


**POLITICS OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY
AND MUTTAHIDA QUAMI MOVEMENT, 1986-2013**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PRIYANKA DUTTA CHOWDHURY



**Centre for South Asian Studies
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

New Delhi – 110067

2016



Centre for South Asian Studies
School Of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi-110067

Tel.: +91-1126704350

Date: 20.07.2016

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “POLITICS OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY AND MUTTAHIDA QUAMI MOVEMENT, 1986-2013” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


Priyanka Dutta Chowdhury
Priyanka Dutta Chowdhury

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Rajesh Kharat
20.7.16

Prof. Rajesh Kharat
(Chairperson, CSAS)


दक्षिण, एशियाई अध्ययन केन्द्र
Centre for South Asian Studies
अंतराष्ट्रीय अध्ययन संस्थान
School of International Studies
जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
Jawaharlal Nehru University
नई दिल्ली/New Delhi-110067

Savita Pande

Prof. Savita Pande
(Supervisor, CSAS)


दक्षिण, एशियाई अध्ययन केन्द्र
Centre for South Asian Studies
अंतराष्ट्रीय अध्ययन संस्थान
School of International Studies
जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
Jawaharlal Nehru University
नई दिल्ली/New Delhi-110067

I DEDICATE THIS THESIS TO MY GRANDPARENTS

ANIMA DASGUPTA

&

PHANINDRA NATH DASGUPTA

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANP	Awami National Party
APMSO	All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organisation
CCC	Central Coordinating Committee
CM	Chief Minister
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic Acid
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HERA	Higher Education Regulatory Authority
HPMC	Hazara Province Movement Committee
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IPS	Indian Political Service
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ittehad
IJT	Jamiat-e-Tulaba
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KKM	Khudai Khidmatgar movement
LI	Lashkar-e-Islam
MP	Member of Parliament
MIT	Mohajir Ittehad Tehrik
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MRC	Mohajir Rabita Council
MQM	Muttahida Quami Movement
NAP	National Awami party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDP	National Democratic Party
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority

NWFP	North West Frontier province
NFCA	National Finance Commission Award
NSF	National Students Federation
PCNA	Post Crisis Need Assessment
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PkMAP/PMAP	Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
PML (N)	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PML (Q)	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam
PCNA	Post Crisis Need Assessment
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PNDA	Pakhtunkhwa National Democratic Alliance
PPIB	Private Power and Infrastructure Board
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PPP (S)	Pakistan People's Party (Sherpao)
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
ROZ	Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
SNGPL	Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UNCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Preface

In the recent world, the concept of ethno-nationalism has re-emerged in the political scene of the multi-ethnic countries. The ethnic political parties are playing an imperative role in this context by representing the specific groups in the process of political bargaining with the states.

Similarly Pakistan, which has been facing the challenge of the ethnic cleavages because of the centralised state structure, is witnessing the rise of ethnic politics interpreted in terms of ethnic political parties.

Among all the ethnic groups in Pakistan, the ethnic issues of the Pakhtuns and Mohajirs stands in contrast to each other and so does their political parties Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement. Both the groups have different political history and different historical references of group consolidation. But it seems that while representing the groups, both the parties have followed a similar trend of ethnic politics in the country.

The Thesis — *“Politics of Ethno-nationalism in Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement, 1986-2013”*— is an attempt to investigate the politico-historical developments of Pakhtun and Mohajir nationalisms, focusing on the role of the political parties —the Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement in carrying forward the movement. The study seeks to make a comparison of the two groups and their ethnic parties to point out the differences between the two and also to find a common trend of ethnic politics in the country.

Chapter I

Introduction

Most of the states in the modern world have hardly been able to escape from the phenomenon of multi-ethnicity. The rapid growth of globalisation and industrialisation is making the mobility of people common. In this respect, it was anticipated that a connected globe will erase most of the distinctions and ethnic polarisations and on the basis of the social collectiveness thus created, the people will become interlinked. But it has been found that more schisms are created and competitions among the various ethnic groups existing within a country or outside it have come up with a new vigour. Many ethnic groups are forming ethnicity-based parties, which are now dominating the internal politics of most of the countries. Thus, instead of reaching a vanishing point, this socio-political aspect of identity has once again brought nationalism and ethnicity to the fore by politicising them.

Among the various identities, ethnicity as a mode of identification, aims to claim its place in the social structure by the sheer virtue of it. Again, when ethnic identity becomes a part of the ethnic consciousness, it can turn into a tool for bargaining for resources by the people associating with this aspect of identification. Thus, when on the basis of this identity people claim their resources, it becomes highly probable that they will clash with the other groups claiming similar resources or making similar claims. Mainly, the reason for confrontation starts from the competition for economic resources, which later moves on towards the competition for social and political resources.

However, it should be kept in mind that ethnicity is not a recent phenomenon and that ethnicity or ethnic communities have been present in various societies for long, and played an important role in human history. Ethnicity is one of the primitive modes of human association and identification (Hutchison and Smith 1996: 3).

But with time, the ethnic consciousness became more prominent and was marked as a categorical identity by the elites, and used in the economic, political or social struggles. Thus, ethnicity became a tool for a power struggle and “for grasping pre-existing homogeneity and difference and for constructing specific versions of such identities” (Calhoun 1993: 221).

Similarly in the South Asian context, the resurgence of ethnic consciousness has been witnessed mainly in terms of its politicisation. Different ethnic political parties are coming to the fore to claim resources on the basis of their ethnic identity. Thus the multi-ethnic states of the region are facing various ethnic competitions and conflicts as the concerned groups want to bargain for their due share, which they feel they are being deprived of by virtue of their ethnic identities. The process of ethnic mobilisation has also posed a number of challenges to the South Asian states by creating various demands such as the protest against discrimination, the struggle for autonomy or secession, etc. (Haque 1998: 13).

This has been so mainly because the subcontinent of South Asia was unable to resist the primordial pulls while undergoing the process of maturation (Azam 2001: 3).

There are several factors responsible for turning this region into a zone of ethnic competition and conflict. The civic culture of the South Asian region is facing challenges from confrontations on the fronts of religion, ethnicity, race, etc. What is seen in this context is that the region often gets entangled with primordial pulls and that it needs to create a balance between all the pulls—primordial, political and universal. In maintaining a balance between all the three, it seems that more than the primordial and universal, the political one has determined the priorities of the region (Azam 2001: 3).

Similarly ethnicity, which can be marked as a social collectiveness based on culture, language, religion, etc., can be seen as taking up a political colour in most of the states of the region. When ethnicity affects the political thinking, it assumes a political relevance and it is this political significance that moves the ethnic groups from the social to the political space, challenging the state formation and response to the ethnic demands. Moreover, it can also be observed that in these multi-ethnic societies the politico-economic structure becomes very competitive as the groups which remain underprivileged begin to mobilise in order to seek power and resources. They start to

claim these resources on the basis of their ethnic identities and this in turn makes these identities clash with the state, thereby hampering the process of building a coherent nation (Azam 2001: 5-6).

Pakistan, marked as it is with inter-ethnic cleavages since independence, stands as a potent example. The ethnic groups of the country are bargaining for resources and their share in the power hierarchy by forming different ethnic parties. These parties are playing an active role as the representatives of the ethnic groups, forming a bridge between the people and the government. In this context the proposed study “Politics of Ethno-nationalism in Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement, 1986-2013” is an attempt to analyse the politico-historical development of the Pakhtun and Mohajir nationalisms, focusing on the role the parties formed by these two ethnic groups in the form of the Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement have played in carrying forward the movement.

The rationale of the study is to give a picture of the ethnic trends in the country and how the parties function in the situation of ethnic competition. As the study aims to deal with the two nationalisms of the Pakhtuns and Mohajirs and the role of their ethnicity-based political parties like the Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement, it is essential to give a conceptual background in the introduction of the research which can serve as a theoretical base for the subsequent chapters. So, the very first chapter will deal with the concepts of ethnicity, ethno-nationalism, the politicisation of ethnicity and the role of the political parties in it.

Conceptual Background

Before going into the matter of ethno-nationalism and its politicisation, a study of ethnicity and nationalism becomes a prerequisite. Therefore, it will be wise to discuss first the issues regarding ethnicity, its contradiction with the modern conception of the nation and then to define the concept of ethno-nationalism in that light. Later, the chapter will also deal with the politicisation of ethnicity, the political parties and the role of the state.




Fig.1.1 *The Process of Politicisation of Ethno-Nationalism.*

Definitions

In the English language, the term ‘ethnicity’ appeared in the Oxford Dictionary in 1953. It was also found in a compilation of articles titled “Ethnicity seems to be a New Term”. But the word is a derivative of an ancient Greek term called *ethnos*, related to non-Christians or Jews, or to pagans. Since the races or language groups of people having common customs and traits are also bound by age-old customs, it was used in different ways but one common link was the presence of common cultural or biological characteristics. Therefore, at the same time, the *ethnos* gave a sense of distinction of one group from the other. Thus, the idea of ‘us and them’ also appeared (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 4).

Therefore, in this context, the ethnic identity as defined by Hutchinson and Smith can be mentioned as the “individual level of identification with a culturally defined collectivity; the sense on the part of the individual that she or he belongs to a particular cultural community” (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 6).

Urmila Phadnis has mentioned that ethnicity deriving from the Greek word *ethnikos* refers to different meanings: (a) the nations that did not convert to Christianity (b) a race or a large group of people having common traits and customs (c) groups in an exotic primitive culture. Ethnic groups are determined by their distinctiveness or the subjective-objective criteria. Thus, according to Phadnis, ethnic groups are a

“historically formed aggregate of people having a real or imaginary association with a specific territory, a shared cluster of beliefs and values connoting its distinctiveness in relation to similar groups and recognised as such by others.”

Therefore, the ethnic groups have a “relatedness” which is based on the feeling of kinship, common myths, memories, etc., which get further emphasised by some sets of symbols (Phadnis 1990:14).

Smith has explained ethnicity by taking the help of symbolism—“a collective name, a myth of common descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory, a sense of solidarity”, etc. He therefore has defined an ethnic community as “a named human population with shared ancestry myths, histories and culture, having association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” (Smith 1987: 32).

A very important conception that can be noted here for the purpose of this research is that Smith, taking these ethnic references, gives an idea of group centrality which is based on two assumptions: one, that the myths of the origins, historical memories and culture of one ethnic group can have the feeling of originality and genuineness and can be said to have a common set of values which that ethnic group calls as natural. The other is that the myths, memories and cultures of the others may lack values and can be defective; thus, these symbols give a feeling of ‘we-ness’ and distinguish the group from the others. These symbols help in having the feeling of a comprehensive group and thus, the future generations can also associate themselves with this aspect (Smith 1987: 32).

While explaining the concept of ethnicity, Richard Davies has pointed out:

“As with other forms of identity, ethnicity provides a sense of belonging as a way of knowing who we are. This enables identification with other individuals of a similar background, something which it can be argued is essential to the security of individuals. This sense of community may be of increasing importance in an age of bureaucratisation and impersonal mass societies, and a world of political alienation and isolation” (Davis 1996: 88)

Haque has discussed three approaches defining the nomenclature and size of an ethnic group:

a) An objective definition

“assumes that though no specific attribute is invariably associated with all ethnic categories, there must be some distinguishing features that clearly separate one group of people from another, whether that feature or features be language, territory, religion, colour, diet, dress or any of them”

b) The subjective definition

“maintains that ethnic identity manifests itself through cultural markers; they stress on the self as well as a group-related feeling of identity distinctiveness and its recognition by others”

c) Syncretism says that an ethnic group has five components—

“subjective belief in real or assumed historical antecedents, a symbolic or real geographical centre, shared cultural emblems, self-ascribed awareness of distinctiveness and belonging to the group and recognition by others of the group differentiation” (Haque 1998: 14-15)

Thus, ethnic perceptions give a feeling of self and how one can associate with others by some markers, while distinguishing oneself from some others. Horowitz says “in general, ethnic identity is strongly felt, behaviour based on ethnicity is normatively sanctioned, and ethnicity is often accompanied by hostility towards an outer group” (Horowitz 1985: 291).

What is to be mentioned here is that some markers of identification gain prominence at a certain point of time, which help to define one’s self in a group. Thus, a change or fluidity in the concept is visible.

As Phadnis has pointed out, “at a given time, a certain cultural marker may gain pre-eminence, with the other cultural criteria operating either in a subordinate or muted manner in the identity assertion of an ethnic group”. She further says that in another situation, the objective attributed may differ. It becomes clear that the situational aspect of this identity symbolises the fact that social changes often affect the formation of the group or the manner in which it responds. Further, it can be said that

ethnic identity formation is marked with fission and fusion. Here by fission, Phadnis refers to the contraction of the group boundary with the division and creation of a new group. Fusion means its expansion with the help of assimilation that is done by the incorporation of other groups (Phadnis 1990:15).

Max Weber defines ethnic groups as

“those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs of both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration; the belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action”

Thus,

“ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organised that inspires the belief in common ethnicity. The belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in customs, physical type, or above all, language exist among its members” (Weber 1996: 35)

Thus, human beings have different identities. Among these identities, some of them are chosen in order to define ethnicity. Smith refers to the common myth of descent where a sense of common ancestry may generate among a group. The feeling of commonality may give rise to ethnic identification based on the common cultural or common tribal links instead of genetic or blood ties. He further says that there are

“myths of spatial and temporal origins, of migration, of ancestry and filiations, of the golden age, of decline and exile and rebirth. It is only much later that these separate myth-motifs are brought together to form a fully elaborated mythology of origin and descent” (Smith 1987: 25)

He also mentions that in the modern era, this work is being done by nationalist intellectuals. Thus, from here it becomes clear that people choose among the identities or that among many identities, some identities become important, which help in the formation of ethnic identification (Smith 1987: 25).

Smith classifies the ethnic groups in the pre-modern era and shows the types of ethnies relevant in the contemporary era:

TYPES OF ETHNIES		
Lateral	Vertical	
“Lateral ethnies are fairly extensive and diffused in character but their ethnic culture is confined to the upper class”.	They are territorially more compact. Their ethnic cultures range from high to low classes.	
	Core	Periphery
	Dominant ethnies whose elites rule the state.	The oppressed and exploited ethnies sideline by the core.

Table 1.1 *Types of Ethnies*, Source: *Based on (Smith 1995:58).*

This aspect can also be used to take note of the contemporary ethnic classifications. Thus, from the above-mentioned definitions, it becomes clear that there are several aspects which can be used to delineate ethnicity. There has long been a debate regarding the nature of the ethnic groups. It is often been assumed by one set of theoreticians that ethnicity is a fixed concept and there cannot be any change in its

identification, whereas another set says that the ethnic identity is not a fixed one. It is flexible and can change with time.

Thus, for the purpose of the research, it will be apt to deal with these two sets of theorisations of ethnicity.




Fig. 1.2 *Two Theories of Ethnicity: Primordialism and Instrumentalism.*

Primordialism and Instrumentalism

Hutchinson and Smith argue that the phenomenon of ethnicity is characterised by paradoxes which vary with situation and time. In their words, there are both “highly durable ethnies”, which trace their origins over several centuries and there are also “the rise of the new ethnies and the dissolution of the old ones”. There are also many fissures in the ethnies and shifts in the ethnic identification. So while describing the concept of ethnicity, the problem basically stands with the concept of multi-identity.

“which includes not only the many different affiliations of individuals with other kind of groupings such as gender, race, class, religion etc. but also many shifting identities between ethnies and ethnic categories” (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 7)

Thus in order to avoid the confusion of shifts in identity formation and for the purpose of the study, it will be wise to categorise the approaches of ethnicity into two broad

camps of 'Primordialism' and 'Instrumentalism'. While the Primordialists believe that people are always grouped together on the basis of primordial characters, the Instrumentalists consider ethnic origin as a recent phenomenon.

Primordialism

The Primordialists believe that ethnic bonds are "natural"; they are "fixed" by the basic experiences and certain primordial attachments based on blood, race, language, religion, region, etc., based on family and kinship. Edward Shils first expressed this concept of ethnicity. While describing family bonds, he talks about "significant relational qualities" which are called as primordial ties, on the basis of which the attachment with the family can be described. He further says that the attachment with the members of the kin is not because of interaction but because of some "ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood". He says that where the affection is not even that strong, "the tangibility of the attachment to the other person, by virtue of our perception of membership, in the kinship group is in evidence" (Shils 1957: 142).

Clifford Geertz has emphasised that in new states, the people are in search of a publicly acknowledged identity for progress and an enhanced standard of living. The citizenship in these modern states is a broad negotiable claim for personal significance. In multi-ethnic states, people sometimes have to subordinate their primordial affiliations to a generalised commitment to civil order or have to get absorbed in some other culture or get subordinated by some other culture. Thus, new states show disaffection towards the primordial pulls. By primordial attachment, Geertz means that it

"stems from the givens—or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens"—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practice. These congruities of bloods, speech, custom and so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves" (Geertz 1996: 41-42)

He also says that though these ties differ in different societies but “for virtually every person, in every society at almost all time, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—some would say spiritual-affinity than from social interaction”. So, he opines that the allegiance to civil states is based on the government power and forces and ideological exhortation, and not on primordial ties. In countries where the civil politics is weak, primordial attachments are preferred or proposed to be the basis of political units. Thus, he points out that unilingual states are more stable than multilingual states as the primordial bonds give feelings of kith and kin and override the social and economic differences and also distinguish one group from the other. A disaffection based on primordial ties can affect the very survival of the state (Geertz 1996: 41-42).

Thus, the concepts of quasi-kinship or race which include physical features, language, region, religion, custom, etc., are important features of primordial ties (Geertz 1973: 261-263).

Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan summarised the points Geertz mentioned as being the primordial values of ethnic ties:

1. Primordial identities are given and all interactions are done within primordial realities.
2. Primordial sentiments are ineffable, overpowering and coercive. They cannot be elucidated or evaluated by referring to social interaction as these realities are binding on people.
3. Primordial identities essentially deal with emotions, sentiments and bonds which make this identity different from others, which are together called as affectivity (Eller and Coughlan 1996: 45-46).

From these above-mentioned aspects, what Eller and Coughlan have deduced is that these ties are ascriptive; they are inflexible. But these aspects could hardly be taken into consideration as the recent ethnic phenomenon has emphasised the fact of its renewal. They point out that ethnic membership can arrive situationally and change according to the circumstances. The Primordialists have ignored the fact that new ethnic groups have also risen. Eller and Coughlan, citing Lal, mention “ethnicity by consent” where she talks of

“The creation of ethnic cultures and identities by people who are not related to one another by descent but who nonetheless lay claim to primordial sentiments and ties and who are committed to a special style of life and a set of conventions which they transmit to their children”

She further talks of the institutionalisation of collective claims on the basis of a scarce distribution of resources. Thus, there can be the rise of previous dormant ties and the formation of new groups and new social interactions which can also give fellow-feeling. Further, when a group is in opposition or under threat, an ethnic feeling can also generate. Thus, the concept of ineffable ties cannot define these situations (Eller and Coughlan 1996: 46-48).

The Primordialist approach has been criticised for being unable to offer any explanatory proof as to the basis for this bond between the individual and the ethno-national community (Brown 2002: 7).

At the same time, it fails to justify “origins, change and dissolution” of the ethnic groups. Further, how the fusions of ethnic groups are taking place through intermarriages cannot be explained with the help of this theorisation (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 8).

As the study focuses on the politicisation of ethnicity, it should also be mentioned here that primordial identities are marked as given identities which are not enough to mobilise self-conscious groups that will be “internally cohesive and externally competitive.” Such a mobilisation can take place in certain conditions.

“When these given cultural makers are infused with an intense, differentiating value, and are elevated into an ethnic ideology. So, in the politicisation of ethnicity these aspects remain no longer the way of knowing who we are, rather it binds those who share them into a special community pursuing a collective goal” (Rothschild 1981: 27).

Instrumentalism

In contrast to the Primordialists, the Instrumentalists believe ethnicity to be a socio-cultural political phenomenon which is necessarily flexible. Anthony D. Smith regards the Instrumentalist approach as resting on the assumption that human beings are members of a wide range of groups living together. As a result, they have a

“variety of collective identity” ranging from family, gender, class and religion to ethnic association (Smith 1995: 31).

“Human beings are continually moving in and out of these collective identities. They choose and construct their identities according to the situation in which they find themselves. Hence according to the Instrumentalists, identity tends to be situational rather than pervasive” (Smith 1995: 30)

The Instrumentalists believe that the cultural contents of ethnic references change with time, economic and political circumstances, cultural fusion and also according to the perception and attitude of the members. So, this identity is never in a static position and tends to vary. The Instrumentalists say that each ethnic group is constantly undergoing change. Thus, this character of ethnicity provides for a defined “symbolic and organisational sight for the people” and therefore it gives a chance for the elites to mobilise resources in the pursuit of common goals within a state (Lloberia 1999).

Hutchinson and Smith argue that the Instrumentalists “treat ethnicity as a social, political and cultural resource for different interest and status groups”. One group of Instrumentalists is of the opinion that the symbols of ethnicity are often manipulated by the elites because of the competition for the socio-political resources and by this, they mobilise the support of the masses. Another group suggests that individuals rationally choose the ethnic group they want to join keeping in mind the material benefits they can thus obtain. This is how the elites strategise this aspect. Further, Hutchinson and Smith also emphasise that the idea of Instrumentalism is often “socially constructed” where the individuals “cut and mix” from a various ethnic heritages and cultures to create their specific ethnic identities. Thus, in this process, the individual cultural identity might get eroded from its institutional base. The Instrumentalist approach further notes that in a wider cultural environment, “elite competition and rational preference maximisation” can also take place (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 9).

Frederick Barth defines ethnicity as the “categories of ascription and identification themselves” and he focuses on the point that the importance of studying the ethnic groups lies in analysing the boundaries more than in investigating the history and internal constitution of the groups. He points out that in anthropology, each ethnic group is designated as “biologically self-perpetuating”; it shares cultural values,

pursues interaction and communication and has membership which has the cultural category of identification. He says that this categorisation doesn't help to understand "the phenomenon of ethnic groups and their place in human society and culture". This identification further helps to assume that boundary maintenance is easy, as on the basis of the isolation of this cultural identification, people maintain isolated lives. His emphasis lies on taking culture as an implication or a result of ethnic group rather than taking it as a definitional or primary character. Barth has pointed out that overemphasising culture can hardly help in understanding the effects of ecology or boundaries on people.

He says,

"The overt cultural forms which can be itemized as traits exhibit the effects of ecology. By this I do not mean to refer to the fact that they reflect a history of adaptation to environment; in a more immediate way they also reflect the external circumstances to which actors must accommodate themselves. The same group of people, with unchanged values and ideas, would surely pursue different patterns of life and institutionalize different forms of behaviour when faced with the different opportunities offered in different environments? Likewise, we must expect to find that one ethnic group, spread over a territory with varying ecologic circumstances, will exhibit regional diversities of overt institutionalized behaviour which do not reflect differences in cultural orientation" (Barth 1996: 75-77)

It is to be noted that while differentiating among the ethnic groups, only certain features which the actors feel important are taken into account and others ignored. Thus, cultural content cannot analyse ethnic categories. Barth says that the emphasis on ascription helps in understanding two things:

"(a) When defined as an ascriptive and exclusive group, the nature of continuity of ethnic units is clear: it depends on the maintenance of a boundary. The cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed, indeed, even the organizational form of the group may change—yet the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of continuity, and investigate the changing cultural form and content and (b) Socially relevant factors alone become diagnostic for membership, not the overt, 'objective' differences which are generated by other factors". (Barth 1998: 15)

Finally, emphasising the concept of social boundary in understanding the concept of ethnic groups, Barth further notes:

“The identification of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement. It thus entails the assumption that the two are fundamentally ‘playing the same game’, and this means that there is between them a potential for diversification and expansion of their social relationship to cover eventually all different sectors and domains of activity. On the other hand, a dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another ethnic group, implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgement of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest” (Barth 1998: 24).

He has also emphasised the fact that there could be a cultural assimilation and incorporation of other groups into an ethnic category. This is done through intermarriages and accepting the people of a different culture living in the same boundary. He says,

“Individuals and small groups, because of specific economic and political circumstances in their former position and among the assimilating group, may change their locality, their subsistence pattern, their political allegiance and form, or their household membership” (Barth 1998: 24)

Stating that the ethnic groups can change with time, Barth also gave political references of the ethnic boundaries—

“Political movements constitute new ways of making cultural differences organizationally relevant, and new ways of articulating the dichotomized ethnic groups. The proliferation of ethnically based pressure groups, political parties, and visions of independent statehood, as well as the multitude of sub-political advancement associations show the importance of these new forms” (Barth 1998: 35)

Thus, Barth is emphasising the fact of how this ethnic identity shows a feature of fluidity which highlights the fact of its political mobilisation. He says that in the process of political mobilisation, the direction of cultural changes also affects it, as political “confrontation can only be implemented by making the groups similar and thereby comparable, and this will have effect on every new sector of activity which is

made politically relevant". As the oppositions can also become structurally similar, this process helps in the reduction of cultural differences (Barth 1998: 35).

Thus, this is a clear departure from the concepts of the Primordialists whose idea of cultural connotation of identity that it cannot be changed, is contested with the flexible nature of the same. Barth also elucidates this ethnic aspect which can become a tool for the politicisation of ethnicity.

But, this idea of manipulation of ethnicity has also been criticised as in all situations it is difficult to manipulate the ethnic ties and also, the historical context has been ignored. But Barth's theory was said to be applicable to the Third World countries if done in a proper way, as it helps to understand the flexible nature of ethnic identity (Llobera 1999).

In a similar context, it is also imperative here to discuss the concept of ethnicity as pointed out by Abner Cohen. He states that contemporary ethnicity is an outcome of interaction among the ethnic groups which is intense and not because of the separation among the groups. Here, he mentions the power equations that were formed during the colonial period. After the states gained independence, a new equation of privilege and deprivation started. Often, the groups that were deprived or those aiming for power have mobilised the people referring to the cultural content and politicising it to have a share in power.

Next, he talks of the tribalism involved in the dynamic rearrangements of relations and customs which was not only an outcome of cultural continuity but also because there was a change in the functioning of customs. Cohen further mentions that ethnicity is a political phenomenon where the traditional customs have been mainly used as an expression for political alignment. Finally, he mentions that the ethnic groups are essentially informal and do not form a part of the official framework of the economic and political power of the state (Cohen 1996: 83-84).

Carter Bentley also states that

"The Instrumentalist models generally hold that changing political and economic contexts disrupt traditional material orders and create novel constellations of shared material interests. People with common interests coalesce into groups in pursuit of those interests"

The gap which the instrumentalists have left is “of how people recognise the commonalities (of interest or sentiment) underlying claims to common identity” (Bentley 1987: 25).

From the perception of the Instrumentalists, it is important to note that ethnicity has been delineated as a situational aspect and can become a tool for mobilisation.

In this context it is imperative to note Paul Brass, who, agreeing with De Vos, defines ethnicity as a “subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people ... of any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups”. He added the phrase “in order to create internal cohesion” (cited in Brass 1991: 19). Thus, cultural content becomes important for the membership of the group. But what must be pointed out here is that the ethnic groups claim a status of recognition either as superior or at least equal to other groups. Often the ethnic groups are also involved as interest groups in the political arena in order to uphold their status in the economic, social or educational sectors. These groups may have an important hold on the political system and also a monopoly on some territory within the country or may demand a state of their own. Thus, the groups aspire for a national status or a nation of their own. And if they achieve it within a state or in a state of its own, it becomes a nationality or nation. Thus, sometimes a “nation may be seen as a particular type of ethnic community or rather as an ethnic community politicised, with recognised group rights in the political system” (Brass 1991: 19). Therefore, nations can be formed on ethnic references. Further, he says that ethnicity can be politicised in the hands of the elites and become a way of elite competition in the hierarchy of power.

So, Brass says that ethnic communities are created and altered by the particular elites in the modernised or post-industrial revolution societies. This involves a competition for the economic, political and social status among the different ethnic categories led by the elites of the respective groups. Often a small group may get absorbed into a well-recognised group in order to gain status. Thus, Brass has mentioned that elite competitions can change the ethnic groups into categories, thereby making that identity flexible (Brass 1996: 89).

Therefore, emphasising on the situational context of ethnicity, he says that ethnicity is not given; instead, it is constructed with time. The elites take certain aspects of ethnicity to consolidate it into a group and finally bargain for the resources. He also

says that the ethnic groups which make demands for the alteration of their social status are often engaged in interest group politics. Further, the process of modernisation has actually enhanced the growth of some regions and benefitted some ethnic groups over others. This has actually heightened the competitive aspect among the groups which are deprived or that were once in an advantageous position (Brass 1996: 86).

Llobera has mentioned that rational choice theorists like Michael Banton and Michael Hechter have emphasised on individual preferences in choosing the ethnic affiliations. Thus, agreeing with this school, Llobera says that while choosing his/her ethnicity, the individual will behave in a way which will maximise the benefits (Llobera 1999).

Thus, the theory of rational choice also goes by this assumption that the human beings rationally choose their pursuit of interest and thus in the ethnic aspect too, they use ethnicity as a tool to bargain for resources and for getting political advantage (Kaufman 2006: 49).

It is worth mentioning here the conception of Michael Brown which distinguishes between ethnic categories and ethnocentric community. Brown feels that one of the major tasks of the nationalists is to turn ethnic categories into ethnic communities, and then to transform ethnic communities into ethnic nations. Therefore, it can be deduced that

“Ethnic identity is often both fluid and intermittent, and it is the manipulation and mobilisation of group identity against structure inequalities, induced discriminations or power politics. Henceforth it is one of many possible identities that could become the motivation for political action” (Brown 1993: 13)

From these theories it can be assumed that ethnicity has become a flexible concept and a tool for manipulation and mobilisation. An important aspect that should be mentioned here is that ethnicity has become one of the key ingredients of nationalism— especially, for the developing states whose boundaries were redrawn by the departing colonial powers. The demarcation of these political boundaries did not take the ethnic aspect into consideration. The ethnic groups were cut in between, leaving people of the same ethnic clans in two or more different countries. Because of

these issues, countries like Pakistan have lately been facing intermittent ethnic cleavages and conflicts of differing magnitudes.

Ethno-Nationalism

Ethnicity can be defined as one of the key ingredients of nationalism. In the context of nationalism, ethnicity becomes a prerequisite.

Walker Connor has dealt with the concept of ethno-nationalism in an apt manner. While defining 'nation', he has referred to the past. In the past, the nation was defined as a

“Community of people characterised by a common language, territory, religion and the like. Probing the nation would be far easier task if could be explained in terms of such tangible criteria”

He mentions the objective criteria for a nation when he says, “the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all non-members in a most vital way”. He says that though many writers deny the importance of kinship while describing national formation, he himself feels that the sense of a unique descent may not coincide with factual history but gives an essence of a common bond and a sense of felt history which binds the people together. He has called this bond as ‘non-rational’ which is away from the rational understanding of the concept of nationalism. Referring to Freud’s idea of a subconscious emotional wellspring, he says that “national bond is subconscious and emotional rather than conscious and rational in its inspiration. It can be analysed but not explained rationally” (Connor 1996: 70-71).

Connor further says that if modernisation lessened the allegiance to ethnic aspects, then the modern nations would not have faced ethnic conflicts—“ethnic consciousness is definitely in the ascendancy as a political force, and that state borders, as presently delimited, are being increasingly challenged by this trend” (Connor 1972: 327). Thus, he has referred to ethnicity as a factor while describing nation-building.

Daniele Conversi in his recent works has dealt with Connor's work on ethno-nationalism. He emphasises that Connor has used the term 'ethno-nationalism' to describe

“Both the loyalty to a nation deprived of its own state and the loyalty to an ethnic group embodied in a specific state, particularly where the latter is conceived as a 'nation-state'. In other words, ethno-nationalism is conceived in a very broad sense and may be used interchangeably with nationalism”

Thus, he has tried to comprehend the perspective of ethno-nationalism from the points raised by Connor. As ethnicity refers to having a common descent, which is basically based on a perception of commonality and common ancestry, he says that Connor is not referring here to tangible elements of culture; he has stressed on the subjective and psychological quality of perceptions and not on objective substances while referring to ethnicity. Conversi further says that “identity is not drawn from facts but from perceptions more than reality” (Conversi 2004: 2).

Connor had defined nation as “a self-differentiating ethnic group”. Conversi says that two important aspects can be seen from this point:

“First, it postulates a continuity between the ethnic and the national dimensions. Second, the emphasis on self awareness implies a stress on perception and, hence, on the psychological realm. Given this subjectivity, the nation is a self-defining category, that is, it is often not definable externally. In other words, it is the subjective experience of self-awareness that brings the nation into being. And given the connection between ethnicity and nationalism, it also follows that the most quintessentially modernist construction, the true nation-state, is au fond an ethnic state” (Conversi 2004: 3)

Citing Connor, Conversi says that while agreeing with Smith, he has further emphasised that nationalism is “ethnically predicated” and said that the

“Ethnos and nation are equivalents: the former derived from ancient Greek, the latter from Latin. It follows that the term ethnonationalism is largely tautological, since ethnicity permeates nationalism anyway” (Conversi 2004: 3)

Ethno-nationalism is defined by Norbu as “the politicised social consciousness centered upon an ethnic identity born out of shared commonalities, seeking to achieve unity, autonomy and group interest by mobilising ethnic-based constituencies” (Norbu 1992: 196).

Urmila Phadnis has mentioned that in an ethnic nation, there is the transformation of an ethnic group in a multi-ethnic society into an ethnic community and then into an ethnic nation (Phadnis 1990: 25).

While dealing with the concept of ethno-nationalism, it will be important to discuss Anthony Smith’s explanation regarding the formation of nations. He has mentioned that the formation of a nation starts with the ethnic ties and identities, which have been formed on a cultural basis. Common myths and memories also form the basis of nationalism. In other words, he sees a link between pre-modern ethnies and modern nations—both formed on the lines of a cultural basis (Smith 1996: 447).

While discussing nationalism and ethnicity, he has also said:

1. “most nations are modern, and so is nationalism as an ideology and movement,
2. ethnies have emerged in every era, and many have been durable;
3. Many nations are formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnies and the ethnic model of the nation remains extremely influential today;
4. Would-be nations that lack a dominant ethnic base often have great problems in forging national consciousness and cohesion.

In other words, the relationship between pre modern ethnic ties and modern nationalism is the key to a large segment of modern national and international politics” (Smith 1996: 447).

Thus while dealing with nationalism, ethnicity has been referred to by scholars like Walker Connor and A. D. Smith as an important ingredient in defining nationalism.

It will be apt to discuss here some of the modernist thinkers who have dealt with nationalism as a modern concept and where they have not counted the ethnic ties as one of the core ingredients of nationalism.

Coming to the concept of ethno-nationalism, a few questions become significant. How is this primitive ethnic identity linked to nationalism? Is there any linking thread between the modern nations and ethnic groups that bind the world together, especially in the developing states like Pakistan?

In the context of nationalism, ethnicity has become a prerequisite and one of the most important components of nationalism in the contemporary period. But the modernist perception, while describing the nation, has opined that it is a modern phenomenon and that the past is largely irrelevant. The nations of today's world are based on the expression of industrial societies where the ethnic aspect is not an essential component.

Scholars like Benedict Anderson talk of “imagined communities” of nationality based on “capitalism and print, the development of secular languages of state, and changing conceptions of time and space” (Anderson 1991: 11).

In forming such kind of nations, according to him, the idea of kinship loses relevance. His imagined community of nationality will thus prevail where the fellow members will be connected by the invisible bonds of nationhood. He says that the linking thread will be print-capitalism, which will bridge the gap between boundaries. Similarly, Gellner opines that nationalism—a modern concept—should be understood in “the light of industrialisation, competition of newly industrialised classes and about the integrating effects of language and education”. He emphasises the importance of cultural homogeneity which is required for the growth of the economy and which should be promoted by the state (Gellner 1983: 51).

Now the question which comes to the fore is whether these theories are applicable in the context of countries such as Pakistan or others in the South Asian subcontinent, where random boundaries were drawn by the departing colonial powers without taking the ethnic aspect into consideration.

Here it will be apt to quote the Pakistani scholar Hamza Alavi, who says that the national identity of Pakistan was not generated from below, but “is imposed from above by those at the heart of the power structure in the country, in reaction to powerful sub-national movements”. In most of the Western countries, national unification movements paved the way for the formation of nation-states and thus the people developed a sense of commonality among themselves, where they could keep aside their parochial ethnic identification and consolidate into a nation. But in countries such as Pakistan, attempts were made to convert the boundaries of state into those of a nation, and not the other way round (Alavi 1989: 1527).

The modern perception of ethno-nationalist leaders uses ethnicity to politicise and bargain for a better place in the power structure. Anthony D. Smith had re-examined how the globe is witnessing ethnic divisions and conflicts and why the nation-states are still facing the problem of ethnic conflict. In dealing with these questions, he emphasised the fact that the nations and ethnicity have a common reference to a cultural past. Thus, in the global era, there is a resurgence of this aspect. While on the one hand there is an assimilative culture where people are getting absorbed in one way of life, on the other there are reassertions of ethnic claims all over. He says that:

“In particular, we are witnessing a rebirth of ethnic nationalism, of religious fundamentalisms and of group antagonism which were thought to have been long buried. Ethnic protests for autonomy and secession, wars of national irredentism and explosive racial conflicts over labour markets and social facilities have proliferated in every continent. In the era of globalization and transcendence, we find ourselves caught in a maelstrom of conflicts over identities and ethnic fragmentation” (Smith 1995: 2)

He mentions that most of the states of the contemporary world are facing a resurgence of ethnic and national identities, which are becoming sensitive political issues. But he further emphasises that nations and nationalisms constituted the basic forces for both the modern and pre-modern eras. For some, this is part of a natural primordial order, as the member of a given nation may “forget” the nation and history of his/her own nation but that the nature “will reassert itself and the nation will be reborn” (Smith 1995: 5). Thus, the ethnic community and nation remain essentially as building blocks, though the form of both may undergo change. The ethnic and national ties will retain their importance, in spite of the social and political transformations (Smith 1995: 5).

Thus, from here ethno-nationalism can be counted as an important concept in defining nationalism in terms of ethnicity. It is imperative to note here that often in the post-colonial states, there is ethnic resurgence and emphasis is given to the aspect of ethno-nationalism. Often, the concept is politicised by the elites. Thus, both nationalism and ethnicity bear political significance in defining the matter.

Paul Brass says that nationalism is a political movement which requires a proper political organisation, able political leadership and resources for the support base. It must have the strength to compete with the other groups and must also be strong

enough to handle the government's efforts in suppressing the movement. In this process, the political group which can command some political resources can identify with the community. Again, as Brass points out, an effective ethno-national movement depends on how the identity of a group is shaped by the leaders and how effective the organisation is in pursuing the nationalistic goals. A dominant political organisation is necessary to further the goals of an organisation. Brass, while dealing with the political context of ethno-nationalism, says that when the movement transfers itself from community to nationality, it involves an inevitable struggle for power between the elites of the movement. In this respect, the ethno-national movement may take a different course if there is a "realignment of political and social forces" and organisations and also if the elites from dominant ethnic groups are ready to share power with aspirant ethnic group leaders (Brass 1991: 48-55).

The politicisation of ethnic groups which gives rise to nationalism is said to arise in response to an objective exploitation of the native group by an alien group. Thus, different explanations have been elaborated in explaining the growth of this kind of ethnic movements:

- a) The relative deprivation of one group may give a feeling that the balance between the goods and the conditions they are entitled to and what they are getting is not the same.
- b) The inequality among the groups can give rise to ethnic movements.
- c) Nationalism can arise when the new ethnic groups with new elites challenge the system of ethnic stratification or the distribution of economic and political resources.
- d) Nationalism can arise when there is sectoral division among the ethnic groups (Brass 1991: 41-45).

It is essential to point out in this context the difference between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The former belongs to the political sphere, whereas the latter is founded on a sociological basis and gets only a political colour in the process of the struggle. Another important distinction is that ethnic nationalism arises from below, unlike state nationalism which is imposed from the top. When the ethnic nationalism rises for political power, it confronts the state nationalism. Thus ethno-nationalism becomes a tool for achieving political power. Khan agreeing with "Smith says that

politics is about capturing and holding power in the state”, and ethno-nationalism is an instrument for doing so. Therefore, ethnicity often becomes a tool for politicisation, and ethnic-based political parties carry forward those movements (Khan 2005: 29).

Smith has also mentioned that political and economic calculations often lead the ethnies to move towards nationhood. Referring to the past, Smith emphasised that to mobilise people into citizens, a new attitude towards power was required. He mentions that it is no longer possible to preserve one’s culture without influencing the distribution of power and for making political claims. In modern times, every aspect of identity has its political claims. Thus, states which do not consist of a system of inclusion into the political culture face various struggles, conflicts and contradictions.

Thus, he says,

“Any ethnie then aspires to nationhood, must become politicised and stake out claims in the competitions for power and influence in the state arena. One can go further: even ethnies that have no intention of becoming nations, that regard themselves as ethnic ‘fragments’ in a wider ethnie the core of which lies elsewhere, even these must enter the political arena both for themselves and for the core to which they feel they are attached. By doing so they hope to influence the policy of the state in which their fragment is incorporated to pursue policies favourable to ethnic core” (Smith 1987:156)

Again, if an ethnie enters into the political arena, it is difficult for it to come out. This politicisation is applicable to the ethnie aspiring to form its own nation or wanting to remain in the larger state. This is because the groups that want their due share can gain it by politicising ethnicity and also if one ethnie is politicised, the others will follow the same line. Moreover, such pervasive influences of the interstate systems can raise the level of competition and conflict between rival ethnies within a state if they show a “vicarious nationalism for opposing ethnies outside since rival states in the system can play on the internal antagonism within other states by manipulating conflicts”. Thus, this kind of circumstances blocks the ethnie from going out of the political sphere and playing an important role in politics (Smith 1987: 157).

Therefore, the politicisation of ethnicity becomes mandatory for ethno-nationalism and to further the claim of the group.

The Politicisation of Ethnicity: Political Parties

From the above discussion the aspect what emerges is that ethnicity which is a fluid concept can be easily mobilised when in the hands of the elites. Thus in terms of nationalism also, a politicised ethnicity becomes an important force in mobilising the groups and in the demand for resources.

Nelson Kasfir says that when ethnic identity is believed to be “fluid and intermittent”, it can become a tool for political action, and the politicisation of identity becomes a natural process. In a political situation, sometimes, the social situations may compel one to choose either one aspect of identity or a combination of various others. This choice of identity can be constant or it may change according to the situation. “Indeed, even when an ethnic identity is preferred, an individual may, within limits, change from one ethnic category to another. This choice is a political resource over which individuals have varying degrees of control”. He says that political participation is based on ethnicity and often incorporates the idea of a common descent along with that of a common culture, language, territory, etc., which is an objective idea. Subjectively, the idea of politicisation can depend on both the reference to a common ancestry from the past or the manipulation of a recent phenomenon. Thus, whether the reference to a common descent is fact or fiction, becomes trivial in this case (Kasfir 1979: 365-366).

Kasfir further says, “If ethnic categories are understood to be subjective and changeable”, then certain political behaviour can be observed while dealing with ethnicity. First of all, if the relation between ethnicity and traditional culture is empirical and variable, then any political solution for the grievances regarding economic or other deprivation may not take the primordial references into consideration. Next, if an individual is identified as belonging to a category at a particular time, it does not mean that for political purposes he/she will associate with the same identity in another place and at another time. Further, if identities are fluid, then there is a possibility that the identity may shift from one ethnicity to another and from one identity to another. Again, assuming that identities are multiple and intermittent, it is the situation which makes the individual choose from among them. Thus, identities can be selected rationally by a calculation of the benefit of the individual or they may be conditioned by values (Kasfir 1979: 366).

Rothschild says that in the

“modern societies politicised ethnicity has become the crucial principle of political legitimisation and de-legitimisation of systems, states, regimes and governments. At the same time it has also become an effective instrument for pressing mundane interests in the society’s competition for power, status and wealth”

He further adds that the politicisation of ethnicity becomes a way of knowing the self and the group with which one associates. It also becomes a tool for demanding respect and power. He emphasises that basically,

“politicized ethnicity is—(i) to render people cognitively aware of the relevance of politics to the health of their ethnic cultural values and vice versa, (ii) to stimulate their concern about this nexus, (iii) to mobilize them into self-conscious ethnic groups, (iv) to direct their behaviour toward activity in the political arena on the basis of this awareness, concern, and group consciousness. Such politicization of ethnicity may ultimately enhance, retard or nullify the political integration of the state; it may legitimate or de-legitimate the state system” (Rothschild 1981: 6)

He emphasises on the fact that the instrument of ethnic mobilisation often becomes a tool for politicisation in the hands of the elites for bargaining for their position in the power structure.

With the rise of modernisation, a tilt towards politicised ethnicity has increased. Thus,

“Politicised ethnicity stresses ideologies, modifies and sometimes virtually re-creates the putatively distinctive and unique cultural heritages of the ethnic groups that it mobilises—precisely at the historical moment when these groups are being thoroughly penetrated by the universal culture of science and technology”

Thus, the politicisation of ethnicity basically preserves the basic ingredients of ethnicity and also sometimes modifies the group according to the necessity of the situation by transforming it into a political group with cosmo-political skills and resources (Rothschild 1981: 3).

