteen-year journey, has never experienced a stable government which is another reason for its under-development.

Caste System

The emergence of cooperative behavior is very difficult in a socio-economic structure where heterogeneous agents are present. Divergence of interests is likely to emerge when socially and economically heterogeneous groups are sharing resources since their interests in resource management may significantly differ from each other.

In comparison to Uttarakhand, Jharkhand is very diverse society. Caste has not vanished from society and political affairs. On the contrary, it appears to be a rigid and publicly legitimate category and institution in the state of Jharkhand (Jha and Pushpendra, 2012:04). It is an important part of people's identity and an instrument to spell out claims as a group. It has been observed that caste identity plays a prominent role in government departments, the selection of beneficiaries for reserved seats and development schemes, in canvassing and in the election of representatives.

Caste plays very important role at all levels in Jharkhand. Area wise vote bank politics is the best example for this. The benefit of policies and schemes goes to those communities or villages/ tolas who have voted for the candidate. The candidate comes to know about this because the result of the counting of votes is declared ward-wise and candidates have paid the voters before the elections. The field research reveals that caste also plays an essential role in village level panchayat elections. People vote for members of their caste group because they assume that their elected candidate, if from the same caste, will feel 'a moral duty to look after members of his caste'. As

[66] In an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2015.

elected local representatives, the choice of beneficiaries for development schemes is made in favor of their own caste group.

Another example which shows that caste plays a significant role in the process of governance is the way extremist groups function in the state. The road from Hazaribag to Shila panchayat is dominated by two Naxalite groups JPC and TPC which are commanded by Ganjus and Yadavas respectively. The condition of the road is relatively good in the area which is dominated by these groups (Sultana to Ichak is dominated by JPC and Semariya to Serendag is dominated by TPC). But their zone of contest lies between Simariya and Shila, as this area is not controlled by either of the groups. The roads are in a deplorable condition as no contractor is willing of work in this area. Both the groups claim that the cost of business within a levy economy in such a situation is high, and therefore, the levy shall be paid to both the groups.

In the nearby Piri Panchayat, the yadava, savs, telis and baniya rule the political economy of an agriculturally productive gram Panchayat. The Mukhiya, wife of the local seller of agricultural inputs (HYV, Fertilizer, etc) and the local intermediary has been active in organizing women who still remained relegated to the domestic chores of the household. However, their influence extends to the agrarian sector as they are increasingly involved in animal rearing and other efforts. However, caste plays an important role for this baniya family in a yadava dominated village as they play one yadava against the other. Furthermore, the Mukhiya pati, who had till elections, got allotted the highest number of wells under MNREGA for his 7 acres of land, is now the distributor of these wells across the Panchayat at an appropriate cost.

To sum up, it can be said that caste is a major obstacle in the process of development in the state of Jharkhand.

Presence of Left Wing Extremism:

Left-wing extremists, popularly known as Maoists worldwide and as Naxalites in India,have been gaining in strength and influence for some time. Today, the menace of Left-wing extremism is the single internal security threat that affects the largest number of States in India. There are more than 30 Left-wing extremist groups which are in operation in the country (Ramana,: 2003:01). Some of them have consistently followed a violent agenda, rejecting parliamentary politics. Others have been

participating in the democratic process with considerable success, while yet others maintain underground cadres, and also participate in parliamentary politics.

In the case of the state of Jharkhand, nearly seventy-five percent of the problem of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is inherited from the erstwhile state of Bihar. In fact, reports indicate that the presence of LWE is the gravest challenge for the state and one of the major reasons responsible for sluggish growth and inadequate state capacity.

'Naxalism' is a movement that was initiated in the year 1967 as a localized revolt against an oppressive landlord in the remote village of Naxalbari in the state of West Bengal (Verma, 2011: 04). Since that time, the movement has greatly expanded and grown and now affects many populated states which are "predominantly agricultural and chronically impoverished" (Morison, 2012: 57). The term 'Naxal' is an umbrella term which comprises a large number of groups with different interests and ideologies, various methods of achieving their goals, and greatly differing levels of activity and/or violence. Regardless of differences, however, the basic premise of the movement over the last 40 years has been to fight against the exploitation and oppression of the rural poor, while engaging in the struggle for social and economic justice. Specifically, this has meant addressing concerns such as "land redistribution, access to public commons, wage increase and anger against sexual oppression of dalit women by dominant castes" (Jha and Pushpendra, 2012: 12).

