ROLE OF NATO IN EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE 2010 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

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RAJEEV RANJAN SINHA

Centre for European Studies

School of International Studies

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI 110067

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Centre for European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067, India

Tel.: (O) 2670 4148, Fax: 91-11-2674 2592, 2674 1586
Email: cessisjnu@gmail.com

Date: 21.07.2016

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **"ROLE OF NATO IN EUROPEAN SECUIRTY: THE 2010 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university

Rajeev Ranjan Sinha.

RAJEEV RANJAN SINHA

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Bhaswati Sarkar

Chairperson, CES

Prof. Ummu Salma Bava

Supervisor

Dedicated to my late grandmother

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LIST OF FIGURES, MAPS AND TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALTBMD	Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DC	Defence Committee
DCI	Defence Capability Initiative
DGAP	Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Auswärtige Politik
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
FRIDE	Fundación para Ias Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo
ICMB	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IES	Institute for European Studies
IFRI	Institut Français des Relations Internationales
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MC	Military Committee
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NRF	NATO Response Force

OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SG	Standing Group
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Forces, Europe
SPS	Science for Peace and Security
STANDEX	Stand-off Detection of Explosives
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TNF	Theatre Nuclear Forces
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	West European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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PREFACE

Security in Europe has been very dynamic in recent history. During the Cold War period, the threats were conventional in nature and West Europe faced an existential threat in the form of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War period, threats are non-conventional, different and complex in nature. The Cold War was the outcome of the breakdown of the political engagement between powers and the Soviet Union, which manifested in the War Time Conferences especially at Potsdam and Yalta. The US and the Soviet Union were two important security actors and were connected to the security of West Europe and East Europe respectively. The study has primarily examined security concerns of Europe in the backdrop of the changing threats. The entire Cold War period was an ideological confrontation where the US and Soviet Union never fought each other in Europe. However, this ideological confrontation led to the division of Europe and bloc politics. The US supported NATO secured West Europe against the Soviet Union led Warsaw Pact East Europe.

NATO as a security actor has played an important role in the European security and for this purpose, it adopted strategic documents which guided NATO's course of action. The 2010 New Strategic Concept in the 21st century reflects importance of NATO in combating new challenges and threats and enhancing security in Europe. NATO cooperates with others actors like the EU, the OSCE and Russia on the issues which are related to European security.

The New Strategic Concept 2010 is a vision that reflects NATO's ambition for European security. It focuses on NATO's core tasks and principle in a transformed security environment. It focuses on promotion of international peace and security through co-operation, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and security through crisis management.

In this context, the thesis attempted to answer the following questions: how has European security been transformed after the end of the Cold War? What are the main elements and challenges to the European security? What is NATO's 2010 New Strategic Concept and how does this address European security? How does NATO engage European Union and Russia in the European security? What is the role of NATO in European security?

With the help of above questions, this thesis examined following two hypotheses: first, NATO's commitment to strengthening European security has been enhanced by its 2010 New Strategic Concept. Second, NATO has to work in the partnership with the European Union and strategically engages Russia in shaping the European security.

This thesis examines the role of NATO in European security and the New Strategic Concept, 2010. This research is undertaken within the context of liberal institutionalism and followed inductive approach. Liberal institutionalism focused on institutional cooperation and the problem associated with collective and cooperative measures. In this context, this theory helped in examining the approach of NATO and its role within institutional cooperation for the European security.

This thesis used primary resources from NATO and the EU, European Commission, European Council reports. Secondary sources included various books, articles published in journals and news reports. This study also included experts interviews in NATO HQ and various think tanks during research visit of Germany and Belgium.

Chapter 1 provided basic understanding of security, traditional and non-traditional security threats. It linked that how these security threats are intertwined with security in Europe during the Cold War and the post- Cold War era. Chapter 2 focused on the changing contours of the European security since the end of the Cold War period and how did NATO responded threats during this period. Chapter 3 explored role of NATO in European security in the context of the 2010 New Strategic Concept. This strategic document has various provisions related to the Euro-Atlantic security and it enhanced security in Europe with the help of its core tasks such as collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. This chapter reflected importance of partnership with other actors like the EU and the OSCE that helped NATO in combating threats and challenges to European security. Chapter 4 is related to the NATO's engagement with Russia in European security. Russia is an important actor in European security and with engaging Russia, NATO is not able to enhance security in Europe. The 2010 New Strategic Concept focused on importance of Russia especially strategic partnership with NATO and it has critical importance for Europe and thus, Russia cannot be ignored in European security. Chapter 5 concluded with new finding in European security and supported the assumed hypothesis.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

European Security has been plausibly summed up as preparing for war, waging war or recovering from war.

<div align="right">

-Kenneth Minogue 2000

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The discourse on security has undergone a profound change in the post-Cold War European politics. The Post-Cold War era brought in a new dynamism in Europe. The disintegration of the Union of Soviets Socialist Republics (USSR), the successful survival of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Maastricht Treaty changed not only the concept of security but European security itself has transformed with the evolution of complex and defused threats. The issues of security are not new for Europe, however, in the 21st century it has entered in a new phase with uncertainty. Europe has multiple actors like NATO, the European Union (EU), Russia and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which are intertwined. These actors along with individual countries have their own specific interests and requirements. External threats during the Cold War were responsible for instability on the European continent. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of threats has undergone a fundamental change and in the light of these developments, NATO has adopted many policies and reformulated its agendas in the form of strategic concepts.

Since, the inception of NATO and changing international security environment, it has transformed itself at regular interval by introducing seven Strategic Concepts[1]. Changing security environment after the World War II was related to the Cold War

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[1] NATO has adopted seven Strategic Concepts since 1949. There were four Strategic Concepts during the Cold War period which were adopted in 1949, 1952, 1957 and 1969 respectively. After the Cold War period, it adopted three Strategic Concepts in the year of 1991, 1999 and 2010 respectively. The Strategic Concept 2010 is the latest Strategic Concept of NATO.

and alliance formation for securing values of West European countries against the Soviet Union. Alliance formation in the form of NATO was the beginning of a new phase in Europe. The formation of NATO was in response to Soviet presence in East Europe after the end of the World War II and on the other hand, formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 was in response, when West Germany joined NATO. Formation of these kind of military alliances created a competitive environment for securing zone of influences in Europe. The Cold War geopolitical pattern was based on rivalry between the United State (US) and the Soviet Union and this rivalry promoted both actors to re-examine their defence agendas and security strategy. NATO adopted four Strategic Concepts during the Cold War period to counter Soviet threats. With the disintegration of the USSR and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the world order transformed from a bipolar to unipolar system. The circumstances at the end of the Cold War provided new impulse and thrust to NATO to continue as a security provider for the West Europe. It provided new priorities and opportunities to NATO to act in the new emerging geopolitical order. The new priorities and opportunities were reflected in the post-Cold War era strategic concepts. The Events of 9/11 changed the perception of the international community towards terrorism. NATO took it as a challenge and this threat appears in its Strategic Concept.

1.1. Security

Security is at the core of the study of states in the international system. Within the modern political lexicon, security is considered as a contested and complex term. It has been defined and re-defined since the era of the Cold War. The term security is classified as a traditional and non-traditional security. Traditional security is related to security of any state from external aggression like war or military threats during the Cold War period and on the other hand, non-traditional security is related to the human or environmental security since the end of the Cold War era and it includes terrorism, organised crime, illegal trafficking and instability in a state.

During the Cold War period, the European security (especially West European security) suffered with traditional threat like aggression of the Soviet Union and it was considered as the existential threat to West European security. After the end of the Cold War, the security environment transformed in Europe and new non-

traditional threats like terrorism, organised crime, illegal trafficking and climate change were identified in Europe.

In the international system, it is considered that security is primarily related to security of a state. In the realistic approach of international relations, security of a state is understood as national security[2]. Security has traditionally been seen as relating to the issues of war and military power. National security is an important aspect in realism. Classical realist thinker Morgenthau defines national security as "integrity of national territory and its institutions" (Morgenthau 1960: 562). Survival is an important dimension to security in international politics. "Survival of a political unit in its identity with certain interest vis-à-vis other units constitutes irreducible minimum" (Morganthau 1971: 219).

Survival is an important aspect for a state or an organisation or a community and it depends upon how they respond to security. For this, cooperation among states to address threats and nations of security communities required. Karl Deutsch an eminent political thinker and strategist defined security community as, a security community is a group of people which has become integrated within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong and wide enough to assure for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. In this community there is a real assurance that the member of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their dispute in some other way (Karl Deutsch 1957). In the west European security, it was required to form a security community in the form of NATO in 1949 to secure western norms and values with military capability.

The English School thinker, Barry Buzan argued that security is an inherently vague and indeterminate concept because it is a state of mind and in an essence, it is an absence of fear (Buzan 24: 1983). The Cold War period was dominated by the idea of national security.

Further by developing the idea of security, Arnold Wolfers identified objective and subjective aspects of security. According to him, "security, in an objective sense,

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[2] In classical realism, national security is considered as prime national interest of a state. The idea of this concept can be traced to the Peace treaty of Westphalia (1648) which is related to the sovereignty of a state.

measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Wolfers 1952: 485). Values, at national and European level, are of greater significance in European security. NATO beyond its military objectives looks at values such as protection of democracy, rule of law and human rights. European community at institutional level acquires these values and it must be protected from identifiable threats. Here, it can be said that NATO acquires certain values when it deals with security issues. In Europe, NATO always felt insecurity for its values from its adversaries.

Security means being secure against threat and identifiable enemy and it requires corresponding calibrated military responds. Security in traditional term related to the state as a referent. When we follow the realistic approach to security then it is related to struggle for the power. State is considered as an actor. It means if any actor can identify its enemy and related threats then it can calculate the requirement of military needs for effective response to the enemy.

According to the Copenhagen school, security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the "security" label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures including the use of force) and becomes part of everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept (Buzan 1991: 432).

When one conceptualises security, four questions have to be keep in mind i.e. whose security, security of what, security from whom and security from what? According to Barry Buzan, it is 'referent object' whose security is required i.e. security of state, human collectives and the individuals (Buzan 1998: 35-42). Security of what, it depends upon whose security is at stake. Whether it is security of state or individual is related to "absence of threats and fears to different values" (Wolfers 1952: 485). The question, Security from whom, is related to source of threat. It may be structural threats like global warming or conventional threat like war or defused threat like terrorism. Next question, security from what, refers to military or non-military forms

of threat. NATO in its Strategic Concept identifies that security of Euro-Atlantic region and European Population including democratic values is required.

When security is discussed, one cannot ignore threat especially existential threat or defused threat. In the 21st century, issues in security are very complex when one takes terrorism or organised crime as a threat to security. "Security is not absence of threat but it is how to cop up with threats or even if mitigate with threats and security is also low vulnerability from outside; security is a process to jointly develop the means to create a kind of security against threat" (Riecke 2013, DGAP Berlin). Threats are always there in international system in various forms and it is important that how a security actor can make that threat less severe or less painful. It means lowering down the severity of threat is also a kind of security against threat.

1.2. Conceptualising Europe

Europe has geopolitical significance within the international system. Europe can be conceptualised within geographical, geopolitical or in security terms. In security terms, there are four Europe as identified by Ole Wæver. He argued that in ascending order of size, one encompassing the European Community (EC) i.e. West Europe; one from Poland to Portugal i.e. non-super power Europe; one from Atlantic to the Urals i.e. Gorvachev's Common European House and one that stretches effectively from Vancouver to Vladivostok i.e. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Europe (Wæver 1989: 287-94). This study, during the Cold War period, is primarily focused on security of West Europe and in the post-Cold War period, it examined security in Europe under the US-led NATO.

"The Concept of Europe during the Cold War period focused on division of Europe in two parts. First, West Europe which was dominated by western allies composed of USA, the UK and France and second, Eastern Europe which was dominated by the Soviet Union eastward of Berlin Wall. During the Cold War, EC Europe emphasised the alienation of Eastern Europe by its absorption into the Soviet Union outside Europe. It frequently formed one pillar of the Atlanticist vision embodied in NATO, but also supported a narrow European vision centred on the evolution of the EC into a union tightly enough integrated to count as a great power" (Buzan 1990: 46).

Identity, ideology and balance of power have been also important context in defining Europe, when one sees Europe from Poland to Portugal. Europe from Poland to Portugal reasserts a European identity between the superpowers i.e. USA and the Soviet Union. It has been a win- win situation for NATO after the end of the Cold War where it successfully survived against Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union lost in this Europe in two senses, First, it lost control of an empire, the possession of which was important to its ideological legitimacy, its forward military defence and its whole standing as a superpower. Second, if this Europe cohered politically, the Soviet Union acquired a strong independent neighbourhood right on its border. Both of these things were happening in an environment of massive change in both ideological and balance of power relations (Buzan 1990: 46).

According to May, "Gorvachev Europe reflects a pre-1945 image of a European security complex including Russia, and stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. Geographical continuity is an important dimension of this Europe. It ensures that Europe consists of Russia and excludes North America" (May, 1984). This view asserts that the US politically differentiated from Europe and supports a dominant position of the Soviet Union on the European continent.

The CSCE Europe is constructed by seeing Europe in terms of the whole superpower confrontation centred in Europe. Although, the CSCE itself grew out of attempts to transcend the Cold War relationships, this Europe assumes a continuity of the engagement of the US and the Soviet Union in European security. The CSCE rested on the recognition that the security interdependence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact required a cooperative framework embracing all of the two alliances if the relationships were ever to be stabilised on the basis other than the balance of terror. It also satisfied the demand for a non-bloc based organisation of sovereign state whose purpose was to look beyond the Cold War bloc structure, while compatible in the short to medium term with the management of the Cold War. The fundamental view underlying the CSCE Europe can provide a basis for a broader civilizational rather than geographical view of Europe encompassing both its Russian and North American offshoots (Buzan 1990: 48-49).

Conceptualizing Europe also depends upon the Charlemagne Europe which is related to close cooperation between Germany and France. Post-World War Europe depends

upon the close relationship between these two state actors as partnership between the former enemies is the core of Europe. One the basis of the relationship between these two states, one can say that Europe is highly institutionalised continent. Europe is, paradoxically, based on a history of a mutual hatred and mistrust (Heurlin 1996: 12). "This Franco-German alliance involves two competing visions of Europe. Basically, Germany is striving for a federal Europe with three identities: regional, national and European. But the French vision is different: A French Europe, based on centralization, a well-functioning and strong unit in World affairs but one which still keeps the concept of the Europe of nation states alive" (Heurlin 1996: 12). It is a unique identity of Europe when one defines it and uses the notion of visions of two state actors to define a geographical area politically in favour of them.

Europe, during the Cold War period, was one of the important places in the world where vulnerability of risks and threats were very high. Due to the ideological confrontation and bloc politics between the US and the Soviet Union, entire Europe was divided in West Europe and East Europe. Thus, maintaining security of West Europe was a primary task of the US-led NATO in European continent.

1.3. Collective Defence and European Security

Collective defence is an important dimension and part of founding principle of NATO. Since the inception of NATO, the concept of collective defence played very important role in NATO's military action. This concept makes NATO a relevant security actor in European security. "The principle of collective defence is at the very heart of NATO's founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance" (NATO 1949: Collective Defence). The principle of collective defence is enshrined in article 5 of the Washington Treaty. According to this article, the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems

necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (Washington Treaty 1949: Article 5). It simply means attack on one ally is considered as attack on all allies.

Collective defence was an importance dimension for the European security during the Cold War period and still it is very relevant for the Alliance. The Alliance has revoked it after the event of 9/11 but never implemented it. This concept reflects self-help for a community or group of states where possibility of cooperation among the like-minded states are high.

1.4. Defining European Security

Defining or conceptualizing European security is a complex issue. It depends upon the security environment of Europe in different phases of international politics like during the two World Wars, the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. The most important phase for the present research is the Cold War period as an important part to define European security and further it provides the base to define it in the post-Cold War period. During the Cold War era, European security was defined in terms of bloc politics and confrontation between two super powers i.e. the US and the USSR. Thus bloc politics lead to a structural issue when dealing with European security. East and West European security was linked to the geopolitical engagement between the US and the USSR. It also incorporates how the security environment during the Cold War avoided nuclear exchange. Further, transformation from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period focuses on the changing dimensions in European security. The Reunification of Germany, the abolition of the Warsaw Pact and successful survival of NATO and emergence of Balkan crisis were major incident transforming European security. Beside these things, there was a major victory of liberal democracy under the leadership of the US and international system became unipolar.

After the end of the Cold War, it was a return of war after a prolonged peace in Europe. The return of war was major issue in European security. At that time securing European values and identities were necessary for European actors like NATO and the EU. During this time period, NATO played an important role in the Balkan crisis till the disintegration of former Yugoslav Republic. Primarily, "European security

would be security of Europeans and to the European nations"[3] (Riecke 2013, DGAP Berlin). It means European population and democracy hold important position in European security. In the 21st century, Europe has no direct military threat rather faced a large number of diffused threats. In this context, challenges play an important role where security actors have to think about it. "European security means security for European model of society, combination of democracy and free market economy, security for high degree of equality, prosperity, security and freedom of European citizens"[4] (Biscop 2013, Egmont Brussels). It means European citizens are important when one discusses about European security.

Geography of a country or a continent has always been an issue of discussion when it is related to border problems. In this regard, European security was vulnerable during the Cold War era. The whole Europe was divided into two regions; West Europe was dominated by NATO allies and East Europe was dominated by the USSR. "European security is not a debate in west Europe but rather in Russia. For western bloc European security includes Europe excluding Russia. European security is limited to borders of the EU and NATO in Europe"[5] (Pertusot 2013, IFRI Brussels). This indicates two things in European security; one is that both NATO and Russia have been engaged in defending their respective borders. For NATO, probably, Russia is not considered as part of European security. Second, Russia in a response to it might have its own vision of European security where USA is not considered as a part of Europe. "European security is understood as multifaceted concept, not only related to military dimension but in the 21st century it also includes challenges to cyber security"[6] (Pertusot 2013, IFRI Brussels). The European security in the 21st century approaches to new challenges like cyber threat.

West European security during the Cold War period was enhanced through NATO development that also enhanced conventional and nuclear weapon comprised of calibrated military responses, as NATO had identified and calibrated the threats during this time period. "European security or defence is primarily done by NATO for

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[3] This statement was given by Riecke H. for researcher on dated 22nd October 2013 in DGAP, Berlin.
[4] This statement was given by Biscop S. for researcher on dated 6th November 2013 in Egmont, Brussels.
[5] This statement was given by Pertushot V. for researcher on dated 6th November 2013 in IFRI, Brussels.
[6] This statement was given by Pertushot V. for researcher on dated 6th November 2013 in IFRI, Brussels.

territorial defence of Europe for members of NATO. When we think about European security, it is related to geographical concept. Apart of it, in the 21st century, European security is based on priorities of Europeans like climate change, migration, maritime security, cyber security etc."[7] (Keohane 2013, FRIDE Brussels). It signifies that European security is shifting from traditional security threat to non-traditional risk and challenges.

The Cold War security priorities have already transformed into a new dimension of security requirements. European security actors in the 21st century are focusing on functional aspect of security which includes new risks and it is required to protect values also. "The Cold War European security was deeply engaged in territorial defence of security and it need intervention from outside as the US-led NATO did it. But today, it is no longer dominant. Transforming Europe includes security for European values, sources, protection of minority. It is very much contextual and functional. One cannot ignore social, political and economic dimension of security. In the 21st century, European security needed political engagement which is essential to counter challenges like terrorism, maritime piracy and failed state. Hence political engagements must be functional. In social dimension, European Governments and institutions are determined to protect minority rights. Economic integration has been base and core of European integration. Securing Europe against any kind of economic crisis or melt down should be part of security"[8] (Rühle 2013, NATO HQ Brussels).

Issues related to national security and instability cannot be ignored in European security. It is also important to till which extent NATO is responding to threats, challenges or risks. Without cooperation with other security actors, NATO alone cannot secure Euro-Atlantic zone. "There are no traditional challenges to European security in next decade. European security is possibly threatened by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), instability beyond border like in Balkans. Problems in Balkan is still unfinished business. These days' cyber security is a major problem for national security in various European countries. Further, energy security and securing supply line are gaining pace in debate and discussion in European security. Comprehensive approach to security, partnership with cooperation, enhancing military capability and

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[7] This statement was given by Keohane D. for researcher on dated 7th November 2013 in FRIDE, Brussels.
[8] This statement was given by Rühle M. for researcher on dated 7th November 2013 in NATO HQ, Brussels.

training, smart defence etc. are essential and required it European security"[9] (Zsolt 2013, NATO HQ Brussels).

One should not ignore context based geopolitical factors when defining European security. Basically it is related to economic and political architecture of Europe since after the end of Second World War. "One should not separate NATO and the EU when defining European security. European security is all about Anglo-American strategic decision making after Great War. It was the UK that promoted the US military engagement in European security through NATO. There was a grand bargain between the UK and the US to maintain European order. Hence, USA replaced the UK by manifesting NATO in European security. The main concern was the USSR and Germany and was to ensure Germans down, Russians out and Americans in. The UK also wanted an alternative to Germany and it was France. Supporting France in the UNSC as a permanent member was major change in European security in terms of balancing security order in Europe. The whole Cold War space is to contain the USSR under the leadership of the US-led NATO"[10] (Simon 2013, IES Vrije University, Brussels). Now, it can be said that European security during the Cold War era was strategically structured among superpower that not only affected European order but also affected global order. "European security was redefined after the collapse of the Soviet Union. New states were formed in Eastern Europe and they were attracted towards western democratic values. European security was transforming with NATO's enlargement towards eastward. NATO in European security focused more on political dimension rather than military. There was major shift in European security after incident of 9/11. NATO under the leadership of the US was searching for new partnership in new century. It changed the face of NATO in European security that NATO alone cannot move ahead. Hence, for securing European security, constructive engagement is required to counter threats" [11] (Simon 2013, IES Vrije University, Brussels).

Now the entire discourse of European security can be divided on the basis of threats, challenges or risk, engagement and security actors with their military capability. The

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[9] This statement was given by Zsolt R. for researcher on dated 7th November 2013 in NATO HQ, Brussels.

[10] This statement was given by Simon L. for researcher on dated 7th November 2013 in IES Vrije University Brussels.

[11] This statement was given by Simon L. for researcher on dated 7th November 2013 in IES Vrije University Brussels.

Cold War European security can be defined as a security order having identified, calibrated and existential military threat with capability of nuclear exchange. In this respect, the USSR was a military threat to West European countries including the US. The possibility of mutual nuclear exchange and mutual destruction maintained a peaceful European security order. The post-Cold War European security can be defined on the basis of challenges or risk. There is no existential military threat to the European security but there are new challenges and risk of cyber-attack, energy security, climate change, illegal migration, and organised crime, terrorism in various forms and WMD in Europe. No actor is capable enough to counter these challenges or threats. Hence, constructive and cooperative security measures with enhanced military capability are required to face these threats in the 21st century.

1.5. NATO

NATO stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. These four terms i.e. North, Atlantic, Treaty and Organisation have specific meaning as well as it defines its objectives. NATO is an organisation of west European and North American countries which was founded after the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949 having a purpose of securing the Euro-Atlantic zone. NATO can be also defined as a political organisation with military objectives. Here, it is important to specify the political and the military. Political, in this context, means that NATO promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defence and security issues to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict (NATO basic points: 2.1). on the other hand, Military means that NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes and if diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations. These are carried out under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty i.e. NATO's founding treaty or under a UN mandate, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organizations (NATO basic points: 2.1).

According to the former US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, "NATO was about more than just banding together against common enemy; it was about creating, consolidating and expanding a zone of safety within which common values and cooperative institutions could prosper" (Talbott 2002: 48). NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military

means. Hence, one can also say that NATO is a political and military alliance of North American and west European countries.

1.6. Strategy

Strategy is a critical term that has been used since ancient time period specially related to warfare and finds great emphasis in the work of ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (The Art of War, 5th Century BC) and Prussian Military General and theorist Carl von Clausewitz (On War, 1832). Gray (2013) defines strategy as military strategy and according to him, military strategy is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics. For a security actor, strategy is an important instrument to shape, fix and define its agenda. Formulation of strategy is a complex task. NATO, since 1949, developed a culture of formulation of strategies. NATO established many Military Committees that discussed and negotiated its strategy. Discussion and negotiation reflected ideas and behaviour of strategy makers. Gray (2013) argued that strategy is made by a process of dialogue and negotiation which has value charged zone of ideas and behaviour. During the Cold War period, strategy for NATO was majorly related to military strategy to defend West Europe against the USSR.

1.7. Cooperative Security

Cooperative security is a new dimension in the discourse on security. This term became popular after the end of the Cold War. It is considered as a more peaceful approach to security through increased international harmony and cooperation. Perhaps NATO is the only organisation which uses the term cooperative security and NATO has mentioned it in Lisbon summit declaration. Collective security is one the three core tasks of it which is required to contribute to safeguarding Alliance (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 1). The cooperative security model presents concentric and mutually reinforcing 'rings of security' and it includes individual security, collective security, collective defence and promoting stability (Cohen 2001: 1).

"Cooperative security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and

institution characterised by shared values and practical and transparent economic, political and defence cooperation" (Cohen 2001: 10). NATO in the 21st century has a primary task to maintain stability and peace. Most of the members are liberal democracy and under an alliance system they are committed for promoting peace and stability in Europe. "Cooperative security is activity among states to lessen the likelihood of war, or its consequences should it occur, that is not directed at any specific state or group of states" (Mihalka 2001: 35). Further it is simplified as state will work together to solve common problems. The term, cooperative security to describe cases where states work together to deal with non-state threats and challenges (Mihalka 2005: 2). NATO's intervention in Kosovo represents an important example of cooperative security where NATO, the EU, the OSCE and neighbouring countries of Yugoslavia supported NATO's action.

Human Rights and humanitarian intervention are also important issue for NATO. "The threat or use of force across border by state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of state within whose territory force is applied" (Holzgrefe 2003: 18). However, this is the definition of humanitarian intervention but important point is that any intervention in other's territory needs massive support of other state actors. This support is possible under cooperative security. Hence, one can say that cooperative security focuses on safe future that leads to cooperation. This kind of cooperation also linked with security community, so it can be said that cooperative security is one consequence of a security community. State actors within this security community work together to counter and address security threats in their surroundings.

