

First Use and Extended Deterrence in American Nuclear Strategy: Analysing Nuclear Decision Making in France and Japan

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2016



Date: 21st July 2016

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**First Use and Extended Deterrence in American Strategy: Analysing Nuclear Decision Making in France and Japan**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for other degree of this university or any other university.

Neha Kumar

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CERTIFICATE

We recommended that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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
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Dedicated to my father CA Kishore Kumar

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Acknowledgements

This book is the result of support and cooperation of many individuals, institutions and libraries. At the end of this work, I am indebted to many.

First and foremost, I express my gratitude to my guide Dr. J Madhan Mohan, who acts as the editor, guide and critique of this work. He constantly worked hard to give shape to my ideas and always motivated me to work hard on the topic. I am constantly thankful for his inexhaustible patience and constant encouragement. I am indebted to him for channelizing my thoughts and to give them a definite shape and form.

Secondly, i am thankful to my father CA Kishore Kumar and my mother Mrs Indra Kumar for teaching me the values of constant hard work and never to give up even in the hardest of the situation. Next came my husband Maj BN Tiwari for constantly pushing me to write for this dissertation and helping me to stay strongly on my path. Last but not least, I am thankful to my four year old daughter Shagun who cooperated with me to set her routine according to the pace of my work.

Thirdly, I am obliged to the generous staff of the JNU lib and Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) for giving my valuable help to finish my tasks. Specially, I am thankful to Mr Mukesh for providing me materials when it is difficult for me to move away from my home. Their kind cooperation and permission to use library facilities has made this work possible.

(Neha Kumar)

Abbreviations

AEB	Atomic Energy Board
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
ANC	African National Congress
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
CEA	Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives
DPG	Defence Planning Guidance
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
EU	European Union
FAS	Federation of American Science
FU	First Use
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IR	International Relations
ISAB	International Security Advisory Board
JAERI	Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

JDA	Japan Defence Agency
KMT	Kuomintang Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
MHW	Ministry of Health and Welfare
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOC	Ministry of Construction
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDPG	National Defence Programme Guideline
NFU	No First Use Policy
NNWS	Non Nuclear Weapon State
NPR	Nuclear Policy Review
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
PARC	Policy Affairs Research Council
PJ	Peronist Justicialist Party

PM	Prime Minister
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RNEP	Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
SDF	Special Defence Forces
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TLAM/N	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear
UCR	Radical Civic Union Party
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to analyse the rationale of the first use policy of nuclear weapons in US nuclear strategy and its impact on extended deterrence and non-proliferation. First use policy means that in the event of any attack (conventional, chemical or nuclear) on the state or its allies, the state could use nuclear weapons in retaliation. The first use policy forms the basis of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) whose aim is to prevent the US allies from any kind of attack coming mainly from the Soviet Union. Even after the Cold War, the US often states that the adoption of 'No First Use' (NFU) policy will affect its policy of providing nuclear umbrella to its allies. The US thereby justifies the adherence to first use policy by arguing that the rules of international nuclear order would have to be different as it is a global power. This raises the question of hegemony and whether there is a need for a nuclear hegemon to preserve the international nuclear stability.

The concept of first use is based on the logic that nuclear weapons are the only effective means to deter conventional or nuclear attacks by the adversary. The US resorts to first use policy of nuclear weapons to protect its allies, deter non-nuclear aggression (chemical or biological attacks) and pre-empt Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attacks. Fred Ikle summarises the policy of the US as 'a defensive resort to nuclear arms in the event of an overwhelming conventional attack that the US Allied Forces cannot turn back with conventional arms alone' (Ikle 1973). Even after the Cold War, the US has been justifying its continuous reliance on nuclear weapons by stating that its first use policy contributes to nuclear non-proliferation by helping to persuade states such as Japan and South Korea so that they have no need to develop their independent nuclear weapons (Halperin 1997).

The debate about the nuclear posture of the US in the context of NFU goes back to 1948 when President Harry Truman of the US stated that they could plan for the use of nuclear weapons but should not count on using them (Feiveson and Hogendoorn 2003: 3). This was soon followed by the nuclear tests of Soviet Union and declaration by the US that it could carry out the first use of nuclear weapons. At that time, the US was against the adoption of the FU of nuclear weapons. The National Security

Advisor Paul Nitze of the US argued in 1950 that ‘No First Use would be interpreted by the USSR as an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a clear indication that we intended to abandon them’ (Feiveson and Hogendoorn 2003: 3). However, there has always been political and moral support for NFU policy at the international level. In the meeting of the World Council of Peace in Stockholm, it was observed that any state, which would be the first to use nuclear weapons against any other country, will be deemed to have committed a crime against humanity. In support of this, 500 million signatures were gathered (Yu and Guangqian 2009: 78). Thus began the first public outcry for adoption of NFU policy. However, the superpowers were always reluctant to adopt NFU policy. The National Security Council (NSC) 1953 stated that in the event of hostilities, the US will consider nuclear weapons as available for use as other weapons (Feiveson and Hogendoorn 2003: 3).

The support for NFU policy can be seen in the various writings of scholars. They regard the FU policy as disadvantageous, suicidal and not credible. There were many writings in the Cold War era by eminent scholars and policy makers in favour of NFU policy. Fred Ikle argued that vastly increased Soviet nuclear capabilities made first-use policy in the context of the US as military and psychologically disadvantageous. He believed that NATO’s nuclear first use might well be an adequate deterrent against Soviet military assault but was apprehensive that it would be revealed as rhetoric in an acute crisis. In such situations, the Soviets would exploit the Western fear that nuclear war is suicidal for both the sides and would try to gain some political concession (Ikle 1973: 270). Herman Kahn had also written in favour of NFU. He regarded the first use of nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe as a means to simply avoid the more complicated capabilities in terms of plans and costs required for improved conventional defence. At the same time, he has pointed out that retaining the credibility of extended deterrence under NFU policy would require a credible ability to counter a conventional attack conventionally and first strike capability, in addition to a rational and morally justifiable nuclear second strike capability (Kahn 1984: 28).

The debate over NFU intensified again in 1982 when an article was published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1982 by four prominent American statesmen: McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith (Bundy et al. 1982: 754). This article also mentioned that the balance of conventional forces must be restored

before the adoption of NFU. However, the presence of Cold War has made the adoption of NFU as a distinct possibility.

Since the end of the Cold War, NFU policy is being emphasised on the grounds that Soviet Union has been disintegrated and there are no imminent dangers, which would require the first use of nuclear weapons. While reflecting the value of adopting first strike, this article also mentioned the dilemma inherent in the declaratory NFU policy. It was stated as follows:

There remains one underlying reality which could not be removed by even the most explicit declaratory policy of NFU. No one on either side could guarantee beyond all possible doubt that if conventional warfare broke out on a large scale there would be no use of nuclear weapons. We could not make that assumption about the Soviet Union and we must recognize that Soviet leaders could not make it about us. As long as the weapons themselves exist, the possibility of their use remains (Bundy et al. 1982: 754).

The publication of the article in *Foreign Affairs* triggered an intense debate over NFU policy in the US. However, it is to be noted that even if the US has never declared NFU, it seems to have followed that policy in the Cold War period. Before the publication of this article, the US was well aware of the fact that Soviet Union was in possession of second strike capability (Buchan et al. 2003: 11). No matter how much effective the US first strike would have been, USSR could have inflicted enormous destruction by retaliation. It was felt that nuclear war could not be fought rationally and therefore both sides adopted Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which was based on the logic that the first strike is suicidal. After this, the famous Cuban missile crisis also showed that the US adopted NFU policy in practice. At that time, the US possessed 1,735 strategic bombers which were capable of eliminating Soviet Union. In numerical terms, the US nuclear superiority was 17:1 *vis-à-vis* Soviet Union (Gerson 2007: 102). But the US has never used nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.

However, the US has always been reluctant to adopt NFU policy in its nuclear doctrine. The reason is that NFU policy always raises questions about nuclear deterrence and alliance cohesion. Extended deterrence threatens retaliation in case, allies are attacked; in contrast, basic deterrence dissuades attack on one's own territory. Extended deterrence requires the US to maintain the possibility that nuclear

weapons could be used first (Lepgold 1990: 3). This seems to be the most important reason for the US to maintain first use policy during the Cold War and thereafter.

However, the question is whether the first use policy *per se* influences nuclear decision-making of the allies of the US in terms of crossing the threshold and pursuing weaponisation or demonstrating restraint and remaining non-nuclear. France is one of such states, which pursued nuclear weaponisation in spite of being a part of the NATO alliance. The argument, which is often given, is that France was not satisfied with the extended deterrence provided by the US and that the Suez Canal crisis provided the ultimate trigger for France to develop nuclear weapons. However, the then Prime Minister Pierre Mendes took a decision in terms of pursuing nuclear programme inside CEA (French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission) in December 1954. The funds were also provided by Ministry of Defence to CEA in 1955 for the development of a prototype weapon, much before the crisis of the Suez Canal (Sagan 1996: 77).

This shows that factors other than the nuclear posture of the US play an important role in influencing nuclear decision making. For instance, Japan has opted for nuclear restraint owing to domestic factors such as constitutional constraints. Therefore, the US could adopt the NFU policy. After the end of the Cold War, it is argued that the threat of the conventional attacks by the Soviet Union has declined and therefore there is no reason for the US to shun NFU policy under the pretext of protection of its allies. Further, NFU policy is linked to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (Arbatov 2008: 5-6). Similarly, Scott Sagan has asserted that the US NFU policy would also enhance the US non-proliferation objectives by increasing international diplomatic support for sanctions (Sagan 2009: 164).

The concept of 'extended deterrence' seems to influence US nuclear strategy in a significant manner. The US has often stated that its nuclear weapons play an important role in reassuring allies, which in turn would reduce the incentives of its allies for acquiring nuclear weapons. The adoption of NFU policy will affect the US commitment to reassure its allies and will further encourage states like Japan and South Korea to have their own nuclear weapons programme (Rhule 2009: 12). The counter-argument is that the current security environment is radically different from

the Cold War period and Russia is no longer perceived as the main adversary. During the Cold War era, the main purpose of nuclear weapons was to deal with Russia's growing conventional forces and to use nuclear weapons in the event of NATO losing conventional war. Such a threat does not exist after the end of the Cold War and there is no logic to maintain the 'first use' policy of nuclear weapons (Feiveson and Hogendoorn 2003: 4). This has resulted in a debate about the feasibility of NFU policy, its relationship with extended deterrence and non-proliferation.

The pertinent question is whether the US first use policy has really prevented the proliferation among its allies. France and Britain are the two states that opted for nuclear weapons in spite of enjoying the status of nuclear allies of the US. On the other hand, Japan, which is an ally of the US, has not gone nuclear to date. It is clear that the US policy of extended deterrence could not prevent France from going nuclear. It is important here to consider two case studies in the context of the US nuclear-first use policy and its role in extended deterrence. The first one is France that opted for nuclear weapons in spite of being the part of NATO. This invalidates the argument of the US that extended deterrence and its first use policy has discouraged its allies from going nuclear and thereby prevented proliferation. According to realist theory, the decision of France to go nuclear was a very simple one. In 1950, the USSR posed a grave threat to the national security of France and the best alternative to build nuclear weapons was to have dependence on US nuclear weapons and NATO security guarantee. As the USSR developed second-strike capability, it reduced the credibility of the US nuclear first use in case of any conflict. According to this explanation, the need for French nuclear weapons was derived from Suez Canal crisis (Sagan 1996: 77). Besides this, France was also convinced that the US forces will continue to be sharply cut in Europe and will be withdrawn entirely. As can be seen from below figure, the US forces were continuously declining after the Second World War:

Table 1: US Troops in Europe (Nelson 1985:45).

Year	Number of the US troops
1945	2613000
1946	278042
1947	103749
1949	82492
1950	79495

Therefore, there has been reduction in the total number of troops of the US but that does not explain the reluctance of other states to not to go nuclear.

Also, France wanted to adopt independent nuclear posture so as to strengthen its international position. In 1951, France adopted the first five-year plan, which stated that its important purpose is to ensure that in the next ten years, France would be an important country. After the Second World War, the military capabilities and international standing of France were not in accordance with the power and status it had before the war. Therefore, the government of the day was finding a way to enhance its power and world prestige (Sagan 1996: 78). This was explained by Charles de Gaulle to President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959:

A France without world responsibility would be unworthy of herself, especially in the eyes of Frenchmen. It is for this reason that she disapproves of NATO, which denies her share in a decision making and which is confined just to Europe. It is for this reason too that she intends to provide herself with an atomic bomb. Only in this way defence and foreign policy will be independent which we prize above everything else (De Gaulle 1971: 209).

After Great Britain, France was the only permanent member of UNSC which was left without atom bomb (Perrin 1976). As a result, the Prime Minister Pierre Mendes felt inferior in its dealings with the other three members of Security Council namely the US, the UK and the USSR which ultimately led to the initiation of the nuclear programme (Mendl 1965: 30). Also, the US and the UK signed a Mutual Defence Agreement that envisaged deepening nuclear cooperation between the two states while Soviets gave direct assistance to China's nuclear weapons programme (Reed

and Stillman 2009: 101). These factors also shaped the decision of France to develop nuclear weapons.

Such a position would seriously weaken the position of France as it was dependent on the US forces for its security environment. After the Second World War, France was not in the position to deal with the security problems and saw the US forces as a viable alternative to deal with the security issues (Trachtenberg 2011: 185). It would make France dependent entirely on its own resources and diplomatic tools in solving its security problems. Also, preserving the US base will come up with a price to cooperate with the US on a wide range of issues (Trachtenberg 2011: 185). This clearly shows that there were a whole range of issues which influenced the decision of France to go for nuclear weapons and these are independent of the US nuclear policy and the operationalisation of extended deterrence.

The scholars also stated that the decision of France to opt for nuclear weapons was the response of post-Second World War security dilemma between the requirements of independent defence and the economic and social imperative of the welfare society (Tertrais 2004: 57). France faced a situation in which there was a collapse of French alliance and defence systems in 1940 which led to the destruction of the Third Republic and the occupation of France by Germany (Messmer and Larcan 1985: 201). France realised that in the case of a conflict, there should be one's own forces as alliance system could disintegrate any time. It was a hard reality for France, particularly, in the case of nuclear weapons where one country has to put at stake its own survival for the protection of its allies. The second reason which forced France to opt for nuclear weapons was the Suez Canal crisis which was the reflection of inability of the Fourth Republic to conduct an independent foreign policy because of its military weakness (Rauf 1995: 50). Third, nuclear weapons will place France under the major League of Nations. France wanted to place itself at par with the US and sustain 'great power status.' Fourth, France also regarded its nuclear weapons as an important force to counter the nuclear weapons of the USSR. If the USSR decided to launch a nuclear attack against Europe, the French nuclear weapons could be used for retaliation (Kohl 1971: 56). This shows that there were various reasons, which made France to decide upon its own nuclear weapons programme which could also

include matters of prestige and the aim to make the calculation of Soviet nuclear weapons complicated.

It is clear that France wants to refine its global image at that time. The economy of France grew slowly as compared to its major international competitors like the UK, Germany, the US and Japan. France faced huge economic losses and underwent a slow recovery process leading to periods of stagnation and decline in the late 1930s. In short, France has lost the capacity to play a role in international affairs (Kohl 1971: 56). Coupled with this was the fear of revival of German military power with the coming of Eisenhower administration. The US adopted the policy of 'New Look' which also allows for the conventional rearmament of Europe including that of Germany. Also, France was of the view that it could not achieve the great power status which Britain enjoyed within the alliance. France was also opposed to an improvement in relations between Germany and the US. The participation of France in the alliance was ambivalent and often grudging (Tertrais 2004: 72). France decided to rectify these measures and sought to gain the status of world power by the development of nuclear weapons.