Thus, this politicisation of ethnicity aims to gain respect and power through its efforts to “enhance, retard or nullify the political assimilation of states” and “may legitimise or de-legitimise their political systems” (Rothschild 1981: 4).

Rudolph says that the role of ethnicity in politics has become so important that it explains the conflict among the groups in a state and also its stability. The political importance of ethnicity is linked to an increased ethnic favouritism and also defines the low interethnic confrontation. So at the local level, a specific party gets created to forward the demand of certain ethnic groups and negotiate with the wider political forces. With this, the politicisation of ethnicity comes to dominate the scene. Ethno-politics also influences the emergence, direction and success of political activity. Ethnic politics is dependent on the circumstances for its rise and also on the leadership policy in carrying forward the movement (Rudolph 2006: 30).

Accordingly, the demands of the ethnic groups which are denied their due share are to be placed before the centre and the power structure is to be pressurised for the fulfilment of their rising aspirations and expectations. But the ethnic-based political parties which are expected to represent the demands of the ethnic groups and provide them with their due share in the political and socio-economic power structure of the state, often use the ethnic card to bargain for power with the centre, ignoring their main aim.

Ethnic Politics

The growth of ethnic politics with the revival of ethnic consciousness came as a surprise as it was thought to have been diluted because of the liberal democratic values and abandonment of atavistic rivalries and communal solidarity. According to Andrew Heywood,

“thus the rise of ethnic politics is linked to the capacity of ethnicity to generate a sense of ‘organic’ identity that is stronger than the civic loyalties and ties that have been typically associated with national consciousness ... The causes of political decentralisation and, in extreme cases, the phenomenon of state collapse have increasingly been fuelled by the emergence of a new style of politics: the politics of ethnic loyalty and regional identity. In some respects, the rise of ethnic politics in the latest century paralleled the emergence of nationalist politics in the nineteenth century, and may have similarly wide-ranging consequences. Whereas nationalism brought about a period of nation building and the destruction of multinational empires, ethnic politics may call the long term survival of the nation itself into question” (Heywood 2007: 180)

Here, the role of the elites and the leaders becomes important. They persuade the members of a certain ethnic group to voice their demands on the basis of their ethnic identity rather than focusing on any other identity. They are convinced that without claiming the resources on the basis of group solidarity, the existence of their values would be endangered and that their aspiration for a personal share of power also jeopardised. After mobilising the groups on ethnic lines, the leaders become assertive for various types of political demands. It is a possibility that a dominant group may mobilise politically to defend its dominance in the state system, or ask for autonomy from within it. Sometimes, when the dominant group sees that power is slipping away from its hands, it may also go in for secession (Rosthchild 1981: 28).

Further, the process of strengthening the ethnic unity may proceed with the making of more demands. The leaders of an ethnic group may voice for their autonomy in the territory inhabited by the ethnic group. They may also have a say in the education of the country as they want to teach their own history, language and culture. Thus the movement of an ethnic group can be taken forward if the leaders are able to get enough support from the masses, especially for making a demand for secession. At the same time, they may make efforts to build a “supportive constituency in one or more foreign countries” in the hope of getting support from the international community (Mehrotra 1998: 833).

Thus, ethnicity becomes a tool in the hands of the political powers which on the virtue of the insecurity of the people try to mould and organise the people to win the power struggle. In the case of a multicultural society like Pakistan, “the national as well as local political power structure often manifests the ethnic consciousness; sometimes this ethnic consciousness is even influenced by both political structures in reciprocal fashion” (Khan 2009:151). Thus, to win the struggle, ethnic political parties are formed.

Ethnic Parties

Maurice Duverger has mentioned that political parties are the main organisations that are involved in the political process of a country. Defining political parties, he says, “Political parties have as their primary goal the conquest of power or a share in its exercise. They try to win seats at elections to name deputies and ministers, and to take

control of the government". Thus, political parties draw their support from a broad base in the country and act within the framework of the society as a whole (Duverger 1972: 1).

Duverger has also pointed out that in the first half of the nineteenth century, what became important was the ideologies of the parties rather than who subscribed to them—"Ideologies, social foundations, structure, organisation, participation, strategy—all these aspects must be taken into account in making a complete analysis of the political party" (Duverger 1972: 1-3).

The elites mobilised the ethnic groups into political parties as that was a way to gain power, as it is the main way to coordinate between the government and the people. Thus, the first and most important work of the political party is to coordinate within the government, within the society and between the government and society. As Richard Kartz points out, coordination involves "maintaining discipline within the parliamentary caucus, coordinating action of parliamentary caucus in support of, or opposition to, the cabinet", organising political activities for citizens and building linkages between the representatives of public offices and citizens. Next, he mentions another important function of the party which is conducting the electoral campaign and structuring competitions. It provides the candidates to link with the symbols, histories of the ideology they represent and in developing policy programmes. It also selects the candidates for election and for office and introduces the citizens to the political system. Further, the most important role that it performs is the representation which the party provides to the individual who supports it and also bridges the gap between the party and the government (Kartz 2008: 299).

While discussing political parties it is important to mention here the concept of David Easton, who talks of an authoritative allocation of values. Analysing the system, he says that what keeps the system going is the input and the output where the system processes the input into output. It therefore gives a consequence for the environment and the system. Easton mentions that the support system is also very important as the government gets its support from the political parties and thus these parties can also help as a communicator between the government and the people and vice versa (Easton 1957: 384). Thus, parties become a legitimisation force for gaining support of

the government and also play an important part in the authoritative allocation of values.




Fig. 1.3 *Politics as the Authoritative Allocation of Values, David Easton (Modified)*
 Source: Frohock, F. M. (1978).

Thus, while dealing with ethnic parties, their organisational structure and references must be taken into consideration. It will also be imperative to note how the growth of ethnic parties has also become important.

Horowitz has mentioned that in ethnic politics, there is a strong reciprocal relationship between the party and society. The societies in which there is a moderate level of ethnic conflict and competition among the ethnic groups see the rise of ethnic parties which sometimes moderate and, at times, foster ethnic conflicts. Defining ethnic groups, he says,

“An ethnically based party derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group and serves the interests of that group. In practice, a party will serve the interests of the group comprising its overwhelming support or quickly forfeit that support, so the test of an ethnic party is simply the distribution of support”

In some countries where there was colonial rule, ethnic parties evolved before independence while in some others, they emerged after independence (Horowitz 1985: 291).

According to Kanchan Chandra,

“An ethnic party is a party that overtly represents itself as a champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and that makes such a representation central to its strategy of mobilising voters. The key distinguishing principles of this definition are those of ascription, exclusion, and centrality: The categories that such a party mobilises are defined according to ascriptive characteristics; the mobilisation of the ‘insider’ ethnic categories is always accompanied by the exclusion of ethnic ‘outsiders’ and, while the party may also highlight other issues, the championing of the cause of an ethnic category or categories is central to its mobilising efforts” (Chandra 2004: 3)

Horowitz has further mentioned that in the states of Asia and Africa where there are ethnic cleavages, there is a tendency for building party systems that aggravate the ethnic conflicts—

“By appealing to electorates in ethnic terms, by making ethnic demands on government, and by bolstering the influence of ethnically chauvinistic elements within each group, parties that begin by merely mirroring ethnic divisions help to deepen and extend them. Hence the oft-heard remark in such states that the politicians have created ethnic conflict” (Horowitz 1985: 291)

Here, it will be important to mention how the major ethnic political parties are becoming important in the politics of a country.

Horowitz says that where ethnic loyalties are strong, the parties tend to organise along ethnic lines. In an ethnically divided society, the social relations among ethnic groups are obstructed which also affects the organisational structure of politics. Common bonds may give rise to party allegiance. In electoral politics, voters often support those parties which are thought to be representing their claims, but sometimes, they may be used as components of action groups in the electoral politics. In the words of Horowitz,

“The minimal basis for ethnic party allegiance, is recognisable to some extent even in societies that are not deeply divided. In any society, members of various ethnic groups rarely distribute themselves randomly among competing

parties. Where conflict levels are high, however, ethnic parties reflect something more than mere affinity and a vague sense of common interest. That something is the mutual incompatibility of ethnic claims in power. Since the party aspires to control the state, and in conflict-prone polities ethnic groups also attempt to exclude others from state power, the emergence of ethnic parties is an integral part of this political struggle” (Horowitz 1985: 294)

Mentioning the reason for the growth of ethnic parties, Horowitz says that ethnic parties derive from the internal aspects of the group and externally from the context of relations with the other groups. It also depends on how the leaders have organised the party along the ethnic lines. This kind of attachment rarely changes and people can rely on this kind of party support (Horowitz 1985: 294-295). It should also be mentioned here that in a divided society, there is the possibility of an ethnic group of dividing support between two parties or supporting a non-ethnic party. An ethnic party always has a specific aim regarding the cause of the concerned ethnic group and its aims remain incompatible with those of the other groups. Horowitz has mentioned that the tendency to organise parties along ethnic lines is very common for the ethnically divided societies, mainly for those where few major ethnic groups meet at the national level of politics. If one party is organised along ethnic lines, the others may follow the same path. But in two important respects, this aspect can be judged: First, the

“Ethnic party systems can and do emerge contrary to the convictions of the principle party leaders. Party leaders may genuinely believe that ethnic divisions are not very important, that they only obscure the issues that ought to concern a nationalist party. A wholly ethnic party system may come into being despite such ideological convictions. Second, party leaders oriented toward the electoral process typically have a strong preferences for strategies calculated to produce electoral victory. To be sure, they may need to make compromises with their own beliefs or the beliefs of key supporters along the way” (Horowitz 1985: 306-307)

In case of the politicised ethnies, it is the political parties which play the main role of the communicator. As one of the important functions of political parties is the aggregation of interests, they serve in taking forward the interest of specific ethnies. The political parties ensure a

“Two-way communication process between the government and the people. It is mainly through the parties that the government is constantly kept informed about the general demands of society, about the interests and attitudes of the people in relation to the governing process.”

Similarly, it is through the parties that people get their political information. Thus political parties can be the bridge between the ruling elites and the demands of the ethnies (Heywood 2007: 275).

Hence, ethnic parties represents or aim to represent an ethnic group in a political system—be it a “sovereign state or a sub-national entity”. Ethnic identities basically act as a reference point for the mobilisation of group identities and compete effectively for their place in the hierarchy of power and for economic resources. Under the leadership of the power-hungry elites, the members of the ethnic group are instructed to form an organised political action-group in order to maximise their interests. Thus politicisation of ethnicity becomes a prerequisite for sharing power (Webera 2009:2-3).

But the problem with the ethnic parties as pointed by Chandra is that they “often fail to attract the support of their target ethnic categories across space and time, even when the ethnic identities they seek to mobilise are politically salient”. Ethnic parties can also lay the foundation of worsening the ethnic tensions by

“promoting party politics along cultural lines, which often leads to the exclusion of a cultural minority. As a consequence, such minorities may feel encouraged to resort to undemocratic or even violent means in order to counter dominance. Further, merely by promoting identity-based politics, ethnic parties can significantly raise the stakes of the political game, reinforcing group identities and thus raising the likelihood of conflict”

Therefore, ethnic politics enhances the chances of conflict, especially in the new democracies (Chandra 2002).

Ethnic parties can be seen as both representing the people of their respective groups and also becoming a tool for conflict among the ethnic groups. But, their importance in the multi-ethnic states cannot be ignored. With the rise of regional politics, an enhanced role is being played by the parties. Thus, a comprehensive study in this

direction enables one to understand the ethnic conditions and the position of the ethnic groups in the state.

The Role of Ethnicity in Post-Colonial States: The Case of South Asia

The ethnic aspect became one of the key ingredients of nationalism in the South Asian states whose borders were redrawn by the departing colonial powers without taking ethnicity into consideration. This left many ethnic groups divided along the borders between two countries. Some groups were made to reside as a minority in some country and others were divided even between the same kith and kin groups (Gurr 1994: 355). Thus, for these states, ethnicity became one of the key concepts defining nationalism in the postcolonial era. Pakistan is a potent example of this where there are various kinds of ethnic problems going on in the country.

Role of the State

While dealing with the ethnic competitions or ethnic politicisation, the role of the state becomes crucial. The struggles of the ethnic groups are either for the state or against it. The states are given the responsibility for the distribution of resources. When the ethnic groups feel they are being deprived of their due share, either they struggle to make the state more responsive or demand to create a separate state of their own (Khan 2005: 36).

The states moves with three forms of power—economic, ideological and political—that serve as a tool for the power of production, persuasion and persecution. While dealing with the relationship between the state and ethnicity, it is worth mentioning here the two approaches of nationalism. The subjective approach deals with the perception of the eternal reality of nationness and of nationalism being the reflection of that reality. The objective approach emphasises that nationness is a modern phenomenon created by nationalism. The nationalistic feelings derive either from the satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the state depending on how far it is able to distribute the resources rationally (Khan 2005: 36). It is because of this reason that countries like Pakistan are facing various ethnic crises.

It is also imperative to note that when a majority of the powerful groups capture state power, the insecurity of the minority or weaker groups becomes intense, and when this weaker section or minority asks for the fulfilment of its demands, the state generally responds in a harsher manner. These kinds of conflicts are evident in South Asia, where “the territorially concentrated groups have developed” an organisational “strength in political and military terms”. Many times, when the governments try to suppress the uprising of the minority groups, there is often coercion and conflicts between the groups and the state (Sahadevan 2002: 113). Likewise, the Punjabisation of the Pakistani politics and military gave an impetus to the other ethnic groups to rise against the state.

The states perform three basic functions of equitable distribution of resources, ensuring political order and the consolidation of separate cultural entities. But in the developing countries, the discrimination between communities isolates the minority or deprived ethnic groups. Therefore, the consolidation of identities remains unfinished. As a result, the cause of ethnic resurgence gets aggravated. The South Asian states which are made up of multi-ethnic societies are unable to avoid the unequal distribution of resources, against their duty to distribute them evenly. Thus, they are always in a system of flux (Upreti 2001: 16).

The grievances of some of the conflict groups in this region have also risen from the postcolonial process of national boundary formation. Also there is a fear of assimilation in the dominant ethnies, a sense of powerlessness, relative deprivation and marginalisation. Thus, in this case, the ethnic reference, being one of the key ingredients in politicisation, has been well used by the political elites for ethnic mobilisation. Thus, ethnicity becomes a manipulated mobilised group identity against structural inequality (Upreti 2001: 17).

Pakistan’s Ethnic Crisis: Reasons

Pakistan is confronting various kinds of ethnic conflicts and competition since its inception. The creation of the state of Pakistan on the basis of religious identity was a landmark event in the history of South Asian politics. But after the creation of the state, there was a different equation of privileges and deprivation among the people of the diverse linguistic and ethnic loyalties forming the new state of Pakistan. The

religious nationalism which was the reference point for forming the state outgrew its validity once the state was created. The political culture of the country started representing the hegemony of a minority group over the majority groups in various sectors. Thus, this started giving rise to a discontent among the various groups which felt deprived. It should be mentioned here that when the country was imagined, initially it was meant to be a federation where the constituent units would be autonomous and sovereign. But, the denial of provincial autonomy made those groups rise against the state as they felt that they were deprived of the socio-economic resources; there was also a monopolisation of power by one or two groups in the centre (Dixit 1999: 6). Because of this, specific ethnic groups started rising against the state and their demands were mobilised under specific regional or ethnic parties. Thus, various demands ranging from social, economic to political, were carried forward by the parties as an emblem of the ethnic groups.

Feroz Ahmed has pointed four reasons of ethnic discontent in the country of Pakistan:




Fig. 1.4 *Determinants of the Ethnic Divisions in Pakistan*

1. Sovereignty: Against the domination of the Punjabi ruling class of Pakistan, the elites of the dominated ethnic groups have raised their demands. The claim has been either for provincial rights, regional autonomy or self-determination—

“Demands for complete independence, confederation with only residual powers for the centre, greater autonomy within the federal structure, creation of new provinces for the groups not having their

own province, and altering the provincial boundaries to create ethnically more homogenous provinces have been voiced from time to time”.

2. Allocation of resources: This is considered by Ahmed as the most important arena of struggle between the centre and the ethnic groups. The share of resources ranges from socio-economic to political. The distribution of “financial resources for development and recurrent expenditures, share in government jobs” with an enhanced “quota system” and opportunities in higher education were among the demands made by the ethnic groups.
3. Inter-province migration: This is a great problem for the well-developed cities like Karachi. Inter-province migration is placing a demographic pressure on many areas and also on the distribution of resources. Thus, because of inter-province migration, there is an ethnic confrontation and conflict going on in the country.
4. Language and culture: The demands to protect the native languages and cultures of the ethnic groups against the domination of the Urdu language, which has given an upper hand to the Mohajirs over the other groups, had led to the rise of many ethnic groups protesting against the state. Thus, other groups have always posed demands to recognise their language and regional culture and on this basis, group identifications have developed in Pakistan (Ahmed 1996: 632-633).

Thus, these reasons were either taken together or selectively to mobilise the ethnic groups. The elites have carefully crafted these demands by mobilising the ethnic groups and have led the struggle by legitimising the demands within the political parties. Thus, these ethnic political parties have raised their voice for specific ethnic groups and demanded a place in the hierarchy of the political struggle.

Another important reason of internal colonialism that can be brought to the fore to understand the ethnic issues of Pakistan is that the dominant ethnic groups have always gotten an upper hand over the others. Thus, these groups have developed a sense of exploitation in their own land. The conception of Michael Hatcher can be brought here, who has described the context of nationalism with the help of the core-periphery model. He said that in modern states, there are two or more cultural groups;

the developed part is the modernised core group and the periphery is a distinctive cultural region on the margins. Though his study is based on the European states, a perspective of internal colonialism can be borrowed from his idea to delineate the ethnic aspects in Pakistan. He says that the national development process begins when the separate cultural identities are blurred and when all of them come together as a cultural assimilation, eroding the previous distinctions. Then he says that in this respect, the core and the peripheral cultures must merge into one comprehensive whole. While merging thus, the peripheral cultures might give rise to political movements in recognising their cultural references also (Hatcher 1975: 6).

But a rare happening of cultural fusion may occur and rather, it can be seen that the core might dominate the periphery politically and exploit it materially. This is because of the process of the uneven distribution of power and resources among the two groups. The core in this respect seeks to stabilise and also monopolise its advantage through the policies aiming at the institutionalisation of the stratified system. It has a greater say in monopolising the resources than the groups at the periphery. Thus, this aspect may give rise once again to a distinctive ethnic division. The pattern of the periphery is marked as a dependent feature, whereas the core is marked as the dominant group. In this situation, the periphery may rise to claim its own status (Hatcher 1975: 4-7).

Hatcher further mentions that in postcolonial societies, after the end of the colonial rule, the sentiment of anti-colonial nationalism dissolved and there was a quick competition for the power share in the administrative aspect. Most of the conflicts applied the reference of culture, language, religion, etc., and the competing elites used it in different degrees to monopolise the power system (Hatcher 1975: 11).

The Pakistani political conflict can be seen in reference to the internal colonial centre-periphery interpretation because of the domination of one province—Punjab—over the other groups (Wright 1991: 299). Even the aspect of giving Urdu the status of the national language was seen by many as part of the discriminatory politics of the country. Thus, this model of internal colonialism can be marked as one factor for the rise of ethnic competition and conflict within the states.

The Pakhtuns and Mohajirs

Pakistan was originally composed of five major ethno-linguistic groups: Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluch, Pakhtuns and Bengalis. The predominately Urdu-speaking migrants who came from India formed the sixth important group in Pakistan. The Mohajirs had undertaken much hardship while migrating to the state of Pakistan. But, they willingly joined the state as they assumed that this new state will be based on religious nationalism and a common faith will bind the country together in spite of having major ethno-linguistic differences. The Mohajirs came and settled in the Karachi area and were part of the Pakistani elite till the introduction of the quota system in the 1970s. Before this, they had accounted for a mere 3 per cent of the population but were holding 21 per cent of the government jobs. They were also prominent in the army and in business. So, initially the Mohajirs were against a parochial ethnic identity; they rather supported a Muslim and Pakistani identity and were supporters of the Muslim League and the Jamat-i-Islami (Waseem 1996: 621-622).

But, the picture changed drastically the moment their share in the state power was pulled down. The introduction of the quota system that facilitated the Sindhis in the civil services and other representative bodies, gave a blow to the Mohajir middle and lower middle class people. They found a gap between what they had and what they should have gotten. This led to the formation of the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) in 1978. Along with the other ethnic student groups, this group started voicing its ethnic identity. It claimed for resources on the basis of this ethnic identity and thus politicised those claims by forming a political party called the Mohajir Quami Movement (later known as the Muttahida Quami Movement) in 1984. The MQM was called as the party of the poor because of its non-elite membership and character. This group was said to be against feudalism and to work genuinely for the poor and deprived people and bargain for the Mohajirs to give them their due share (Haq 1995: 991). Thus, the Mohajirs though being once a privileged group, marked themselves as an ethnic group in Pakistan.

On the other hand with the creation of Pakistan, the Pakhtuns who constitute another important ethnic group in Pakistan, started voicing their own ethnicity and nationalism. The Pakhtuns were not in favour in joining the state. This group had a strong cultural history and the British rule could hardly change the ethnic aspect of the

group. The centralised state system which denied provincial autonomy led the Pakhtuns to politicise their identity forming a political group called the National Awami Party (NAP). The NAP was a liberal pro-Pakhtun group, which claimed for regional autonomy and an increased cultural expression. Over time, the NAP dissolved and formed the Awami National Party (ANP) which is a more pro-Pakhtun party, to cope with the new challenges (Ghufran 2009: 109).

Thus, both the Pakhtun and Mohajir nationalisms have their own distinctive characters. The main point of diversification between these two nationalisms lies in the fact that the Pakhtun nationalism was an outcome of the severe deprivation of the Pakhtuns in their own land, whereas Mohajir nationalism is an example of the nationalism of the migrants who started to protest and claim for their identity after a fall from their privileged position in the hierarchy of power. Thus, Mohajir nationalism “represents a paradox in the context of ethnic conflict”. Unlike the Pakhtun nationalist movement which has a respective geographical unit and a well-defined ethnic history, the Mohajir ethnicity is called as “still passing through its birth pangs”; it is basically “ethnicity-in-making” (Waseem 1996: 681).

Their respective political parties also show a departure from similar trends. The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) is a product of the middle and lower middle class urban Mohajirs who view themselves as dispossessed. On other hand, the Awami National Party (ANP) is basically led by the elite members of the Pakhtun community. The organisation of MQM and the tactics used by them are also in sharp contrast to those of the ANP. The MQM has introduced “violent, populist and semi-fascist politics” to the urban centres of Sindh. This is “directly linked to its class composition—predominantly young, urban middle and lower middle class students and professionals”, which differs largely from the politics advocated by the ANP (Khan 2005: 163).

The ideological differences are also potent. The ANP’s political position is considered to be a leftist, which advocates for “socialism, public sector government, and economic egalitarianism” and follows the idea of democratic socialism (ANP Manifesto). On the contrary, the MQM maintains a liberal and progressive stance on many political and social issues and follows social liberalism. But the line where these

two parties converge is that presently, they both aim to address the demands of the other ethnic groups and the issues of vital importance.

Thus, in this background, there is an urgent need to examine the politics of these two ethnic nationalisms, which are posing a security threat to Pakistan. This particular area has been selected for research mainly to investigate the diversified ethnic problems in Pakistan and the role of the political parties. The research will also take note of the differences in the organisational and functional structure of the two parties—ANP and MQM—which were coalition partners in the centre alongside the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) till 2012. It will also deal with the strategies employed by the ANP and the MQM to bargain for their ethnic groups with the centre. Along with that, it will also take into consideration their role in handling the problem of violence and their work for the well-being of the people.

Therefore, the importance of this study is to know the factors and causes leading to the problem of ethnic crisis in the region and also the role of the political parties in this context with a special reference to the Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement. At the same time, it is important to justify through the study, the two hypotheses before coming to a conclusion.

They are:

- Pakhtun and Mohajir ethno-nationalism as manifested in Pakistan can be explained more in terms of Instrumentalism rather than Primordialism.
- The Awami National Party and the Muttahida Quami Movement are using their respective ethno-nationalisms more as a bargaining tool with the centre rather than following the party ideology to remain in power.

The above-mentioned discussion has given an idea of the conceptual background of ethno-nationalism and the role of the political parties, which will help to enlighten the facts, problems and prospects of the areas of Pakhtun and Mohajir nationalisms and about the politicisation of ethnicity. The subsequent chapters will deal with all these issues.

Chapter II

Pakhtun Nationalism in Pakistan and the Awami National Party

The ethnically plural societies of the modern world which got fragmented along the line of culture, language, race, religion etc has brought a new kind of politics to the states. Ethnic aspirations defined in terms of its politicisation gave rise to mobilisation of people under one broad head of ethnic category. From there the categorisations were converted to political parties which marked itself the emblem of representation and political mobilisation of the ethnic groups.

Pakistan is not an exception in this regard. Being a state of ethnic diversity Pakistan has witnessed a number of nationalistic and ethnic movements translated into its politicisation. With the creation of the country, Pakistan started fighting with various problems of intricate nature. Among them ethnic demands became one of the delicate issues faced by the new state. The main challenge was to create a consolidated identity in the ethnically diverse nation of Pakistan (Majeed 2012: 54).

The issue of ideology interpreted in terms of religious nationalism was unable to surpass the problem of ethnic diversity in Pakistan. Thus the problem of ethno-nationalism and its politicisation became hindering force in translating the Pakistani state into a coherent nation (Malik 1997:168).

Iftikar Malik mentions:

“When ethnic heterogeneity and cultural pluralism started posing threats to the whole country then rhetorical emphasis was placed on religious commonality under the constant supervision of bureaucratic-military establishment.” (Malik 1997: 168)

This is mainly because initially it was the tendency of the centre to dismiss the ethnic heterogeneity and demands like “provincial autonomy, devolution of power, decentralisation and equitable policies that govern relations with the centre” and impose a centralised rule on them.

Stephen Cohen has pointed out that Pakistan is one of the linguistically complex states of the world and each of its provinces consists of different ethno linguistic groups. These groups' identity is marked by:

“cultural marks, often claiming they are a ‘people’ or a ‘nation’. Some seek independence and want to form an ethnically or linguistically homogeneous state; some seek greater autonomy within a state or province, and others move back and forth between these two goals or remain ambiguous” (Cohen 2004: 201)

This perspective got strengthened when ethnicity was categorised as groups and in the context of their competition, their politicisation got legitimised (Behuria 2005: 62).

Pakistan has faced the ethnic resurgences from time to time because of the mobilisation of the resources of two ethnic groups - the Punjabis and Mohajirs who have dominated the state establishments. Thus the non-Punjabi ethnic groups and indigenous people of the other provinces have avowed for the equal distribution of resources which they were deprived of by the state. Another important aspect that should be brought in this context is that the centralised authoritarian military rule had served to “reinforce the control of the dominant ethnic group” which had enhanced the ethnic tensions in the country. Even with the coming of the democratic governments the ethnic conflicts didn't stop. It is worth mentioning here that while the indigenous people of the land i.e. the Baluch, Sindhis and Pakhtuns comprise less than 30 % of the population, but territorially they occupy 72 % of Pakistan's territory. But the centralised state structure and their controlling of resources gave the other ethnic groups a sense of alienation in their own lands and they felt that they have been internally colonised by the Punjabi-Mohajir domination (Harrison 1988: 267-270).

Thus the Pakhtuns, who are one of the dominant ethnic groups in Pakistan, is posing one of the greatest challenges in terms of their ethno-nationalistic movements translated into politicisation. The Pakhtun nationalistic movement was well active before and after the creation of Pakistan, and then faded away for some twenty years but is now experiencing resurgence in terms of its politicisations and other demands (Cohen 2004: 201).

As Adeel Khan has mentioned that historically,

“The rise of the Pakhtun nationalism can be explained as a result of the centralised bureaucratic state system’s effort to replace the decentralised agro-illiterate semi tribal system of control”(Khan 2005: 91)

The beginning of the nationalist movement of the Pakhtuns can be traced with the rise of the small khans against the big khans who were controlling the feudal structure. The colonial masters who tried to expand its control with the help of the big khans by controlling their mode of production also faced with the same kind of resistance from the Pakhtun people.¹ The protest against the colonial rule and exploitation of the feudal lords brought discontent against the colonial masters and big khans. This is because of the independence the group have enjoyed in their land with a well developed idea of self rule. After independence the centralised structure also hardly gave any opportunity for the Pakhtuns to have autonomy to govern themselves (Khan 2005: 91).

Thus to fulfill the basic aspiration and to voice for their due share, the Pakhtuns started leaning towards ethnic-based parties in the absence of any mass-based party. They also started extending support to the ethno-political leaders who formed the ethno-political organisations in the hope that the demands posed by them will be fulfilled. Thus the relationship between ethnicity and political system became more important in Pakistan because ethnicity is “essentially a continuous, dynamic process that occurs between two or more ethnic populations and influences social life of humans” (Khan 2009: 149).

Pakhtuns are said to have a “more developed political and ethnic consciousness compared to other ethnic groups in Pakistan” because of its role in the freedom movement and its glorious historic past (Khan 2003: 69).

Pakhtun nationalism and its movement either for secession or for autonomy was considered as the most serious threat to the state of Pakistan after its creation and till 1970s the Pakhtuns were not accommodated in the Pakistani politics and their

¹ The new market economy which was introduced by the British in the province of Northwest Frontier, gave rise to small propertied class called the small khans. This class of small khans or small propertied people wanted political reforms in the province which would enfranchise them by giving more say or representation in governance (Bashir 1984: 59).

demands were mainly unheard. But during the last three decades of the 20th century Pakhtun politics had undergone various changes. Presently, Pakhtuns, occupy important positions in the hierarchy of power of the state, who were once against the creation of the state and voiced for secession (Khan 2003: 68).

The Pakhtun politics came by holding the hands of Khudai Khidmatgars and made its struggle felt with National Awami Party and finally established itself with the coming of the specifically Pakhtun-based Awami National Party.

This chapter provides a short survey of the origin and growth of Pakhtun nationalism in Pakistan especially in the area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,² followed by the trends of this nationalism and the factors influencing its growth. It will also try to analyse politicisation of ethnicity of the Pakhtuns and the birth of Awami National Party.

Who are the Pakhtuns: History and Origin

While tracing the history of the Pakhtun people it is seen that the Pakhtuns are strongly ethnocentric people who have an immense pride in their Pakhtunhood from the very beginning. Erland Jasson says that

“The very name Pakhtun spells honour and glory, wrote the warrior poet Khushal Khan Khattak in the 17th century and the Pakhtuns one meets today say much the same. There are a number of sources stating the different origins but as a whole they tend to show a corresponding degree of contempt for non-Pakhtuns”(Jasson 1981: 33)

Amin Saikal says that the Greek historian Herodotus (484–425 BC) traces Pakhtuns’ existence as far back as 2,500 years ago. The subsequent historians have also established this fact of their existence like the British writer and traveller Henry Walter Bellew (1834–1892), who have researched widely on various Pakhtun tribes (Saikal 2010: 6).

The Pakhtuns’ home territory has historically covered today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan. The land stretched from the Indus River running from Kashmir all the way through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, to the Hindu Kush ranges that divides

² Pakhtunkhwa means near the Pakhtuns.

Afghanistan into north and south. In the past this area was identified as “Pakhtunkhwa” or “Pashtun Quarter” (Saikal 2010: 6).

According to Olaf Caroe, who calls the Pakhtuns as Pathan, the country of the Pathans is quite difficult to describe. He says the land can be seen or described as “fortification running parallel into two belts, first a moat and then a rampant, along the line of the Indus which here runs almost north to south, with a slight bend towards the west. Towards the south the rampant stands back much further from the river. Behind the rampant begins the great Iranian plateau which except through the Sulaiman mountains, has no drainage to the sea.” He further says that the first belt is made of plains and valleys along the river and the second one is the area of the Sulaiman Mountain running southwards from its apex in the mighty ranges of the Hindukush. Among the plain lands is Peshawar, Kohat, Banu–Marwat and the Derajat. The Sulaiman chain runs north-east and south-west and opens to the eastern part of the world which is the Iranian world. This he calls Pakhtunkhwa the land of the Pakhtuns (Caroe 1958: 1533). In addition he further states that,

“Afghans and Pathans dwell in a territory intersected by an international frontier, the Durand Line, drawn in 1893. In Afghanistan they occupy a sparsely populated larger area, but in Pakistan they are much densely populated in the plains. Before 1747, when the great Ahmad Shah Abdali founded it, there was no such country as Afghanistan; the territories inhabited by people of Afghan stock were divided between the Persian and the Mughal Empires.” (Caroe 1958: 920)

Today Pakhtuns of both sides of Durand Line share common cultural identity which Harrison says “dates back at least to the Pakti kingdom mentioned in the writings of Herodotus and possibly earlier” (Harrison 2008: 3).

The area that comes under the present Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is the homeland of the Pakhtuns in present day Pakistan, at various points of history, was under the suzerainty of different kingdoms. The importance of the place lies in its location which is on the “fringes of the great Empires founded by the Iranians, Indians and Central Asians.” Historically, the regions which comprise the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and Punjab in present Pakistan were under the suzerainty of Afghanistan under the ruling dynasty of Kabul. The western part of Afghanistan has a Persian influence as the language and culture bears the traces, while in the east,

i.e. the area which covers present Pakistan had close contacts with the Mughal Empire of India. (Pattanaik 1998: 764)

In a recent study, the DNA of majority of people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA matched with the inhabitants of Central & South Asia and Eastern European people but the DNA of the people of Peshawar was found similar to the residents of Kandahar and North Afghanistan (*Dawn*, 15 February 2012).³

Siddique gives a well-articulated picture about the Pakhtuns. He said Pakhtuns have related names like ‘Afghan’, ‘Pashtun’ which is referred to the residents of Afghanistan. Many residents of the North West Pakistan still refer themselves as Afghans. The term Pathan was said to be used by the British colonial masters. The locals use the word Pakhtun (in Pakistan). Many Pakhtun leaders see the Pakhtuns as most maligned in the twenty first century. This is because the new kind of politics which is going on in both sides of the Durand line after the rise of the religious extremism.

Abubakar Siddiqi further mentions that because of the lack of census data, it is estimated (as of 2014) as many as fifty million –Pakhtuns live in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While they nearly cover half of Afghanistan’s population, in Pakistan they are the largest minority making fifteen to twenty percent of the population of Pakistan. He has marked the original Pakhtun homeland situated between Hindukush mountains in central Afghanistan and the Indus river that cuts across Pakistan , but Pakhtuns are said to be spread over a vast territory now a days. In Afghanistan the Pakhtuns extends to Amu Darya which border with Central Asia, where Pakhtuns have grown with time. In Pakistan, presently Karachi has become the home to many urban Pakhtun population. Though the Pakhtuns has seen many conflicts and contradictions together but they were grouped together or integrated in to a single empire, state or political system (Siddiqi 2014: 11-12). Thus the politics of the group has shaped accordingly.

³This has been stated by Professor Mohammad Naeem of the department of Computer Science while speaking on a seminar titled “Pakhtun Ethnogenesis in light of DNA study”, in Area Study Centre of the University of Peshawar. Professor Naeem said in 2011, a DNA test of 270 persons of KP Pakhtunkhwa and FATA was conducted (*Dawn* 15 February 2012).

In “The Pathans”, written by British Governor Olaf Caroe, has given the picture of the strengths of the Pakhtuns (he refers as Pathans). He remarks:

“The force of Pathan character, the bravery of the Pathan soldier, the shrewdness of Pathan assessments of political realism, once carried the forefathers of this people to high positions of authority outside their own country. So it will be again and the more easily in the light of the renaissance in the home-land, to which in their hearts they return, however far away. They need have no fear that they cannot pull their weight in the larger organism; they are like the Scots in Great Britain. Like other highland men, the Pathans of Pakistan will be found before long to be largely in control of the fortunes of their country” (Caroe 1958: 437).

Thus he believed that the Pakhtuns would be the ruler of the land of Pakistan with their skills, strength and understanding of the political realism. Thus he gave a perception that their Pakhtun identity can hardly be dominated or subsided.

Before going in to the nationalism of the Pakhtuns it is important to take note of conducts of the Pakhtuns which is called the Pakhtunwali — a cultural code of ethics and behaviour of Pakhtuns. This code shows a democratic structure of the society along with certain traditions which served in the backdrop of growth of nationalism of the Pakhtuns against any kind of domination.

Pakhtunwali is a code of conduct or ethics of the Pakhtuns which they follow in their lives. This code dates back to pre Islamic era. First is Melmastia or (hospitality) which means the Pakhtuns believe in the protection of the guests and provide hospitality to them. Thus a Pakhtun will not allow anybody to harm his guest in the company of the host.

“Badal (revenge) means to seek justice or take revenge against the wrongdoer. There is no time limit as to when the injustice can be avenged. If badal is not exercised, the offended man or his family will be considered stripped of honour. However, this practice sometime leads to generations of blood feud. Nanawatai (sanctuary) means a person who seeks refuge in the house of another. The host Pakhtun is honour-bound to offer that protection, even at the cost of his own family” (Mehsud, *Dawn*, 6 December 2015).

Apart from that *Jargah or Jirga*—is a council of Pakhtun elders through which justice is given. The Jirga settles disputes through negotiations where people can speak for

their rights. And *Namoos* which means respect of women, country, and property is another important duty of the Pakhtuns (Mehsud, *Dawn*, 6 December 2015).

For Pakhtuns, Harling citing Palwasha Kakar says that, Pakhtunwali is “so essential to the identity of the Pakhtun that there is no distinction between practicing Pakhtunwali and being a Pakhtun”. He further mentions that the Pakhtuns also believe that Pakhtunwali is there from before the existence of Islam. In terms of religious identity Pakhtuns are Muslims who follow Sunni Islam according to the Hanafi School of law which is said to be a liberal school of law among the others. This school believes in decentralisation of power of state and resist centralised system. Further customary law of Hanafi school and Pakhtunwali coexist for jurisprudence, but if there is a conflict between the two the Pakhtunwali presides. In this system the religious clerics or Mullahs play a subordinate role to the tribal leaders and when they have tried to degrade Pakhtunwali by religious fanaticism they were stopped by the tribal chiefs (Haring 2010:2).

Thus from here it becomes clear that the ethnic identity plays more important role in shaping the identity of the Pakhtuns who have a tribal democratic culture where religious fanaticism becomes an irrelevant force. Harrison (2008) has also noted that the Pakhtun culture is an egalitarian one where it has been epitomised by the role of the jirgah (assembly). The tribal chief who is the most powerful man also shares power with the mullah (Harison 2008:3).

To have an understanding of the Pakhtun nationalism it is imperative to note about the division in the Pakhtun society which will give a clear picture how the politicisation was shaped in the society. As Amin Saikal states that the Pakhtuns have

“constantly suffered not only from internal divisions, but also from foreign subjugation, which has instilled among them an acute perception of deprivation and victimisation. All this has come to lay the necessary historical foundations for a distinct Pakhtun identity and codes of behaviour, and therefore, for the growth of what can be termed as Pakhtun nationalism in pursuit of self-rule and independence”(Saikal 2010:6)

He further says that often the Pakhtuns have been fragmented into various social segments, and at times they have been involved in conflicts with each other. They have often been subjugated by the outside forces as there were periodic interventions because of the geopolitical importance of the places they inhabit. But time to time

there has been attempts made by the leaders to unite them to work towards the independence of this group. Though sometime the effort was ineffective but there have been periods during which the Pakhtuns have shown nationalist solidarity, to rise against the military offenses and territorial conquests, or if threatened by an outside force (Saikal 2010:6).




Chart 2.1 *Population of Pakistan according to Mother Tongue 1998.*

Source: Based on data Pakistan Bureau of Statistics “Population by Mother Tongue, 1998 census”

Presently the Pakhtuns in Pakistan are a little more than 15% of the population. But they are divided in the urban and rural setup. The society is in the way of transition, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where the tribal setup has almost diminished but FATA is still dominated by the Pakhtun tribes. The nationalism and the nationalist politics of this group have developed along this line.




Chart 2.2 *Pakhtun speaking population.*

Source: Based on data Pakistan Bureau of Statistics “Population by Mother Tongue, 1998 census”

The graph shows Pakhtun population in present day Pakistan along with the rural and urban divide.

The Beginning of Politicisation of Ethnicity among the Pakhtun people of Pakistan

The Pakhtun nationalism of Pakistan lays its roots long before the independence of 1947 and has a history of an active ethno-nationalist movement especially in the North West Frontier Province (Ghufran 2009: 1095). The study will mainly focus on this area to comprehend the historical roots of Awami National Party. The nationalism of the Pakhtuns developed in the settled areas of Pakistan with the Khudai Khidmatgars before independence, then translating itself to National Awami party and finally to Awami National Party.

As Adeel Khan points out, what is known of Pakhtun history indicates that the structure of Pakhtun society was mainly tribal with little settled lands initially. Most of the lands which comprised Pakhtun territory were made of dry mountainous

regions, except the Peshawar valley which is fertile. Thus, agriculture was very difficult to achieve in this kind of terrain, and therefore their survival was mainly dependent on warfare and adventures. This is why Adeel Khan have said that,

“The Mughal king Babur described the Pakhtuns as people given to plundering, and it is believed that their political influence grew with a sudden increase in their numbers as well as their role as mercenaries in the Persian and Mughal armies”(Khan 2003: 69).

But with the coming of the British there were various changes noticed in the Pakhtun society. These changes led to the growth of ethnic consciousness of the people which translated into nationalism of the Pakhtuns. After the coming of the British, the Sikhs who captured the Pakhtun dominated area of southern part of Afghanistan and made it a part of Punjab was cut short by the colonial rule. The British penetrated into the area after conquering it and had an administrative setup to make the region a buffer zone between the British India and Russia. British controlled the area with the help of local khans, pirs and mullahs. Adeel Khan says the main reason for this was that this area was not that productive for the British except for the strategic location at the same time the colonial administration were constantly threatened by the Pakhtuns. The province was given the name North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1901 and was separated from Punjab. But it should be pointed out here that the tribal zones of the area were separated from “six settled districts” of Peshawar, Mardan, Bannu, Kohat, Hazara and Der Ismael Khan and the tribal zone was given the status of special administrative zones. Thus the NWFP had two kinds of boundaries one was dividing the British India from Afghanistan and the divided the tribal zone from the settled area of the province (Khan 2005:85).

Olaf Caroe in his book ‘The Pathans’ has mentioned that a British officer called Roos-Keppel (R-K) was so impressed by the Pathans that after the Montague Chemsford reform, understanding the tribal setup of the Pakhtuns, he said Pathans were not ready for the change or adopt responsible government.

“No franchise for Pathans, no elections, no legislature, no ministry not even elections to local bodies, for the Ripon reforms of the eighties had not been forced on the frontier. R-K thought the whole system so much flummery; if challenged, his answer would have been the Pathans had their own methods of democracy, much more to their taste” (Caroe1958: 425).

Thus the officer did not allow change but it can be anticipated that the Pathans had a strong democratic structure in the society and they had a strong sense of independence. This can also mean that as the new democratic structure was unfit for the tribal society they preferred not extending it to the area. This was seen by many as a discriminatory politics by the British.

Singer says that, while the rest of British India had been given a reformed local administration and greater local autonomy in 1919,

“The North West Frontier district was deemed too sensitive to be given the same status and was thought unable to cope with such change. It was therefore not made a province with its own Governor, nor did it have the other trappings of regional democracy that were being implemented elsewhere. This provoked many Pakhtun Khans and intellectuals into active opposition to British rule and led to a curious alliance between anti-British Muslims and Hindu developers” (Singer 1984: 193-194)

Adeel Khan has also mentioned that the British called the area and the people as - “a wild land of unruly independent people” who “could neither be conquered nor tamed”. He mentioned that the colonial power also said that the Pakhtuns were ready to die for their code of conduct Pakhtunwali and they denied any kind of subjugation to the alien power. But Khan calls this as stereotyping the Pathans by the colonial masters (Khan 2005: 85-86).

It is imperative to note as Adeel Khan points out that the colonial authorities were so apprehensive about the Pakhtuns and the area that none of the 1909 or 1920 reform were introduced in the province and those who even talked for the introduction of the reform were punished (Khan 2005: 86).

Therefore the consciousness of the Pakhtuns which was already there in the subtle manner developed to a greater extent because of the considerable political development in the country. This helped them to have a sense of “apprehension against their dispossession of the resources” and also their rights which they felt they were entitled to get. This position was further strengthened by certain string of events in the neighbourhood which gave the impetus to rise in a nationalist struggle among the Pakhtuns (Sayeed 1980: 121).

After the World War I three issues can be called as initial eye opener for the Pakhtuns which acted as a force behind the nationalistic cognisance of the group. The first was the Rowlatt Act which restricted freedom in all parts of India by extending emergency measures and the frontier also rose in struggle along with the other parts of the country. The third Afghan war was the second which led the sympathetic Pakhtuns of the Indian side to give support to their kinsman on the other side of the border. The Khilafat movement can be cited as the third incident which wielded wide response and gave the motivation to rise for their rights. Several Khilafat committees were formed in the province as a symbol of Khilafat agitation which was for the Khilafat of the Muslim world. The Government of India while investigating the cause of unrest in the province found that the “aspiration for reform was awakened into full consciousness.” Therefore they recommended that the Act of 1919 (Montague and Chelmsford reform) should be extended to the province but nothing came out of it (Jasson 1981: 47).