1.8. Crisis Management

Crisis management has always been an important security task to those who provide security. Crisis management is one of NATO's fundamental security tasks. It can involve military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crises before, during and after the conflicts. One of its strengths is its crisis management capacity, based on experience, tried and tested crisis management procedures and an integrated military command structure. This enables it to deal with a wide range of crises in an increasingly complex security environment, employing an appropriate

mix of political and military tools to help manage emerging crises, which could pose a threat to the security of the Alliance's territory and populations (NATO Crisis Management 2010).

The 2010 Strategic Concept broadened NATO's thinking on crisis management, envisaging its involvement at all stages of a crisis. It will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction. It also recognised the imperative for a greater number of actors to participate and coordinate their efforts and considered a broader range of tools to be used. More generally, it adopted a comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to crisis management that goes hand-in-hand with greater emphasis on training, developing local forces, enhancing civil-military planning and interaction, and greater interoperability between NATO and partner forces (NATO 2010: The New Strategic Concept).

Crisis management is an old phrase in the NATO. The preamble and the first six articles of the Washington Treaty are the basis of NATO. It represents a new approach to security in the Alliance. The Alliance's crisis management process is founded on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty which emphasises the need for Alliance consultation. The article states that the parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened. This article established one of the most important mechanisms, the consultation procedure, which is implemented whenever any ally considers the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the allies to be threatened (Leitao 2001: 1).

NATO has set its crisis management goals and for achievements of these goals, it follows certain basic principles. According to Ivo Marinov, NATO has various crisis management goals. First, Contribution to the effective conflict prevention; second, effective crisis management to prevent their escalation into conflicts; third, ensure the readiness of civilian and military capabilities; fourth, control and prevention of escalation and discoursing the aggressor from violence in the military actions and fifth, crisis de-escalation after stopping violence or end of disaster (Marinov 2014: 3). During the crisis management operation, NATO gives supremacy to NAC for consensus making on crisis management. It follows permanent representation of

NATO nations and political control over military aspects to manage crisis management. NATO has played very important role in crisis management during Yugoslav, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Active Endeavour in Mediterranean.

1.9. Military Capability

Military capability is one of the most important aspects for NATO to perform its core tasks like collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security such that they can play important role in Euro-Atlantic security. Allied leaders reaffirmed their determination to ensure that NATO retains and develops the capabilities necessary to perform its essential core tasks in Chicago Summit 2012. At the September 2014 Summit in Wales, "Allies further enhanced their ability to meet the demands of the three essential core tasks, while dealing with an acute financial crisis and responding to evolving geo-strategic challenges" (NATO Wales Summit 2014). With the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept, Alliance leaders committed to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of Allies' populations.

NATO Heads of State and Government launched a Defence Capability Initiative (DCI) at Washington in 1999. The objective of this act is to improve interoperability among Alliance's forces and partner's forces where it is possible as will. Such interoperability is needed because Alliance's goals and challenges have changed over the years. These days' potential threats are more likely to result from regional conflicts, ethnic strife and proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The Organisation will have to face operations completely different than these resulting from Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty. For enhancing military capability contributions are required from partners and other non-allied nations during emergency (Idzik 2002: 187).

DCI establishes a temporary high level steering group which objective is to implement provisions of DCI and achieve coordination and harmonization in force planning. For this purpose, there may be used civilian transport assets for deployments but it demands civilian legislation enabling such use of equipment and human factors like required doctrine, training and operational procedures. Despite different introduction of advanced capabilities among Allies interoperability requires

standardisation and technological development (Idzik 2002: 187). The changing security environment and defused threats and risks can cause threat to European security and hence in such environment strengthen military capability is highly required for NATO such that they can defend NATO area.

Information superiority is key element to military capability. NATO will therefore continue to develop and acquire a range of networked information systems i.e. automated information systems that support the two strategic commands. They cover a number of domains, including, land, air, maritime, intelligence, logistics and the common operating picture, with a view to enabling more informed and effective, holistic oversight, decision making and command and control. Apart of it, NATO has developed federated mission networking, air command and control, joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, allied ground surveillance, air borne warning and control system. These are symbol of technical advancement of this organisation (NATO Improving Capabilities 2015). These are helpful for NATO in any operations that also strengthen its military capability as well as superiority in comparison to other organisations.

NATO leaders are regularly assessing and reviewing the capabilities needed to conduct the full range of the Alliance's missions in the evolving geo-strategic environment. At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, NATO leaders made a pledge to improve the Alliance's planning processes and specific capabilities in pursuit of the "NATO Forces 2020" goal. The vision for NATO forces in 2020 and beyond is one of modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment (NATO Improving Capabilities 2015). All these capability strategy and requirements indicates for the formation of a smart defence.

1.10. The New Strategic Concept

NATO has seven strategic concepts since its inception and these strategic concepts have provided the guidelines for the Alliance functioning. According to the changes in the security environment, there has been a commensurate change in its priorities and functions. Since 1949 to 2010, it adopted seven different Strategic Concepts to fulfil its interest in the context of the changing security environment. Strategic

Concept is an official document or a statement of purpose that is crafted to fit the security needs of a changing world.

"Strategic Concepts lay down the alliance's core task and principles, its values, the evolving security environment and the alliance's strategic objectives for the next decade. The 2010 Strategic Concept defines NATO's core tasks as: collective defence, crisis-management and cooperative security" (The 2010 Strategic Concept).

It is also important to focus on the word 'New'; here the term new is used with strategic concept. There are reasons to call strategic concept as a new strategic concept. The 2010 new strategic concept is the first and latest document in the 21st century, it is new in the sense that it has adopted a new strategy, new visions, and new priorities to deter and counter new emerging challenges and threats. The 2010 New Strategic Concept is distinct and different from its previous strategic concepts.

1.11. Nature and Characteristics of NATO

Nature and Characteristic of NATO depends upon its role that it has played since its inception. Identifying or fixing its nature or characteristics is not an easy task. As it has been a dynamic and continuous organisation, one cannot fix its characteristic. Its nature and characteristic during the Cold War is different from the post-Cold War NATO. There are various characteristics of NATO such as transatlantic link, the US leadership, area of operations, decision making, top-down guidance, mission spectrum, capabilities, political and military nature, membership and enlargement, partnership and threat perceptions (Spiegeleire 2006). NATO's definition composes its nature i.e. NATO is political as well as military in its nature. Its political nature focuses on its characteristics like consultation, cooperation and dialogue process with other actors on various issues in international system. Many scholars argue that NATO is primarily military in nature. It means that it is an entity which deals with security and defence issues. Dealing with security and defence issues are not an easy task. It required military capability and defence establishment. NATO under the US leadership has developed strong military capability and it can be seen in its military operations in Balkan, Iraq and Afghanistan. In this regard, one can say that its character lies in its military capability and political bargaining. The US leadership of

NATO further shows transatlantic link. This link is very much political and operational since the Cold War period between American and European allies.

Any political or military activity depends upon decision making. Decision making as a characteristic of NATO shows its capability to achieve consensus upon various ongoing issues. This decision making needs guidance i.e. top down guidance; it means that NATO is able to dominate or overrule decisions and actions of its members.

NATO always conducts its operation within the geographical range with aim and objectives to resolve conflict. It means that it has an area of operation within which it identifies threat and it uses its military capability after consultation, cooperation and decision making. It alone cannot conduct all operations; hence it needs an effective and strategic partnership. Under the strategic partnership, it sets goal which is to be achieve jointly.

NATO during the Cold War had identified existential military threat like the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Its primary task was to strengthen alliance against the Soviet Union. The Alliance's formation and enlargement are its important characteristic. The whole international system is asymmetrical in power structure. In this regard, state actors try to be part of strong alliance that can protect its interest against any other state or non-state actors. The Alliance formation is integral to the enlargement process. When it was formed, it had twelve member states and today after various rounds of enlargement, it has twenty-eight member states. The primary concern of NATO's enlargement is to secure European population and democratic values.

In the 21st century, NATO is a transformed, functional and a security actor with continuity. It has transformed itself according to the changing security environment. The Post-Cold War NATO successfully continued with new security challenges and risks. It does not focus only on conventional military threat but also focuses on environmental and resource constraints, climate change, health risks, energy security and cyber threat. It has included these challenges in its latest Strategic Concept. It is an organisation which is always ready for consultations and regular official meetings related to challenges and risks.

Its strategic documents are also its major characteristic. It always works under the guidance of written document. This written document is known as strategic document. Since 1949, it has formulated seven strategic documents. Strategic documents are symbol of its unity in decision making and cooperation. Through it, NATO can focus on its core tasks.

1.12. Challenges and Threats to European Security in the 21st Century

Europe has always been suffering with challenges and threats. It has seen many wars in its history. The Great War and the Cold War posed instability and insecurity in Europe. Initially, Europe has conventional military threats but today threats and challenges are diversified. During the Cold War, Europe had existential military threat but the post-Cold War Europe has terrorism as a defused threat and it has challenges like weapon of mass destruction, Climate change, energy security, health risks, migration, illegal trafficking, piracy and cyber security.

In the 21st century is the age of uncertainty for both NATO and European Security. NATO, since its inception, has been identifying threats and challenges through its various strategic concepts. In the present time period, it has its New Strategic Concept which mentions threats and challenges. There are two types of threat i.e. military and non-military threats and challenges. Recently, there is massive change in security environment of Europe due to Ukrainian crisis on the issue of Crimean annexation by Russia. NATO Russia Council is dismantled and it is a big setback to European security after Russian-Georgian conflict. This situation led to the military deployment from both sides and it may lead to military confrontation. According to New Strategic Concept, successful economic, political reform and stability is required in Ukraine for the security of Euro-Atlantic region (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 35).

The first challenge, according to New Strategic Concept, is regarding arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. NATO is committed for this effort to secure Europe (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 7). For this purpose, it will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity and transparency. On the issue of WMD, it recalled it Strasbourg/Kehl Summit having serious concern with Iran's nuclear programme. It will continue to

implement its strategic level policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 54, 55). Second, NATO is committed to protect its European population, territory and forces. For it, it has decided to develop missile defence capability but it is strongly opposed by Russia. Russia is not ready to accept any missile defence programme of NATO in Europe (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 8). Third, next challenge in front of NATO is to maintain regional stability and security throughout Balkans. Fourth, terrorism and counter piracy in European vicinity is another challenge for NATO. It has conducted Operation Active Endeavour and Operation Ocean Shield in Horn of Africa (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 18, 19). Fifth, it considers extremism, terrorism, transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in narcotics and people as serious threat to alliance security in Europe. It will continue to enhance both the political and the military aspects to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against these threats (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 60). Sixth, cyber security is one the emerging challenges for NATO and it is threat to information security and defence establishment. It can cause cyber-attack which is vulnerable to critical systems in many aspects. It has already adopted cyber defence policy in June 2011 (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 61).

Further, non-military threats are related to energy security, climate change, health risk and water scarcity where NATO is going to diversify its role and strategies against these challenges and risks. A stable and reliable energy supply and interconnectivity of energy networks are of critical importance for the Alliance. It cannot ignore other important risks like climate change and health risks (NATO 2010: Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 62, 63). These new emerging challenges and risks will affect new security environment in Europe.

1.13. Research Framework

In this context, the thesis attempted to answer the following questions: how has European security been transformed after the end of the Cold War? What are the main elements and challenges to the European security? What is NATO's 2010 New Strategic Concept and how does this address European security? How does NATO

engage European Union and Russia in the European security? What is the role of NATO in European security?

With the help of above questions, this thesis examined following two hypotheses: first, NATO's commitment to strengthening European security has been enhanced by its 2010 New Strategic Concept. Second, NATO has to work in the partnership with the European Union and strategically engages Russia in shaping the European security.

This thesis examined the role of NATO in European security and the New Strategic Concept 2010. This research is undertaken within the context of liberal institutionalism and followed deductive approach. Liberal institutionalism focused on institutional cooperation and the problem associated with collective and cooperative measures. In this context, this theory helped in examining the approach of NATO and its role within institutional cooperation in the European security.

This thesis has used primary resources from NATO and the EU, European Commission, European Council reports. Secondary sources included various books, articles published in journals and news reports. This study also included experts interviews in NATO HQ and various think tanks during research visit of Germany and Belgium.

NATO always has to ready to respond new challenges in coming decades. For it, it has to mitigate with new risks and challenges with more flexible and reliable apparatus. As it is known that threats are also strategic in nature in present time period and nature of European Security is also changing according to new security environment. In this respect, it is also important to focus on changing contours of European security since the end of Second World War and how NATO accommodate itself in changing patterns of European security.

CHAPTER 2

THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: 1945-1990

Since the end of the Second World War, security in Europe has been very dynamic and changing. The year 1945 was a mile stone in international relations history when the two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were targeted by the US with atomic bomb on dated 6 August and 9 August 1945 respectively. This nuclear attack signalled the end of Second World War in the far East. But it was not an end, it saw the beginning of the Cold War[12] in Europe. The British writer George Orwell focused on key question "whether the use of nuclear bomb came with peace or not. He argued that it was a rare and costly object as difficult to produce as a battleship, it is likelier to put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely a peace that is no peace" (Orwell 1945). Recent European history from the 18th-20th century has always been suffering from war or war like situations. The advent of the Cold War changed the scenario of security system in Europe. Adrian Hyde-Price (1992) argued that security system was built on the bipolar division of Europe and the hegemony of the two superpowers within their respective alliance system (Hyde-Price 1992: 36). Security in Europe transformed rapidly after the end of the Second World War with the emergence of two new actors in Europe. These two new actors represented the ideological division with confrontation and arms race. In this context, during the Cold War, security can be divided in two geographic areas, first, West European security under the dominant security umbrella of NATO led by the US and second, East Europe, which was controlled by the Soviet Union.

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[12] The term Cold War was used by British Journalist George Orwell in his essay "You and the Atomic Bomb" in October 1945. American writer Walter Lippmann wrote a famous book "The Cold War" in 1947. Lippmann referred Cold War as a war like situation between two power blocs, but it was not a war. It was a diplomatic war without any armed conflict. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the early 1950s defined Cold War as a moral crusade for moral values for good against bad, right against wrong and religion against atheism. For Dulles, Soviet Union represented bad, wrong and atheism. US Policy Planning Staff Member Louis J. Halle, in his book "The Cold War As History", mentioned that the Cold War was a situation of high tension between two blocs in which there was no trust left among erstwhile allies and there was no direct warfare between adversaries.

Establishing security in Europe was a long term process caught between the United States and the Soviet Union that began in the aftermath of the surrender of Germany on dated 7 May 1945. In 1941, Nazi aggression against the USSR turned the Soviet regime into an ally of the Western democracies. But in the post-World War II world, increasingly divergent viewpoints created rifts between the former allies. The United States and the Soviet Union gradually built up their own sphere of influence on the European continent, dividing not only Europe but the world into two opposite camps. The Cold War was therefore not exclusively a confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union restricted to Europe but a global conflict that affected all countries and it is called as the structural impact on global politics.

Indeed, Europe was divided into two blocs and it became one of the main platforms of ideological confrontation. In Western Europe, the European integration process began with the support of the United States, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe became satellites of the Soviet Union. From 1947 onwards, the two adversaries, employing all the resources at their disposal for intimidation and subversion, clashed in a lengthy strategic and ideological conflict punctuated by crises of varying intensity. Nuclear deterrence was the only effective means of preventing a military confrontation. Ironically, this 'balance of terror' actually served as a stimulus for the arms race. Periods of tension alternated between moments of détente or improved relations between the two camps. Raymond Aron argued that the "Cold War system produced improbable war, impossible peace" (Gaspar 2007: 186). The Cold War finally came to an end in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.

This chapter is focused on the European security especially on West European security and how it changed from 1945 to 1990. It examines the changing contours of the European security and the role of NATO for West European Security during the Cold War period.

2.1. War Time Conferences: Shaping the Agenda for European Security

Many aspects of European security during the Cold War is interlinked with the war time conferences i.e. the conferences from The Atlantic Charter (1941) to The Potsdam Conference (1945). Among these conferences, Yalta (4 February 1945) and

Potsdam Conferences (17 July 1945) were the most important and played an important role in defining European security in 1945. During the early stage of Second World War, there was distrust between Western powers on the one hand and Soviet Union on the other hand but this distrust was mitigated by their mutual need to defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan. In order to enhance the cooperation among the US, UK, France and Soviet Union, a series of War Time Conferences were held.

Table: 2.1 List of War Time Conferences

War Time Conferences	Date
The United Nations Declaration	1 January 1941
The Casablanca Conference	14-24 January 1943
The Moscow Conference	19-30 October 1943
The Cairo Conference	22-25 November 1943
The Tehran Conference	28 November-1 December 1943
The Bretton Woods Conference	1-15 July 1944
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference	21 August-7 October 1944
The Quebec Conference	11 September 1944
The Moscow Conference	9 October 1944
The Yalta Conference	4-11 February 1945
The San Francisco Conference	25 April-26 June 1945
The Potsdam Conference	17 July-2 August 1945

Source: Compiled from various sources

In February 1945, 'Operation Argonaut'[13] was an important meeting among US President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill and Soviet leader Stalin who discussed a new world order, especially focusing on the re-organisation of Europe, after Second World War. Further, in this operation, it was the anti-Nazi coalition of the US, the UK and the USSR were based not on accidental motives, but on the vital interests of each of its participants. The Yalta Conference mostly dealt with political problems, such as the peaceful coexistence of the states. David Ghere (2010) mentioned that these leaders sought to defeat Nazi Germany, but they were also concerned about the future of post-World War II Europe. Anticipating conflict with each other, American and Soviet leaders sought to establish a post-World War II world in their own best interests. But on the other hand, the British leadership was uncomfortable as a second rate power and hoped to protect their interest and so

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[13] This operation was a code name of Yalta Conference on 4 to 11 February 1945. The purpose of this conference was to re-organise Europe after Second World War.

desired to emerge as the leader of a powerful post-World War II Western Europe (Ghere 2010: 48). It means that it was aiming to do with greater coordination of efforts of the three countries at the concluding stage of the Second World War and solution of problems pertaining to the post-World War II order in Europe. During the war time conferences, French Government's major focus was defence against the German threat.

French had worst war experience with Germany and was not in favour of German re-emergence. Michael Creswell (2003) and Marc Trachtenberg (2003) focuses, "The French Government was not eager in the immediate post-World War II period to see a Western bloc come into being to balance Soviet power in Europe" (Creswell and Trachtenberg 2003: 8). The prime objective was to keep Germany down by preserving the wartime Alliance integral. Michael Creswell (2003) further argues that the French problem was related to build up Germany after the end of the Cold War which was supported by the US and the UK (Creswell 2003: 9). In a response, French Prime Minister René Pleven proposed to establish European Defence Community (EDC) against the US decision on armament and accession of West Germany. The EDC never became a reality due to refusal of French Parliament on the issue of national sovereignty. The circumstances were rapidly changing after the Second World War and the cooperation which was shown during the war time conferences diminished due to growing differences as the allied powers were looking for their own self-interest in Europe. As John Lewis Gaddis argued that Stalin desired to establish a zone of influence, security for the communist regimes and its ideology all over Europe. On the other hand, US promoted its own influence in Europe i.e. pushing democratic values, freedom and equality (Gaddis 2005: 10-16). Alan Bullock (1992) argued, "Soviet premier Stalin did not want any internal challenge and external threat that could harm his interest and communist ideology not only in post-World War II Europe but also anywhere in the World. The interests of the communists elsewhere in the world would never outweigh the priorities of the Soviet Union as he had determined them" (Bullock 1992: 464). John Levis Gaddis argued that Stalin believed "Soviet Union paid huge treasure and blood during Second World War and it would be USSR that must determine who got what after the war. Stalin wanted to regain its lost territories to Germany and it also demanded portions of Finland, Poland and

Romania which was signed in the Non-Aggression Pact[14] of 1939 with Hitler's Germany. Stalin was also looking for territorial concessions at the expense of Iran and Turkey as well as naval bases in Mediterranean. Stalin had a grand vision and that was related to peacefully accomplished but historically determined domination of Europe" (Gaddis 2005: 11). The demands and visions of Stalin were not accepted by the Western Allies, especially the US did not want that Soviet sphere of influence spread in entire Europe.

Map 1: Occupation Zone 1945

Source: Ministry of Defence, UK 1964

On the other hand, US led Western Allies had their own objectives which were totally different from Stalin's ideas. Gaddis (2005) and Mason (1996) argue that Western Allies had different objectives for the European continent and emphasised on

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[14] This Pact was signed between Nazi Germany and Soviet Union on dated 23 August 1939. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was a guarantee of not waging war or conflict like situation by each party towards the other, and a written commitment that neither party would ally itself to, or aid, an enemy of the other party. Nazi Germany broke this Pact by attacking on Soviet position in Eastern Poland on dated 22 June 1942.

freedom, democracy and equality after the end of Second World War. The democratic norms and values were against the vision of Stalin. Due to the growing differences, Yalta Conference (4 February 1945) and Potsdam Conference (17 July 1945) were organised where issues including division of Germany was discussed. David S. Painter argued that after the defeat of Nazi Germany, post-World War II rivalry was fast replacing war time cooperation. The Allies also decided that the main source of reparations for each power would be its own occupation zone (Painter 1999: 14).

The Yalta Conference Report took major steps for the then European security and that was focused on the defeat of Germany, its occupation and control and towards it paying reparation, declaration on liberated Europe and issues related to Poland and Yugoslavia (Yalta Conference 1945: 1005-12). These issues could be seen as the fullest commitment of the allied powers in Europe to defeat Nazism and establish a peaceful and cooperative environment in Europe. There was a purpose to demilitarise Germany such that it could never be able to disturb peace of Europe. In addition, the allied powers divided Germany into four zones of occupation and these were controlled by the US, the UK, France and the USSR. This change came after the use of atom bomb by the USA without consulting USSR. It was argued that the end of World War removed the main incentive for cooperation and made all three less inclined to compromise. The US and British willingness to respect USSR lessened after defeat of Germany and successful test of the atom bomb. On the other hand, after the defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan, USSR differed from USA (Painter 1999: 14). It was signalling the beginning of new era and that was the Cold War with ideological confrontation and bloc politics.

In the above context, it can be said that the Yalta Conference signalled new changes in the power equation which would impact European security. The creation of zone of influence reflected the balance of power because Soviet forces were controlling Central and Eastern Europe. Due to this situation, the cooperation among allies diminished and confrontation was growing.

The second half of 1945 witnessed political and economic changes and that was related to change in leadership in USA (President Dwight D. Eisenhower came in power), Churchill was defeated and the Labour Party won the election in the UK, defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, the Potsdam Conference fulfilled the

agenda of the Yalta Conference and use of atom bomb on two Japanese cities namely, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Potsdam Conference (17 July 1945) emphasised on major tasks like complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and division of Germany into zones of occupation (Potsdam Conference 1945: 1207-23).

2.2. Post-World War II Europe and the Beginning of Division

Sean Kay in his book, NATO and the Future of European Security, argued that Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and consolidating its gain through the creation of puppet regimes was a major challenge for West Europe. There were heavy military and artillery concentration of Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Western intelligence estimates concluded that in the immediate post-war years, the Soviet Union had some five million men in the armed forces and strategic reserves in Eastern Europe (Kay 1998: 13). The Soviet Union thus had a real numerical superiority in terms of men and heavy weapons. On the other hand, there were massive economic and military problems in Western Europe, especially in Germany. Western Europe by itself was not capable enough to balance Soviet power and this was not a good signal for West European security.

Sean Kay (1998) states that after the end of the Second World War, it was felt that US involvement in European security was necessary and important because of the immediate concerns over the Soviet motives in East Europe, the potential for a renewal of German nationalism and the inability of Britain to maintain its traditional stabilizing influence on the continental balance of power (Kay 1998: 13). The United States was the great victor of the Second World War and its human and material losses were relatively low, and even though the US Army was almost completely demobilised a few months after the end of hostilities. The United States remained the world's leading military power. It was the only country with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons till 1949. It also confirmed its status as the world's leading economic power. This situation forced US to involve and counter USSR in European continent.

John Lewis Gaddis in his book, The Cold War: A New History, argued that Stalin did not want to restore the balance of power in Europe but rather to control Europe. He had a determined vision to dominate Europe, but his objective failed due to the evolving policies of the US in the post-World War Europe (Gaddis 2006: 14). This

reflects that both superpowers had very different ambitions towards Europe. The conflict of interest between the new powers gradually multiplied, and a climate of fear and suspicion reigned. Each country feared the newfound power of the other. The Soviets felt surrounded and threatened by the West and accused the United States of spearheading imperialist expansion. The Americans were concerned at the Communist expansion and accused Stalin of breaching the Yalta Agreement on the right of free peoples to self-determination. This led to long term tension between both superpowers.

When Churchill delivered his famous Fulton speech on 5 March 1946, he spoke about the change in the hitherto power equation. Wherein, he mentioned that

> *"The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with this primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future. As you look around you, you must feel not only the sense of duty done, but also you must feel anxiety lest you fall below the level of achievement(...)except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization." (Churchill Fulton Speech 1946).*

This speech signalled the division of Europe and new balance of power established. Tracy C. Davis (2010) argued, "the Allies invoked the iron curtain to characterize Germany's eastern front, while Nazis used it to vilify Soviet tactics of occupation. After the war, the curtain became more literal; not just the division of Berlin but the impenetrable boundary for all but a few emigrants headed in either direction" (Davis 2010: 90). It not only divided European territory but also divided many families and population. It shows that it also had a societal impact on European security after World War II. Spencer Warner (1995) pointed out about Soviet-sponsored repression in Eastern Europe, where the power of the State was exercised without restraint, either by dictators or by compact oligarchies operating through a privileged party and a political police. Churchill acknowledged that the United States and Great Britain could not interfere forcibly, but insisted that they must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world (Warner 1995: 39).