However, there are strong domestic reasons which influence the nuclear decision-making of France. The domestic reasons also explained that why France decided to have weapons in the 1960s while it had already carried out work on nuclear weapons programme in 1950s. This research will focus on explanation of those domestic factors. On the other hand, there is a case of Japan, which has decided not to develop its own nuclear weapons. Japan's Prime Minister Taro Aso made the following statement at the press conference held on 9 August 2009 in Nagasaki:

In international society, there exists large arsenals including nuclear forces...It could disturb the deterrence balance and undermine security to have a discussion on separating nuclear weapons from other weapons. Even if a nuclear power says it won't make a pre-emptive strike, there is no way to verify this intention. I would wonder if this is a realistic way to ensure Japan's security (Aso 2009).

However, there are certain circumstances in which Japan may decide to go nuclear. Mortin Halperin has summarised the conditions under which Japan could opt to go nuclear. The three conditions under which Japan could go nuclear are as follows: (a)

consensus in Japan that the US could not be relied upon to defend Japan (b) the development of Korean nuclear capability and (c) the failure to achieve nuclear disarmament coupled with China's nuclear and military modernisation (Halperin 1997: 20). Japan is already worried about the credibility of the US nuclear deterrence as it has banned nuclear testing. In the absence of nuclear weapons, Japan is apprehensive about the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons. Further, Japan doubts the willingness of the US to come to its rescue with nuclear weapons in the case of a conflict (Neil 2013: 123). The adoption of NFU policy by the US will exacerbate Japan's insecurity. The other view states that it will not be easy for Japan to exercise its nuclear option, even if the US decided to adopt NFU policy. The adoption of NFU policy by the US does not mean withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella. The US will retaliate in the case of a nuclear or conventional attack on Japan. Yet another possibility is that the pursuit of the nuclear option by Japan will jeopardise its security agreement with the US. This will affect the credibility of Japan in the international community. The US could also impose economic sanctions on Japan, if it decides to develop nuclear weapons. Shigeru Ishiba, the former minister of defence of Japan, observed that Japan would not be able to get nuclear fuel, if it decides to go nuclear. Japan will face a major economic dilemma (Ishiba and Ogawa 2009: 284).

This clearly shows that there are various reasons on the basis of which the state decides to go nuclear. These are independent of the US declaratory policy of 'first use' and also that of 'extended deterrence.' Therefore, the US is acting as a nuclear hegemon so as to preserve the international nuclear order. Given this, the question is whether there is a need for a global hegemon to prevent nuclear proliferation. This raises the question of hegemony in International Relations. The term hegemony is derived from the Greek word 'hegemon' which means 'leader', or 'ruler.' The Oxford Dictionary defines hegemony as 'leadership or dominance, especially by one state or social group over others' (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2000: 604). The term 'hegemonic' is defined as 'ruling or dominant in a political or social context' (Duong 2002: 57). Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been the most powerful state in the international system. The main aim of the US is to sustain its hegemony and primacy in the international system.

The writings of William Kristol and Robert Kagan are illustrative in this context. They observed that the US enjoyed ideological and strategic predominance. The first objective of US foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America's security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 20). For them, the US should preserve its hegemony after the Cold War. They consider multipolarity as the worst possible scenario, which is 'unpredictable, bloody and unstable' (Kristol and Kagan 1996). The only way to protect this is to preserve American hegemony. Kristol and Kagan argued that American hegemony is the only reliable guarantor of peace and international order (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 23). Similarly, Zalmay Khalilzad argued that 'US leadership would be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar and multipolar balance of power' (Khalilzad 1995: 94). The US has maintained itself in the centre of the international system around which other powers like EU, China, Japan, Russia and India revolve. If necessary, the US would take 'preventive measures' against possible rivals. It is a strategy, which implies that in the absence of the US involvement at strategic levels, the international system will become highly unstable. The American strategy is to maintain its position at the apex. The US strategy has been to ensure that other powers do not align amongst themselves so as to challenge US supremacy (Layne and Thayer 2007: 52).

The concept of hegemony has been deliberated by several scholars; it is argued that order is the result of concentration of power capabilities in a single state that uses its commanding position to maintain order in the state. The decline of hegemonic power means that order will decay (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984; Ikenberry 1998). Robert Keohane defines hegemony as 'preponderance of material resources' (Keohane 1984: 28) Gilpin maintains that a hegemon controls or dominates the lesser states in the system thereby uniting other states into a single international system (Gilpin 1981: 28). The hegemonic stability theory states that international economic openness and stability occurs, when there is a single dominant power. The argument is that hegemon is necessary for the following reasons (a) the existence of liberal international economy (b) a relatively peaceful and secure international order (Gilpin 1987: 88). The security version of hegemonic stability theory argues that world order is created and maintained by a hegemonic state that uses its power capabilities to organise relations among states. The preponderance of power held by a state allows it

to offer incentives, both positive and negative, to other states. Gilpin points out that though the hegemon is motivated by cosmopolitan economic goals, the US as a hegemon has been motivated by enlightened self-interest and security objectives (Gilpin 1981: 80). In other words, hegemony is a necessary and sufficient condition for creating a hegemonic order (Keohane 1984). Hegemonic leadership creates cooperation. The decline of hegemony does not necessarily mean the rise of conflict and the collapse of peaceful world order (Keohane 1984: 31-32).

The most important work in the field of hegemony is done by Gramsci. The Gramsci's approach to hegemony merits attention and elaboration. According to Gramsci, hegemony is exercised when a certain class or group that has abundance of resources and means and is able to control other groups to support that structure. According to Gramsci, hegemony is achieved when a provisional alliance of a certain social group exerts a consensus, which makes the power of the dominant group appear both natural and legitimate. Institutions such as mass media, educational and religious systems play an important role through which hegemony is maintained, exercised and maintained (Duong 2002: 60). Although, Gramsci's notion of hegemony is based on domestic politics, it could be applied to the international system. This has been done by Robert Cox.

Robert Cox developed the notion of hegemony from Gramsci's *Prison notebooks*. His idea of hegemony is different from the traditional concept of hegemony. He uses hegemony 'as the structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that infuse the whole system of states and non-state entities' (Cox 1992: 140). According to him, these values are stable, unquestioned and are universally accepted. Cox maintained that 'world hegemony is not simply another order but one in which a dominant mode of production, culture and system of social institutions penetrates all countries' (Cox 1992: 137). World hegemony is described as a 'social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot simply be one of these things but must be all three' (Cox 1992: 62). For Cox, the creation of world order is the result of hegemon and the formation of a 'historic bloc'. A historic bloc is organised around a set of hegemonic ideas, which states that a dominant ideology forms the basis of an alliance between social classes. Therefore, a successful historic bloc is organised through the exercise of 'intellectual and moral leadership' and forms

the organic link between political and civil society (the extended or integral state) (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 87). The emergence of a new historic bloc is the result of passive evolution (war of movement). Moreover, it needs ‘persuasive ideas and arguments (Gramsci’s ethnic-political level) which build on and catalyse its political networks and organisation’ (Gill 1996: 94). In the neo-Gramscian sense, hegemony is based on consent and consensus rather than coercion. The hegemonic order therefore emerges out of successful formation of historic bloc of social forces in which the dominant ideology is accepted by the subordinate class.

If applied to the context of nuclear weapons, nuclear hegemon is the kind of state which has superior and modernised nuclear forces, which could be used in maintaining stability in international relations. As mentioned above, the maintenance of the US nuclear weapons along with first use policy is rationalised as being essential for the protection of the US allies and preventing allies from obtaining nuclear weapons. This has been mentioned in various official US documents. The ‘Strategic Posture Commission’ has mentioned that the US non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon extended deterrence (Congressional Commission 2008: 8). The US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander General Chilton has mentioned that maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent capability could be seen as an important non-proliferation tool for deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies (Chilton 2009: 7). If they obtain nuclear weapons, there will be proliferation and global nuclear order will be jeopardised. This is the rationale for first use policy given by the US and its allies. The rationale that underlies first use policy is a contested one. It is in this context that the probable consequences of adhering to NFU are often exaggerated. This study seeks to re-examine the logic of first use policy in the US nuclear strategy and the desirability of a nuclear hegemon in maintaining global nuclear order.

This literature review clearly shows that there are various domestic reasons which influence nuclear decision making of the states that are placed under the nuclear umbrella. The study is an attempt to decipher the motivations that influence nuclear decision-making in such states.

This study would examine the role of first use policy in sustaining extended deterrence and alliance cohesion. The US believes that it is important to maintain first use policy so as to assure its allies and reduce incentives for nuclear proliferation. It is believed that NFU will enhance the prospect of achieving non-proliferation. This research aims to analyse the impact of first use policy on extended deterrence, alliance cohesion and non-proliferation by analysing the case studies of France and Japan. The question raised here is simple: why is it that France decided to develop its own nuclear weapons in spite of having the US nuclear umbrella and Japan seems dependent on the nuclear security guarantee of the US despite nuclear threats from North Korea and China? The decisions of France and Japan pertaining to nuclear weapons shows that domestic politics and socio-cultural milieu play an important role, which invalidate the rationale of US first use policy. This research aims to critically examine the rationale of first use policy in US nuclear strategy in the context of non-proliferation and alliance cohesion. It also attempts to explain nuclear decision making in those states that are placed under the nuclear umbrella.

This study made an attempt to address the following questions:

1. Why is it that few states have gone nuclear in spite of nuclear umbrella and others have decided to remain non-nuclear?
2. What is the rationale of nuclear hegemony?
3. What explains the reluctance of the US in adopting 'No First Use' (NFU) in its nuclear strategy?
4. Why did France go nuclear in spite of the nuclear umbrella?
5. Why has Japan decided to remain dependent on the US nuclear umbrella in spite of nuclear threats emanating from North Korea and China?

At the beginning of this study, the following hypotheses were proposed and tested thereafter:

1. A stable international nuclear order necessitates the presence of a nuclear hegemon such as the United States which claims exceptionalism for the same reason.

2. The decision of France to go nuclear can be attributed to the prestige attached to nuclear weapons that outweighed rational considerations pertaining to the nuclear umbrella.
3. Japan's restraint in terms of not going nuclear could be less explained by extended deterrence and better understood as a preference, which is rooted in the socio-cultural milieu.
4. Nuclear decision-making amongst US allies is impacted less by extended deterrence and more by domestic preferences.

Towards the end of the study, the following inferences were arrived at:

1. Nuclear umbrella or extended deterrence which is linked to first use does not constrain the nuclear behaviour of the states in any case. There is no merit in the argument.
2. The decision of France to go nuclear is primarily attributed to domestic factors in the form of preference.
3. Japan's restraint in terms of not going nuclear could be less explained by extended deterrence and better understood as a preference, which is rooted in the socio-cultural milieu. This hypothesis was proved.
4. Nuclear decision-making amongst US allies is impacted less by extended deterrence and more by domestic preferences.

Research Methods

This research primarily uses the qualitative method. Case study technique is used. The chosen cases signify a mix of situations: France that went nuclear in spite of the nuclear umbrella and Japan, which decided to remain non-nuclear. The design allows for a variation in the dependent variable, *i.e.* nuclear behaviour of states that are placed under the nuclear umbrella. Qualitative techniques will be used. Primary and secondary sources have been used. Interviews have been conducted with academics and policy makers on the subject of research.

Organisation of the thesis

Chapter One: Introduction

This chapter introduces the theme of research, provides the rationale and specifies research questions and hypotheses.

Chapter Two: Nuclear first use and extended deterrence in US nuclear strategy

This chapter analyses the rationale of nuclear first use in US nuclear strategy. It examines the link between nuclear first use and extended deterrence and that between extended deterrence and non-proliferation.

Chapter Three: Domestic Determinants and Nuclear Decision-Making

This chapter analyses the role of domestic determinants in nuclear decision making of a country.

Chapter Four: Nuclear decision-making: the case of France

This chapter examines the factors that have influenced France in exercising the nuclear option in spite of having the nuclear umbrella of the US.

Chapter Five: Nuclear decision-making: the case of Japan

This chapter examine the reasons, which influence Japan's nuclear behaviour. It seeks to explain the non-nuclear weapon status of Japan despite probable threats from China and North Korea.

Chapter Six: Nuclear hegemony and non-proliferation

Based on the previous case study driven chapters, this chapter re-examines the rationale of nuclear hegemony and its implications for non-proliferation.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This chapter will summarise the major inferences of the study.

Chapter Two

Nuclear First Use and Extended Deterrence in the US Nuclear Strategy

The declaratory policy of the US changed marginally even after the end of the Cold War although the nature of threats faced by the US has changed drastically. The US continues to have large stockpile of nuclear weapons and traditional deterrence posture. Even after repeated calls to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the US strategic calculations, there have been no such changes. The US still regards nuclear weapons as the important means in deterring all kind of possible conflicts coming from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea or from terrorist. Nuclear Weapons threat has been played several times by the US to make diplomatic end of conflict in its own favour. That's why it is often said that the US is not yet over with the Cold War mentality of nuclear weapons. After the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union's atomic and conventional threat is soon replaced by the threats of terrorist groups and outliers states. The Gulf War I show the rise of 'new global order' with the end of 'Cold War' (Yilmaz 2008: 48). It shows that the threats to the US and its allies will not coming from the big powers but from the small, unstable states and from the terrorist activities which are often sponsored by them. This war also shows the wish of the US to maintain itself at the position of the global policeman and to hold the global supremacy (Ituma 2012). On the other hand, the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks shows the price of the failure of the US foreign policies and failure of other states to accept the US as a global superior power. However, in both the cases what is common is the 'non-nuclear' threat which cannot be dealt with the US nuclear weapons arsenals. This was quickly realised by the US, and they define that the immediate danger is posed by the outliers' states and their nuclear ambitions. In 1995, Mandelbaum defined 'rogue state's states of Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya and Algeria and stated that:

Each is influenced by the ideology Marxism, Leninism, Islamic Fundamentalism or Arab Socialism-with anti-Western and Anti-American features. All suffered politically and militarily from the collapse of Soviet Union, which, by depriving them of patron and protector-gave added impetus to their nuclear ambitions. None is a fully-fledged democracy (Mandelbaum 1995: 34).

The event of 11 September 2001 clearly shows that threat is coming not from any one large state but from the scattered organisations which have become the breeding grounds of terrorism. It was also realised by the US that Russia is no more regarded as an enemy. As mentioned in 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR), ‘Russia is no longer an adversary and prospects of military confrontations have declined steadily’ (Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010: iv). The new decade is marked by the catastrophic events of 11 September 2001 clearly shows how the nature of the threat has changed for the US. The various reviews conducted by the US including the 1993 bottom up review, (Aspin 1993: 2), the nuclear posture review of 1994 and QDR 1994 has mentioned about the changes in the threat environment after the end of the Cold War. The marked change in the nature of the threat lies in the fact that the US has to deal with the groups or people which cannot be deterred by the traditional methods of deterrence.¹ As noted by Donald Rumsfeld:

We have entered an era of enemies without country or conscience, which operate in small cells scattered across the globe. Yet our forces continue to be arranged essentially to fight large armies, navies, and air forces. The world has changed, and so must we (Rumsfeld 2004).

Still, the US continues to stress on nuclear weapons as an important part in deterring adversaries with stress on the concepts like FU. As mentioned in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR):

The United States is not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted (Nuclear Posture Review Report : 2010).

The FU policy means that there is a possibility that the US could use nuclear weapons first against an adversary during a conflict. This was first mentioned clearly by Eisenhower administration in NSC 162/1 ‘In the event of hostilities, the US will consider nuclear weapons to be available for use as other munitions’ (The Executive

¹ The working of a traditional deterrence system require effective communication and a physical presence of an adversary which is absent in terrorist groups. Also, terrorist groups are not concern about their survival and the threat of mass destruction does not work for them. Additionally, rogue states are often regarded as ‘unmindful’ who will not fear their destruction if the regime survival is under question. Therefore, traditional deterrence system which worked against the USSR is difficult to work against the terrorist groups and rogue states. For details please see work by Elbridge Colly, Restoring Deterrence, URL: <http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/images/issues/200707u/Restoring%20Deterrence.pdf>

Secretary 1953: 8). Since then, the US FU policy has been an important part of its nuclear doctrine. However, the US FU Policy does not necessarily mean that the use of nuclear weapons is unavoidable in case of any attack on the US and its allies. The US has mentioned in NPR 2010 that it will use nuclear weapons only in ‘extreme circumstances’ and that too only against those states which have nuclear weapons and that are not in compliance with the NPT treaty. The US could attack against a state which has carried out chemical, biological, conventional or nuclear attacks against the US and its allies. For example, the US used the nuclear threat to deter the possibility of chemical or biological attacks by Iraq during Gulf War I (Hussein 1991). There is only one instance where the US has actually carried out nuclear attacks (Hiroshima and Nagasaki). In all other events, the US has fully exercised the threat of atomic attacks and FU to achieve its foreign objectives.