The Naxal movement in the state of Jharkhand as well as in other states is comprised of dozens of different fractions. Over the years, these fractions have merged and split with remarkable frequency, often due to disputes between castes (Prakash et.al., 2012: 18-19). The most important merger took place in 2004 and resulted in the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) - CPI (Maoist), which is active at the national level (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011: 17). According to the field work, it seems that there are four major Naxal parties currently active in the state of Jharkhand, namely CPI (Maoist), The Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC),the Jharkhand Prastuti Committee (JPC) and the Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT). Two further parties are present in the region as well – the Shastr Pratirodh Manch (SPM) and the Revolutionary Core Committee (RCC) – but according to the Naxal activists interviewed, these are both minor parties.

The districts in which the fieldwork was conducted present a wide range of reasons for the rise of Naxal organisations. In the Lohardaga district, villagers in general agreed that starvation, illiteracy and unemployment are the major causes for the rise of Naxalism in the district. People who do not even have the means to migrate to cities for work have been the most vulnerable lot in terms of joining Naxal outfits.[67] However, in the resource and revenue rich region of Hazaribagh, the lure of 'power flowing from the barrel of the gun' and the potential for social mobility by tapping into the overflowing levy economy seem to be the primary factors behind the rise in the numbers of Naxal organisations and their members.[68]

The presence of these organizations has also affected the lives of civilians adversely. The Naxalites have been accused of violating various principles of human rights including forcibly displacing people, recruiting children, targeting schools and public facilities, making civilians the objects of armed conflict, and participating in vigilante justice (Field Survey; Sahay, 2008:09).

It has been asserted by the respondents during fieldwork that the presence of Naxalites has adversely affected the infrastructural capacity of the state. It has been reported that in the Naxalite conflict, from 2008 to 2010, several school buildings, health centres and railway stations were blown up and at least 37 schools were occupied at some point by security forces in the state of Jharkhand[69].

One of the respondents told us about the incident in which "a boy in Mandar Block was tortured for refusing to join the Naxalites Children brigade"[70]. He also confirmed incidents in which the Naxalites damage common property so that it cannot be used by security forces. He mentioned an incident in which "suspected Maoists blew up

[67] Most of villagers participating in group discussion, in one of the interior villages in Kisko block on 26/12/12 agreed to this being the primary causal factor behind people joining naxalism.
[68] Every single respondent, across categories of social actors, from the districts of Hazaribag, Chatra and Gaya seems to agree that the potential social mobility through appropriated levies seems to be most crucial factor in leading more and more people to join naxal organizations. These responses were collected over the course of 3 fieldworks between November, 2011 and February, 2015.
[69] Raj Kumar, "State Police Launch Leaflet War on Rebels", The Telegraph, Calcutta, India, June 26, 2009; Zeenews.com, "Maoists Blow Up School Building in Jharkhand", May 23, 2009; PTI, "Maoists Blow Up School Building, Health Centre", March 23, 2009; PTI, "School Building Blown Up by Maoists in Palamu", April 10, 2009; Indo Asian News Service, "Maoists Blow Up Railway Station, School in Jharkhand", April 22, 2009.
[70] In a personal interview during fieldwork in 2015.

school building in Paki block, Palamu district and left a pamphlet at the scene stating that the building was destroyed to prevent security forces using it in future"[71].

The District Planning Officer, Hazaribagh stated that "Naxals play a very negative role in the entire scheme of affairs. They create hurdles in the development of the state. They interfere in development projects by demanding a levy from the contractors or else they do not allow the construction of any project to take place. Villagers as well as the administrators are living under threat of the fear created by the Naxals".