The growing link between the US and West Europe further led to a major shift and it was related to the containment of the Soviet Union, as they did not want the spread of

Soviet expansion towards the west. For this purpose, the US President Harry S. Truman proposed in his 12 March 1947 famous speech come to be called as the Truman Doctrine:

> *The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. (...,) The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Greece is to survive as a free nation (...,) Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances, (...,) The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists (...,) We must take immediate and resolute action. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds (...,) I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war. (Truman Speech 1947).*

Truman's speech which was to become a long term doctrine provided emergency aid to countries in West Europe against communism and tried to contain the domino effect of the spread of communism. Greece and Turkey were beneficiaries of this doctrine and it was required to help Greece with $ 400 million after their civil war i.e. Greek Civil War[15] (1946-49), otherwise, Greece might fall under the impact of communism. Eric Foner argued that the Truman doctrine was committed to assist against communist regime throughout the world and to build global military alliance against the Soviet Union (Foner 2006: 892).

Churchill's Fulton speech and the Truman's statement were two important steps that checked the growing influence of the USSR on the European continent. It also contributed to the growth of bloc politics not only at the European but also at the global level.

Amidst this backdrop, the US took another major step in the form of Marshall Plan (5 June 1947), also known as European Recovery Programme, the economic recovery of Europe. The US Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a massive aid programme for Europe and this plan pumped $ 13.3 billion to countries of Europe.

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[15] The Greek Civil War was fought between Greek Government Army on one hand and Democratic Army of Greece on the other hand. Greek Government Army was supported by US and the UK on one side and Democratic Army of Greece which was the military branch of Greek Communist Party was supported by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. In this case Greek Government was funded by Truman Doctrine.

The Soviet Union prevented the countries of Central and Eastern Europe from taking advantage of the Marshall Plan and consequently, on the West European economies could benefit from the American economic assistance. Thus, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan committed the US to supporting Western Europe both politically and economically.

John Lavis Gaddis (1997: 158) and Robert McMahon (2003: 30) argue that Stalin fell in the trap of this plan and a delegation was sent to Paris for discussion from Soviet side. Soviet Union repudiated this plan and it resulted in economic and political division of Europe. In a response to it Stalin initiated Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)[16] in September 1947. It was an answer to the Marshall Plan and due to it there was East-West crisis. Soviet Union, with the help of Cominform, tried to bind Eastern European countries under its own command.

2.3. Transforming West European Security System (1948-49)

As a consequence of Yalta and Potsdam Conference, Berlin was also divided into four sectors, as Germany was divided earlier. This was an important phase when the US, the UK and France decided to combine the economy of Western occupied zone. Roger Gene Miller (2010) pointed out that for the improvement of economy of the Western occupied zone, it was required to combine all three occupied zone and form Trizone[17] in May 1948 (Miller 2000: 13). Henry Ashby Turner (1987) argued that Europe could not be rebuilt until economy of Trizone was rehabilitated and for it, Western powers implemented monetary reform and Soviet Union was excluded from these arrangements (Turner 1987: 23). In a response to it, the Soviet Union initiated the Berlin Blockade (24 June 1948- 12 May 1949) and did not recognise the development in Western occupied zones.

The Berlin Blockade was one of the most important phases in Europe at the initial stage of the Cold War in 1948, when Stalin rejected the Marshall Plan as well as introduction of the Deutsch Mark in the Western zone of Germany. John W. Mason argued "Lenin's dictum, 'Whoever has Germany has Europe' was very relevant and

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[16] It was soviet dominated organisation of communist parties and its main task was to keep the Communist Parties in Europe compliant to Moscow and to proclaim the Soviet way as the only way to socialism. it was dissolved in 1956.

[17] It is also known as Trizonesia and further it became Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

in this context the two Cold War antagonists did not want to lose its position especially on the issue of Germany" (Mason 1996: 11).

Map 2: Divided Berlin

Source: The Berlin Region Map

Stalin perceived Marshall Aid as undermining Soviet influence in Central-Eastern Europe and Moscow blocked all rail, road and other mode of transportation between the Western part of Berlin and the rest of the Western part of Germany and this massively affected the life of people in West Berlin. The main objective of this blockade was to prevent the economic recovery of Western part of Germany.

The Soviet led Berlin Blockade changed the discourse on security in Europe and for the first time, Western leadership was looking for the formation of a defence organisation. David C. Isby (1985) emphasised that it was required to counter Soviet military threat in the West Europe. It was also required that US must participate in the

formation of defence organisation (Isby 1985: 13). The Treaty of Brussels[18] (17 March 1948) confirmed the formation of West European Union's (WEU) defence organisation in 1948. Amidst this backdrop, US led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. It was a milestone in West European and Trans-Atlantic region to counter Soviet militarism and recognised the security discourse in Europe. Although in an anecdotal way it said that the first NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay said that NATO was formed 'to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down' (Reynolds 1994: 13). The reality was not far off the mark. It was considered under the leadership of the US, Soviet threats could be checked in West Europe on the one hand and on the other hand, no one wanted to see German emergence again on European continent.

Formation of NATO community which was related to security of Western Europe. Prominent political scientist Carl W. Deutsch (1957) in his seminal work defined a security community as,

> *A security community is a group of people which has become integrated within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong and wide enough to assure for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. In this community there is a real assurance that the member of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their dispute in some other way (Karl Deutsch 1957).*

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949. NATO, as a military organisation, constitutes a system of collective defence and its member states agree to a mutual defence to an attack by any external actor. This organisation was made to secure the security and safety of North Atlantic region and there were 12 founding members of this organisation namely; USA, the UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal. This Treaty institutionalised the balance of power and security arrangement in West European security against the Soviet threat. "There were other reasons also like deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration and formation of NATO was a major political

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[18] This Treaty was signed between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK and it was intended to provide Western Europe with a bulwark against communist threat.

achievement for West Europe and North Atlantic Region" (NATO: A Short History of NATO).

According to the North Atlantic Treaty (1949),

> *The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and their desire to live in peace and security with all peoples and all governments, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and aggression. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security (North Atlantic Treaty 1949).*

NATO's Article 5 provides security guarantee to its member states and it incorporates armed attack on one will be considered as attack on all and, termed as collective defence, recognised by Article 51 of Charter of UN[19]. In the face of growing Soviet expansionism, formation of NATO was a major milestone for West European security.

NATO was considered as more than a military alliance, but also a political organisation which was actively involved in consultation and decision making. The primary function of NATO was to promote collective defence by signalling to the Soviet Union, a collective intent of self-defence especially will of the member states to come to each other's aid in the event of an attack. Further, it had to reassure the West European members of their safety so they could assume responsibility for their security and thus enhance allied burden sharing.

The political and military equations between US and USSR rapidly changed between 1945-1949. US and its West European allies felt communism was a new enemy and threat for western democracy and its values. On the other hand, Soviet Union also perceived the presence of US and its activities in West Europe as a threat to the communist world. The year of 1949 saw another change and it was nuclear test by USSR. This situation primarily responsible for the arms race on the European continent but this situation ensured balance of power in European security.

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[19] Article 51 provides for the right of countries to engage in self-defence, including collective self-defence, against an armed attack.

2.4. West European Security, NATO and the Phase of Containment (1949-1954)

NATO was formed in this era with an objective to provide security to West European countries against Soviet aggression. The major change in European security in this phase was the nuclear test by Soviet Union in 1949 and this ended the US nuclear hegemony. It introduced the nuclear balance of power in European security.

In order to respond to Soviet threat, NATO formulated a strategic document known as 'The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area' (NATO 1997: XI). The first Strategic Concept in 1949 was accomplished in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of United Nations. "It was determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (NATO 1997: XI). It means that the first Strategic Concept was determined for stability and well-being of Alliance and further preservation of peace and security for the North Atlantic Region. Maintaining peace, security and stability needs defence and military strength. It was not possible without adequate military strength, economic resource and the man power.

Security of the North Atlantic Region was of primary concern and for this purpose, it was primary requirement that all members must pose and ensure unity of thought. Without unity of thought, it was impossible to achieve vested objectives of the Alliance during the period of containment (NATO Military Committee 3 1949: 2-5). NATO's Military Committee focused on this unity of thought further interlinked with two purposes, first, preventing war; and second, for the purpose of common defence, it was required to ensure the effective application of the military and industrial strength of member states (NATO Military Committee 3 1949: 2-5). It was directly related to the notion of burden sharing among the members at the initial stage of NATO. It was the key strength and the Strategic Concept emphasised that every member state had to contribute its military and industrial strength to secure West Europe against Soviet threats.

No organisation can achieve its target without having principles relating to its strategy. In this regard, the first Strategic Concept identified certain principles that were fundamental for its successful functioning. It was also emphasised that these principles must be the part of common defence programme. The principal of

collective defence, military capability, mutual support and maximum efficiency of armed forces with minimum expenditure were included in the Strategic Concept (NATO Military Committee 3 1949: 2-5). The notion of self-defence was realistic and it was related to common action in defence against armed attack through self-help and mutual aid. It was strategically argued that why military capability was required in the then security environment. During the Cold War era and Soviet Union was biggest existential threat to West European security. Hence, enhanced military capability was required without hampering the economic stability.

In this context, André Gerolymatos (2004) in his work, argues that the Communists engaged in violent conflicts against the Greek government forces who were receiving massive military and financial aid from Britain and, later, from the USA. These countries feared that Greece, the last of the Balkan states to resist Soviet domination, would in turn fall to the Communists. As a neighbour of Turkey, Greece was an area of prime importance from an economic and strategic viewpoint for preventing Soviet domination of the Eastern Mediterranean (Gerolymatos 2004: 32).

The United States was committed to preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the Greek kingdom and encouraged to establish a government of national unity and to undertake a series of economic reforms. "The United States assumed the position of undisputed leader of the 'free world'. Greece enjoyed the benefits of the Marshall Plan and gradually became part of the Western system, joining the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1951". The Soviet Union formed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance COMECON[20] which included few Central European countries with the intention to suppress the impact of Marshall Plan in Europe.

Containment and forward strategy were two important policies of US and NATO towards Soviet Russia. The objective was to contain the Soviet Union and block any Soviet movement towards West Europe as possible. A second major development in 1949 was the formal establishment of West Germany (FRG) by uniting the three occupation zones of the Western allies and East Germany (GDR) came into being from the zone controlled by the Soviet Union. It led to the physical division of Germany.

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[20] It was founded in 5 January 1949 by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland.

Map 3: Divided Germany

Source: Ministry of Defence, UK, 1964

"Containment had a defensive goal and it recognised that the Soviets were unlikely to be dislodged, but that measures could be taken to prevent the extension of Soviet influence westward" (Herd 2013: 18). For defending any possible attack or aggression from the East, it was agreed to develop a forward defence strategy, that would possibly defend NATO European countries. There was a major reason behind it and it was related to the increasing influence of communism in Czechoslovakia, which was under the control of the communist regime. It is argued that the North Atlantic Council instructed the defence committee to plan for an integrated force under the centralized command of a supreme commander adequate to deter Soviet forces (Herd 2013: 18). This implied that Europe would be defended largely on the German territory, and the Council therefore considered the political and military participation of West Germany.

However, the breakout of the Korean War in 1950 made NATO to rethink and reshape its first Strategic Concept. At this stage, it had to address two important issues of immediate concern, first, the effectiveness of NATO military structure and second, the strength of NATO forces. For effective military structure, the NAC approved the establishment of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), which had to work under centralised command. In addition, the Supreme Head Quarters Allied Force Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), These establishment enhanced NATO's military capability in 1950s.

This Strategic Concept adopted defence policy for West European countries. It was part of regional planning group. Due to the Korean War, NATO adopted "forward strategy" and it was tried to hold the enemy as far to the East in Germany close to the iron curtain as possible. This was required for NATO to limit or contain the Soviet Union till the boundary of East Germany (NATO Military Committee 14, 1950: 8). The Defence Policy of this phase tried to convince the Soviet Union that war did not pay, and, should war occur, to ensure a successful defence of the North Atlantic Area. It also ensured to oppose any peacetime attempts by the Soviet Union to increase their threat to NATO members. It also ensured a balanced, efficient and technically superior military force against its adversaries.

This Strategic Concept, in the event of war, had provision for combined and coordinated action to defend the member's population and territory against the enemy. It was emphasised that it would be to defend Europe. It means that if Europe will be safe then the North Atlantic Area would also be safe. For this purpose, it identified the three European regions must be considered as a whole and in the view of their geographical position constitute the couverture, facing east, of the North Atlantic Area.

It is also important to focus on the political factor of this phase. In this phase, it is known that the two important organisations came into existence, first, NATO itself and second, COMECON led by Soviet Union. The 13th Defence Committee of 1950 focused on the political factors were related to political alignment and this was the most important aspect related to formation of bloc politics in the early phase of the Cold War period. The East European countries were aligned with Soviet Union bloc against Western alliance and on the other hand Western Bloc were organised against

Soviet Bloc. The Soviet bloc had its own political aims and objectives with military attitude towards the West (Defence Committee 13, 1950: 17).

The then Strategic Concept identified Soviet Union had its own objective to create communist world order against capitalist world order under its domination. The role of Soviet Union in the attainment of this objective was to provide a secure base and powerful support for the international communist movement. The immediate political objective of Soviets was in resorting to war and therefore to destroy the alliance in the West. It is also required to find out the political aim and wills of satellite states of the Soviet Union. According to the Strategic Concept, Soviets never provided space for separate political objectives distinguished from those of Soviet Union (Defence Committee 13, 1950: 17). It means that the political objectives of both sides were to establish sphere of influence primarily in entire Europe and both were countering each other.

The strategic concept during this phase tried to solve the problem which was related to the strength of NATO forces. It was found that NATO forces were not matched up in comparison to Soviet conventional forces apart of its nuclear weapon capability. However, both were equipped with nuclear arsenal but NATO decided to provide new look to its forces. Hence it was decided to shift the emphasis of their defence policy to greater dependency on the use of nuclear weapon. It created a situation of balance of power in European security which was based on nuclear strength, also known as strategic balance in European security.

In 1951-52, European security was moving towards peace and stability when political maturity and negotiation resulted in the formation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). For avoiding war between Germany and France, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed formation of ECSC on 9 May 1950. This initiative was the first step of European integration that enabled a parallel community building in economic forum. This event led to the Treaty of Paris (18 April 1951) which was signed among West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg was a monumental step in overcoming historical animosity and developing a new partnership. So, West Europe moved for an institutional development and multilateral arrangement. As a result, there was new political beginning based on cooperation in Western Europe and economic stability resulted in

diminishing fear of war between Germany and France. Amidst of it, NATO expanded its membership and it opened its door for Greece and Turkey in 1952. The early events of 1950s was a success for Western Alliance in Europe where they strengthen themselves against Soviet Union.

2.5. The Phase of Massive Retaliation (1954-1960)

During this period, NATO was guided by the strategy of massive retaliation. It was a policy of deterrence based on the idea that NATO would respond with every means at its disposal, specifically including nuclear weapons, to any aggression or threat against any of its member countries. This policy also intended to cut defence spending by adopting the strategy that viewed nuclear weapons as weapons of first resort. Graeme P. Herd (2013) argued that in the context of European security, NATO allies were interested in the proposal to deploy tactical nuclear weapon to front line units in Europe. Nuclear weapons, strategic or tactical, were defence on the cheap avoiding the cost of increased conventional forces and appealed to the European allies (Herd 2013: 18). During this phase, in 1955, allies ended military occupation of West Germany and it was given membership of NATO. It was a big change in European security because allies were changing their approach towards West Germany and the process of rearmament started there, although France was worried about it. In a response, Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact in 1955 and by this it became military counterpart to NATO.

It was the era of arms race, Soviet Union launched the Sputnik-I in 1957 and in a response to it, US led NATO decided to deploy Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile towards Europe under the Supreme Allied Command Europe. These developments led to a balance of conventional and nuclear forces. Herd (2013) further argued that the Europeans were always worried that the advent of the tactical nuclear and theatre nuclear weapons could decouple the US from Europe in the event of a major Soviet invasion and that the two superpowers would fight a nuclear battle on European territory (Herd 2013: 19). In 1958, Soviet leaders virtually gave an ultimatum to the West, demanding for entire Berlin the status of a demilitarised free city. It also confronted the West, either to recognise a free demilitarised Berlin or be ready for a war question being who was to stamp the transit documents between East and West. It was not accepted by the Western leaders. No leadership wanted war in this situation

where both sides were capable of nuclear attack. At Camp David[21], formal talks were held among leaders and tension regarding Berlin was lowered. Issues of disarmament and demilitarisation were suggested in the meetings. The incident of U-2[22] in May 1960 made the spirit of Camp David worthless and there was increase in tension in entire Europe over U-2 incident. People from East Berlin were fleeing towards West Berlin and it also created brain drain situation in East Berlin and East Germany and on 13 August 1961, East Berlin was separated by a physical boundary from West Berlin through the construction of the Berlin Wall. This was an unexpected move by the Soviet Union that divided many families in Germany and this situation created a question mark on the future of German unification.

Hence, one can say that, this was very sensitive era due to the two blocs in Europe involved in arms race especially developing missiles and considering nuclear weapon as a first and last resort to deter each other. This posed a major dilemma to the European states that if both the US and the Soviet Union confronted each other, then Europeans would have to suffer more.

2.6. West European Security and the Phase of Flexible Response (1962-1979)

The U-2 incident further led to Cuban Missile Crisis. October 1962 witnessed the Cuban missile crisis and added little to European security but it was an important event for it. Lens Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (2015) argued that the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union concerning Soviet ballistic missile deployment in Cuba was the closest during the Cold War period that came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war (Scott 2015: 17). Marry S. McAuliffe (1992) argued that during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs was not only militarised but also nuclearized. Soviet Union deployed R-12, R-7, SS-4 ballistic missiles with nuclear warhead in the Bay of Pigs and on the other hand the US deployed Jupiter ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey (McAulifee 1992: 4-10). This crisis ended with certain compromise that the Soviet Union would withdraw its nuclear arsenal from Cuba and in response to it, the US would not take any action against the Castro regime in Cuba and also the US

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[21] From 15 to 27 September 1959, At Camp David, US President Eisenhower and Soviet leader Khrushchev met on the issue of Berlin. This meeting has improved the atmosphere between the two blocs.
[22] On 1 May 1960, an US U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union. However, US denied that it was a spy plane but this incident made the spirit of Camp David worthless. This incident destroyed the chances of an early improvement in East-West relations.

had to withdraw its nuclear arsenal from Italy and Turkey. This was a signal that both were reducing nuclear armaments. There was a surprising incident in 1963 that France unanimously declared the withdrawal of its naval fleet from NATO. However, it was not a major setback to the allies but France wanted to regulate its nuclear plans independently. In the next move in 1966, France again withdrew its force from NATO's Collective Command Structure. But on the other hand, France committed that it will always be with the allies against the communist regime and Soviet Union in security of West Europe. During this phase, both superpowers signed many agreements that cut down nuclear arsenal and their testing and missiles.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the two superpowers agreed to install a direct hotline between Washington D.C. and Moscow enabling leaders of both countries to quickly interact with each other in a time of urgency, and reduce the chances that future crises could escalate into an all-out war. Following this, there was the period of Détente from 1969-1979, when the tensions between the two super powers were eased. The most obvious action of détente was the series of summits held between the leaders of the two superpowers and the treaties that resulted from these meetings. In the early 1960s, before détente, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed on August 5, 1963. Later, the Outer Space Treaty (22 January 1967) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), July 1968, were two of the first building blocks of détente.

SALT-I (1972) and Helsinki Accord (1975) were major initiatives in the Cold War era. It made Europe safer because any undesirable happening could lead to nuclear exchange and Europe was possible battle ground for it. Hence, this could be considered as contributory to European security.

As the environment was rapidly changing during the Cold War period, the 1970s was important for the Helsinki Accord. Meanwhile, Harmel Report was prepared for NATO and its purpose was to study the future tasks which face the alliance and it procedure for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the alliance as durable peace (Harmel Report 1967: para.1).

Ivo Lapennal (1977) pointed out "the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in 1975, met and drafted the Helsinki Accords, a wide ranging series of agreements on economic, political, and human rights issues. The CSCE was

initiated by the USSR, involving 35 states throughout Europe. One of the most prevalent and discussed issue, after the conference was that of human rights violations in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Constitution directly violated the Declaration of Human Rights from the United Nations, and this issue became a prominent point of separation between the United States and the Soviet Union" (Lapennal 1977: 1-2).

The Helsinki Conference in 1975 and its final act are considered as an important achievement in European security. Achievements of Helsinki Conference were referred as symbolic culmination of detente in Europe. The principal concern of West European countries in the 1970s in the field of security was to combine the Western alliance with the improved relations with the Soviet Union. This improved relation was a positive signal for the European security environment because relationship between the two blocs was relatively relaxed, more cultural, and commercial and reduction in the forces were ensured. Davy (2013) argued that the Soviet Union had been pressing for various versions of a European Security Conference. Its leaders had always felt insecure in Eastern Europe, aware of the illegitimacy and unpopularity of their occupation, fearful of uprisings, suspicious of Western attempts to undermine their rule, and worried especially by West Germany, which remained a serious potential threat in their eyes. They hoped that a multilateral declaration would legitimise and stabilise their European empire (Davy 2009: 2).

The major aspect of the Helsinki Conference was the question relating to security of Europe and the Three Baskets. David Williamson (2006) argued that CSCE reaffirmed the objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to their security. It was convinced that efforts to make détente both a continuing and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process and universal in scope (Williamson 2006: 146). "Considering that solidarity among peoples, as well as the common purpose of the participating States in achieving the aims as set forth by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, should lead to the development of better and closer relations among them in all fields and thus to overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations, and to better mutual understanding" (CSCE Final Act 1975: 3). The Final Act ensured sovereign equality and respects of rights for all European nations. It focused on no use of force, inviolability of national border and peaceful settlement of disputes in Europe. Non-

interference in internal matters, freedom of expression and fundamental freedom including human rights are other important provisions of this accord that is significant for European security.

From 1975 to 1979, the growing impact of the Helsinki Accord was witnessed in all fields like political, economic, security and civil society relations and this was signified given that the reason for the decline of détente in the late 1970s, especially the U.S. policy of détente, was the lack of compatibility between the reality of continuing competition and the Nixon administration's overblown image of détente as building a structure of peace. President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, were fully aware of the reality and waged détente vigorously to gain advantage in the global competition with the Soviet Union. They did not acknowledge this fact and could not control adverse public reaction when the Soviet leaders sought to do the same.

David Williamson (2006) pointed out that Nixon's comment that 'détente does not mean the end of danger…détente is not the same as lasting peace'. The USSR intensified its efforts to intervene and support sympathetic regimes in the Middle East, Africa and Asia on one hand, while the new US President, Jimmy Carter, made human rights in Eastern Europe one of the priorities of his foreign policy. However, the first major blow to the new Helsinki spirit came down when Moscow placed SS-20 medium-range missiles in Eastern Europe in 1976. This led NATO to adopt in 1979 the controversial dual-track policy. In a response, the US would deploy its own medium-range Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe (Williamson 2006: 147-48).

These events led to massive change in European security in the form of the New Cold War (1979) and with it the spirit of détente over. It started with Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet Union wanted to accept status quo in Europe but not elsewhere. During this period NATO was successfully expanding its membership. Spain joined NATO in 1982 and it strengthen its hold in Europe.

2.7. Dual Track Approach: Implication for West European Security

The late 1970s was very crucial for NATO and its implication for the West European security. Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and US changed its foreign

policy which was based on détente (easing East-West tension). Russell R. Sherrett (1979) pointed out that NATO and the European community debated the need for deployment of a new generation of nuclear force. The Dual Track[23] decision of 1979 looked at Intermediate Range Nuclear Force modernisation and arms control negotiation (Sherrett 1979: 25). First Track was related to deployment of new Pershing-II missiles in West Europe. On the other hand, second Track was focused on arms control negotiation with Soviet Union. This approach was also seen as to counter Soviet expansionism during the New Cold War.

Its implication was not in the favour of European security as it also led to the end of era of Detente. Stephanie Freeman (2014) argues that the NATO dual-track decision led to the outbreak of the Euro missiles crisis, which ranged from 1979 to 1983. The Soviets refused to participate in arms control negotiations on theatre nuclear forces for nearly two years, which further damaged the already strained state of superpower relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the end of détente (Freeman 2014: 332). It was further argued that the dual-track decision had been the "last drop tipping the scales" that prompted Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to approve the Afghan operation, as he feared that the United States could next deploy short-range missiles on the Soviet Union's southern border in Afghanistan (Freeman 2014: 332). Due to this situation, the relationship between two superpower drifted and in West Europe, there were massive protest against this approach.

The last stage of European security during the Cold War was related to two important years i.e.1985 and 1989-90 and the events occurred during this period. General Secretary of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in Soviet Union in 1985 and since this point of time, security environment was changing and turning in favour of West Europe. Lawrence S. Kaplan (2003) argued "there was a sense of triumph in the West. This emotion was hardly surprising as the allies watched Gorbachev's reform policies tearing down the barriers that had been built up between East and West for more than a generation. Not only was there unilateral Soviet reduction in conventional forces to match reductions in nuclear

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[23] The dual-track decision constituted NATO's response to the Soviet Union's modernisation and expansion of its Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe, which began in 1977 with the deployment of SS-20 missiles and Tu-22M "Backfire" bombers in the European part of the Soviet Union.

weaponry, there was also the loosing of controls over the Warsaw Pact allies" (Kaplan 2004: 103). In the elections of March 1989, communist governments were thrown out from Poland, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Eeden mentioned that

> *The year 1989 often described as an annus mirabilis[24]. It was the year in which various, mostly peaceful, forms of social upheaval in Eastern Europe drastically changed the European geopolitical landscape. The Berlin wall came down, borders opened and communist regimes in Eastern Europe fell one after another. East and west were no longer separated by the so called Iron Curtain. The events of 1989 stood as the basis of a major cultural, economic and socio-political transformation of Eastern Europe (Eeden 2011: 1).*

The late 1980s was very important and significant in European security, when fall of Berlin Wall took place in November 1989. The reunification of Germany and disintegration of Soviet Union provided new look to Europe and European security. "At the end of the Cold War, the vision of a Europe whole and free was readily adopted as a baseline concept for what was then called a new European security architecture. 'Whole' implies both the end of ideological East-West division of the Cold War and an entity" (Sauerwein 1995: 2). The European security was the product of East-West confrontation. In the post-Cold War, the era of bipolarity over and it was the US that become hegemon in the entire world.