After the end of the Cold War, there has been a call by the scholars that the US should adopt NFU policy. However, the US has been reluctant to move away from FU policy. The stated goal of NFU policy is to help to achieve the ideal goal of nuclear disarmament. Scholars mentioned that NFU policy declaration would be a way to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, which will ultimately result in nuclear disarmament (Arbatov 2008: 2). However, some policy makers are of the viewpoint that there is no direct link between the nuclear disarmament and NFU policy. However, FU policy represents the offensive nature and war kind of mentality of a state which makes it necessary for the adversary to develop weapons and thus making nuclear disarmament a distinct possibility (Kristensen 2015). However, there are scholars who believe that NFU is an important step in nuclear disarmament because it is adopted by the states who believe that they can protect their vital interests with the help of non nuclear means. Therefore, they could make progress in achieving nuclear disarmament as nuclear weapons will become obsolete (James Acton 2015). Despite such links between the nuclear disarmament and NFU, the US has been reluctant to adopt this policy although it has made several proclamations of ‘global nuclear disarmament’ (Obama 2009). The reason stated by the US is that FU strengthened extended deterrence leading to non-proliferation. This chapter will discuss the debate over the US FU policy and then will assess the relationship between the declared goal of FU, extended deterrence and non-proliferation

The NFU and FU Debate

NFU means that nuclear weapons will be used only in retaliation if an adversary has used nuclear weapons against the concerned state. The concept of NFU was first proposed by the US in the 1946 Baruch Plan, which stated that the nuclear weapons should be banned from the current and future arsenals (Baruch Plan 1946). McGeorge Bundy has stated that 'If there were no nuclear weapons, we would be exactly in the same position in terms of our need for other defensive strength as we would be under no first use.' (Weiler 1983: 28). ' Therefore, the concept of NFU was American but has never been adopted by the US. However, the US maintains FU policy, which means that the US could use nuclear weapons in response to any nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional attacks. This is quite a dangerous policy form a state that has not hesitated to use nuclear weapons in Japan to bring 'the early resolution of a conflict (Gerson 2007: 44).' Besides using nuclear weapons to bring the early resolution of conflict, the US has used nuclear weapons against Japan so as to show its capability to the future adversary, *i.e.*, USSR.

The debate about the concept of NFU has been initiated by the US policy makers even in the Cold War period. The policy makers of the US like McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith stated in an article that it is highly unlikely that atomic war will take place as both the superpowers do understand the destructive nature of nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons by the alliance and against the alliance can result into general escalation leading to nuclear war, which will outweigh the political victory and military advantages. Therefore, the US should move from FU to NFU (Bundy et al 1982: 758). However, it is necessary for the US to maintain high level of conventional forces and survivability of nuclear weapons to gain advantage in war. The proposal was turned down as it was believed that NFU policy will make conventional war more likely in which USSR holds supremacy (Kaiser et.al 1982: 1160). The scholars and policy makers do stress the importance of nuclear weapons in deterring the aggression of Soviet Union. As mentioned by Robert Oppenheimer who has led the Manhattan Project, those atomic weapons is not just one element in the arsenals with which the US hopes to deter the Soviet Union. However, it is the only weapon with which we hope to stop any war like situations in Europe (Oppenheimer 1953: 528).

After the cold war, it was mentioned that the US no longer face the nuclear or conventional threat of the Soviet Union and therefore it is time for it to adopt NFU policy. A letter dedicated to President Obama which was signed by thirteen people working for arms control was submitted which calls that the forthcoming nuclear policy posture should mention that the aim of the nuclear weapons should be to deter the nuclear attacks on the US and its allies (Arms control 2010: 1). However, President Obama has ruled out the 'no first use policy' with regard to nuclear weapons (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010). However, the US mentioned following reasons for adoption of FU policy in the post cold war period:

(i) To Deter Conventional Attacks: The use of first use of nuclear weapons to deter conventional attacks of USSR has been the legacy of the Cold War. Although, the Cold War has ended, the US has still maintained this policy. The US mentions that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia is no longer regarded as an enemy. However, it is stated that there is still divergence of interests between the two countries. (NPR 2010: 8). The recent case of Ukraine and Georgia is regarded as an example of the aggressive stance of Russia. Russia could use its future conventional weapons against the US and NATO to achieve its aims. The US Military Strategy has mentioned that:

Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbours and is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia's military actions are underpinning regional security directly and through proxy wars. These actions violate numerous agreement that Russia has signed in accordance with international norms including UN Charter, Helsinki Accords, Russia-NATO Founding Acts, Budapest Agreement and Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (The Joint Chief of Staff: 2).

The Russian Military Doctrine of 2014 states that although Russia preserves the use of nuclear weapons to deter the attacks of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and conventional weapons, the efficiency of nuclear weapons has declined due to rise of low-intensity conflict (Russian Ministry of Defence 2014). Therefore, Russia should maintain conventional weapons along with development of precision weapons and air space defence forces (Dyner 2015:3). Even the US Army Chief Gen Mac Willey said that:

Russian nuclear capability is significant. They have reorganised their conventional capability, their special operations capability. So Russia bears close watching and that is why I said they are number one threat to the US (Willey 2015).

There is a continuous stress of Russia on the conventional weapons like the Cold War period. This has been the cause of concern for the US and allies. As said by Bradshaw, 'Russia might believe the large-scale conventional forces that she has shown, she can generate at very small notice...could be used in future not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize NATO territory (Russia May Try to Seize NATO territory says General 2015). It is important to note here that Russia possesses enough conventional military to possess a threat to the small NATO states and to challenge their sovereignty (Perkovich 2013: 12).

The Russian conventional capabilities consist of a weapon which has capability to jam all radars; all control circuits, all system of transmission etc. As the present war components are based on C4 (command, control, communication and intelligence), Russia has the capability to jam all the systems² (Nexus 2015). Russia also has several cruise missile capabilities which consist of 26 stealth cruise missiles. As a result, it is believed that Russia does have the capability to stand against the US in case of conventional warfare (Russia Insider: 2015). The Russia's conventional weapons capability was also demonstrated in Zapad exercise which was intended to have counterterrorist operations. However, it does show NATO states what Russia is really capable of. It demonstrates:

- a. Large scale deployment of conventional forces,
- b. Search rescue operations of Russia
- c. Amphibious landing and anti-landing operations
- d. Air and ground strikes on enemy targets
- e. Submarine and Anti-Submarine warfare
- f. Missile strikes with long range precision strikes.

² The Russian capability to jam radars can be seen from the war in Ukraine and Syria. Russia is using Krasukha-4 effectively to jam radars and aircrafts. For details, please see <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/21/russia-winning-the-electronic-war/>. As, the US is entirely depend on C4 systems during war, it stand disadvantageous in such war against Russia.

g. Airborne and assault operations (House of Commons Defence Committees : Part Two-NATO 2015)

As a result, the US needs to preserve its FU policy to protect the US and its allies from any possible Russian conventional attacks. However, it is important to remember that the US has highly advanced conventional weapons and new systems, which clearly outstrip the conventional capabilities of any country (Gerson 2010: 36). The US has maintained the high budget of maintaining and to keep update its conventional forces to deal with any conventional contingency either with Russia or China. The new concepts of Global Prompt Strike are also being discussed in the US which makes the case for the reduced role of nuclear weapons in the future conflicts. Russia is totally against the employment of Global Prompt Strike and its combination with the US BMD systems. Russia regards its employment as a major obstacle in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in its own thinking. The problem is that if the US reduces the role of nuclear in its war fighting doctrine, it will strengthen its conventional capabilities. As other nations are not yet able to modernise their conventional weapons to that level, they will end up in depending more on nuclear weapons. As President Obama has himself mentioned, ‘the concept of the global prompt strike is an effort to move towards less emphasis on nuclear weapons while making certain that our conventional weapons capability is an effective deterrent’ (Sanger and Shanker 2010: 2). The most important example of the conventional war superiority and its role was manifested in Gulf War I.

(ii) To Deter Chemical/Biological Attacks: The US states that nuclear weapons and FU are important part of defense policies to deter the chemical and biological attacks of the adversarial state. There are many countries from Libya in North Africa through Iraq and Iran in Persian Gulf to North Korea in Northeast Asia with chemical and biological weapons – therefore, the US did face the hostile threat of chemical and biological weapons. The US suspects that countries which possess biological weapons are China, Cuba, Egypt, Israel, Iran North Korea, Russia, Syria and Taiwan (CRS Report for Congress 2008: 15). These countries have inferior conventional and nuclear capability as compared to the US, and

therefore, they can use these weapons to gain advantage in war (Dunn 2001: 28). For example, the CBW weapons could have been used by Iraq in the earlier stages of conflict to gain advantage. Similarly, in future war of North Korea or Iran, WMD could be used to seize the advantage. The weaker states would try to take a strategic advantage by developing WMD capabilities against the technological advance state. As said by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, was that “American [conventional] military superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical attack against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically. Also, when the regime change in these areas is inevitable, the state may prefer the use of CBW agents. The other possibility could be the use of such weapons by North Korea to bring a halt to the US-ROK counteroffensive across DMZ in the future second Korean War (Dunn 2001: 28).

The US has destroyed its chemical and conventional weapons in accordance with the convention of chemical and biological weapons programme. Therefore, it is not left with any other weapon in the arsenal, other than nuclear weapon, to respond in kind to such attacks. The example of Gulf War I is often cited to show that how the threat to use nuclear weapons deterred Iraq from using any chemical and biological weapons. *Newsweek* reported:

Saddam had ordered his commanders to fire chemical munitions as soon as the allies launched a ground offensive, according to U.S. intelligence sources. The U.S. Central Command also believes that chemical-rocket units were moved from Kuwait City to positions near the Saudi border. Iraqi Frog-7 missiles can carry chemical warheads up to 43.5 miles; mortar and artillery pieces can deliver the same chemical agents up to 18 miles (Masland and Waller 1991: 9)

However, Iraq was unable rather than unwilling to use nuclear weapons during the conflict. Before the commencement of Gulf War I, Iraq moved its chemical and biological bombs to airfields and filled warheads with chemical and biological weapons (Halperin 2009: 20). At the same time, the US bombed the airfields, command and control structure and lines of communication making it difficult for Iraq to launch such weapons (Feiveson

1999: 39). Further, Iraqi President mentions that he preserved such weapons to be used as last resort if the US decided to use WMD against Iraq (Buch and Sagan 2013). In fact, the use of nuclear weapons during WMD attacks is not credible as mentioned in the memories of Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell and James Marker that the US did not intend to use nuclear weapons even in retaliation to chemical and biological weapons use by Iraq. James Steinberg has rightly explained this:

Nuclear Weapons are much less credible in deterring conventional, chemical or biological attacks. In such cases, the credibility gained and harm threatened is inversely related. The reduction in the level of violence threatened increases the likelihood that the threat will be carried out because it lowers the risk that the conflict will result into all out nuclear war. However, if the level of violence is increased the likelihood of carrying it lowers as it contains the risks of raising the conflict into all out nuclear war. A more effective way of deterring and defeating against non nuclear attacks- and giving the President a wider range of credible response options- would be to relay on a robust array of conventional strike capabilities and strong declaratory policies (The National Security Advisory Group 2007).

Therefore, the problem is that the use of nuclear weapons by the US to deter WMD attacks lacks credibility. It may be possible that the use of chemical or biological weapons by the adversary may cause little casualties. However, this may have huge political and strategic implications. Under such conditions, it is practically impossible to conduct the first-strike atomic attacks on the adversary. Even if there is significant damage due to the use of these weapons, there will be pressure from the coalition partners, regional neighbours and domestic public to not to go nuclear (Dunn 2001: 30).

Furthermore, technically it is impossible for the US to destroy chemical and biological weapons with the use of nuclear weapons. The US needs real time intelligence so that it could denote nuclear weapons in a bunker only which contains WMD to avoid the spread of pathogens in such a situation. As it is well known, it is difficult to get such real time intelligence about adversary's chemical and biological weapons (Gerson 2010:.24). Also, the recent Syrian

crisis has shown that the US has no willingness to carry out the nuclear attacks against the chemical and biological attacks of the adversary (Rief 2013).

iii. To Deter Possible Nuclear Terrorism: The post-cold war world order was awakened to the possible threat of nuclear weapons proliferation in the hands of terrorist groups, which was revealed by the illicit A.Q. Khan network of proliferation. As mentioned by President Obama of the US, ‘The emergence of nuclear terrorism is the gravest danger we face’ (Mooney 2008). The US is concerned that nuclear weapons could be acquired by a terrorist group which might threaten or use nuclear weapons against the US. The large scale of casualties which a nuclear weapon can inflict promotes these terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons. As stated by Al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith has stated al-Qaeda's objective: "to kill 4 million Americans—2 million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands." (Gheith 2007). As he explains, this is what justice requires balancing the scales for casualties supposedly inflicted on Muslims by the United States and Israel.

There are possibly four ways by which the nuclear weapons could be acquired and used by the terrorist groups, as mentioned below:

- a. Theft and denotation of an in act nuclear weapons.
- b. The theft or purchase of fissile material leading to fabrication and denotation of nuclear weapons – an improvised nuclear weapons device
- c. The unauthorised acquisition of radioactive material contributing to the fabrication and detonation of a radiological dispersion device –a dirty bomb or a radiation emission device (Ferguson and Potter 2003: 3).

There have been indications by the terrorist groups also that they too are willing to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1999, Osama Bin Laden mentions that it is the ‘religious duty’ to obtain nuclear weapons (ABC News 1999). In 2009, the Al Qaeda mentions that it would use nuclear weapons in Pakistan against the US, provided it acquires them (Ersan 2009). In 2010, President Obama of the US declares that ‘We know that organisations like Al Qaeda are in a process of securing nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction

and would have no compunction at using them' (Spillius 2010). There are also leaked reports, which state that the terrorist groups have access to uranium (Rahim 2011).