Another respondent, a para-teacher by profession, also said that "even with the employment opportunities present in the region, nobody would like to work over here because of these Naxal outfits. No one knows whose turn it is next and nobody would like to work in exchange for their lives". When asked about the kind of fear from the Naxal outfits, he cited a few examples in which government teachers and their families were killed and thrashed by the armed squad of Naxalites for refusing to make payments to them[72].

In short, most of the respondents from the districts under study argued that the presence of Naxal outfits in the state has had an adverse impact on its development.

Factors Responsible for the Insufficient State Capacity in the State of Uttarakhand

The political processes in the state of Uttarakhand also revolve around the idea of distribution of resources and the governmental mechanisms of implementing the idea of development. A wide range of policies were reinforced while new ones were simultaneously formulated to ensure holistic development of the state, but the state has remained unable to optimize the benefits of all the resources it has. The reasons for the inadequate state capacity of the state are: the difficult terrain of the state, new reforms and state policies, and migration.

[71] In a personal interview conducted during fieldwork in 2015.
[72] In a discussion during field survey in 2015, this respondent cited the incidents which took place in the district of Seraikela – Kharsawan on April 8, 2009 and in the district of Chatra in the year 2011.

Difficult Topography of the State:

Uttarakhand is primarily a mountainous state as the plains constitute only about 10 percent of its geographical area. Out of 13 districts, only Haridwar, Udham Singh Nagar and some parts of Dehradun and Nainital districts are in the plains. The state is a part of the central Himalayas and most of the northern area comprises of high ranges and glaciers and the lower reaches are covered by dense forests.

During the field work, almost all the respondents argued that due to its different and difficult terrain, most of the revenue every year is spent on repair and maintenance of the existing infrastructure instead of developing a new one. The cost of developing infrastructure in this state is much higher than the other states because of its different topography.

One of the respondents from a government office told us that the cost of service delivery in the state is almost 2 to 3 times more than the national average due to its hilly difficult terrain and notifications under Green Statutes.

The Chief Medical Officer of Rudraprayag said that the officers do not wish to work and relocate to this region due to its landscape. "People like to visit this place and enjoy but hardly anyone want sto stay back and work here. We have positions lying vacant in our department but the younger generation does not want to serve here"[73].

The difficult geographical conditions of the state affect its administrative and infrastructural capacity the most.

New Reforms and State Policies:

There were high expectations among the local people that the formation of a separate state would bring about an economic upsurge. However, the expectations were disappointed as development work took place in the regions which were already developed. The Industrial policy introduced by the state attracted numerous industrial plants but only in the urban plains region while the rural hilly districts were left out. This created a situation of regional inequality and imbalanced development. As per the industrial policy of the state, big industrial units were given many benefits such as tax exemptions for a time period of five years, excise duty exemptions for an initial

[73] In an interview conducted during field work in March, 2015.

ten years, eligibility for capital investment subsidy and so on, whereas no attention was given to the setting up of small scale industries and cottage industries in the rural areas.

Similarly, a great deal of emphasis was given to the tourism sector. The state offers enormous opportunities for the development of a vast array of tourism related activities and services. In fact, it is the first state of India that has established a Tourism Development Board to promote, advise, regulate and licensing authority for tourism in the state and have formulated a detailed tourism policy. This policy also gives various fiscal advantages to the big investors. However, the policy makers and investors, while developing infrastructure for tourism and the related activities ignores the geographical conditions of the state which invites natural disasters like landslides and earth quakes, and worsens the conditions for its already vulnerable population.

Moreover, the state comes under an eco-sensitive zone, so while formulating policies to develop the state it is required that the policy makers keep in mind that nature must also be taken care of. However, it has been observed that despite facing natural disasters almost every year, the state has never been able to manage the situation, even for a single year. Every year, destruction due to natural disasters like cloud bursts, landslides and floods occurs, leading to both human and infrastructural loss.