2.8. Characterising European Security during the Cold War Period

On the basis of above study, it can be said that nature and characteristics of European security basically depended upon security environment, order and the actors involved in that security environment with military capability. European security can be defined and characterise on the basis of changing contours of the European security during the Cold War. In this regard, one can find various characteristics of European security.

First, the European security, during the Cold War, was based on ideological confrontation with two bloc politics. The entire world felt the impact of this ideological confrontation. Within this environment, the Non-aligned Movement also managed to establish itself.

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[24] It is a Latin phrase which refers 'wonderful year'. Originally, it was first used in year 1666 from escaping major calamity in England.

Second, the then European security can be characterised as long term peace in Europe. Both, the US and the Soviet Union never went to war against each other rather there was intense ideological confrontation.

Third, threats were identifiable in European continent. US-led NATO and Soviet Union led Warsaw Pact were two major adversaries to each other and both actors identified each other as threat to their security. This was an existential threat for both sides, due to the presence of nuclear weapons.

Fourth, entire Cold War period, there was no direct war on the European continent and there was only war of words or ideological confrontation. It also shows that both superpowers were well aware of the dangerous impact of nuclear exchange and therefore, they did not allow any crisis to escalate on the continent.

Fifth, the entire European security order was bipolar in nature and both actors tried to increase their sphere of influence not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world.

Sixth, in European security, it is visible that both actors tried their best to balance each other by enhancing military and nuclear capability. It means that balance of power was an important dimension in European Security. After the end of the Cold War, nature and characteristic of European security changed rapidly due to the emergence of new security environment in Europe and the world.

2.9. Mapping the changing contours of European Security during the Cold War Period

On the basis of above research, the changing contours of European security during the Cold War can be classified as development and its outcome in respective decades.

Table: 2.2 Developments and Outcomes of European Security during the Cold War Period

Decade	Year	Develop-ments	Actors	Opportunities/ Threats as seen from a West European Perspective	Outcome
1945 -50	1945	Yalta Conference	US, UK, and USSR	Soviet threat	Division of Germany

Decade	Year	Developments	Actors	Opportunities/ Threats as seen from a West European Perspective	Outcome
		Potsdam Conference	US, UK, and USSR	Soviet threat	Division of Germany and Beginning of the Cold War
	1946	Fulton Speech	UK	Soviet threat	Iron Curtain & East-West antagonism
	1947	Truman Speech	US	Soviet threat	Containment of USSR
		Marshall Plan		Economic Support	Economic revitalisation of West European Countries of Europe
	1948	Berlin Blockade	USSR		Berlin Airlift
	1949	North Atlantic Treaty	US, Canada and West European countries	Soviet threat	Formation of NATO and NATO's first Strategic Concept
		Atom bomb exploded by USSR	USSR	To counter the US nuclear hegemony	Atomic parity with US
		Formation of FRG and GDR	US, UK, France and USSR	Cold War	Division of Germany
	1950	Korean War	South Korea, US, UK and North Korea, China, USSR	Expanding Cold War in Far East	NATO's Forward Strategy
1951-60	1951-1952	Treaty of Paris	West Germany, France, Italy and BENELUX	Economic integration of West Europe	Formation of ECSC

Decade	Year	Develop-ments	Actors	Opportunities/ Threats as seen from a West European Perspective	Outcome
	1952	Second Strategic Concept	NATO	NATO reshaped its first Strategic Concept	Formation of SACEUR, SHAPE, SACLANT and NATO adopted forward strategy
	1955	West Germany joined NATO	NATO and West Germany	USSR threat	USSR established Warsaw Pact
	1956	Hungarian Uprising	Common student of Hungary	Challenging USSR policies in Hungary	Imminent triumph of Socialism
		Suez Crisis	Israel, Egypt, UK, France, US, USSR, UN	US established its hegemonic position	Nationalisation of Suez Canal, decline of the UK as major power in the world
	1957	Launch of Sputnik I	USSR		Space race
		Third Strategic Concept	NATO	Soviet threat	Massive retaliation
	1960	U-2 incident	US and USSR	Soviet threat	Collapse of Four Power Paris Summit
1961-70	1961	Incident of Bay of Pigs	US, USSR and Cuba	Soviet and Cuban Confrontation against US-led NATO	Failure of US in this region.
		Berlin Wall built	US and USSR	Soviet threat	Soviet Union restricted emigration and brain drain from East

Decade	Year	Developments	Actors	Opportunities/ Threats as seen from a West European Perspective	Outcome
					Germany to West Germany
	1962	Cuban Missile Crisis	US and USSR	Soviet threat	The US and USSR closer to nuclear war but it did not happen. Both came closer for disarmament and the Cold War ended.
		French NATO withdrawal	France and NATO		NATO unity breached
	1963	Beginning of era of Détente	US and USSR	From confrontation to cooperation on disarmament	Signing on PTBT
	1967	Prague Spring	USSR and Czechoslovakia	Soviet threat	Brezhnev Doctrine
		Harmel Report	NATO	Soviet threat	Flexible response
	1969	The Fourth Strategic Concept	NATO	Scope for cooperation between US and USSR	Focus on Concept of Flexibility against aggression
1971-80	1972	Era of peaceful coexistence	US and USSR	Cooperation on arms control	SALT I
	1975	CSCE	CSCE member states	Cooperation among CSCE members	Helsinki Accord and physical division of Europe
	1979	Soviet invasion of	USSR	Soviet threat	Dual Track Approach of NATO, End

Decade	Year	Developments	Actors	Opportunities/ Threats as seen from a West European Perspective	Outcome
		Afghanistan			of détente and beginning of the New Cold War
	1980	Change in leadership in US (Ronald Regan as a President)	US	Soviet threat	Regan Doctrine
1981-90	1981	Marshal law imposed in Poland	Poland, USSR and US	Polish and Soviet Confrontation	Economic sanction imposed on Poland and USSR
	1983	SDI initiative of Europe	US	Soviet threat	Star Wars
	1985	Gorbachev Reforms	USSR	Glasnost and Perestroika	Redirection of political and economic condition of USSR
	1987	INF Treaty	US and USSR	Cooperation on disarmament	Elimination of intermediate and short range missiles
	1989	Fall of Berlin Wall	East and West Germany	Soviet threat	Division of Europe ended
	1990	Reunification of Germany	East and West Germany	Soviet threat	Division of Europe ended

Source: compiled by the researcher

The collapse of Communism within the Eastern bloc and the break-up of the Soviet Union put an end to the Cold War. The new regimes declared their intention to turn to the countries of Western Europe for the necessary economic aid and assistance to facilitate the transition. The fall of the Berlin Wall also paved the way for the reunification of Germany. Europe's organizational infrastructures also had to be enlarged and transformed so that they would be better suited to the new political order in Eastern Europe. From the end of the 1990s, the two former Cold War enemies embarked on a process of disarmament. The negotiations led to the signing of agreements for the progressive reduction of the number of conventional and nuclear weapons on European continent. Relations between the United States and the Russian Federation also began to normalise and the two countries embarked on bilateral negotiations on strategic arms reduction.

With the end of the Cold War, the era of long peace over in Europe. The late 1980s was the phase of transition and during this time period, two dramatic changes occurred and these were related to reunification of Germany and collapse of Soviet Union. The most important aspect in the Cold War was that there was no direct war on the European continent between the two superpowers. In order to remain relevant in the changing times and the European countries as well, end of the Cold War came with new possibilities and world became unipolar with one hegemon and that was United States, and NATO successfully survived under the US leadership. At the end of the Cold War Europe and European Security was rapidly changing. Central and Eastern European countries were liberated, new actors emerged in Europe. The bipolarity of world order was over. The new security environment in the Europe was signalling for new security equations in Europe. During this time period, NATO survived successfully against Warsaw Pact and in that circumstances NATO adopted Strategic Concept 1991 to provide new guidelines in new security environment. The Post-Cold War era came with new threats and challenges that NATO had to confront and respond to it. With the end of the Cold War, era of existential threat over and unipolar system with US hegemon established in the entire world.

CHAPTER 3

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2010

"NATO is an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values. But the world is changing. We face new threats and new challenges. And this Strategic Concept will ensure that NATO remains as effective as ever in defending our peace, our security and our prosperity."

- Anders Fogh Rasmussen[25], Secretary General NATO, 19 Nov. 2010

The Post-Cold War security environment was distinct and uncertain on the European continent, as there were many political and strategic changes and these changes played an important role in shaping security environment. There were two major shifts at the end of the Cold War, first, the fall of Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany, and second, the disintegration of the Soviet Union. These two political shifts changed perspective on the entire European security. The political environment of Europe was changing rapidly and radically at that time and NATO had to set its new agenda for the defence of European democracies in the evolving security environment and in this new strategic environment NATO was the life line for its member countries.

3.1. Bipolarity in Transition

The fundamental political changes in Europe and at the end of the Cold War signalled the beginning of a new era, which was no more characterised by confrontation and military deterrence. The era of bipolarity was over with the end of the Cold War and the new system emerged in international arena. With the end of the East-West

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[25] Anders Fogh Rasmussen was 12th Secretary General of NATO since 2009 to 2014.

ideological confrontation and disintegration of USSR, new political, economic and social change appeared in Europe. Bipolarity was replaced by unipolarity and in the Central-Eastern European countries, the socio-economic circumstances were rapidly changing and looking towards westerns norms of social, democratic and economic values. Adrian Hyde-Price (1992) argued that the dramatic and unexpected events of 1989-91 marked the end of the security system which was prevalent during the Cold War period. The security system in Europe improved as a result of the changes in Germany i.e. reunification of Germany, emergence of Russia i.e. future of former Soviet Union (Hyde-Price 1992: 38). Reunification of Germany symbolized victory of western values. The first change i.e. reunified Germany remained part of the Alliance and the other European institutions. All countries of the European Community were working for the development of a political union and it also focused on the development of a European security identity and enhancement of the role of West European Union (WEU) which was important for the European security order. Europe in this strategic and changing environment was gradually moving towards integration (NATO Strategic Concept 1991: para.2). It means that all member states were working for European integration and enhanced role of NATO in Europe. It was identified that the development of European security identity and defence role will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

The next change was disintegration of the Soviet Union and with this, its satellite states became sovereign and attracted towards Western values of democracy and rule of law. The successful survival of NATO and termination of Warsaw pact changed the Cold War pattern of polarity and after the establishment of the hegemonic position of the US with NATO, bipolarity disappeared from the European security system. The new political changes and equations were related to new cooperation between NATO and Russia. The changed security environment came with new international order and it was the end of the bipolar bloc confrontation. It was a new era of international order which was characterised with unipolar international system. It provided the US-led NATO a unique position in European security.

3.2. The Post-Cold War Europe and the New Strategic Environment
NATO and The Strategic Concept 1991

One cannot ignore the emerging and new security challenges and risks to Europe after the end of the Cold War. However, there was no direct threat from Russia at that time, but maintaining peace and stability in Europe was of major concern of the Alliance. Graeme P. Herd quoted this Strategic Concept as a "strategy without an adversary" (Herd 2013: 23). In the new strategic environment, NATO adopted the Alliance's Strategic Concept at their Rome Summit in 1991. Rob de Wijk(1997) pointed out that the Strategic Concept 1991 reflected the political and military turbulence and uncertainty of that time. Popular revolts covered the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, disintegration of Yugoslavia, a U.S.-led coalition intervened in the Persian Gulf, Moscow witnessed an unsuccessful coup d'état 1991, and the Baltic Republics became independent (Wijk 1997: 13-46).

Figure: 3.1 Strategic Environment at the beginning of 1991

Source: Compiled by researcher

NATO had been careful about the periphery of Europe especially Southern Mediterranean and Middle-East which was disturbed during the Gulf War 1991. "The new environment did not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The changed environment offered new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security" (NATO Strategic Concept 1991: para.11). NATO was aware of instability and disturbance in its periphery, and it strengthen its military power to counter any possible threat from this region which could harm stability in Europe. NATO played an important role by conducting Operation Anchor Guard (1990-91), Operation Ace Guard (1991), Operation Allied Good Will (1992), Operation Agile Genie (1992) and other operations at the initial phase of 1990s. Its active role indicated that NATO was worried for peace and security in Europe and its periphery during 1990-1999.

Table: 3.1 NATO's Operations (1990-1999)

Operations	Year	Assistance	Action Against
Operation Anchor Guard	10 August 1990 - 9 March 1991	Turkey	Iraq
Operation Ace Guard	3 January 1991 - 8 March 1991	Turkey	Iraq
Operation Allied Good Will I&II	February - March 1992	Russia and CIS	---------
Operation Agile Genie	1 - 19 May 1992	Pan am Airliner	Libya
Operation MARITIME MONITOR	July - November 1992	Ensuring arms embargo	Former Yugoslavia
Operation SKY MONITOR	October 1992 - April 1993	UNSC's no fly zone over Bosnia	Former Yugoslavia
Operation DENY FLIGHT	April 1993 - December 1995	UNSC's no fly zone over Bosnia	Bosnian Serb Air troops
Operation SHARP GUARD	June 1993 - October 1996	UN's weapon embargo	Former Yugoslavia
Operation JOINT ENDAEVOUR	December 1995 - December 1996	IFOR	Bosnia
Operation EAGLE EYE	October 1998 - March 1999	Kosovo	Serbs in Kosovo
Operation ALLIED FORCE	March 1999 - June 1999		Bombing on Former Yugoslavia

Source: NATO official website 1999

During this period arms control was a major issue, for this purpose, US President Bush (1991) and Russian President Gorbachev initiated Presidential Nuclear Initiative[26] on 27 September 1991. On this issue, the Strategic Concept of 1991 focused on, "increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms and this further led to an unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe" (NATO Strategic Concept 1991: para. 3). For this purpose, the Strategic Concept favoured implementation of the 1991 START Treaty and it would lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reduction in the field of strategic nuclear arms as well as nuclear force (NATO Strategic Concept 1991: para.3). Russia's conventional force and its nuclear arsenal was comparatively larger than other European countries, hence NATO took it as a challenge in European security. This initiative led to the arms control which was required for mutual confidence between US led NATO and Russia.

Another major change after the Cold War was related to the security of Central and East European countries. Andrew Cottey (1995) argued that NATO in a limited manner offered the hand of friendship to Central and East European countries through diplomatic and military means. Due to coup attempts in former USSR in August 1991, NATO showed its interest in institutionalizing its relations with the countries to Central and Eastern Europe (Cottey 1995: 141). As an outcome, in European security, NATO in the Rome Summit (Rome Summit on Peace and Cooperation 1991), invited these countries in North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on democratic civil-military relations, civil-military cooperation and for defence planning.

In relation to it, another change was associated with reorientation in NATO's defence efforts. Laure Paquette (1995) pointed that the Strategic Concept emphasised on lower force readiness level and that could command various multinational interventions in European security (Paquette 1995: 744). The lowering down of defence forces also indicates that the NATO did not have any existential threat like USSR after the end of the Cold War in the European continent. Readiness level approach of NATO was very useful in various interventions in Yugoslav Wars/Balkan Wars with ethnic and religious rivalries impacting security of Europe.

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[26] In September and October 1991, US President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced a series of policy initiatives declaring that the United States and the Soviet Union and later Russia would reduce their arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. These initiatives were known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.

Risks were identified in the then security environment in the form of ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. Ethnic problems in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo created instability to European security and it was considered as return of crisis in European security and the long term end of peace in Europe over after the end of the Cold War. The Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001) were the first major ethnic conflict after the end of the Cold War and was considered as a new challenge in Europe. Alastair Finlan (2004) argued that due to ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, territorial disputes emerged and it led to the split of Yugoslavia and further it led to military conflicts in this region (Finlan 2004: 8). NATO played an important role in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95), where it initiated crisis response activities. For this purpose, NATO sent Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia in 1995 (NATO Factsheet 2015). Tom Lansford (1999) argued that in the new security environment, Europe faced new security challenges like re-emergence of nationalism and ethnic strife, proliferation of WMD soft security issues like refugees problem (Lansford 1999: 2-5). The re-emergence of nationalism in Europe (especially in the Balkan region) was the major reason for unrest and conflict in Europe as it led to massive refugee problem in Europe. In the last phase of the 1990s, "NATO played an important role in Kosovo where it initiated peace support mission which is known as Kosovo Force (KFOR)" (NATO 2016). KFOR's tasks were to deter renewed hostilities, establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, support the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with the international civil presence. It shows that NATO missions and objectives which were mentioned in its strategic documents are not only important but it shows its commitment for stability and peace in Europe.

Table: 3.2 NATO Operations during the 1990s

NATO Operation Zone	Operations	Personals (Allied Troops)
Gulf (1990-91)	ACE Mobile Force	
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95)	IFOR	60000
	SFOR	31000
Kosovo (1999)	KFOR	4500

Source: Compiled from NATO Official website

Table 3.2 reflects the importance of NATO after the end of the Cold War in European security. The various operations were only possible due to the survival of NATO and its active engagement in European security.

In this strategic environment, NATO focused on how to increase stability in European security. Further for enhancing security in Europe, it was required to prepare for the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe. It was an important issue because during the entire Cold War period, Central and Eastern European countries were under strict command of communist regime and Sooviet forces were on the ground. There was another massive change in 1991 and "NATO moved beyond the Harmel Reports's defence and détente to three mutually reinforcing elements like dialogue, cooperation and maintenance of a collective defence capability" (Herd 2013: 23). From this point, it is clear that the post-Cold War era was not the era of détente, and with the disintegration of Soviet Union, era of existential threat was over. Hence, it was required to focus on dialogue and cooperation with the newly established Russia and its former satellite states.

For a successful security or defence organisation, it is required to manage healthy relationship among members. In this context, the strategic document focused on common commitment, mutual cooperation, solidarity and collective effort to enhance their ability and to counter challenges and risks. The basic purpose behind it was to incorporate the transatlantic link (The New Strategic Concept 1991: para. 11). The transatlantic link was a key link that connected security of North America to the security of Europe. This link ensures combined defence under a single frame of collective defence of Alliance. This is also considered as permanent security link between North America and Europe.

As security in the new Europe was uncertain and vulnerable, hence, NATO was assigned fundamental security tasks and it included, first, "to maintain stable security environment in Europe which was based on the growth of democratic institution and commitment to the peaceful resolution of the dispute, second, to defend member states against any kind of threat and to preserve strategic balance within Europe" (The New Strategic Concept 1991: para. 11). No democratic institution can survive in unstable political environment and one can achieve stable security environment only through dialogue and mutual cooperation on the issue of dispute. After 1991, new

Russia with new Europe was possessing a large conventional army and nuclear arsenal. This situation was not in the favour of European security. Hence, it was focused that European security should have strategic balance not through arms race but through strategic arms reduction. This strategic document also advocated to maintain minimum credibility in combination of conventional force and nuclear force.

Table: 3.3 Security Challenges and Risks identified in Strategic Concept 1991

Security Challenges	Risks	Fundamental Tasks
Nuclear Arsenal (WMD)	Economic difficulties	Preserve stable peace and security in Europe
Ballistic Missile	Social difficulties	Maintenance of military capability
Proliferation of Weapon Technology	Political difficulties	Promotion of democratic values and institutions
Terrorism	Ethnic rivalries	Preservation of strategic balance in Europe
Sabotage	Territorial disputes	Counter threats against NATO members

Source: Alliance's Strategic Concept 1991

The above table points out that NATO identified security challenges and risks after the end of the Cold War and it formulated fundamental tasks to counter challenges and risks to European security.

The major objective of this Strategic Concept was to defend the Alliance members against any challenges, threats and risks. This was only possible through cooperation, dialogue, collective defence, conflict prevention and crisis management. Maintaining peace and security was not possible without the US-led NATO.

During this period, Europeans were expressing their interest for change. It was found that European nations were interested in European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)27 and till the end of this decade they also wanted to develop separate security arrangement independent of NATO and this was confirmed in Treaty of St. Malo in 1998. Continued ethnic problems in Kosovo and lesser importance to growing

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27 EDSI was developed by NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin in 1996. The objective was the preparation of West European Union operation with the involvement of WEU and NATO on identification within the Alliance of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets and elaboration of appropriate multinational European command within NATO in order to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations.

terrorism made NATO to rethink and revise its Strategic Concept. Gülnur Aybet (2010) focused on shortcomings that led to change in the 1991 Strategic Concept and he mentioned that the Strategic Concept of the 1991 did not meet all requirements and new security challenges like airlift capability, rapid deployment of forces to distant places at the time of conflict" (Aybet 2010: 41). For ensuring enhanced security in Europe especially for Alliance's members, NATO had to acquire military capability to counter threats. In this change and continuity, NATO adopted New Strategic Concept 1999.

3.3. The Strategic Concept 1999: Continuity and Change

The Strategic Concept of 1999 was the symbol of continuity and positive change in NATO towards new security environment in Europe and its periphery. The Post-Cold War Europe, especially at the end the 20th century, was more integrated but complex. The positive change in the security environment included consultation, crisis management, and partnership with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean countries, incorporation of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and the approach to security in the 21st century.

This Strategic Concept was adopted at the last stage of the 20th century, hence, it was important that how it responded to security in the 21st century as it was totally futuristic in nature and it was a difficult task for NATO to counter threats alone. But with the previous experience, its strategic tasks were reshaped with enhanced and effective military capability.

The Strategic Concept 1999 incorporated terrorism but it only appeared in a peripheral manner. According to paragraph 24 of this strategic document, "any armed attack on the territory of the Allies would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Alliance's security can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, like actions of terrorism, sabotage, organised crime and uncontrolled movement of people as an outcome of armed conflict" (NATO Strategic Concept 1999: para. 24). In this situation, Alliance's member can consult and coordinate each other under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty such that they can respond to risks.

According to the Strategic Concept 1999, "the Alliance was committed to a broad approach to security which recognised the importance of political, economic, social

and environmental factors in addition to indispensable defence dimension. This approach formed the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks. It also increased its efforts to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations" (Strategic Concept 1999: para. 27). This reflects that defence dimension was not only enough for ensuring security to Euro-Atlantic region. Europe needs not only military security but also political, economic and social security in the existing security environment.

After the formation of the EU (Maastricht Treaty 1992), the European states wanted the West European Union (WEU) to assume greater responsibility in the field of security and defence. However, this was a separate initiative but further it was mentioned that the ESDI (1996) will be developed within the NATO. Establishment of the ESDI was not possible without close coordination, consultation and cooperation between NATO and the WEU. Even the available resources of the WEU were not enough to meet the defence requirement and hence cooperation was required for it. The development of ESDI was an essential part of the improvement of European military capabilities. The Alliance's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was designed to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of NATO missions and it was expected that it will play a crucial role in this process. It was also focused that if required, NATO and the EU would also consult each other for cooperation.

Preserving security, maintain stability and preventing war is not an easy task for any security actor. For these purposes, effective partnership, cooperation and dialogue process is required among various security actors. In this context, this strategic document focused on the importance of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). For NATO, it was important to cooperate with its partners under the framework of EAPC. "The EAPC consultations built increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management (Strategic Concept 1999: para. 34). The Partnership for Peace (PfP) has been the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its partners and for enhancing interoperability between partners and NATO. The Alliance has been committed to increase the role of partners in PfP decision-making and planning. NATO can consult any active partners if they perceive a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence and security.

This strategic document provided special focus on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean regions. These are important for peace, stability and cooperation in Euro-Atlantic Region. NATO cannot ignore Russia in European security. Within the framework of the "NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security" which was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. Both agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area (Strategic Concept 1999: para. 36). It shows that Russia is important for NATO and European security. After NATO, Russia has been second major power in Europe. Hence, NATO expected that Russia would play an important role in security of Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine has occupied a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and has been an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO has been committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance always to supported Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and Eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole. It is also important for NATO for its further eastward enlargement. Ronald Asmus (2002) argued that the Strategic Concept 1999, "emphasised an enlarged NATO assuming new mission to project stability beyond its immediate borders as one central pillar of a new Euro-Atlantic community" (Asmus 2002: 13).

According to the Strategic Concept 1999, the Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue process has been an integral part of NATO's co-operative approach to security. It provided a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region. The Alliance has been

committed to develop progressively the political, civil, and military aspects of the dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue. It has been also important in the sense that this region is peripheral to Europe and if periphery of Europe would be secure then European security will be also secure.

For a security actor, it is important to enhance its sphere of influence and therefore, NATO as a security actor always shows its interest in maintaining and enhancing its sphere of influence. For this purpose, enlargement has been an important strategic agenda of NATO in Europe. In this context, this strategic document focused on enlargement issue and according to which, the Alliance would remain open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in the coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. NATO has established a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the context of its wider relationship with them.

3.4. NATO's Enlargement (1999), European Security and End of the 20th Century

The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process. NATO's "open door policy" is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that membership is open to any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" (NATO 2015a: Enlargement). NATO provided membership to the East European countries namely Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland on 12 March 1999. This was the first enlargement after the end of the Cold War and it was a success of NATO that they enlarged their zone of security towards Eastern Europe.

3.5. The Beginning of 21st Century: A Changed Security Environment

In the 21st century European security is rapidly changing and adjusting in the new international security environment. The changing security environment needs transformation in NATO's objectives such that it can ensure peace and stability for its members in North Atlantic region. Strategic planning is an integral part of a security actor when it deals with security challenges in distinct security environment. The 21st century Europe and its security related requirement is distinct and different from 20th century. It needs new tools, fundamentals, resources and commitments for ensuring a strong and safer NATO community. It made NATO's top leadership to rethink and reformulate a New Strategic Concept to cop up with the changing security environment. It is important to focus on NATO's Strategic Concept that how does it respond to threats and guides NATO for a specific decade and security environment.