Therefore, the US wishes to maintain FU policy to deal with the possibility of the terrorist's atomic attacks or atomic attacks by any other rival country. However, even if the terrorist group acquires nuclear weapons it is very difficult for the US to retaliate with the same due to the tendency of the terrorist group to assimilate into the civilian population. Furthermore, it is very hard for terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons. The reason is that if a state gives nuclear weapons to terrorist, it will fear retaliation from the US. The US could trace the 'nuclear forensics' *i.e.* the bomb's isotopic fingerprints to trace the fissile material device back to the reactors, enrichment facilities or uranium mines (Keir and Daryl 2013: 82). However, this logic again brings back the utility of first use so as to drive away the country from using nuclear weapons. Further, it is difficult to deter terrorists with a threat of nuclear deterrence as they do not assess the cost and benefits in a rational manner and could not be communicated properly (Nelly 2013). Therefore, it is quite difficult to imagine a situation where a terrorist organisation gains access to nuclear weapons.

iv. Counterforce Attacks: Since the Cold War, the US has retained the FU of nuclear weapons for 'counterforce force' attacks, which means the attacks designed to limit damage to the US in the case of deterrence failure (The Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office 1978: xi). The idea behind counterforce attacks is that the US should use nuclear weapons first to destroy the enemy forces before they can use them against the US. The new guidance strategy of the US clearly states 'The new guidance requires the United States to maintain significant counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries. The new guidance does not rely on a 'counter-value' or 'minimum deterrence' strategy (Department of Defense 2013: 4). In a nuclear strategy, counterforce targets implies to attacking such targets of an enemy with nuclear weapons which has military value like silos of ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarine or command and control structure. The aim of such

an attack is to disarm an enemy before it could carry out nuclear attacks. It is more an offensive strategy than a defensive one. On the other hand, counter value targets focus on targeting population centers, economic or political resources. The logic of counterforce attacks let the US to accumulate large numbers of weapons because nuclear forces of the other countries are dispersed and the US could require the use of multiple numbers of nuclear weapons to destroy their targets (Keir and Press 2013:1). As a result, the US develops the large number of weapons to use it against the silos, bomber bases, command structures, etc. of the rival states. A study was conducted in 2012 concluded that the US could reduce its number of nuclear weapons to 450 warheads in the absence of such counterforce attacks strategy without jeopardizing the security of its own nation and that of allies (Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission 2012: 9). The counterforce missions of nuclear weapons increase the numbers of nuclear weapons one have. If one has to destroy only the population centre, a state will need only few nuclear bombs. On the other hand, if one has to destroy the counterforce targets, each side had to have as many weapons as the other side for counterforce attacks, plus more to shoot at 'value' targets like cities leading to never ending arms race and large stockpiling of nuclear weapons


The US used to also advocate the use of Earth Penetrating Weapon (EPW) in counterforce operations. Again, there are technical problems in achieving results from nuclear EPW. The maximum depth which these earth penetrating weapons can achieve is 10-20 meters. As the US increases the yield of a weapon, the depth limits of the weapon decrease. The US currently possesses B-61 MOD 11, which has a yield between 0.3-0.3kt. Therefore, an adversary can escape from the US by digging deep to keep its weapons. Another problem is radioactivity which can destroy many civilians (Greson 2010: 32). Most of these targets are located underground in urban areas. Therefore, a nuclear attack would imply to inflicting a large number of injuries to civilian population also (Gromley 2006: 135)

Therefore, it has been stressed that Conventional EPW could provide a reliable answer to deal with the hardened targets. The US conventional inventory to

carry out the counterforce attacks consists of the B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers which are loaded with precision strike munitions. The US also plans to develop long range capability by 2018. The US Navy also has converted four of its 18 Trident submarines, which have the capability to carry out 154 TML cruise missiles. The US also plans to develop a small number of Trident D-5 atomic missiles on the remaining 14 atomic boats with conventional warheads to achieve global prompt strike system (Gromley 2006 : 141). This shows that the US has enough capability to carry out conventional attacks to carry out counterforce operations without need of the FU policy of nuclear weapons.

v. To Deter Nuclear Attacks: One of the main reasons cited since the Cold War is that FU policy is essential to deter atomic attacks on the US and its allies. This is still considered an important reason from the US perspective as there is spread of the nuclear weapons after the Cold War period with the rise of new atomic threats such as Iran and North Korea. However, the US remains superior when it comes to the nuclear weapons question. According to recent estimates, Russia has approximately 1,512 strategic warheads deployed on 498 ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers. According to Federation of American Scientists (FAS), it has 1000 non deployed and 2000 strategic warheads making of 4512 nuclear warheads in total. China has 250 warheads. France has 300 and UK has approximately 160 warheads. India and Pakistan have approximately 100 atomic warheads, and North Korea has less than 10 atomic warheads (Kristensen 2014: 11). This has been clearly manifested in the below figure 1:

Figure 1: Approximate Nuclear Weapons Inventory in the World (Zarrachina 2012)



Therefore, the US can absorb the nuclear damage and can retaliate with the full force. No country is irrational to commit suicide by denoting the nuclear weapons on the US territory. Furthermore, the US has developed such kinds of conventional weapons, which are similar in power to the nuclear weapons. The only difference between conventional and nuclear weapons of such type is that these weapons do not leave the residual trail of death by radioactivity's that are the basic characteristic of nuclear weapons (Rief 2013)

Therefore, the US argument for having FU policy has been countered by various scholars and policy makers. However, the US has adopted FU policy since the Cold War period. The whole strategic and military plan of the US suggests that the nuclear weapons could be used first by the US. The entire infrastructure of the US was designed to carry out the 'launch on warning' attacks.³ This involves the network of satellites for the early detection of missile launch, the detection of nuclear denotations, long range radar systems and terminal phase radar systems. The systems relied on an elaborate system for the interpretation of strategic and tactical warning. Strategic warning systems generally involve the interpretation of the US relations with the international community in general. It is then translated into the elaborated system of "Defence Condition" (DefCON) which is rated on the scale of DefCon 5 (the lowest level of alert) to DefCon 1 (the highest level of alert). Tactical warnings involve the early-warning attacks to detect the launch of the nuclear weapons. This system is designed to carry out the rapid launch of attacks as soon as the authorisation is given by the National Command Authority (Bluth 2000: 27). After the end of the Cold War, the most convincing argument given by the US to adopt FU policy is its stated link by extended deterrence and non-proliferation as described in the next section.

Therefore, according to the US, the nuclear weapons do fulfill three interrelated purposes, for which it is necessary to preserve FU policy:

The U.S. nuclear arsenal plays three distinct but interrelated roles that presently cannot be fulfilled by any other type of weapon. First, the fundamental purpose of U.S. nuclear forces is political: to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and achieve our national objectives without use


³ Under launch on warning attacks, the retaliatory capability is launched on receiving warnings of an adversary attacks. The attack is launched even when the adversary missiles are still in air. This policy requires having hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons and FU policies.

of military force. U.S. nuclear weapons help deter attacks from adversaries using all types of weapons of mass destruction. In other words, our objective is to use nuclear weapons politically to prevent our having to use military force. To be effective politically, our weapons must be appropriate to the threat, and the United States must be perceived as having both the will and the capability to employ nuclear weapons

The third role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to help prevent nuclear proliferation by extending our deterrent—the nuclear umbrella. There are several countries which could, with little effort and time, develop their own nuclear weapons but do not because they trust in and rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent (Bailey 2007: 2)

Therefore, the US is using nuclear weapons, for almost all kinds of attacks, as manifested in the figure depicted in the next page. However, the US has exaggerated the threat and these can be dealt well with the use of conventional weapons only. The only strong claim for FU policy is the extended deterrence and non-proliferation.

Figure 2: Nuclear Uses of United States



FU, Extended Deterrence and Non-Proliferation

The concept of extended deterrence can be defined as a confrontation of system in which the policymakers of one state (defender) threaten the use of force against another state (potential attacker) in an attempt to prevent that state from using military force against an ally- or territory controlled by an ally (protégée) –of the defender (Morgan 1977: 37). Therefore, the objective of extended deterrence is to protect other countries, which are preferably allies, and territories from attack, in contrast to preventing an attack on one's own national territory (which is defined as deterrence). The example of extended nuclear deterrence includes rotating aircraft from CONUS to Guam. US Air Force B-2 and B-52H long-range nuclear-capable bombers maintain a “continuous presence” in the Pacific. The use of these rotations for extended deterrence and assurance purposes began in 2003 after the deployment of U.S. forces to Iraq. They were intended to assure regional allies and deter potential adversaries by visibly demonstrating to all regional actors that the deployment of significant forces to the Middle East would not curtail the U.S. ability to project power into a second vital strategic theatre. The aircraft continue to serve a dual “deter and assure” mission today.

The policy of extended deterrence was a part of the US Cold War strategy to prevent attacks on Europe and other areas of concern like South Korea and Japan.⁴ However, even after Cold War the policy of extended deterrence remains an important part of the US to maintain influence in the concerned area and to prevent nuclear proliferation. Here comes the justification and linkage between the FU, extended deterrence and non-proliferation. The US has often mentioned that since the end of the Cold War period that it needs to retain FU policy to protect its allies and to eliminate their need to develop independent nuclear weapons and to promote atomic non-proliferation, which is an important step in achieving nuclear disarmament.⁵ It has been debated that the lack of credible security guarantee until 1949 was the main cause of nuclear proliferation during that period. Even after the Cold War, countries such as France, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and China build nuclear weapons

⁴ These states lack the capability to defend themselves from the Soviet aggression. In order to prevent these states from the soviet attacks and to prevent them to fall under the Soviet influence, the US came up with the concept of extended nuclear deterrence.

⁵ The US believes that since it is providing nuclear assurances to its allies, it removes their incentives to go nuclear and thus leading to non-proliferation. The examples are Japan and South Korea


arsenals as they were not the part of the security guarantee. The countries give away their nuclear weapons programme only when they felt secured by the security alliance system offered by the US, such as, South Africa, Japan, Norway, and Australia. This quasi-correlation suggests that it is important to preserve the extended deterrence to prevent nuclear non-proliferation (Huth 1988: 424).

Here, the US combines the realistic approach (need for having nuclear weapons and FU) to an idealistic approach (non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament) to gain justification for its policy. The concept of deterrence means to prevent any attack on one's own territory by threatening unacceptable loss and damage in return. However, the US felt during the Cold War period that its interests are related to other states also as it is one of the superpowers. The problem was that these were small states and were unable to withstand the attacks by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the US decided to extend its protection and deterrence to these states and coined the term 'extended deterrence' to protect its allies. The problem with extended deterrence is mentioned by Schelling:

The difference between the national homeland and everything "abroad" is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and threats that have to be made credible. To project the shadow of one's military forces over other countries and territories an act of diplomacy. To fight abroad is the military act, but to persuade enemies or allies that one would fight abroad, under circumstances of great cost and risk, require more than a military capability. It requires projecting intentions. It requires having those intentions, even deliberately acquiring them, and communicating them persuasively to make other countries behave. (Schelling 1966: 66).

Therefore, the credibility of extended deterrence depends on many factors as mentioned in Fig 3.

Fig 3: Requirements of Extended Deterrence (Huth 1988:423)



Therefore, the US seeks to secure its allies by its declaratory policies, preservation of weapons and by alliance commitments. Even after the Cold War period, the US feels that it needs to protect its allies from ‘peer competitors, rogue states and terrorist groups’ and it is important for the US to have FU policy for this. The post-cold war period opens up to new nuclear realities like proliferation of nuclear weapons, emergence of new nuclear states and grave threat of terrorist attacks making it necessary for the US to have FU policy so that its allies won’t feel threatened or abandoned. Presently, the US is committed to 30 countries (27 NATO countries and others include Japan, South Korea and Australia).

The importance of FU and extended deterrence has been stressed by International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) reports which states that the U.S. nuclear umbrella ‘have been, and continue to be, the single most important reason that many allies have fore sworn nuclear weapons’ (International Security Advisory Board 2007: 23). Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters mentioned that the US security guarantees were the main factors in the rollback of South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear weapons (Hersman and Peters 2006: 547). Therefore, adoption of NFU policy might result in the loss of credibility in extended deterrence posture leading to further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The possible impact of the reduced role of nuclear weapons on the alliance cohesion has been stressed by the US allies also. As mentioned by Cheon Seongwhun, a senior Research Fellow in RoK at the Institute of National Unification ‘decisions to reduce the role of nuclear weapons... will inevitably have the effect of shrinking the nuclear umbrella the US provides for its allies’(Seongwhun 2010). The countries like Japan and South Korea often stated that the US could bolster its nuclear weapons capabilities otherwise they would need to develop their national nuclear weapons programme. Walt Slocombe, in a testimony to the US Congress in 1997 when he was the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, mentioned

The importance of the role of US nuclear capability in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons often goes unnoticed. The extension of a credible US nuclear deterrent to allies has been an important non-proliferation tool. It has removed incentives for key allies, in a still dangerous world, to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces, as many are technically capable of doing. Indeed, our strong security relationships have probably played

as great a role in non-proliferation over the past 40 years as has the NPT (Walter B. Slocombe 1997)

This stated link between the FU, extended deterrence and non-proliferation has been mentioned in the various government proclamations of the US. As mentioned in the 2013 report on *Nuclear Employment Strategy* of the United States the US will use nuclear weapons to deter and defend its allies. It has been stated:

1. The fundamental role US nuclear weapon remains to deter nuclear attack on the US and its allies and partners.
2. The US will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, or its allies and partners
3. The US will maintain a credible deterrent capable of convincing any potential adversary that the adverse consequences of attack the US or our allies and partners far outweigh any potential benefit they may seek to gain from such an attack.
4. US policy is to achieve a credible deterrent, with the lowest possible number of nuclear attacks, consistent with our current and future security requirements and those of our Allies and partners (Department of Defence 2013).

Interpreting the following points, the US stresses the role of nuclear weapons to deter the US and its allies. However, it is subject to the limitations as the US mentioned that it will not use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS). Therefore, it mentions that the use of nuclear weapons will be in extreme circumstances only. The next steps reiterated the role of nuclear weapons in deterring the conflict. Therefore, the extended nuclear by the US has been regarded as an important tool in non-proliferation. The US needs nuclear weapons in order to ensure allies of its security guarantees. Walt Slocombe, the Under Secretary of Defense Policy of the US has mentioned in a testimony to Congress:

The importance of the role of US nuclear capability in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons often goes unnoticed. The extension of a credible US nuclear deterrent to allies has been an important non proliferation tool. It has removed incentives for key allies, in a still dangerous world, to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces, as many are technically capable of doing. Indeed, our strong security relationships have probably played as

great a role in non proliferation over the past 40 years as has the NPT (Slocombe, 1997).

Therefore, the US has been reluctant to adopt NFU policy and stated in NPR

The US will continue to consider a possible nuclear response in 'extreme circumstances' to defend the vital interests of the US or its allies or partners to include chemical/biological or conventional attacks by states with nuclear weapons or outside the NPT regime (Department of Defense 2010: 10)

Therefore, there is the positive relationship stated by the US between the FU, Extended Deterrence and Non-Proliferation. Here the continued role of the US nuclear weapons is considered necessary for non-proliferation, which will in the future lead to nuclear disarmament. This stated link has been criticised by the proponents of NFU. The stated links between FU policy, extended deterrence and non-proliferation have been criticised by Butfooy as mentioned below:

It could also be argued that the supposed extended-deterrence and related non-proliferation benefits of maintaining a US first-use option are mostly based on extrapolation from the Cold War and are less relevant given contemporary circumstances. There is little evidence of official American analytical work on the likely impact of a no-first-use declaration on contemporary extended deterrence or proliferation. The common conflation of first-use policy with generalised notions of the nuclear umbrella looks more rhetorical than analytical. The implied choice offered by defenders of the status quo is that the United States can either keep its first-use policy, or abandon extended deterrence and face the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan and others, as if the threat of first use is the pillar on which all else rests. Implying that the current world order would come tumbling down if the first-use option was abandoned, or merely modified in accordance with tighter NSAs [negative security assurances], might be a good debating tactic, but oversimplifies and over estimate the matter (Butfooy 2008: 119).

The problem which lies with the extended deterrence is that both the potential challenger and the defender's allies must be convinced about the threat. Therefore, the US needs to maintain such an atomic policy, which would result into credibility of the atomic threat. As mentioned by Thomas Schelling , 'to fight abroad is the military act but to persuade enemies or allies that one would fight abroad under circumstances of great risks and cost, requires more than the military capability' (Schelling 1966). Here

comes the justification of the US to maintain the FU policy so as to strengthen the continued role of nuclear weapons in the US nuclear strategy.

2.3 The exaggeration of the US proliferation threats, FU and extended deterrence

The question is how valid is the truth in the US policies that it has been reluctant to adopt NFU policy because FU strengthens nuclear extended deterrence leading to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. What is so great about the term ‘non-proliferation’ for which the US has to adopt FU policy, which could endanger many states and citizens? From last many years, the US Presidential candidate has considered the threat of nuclear weapon proliferation as the most important threat faced by the US. In 2004, the US Presidential candidate John Kerry and George Bush stated that ‘nuclear proliferation is the most important threat faced by the US security’ (CNN 2004). Similarly, Presidential candidate John McCain has mentioned in the candidature debate that, ‘no problem we face poses a greater threat than the nuclear proliferation’ (New York Times 2008). In fact, it can be said that the combinations of FU policy along with the high conventional weapons and defensive systems are making the process of nuclear disarmament more difficult. The need to assure allies and to deter an enemy could be achieved by the adoption of NFU policy combined with the threat of the conventional weapons. Therefore, the whole concept of FU policy to maintain extended deterrence and non-proliferation is somewhere exaggerated. As mentioned by Scott Sagan, the entire concept of the nuclear umbrella is faulty. The reason is that nuclear umbrella represents the ‘defensive shield.’ For which even the NFU policy is credible (Sagan 2009: 168).