To strike against the discrimination the Pakhtuns first established themselves in the nationalist movements in 1907 where Ram Chandra Bharadwaj organised a Party called the Provincial Congress but it was suppressed. Another organisation worth mentioning is the Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afghania or Society of the Reform of Afghans which helped in the growth of Pakhtun consciousness (Rittenberg 1977: 67).

But it was in 1931 that the movement or political national consciousness of the Pakhtuns came into being with the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He started the Khudai Khidmatgar (KKM – Servants of God) which was a social reformist and political resistance movement, in 1929. The majority of his followers were peasants and the poor, who felt exploited by the feudal landlords and the imperial revenue system. Ghaffar Khan believed in Pakhtunwali (a cultural code of ethics and behaviour of Pakhtuns) but wanted to reorganise the society of the Pakhtuns politically based on the modern democratic principles. Along with political reformation the social reformation was also important for the KKM. They wanted to restructure the society by restricting certain traditions like “Badal” (the common practice of revenge for settling scores) through education and social justice which would help in the progress of this community.

“Freedom of the individual was an integral part of the code but living a colonised life, according to Ghaffar Khan, was in contradiction to it. Thus the

KKM tried to awaken the political consciousness of the Pakhtuns against the British colonial rule, but strictly following the principles of non-violence” (Ghufran 2009: 1095-1096)

The unique thing about Khudai Khidmatgars was among the various Muslim movements its ideology and its style of practicing was very different. KKM focused on

“individual voluntary self-reformation; a lifelong commitment to serving humanity; rejection of violence, discrimination, sectarianism or polemical factionalism; protection of non-Muslim minority rights; non-communalism and egalitarian political philosophy; and the championing of women’s and children’s rights ” (Khan 1999: 22).

Talking about this political party, Olaf Caroe said:

“British immobility in conceding a measure of responsible government to the frontiers released other forces. There arose a new political party in the villages, a party which in the absence of ballot box or any form of expression by parliamentary means, was necessarily conceived first as a pressure group and subsequently as a mass movement for agitation against established order ”(Caroe 1965: 431)

Another party that can be mentioned here is the organisation of ‘Zalme Pakhtuns’ headed by Ghani Khan. This organisation was not strictly non violent in character, and was said to be an offshoot of KKM. It was exclusively for Pakhtun liberation, but it was unable to prove itself and faded away with time (Jasson 1981: 206).

KKM’s importance lies in the fact that keeping the tradition intact, they wanted to reform the society which would benefit the Pakhtuns. They boycotted the British institutions of law and order and wanted to replace them with Pakhtun institution of ‘jirga’ for the settling of civil-criminal cases. Ghaffar Khan was interested in educating the people, eradicating poverty and eliminating all sorts of oppression on the Pakhtuns. He also mentioned that the divided Pakhtuns should come together otherwise they would be exploited by the British. But it should be noted that the KKM was unable to penetrate into the tribal areas that served as the physical bridge between Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The tribal areas were mainly autonomous from

the control of the British and many *jirgas* also transferred power to the state. So they remained mainly out of the influence of the KKM (Gufran 2009: 1095-1096).

Another trend of Pakhtun nationalism lies in the politics played by the British in demarcating the boundaries between the Pakhtun people of Afghanistan and Pakistan (then British India). The ethnic overlapping between the two countries and imposed border by the colonial rule is still serving as a potent threat in managing relations between the countries and the Pakhtun people (Harrison 2008: 4).

The British adopted a “closed border policy” towards the Pakhtun tribal area and maintained a policy of minimum interference in the area. By 1876, to save India from Tsarist Russia led British to opt for a “Forward Policy”. Thus they started considerable actions in the area to have influence in Afghanistan (Saikal 2010: 8).

This gave rise to the second Anglo-Afghan war where Afghanistan agreed to British suzerainty and a border was drawn to demarcate boundary of Afghanistan and Russia in 1887.

“A reciprocal Durand Line Agreement was drawn between the British Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan in 1893. This line demarcated the outer frontier of British India. Afghanistan also created a narrow land corridor in the north-east to ensure that the Russian empire in Central Asia and British India did not have a common border in Central Asia which can turn into a bone of contention between them. This resulted in the Wakhan Corridor, which separates Pakistan’s northern areas from Tajikistan” (Saikal 2010: 8-9).

Therefore the Pakhtun areas were divided by the British according to their conveniences separating the Pakhtuns between two countries. This zone later served as the most problematic area between Afghanistan and Pakistan because of the easy movements of the Pakhtuns from both sides. Erland Jasson says that,

“The Afghanistan government always felt that they could handle these tribes better as they have an ethnic linkage. With the end of the British Empire the Pakhtun areas under the British also became independent. Kabul had sought to open negotiations on the issue of return of the territories and dreamt of merger of the Pakhtun areas with Afghanistan. It kept on supporting the Pakhtun nationalists in the hope that those areas would be included in Afghanistan.”(Jasson 1981: 206)

The Pakhtun Nationalism and Khudai Khidmatgars (KKM)

As the historical root of Awami National Party lies in the genesis of Khudai Khadmatgars, it will be important to note the formation, social condition and leadership of KKM to comprehend the study appropriately. This will help to perceive how the politics of this group has shaped itself with time.

The nationalism of the Pakhtuns in the settled areas started with the coming of the British and the domination of the big khans on the smaller peasants. The changes that were brought by the coming of the British affected the lives of the Pakhtuns.

Despite indirect rule under the British in NWFP as stated earlier, there were some noteworthy transformations that took place in the region that caused some far-reaching changes in the Pakhtun society. This can be counted as a British strategy to take in confidence of some big khans or the rich landlords. Along with this new land revenue systems were introduced in the area, which gave rise to a new market economy. Further there was recruitment of Pakhtuns in the British army, introduction of modern education system, and construction of roads and railway lines. Thus the Pakhtuns saw new ways of modernisation during this time. The new revenue system imposed by the British taking help of the local khans or Feudal lords and pirs, changed the system of previous land owning. There was introduction of land ownership which gave rise to landless peasants. Thus the previous system of landowner-tenant relationship was replaced. This created the class of poor peasants who had to pay high taxes which imposed an extensive pressure on the peasants (Khan 2003: 71).

By the 1930s, most of the productive lands were taken over by the landlords. During 1911-31, “the proportion of peasant owners dropped from 72.5 % to 42 %.” Further the opening of the market economy gave rise to a class of Pakhtun merchants whose trade was enhanced by the opening of newly made roads and railways. Thus a class division was visible in the Pakhtun society. Therefore the capitalist economic relations which started after the coming of the British and introducing new economic system negatively affected the local artisans who now had to compete with the factory made articles of the British (Khan 2003: 71). Further in terms of economic relations, Adeel Khan has mentioned that NWFP was divided in two parts.

“In the settled areas, the introduction of new revenue system created few big landlords and a large number of landless peasants; the market economy gave birth to a Pakhtun bourgeoisie and an increasing number of pauperised artisans and other proletariat. In the tribal areas, the old economic relations remained intact” (Khan 2003:72)

The colonial administration used the divide between the small and big khans to maintain the local power relationships. The big khans were made local elites as there was a need for an active state patronage for the British because the British were not much residing in the areas. For the small khans a sense of being left out or deprivation gave rise to a feeling of strong hatred against the colonial government and the local elites that eventually showed resentment and opposition to the two groups of British and big khans (Khan 2003: 72).

The Khudai Khidmatgars were against the British policy to exploit the masses of the Northwest and create a sharp divide among them. The KKM thus had many times spoilt the effort of the British to dominate the province according to their wishes. Wali Khan has said that

“The British were using Islam to save their Empire; the Khudai Khidmatgars were fighting in the Islamic spirit to waste their Empire. They wanted self-determination. They wanted their national wealth to benefit the poor, the meek and the down-trodden. For this purpose they united with the party which was fighting for freedom. That was the Indian National Congress, a national body, which included Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians”(Khan 2004:71)

Wali Khan further emphasises that British taking help of the propertied class tried to exploit the KKM movement which was not going in the favour of the British. After a tough fight the British were finally compelled to give the Frontier a status of equality with the other states. Wali Khan remarks,

“When in keeping with the provisions of the 1935 Act, elections were held, the British saw all their handpicked men being defeated one by one, by the Khudai Khidmatgars. Although the Khudai Khidmatgars did not attain an absolute majority, out of the fifty Assembly seats they won nineteen. This election proved two points. First, there was no party as well organised as the Khudai Khidmatgars. Secondly, that their popularity was such that even British patronage could not guarantee victory.” (Khan 2004: 72-73).

Thus the political organisation of the party was strong and it got support mainly from the small khans and peasants because of its fight against the feudal lords.

In the elections of 1935

“The largest and most organized party was Congress which contested elections under the banner of Provincial Parliamentary Board as Congress was banned in Frontier due to its Civil Disobedience Movement. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was also banned to enter in the province and in his absence Dr. Khan Sahib led the party. The Congress candidates were nominated on the basis of loyalty to the nationalist cause and their prestige in society. In the Muslim rural constituencies the Congress candidates were largely small Khans. Most of the Congress candidates in the Muslim urban and general constituencies were lawyers” (Ahmad 2011: 125)

It should also be noted that the North West Frontier Province was the most sensitive area and as Wali khan says “which had all along opposed the domestic policies of the Muslim League and the international policies of the British”. It is for this reason the region saw the popularity of the Congress supported by the KKM (Khan 2004:196).

In Peshawar and Mardan, Khudai Khidmatgars had a strong influence. In this election the traditional following were more important than party policies. Thus there was a fight between the congress and the non-congress. KKM did well in the areas. They won nineteen seats and remaining twenty two candidates were independent.

“In Peshawar District all Muslim rural seats were won by the Congress, and in Mardan the Congress won three out of five. In the remaining two Mardan constituencies the Congress candidates had been disqualified. The Congress soon captured these seats too by filing successful election petitions and then winning the by-elections” (Ahmad 2011: 129)

In the District of Hazara which is a non-Pakhtun area, the Congress did badly as they won two out of nine Muslim urban seats there (Ahmad 2011: 127-129).

Thus from the very beginning these areas remained the strong holds of the KKM and later its predecessors NAP and ANP especially in the plain areas of Peshawar and Mardan. After the winning of the Congress with the help of KKM the frontier Muslim League came into existence as they were afraid of monopoly of Congress power in the province. It is to be pointed here that the Muslim League was not famous in the province because KKM had already established their strongholds in the province by

struggle against the British to save Islam and the people who were exploited by the colonial masters and big feudal lords (Jasson 1981:115-116).

The British, in fact, supported the Muslim League in the NWFP to weaken the KKM by helping the big khans (rich landlords) who were mainly the part of Muslim League of the region through land grants and subsidies. But KKM was a reformist movement which rose for the social justice of the people of NWFP. Adeel Khan remarks that,

“This was consistent with the well-developed British policy of supporting local land elites in the provinces to maintain peace and order, not to mention loyalty to the British crown. These Khans became active members of the Muslim League, and carried out propaganda against the pro-Congress policy of the Khudai Khidmatagars. The non-Pakhtun pirs were also granted lands and they too had a wide support for the Muslim League”(Khan 2003: 60)

As a result of this the small khans appealed to the peasants who were also resentful of the big khans who imposed high taxes on them making them landless to unite together under one umbrella of KKM. Further the traders who felt dejected and deprived with the influence of the landlords and the educated masses also joined KKM. Thus Adeel Khan aptly mentions that

“The process of social mobility set in motion by the introduction of the market economy, modern education and state employment was accelerated by a conflict of interests between the local elites as the disgruntled small Khans began to translate their sense of alienation into nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment that eventually took the shape of a movement”(Khan 2003: 71)

Thus though the big Khans went against the KKM it was well supported by the small Khans and peasants who fell prey to the British politics.

Syed Waqar Ali Shah aptly analysed the support of different strata of society for the movement led by Bacha Khan,

“To the Pakhtun intelligentsia, it was a movement for the revival of Pakhtun culture with its distinct identity. To the smaller khans, it was a movement that demanded political reforms for the province that would enfranchise them and give them a greater role in governance. Its anti-colonial stand suited the majority of anti-establishment ulema, who always regarded British rule in the subcontinent as a curse. For the peasants and other poor classes it was against their economic oppressors: British imperialism and its agents, the pro-British Nawabs, Khan Bahadurs and the big Khans.” (cited in Khan 2003: 72)

Thus from here the picture becomes clear that the movement to safeguard the rights of the Pakhtuns were led by the small khans and the peasants. The wave of nationalism came in the agrarian society of the Pakhtuns after the introduction of the modernisation and new economic system in the society. With the bureaucratic structure of the state and the market economy which produced different classes in the Pakhtun society, different structures of allegiance grew among the Pakhtuns. “Despite the emergence of new status groups and their new interests, aspirations and frustrations, it was initially the minor Khans and peasants who were hit hardest by the colonial policies”(Khan 2003: 71). Thus this deprivation coupled with the nationalist sentiment formed the support base of KKM.

It is worth mentioning here that KKM was successful throughout 1930s and 1940s in mobilising political support of the Pakhtuns against government-backed interest groups. This was mainly because British government installed a system of penetration in the tribal system with the use of mullahs and Islam to keep the Pakhtun society divided. The British also used Islam and the mullahs to win Pakhtun support against foreign powers and the influence of KKM and Congress (Sayeed 1980: 17).

But KKM as a reformist movement was able to get support from both the deprived and other classes who were deprived of their rights by the British. In this situation Ghaffar Khan realised that cooperation with the Muslim League was difficult because of its initial pro-British tilt, in spite of its claims to be the sole representative of Indian Muslims. It should be pointed here that when the Muslim League favoured an independent homeland for Indian Muslims to be called ‘Pakistan’, the Pakhtuns became torn between two opposite political forces — one favouring partition and the other a united India (Ghufran 2009: 1097).

Coming to Ghaffar Khan’s alliance with the Congress, it was his strategy to stop the British politics in the region. He could have never been a supporter of Muslim League in the province who was the devotee to the British and was made up of the big khans. He also knew it was not easy for the Congress to establish their grounds in the region as it was a Hindu dominant party. So Khalid B Sayeed mentions that,

“He worked tirelessly among the Pakhtun peasants and secured a large following for himself. With the support of his Khudai Khidmatgar, the Congress won 17 out of 50 seats in the 1937 provincial elections. The Congress victory looked all the more impressive with its 15 out of 36 Muslim

seats in comparison to the Muslim League, which could not win a single seat” (Sayeed 1980: 75)

It should also be mentioned here that in 1946 elections Congress once again won. Many big khans who were the supporters of Muslim League tried hard to make the party win but failed despite all the efforts. Congress got 30 out of 50 seats and in Pakhtun areas they got 16 out of 22 seats (Khan 2003: 76).

Though in the 1946 election the Muslim League was unable to win majority, but being a Muslim majority province the North West Frontier officially became part of Pakistan through a referendum in July 1947. The Khudai Khidmatagars boycotted this referendum because it did not include the option of either an independent Pakhtunistan or joining with Afghanistan. Instead, the only two options available were accession to either India or Pakistan after independence from the colonial rule. In contrast, the Muslim League, which participated in the referendum, supported accession to Pakistan (Ghufran 2009:1098).

While giving the interpretation of the Lahore resolution, the KKM leaders had argued and the result of the referendum was not accepted by them. Phadnis mentions that

“The referendum options were more than restricted in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. First, it was not held in the centrally administered tribal areas which had a dominantly Pathan population. Secondly, in view of the restricted nature of adult franchise, only about 15 % of the Pathan population qualified as voters. Lastly, even in such a restricted electorate, boycott of the elections by KKM further robbed the legitimacy” (Phadnis 1984:193)

Congress accepted the result of the referendum, thereby acknowledging the NWFP as part of the new state of Pakistan. The result of the July 1947 referendum gave a major blow to Pakhtun nationalists and their Congress allies who never wanted Pakhtuns to be a part of Pakistan but rather wanted autonomy within the Indian state (Ghufran 2009: 1098).

Shocked by the decision of the Congress in supporting partition, Ghaffar Khan felt it was an act of treachery and it is like throwing them to the wolves. Later Ghaffar Khan came up with the idea of Pakhtunistan- an independent state of the Pakhtuns which will hold their power position and they didn't have to be a part of Pakistan. But the

Muslim League with the help from the British were able to convince people of the frontiers to join Pakistan. Thus with a referendum NWPF became a part of Pakistan (Khan 2003: 95-97).

Pakhtun Nationalism after Independence

After the creation of Pakistan and the Pakhtuns joining it, the nationalists of the KKM, fearing Punjabi domination in the newly formed country, started demanding an independent state to be called “Pakhtunistan” (or Pashtunistan).

Adeel Khan mentions that initially a large number of Pakhtuns were sympathetic towards separatist demands. This was mainly because NWFP and Balochistan geographically and historically was hardly a part of South Asia. They had a distinct language and had little in common with South Asian traditions and culture. Though Pakistan made Urdu as national language still the regional languages became one of the distinctive marks of identity in the country where Pakhtu language was in contrast with the other languages like Punjabi and Sindhi.

Further this divide was strengthened with the centralisation of power by the state. Adeel Khan states that:

“Such cultural and linguistic differences were bound to play a role in shaping the political aspirations of the people contrary to the integrationist policies of the Pakistan government dominated by Punjabis and Mohajirs. The sense of a lack of participation became even more jarring due to the absence of electoral politics for more than two decades after the creation of Pakistan. Under the circumstances, the separatist sentiment had the potential to become a serious threat, had there been a strong political organisation behind it. But the ineptitude and ambivalence of the nationalist leadership precluded the possibility of any such eventuality” (Khan 2003: 80)

Thus the organisational dilemma of the leaders prevented any workable plan for the new state. But it should be pointed here that the Pakhtuns wanted to maintain a distinct identity from the very beginning. They were resentful of the Punjabis even before independence and also opposed to the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan. This line of thinking is well reflected in the declaration of Nawaz Khan, the speaker of the frontier assembly, who said:

“Pathans and Punjabis are two major nations by any definition or test of nation. We are a nation of three million, and what is more, we, the frontier Pathans, are body of people with our own distinctive culture, civilisation, language, literature art and architecture, names and nomenclature, art and sensitive values and proportion, legal and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions and aptitudes and ambition. In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and by all canons of international law a Pathan is quite separate from a Punjabi”(cited in Khan 2003 : 86)

After the creation of Pakistan there started a sense of deprivation among the Pakhtuns. The pledge of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League “in Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940 that the Pakistani state would be a confederation under which the main constituent units of East Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan would be autonomous and sovereign, and that the central government would be limited to defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade, communications and currency” was hardly implemented (Saikal 2010: 7). The promises of autonomy faded away after the creation of the state and never translated to reality.

After this there was again movements for the creation of the new state called Pakhtunistan which was also supported by Afghanistan. But the nationalists of Pakistan had certain reservations regarding joining Afghanistan.

Adeel Khan has mentioned that with the existence of one Pakhtun dominated state — Afghanistan, demand for another shows the division among the Pakhtun society as created by the British. He says:

“The demand of nationalism would have been convincible if the criteria of nationalism were not history, culture and traditions of people as the nationalist claims, but about gaining political power by appealing to popular support in the name of common history, culture and tradition”

Therefore that Pakhtun leadership never wanted a future with Afghanistan where they had to give up the politics of Pakhtun nationalism. Therefore the state of Pakhtunistan never translated into reality (Khan 2005: 96).

After realising that “Pakhtunistan” was an unworkable demand because of the fear of inclusion of the Pakhtun state in Afghanistan, Ghaffar Khan began shifting focus from demanding an independent state to demanding increased autonomy for the province.

The Khudai Khidmatgars expressed their loyalty to Pakistan “18 days after independence” at a meeting at Sardarab and in March 1948, Ghaffar Khan attended the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) where he explained his concept of Pakhtunistan, which meant autonomy within Pakistan for the Pakhtuns and not a separate state for the group (Afzal 2001: 37).

After the creation of Pakistan, the Pakhtuns raised the demands of removal of artificial boundaries and integration of all “Pakhtu Speaking” areas into an integrated province called Pakhtunistan as the names of the other provinces were based on the names of the ethnic groups of the country. They further wanted abolition of traditional feudal sardari system, equal representation of the Pakhtuns in the socio-economic and politico administrative fields of national life. But Pakistan overlooked the demands of the Pakhtun regionalists and imposed one unit scheme in order to centralise power mechanism of entire West Pakistan (Singh 2003: 48).

Formation of National Awami Party

After the creation of Pakistan, the political arrangement in the state was centralisation of power which put restrictions in devaluation of power and created uproar all over Pakistan by the provinces. The one unit scheme, which was introduced in this way was a direct threat to the autonomy which was promised to the provinces during the time of independence in the name of the national integration. Thus the Pakhtuns who accepted being a part of Pakistan once again rose in revolt with the coming of the one unit scheme (Kukreja 2003: 20). To protest, anti-one unit front was established by the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Awami League. This front was later joint by Sindh Hari Committee and the Azad Pakistan Party.

The establishment of the one unit plan organisationally activated Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib. Ghaffar Khan joined hands with G.M. Syed and Mian Iftikharuddin to form the National League, which later transformed into the National Awami Party (NAP). East Pakistan’s Ganatantric Dal and elements of the banned Communist Party also joined the NAP (Feroz 1998: 219).

Though there were various perceptions of the members of NAP regarding the issue of provincial autonomy, one unit scheme etc. but the thing which tied them up was the

fear of the central government and domination by it. Thus voicing for provincial autonomy, opposing for SEATO and CENTO (anti imperialism) and anti-feudalism became the main agendas of NAP (Rashiduzzaman 1970: 396)

The National Awami Party, which is marked as a leftist progressive political party, was founded in 1957 in Dhaka with the integration of several progressive political parties. It was regarded as the “only opposition party to Ayub Khan’s pro-US regime in 1960s and was also believed by some as the front organisation of the Communist Party of Pakistan” (Rafique 1987: 110).

The NAP included people from various ethnic backgrounds voicing for their rights. Its founding members were politicians and intellectuals like

“former Muslim League member and socialist, Mian Iftikharuddin; Sindhi scholar and nationalist, G.M. Syed; Pashtun (Pakhtun) nationalist and ideologue, Bacha Khan; Pashtun nationalist Abdul Samad Achakzai; Bengali leftist leader Maulana Bhashani; and Baloch nationalist, Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo.” (Paracha, *Dawn*, 9 November 2014).

It is also important to note that the party called itself a “socialist-democratic party” working mainly for the democratic reforms and more autonomy for the country’s provinces and people who were non-Punjabi and non-Mohajirs. But it also included Mohajir and Punjabi activists who were once a part of Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) that was banned in 1951 (Paracha, *Dawn*, 9 November 2014). Thus NAP represented the nationalists and also the communists.

Hameed Khan has mentioned that Wali Khan gives a clear picture of National Awami Party saying,

“There was a get-together of the democratic forces in 1948 in Karachi when the need for forming a Party was decided. Soon after wards there were wholesale arrests in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). It was in 1956 when the threads were picked up again and the actual party took a concrete shape where several political organisations from the western wing combined to form the National Party of Pakistan. The constituent units were the Khudai Khidmatgars from NWFP led by Ghaffar Khan, from Baluchistan Wrore Pakhtoon Party led by Abdus Samad, Asthman Gal with Prince Abdul Karim at its head, from Sind, Sind Hari Committee and from Punjab came the Azad Pakistan Party. This party assumed a truly national colour within a year in 1957 when it was joined by the Awami league of East Pakistan lead by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and other organisations like

Ganatrantic dal, the Pakistan National Awami Party then came in to existence.”(Khan 1971: 104)

Thus the first leftist organisation, the National Awami Party till 1958 held the balance of power in the East and West Pakistan legislatures before the beginning of military coup in the country. In the National Assembly of Pakistan this party provided a small but articulated opposition which constantly voiced for anti-Western policy and dismemberment of “One Unit” in West Pakistan. They did not hold office in centre and province and their main aim was to make “down-trodden” of the society more conscious of their problems. Further NAP declared an uncompromising struggle against the imperialism and feudalism of the country. The martial Law of 1958 was a set-back for the NAP but it continued its functioning underground. After the introduction of the 1962 Constitution and revival of political activities the NAP leaders joined the National Democratic Front (NDF) to fight against the martial regime of Ayub Khan and to keep their opposition alive (Rashiduzzaman, 1970: 394).

Significantly the NAP acted according to the need of the time. Instead of putting specific demands it voiced for provincial autonomy and decentralisation of power. Thus the NAP initially, instead of taking any ethnic colour, worked for restoration of regional autonomy, land reforms and independent foreign policy. Another fact that is worth mentioning here is that the politicians who were the members of the NAP never supported Muslim League and in fact opposed the demands of Pakistan. Safdar Mahmood opines about the NAP:

“As they worked actively for finding a role in united India, they naturally had problems finding a role in Pakistan’s politics. They enjoyed some support in their respective areas and over the time found a role for themselves in the post-independence era of politics by championing the cause of provincial autonomy, and at a time clamoured for the establishment of “Pakhtunistan” for the Pathans, “Sindhu Desh” for the Sindhis and Baluchistan for the Baluchis. Thus the NAP became a forum of regionalists and socialists and was rightly described as a ‘union of malcounters’ who were always in opposition. It stood for abolition of feudalism, better peasant-proprietor relationship, withdrawal from the defence pact and reconstruction of the economy through encouragement of national enterprise and securing the rights of working class through state intervention.” (Mahmood 2000: 147)

The Journey of National Awami Party

The National Awami Party represented left wing politics in Pakistan. As the party was born during a period of centralised rule in Pakistan, so its core aim at that point of time was disbanding the One Unit scheme and demanding for devolution of power to the provinces. After its organisation, NAP became one of the well organised parties of Pakistan and in the promised election of 1958 they stood as one of the strongest party. But after the military coup by Ayub Khan the political parties were banned in the country. With the removal of the ban

“NAP returned to agitate for provincial autonomy and the removal of the One Unit. It also demanded the holding of direct elections and the adoption of an independent and non-allied foreign policy in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union” (Paracha, *Dawn*, 9 November 2014)

The National Awami Party gave emphasis on the formation of nation on linguistic and ethnic basics rather than on religion and they said the provinces must be reorganised on linguistic basis. The party advocated the con-federal structure of the government and held it necessity to give supreme authority to the provinces. Only defence and foreign policy were to be controlled by the federal government. It supported the state ideology on the basis of socialism (Khan 1971). The NAP urged that the foreign policy of the state must be Non-Aligned and Pakistan should withdraw itself from the SEATO and CENTO agreement as it was just a bandwagon act of Pakistan for the United States.

Being a coalition of so many parties, different groups in it felt more strongly about one or the other item of its programme, which often led to serious tension. Further the tension inside the group was aggravated with Ayub Khan’s foreign policy and international rifts in the communist world. The frontier people of the National Awami Party did not like the close relation of Pakistan with People’s Republic of China. But the east wing fraction of the NAP sided with Khan’s policy and was not against the pro-China foreign policy issues taken by the President (Afzal 1987: 108)

Thus NAP which was formed with a coalition of leftist parties over the two wings saw it’s breaking up on 30 June and 1 July 1968 in a meeting in Peshawar where Wali Khan spelled the division between pro-Moscow and pro-China branch and said National Awami Party is a separate party. Basically there were internal contradictions

because of which the party was divided into two fractions. Other factors contributing to fragmentation was Maulana Bhashani's emphasis on the rights of the labour and peasants and Ghaffar Khan's enthusiasm about the dissolution of one unit. As a result, "the patch work" of the leftist parties could not continue for long and with Bhashani's pro Chinese orientation and Wali Khan's and Professor Muzaffar Ahmed's support for the USSR, ended in the split in the party along this line (Afzal 1987: 108).

The pro-China faction which was led by Bhashani propounded the party should be based on working with the peasants and work for the land reforms. He rejected the concept of democracy and marked it as a tool for the bourgeoisie politics. After the split, the pro-Soviet NAP dominated by people of West Pakistan became NAP-Wali and the pro-China faction became NAP-Bhashani. NAP of Wali Khan was joined by the Pakhtun, Baloch and Sindhi leadership and thus became the bigger faction than NAP-Bhashani (Parach, *Dawn*, 9 November 2014).

In the 1970 elections NAP came out winning second number of seats in NWFP, in Balochistan it got maximum seats and in East Pakistan it won a handful of seats. Shabir Shah of The News International reports that

"Wali Khan was the first politician from West Pakistan who visited East Pakistan to show sympathy with the flood and famine affected masses of East Pakistan. He had stayed there for 12 days and was also the first politician from West Pakistan to have given party tickets to 49 candidates of NAP. He also visited East Pakistan during the election campaign. He had managed to emerge triumphant from his home district of Charsadda, bagging both National and provincial assembly seats"(Shah, *The News International*, 3 May 2015)

The News International also reports that Bhutto went to meet Wali Khan but he denied and Wali Khan, in his book "Facts are sacred" wrote that as NAP was against the military operation in East Pakistan so on November 26, 1971, Yahya Khan banned NAP. However, the coming of the Bhutto government on December 21, 1971, the ban on NAP was removed. After this Wali Khan supported the Bhutto led PPP government and was in coalition with PPP in NWFP and Balochistan. But this alliance was short lived as Bhutto did not appoint governors of NWFP and Balochistan from NAP and NAP started protesting against the government. After this the federal security forces attacked an opposition rally at Rawalpindi where many NAP members were present. Following this incident Bhutto dissolved the coalition

government of the NAP and JUI in Balochistan in February 1973 (Shah, *The News International*, 3 May 2015).

Bhutto regime also accused the NAP government in Balochistan of supporting the separatist movement in the province and said there was discovery of illegal arms in the Iraqi embassy. On this allegation Bhutto dismissed the Balochistan government and Governor's rule was imposed there. In 1975 after the killing of NWFP's PPP president Hayyat Sherpao, Bhutto regime accused the NAP of the assassination of the PPP president and banned the party through legal orders and therefore ending the largest single political congregation of the major left-wing nationalists and communists of Balochs, Pakhtuns and Sindhis in Pakistan (Paracha, *Dawn*, 9 November 2014). Many leaders of NAP were arrested and put behind the bar.

“A reference in this context was hence sent to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in June 1975. NAP was accused to be an anti-state party that was busy in destroying Pakistan on the instigation of the Afghan government” (Shah, *The News International*, 3 May 2015)

Thus in the 1970s once again there was demand for the Pakhtunistan which was raised by the NAP, after banning of the party. During this time most of the situations went in favour of demanding an independent state of the Pakhtuns. The internal developments of Afghanistan also gave rise to the movement. At this time in Afghanistan Sardar Daud, who was a supporter of Pakhtunistan issue came into power. He gave shelter to many NAP nationalists such as Ajmal Khattak, Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bacha Khan) and Ayub Khan Achakzai. The secession of East Pakistan also influenced the demand for an independent state for the Pakhtuns. Further the fear of domination by the centre specially by the Punjabis and Mohajirs made the Pakhtuns sceptical (Bangash and Jan 2015: 238).

Thus the demand raised its head during this time mainly to have a considerable hold of the situation in favour of the Pakhtuns. Ajmal Khattak (secretary general of NAP) in an interview given to Al Fatah remarked:

“Although the calls for secession and separation are seldom made openly, the objective of NAP was no less than the establishment of an independent Pakhtoonistan. This feeling was strengthened after the civil war in Pakistan and events that led to the formation of Bangladesh.” (Bangash and Jan 2015: 237)

As the centre had always used forces, banned the party and imprisoned many leaders the loyalty to the state of Pakistan remained ambivalent for the members of NAP. Tahir Amin analysing the 1970 vote turn out have mentioned that as NAP had an ambivalent relation with the centre so they were never able to get the support of the educated middle and upper middle class who got well integrated with the system of the country. Thus NAP was not able to get the support of urban Pakhtuns, and only the rural areas where KKM had a considerable influence, supported the Party. In the rural areas also the support gradually decreased because of NAP's anti-establishment policies (Amin 1988: 91).

After this NAP was revived in 1978 under the name of National Democratic Party (NDP) but this again came to an end in 1982 during Gen Zia's dictatorship. Finally after so much struggle in 1986 on the ideological background of KKM and NAP Awami National Party was formed though the Baloch and Sindhis broke away leaving ANP to be an entirely Pakhtun party(Parach, *Dawn*, 9 November 2014)

Another party which was born during this time was Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) which is a Pakhtun democratic political party in Pakistan. It was born after the fragmentation of NAP where the Baloch and Pakhtun nationalists got separated after a dispute over the rights of Pakhtuns in Balochistan. Initially the name was Pakhtunkhwa National Awami Party but after it merged itself with Mazdoor Kisan party it took the name Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party. The motto of PKMAP was to unite the Pakhtuns of Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa provinces of Pakistan. This party was unable to get the national colour due to its ethnic posture. It serves as bridge between the PPP and the PML (N). Thus, unlike the ANP, it has failed to generate dominant support and has remained restricted to the province of Baluchistan (Shaheed 2002; Shah *Dawn* 1 May 2013: 77).

From National Awami Party to Awami National Party: Representative of the Pakhtuns

Before coming to the politics of Awami National Party, which is said to be made on the ideologies of NAP, some ideological consideration and support base of NAP needs to be analysed.

After the disintegration of the party into two fractions, the western wing of the NAP headed by Wali Khan had only substantial support in the NWFP and Baluchistan in the Pakhtun-dominated areas. Mahmood points that NAP was neither organised properly nor enjoyed popular support in other areas of Pakistan. The 1970 manifesto of NAP called for establishment of democracy, socialism, nationalisation of industries, a welfare state and an independent foreign policy. It is very important to note that Wali Khan unlike Gaffar Khan tried to mobilise the landowning class and petty bourgeoisie, particularly in Peshawar and Mardan divisions by stressing NWFP's "underdevelopment at the hands of Punjabi dominated centre." Thus his appeal was mainly on the basis of Pakhtun culture. But initially the party was unable to get good support from the people apart from Peshawar and Mardan. Thus it failed to establish itself as a majority party. The party was known for its regional approach in politics and concentrated on the problems of their respective areas while conspicuously ignoring the national issues (Mahmood 2000: 147).

But the National Awami Party leaders often gave the reason that because of their constant confinement and restriction placed on their political activities they had not been able to translate Pakhtun ethnic consciousness into widespread support for their political party throughout the province (Sayeed 1980: 130).

The general elections held in 1970 brought the NAP to the forefront as the opposition party.

"It contested 64 seats for the National Assembly election from both the wings at the national and provincial levels and 6 of its candidates were elected including Wali Khan. In the Provincial Assembly it got 13 seats in NWFP and 8 seats in Balochistan" (Verma 2006 : 24)

In this election Wali Khan's support base is said to remain in the landed class of the NWFP areas. In this respect it will be apt to bring some analysis made by Feroz Ahmed who pointed out that in the 1971 election NAP and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in spite of having a similar kind of ideology failed to work together. The personality of Wali Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto clashed over the power share. Wali Khan was in the opposition after the election. He formed the United Democratic Front with the right wing parties and became its leader during this time (Ahmed 1998: 224).

Thus in 1972, the NAP and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) formed a coalition government in NWFP and Baluchistan. The central government at that time accused Wali Khan of involving in anti-state activities of charting a plan for disintegration of Pakistan in the alleged 'London Plan'. Meanwhile the Baluchistan crisis gave another push to the politics of NAP after the discovery of arms in the Iraqi Embassy allegedly for transfer to Baluchistan. Finally the Liaqat Bagh Massacre that saw firing on the NAP supporters also gave a blow to the party. The party was banned by the then Bhutto government. (Mahmood 2000: 147).

As most of the leaders of NAP were imprisoned, only Sherbaz Khan Mazari who formed a new political party named the National Democratic Party (NDP) on the ideologies of NAP in 1976 kept the struggle alive. Sherbaz Khan Mazari led the NDP and they joined Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan. During this time the party faced a further split between

“far left elements led by Khair Bakhsh Marri advocating outright separation and armed struggle and those advocating political struggle led by Sherbaz Khan Mazari. The split ended the alliance between Pakhtun Nationalists and Baloch Nationalists.”

During the 1977 election, the National Democratic Party became a part of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) with JUI against Bhutto. It got 17 out of 26 seats but as PNA became a part of Zia government so NDP walked out of the alliance (Verma 2006: 25). Thus on these considerations Awami National Party was formed.

While analysing NAP Feroz Ahmed has pointed out many contradictions with the ideology of its predecessors and its working style. He points that while KKM fought for the rights of the peasants and deprived section, NAP consisted of those people who tried to control the means of production. Thus Ahmed stresses on the point that NAP became a platform for petty bourgeoisie and the landlords who desired to become industrial capitalists. The educated class whose demands were not fulfilled by the state and economic aspiration were not met, their ambition to get a place in the hierarchy of power system made them demand either for autonomy or secession. Though not all landlords and petty bourgeoisie was its support base but NAP got support from most of them (Ahmad 1988:200)

There were further contradictions, as Ahmed mentions with its own ideologies and working pattern. These were in respect of various issues from its manifestations. While NAP has always propounded for regional parity but had given election ticket to Ghulam Farooque who was the main architect of disparity in industrialization. Further, Feroz Ahmed has pointed out

“While it used the protection of national languages as a principal issue in its struggle against One Unit, it adopted Urdu as the official languages of the province no sooner than it formed the government. While it portrayed itself as the well wisher of the workers, one of the first acts of its government was to ban strikes. While its greatest claim was to represent the Pushtoon peasants, at no time in Pakistan’s history the repression against the peasants had been greater than during the NAP’s tenure in office. While it bragged about democracy and secularism, it consented to the continuation of emergency powers and made Mufti Mahmood the Chief Ministers of Sarhad. While it considered its name to be synonymous with maximum autonomy, it agreed to a constitution which granted to the provinces fewer powers than the 1935 act of British India” (Ahmed 1998: 200)

After the dissolution of National Awami Party, Awami National Party was born. Keeping similar kind of perspective and ideology towards politics ANP, like KKM and NAP, believes politics as a way to reach the masses. Thus to serve the masses and in order to make the country a developed one, ANP focused on eradication of poverty, protection of human rights, educating the masses and fighting against the terrorism. The ANP further aimed to unite the people of Pakistan irrespective of their ethnic considerations, race faith etc by empowering individual units and having considerable provincial autonomy so that a fair share of rights can be given to the people. (Awami national Party, *Dawn*, 17 January 2012)

The manifesto of the Awami National Party gives a detail of the goals and objective of the party. It seems that in some cases it is in contrast with the NAP. With time the ANP has changed and broadened its goals and objectives. It has tried to accommodate the issues that are of immediate concern now. Though it works for the Pakhtuns and have support base mostly among the Pakhtuns, but it is nowhere mentioned in its manifesto that it is a Pakhtun nationalist party. Rather it tries to work for the overall development of the people of the neglected provinces emphasizing on the areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Thus the preamble of the party states:

“The ANP, like its predecessors, the NAP (National Awami Party) and the NDP (National Democratic Party), looks upon politics primarily as a public service, particularly to the poor and the disadvantaged. Hence the Party is dedicated to the promotion of democracy and freedom, the eradication of poverty, the protection of human rights, the combating of extremism in all its forms and the creation of equal opportunities for all citizens. It firmly believes in peace and non-violence as the best way to resolve all issues. It is committed to secure for all the federating units of Pakistan their full political, social and economic rights as equal partners in the federation and their fair share in national progress and prosperity. In the pursuit of these goals, the ANP is ready to work together with like-minded forces in Pakistan and to subscribe to partnerships with all peace loving countries of the world.”(Party Manifesto, ANP 2008)

Thus it seems that ANP on the principle of Democratic socialism wants to achieve the dreams laid down by Ghaffar Khan in making the country and specially the Pakhtun society more peaceful and prosperous with the freedom to exercise their rights.

The Awami National Party and the Political scenario

It should be pointed out here that the birth of the ANP was in a situation which was in a stark contrast with that of the NAP because of the political scenario which was prevailing in Pakistan. ANP was formed in the period of cold war, when Pakistan became an important area for proxy war between the United States of America and Soviet Union in Afghanistan. That period was dominated by the martial law of Zia-ul-Haq and witnessed his policy of Islamisation and Afghan Jihad. Thus in this background ANP started with the agenda of ending of martial law in the country. Their main focus remained with restoration of democracy in Pakistan maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan. It is to be mentioned here that during this time some members of the party walked out to form Qaumi Inqilabi Party. After the split ANP specifically took the ethnic colour representing the Pakhtuns. ANP also aimed end of the Punjabi domination in Pakistan and also to apply a policy of non-interference in the internal matters of Afghanistan by the state of Pakistan (BBC Urdu 2008).

After the formation of the party, Wali Khan's support for Moscow on the Afghan Issue and his leanings towards India prevented its broadening of influence to the other parts of the country especially Punjab. Thus ANP remained limited to the areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). It is important to note that after its formation in 1986, ANP actively participated in the 1988 elections. The party at that time focused on

“Full provincial autonomy to all the constituent units of the federation, except in matters of defense, foreign affairs, currency and communication. It promised not to legislate against Quran and Sunnah. It advocated revolutionary changes in the agricultural system, establishment of heavy industries in the private sector, protection of the tenants' rights, and an independent foreign policy”(Mahmood 2004: 151)

After the election following General Zia's death in 1988, the Awami National Party won majority seats in the NWFP, but it fell short of forming a government in the province. ANP also failed over the issue of the appointment of the Provincial Governor. The Awami National Party won 6 seats in the National Assembly in the 1990 elections and 3 seats in 1993 national elections. Its base still remained in the NWFP and northern Balochistan during this time.

It is very interesting to note that in the end of 1994, when people of the North West Frontier Provinces became fully integrated into the political process of the country, ANP joined the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) coalition. The ANP was in coalition with the IJI irrespective of the fact that the former was opposed to Kalabag dam construction which flooded the areas of Peshawar and Noshahra and also opposed the withdrawal of tax concession to Gadoon Amanzai industrial estate in the NWFP (Shah 1997: 174).

Thus from here it is visible that to have its importance in the politics of the country and to spread its wings beyond the province, Awami National Party involved itself in the hardcore politics for a better position in the power share.

For the purpose of the study, this researcher interviewed Sartaj Khan, who is the general secretary of ANP of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa presently (2016) via Whatsapp Call on 17 May 2016. His interview gives a perception that ANP does not like to call itself an exclusively Pakhtun party as it works for the people of the whole country mainly for those who are deprived.

Interview with Sartaj Khan

Q. How can you define Pakhtun ethnicity?

Pakhtuns are the brave soldiers of the country who has fought for their rights always. They are liberal and service to humanity is their main concern. Regarding ethnicity they have equal importance for Pakhtun and Pakistani identity. (He quoted Wali Khan) "I have been a Pakhtun for six thousand years, a Muslim for thirteen hundred years, and a Pakistani for sixty eight years."

Q. What is the aim of Awami National Party?

ANP is a liberal secular party of Pakistan. Though it is a Pakhtun based party but it works for all Pakistani. The Party works on the ideology of Bacha Khan. From Khudai Khidmatgars to NAP, ANP has worked on the same line. Serving humanity is the main concern of the party and it has its office throughout the country.

Q. Being a secular force, ANP members are constantly being targeted by the Taliban. What is your take on it?

Talibans are extremist forces and enemy of the whole country.

Q. How can you define the situation in Karachi?

In Karachi Pakhtuns are being targeted frequently and so is in Afghanistan.

Q. How do you define MQM's role in Karachi?

MQM has destroyed Karachi. They mainly depend on foreign funding and run the party. Many MQM workers have come out of the party and they also say the same.

Q. Is your fight still against the monopolization of resources by the Punjabis?

No comments.

Q. Can we call ANP representing the rights of the Pakhtuns only?

ANP is a secular force and as their aim is to serve for the cause of humanity they work for all the Pakistanis especially in need.

The Awami National Party and Alliance Politics

To analyse the political role played by Awami National party it is imperative to note how the party has played its role in the politics of the country and what were the ways

taken by the party to be in power. In case of ANP, it has mainly followed the policy of alliance formation with parties to remain in power.

Political alliance is a process through which the parties collectively pursue common goal or objective. This process requires commitments from the parties regarding the distribution of resources to achieve the goal. Thus political alliance is a temporary arrangement for the groups to work towards a common goal. In other words, it is

“The union of different political parties or groups for a particular purpose, usually for a limited time. In multi-party systems no single party can win a majority of seats. Party alliances may be forged either by giving serious considerations to ideological positions of respective parties on political chessboard or by ignoring them altogether” (Mustafa 2010: 104)

Sometimes forming alliance with parties ideologically completely different may lead to breakup of the alliance. Thus the politics of ANP can be evaluated taking this background into consideration.

After coming to power the ANP has formed alliance with different parties to stay in power. Though differences on certain issues broke them, but after the 2008 election it went more or less well with the coalition until 2013 elections where the political party saw its defeat.

Tracing the line from 1988, it is seen that the ANP has maintained a significant presence in the legislatures. Of the 80 seats in the KP assembly, it won 10 in the 1988 election where it formed a coalition with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) (Syed, *Dawn*, 12 January 2008).