Migration:

Migration from one area to another in search of improved livelihood has been a key feature of human history. While some regions and sectors fall behind in their capacity to support populations, others move ahead and people migrate to access these emerging opportunities. Employment generation in Uttarakhand has always faced a constraint because of the hilly terrain and forest landscape. Agriculture has not progressed in the same way as in some of the neighboring states due to problems of irrigation, low levels of fertilizers, and small size of land holdings. Industrialization on a larger scale is ruled out due to the geography of the region. People have to look for job elsewhere and hence, migration is high.

The Chief Development Officer of Bageshwar said, in an interview, that “the brain-drain concept has adversely affected the state’s effort in launching any ambitious scheme of development. Many remote villages of Uttarakhand have turned into ghost

villages as they have been abandoned by the villagers. In search of jobs they will go till Punjab and Rajasthan but will not work over here in the rural areas. If our own people will migrate, then nobody from outside will come to develop us. We have to develop our region ourselves"[74].

Conclusion:

Though both the regions were carved out of their parent states after a long people's movement, and with high expectations of economic and human development, they were not able to achieve this for their populations because of inadequate state capacity. There are differences in their performances on the development front because of differences in their levels of state capacity. The major factors responsible for the insufficient state capacities of both the states are corruption, the increased control of bureaucracy or the centralization of power, and the low participation rate of women in the process of governance.

The difference in state capacities also suggests that it is the quality of institutions of governance and not the quantity of resources that form a significant explanation of development outcomes. Access to resources does not guarantee the overall development of the region and its people. It is the quality of institutions of governance which matters.

[74] Interview conducted during fieldwork in March 2015.

Conclusion

A sense of strong regional affinity, intensified by uneven economic conditions and leading to wide noticeable disparities in terms of development was the main reason behind the demand and creation of smaller states like Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. Following the argument given by Development Economists in the 1950s[75], it was argued that the regions of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand have remained backward due to injustice, exploitation and internal colonialism; otherwise, these regions are full of natural resources which if utilized to their optimal level can turn into huge amount of profits which can be converted into socio-economic development of their people.

However, the present scenario of development in the states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand shows that a variant of the phenomenon of 'resource curse' afflicts these states. Our analysis of the way in which the infrastructure and administrative capacity of these states have manifested in the last one decade indicates that the phrase 'small is beautiful' is proving to be only partially true for Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. The analysis shows that although the growth performance of smaller states is commendable, the belief that creation of smaller states will necessarily lead to faster growth and development of the region is simply not true.

This study has shown that the interaction of socio-economic, physical and institutional variables influences the process of development of any state. In the process, the following insights have come to the fore.

There has been much debate about whether the new, smaller states with huge amounts of natural resources have done better in terms of both governance and economic performance. According to the literature on the local resource curse, the main category of explanation relies on the interplay between local political institutions and local economic benefits from natural resources. There could be both positive as well as negative effects of such economic benefits. The positive effect includes improved provision of local public goods if revenues accrue locally and politicians are responsive to local interests, while negative effects are driven by lack of political responsiveness and capture of rents (Dhillon et al, 2015:04).

[75] In 1950s Development Economists argued that resource abundance would help the backward states. According to them, States with abundant natural resources could most easily overcome the problems of capital shortfalls because of their ability to export primary commodities and ability to attract foreign investors (Ross: 1999).

The empirical evidence from the present study confirms the argument of Caselli and Michaels (2013), Brollo et al. (2013) and Khemani (2013) who argue that revenue benefits can leave public goods provision unaffected and lead instead to corruption. Khemani (2013: 22-23) argues that a state/region where politicians make transfers to a key group of voters to retain power can also result in lower welfare. Based on the analysis of four districts of two states, it has been observed that despite having huge amounts of natural resources, Jharkhand was unable to perform well in comparison to its parent stateBihar and Uttarakhand, because of poor and corrupt leadership and because of the availability of large mining rents.

The study shows that the impact of resource curse is more on the state of Jharkhand than Uttarakhand because post break up Uttarakhand does not have very much in point source resources whereas Jharkhand received almost all of the resources relative to Bihar. In Jharkhand, the ruling elite use the state's huge mineral resources for fulfilling the ambition of private accumulation. They get a share of rents or profits by using their powers to issue licences, etc. Best example is Madhu Koda, the fifth Chief Minister of Jharkhand.