The other question which this research raised is why the US and the world have been so enthusiastic about the concept of ‘non-proliferation’ that it is ready to accept the US FU policy for that. The reason is that the US has often articulated the concept of atomic proliferation as a means to achieve atomic disarmament. Here, the connection between the FU, extended deterrence and non-proliferation implies to demonstrating that the US nuclear weapons play an important role in achieving the non-proliferation objectives which will lead to disarmament in the future. The reduced achievement of atomic non-proliferation will result from the means reduction of nuclear dangers and therefore, will also reduce the incentive for the states to develop nuclear weapons leading to nuclear disarmament. It is said that without a regime which could check the

spread of nuclear weapons, it is impossible to achieve the world of nuclear disarmament (Lodgaard and Maerli 2007: 9). This has also been mentioned by Gareth Evans who is the co-chair of New International Commission on Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament, said:

Here is still no firm commitment not only to effective non-proliferation strategies, but to the big issue of disarmament which is inextricably linked with it. As the Canberra Commission said back in 1996, so long as anyone has nuclear weapons, others will want them, and as long as anyone has them, there's a very real risk that they'll be used (Arms Control Today 2008)

Therefore, the US strongly believes that there is a strong relationship between the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to achieve non-proliferation, it is important to have concepts like FU and extended deterrence. The US has often stated that the world has to demonstrate its cooperation with the US to non-proliferation before it could take steps to end nuclear armaments in totality. Here, the US is linking FU policy to extended deterrence and non-proliferation to serve following purposes:

- (1) To preserve FU policy so that the US could use its nuclear threats in post Cold War period to threaten its adversaries and its peer competitors from doing any adventurism.
- (2) To preserve the credibility of extended deterrence to preserve its domination in the areas. Furthermore, the concept of 'extended deterrence' is no more applicable in the present scenarios as it was during the cold war period. The reason is that as there are no such immediate nuclear threats for which the US needs such nuclear weapons to deter.
- (3) To link its nuclear weapons policies to non-proliferation and ultimately to disarmament to preserve the legitimacy of its doctrines.

Furthermore, non-proliferation has been often thought as a process of the US to delay disarmament for the infinite period.

It is important to note that not just the US, but the NWS has come to perceive that it is in its own interest to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The history shows that

this perception was particularly followed by the US to deny the nuclear demands of even the closest ally to have nuclear weapons. In 1945 and 1946 the US excluded both French and the British scientists to have access to the American efforts to build nuclear weapons despite the fact that both the countries have given crucial contribution in the Manhattan project. Although the UK-US cooperation was resorted, the French plans to develop nuclear weapons were not approved (UNIDR 1987:7). The reason for such a hesitance on the part of nuclear weapons states is evident. If the political adversary or an NNWS ally of an adversary obtains nuclear weapons, security implications are manifest. With the rise of NWS, the power of existing NWS to control nuclear war is diminished. In spite of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the ally will lessen the latter's dependence, complicate the strategic calculations and confuse the negotiations of nuclear weapons arms control arrangement (UNIDR 1987: 7). Therefore, the US stands clearly for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, no clear steps have been taken to ensure nuclear disarmament.

The importance of maintaining atomic forces has been stressed by the US since the development of nuclear weapons. As mentioned by President Churchill, who once stated, 'peace is the child of terror and the threat of the devastating nuclear war will be helpful in maintaining peace' (Doyle 2013: 7). The US has used the nuclear threats effectively since the cold war period to bring resolution of conflicts in its own favour. For this, it is important to have FU policy in place. There was a continuous threat of nuclear weapon use during Cold War in the Korean crisis, Vietnam crisis and even in Gulf War I (Gerson 2007: 26). Even after Cold War, the US has kept open the policy of FU so that it could deter chemical, biological attacks and could pose risks to other hardened targets (Sagan 2009: 174). The US has given nuclear threats approximately 14 times since the end of cold war, as shown in the following table.

Table 2: Nuclear Threats Given by the US (Gerson 2007: 27)

Year	Threats Given to	Nature of threat
1991	Iraq	President Bush issued a letter to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein saying that ‘Let me state that the US will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait’s oil fields and installations....The American people would respond in the strongest possible response possible. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order act of this kind.’
1993	DPRK	‘If North Korea developed and used nuclear weapons we will quickly retaliate. It would mean the end of their country as they know it.’
1994	Iraq	The US President order the movement of USS George Washington quickly to the Persian Gulf
1995	DPRK	Gen. Eugene Habiger stated in a testimony before the Congress plays a very large role. Not only was that message passed in 1990 by the President [to Iraq], that same message was passed to the North Koreans back in 1995, when the North Koreans were not coming off their reactor approach...” ⁴⁸ This threat was likely passed after March 25, when North Korea announced that it would resume nuclear activities if a contract for the provision of light water reactors (under the terms of the recently-signed Agreed Framework) was not concluded by April 21. The threat was likely passed before June 13, when the US and DPRK issued a joint statement which temporarily resolved the dispute
1995	China	The U.S.S. Nimitz and its escort ships pass through the Taiwan Strait, the first such transit since the normalization of US-China relations in 1979. The passage was not publicly acknowledged until January 26, 1996. ⁴
1996	China	A Chinese official tells former Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman that China can act militarily against Taiwan without fear of US intervention because US leaders ‘care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.’ This is conveyed by Freeman to US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Freeman’s impression is that ‘some in Beijing may be prepared to engage in nuclear blackmail against the U.S. to insure that Americans do no [sic] obstruct’ China’s efforts ‘to defend the principles of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and Chinese national unity.’
1996	China	The US moves the carrier Independence to a position approximately 230 miles southeast of Taiwan in response to heightened China-Taiwan tensions. A sailor tells the <i>Los Angeles Times</i> that US fighter aircraft based on the Independence can reach the Taiwan Strait in 30 minutes.
1998	Iraq	Bacon states that with regard to the use of nuclear weapons in a possible US strike on Iraqi nuclear facilities, “I don’t think we’ve ruled anything in or out in this regard.”
1998	Iraq	Saddam Hussein “should be in no doubt that if he were to [use chemical weapons] there would be a proportionate response.”
2002	Iraq	‘Again, all options are on the table. But one thing I will not allow is a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction.’
2002	Iraq	States of concern ‘can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons’

Year	Threats Given to	Nature of threat
2003	Iraq	Saddam Hussein 'should anticipate that the United States will use whatever means necessary to protect us and the world from a holocaust,' Card said. When asked if that included nuclear weapons, Card responded, 'I'm not going to put anything on the table or off the table.'
2006	DPRK	'Secretary Rumsfeld offered assurances of firm US commitment and immediate support to the ROK, including continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, consistent with the Mutual Defence Treaty'
2007	DPRK	The North Korean provocations, including missile launches in July and a nuclear test in October 2006, serve as stark reminders of the importance of transforming the US.-Japan Alliance to ensure its continued effectiveness in the ever changing security environment. ... US extended deterrence underpins the defence of Japan and regional security. The US reaffirmed that the full range of US military capabilities -both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities- form the core of extended deterrence and support US commitments to the defence of Japan."

Recently also, there were reports in the wake of Ukraine's crisis that the US B-2 Stealth Bombers have been arrived in Europe for training and it is known that B-2s were originally designed as nuclear bombers (Zuesse 2014). Therefore, the threat of nuclear weapons attacks are kept by the US with the preservation of FU policy and are important tools for achieving the political objectives. In fact, the US has offered more aggressive policies by adopting policies of extended deterrence, eschewing first use policy, seeking nuclear superiority and giving nuclear threats. As mentioned by Richard Betts, 'Washington has more frequent interests in nuclear blackmail than Moscow' (Betts 1987:11).

Furthermore, the argument of the US that FU policy is important for the performance of deterrence function is faulty. There are no immediate threats after the Cold War period to the US mainland for which it needs to preserve FU policy. This ends the justification of the US to maintain its deterrence posture along with the large atomic arsenals and Cold War concepts of FU. Here comes the need for preserving concepts of 'extended deterrence.' According to the US, the states of Europe and Asia do face nuclear threats along the borders for which it became necessary to sustain the concept of FU for preserving deterrence functions. The report published in 2012 entitled 'Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence' stated that the US 'will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure US allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments' (US Department of Defence 2012). They do face the threat of terrorism, but it is impossible to deter terrorism with nuclear weapons on account of the tendency of terrorist to assimilate with the civilian population. Even if the US attacks countries that support terrorist groups, it would have the large scale moral, political and strategic implications.

Only Russia can threaten the European allies of the US with its nuclear weapons. The recent examples of Georgia and Ukraine are given to demonstrate the aggressive stance of Russia. However, it is important to note that Russia has attacked Non-NATO countries and has not threatened European allies of the US after the Cold War period. Russia is not an irrational state to launch nuclear or conventional attacks against the US allies. The threats of new emerging states such as Iran and North

Korea are exaggerated as they do not possess enough capability to strike US allies in Asia or Western Europe (Penketh 2008). The total nuclear arsenal of Iran and North Korea is only 10-15 warheads (Rosen 2015). These threats can be tackled by the smart conventional weapons. Therefore, the threats faced by the US allies have been often exaggerated to rationalise and justify FU policy.

The other fear for the US is that it can face a situation of ‘coercive nuclear escalation.’ It means that a conventional inferior country could seek to attack the US with its nuclear weapons when there is a question of regime survival. As mentioned by North Korea in 2015:

North Korea says it is ready to use nuclear weapons against the United States and other foes if they pursue "their reckless hostile policy" toward Kim Jong regime (CNN 2015).

This probable use of nuclear weapons is not only possible from the side of Iran or North Korea but also from the side of China and Russia. As mentioned by Admiral (ret'd) Dennis C. Blair

(T)he US has the capacity to achieve its war aims in conflict with North Korea, China and Iran without the use of nuclear weapons....The most likely circumstances of nuclear exchanges in these war arise from American military superiority at the conventional level of war. With the US on the way to victory, the governments of Iran, North Korea, China and Russia might threaten or actually use nuclear weapons to attempt to stop the war short of complete defeat (Blair 2009: 51-52).

Under such a condition, the US also may seek to preserve its nuclear FU policy to attack the military establishment of the adversary's country (Keir and Press 2011: 4). Such kind of possibility to carry out nuclear attacks became possible due to the increasing change in technology. It was previously impossible to carry out such kind of atomic attacks on hardened instalments during the Cold War period. Furthermore, USSR possessed the large amount of nuclear arsenal making it almost impossible for the US to carry out successful attacks to disarm the adversary.

However, the situation has changed in the post-cold war period. In the present context, although, there has been increase in the nuclear weapon state the atomic arsenals of the countries have declined. States such as China, Iran and North Korea did

not possess the large amount of nuclear arsenals which were the basic feature of USSR during the Cold War period. Today, the reduced nuclear weapons arsenals of the countries are combined with the improvements in guidance systems making such an attack a possibility. Kieth and Liber even say that such a strike could even disarm the Russia which was impossible during the Cold War period (Keir and Press 2013:7).

This clearly shows that the US needs to protect FU policy and nuclear supremacy to gain advantages in the battles. The combination of the BMD systems, improvement in guidance and reconnaissance technology makes it possible to disarm the enemy and to limit damage to its homeland and allies. Therefore, the US gained upper hand in any international conflict (Keir and Press 2013:8). For this purpose, the US still maintains a nuclear triad consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers. The US maintains that these forces should be operated on a day-to-day manner to maintain strategic stability with Russia, China, regional adversaries and to assure the US Allies (Nuclear Posture Review 2010)

This clearly shows that the US could deal with the adversaries with the help of new technological conventional weapons.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A step to delay Nuclear Disarmament indefinitely

The US, thus, have stressed upon about nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament but has been reluctant to adopt NFU policy as a first step in delegitimising the role of nuclear weapons and as a step for nuclear disarmament. The problem is that the US has never taken any initiative to decrease the role of nuclear weapons since the Cold War period despite several policy proclamations. Indeed, the US has realised that the goal of nuclear disarmament is apparently faulty and it is better to focus on nuclear non-proliferation which will facilitate in preserving the US nuclear superiority and thus the nuclear hegemony. As it has been stated that, 'A Nuclear Weapon Free World (NFWF) is only practical if civil nuclear energy are banned, too, or at least placed under the international control' (Holdern 1998: 26). However, the problem with this perception is that countries of the world will never willingly give up their nuclear energy or will decide to place it under the international control because it will have impact on the economic well being of the country. The supporters of NFWF says that 'NFWF is only possible when there will not be any nuclear weapon, even in the hands of the international nuclear authority.' This is

however, practically not possible because it has ruled out the chance of cheating by the individual states who might possess the nuclear weapons by cheating other states. The end of Cold War has also reinforced the idea that the rise of nuclear weapons states act as the equaliser in the international system which makes it more difficult for the current great powers to achieve the aim of global zero (Holdern 1998 : 39).

This shows that despite of the end of the Cold War, the nuclear weapon remain an important ingredient in the recipe of the US foreign relations. As mentioned soon after the Cold War era 'It is the end of the Cold War period and not the end of nuclear period.' High hopes for nuclear disarmament were raised after the coming of the US President Barack Obama as he declared the aim of the US as achieving 'global zero' (Obama 2009).' However, there have been no substantial changes in the policy of the US with regards to nuclear weapons. The US and other nuclear powers are never interested in implementing Article XI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which states:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968).

Beside this, there has been the UN Resolution of 1665 which stresses on Nuclear Non-Proliferation only (UN General Assembly Resolution 1965). The US has not taken even one step to achieve nuclear disarmament like reductions in nuclear weapons programmes, declarations of NFU policies or deemphasising the role of nuclear weapons. The US itself maintained that it has more than required numbers of nuclear weapons needed to protect the US and its allies (Kristensen 2014). It is clear that the US is not interested in pursuing nuclear disarmament. Instead, it is interested

a. The Nuclear Modernisation programme of the US


The US has justified its modernisation programme by stating that:

At a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce existing stockpiles, because eventually we won't have as much confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do

have. Currently, the United States is not the only declared nuclear power that is modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead. The United Kingdom and France have programmes to maintain their deterrent capabilities. China and Russia have embarked on an ambitious path to design and field new weapons. To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization programme (Gates 2008).

Even, Barack Obama has been the only President of the US who has taken steps to reduce nuclear weapons. The US President Obama has declared clearly that the US intends to modernise or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery system, a heavy bomber and air launched cruise missiles, an ICBM and an SSBN and SLBM (Obama 2011). This shows the US interest in carrying out modernisation programmes, as mentioned in the figure below:

Fig 4: Annual Changes in Size of US Nuclear Weapon Stockpile 1945-2014
(Kristensen 2014)



The official documents mention only about nuclear non-proliferation and not about the nuclear disarmament. For example, President Obama of the US has organized the Nuclear Security Summit and mentioned only about the efforts to be taken to reduce the nuclear dangers by commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. As he stated in 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

We've agreed that nuclear terrorism is one of the most urgent and serious threats to global security. We agreed to the goal of securing the world's nuclear materials in four years. We committed ourselves to specific and concrete actions. And to get this done, we agreed a new effort of sustained and effective international cooperation was required, that we would need to create an architecture in which we could share best practices, help to enforce many of the commitments that we had already made, and continue to improve every aspect of this issue (Obama 2012).