The relevance of the Strategic Concept 1999 was questioned at the onset of the 21st century. The Year 2001 created question mark on the relevance and viability of this strategic document. NATO's strategic documents hardly focused on terrorism and the event of 9/11 changed entire perspective of Alliance's on security and defence issues. The Afghanistan Mission (2001-2014), Iraq War (2003) and Russia-Georgia War (2008) were another major issues which were not expected. In the era of globalised security challenges and risks, NATO needed to revise its strategic documents to incorporate new challenges which were more vulnerable to its members. These challenges were identified as terrorism, WMD, cyber threat, global warming, energy security, health risks like HIV AIDS and hunger. NATO adopted its first post-9/11 strategic document to counter threats and risks in Lisbon in 2010. But before coming to the new strategic document, it is necessary to focus on key developments in NATO from 2001 to 2009.

3.6. Security in Europe: A Critical Issue

"A Secure Europe in a Better World" (ESS 2003: 1), reflects that Europe can only be secure if the world remains secure. Security in Europe has always been a critical issue. Old Europe reflects that the two World War and the Cold War were critical for Europe and European security has suffered more from it. In New Europe, European security has two dimensions which make it critical and it is related to internal security

and external security factors in European security. Andrew Cottey (2007), Steve Marsh and Wyn Rees (2012) argue that regional instability like in the Balkans, illegal immigration and asylum, organised crime and drug trafficking have been internal security threats to Europe on the one hand, while transnational terrorism and WMD are considered as external threats to European security. NATO, the EU and the OSCEhave almost common members and most of the common members belong to Europe. In this regard, European countries have to cooperate on the critical issues related to security in Europe.

3.7. Developments in NATO (2001-2009)

3.7.1. NATO Out of Area Approach

The incident of 9/11 made NATO to rethink its defence strategy and for the first time, in the history of NATO, it invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to defend their population, boundary and values not only in North Atlantic region but globally. The unprecedented incident of 9/11 led NATO to 'out of area' action in Afghanistan against terrorism. It pushed NATO into the role of a global alliance. Out-of-area missions became an official part of NATO strategy in 2002, when the allies agreed at their summit in Prague that NATO needed to be able to field forces that could move quickly to wherever they are needed to sustain operations over distance and time, and to achieve their objectives.

Veronica M. Kitchen (2010) argues that the change in NATO's definition of its area of primary responsibility meant that the old distinction between in and out of area no longer applied, and the rules on how to agree or disagree on such matters, defined during the Cold War by the strict hierarchy established by the out of area norms, did not either. Missions in the spirit of Article 4 have become the bread and butter of NATO, but the rules for how to agree or disagree were always dependent on NATO having a more important mission in the defence of Europe. Now, the area of responsibility of NATO is defined globally and it seems that missions beyond mutual defence are the most common mission with mutual defence (Kitchen 2010).

Prague Summit (2002) was an important meeting of NATO after the event of 9/11, where member states discussed about the expansion of the membership of the Alliance, new partners and new capabilities. "Alliance extended invitation to

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia" (Prague Summit 2002: 20). The purpose of this expansion was related to expand NATO's zone of security in European continent such that they could enhance their security and reaffirm their Open Door Policy (Art. 10 of the Washington Treaty). Perceiving terrorism as a threat, NATO took a decision on terrorism and a new military concept for defence against terrorism was approved by it. It was also decided to launch the Partnership Action Plan against terrorism. With this agreement, NATO tried to strengthen its anti-terror capabilities. Alliances also focused on new capabilities to strengthen its preparedness and ability to take on full spectrum of security challenges before it. These new capabilities were related to defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence. Further, it paved the way for effective command, control, communication and air-sea lift capability (Prague Summit 2002: 26).

3.7.2. NATO and European Security Strategy (ESS-2003), OSCE: Actor's Strategic Commonalities

The EU drafted ESS-2003 which was an important step after 9/11. This step enhanced the Trans-Atlantic cooperation on security and defence, and NATO-EU relationship strengthen for long term security responsibilities. Cooperation was enhanced in the field of internal security under a single political platform. NATO and the EU strengthen its security arrangements, the EU could access NATO's planning capabilities and assets. This was required for the internal security of the Europe.

The Post-9/11 era was the era of continued transformation for NATO and for this transformation, Alliance required political guidance. For this purpose, "Alliance endorsed their Comprehensive Political Guidance which provides a framework and political direction for NATO's continuing change for coming years" (Riga Summit 2006: Para. 2).

NATO, the EU and the OSCE are three security actors in Europe, however, NATO and the EU play important role in the area of security and defence of Euro-Atlantic region. It is important to discuss why did the EU formulates ESS in 2003 and are there any commonality in their strategies.

Table: 3.4 Strategic Commonalities among NATO, the EU and OSCE

Actors in Europe	Strategic Commonalities
NATO and the EU	Terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflict of conflict outside the Euro-Atlantic region.
NATO, the EU and OSCE	Combating terrorism

Source: NATO 2010, ESS 2003, OSCE

According to the above table (3.4), the most important and common threat to Europe is terrorism. However, terrorism was not a new issue in 2001 but the incident of 9/11 was occurred first time in US and it was perceived as a global threat. After this incident, NATO and the EU both changed their defence strategy and terrorism was identified as a threat to Euro-Atlantic region.

3.7.3. EES and NATO: Interlinked with European Security

The ESS is a brief but comprehensive document titled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', which analysed and defined for the first time the EU's security environment, identifying key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU in Europe and its periphery.

For ensuring security in Europe, the ESS emphasised on more active, capable and coherent Europe. It focuses on common threat assessment with partners like NATO and for the capability enhancement, EU and NATO has a permanent arrangement named as Berlin Plus arrangement. ESS further outlined that institution must work in coordination for security of Europe (ESS 2003: 10-12).

3.7.4. NATO and The EU: Berlin Plus Agreement

17 March 2003 was a landmark in the relations between the two organisations that is NATO and the EU, when both actors signed the Berlin Plus Agreement. This agreement was required for capability enhancement of the EU and accessing NATO assets by the EU. NATO and the EU agreed on mutual crisis consultation arrangements that led to gear towards an efficient and rapid decision-making in each organisation in the presence of a crisis. Under this arrangement, "NATO guaranteed that the EU could access to NATO's planning, the EU may request that NATO can make available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military operations

and the EU may request the use of NATO assets and capabilities" (Berlin Plus Agreement 2003: 1-3). Operation CONCORDIA (31 March 2003) in Republic of Macedonia was the first EU military operation where EU accessed NATO assets. The Berlin Plus Agreement was an important agreement where NATO proved that as a security provider, NATO is aware of security concerns of Europe and thus NATO has contributed to European security.

NATO and the EU are also aware about its near periphery like Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa. For maintaining peace and security in Europe, it is required that the near periphery of Europe should peaceful and stable. For this purpose, NATO and the EU collaborated in Operation ARTEMIS (30 May 2003) in Democratic Republic of Congo. For securing maritime interest of member states in Europe, both NATO and EU actively participated in maritime operations in Gulf of Aden. The EU conducted EUNAVFOR-ATLANTA (8 December 2008) and NATO conducted Operation Ocean Shield (17 August 2009) for maintaining stability in this region.

3.7.5. NATO-EU Enlargement (2004) and Impact on European Security

"Russia strongly opposed NATO enlargement to the Baltic States vis-a-vis Russia initially viewed EU enlargement as a fairly positive process, which would provide an alternative to the expansion of NATO. Generally, the EU was regarded as a relatively benign international organisation, whose inclusion of the Baltic States would have very limited impact on Russia" (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007: 308).

Table: 3.5 NATO and the EU Enlargement

NATO Enlargement (29 March 2004)	EU Enlargement (1 May 2004)
Bulgaria	Czech Republic
Estonia	Estonia
Latvia	Latvia
Lithuania	Lithuania
Slovenia	Slovenia
Slovakia	Slovakia
Romania	Poland
	Malta
	Hungary
	Cyprus

Source: NATO Enlargement 2004 and EU Enlargement 2004

The 2004 enlargement was a grand enlargement and of great success in the history of NATO and the EU respectively in 2004. Russia did not express any problem on the EU enlargement but when it came to the NATO enlargement, Russia heavily opposed and responded it politico-military impact in future.

"NATO enlargement was perceived negatively by almost all political forces in Russia. The representatives of the 'derzhavniki' stressed that it would lead to the diminution of Russia's influence in the world and worsen its geopolitical and geo-strategic situation. The 'liberals' argued that NATO enlargement could damage the prospects of the democratic forces in Russia. All political elites feared the emergence of new 'dividing lines' in Europe" (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007: 314). Russia perceived it as a military threat to itself as well as they considered it as NATO's sole presence in Europe as a collective security provider. Russia expressed that NATO had drawn dividing line in Europe which was not good for Europe. As a result, Russia forced to Baltic states to ratify Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

One again, NATO with the help of Open Door Policy, enlarged itself towards East. NATO extended its security zone in Europe against any possible threat from Russia. On the issue of CFE Treaty, NATO declared in Bucharest Summit (2008) that NATO and Russia are equal partners. NATO emphasis was on cooperation and partnership with Russia. In this context, it can be said that NATO was successfully contributing to European security with the help of enlargement process.

3.7.6. NATO, EU's Revised ESS-2008 and European Security

NATO in its contribution to European security has played important role and it reflects in its regular revision of its strategic documents and commitments to maintain security and stability in Europe.

Table 3.6 NATO and ESS-2008

NATO (Bucharest Summit)	European Security Strategy (ESS)	
2008	2003	2008
Terrorism (Afghanistan Issue), UNSCR 1373	Terrorism	Terrorism
Proliferation of WMD, arms control and disarmament	Proliferation of WMD	Proliferation of WMD (Iranian Issue)
Regional Security and Stability in Balkan, Mediterranean region	Regional Conflict	Regional Conflict
	State Failure	State Failure
	Organised Crime	Organised Crime
Cyber Defence		Cyber Security
Energy Security Policy		Energy Security
		Climate Change
	Piracy	Piracy
NATO Open Door Policy continues		
Strengthen Partnership for Peace		
NATO-Russia Cooperation		
NATO-Russia Missile Defence		

Source: NATO Bucharest Summit, ESS-2008, ESS-2003

The above table (3.6) reflects that NATO and the EU regularly evaluate their policies for ensuring security in Europe as per security environment. Major changes took place in NATO's and the EU's policies in 2008. Both actors reaffirmed their position on terrorism, WMD, regional conflict and stability. In 2008, both actors, according to the changing environment, adopted policies related to Cyber defence and energy security.

NATO and the EU as a parallel actor are playing important role in European security by timely addressing security threats. Both actors alone cannot guarantee the Euro-Atlantic security and hence, cooperation on certain common aspects are very important. The commonalities of agenda of both the actors, NATO shares its renewed commitment to European security.

3.8. NATO Formulates: A New Strategic Concept

NATO needed a new Strategic Concept because the world had changed since 1999, and the provisions which were mentioned in the Strategic Concept 1999 did not fulfil

the requirements of the 21st century Europe. Dramatically, the event of 9/11 and subsequent attacks like Istanbul bombing (2003), Madrid Train Bombing (2004), Multiple bombing in London (2005) and Glasgow attack (2007) were shocking and unacceptable incidents of terrorism demonstrated the deadly connections between technology and terror. In response, NATO has drawn troops far from home, illuminated the need for intelligence-sharing, and complicated planning for defence. Further, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is under increasing stress and incidents of instability along Europe's periphery have revived tensions. Innovative modes of gathering, sending and storing information have brought with them new threats. The security implications of terrorism, piracy, energy supply risks and environmental neglect have become more visible. Meanwhile, the Alliance has grown to twenty-eight (two new state added in NATO), enlarging both NATO's capabilities and its commitments. It promotes NATO to rethink about the new environment and the time is right to take a fresh look at the Alliance's missions, procedures and plans (NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic engagement). NATO is moving towards 2020 and for it, NATO decided its priorities, vision and purposes.

3.8.1. NATO's Priorities and basis for The New Strategic Concept 2010

According to NATO's 2020 Assured Security and Dynamic engagement, NATO has following priorities,

1. NATO's Priorities and Basis for The New Strategic Concept 2010
2. Reaffirming NATO's core commitment related to collective defence
3. Protection against unconventional threats
4. Establishing guidelines for operations outside Alliance's borders
5. Creating the conditions for success in Afghanistan
6. Consultation to manage crisis
7. A new era of partnership
8. Participating in a comprehensive approach to complex problems
9. Engaging with Russia
10. Maintaining Open Door Policy
11. New capabilities for new era
12. Nuclear weapon policy for solidarity in pursuit of peace
13. The new mission of missile defence

14. Responding rising dangers of cyber attacks (NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement).

For the fulfilment of above mentioned priorities, NATO must have the sustained commitment and united effort of its members. NATO's ongoing responsibilities are integrated that each Ally must meet. The Alliance must summon the resources needed to back its obligations with capabilities so that the full range of threats to its security are not only contained but also defeated.

3.9. The New Strategic Concept 2010

In 2010, NATO leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept in Lisbon that has to serve as the Alliance's roadmap for the next ten years and that reconfirms the commitment to protect one another against attack as the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security. "Strategic Concept lays down the Alliance's core tasks and principles, its values, the evolving security environment and the Alliance's strategic objectives for next decade. The 2010 Strategic Concept defines NATO's core task as: collective defence, crisis-management and cooperative security" (NATO 2010: The New Strategic Concept). The New Strategic Concept needs Allies to invest in key capabilities to meet emerging threats like terrorism, proliferation of ballistic missile and WMD, cyber attacks and agree to develop capabilities within NATO that is necessary to protect against ballistic missile attacks and cyber attacks. The Alliance has observed that these threats are vulnerable against security of Euro-Atlantic region and its population. The Alliance has to develop new mechanisms and structure to counter threats or risks.

Martynas Zapolskis (2009) argued, "the main elements and functions of the Alliance remain unchanged. The New strategy casts NATO as a multifunctional security structure, which combines collective security and collective defence dimensions on the one hand with active policy of promoting stability on the other hand. The most important difference between 1999 and 2010 documents is the multifunctional character and high level of ambitions in the new strategic plan in such areas as civilian capabilities, missile defence, cyber security and NATO-EU relations or NATO-Russia relations etc. The New Strategic Concept modernizes NATO and establishes unity about the main tasks of the Alliance" (Zapolskis 2009: 35).

According to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "this is an action plan...which sets out clearly the concrete steps that NATO will take and it will put in place an Alliance that is more effective, more engaged and more efficient than ever before. It focuses on active engagement with modern defence" (NATO 2010: The New Strategic Concept). The New Strategic Concept offers more opportunities to partner countries around the globe for dialogue and cooperation, and commits NATO to reinforce cooperation with Russia. It keeps the door open to European democracies. The document highlights the need for NATO to always ready to play an active role in crisis management operations, whenever it is required. It emphasises that the Alliance continues as cost-effective and ensures continuous internal reforms (NATO 2010: The New Strategic Concept).

3.9.1. The New Strategic Concept 2010: Active Engagement and Modern Defence

"No single country has the capability to tackle today's complex problems on its own" (European Council 2003). NATO as a security actor alone is not capable enough to counter all threats and challenges. In this context, Strategic Concept emphasises on active engagement and cooperation with other actors. The active engagement includes promoting international security through cooperation, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It also incorporates open door and partnership policy. Open door refers to "NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability" (NATO 2010a: Active Engagement, Modern Defence). For it, cooperative security plays very important role. Countries which are not the part of collective defence, they can engage with NATO under the framework of cooperative security. This is required for maintaining peace and security in Euro-Atlantic region.

"Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhance security in Europe and to defend the values on which our Alliance is based upon. These relationships are based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect" (NATO 2010a: Active Engagement, Modern Defence). In this context, NATO focuses on partnership with two important European actors, namely, the EU and Russia.

NATO also cooperates with UN and its framework for maintaining peace and security in Euro-Atlantic region.

The New Strategic Concept (2010) focuses on a changing strategic environment and in this environment, NATO has to strengthen itself against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners (NATO 2010a: Active Engagement, Modern Defence). Active Engagement is the combination of partnership, cooperation and dialogue process. This engagement, further, looks at new partnership and with the help of dialogue and cooperation, a security actor develops new capability to counter threats and challenges. In the framework of active engagement, NATO is establishing and searching new partners in Europe and European periphery to ensure security, peace and stability against threat.

Active engagement is also related to modern defence which is based on new capability and deterrence capacity. No defence can be called as until, it is the combination of smart forces with modern technology. NATO for the security purpose is improving its armed forces and acquiring modern technology. These days, threats are also strategic in nature and to counter these threat, NATO must have to focus on Active Engagement and Modern Defence. According to Former Secretary General A. F. Rasmussen, "NATO is committed for safety and security of their citizens and this commitment inspires the Alliance to prevent crisis, manage conflict and stabilise post-conflict situation. For it, the Alliance ensures engagement with the UN and the EU, and other partners" (Rasmussen 2010: The New Strategic Concept). Prevention and management of crisis are critical in nature and Alliance emphasised on political engagement at global level. Political engagement helps in cooperation, dialogue and understanding the nature of crisis or threat. This political engagement may ensure partnership to resolve issues or crisis. Amidst of it, the Alliance, in context of active engagement, commits for "World Without Nuclear Weapons" on one hand but on the other hand it also ensures that Alliance will remain a nuclear Alliance, if there are nuclear weapons in the world. It points out that the Alliance wants to remain a nuclear group against threats.

3.9.2. Major Provisions for European Security under the 2010 New Strategic Concept

As the European Security environment has got transformed, there have been different kinds of responses to address the security challenges. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces, and invite Russia to cooperate in this issue (NATO 2010: para. 8).

The document mentions that operational experience with military means is not enough on its own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. Both, within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach[28] that effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instrument (NATO 2010: para. 23). In addition to the NATO, the OSCE is an important regional security organisation and a forum for dialogue on issues relevant to Euro-Atlantic security.

Political and economic reforms are an important aspect of security. In this context, the NAC focuses on stability and successful political and economic reform in Georgia and Ukraine are important for Euro-Atlantic security. NAC will continue to develop the partnerships with these countries taking into account the Euro-Atlantic aspiration or orientation of each of countries (NATO 2010: para. 35).

NATO alone is not enough to ensure peace and security in Europe. Partnership of all actors are required for this purpose. For this purpose, NATO uses Partnership for Peace (PfP) as an instrument. PfP is central to NATO's vision of Europe as a whole, free and peaceful. It further develops the PfP as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation, including enhanced military interoperability, and will continue to develop policy initiative (NATO 2010: para. 40).

Quick and rapid military responses are required against emerging crisis. The NATO Response Force (NRF) provides a rapidly deployable, credible force for collective defence and crisis operation, as well as visible assurance to all allies of NATO's

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[28] Comprehensive Approach was adopted in the 2006 NATO Riga Summit Final Declaration and it can be defined as "the ability to draw together the various instruments of the Alliance brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well as ability to coordinate with the others actors" (NATO Riga Summit 2006).

cohesion and commitment to deterrence and collective defence, including through planning, training and exercises (NATO 2010: para. 70).

3.9.3. Core Tasks and Principles of NATO

"NATO identifies current security environment as modern security environment and new challenges, threats and risks are more prominent. In this case, the Alliance has opted three major core task like collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security" (NATO 2010a: Active Engagement, Modern Defence). Primarily, these three core tasks have to serve the purpose related to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law and finally, it is committed for the security of the Euro-Atlantic region by political and military means under the principle of charter of UN and Washington Treaty.

3.9.4. Collective Defence

The United States was targeted by terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept had identified terrorism as one of the threats that affects NATO's security. After the incident of 9/11, NATO engaged itself actively in the fight against terrorism and it launched its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area known as out of area approach and it led to far-reaching transformation of its capabilities. It also led NATO to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history. However, US declined from initiating any action under Art. 5 and preferred to launch its own military operation. NATO members showed their harmony towards the US by condemning the terrorist attack and decided to take action, and the Alliance initiated Operation Endeavour in Afghanistan.

3.9.5. Crisis Management: A Tool of Security

Crisis management is one of the core tasks of NATO as indicated the new Strategic Concept. NATO as a security actor needs the mechanism of crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing

crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in the post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security (NATO 2010a: Active Engagement, Modern Defence).

For crisis management, NATO has to monitor and analyse the international security environment, it has to enhance intelligence sharing, develop doctrine and military capability within Alliance. Interface or interlink with civilian partners for civilian crisis management is necessary for creating peaceful and secure security environment. Hence, one can say that crisis management is important dimension or a tool for security.

3.9.6. NATO Operations in the 21st Century

Table: 3.7 NATO Operations

Operation	Date	Action
Enduring Freedom	20 December 2001-28 December 2014	Against terrorism in Afghanistan
Ocean Shield	17 August 2009- present	Against sea pirates (Piracy) Gulf of Aden
Unified Protector	27 March- 31 October 2011	Libya
Active Fence	December 2012-present	Support for turkey against Syrian missile attack
Resolute Support Mission	January 2015-present	Support Afghan Forces

Source: NATO official website

NATO is an active security provider and it is proved by its various missions. Table 3.7 points out that the Alliance is active in monitoring and taking action outside its boundary. Since 2001, NATO actively participated in various action against terrorism, piracy and instability in different parts of World.

3.9.7. Cooperative Security

NATO member can be affected by political and security developments outside its border. "The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security through partnership with relevant countries and other international institutions, by contributing

to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, and keeping door open to all European democracies" (NATO 2010: Active Engagement, Modern Defence). For maintain peace and stability in Europe, NATO under the framework of cooperative security, extends cooperation with international institutions. This mechanism helps the Alliance keeping eyes on illegal activities of arms and proliferation of WMD.

3.9.8. NATO and European Security: Threats and Challenges Identified

In the 21st century, NATO's New Strategic Concept has identified threats and challenges which are vulnerable for its member states and its citizens. Under its primary task, it has to promote, support and prepare a roadmap for NATO to counter and deter varieties of challenges. This Strategic Concept 2010 has identified following threats,

1. It takes arms control, disarmament and nuclear proliferation including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as problems and challenges. It is committed to control these problems.

2. Missile defence is another challenge for it. It is committed to develop missile defence shield programme to protect European population.

3. Cyber threat is an emerging and fast growing challenge for it. It is a threat to national security. Hence, this strategic concept emphasised to develop cyber defence capability.

4. It focuses on immediate risks like energy security, key environmental and resource constrains, including health risk, climate change, water scarcity etc.

5. Apart of above mentioned threats, challenges or risks, it is committed against extremism, terrorism, transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people ((NATO 2010: Active Engagement, Modern Defence)

Apart of these issues there are many problems which are identified by the new Strategic Concept. These challenges make NATO aware, prepare for action i.e. readiness and enhancing for its military capability. Hence, NATO adopted it and it is important for NATO in the 21st century.

3.10. New Threats and NATO

3.10.1. Terrorism

In the 20th century, NATO's strategic documents hardly provided space to terrorism. But at the very beginning of the 21st century, NATO member states suffered with world's largest terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. It was not the end, but there was a series of terrorist attack on NATO members as well as non-NATO members in the entire world. European cities like Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Glasgow (2007) were targeted by terrorist group. 9/11 attack on the US was first major attack on it ever happened in the past. US is most powerful member state of NATO and this attack led NATO to re-think about dangers of terrorism. NATO invoked its Article 5 under the principle of UN charter and stand confirmed to defeat terrorism. However, this attack was not on the European continent but outside. Observing all these incident, NATO decided to incorporate terrorism as a new threat in its New Strategic Concept.

Table: 3.8 Terrorist Activities during 2001-2005

Terrorist Activities (Countries)	No. of people killed (approximately)
USA	3007
Turkey	144
Spain	215
UK	69

Source: Global Terrorism Database 2010

Table: 3.9 Terrorist activities during 2006-2010

Terrorist activities (Countries)	No. of people killed (approximately)
Turkey	143
US	25
Spain	08
UK	07
Greece	05
France	04
Germany	03

Source: Global Terrorism Database 2010

On the basis of study of above table (table 3.8 and table 3.9), it can be said that terrorist activities are increasing from 2001 to 2010 and above mentioned countries

are NATO members. Hence, it is NATO's great concern that terrorism is an emerging and new threat for NATO members. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO members countries. The increasing threat of ISIS is most important dimension relating to the security of Euro-Atlantic region. The recent attack in Paris (2016) proved that the Alliance have to take major initiative against terrorist activities.

3.10.2. Cyber Security: An Emerging Issue in European Security

In the 21st century, cyberspace is an important aspect of human activities and all modern technologies are directly or indirectly connected to cyber space. Due to its sophistication, it has been vulnerable and there is always possibility of threat to cyber security.

Table: 3.10 Cyber Attack during 2006-2011

Country	Year	Affected Organisation
United States	4 December 2006	NASA
Estonia	27 April 2007	Various government agencies
United States	June 2007	Department of Defence
Georgia	5 August 2008	Government Agency
France	9 December 2010	Ministry of France
Canada	3 January2011	Defence, Research and Development
United States	July 2011	Department of Defence's Cyber Strategy
Germany	2015	Lower House, Parliament

Source: Compiled by researcher

The table 3.10 reflects that during last 10 years (2006-2016), NATO members have faced severe cyber attack on their government agencies and it was a threat for their internal security. It may harm their communication network, supply line, information system, critical infrastructure and other sensitive government agencies.

The New Strategic Concept 2010 emphasised on more frequent and organised Cyber attacks that can harm government administration, businesses, transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure. Cyber-attack threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. There may be many sources of Cyber attacks like foreign militaries, intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and extremist groups (The Strategic Concept 2010: para. 12).

Cyber threats and attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated and damaging. The Alliance is faced with an evolving complex threat environment. State and non-state actors can use cyber-attacks in the context of military operations. In recent events, cyber-attacks have been part of hybrid warfare. NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance's core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats and attacks it faces

NATO included Cyber defence as core task of collective defence. It has signed a technical arrangement on cyber defence cooperation with the EU in February 2016. It has declared that international law applies in cyberspace and it is responsible for the protection of its own networks. Allies will be responsible for the protection of their national networks and it will be compatible with NATO. It enhances its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises. Allies are committed to enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber-attacks. It is intensifying its cooperation with industry with the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership.

Cooperation with Partners on Cyber Defence

Cyber threats challenge state borders and organisational boundaries and to counter these threats, NATO engages with relevant countries and organisations to improve international security. It's engagement with partner countries is based on shared values and common approaches to cyber defence. Alliance cooperated with partners are handled on a basis founded on mutual interest. NATO also works with the EU, the UN, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. The Alliance's cooperation with other international organisations is complementary and avoids unnecessary copying of effort (NATO Cyber Defence).