It is important to note here that at this point of time ANP kept the ideological clashes aside and made coalition with PPP. However the cooperation with the PPP did not last long because the parties developed differences regarding power distribution of the ANP ministers and also appointing the governor. This turned to hostility between the two and ANP after quitting from the alliance joined hands with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz [PML(N)] . After this ANP put candidates in the 1990 elections where ANP benefitted from this coalition. It secured 6 seats in the National Assembly and 22 seats in the NWFP Assembly. Besides it won 4 seats in the Senate. The PML (N)-ANP coalition government, remained in power headed by Mir Afzal Khan in the NWFP till Nawaz Sharif government was removed from the center in 1993. After this

ANP again co-operated with the PML (N) in the 1993 elections where it secured 3 seats in the National Assembly and 21 seats in the NWFP, but that ministry could not stay in power for more than two months (Mahmood 2004: 151).

After this ANP participated in the 1997 elections, where it won 9 seats in the National Assembly and 27 seats in the NWFP Assembly. It was an achievement for the party who were represented in the central as well as in the provincial governments. Mahmood said that ANP tried to play a different type of bargaining strategy during this time. He said

“When Sharif government was besieged in its conflict with the judiciary, the party thought it fit to pressurize the beleaguered Prime Minister to change the name to Pakhtunkhwa. But because of pressure from within the PML (N), Nawaz Sharif refused to accept this demand; this led to a breakup of the nine year old PML (N)-ANP cooperation” (Mahmood 2004: 162)

After Pervez Musharraf came to power, ANP to restore democracy in the state became a part of Alliance for Restoration of Democracy till the 9/11 incident and it also supported the USA in war on terror mission to oust the Taliban from Pakistan. This stance of ANP led many to think that it has a pro-western attitude which goes against the ideologies of the party and its predecessors. Thus taking advantage of this situation the coalition of regional parties the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), was able to buy the sentiments of the people on the basis of its anti-American stance (Mahmood 2004: 162). Thus in 2002 MMA won the elections and formed their government in the province till 2008.

Before the 2008 election the key Pakhtun nationalist forces in the province, consisting of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) and the Awami National Party (ANP) joined hands to fight the problems being faced by the Pakhtuns and also to contest the elections from a single platform. Keeping aside their differences, the two parties formed the Pakhtunkhwa National Democratic Alliance (PNDA) (Ahmed 2007)

In the 2008 election ANP emerged as the largest party in the house of NWFP and formed the government in coalition with the PPP in the centre and the province of NWFP. From 2008-2013 ANP was in power both in the centre and the province until its defeat in the 2013 elections. It has been observed that the party's bias for socialism

is said to be more in theory than in practice where they fought for the position in the power hierarchy (Syed, *Dawn*, 12 January 2008).

The 2008 Election: ANP's coming to the Fore

A new journey took place for the Awami National Party from 2008, and since then there was no looking back till the 2013 elections. The ANP managed to make a position in the political hierarchy, having a majority government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and being in the coalition government of Pakistan in 2008. It won 10 seats in the national assembly in 2008.




Chart 2.3 *Number of seats won by Major Political Parties in 2002-2008 National Assembly Elections, Source: (Chandran and Chakravarthi 2008: 2)*

In the elections of 2008 in NWFP, ANP made its way to the provincial government winning 31 seats and so did the PPP winning 17 assembly seats. The MMA, which secured 48 provincial seats in 2002, won only 10 seats in 2008. Both ANP and PPP won 8 seats respectively in the province in 2002. The PML-N and PML-Q in 2008 secured 5 seats while the independents with 21 seats became the second largest group in the assembly with 21 seats (Chandran and Chakravarthi 2008: 2).




Chart 2.4 Number of Seats Won by Major Political Parties in 2002-2008 Elections of NWFP Assembly, Source: *Chandran and Chakravarthi, (2008)*.

Another important thing which should be mentioned here is that during the 2008 elections Awami Party won 2 seats in the Sindh provincial assembly. This was mainly because Karachi emerged as the largest Pakhtun city in the world, which actually gave rise to bitter rivalry between MQM and ANP. This rivalry will be discussed in detail in the fifth chapter of the thesis (IDSA report 2010).

In KP, where ANP had its maximum support after the election of 2008, it called for certain demands like KP should get provincial, national and international attention. At that time they asked the centre to balance the Pakhtuns of Pakistan and the international actors of the US and Afghanistan in a proper manner. They further demanded, a vigil should be kept on the non state actors like the al-Qaeda and Taliban to avoid any kind of challenge posed on the province of the ANP government. (Chandran and Chakravarthi 2008, IPCS)

After winning the elections the ANP changed the name of the province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Opinion on Pakhtun Politics and Awami National Party

It is very important to note that how the Pakhtun politics have changed with time. For the purpose of the study, this researcher interviewed Professor Ijaz Khan, who is an eminent professor of Peshawar University and have widely researched on Pakhtun nationalism, via Gmail dated 4 June 2016.

Interview with Prof Ijaz Khan

Q. What is the present status of ethnic politics in Pakistan?

Ethnic sense of identity is quite strong in Pakistan but the political parties representing the ethnic groups are not very strong due to a variety of reasons. The policies and attitude of the centralized state structure and unitary religious based ideology despite being a federation as well as weaknesses of these political parties in addition to many other factors is responsible.

Q. How active is Pakhtun national movement in Pakistan?

Pakhtun nationalist movement is not that strong now if one goes by electoral results of political parties championing it. However, that is more a weakness of these political parties than popular support for Pakhtun National Rights or feelings of deprivation and alienation among Pakhtuns. These parties are not changing with changing times and are mainly rural feudal and tribal based, while nationalism is more of a modernizing idea than social conservatism with which these parties are identified, even if politically they take more progressive stands on different issues. These parties are structurally and socially conservative even if politically modern.

Q. How can you define the Pakhtun society?

The Pakhtun society can be divided into rural and urban setup. Though the tribal system/structure is no longer there in the society but the tribal thinking still remains there in varying percentages. The Pakhtun society is going under transformation of modernisation and collapsing tribal setup but still references are drawn from the tribal structure of the society.

Q. What is the role played by the ANP in the politics of the country?

Awami National Party is a Pakhtun based party which was born out of the National Awami party. Awami National Party remains more strongly as a regional party with its strong holds in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pakhtun Diaspora.

Q. Are all the Pakhtuns supporter of Awami National Party?

Awami National Party though is a Pakhtun based party but as the society is divided into rural and urban sections, the support of the Party is also divided.

It is basically the rural Pakhtuns who form the main support base for the party and only in the Peshawar and Mardan the support of the party is visible. Even in these areas the people who have come and settled from the rural areas form the main support base of the party.

Apart from that, Pakhtuns are also supporters of PPP, PML(N), PTI, QWP and also some religious parties like Jamiat-ul-Ulema and JI etc. In fact, in the 2013 elections PTI got more Pakhtun votes than ANP. However, ANP is still considered as a party representing Pakhtun national issues.

Q. Can we call ANP a Pakhtun Party?

Though ANP states it works for the rights of the deprived Pakistanis but its support base lies within the Pakhtun society of Pakistan and its constituencies are based in the Pakhtun dominated areas. There is rarely any non Pakhtun holding position in the Party.

Q. Is ANP representing the ideas of Bacha Khan?

Bacha Khan was a social reformist and he wanted to democratize and modernize the society with education and prosperity. KKM also worked for the rights of the peasants. Khudai Khidmatgar Movement (KKM) had the lower echelons of Pakhtun society as its followers. ANP on the other side has more evenly support base among the various classes though mostly but not exclusively rural based. ANP does claim to be following the footsteps of Bacha Khan and thus has established Bacha Khan Education trust, which runs a number of schools around Pakhtunkhwa.

Q. What are the other parties representing the Pakhtuns?

The other parties working for the Pakhtuns are Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami party (Finds support mainly in Balochistan) and recently formed Quami Watan Party of Aftab Ahmad Sherpao which is said to have a neo-Pakhtun ideology and is based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Q. What is the difference between NAP and ANP?

NAP was a Pakistan level party bringing together representative of all national groups of Pakistan, in addition to Communists, who found it a convenient platform after the ban on Communist Party of Pakistan in the 1950s. It was a conglomeration of different nationalists and communists of Pakistan. ANP also formally is a Pakistan level party based on the ideas of NAP. In fact when it was formed in 1996, it had in its fold representatives of different ethnic groups of Pakistan, however, very soon all others left it and ANP became limited to Pakhtuns only.

Q. What is your opinion about ANP and what are the reasons for its failure in 2013 elections?

There are several reasons, the party workers were often targeted by the Taliban and it could not carry out election campaign freely as other parties were doing; second it was not preferred by the Pakistani establishment due to it being a suspect in its eyes due to Bacha Khan relationship with Indian National Congress before 1947 and its pro Indian attitude; Apart from that ANP members were charged of corruption and mismanagement.

The Ups and Downs of Pakhtun Politics and Political Parties

It is very important to note that how the change in the politics of the Pakhtuns becomes prominent. The initial support which the Pakhtuns had during KKM declined after the formation of National Awami Party (NAP) in the 1960s. By late 1960s, as the Pakhtuns got well integrated in the state system of Pakistan and had a considerable hold in the army and civil bureaucracy, the support for NAP decreased. Adeel Khan has summarised this

“The first free elections were held in 1970, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) with its 7 seats emerged as the main winner, whereas the National Awami Party, headed by Ghaffar Khan’s son Wali Khan, won only 3 seats and 18.4 percent votes. Even in the 1993-97 elections the Awami National Party was unable to hold its grip. Throughout these years the NAP, now ANP (Awami National Party) had won only in the prosperous region of Peshawar and Mardan. This region is not only the most fertile in the NWFP but also the most educated and thus has a larger share in power. As a real beneficiary of power and privileges its support for the ANP obviously means not a desire for separation but for a bigger chunk in power and privileges.”(Khan 2003: 82)

Thus according to him the ethnic nationalism which once was used to bargain for the share of resources for the people remained a tool for maintaining a place in the hierarchy of power in the hands of the politicians. Also the party got support from a specific class of the Pakhtuns mostly in the places of Mardan and Peshawar and in the rural areas of KP.

It should be taken into consideration that the Pakhtun struggle has often been marked as class struggle by many scholars like Feroz Ahmed. It was basically the struggle of the middle class bourgeoisie who had an aspiration to control the state power. It was not a unified movement and basically this class of people rose for the demand of

Pakhtunistan twice in history but later when they found that the best can be achieved in the state of Pakistan they voiced for the autonomy within the federation. This class struggle can also be seen in the politicisation of the Pakhtuns. It can be cited as a reason that the political parties of NAP and ANP lost much of its support from the other Pakhtuns (Bangash and Jan 2015: 243-244).

Adeel Khan have further mentioned that even when Ghaffar Khan was leading the party there was no proper plan regarding the future of the Pakhtuns. The main issues that he raised were either making of an independent state for the Pakhtuns or having share of power in the existing one. Adeel Khan states that

“Despite being a social reformer and peasant leader, Ghaffar Khan never favoured any radical social or agrarian reforms that would have broken the hold of the landowners and benefited the peasantry. In fact, the Congress ministry’s action to strip the landed gentry of its privileges was not to his likings, as he thought it would antagonize the big Khans. Under Wali Khan, the party lost its populist aura and ended up becoming an elitist pressure group whose politics is to enter into or withdraw from one alliance or another to make or break a government” (Khan 2003: 72).

However, after the 2008 election ANP got back much of its fame and worked mostly according to its manifesto and remained in the center as a coalition partner till 2013. But the 2013 election saw the defeat of the ANP which was wiped away by Pakistan Tahreek-e-Insaf (PTI), losing its considerable hold in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This time there was a considerable hold of the religious forces also in the Pakhtun society.

In the 2013 election ANP was almost wiped away from the electoral map of Pakistan. ANP got one seat in National assembly, four in KP and one in Balochistan. ANP lost many of its seats to PTI. Apart from the fact that its secular orientation did not help to get support from the religious forces, they were also being targeted by the extremist forces. This was the reason why the party was unable to carry out its election campaigning before the election. Along with that ANP was also charged of corruption which became another important point for its defeat (Joshua, Hindu, 23 March 2013).

Anita Joshua in *Hindu* has quoted Karachi-based internally displaced researcher Ali Arqam, who has pointed out that ANP has failed to keep up with time while campaigning for the election. He says:

“ANP relied on the traditional power centres of Pashtun society; approaching people through family elders and jirgas . PTI employed the tactics of direct approach to the urban and peri-urban youth. The latter was successful as the traditional power centres are diminishing in Pashtun society. Also, the ANP failed to respond to the growing urbanisation and the urge among the urban youth to get mainstreamed instead of remaining tied to Pashtun nationalism.”

Thus the urbanised Pakhtun population rarely connected them with ANP as the party followed its traditional way of approach. (Joshua, *Hindu*, 23 March 2013)

ANP lost its hold both at the national level, and in the KP province, which was their stronghold. Wali Khan has said, “There is a weakness of policy, weakness of governance and weakness of organization within the ANP” after the defeat of ANP in 2013 elections (Qalandar, *The Express Tribune*, 4 September 213).

Wali Khan also adds that the “basic reason for the defeat was absence of communication between leadership and workers of the party,” thus opening the way for other parties. (Fida, *The News Tribe*, 31 August 2013)

Apart from that many members of ANP were targeted by the Pakistani Taliban before and during the elections. This had affected the election campaign of the party and because of the lack of a proper election campaigning ANP lost the elections. Thus other parties got an upper hand in this case. The secular socialist ideology can be mentioned as another point why it was targeted by the Taliban and religious forces. Further ANP was also accused of corruption and becoming a place for family politics for which it was said to lose its considerable support from the people.

The picture becomes very clear in this context that power play within the party stands more important than working for the people. Thus from the very beginning the ideology of ANP and its predecessors were said to be more in papers than in reality. Apart from that its support base and its style of working shows contradiction with the ideology of the party. A comparative study is made in the fourth chapter with details of its programmes to give a clear picture of the trend of politics of ethno-nationalism.

Chapter III

Mohajir Nationalism in Pakistan and the Muttahida Quami Movement

“The word Mohajir is just an identity of those who migrated to Pakistan. Whenever and wherever this type of migration takes place, it takes time to assimilate. Take the example of the United States. Do you think that the Americans comprise of one race, nation or a nationality? In the United States, the assimilation was not defined whereas in Pakistan, Mohajir assimilation was defined. Mohajirs have chosen to become Pakistanis and they feel pride in doing so.

The one-nation concept never emerged because of the disparity and that is why cultural pluralism could not arise. Why do you target Mohajirs only? Why is there no objection at those who talk and insist on being referred to as Punjabis, Sindhis, Baloch, Pakhtoons and Seraikis?” – Altaf Hussain (Amjad, and Shahzareah, The News, 5 September 2000)

In multi-ethnic countries where there is domination of one or two cultures, the growth of an assimilative culture based on pluralism becomes difficult to achieve. In such a situation, ethnicity becomes a mode of identification for the group who bargain for their position in the state hierarchy on the basis of it. Even a privileged group can try to safeguard their position in the political hierarchy by emphasising their ethnic identification in certain situations.

Similarly in Pakistan due to the lack of an assimilative culture, various ethnic groups have risen from time to time to safeguard their demands. Nationalism based on ethnicity has also created and sometimes amplified different kinds of ethnic politics. Mohammad Waseem says that ethnicity has become a marker and a source of explanation for interest formulation in terms of group categorisation and identity formation, mainly because the states have defaulted on providing not only security of life, property or justice, but was also unable to ensure equal distribution of resources to the people (Waseem 1996: 617).

Indian Muslim migrants, termed as Mohajirs, are Urdu-speaking and have mostly migrated from the Muslim minority provinces of India to Pakistan after the Partition. They were the most enthusiastic supporters of the state nationalism based on Islamic

ideology. These migrants, who settled down in the urban areas of Sindh, especially in the Karachi area, enjoyed a good share of the state resources and position in the state hierarchy. This was mainly because of their educational background and experiences in administrative work during the colonial period (Khan 2005: 161).

But after 1970, they aspired for a separate ethnic identity as they felt that they had been deprived of their due because of the introduction of quota system in Sindh. So in order to voice their ethnicity they formed a political group called the Mohajir Quami Movement in 1984, which later became Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM). This group was formed to affirm their identity, and by the end of 1980s it not only gained importance among the Mohajirs but also became one of the key players in the ethnic politics of Pakistan. However, the tactics used by this organisation have led Karachi become one of the most dangerous places of Pakistan, thereby making this ethnic issue a matter of concern (Khan 2005: 161).

Therefore, an attempt is made in this chapter to know how and why the ethnic identity of the Mohajirs came into being. It also focuses on the growth of Mohajir nationalism after the fall from their position in the 1970s. Further, details of the rise of Muttahida Quami Movement and the tactics used by them to carry forward the movement will be elaborated. The latter part of the chapter juxtaposes the present situation of the Mohajirs and the role of the MQM.

Historical Background

Before arriving to the ethnic identification of the Mohajirs, a glimpse of the history of the state formation and the reason for their migration is to be noted. A significant aspect that should be mentioned here is that the Urdu-speaking community of the undivided India largely formed the main Mohajir community of Pakistan. They were the pioneers of the struggle for a new state. So in this context it is imperative to look at why this community willingly migrated to Pakistan, keeping religious nationalism in focus. Further, a study of the political situation should also be taken in consideration while comprehending their position in undivided India. As the movement for the creation of Pakistan belonged mainly to the United Provinces (UP) of India, a survey of the situation of the Urdu-speaking Muslims of this province before the Partition should also be taken to consideration.

Christophe Jaffrelot mentions that Mohammad Ali Jinnah wanted to construct a strong state relying on the principles of “one nation, one culture, one language”. According to him, “Pakistan was intended to be the homeland of the Muslims of British India, and its language could be nothing else but Urdu.” Jinnah had the ideology but what didn’t support him was the geography of Pakistan, which had Muslims from various ethnic and social structures. Thus the thrust for the creation of a new state basically came from the Muslims of the provinces – who were minority in undivided India – to create a space where they can be saved from social decline. The Muslims of the United Provinces were the most important ones among them who were turned down by the policies in British India and greatly affected after the 1857 Revolt. Being educated and having a position in the social structure, these Muslims formed the backbone of the movement for the creation of Pakistan (Jaffrelot 2002: 8-9).

After the 1857 Revolt, the Muslim landlords were deprived of their properties for taking part in the mutiny and so were the intelligentsia (belonging to the same class), who were also discriminated on the basis of “aristocratic milieu”. The Muslims, who already received a blow when Persian was replaced by Indian vernaculars in 1837 for judicial and fiscal matters, were further weakened in 1899 by the recognition of Hindi as the official language of United Province with equal emphasis as of Urdu (Jaffrelot 2002: 8-9).

It is also worth mentioning that Urdu and Hindi are similar languages but Urdu was never represented as a Muslim identity. It was when the Hindu elites pressurised the British to declare Hindi as an administrative language in the United Provinces that Urdu became an emblem of Muslim identity. The fear of losing their position in government sectors and education made the Muslims equate Urdu with their identity. So this issue became a main component of economic competition between the two communities (Giorgio 2007: 74-75).

After the 1857 Revolt, mutual suspicion developed between the Muslims and the British. Thus the Non-Muslims, preponderantly the Hindus, who had already started educating themselves in modern education and were engaged in professions like administration, commerce and industry, started getting advantages due to this divide. The struggle for existence among the Muslim urban middle classes was severe during

this time and they had to compete with the modern, educated Hindus. The Hindus had made a firm ground for themselves in every way possible, which gave a blow to the Muslims, who wanted to have a stable position of their own. This factor of uneven economic development thus provided real basis for fears of “Hindu imperialism” among the Muslims (Spate 1948: 5-7).

Certain policies of the British also made the Muslims fear that they will further lose their influences as they were minority in the provinces. In 1882, the Local Self Government Act permitted the Indians who were enfranchised to elect some of their local representatives. In 1909, the provinces of the Raj were granted partly elected Legislative Councils. The introduction of elective principles enhanced fear among the Muslims that their position would further be marginalised as they were only one-fifth of the population according to 1881 Census, and in democratic principles numbers always play a crucial role. These British policies greatly affected the Muslims of the United Provinces, since they formed only 13.4% of total population in this region (Jaffrelot 2002: 8-9).

In the 19th century, the UP Muslims were mobilised under the guidance of Syed Ahmed Khan, who was eager to improve the educational level of his community. This prompted him to establish Aligarh Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College (MAO) in 1896, which became Aligarh Muslim University in 1911. The college trained the first generation opponents of the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress, where only 6.6% of Muslim delegates taking part in its annual session between 1892 and 1909. The 1882 Local Self Government Act and the establishment of Legislative Councils in 1909 became a cause of concern for Syed Ahmed Khan and his followers. In this situation the secretary of MAO College demanded separate electorate. This came as a price for “divide and rule” policy by the British. Henceforth, the Muslims of UP started playing a key role. This was further enlarged by the creation of the Muslim League (1906) and the Khilafat Movement (Jaffrelot 2002: 8-9).

The Muslim League was dominated by the wealthy landlords and Muslim professionals from UP and Bihar. They were mostly secular in orientation but had concern for the Muslims in British India. The League was not in favour of a separate Muslim state until the Punjabi poet-politician Mohammad Iqbal raised the idea of naming the country of Pakistan. His idea was supported by a group of Indian students

at Cambridge. As the prospect of British withdrawal increased in South Asia, Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah declared his support for the idea of Pakistan in the Lahore Resolution of 1940 (Cohen 2004: 5-6).

“In the Lahore session of the Muslim League in March 1940, Jinnah claimed that Islam and Hinduism were ‘not religions in the strict sense of the word’ but were ‘different and distinct social orders’. Since both communities belonged to ‘two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures’, any attempt to ‘yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to a growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.” (Giorgio 2007: 74-75)

The Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League (1940) also claimed for an independent status of “areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India”. Geographically, these consisted of five provinces: Sind, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province, western part of Punjab and eastern part of Bengal (Spate 1948: 5-7).

The year after the Lahore Resolution, Jamat-i-Islami was founded, which also supported the same idea. Following negotiations between the British, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, Pakistan was finally created on 14th August 1947 (Cohen 2004: 5-6).

Thus religion became the basis for the creation of Pakistan, whose main supporters were migrants to the new state. In order to comprehend the aspirations of the migrants in Pakistan, an analysis needs to be made to understand how the consciousness of these Muslims developed in undivided India.

The Rise of Consciousness: Politics of Identity

The above discussion has pointed towards the declining condition of the Muslims and their competition with the Hindus, which led them to form their own state. But a significant change in their position was observed after the Muslims started receiving English education and began to get well absorbed in the system.

The Muslims initially were against the British Raj as they ousted Mughal rule from the country and imposed colonial rule in its place. So they distanced themselves from

Western education and culture, thereby shunning their growth in comparison to the Hindus. Syed Ahmed Khan understood the situation and founded Aligarh Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in 1886 for imparting modern education to the Muslims and promoting their social and economic development. This made the Muslims realise that they were being left behind by the Hindus, who from the very beginning saw the light of education. Before Syed Ahmed Khan started Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Sayed Amir Ali founded the Central National Mohammadan Association in 1877 that proposed to work with the progressive tendencies of the Western culture. It dealt with the problem of Muslim education and their meagre representation in the government offices. After these reformative steps, the Muslims became acquainted with modern education. But the British government's move towards self-rule – in Morley-Minto Reform 1919 and Government of India Act 1935 – made the Muslims realise that the majority Hindus will always have an upper hand in the system by virtue of their population (Ayaz 2013: 24-25).

Babar Ayaz mentions that according to Pakistani historian Mubarak Ali the introduction of the democratic institutions, which favoured the majority Hindus created a minority complex among the Muslims. This gave rise to the Muslim political identity, which wanted to assert itself in the form of creation of Pakistan. The Muslims asked for a separate electorate in 1882, thus laying seeds for a separate identity politics based on religion (Ayaz 2013: 25-26).

It is to be pointed out here that the Muslim League, which was found in 1906 was influenced by Syed Ahmed Khan's tradition and was led by the elite Muslims to defend their interests, get special consideration from the British, and to oppose the Congress. Though the Muslim League was founded in Dhaka, it was strongly supported in the Urdu-speaking heartland of India – in the United Province between Delhi and Allahabad. The foundation of the Muslim League was made when Hindi was made an official language and was given equal footing that of Urdu. It alarmed the Muslims that Hindi might edge out Urdu from the governmental work, as the Hindus have a numerical majority (Lieven 2011: 53).

Lance Brennan has also reiterated the same. In his words,

“The problems facing the Muslim elite of U.P. in the first decade of the twentieth century were daunting. Economically they were shaky, in that of the three basic occupations on which they relied, executive positions in the P.C.S.,

the middle-ranking positions in the police force, and zamindari, the first two were vulnerable, and the latter (outside Oudh) was of declining value.”

He also points out that the Muslims at that time were not participating in modern English education like the Hindus and their Urdu language had to share space with Hindi as the vernacular languages of the province. This gave them a feeling that they would be outnumbered by the Hindus in democratic representation (Brennan 1984: 249).

After the formation of the MAO College and the Muslims becoming conscious of their rights, their condition was improved in India. They achieved a fixed share in Indian Civil Service (ICS) and UP Public Service Commission (PSC), as well as enjoyed a favoured position in bureaucracy (Brennan 1984: 251).

In 1909 the Muslims got separate electorate. In the Lucknow Pact of 1916 they secured agreement with the Congress for separate electorate and 30% of the seats in the reform council. Between 1920 and 1937, the Muslims were selected by the Governor as members of “transferred departments in UP”. Their position was further uplifted in the Government of India Act of 1935 where it was guaranteed that the Muslims would be included in any elected ministry. Their position was also boosted in the civil services, education etc., except in the fact that their land holding was declining with time (Brennan 1984: 258- 259).

Now the question that comes to the fore is: what was the basic thrust for these Urdu-speaking Muslims to migrate to Pakistan? Paul. R. Brass mentions the reason to be political, which developed after the election of 1937 that compelled the elites of the Muslim League to plan a separate country for the Muslims. He says,

“The census figures for 1911 and 1921 on employment by religion in UP, which are the latest available comprehensive figures, demonstrate clearly that up to that time, Muslims were either over-represented or proportionately well represented in comparison to the Hindus not only in government employment, but in every major category of employment in both the modern urban sectors of the economy and in elite sectors of the traditional rural economy. In many key categories, Muslims approached equality in numbers with and even surpassed the number of Hindus.” (Brass 1970: 173)

Brass also states that the political representation of the Muslims in the local self-governing bodies in UP in the 1920s show over-representation of them.

“In 1923, 25.2 per cent and in 1925-26, 33.7 per cent of the elected members of the 48 district boards in UP were Muslims. In March 1928, the UP Government revealed that 66 of out of 240 members of Notified Area Committees (small town governments), or 27.5 per cent and 291 out of 935 members of municipal boards, or 41.8 per cent were Muslims.” (Brass 1970: 183-184)

The Muslim League got most of its support from this region. Although initially it was only supported by the elites, later it managed to gather the support of the middle- and lower-class people. But it was the 1937 election which became the main determining factor for the migration of the Muslims. Paul Brass has explained this:

“It would appear that the minority status of the Muslims of the north itself gave impetus to Muslim separatist demands. Minority politics again became decisive in U P Hindu-Muslim relations in 1937 when, separate electorates notwithstanding, U P Muslims in the Muslim League were unable to win power either through elections or through negotiations in the provincial government of U P and decided to re-organise, mobilise the Muslim electorate, and change the terms of political competition by raising the Pakistan demand.” (Brass 1970: 168)

Further he adds,

“U P Muslims took the lead because they were a privileged minority in the nineteenth century in the region and their leaders were determined to maintain their privileges. Until 1940 Muslim separatism in India was a movement for minority privileges within India.” (Brass 1970: 185)

Therefore according to him, the UP Muslims took the lead because they feared loss of their position if they stayed back in the country. So the main thrust for creating a state came from the factor that the position of the Muslims should be kept intact in the new state, where they wouldn't have to compete with the Hindu elites for power share (Brass 1970: 185).

Thus the Urdu-speaking community willingly migrated to Pakistan since they had the fear of Hindu domination in the country. They called themselves the proponent of the state as they felt they would be able to hold their position in the new state where their authority would not be challenged. After coming to Pakistan they were called as Mohajirs, which meant migrants.

Making of the Mohajir Identity

The term 'Mohajir' is said to have been derived from the word 'Hijra', which denotes the flight of Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina to avoid the harassment by the enemies of Islam. Later its connotation was also used as migration for the cause of Islam (Ahmed 1998: 93).

The migrants initially took immense pride in the term Mohajir as it had religious connotation. They considered it a proper term to describe their migration for the cause of Islam and to a country created on the basis of religion. But in the present milieu, Mohajir refers to the migrant, Urdu-speaking population from India (Pattanaik 2008: 459).

Since the term originally was used to signify Prophet Muhammad's flight from Mecca to Medina, this concept of migration of the Muslims also had a connotation of pilgrimage in the new land. It was mainly used to signify their noble cause of migration and that they deserved a significant place in the new country (Dryland 2000: 123).

The concept of Mohajir has other fascinating connotations that both denotes the group's sense of belonging as well as anguish. The word is basically used to denote a migrant, which also refers to a transitory identity that is mainly based on the movement. If this aspect of the term is considered then it can be said that migration can occur with not much emotional attachment to the land, which one migrates to and migrants also have a sense of loss of their own lands. This connotation of the term refers to longing of the group for the land they have left. Thus it suggests a psychological trauma and a sacrifice which has occurred due to migration. In this sense, the term is deployed in the process of claiming rights based on loss referring to the past (Saigol 2002: 2). But in case of the Mohajirs, although they had fear of loss, but they had expectation from the land to which they were migrating.

Feroz Ahmad describes that the term Mohajir was also applied to the radical Indian Muslims who migrated to Afghanistan in the 1920s to protest against the British occupation of India. Later, it was used to describe the 7 million Indian Muslims who came to Pakistan from India due to the Partition. About 70% of these refugees were Punjabis who had migrated from East Punjab and settled mostly in West Punjab. This area absorbed 80% of West Pakistan's refugee population and because of similar

culture and language these people assimilated quickly in West Punjab and ceased to identify themselves as Mohajirs (Ahmed 1998: 91-92).

Ahmed further mentions that a little above 4% of Punjab's population comprised of Urdu-speaking people who also got incorporated into the Punjabi mainstream culturally or by learning their language. In Sindh, where 18% of the refugees settled down, the immigrant population was ethnically and culturally distinct from the Sindhis. The former were Urdu-speaking Muslims from Delhi, United Provinces, Central Provinces, Ajmer, Rajputana, Hyderabad, Bihar etc. These migrants who were close to almost 20% of the population of Sindh mostly settled down in the urban centres (Ahmed 1998: 91-92).

The refugees who came from the Muslim-minority provinces of India settled down in Sindh, especially in Karachi, and occupied 55% of the city's population. This kind of settlement allowed for a cultural isolation for these people who were later called Mohajirs. Thus, people who were Urdu speaking or having the same condition as the Urdu speakers, and who adopted Urdu as their language of literacy called themselves Mohajirs. The term is now used to denote the people who are Urdu speakers and descendants of those who migrated from India during the Partition. As Feroz Ahmed says,

“in this sense the appellation, though not delivered from the territory, race, religion, language or nationality of the group, has become specific to a linguistic group, drawn from geographically dispersed mother populations but forced to congeal within a restricted territory in Pakistan.” (Ahmed 1998: 91-92)

Chishti in *Friday Times* mentions that the term Mohajir was emphasised more in the 1970s and 1980s when the immigrants were called as “Hindustan Raan” and “Panah Guzeer” or “Makars”. Since then the immigrants started calling themselves Mohajirs. But he states that this group has for long suffered an identity crisis and was in search of its own roots as they were not well accepted by the other ethnic groups of Pakistan (Chishti, *Friday Times*, 11-17 November 2011).

The Mohajirs' connection with India has made the situation worse as they are still termed as the refugees or migrants. Another problem, as identified by Feroz Ahmed, is as these people had geographical diversity while living in India and their diversity

in the “historically evolved Muslim identity in an Urdu/Hindi/Hindustani milieu, the group has been unable to identify itself around its most natural denominator, the Urdu Language” (Ahmed 1998: 92).

In an article published in the *Dawn* newspaper of Pakistan, Nadeem F. Paracha states, “Unlike the country’s other major ethnic groups, Mohajirs are not ‘people of the soil’. Their roots lie in areas that are outside of what today is Pakistan.” It was further reported that these people who came from North India mostly settled in Karachi and became a part of Pakistani ruling elite along with the Punjabis. Being highly educated, this group started controlling the bureaucracy and the economy of the city (Paracha, *Dawn*, 20 April 2014).

Thus from here it is clear that a distinction is being made between the indigenous people and the migrants by saying that the latter are not original inhabitants. It is to be pointed here that these migrants, especially belonging to the middle and lower class, had to suffer a lot during migration. In spite of this, they had expectations from the new land and hoped for an improved life. Therefore, all these factors worked behind the making of Mohajir identity.

Ethnic Aspiration of the Mohajirs




Fig 3.1 *Aspiration of the Mohajirs for which they migrated to Pakistan*

After the Partition in August 1947, the borders remained open till April 1951. According to Haq, 6 million Non-Muslims moved from Pakistan to India and about 8 million Muslims moved from India to Pakistan. The majority of the Muslim refugees

came from East Punjab and settled in West Punjab, but some of the migrants went to Sindh. The vast majority of the latter came from the Urdu-speaking Muslim communities in the other northern, central and western provinces of India, and settled mostly in the urban areas of Sindh. According to the 1951 census, close to 55% of the population of Karachi were Mohajirs (Haq 1995: 991).

The Pakistan Bureau report of 1998 Census says that 41.1% of Urdu-speaking Mohajirs dwelled in Sindh.




Chart 3.1 Urdu Speaking Population of Pakistan (Census 1998), Source: Data based on Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (1998)

During the first decade after the Partition, this Urdu-speaking group, along with the Punjabis, were dominant in Pakistan’s political and bureaucratic arena. Between 1947-58 most of the significant political offices were held by both Punjabi-speaking and Urdu-speaking refugees, who occupied 18 out of a total of 27 offices of Governor General, President, Prime Minister, Provincial Governors and Chief Ministers. These political elites, emphasising on Islamic identity, selected Urdu as the national language of the country. This stance was claimed to be taken to construct the very foundation for a homogenise state that was intended to generate a common national

outlook of the people. This aspect gave an upper hand to the Urdu speakers and their importance in the political setup of the country was further lifted (Haq 1995: 991).

Another important thing to be mentioned here is that in Karachi, where most of the Urdu-speaking migrants came and settled down, was mostly inhabited by the Hindus before independence. The Hindu community occupied most of the white-collar jobs. With their departure, a vacuum was created in the shops, banks, industry or government offices, which were filled up by the educated Mohajirs. This was mainly due to the reason that the Sindhis were ill-equipped to occupy the higher job positions, mostly because of the lack of education among them. The Sindhis had a feudal rural structure without much emancipation in education (Dryland 2000: 123-124). Therefore, with their education and knowledge of administration the Mohajirs were able to successfully make a place for themselves in the state of Pakistan. It needs to be noted here that apart from educational background, the Mohajirs had huge differences in culture, traditions and customs with the other groups.

Further, the Mohajirs came from the areas, which after 1857, witnessed a change in the political setup, where the elite groups of Nawabs and landlords were left with little political power. The urban Muslim community of North and Central India began to seek a place for themselves in the society with the help of modern education in the British India and also replaced the leadership of the Nawabs and landlords by forming the Muslim League. The Muslim League's structure, constitution and working procedures were democratic in nature. Thus Mohajirs came to Pakistan with the hope of a democratic culture where there will be a well-represented system (Chitkara 1996: 50).

On the other hand, Punjabis – a dominant group in Pakistan – remained loyal to the British, by occupying important positions in the forces during the British period. The British had a good relationship with the Punjabi and Sindhi landed aristocracy. So the system that developed in Punjab and Sindh was very different from that of North and Central India. The administration in Punjab and Sindh was built around strong executive; political and economic problems were solved in a paternalistic way. The socio-political structure of these places had huge differences with the areas where Mohajirs came from. Therefore, these distinctions hardly gave the Mohajirs a chance

to consolidate with the other groups, especially the Sindhis of Pakistan (Chitkara 1996: 50).

After arriving in Pakistan, the Mohajirs, who were only 3% of the total population had 21% of the jobs. If the senior jobs are also taken into account, they held 33.5% in federal bureaucracy in 1973 and 20% in the Secretariat group in 1974. However, their share came down to 18.3% in 1986 and 14.3% in 1989 respectively. The Mohajirs were not only prominent in politics and bureaucracy of the country, but also played an imperative role in business. The Gujarati-speaking migrants from Bombay – especially Memon, Bohra and Khoja communities – were the progenitors of industrialisation in Pakistan. These Mohajirs after coming to Pakistan controlled 7 of the 12 largest industrial houses. Thus, from the very beginning they had enjoyed a privileged position in Pakistan (Waseem 1996: 991).

Despite being only 3% of the population, the important portfolios of the state went to the Mohajirs between 1948 and 1958. As Khan puts it,

“At the time of partition, there were 101 Muslim officers in the Indian Civil Services (ICS) and Indian Political Services (IPS). Of this ninety five opted for Pakistan. Out of eighty three ICS officers, forty nine were Urdu-speakers from the minority provinces.” (Khan 2005: 167)

Now arises the question: why did the Mohajirs enjoy such significant position? These elite Muslims who migrated to Pakistan belonged to the United Provinces and were strong supporters of the Muslim League. They already had a dominant position in India and were economically and politically sound.

In 1948, the Liaquat Ali Khan government introduced a quota system for civil services to increase the number of Bengalis who were under-represented in it. For the Bengalis, who consisted 56.75% of the total population, it was 42% reservation. But for the Mohajirs the quota was 2% for 1.5% population. Again an additional 15% allocation for the future migrants was made by the government during this time. Furthermore, the revised quota of 1949 reduced the Bengali and Non-Punjabi areas' share by 2% and allocated 20% to the merit category. This brought more benefit to the Mohajirs who were almost 70% literate. By 1950, Mohajirs, who were 2% of Sindh's total population, had 46.6% share in civil services. Though their share in the non-

official positions was not that high but they had high shares in senior positions – 23% in 1968 (Khan 2005: 167-168).

In the hands of the Punjabis and the Mohajirs, the One Unit Plan was also devised, Urdu was made the national language and the flag of Pakistani identity was kept flying. In terms of economic development, Karachi and Hyderabad, where most of the Mohajirs resided, were made commercial hubs of the country. The Karachi-based industrial houses controlled 96% of Muslim-owned private industries and over 80% of private banks and insurance companies (Khan 2005: 167-168).

Further, Karachi, which was made the capital of Pakistan was annexed by the Federal government during this time. Thus from the economic and political points of view this area became the hotspot of power. Under the One Unit Plan, Karachi remained the capital where the Punjabi-Mohajir elites dominated the federal bureaucracy of the country. This plan was made to consolidate the concept of religious nationalism where West Pakistan was considered as one unit. The plan boosted the condition of the Mohajirs both politically and socially, and their idea of Pakistani nationalism based on religion was upheld (Ayaz 2013: 83-84).

The position of the Mohajirs in the Pakistani society was further reinforced with the military-bureaucratic cooperation. The Mohajirs occupying important positions in bureaucracy remained firmly ingrained in the political and economic power setup of the country throughout the period of military rule. Pattanaik has mentioned that Ross Massood, a senior bureaucrat, while emphasising on the significance of the bureaucracy said, “The army are military bureaucrats but they do not know the system so need us (bureaucrats) to guide them.” The military-bureaucracy relation led the Mohajirs to bargain for their power and position in Pakistan (Pattanaik 1999: 461).

The very fact that the privileged ethnic group of the Mohajirs had control over the resources and jobs along with the Punjabis gave rise to ethnic tension among other ethnic groups of Pakistan. They started voicing concern for their share in politics and economy on the basis of their ethnic and regional identities. This gradually developed a group consciousness among the Mohajirs too, when they found that the basis of their identity could be used to bargain with the state for resource share.

Thus while talking about the ethnic aspirations of the Mohajirs it could be said that initially the Mohajirs were against the concept of parochial ethnic identity, which

would have narrowed down the concept of the unity of the state based on religious nationalism. They rather supported Muslim and Pakistani identity and were supporters of the Muslim League and the Jamat-i-islami. Mohammad Waseem has said that “they had made the trek from India as a blessed minority and operated at the national, not provincial level” with their economic and political strongholds (Waseem 1996: 621-622).

On the basis of their culture and position in Pakistan, Feroz Ahmed discussed the following privileged positions of the Mohajirs that they enjoyed for being educated and well-employed.




Fig 3.2 *The privileged Position Enjoyed by the Mohajirs (Ahmed 1998: 102-103).*

However, it should be noted here that the lower-middle and middle class Mohajirs had to undergo hardships after coming to Pakistan. Though the highly educated Mohajirs were able to settle down quickly in the urban areas of Karachi, the less-affluent people had to undergo hardships after migration. Dryland states,

“*Kaccii aabaadii (mud huts)* housing sprang up in the city centre areas. The poor and low-income earners among the migrants of necessity occupied the open spaces adjacent to the city, and illegally squatted on all ‘available open spaces’, including the compounds of school buildings, footpaths and playgrounds’. Afterwards they moved out to areas such as Korangi, New Karachi, Baldia, Orangi, and Malir where government houses had been built for them.” (Dryland 2000: 125)

Further, the struggle for the Muslim refugees who worked as peasants continued even after migration as their advancement was blocked by the Sindhi landlords who did not easily give space for the Mohajirs to cultivate the lands left by the Hindus and the Sikhs (Dryland 2000: 125). Therefore, the sufferers of migration were not the well-educated, upper-class Mohajirs. It was essentially the less-skilled and less-educated class who had to suffer the hardship of the migration. The migrant small traders, weavers and goldsmiths who lacked the financial backing and support of the big families remained dependent on the Gujarati business class migrants who controlled many industries of Pakistan (Dryland 2000: 129).

Although many lower-class Mohajirs continued to be in poverty because of the limitation of resources to the poor, but according to social surveys their position recovered rather rapidly and they were in a better social condition as compared to migrants of other ethnic groups. Again their cultural domination and the official promotion of Urdu, along with the growth of Urdu press further facilitated their position. These conditions helped the Mohajirs to enhance their situation by emphasising that all the people should have one identity as Pakistanis and one language. They claimed that any ethnic identity was not in priority in front of the Pakistani identity. The Muslim nationalist politics represented by the Muslim League remained the ideological position of the Mohajirs initially (Ahmed 1998: 104).

But still the Mohajirs had a dilemma regarding the status they had. The Mohajirs who settled in Karachi had the expectation that with their pioneering record in the struggle for Pakistan they would be given their due share in the state’s power structure.

Chitkara explains this dilemma quoting Mani Shankar Aiyar in “Pakistan Papers” in 1994. He says that in Pakistan he had not found the desired goal for which the Mohajirs fought. He seemed to be insecure about the future of the Mohajirs. But at the same time he emphasised on the fact that the Mohajirs are the most educated, articulated group in the country having connection with India as the Mohajirs have migrated from UP, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Hence they almost represented mini-India in Karachi. This community also uprooted themselves and came to a promised land and dedicated themselves to the thought that “I am a Pakistani because I am not an Indian” (Chitkara 1996: 51).

Beginning of the Mohajir Ethnic Struggle

In the beginning the Mohajirs were welcomed in the new country. The then Chief Minister of Sindh, M. Ayub Khuhro, even claimed that “the Sindhis were modern-day Ansars”, which meant hosts to the migrants. It was a reference to “the hosts of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions who were welcomed in Madina upon migration from Mecca in the early days of Islam” (Khalidi 1998: 342).

But the insecurity of the Sindhis grew with the second phase of migration from Hyderabad, Deccan in 1948 when another fresh wave of people came to Pakistan after the fall of the Muslims in those provinces. These people were mainly the volunteers who opposed aggression. Even from Mysore and Madras smaller groups of Muslims came to Pakistan in search of a better life (Khalidi 1998: 342-343).

As an overwhelming majority of the refugees from UP, Central Provinces, Bombay, Hyderabad or further South settled in Karachi and other parts of Sindh, a pressure was created on the socio-economic pattern of Sindh. This also made a demographic shift in the province (Chitkara 1996: 51).

With the coming of the Mohajirs – especially the second wave – in Pakistan the Sindhis became conscious of the fact that they would have to share their resources with the migrants. The Sindhis also understood that being more educated, these groups would have a fair share in the hierarchy of state power in both economic and political terms.

Chitkara says,

“they represented a highly educated, civilized, cultured and hardworking group of mostly Urdu-speaking immigrants of Indian origin, who had immensely contributed to the creation of Pakistan. That decade also saw these “Mohajirs” occupying the choicest positions in the civil society, bureaucracy, judiciary in industry and finance.” (Chitkara 1996: 51)

As noted by Khalidi, G.M. Syed, a Sindhi nationalist leader, cautioned in 1949 that the influx of the Mohajirs

“looms ahead like a terrible nightmare, in which the people of Sindh would be trampled upon as mere serfs by the more numerous and aggressive outsiders... The Sindhi people as they have been known to history so far, may well perish and be remembered only as an extinct race.” (Khalidi 1998: 344)

The Sindhi leader started the movement *Jiye Sindh* to defend the Sindhis’ rights as “Sons of the soil”. This was intended to protect the rights and resources for the Sindhis against the migrants or the Mohajirs, as the latter had an important role in the country’s power share and had monopolised the economic resources of the province (Singh 2003: 43-44).