Further, the arms control treaty like START is nothing but a mockery. It has been mentioned by experts that the START treaty changes only the number game but allows the US and Russia to deploy the same number of nuclear weapons as have been permissible under the SORT treaty. As mentioned by Hans Kristensen of FAS:

while the treaty reduces the legal limit for deployed strategic warheads, it doesn't actually reduce the number of warheads. Indeed, the treaty does not --require destruction of a single nuclear warhead and actually permits the United States and Russia to deploy almost the same number of strategic warheads that were permitted by the 2002 Moscow Treaty (Kristensen 2010).

The treaty places no limit on the modernisation of nuclear weapons programmes providing that 'modernisation and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.' Therefore, when the US decreases the number of weapons, it also increases the quality of the nuclear weapons programme by developing systems like BMD and Prompt Global Strike programmes, which enables the US in retaining its nuclear hegemony (Kristensen 2010). The intention of the US President for maintaining the nuclear weapons programmes can be seen from the fact that Obama's administration tried to pre-empt the inevitable demands for increased nuclear weapons funding in exchange for new START even before the treaty has been negotiated. Obama's administration proposes the increase of almost 10 percent for the Department of Energy nuclear weapons programme. By May 2011, the administration was committed to a budgeting of total \$180 billion over the next ten years for nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Bob Corker, the Republican Senator from Tennessee

(home of Oak Ridge National Laboratory) stated that ‘The New START treaty could be easily called as the Nuclear Modernisation and Missile Defence Act of 2010’ (Deen 2014).

This clearly reflects that the policy of the US government is to sustain nuclear hegemony by taking to maintain high quality and technology of nuclear weapons and pursuing the escalation domination at all levels of warfare with the most powerful conventional forces operating worldwide under the umbrella of nuclear forces. Since the Cold War period, the US considers it necessary to maintain the nuclear superiority to deter the threats from the Soviet Union. Since then, the US policy is guided by the premise that in an anarchic world with expansionist and nuclear-armed enemies there is no other way to maintain peace – other than the maintenance of nuclear superiority (Njolstad 1997: 3). The treaties such as START, which aims to reduce the nuclear weapons are to a great extent cosmetic and leave the danger of the nuclear weapons mostly unchanged.

Besides this, the US has taken steps to modernise its nuclear weapons. The US has recently decided to carry out nuclear modernisation which is obviously at odds with the aim of achieving ‘global zero.’ It is expected that the US will spend \$335 billion on the modernisation of nuclear weapons (Board and Sanger 2014). The reductions which are carried out by the US under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will be offset by the upgrades in the quality of the weapons. Besides this, the US is also undertaking programmes of ‘Ballistic Missile Defence’ and ‘Prompt Global Strike’ which affect the disarmament process in return.

b. Preservation of Tactical Weapons, Making Nuclear Disarmament more difficult

The NFU policy will also have impact on tactical nuclear weapons which the US maintains to protect its allies. The NFU policy would require many military, strategic and political changes for which the US is not willing. For example, it will require the US to give away its tactical nuclear weapons completely due to its first-strike characteristics. The tactical nuclear weapons are likely to be employed early in the conflict to avoid capture or destruction of its forces by the adversary’s conventional attacks. Even if the US decides not to opt for NFU, for the time being, it may take a pledge to eliminate or to reduce the role of tactical nuclear weapons, which is obviously not coming from the US. The US continues to stress the role of tactical

nuclear weapons. As the US has mentioned in 2010 NPR that the primary role of the US atomic arsenal is to deter an atomic attack against the US, its allies and partners (Nuclear Posture Review 2010). For this, it is important for the US to maintain the forward-deploy nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers. This also requires the extension of the US B-61 bomb (Klein 2014). At a press conference in Tallinn on 22 April, 2010, NATO Secretary-General Anders Rasmussen suggested that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons should remain in Europe: ‘My personal opinion is that the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is part of deterrence to be taken seriously’ (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010). The Lisbon Summit declaration also explicitly calls for a review of ‘NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance’ (Davis 2010). This strategic review would include nuclear weapons, missile defence, and conventional weapons.

However, the practical use of the tactical weapons after Cold War to date is questionable, and it has been stated that the commitments to allies can be met by conventional weapons or strategic nuclear deterrence. US EU Command (EUCOM) “no longer recognizes the political imperative of U.S. nuclear weapons within the Alliance” (Secretary of Defence Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management 2008). In 2009, German Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier was less diplomatic, stating that these weapons ‘are absolutely senseless today.’ His successor, Guido Westerwelle, argued during the Munich Security Conference in early 2010 that ‘the last remaining nuclear weapons in Germany are a relic of the Cold War.’ Even hawks like Karl-Heinz Kamp admit that ‘the critics of the US nuclear presence in Europe have a point when they state that the current strategic rationale for nuclear bombs on European soil is at best doubtful.’ (Karl Heinz 2010) It is mentioned in the 2013 report by the Stimson Centre that tactical nuclear weapons increase the risk of proliferation. They add less to deterrence and complicate safety and security by inviting pre-emption (Klein 2014). However, weapons are still regarded important by the US in their security calculations.

This shows the continuous disinterest on the part of the US to achieve global nuclear disarmament. The idea and the concept of ‘global disarmament’ remains an ‘elusive idea’ which stays only on paper. The US proposes to have nuclear disarmament in future and presses the nation to have non proliferation which fulfils the US foreign and military objectives.

c. Continuous Reliance on Nuclear Weapons, No Move on Nuclear Disarmament

The US nuclear weapons are so much embedded in the foreign policy and military strategy that it is difficult for the US to reduce the role of nuclear weapons by declaring NFU policies. The problem is that since the Cold War, the US has tried to achieve its political and foreign goals with the help of the nuclear weapons. The US has used nuclear weapons in Japan to achieve its foreign objectives and has used its nuclear threats at several occasions such as Korean War, Vietnam War and even in destabilising situations of Middle East. Therefore, the US has been reluctant to the idea of the nuclear weapons disarmament during the Cold War period. After the end of Cold War, the Soviet Union dissolved and there were no such grave atomic threats for which the US needs to stress continuously on the role of nuclear weapons. As a result, the US came up with the arguments of chemical and biological weapons, rogue states, nuclear terrorism and peer competitors of China and Russia for which the US feels that it is necessary to stress the role of nuclear weapons. These arguments have been countered by various scholars, and it has been stated that the US is the only nuclear hegemon in the post-cold war era which can easily deal with these threats even with the highly-developed conventional weapons. Consequently, the US came up with the argument of nuclear weapons, extended deterrence and non-proliferation, which provide justification for its continued role of the nuclear weapons by the name of securing allies and to achieve the stated aim of nuclear non-proliferation. This serves all the three main purposes of the US policy namely to stress the role of nuclear weapons, securing allies and continuing its hegemony and achieving the stated aim of non-proliferation to shun away from global nuclear disarmament.

The Advantages for the US to have continuous stress on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Extended Deterrence: Move Towards Nuclear Hegemony

Nuclear non-proliferation is aimed to divide the world into two parts of haves and have-nots where the US and other major powers continue to have nuclear weapons while other states are deprived of their possession. The US aims to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament in future to remove this disparity. However, the problem is that as long as the US continues to have nuclear weapons, other states will also be tempted to have them thereby leading to proliferation of nuclear weapons, necessitated nuclear proliferation and alliance formations. Further, the US has articulated the viewpoint

that non-proliferation is essential for disarmament and therefore, countries must strive first to achieve non-proliferation.

Such a stress on non-proliferation serves many purposes of the US strategy. First, the US no longer faces threats in the form of Soviet Union conventional or nuclear weapons threat. The post-cold war threats are in the form of presence of loose nukes at the global level. Therefore, the US aims to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and their materials with the help of non-proliferation. The problem arises as the countries like India began to question the non-proliferation regime as it divides the world into parts: one part having access to these materials and the other part being deprived of it. The US address this issue by linking non-proliferation to disarmament policy and also by stating that 'establishing nuclear disarmament as an explicit long term goal of the US policy agenda will pursue other states in the short term to forgo nuclear weapons and cooperate in restricting access to fissile materials' (Santana 2011:5). The US in turn has linked these non-proliferation policies to FU and extended deterrence so as to continue to stress the role of its nuclear weapons even after Cold War. Thirdly the development of nuclear weapons requires complex industrial and technological capability. The US seeks to limit access of such kind of industrialisation to other states by incorporating them into the non-proliferation regime.

Beside this, it is important to consider that 'nuclear deterrence' theory provides the rationale for the arms race and continuous development of destructive weapons. Both the US and Soviet Union used the concepts of rational deterrence theory to legitimise the nuclear policy. The deterrence theory articulated that the structure of international hierarchy was codified with respect to the possession of nuclear weapons. However, after the Cold War period, this aspect of rational deterrence theory cannot be applicable as the US remains the conventional and atomic superpower among its peer competitors and adversaries. Furthermore, it was said that main threat was emanating from new atomic states such as Iran and North Korea and from terrorist attacks, which are not so 'rational' to understand and practice the concept of deterrence during wartime. Therefore, the US needs to stress and codify the concept of 'extended deterrence' to stress the continued reliance of its nuclear weapons and First-Use Policy.


The US, in fact, has exaggerated the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons as without doing so, it would have been difficult for the US to justify the security of

nuclear weapons. The US stated that the end of Cold War has resulted into the emergence of ‘threat blank.’ By 1990 the senior Pentagon officials and many members of Congress began to use a common analysis and terminology to describe the threat of nuclear proliferation (Klare 1995: 27). In fact, the US invaded Iraq because of presence of the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. James Woolsey famously said that ‘We have slain a large (Soviet Union) dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes’ (Jehl 2013). Instead of regarding their own nuclear weapons as a means of proliferation, the US began to stress that its nuclear weapons do play an important role in preventing the proliferation of weapons. Without exaggeration of such a threat, it would not have been possible for the US to justify its nuclear supremacy and first use policy.

The reason for the US argument for preserving the FU policy and to link it to non-proliferation and extended deterrence is to therefore find a justification for the possession of such a large number of nuclear weapons. The US in actuality sees a potential strategic advantage in striking first. Such a large number of nuclear forces make it easy for the US to be a first striker without using it’s all the existing arsenals. The main aim here is to use and turn the balance of power to its own advantage and to prevent another side from reaping a correspondence advantage. The US will point to the other country military establishments first rather than the targeting their civilian counterparts. Here, the main aim of the US will be to limit the escalation of the conflict by two means. First, the establishment of BMD systems to counter the nuclear attacks. Second, to keep nuclear warheads in reserve for any counterattack. These capabilities gave the US all the advantages of being first and to turn tables in its own favour.

However, the global nuclear order does not fully adhere to the rules set by the US. As the US delays the rules of the global disarmament, more and more countries are being attracted to the incentive of developing nuclear weapons. As the world is divided into two parts, the incentives and advantages enjoyed by nuclear weapons states cannot be enjoyed by other states. As the rules and regimes are being imposed on other states to develop nuclear weapons, the countries aspire to acquire them. As stated ‘you cannot have those means you should desire to have them.’ As a result, it created the ‘circle of nuclear proliferation’ depicted in the figure below

Fig 5: Circle of Nuclear Proliferation



Besides all this, it is difficult to see the applicability of the concept of extended nuclear deterrence in the post-cold war period. The concept of extended deterrence clearly serves the concept of enlargement, as mentioned:

Without enlargement, Europe will remain unfinished business. Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East (Robertson 2002).

The proponents of extended nuclear deterrence often give the example of Russia's Ukraine conflict to show the continuous utility of extended deterrence. However, the case here is quite different from the Cold War period. There are potential flash points in both Europe and Asia such as Senkanu Island disputes, Taiwan, etc. However, the question is whether these areas are so much important to the US that it is important for it to exercise the nuclear threat or the possible use of nuclear weapons? The answer is that America's cold war commitments of extended nuclear deterrence will not be credible because the stakes would not be great. For example, given the case of Ukraine, Russia would not place little credence in the US guarantees because Ukraine is not vital to the US interests.

The question of effectiveness of nuclear non-proliferation has been argued by William C. Martel. He said that the US nuclear non-proliferation had worked in the past but is not relevant in the present context. The US created non-proliferation regimes to counter the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the P-5 states. This policy was successful in the Cold War period but was not applicable in the present context. The reason is that states beyond the P-5 begun to see nuclear weapons as a way to achieve their security and a solution to fill up their security gaps. This can be seen from the cases of India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq and Iran. Furthermore, the US has demonstrated that nuclear weapons are the only means to achieve the great power status. The US has also demonstrated that nuclear weapons constitute the important tool for dissuasion of US military interventions.

Conclusion

It is important here to know that the US nuclear weapons policy was at no time based on the pure deterrence theory. As explained by Allan Krass and Dan Smith ‘the US was never satisfied by making such weapons systems, which can deal with the Soviet Union only. The main aim of the US is to make such a weapon system by which it can dominate and flourish in the world (Krass and Smith 1982:7). The present system of the American first use and extended deterrence meant to dominate the interests of the US in Europe and Asia. The possession of the superior nuclear weapons gives the US all three modes of control, *i.e.*, coercion, self-interest and legitimacy. By being and preserving the superiority in the world affairs, the US exempts itself from the rules of nuclear weapons proliferation, which are otherwise binding on the other states. As William Appleman once stated, ‘self-proposed internationalist saw America as a ‘world unto itself’ proliferating US solutions for all but ignoring lessons taught by other countries.’ Therefore, the US always came up with the ideas such as non-proliferation, first use politics and alliance build up. The stated goal of all these concepts is to prevent attacks on the US and its allies by controlling the spread of weapons and by protecting the allies through its nuclear weapons. It also serves the deeper role of the US to maintain a powerful position in the international system. Preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons while shunning away from the disarmament always served the hegemonic image of the US in the Realist and Gramscian sense. The end of Cold War did open the way for nuclear disarmament and end of alliance politics, but the old structures continue to work. They were based on the arguments that nuclear weapons led the US to win Cold War and to deal with the US-Soviet impasse.

Therefore, the concepts are being developed and used by the US to justify its own policies and strategies in the nuclear realm, to preserve nuclear hegemony and nuclear superiority. Since the advent of the nuclear weapons, there have been efforts by the US to cut the spread of nuclear weapons while retaining the monopoly of the nuclear weapons system. President Truman clearly stated that it would not share the nuclear know how with the other countries, even with Britain. The problem was that the US wished to maintain nuclear weapons while blocking all the way for the other states to develop nuclear weapons. As said in the very beginning by President Truman, ‘US would not throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can’t arm against

us' (Arise 1956: 133). The earlier efforts to have international control over the nuclear weapons were not successful. The examples of this were Oppenheimer proposals to maintain the international atomic control of all fissionable material which will disseminate the resources for peaceful prospects. The reasons were the belief that the US with nuclear weapons has the capability to police the globe. Similarly, Baruch Plan also tries to maintain international atomic control and to ban the bomb which was later rejected by the US in the hope of maintaining nuclear supremacy. The Soviets clearly stated that the US wished to have concessions from Soviet side while the latter did not want to give up nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the concept of 'non-proliferation, extended deterrence and first use' is made and publicised by the US to legitimise the role and superiority of its own nuclear weapons. In fact, there are other reasons which motivate state to develop or not to develop their own nuclear weapons which are totally independent of the US nuclear weapons policy. This has been explained the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Domestic Determinants and Nuclear Weapons Decision Making

Introduction

The role of domestic politics has been largely ignored in the realm of international relations and especially in the field of nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the study of international relations has largely excluded the study of domestic politics and distinguishes the two spheres as a 'great divide' (Clark 1999: 52). The difference between the two is mentioned in the table indicated below:


Table 3: Difference between Domestic and International Politics (Devetak 2012:4).