3.10.3. Instability or Conflict Beyond European Borders

Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by promoting extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people. Instability in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq

(2003), Tunisia (2010), Syria (2011), Libya (2011), Egypt (2011), Yemen (2011) and Algeria (2011) were real threat for security of Europe. Due to instability and conflict in these countries huge number of refuge moved towards European countries and managing the refugees is a major problem. Instability and conflict also led to issued related to terrorist activities.

3.10.4. Disruption in Energy Supply

Europe's dependency on oil and gas is growing. Rising powers such as China and India will require an ever greater amount of energy. These days fossil fuels has become ever harder and more expensive to access. Other factors are the rising debate on climate change and on the future of nuclear power. Armed threats to energy supplies through terrorist attacks or piracy or cyber-attack are increasing. Energy supply systems are increasingly interconnected by computerised transmission networks which are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The political instability in many energy producing states remains a source of concern. NATO have to take sharp attention on these issues which are vulnerable to their members and it must have to take initiative to fix safe and continuous supply of energy. It is important for the well-being of human being and thus it serves the purpose of human secuirty.

Section 13 of the New Strategic Concept points out that NATO members require greater international efforts to ensure their flexibility against attack or disruption. Some NATO member states are dependent on foreign energy suppliers and on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs.

Russia, Central Asia, Caucasus countries and OPEC are the foreign energy suppliers to NATO members in European continent. Table 3.11 reflects that NATO member countries are massively dependent on Russian gas supply. According to European Commission, European countries were dependent on 39 percent of its gas import on Russia in 2013 (European Commission 2013). Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) supplied 40 percent of crude oil in 2012 and in a joint meeting with the EU, it will supply 108.5 million (approx.) barrel oil per day by 2035 to European countries (EU-OPEC Energy Dialogue 2014:1-2). If this energy supply is interrupted due to any attack or intervention, then Alliance members have to suffer major energy

crisis. NATO has to ensure security of supply line not only in Europe but also in the Gulf and Mediterranean region.

Russian gas supply to NATO members

Table: 3.11 Energy (gas) dependency of NATO members on Russia

NATO Members (Dependent on Russian Gas)	Dependency in percentage (%)
Estonia	100
Latvia	100
Lithuania	100
Bulgaria	98
Czech Republic	90
Slovakia	88
Poland	65
Greece	64
Hungary	60
Slovenia	55
Germany	45
Belgium	44

Source: CIEP Fact Sheet

3.10.5. Environmental and Resource Constraints

The New Strategic Concept focused on environmental and resource constraints that also includes health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs (The Strategic Concept 2010: para. 15). These challenges have potential to affect NATO member states. NATO follows collaborative approach to environmental issues and under this framework, it discusses with academia, industries and governmental agencies. NATO defines environment as "the surroundings in which an organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelations" (NATO 2014: Environment-NATO Stake). It is a surprising fact that NATO as a military organisation, it is focusing on environmental and related issued. It is a major shift in NATO's approach.

NATO's activities related to environment

According to NATO's environment stake,

1. Protection of environment from damaging effects of the military operations

2. To promote environmental friendly management practices in training areas and during operations

3. adapting military assets to a hostile physical environment

4. preparing for and responding to natural and man-made disasters

5. addressing the impact of climate change

6. educating NATO's officers on all aspects of environmental challenges

7. supporting partner countries in building local capabilities

8. enhancing energy efficiency and fossil fuel independence

9. building environmentally friendly infrastructures (NATO 2014: NATO Environment stake).

3.10.6. WMD Proliferation Threat

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is one of the new threats of concern for global stability and prosperity. The world is witnessing the acquisition of substantial modern military capabilities by many State and non-state actors, which is a serious threat to human being and environment. Instability and conflicts among many regions, countries and extremist groups are growing across the world, which poses threats for peace and security of Euro-Atlantic region. Thus, NATO has taken proliferation of WMD as one of the serious issue in its new Strategic Concept, 2010.

NATO defines non-proliferation as "all efforts to prevent proliferation from occurring, or should it occur, to reverse it by any other means than the use of military force." (NATO 2016: Arms Control, disarmament and non-proliferation). NATO allies are actively engaged in non-proliferation of WMD, through its comprehensive political, military and civilian approach. Political approach of non-proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, are arm control and disarmament agreement with nations and organisations. Improvement programme in CBRN defence capabilities and combined joint CBRN Defence Task Force are military approach of non-proliferation of WMD.

NATO's Initiatives in WMD Non-Proliferations

In May 2000, NATO established a WMD non-proliferation centre, which was a major initiative after approval at the April 1999 Washington Summit. The core task of this

centre is to support defence efforts that improve the NATO and its Alliance's preparedness to respond to the risks of growing WMD proliferation, to promote understanding of WMD issues, develop ways of responding to them, improve intelligence and information sharing, enhance existing Allied military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and counter threats posed by these weapons as well as to new hybrid and non-state actor's threats. Other important initiatives of NATO are to establish Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (CJ-CBRND-TF), the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE), the Defence Against Terrorism COE (DAT CEO) and other agencies that support NATO's response to the WMD threat.

Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force

This task force is comprised of multinational CBRN Defence Battalion and the Joint Assessment Team. The Task Force is led by an individual Ally of NATO on 12-month rotational basis. It operates within the NATO Response Force (NRF) and designed to perform a full range of CBRN defence missions. It also works independently as required to help civilian authorities in NATO member countries.

Joint Centre of Excellence on CBRN Defence

The JCBRN Defence COE in Vyskov, the Czech Republic was officially activated and accredited as an International Military Organisation by the North Atlantic Council in July 2007. It is an international military organisation sponsored and supported by the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Mission and major task of this CEO is to

i) Provide advice in all CBRN defence related areas.
ii) Develop CBRN defence doctrines, standards, knowledge to support improvement of interoperability and capabilities.
iii) Provide opportunities to enhance education and training.
iv) Contribute to the relevant lessons learned processes.

v) Within a PoW approved by the SC, assist NATO, SNs and other international institutions/organisations in their CBRN defence related efforts, including validation through experimentation.

With the above mentioned mission, this CEO has contributed a lot in security of NATO allies. This COE also integrates a CBRN Reach Back Element (RBE), which has reached Full Operational Capability (FOC) in January 2016. This Reach back capability provides timely and comprehensive scientific (technical) and operational CBRN expertise, assessments and advice to NATO commanders, their staff and deployed forces during planning and execution of operations.

NATO is also engaged in strengthening cooperation in the field of WMD non-proliferation, with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and other regional organisations and multilateral initiatives that address threats of WMD proliferation.

Apart from the above mentioned initiatives NATO organises an annual non-proliferation conference involving a significant number of non-member countries. In 2015, the event was hosted by Qatar for the second time, which is a partner country of NATO. The proliferation conference held another successful session in Ljubljana, Slovenia in May 2016.

The Alliance also participates in relevant conferences organised by other international institutions, including the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the EU, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and others.

Table: 3.12 NATO's initiative on WMD Threats

Year	Event
1999	Washington Summit
2000	Establishment of WMD Non-Proliferation Centre
2002	Prague Summit
2003	Creation of Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion and Joint Assessment Team
2006	Endorsement of Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG)
2007	Establishment of Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence
2009	Approval of Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy on WMD

2010	Lisbon Summit
2011	Establishment of Arms Control and Disarmament Committee
2012	Chicago Summit
2014	Wales Summit Declaration

Source: NATO official website

3.11. NATO's New Defence Capabilities in the 21st Century

NATO has developed new defence capabilities against the new security challenges and risks. According to the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, it has taken following steps,

1. maintaining nuclear and conventional forces and the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defence and crisis management, including at strategic distance,

2. to develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out responsibilities under Article 5, including with the NATO Response Force,

3. ensuring necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges,

4. ensure participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, command, control and consultation arrangements,

5. development of the capability to defend their populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of their collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. The Alliance actively seeks cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners,

6. NATO is also looking for capacity development to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological including nuclear weapons of mass destruction,

7. Development of ability to prevent, detect, defend against cyber attacks, to enhance and coordinate national cyber defence capabilities and bringing all members under centralized cyber protection,

8. enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with

partners, the development of appropriate military capabilities and to train local forces to fight against terrorism

9. develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines,

10. development and access of advance emerging technologies against threats,

11. it is important to maintain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that Alliance's armed forces are sufficiently resourced (NATO 2012: NATO Defence Capabilities Towards NATO Forces 2020: 1-4).

For above mentioned objectives, NATO has prepared the goal of NATO Forces 2020, and Alliance is structuring modern, tightly connected force, well equipped, exercised so that it can operate in adverse security environment. "NATO is preparing for smart defence for next generation as a new approach. It will represent a changed outlook, the opportunity for a renewed culture of cooperation in which multinational collaboration will be given new prominence as an effective and efficient option for developing critical capabilities" (NATO 2012: Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Towards NATO Forces 2020). If NATO really wants to develop new capability for the Alliance, then, it has to learn from previous operations especially from operation in Afghanistan. It must have to strengthen NATO Command Structure, its Force Structure and national headquarters.

3.11.1. Partnership and Open Door Policy

Partnership and Open Door policies are major initiatives taken by NATO and these two policies are playing an important role in Euro-Atlantic security. These are strategic in nature and have significance in cooperation, consultation, dialogue and transparency. "This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership." (NATO 1994: Partnership for Peace Framework Document). This led to a true development of partnership for security culture and it helps in European security by peace-support mission, defence reform, disaster preparedness and response and security for science and environment.

Table:3.13 NATO and Partnership

Partnership Approach	Partnership
Euro-Atlantic Security	Network with countries and organisations, (NATO-EU), (NATO-OSCE)
Political dialogue and practical cooperation	Network with countries and organisations, (NATO-UN)
Capability Development	NATO-EU
Peace, stability and Security	NATO-Russia
Constructive partnership (Missile Defence)	NATO-Russia
EAPC	NATO- Mediterranean Countries
PfP	NATO- Mediterranean Countries
Consultation and military cooperation	NATO-Ukraine, NATO-Georgia

Source: NATO official website

"NATO's partnership strategy has two options to move forward, moving towards democratic peace or clash of civilizations. These options mean choosing between the global approach with intensified development of value-based partnerships identifying us and others (oriented towards clash of civilization) or developing interest-based partnerships on regional basis simultaneously with the development of the value-based security community (oriented towards democratic peace). The variety of options is also influenced by different security cultures evolved in the United States and in some European Allies" (Mölder 2007: 1).

3.12. Nature and Characteristics of the New Strategic Concept 2010

During the Cold War period, primarily, nature of the strategic concept was based on nuclear rivalry between US led NATO and Soviet Union. According to Initial Strategic Planning 1949-50, military measures to implement defence concept called for the Alliance to insure the ability to deliver atomic bomb promptly. This proposed use of nuclear weapon was to defend the North Atlantic Area (Pedlow 1997: XI). Further it was related to nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. Soviet Union was considered as the largest adversary of NATO and it was only nuclear deterrence by which both could balance each other. Hence, it can be said that whole Cold War era was dominated by nuclear balance of power and which is focused by Strategic Concept. Strategic Concepts can be grouped into two parts; one which were adopted

during the Cold War era and other which were adopted during the post-Cold War era. There are specific nature and characteristics of strategic concepts with respect to the security environment.

The Cold War Period Strategic Concepts were classified in its character. It has two meanings, first, it was very much focused on certain kind of objectives like nuclear deterrence and containing Soviet Union during the entire Cold War period, second, it was not open to public. These were kept secret as for achieving its objectives. On the other hand, strategic document which were adopted after the Cold War are non-classified in nature and these have multiple task and multiple threats. These strategic documents are open to public and it shows its degree of transparency.

Strategic Concepts during the Cold War period were focused on conventional and existential threats. But, the post-Cold War Strategic Concepts prioritise non-conventional challenges and risks. Regional planning for security and defence has been always integral part of these documents. These strategic documents are flexible in nature. It means that there has been always scope for change and adaptability in it. Further, these changes show that the degree of continuity of strategic documents. These documents have been defensive in nature and this defensive nature lies in its short, medium and long term planning.

These Strategic Concepts have been characterised by its nature to maintain strategic balance in Europe. All strategic documents of NATO have specific tasks, objectives and principle to perform in a specific manner. These Strategic Concepts reflects a certain kind of vision that it has to achieve in a specific period. The Post-Cold War Strategic Concepts are unclassified and it is open for common public. The strategic visions incorporate its responsibility and belief for peace, stability, cooperation, consultation, dialogue, partnership, promoting democracy and safeguarding human rights and rule of law. The 2010 New Strategic Concept focuses on non-military dimensions like environment, energy security, health risks and water scarcity. It reflects that NATO is adopting new characteristics of non-military dimensions in order to better address the new security risks for the members.

3.13. Future of The New Strategic Concept

The 2010 New Strategic Concept is an operational guideline for NATO but it has to change its approach for coming decade. Analysing the fact that whether it is successful concept or not, one has to see its structural part. NATO command structure and operational structure have to improve. Recent activities of ISIS and Paris Attack (2016) reflect its weakness. The NATO command structure still not fully able to control terrorist activities. At many issues, it is successful but at certain point like Ukrainian Crisis, it is not successful. Today, the Concept has failed to bridge the gap between NATO and Russia. On the crisis in Syria and climate change, there is lack of consensus among Alliance members. Herd (2013) argued that the Strategic Concept must be read alongside the summit declaration and the NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement. The New Strategic Concept makes a good case for NATO's relevance in the 21st century, and, after the amazing adaptation this Cold War Alliance underwent after the end of East-West confrontation, it marks another significant transformational step. What is needed is for allies to demonstrate political will and provide the resources for implementing what they have proclaimed (Herd et al. 2013: 30). It also signifies that strong will power with determination will manage the changing security environment in the 21st century and with the guidelines of Strategic Concept, NATO will prepare its roadmap in coming future.

Security in Europe is not possible until and unless, the regional player or organisation will not participate in it. It means that in the 21st century, NATO with its strategic documents cannot decide the future of European security alone. It has to interplay with the EU, Russia and OSCE in European security such that it can secure and reshape the European security order in changing security environment. The ongoing Ukrainian Crisis will be the litmus test for NATO and the EU and how both respond to this situation and Russia. This crisis can create instability in European security and affect the essence of cooperation, consultation and dialogue process.

CHAPTER 4

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: ENGAGING RUSSIA

NATO and Russia have been two important actors in Europe and both have significant role for European security equation. Russia became the successor of the USSR after the end of the Cold War. The US-led NATO and the USSR-led Warsaw Pact were adversaries to each other and both formed bloc politics in the international geopolitics. This bloc politics was based on ideological confrontation and there was a huge difference between both actors on the issue of European security. Both actors have their own interests, ambitions, objectives and priorities towards security in Europe. "Managing sphere of influence in Europe is an important area where both actors always try to fulfil their interests. Norms, values and identity play an important role in their relationships. During the Cold War era, NATO considered Soviet Union as a threat to European security, rule of law and democracy. Soviet Union was considered as a dictator in the Central-East Europe and NATO never wanted that Soviet Union enhance its impact in West Europe" (Braun 2008: 55). The Paris Charter was signed on 19 November 1990 and "it asserted democracy as a legitimate form of government in Europe and propagated the protection of human rights as the only way to establish relationship between member state and citizens" (Pouliot 2010: 151). The Paris Charter was the first step after the end of the Cold War, when democracy was supported to strengthen the norms of peace and stability in Europe, thus enhancing the security in Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO's focus was based on building a partnership with Russia as it is an integral part of European continent as well as critical for European security. Therefore, NATO cannot ignore Russia when European security is discussed at their agenda. NATO's ambition of peaceful and stable Europe is not possible without engaging Russia in European security and thus in various Strategic Concepts, provided space to Russia and it shows importance of Russia for NATO.

4.1. Provisions under the Post-Cold War NATO's Strategic Concepts

NATO's Strategic Concept 1991 and 1999

It was essential to transform the North Atlantic Alliance to reflect a new and more promising entity in Europe just after the end of the Cold War. As Europe was transforming, in this context NATO and newly formed Russia was also transforming and shaping their relationship and role in European security. NATO's New Strategic Concept 1991 focused on relationship with Russia in the transformed security environment. According to the Strategic Concept 1991, "the profound political changes took place in Central and Eastern Europe which improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance pursued to achieve its objectives. The USSR's former satellites recovered their sovereignty. The three Baltic Republics regained their independence and Soviet forces left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and their withdrawal from Poland and East Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They included policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation during the Cold War period thus overcome" (NATO 1991: The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, para. 1).

Without the dialogue process, it was not possible to cooperate among the Alliance and newly independent countries of the Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. It was required to establish proper channel of dialogue with the help of diplomatic means. "The new situation in Europe multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with Russia and the other countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, as provided in the London Declaration held on 5 July 1990. Through such means, the Allies individually and collectively, seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, and thus reinforced stability. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue provided a foundation for greater cooperation

throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means" (NATO 1991: The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, para. 28).

At the last stage of the 1990s, NATO further tried to cope up with new challenges and threats, it was also required to re-define the relationship with Russia after the Balkan Crisis and NATO tried to involve Russia in European security with greater responsibility. "The Alliance operated in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks were there which resulted in the acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played as essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role, its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean countries. It reflects determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area" (NATO 1999: The Alliance's Strategic Concept, para. 12).

4.2. Provisions Under the New Strategic Concept 2010

According to the NATO's Lisbon Summit (2010), 'Active Engagement Modern Defence', NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance and in the light of common security interests, "allies are determined to build a lasting and inclusive peace with Russia in the Euro-Atlantic Area. It was based on shared responsibility to counter common challenges which was jointly identified. It was decided for a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia and with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia. The Alliance is committed for the goals, principles and commitments which underpin the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and welcomed the completion of the Joint Review of the 21st century common security challenges, which has identified practical cooperation projects on Afghanistan, including counter-narcotics, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, and disaster response" (NATO 2010: Active Engagement Modern Defence, para. 33-34).

"Allies supported the new extended arrangements offered by Russia to facilitate ISAF transit to and from Afghanistan. NATO has been expecting cooperation with Russia on missile defence, including through the resumption of theatre missile defence

exercises. It was also decided to discuss in the NRC a range of other topics, including Afghanistan, implementing OSCE principles, military deployments, including any that could be perceived as threatening, information sharing and transparency on military doctrine and posture, as well as the overall disparity in short-range nuclear weapons, arms control, and other security issues. It was agreed to discuss all these matters in the NRC, which is a forum for political dialogue at all times and on all issues, including where both disagree. The Alliance's dialogue and cooperation with Russia also help us to resolve differences by building trust, mutual confidence, transparency, predictability and mutual understanding" (NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010: para. 38).

4.3. Russia Matters for NATO

In the present global situation, Russia cannot be ignored because of its importance at the international platform. After the end of the Cold War, the geopolitics changed dramatically, power equation changed and new threats emerged. Russia has its own importance due to following factors; one, Russia has veto power in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC); second, Russia can play important role in combatting terrorism, third; Russia has huge energy resource. These three factors force NATO to re-think about Russia. Russia as an actor can use veto against US decision related to NATO and on the other hand, Russia can be a strategic partner of NATO against terrorism and most of the NATO members are dependent on Russia's energy supply to Europe.

James F. Collins and Matthew Rojansky (2010), emphasised on the importance of Russia and suggested following points that indicates Russia matters not only for the US but also for NATO in European security. first, Russia's nukes are still an existential threat; second, Russia is a swing vote on the international state; third, Russia is big; fourth, Russia's environment matters; fifth, Russia is rich; sixth, one word energy; seventh, Russia is a staunch ally in the war on terror; eighth, the road to Tehran and Pyongyang go through Moscow; ninth, Russia can be a peace maker; tenth, Russian buy US goods (Collins and Rojansky 2010: 1). The above points make Russia's position unique and strong especially in Europe and thus, it also matters for NATO.

NATO strongly supports principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law and committed to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. While, Russia lacks in principle of liberty, democracy and rule of law and Russian political system is considered as an authoritarian system. These Russian norms are threat for the East European countries and it can also affect the stability and peace in European security. S. Neil Macfarlane (2008) argues that NATO enlargement is not only considered to create a single security space, but also a single normative space i.e. a space characterized by democratic values, respect for human rights, open economies, and durable peace. Not only NATO, but the EU and the OSCE support this shared vision in the European sphere (Macfarlane 2008: 39). The early phase of 1990 was related to transition which evolved against the autocratic regime in Russia and this transition was termed as 'war for democratisation'. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2008) focuses that after the disintegration of USSR, the major challenge was to establish democratic government in Central-Eastern Europe and it led to conflict like situation and re-emergence of nationalism in Europe which was observed in Baltic Countries and Yugoslav War (1991). During the initial phase of democratization, Russia fought two wars against the breakaway province of Chechnya in 1994 (Mansfield and Snyder 2008: 12). These events confirmed that newly break away countries were moving towards independence, democracy, liberty and autonomy and it was supported by NATO. For this purpose, the Alliance intervened in Yugoslavia in 1991 and thus, for maintaining stability and peace in the Europe, NATO is committed for democratic values and thus, any Russian activity against the democratic principle matters for the Alliance in European security.

4.4. Outlining NATO-Russia Relationship: 1991-2000

NATO-Russia relationship can be defined broadly in two phases. This first phase is the Cold War period, where the relationship is known as NATO-Soviet Union relationship and the second phase is known as the post-Cold War phase, where relationship between both actors is known as NATO-Russia relationship.

Relationship between NATO and Russia can be defined on the basis of mutual distrust during the Cold War period. Both actors have been rival to each other and this mutual distrust was outcome of the World War II situation where allies were looking for restructuring European security with safer borders. According to John L. Gaddis,

"Each side held dissimilar ideas regarding the establishment and maintenance of the post-World War II security situation in Europe" (Gaddis 2005: 13-23).

The study focused on the post-Cold War NATO and its engagement with Russia in European security. NATO has high degree of priority to establish reliable partnership with Russia since the end of the Cold War and It always emphasised for true strategic partnership with Russia. However, both have their own priorities regarding security in Europe and accordingly both respond to each other. This also created challenges for each other and that led to form a new fault line in European security.

"NATO-Russia relations formally began in 1991 at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was created after the end of the Cold War as a forum for consultation to support a new cooperative relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe" (NATO 2011: The North Atlantic Cooperation Council). This was the first initiative between both actors to normalise their relationship on European continent. In the next step, both agreed on PfP Programme and it was implemented on 22 June 1994. This was a major programme of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries of the Eastern Europe. This step was an important step for establishing security in Europe and the cooperation between NATO and individual partners was required for the development of mutual trust between former adversaries. Russia had already lost its status of super power after 1991 and it was also not in condition to counter NATO and thus, there was less possibility of conflict between both actors and this situation led to a peaceful situation in Europe. Meanwhile, NATO and Russia were involved in Balkan Crisis and Chechen Crisis respectively in 1994-1995. It remarked that both actors were involved in crisis ridden area where stability and peace were not certain.

"Based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the PfP is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries" (NATO PfP 2014: Partnership for Peace Programme). Russia deployed its troop under NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996. It enhanced the cooperative measures between both entities. There are 22 members in this programme and their activities are related to defence, defence policy and reform, civil-military relations, military to

military cooperation, training, disaster response and cooperation on environmental issues. The purpose of the PfP is to enhance stability, reduce threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries. This was a successful step in the favour of European security to reduce trust deficit and threat perception especially between the NATO and Russia.

It was United States and Soviet Union, who wanted to reshape security in Europe according to their respective wills and interests. After the end of the Cold War, both engaged in cooperation and conflict in various agendas on European security. Both have different perceptions and ideology which finally emerged in terms of distrust. "A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia based on respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act best serves security in the Euro-Atlantic area" (NATO Kehl Summit 2009). The Alliance stands ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges that both were facing at that time.

"In 1997, NATO-Russia relations took another big step forward with the signature of the Founding Act, which expressed the common goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, providing a true basis for the development of a strong and durable partnership (NATO EAPC 2014: The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council)". John Kriendler (2013) points out that the Founding Act also contained that "the allies reiterated that they had no intension, no plan, no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members and do not foresee any future need to do so and also they had no plan to storage nuclear weapon on their site" (Kriendler 2013: 86). It arranged the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a forum for regular consultation on security issues of common concern, aimed at helping build mutual confidence through dialogue. In this institution, NATO and Russia started developing a programme of consultation and cooperation. But due to NATO's air strikes in Kosovo Crisis in 1999 without consulting Russia as a partner, led to instability in European continent. It was strongly opposed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and he warned NATO by saying, "I told NATO, the Americans, the Germans, do not push us toward military action, otherwise there will be a European war for sure, and possibly a World War, we are against this" (Bohlen 1999: The New York Times). NATO was warned for deployment of ground troops in Kosovo and Russia suspended participation in PJC. It was a visible drift between both actors but Europe

survived from any direct clash between NATO and Russia. Despite it, Russian peacekeepers were deployed in NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo in June 1999. The PJC was further replaced by NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002.

Table: 4.1 NATO-Russia Partnership

Partnership	Year
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)	20 December 1991
Partnership for Peace Programme	10 January 1994
Russian Force in NATO led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina	1996
NATO-Russia Founding Act	27 May 1997
Russian Force in NATO led peacekeeping operation in Kosovo	June 1999

Source: NATO Official Website

Table 4.1 reflects that during 1991-1999, NATO and Russia were committed for maintaining peace and stability in Europe and for that purpose Russia sent their forces twice in NATO led mission in European continent.

"Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia committed themselves to develop their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. NATO and Russia also agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe" (NATO 1999: para.36). A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

"NATO relations with Russia has seemed to develop in ups and downs throughout their entire history. But, even at the stages of cooperation, as the recent phase of bilateral rapprochement indicated, it can be generally characterised with Lenin's formula, one step forward, two steps backward. Since this cliché is still in the mind of many on both sides, who have failed to overcome the Cold War stereotypes and the darkness of mutual distrust" (Director 2004: 479). NATO air strike during the Kosovo Crisis (1999), one again created a situation of distrust between two actors in Europe.