A similar kind of insecurity also grew among the Mohajirs who felt like outsiders in the new land. Khalidi mentions that in an anonymous letter of a Mohajir published in *Dawn* on 18 January 1948, it was written,

“I feel it is the struggle and sacrifices of people like us that went a long way towards the realization of Pakistan. Or is it that we were cleverly duped and Pakistan was meant for the people of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, Frontier, and Bengal only and not for every Musalman of India?” (Khalidi 1998: 344)

From this statement the apprehension of the Mohajirs against other ethnic groups was clear as they felt that the latter did not like them. Thus within a few years the initial welcome by the Sindhis were outworn. After the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the Mohajirs lost much of their political share although they remained firmly entrenched in the civil service, educational institutions, journalism, business, industry and independent professions (Khalidi 1998: 344).

Alienation of the Mohajirs

The death of Liaquat Ali and Jinnah, and coming to power of General Ayub Khan through a military coup d'état in 1958 marked the most powerful phase of military domination in Pakistan. The increase in military's power signalled a restriction of power of the Mohajir-dominated bureaucracy. The Mohajirs, who were junior partners with the Punjabis in bureaucracy, were crystallised during this phase. With the coming in of Ayub Khan, the Mohajirs were replaced by the Pakhtuns and the Punjabis in the police services (Ahmed 1998: 107).

But there wasn't complete decline of the Mohajirs' supremacy during this time. The economic development in manufacturing and service sectors with the help of the Western nations in the Ayub-era actually benefitted the Mohajirs and the Punjabis. The Mohajirs' property claims were extended to 7.5% and agricultural lands were given to them for settlement in Sindh. For the poorer sections Ayub Khan constructed residential quarters. By the end of 1962, most of Ayub Khan's top officials were Mohajirs. Feroz Ahmed opines that with the economic progress, the Mohajirs created both positive and negative aspects. On one hand the Mohajirs had high expectations and were concerned about the fact that they should not be deprived, but at the same time they were depriving the others about which they were not concerned (Ahmed 1998: 107-108).

A blow to the Mohajir supremacy, however, came in the 1960s when there was green revolution in Punjab which altered the economic, demographic and political scenario of Pakistan. As capitalism developed deep roots into the Punjabi economy mainly uplifting social and economic relations of production, the prosperity of the group gave an impetus for future leaders both in economic and political spheres. Thus from here not only new, dynamic entrepreneurs were born, there was also spread of education and migration of these educated people to the cities (including Karachi) for government jobs, which gave a tough competition to the Mohajirs (Zaidi 1991: 1295).

Further, with the development in Karachi during Ayub-era, many Pakhtuns from North West Frontiers started migrating to Karachi for a better standard of living. This posed challenged to the Mohajirs and they accused Ayub Khan's government for his bias against them in urban Sindh and called his decision to move the capital from Karachi to Islamabad as a deliberate attempt to marginalise them (Haq 1995: 992).

During this time the Mohajirs were staunch supporters of the religious parties who were against the Ayub regime. The first generation of Mohajirs wanted to show it strongly that the main reason for their migration was not economic, but rather for a country based on religious nationalism (Ayaz 2013: 88).

However, the quota system in Pakistan was prevalent since 1949. The new “complex regional and special interest quotas” were there for the recruitment in the federal, provincial and semi-governmental posts. There were also similar quotas in the educational sectors with varying multitudes. But it is to be pointed here that although the quota system made the bureaucracy more representative, urban Sindh and Punjab still continued to be over-represented in the federal bureaucracy (Haq 1995: 992).

A mention also needs to be made here about the Sindhi-Mohajir conflict. The Mohajirs made a conscious choice to move to Pakistan and they became a privileged minority with good jobs, education, business etc. Since they had gone through the trauma of the Partition they felt that it was their right to be the rulers of the state as Pakistan was created by the efforts of the Mohajirs. Thus with superior position in colonial administration they started looking down at the indigenous Sindhis (Khan 2005: 169-170).

The rural Sindhis, who had suffered economically and socially, mainly because of the feudal structure and lack of access to urban resources, were seen by the Mohajirs as culturally and educationally inferior. Being feudal in nature the Sindhi society hindered social and economic development. The Mohajirs settled in the urban areas of Sindh and developed a bias towards the Sindhis (Khan 2005: 169-170).

Even religion, which was the common link between the Sindhis and the Mohajirs, could not solve their hostility. Difference in culture and language always stood in the path of development of a consolidated culture and cordial relationship between the two. Even the modernised Islam of the Mohajirs was in sharp contrast to the folk, Sufi-influenced, syncretism Islam of the Sindhis. Instead of adopting the Sindhi culture, the Mohajirs tried to impose their own culture on the Sindhis. Thus the conflict between the two was clearly visible from the 1970s, which in turn gave rise to Mohajir ethnic consciousness and its politicisation (Khan 2005: 169-170).

Growth of Mohajir Ethnic Consciousness

The growth of Mohajir ethnic consciousness happened in respect to the ethnic politics of other communities. After the Ayub-era and One Unit Plan the consciousness and deprivation of the other communities led to group consciousness among the Mohajirs and they started voicing for provincial autonomy and equal distribution of resources. Pakistan's first free national elections in 1970 witnessed the swearing in of democratic leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This election changed many things in Pakistan including the political, administrative, geographical structure of the state. The 1971 war with India in which East Pakistan was separated and formed as Bangladesh changed the political scenario of Pakistan where ethno-national politics came to dominate (Ahmed 1998: 112).

The 1970 election brought Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in power as the elected President. With the formation of Bangladesh, the Punjabis became the majority community. Although in Sindh the Mohajirs had increased in population from 2% to 4%, it was still not able to get a substantial share in the political hierarchy of the country. They also had no province of their own. Further, the Mohajirs thought that the immigrant status never gave them a chance for effective representation in the national or provincial government. By this time a substantial proportion of the military positions were occupied by the Pakhtuns (Ahmed 1998: 113).

The Sindhis were also making a strong demand for the civilian jobs. They started voicing their own grievances and were opting for the state-wise quota system. The sons of the soil, the Sindhis, pressurised the federal governments to secure their positions by providing quota and also make Sindhi as the official language of the province. Finally after a prolonged riot between the two, the Sindhi Language Bill was passed on 8 July 1972 (Singh 2003: 44).

One of the most devastating impact of the creation of Bangladesh on the Mohajirs was that it gave a blow to the concept of 'Two Nation Theory', which justified the creation of Pakistan on the basis of religion. The division of Pakistan on the basis of language and ethnicity caused resentment among the Mohajirs regarding their future. They thought that Sindh could also become a country where they would have to live like second-class citizens, just like the Biharis in Bangladesh (Ahmed 1998: 113). Thus

they felt it would lead to the same situation when they suffered in India in the hands of the Hindus in the past.

During Bhutto's government some policies gave a blow to the Mohajir's privileged status in the national as well as in the Sindh province. These policies included nationalisation of private sector enterprises, reforms in the structure of the civil services, reformulation of the quota system and reintroduction of Sindhi language as the medium of instruction (Khan 2005: 171).

They received further setback when the Karachi-based industrialists, who were in almost total control of the resources in both wings of the country, had to suffer because of the loss of the eastern wing of Pakistan. With this separation they lost resources and the way to foreign exchange. The Bhutto government also nationalised banks and insurance companies, which gave further hurt the Mohajirs. Some big industrial houses lost 50% to 75% of their assets due to the nationalisation policy of Bhutto. Although the Mohajirs did not lose their employment because of these policies, but it certainly was a blow to their official status (Khan 2005: 171).

In this context Adeel Khan says,

“The damaging aspect of the nationalisation for Mohajirs was that when these enterprises became part of the public sectors owned by the state, entry for employment had to be made through quota system of regulating employment. Under these circumstances, it was natural for the Mohajirs, whose share in industrial labour was as high as 90 percent, to feel anxious, indeed frightened.” (Khan 2005: 171)

Many of the Mohajirs were distressed by Bhutto's policies in the 1970s, which were perceived as anti-Mohajir policies. Under his government, Sindh was given 19% share in the federal bureaucracy. Haq mentions,

“for recruitment into federal and provincial bureaucracies and admission into educational institutions, further allocation was made based on rural (60%) and urban (40%) “domiciles” in Sindh. The Domicile, a document that determines an individual's place of residence, became a dreaded piece of paper for many Mohajir youth. The rural/urban quota, in practice, meant an ethnic quota for Sindhis (rural) and Urdu-speaking Muhajirs (urban).” (Haq 1995: 992)

Though the Mohajirs continued to dominate the federal bureaucracy and management positions in the private sector, but the quota system restricted their opportunities at the

provincial level and created competition at the federal level. However, with the introduction of the quota system, there was not much decline in the job share of the Mohajirs in absolute terms, but there was a relative decline in comparison to the increase in job share of the Punjabis, Pathans and Sindhis (Haq 1995: 992).

It is significant to note here what Farhan Hanif Siddiqi says. According to him, the quota system was not new for the Mohajirs. Liaquat Ali Khan in September 1948 first introduced quota to achieve parity between the eastern and western wings of the country. This system had favoured the Mohajirs as in Karachi, they received a 2% quota despite of having 1.5% population. An additional 15% allocation was also made for the migrants from India. But Bhutto amended this quota system and made new regional quotas in the federal bureaucracy.

“Introduced in 1971, the quota mandated that 10 percent of the vacancies in government be filled on the basis of all-Pakistan merit, 50 percent allocated to the Punjab, 11.5 percent to the North West Frontier Province, 7.6 percent to urban Sindh, 11.4 percent to rural Sindh and 3.5 percent to Balochistan.” (Siddiqi 2012: 98)

Because of the quota system the Mohajirs felt that the Sindhis were gaining ground in the area with the help of the Sindhi Prime Minister Bhutto (Siddiqi 2012: 98).

Furthermore, although the Mohajir upper and upper-middle classes had sustained to do well, it was the middle and lower-middle class Mohajir youth who actually felt constraints of the quota system. Haq notes,

“Because the criterion for favoured status (domicile) is largely ascribed and not based on need or achievement, it follows *et ceteris paribus* that the quota favours the relatively well-off candidate from both backward and developed regions.” (Haq 1998: 992)

After the introduction of 60:40 quota to facilitate the Sindhis, there was also a major shift in the urban-based allocation. During his time, Bhutto had abolished the special status given to Karachi and brought down the merit seats percentage from 20 to 10. From then onwards, the Mohajirs had to face the policy of representation based on population and not social status. Because of this quota system their position in the civil services also declined. The system of “lateral entry” facilitated the “technocrats”

who can join the state apparatus without giving competitive examinations. This aspect aided support for the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Bhutto (Khan 2005: 172).

Further setback came in the form of language issue. In 1972, the Bhutto government moved a bill in Sindh Assembly to reintroduce Sindhi language as the medium of instruction. There was a huge protest by the Mohajirs regarding this (Khan 2005: 172).

This bill made Sindhi as second language to the students not receiving instruction in Sindhi. It also made compulsory for a regional government official to learn the language (Ahmed 1998: 115).

The Sindhi Language Bill mentioned education and employment in its Clause 4. It stated, according to Siddiqi,

“1) Sindhi and Urdu shall be compulsory subjects for study in class IV to XII in all institutions in which such classes are held. 2) The introduction of Sindhi as compulsory subject shall commence at the lowest level, namely class IV, and by stages to be prescribed, be introduced in higher classes up to class XII.” (Siddiqi 2012: 93)

And in clause 6,

“Subject to provisions of the Constitution, Government may make arrangements for progressive use of Sindhi language in offices and departments of government including courts and Assembly.” (Siddiqi 2012: 93)

The Mohajirs opposed the bill and wanted to add “in addition to a national language” after the word “Assembly” in clause 6. They wanted to ensure that Urdu should be used along with Sindhi in the government departments. This led to a protest by the Urdu-speaking people, ultimately leading to riots between the Mohajirs and the Sindhis in the city. Thus this bill was an alarm for the Mohajirs, signalling decline of their position (Siddiqi 2012: 93).

The Mohajirs increasingly became insecure of the Sindhis as they never wanted to lose their position in education and employment. This insecurity actually led to the growth of ethnic consciousness among the Mohajirs.

The new quota system had its effect with an anticipated decline in the share of the Mohajirs. In urban Sindh, the Mohajirs experienced a fall in recruitment from 30.1%

in 1973 to 20.2% in 1983, while the Sindhi share in federal bureaucracy increased from 3.1% in 1973 to 5.1% in 1983. But despite all this, the Mohajirs continued to dominate the bureaucracy and was over-represented in respect to their population. It was only a certain class, mainly the middle and the lower classes, which felt constrains of the quota system both in the federal and provincial system. They had a tough competition not only with the Sindhis but with the Pathans and the Punjabis as well. In Karachi, they had to face competition of the other migrants who were also included in the urban quota (Haq 1995: 993).

What the Mohajirs felt was that there was a disparity in what they got and what they should have got. They saw the gap between the society's resources and opportunities to which they felt entitled to. This was mainly because the Mohajirs always felt that the struggle they had to undertake while migration and creating the state should be awarded with more privileges and resources (Haq 1995: 993).




Fig 3.3: Disparity between what the Mohajirs expected and what they received

Ethnic Politics of the Mohajirs: Rise of the MQM

The approach of the Mohajirs to ethnic politics can be divided into two phases. The first phase was pre-1971, when they were dominant in the Pakistani bureaucracy and political benefits, which ensured a privileged position in the country's power structure. The second was post-1971, which brought disappointment about their

notion of unity on the basis of religion after the creation of Bangladesh (Pattanaik 2008: 463).

Veena Kukreja comments that the rise of the Mohajir Quami Movement came to the forefront with the rise of the nationalist sentiments of other ethnic groups. Until 1970s, the dominant Mohajir groups saw the demands of the other groups on the basis of specific ethnicity, as opposed to the national unity of the country and the concept of Two Nation Theory. But the secession of East Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh was a defining moment for the Mohajirs in two ways – first, the failure of Two Nation Theory and second, the question of the Bihari refugees and their condition in Bangladesh (Kukreja 2003: 148).

After the creation of Bangladesh, which gave a push to ethnic politics in Pakistan, Sindhis also became conscious of their rights and started voicing for them. This led to confrontation between the Sindhis and Mohajirs on various issues such as language policy, quota system, power share etc. After 1971 with the emergence of new power equations, the Mohajirs' presence in politics also declined. As Pattanaik points out, "Certain reasons can be cited to explain this: they did not have the political constituency to fight elections from and they lacked social roots for mass mobilization." (Pattanaik 2008: 463)

The alienation had started from the time of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. During the 1977 election the Mohajirs sided with the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) as opposition to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Though the PPP won the election but lost to the PNA in the cities of Sindh. After the election, the military took over the democratic government, but the shift in the situation became a matter of concern for the Mohajirs (Siddiqi 2008: 121).

During the period of Mumtaz Bhutto as the Chief Minister, Urdu was replaced with Sindhi at primary school level to save the Sindhis from Mohajir influences and the growing domination of the Urdu-speaking migrants. This triggered an uproar among the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in Karachi, Hyderabad, Nawabshah, Sukkur and Mirpur Khas. The Mohajir-dominated areas soon rose in revolt and kicked off protests and rallies. They proclaimed the death of Urdu by saying, "Urdu ka janaza hai, bari dhum se nikle..." which translates to "Urdu's funeral procession proceeded with pomp and

circumstances”. There were language riots and the streets of Karachi witnessed long marches and police actions (Siddiqi 2008: 121).

During the Zia-ul-Haq period the government was initially in favour of the Mohajirs and the latter had a good share in the politics of Pakistan. But with time the Pakhtuns became junior partners in military and bureaucracy, reducing the share of the Mohajirs. The Punjabis settled in Karachi gave competition to the Mohajir youths in services and education. There were also Pakhtun-Mohajir clashes for factory jobs worsening the situation (Ahmed 1998: 118-119).

Another factor that can be discussed here is that after 1971 the Mohajirs felt that it was important for them to take part in ethnic politics, otherwise their condition would be worse than the Biharis in Bangladesh. With the growth of Sindhi nationalism the Mohajirs felt insecure and started voicing for their own ethnicity.

After the formation of Bangladesh the Mohajirs were confronted with a dilemma of choosing between two options: to retain their identity as a group with distinct ethno-cultural identity, or to merge with the identity of the original inhabitants of Pakistan. Among these two choices Mohajirs favoured to retain their own identity and language rather than incorporating with the Sindhis. To voice for their own ethnicity they felt the need to create a party of their own. However, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan, the two parties that the Mohajirs supported, were both religious parties and were unable to satisfy their needs based on ethnic demands (Siddiqi 2008: 6).

After the Mohajir-Sindhi language riot, the Mohajirs consolidated more as a group. Therefore, the protection of the Mohajirs as a nationality gained priority. During this time Muhmud-ul-Haq Usmani, a member of National Awami Party (NAP) launched the “Urdu Qaumi Council”, which for the first time declared the Mohajirs as a ‘fifth nationality’ of Pakistan. The group had similar charter as that of the NAP with the additional demand of claiming the Mohajirs as a ‘fifth nationality’. The council had many important personalities as its members. Rais Amrohvi galvanised Urdu speakers through his columns in the Pakistani newspaper *Jang*. He also defended the Mohajirs as the ‘fifth nationality’ of Pakistan (Gayer 2014: 85-86).

After this there were many small organisations like Tehrik-e-Shehri Hukumat, Tehrik-e-Istiqlal, which consolidated the Mohajir group consciousness by voicing for them.

In 1978, Salim Haider launched the Mohajir Medicos Association. He was also one of the founding members of the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) along with Altaf Hussain (Gayer 2014: 85-86).

The Mohajir consciousness was further crystallised in the universities and colleges after the new policies enunciated by the government. The Mohajir students had to compete with the other student associations based on linguistic and regional lines, including the Punjab Students Association, Pakhtun Students Association, Baloch Students Organisation and Jiye Sindh Students Federation. This led to the formation of the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) on 11th June 1978 in the University of Karachi. The APMSO was created mainly because the PNA was unable to fulfil its promises and could not safeguard the Mohajir interests. The leaders of the PNA failed to eradicate the quota system and secure lives of the Mohajirs against the perceived tyranny and violence (Waseem 1996: 625).

The political demands of the APMSO were entitled 'Pakistani Nationalism and the Concept of Nationalism in the World'. In this Pamphlet, Azim Ahmad Tariq, Vice chairman of the APMSO, said that after the closer of border in 1951 Pakistan became a Muslim state, but it had sidelined the Muslim migrants from the minority provinces of India and instead had made a government structure dominated by the Punjabis. The APMSO also emphasised on the fact that the Sindhis and the Mohajirs have different cultures and therefore demanded a separate Mohajir province. They also asked to remove the biased laws relating to the quota system and the domicile (Siddiqi 2012: 101).

The quota system mainly affected the middle class and the lower class Mohajirs. Thus the grievances expressed by the students of these classes were not only against the Non-Mohajirs but also against the elite-class Mohajirs. The APMSO was treated with disrespect by the Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT) in the campus along with other student unions. The situation worsened when the APMSO attacked the IJT, for which the former remained out of the campus. Meanwhile, Altaf Hussain and other members became vocal about the issues of Mohajirs in public and also started a magazine called *Al-Mohajir* in May 1982. With other leftist organisations they took part in the United Students Movement that opposed the IJT (Siddiqi 2012: 101-102).

After all these efforts at the student level, the party were taken to the national level by the formation of the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) in March 1984 with Altaf Hussain as its chief. With the formation of the MQM Altaf Hussain said that it was a party of the middle and lower-middle class people. He also distinguished the MQM from the PPP and the Muslim League (ML) by saying that the MQM was not composed of feudal lords like those two mainstream parties. He also said that the Mohajirs should be given the status of fifth nationality and employment in government services on the basis of population and not the quota system (Siddiqi 2012: 101-102).

However, the Mohajirs later said that the demand for a separate province was not in the card. Rather they wanted to live peacefully with their Sindhi brothers. They focused on the idea of cooperation with the Sindhis because they wanted to fight against the Punjabi domination, which had then become the real threat to the authority of the Mohajirs. For this, they needed to keep the Sindhis by their side. The Sindhis also supported the Mohajirs as they felt that to stop the Punjabi-Pakhtun domination they needed the Mohajirs' help (Paracha, *Dawn*, 23 October 2011).

Dawn reports that in 1969 Amir H. Kazmi, the head of his own faction of the Marxist National Student Federation, was the first to raise the banner of Mohajir nationalism. Regarding the formation of the MQM, it is commonly perceived that Zia-ul-Haq had helped to create the MQM to stop other political parties like the PPP and Jamat-i-Islami (JI) to have influence in Karachi. But *Dawn* reports that the reason behind the formation of the MQM was economic. According to famous Sindhi scholar Ibrahim Joyo, the Punjabi economic domination negatively impacted the leading business Mohajir communities. In such a situation, these communities formed the Maha Sindh (MS), an organisation to protect the interests of Karachi's Memon, Gujarati and Mohajir businessmen and traders. After this, the Maha Sindh financed the formation of the MQM (Paracha, *Dawn*, 23 October 2011).

From 1988 the MQM started participating in elections. In the 1988 election, the PPP needed support from the MQM to form their government. In early 1988 Altaf Hussain issued the MQM's 'Charter of Resolution', which clearly stated their aims and aspirations.

It included:

1. Sindh's domicile certificates must be issued to those who are residing in Sindh for the last 20 years.
2. Only the locals should be recruited in police services and intelligence agencies.
3. Both the Mohajirs and the Sindhis should be allowed to have weapon licences and these licences should be acquired in a simple way.
4. For the licence of commercial transport, locals should be preferred and should be given to a person with educational qualification not below matriculation.
5. Locals should be given preferences in government and semi-governmental posts, educational institutions and all the locals should have the right to vote.
6. The Afghan refugees should be banned from running businesses or owning property in Karachi and should be sent back to camps.
7. For federal government 10% merit quota should be abolished and replaced with population quota.
8. Stranded Pakistanis should be accepted as nationals especially the Biharis in Bangladesh.
9. Liaquat Ali Khan and Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai's death anniversaries should be proclaimed as national holidays (Jaffrelot 2015; Siddiqi 2012: 168, 102).

The PPP accepted the demands and out of political expediency, its leader, Benazir Bhutto, said that most of the demands are part of the PPP's manifesto.

In 1988, the MQM went for a political alliance with the PPP. This brought the MQM into power at the provincial level and in return they supported the PPP at the federal government. But the accord between the two broke down because of the federal government's unwillingness to repatriate the Biharies from Bangladesh and to recruit candidates to the federal bureaucracy from placement bureaus. This bureau was used by the PPP to recruit their own party candidates and the Sindhis into civil services (Samad 2002: 68-69).

After breakup, massive ethnic conflicts took place in the city. Finally there was downfall of the Benazir Bhutto government and the MQM formed an alliance with the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N). But even after Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister, ethnic conflicts continued and was compounded by violence. Thus

the situation lead the military to act against the MQM. The Army entered Karachi and started to downsize the party by a clean-up process. These decisions were taken by the Army and it is said that the Sharif government had no interference in it (Samad 2002: 68-69).

After the 1990 elections, the MQM entered into a new alliance with the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). But problems cropped up with the tactics of the MQM that were violent and even after their representation in the federal government, they didn't put a stop to it. The Pakistani government became intolerant regarding violence spread by the MQM and helped to form the MQM (Haqiqi) to counter the former (Khan 2005: 178).

Yunas Samad mentions that as the MQM was taking a lead role in the state machinery and influenced the federal government, authorities at the centre were afraid of losing control of the province. That is why the Army supported the Haqiqi group, a fraction of MQM, which could challenge the MQM's authority. But in spite of these efforts, the MQM still held its position among the Mohajirs of Karachi (Samad 2002: 69).

This takes us to the discussion about the other sections of the MQM. Beside Altaf Hussain's MQM, there were MQM (Haqiqi), the Mohajir Ittehad Tehrik (MIT) and the Mohajir Rabita Council (MRC).

The MQM (Haqiqi) was formed in 1991 due to ethnic conflicts within the MQM. There were personality clashes between the leaders, as well as Bihari and Non-Bihari conflicts within the party. Another factor that acted for the split was changing of the name of the party from 'Mohajir' to 'Muttahida' (means united). It brought criticism to Altaf Hussain from Afaq Ahmed and Amir Khan, as they felt that it was better to focus on the issues of the Mohajirs first and then to think about national politics. They were also against the Bihari domination in the MQM. So they both broke away and formed the MQM (Haqiqi) (Siddiqi 2012: 104).

The Mohajir Ittehad Tehrik (MIT) was formed in 1984 by Dr Halim Haider who was one of the founding members of the APMSO in 1978. He was against the soft stance of Altaf Hussain towards the Sindhis. He felt that it was not apt to ally with the Sindhis who don't have a proper attitude towards the Mohajirs. Dr Haider also felt that identity of the Mohajirs stemmed from their language. He also wanted a separate province for the Mohajirs. The MIT had vote bank in small areas of Sindh, and had

also organised rallies in the 1980s. But later when there was a strong clash between the Mohajirs and the Sindhis, the party could hardly survive, as most of the people aligned with bigger parties like the MQM (Gayer 2014; Siddiqi 2012; Verkaaik 2004: 86, 104, 77).

The Mohajir Rabita Council (MRC) was formed on 26th March 1988 with Maulana Wasi Mazhar Nadvi as its President. In spite of the presence of the MQM, the MRC was formed because it represented the first generation of the Mohajirs. This organisation also witnessed non-Bihari and Bihari clashes and were more concerned with community feeling. The MRC too faded with time (Gayer 2014; Verkaaik 2004: 86, 77).

Therefore, Mohajir politics developed through various phases and under different conditions in comparison to other ethnic groups. Though different organisations were formed to voice for Mohajir politics, but the MQM is the most important organisation that has dominated the politics of Sindh and Pakistan.

However, the MQM became a cause of concern for the centre due to the tactics used by it. During the late 1980s, the MQM was alleged for using its power and violent methods to terrorise journalists, vendors and industrialists for money to run the organisation. They also forced the people to pay for their organisation. To stop this, Operation Clean-up began in May 1992 aimed to uproot those who were creating violence in Karachi (Siddiqi 2012: 106). Needless to say, the MQM was the target and this resulted in the death of many party workers and civilians.

Oskar Verkaaik mentions that the operation took the form of manhunt and the Army claimed that there were torture cells run by the MQM. Thus, the confrontation between the MQM and the Army made Karachi a terrible place to live in. The Army also accused the MQM of trying to create a state of their own called Jinnahpur or Urdudesh (Verkaaik 2004: 85).

Even the army blamed the MQM for spreading violence and terrorist activities over certain parts of Sindh and their plan to handover certain areas to India after they form their own state. Many cases were put on Altaf Hussain and his fellow party leaders. The army also disqualified the MQM from contesting elections in certain places of Sindh. It said that they could contest only from 4 constituencies and the others should be left for the Haqiqi group. The basic aim of the Army, as Siddiqi says, was to bar

the MQM from contesting elections and coming to national politics from where they can bargain for their ethnic group. In the Provincial Assembly elections too, the Mohajirs came second after the PPP. Interestingly, even after so many incidents the MQM did not lose its popularity among the Mohajirs in Karachi and continued to have a power share in the province (Siddiqi 2012: 106).

Operation Clean-up continued till 1994 when the Army decided to withdraw from the civil war. But after Benazir Bhutto's coming to power in the 1993 elections, she decided to take the matter in her own hands. However the situation worsened and Karachi witnessed more bloodshed. Verkaaik said that the coming in of the new government in 1993 "infused new life into the watered-down army operation" (Verkaaik 2004: 85).

From July 1995 to January 1996, as many as 70 police encounters took place, 120 terrorists were killed and numerous deaths of MQM sympathisers and party workers. Many police personnel were also killed and police stations came under attack (Siddiqi 2012: 106).

Although Operation Clean-up was organised to flush out the criminal elements and destroy the organisational structure of the party, still the support base of the MQM did not erode. In 1994, the MQM came up with a new list of demands. During this time the PPP and the PML both tried to strike a deal with the MQM to gain its support but the latter's demands made it impossible to do so. The new list was anti-Sindhi and urban-centred, and unlike the previous one, this list showed the competition of both the groups of Mohajirs and Sindhis. The Mohajirs not only proposed proportional representation but also called for rotation in the representation of the Mohajirs and the Sindhis as Governor and Chief Minister. They also demanded to increase the urban quota, drop cases against the MQM and a new province for them where they can safeguard their rights and can work for proper devolution of power (Khan 2005: 180).

In 1997, the Mohajir Quami Movement changed its name to Muttahida Quami Movement. The spokesman of the party said that the party wanted to include people from all over Pakistan in its fold since the MQM was not against any nationality or institution, but against the forces that exploit the society like feudal lords, corrupt government officials, bureaucrats and generals. But still the MQM did not stop speaking for the rights of the Mohajirs (Siddiqi 2012: 106-107).

Yunus Samad has said the change of MQM's name signifies its extension of influence to the other provinces. At the same time it wanted to inflate its political influences as the third largest party in the politics of Pakistan. By the name change it wanted to remove the tag of a Mohajir party and also tried to make it acceptable to the military. Further it wanted to remove the label of an 'anti-state organisation' by expanding its political agenda to the people and mark itself as a party working for the deprived of the country (Samad 2002: 76).

In the 1997 elections Nawaz Sharif's PML-N won a majority seats – 134 out of 203. The PML-N then formed alliance with the MQM in Sindh. Although the MQM had boycotted the election in 1993, but in 1997 it won 12 seats in National Assembly. In the province it won 28 seats – 21 in Karachi, 4 in Hyderabad and 1 each in Sukkur, Mirpurkhas and Nawabshah. The MQM entered into an alliance with the PML-N and not with PPP because the first military crackdown was undertaken under the regime of the PPP government. The MQM had an accord with the PML-N, which focused on the aspect that while the Chief Minister will be a PML-N nominee, the Governor and the Speaker will be nominated by the MQM. The accord also included the reparation of the Biharis from Bangladesh, the increase of quota for Mohajirs to 11.5%, judicial inquiry to be made on the PPP crackdown, monetary compensation for the victims, conduction of census, terrorist-identified party cadres to be punished among other features. But still violence continued in the city by the armed wing of the MQM. The final blow came with the killing of Hakim Saeed, a respected figure of Sindh. Sharif suspended Sindh's Provincial Assembly and proclaimed Governor's rule. The MQM was accused for this assassination (Samad 2002: 75-79).

Objectives of the MQM

The Preamble of the MQM states the party's objective as,

“Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) believes in Realism and Practicalism. Acceptance of reality with an open heart is Realism, a concept based upon the philosophy of its Founder and Leader Mr. Altaf Hussain. Based on Realism positive achievement made through ideologically supported pragmatic programs is called Practicalism.” (MQM Manifesto 2013)

The MQM aims that with these two principles, they will serve the people of Pakistan. Pakistan is dominated by feudal lords, *waderas* and bureaucrats, who controls the country's political life, administrative services, military establishments, economy and the general decision-making process. Because of this the common masses hardly get a chance to exercise their political and economic power in running the affairs of the state. This class also dominates the Assembly, so the MQM aims to be the party of the commons and wants to secure the rights of the citizens and give them able representation in the political structure of the country. Further, the MQM states that their party is different from the upper-class dominated politics and it solely works for the rights of the poor and the middle class people. The party aims to work for the common people restore the country's democracy by giving representation to masses (MQM Manifesto 2013).

Kukreja mentions that the formation of the MQM is an exception in the recent history of Pakistan by virtue of its specific character. The party is predominantly urban in class structure and have youth membership. According to her, "the people were mobilised on the basis of 'imagined' ethnicity and motivated by radical ideas." The group was often branded as a terrorist organisation. But the MQM is an exception in the traditional politics of Pakistan as it mainly consists of the middle and lower-middle class people (Kukreja 2003: 143).

Iftikar Malik says that the MQM has the largest urban representation of all the political parties in Pakistan. It has been the only middle-class political organisation and instead of pretending to be secular it appeared more mundane. It focused its politics on the region and though the MQM was anticipated to be a cross-regional party, it remained restricted to Sindh. Apart from the PPP, the MQM is another political party that has been able to mobilise women in the country's history. Further, it is the party of the youths, which reflects recent demographic realities in Pakistan. Along with this, the MQM has the largest proportion of educated members. It was able to mobilise large demonstrations, especially in Karachi. The party has ward committees, *mohalla* units, regional sectors and provincial structures with international networks in the UK, USA and Arabian Gulfs (Malik 1997: 224-225).

The MQM is in favour of land reforms, preservation of cultural heritage and electoral reforms. As its founders had experienced unemployment and abuse of power by the

police, bureaucracy and feudal lords, they stand firmly for the struggling class of Pakistan (Malik 1997: 224-225).

As Moonis Ahmar notes, some critics have pointed out that the Mohajirs cannot be considered as a case of ethnic nationalism because they are not the original inhabitants of Pakistan. Coming from different places of India they have different cultural and racial terms. The only point of similarity between them is their language but that cannot form the basis of “Mohajir nationalism” in Pakistan. The critics have also accused the MQM for adopting fascist methods, leading to destruction of the Mohajir community. Ahmar has quoted a Karachi-based journalist saying,

“MQM's defects from the viewpoint of a democrat are well known and it has needlessly suffered more for that reason. It [MQM] is intolerant of both dissent within and opposition from without. It has no internal democracy. It is tailored around one personality. It has seen no internal elections. All its policies are made by one person.” (Ahmar 1996: 1036-1038)

Critics also pointed out that the Haqiqi group came up because of the intolerant policies of Altaf Hussain. It was because of the violent policies by the group that the community had to suffer. But supporters have mentioned that on the basis of common language, culture and history of migration the Mohajirs can consolidate into a group. According to them, the able leadership of Altaf Hussain and the MQM helped the group to represent itself in the politics of the region (Ahmar 1996: 1036-1038).

Laurent Gayer notes,

“MQM has been counter balancing its maximalist posture with a resolutely pragmatic approach towards politics. From its earliest days Mohajir Nationalism has been concerned with the control and allocation of public resources, starting with admissions to the universities and colleges of Sindh.” (Gayer 2014: 97)

Malik has also emphasised that Altaf Hussain is the uncontested leader of the MQM and called its movements as fascist in nature. He mentions that the party used strong-arm tactics where the press was blackmailed, and carried on notorious activities like kidnapping and terrorist acts. Like other parties, the MQM too prefers to be in power both in metropolitan and national politics. It also had alliances with the military and intelligence agencies to keep up its power position (Malik 1997: 226).

In terms of strategy, the MQM has used the policy of hostility even when it was in coalition with the various parties of Pakistan to bargain for their position and the people they represent (Malik 1997: 226).

Interview

The following is an interview of eminent scholar Moonis Ahmar taken by this researcher via Gmail dated 19 June 2016. Ahmar shares his opinion on Mohajir nationalism and the MQM.

Interview with Moonis Ahmar

Q. Is the word Mohajir still used in Pakistan to refer the refugees from India?

Yes, and mostly in terms of those whose ancestors migrated from India at the time of the Partition. Furthermore, the word ‘Mohajir’ is also used to refer to those who migrated from Afghanistan from time to time, particularly after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979.

Q. Are the Mohajirs still enjoying a privileged position in the state hierarchy of power?

Not much, as their privileged position diminished during Ayub Khan’s martial law and the shifting of capital from Karachi to Rawalpindi (Islamabad) in 1960.

The nationalisation of industries, banks and insurance companies during Z.A. Bhutto’s government also deprived the Urdu-speaking community of its clout in the private sector.

Q. In this respect how important is the ethno-national movement of the Mohajirs?

It is still a force because of the quota system imposed during Z.A. Bhutto’s regime by giving 60% jobs in quota to rural Sindh and 40% to urban Sindh. An accusation is made by the MQM that Karachi contributes 60% of the federal revenue but get only a meagre amount.

Q. As the MQM manifesto says it works mainly for the middle and the lower middle classes, so can it be said that the movement of the Mohajirs are divided (according to class)?

In 1997, the MQM changed its name from Mohajir to Muttahida (United) Quami Movement and claimed to struggle for the rights of lower and middle classes in Pakistan regardless of their ethnic origin. But in the last 4 years, it is believed to have reverted to its Mohajir slogan.

Q. *What is the support base of the party and which class does it represents truly?*

Its vote bank is still intact as was manifested in the last local bodies' elections where the MQM emerged as a dominant party in the urban areas of Sindh (Karachi and Hyderabad). Theoretically, it represents the middle class but its leadership is accused of betraying its cause and has accumulated enormous wealth.

Participation in Mainstream Politics

Post-1997, the MQM once again participated in mainstream politics with a changed name. After 1999, General Musharraf came to power and helped the MQM to bring back its lost glory by giving areas of political participation. The 2002 elections gave space for the MQM in Pakistan's politics and Musharraf supported the party in Sindh to keep away the PPP from the area (Hoodbhoy 2012: 59).

Post-2002, the MQM began to restore itself after the crises it faced in the previous decade. It decided to end hostilities with the state by allying itself with the General Musharraf's dictatorship (1999-2008). The MQM, which already had given its own concept of Mohajir nationalism, added two more dimensions to it. As Paracha from *Dawn* reports,

“the Mohajirs as ‘Urdu-speaking Sindhis’ who were connected to the Sindhi-speakers of the province in a spiritual bond emerging from the teachings of Sindh's ‘patron saint’ Shah Abdul Latif. This was MQM's way of resolving the Mohajirs' early failures to fully integrate Sindhi culture. The other dimension that emerged during this period among the Mohajir community (through the MQM), was to address the disposition of Mohajir identity in the (urban) Mohajir-majority areas of Sindh.” (Paracha, *Dawn*, 20 April 2014)

Thus with time, a change of ideas was seen in the party, with the objective of regaining its status as a party for all and to proclaim its incorporationalist politics.

In the 2008 election, the MQM again allied with the PPP and became a part of the ruling coalition both at the National Assembly and in Sindh. In 2002, the MQM won 13 seats in the National Assembly and 28 seats in the Provincial Assembly. The 2008 election improved this tally and the party fared better. It won 19 seats in the National Assembly and 39 seats in the Provincial Assembly (Chandran and Chakravarthi 2008:2).




Chart 3.2 MQM’s Position in 2002 and 2008 National Assembly Elections. Source: (Chandran and Chakravarthi 2008: 2)




Chart 3.3 MQM’s Position in 2002 and 2008 Sindh Provincial Assembly Elections. Source: (Chandran and Chakravarthi 2008: 2).

In 2012, the MQM announced that it had decided to quit the federal and provincial governments in protest against what it described as the ‘negative attitude’ of the PPP. The Sindh People’s Local Government Act, 2012 was also annulled. “The act had

been seen a major prize for the MQM for its oft-broken alliance at the centre and in Sindh for providing a separate local government system for its powerbase in Karachi.” (*Dawn*, 25 May 2013)

In the 2013 elections, the Mohajirs’ share of votes dropped considerably and there were inroads of new parties like the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The data compiled by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and reported by *Dawn* says that “of the 61 National Assembly seats from Sindh, the PPP won 29, the MQM 18, the Pakistan Muslim League-Functional 5, and the National People’s Party won 2 seats” (*Dawn*, 16 May 2013). In Sindh, the MQM has joined the coalition. It is in the opposition in the National Assembly and occupies the fourth position in terms of power and popularity in the politics of Pakistan.

Thus from the above discussion it becomes imperative to note that the politics of the MQM remains strong for the reason that it represents the Mohajirs in inter-ethnic rivalry. The MQM rose up in such a time when it was necessary to fight for the middle and lower-middle class Mohajirs. The community also felt threatened by the new immigrants and the resurgence of the Sindhis, when the MQM started bargaining for the Mohajirs (Cohen 2004: 218).

Recently the MQM has adopted a soft stance towards the Sindhis as they feel that the problem of the Mohajirs with the other dominant groups (Punjabis and Pakhtuns) should be dealt first and then their problems with the Sindhis can be resolved. It is to be noted here that the party actually voiced for the struggling class and the middle-class educated youth who were unemployed and many have to live in shanty towns. The party aimed to stand for the Mohajirs’ problems and Adeel Khan says their tactics of violence was a way to show their frustration (Khan 2005: 183).

Therefore, the picture that can be drawn from here is that the Mohajirs are now an important force in the politics of Pakistan. The MQM occupies an important position in the power hierarchy of the country. The manifestoes and the strategies of the MQM will be dealt in the subsequent chapters to get a clear picture of how much this ethnicity and the political party is different from other nationalities of Pakistan like the Pakhtuns. The following chapter will try to give a picture that how the migrants who were against ethnic identification came to politics holding hands of the MQM. Also a comparative study will be made, which is the basic aim of this thesis, between

the Pakhtuns and the Mohajirs along with their political parties, the Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement. This comparative study will help in getting a rough depiction of how differently ethnic politics function in Pakistan within different ethnicities.

This chapter ends with an interesting interview given by a Mohajir student that shows us her idea about the ethnicity and politics of the country.

Interview

A Mohajir student states her opinion on the identity and politics in an interview taken by the researcher via Gmail dated 1 June 2016.

Interview with Hira Hashmi

Date of Birth: 11th May

Q. With which ethnicity can you associate?

Pakhtun Seraiki Sindhi

Mohajir Punjabi Baloch

Q. What significance the term Mohajir bears after so many years?

In Karachi specifically, the term still holds quite significance, actually Punjab is the most populace province of the country and grabs pretty huge chunk of budget published by the government every year. Therefore, public that carries the badge of mohajir feels insecure.

Q. How ethnic politics of Pakistan have changed with time?

The buds of ethnicity have been watered since the early days of Pakistan politics. By the passage of time the plant grew well with strong branches and deep roots.

Q. Which political party you think is the most popular among your ethnic group?

MQM – Mutahida Qoumi Movement, former Mohajir Qoumi Movement.

Q. Are you a sympathiser or an active participant of any political party? If yes, mention the name of the party.

Neither I am a sympathiser nor a participant of any political party.

Q. What is your idea about the MQM?

In my views, MQM is more of a terror organization than a political one. It's a gang of mischievous folk spreading fear and panic.

Q. How much popular do you think the party is?

In Karachi and Hyderabad, it is the most popular party of the region. Whereas in the interior of province Sindh, PPP (Pakistan People`s Party) enjoys strong voter list.

Q. Can you call the MQM true representatives of the Mohajirs?

In the initial years of its establishment, it was heard that the party have provided social welfare services to mohajirs, but afterwards it turned stagnant.

Q. What is your comment on the ongoing conflict between the Mohajirs and other groups in Karachi?

The conflict between Urdu speaking and Pashto speaking was deliberately cultivated in Karachi in order to create an environment of chaos in the city of lights. However, under anti-terrorism act, rangers have been given special powers to control target killings and other crimes.

Q. Do you think the Pakhtuns are playing an active role in the conflict? What do you think about the ANP?

Amid the rise of growing political conflict, both the parties ANP and MQM played an active role to fuel it. The political workers of these rival parties seemed to be blood thirsty.

Q. Do you think these political parties are actually working for the people or are simply bargaining for power in the name of ethnicity?

It's only the game of power, had these political parties working for the betterment of their people, things would have been fairly better than the current situation. Public has often been exploited in the name of ethnicity.

Chapter IV

Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement – A Comparative Study

When the state of Pakistan was created in 1947, it was anticipated that the new state would provide equal opportunities to all its citizens without discrimination. This implied equitable distribution of resources and maintenance of an equitable socio-political base to all ethnic groups, religions, regions, etc. What came about, however, was the domination of one or two groups, leaving people divided along ethnic lines. As a result, the politics of ethnic nationalism came to dominate the scene in Pakistan.

The political parties played a major role in mobilising the ethnic groups. In this context, ethnic groups were treated not as cultural groups but as political actors. The demands which remained unmet in terms of the share of socio-economic resources were taken forward by the ethnic-based political parties (Siddiqi 2012: 14). This chapter makes a comparative study of the political parties of two ethnic groups of Pakistan, namely, the Pakhtuns and the Mohajirs and the pattern they have followed while bargaining with the centre. Though both the groups have different cultural histories and background and their politicisation also has started in different ways, it is seen that while bargaining with the centre they have often followed a similar pattern and also sometimes took ethnicity as a situational concept.

Ethnic Parties

In multiethnic societies like Pakistan the local and national powers either individually or together have often manifested the people's ethnic consciousness on the basis of which the parties shape their politics (Khan 2009: 151). As stated earlier, religious nationalism, which was the basis of the creation of Pakistan, lost its vigour once the state was created, and the ethnic aspect came to dominate the scene. Again, because of the absence of a mass-based party the consciousness became stronger among the groups and regional parties were formed taking ethnic aspects into consideration.