Domestic Politics	International Politics
Inside	Outside
Hierarchy	Anarchy
Monopoly over instruments of violence	Decentralised instruments of violence
Lawful Authority	Self-Help
Security	Security/Insecurity Dilemma
Justice	Power
Community	Friends and Enemies
Peace and Order	War

The reason behind ignoring domestic factors is that international relations traditionally is based on three basic assumptions which ignored the role played by domestic politics. The first assumption states that 'international relations' constitutes the study of fundamental and persistent forces of world politics and the basic drivers who determine the foreign policies of state. This means that international relations and the activities occurring in the international arena only decide the international relations policy. This assumption is clearly devoid of any mention of the role of domestic factors. The second assumption is the concept of 'rationality' responding to circumstances in which they find themselves in the sense of maximising their own

security interests. This assumption means that states have only one basic rational interest which is to maximize their own security either by building weapons or by building alliances. This means complete ignore of the domestic politics in international relations. This assumption gave rise to study of systematic explanations alone in the study of politics. Thirdly, the assumption in IR that state is a unitary actor that completely ignores the other constituent units of which the state is composed of (Frankel 1996: xiv-xivv). The major theory in the study of the international relations is the realist theory. The proponents of realist theory do recognize the need to stress upon the concept of domestic politics. For instance, Morgenthau has mentioned , ‘domestic and international politics are but two different manifestations of same phenomena: the struggle for power’(Morgenthau 1948:22) ‘State is not a unitary billiard ball but a pivot adjudicating between international and domestic pressures (Putnam 1988: 428). However, a deep inquiry into the domestic factors has not been initiated, especially in the realm of nuclear weapons. These factors along with the other explanations are often used to explain the proliferation policies of the state, as explained in the figure depicted in the next page

Fig 6: The Logic of Nuclear Proliferation (Monteiro and Debs 2014: 38)



Later, other theorists recognised that domestic politics do have a role to play in international relations. The stress on domestic factors in the international relations led to the rise of theories like liberalism and constructivism. In the post-cold war era, domestic politics began to play a more important role because members of states are going through significant political transitions in terms of leadership, ideological flux, institutional alterations or societal formations. There are countries like Iraq, Syria going through leadership change and civil war, ideological differences between western countries and Muslim countries leading to divide between the states. All these things have significant impact on the international relations .The domestic politics begun to have significant impact on the international relations, particularly owing to absence of any great power politics (Kim 2010: 54). Therefore, a debate begins about to what extent the domestic politics affect the international relations and which aspect matters most: the presence and character of bureaucracy (Kissinger, Allison, Halperin), the pressure of masses on the policy making (Kissinger, Wilson, Lenin), the strength and autonomy of the state (Gilpin, Kranser, Katzenstein), the drivers of the advanced capitalist economy (Lenin, Magdoff, Baran and Sweezy), the perceptual set of leaders (Jervis, Steinbrunner and Breacher), national style (Hoffman), the logic of industrial development (Kurz), the character of domestic coalitions (Katzenstein), the relative weight of transitional actors in the given policy (Nye) and the level of modernization (Morse) (Gourevitch 1978: 901). The problem with such a kind of argument is that it ignores the concept of domestic politics and focuses more on process and institutional arrangement.

The most important work done to explore the role of domestic politics in the international relations is the work done by Robert Putnam (Putnam 1988:432). The work of Robert Putnam tries to explore the link between domestic and international politics. Here, Robert Putnam represents an important analysis demonstrating that domestic groups pursue their interests by pressurising the government to adopt favourable policies, and a politician seeks power by developing coalitions among these groups. At the international level, the politician seeks to achieve its domestic interests by minimising the adverse consequences at the international level (Putnam 1988: 434). In the opinion of Putnam, national level domestic groups attempt to secure their interests by ‘pressurising the government to adopt favourable policies and politicians seek power by forming coalitions among these groups.’ At international

level, the national government endeavours to 'maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments.' Robert Putnam has manifested the board of game, which is played simultaneously: the game board of domestic politics and the game board of international politics. What is happening at the international politics has an impact on domestic politics. However, one can control international politics but domestic politics cannot be influenced by external factors. Therefore, by determining the type and extent of domestic politics, one can predict international politics (Putnam 1988: 434). The problem is that the policy which seems to be perfect for one part of a board may not be convincing to another part of a board. Furthermore, if the key player at the international level is dissatisfied, the whole game will be reversed (Putnam 1988: 436).

Although, the work of the Robert Putnam represents an interesting piece, it does focus on negotiations. The work has been criticised for ignoring different forms of domestic-international interactions such as transnational, Trans-governmental and cross-level interactions. (Eliis 2001: 11). The work in this area failed to represent the role of domestic politics in the military policy formulations, and nuclear weapons decision making.

Most of the work in this area of nuclear weapons proliferation stress on three major schools of thoughts: realist theory, liberal theory and constructivist theory. For instance, the realist theory of international relations which is so far the most dominant theory is based on the fact that the nuclear weapon development programmes constitute a response to insecurity and a form of balancing against the external threats. However, the realist theory of international relations is too abstract in predicting about the conditions under which a state will build nuclear weapons instead of following their long term defence policies under the realm of conventional weapons. Moreover, it operates at the systematic level which ignores the specific social, political, technical or psychological capabilities to build bombs (Lavoy 2008: 701).

The three most prominent works done in the nuclear weapons and domestic politics field are by Scott Sagan, Etel Solingen and Jacques Hymns.

Analysis of Work by Scott Sagan, Etel Solingen and Jacques Hymns in the realm of Nuclear Weapons Decision Making

Scott Sagan has argued that it is in the political interests of the individual leaders or in the bureaucratic interests of the state to develop nuclear weapons. He has mentioned three kinds of actors in the study of the decision making of the nuclear weapons: the state nuclear establishment (which includes officials in the state-run laboratories as well as civilian reactor facilities), important units within the professional military (air force, army and navy), politicians in the state in which political parties favour nuclear weapons acquisition. Scott Sagan mentions that when such actors are strong enough to control the government, the decision is made to develop nuclear weapons. He states that 'whether or not the acquisition of nuclear weapons serves the national interests of a state, it is likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic interests of a state' (Sagan 1996: 63).

The basic assumption of this model is that bureaucracy is not the recipient of the decisions received from the political actors. However, they develop such conditions, which favour development of nuclear weapons like raising the threat perceptions of the state. Similarly, scientific establishment also favours the development of nuclear weapons because it keeps the money and funds flowing in their laboratories (Sagan 2011: 224). In contrast, there are events such as when a country decides on nuclear weapons differently in spite of the public opinion and bureaucratic wishes. Ukraine represents an exception to the case study of domestic model as proposed by Sagan. Here, the public opinion was strongly in favour of nuclear weapons development. Ukraine's leadership, in fact, faced considerable criticism from the local political group and nationalists for its decision to give up nuclear weapons. The public in Ukraine were critical of the security threats faced by the Russia and want Ukraine to build nuclear weapons. The public polls indicated:

Despite the tragic consequences of the Chernobyl accident, public opinion polls in Ukraine showed rapidly growing support for keeping nuclear weapons in 1992 and 1993: polls showed support for an independent arsenal increasing from 18 percent in May 1992 to 36 percent in March 1993, to as much as 45 percent in Summer 1993 (UK Essays 2015). In fact, many military officers like General Volodomyr Toubko and senior political officers lobbied to retain nuclear weapons for deterrence (UK Essays 2015). However, Ukraine decided against nuclear

weapons and joined the NPT. Further, this model cannot be applicable to the highly centralised governmental systems, such as those prevalent in the Middle East where the role of bureaucracy or nuclear energy establishment is limited (Bhagat 2006: 6)

Therefore, Sagan's model of domestic and bureaucratic politics cannot be universally applied. This raises a question as to why particular bureaucracy or political party in power considers it as important to have or not to have nuclear weapons programmes. What are the factors which frame their decision making with regard to the development of nuclear weapons? The other question which is often raised with regard to domestic politics model is that it is not clear that self - interest of bureaucracy induces the state to develop nuclear weapons. It is right that institutions such as Atomic Energy need big budgets for them to survive. However, they also need autonomy to operate. As stated by David Lilenthal that 'the major way to lose autonomy is to become the defence contractor.' It is true that army needs power and loves bombs. However, they also tend to be away from 'push button' which will make war more likely (Halperin 1974). Therefore, the work of Scott Sagan did not provide the complete analysis of the factors which affect the domestic agents and their decisions to develop nuclear weapons.

Another work done in the field of domestic determinants of nuclear weapons decision making is by Etel Solingen. She stated that the economic component of domestic liberalisation in a different regional context may bring us closer to identifying an important engine of regime creation. The basic assumption here is that states adopting economic liberalisation are more prone to adopt the nuclear non-proliferation regime rather than the states that have closed economy (Solingen 2007: 26). She states:

Leaders and leading coalitions interrupt security issues through the prism of their own efforts to accumulate and retain power at home. Internationalizing leaders define economic growth and global access as crucial for advancing state security, rejecting nuclear weapons if the latter endanger those core objectives. Conversely, inward looking leaders thrive by defining as self-help while promoting constituencies that variously favour economic, political, strategic, religious or cultural autonomy. Indigenous nuclear weapons are compatible with-albeit not necessarily a requirement of such models. Put differently, domestic survival model may be seen as filters through which security is defined (Solingen 2007: 52-53).

Solingen has criticised the neo-realist and liberal theory of international relations with regard to nuclear weapons. The neo-realist theory maintains that nuclear weapons are built to deal with the external vulnerabilities. However, states such as Taiwan and South Korea are externally vulnerable but have chosen to remain non-nuclear. The counter argument given by the neo realist theory for this is that these states get the external protection given by the US and was the main reasons for the states like South Korea and Taiwan to adopt the non-nuclear weapons status. However, the alliance protection has played no role in the decisions of Egypt, Argentina, Brazil or South Africa. Similarly, applying the liberal theory, the author states that democracies may adopt not to develop nuclear weapons as it entails the most violent kind of protection. The little failure of nuclear deterrence may result in the devastation which may not be acceptable to a democratic country. Therefore, fellow democracies do not go for war against each other. Nuclear Weapons could play a role in dealing with non-democratic power who is more interested in using its monopolised power (Solingen 2007: 60). Secondly, democracies are based on the rule of law and generally infringed from doing something, which will weaken their credibility and commitments, both internally and externally. Consequently democracies states that if they enter the nuclear non proliferation accord, will follow it as compared to a non-democratic country will not hesitate to break its commitment. The anti-nuclear group in democratic countries also plays an important role in forcing democratic government to follow its commitment of non-proliferation, once entered (Ruble 2009: 215). As a result, democratic countries are more likely to follow the accord of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. However, there are cases of India and Pakistan the democratic countries which decided to go nuclear while military dictatorship like Brazil and Argentina decided to remain non-nuclear.

In addition to it, Solingen discusses about rewarding countries which follow the norm of nuclear proliferation and punishing others that do not follow the norm of nuclear proliferation. The rubric of punishing and awarding countries does not go beyond the fabric of the US policies (Lantis 2008: 352). If we take the case of Iran, it did not stop its nuclear weapons programme even when sanctions were imposed. Further, Solingen ignores the role played by the individuals in decision making and rather focus on regime types only (Lantis 2008: 352).

Jacques Hymns developed the theory of nuclear proliferation in his book *Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*. Hymns argue that the decision to develop nuclear weapons is influenced more by the perceptions of individual leaders. He begins by criticising realist theory by stating that a number of states possesses the capability to develop nuclear weapons but has refrained from developing them. This represents a gap in realist theory. He gave the concept of National Identity Conception (NIC) which is responsible for the decision of a leader to develop or not to develop nuclear weapons. He defined NIC as ‘two dimensional (1) his or her sense of what the nation naturally stands for and of (2) how high it naturally stands, in comparison to others in the international arena.’ (Hymns 2006:18). The first dimension also depends on the degree of shared interests and norms with the other external actors. This view can be either ‘oppositional’ where a state sees itself in opposition to the other actors or ‘sportsman like’ where a state sees itself in comparison with the other actors. The second dimension refers to the standing of a state in relation to the other states of the international area. When a state sees itself as equal or superior to other states, ‘nationalist’ sentiments are present. On the other hand, if a state sees itself as inferior to other states, ‘subaltern’ pattern is visible. The leaders having ‘oppositional nationalist’ take the decision to develop nuclear bombs. The ‘oppositional nationalist’ combines the intense enmity towards the rival and intense pride in state’s ability to control the challenger. However, what have been ignored in this theory are the factors and domestic regimes which are responsible for the rise of such sentiments. .

Andrew Moravcsik: Liberal Theory of Preferences

I have taken Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of preferences and applied it to the nuclear-decision making in a country. Andrew Moravcsik’s theory states that preferences are more important than the stated capability of a nation (which is a realist argument). There are three assumptions in the Liberal theory of preferences:

1. The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence (Moravcsik 1997: 516).

This theory gives prime importance to individual's preferences. Here, individuals are regarded as average, rational and risk-averse with different tastes, social commitments and resource endowments. According to this theory, society is prior to state and domestic state-society relationship constitutes the centrality of politics. According to liberal theory, society is composed of such individuals who have autonomous interests and identities and these individuals make private groups and organisations to advance their interests. The interaction of these individuals results into a formation of social and political order. Even in non-liberal society, these individuals try to realise their preferences through such interactions although they are not always in a position to articulate or realise them. The individuals here advance their interests through political exchange and collective actions. The liberal theory rejects the notion that there is automatic harmony of interest in a society. Rather, there exists difference of interests and preferences in a society. (Moravscik 1997: 517). There are three main tenets emerge from this assumption:

1. The fundamental determinant of politics lies in society. Private individuals are independent of state and determine their personal gains and losses from foreign policy, popular support for foreign policy initiative, for governmental institutions and for survival of state itself. These factors are totally dependent on the individual preferences and their relation to international environment.
2. Social order and progress can only be realized through institutions that channel private incentives towards social goals of wealth and security.
3. Under circumstances of minimal rights and regulated competition, liberals believe that political and social economic development in the direction of greater wealth and security is possible (Moravscik 1997: 4)

On the basis of this, there emerge conflicting and cooperating situations in the society:

Table 4: Conflicting vs. Cooperating Situations

Conflicting Situations	Cooperating Situations
Deep and irreconcilable differences in beliefs about the provisions of public goods, such as borders, culture etc	Complementary beliefs
Extreme scarcity of resources	Relative abundance
Inequalities in social influence at large	Social power is equitably distributed

2. States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics (Moravcsik 1997: 518).

According to liberal conception, the state acts as not as actor but a representative institution which acts as a ‘transmission belt ‘by which preferences and social power of individuals are translated into policy.’ Individuals turn towards state when they are unable to achieve their goals by private behaviour. They began to pressurise the government to formulate their policy which will be consistent with their preferences. The state represents particular society and represents certain groups which in turn alter the state preferences (Moravcsik 1997: 518).

The system of interest intimation takes the form of (a) direct voice (through formal electoral mechanisms or the informal actions of interest groups, personal networks or public persuasion) (b) indirect form of exit (through social reactions of policy). Pure tyranny represents voice of a single person while pure democracy represents the voice of a lot of people. The state policy in the international conflict is represented by the imperfect or partial representation. Under impartial representation, there is concentration of power to form both outside and inside the state apparatus which captures the state and tries to extract gains from the international conflict while transferring costs to others or to society as a whole (Moravcsik 1997: 10).

The two assumptions clearly imply that states do not automatically maximise fixed, homogenous conception of security or sovereignty. Rather they pursue particular


interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty as preferred by powerful domestic groups enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.

3. The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behaviour (Moravcsik 1997: 520).

This assumption believes that the behaviour of states reflect the nature and configuration of preferences. The above-mentioned two assumptions clearly reflect that state behaviour reflects various preferences which in turn drive the state policy. In international area, each state tries to realise its preferences under the various constraints imposed by the preferences of other states. The policy of interdependence explains the link between the state preferences on the one hand and the behaviour of one or more states on the other hand. The policy of interdependence is defined as ‘the set of costs and benefits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realise their preferences.’ When preferences of states are complementary to each other, harmonious coexistence is expected. While when the dominant social groups try to achieve their preferences by imposing necessarily costs on the dominant social groups in other countries government faces a bargaining game with few mutual gains and high potential of interstate tension and conflict. Under this, the revisionist preferences mean that states advance their preferences which will revise the status quo under the strategic circumstances (Moravcsik 1997: 521).