NATO-Russia relationship was basically based on distrust and this distrust is further related to relative attitudes on the issues of security of both entities. The end of the Cold War has not solved the problem of distrust between Russia and Western countries; the two sides definition of national interests have been largely incompatible. While, Western governments have expected Russia to follow their norms in security policies. Russia insisted on equal relationships and viewed the unwillingness of the West to accommodate the Kremlin as threatening or disrespectful to Russia's interests. The recent efforts to reset US-Russian and NATO-Russian relations had yet to produce evidence of robust cooperation between the two sides. For instance, "NATO has declined Russia's invitations to jointly address the security vacuum in Eurasia by pooling resources with the Moscow-dominant Collective Security Treaty Organization. Progress on cooperation with the Missile Defence System is also quite limited, with NATO and Russia increasingly pursuing two separate tracks of developing their security infrastructure" (Tsygankov 2012: 3-4).

The first ten years of NATO-Russia relationship did not suffer any direct clash, rather, both confirmed cooperation in NACC and PfP. The year 1998-1999 was problematic for Russia, which faced economic crisis and Yeltsin resignation led to leadership change in Russia. Vladimir Putin became President of Russia at the dawn of the 21st century.

4.5. NATO-Russia Relations: Post-2000

In the 21st century, early relationship between NATO and Russia characterised by the framework of cooperation, dialogue and consultation. It means that both have certain areas of engagement where they can cooperate with each other on the issues such as terrorism, WMD, failed state and arms control. The year 2000 was a year of change in Russia, as Vladimir Putin became President of Russia on 7 May 2000. For Europe in particular and globally as well, there was expectation of new hope from this leadership to active engagement with Europe. Putin's first term during 2000-2004 was positive for Europe and for NATO and both actors cooperated with each other on the issue of terrorism.

After the event of 9/11, NATO and Russia cooperated with each other on information sharing and anti-terrorist activities. For this purpose, both formed the NATO-Russia

Council (NRC) on 28 May 2002 by the Declaration on "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" (NATO 2002: NATO-Russia relation a new quality). The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was a tool for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. Within the NRC, the individual NATO member states and Russia have worked as equal partners on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest. The purpose of the NRC has been to serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. Operating on the basis of consensus, it has sought to promote continuous political dialogue on security issues with a view to the early identification of emerging problems, the determination of common approaches, the development of practical cooperation and the conduct of joint operations. The NATO-Russia Council has focused on all areas of mutual interest identified in the Founding Act 1997. New areas have been added to the NRC's agenda by the mutual consent of its members (NATO 2011a: NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism).

Despite such cooperation, both NATO and Russia have contested perceptions about each other and relates to blame game in this situation. According to the Russians the presence of NATO creates a few issues, first, NATO is trying to encircle Russia by enlargement, second, NATO has tried to isolate or marginalise Russia in Europe, third, NATO missile defence targets Russia, fourth, NATO exercises are provocative which threatens Russia, fifth, NATO leaders promised at the time of German reunification that the Alliance would not expand to the East (NATO 2015: Russia's top five myths about NATO). On the other hand, NATO assumes that Russia is a threat to its objectives in East Europe. Russian annexation of Crimea further reinforces the impression that it is a threat to democracy and rule of law in European security.

NRC was one of the important forums for both actors for cooperation in various areas in European security but due to onset of the Ukrainian Crisis, NATO suspended this Council in April 2014. This issue was related to violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Alliance suspended all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia including in the NRC. However, the Alliance agreed to keep channels of communication open in the NRC and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow the exchange of views, first and foremost on this crisis (NATO 2014: NATO-Russia Council).

4.5.1. Engaging Russia in European Security

There are many areas where NATO and Russia can cooperate to establish peace and security in Europe. Cooperation on counter terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD and arms control, issues related to nuclear weapons, military to military cooperation and counter piracy are major areas of dialogue, consultation and action where both can play major role in collaborative manner.

4.5.2. Counter Terrorism

In December 2004, the NRC action plan on terrorism was launched to improve coordination and provide strategic direction for cooperation in this area. NRC emphasized the importance of cooperation in the fight against terrorism at NATO Lisbon Conference in November 2010 and an action plan on terrorism was approved in April 2011. "A first NRC civil-military counter-terrorism exercise was conducted at NATO Headquarters in March 2012. Regular exchanges of information and in-depth consultations took place within the NRC on various aspects of combating terrorism. Under the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, an information exchange system was developed to provide air traffic transparency and early notification of suspicious air activities to help prevent terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attack on the United States" (NATO 2014: Key area of Cooperation prior to 2014). This mechanism is important for the security of Euro-Atlantic region against terrorism and without Russian cooperation, it is not possible for NATO alone to secure peace and stability in Europe. Under NRC, Russia has sent their vessels in Mediterranean region several times in 2010.

4.5.3. Non-Proliferation and the Arms Control

The NRC is aware of the dangers of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and to manage and control it, the Council developed dialogue on issues related to the non-proliferation of WMD. It was recommended to strengthen existing non-proliferation arrangements and expert discussions on possible practical cooperation in the protection against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It was also decided to control their means of delivery. NRC has to work together to promote effective multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The NRC also provided a forum for discussions on issues related to conventional arms control, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Open Skies Treaty and Confidence Building Measures. A key priority for all NRC nations was to work towards the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. The Allies expressed concern over Russia's unilateral suspension of its participation in the treaty in December 2007. At the NATO Lisbon Summit (2010), "NRC leaders emphasised their strong support for the revitalisation and modernisation of the conventional arms control regime in Europe and their readiness to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues of interest to the NRC" (NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010).

The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is another issue where dialogue and consultation are required. In July 2014, "the US briefed the NAC on its determination that Russia is in violation of its obligations under the Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometres, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. The Treaty, which entered into force in 1988, was concluded to reduce threats to security and stability in Europe, in particular the threat of short-warning attack on targets of strategic importance. It has a special place in history, as it required the verifiable elimination of an entire class of missiles possessed by the United States and the former Soviet Union" (NATO 2014: Key area of Cooperation prior to 2014).

The INF Treaty remains a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, one that benefits the security of all parties and must be preserved. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the Allied leaders underlined that Russia should work constructively to resolve this critical treaty and preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by returning to full compliance in a verifiable manner.

4.5.4. Nuclear Weapons Issues

NRC countries also observed four nuclear weapon accident which took place in Russia and each of the nuclear weapon states of NATO (France, the UK and the US) during 2004-2007. In June 2011, NRC countries participated in an exercise dealing with emergency response to a nuclear weapon incident. Such activities increased transparency, developed common understanding of nuclear weapon accident response

procedures, and built confidence that the nuclear weapon states were fully capable of responding effectively to any emergency involving nuclear weapons. These types of exercise based cooperation among NRC is highly required for the safety of European population.

4.5.5. Military-to-Military Cooperation

Since the NRC was established, military liaison arrangements have been enhanced, at the Allied Commands for Operations and for Transformation, as well as in Moscow. A key objective of military-to-military cooperation was to build trust, confidence and transparency, and to improve the ability of NATO and Russian forces to work together in preparation for possible future joint military operations. Areas of cooperation included logistics, combating terrorism, search and rescue at sea, countering piracy, theatre missile defence or missile defence and military academic exchanges and related military activities (NATO 2014: Key area of Cooperation prior to 2014).

4.5.6. Countering Piracy

Countering piracy was one of the key areas of common interest and concern which were identified in the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges approved at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Cooperation at the tactical level developed from late 2008 between Russian vessels and Allied ships deployed as part of Operation Ocean Shield, NATO's counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. At the operational level, regular meetings between staffs sought to enhance NATO-Russia maritime cooperation. Russian ships also used the training facilities of the NATO Maritime Interdiction Training Centre in Crete, Greece, to prepare for counter-piracy missions.

NATO and Russia can cooperate on above mentioned issues which is primarily of military in nature. But, in European security, securing their interest is of prime agenda. NATO has its own enlargement agenda, missile defence system in the Eastern Europe, which are always opposed by Russia. NATO and Russia are not only actors in Europe, but the EU and the OSCE also play and important role with NATO and Russia to secure peace and stability in Europe. Enlargement of NATO towards

Eastern Europe is an important context in European security by which the Alliance guaranteed the security of the East European countries.

4.6. NATO's Enlargement and Russia: Impact on European Security

NATO's open door policy is an important policy which attracts European countries to get membership of the Alliance. "According to the Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of the Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" (NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010: para. 13).

Oksana Antonenko and Bastian Giegerich (2009) argues that the problems of NATO-Russia relations involve the Cold War legacies, differences in strategic culture, and an anxiety with process over substances. The Cold War legacies still shape mutual perceptions of threat against each other. Russians still view NATO as an anti-Russia organisation which remains a threat to their security, despite NATO's clear statement that the Alliance is defensive and not directed against anyone. Russian leadership also view NATO as an instrument of US policy in both Europe and Eurasia. Finally, they believe that NATO enlargement is a zero-sum attempt to provide security for NATO members at Russia's expense (Antonenko and Giegerich 2009: 14).

Enlargement of NATO, since its inception, has been dynamic and controversial issue in European security. Their purpose of enlargement has been to improve Alliance's defence. NATO enlargement has been continuing since the Cold War period. "During the Korean War (1950), Greece and Turkey were given membership in 1952 to counter the Soviet Union. Further, West Germany was added in NATO in 1955, when it created its Bundeswehr and Spain was added in 1982 for strategic depth against Soviet Union. The Alliance faced many defence challenges like Berlin Crisis in 1961 and Czechoslovakia Crisis in 1968. NATO's greatest Cold War test came with the dual track decision invoked during 1978-84. This was a long term effort to hold the Alliance together" (Simom 2008: 92).

The issue of enlargement has some major questions such as, why is NATO offering membership to its former Cold War adversaries? Is it resulted from the evolution of a

transatlantic security community? Robert W. Rauchhaus (2000) argues that the US is most powerful member of the Alliance and it wants to maintain the post-Cold War power status quo and it wants to extend its influence eastward with the help of NATO against Russia (Rauchhaus 2000: 174). The US-led NATO, after the end of the Cold War, do not want that Russia re-emerges as a super power against the Alliance. In 1999, three countries joined NATO and they were Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. It was the era, when NATO was conducting its operation in Kosovo and it was necessary to maintain stability in Balkan region. With the enlargement of 1999, NATO further expanded eastward nearer to Russia boundary. On the other hand, Baltic countries were also strategically important for the Alliance. NATO was committed for maintaining independence of Baltic States after the disintegration of Soviet Union and therefore, NATO provided membership to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004. After it, Albania and Croatia were given membership of the Alliance. The Purpose of this enlargement is to strengthen NATO's capability in European security, building cooperative security environment and reviving PfP in European security. Russia perceived it as NATO's antagonism in Eastern Europe. Eastward enlargement is a window of opportunity for NATO to enhance its influence and establish the importance of western norms and values against Russia.

Table 4.2 NATO's Enlargement 2004 and Russian Response

Issue	Public Discussion	Russia's Expectations	Accuracy of Russia's Expectations
Military Implication	high	Damage to Russia's strategic interest	exaggerated
New dividing line in Europe	high	Obstacles to cooperation, exclusion of Russia from decision-making on European security	wrong
Recourse transit route	moderate	Interest of Russian oil exporters would be jeopardised	wrong
Future enlargement	Very low	Would open path to future enlargement in the CIS	Likelihood underestimated
Kaliningrad	high	Complications for defence capabilities and military transit through Lithuania	Wrong

Source: L. A. Karabeshkin and D. R. Spechler (2007)

The NATO enlargement 2004 may be a success for the Alliance but it was not acceptable for Russia. Russian reaction was not in favour of European security and this enlargement was perceived as threat to Russian Military strategy. L. A. Karabeshkin and D. R. Spechler (2007) argues that "NATO steps toward eastward enlargement and the accession of the Central and East European countries will be considered a challenge to Russia's national security. Implementation of Alliance plans for the accession of the first three Eastern European countries to NATO has drastically changed the power ratio on the continent and resulted in a severe imbalance in favour of the Alliance" (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007: 314-15).

In this Context, Russia geo-strategically claimed possible deployment of Alliance forces in the Baltic States. "The geo-strategic location of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which in case of accession to NATO would be linked with the Atlantic Alliance solely by a narrow corridor, from the very beginning challenged both the credibility of NATO security guarantees to the Baltic States and Brussels' assurance that NATO troops would not be permanently deployed on the territory of these new member countries" (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007:315). This region is a key region for both NATO and Russia and hence, both want a strong politico-military presence here. But the enlargement of NATO, created a threat perception for Russia in this region that might affect European security.

NATO's eastern enlargement may create new dividing line in Europe and Russia is not ready to accept. The enlargement enhances the sphere of democracy in one hand, but on the other hand, it created an illusionary situation for Russia. Russia perceives it as a new line of divide in favour of US-led NATO that undermine security and sovereignty of Russia. The Second term of President Putin (2004-2008) was not easy, as NATO was moving beyond Putin expectations and that was the result of NATO's enlargement in 2004. The values, norms and hope which were expected in NRC proved worthless and Russia assumed NATO's approach to enlargement as a regional ambiguity and perceived it as extended deterrence of NATO in eastern Europe.

According to Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO welcomed Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. It was agreed that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. The democratic reforms in Ukraine and

Georgia, look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia was welcomed. Membership Action Plan (MAP) is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. It was cleared that NATO supports these countries' applications for MAP. Therefore, it was decided to begin an intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications (NATO 2008: Bucharest Summit Declaration).

Further, both have fault lines in their relationship. This fault line is created due to managing their area of influence. Both do not want to lose their influence in European security. This is related to enlargement of NATO and NATO's Missile Defence Programme, where Russia is against of it and it perceives it as a security to their own threat (Solan 2008: 74).

After the Georgian and Ukrainian Crisis in European security, NATO became active in Black Sea region. These two crises made the two entities again at the stage of mistrust, suspicion and new Cold War situation. Russia is against any further enlargement of NATO eastward. Ukraine, in East Europe, is considered as a red line for Alliance. For the purpose of energy security, Black Sea region is very important for NATO. "Black Sea serves as a barrier against potential threats for NATO and as important security bridge connecting the Mediterranean to Caucasus and Caspian. Promoting Black Sea Regional Cooperation has particular relevance for NATO in that all the greater Black Sea Partners have signed the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (Simom 2008: 105).

4.7. Ballistic Missile Defence: A Controversial Issue

The key policy document providing the framework for NATO's activities in the area of BMD is NATO's Strategic Concept. In addition, BMD is an important aspect of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012. Former Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen has repeatedly urged European and American leaders to collaborate with Russia in developing a comprehensive missile-defence architecture that would be jointly built and managed by Moscow and its new partners. It was identified that there would be probable threat of Iranian missiles attack with nuclear warhead in coming future. "It was argued that pursuing a joint NATO–Russia

initiative could build a foundation for concrete security cooperation among the parties in other areas. Rasmussen's vision of 'one security roof that protects us all' extending 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok' is certainly bold, and his pessimistic threat assessment regarding Iran is now shared by many Western and Russian analysts. In principle, he is also correct that having one security roof would be a very strong political symbol that Russia is fully part of the Euro-Atlantic family … not outside, but very much inside" (Weitz 2010: 99).

"The dispute over the George W. Bush administration's plans to construct a third site for US national missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic contributed to the most serious downturn in Russian–US relations in previous decade. Even after President Barack Obama relocated the initial phase of the planned deployments closer to Iran and further away from the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) based in central Russia, which Moscow considers a vital element of its strategic nuclear deterrent, Russian policymakers continued to express unease at Washington's plans for Europe" (Weitz: 101). Russia was very much doubtful about this project. After the event of 9/11 attack, US and NATO both were primarily cautious about security of US. This missile shielding programme undermines Russian deterrence and hence, Moscow was against.

Ballistic Missile Defence Review of April 2010, insisted that "American missile defences are not designed to oppose Russia. But many Russian analysts continue to perceive them as aiming to establish a forward-based infrastructure that the United States could eventually use to negate Russia's nuclear deterrent" (US Department of Defence 2010: 4-5). By this report, US tried to convince that this missile shield programme is not threat to Russia.

"Moscow's key concern throughout the years has been that missile defence in and for Europe could undermine the Russian strategic deterrent. It was evident during the years of the George W. Bush administration, with its plan for a third site in Europe, and also under the Obama administration, which created the European Phased Adaptive Approach. In May 2012, missile-defence conference, Russia claimed that ground-based interceptors would be able to intercept its strategic missiles. It concluded that 'interceptors deployed close to Russian borders and ones that can achieve higher speeds are a threat to Russia's strategic deterrence and will call for

countermeasures'. American and NATO officials rejected Moscow's claim, stating that the European Phased Adaptive Approach 'cannot negate Russia's strategic deterrent' because the US interceptors deployed in Poland were not fast enough to catch Russian ICBMs and would result in a tail chase" (Zadra 2014: 53).

NATO and Russia's closed-door discussions on missile defence were characterised by a lack of trust. This shortfall was evident on both sides, but was probably perceived to be a larger hurdle in Moscow. Russia did not believe that the NATO proposals for missile-defence cooperation made in Lisbon and Chicago were genuine because it did not trust the Alliance's biggest shareholder, the US. Moscow had always felt that Washington was the real driving force behind NATO's missile-defence effort, and it had neither forgotten nor forgiven the US for withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 (Zadra 2014: 55).

According to the New Strategic Concept, "NATO has decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces, and invited Russia to cooperate with Alliance" (NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010: para. 2).

The threat to NATO European populations, territory and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing. As missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat, Alliance decided that it will develop a missile defence capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. The aim of a NATO missile defence capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.

It is decided that the scope of NATO's current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme's command, control and communications capabilities will be expanded beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory and forces (NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010: para. 37). In this context, the United States European Phased

Adaptive Approach is welcomed as a valuable national contribution to the NATO missile defence architecture, as are other possible voluntary contributions by Allies.

Alliance will continue to explore opportunities for missile defence co-operation with Russia in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence. NATO reaffirm the Alliance's readiness to invite Russia to explore jointly the potential for linking current and planned missile defence systems at an appropriate time in mutually beneficial ways. NATO missile defence efforts and the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach provide enhanced possibilities to do this (NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010: para. 38).

It can be said that the missile defence programme is an issue of controversy. After the Ukrainian Crisis, NATO's approach is totally changed about Russia and it has stationed its missile contingent at the Russian border. Since the initial phase of this programme, Russia was doubtful for this and hence, this programme is dangerous for European security if both entities would not come to a consensus.

4.8. NATO-Russia Relations: Georgian Crisis and the European Security

Georgian crisis is considered as first crisis in Europe in the 21st century. It created instability in Europe and there is direct armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. NATO took this situation as a threat to Euro-Atlantic security. This crisis makes the NATO-Russia and Russia-Georgia relationship in tensed situation. An emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council was called on 19 August 2008 and in which NATO foreign ministers proposed for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on respect for Georgia's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. They condemned the use of force, which was inconsistent with the commitments to the peaceful resolution of conflicts that both Georgia and Russia have made under the Partnership for Peace as well as other international agreements. The Allies expressed particular concern over Russia's disproportionate military action, which was incompatible with Russia's peacekeeping role in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was proposed that the immediate withdrawal of its troops from the areas it was required to leave (NATO Review Magazine 2010: The Ukraine crisis and NATO-Russia relations).

"Georgia requested Allies to provide support in a number of areas assessing the damage to civil infrastructure and the state of the ministry of defence and armed forces; supporting the re-establishment of the air traffic system; and advising on cyber defence issues. The North Atlantic Council condemned and called for the reversal of Russia's decision to extend recognition to the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states" (NATO 2008: Response to Georgian Crisis).

The Allies continue to support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders. NATO did not recognise elections in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, stating that the holding of such elections did not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement. NATO equally did not recognise the signature of so-called treaties between Russia and the breakaway regions. The Allies welcome Georgia's efforts to seek a resolution to the crises with South Ossetia and Abkhazia through peaceful means. They strongly support Georgia's current strategy of engagement with the two breakaway regions, which envisions a constructive way forward through fostering economic ties and people-to-people contacts to build confidence.

The Allies also welcomed the steps Georgia has taken unilaterally towards Russia in recent years, including the removal of visa requirements for Russian citizens, the agreement on Russia's membership of the World Trade Organization; as well as the direct dialogue that has been initiated with the Russian government by the Georgian government, which came into power in October 2012 (NATO 2008: Response to Georgian Crisis).

Russia invaded Georgia and undermined its territorial integrity without incurring any lasting political costs in its foreign relations with Europe and the US-led NATO. Russia went beyond that step to recognize unilaterally the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and insists on the OSCE and its member states making similar recognitions as a precondition of any formal peace conference. Thus Moscow used this war to chip away at the foundations of the European and international political order, a highly reckless act given its own problems in the North Caucasus.

"By its actions Russia openly violated the 1975 Helsinki treaty, the cornerstone of European security, and what one might call the constitutional foundation of the current world order, and forcibly altered the boundaries of a sovereign European state

and signatory of that treaty with impunity. Russia's actions have given rise to significantly heightened fears throughout Central and Eastern Europe about the possibility of separatism and support by Russia for such movements against the states that broke free of the Warsaw Pact in 1989. This concern applies with particular force to countries like Slovakia with its eternal concern for its Hungarian minority, the Baltic states, who have ample reason to expect Moscow to exploit that issue in an effort to destabilize and unhinge their security as it already tried to do so in 2007, and of course, Ukraine as we shall see below. Its vexed issue of Crimea has already shown too much potential from Kiev's standpoint for becoming the centre of a Russian-led separatist movement" (Blank 2009: 426).

Russia successfully demonstrated the US' and Europe's (and thus NATO's) inability or unwillingness to stand up in resolute fashion for Georgia or do anything constructive for her. Not only did that Western failure shake the confidence of CIS members that the West might present credible support to them against Russia, it also further alarmed European members of NATO. The US had to issue new reminders of its guarantees to the Baltic States and support for Ukraine while Poland and Norway had previously openly voiced their apprehensions that NATO's Article V guarantees were not fully credible or viable. This episode only strengthened those apprehensions (Blank 2009: 427).

Beyond that threat, Russian spokesmen are now threatening that an enlarged NATO means war and are attempting to create alternate military arrangements in Europe. "Moscow proposed joint manoeuvres of armies and navies to Finland and expanded military sales to the Finnish Defence Forces. Finland, for obvious reason politely turned down these offers" (Lappalainen 2008: 10). At the same time Russia was clearly revelling in its perceived victory over a supine and confused Europe. Thus Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov told the Finnish press that "rather than military contacts with Europe becoming more difficult, the dialogue has become more and more constructive" (Blank 2009: 429).

4.9. Ukrainian Crisis and European Security

After the end of Cold War, Ukrainian Crisis is one of the most controversial issues in Euro-Atlantic security where both NATO and Russia are heavily engaged. After the

Georgian conflict (2008), perhaps relationship between NATO and Russia is at worst situation. Perception and misperception are important aspect to understand the relationship between two actors. We have Cold War history, bloc politics and post-Cold War situations, from where we can analyse the ups and downs in the relationship between NATO and Russia. Here one may raise questions, why Ukraine and Ukrainian Crisis are important for both actors? How much Ukrainian Crisis has potential to affect the relations between NATO and Russia? What are the key issues regarding this crisis between these two actors? How can tensed relation between both actors affect European regional security dimensions? Ukrainian Crisis seems to be a potential turning point in European Security. It has potential to affect and redefine NATO-Russia relations. This crisis has changed the security landscape in Eastern Europe and one can see the new security reality in this reason. Not only Europe but whole international community are looking towards responses of NATO as well as Russia. Both actors have analysed and trying to redefine and reconstruct their relationship.

4.10. Genesis of the Ukrainian Crisis

The Ukrainian Crisis is the biggest geopolitical shock to European security after the end of Cold War. In November 2013, former president Victor Yanukovich decided not to sign the agreement on associated membership with the European Union (EU) in favour of aid and natural gas agreements with Russia during the Eastern Partnership Summit held at Vilnius, Lithuania. This move was strongly opposed by pro-western protesters. Associated Membership Agreement with the EU but not signed, supports closer economic ties, increased mobility and expanding cooperation in various fields like agriculture, research, environment and migration. This approach has strong support of West-Ukrainian population. But on the other hand, Russia and East-Ukrainian population support Russian aid and assistances. Most of the Eastern and Southern Ukraine population is ethnic Russian and henceforth, they support Russia. The divide between East and West Ukraine is the important cause that supported Ukrainian Crisis. Throughout the 2014, there were massive protest, killings, capturing of government buildings, strikes, coup and formation of new government in Ukraine, crisis and referendum in Crimea, military movement from Russian and Ukrainian side occurred in Ukraine.

4.11. Ukrainian Crisis: A Key Issue in the NATO-Russia Relations

"The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated, how both Russia and NATO are using the post-Soviet space as a new geopolitical battleground to resolve issues left unsettled after the conclusion of the Cold War" (Fenenko 2015: 3). The Ukrainian Crisis pushed NATO and Russia into new phase of rivalry. First, it is ideological differences which were dominant during the Cold War period still continuing in the mind setup of political leadership of both the actors. Second, both actors do not want to lose their sphere of influence in European security. Third, Russia does not want that NATO to expand Eastward in Europe, on the other hand NATO is committed for democratic values and security of East European countries. NATO also wants to setup missile defence shield in East European countries especially in Ukraine and of which Russia is opposing. Increasing influence of NATO in Ukraine shows new European security order which is not accepted by Russia. "The Euro-Atlantic area in the early 21st century, still has a mind-set geared towards bipolar confrontation. The Ukraine Crisis seems to have proved that NATO and Russia have entered a far more dangerous period of rivalry which is a game without rules" (Fenenko 2015: 4).