The resource curse is also compounded by political and administrative instability in both the states. Both the states have witnessed the frequent change of Chief Ministers and governments along with frequent transfer of officials. Hence, there is rush to make money among the ministers and officials before the government changes or official is transferred.

The study also confirms the fact that these states are facing the problem of resource curse because of the state's institutional inability to extract and deploy resources, enforce property rights, and resists the demands of interest groups and rent seekers.

Another important insight of the study is that there is no direct relationship between formation of smaller states and improvement in economic conditions. The field study proves that the assumption that the formation of a separate state will lead to more funds and hence more development is a mere illusion. In fact, receipt of more funds leads to more corruption into the system.

Though it has been observed that the state of Jharkhand has failed to exploit its natural resources endowments to drive its economic growth in the last fifteen years,

the spectacular growth performance of the state of Uttarakhand is not solely the result of its efficiency in exploiting its resources, but largely due to the tax concessions it receives being a hill state.

During the field survey, in all the four districts of two states, it was seen that most people felt that the incidence of corruption had increased with the formation of a separate state. They argued that with the access to more resources and revenues, the incidence of corruption were no longer confined to big ministers and higher officials but had now become a norm in the newly institutionalized PRIs also. In both the states, respondents recounted how the number of bribe takers has increased with the attainment of statehood and how the increasing incidence of corruption is creating obstacles in the process of development of the state.

The third significant insight of the study is that smaller states are more vulnerable to the pressures of corporations and multi-national corporations due to their small scale economies and the greed of the newly emergent regional elite. In both the states, the interviews in the field emphasized the nexus between the business man, politicians and bureaucrats. In the state of Uttarakhand, the competition between MNCs like TATA, Ashok Leyland, Vedanta, RSB Transmission and Bajaj Motors to set up manufacturing units is also a significant example which shows that there is a constant pressure by corporations on the economies of smaller states. Similarly, the presence of HINDALCO in Jharkhand and its say in the making of industrial and mining policies shows the vulnerability of the small scale economies of new smaller states.

The fourth significant insight of the study is that the creation of smaller geographical entities does not necessarily ensure better democratic governance. It is said that smaller states result in an easier and better administration as decentralized institutions are assumed to perform better on the criterion of efficiency and equity. It was assumed that the creation of separate states will expand direct citizen participation in local administration and local authorities will have better time and place specific information which will lead to better targeted policies and lower transaction costs. It was also believed that the formation of smaller states would facilitate people's participation in development and resource management as people can foregather to collectively debate and deliberate on issues of common concern.

However, during field work, it was observed that creation of smaller geographical as well as administrative entities does not necessarily ensure better democratic governance. It has been witnessed that over time the control of bureaucracy over the use of resources has increased. If one evaluates the pattern of interaction among the institutions of governance, it is observed that though both the states – Jharkhand and Uttarakhand- claim to follow a decentralized 'bottom-up approach', in practice it is very much a top-down approach. Villagers have to look to the officials of district administration for approval of their each and every move.

Though it has been asserted by the state governments that the policy formulation process has moved away from the domain of bureaucracy and experts to consultations with many stakeholders from the public and private sectors and civil society, in reality it is observed that at the grassroots level the sphere of bureaucratic influence has increased. For example, in the state of Jharkhand, during the field survey, it was observed that PRIs do not have autonomy in terms of choice of projects or the manner in which they are to be executed. The district administration would ask the panchayat representatives to submit a list of works that they wanted in the panchayat but some of them would be replaced at the Block level and some by the District officials. Due to this, a protest was called by the heads of panchayats across the state to demand the full rights of the panchayats.

Similarly, in the state of Uttarakhand also, it was observed that though the micro-plans are formulated with consensus of the villagers, they require consultations with the BDO. The Executive Committee has been provided with the power to formulate bye-laws but those laws can be implemented only with the consent of the District Magistrate.