Citing some reasons for the growth of ethnic politics in the country, Iftikhar Malik notes:

“The particularistic state structure, authoritarianism and inter-regional imbalances together with uneven development in line with the major demographic changes caused by immigration, led to increased tensions in the polity. The symbolic relationship between the forces of authority and ideology, while skirting the exigencies of nation-building, deeply politicised ethnicity, which was always considered to be a law-and-order question rather than part of a governability crisis.” (Malik 1997: 181)

In Malik’s view, the state of Pakistan was never accommodative of the ethnic aspect. In the 1960s and ’80s the martial regimes also played an important role in marginalising the ethnic groups. Again in the 1980s, various intelligence agencies sought to curb the influence of PPP- and JUI-sponsored ethnic movements. Because of the authoritarian centre and the absence of mass-based parties, the primordial references to ethnicity were once again drawn by the groups to mobilise into an ethnic party. Further,

“The elitist and ethnically discretionary character of the state itself betrayed official efforts for national integration and an added momentum was provided by migration, urbanisation, archaic means of communication, trans-border support, weakening of the civil sectors and monopolisation of scarce resources by non-development sectors like defence, leaving little for the rest.” (Malik 1997: 181-182)

Several factors were responsible for the growth of ethnic nationalism and politics in the country, as discussed below.

A General Perspective on the Growth of Ethnic Politics

The lack of democratic culture because of military rule, decaying of political institutions and failure of the growth of any mass-based party gave rise to ethnic-based politics in Pakistan. These parties came up with the orientation to represent the will of different ethnic groups, as the national parties were hardly representing the specific demands of these groups.

Hasan Askari Rizvi remarks:

“A political party organises people as an identifiable political configuration based on a political agenda or programme. Each political configuration based on a political party is a ‘purveyor of ideas’ that either represents the articulation and aggregation of interests and concerns of a society in general or a particular class, religion or social-political formation. The party may identify with an abstract ideological formulation and advocate the solution of societal problems within the framework of its ideology. These ideological parties may be less inclined to cooperate with political players that don’t fully share their ideology. However, the post cold war era suggests that such ideological parties are more inclined to work with other political parties on a minimum common agenda and adopt a pluralistic perspective in the political domain without formally abandoning their ideological, class and ethnic-regional identification.” (Rizvi 2010: 81)

Pakistan’s present political structure compels parties to form coalitions and alliances not always based on the same ideological orientation to remain in power or to bargain for a place in the political hierarchy of the country.

The main task of any political party is thus to aggregate interests and issues into a broad policy option and to mobilise and organise people and public opinion and also recruit people. The parties try to gain power by fighting elections. Their main task is to “constantly review the performance of the government and suggest remedial measures within and without Parliament” (Rizvi 2010: 81).

The origin of political parties in Pakistan was different from that in Europe and America. In the latter case, the rise and expansion of political parties was linked with the development of representative government. These parties had members of elected assemblies in the initial stages. But such was not the case with Pakistan. As a result, the growth of the parties and their functioning in Pakistan always lacked a democratic culture (Wollack 2002: 3).

The absence of mass-based parties gave rise to regional politics based on ethnicity. The Muslim League, which developed as a part of the nationalist struggle, was unable to accommodate the aspirations of the multicultural masses of Pakistan. In the initial stages the Muslim League functioned as an advocacy group and had nothing to do with the introduction of elected assemblies. It developed outside the legislatures. Later, the party contested elections and entered the legislatures in pursuit of its political agenda. As a nationalist movement, its role in popular mobilisation outside

the legislature was more significant for shaping the nature and dynamics of political parties (Rizvi 2001: 81). Further,

“As the party that led the independence movement, the Muslim League enjoyed support of the Muslims across social and economic divides. After independence, the Muslim League could not successfully transform itself from a nationalistic movement to a nationwide political party that commanded the loyalty of people across regional and political divides. It was unable to recognise the imperatives of nation state building in the context of an independent state. It could not articulate a credible platform to this end and thus lost momentum.” (Rizvi 2010: 81-82)

Due to the party’s lack of democratic culture and assimilative politics the ethnic parties started dominating the scene of electoral politics in Pakistan.

The Muslim League lost its dominant political position in Pakistani politics within seven years of independence because “it failed to inspire the socio-economic agenda”. Its internal weakness contributed much to it. The League’s factionalism gave rise to different political parties. The provinces also came up with specific demands and on the basis of different sections of society, ethnic and religious political parties took birth (Rizvi 2010: 81-82).

Tahir Amin has pointed out that the growth of ethno-nationalism and its politics had its roots in the initial problem of the creation of the state. Before independence, he says, there was no consensus regarding the future agenda of the nation, on account of three reasons:

- a) The League lacked consensus among the members as regards what kind of nation was to be built.
- b) The educated masses who led the movement for Pakistan were also not sure about the future agenda of the state.
- c) The liberals wanted a state which would be secular based on the western model; the Islamists wanted a religious state; and the leftist elements wanted the state to be socialist (Amin 1988: 67).

Contradictions regarding the nature of the state existed even before partition. After the creation of the state this divide became visible and wider. The Muslim League did not devise a suitable mechanism to include regional claims within the party. Consequently, the issue of centralisation of power within the party and the issue of

language remained unresolved. Power was centralised mainly among the people who came from India. Also, the Muslim-majority provinces in pre-partition India hardly found a support base in the party, with the party mainly being represented by the people from Muslim-minority provinces in India. Hence the regional and ethnic nationalists formed their parties to bargain with the centre (Amin 1988: 67-68).

Military interference in the politics of the country also curbed the functioning of the political parties. Urmila Phadnis notes that “in terms of regime variation, Pakistan offers a kaleidoscope moving from one-party dominance to multiparty, to military rule, to guided ‘basic democracy’, to quasi-democratic one-party dominance, to military ‘guardianship’.” The Muslim League also suffered from structural weaknesses. As its majority support base was migrants from India, its leaders found little support in the constituent assembly of the country. Again, the League failed to encourage other provincial leaders to join it in order to become a mass-based party. Personality clashes in the party led to its further fragmentation, thus making it a minor party in Pakistan (Phadnis 1990: 73).

On the other hand, among the ethnic and region-specific political parties, according to Hasan A. Rizvi,

“party discipline was almost non-existent, with the obvious result that every major shift in party loyalty produced a veritable crisis. These crises appeared so frequently that *The Times*, London, cited the provinces of Pakistan as an almost classic example of what Aristotle called as Stasis – factional unrest which is the most dangerous enemy of constitutional and orderly government. It was caused by factors like fundamental cleavages in social structure, differences in religion, culture and classes, and the fact of the political revolution not coinciding with social alteration.”

The ethnic-based parties became emblems of ethnic and regional representation against the military governments and the Muslim League (Rizvi 2010: 82). But later, with the coming of the democratic regimes, the ethnic parties flourished, especially after 2008.

Ethno-nationalism was present even before partition, and ethnic-based groups fought against the colonial rule. Maryam S. Khan points out that

“Region-based political groups in Pakistan have historically mobilised for political power largely around ethnic and linguistic identities. Since colonial times, there has been a history of political bargaining by groups in the Indian

subcontinent along ethnic lines. From amongst the different ethnic groups that formed part of Pakistan at its inception, the Bengalis, Sindhis, Pakhtuns and Balochis were, at different moments in pre-partition India, known for their vociferous political agitation against the British colonisers. To varying extents, their political agitation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took the form of organised movements that called for British withdrawal from India on the one hand and territorial and political independence for these groups on the other.” (Khan 2014: 77-78)

Post-partition, these groups started demanding territorial independence and provincial autonomy. The Pakhtuns’ ethno-national movement was well developed before partition and they had for long voiced their ethnic aspirations politically. The Mohajirs on the other hand were initially against any kind of ethnic polarisation but voiced their ethnic aspirations after their fall from their previous privileged position in independent Pakistan. They formed their ethnic party when they found that the position which they had in the state hierarchy was challenged by other ethnic groups.

Two Nationalisms: A Comparative Study

The Pakhtuns

The Pakhtuns’ sense of separate ethnic identity – as distinct from their religious identity – was so strong that they resented their subjugation both by the British and the Muslim League. Ghaffar Khan, with the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) Movement (KKM) protested against the colonial subjugation and also rose against the economic exploitation of the peasants and small business class (Ghufran 2009; Khan 2005: 1096, 85-86).

The KKM, supporting the Indian National Congress, entered into the politics of the province of the North West Frontier and mustered considerable support even in the provinces where the Muslim League could hardly find a place. Initially, the KKM was not in favour of joining either India or Pakistan and wanted a separate Pakhtun state. But after the leaders of the Muslim League promised that all the provinces of Pakistan would have their autonomy where they could safeguard their culture and rule, in the referendum, the Pakhtuns opted to join the newly created state of Pakistan, forming NWFP as part of Pakistan. But when Pakistan went back on its promises of provincial

autonomy and decentralisation of power, the Pakhtuns reasserted themselves. This led to the formation of the National Awami Party (NAP).

But after partition, Pakhtun nationalism lost its vigour. The NAP became the vanguard of the Pakhtuns and worked with the other factions on certain common agendas. Initially the party shifted its demands from secession to autonomy within Pakistan and wanted to enjoy considerable hold in the provincial politics. Later, as Adeel Khan points out, the NAP became a platform for civil servants, army personnel and local investors and it was only left with satisfying the demands of the political leaders (Khan 2005:103).

The Awami National Party (ANP), which was formed in July 1986 after the dissolution of NAP, is basically an ethnic Pakhtun or Pathan party based in the Pakhtun-dominated areas and is now led by Asfandyar Wali Khan. The new party, with a socialist orientation, became the emblem of Pakhtun nationalism, remaining mostly confined to NWFP (Verma 2006: 27). After 2008 the ANP became the coalition partner both at the centre with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and formed a government in NWFP also. But the secular politics of the Pakhtuns lost popularity because of the growth of the fundamentalist and religious forces in the Pakhtun-dominated area.

ANP: Lessons Learnt from NAP

The ANP has shifted much of its focus to new areas for its sustenance.

The NAP was more national in character than its reincarnation ANP. It fought political battles against anti-democratic forces and military regimes. It was against any kind of military alliances (like CENTO and SEATO) with the western world and wanted Pakistan to have an independent foreign policy. Instead of taking a Pakhtun colour, as a nationalist party it advocated for the rights of the provinces. But after the break-up of the Bhashani group it lost its national colour. The NAP preferred to sit in the opposition mainly in the Ayub era and opposed Ayub for his close relationship with the US and also for his refusal to devolve power (Paracha, *Dawn*, 29 August 2013). The NAP was also vocally against the Punjabi-dominated centre. Initially it was opposed to the PPP in spite of both parties having similar ideologies. Under the

NAP's leadership, there was hardly any positive development for the Pakhtuns apart from the fact that it was a strong opposition to the establishment (Verma 2006: 24).

The ANP on the other hand is distinctly seen as a Pakhtun-based party. Unlike the NAP, it is not against the establishment. As a Pakhtun-based party, it has tried to build its base as a regional party. It has formed coalitions to be in power both with the PPP and the PML(N) irrespective of the ideologies (Mahmood 2004: 151).

The ANP, unlike the NAP, has also extended its hands of friendship towards Punjab. It has also maintained good relations with the US, opining that it is necessary for Pakistan to support the US in its operation against the Taliban (ANP, Official Website).

Learning from its predecessor, the ANP has also applied a different strategy to stay in power. It also works for the issues of human security in Pakistan. In due course of time it has become one of the popular regional parties in the politics of Pakistan.




Fig. 4.1 NAP and ANP Orientations Compared

Before the election in 2008, Asfandyar Wali Khan, in an interview regarding the priorities of the ANP, said,

“ANP leadership has been advocating for provincial autonomy since the creation of Pakistan. We should have rights over our own resources and the other provinces should enjoy the same rights. Pakistan is not the Punjab and the Punjab is not Pakistan. We know that ‘Big Brother’ should have the lion’s share but he must refrain from devouring all the vitals at the cost of the small provinces. If this practice continues we invite more disorder. Provincial autonomy under the 1973 Constitution is not enough. It should be reopened.”
(Khan, *Dawn*, 12 October 2008)

It seems that the ANP, though it is a regional party, aspires to play a bigger role in the politics of Pakistan. It claims to work for all the deprived in the Pakhtun region and outside it.

The Mohajirs

Mohajir nationalism or the consciousness of Mohajir identity started on a different note from that of the Pakhtuns. Initially, the Mohajirs were not supporters of a parochial ethnic identity. They always advocated for the consolidation of Pakistan on the basis of religious nationalism.

The migrants who came from different parts of India after partition called themselves Mohajirs and constituted a part of the urban population of Sindh. Those migrants who came from East Punjab settled in West Punjab and got assimilated with the natives because of the similarity of language and culture. But the Mohajirs found it very difficult to assimilate with the local people. Among them, people who came from UP and Bihar and spoke Urdu, started having a considerable influence in the area of Karachi (Mohammad 1996: 619-620). They settled mainly in the cities of Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpurkhas and Sukkur.

The Sindhi economy, as Zaidi points out, “was mainly agricultural and feudal with some trading centres and market towns with very little industry. Sindhis prominent in political life were mainly representatives from the feudal order since the bourgeois and petty bourgeois class was still in its embryonic form.” The Mohajirs on the other hand belonged to the more novel urban capitalist culture with representatives from

large entrepreneurial, administrative and educated petty bourgeois service class. They also had representatives from well-trained working classes (Zaidi 1991:1295). This gave them the upper hand over the Sindhis in terms of socio-economic aspects.

The Mohajirs also felt that they were the most conscious group of Muslim identity and the vanguard of the creation of the state of Pakistan. As they had a stronger “political manoeuvring and had the skills which were necessary to form and run the state machinery, they took over economic and political power in Pakistan” (Zaidi 1991:1295). Whereas the political leadership was taken by Jinnah and Liaquat Ali, most of the bureaucratic positions were filled by the Mohajirs. The entrepreneurs and the working class also started working for the industries. As Karachi became the commercial capital, the Mohajirs attained enhanced support to build a strong position in the socio-economic and political aspects of Pakistan (Zaidi 1991:1295). They became one of the most privileged groups in the country.

But the tide turned against the Mohajirs after the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali in the 1950s. The Mohajirs then claimed that they were pushed aside from their political status by the Punjabis and Pathans. In the Ayub era the shifting of the capital from Karachi to Islamabad was seen by the Mohajirs as a discriminatory move, a conspiracy by the Pathan ruler against them (Haq 1995: 992).

Mohamad Waseem points out three areas of change which affected the Mohajirs, as follows. First, the One-Unit scheme enhanced the employment prospects of the Punjabis. Second, Ayub’s coup in 1958 put the Punjabi generals in important positions in the corporate sector, which enabled them to promote the interests of fellow Punjabis. Third, the change of the capital from Karachi to Islamabad gave centrality to the Punjabis. This gave the Mohajirs a sense of alienation in their own land (Waseem 1996: 622).

Ayub Khan, being a Pakhtun, laid more emphasis on the settlement of Pakhtuns in the urban areas of Sindh. During this time the Mohajirs also faced competition from the emerging middle class of the indigenous people and also from the Pakhtun migrants in middle and lower section of jobs. Academically, though there was an increase of Mohajir students with secondary school certificate or two years of college degree, there was little increase in the number of Mohajir students in medical and engineering. The Mohajirs also faced competition from the Punjabis who migrated to

Karachi in the non-professional colleges. In consequence, Mohajir students rose against the Ayub regime in 1961 under leftist Mohajir leaders. The Mohajirs as a community also developed a severe hatred of the Pakhtuns. The consciousness of discrimination shaped the minds of the Mohajirs, consolidating them as an ethnic group (Dixit 2012: 68-69).

During the era of Z.A. Bhutto in the 1970s,

“Sindh was given a 19% share in the federal bureaucracy. For recruitment into federal and provincial bureaucracies and admission into educational institutions, further allocation was made based on rural (60%) and urban (40%) ‘domiciles’ in Sindh. The Domicile, a document that determines an individual’s place of residence, became a dreaded piece of paper for many Mohajir youth. The rural/urban quota, in practice, meant an ethnic quota for Sindhis (rural) and Urdu-speaking Mohajirs (urban).” (Haq 1995: 992)

The quota system was a severe blow to middle and lower middle class Mohajir youth. A further cause of grievance for the Mohajirs was the Sindhi language bill passed in 1972, which made Sindhi the second language and made it compulsory for government officials to learn Sindhi within a specific period of time. In retaliation, the Mohajirs joined the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against Bhutto and initially supported the Zia government. But during the Zia rule the situation of the Mohajirs declined further and the Pakhtun-Punjabi domination became conspicuous in the city (Haq 1995: 992).

The Mohajirs then started articulating their desire to separate Karachi from Sindh. As *Dawn* reports,

“Consequently, the first ever demand to separate Karachi from Sindh and recognise the *Mohajirs* as a distinct ethnicity actually came from an influential faction of the left-wing National Students Federation (NSF) that was associated with the NAP. In 1969 Amir H. Kazmi, the head of his own faction of the Marxist NSF, was one of the first political leaders to raise the banner of *Mohajir* nationalism.” (Paracha, *Dawn*, 23 August 2012)

The Mohajir Politics




Fig. 4.2 *Stages of Mohajir Politics*

The Mohajirs, who were initially supporters of religious political parties like the Jamat-i-Islami (JI), felt that their demands were not adequately represented by the political parties. The JI was even alleged to have supported the Zia regime in exploiting the Mohajirs. In these circumstances, Altaf Hussain felt that the Mohajirs must organise as a separate ethnic group to bargain for socio-economic resources. In 1978 Altaf Hussain and Azeem Tariq formed the All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organisation (APMSO) as the student wing of the Mohajir organisation (Paracha, *Dawn*, 23 August 2012).

APMSO performed poorly in the 1980 elections of Karachi University. In 1981 it joined with other ethnic groups and formed the United Students Movement and gradually started gaining focus in the 1981 election. APMSO started gaining popularity among Mohajir students, which helped in shaping the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) in 1984. The MQM dominated the politics of urban Sindh and was able to get substantial support of the Mohajirs. The party has been in power with different coalition partners and has changed its name from Mohajir Quami Movement to Muttahida (united) Quami Movement, aspiring for a bigger political role in the country.

ANP and MQM: A Comparative Study

Pakhtun and Mohajir nationalisms have their distinctive characters. Pakhtun ethnic consciousness existed before the creation of the state of Pakistan. Their ethnic nationalism has developed residing in a specific place having references of specific language and culture. They were against the subjugation of their ethnic identity under the banner of religious nationalism. The Mohajirs' ethnic context on the other hand is more contemporary. Their nationalism is based mainly on language and their area of residence. It mostly developed in respect to the other ethnic groups who challenged their privileged authority.

ANP's Objectives

The ANP in its manifesto mentions that its principles are based on the teachings of Ghaffar Khan. His ideology to free people from foreign or internal domination became the main inspiration in framing the party manifesto. Ghaffar Khan aimed to free the masses from any kind of subjugation and take them out of poverty, ignorance, customs and biases hindering their growth, internal disharmony, political inertia, etc. Further, he wanted to “ensure political and social justice for all people and nations and wanted them to live freely, with internal peace, justice and cooperation.” The ANP manifesto (2008) mentions that its prime focus is to provide socio-political justice to the people of Pakistan. Along with providing political and social justice to the people the party also aims to promote democracy and more devolution of power (ANP Manifesto 2008).

The ANP thus is a left-liberal secular party. It believes that the state should not intervene in citizens' religious affairs and that the state and government should not discriminate among the citizens on the basis of religion, language, culture, region etc. Initially, the ANP was more socialist but has changed much of its agenda to suit the situation. The party has formed alliances with the PPP and PML-N many times for its survival (*Dawn*, 1 April 2013).

MQM's Objectives

The MQM's objectives are based on a realistic and pragmatic assessment of the situation in Pakistan. The party's main aim is to work for the people and establish a proper democratic culture in the country. The MQM is of the view that Pakistan's feudal lords have dominated the politics, bureaucracy and economy of the country, whereas the general masses are deprived of their share in the economic and power structure of the country. The MQM wants to establish a political culture in the country where a true representative democracy will prevail, where everyone will get their due share in exercising their rights. Basically, the MQM's philosophy is to work for the lower and middle class people and chart out a politics which will be different from upper class politics. The MQM aims to establish free market economy, reforms in agricultural industry, commerce, education, health, defence, etc. (MQM Manifesto 2013).

In sum, the ANP aims to work for the betterment of the people by eradicating poverty, protecting from extremism and safeguarding human rights. The MQM on the other hand works for the middle and lower class people. It does not have any left- or right-wing ideological orientation. The party mainly aims to consolidate people coming from an Urdu-speaking background. However, now the MQM aims to work for everyone who are deprived of their rights, though its support base remains within the Mohajirs of urban Sindh. Further, the party's motive is to establish social justice in society and complete eradication of corruption from the country (Baloch 2012: 7-8).

ANP Manifestos: Focus Areas

ANP manifestos emphasise several aspects of human development not only for the Pakhtuns but for the people of Pakistan as a whole.

Internal Affairs: One of the ANP's current priorities is to take the country out of terrorism which is posing a constant threat. After coming to power in 2008, the ANP purged many party members to achieve the goal of peace and security. But the ANP wants a welfare state rather than just a security-based state and desires the state to work for the welfare of the people. So it wants to review the current foreign policy of

the country to enable Pakistan to play a more important role as an international player (ANP Manifesto 2008).

Political Agenda: Explaining the party agenda, Shamim-ur-Rahman says:

“The party plans for each federating unit to be autonomous in its regional matters with the federal government retaining control over currency, external affairs, communication and defence only. Furthermore, each federating unit will have the right to utilise its resources to its own advantage as long as the interests of another federating unit are not harmed. The federal legislature shall be bicameral, the House of Representatives shall be chosen on the basis of adult franchise and equal representation shall be given to all the federating units. Meanwhile, the party pledges to ensure the rights of each nationality on the basis of equality, and every nationality will have equal opportunity to take part in state affairs.” (Rahman, *Dawn*, 15 February 2008)

This agenda is similar to that of the NAP, which also always fought for the decentralisation of power and for federal autonomy.

The party manifesto also states that the preservation of “democracy and the rule of law, protection of the rights and identities of the peoples of all provinces of Pakistan and unrestricted freedom for the development of their cultures and languages” remains the party’s priority (ANP Manifesto 2008).

The ANP is against any kind of discrimination and stands for the fundamental rights of the people, with emphasis on maintenance of law and order to protect the security of citizens. Further, it stands for independent judiciary and non-interference of the armed forces in the politics of the country. The ANP also aims to reduce the defence budget and plough the saved revenues into the development of the country. It favours that the “federal legislature shall continue to be bicameral as at present, but the powers of the Senate shall be enhanced so as to include initiation of money bills and approval of higher appointments” (ANP Manifesto 2008).

Human Security: Believing that the individual should have a life that is worth living, the ANP focuses on the welfare of every individual in the country. Pakistan suffers from various discriminations and from poverty, income inequality, ill health, discrimination against women, illiteracy, etc. Taking off from this state of affairs, the ANP intends to struggle for a society based on equity and respect for the individual. The ANP believes that social justice must be ensured by the state to have an overall development of the country (ANP Manifesto 2008)).

Women, Child and Minority Rights and Empowerment: The ANP manifesto states, “Pakistani women are trapped in a web of dependency and subordination due to their low social, economic, and political status. The majority of women suffer from all forms of poverty, discrimination and violence.” The ANP promises to work towards emancipating women and helping them attain their rightful position in society. The ANP is also concerned about the degradation of climate and the poor health condition of the people, and promises to work for environmental and health security.

The ANP promises to work for child rights and to provide the facilities for their education as stated in the constitution. It also promises to “legislate and implement child labour laws to ensure that child labour under the age of 16 years is prohibited in all formal and informal sectors including the domestic sector” (ANP Manifesto 2008).

Pakistan’s 18th constitution amendment provides for compulsory and free education till 16 years of age. The ANP aims to work on this aspect so that it helps in the proper growth and development of society. It also promises to allocate more funds to education and to free the education system of feudal bias. As a corollary of this measure, it proposes to help eradicate extremism and terrorism in the region (ANP Manifesto 2013).

Labour Rights, Fiscal Issues and Regional Trade: Before drawing up their election manifestos for 2013, leading political parties, including the ANP, and workers’ representatives jointly agreed on the importance of including labour rights in the manifestos in order to ensure strict implementation of labour rights in the country. The ANP also places heavy emphasis on fiscal discipline of the country (ANP Manifesto 2013).

The ANP aims for public sector development to smooth the process of economic progress of the country. At the same time it wants income security for low income groups. The ANP promises to encourage and protect foreign investments and to offer special incentives in this regard. The ANP manifesto says in addition:

“New oil and gas discoveries have been made in Pukhtunkhwa, so new royalty rates will be negotiated to generate more resources for the development of the

province. Gungari North Western Gas Company, with its headquarters in Pakhtunkhwa, shall be established on the lines of SNGPL.”⁴

The ANP also promises to develop irrigation projects, etc. (ANP Manifesto 2008).

While discussing the economy, party President Asfandyar Wali Khan said,

“The toughest task in front of the government is to handle the economic problems. The soaring prices of essential commodities have already broken the backbone of the people. They are not satisfied with the state of the economy. An economy is strong when the benefits reach the people.” (Khan, *Dawn*, 12 October 2008)

Related to fiscal issues, regarding regional trade the ANP promises to enhance bilateral and multilateral trade links especially from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to Central Asia and other parts of the world. The ANP also supports the concept of the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZ), which will enhance Pakistan’s trade (ANP Manifesto 2008).

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA): The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is the tribal Pakhtun zone, covering an area of 27,000 square kilometres and with a population of about 4 million.

“This region is administered by the President under Articles 246 and 247 of the Constitution. Here Pakistani laws are not applicable, the jurisdiction of the superior courts has not been extended and the inhabitants do not enjoy fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. The tribes remain victims of poverty and the area has the lowest social indices in the country. The literacy rate is only 17% versus the national average of 45%. Female literacy is an abject 3 % versus 32% for the rest of the country.” (ANP Manifesto 2013)

FATA has porous borders and is underdeveloped, which has led to the growth of extremist forces in the region. The ANP wants to extend political and socio-economic reform to FATA by giving seats in the Provincial Assembly and extending the Political Party Act to this area. The ANP also wants merger of FATA with KP (ANP Manifesto 2008).

Before the 2013 elections, ANP Vice President Mohammad Adeel said that his party would focus on the improvement of law and order situation of Pakistan. With the objective of working for peace, the ANP would focus on the rights of women,

⁴ Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) is the largest integrated natural gas company extending from Sui in Balochistan to Peshawar in KP.

children, labourers and minorities. The ANP would also focus on extending help to the farmers. Towards promoting the industrial sector, it would establish more institutes for technical education. The party would also work for the eradication of terrorism and extremism in the country and especially in FATA (*Dawn*, 25 March 2013).

Relations with the United States: Though it strongly believes in an independent foreign policy, like its predecessor NAP, the ANP is not against cooperation with the United States. In its view, cooperation with the US can bring positive development in Pakistan by jointly fighting against terrorism. The then federal Minister for Railways, Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour of the ANP, in 2012 asked to reopen the NATO supply routes to safeguard the national interest. But the ANP has consistently opposed Pakistan becoming part of any military alliance to fight proxy wars. It does not want the outside world to take advantage of Pakistan's vulnerabilities (Hasnain, *Dawn*, 24 March 2012).

Achievements and Failures of ANP: A Media Survey

In 2010 the KP Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain said that the ruling party ANP had always advocated for the protection of women's rights. He added that the Bacha Khan Women Institute, which the ANP government had set up, was mainly to impart training to women in different fields, so that they could support their families. He said further, "We have also established a commission for the rights of women, headed by a woman minister, and given it the task of protection of women rights" (*Dawn*, 26 September 2010).

While the ANP was in power during 2008-2013, Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti announced the construction of a road from Sherpao to Shamsabad costing over Rs 130 million. He also promised

"upgradation of schools, establishment of new schools and community health centres, construction of roads, construction of Bacha Khan Park at Shabqadar, establishment of science and computer laboratories in schools, construction of additional rooms in schools, bridges, electrification and sanitation works, etc." (*Dawn*, 7 October 2011)

The White Papers of the KP government mentioned that many colleges for women were established during 2011-2012 and the government planned for many new universities. The establishment of the “Higher Education Regulatory Authority (HERA)” created a positive scope for “regulatory avenues for higher education in the private sector”. Liberal grants and allocation of budget were made for the colleges and public schools and for science laboratories and libraries during this time (KP White Paper 2011-2012).

As reported by *Dawn*, in 2011, the provincial government especially emphasised the issue of child rights and implementation of the existing as well as future laws in this regard. The KP government, which was run by the ANP at that time, asked to include domestic child labour in the list of hazardous occupations under the Employment of Children Act, 1991. ANP MP Shagufta Malik said that “to secure the rights of children the government had already enacted the Child Protection and Welfare Act”. The law was comprehensive and provided punishments for different offences against children. She said that the government had set up five child protection units in different districts of the province” (*Dawn*, 25 March 2011).

It thus becomes clear that the ANP tried to fulfil its manifesto promises when in power.

After the 2008 election Asfandiyar Wali Khan said that the government had restored Parliament’s powers through the 18th Constitution Amendment, which had been destroyed by the military dictatorship of the country. He said that during this time the provincial government led by the ANP was involved in development work for the people. He considered the renaming of the province as one of the biggest achievements of the party. He added that the ANP had been victimised many times by the militants and so to come to a viable solution the party held talks with the militants. He welcomed reforms in FATA and demanded further measures to take the tribal people into confidence (*Pak Tribune*, 1 January 2012).

Further, the ANP claimed that during its tenure maximum budget was spent on the welfare of the people. KP Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti said, “The provincial government has set up its own Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Oil and Gas Development Company.” Further, the ANP government worked for the upgradation of various canals and construction of roads (*Dawn*, 29 November 2011).

ANP's Failures: Former PPP (Sherpao) Central Chairman Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, pointing out the ANP's failures, has stated that "The champions of Pakhtuns have disappointed the people and thus they are joining our party in different parts of the country." He added that the national party had badly failed to protect the interest of the Pakhtuns. Further, the ANP was unable to curb the protracted violence in the region by the militants (*Daily Times*, 17 December 2011).

Amir Muqam, who was president of the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid KP said to *Dawn* in 2012 that the ANP in its four-year stint in government "had given the masses the gifts of price hike, joblessness and load shedding. Lucrative national institutions like Pakistan Steel Mills, PIA and Pakistan Railways were on the verge of collapse" due to excessive corruption of the rulers. He said that as a coalition partner the ANP was responsible for destroying the country's institutions and the people should reject it in the next general elections (*Dawn*, 1 January 2011).

The ANP was accused of corruption and was also blamed for being unable to stabilise the condition of the Pakhtuns. These failures gave rise to another party, the Quami Watan Party. This party was formed by the PPP-Sherpao focusing on a new Pakhtun nationalist agenda. Party chairman Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao said,

"The so-called Pashtun nationalist parties have failed to deliver, and have disappointed the people of the province, the tribal areas, Karachi and other parts of the country where the Pashtuns are settled.... That has created a vacuum that we are going to fill. We aim to introduce neo-nationalism in the region." (Rehman, *Friday Times*, 16-22 November 2012)

Challenges in FATA: FATA is a particularly unstable region in terms of security. To stabilise FATA, the ANP initially talked about its merger with KP. But according to Farhat Taj, this will not solve the problem (*Taj Daily Times*, 21 Jan 2012). Aware of the complexity of the matter, the ANP government reached a consensus to let FATA decide whether to join KP or not. In 2012, former senator Haji Mohammad Adeel said that if FATA merged with KP it could get the advantages and constitutional grants like KP. "Like the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, FATA can also get the same package if it is merged with the province," he said, adding that this could be discussed with the genuine representatives and elders of tribal areas (Ali, *Dawn*, 30 January 2012).

MQM Manifestos

The MQM manifesto deliberates the vision how the party wants the government to be run, its aims and the measures it would like to take after coming to power. The MQM has always wanted Pakistan to be a participatory democracy, where the state must ensure the social and economic well-being of the people. The party also desires to make a country where there will be no discrimination on the basis of religion, region, race, gender, etc. (MQM Manifesto 2013).

Participatory Democracy at the Local Level and Urban Development: Advocating functional and participatory democracy both at the national and local levels, the MQM demands elected local government system where the election will be held within three months of the holding of general elections in the country.

MQM leader Dr Farooq Sattar has said that provincial autonomy is the government's priority. But he has pointed out that though the democratic government completed five years (from 2008-2013), the local government system was not democratic enough and required more devolution of power. In his words, "The future of democracy and common man cannot be secured without the third tier of the government." Hence, the MQM aimed

"to create a single administrative agency in every city or district that should be under the administrative control of an elected mayor for unity of command. The traffic administration would be delinked from the police in all metropolitan cities and the department would be transferred to the city or district government." (*Dawn*, 2 April 2013)

The MQM's 2008 manifesto states that the centre should retain the subjects of defence, foreign affairs and currency and all the other subjects should fall within the jurisdiction of the federal units. Along with urban growth, rural growth should also be emphasised and for poverty reduction the rural economies should be targeted. The party maintains that unplanned infrastructure is crushing the cities and there is growth of slums and shortage of basic amenities. So the MQM wanted to undertake a proper planning of the urban areas. According to the MQM manifesto (2013), "the police would be brought under the administrative control of the city and district governments and provincial accountability bureaus would be set up to curb corruption".

Education and Health: The MQM 2013 manifesto focused on education, health and energy. Deputy Convener of the party's Rabita (coordination) Committee Dr Farooq Sattar said the party would have greater focus on human progress. The party favoured allocation of 20 per cent of the revenue budget to the education sector in the provinces. It would get rid of the dual standard of education. Urdu medium educational institutions would be upgraded to the level of English medium. Madaris (religious seminaries) would be brought on par with the mainstream education at the national level. The government would take initiatives to promote school enrolment (*Dawn*, 1 April 2013; MQM Manifesto 2013).

Health would be included as a mandatory right of the citizens in the social sector, and constitutional amendments would be carried out in this regard. The prices of petroleum and natural gas products would be reduced. A national gas policy would be formulated in order to resolve the prevailing energy crisis in the country. Cooperative farming would be promoted. Feudal lords and businessmen would be brought under the national tax net (*Dawn*, 1 April 2013; MQM Manifesto 2013).

Economy, Unemployment and Poverty Alleviation: The MQM aimed to alleviate poverty, improve sustenance level for the common person, reduce the prices of basic items, etc. The party would work for more industrialisation and growth to improve employment prospects. In this endeavour, an effort would be made to elevate human resources. Special support would be provided for food and energy, etc. An effort would be made to improve the growth of agriculture. In the urban areas, wage discrepancies would be reduced. A comprehensive national policy would be created to suggest methods to curb poverty (MQM Manifesto 2013).

Governance and Corruption: Since the inception of Pakistan, the system of governance has been centralised and the citizens have been denied basic democratic rights. The MQM would eradicate the anarchical state of affairs but also establish the rule of law within the country. The working of the government would be made transparent in order to curb corruption (MQM Manifesto 2012).

Law and Order: Law and order would be established by protecting the life, dignity and property of citizens and by promoting greater participation of the people from all ethnic groups in evolving a better security environment. There would also be a well manageable transparent police system (MQM Manifesto 2013).

Terrorism: A National Counter Terrorism Policy would be developed. Work would also be done on the root causes of terrorism (MQM Manifesto 2013).

Foreign Affairs: An independent foreign policy would be developed for Pakistan. Friendly relations with neighbours would be promoted, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. The Kashmir issue would be solved by promoting confidence-building measures (MQM Manifesto 2013).

Other Issues: The MQM lays emphasis on women and children's rights and also the rights of non-Muslims. There would be special emphasis on the development of youth and cultural development of society. There would be free media, press freedom, and independence of the judiciary to ensure a proper democratic setup (MQM Manifesto 2013).

Achievements and Failures of MQM: A Media Survey

The MQM has done some positive and successful work on provincial autonomy and devolution of power to the local government. In 2009 the MQM introduced the bill on provincial autonomy with the consent of the PPP. The 60-clause bill sought what it called, in a statement of objects and reasons, "complete autonomy (for the provinces) as in vogue all over the world and as envisioned by the founding fathers of the country". The bill was meant to revise the Federal Legislative List in the constitution's Fourth Schedule and sought abolition of the Concurrent Legislative List (*Dawn*, 28 January 2009). The passage of the bill was counted as a big achievement of the party.

Regarding the rights of women, in a women's convention organised by the MQM, the party urged to stop all sorts of discriminatory gender politics. The party said that practices like honour killing or marrying the Quran should be stopped. The convention also stressed that "women should be provided with equal opportunities in employment, business, governance, education, health and other sectors so that they could play their due role in national development" (*Dawn*, 26 June 2015). A positive step was taken by the MQM in this direction.

The MQM also worked to break the feudal structure of the Pakistani society. In 2010 it submitted to the National Assembly Secretariat a land reforms bill mainly aimed at

the distribution of large landholdings among the landless and small farmers. The bill aimed to reduce disparities of income, increase agricultural productivity and also optimal use of water (Wasim, *Dawn*, 13 October 2010).

In 2015 Altaf Hussain asked the government for an increase of allocation of funds (at least 4 to 5 per cent of GDP) for the education sector. He also stressed that merit should be the basis for admission to the Altaf Hussain University (AHU) in Hyderabad, which was set up by real estate tycoon Malik Riaz Hussain. In the university, Altaf Hussain Scholarships would be offered. Also, a clean drinking water supply project would be launched in Hyderabad. Houses would be built for families of 300 slain MQM activists in the city (Khan, *Dawn*, 31 January 2015).

In 2011 the MQM brought out a nine-point “Charter of Economy”. The charter included most of the old demands of the party, like imposition of agricultural income tax, introduction of land reforms, plugging leakages in the tax collection system, recovery of loans written off on political grounds and reduction in the non-development expenditures. The charter also spoke of lowering the prices of basic amenities like wheat, agricultural products, etc. The MQM believed that imposing agricultural tax would bring the government at least Rs 200 billion annual revenue. The MQM also wanted “the government to get the additional income of Rs 400 billion refunded by the ‘feudals’ or 30 per cent tax on this extra income be imposed.” It also called for reduction of the cabinet size and a ban on luxury cars by the Presidents and Prime Ministers in the interests of economy (*Dawn*, 2 February 2011).

The MQM also called for a more comprehensive national counterterrorism policy, considering that “military courts are not a permanent solution to control terrorism and militancy in the country”. The government would have to “modernise the policing system and take effective measures to protect judges and witnesses” (*Dawn*, 28 December 2014).

Earlier in 2003, Altaf Hussain constituted committees to enable the minorities to help resolve their problems in terms of discrimination within the country. He said,

“Everyone living in Pakistan is entitled to equal rights under the tenets of our noble religion — Islam — with guarantees given by the Constitution. It is a party of the poor, working for promoting the middle class. And the day is not far off when the repressed and the downtrodden will have their final say.” (*Dawn*, 24 November 2003)

In terms of failures, the MQM has been criticised on various grounds, such as the corruption issue. In 2004, the then secretary-general of JI Sindh, Rashid Naseem, accused the MQM of disturbing law and order in Karachi and said that the common masses were tired of the bloodshed, extortion and hooliganism of the MQM (*Dawn*, 4 January 2004). The MQM's tactics of violent politics were also criticised by various political parties and in Karachi they were said to be targeting the Pakhtuns. This matter will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

Some aberrations were also noticed in the MQM's ideology. In 2010 Altaf Hussain asked the "patriotic generals" to impose a sort of martial law in the country in order to uproot feudalism from society and politics. This statement was condemned by other party cadres for its proposed compromise with democracy (*Dawn*, 29 August 2010).

The MQM was also accused of corruption. *Dawn* reported that BBC had established a report alleging that the MQM was taking funds from India to run the party, but the MQM refuted these reports (*Dawn*, 25 June 2015).

Internal rifts were also reported within the party. The leaders were charged with corruption and their position depended mainly on the will of the chief of the party, Altaf Hussain, who himself was charged with corruption. Some senior leaders said that "the MQM was ignoring problems of its core constituents due to its internal problems, as complaints of water shortage, power load shedding and lack of cleanliness were on the rise. It all started after the May 11, 2013 general elections." As a senior leader pointed out, "Politically we are strong, but at the organisational level we are not that good and unfortunately the whole world is now seeing it" (Ashfaq, *Dawn*, 30 December 2014).

Because of the internal strife many MQM leaders quit the party. The former Karachi mayor and an important leader of MQM, Mustafa Kamal, after coming out of the party formed his own Pak Sarzameen Party and was joined by many important members of the MQM like Advocate Anis, Raza Haroon, Anis Kaimkhani, Dr Sagheer, Iftikhar Alam, and Waseem Aftab (*Dawn*, 23 March 2016). Nevertheless, still the party enjoys substantial support in urban Sindh.

Comparison of Issues According to Priority

Comparing the manifestos of the ANP and the MQM, it appears that the MQM is trying to explore a number of issues and wants to touch upon a wide range of areas to emphasise that it basically wants to work for the masses and not for any specific group. On the other hand, the ANP manifesto highlights its secular socialist orientation with emphasis to work in the regions which are less developed and also touch upon tribal areas. The focus of ANP remains in the Pakhtun dominated areas and the areas of their political importance.

Issue	ANP	MQM
Devolution and Local Government System	Favours greater participation of women and following the 18th amendment in terms of oil, gas water, education, etc.	Wants to devolve the local government system to facilitate rural urban integration.
Education	Lays special emphasis on education and wants to allot 6 per cent of GDP on education. Calls for restructuring of the education system, not dominated by a feudal class structure.	Wants to allot 5 per cent of the budget to education. Wants to improve Urdu medium schools.
Unemployment	Wants to work for proper employment opportunities and for vocational training.	Proposes to narrow the gap between wage rise and inflation. Wants greater public investment in agriculture and livestock. Wants to reduce tax for the lower income group and to introduce social security scheme for the adult population. With promotion of education, training and poverty

		alleviation, wants to solve the problem of unemployment.
Poverty Alleviation	ANP is committed to rationalise defence expenditure, with emphasis on economic and social welfare.	Wants better educational and health facilities with fair distribution of resources. Wants special consideration to the poor in taxation. Talks of several schemes for the low income group.
Agricultural Development and Water Resources	Wants to give special attention to the livestock sector, poultry farming and cash crops. Aims to work for irrigation projects, especially in KP. Opposes any project which will not benefit the people of KP and will degrade environment, land, etc.	Wanted passage of Land Reforms Bill of 2010, increased share for cultivators, promotion of agro-based industries, new water reservoirs. Also wishes to establish Hari courts under Sindh Tenancy Act of 1950.
Health	Wants to allocate 6 per cent GDP to health services. Also wants decentralisation of health services, putting emphasis on mother and child care. Emphasis on primary health care.	Public expenditure should go to 5 per cent of GDP on health. Emphasis on primary health care services and introduction of more hospitals.

Woman Development rights of non- Muslims	Wants women's participation in decision-making and 33 per cent increase in representation in Parliament. Respect for all groups.	Wants stricter laws for domestic violence and discrimination. Wants 50 per cent increase in women's representation in Parliament. No discrimination against minorities and women.
Labour rights	Supports trade unions and labour rights in the informal sector.	Wants to establish a monitoring board to ensure a respectable wage structure.
Youth	Emphasises skill development by various trainings.	Increase of seats and enhancement of vocational training.
Environment	Wants to maintain clean environment, clean water, etc.	Use of natural resources, extensive forestation, environment-friendly urban development.
Foreign Relations	Resolving problems with India and Kashmir issue. Relations with Afghanistan to be strengthened. Relations with China and America to be maintained.	Solving Kashmir issue, CBMs with India. Good relations to be maintained with neighbours. No mention of China or America.
FATA	FATA to be a part of KP. Amendments to strengthen the area and keep away from terrorism.	No specific demands.

Table 4.1 *Priority Issues of ANP and MQM (2013).*

Source: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (2013), p. 13-40.

Issue	ANP	MQM
Devolution and Local Government System	General	Detailed
Education	Extensive	Detailed
Unemployment	General	Detailed
Poverty Alleviation	General	Detailed
Agricultural Development and Water Resources	Detailed	Extensive
Health	Detailed	Extensive
Woman Development rights of non-Muslims	General	Detailed
Labour Rights	General	Detailed
Youth		
Environment	General	Detailed
Foreign Relations	Detailed	General
FATA	Detailed	Nothing Mentioned
Counter Terrorism	Extensive	Detailed

Table 4.2 *Treatment of Priority Issues in 2013 Manifesto*

Source: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (2013), p. 9.

Comparing the manifestos it can be seen that the MQM emphasises more the socio-economic issues of the country. MQM actually wants to play a larger politics than the ANP and that is why it is advocating more for the downtrodden and middle class people of Pakistan. This was why it changed its name from Mohajir to Muttahida

(united). The ANP on the other hand shows that it is more interested in dealing with areas it is concerned with, like KP and FATA, foreign policy and terrorism. Though the ANP is also trying to widen its base, the Pakhtuns are its support base.

Leadership

One important parameter for measuring the success or failure of a party is to examine its leadership. The ANP is now headed by Asfandiyar Wali, son of Wali Khan (leader of NAP) and grandson of Ghaffar Khan. He began his political career as an activist in 1968 during the Ayub regime. He was a member of the Pakhtun Student Federation (PSF) who were lobbying for the establishment of democracy in the country. Hailing from a political family, he had good guidance to pursue politics in Pakistan. According to *Dawn*,

“Asfandiyar’s parliamentary career began in 1990 when he was elected to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then known as North West Frontier Province) provincial assembly. He was first elected to the National Assembly in 1993. Also winning another seat in the NA in the 1997 general election, he was later elected Senator for a six-year term (in 2003). In February 2008, Asfandiyar was elected MNA for a third time in his legislative career.