In this scenario, Russia's integration project for Eurasian Union is an important project and it is believed that the US is not in favour it. Within the context of Ukrainian Crisis, US wants to dismantle this Russian project and tries to create drift between Russia and Ukraine. After the Russian annexation of Crimea, the US led NATO and the EU became very active in East European region. Both NATO and the EU try to put political and economic pressure and sanctions on Russia. Further, Ukraine has military plan against Russia which is supported by NATO. Russia is opposing this activity and involvement of NATO. Socio-economic aspect is an important dimension in Ukrainian Crisis and East and South-East Ukraine are ethnically Russian and most of the industries and economic hub is located in Crimean Peninsula. Henceforth, Russia is interested in this region in favour of Russian ethnic population and it is opposed by NATO, Ukraine and the EU. In this continuation, we have to look how much NATO and Russia are responsive towards each other and it is reflected in their relationship.

NATO and Russia have long term relationship with many perception and misperception. Here, one can see the new era of their relationship after Ukrainian

Crisis. NATO is following all the events related to this crisis and in March 2014, North Atlantic Council condemned Russia's military escalation in Crimea and it also declared referendum in Crimea illegal and illegitimate. In response to Russia-Ukraine conflict, all practical civil and military cooperation under NATO-Russia Council was suspended in April 2014 (NATO 2014: NATO's relation with Russia). "In NATO's Wales Summit September 2014, Russia was criticised for its military intervention in Ukraine. It was demanded that Russia should withdraw its forces from Ukraine and respective border. NATO also blamed Russia for not following international law and obligation regarding Ukrainian sovereignty" (NATO 2014: NATO's relation with Russia).

NATO and Ukraine became a close partner after the advent of Ukrainian Crisis. NATO decided to help Ukraine in developing capacity building and implementation of Trust Fund projects on command, control, communication and computer against Russia (NATO 2014a: NATO's relation with Ukrainian). NATO agrees on concrete support measures for Ukraine to strengthen its ability to provide for its own security. Measures include a number of immediate and short-term actions to help Ukraine cope with the current conflict, and longer-term measures geared towards capacity-building, capability development, and deep reform of the armed forces and the security sector (NATO 2014a: NATO's relation with Ukrainian). Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signs into law a bill to cancel the non-bloc status of Ukraine and announces that Ukraine will start a process to achieve the criteria needed for NATO membership and also integrate into the Euro-Atlantic security space on 29 December 2014 (NATO 2014a: NATO's relation with Ukraine).

The new NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on February 2015, emphasised that NATO will go through biggest military expansion to combat Russian military aggression in Ukraine (International Business Times, 2015). In a reply to it, Russia mentioned that it is preparing an adequate response to NATO's move of expanding its forces in Eastern Europe. Russia clearly mentioned that it will protect its interest in this region. NATO's latest expansion creates a great risk for Russia in the Baltic region and could even snowball into a military confrontation between Moscow's forces and their adversaries (International Business Times, 2015a). NATO has already indicated that if required allies may deploy strong response force against Russia. On the other hand, Russia has options also open for nuclear response against its

adversaries. Both actors are continued in blaming each other on this crisis. Still this crisis is going on and international community is hopeful for a constructive solution.

4.12. Engaging Russia: A tuff task for NATO

Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia is considered as expanding power. NATO by its various strategies tries to engage Russia but Russia considers these strategies as undermining the Russian security. Russia wants rollback of NATO from Eastern Europe and against of any kind of establishment of missile defence system in the Central-East European countries. Russia posed massive aggression during Georgian Conflict (2008) and Ukrainian Conflict (2013-2014), it reflects that Russia is very much aware about security challenge in their region and it do not want any kind of intervention. Dramatically, NATO did not intervene in the both cases against Russia, it signals that NATO do not want any conflict with Russia in this region, as it also poses massive nuclear deterrence. NATO, by default not involving in Georgian and Ukrainian crisis has served the purpose to maintain stability and peace in European security.

If NATO wants effective engagement with Russia then, it has to engage the EU and the OSCE in Europe.

Table: 4.3 Russian perception for NATO, the EU and the OSCE

|	**NATO**	**EU**	**OSCE**
Russian Perception for NATO, the EU and the OSCE	Military organisation	Diplomatic/Non-military body	Russia is a member of it
	Antagonist	EU enlargement-less problematic	cooperation
	Eastward Expansionist	Russian energy importer	cooperation

Source: Compiled by researcher

In Europe, Russia has different perception for actors like NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Russia considers NATO as a military organisation that can be a possible threat for it, however, NATO has already declared that NATO is not a threat for Russia. NATO's eastward expansion is considered as expansionist policy in Russia's view and due to it antagonism developed between them. On the other hand, Russia is a member of the OSCE where it expects cooperation with other European countries.

The EU is a non-military body, more diplomatic organisation and importer of Russian energy. Eastward enlargement of the EU is less problematic for Russia because it is non-military in nature. NATO has to utilize these different perception of Russia in European security. Further, it reflects that NATO has to engage the EU and the OSCE to manage relationship with Russia.

According to NATO's New Strategic Concept 2010, increasing energy needs and dependence on foreign energy supply will further shape the future security environment in Europe (NATO New Strategic Concept 2010: para. 13,15). In this context, energy will be a critical issue in European security where NATO can engage Russia for sustainable supply of gas and oil to European country. But recent oil price down hampered Russian energy market due to that Russia's bargaining in Europe is weaken. But in near future, energy will be a major issue in Europe where NATO can engage Russia.

Figure 4.1 Common members in NATO, the EU and the OSCE

Source: NATO official website

(*UK is not the member of the EU after Brexit 2016.)

NATO, the EU and the OSCE can involve in burden sharing mechanism, it is possible due to there are many common European countries who are common members of these three organisations. On the other hand, NATO can engage Russia on the issue of organised crime. According to NATO's New Strategic Concept 2010, trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arm, narcotics and people are threat to European security (NATO New Strategic Concept 2010: para.11). On this issue, NATO, the EU, the OSCE and Russia can cooperate with each other.

NATO and Russia both have expectations from each other in European security. NATO's expansion towards Eastern Europe, missile defence system, successful survival of NATO after the Cold War, influence of West on one hand, and on the other hand, emerging and expanding Russian power under Putin, Russian initiative of Eurasian Union, Russia aggression against Georgia and annexation of Crimea created an environment of trust deficit in Europe. Both actors have to manage it and create a cooperative and collaborative environment to ensure security in Europe. The recent terrorist attack in Paris, Brussels and Nice (July 2016) provides an opportunity to both actors to engage each other against threats and challenges in European security.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the 21st century, European security has transformed and it is facing new challenges and threats in the new security environment which is different from what prevailed during the Cold War period when the threats were conventional in nature and West Europe faced an existential threat in the form of Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War period, threats are non-conventional, diffused and complex in nature. The Cold War was the outcome of the breakdown of the political engagement between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, which manifested in the war time conferences especially at Potsdam and Yalta in 1945. The US and the Soviet Union were two important security actors and were connected to the security of West and East Europe respectively.

This study has primarily examined security concerns of Europe in the backdrop of the changing threats in the post-Cold War period. The entire Cold War period was an ideological confrontation where the US and the Soviet Union never fought each other in Europe. However, this ideological confrontation led to the division of Europe and bloc politics. The US supported NATO secured West Europe against the Soviet Union led Warsaw Pact in Central and East Europe. Western values like liberty, democracy, free market economy and human rights were followed in West Europe and in contrast to it, Soviet Union followed norms of socialism, command economy and dictatorship in Central and East Europe.

NATO was formed in 1949 to protect West Europe as well as the western values. No actor can protect its population, territory and regime without having a concrete strategy. In this context, NATO as a security provider in West Europe adopted its strategic vision in a document known as the Strategic Concept and this was updated periodically to reflect the changing security concerns from 1949 to the present. NATO followed four different Strategic Concepts during the Cold War period from 1949-

1990. In the post-Cold War era, while the Warsaw Pact collapsed, NATO reinvented itself and three strategic documents were launched in the post-Cold War period-1991, 1999 and 2010. The 2010 New Strategic Concept is the latest strategic document, which guides NATO's course of action in the 21st century.

Seen from a liberal institutionalist perspective, the scope for the cooperation among likeminded actors resulted in the creation of NATO, that advanced the security concerns of its members in what Karl Deutsch (1957) calls a '*security community*'. The Cold War period was dynamic and NATO successfully defended West Europe against threats and challenges in the changed security environment. For ensuring security in West Europe, NATO formulated its first strategic document and created its military structure, the formation of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Forces, Europe (SHAPE) that reflected its collective its military capability. As the study shows that the changing security threats in Europe drew different responses from NATO. During the 1950s, NATO adopted a '*forward strategy*' (1955) and '*strategy of massive retaliation*' (1954) against the Soviet Union to secure West Europe. In the 1960's, the Alliance followed the policy of *'flexible response'* (1961) against its adversaries and it resulted in cooperation on arms control treaties. Further, the 1975 Helsinki Accords facilitated cooperation between the West and the East and played an important role in European security, whereas the 1979 *dual track approach* came in the backdrop of heightened tensions between Washington and Moscow with the outbreak of the new Cold War. The Helsinki Accord advocated for sovereignty and territorial integrity of European nations, self-determination of people and human rights and helped to mitigate the physical division of Europe. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in NATO's dual track approach and under its provision NATO expanded it Theatre Nuclear Missile against Soviet Union, which drew both sides into an arms race.

The Year 1979 was a turning point when new Cold War was started due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During this period (1979-1989), there was leadership change in the US and Soviet Union when Regan and Gorbachev became president of their respective countries. Gorbachev took major steps like Glasnost and Perestroika in 1985 that led to openness and reconstruction of Soviet Union. It was a major shift in Soviet Union at the last stage of the Cold War. Further in 1989, there was massive

change in European security and it was related to fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany. This led to the change in the security environment of Europe and it signalled the end of the Cold War. There was another major shift in Europe when Soviet Union collapsed and with this incident Europe entered in the new phase. This new phase signalled the end of long term peace and return of war in Europe, end of bloc politics and world became unipolar. By 1991, NATO was reinventing itself and had put out its first and revamped Strategic Concept after the end of the Cold War, whereas on the other side, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded.

Europe was transforming rapidly at the early years of 1990s, when European Economic Community formed the European Union and thus it was a great success for European in the process of their integration. During this period, Europe also faced Yugoslav Wars (1991-1999) where NATO had played an important role. The EU under the Maastricht Treaty formed Common Foreign and Security Policy and it further led to the formation of European Security and Defence Identity. The last phase of 1990s was also very dynamic when, the UK and France was looking for military capability of the EU under St. Malo Treaty in 1998 and meanwhile, NATO was involved in airstrike in Serbia in 1999. NATO adopted its another strategic document in 1999 that reflected the threats and challenges in Euro-Atlantic region.

The very much beginning of the 21st century witnessed the incident of 9/11, NATO has dramatically changed its approach towards threats and challenges. NATO, for first time in its history, invoked Article 5, the core of the concept of self-defence but the US declined to use this provision and launched its own action against terrorism in Afghanistan. This terrorist attack on the US, resulted in NATO expanding its threat perception. It is in this context that the Strategic Concept 2010 included and focussed on terrorism as a prime threat for the Alliance and its population. In the new security environment in Europe, countering complex and defused threats are not an easy task and therefore, NATO needed new capabilities and new partners with cores tasks like collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. For securing Europe, NATO has focused on cooperation with the EU, OSCE and Russia. In the changing security environment, it is acknowledged that without cooperation, no single actor is capable enough to counter the new security threats and challenges.

In the post-Cold War period, NATO conducted a series of operations in the Balkan region to maintain stability and peace. However, in a significant move, NATO subsequently went out of area and conducted its operation in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that marked its role outside Europe in response to possible threats for European security. NATO's engagement with the EU and OSCE reflected some commonality in their strategic vision that might be helpful for NATO to conduct operations and share their burden among other actors in Europe. The NATO and Russia engagement resulted in a kind of security dilemma which is directly related to the process of NATO's enlargement. The enlargement of 1999 and 2004 was not accepted by Russia on the one hand and on the other side, this enlargement reduced the distance between the Russian border and NATO countries in Central and East Europe. NATO always supported a partnership with Russia with the long term goal to build it to a strategic level and also engaged it under the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). But, NATO's missile defence system, eastward enlargement and Russian intervention in the region especially in Georgia and in Ukraine and more recently the annexation of Crimea has created a drift and mistrust between NATO and Russia and this has had an impact on European security. However, as NATO is an institutional arrangement for collective self-defence and it has been able to counter the Soviet threats due to it having both a strategy and military capability. It does not mean that there is no scope for cooperation between these two actors, both can cooperate on the issue of terrorism, WMD, arms control, organised crime and other illegal activities.

From the strategic point of view, the Strategic Concept 2010 has been an important document for NATO which directs and guides its action for promoting peace, stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. For this purpose, the strategic document emphasised on reform and transformation in the Alliance in order to better provide for security. NATO must have sufficient resources and support from its partners to carry a successful operation under a single military command structure. NATO's various operation reflects that without resource, force diployability, maximum coherence in defence planning, better defence structure and joint defence operation, it is not possible to defeat and control threats and challenges.

The study engaged itself with two hypotheses in the above context; first, NATO's commitment to strengthening European security has been enhanced by its 2010 New

Strategic Concept. Second, NATO has to work in partnership with the European Union and strategically engage Russia in shaping European security.

Key Findings

The research showed that a liberal institutional framework provided a good method to analyse NATO as a security actor in Europe, as this approach focuses on internal capabilities of an institution.

1. The New Strategic Concept 2010 is a well prepared, focused and result oriented document.

It addresses many emerging threats, risks and challenges and on the other hand, it is developing new capabilities and new partnerships with certain tasks and principles to secure Europe. NATO is looking for new capability and new partners under the framework of cooperative security in order to better address the new security threats. The 2010 New Strategic Concept seems to be futuristic but it provides solid arrangement against threats and challenges. The Alliance had to learn from the Afghanistan mission (2001) and accordingly, determine the political and strategic criteria necessary to establish the goals of its future mission. Europe's extended neighbourhood in the south is not very stable especially in the Middle-East and the Maghreb region. Recent Arab Spring, Syrian Crisis and emergence of ISIS showed the rise of non-traditional threats and the growing unpredictability in the security environment. Thus NATO has to find a way to address the growing unpredictability in the security environment in order to secure Europe.

2. NATO lags in effective response especially in the case of Georgian and Crimean Crisis against Russia.

Another aspect impacting European security in the relation between NATO and Russia. European security has also been fluctuating in nature. NATO wants a strong partnership with Russia drew its strategic importance to Europe NATO would prefer to see a democratic Russia respecting internal law principles, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Both NATO and Russia have their zone of influence in the European continent. US perceives Russia as an expanding power under Putin, more so after the Russian annexation of Crimea. On the other hand, US-led NATO with the help of enlargement and Open Door Policy is expanding eastward

and this is considered as a threat by Russia. The 2004 enlargement of NATO brought much needed security to the Central Eastern European countries. However, Russia perceived this as an active way of identifying the erstwhile Warsaw Pact members and destabilizing its security consensus in the region. On the issue of ballistic missile defence system, US-led NATO wants to establish missile defence system in Poland and Hungary against possible missile attack.

The Georgian (2008) and Crimean (2013-2014) Crises were unique in the European continent where NATO was seen as a talking shop. NATO is very much aware about the nuclear deterrence capability of Russia. European NATO members do not want any war like involvement with Russia, finally it will harm Europe only. US-led NATO only responded to these two crises with few sanctions against Russia. It created a question mark on the ability of an effective response of NATO. NATO clearly mentioned that Georgia and Ukraine are not member countries, therefore they cannot be the part of collective security mechanism. Another question in this regard is related to peace, stability, security and territorial integrity in European neighbourhood. In the Georgian case, Ossetia and Abkhazia were separated from Georgia which is a question mark on its integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and on the other hand, in the Ukrainian issue, Crimea was successfully annexed by Russia. NATO only sent its fleets in Mediterranean and Black Sea region but did not take any interventionist action in Crimea did not meant escalation. The Enlargement and the Open Door Policy of NATO resulted in long standing tension around Russia's near abroad i.e. in Eastern Europe. US proposal for a missile defence interceptor site in Eastern Europe and concerns over a rising Russia following the conflict in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2013 had led to the halt in the relationship. It included the suspension of the NRC and the suspension of Russian participation in the CFE Treaty. NATO's Lisbon Summit Declaration (2010) which was aimed at rapprochement in NATO-Russian relations proved wrong. It reflects that the future of European security in the context of Russia's engagement with it is uncertain and this can pose difficulty to maintain peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

3. Terrorism is a major non-traditional threat for NATO in the 21st Century.

On the issue of 9/11, Article 5 of Washington treaty was invoked but not used by the US. The Alliance's military were deployed out of area to counter terrorism in

Afghanistan. On the other hand, Europe also suffered with major terrorist activities in Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004), London (2005), Glasgow (2007) and recently terrorist attacks in France (2015-2016) and Belgium (2016) occurred. In the post-9/11 period, the non-traditional threats have the ability to significantly undermine European security. In this context, NATO as a security provider assumed even more signified European Security Strategy (ESS) and Strategic Concept 2010. Terrorism is considered as a defused, complex and hybrid threat to international community. Terrorist organisations as non-state actors also use strategy and planning for their activities and this led to defuse and complex threat. Since 9/11, US-led NATO has declared War on Terror, but experiences of Afghanistan proved that it is not an easy task to counter terrorism. The Aftermath of Afghanistan was resulted in increase in the number of terrorist activities. The recent emergence of ISIS forced NATO to rethink about its current strategic document. NATO is looking for new capabilities and partnership as it is mentioned in the New Strategic Concept 2010 and after the adoption of the new strategic document, NATO focuses on cooperation and partnership to counter terrorist activities. It also reflects that NATO information and intelligence sharing mechanism, which is incorporated in the New Strategic Concept, is evolving and well equipped mechanism.

4. NATO is transforming and it also address non-military threats like health risks, water scarcity, environmental degradation and climate change.

It is an interesting aspect that NATO as a defence organisation changing its nature and looking for new role in non-military activity. The above mentioned issues in this section are of non-military in nature and for an instance, its management can be successfully handled by national governments i.e. individual member states of NATO. It can be managed with the help of non-military crisis management. It focuses that NATO is an inspirational actor which also indicates non-conventional threats are also important and it must be controlled. For the peace and prosperity in Europe, it is required that actors in European security must interact with each other on these emerging issues. Resource depletion, climate change and environmental degradation may responsible for migration and refugee issue, it can cause conflict and instability in European security.

5. NATO has not only enhanced security in Europe rather it has also managed security threats under its core tasks.

However, Europe is not completely secured in the changed security environment and in the 21st century, Europe is suffering with terrorism, illegal activities, organised crime, instability in neighbourhood and refugee's crisis. To counter these threats and challenges, the Alliance has developed new vision and new capabilities which are able to prevent threats under collaborative measures. NATO has included mechanism 'security through crisis management'. It accesses both political and military tool to control and manage crisis like situations. NATO has successfully implemented crisis management operation in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Mediterranean region, Horn of Africa and in Libya.

The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept is a political negotiation based on different threat perceptions within the Alliance and especially in the Euro-Atlantic region. It means serious consequences for multinational operations on the militaries of the Alliance especially European NATO members like France, Germany, and the UK. For more strength and capability, NATO has to focus on the development and increase in military budgets. Small NATO member are generally not ready for hefty budget expenditure on military. NATO as an Alliance, has to take cooperative initiative with member states to achieve its established goals mentioned in the New Strategic Concept 2010.

The development of NATO's capabilities is a priority for both collective defence and crisis response management at multinational level. The effectiveness of tactical actions and operational planning to achieve strategic goals in multinational operations requires cooperation under Partnership for Peace (PfP) mechanism. Effective multinational crisis management operations under NATO command requires three initiatives. First, NATO needs to adapt its command structure to assimilate civilian planning capabilities at the operational level. Second, NATO should enable the Alliance to conduct multinational logistics more efficiently with the help of consultation and coordination. Third, NATO needs to adapt its operational doctrine, that can help in enhancing its interoperability at NATO and the EU level. Fourth, NATO has to understand the problems of Russia which is related to their sovereignty. Both actors do not want conflict with each. Russia considers NATO's enlargement as a threat perception. In that case, NATO must have to define and limit its boundary in

the Eastern Europe. NATO as a security provider in Europe must take Russia in confidence and cooperate with other actor like the OSCE. NATO's cooperation with the EU, the OSCE is further related to burden sharing and it is helpful for their capability enhancement.

Reshaping European security is an important dimension, where it was expected that NATO had capability to reshape European security, but this is not an easy task for NATO as a security actor. NATO alone is not able to reshape European security, however, it can play major role in maintaining and providing security in Europe. Negotiations among the security actors in Europe can help in resolving the problems. NATO as a security provider, can only reshape its security policies which is reflected in its strategic documents.

It is also argued that whether NATO is still essential for European security or not? NATO as an Alliance is essential part of Europe which has been playing an important role since the advent of the Cold War. It was NATO that successfully countered he Soviet Union and maintained balance of power in Europe. On the other hand, after the end of the Cold War, it was the only actor to respond in the Yugoslav Civil War. It is essential for European security because it is an alliance of democratic countries in Europe. There are new threats and risks in the new strategic environment, it is NATO that can respond to these threats under provisions of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

After 2010, there were new changes in Europe and in its vicinity and in that context, NATO held three important Summits at Chicago (2012), Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016). These Summits reflect continuity in NATO's policies, activities and its awareness towards new changes which can endanger European security. The 2010 New Strategic Concept does not deal with major changes after 2010 and for addressing the post 2010 challenges, NATO held the Chicago Summit (2012) where it discussed on the Arab Spring, the Libyan Civil War and transition of NATO forces in Afghanistan. It also discussed on threats from the Iranian nuclear programme which could lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Shrinking defence budget and readiness of diployability are two problems for the Alliance in the 21st century and hence, NATO adopts a smart defence policy to address it. In a sequence, for

addressing problems of Ukraine, Crimean Crisis, NATO conducted the Wales Summit.

NATO as a security actor in Europe has always been an active organisation which is committed for the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. For this purpose, it focuses on new capabilities, reforms in policies and transformation according to the security environment. As this study has revealed that NATO is a critical security actor which identified new changes in the form of challenges and threats in its New Strategic Concept for maintaining security in Europe. For this purpose, it manages relationship with Russia but new realities and changes dictates overall partnership with it. To respond better and effectively to the new changes, new requirements and new strategic environment, it needs revisiting of its strategic document after a certain interval of years.

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"Strategic Concept

For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation"

Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon

Active Engagement, Modern Defence

Preface

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

- It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
- It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
- It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
- It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
- It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

- It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO's essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

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Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.

2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO's territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

a. **Collective defence**. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

b. **Crisis management**. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

c. **Cooperative security**. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards.

5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.

6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.

8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions.

10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.

11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.

12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.

13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is

transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

14. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.

15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

Defence and Deterrence

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;

- maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;

- develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance's expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;

- carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;

- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;

- develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;

- further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;

- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;

- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;

- develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;

- ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;

- sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;

- continue to review NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO's borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.

22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.

23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.

24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.

25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:

- enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;
- further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
- form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
- enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum;
- develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
- identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
- broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and

should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:

- We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

- With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.

- In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.

- We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.

- We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.

- National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

Open Door

27. NATO's enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free,

and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.

- The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

Partnerships

28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO's fundamental tasks.

29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO's operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:

- We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.

- We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.

- We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.

- We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.

31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance

aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:

- enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
- more regular political consultation; and
- enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.

32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
- enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:

- enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
- use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:

- enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;

- continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;

- facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;

- deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;

- develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.

37. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:

- maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO's usability targets;
- ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
- develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of costeffectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
- preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;
- engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.

An Alliance for the 21st Century

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe's

most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.

APPENDIX - II

List of Experts Interviewed and Institutions Visited during Field Work
(June-November 2013)

S. №	Day, Date & Time of Interview	Person/Expert Interviewed	Expert's Affiliation	Place of Interview
1.	Thursday, 17 October 2013, 02.00 PM	Dr. Nadine Mensel	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	Berlin, Germany
2.	Tuesday, 22 October 2013, 09.00 AM	Dr. Henning Reicke	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. (DGAP)	Berlin, Germany
3.	Tuesday, 22 October 2013, 10.00 AM	Dr. Patrick Keller	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	Berlin, Germany
4.	Wednesday, 6 November 2013, 09.30 AM	Dr. Vivien Pertusot	Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)	Brussels, Belgium
5.	Wednesday, 6 November 2013, 03.00 PM	Dr. Sven Biscop	EGMONT	Brussels, Belgium
6.	Thursday, 7 November 2013, 11.00 AM	Dr. Daniel Keohane	FRIDE	Brussels, Belgium
7.	Thursday, 7 November 2013, 01.30 PM	Dr. Michael Ruhle	NATO Parliamentary Assembly (HQ)	Brussels, Belgium
8.	Thursday, 7 November 2013, 02.30 PM	Dr. RabaiZsolt	NATO H.Q.	Brussels, Belgium
9.	Thursday, 7 November 2013, 04.00 PM	Dr. Luis Simon	Institute for European Studies (IES), Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)	Brussels, Belgium
10.	Wednesday, 13 November 2013, 04.00 PM	Dr. Stefan Meister	European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Berlin	Berlin, Germany
11.	Tuesday, 4 June 2013, 9.00 AM	Dr. Ingo Peters, Professor of Political Science	Freie Universität Berlin	Berlin, Germany

APPENDIX - III

QUESTIONNAIRE

List of Questions asked in interview with the experts on European security and NATO during June-November, 2013

1. How can one define European security in the 21st century?

2. What are the nature and characteristics of European Security in the 21st century?

3. How can NATO and the EU cooperate in shaping European security for next decade?

4. Is Eastward enlargement of NATO a threat for stability in European security, as it is strongly opposed by Russia?

5. How can ongoing Syrian crisis affect European security?

6. How does the European Security cope up with the changing security environment?

7. Does the 2010 New Strategic Concept of NATO capable to reshape European security?

8. How do NATO and the EU cooperate to counter Emerging security challenges in the 21st century?

9. How does NATO engage Russia in European security?

10. How does Russia response NATO's strategic steps in Europe?

11. What are the Russia's perspectives and approach towards European security?

12. What are the major contradictions between NATO and Russia in European security?

13. What are major elements of contradictions between NATO and the EU on the issues of European security?

14. How does NATO as a security actor exist in European security?

15. What are the new developments in European security in the 21st century?