The fifth observation of this study is that the leadership plays a vital role in the performance of any state. A leader is one who makes things happen that would not otherwise happen. A leader is an individual who has the power and ability to influence. There are two types of leaders: Instrumental and Societal. An instrumental leader is one who uses her/his power in the pursuit of private goals. For her/him, the main concern is how s/he can use her/his office to achieve personal objectives, whereas the 'Societal' leader is one who uses her/his power and influence for broader community objectives.

In the case of Jharkhand as well as Uttarakhand, it has been noticed that most of the leaders have been instrumental leaders who have reputedly exploited their office for their personal gains. Be it Madhu Koda, Arjun Munda of Jharkhand or Ramesh Pokhriyal 'Nishank' and Vijay Bahuguna of Uttarkhand, all of the ministers are alleged to have used their offices for individual objectives.

Sixth important insight of the study is that other than physical conditions; social conditions of the society as well affect the process of development. The study shows that caste, a form of social stratification also influences the process of development. It is not easy to expect cooperative behavior in a socio-economic structure where diverse agents are present. Divergence of interests is likely to emerge when socially and economically heterogeneous groups are sharing resources since their interests in resource management may significantly differ from each other.

The field work shows that one of the significant factors responsible for the sluggish growth of Jharkhand in comparison to Uttarakhand is its complex society in terms of social stratification. The caste plays a significant role in the process of distribution of benefits of development among the people in Jharkhand. It is a central element of people's identity and an instrument to spell out claims as a group. It has been observed that caste identity plays a prominent role in government departments, the selection of beneficiaries for reserved seats and development schemes, in canvassing and in the election of representatives.

On the other hand in the state of Uttarakhand, one does not find such intrinsic social heterogeneity. Caste system does prevail there but it is not as rigid as it is in Jharkhand. In comparison to the plain regions the caste system of the hill region is characterized by fewer levels of stratification. In Uttarakhand, the caste structure is defined in a twofold division, i.e., high caste group comprising of Brahmins and Rajputs and Low caste groups called Doms or dalits.

In Jharkhand we see, that benefits are allocated not only according to four constitutional categories (General, SCs, STs and OBCs) but there is further sub categories within the major categories, for example, Sav, Teli, Kurmi, Ganju, Yadav etc. This deeper division affects the process of development in significant manner.

Another important insight from the study is that other than socio-economic conditions, the geographical conditions also impact the process of development in a considerable way. The cost of service delivery becomes almost 2 to 3 times higher than the original cost due to its difficult terrain. The field study of Uttarakhand shows that a geographic condition plays an important role in the development of the region. For example, the development of roads and the recruitment process of education and health sector of hill districts of Uttarakhand are highly affected by its topography. The Officer at Roads Construction office informed that we are not able to cover the entire region with all weather roads because of the geographic conditions of the region. The geographic conditions of the region allow the department to work only for three –four months. In rest of the year, our department is engaged either in the paper work or repairing work.

Similarly the Health Officer of Rudraprayag said the officers do not wish to work and relocate to this region due to its landscape. "People like to visit this place and enjoy but hardly anyone wants to stay back and work here. We have positions lying vacant in our department but the younger generation does not want to serve here"[76].

In short, it can be said that, more than the size of a state and access to resources, it is the quality of governance and administration and the leadership's vision that determines whether a particular state will perform better than the others or not. Smaller administrative units with huge amounts of resources will be able to perform well only if they strike the right balance between effectiveness, efficiency, equity and sustainability. Issues which require greater attention are:

- Strengthening of Community Management: Institutions like panchayats needs to be strengthened to increase the level of participation and representation of the local communities. The Sarpanch and other members of the Executive Committee should be given more decision making power so that they can function autonomously. Though the implementation of decentralization has increased opportunities for participation by local communities, it requires capacity building which should focus not only on managerial skills but also on competence to participate in the policy process.

[76] In an interview conducted during field work in March, 2015.

- Strengthening of Anti-Corruption Measures: More funds have led to more leakage into the system, therefore a strengthening of anti-corruption measures is urgently needed. It is required to have a reasonable and transparent tax structure; transparent and stricter scrutiny procedure for government tenders, orders, auctions and sale of public owned assets; minimization of the discretionary powers of ministers and bureaucrats and a genuine autonomy for the public sector, for a state to achieve its socio-economic goals.