...

While he acted in various capacities during his role as lawmaker, Asfandiyar’s most notable feat has been to keep the party together in the wake of what can be viewed as frequent leadership changes in a hostile political climate.”

Starting from renaming the province (from NWFP to KP) to devolution of power to the provinces, most of the ANP’s achievements were under Asfandiyar’s leadership (*Dawn*, 23 March 2013).

On the other hand the MQM chief Altaf Hussain is a Mohajir. He joined politics in college and served as General Secretary and later as President of the National Students’ Action Committee. He along with some other Mohajir students formed the APMSO on 11 June 1978, which later transformed itself into MQM. The APMSO and later MQM struggled for the rights of the Mohajirs. After Army operations in Karachi, Altaf Hussain fled to London and remained in political asylum. He has always emphasised his politics to be for the middle and lower middle class people. He has been against hereditary politics and he has said he was able to make this political

party for the common masses and not for the feudal lords (MQM Official Website). Unlike the ANP, MQM leadership is not dominated by family politics.

Internal Democracy

The MQM's main founder and ideologue is Altaf Hussain. The Rabita Committee is the main coordinating committee and it can seek guidance from Altaf Hussain or the chief of the party. But though the members are elected in the Rabita Committee, their membership depends on the discretionary power of the MQM head. There is also a hierarchy of power in the party: (i) Convenor of the Central Coordinating Committee (CCC); (ii) Deputy Convenor CCC; (iii) Members CCC; and (iv) Finance Secretary. There are coordination committees at the provincial and local levels and also district/zonal/divisional committees in Sindh province. But in other provinces such as Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan, there are only provincial committees. The last party election was held in 2012; the next elections are due in 2016 (PILDAT Report 2016).

“Currently, the party is trying to reorganise some of the setups within the party, for example, there are 3 ‘Sectors’ and 200 ‘Units’ in Karachi, and the party administration is trying to keep not more than 10 office bearers in each sector. Every sector and unit proposes names to the Rabita Committee in order to appoint or re-appoint someone to the committee or to any position in the party. Mr. Altaf Hussain consults his own consultation group. The constitutional requirement of consultation is apparently fulfilled because active and regular consultation with the MQM chief takes place.” (PILDAT Report 2016)

Meetings are held throughout the year and the party council meets once a month. No member of Altaf Hussain's family occupies a position in the party. Altaf Hussain has always been the chief of the party. PILDAT in its report ranks MQM as the fifth in terms of internal democracy compared with other parties in Pakistan (PILDAT Report 2016).

As regards the ANP, its Central Cabinet is an elected body, which currently has 27 members. Amendment to the party constitution can be made by “two-thirds majority of the present members of the Central Council”. The president is the party head. His powers include nominating members mainly for the Central Council and Central Executive Committee. The secretary general and vice president occupy the next important positions. The constitutional bodies are well coordinated and divided. At

the centre it is Central Council; Central Executive Council; Central Cabinet; Central Parliamentary Party; and Central Election Office. The provinces consist of

“Executive Councils of the National Units i.e. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab and Saraeki; Cabinets of National Units; Parliamentary Boards of National Units; Parliamentary Parties of National Units; Volunteer groups of National Units; District, Tehsil (Taluka/Tappa), Wards/Primary Committees of National Units and Election Commissions of National Units.” (PILDAT Report 2016)

The party members are elected. There are regular meetings in the party. The party’s leadership is dynastic. Asfandyar Wali Khan has been the party President for the last sixteen years. PILDAT ranks the ANP in the fourth position in comparison to other parties; it was second according to the 2014 PILDAT report. As the report suggests, the ANP except its family participation, shows a more democratic structure than the MQM.

Areas of Concern

The MQM has for long been advocating devolution of power to the provinces. It also aims to improve the economic condition of the weaker section of society. In an interview given in 2000 (Bakhtiar 2000), Altaf Hussain said:

“We have been demanding for long that the smaller provinces of the country be given their due rights. And that is exactly why we are now demanding a new constitution – a constitution that ensures equal rights for everyone. If smaller provinces and ethno-linguistic minorities feel threatened from majority rule, as was the case before the partition of the subcontinent, one would find it extremely difficult to justify the two-nation theory.”

About the MQM’s grievances against the Punjabi establishment:

“It is the Punjabi establishment which has been denying the smaller provinces their rights. The common people of the Punjab, however, do fall prey to the establishment’s propaganda. When the establishment says the Baloch are traitors, the common people of the Punjab believe it. Similarly, when the Punjabi establishment brands the Pathans, the Sindhis and the Mohajirs as traitors, the Punjabis believe it.”

About his concept of autonomy:

“What we mean by autonomy is the transfer of all powers and authority to the provinces with the exception of three subjects: foreign affairs, defence and currency. Baloch and Sindhi nationalists may have a concept of autonomy different from ours. But the demand for autonomy remains the common factor between all of us.”

About if the MQM gives a call for action how will the Mohajirs respond:

“I think the MQM still enjoys the support of Mohajirs and other oppressed people. Its vote bank has increased and they will say lab-baek to our calls. But the MQM does not want to divide Sindh. It only wants to attain the rights of the Mohajirs as well as the Sindhis with whom we must coexist.”

The MQM has been targeted by the Army several times for the tactics used by the party. Often, this group was termed as a terrorist organisation. Arif Jamal has said that the MQM is targeted by the military to establish its strong foothold in Pakistan.

“In or out of power, the Pakistani army continues to make and break political parties. In the second half of the 1980s, it encouraged and supported the formation and rise of the MQM in order to damage the PPP in Sindh. In the 1990s, the army generals felt the MQM had become too big to handle, so they created divisions in it. The MQM is not the only political party which continuously faces such wrath of the army; other political parties, too, face similar kind of treatment from the generals. The army uses different ways to create divisions in different political parties at different times. The reason is that strong political parties are a direct threat to the supremacy of the military in politics.” (Shams 2015)




Fig. 4.3 Constituents of Pakhtun Forces.

For the ANP, the threat to its ideology of secularism coming from the religious and extremist forces restricts it to work for the well-being of the people. As there is a strict division in the Pakhtun society it is becoming very difficult for the secular forces to survive. The ANP is therefore focused more on FATA, where there is a more fundamentalist confrontation and also on counterterrorism, as most of the ANP members are targeted by the Taliban.

Asfandiyar Wali Khan, president of the ANP, said in an interview that Pakhtun nationalism is to be understood on the basis of the structure of Pakhtun society. At present three entities prevail in the society, which has complicated the issue of a secular coherent Pakhtun nationalism. They are the religious political entities, the ANP and the liberal forces, and the Taliban. These three forces are making the growth of a strong unified Pakhtun nationalism more complicated. After the Afghan Jihad the preachers coming to Pakhtun areas convinced the older people to keep away from any kind of modernisation and also music. These developments have pushed the Pakhtuns towards religious orthodoxies where the secular factor of nationalism has become vague (Abbas, *ARY News*, 2011).

The presence of the Taliban in Pakhtun society is also a big challenge, even to the extent that the Pakhtuns are often equated with the Taliban. The areas particularly affected by this challenge are North and South Waziristan, Bajour and Madan. The military action in these areas to keep away the Taliban has not brought down their influence. Pakhtun nationalism is also facing a great threat in Karachi, as they are being equated with the Taliban. This is because the Mohajirs are unable to accept the Pakhtuns as a “reality in Karachi” (Abbas, *ARY News*, 2011).

The Pakhtun-dominated regions are also becoming unstable economically, politically and socially. The conflict between the secular, extremist and religious forces is turning Pakhtun areas virtually into war zones. The constant conflict is hampering growth in the region and is increasing poverty, unemployment, etc. (Hussain, *Dawn*, 26 November 2008). To cope with the situation the Pakhtuns’ ethnic consciousness is becoming fluid.

Interviews

To have a more comprehensive idea about the ethnic politics and the nationalism of the Pakhtuns and the Mohajirs, this researcher interviewed an eminent journalist and scholar, Arif Jamal (by e-mail), and Palwasa Abbas, Vice President, National Youth Organisation (the youth wing of the ANP), on facebook.

Interview with Arif Jamal

Q. What is the present status of ethnic politics in Pakistan?

Ethnic politics play a very small role in Pakistani politics. The only ethnic political party which has an appeal to voters is MQM (Altaf). The ANP also has some appeal but it cannot win elections purely on ethnic basis although it receives substantial support from Pashtuns for ethnic reasons. The ANP wins only when it succeeds to appeal to a large part of the constituents for reasons other than Pashtun ethnicity.

The rise of Islamist parties and groups in the last 20-30 years has further diminished the role of ethnicity in Pashtun areas. Let us not forget that JUI and JI have always had some support base in Pashtun areas and have been winning elections. Conservative parties such as the Muslim League have also been winning in Pashtun areas. However, the ANP or its predecessors have had little support outside of Pashtun areas.

Q. How active is the Pakhtun national movement in Pakistan?

There is very little left of the Pashtun movement in Pakistan. Even the ANP does not claim to be a Pashtun party. Pakhtoonkhwa Milli party of Mehmood Khan Achakzai in Balochistan is perhaps the only party whose raison d'etre is Pakhtoon ethnicity.

Q. What is the role played by the ANP in the politics of the country?

It is a major party in KP. It is democratic and supports other democratic parties except MQM, which is seen as the major rival party. It stands with PPP and PML to resist the army in politics.

Q. What is your opinion about the ANP and what are the reasons for its failure in the 2013 elections?

In addition to the other reasons I have talked about before, one major reason was the rise of Islamist/Jihadist groups which threatened it. Islamist/Jihadist groups like the TTP allowed only Tehreek e Insaf and PML to run election campaigns.

Q. What are the other parties representing the Pakhtuns?

Pakhtoonkhwa Milli party of Mehmood Achakzai in Balochistan.

Q. How different is the ethnic politics of the Mohajirs from that of the Pakhtuns?

A large number of Mohajirs do not vote for the MQM or its offshoots. But those who vote for the MQM do so only because they are Mohajirs and the MQM represents Mohajirs. Not all voters of the ANP vote for the ANP because they are Pashtuns.

Q. What role is played by the MQM in the politics of the country?

The majority party in Sindh is the PPP, which always tries to keep the MQM in the coalition so that they do not make trouble for them. Like this they also get 12-14 MQM votes in the National Assembly and a few in the Senate.

Q. What are the other parties advocating the rights of the Mohajirs?

Only MQM (Haqiqi).

Q. Can we call the MQM true representatives of the Mohajirs after its change of name from Mohajir to Muttahida Quami Movement?

The change of name did not change anything else.

Q. How Strong is the party after the 2013 elections?

Witch-hunting of politicians, especially the MQM, by the military is taking its toll. It is weaker than before.

An informal chat with Palwasa Abbas on Facebook dated 14 May 2016.

She said, “A fair answer will be that the Pakhtuns of KP and Quetta are represented in the true sense by two political parties – the ANP and PMAP. The ANP movement is stronger in KP, and Pakhtoonkwa Mili Awami Party in Balochistan. Apart from many problems Pakhtuns are facing in Pakistan our party the ANP is in a true sense struggling for the rights of our people, the Pakhtuns. We have a strong presence. The ANP is a nationalist party which believes in the equality of all the nationalities of Pakistan and is a strong voice for their genuine rights. Though the ANP has not much presence in mainstream national parliamentary politics, still our representation in the national political scene is quite strong. The main reason for our failure in the 2013 elections was our party’s stand against the Taliban. We faced severe attacks on our leadership and were deprived from running campaigns and to reach the masses on the ground.”

When asked about the difference of ethnic nationalism and politics of Pakhtuns and Mohajirs, she said, “Pakhtoons are no migrants on this land and Mohajirs are. Our struggle has been for different aims for the same rights. We are settled in FATA and KP since centuries. Mohajir immigration in the region is decades long. We want rights, equality and respect with acceptance in this land as equal citizens of the state.

Though the MQM name has changed, it still is the biggest force representing Mohajirs. MQM is a voice for Mohajirs who arrived in Pakistan after partition. The ANP is a nationalist party working since Khudai Khidmatgar Tehreek of Bacha Khan Baba for the rights of all the oppressed in the region.”

A Comparative Analysis

The ANP can be marked as a left-wing, secular, Pakhtun nationalist party, which mainly draws its support from KP (especially Peshawar and Mardan and other rural areas). The party currently is active in Karachi and other Pakhtun-dominated areas. On the other hand the MQM can be called a secular, liberal party finding support mainly from Karachi and some parts of Hyderabad (*Al Jazeera* 6 May 2013).

Though both parties started with ethnic parties, the MQM has changed its name from Mohajir to Muttahida (to mean united). The party has broadened its scope to participate in national level politics. The ANP has the main support base in Pakhtun-dominated areas. But the party never calls itself a Pakhtun party and aims to represent all the people of Pakistan though its agendas focus on the problems of Pakhtun-dominated KP and FATA.

The ANP and MQM have several differentiations in terms of their orientation and tactics. The MQM basically fights for the lower and middle-class Mohajirs and lays emphasis more on devolution of power, economic aspects and education of the masses, especially for the people who are struggling to lead a prosperous and peaceful life. On the other hand the ANP's core agenda lies in demanding socio-political security for the Pakhtun people. As the zones which are dominated by the Pakhtuns are war-prone because of the terrorist activities, the ANP basically seeks a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy from the centre. The ANP also demands inclusion of FATA in KP so that a proper administration can be secured. As the *Express Tribune* reports,

“being a secular political entity, the Awami National Party (ANP) is destined to face terrorist attacks. After assuming power in KP in 2008, the party chose to fight militancy which had already seeped into various parts of the province from neighbouring tribal regions. Since then, the party has topped the hit list of Taliban militants. It is the only political force who not only have adopted a clear stance on how to tackle militancy, but also demand

military operations in Malakand Division, particularly in Swat.” (Rauf, *Express Tribune*, 23 December 2012)

But the ANP has lost its vigour for various reasons such as its hierarchical hereditary politics, corruption and its anti-Taliban strategy. The secular politics of the Pakhtuns are in decline. Consequently, the ANP is losing much of its strength in the Pakhtun areas. Also, because of the Taliban activity, they are hampered in their work.

Though both the MQM and the ANP aim to fight for their respective ethnic groups, they have got involved in the power play of the politics of Pakistan. The ANP has become an emblem of hereditary politics and the MQM has started widening its scope, from a political party for the Mohajirs to fight for all the deprived groups, to remain in power. The two parties’ power struggle is clearly visible in Karachi, where they have been involved in establishing their legitimacy, especially from 2008-2013. The next chapter will throw further light on this issue.

Chapter V

Conflict in Karachi

Ethnic clashes embedded in power politics and competitions over resources have turned many important cities into graveyards of ethnic divergence. The port city of Karachi, the capital of Sindh province and the commercial hub of Pakistan, where multi-ethnic conflicts have ascended over the last century, is a classic example of this unfortunate phenomenon.

Commercially the most developed city of Pakistan, Karachi has been witness to the mobility of various ethnic groups such as Mohajirs, Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Balochs, Sindhis, etc. The Mohajirs, who settled mostly in Karachi during partition and were the dominant ethnic group in the city, are now facing a threat to their predominance from the other groups. The Pakhtuns settled in the city in different waves of migration, making Karachi the heartland of their commercial activities. There are now more Pakhtuns in Karachi than in Peshawar. The migration of various groups has not only changed the city's demography but has translated it into a ground of ethnic conflict and competition. Sporadic violence has become common in the city, resulting in loss of lives and property. Iftikhar Malik comments: "Karachi's volatility not only demoralises all of Pakistan and its well-wishers, it equally stipulates an ongoing nightmare for its own inhabitants, painfully stuck on a cliff hanger" (Malik 1998: 2219).

According to Laurent Gayer, the crisis facing Karachi is partly because of the failure of successive Pakistani governments to implement development plans in the city. The trans-nationalisation of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s has further heightened the ethnic resentment, which has not only fragmented the urban space, but has also generated ethnic clashes and militancy in the city. These ongoing issues have also enhanced the role of ethnic parties in the politics of Karachi (Gayer 2007: 515).

The prevailing chaos has encouraged the ethnic parties to strengthen their roots in the city and bargain for their respective groups. This chapter is exclusively concerned with the clash between the Mohajirs and the Pakhtuns.

Geostrategic Significance of Karachi

According to Laurent Gayer, the port city of Karachi was discovered by Sir Charles David Napier. Initially it was not so important as a commercial port, though it linked the world with two doors of salt water (Kharadar), which was the access point of the Arabian Sea, and sweet water (Mithadar), which faced the Lyari river. The British developed the port commercially for high tonnage ships. The port of Karachi thus became very important for connecting Sindh and Punjab with the Persian Gulf and also connected China and Africa. From 1854 onwards Karachi port was further modernised by the British. In the 1860s, Karachi's economy benefited from the American cotton crisis and in the 1870s McLeod Road became the hub of Karachi's commercial and financial activities (Gayer 2007: 517).

In the meanwhile many European banks and firms were opened in the zone, and with the railway links connecting Sindh with Punjab, the transportation of wheat and cotton to the port was further enhanced. Karachi, after Bombay, became the second-largest vegetable market of the region and outstripped Bombay in wheat export. After World War I it became the food basket supplying food to the British soldiers. During World War II it became a major "ship hospital" and also became an important zone for food supply. Overall, Karachi became one of the important commercial zones of British India with marvellous economic and political significance (Gayer 2007: 517).

At the turn of the twentieth century, the strategic thinker Alfred T. Mahan talked about the importance of sea power. In his view, "command of the sea" is the dominant form of political power. It also acts as a crucial factor in determining the political relations among states. Giving the example of the Russian empire, Mahan pointed out how landlocked Russia had overcome its weakness as a land power through access to the sea. Britain, on account of its control over the Suez Canal, Straits of Gibraltar and the English Channel had become strong enough to control the rest of Europe's access and also the land beyond the Atlantic and the Mediterranean (Banerjee 1998: 25-28).

The Karachi port lies along Pakistan's coastline, which stretches from the Straits of Hormuz to India's border. It connects important parts of Afghanistan, Central Asia and Western China and has become an important gateway to the region. It is said that Alexander, who stayed in Karachi on his way back to Macedonia, identified this place

as “the bridge between east and west” and also recognised the immense potential of commerce and trade of Karachi’s hinterland (Shirazi 2007).

Karachi in recent times has turned into a mega city of the world. Its economic importance may be seen from the fact that it contributes to more than 20 per cent GDP and 70 per cent of the national exchequer to Pakistan. The city is home to a large number of banks, corporations, and shipping, transport, entertainment and arts activity. It is not only an important trade route to Pakistan but also facilitates landlocked Afghanistan and provides supply lines to the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The city has high potential to be a strategic hub of global trade (Isran and Isran 2014: 217). According to Bettina Robotka,

“Karachi handles 95% of Pakistan’s foreign trade, contributes 30% to Pakistan’s manufacturing sector, and almost 90% of the head offices of the banks, financial institutions and multinational companies operate from Karachi. The country’s largest stock exchange is Karachi-based, making it the financial and commercial centre of the country as well.” (Robotka 2013: 2)

Apart from 20 per cent of the national GDP, Karachi also “adds 45 per cent of the national value added, retains 40 per cent of the national employment in large-scale manufacturing, holds 50 per cent of bank deposits and contributes 25 per cent of national revenues and 40 per cent of provincial revenues” (Robotka 2013: 2).

Ethnic Aspect of Karachi

With the ingress of various ethnic groups and the constant change of its demographics, the port city has become the heartland of ethnic conflict in Pakistan. During partition Karachi came under huge demographic pressure because of the influx of Mohajirs. This group included highly proficient bureaucrats and work forces, which helped in the development of the city into an economic and political hub of Pakistan. On 22 May 1948 Karachi was made the capital of Pakistan, overlooking the claims of Lahore and Rawalpindi. The Constituent Assembly decided Karachi to be a federally administered area and thought to separate it from Sindh. This fuelled anger among the Sindhis, who considered it a discriminatory move. They also chafed at the Mohajirs’ monopolisation of the city (Gayer 2007: 518).

According to Robotka,

“At the time of partition Karachi had slightly less than half a million inhabitants. At the time of the foundation of Pakistan in 1947 Sindhis and Sindhi speaking Baloch formed about 62% of the population of Karachi while Urdu speaking were only about 6%. However, by 1951 the population of Karachi had increased to 1.14 million due to the influx of refugees and the ethnic mix had changed dramatically. Now 50% of the population was Urdu speaking and the Sindhi speaking had been reduced to about 8%.” (Robotka 2013: 5)

As migration from India continued during the 1950s, the Urdu speakers increased to 58 per cent of the population. The Sindhis, who saw the migrants, who were well read taking away their jobs, university seats, business opportunities, etc., resented this situation (Robotka 2013: 5).

In terms of the various stages of migration to Karachi over the decades, the first stage was the pre-independence and immediate post-independence period (1940s-1950s) of the refugees from British India and independent India. The second wave of migration was of the Pakhtuns and the Punjabis, 1960s-1980s. The third wave comprised the Sindhis, who after the coming of Mumtaz Bhutto in power, came for prestigious jobs in the city. After the shifting of the federal capital to Islamabad, Karachi was integrated into the Sindh province. The new job quota which was introduced by the Bhutto government attracted the Sindhis to Karachi. The fourth wave of migration began after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. These migrants were mainly political refugees from Afghanistan. Gradually, after this Karachi became a hub of underground criminal and other unlawful activities such as drug smuggling and human trafficking (Mujtaba et al. 2009: 5).

In the first wave of migration to Karachi city, the Mohajirs found it very difficult to share the space with the indigenous Sindhis. Initially, the ethnic distinction between the migrants and the indigenous people had no political role. Hence,

“subject to availability of opportunity and the absence of any discriminatory state policy, ethnic distinctions primarily became a means of social identification in an anonymous urban setting, of populations transplanted from a pre-modern context, with which context they continued to be associated and had invariably maintained links” (Mumtaz 1990: 232).

The Mohajirs' marginalisation started with the Ayub era, when the Pakhtuns started their migration to urban Sindh (Chitkara 1996: 44). According to Mumtaz,

“These people were not only labourers; they also gradually took over, almost entirely, the public transport system of the city. The report of the inquiry into Karachi's affairs commissioned by the Prime Minister in May 1988 shows only 557 buses in the city at present to be Government property, as opposed to 1,253 private buses and a total of 85,709 privately run taxis, rickshaws, trucks, and mini-buses, the bulk of which are reportedly owned by migrants from the NWFP.” (Mumtaz 1990: 232)

Further, the wave of Punjabi migrants, who were both small businessmen and labourers, started giving competition to the Mohajirs both in business and in recruitment of the small-scale industries. They also started occupying the seats allotted under the urban quota system, mainly in the civil services, which was previously dominated by the Mohajirs (Mumtaz 1990: 232).

During the December 1964 presidential elections, because they supported Fatima Jinnah against Ayub Khan, the Mohajirs had to face a series of attacks by Ayub's son Gohar. The Mohajirs were anti-Ayub mainly because Ayub pursued a policy of dictatorship under the veil of democracy by launching an electoral process which the Mohajirs doubted was rigged. They were also angry with the Ayub regime because of its shifting the capital from Karachi to Islamabad.

It was mainly after the coming of the Pakhtuns that the Mohajirs got a blow in terms of losing their jobs and also witnessed a shift in demography. After this there were clashes between the Mohajirs and the Pakhtuns. Moonis Ahmar says, “The Mohajir-Pathan clashes in late 1964 and early 1965 were the first ethnic riots in Karachi and determined the future course of ethnic politics in urban Sindh” (Ahmar 1996: 1032).

Gayer says that in the 1980s, the clash between the Pakhtuns and the Mohajirs started when Karachi's urban crisis fuelled social antagonisms with the coming of the Pakhtuns from NWFP. The Afghan jihad along with the refugees also brought arms into the city, further complicating the situation (Gayer 2007: 518). Over the decades, the city's demography has changed to such an extent that, according to the 1998 census, “48 per cent of the city's population is Urdu-speaking, 14 per cent Punjabi-speaking, 12 per cent Pashto-speaking and about 9 per cent is Sindhi-speaking.” The

Pakhtun population has increased further over the years (Ahmed, *Express Tribune*, 28 August 2010).

An Understanding

According to Blagojevic, in an ethnically diverse city, people can become uncertain about their social, economic and political future and compete with other groups for establishment. People who become insecure about their future generally merge into a group. Political entrepreneurs mobilise this ethnic consciousness by promoting inter-ethnic animosities with the tools of blaming other ethnic groups or the system, creating fear and hatred for the other groups, etc. This results in an inter-ethnic competition over resources and rights, which can also turn violent. This approach is called the political entrepreneurs approach, wherein the political elites can mobilise groups for their own purposes. In this aspect the institutional approach also becomes important, as sometimes the institutions allow such kind of practices or sometimes are unable to prevent the conflicts (Blagojevic 2009: 9-10).

The Mohajirs of Karachi had a considerable hold and their political party dominates the city's politics. But the equations changed after the migration of various ethnic groups into the city. This challenged the Mohajirs' authority and they rose in conflict with other groups, especially the Pakhtuns who came from the NWFP. For the Pakhtuns, after migrating to Karachi the problem was to stabilise their footing in the city by ensuring for themselves proper and equitable distribution of resources.

The incidents which highlighted the Mohajir-Pakhtun animosity were the riots of 1985 and 1986. In 1985, the riots started when a Mohajir girl was run over by a Pakhtun bus driver. In retaliation, the Mohajirs burnt Pakhtun-owned buses, with the Pakhtuns in turn burning Mohajir houses. Officially the death toll was estimated to be 50. In Qasaba and Aligarh, Pakhtuns armed with Kalashnikovs targeted Mohajirs as a reaction to the army knocking down the illegal drugs and arms market. The riots continued in the city for five days (*Dawn*, 13 October 2012).

In course of time, the Pakhtuns and Punjabis formed the Irfanullah Marwat-led Punjabi-Pakhtun Ittehad for protesting against the Mohajirs. The MQM in turn encouraged the party members to take up arms to defend themselves from the other

groups, especially Pakhtuns and cadres of the PPP and later the ANP. Husain from *Dawn* reports that

“according to the WikiLeaks papers released through this newspaper, the US consulate in Karachi estimates that out of all the armed groups in the city, the MQM has the largest group of around 10,000, with another 25,000 in reserve. If true, this makes it amongst the most potent forces in Karachi.”

But the demographic shift in the city clipped the MQM’s wings, and the party was not able to extend its influence beyond the region (Husain, *Dawn*, 6 April 2012).

The inter-ethnic clashes had long roots in history. Jamil in *Daily Times* states that the Mohajirs’ settling down in Karachi had created an “unplanned settlement”. Until the 1980s, Mohajir entrepreneurs managed settlements mainly in the illegal subdivisions. This status quo was challenged by the Pakhtun migrants to the city. The Mohajirs tried to retain their settlements and their dominance in the transportation business, which eventually became Pakhtun-dominated (Jamil, *Daily Times*, 14 August 2010).

To safeguard the Mohajirs’ interests, in 1985 the MQM was formed. According to Jamil, with the formation of the MQM, “the dynamics of the conflict changed. The MQM mobilised the Urdu-speaking people to make Karachi its exclusive preserve, and also to dominate other cities in Sindh like Hyderabad and Sukkur” (Jamil, *Daily Times*, 14 August 2010).

After its first electoral victory in 1988, the MQM gave a new political angle to the ongoing violence of the city. The flow of firearms following the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan further heightened violence in the city which was rapidly divided into enclaves, which were then controlled by the militias. Since the 1980s the Mohajirs and the Pakhtuns were engaged in ethno-political clashes to gain command over the city’s infrastructure and resources (Yusuf 2012: 6).

Karachi now has the largest population of Pakhtuns, surpassing Peshawar, Quetta and Kandahar. It was during the Ayub regime that Karachi became the heartland of Pakhtun migration from the northwest because of the rapid industrialisation and economic boom in the city. The opportunities for employment in textile, transport and construction opened new opportunities for them. Often the Mohajirs were not ready to take up low-wage jobs, whereas the Pakhtuns did not have that inhibition. According

to the 1998 census there were 14 per cent of Pakhtuns in the population of Karachi, who contributed to the city's economy through labour, petty jobs and small trade. The Pakhtun population increased further with new arrivals from KP and FATA in the 2000s, predominantly because of the counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas (2007-2011) and also after the 2005 earthquake. Now Pakhtuns constitute 22 per cent of the population of Karachi (Rehman, *The Friday Times*, 2-8 September 2011).

Initially the Pakhtuns settled in two neighbourhoods of Pathan Colony and Sohrab Goth, but with the increase of their numbers they spread to new neighbourhoods. The Mohajirs have long claimed that the Pakhtuns are involved in land grabbing and smuggling operations in the city, which allegation the Pakhtuns deny (Chinoy 2009).

During the 1980s, the MQM was formed as the political party to represent the Mohajirs and the ANP to represent the Pakhtuns. During this time the Afghan resistance to Russian occupation gave birth to Islamic militancy, which aggravated violent conflicts all over Pakistan and especially in Karachi. The city became a hotbed of political parties with ethnic agendas, and even political parties like the PPP and PML(N) started drawing on their ethnic references to remain in position in the city. These political parties also had their armed wings, thus worsening the situation (Mumtaz 1990: 244).

Politicisation of Ethnicity

The Mohajir-Pakhtun confrontation started with the clash over control of the transportation business, which was at the time dominated by the Pakhtuns. Laurent Gayer notes:

“The 1985 riot thus erupted in a context of general public grievances, which included the transport problem, as well as the informal housing crisis. This urban crisis only took an ‘ethnic’ tone due to the communal division of work in the city and to the ethnic affiliations of the main protagonists in Karachi’s new real estate politics. In other words, all inhabitants of Karachi came to see the Pathans as factors of nuisance and insecurity not because of their ethnic origins but because of their professions, and the clashes which occurred between Pathans and Biharies (Mohajirs) in April 1985 and December 1986 had less to do with ethnicity than with the new politics of public transportation and real estate development in the city’s squatter settlements. The new demography of the city also came to play a key role in Karachi’s slip into violence in the 1980s.” (Gayer 2007: 525)

The situation has now taken a complicated shape, where there are many dynamics of competition which have given rise to complicated ethnic equations of conflict. First is the Sindhis vs. non-Sindhis parameter, including the Punjabis and Pakhtuns who have often conflicted with the Mohajirs in several aspects. The position of the religious minorities and illegal migrants is somewhat neutral in these tussles. There are also religious minorities and the militants who are adding to Karachi's conflict dynamics (Mumtaz 1990: 244).




Fig. 5.1 *Different Dynamics of Karachi Conflict.*

The Mohajirs had an easy access to jobs because of the Hindus' migration from Karachi during partition. But such opportunities were restricted after the imposition of the quota especially in employment in the civil sector and in educational institutions and because of the increase in population with the coming of the Pakhtuns. To cope with the problems affecting the Mohajirs the formation of an ethnic party of the Mohajirs was inevitable (Mumtaz 1990: 244).

After the formation of the MQM and its first electoral victory in 1987, a new angle was added to the ethnic conflict. In the 1980s the Mohajirs and the Pakhtuns were engaged in competition and conflict, resorting to the firearms coming to Karachi during the Afghan jihad. In the 1990s the army launched Operation Clean-up to curb the Mohajir militancy. The Sindh police were entrusted with its implementation so that it did not appear that any specific political party was being targeted. During this operation, there were extensive extrajudicial killings of the Mohajir militia, which created tension between the MQM and the PPP under Benazir Bhutto in 1992 and PML-N in 1994. After this operation there was a lull in violence (Hausen et al. 2009: 6).

But the federal and provincial governments were unable to curb the violence in the city during the 1990s. Moonis Ahmar notes:

“Some Karachi-based writers have charged that during certain search-and-siege operations by the police and rangers in MQM-dominated areas, residents are not only surrounded but are denied water and electricity as a matter of policy. The conflict between the MQM and its splinter group, the MQM (Haqqiqi), has also been violent, with considerable loss of life. The failure of the government, both federal and provincial, to provide security to the people of Karachi and other urban centres of Sindh has undermined the authority of the state and raised doubts about the future of law and order in the country.” (Ahmar 1996: 1040)

These incidents helped to strengthen the MQM’s place in Karachi, where the Mohajirs saw it as their true representative, rather than trusting the state.

According to Nichola Khan, various reasons such as poverty, unemployment, restricted opportunities for social mobility, military coups and police actions were responsible for the violent situation in the city, conducted especially by the Mohajir youths. The MQM had popular support from the deprived people. “For them, killings structured the basis for acquiring alternative forms of education, employment, manhood and social respect and mobility” (Khan 2007: 2443). For the Mohajir youths involved in violence, aligning with the party was a means of venting their frustration.

“Although [Altaf] Hussain’s leadership is undoubtedly paternalistic in character, patriarchy and the role of fathers can only metaphorically explain his unquestioned authority in MQM’s power structure and his wider capacity to rhetorically encapsulate people’s transcendental desires for recognition and higher purpose.” (Khan 2007: 2442)

Through the struggle since the 1980s the MQM never lost its support base and with time it was marked as the representative of the Mohajirs. Violence became a tool for the MQM to establish authority with its youth support. The failure of state agencies and military operations further consolidated the party's support base.

After some respite in the violence, there was a political showdown between the MQM and the ANP in 2007 as regards their stand on the deposed Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. As Yusuf describes the episode,

“On May 12 of that year, the MQM, which formed the government with then-president Pervez Musharraf, organized to prevent the arrival in Karachi of Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, a Supreme Court chief justice whom Musharraf had deposed. The MQM's plans were opposed by the ANP and PPP, which at the time formed the opposition at the federal level. MQM party workers were accused of launching highly coordinated attacks against ANP and PPP supporters, killing forty-three people, primarily Pashtuns. Fourteen MQM workers were also killed in retaliatory actions.” (Yusuf 2012: 82)

With this incident the direct confrontation of interest between the two groups came to the fore and the ANP established its foothold in Karachi politically. Before 2008, the Pakhtuns mainly aligned with the religious and other parties. But the ANP's support increased after the Chaudhry issue was politicised on the basis of ethnic identification, which increased the importance of ethnic-based parties.

According to Rehman, Ishaq Khan, who was a Pakhtun leader of Jammāt-e-Islami (JI) and headed the party in Karachi's Pakhtun-dominated west district, said, “Rejecting the ethno-lingual politics of the ANP, Pakhtuns of Karachi had voted for religious parties in 2002 general elections and Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) had four Pakhtun members in Sindh Assembly and one in the National Assembly from Karachi.” In the 2008 elections the ANP won two seats from Karachi because of its coalition with the PPP and also because the JI boycotted the election (Rehman, *The Friday Times*, 2-8 September 2011). Thereafter, the ANP vociferously claimed to represent the Pakhtuns in Karachi. It claimed to represent the 22 per cent Pakhtun population in the city on the basis of their victimisation especially by the Mohajirs.

After the further ingress of the Pakhtuns into the city to escape the military operation in the tribal belts and following the ANP's electoral victory, the MQM became

seriously concerned about losing its political hold in the city. Mohajirs currently make up 48 per cent of the city's population and hold considerable power. But unlike the ANP and PPP it does not have a provincial base to draw new support. Hence, before the 2013 elections the constant show of power through violence was a way of ensuring its political power. The constant violence prevented further migration into the city and restricted the shifting of the city's demography, which could have complicated the election outcome to the MQM's disadvantage. Violence was used to actually demarcate ethnic zones along electoral lines (Yusuf 2012: 8-9).

Shahi Syed, then president of the ANP in Sindh (2011), said, "The discrimination against Pakhtuns in Karachi was exacerbated during Gen. Pervez Musharaf's regime when he completely handed over Karachi and Hyderabad to the MQM." The fight in Karachi was not about Pakhtuns and the ANP, it was about the control of Karachi and Hyderabad by the MQM, he said. Syed pointed out that the 1973 constitution allows every citizen to do business in every city. He further accused the MQM of "running a propaganda" of calling all Pakhtuns Taliban to get rid of the Pakhtuns from the city (Rehman, *The Friday Times*, 2-8 September 2011).

The ANP leaders also claimed that during the violence of 1985-86 they were ready to negotiate with the MQM leaders but now the situation had worsened. Rejecting this claim, Gul Faraz Khattak, who was a Pakhtun member of the MQM's Rabita Committee, said in an interview, "Not all Pakhtuns support the ANP. Some elements fuel ethnic violence in the city to protect their illicit businesses." Khattak said that the MQM showed an interest in talking to the ANP to end the violence in the city, but the ANP leadership was not interested (Rehman, *The Friday Times*, 2-8 September).

Today, the Pakhtuns are the second-largest ethnic group in Karachi, but they were politically under-represented before 2008. But after 2008 things changed, with the ANP winning seats in the area. Apart from the confrontation between the Mohajirs and the Pakhtuns, non-availability of water, lack of education and health facilities, electricity and the deteriorating security situation for the Pakhtuns also paved the ground for the ANP. The Pakhtuns have specific tribal and religious affinity, and after the 2007 ethnic clashes the ANP found the ground to make itself the spokesperson of all the Pakhtuns in Karachi. Its anti-Taliban outlook also gave it the upper hand in Karachi during this time (Robotka 2013: 12).

Meanwhile chafing against the ANP's anti-Taliban outlook, the then chief of the TTP 2013, Hakimullah Masood, directed TTP members in Karachi to take action against the ANP as the ANP's secularism and anti-Taliban policy were posing a constant threat to TTP. TTP closed many ANP offices, accusing the ANP of murder and extortion. It is said that after this the security condition slightly improved in Karachi (Robotka 2013: 13).

Politicisation of Karachi

Mohajirs from India migrating to Karachi mainly settled in Landhi, Korangi and New Karachi. They faced problems of housing, transportation and livelihood. But gradually they started stabilising the economy by setting up informal businesses on a large scale. At first, the city was dominated by religious parties. But when the MQM was formed to represent the Mohajirs, it attained undisputed 90 per cent share of seats in Karachi and the rest was for the PPP. In the process, the MQM wiped away the Jamat-i-Islami and Jamait-i-Ulema Pakistan. Even the 1990s, when there was the worst law and order situation, saw the MQM dominating the scene (Paras, *Daily Times*, 21September 2011).

Gradually, with improved facilities, Karachi became home for various ethnic groups like the Mohajirs, Pakhtuns, Baloch, Sindhi, Makrani, Punjabi as well as immigrants from Pakistan's neighbouring countries. Divisions based on ethnic allegiances later transformed into political competition and conflicts.

After Operation Clean-up, there was a lull in the violence. During the Musharraf era the district government system was introduced in 2001. According to Paras,

“During Musharraf's era, law and order in Karachi remained almost under control. This era was marked by the development initiatives introduced on a large scale, indicating the success of the decentralisation experience in this urban set-up but, on the other hand, it has been argued that the ruling party tried to marginalise other linguistic and ethnic groups in the city.” (Paras , *Daily Times*, 21September 2011)

The MQM tried to sideline the other groups with violence. There were also massive corruption and loopholes in the government machinery. In consequence, the number of land grabbers and extortion groups increased massively (Paras, *Daily Times*, 21 September 2011)

After the war on terrorism launched in Afghanistan by the US-led coalition in 2002, the situation in Pakhtun-dominated areas turned violent. In the 2002 elections there was a rise of religious parties, which formed a coalition named Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). The MMA stood against the elimination of the Pakhtun Taliban and also the war on terror. It also helped the Afghans to migrate and settle in KP and Karachi. The MMA was able to change the election result of not only KP but also Karachi. It won five NA and seven provincial assembly seats in Karachi, out of which one Pakhtun candidate from the MMA won an NA seat and four bagged provincial assembly seats. In addition, two Pakhtuns – one from the PPP and another from the National Alliance – booked places in the Sindh Assembly. Before the 2008 elections, with the rise of religious Pakhtun forces, a consolidated Pakhtun identity lost much of its vigour. Many refugees migrated to Karachi, complicating the situation where Pakhtuns were mostly marked as Taliban by the other ethnic groups (*Dawn*, 11 May 2013).

With the insurgencies in the tribal areas, many Pakhtuns started migrating to Karachi. The US-led anti-militant operations in KP and FATA, the drone attacks and the earthquake, all worked together to escalate migration. The migrating Pakhtuns faced tremendous harassment from other groups, and the militants and the religious parties were unable to uplift their status because of the ethnic confrontation. Regretting the choice they had made in the 2002 election, the Pakhtuns in 2008 shifted their allegiance to the ANP in Peshawar and Karachi. The ANP was thus able to get two seats from west and east of Karachi. With this electoral performance of the ANP, Karachi saw more inflow of migrants from KP and FATA, as the migrating Pakhtuns thought that the ANP, being a Pakhtun party, could ably safeguard their status in Karachi. Gradually, Karachi became the largest Pakhtun-populated city, more than Peshawar, Kandahar and Quetta (*Dawn*, 11 May 2013).

In the 2008 election, the political space was shared by the MQM, PPP and the ANP in Karachi. For the first time, the ANP formed a coalition with the PPP and the MQM in Karachi. In the election in Sindh,

“The PPP won 69 provincial assembly seats, MQM 39 seats followed by PML-Q who got 10 seats. The ANP won 2 seats and the PML-N failed to get any. The MQM dominated Karachi and Hyderabad winning 17 out of 20 NA seats and 35 out of 42 PS (provincial assembly Sindh) seats in Karachi.” (Chandran and Chakravarthi 2008)

After the election, the MQM-ANP and MQM-PPP rivalry again came to the fore. After the influx of the Pakhtuns in Karachi, the MQM began accusing the Pakhtuns of Talibanising Karachi and also led the campaign of anti-Talibanisation. The Sindhis and the Baloch have also said that the MQM tried to monopolise Karachi in this way (*Daily Times*, 12 January 2010). The MQM, fearing a demographic shift and change in power equation, to stop the Pakhtuns from migrating to Karachi asked for registration of the immigrants. Ahmed from *Daily Times* reports:

“The MQM pressed for a mechanism under which the newly arrived people could be registered. The proposal, however, fell through as it was vehemently opposed by the ANP and was unable to secure the endorsement of the other coalition partner of the MQM in the Sindh government, namely the PPP. But the MQM continued to oppose the arrival of Pakhtuns in Karachi.”

On this account, violence escalated in Karachi. It was assumed that the armed wings of the political parties were responsible for this situation (Ahmed, *Daily Times*, 4 December 2012).

Though the MQM won the election in Sindh in coalition with the ANP and PPP, it accused the ANP of involvement with the Taliban and protecting them in Karachi and demanded action against the ANP on this account. The MQM also blamed the PPP government of “extending open support to the ANP which is involved in land grabbing and armed activities”. Such internecine conflicts within the coalition naturally affected the government’s functioning (*Daily Times*, 12 May 2009).

The ANP at this time became an emblem of Pakhtun representation, providing leadership to 4 million Karachi Pakhtuns. The JUI and the Deobandi Madrassas mostly became enfeebled. The Pakhtuns in Karachi also sought refuge from the

Barelvi clergy, who were anti-Pakhtun and also a potent militant force of the city. During this time the Mohajir-Sindhi divide slid into the background and the Mohajir-Pakhtun divide came to the fore. Meanwhile, because of the army operations carried out in FATA, more Pakhtuns came to Karachi. This created pressure on the ANP to give them a political safety net, which aggravated its contradiction with the MQM (*Daily Times*, 12 May 2009).

After accusations by the MQM, the ANP held the MQM liable for the casualties caused in Karachi with violent activities (Khan 2010). The MQM in its turn demanded a ban on the ANP for involvement in terrorist activities in the country, calling the ANP the biggest terrorist party of Pakistan (*The News International*, 12 September 2011).

During the period of 2008-2013 many parts of Pakistan including Karachi, FATA and KP were under the threat of terrorists. The PPP-ANP-MQM coalition regime, which created the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), did not allow it to function properly, given that the agency was mainly filled with bureaucrats or political appointees (Abbasi, *The News International*, 27 April 2013).

The MQM was unable to accept the ANP and PPP as a political reality of Karachi. To keep its hold on the city it marked all Pakhtuns as Taliban. In a gesture of compromise, on the death anniversary of Khan Abdul Ghafar and Abdul Wali Khan, the ANP Chief Asfandyar Wali said:

“Muttahida Qaumi Movement would have to admit the fact that Karachi belongs to all Pakistanis. It is our contention that war cannot be a solution to any problem. I am ready to hold talks with anyone only if they accept the writ of the government and condemn terrorism. Pakhtuns are a reality which must be recognised.” (*The News International*, 26 January 2011)

In 2013, a consensus emerged among the different political parties on dealing with the security situation of Karachi. The PPP, ANP, JI, JUF-F and MQM supported the Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan’s appeal for a targeted operation in the city. They agreed to take action against the criminals who had targeted innocent people and party workers (*Geo Tv*, 29 August 2013). But that action was not taken during the tenure of the PPP-MQM-ANP regime (2008-2013).