This study concludes with the claim that though socio-economic and physical factors have a profound impact on the development process of a state, what matters most is the quality of institutions of governance. The analysis also reveals that after the passage of a planned decade, the aim of achieving equitable political governance and high levels of development has remained limited in the states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. These states do have the potential to develop and empower the historically excluded but what is required is a serious commitment on the part of the institutions and actors involved in the process of implementation.

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Annexures

Annexure 1

Interview Schedule for Common Household

General Information: Name Sex Age Group

Educational Qualification: Till Class 8th ☐; 10th ☐; 12th ☐; Graduate ☐; Higher ☐

Category they belong to: Community they belong to:

Land Holding: Less than 2 acre ☐ 2 -5 acre ☐; 5-10 acre ☐; More than 10 acre ☐

Source of Employment/Income

Do they belong to/ are members of any organization

State Society Interaction:

For how long you have been staying here?

Do you think some changes have taken place after the creation of state?

What are those changes?

Do you think some sort of development has taken place in the region after the creation of state?

Does your village have a school?

Does teacher's come to that school regularly?

Does your village have a hospital / health centre facility?

How many doctors are there?

Are you satisfied with the services provided by the hospital?

What is the status of connectivity of your village to the market?

What are the employment opportunities in your region?

Do you know your state officials?

When and why do you interact with state officials?

Which official do you interact with the most?

Do they interact with the state officials directly or via intermediaries, their role and its cost?

Participation in Governance Initiatives:

What government policies are being implemented in your areas?

What are the entitlements given by these policies to the beneficiary?

Have you availed/benefitted from any of the policies? Which one and how? why not?

What were the procedures involved in receiving benefits?

What documents are required for identity of beneficiary, and the process of procuring them?

Do intermediaries play a role, which one, and how?

What are the challenges of interaction?

Role of PRIs:

Who is your Mukhiya: ; and Ward Member:

How often do you meet them: More than once a week ☐; At least once a week ☐; More than once a month ☐; At least once a month ☐; Never ☐

How is your interaction with your PRI representatives?

Have you participated in Gram Sabha meetings?

What is the most common reason for meeting them? How do they help?

Are the Panchayat doing any public work? How are the works undertaken, in terms of choice of location and beneficiary?

Do representatives from your community pay better attention to your concerns?

Have you heard of Village Development Committee? What does it do?

Does your village have agricultural/health/education/infrastructure Committee? If yes, who all are their members? How are they selected?

Is there any sort of benefit if those members belong to your community?

Do PRI representative facilitate your interaction with government official?

Annexure 2

Interview Schedules for Intermediate Class (Business man/Bus operator/ Petrol Pump Owner/ Contractors/ Private Schools/ Hospitals/ Local notables or political actors)

General Information: Name Sex Age Group

Educational Qualification: Till Class 8th ☐; 10th ☐; 12th ☐; Graduate ☐; Higher ☐

Category they belong to: Community they belong to:

Land Holding: Less than 2 acre ☐ 2 -5 acre ☐; 5-10 acre ☐; More than 10 acre ☐

Source of Employment/Income

Do they belong to/ are members of any organization

Area of Operation:

What your business all about?

What is your area of operation?

Which governmental official do you interact with?

What official documents do you need to carry out your business?

State and Business

What hurdles do you face in the operation of your business from government officials?

Do you need intermediaries to interact with government officials?

What role do they play in your interaction?

Do you pay bribe to officials, how often?

How did you come to know about these mechanisms?

Interaction with PRI:

Do you interact with PRI representatives?

Who do you contact first or do they contact you?

What are the concerns of these interactions?

Political Parties/ Organizations:

Are you associated with any organization?

Do MLA/ MP help and at what cost (bribe/vote)?

Are officials/ MP/MLA from the same community of any help in facilitating your business?

Women in Business: Do you know any women in your business?

Annexure 3

Interview Schedules for Government Officials at District or Block Level:

General Information: Name Sex Age Group

Educational Qualification: Till Class 8th ☐; 10th ☐; 12th ☐; Graduate ☐; Higher ☐

State they belong to:

Category they belong to: Community they belong to:

Role they perform:

How do you see the separation of the region from its parent state?

Has separate statehood helped the region in developing itself?

What are the developments in terms of infrastructural capacity that has taken place?

Do you think there are sufficient numbers of people to manage the infrastructure of the state?

What are the reasons of vacant positions in various offices?

Policies and Procedures

What are the problems faced by reserved/ vulnerable categories? Has reservation empowered weaker sections?

What are the policies for SC/ST/OBC/ Women/ Poor that are being implemented / processed by you? What are the entitlements ensured by various policies?

How are the funds available for these policies (by which agency of the government) controlled and distributed?

Which other governmental/non-governmental organizations are involved in the implementation of these policies? How are they coordinated with and their hierarchy?

What is the procedure of implementation of these policies?

What provision of transparency and accountability are in place in these procedures?

What are the procedural bottle-necks they face in implementing these policies?

What are the capacity gaps (of their department) they face in implementing these policies?

State and PRIs

Who among the PRI representatives meets you? For what purposes do they meet you?

Who among the PRI representative do you meet? For what purposes do you meet him?

How have the PRIs changed the way you interact with people?

How has the PRI affected the marginalized sections of the society?

How has the PRI affected the security situation in the region?

What were the functions they had that are now being implemented to PRI?

Annexure 4

Interview Schedule for PRI Representative/ Political Organization Leaders:

General Information: Name Sex Age Group

Representative as and of:

Educational Qualification: Till Class 8th ☐; 10th ☐; 12th ☐; Graduate ☐; Higher ☐

Category they belong to: Community they belong to:

Land Holding: Less than 2 acre ☐ 2 -5 acre ☐; 5-10 acre ☐; More than 10 acre ☐

Source of Employment/Income

Do they belong to/ are members of any organization

For how long you have been staying here?

Do you think some changes have taken place after the creation of state?

What are those changes?

What do you mean by development?

Do you think some sort of development has taken place in the region after the creation of state?

Does your village have a school?

Does teacher's come to that school regularly?

Does your village have a hospital / health centre facility?

How many doctors are there?

Are you satisfied with the services provided by the hospital?

What is the status of connectivity of your village to the market?

Policy Implement:

What policies are being implemented by your constituency?

What role do Panchayat have, by law, in implementing the policies?

What role do you actually play in the implementation?

What are the processes and procedure involved in the implementation?

What are the challenges you face in implementing policies?

PRI People Interaction:

Why do people come to you for?

How do you help them in various situations?

Which situation are you most helpful in / least helpful in?

What is the most common problem of the people?

Do you keep a record of their grievances and actions taken?

Do you organize regular meeting in your constitution level and composition of participant in these meetings?

Are representative from the same community empower their community?

Who all do you interact with among government officials?

When do you meet the government officials?

State PRI interaction:

What are the common reasons for meeting them?

Has their attitude changed since election / over time?

Do they listen to and work upon your concern?

Do you have any mechanism of keeping records of such interaction?

Do you know about social audit?

Do officials of the same community makes a difference?

How is your interaction with fellow and higher up PRI representatives?

Annexure 4

Pictures from the field showing infrastructural capacity



Health facilities – Sadar Hospital Hazaribagh, Jharkhand

Slogan notices dessiminating information about benefits of cleanliness and education outside District Office, Hazaribagh, Jharkhand.

Pictures showcasing condition of Sanitation Facilities in Jharkhand

Condition of Men Toilet, District Office, Lohardaga

Condition of Women Toilet, District Office, Lohardaga

Primary School, Bageshwar District, Uttarakhand

Notice Board indicating the Tenure of Chief Development Officers in Office, Rudraprayag, Uttarakhand

Sanitation facilities in the state of Uttarakhand

Health Infrastructure, Rudraprayag, Uttarakhand