Political Constrains and Strategies

After forming the PPP-MQM-ANP coalition government in 2008, there were struggles to establish a smooth ground and power for all the three coalition partners. Their power rivalry could be perceived in their role in Karachi. As the political struggle continued, the situation further deteriorated in the city, with violent gang wars, drug and arms trafficking, extortion, and the growth of land-grabbing mafia. The coalition parties were alleged to have links with these groups. The MQM already had a grouse against the PPP and PML(N) because of the operation carried out by these parties during 1992-1994 to curb its armed wing. Hence, as a political strategy the PPP government was against repeating the same action. Neither did the PPP want to upset the ANP which was supporting it at the centre and in KP. The Pakhtuns, having a good hold of the transport business in Karachi, were themselves supporting the PPP. The power equation in the city further complicated the problems. According to Najam Sethi, the twofold problem of the city was “the proliferation of armed, autonomous, non-state actor mafias allied to each political party; and the MQM’s unwillingness to accept a fair power-sharing formula.” This was mainly because during Musharraf’s regime the MQM had been the sole actor for the Mohajirs in Karachi (Sethi, *The Friday Times*, 26 August -1 September 2011).

Meanwhile the MQM and the ANP often blamed each other for the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi. Then Interior Minister (ANP), Abdul Nabi Bangash, said that the MQM took no action on the report on targeted killings. “Whenever a Pakhtun is killed in Karachi”, he said, “condolence messages are sent to London.” The then Minister for Ports and Shipping, Babar Ghouri, said on the other hand that many Pakhtuns were being killed in KP and the ANP leaders were reluctant to acknowledge this. He said, “We care more about the ideology of Bacha Khan than you.” He also said that the Pakhtun migrants had been accommodated well in Karachi. He also urged for a joint venture to solve the problem (Anis, *The News International*, 28 September 2010).

After the 2008 elections, where the ANP and the MQM won seats in the province, both were involved in the power struggle to secure their position in the city, unleashing deadly violence in the city. As *Dawn* reports, “in 2010 and 2011, when the MQM began to allege that the Taliban were acquiring a presence in the city, the ANP

accused it of trying to use that claim as a pretext to ethnically cleanse Karachi of Pakhtuns.” In the Frontier Colony attack of 13 August 2012, the local ANP office-bearer and former UC Nazim, Amir Sardar, and two party workers were killed. Thereafter, a number of ANP offices were shut down and many ANP officials were killed or thrown out of the Pakhtun-dominated areas. Qadir Khan, an ANP spokesman who had joined the MQM, said, “No political party or group can stand up to these militants” (Zaman and Syed, *Dawn*, 31 March 2013).

Before the election of 2013, the ANP’s influence in Karachi had declined on account of the Taliban’s growing influence in the city. *News International* reported, “The Taliban and other militant groups have expanded their network in Karachi, especially in the Pakhtun-dominated suburban neighbourhoods, and have forced the ANP to wind up their operations.” Many areas like Sohrab Goth, SITE, Orangi and Baldia towns became “no-go areas” for ANP workers due to the presence of the Taliban. As a result, the JUI-F and other religious parties, which had lost the Pakhtuns’ support after 2008, were able to regain much of that support and were able to carry out their election campaign. It was also reported that the Pakhtuns living in the stronghold areas of the MQM might prefer to vote for that party (Azmat, *The News International*, 6 April 2013).

To regain the ground they had lost to the Pakhtuns, the MQM leaders said that they were not against any ethnicity. The name Muttahida meant all people, they said. Before the 2013 elections Altaf Hussain said,

“Today I apologise to all Pakhtuns if I have committed any wrong against them. And in case Pakhtuns have committed any wrong against Mohajirs then I request the Mohajirs to pardon their brethren. Today I claim that there is no Pakhtun-Mohajir conflict in Karachi.”

Altaf Hussain also talked about strengthening the MQM’s roots in KP through cooperation with the Pakhtuns. He said,

“From today, the MQM would focus on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and members of its coordination committee and organisers should make preparations for the coming election. We will field our candidates in all constituencies in the country, including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.” (Khattak, *Dawn*, 3 March 2013)

Political Power Game




Fig. 5.2 Main Areas of Pakhtun-Mohajir Confrontation.

Karachi, mostly dominated by Mohajirs, is the most pluralistic city of Pakistan. The Mohajirs voted for the religious parties in the 1970s mainly because when they came from India they believed in Pakistani nationalism.

“And since only the religious parties had directly linked Pakistani nationalism with Islam (thus transcending the need to be tied to an ethnic base or culture to be called people of the soil), the majority of the Mohajirs counterbalanced their social liberalism with political conservatism and voted for JI and JUP.” (Paracha, *Dawn*, 1 July 2012)

After General Zia’s rise to power, the influence of the mainstream parties was restricted and there was a rise of an urban industrialised class. This gave rise to individual ethnic-based politics. After Zia’s death, the MQM rose to prominence and has been dominating the politics of Karachi (Paracha, *Dawn*, 1 July 2012).

The conflict in Karachi was mainly a power struggle of identities. The MQM has always remained the dominant party and draws its strength from the middle class Urdu-speaking electorate, who are mainly descendants of Mohajirs. It is trying to eliminate its opponents to keep up its strength. The clash between the Mohajirs and

the Pakhtuns started basically after the Pakhtuns started claiming the white-collar jobs after getting good education (Hasan, *BBC*, 12 February 2009).

The PPP also formed a coalition with the ANP in KP and Karachi. The period 2008-2013 saw the coalition politics of PPP, the ANP and the MQM. During this coalition phase, the PPP wanted to re-demarcate the constituencies in Karachi and to share the representation of the city with the other ethnic communities living in Karachi. The PPP decided to divide the city into five districts ostensibly to better equip the administration, but the real intention was to carve out more seats for itself and the ANP in the city. But this task became difficult because there was no census in the country after 1998. According to Ayaz, “ANP has been saying that the Pakhtun population is close to five to six million which means almost 30 percent of the 18 million Karachi population.” The tussle between the MQM and the ANP was mainly because of the vote bank. In the context of this ongoing demographic shift both the parties tried to manage their power share. During this time, a number of Pakhtuns living in Karachi, who were registered voters of KP, were trying to register in Karachi with the help of the ANP. This became a threat to the MQM (Ayaz, *Daily Times*, 9 July 2011).

Saleem Safi has said that the Pakhtuns of Karachi voted for the ANP in 2008 as it was the party which could have challenged the MQM.

“And one of the reasons why the ANP even won there was because both the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf boycotted the elections. Moreover, the Pakhtuns who voted for the ANP in the 2008 elections did not necessarily share their ideological belief but did so because the ANP was the only one that was willing to challenge the Muttahida Qaumi Movement on home turf. One must understand that Pakhtuns in Karachi have either voted for the JI, the PML-N or the PPP.”

Later on, the PTI also has emerged as an adversary to the MQM both politically and electorally (Siddiqui, *Dawn*, 16 May 2013).

During 2008-2013 the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi also influenced the migration of the Pakhtuns back to their hometowns. The ANP’s then Sindh president Shahi Syed showed concern regarding the Pakhtuns who were fleeing back to KP and Balochistan as their properties were destroyed and shops and restaurants were damaged especially in the Urdu-speaking localities. “People are kidnapped and

their drilled bodies stuffed in bags are dumped in open plots or in drains but law enforcement agencies are yet to arrest the killers”, he said. The only demand of the people was restoration of peace and security by the arrest of killers and destruction of torture cells everywhere, he said. He added that many cases of murder were not registered by the police. “About 4,000 Pakhtuns living in localities of Urdu-speaking people because of their businesses or jobs have been forced to flee”, he said. JI deputy chief Sirajul Haq said that it was not the problem of Pakhtuns only, as every community had suffered owing to targeted killings. The entire responsibility rested with the coalition partners in the government (*Dawn*, 29 August 2011).

Nichola Khan, who is a senior lecturer at the University of Brighton, in an interview with Maher Mahim, spoke about the similarity of violence used by the two groups.

“One implication in both cases is that violence is an outcome of ‘ethnicisation’, of irreconcilable differences between ethnic groups, and ‘all’ – Mohajirs, Pathans, Baloch or Sindhis – are the same. This view, which has also been a very effective tool of political mobilisation, has little to say about neighbourhoods in Liaquatabad for example – routinely portrayed as a hotbed of MQM militancy – where Baloch paan vendors, Pathan watchmen, Kashmiri labourers, Sindhi office workers and Mohajir shopkeepers trade and coexist peacefully.”

She agreed that violence is used as a means to retain power and political position (Maher 2013). These political parties also have armed wings, which are involved in illegal activities including squatting in buildings, plots, extortion, etc. (*Dawn*, 29 August 2011).

According to Dr Farrukh Saleem, who is a political scientist, economic theorist and financial analyst,

“For the MQM, Karachi is the lone source of some two-dozen National Assembly seats and 51 Provincial Assembly seats. Karachi enables the MQM to capture more than its fair share of clout in Islamabad as well as in Karachi. For the MQM, its entire electoral base is up in flames. For the ANP, the party claims to represent some 25 percent of Karachi’s population but only has two seats in a 168-seat Sindh Assembly. For the ANP Karachi is a Rs 10 billion pie in which it feels that the party is not getting its fair share. For the PPP, Karachi only produces half-a-dozen seats of the 93 that the PPP won in Sindh. In essence, 95 percent of the PPP’s political stakes in Sindh are outside of Karachi. The PPP views the MQM-ANP bloodbath as being to the PPP’s political advantage.” (Saleem 2012)

Saleem also mentions how the resources of the provinces are wasted by the terror created by TTP. The bloodshed continued as the MQM feared loss of status and the ANP wanted to make its political presence prominent with the help of the Pakhtun vote bank (Saleem 2012).

The ANP's authority in the city was challenged not only by the MQM but also by the TTP, because the ANP was its Pakhtun rival in ideology and also power share. After the coming of the TTP in the city, within a year, 2012-2013, the ANP was wiped away from Karachi. After this the TTP also targeted the MQM. The confrontation to occupy the political space continued in the city among several groups (Gayer 2014: 164).

In Karachi, ethnic political parties have become an important part of the life of the people. More than state authority, the people are inclined to their respective political parties.

“If a person needs a job, or wants to get his child admitted to a school, wants a domicile certificate, wishes to get an FIR registered, or get a friend released from legal or illegal police custody, he will go to his ethnic organisation or networks.”

Ethnicity has gradually enhanced its importance by having a greater influence in the day-to-day life of the people. Voting along ethnic lines has also increased in the city. “The Pakhtuns vote for the JUI and the ANP. Sindhis and Baloch vote for the PPP, middle-class Punjabis vote for the Muslim League and the Urdu speakers for the MQM” (*Dawn*, 25 June 2010).

The inter-ethnic confrontation is at three levels: the economic, which is mainly among the Pakhtuns and Mohajirs, the political between the ANP and the MQM; and both of these leading to ethnic confrontation in the city.

In the 2013 election the ANP withered away from Karachi's politics. The MQM also lost some seats. *Dawn* (16 May 2013) reported that this was because the PTI had emerged as a considerable force in Karachi city (it won 8 per cent of the vote), taking some of the PPP and MQM vote. The PTI has become an important force in Karachi and claims to represent Pakhtuns. Its pro-Taliban attitude gave it leverage over the secular-oriented ANP.

As regards finding a viable solution to the ethnic-based violence in Karachi, political scientist and defence analyst Ayesha Siddiqa says that the army cannot bring a viable solution as it is not trained for urban operations. Deploying the army will generate popular opposition against the military. Only a political solution can help in sustaining peace in the city (*Dawn*, 9 September 2009).

The MQM and the ANP have both tried to expand their political influence in the city and have bargained for their position with the PPP from 2008-2013. The MQM was able to keep up its political might through violence. The ANP, being secular in orientation, has lost much of its support after 2013.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

In today's world, the question of identity, interpreted in terms of ethnicity, has started dominating the internal politics of various countries. With the rise of globalisation and modern technologies, it was anticipated that a more connected world will be formed based on the common consciousness and "imagined bonds". Rather, it was seen that people are becoming conscious of preserving their identities. This is mainly because with increasing trans-border movements, migration and also the internationalisation of many economic and social activities, people are becoming more conscious of preserving their long-established traditions. Thus they are becoming conscious of conserving their specific identities based on ethnicity, race, region, religion, etc.

Further, the connected world has also opened an arena of competition among the people where they have to safeguard their position in the hierarchy of power. Therefore, this situation of competition and deprivation can give rise to a conscious identification on the basis of which people can claim resources and safeguard their position in the world. Under these circumstances, people may refer to their primordial identities while forming a group based on certain commonalities. These commonalities can turn group identification into group consciousness; by virtue of this collective identity, the members feel they are being deprived and thus they can bargain for their resources on its basis. Often, in this situation, particularly in the case of ethnic groups, certain components of the ethnic identification are taken into account especially by the leaders where the group consciousness is turned into a political entity and finally into political parties.

In this aspect, the role of the leadership is very important, as it is its prerogative to choose some components of identification in a particular situation to present the demands of the groups and bargain with the state. In this way, some aspects of ethnicity are instrumentalised to form a group whose aspirations in that situation are placed in front of the political authorities. The aim is thus to fulfil those aspirations of that group based on ethnic identification.

Here, the role of the state also becomes important, especially in cases where a pluralistic society exists. States which consist of multi-ethnic groups but cannot ensure an assimilated culture and those that do not focus on an equitable distribution of resources, compel the citizens to form their own ethnic political groups to bargain for the resources with the state. In these kinds of states, there are either one or two dominant groups which have a total control over socio-economic and political resources and on the basis of this relative deprivation, the other groups may rise to claim their share of the resources by forming political parties of their own. At the same time, in order to retain the position the dominant groups have, they can also instrumentalise certain aspects of their identification and can start bargaining for their position.

Another problem which becomes very intricate for most of the South Asian countries is that when the boundary of the state was drawn by the colonial masters, the ethnic aspects were not taken to consideration. Thus the concept of nation-building for the developing countries, where it was tried that the states become nations, becomes very different from that in the Western countries where state formation has originated from the feeling of nationalism.

Pakistan also suffers from a similar problem. The country is multi-ethnic, but where there is the domination of one or two groups which has given rise to serious ethnic competition and conflict. It has been observed that the state has failed to respect the plurality of the groups but instead has wanted to impose the dominant culture on them in the name of nationalism. Thus, the country failed to have an assimilative culture based on democratic principles. Consequently, ethnic groups often entered into a conflict either with the state authorities or with other ethnic groups.

When Pakistan was created, it was promised by its makers that the country will be a proper federation with the devolution of power. Religious nationalism which was the reference point for the creation of the state lost its validity once the state came into being. The political authorities of the state tried to bind together the people of the country under one centralised system, keeping the religious aspect in focus. But, it actually aggravated the problem where the concept of the melting pot was used for the ethnic groups instead of making them collaborate as part of an assimilative culture.

In this context, the ethnic issues which are constantly posing a threat to the country of Pakistan need to be examined. For the purpose of this study, two ethnic groups of Pakistan, the Pakhtuns and Mohajirs, were taken into account and their respective political parties, the Awami National Party and Muttahida Quami Movement, were examined. The basic aim of the study was to check that by politicising ethnicity, certain ethnic components were taken into account which were favourable in that situation. Thus, the focus remains on how the identities are instrumentalised and used for bargaining by the political parties in the hierarchy of power. Further, it is to be noted that while doing so, the political parties have often compromised with their aims regarding their respective groups; rather, they have applied different strategies to remain in power and affirm their position in the politics of Pakistan.

The chapters of the thesis have provided details about the two groups and their political parties. In the conclusion, it will be significant to note how the ethnic identifications are instrumentalised and the role of the political parties in this process. Thus, before concluding, a quick recapitulation of the two nationalisms and their politics will help in evaluating the study properly.

Pakhtun and Mohajir Ethnicity: A Departure from the Primordial Concept of Ethnicity

A comparison of both the nationalisms and their political parties was made in the fourth chapter. Now, to find the trend of the ethnic politics of Pakistan, two diverse ethnic groups are taken up here. Though both the groups started their journey at different points in time and under different circumstances, they have some similar traits. First, it will be significant to note how the ethnic groups have departed from the primordial concept and have instrumentalised their ethno-nationalism by politicising it.

It will be apt to take the Pakhtun nationalism into consideration first. The very basis of Pakhtun nationalism was that the Pakhtuns were intolerant of any kind of subjugation. This was the reason why they voiced the demand for their own homeland and were against any suppression by the British or the powerful khans. It is a very important fact that the primordial aspect of Pakhtuns based on their code of conduct of Pakhtunwali which lays the rules of their daily life and language, formed an integral part of their ethnic identification. The Pakhtuns formed a strong group of

ethnic categorisation, which was not ready to compromise on its identity under any circumstances. For this, they wanted to form their own state.

But strangely after the formation of the state of Pakistan, the Pakhtuns and their political parties found it easier to stay with Pakistan rather than forming their own state. Scholars like Adeel Khan, Feroz Ahmed and others have mentioned that the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and the urban middle class of the Pakhtuns which formed the main support base of the nationalist movement before the creation of Pakistan, started dominating the transport business in the country, especially in Punjab and Sindh. Therefore they found it best to remain with the state where their economic interests were at par with the integration of Pakistan at that point of time. The migration of the Pakhtun workers to the urban centres of the country especially Karachi, provided them with employment opportunities; they were well represented in the army and gradually, their share in the political structure also increased. That is why the demands shifted from secession to autonomy. Moreover, the peasants who were participants in the movement against the British found that the national integration could serve their interest more than voicing for secession, where there will be fear of domination by the landlords if a new country of the Pakhtuns was formed. Another important fact which has been pointed by Feroz Ahmed (1996) is that in comparison to the other ethnic groups in Pakistan, the Pakhtuns have never demanded a national status for their language. They got integrated in the state system of Pakistan and most of them learnt Urdu; the nationalism was kept alive only in the hand of its political parties to secure their position in the hierarchy of power.

Further, the Pakhtun migration to other parts of Pakistan in search for a better standard of living never led the Pakhtun nationalism to be sturdy. And, the consolidated Pakhtun nationalism based on 'given identities' started getting disintegrated with time and circumstances. Moreover, the secular aspect of that nationalism was undermined by the religious political parties and the extremist forces. A cultural division was seen between the people of the plains and the tribal areas. Thus, the division among the Pakhtun people clearly shows that with due time, the primordial references diminished and only certain aspects of the identity were taken up in a specific situation by the political parties to raise their voice for the people (mainly against the domination of the Punjabis and Mohajirs).

The Taliban who are ethnically Pakhtun, have further brought down the status of Pakhtun nationalist ideologies, the struggle for which is often being equated with that of the Taliban. The Pakistani Pakhtun Taliban manifested their aspiration to change the structure of the state and also the ideological make-up of Pakistan and wanted to make the rules of the state based on the Islamic law, *Shariah*.

This shows how much Pakhtun nationalism has weakened over the last forty years and illustrates the fact that more than a primordial character, it is mainly focusing on the recent phenomenon of ethnicity, whether in terms of changing the demand from secession to autonomy or challenging the secular aspect of nationalism by the different forces in the country. Therefore, this justifies that from primordialism, the ethnic groups are now instrumentalising their ethnic aspects according to the situation.

Coming to the Mohajirs, initially this group was against any kind of ethnic polarisation. To begin with The Urdu-speaking migrants who came from the Muslim-minority provinces of India were staunch supporters of a state based on religious nationalism. Unlike the Pakhtuns, they willingly joined the state of Pakistan. After coming to Pakistan, the educated migrants quickly took the place of the Hindus who had dominated the economic structure of urban Sindh. The upper and upper middle class got well-integrated while the middle and the lower class took some time to settle and gradually they also got well integrated into the state system. The Mohajirs along with the Punjabis started dominating the socio-economic and political milieu of the country.

Being staunch supporters of a nationalism based on Islam, they never aspired to become an ethnic group. They preferred to retain their Pakistani identity. For this, initially, they did not have any ethnic specific political party. Thus after coming to Pakistan, they always supported their Muslim identity which was the basis for the creation of the state. They mainly supported the religious political parties and were away from any kind of narrow ethnic polarisation which challenged the very foundation of the state.

But with time, there was a shift in the status of the Mohajirs. During the Ayub era, a lot of Pakhtuns started migrating to Karachi in search of jobs. Karachi, which is the commercial hub of the country, was dominated mainly by the Mohajirs. Thus, the demographic shift which was created by the migration of the Pakhtuns and Punjabis

posed challenges for the Mohajirs, especially those belonging to the middle and lower middle classes. Further, the recruitment of the Pakhtuns in the army gave another blow to the Mohajirs. The major challenge which confronted the Mohajirs was in the 1970s, after the introduction of the quota system where rural Sindh got its due representation. The introduction of the Sindhi Language Bill gave a final blow to the Mohajirs who now had to share their position with the Sindhis. These enactments which hardly bothered the upper class Mohajirs, gave a blow to the middle class Mohajir youth. Frustrated with these developments, the Mohajir students formed their party called the All Pakistan Mohajir Student Association and finally converted it into a party to fight for the rights of the Mohajirs, which came to be called the Mohajir Quami Movement.

Thus it is very important to note that the Mohajirs who were against any kind of ethnic polarisation initially, formed an ethnic group and politicised ethnicity to bargain for their own status. Further, after the separation of East Pakistan and the rise in ethnic demands by other groups, the Mohajirs found that if they did not hold onto their group solidarity by virtue of being a numerical minority, they will face the same fate which they faced in India vis-à-vis the Hindus. Thus according to the demands of the situation, they consolidated into a group forming a political party to voice their rights.

Thus, Mohajir nationalism can be said to have come up after a fall in position on the basis of a common language, culture, common history of migration, humiliation by the other groups, etc. The Mohajirs formed their political party and voiced for a system which will ensure a secure position for them in both the economic and political spheres. It is imperative to note that the feeling of oneness and the need to consolidate as a group came to the Mohajirs when their authority got challenged by other groups. Along with that, when the other groups were claiming for their resources on the basis of ethnic identification, the Mohajirs felt that they will be relatively deprived if they did not bargain for their position on the basis of their ethnicity. Therefore, even after being a dominant group, they bargained for their authority as they felt that their sacrifices in the creation of the state should be awarded by securing a privileged position for them.

Therefore, Iftikar Malik says that Mohajir nationalism has been marked as an expression of cultural distinctness, rather than a perfect case of ethnic nationalism. In this case, ethnicity was not formed on the basis of any given identity. The Mohajirs formed the group in which the MQM has transformed a “Mohajir consciousness into a full-fledged ethnic identity”. Thus, Mohajir nationalism shows an inclination towards instrumentalism rather than towards a primordialist trend (Malik 1997: 254).

The Politics of Bargaining

The Pakhtun nationalism has recently come to face various challenges—a secular nationalism is being confronted by the religious forces and the presence of the Taliban in the Pakhtun-dominated areas. Again, the Pakhtuns of Karachi are also facing the problem of integration within the society and are often being victimised as Taliban. Thus, in this context, the role of the Awami National Party becomes important for carrying forward the demands of the Pakhtuns and for facing the challenges strong-headedly. These challenges have also increased the importance of this Pakhtun-based party in the country and have also amplified its scope in the politics of Pakistan.

To start with, the Khudai Khidmatgar of Ghaffar Khan laid the foundation stone for the Pakhtun politics before the creation of Pakistan. The socio-economic movement was meant to serve the people and aimed to have a democratic society based on equitable principles where no subjugation of the people, especially of the Pakhtuns, would be made. After the creation of the state, the National Awami Party emerged as the representative of the Pakhtuns. The NAP was more of a nationalist force which mainly stood for provincial autonomy and a democratic devolution of power to the provinces. After the dissolution of the NAP, the Awami National party was formed which was said to be the true representative of the Pakhtuns.

Now, the question is, how has the party worked for the Pakhtuns?

It is to be mentioned here that the Awami National Party, has at least never proclaimed that it is a party for the Pakhtuns, but its support base is found mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The Awami National Party gets its support mainly in Peshawar and Mardan and has a strong support base in the rural areas of KP. Being

secular in nature, the party was challenged by religious and extremist forces. That is why the ANP was unable to make a successful government, except in 2008.

It is important to note that the ANP in its journey has actually abandoned the idea of working exclusively for the Pakhtuns and has entered into a new phase of power play. To start with, the ANP formed a coalition government with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) both at the national and provincial levels (in KP) after the 1988 elections and then in 1989; after the alliance did not work out, it formed an alliance with the Pakistan Muslim League in June 1989. The ANP also joined the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) coalition and after joining it, it hardly referred to itself as an exclusively Pakhtun party. In 1993, it formed an alliance with the PML (N). In 2008, it again formed an alliance with the PPP to remain in power at the province and at the centre. Thus it seems that to remain in power, the Awami National Party has formed coalitions with different parties, irrespective of their ideological considerations.

The party manifesto of the ANP talks more about the general aspects of Pakistan, with some specification on the issues of the Pakhtuns. In order to get a proper position in the mainstream politics, the Awami National Party has started to voice the issues of vital importance and the rights of other ethnic groups also. So far, except for the change of the name of the province, a considerable enhancement of the status of the Pakhtuns was not seen especially in the less politically powerful areas of Pakistan. At the same time, it is true that there are a number of challenges which are in front of the ANP and the proper progress of these areas is a time-consuming process. Though the ANP claims that a lot of improvements were made, hardly any results are visible, except in a few cases.

Further, the ANP so far has not been able to curtail the challenges of extremism nor worked for the development of the underprivileged areas like FATA, except urging its inclusion into KP. Again, the ANP has become a political party of hereditary politics with internal rifts and corruption.

It will be worth mentioning here that the strategic changes made by the ANP and its overall approach have created a position for itself in the political power hierarchy of Pakistan which the NAP failed to get. Further, it is to be noted here that after getting well-integrated into the country, the Pakhtuns hardly voiced their nationalism. So, it

can be said that the nationalism of this group is not so strong presently as it was in the 1970s, but in the hands of the Awami National Party, it is being kept alive.

It can be justified that the ANP's position which it is enjoying today is because of branding itself as a Pakhtun party working on the principles of Ghaffar Khan and aspiring to serve the masses of Pakistan. Thus from here it can be said that the ANP is using Pakhtun nationalism more as a bargaining tool with the centre rather than following the party ideology, since it was seen that irrespective of the party ideology, the ANP has formed coalitions with different parties to stay in power and at the same time it has ignored the issues of vital importance in the areas of the Pakhtuns.

In the case of the MQM, the party came into being to safeguard the rights of the Mohajirs, especially those of the middle and the lower middle classes. Though the MQM initially provided a platform for the Mohajir youth to voice their own rights, later the party came to aspire for a bigger role in the politics of Pakistan.

To remain in power, the MQM also formed coalitions with the parties of different ideologies. In 1988, the MQM formed a political alliance with the PPP as it opened the door of power for the former in both at the provincial and the national level. After the ending of the alliance with the PPP, the MQM formed a coalition with PML (N). In the elections of 1990, the MQM entered into a new alliance with the IJI. After this, because of the violent tactics used by the party and the chaos in Karachi, there was a clean-up operation led by the military.

After a lull, the MQM again came back into politics with the change of name from Mohajir to Muttahida. This was basically to have a wider role in national politics and also to mark itself not only as a party of the Mohajirs but also as a party fighting for the rights of those people of Pakistan who were deprived. In 1997, it formed a coalition with the PML (N) and stayed in power. In 2002, the MQM also supported Pervez Musharraf and decided to have a cordial relation with the state authorities. In 2008, it formed a coalition with the PPP in the province and the centre till 2013. Thus, the MQM not only have formed alliances with different parties to remain in power but has also changed its name to have a wider role in the politics of Pakistan.

The violent tactics used by the party was a means to achieve its goal. Further, the MQM was mainly busy with securing Karachi in its favour and was not ready to share power with any other parties there. A clash of interests was always visible among the

Mohajirs and the Pakhtuns in Karachi where violent means were used to maintain the authority of the respective parties.

Further the Muttahida Quami Movement is being accused of following a fascist ideology, because of the domination of its political leader Altaf Hussain. The internal party democracy also seems vague and the leaders are being charged of corruption. The internal rifts in the party gave rise to a new party called the Pak Sarzameen Party in 2016.

Thus, the MQM, with new strategies and tactics, came to play an important role in Pakistan. The party which aimed to work for the Mohajirs now claims to be a party of the deprived Pakistanis. Further, except for working for the devolution of power, any substantial achievement is hardly found on part of the party. Therefore, in the case of the MQM, it can be said that more than working for its respective ethnic group, it has applied a bargaining strategy to remain in power.

Both the Mohajir and Pakhtun nationalisms are not so active in today's Pakistan, but the political parties have kept them alive in Karachi and through their bargaining strategies.

When both the parties were in coalition with the PPP from 2008-2013, both the ANP and the MQM in order to retain power did not take any strong step to stop the violence in Karachi as this could have upset the coalition partners. Further, the MQM with its violent strategies has also bargained with the centre, waving the card of Mohajir nationalism. The recent extremist threats in the Pakhtun regions one again brought the concern of the Pakhtuns to the fore and the ANP using the card of secular Pakhtun force remained in power as the representative of the group(2008-2013), but hardly serving the masses.

Therefore, on these grounds the hypothesis of the study “*The Awami National Party and the Muttahida Quami Movement are using their respective ethno-nationalisms more as a bargaining tool with the centre rather than following the party ideology*” has been proved correct.

The Instrumentalisation of Ethnic Politics

The study can be concluded by saying that the politics of ethno-nationalism has come to occupy a predominant position in the state of Pakistan. The two ethnic groups, the Pakhtuns and the Mohajirs, which present a diversified picture of ethnicity, point to a common trend of ethnic politics in the country. The ethnic consciousness of the Pakhtuns and the Mohajirs became active with deprivation—be it in the economic, social or political spheres.

Again, a common perspective which should be noticed here is that all the Pakhtuns and Mohajirs have not aligned themselves either with the ANP or the MQM. The struggle of both the groups has remained divided. For the Pakhtuns, first the KKM and then the NAP mainly got the support of small khans and peasants who were aspiring for a better position at that time. In the case of the ANP also, only the secular-minded Pakhtuns are its supporters. For the Mohajirs though, the MQM had the biggest support but it was basically formed by the middle class urban youth who got a blow from the prevailing quota system of the state at that time. The party also has a support base from the economically weaker sections which had to compete with the other groups in Karachi, especially in the lower kinds of jobs.

As mentioned above, both the groups have departed from the primordial or a given concept of ethnicity and tend to incline towards instrumentalism. The politics of both the parties started in a given situation where ethnicity has been placed as a situational concept. Again, the political parties of both the groups, though different in structure and ideology, have shown that certain components of ethnic identification were taken up in order to consolidate ethnicity into a group under certain situations. In the case of the Pakhtuns, it was the glory and history of bravery and of not being subjugated, and for the Mohajirs, it were the language and history of migration which were taken together for the formation of the respective ethnic groups.

Thus, from here it can be said that, with various differences, a common trend of the politics is visible where the ethnic groups can translate into ethnic categories of politics under certain circumstances. The case of the Pakhtuns and the Mohajirs aptly justifies this situation. The divided Pakhtun society and the struggling class of the Mohajirs which formed the support base of the parties clearly indicate the flux and the fluid nature of the ethnic politics. It also signifies that the reference to some ethnic

elements (mostly primordial or given elements) was given by the people and the leaders in a certain situation to consolidate into a group and later the references were changed as per their convenience, or it can be said that the identities are instrumentalised when the groups are politicised. Thus, the politics of the Pakhtun and Mohajir ethno-nationalism has made the triumph of politicisation of ethnicity and nationalism becoming interpreted on the basis of instrumentalism in the politics of Pakistan.

Therefore, the other hypothesis of the research “*Pakhtun and Mohajir ethno-nationalism as manifested in Pakistan can be explained more in terms of Instrumentalism rather than Primordialism*” also being proved correct.

Therefore, the research has given an elucidation of ethnicity and ethnic politics in a multi-ethnic country like Pakistan and in the South Asian context.

Interviews and Opinions:

The interviews and opinions taken by this research scholar will give different perspectives of some eminent scholars and politicians which will further help in elucidation of the study.

Interview with Khadim Hussain (25 June 2016) (*the Managing Director of Baacha Khan Trust Educational Foundation (BKTEF), Peshawar , Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*)

Q1. How active is the Pakhtun ethno-nationalism in Pakistan?

The Pakhtun Nationalism in Pakistan evolved around three fundamental questions. First, a quest for politic-economic empowerment and autonomy.

Second, unity of the Pashtuns who have been divided and ruptured by the colonisers in 19th Century. Third, establishment of structures that leads to social justice. Hence, it is not only ‘ethno-nationalism’ in the strictest sense of the world.

With the post-colonial state oligarchies rendering the Pashtuns more dis-empowered politically and economically, youth belonging to various sections of Pashtun nation and society are giving more impetus to the struggle of the Pashtuns both in theoretical domain and pragmatic politics. This phenomenon can be seen in:

Overwhelming support for the demand of Pashto to be made a compulsory subject at schools

High increase in the publication of books on Pashtun icons/legends every year

More than a dozen TV channels

Some two dozen FM radios

Increase in the publication of research journals in Pashto

Increase in the publication of dailies, weeklies and monthlies in Pashto

Overwhelming presence of Pashtun nationalist narrative on Internet and social media

Q2. How can you divide the Pakhtun society?

There are geographical, political and cultural variations in the Pashtun society. 1- Colonial dispensation divided across geographical lines between the sections of Pashtun society living to the west of Durand line and the sections living to the east of Durand Line to distort the natural divisions of Loya (great) Ningahar, Loya Kandahar and Loya Paktia. 2- Administrative/political units formed by the colonial and post-colonial dispensation to the east of Durand Line: a- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, b-northern Balochistan, and c- FATA. Cultural variations exist in Northern (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Central (FATA) and Southern Pakhtunkhwa (northern Balochistan).

Q3. How ANP is taking forward the ideology of Bacha Khan in the present situation?

The ANP is taking forward the ideology of Baacha Khan through three narratives:

Creating a narrative of non-violence to develop alternatives for the economy of war developed on the Pashtun belt for the last several decades. This also includes political strategies for the change of belligerent foreign policy through non-state armed militias adopted by the security establishment of Pakistan. ANP is perhaps the only political party which has a clear stance in favour of peaceful co-existence between Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.

Bringing together various sections of the Pashtun communities through pressurizing the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan,

Pro-people, secular and non-violent struggle for federal parliamentary democracy.

Q4. Can ANP be called a Pakhtun Party?

ANP might be called Pashtun party in the context of its organization and pro-Pashtun narratives but can be called as a secular political party in the context of its struggle for federal parliamentary democracy.

Q5. Can Awami National Party be called the true representatives of the Pakhtuns?

ANP can be called perhaps the only party that represents national, social and political aspirations of the Pashtuns. That's the reason that during any debate on the Pashtuns' interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan, ANP is particularly referred to whether positively or negatively.

Q6. What is the support base of the Party?

ANP has an overwhelming support among the middle, lower middle and working classes in Peshawar Valley (Peshawar, Nowshera, Swabi, Mardan and Charsadda), Quetta (northern Balochistan) besides FATA and Malakand Division in Pakistan and great Ningarhar, great Kandahar and to some extent great Paktia in Afghanistan. The support base is demonstrated during membership campaign of the party and its affiliate organizations (Friends doctors, Pakhtun Students Federation, National Youth Organization, Friends Lawyers and Friends Teachers) after every four years. The membership campaign registered 2.4 million members.

Q7. How different is ANP from NAP?

ANP carries forward most of the policies and narratives adopted by NAP with the difference that NAP had Baloch, Sindhi and Bengali leadership while ANP mostly consists of Pashtun leadership and intelligentsia.

Q8. Which class of people supports ANP among the Pakhtuns?

The middle, lower middle and working classes.

Q9. What other parties are representing demands of the Pakhtuns?

The Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party also represents demands of the Pashtun mostly in southern belt of the Pashtuns, i.e., northern Balochistan.

Q10. What is ANP doing to improve the condition of people in FATA?

ANP is striving to raise the following issues of FATA in Pakistani parliament and public domains:

Decolonization of FATA by doing away with the Frontier Crimes Regulation and extending judicial and parliamentary domains to FATA to ensure fundamental rights of the people of FATA.

Merging of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Enhancing the development index of FATA

Q8. What is the status of the Pakhtuns in Karachi?

Karachi perhaps accommodates the largest Pashtun population as compared to any other city of Pakistan. The Pashtuns mostly live there as workers. A vibrant Pashtun literati has also evolved in Karachi over the past three decades.

Q9. Do you think the Mohajirs are playing an active role in Karachi?

Perhaps there are no two opinions about the overwhelmingly active political and social role of Mohajirs in Karachi.

Q10. Are the Mohajirs not accepting the Pakhtuns in Karachi?

The Mohajirs accept the Pashtuns in Karachi as settled not local. They would like the Pashtuns to play second fiddle to the Mohajirs in resources and political space.

Q11. What is your idea about MQM?

MQM might have been a vibrant political party with secular leanings if it had not overwhelmingly counted on the narrow ethnic sloganeering.

Q12. Do you think these political parties are actually working for the people or are simply bargaining for power in the name of ethnicity?

The track record of participation in legislation and governance show that these parties work for their respective communities with an aspiration to have share in political power of the state.

Nasreen Ghufra is a Professor at Peshawar University in the department of Political Science. When asked about the ethnic politics, Pakhtun and Mohajir ethnicity and politics, their support base and their relations with each other in Pakistan, she gave the following opinion.

Opinion Nasreen Ghufra (15 June 2016)

Pakistani politics is not devoid of ethnicity. Wherever, leaders derive major benefits and enlarging a vote bank the ethnic card has been effectively used. However, we cannot overlook the fact that to steer ahead at national or international level, ethnicity has little room in Pakistani politics.

The four provinces having different ethnic groups are sharply divided but the national parties appealing to a larger populace beyond certain ethnic groups have made sound groundings e.g. PML - N; PPP and PTI despite the former two having roots in Punjab and Sindh respectively.

Pukhtun nationalism exists in pockets of KP and Balochistan.

The ANP and PKMAP represents Pakhtun nationalism. The fact that ANP badly lost in the last general elections is reflective of the changing voting behaviour of Pukhtuns. In KP we see all major parties trying to register youth. But PTI has gained more popularity among Pukhtuns which does not use the ethnic card.

Amongst the urban and educated youth PTI is leading, leaving behind ANP. MQM from the Pukhtuns perspective is largely seen to have played a negative role and mohajirs and Pukhtuns living in Karachi see each other as adversaries.

The MQM is more disciplined as compared to ANP but both parties have not fully gained their objectives and have played divisive role in the country's politics.

Interview with Moonis Ahmar (13 May 2016) (Meritorious Professor of International Relations and Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Karachi)

Q1. What is the present status of ethnic politics in Pakistan?

A. That type of politics is obvious in the provinces of Sindh, Balochistan and KPK. In Punjab, the demand for a separate province composed of Siraiki speaking people is a reflection that ethnic politics still exists. In Sindh, it is in the lines of Urdu speaking (Mohajir) and Sindhi speaking (native Sindhis). In Balochistan, it is between the Baloch and non-Baloch ethnic groups. But at the moment, ethnic politics has not turned violent.

Q2. How active is Pakhtun national movement in Pakistan?

A. In the last three decades or so Pashtun nationalism has faded because Pashtuns have been co-opted in Pakistan's power structure. But, in post-9/11 one can observe the surge of Pashtun religious nationalism.

Q3. What is the role played by the ANP in the politics of the country?

A. ANP lost badly in 2013 general elections but sometimes, it still uses 'Pashtun' card.

Q4. What is your opinion about ANP and what are the reasons for its failure in 2013 elections?

A. Corrupt leadership and conflict between Begum Nasim Wali Khan, the widow of Khan Abdul Wali Khan and her step son Asfandyar Wali Khan who heads the ANP.

Q4. What are the other parties representing the Pakhtuns?

A. Tehrek-i-Insaf which has a coalition government in KPK with Jamaati-Islami. PML (N) also has following in KPK but in the Hindko speaking areas of Hazara division. PPPP has been marginalized in KPK because of its poor performance in May 2013 elections. JUI Fazlul Rehman group also represents Pakhtuns but like some political parties couldn't perform well in May 2013 elections.

Q5. How different is the ethnic politics of the Mohajirs than the Pakhtuns?

A. There is qualitative different between the two. Mohajir ethnic politics is restricted to the urban areas of Sindh and it has a clash along with native Sindhis also with the Pashtuns settled in Karachi. Whereas, the Pashtun ethnic politics, as I said earlier is played when ANP wants to influence the federal government for the accomplishment of some of its interests.

6. What role is played by the MQM in the politics of the country?

A. These days it is not that influential because of the fading role of its leaders in view of its ill health and the murder cases of former Deputy Convenor of MQM Imran Farooq and money laundering.

Furthermore, its equation with PPP which has a government in Sindh is not good and also with the the PML (N) which has its government at the federal level. Its ties with the the military and security agencies also worsened because of alleged excesses committed by the Rangers in Karachi operation.

Q7. What are the other parties voicing for the rights of the Mohajirs?

Newly formed party by the former mayor of Karachi who couple of years ago was MQM loyalist but parted ways because of serious differences on various matters. Last month he formed "Pak Sarzamin Party".

Q8. Can we call Muttahida Quami Movement true representatives of the Mohajirs after its change of name from Mohajir to Muttahida Quami movement?

To a large extent.

Q9. How Strong is the Party after 2013 elections?

It still maintains its vote bank as was reflected in local bodies elections held last year December.

Interview with Ishtiaq Ahmed (9 May 2016) (Professor of Emeritus at Stockholm University)

Q1. What is the present status of ethnic politics in the country?

You mean in Pakistan? Ethnic politics remain at the centre of political mobilization and terrorism in Karachi though elsewhere it is religious extremism and sectarianism which wreak havoc on innocent people.

Q2. What is the status of the Pakhtuns in the ethnic politics of the country?

In Karachi they are in direct conflict with the MQM but in their own province – Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa – that is not the case.

Q3. What is the role played by the ANP in the politics of the country?

Once again, a very broad question. It is a regional or provincial party and largely in decline because their leaders were guilty of corruption like other leaders of Pakistan.

Q4. What are the other parties representing the Pakhtuns?

Jamiat Ulema Islam is essentially a Pakhtun party though it is part of the Deobandi network.

Q5. How different is the ethnic politics of the Mohajirs than the Pakhtuns?

I have explained that above.

Q6. What role is played by the MQM in the politics of the country?

Well, it has been part of coalition governments in the past. Currently it is been ridden with internal revolts and so it is in disarray at the moment.

Q7. Are all the Mohajirs supporter of MQM?

Well, all is a word we do not use unless we have conclusive proof of it. Most are still with the MQM but the MQM itself is now undergoing internal rebellion.

Q8. What are the other parties voicing for the rights of the Mohajirs?

Locally, in Karachi, the Jamaat-e-Islami used to be the Mohajir party before MQM displaced it. I am told that the Sunni Tehrik is also has a strong support among Mohajirs in Karachi.

Q9. How different is the politics of MQM from ANP?

The ANP evolved over a long period of time and was a party of the Pakhtuns while MQM is a party of Mohajirs but one cannot blame ANP for being a terrorist party while MQM still uses violence and intimidation.

Q10. Are they really the representatives of their respective ethnic groups or they are using ethnicity as a tool to bargain with the centre? Sate your opinion.

Strange question! Ethnicity as a tool of bargaining does not make them either true or untrue representatives of their groups.

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5

Annexure-I
Jawaharlal Nehru University
Thesis/Dissertation Authentication Certificate

Name of the Author (Research Scholar)	PRIYANKA DUTTA CHOWDHURY
Degree	Ph.D
Department/Centre	Centre for South Asian Studies
School	School of International Studies
Name of affiliated Institution for which JNU is granting the degree	
Guide/Supervisor	Prof. Savita Pande
Thesis/Dissertation Title	POLITICS OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN; A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY
Date of Submission	20-7-16

AND MUTTAH QUAMI MOVE-NT, 1986

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Annexure-II

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1.	Title	POLITICS OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY AND MUTTAHIDA QWAMI MOVEMENT, 1986-2013
2.	Alternative Title, if any	
3.	Name of Research Scholar	PRIYANKA DUTTA CHOWDHURY
4.	Name of Guide/Supervisor(s)	1. Prof. Savita Pande 2. 3.
5.	Name of Degree	Ph.D
6.	Level of Degree	
7.	Department/Centre	South Asian Studies
8.	School	International Studies
9.	Name of affiliated Institution for which JNU is granting the degree	
10.	Date of Submission	20-2-16
11.	Subject Keywords	1. Pakistan 2. Ethno-Nationalism 3. Awami National Party 4. Muttahida Qwami Movement 5.
12.	Coverage (for time periods or spatial regions only)	
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14.	File Format of thesis and accompanying material, if any (PDF, MPEG, etc.)	

Annexure-III
 Jawaharlal Nehru University
 Consent Form for Digital Archiving

7

Name of the Author (Research Scholar)	PRIYANKA DUTTA CHOWDHURY
Degree	Ph.D
Department/Centre	South Asian Studies
School	International Studies
Name of affiliated Institution for which JNU is granting the degree	
Guide/Supervisor(s)	Prof. Savita Pande
Thesis/Dissertation Title	POLITICS OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY AND MUTTA HIBA QUAMI MOVEMENT, 1986-2013
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