By applying liberal theory of international relations to the nuclear decision making of a country, the preference of a country to go nuclear or not could be examined. This study engages with the source of a preference of a country which is coming from the public opinion, economic priorities, institutional and government preferences and also from the kind of representation it has.

Figure 7: Liberal Preference Theory



South Africa

For example, let us consider the case study of South Africa. South Africa is the only country which has made nuclear weapons and has decided to give it up in 1990. Realist studies often say that reduced security threat with the dissolution of Soviet Union influenced the decision of South Africa to give up its nuclear weapons. The reasoning of De Klerk generally accepted the realist sentiment, as he mentions:

Under the circumstances, the retention of nuclear capability does not make sense-if we ever had in the first place-and had become an obstacle to the development of international relations. I accordingly decided to dismantle our capability (BBC 1993a).

However, several other arguments were made to counter realist explanations by stating that there were other technical problems which were faced by the South Africa such as the failure in delivering bombs and impracticality of the state in developing nuclear weapons. Also, it was regarded as a move which will be a ‘suicidal attempt’ on the part of it (Long and Grillot 2000: 29). However, evidence suggests that South Africa does have a technical capability to develop bomb. It is stated ‘evidence suggests that South Africa has developed a significant nuclear explosive capability which is explosive and compelling (National Intelligence Estimates 1964:4). Therefore, the argument pertaining to technological capability does not fit well.

The South African government’s decision to develop or not to develop nuclear weapons came from the preferences of the South Africa to go nuclear or not. The work on nuclear weapons was mainly carried out by the ‘white government’ or apartheid government. The nuclear issues or foreign policy issues were hardly debated by the public. Therefore, it was basically the preference of the then government of South Africa to go nuclear. The factors which shaped the preference of South Africa’s government were international isolation.

Due to the domestic policy of apartheid, the government of South Africa faced international isolation which was clearly seen at the UN where no member supports South Africa. The UN members were divided on South Africa’s regime into two parts: the first is ‘militia’ which mainly consists of the Communist bloc. They want direct action on South Africa. The others are ‘moderates’ consisting of the western states which opted for the legalistic approach. This international isolation resulted in

reserve dropping of 37 million pounds and withdrawal of some industrial investments (Barber 1990: 53).

Therefore, during this period the development of nuclear weapons could be a way to end isolation and to win international attention. Nuclear weapons could be seen as a means to provide international status symbol and will provide the white regime with aura and legitimacy (International Peace Academy Report 1988: 79). In addition, it is important here to note that South Africa was internationally isolated during this period due to its apartheid policies. There were restrictions imposed on South Africa with regard to conventional weapons. South Africa was dependent on foreign licenses and for obtaining spare parts for weapons production and maintenance. This became difficult to obtain owing to international sanctions. As a result, it was felt by the South African government that it is falling behind modernisation and will gradually fall behind the other industrialised country in the weapons (Moore 1988: 55). An October 1977 US Special National Intelligence Estimate attributed South Africa's decision to pursue nuclear weapons to the country's 'growing feeling of isolation and helplessness, perceptions of major military threat and desires for regional prestige but did not conclude that any country neighbouring South Africa posed a serious military threat, and desires for regional prestige' (Special National Intelligence Estimate 1974). Therefore, it considered it as important to develop nuclear weapons so as to face external threats (Stumpf 1999: 4). Second, South Africa government tried to win NATO and to get into an alliance system during the Apartheid. (Barber 1990: 57)

However, the preference of South Africa was changed as soon as apartheid government was replaced by African National Congress (ANC) which represents the public at large. The people of South Africa were fed up with the international isolation which affected them economically. The comprehensive survey was conducted in 1997 by Philip Nel and Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, which polled 3,500 South Africans of all races on their attitudes towards foreign policy issues. The survey found that the public considered domestic considerations— employment, crime, housing, and education—far more important than foreign policy issues such as trade policy, peacekeeping, and land mines, of which only a handful of respondents (almost all from high-income groups) considered as priorities (Siko 2014:56). The public at large were interested purely on the issues which are related to it- *i.e.*, economic issues

for which it was necessary for South Africa to open its doors to the world and to give up its nuclear weapons. Soon after the post-apartheid period, De Klerk appointed an expert committee to look into the benefits and liabilities of maintaining the nuclear deterrent and of joining NPT (Lieberman 2001: 73). The committee recommended terminating and completely dismantling the nuclear programmes. It was stated that similar kinds of sanctions as of Iraq could be imposed on South Africa ally, and therefore, it was beneficial to South Africa to give up nuclear weapons (De Villiers 1993). After the period of continuous isolation, the ANC party was willing to open up its relations with the international community and to give up the bomb. The policy of non-proliferation was the part of ANC since the beginning. As mentioned by Nelson Mandela, 'The ANC will abide by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We will fully support the declaration' (Albright 1998: 47). This case therefore clearly shows that the preference of a country has changed from nuclear to non-nuclear decision making.

North Korea

North Korea has a totalitarian government and one party system and therefore the preference has been framed by the government. The role of civil society is negligible as stated,

North Korea has no rule of law, no independent court system, no civil society, and no private institutionalized religion. It has no independent news media as a break on the abuses of the state, no independent political parties (other than the single legal party, the Workers or Communist Party), no freedom of expression, and no choice of competing candidates on the ballot for public or party office (Smith 2014).

The government of North Korea articulated the preference for nuclear weapons. The politics of North Korea took place within the framework of the official concept of *Juche*. The official principle of *Juche* was expressed in a speech given by Kim Sung titled 'Let us defend the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self Reliance and Self Defence more thoughtfully in all fields of State Activities.' He declared:

The government of Republic will implement with all consistency the line of independence, self-sustenance, and self defence to consolidate the political independence of a country (chaju), build up more solidly the foundations of an independent national economy capable of

insuring the complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation (charip) and increasing the country's defence capabilities so as to safeguard the security of the fatherland reliability by our own force (chawi), by splendidly employing our Party idea of Juche in all fields. (Kim 1990: 47)

Such a preference of North Korea was mainly due to the fact that despite all economic challenges⁶, North Korea still has a stable political system. It is mainly due to the issue of nuclear weapons, to which North Korean leaders have attached a great importance. In fact, North Korea has used nuclear weapons development to achieve the economic concessions and economic bargain at the international level.⁷ The Kim's has attached the greatest importance to Kim's Songun or 'military-first' system, which has not only strengthened its regime position but has also become his norm. The concepts of Songun and Juche (self-reliance systems) systems have been used to justify the nuclear weapons programme of North Korea. The nuclear weapons programme in Songun politics can allow the regime to spread an ideology, show a strong symbol and to meet its bureaucratic interests such as the access to more resources. It is often articulated that it is important to spread the programme of North Korea's nuclear weapons under the disguise of Songun politics so as to achieve the regime stability (Nakatani 2012). The nuclear programme give people of North Korea a sense of pride and reflect their nation as 'strong and prosperous' despite of the economic problems. Now, the North Korea has shifted its policy from Songun to *Pyongjin Line* , i.e. the strategic course on parallel construction of economy and nuclear weapons. According to the MOFA spokesman statement on 4 October 2014,

The DPRK's nuclear force serves a powerful treasured *sword* to protect the sovereignty of the country and the dignity of the nation and provides a sure *guarantee* for focusing efforts on preserving peace and security, building economy and improving the standard of the people's living. (KCNA, 2014)

Therefore, nuclear weapons have become the means of survival and legitimacy for the North Korean Political System.

⁶ The North Korean economy has been described as one of the most isolated and bleak economy of the world. It was completely bypassed by the economic miracles of the Asian subcontinent which brought economic prosperity to the countries like Taiwan and Singapore. The concept of Juche has cut down the foreign investment and has made North Korea's economy as bleak.

⁷ The Bush administration then negotiated a nuclear agreement with the North in February 2007 and even went as far as to remove North Korea from the state-sponsored terrorism list and to resume food aid in 2008, at the cost of straining the U.S. relationship with its closest regional ally, in Japan.

The denuclearisation question is not considered by North Korea because DPRK authorities have praised the atomic programme as one of the greatest achievements of Kim II-sung and Kim Jong-ill (Dalton 2012: 168). According to the text of the revised constitution, which was adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly in April 2012, North Korea was 19 a full-fledged "nuclear power," whose acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability was one of the greatest achievements of Kim Jong-II (Akihiko 2012). Kim Jong-un has, in fact, gained legitimacy from his family's legacy with the help of its nuclear accomplishment. He has established himself as the defender of the *juche* (self-reliance) ideology. Therefore, giving up nuclear weapons would mean giving away of such an ideology, which may cost to have an impact on his regime. The continuity of North Korean regime has resulted in continuity of its nuclear programme also since 1950s.

North Korea also faced a regime crisis after the death of the Kim death. As observed by one expert;

By 1993, North Korea was a country without a national strategy. To be more precise, it had a national strategy-the same one it always had-but this was almost completely irrelevant to the problems at hand. The pressing problem at hand is regime survival. (Ebertandt 1996: 14).

The North Korean regime is facing a threat of collapse due to economic reasons. Therefore, its leaders have considered the nuclear weapons as the insurance policy against the most pressing problem of regime survival. The North Korean leaders know that Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing will view the collapse or revolt within North Korea from different parameters if it does possess the nuclear weapons. A chaotic transfer of power within a state that possesses nuclear weapons cannot be ignored. If it is convinced that the regime of North Korea is about to collapse, the possession of nuclear weapons could be seen as a guarantee to gain support from the neighbour (Harknett1996:57).

South Korea

The preference of South Korea to build nuclear weapons was mainly due to the US withdrawal in the region⁸ (Synder and Lee 2012: 170), and is unable to explain the

⁸ The US suffered fiscal deficit during the Korean War. As a result, it tried to cut defence spending by withdrawing the armed troops stationed abroad. The US cut back its forces in South Korea also as South Korea stands as a biggest recipient of the US aid in the cold war. But South Korea lacked military to support itself. As a result, South Korea undertook a programme of "self-reliant national

current impasse in South Korea's decision making. Currently, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons, and South Korea has seen and experienced problems with the US alliance. Korean President Park Geun-hye warned in May 2014 that another nuclear bomb test by North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) would be "crossing a Rubicon" and would make it "difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring in this area." Moreover, it has the capability to build nuclear weapons (economic and technological) which was absent during the cold war period (Paul 2000: 134).

South Korea has seen the era of dictatorship during the cold war period and therefore the preference to build nuclear weapons was mainly framed by the individual leader. At that point of time, it has taken the decision to develop nuclear weapons. As reported in 1960, Kim II wished to develop nuclear weapons for South Korea. In November 1974, there were reports by the national Security Council that there are possible sales of Canadian nuclear reactor to South Korea. In July 1965, the US believes that the South Korean programme has reached to such a phase where it is important to 'approach the Koreans directly' (Yang 2011: 24). This clearly proves that South Korea does have intentions to build nuclear weapons when it was under dictatorship. The South Korea gave up its nuclear programmes in 1975 (Hersman and Peter 2006: 542), a period which is marked by political turmoil and agitations in the country. After coming of democracy, South Korea never took a decision to develop its nuclear weapons and rallied on the US nuclear umbrella despite the fact that North Korea went nuclear.

After the coming of democracy, South Korea focused its energies more on carrying out political reforms, combating corruption, improving the international competitiveness of Korean firms and formulating politically acceptable strategies for opening up the economy. This clearly means civil society preference for economic development. It deliberately avoided the nuclear question which involves the risk of targeting 'unification' of the Korean peninsula which is a major political issue (Park 1998:113). As a result, it continues to rally on the US nuclear umbrella despite a slowdown of its relationship with it. South Korean leaders deliberately prevented the

defense" but concluded that building a sufficient conventional deterrent would be expensive and time-consuming. In the early 1970s, therefore, a nuclear weapons programme began.

rise of North Korea's nuclear programme as the emergent threat which requires urgent military revamps in the post-cold war period.

The South Korean policy continues to rely on the three main pillars of (a) National Security: dependence on nuclear weapons (b) Economic Development (c) US alliance (Levkowitz 2013: 9). Such a policy carries no risks and therefore it is safe to follow in the context of political instability of the South Korea. There has been a sense of continuity in South Korean policy because it has been, so far, well-known in maintaining its autonomy since the cold war period. As mentioned by Prof Kang, 'Korea's foreign policy can be seen as historically successful, except for the period of Japanese colonial rule, because it could maintain its independence or at least its national autonomy.' South Korea's political establishments have found themselves safe in the US allied system despite some ups and downs in the relationship-whether economic or military (Solarz 1989: 3). On the other hand, the development of nuclear weapons could have serious ramifications which an instable political regime could not bear. Moreover, The US economic assistance was crucial for South Korea to recover from Korean War and has played an important role in economic growth in the 1960s (Williams 2004: 63).

It is also important to note that South Korea's foreign and defence policy can always be seen through the prism of the relations with North Korea due to which it was unable to pursue any other goals. The dependence of South Korea on the US was the source of economic as well as military assistance for the modernisation and expansion of South Korea's military forces (Heo and Roehrig 2014: 50). The slogan of South Korea was 'Construction first, Unification later' (Korea 1995: 50). Therefore, the best and the safest policy for South Korea were to bandwagon with the US which will give both the economic and military security. The American assistance alone transfers the image of South Korea from the kind of 'international beggar' to 'munificent nation.' In the post cold war period also, South Korea felt that there is no better policy other than to follow the American bandwagon so as to prevent nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula or to counter the threat of nuclear proliferation by North Korea (Tow 2009: 117).

In addition, it is important to note that the role of citizens and civil-society groups within the area of foreign policy is negligible. Foreign-policy issues are mostly

untouched by the development of the democratisation. Foreign-policy has mostly not been a matter of concern in electoral competition. The electorate was primarily concerned with the issue of economic development only (Jiyoon 2013: 2). Therefore, the country's President was mainly concerned with the issue of economic development. It is impossible even for South Korea to bring change in the mentality of the South Korea electorate and to bring major foreign policy changes such as the development of nuclear weapons due to an instable political system. For South Korea, the bandwagon with the US provided the safest answer for economic misery and also for nuclearisation of North Korea rather than opting for independence-both in an economic and nuclear sense.

India and Pakistan

India tested its nuclear weapons in 1974 under the Congress-led government of Indira Gandhi. However, India was not bold enough to declare itself as a nuclear weapons state. The non-nuclear preference was mainly due to the economic reasons. The possible reason for this was India's dependence on the US for food supplies (Kumar 2007). Years before the underground nuclear test, in February 1969, in the face of a question on the manufacture of the atomic bomb by India in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated that the core of India's security lay in industrial and economic strength and that India ought not to panic about the nuclear power of one of its next door neighbours (meaning China). She asserted, 'Let us not undermine the growth of our economy by diverting resources towards that end (i.e., the nuclear bomb)'.⁹ (Ministry of External Affairs Files 1969). Secondly, Nehru's wish to make India a non-nuclear weapon state and at the same time a technological superior country (Bingham 2012: 206). Therefore, Indira Gandhi followed the legacy of her father and decided not to declare India as a 'nuclear-weapon' state but instead pursued nuclear programmes for peaceful purpose. Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh called the American chargé d'affaires David T. Schneider to inform him that India had 'carried out peaceful nuclear explosion' two hours earlier. Singh explained that the PNE was necessary 'to keep India abreast of the technology...for such purposes as mining and earth moving' and that India

⁹ It is important to remember that Indira Gandhi won election in 1971 due to her popular slogan 'Garibi Hatao'. Her government faced economic problems due to Indo-Pak war of 1971 and oil shock of 1973. This was the reason for her prime focus on the economic front rather than laying stress on the development of nuclear bomb.

remained 'absolutely committed against the use of nuclear energy for military purposes' (Central Policy File: 1969)

However, the preference of India changed in 1998 when it declares itself as a nuclear weapon state. The coming of the BJP marked an important change which resulted in the declaration of India as a nuclear weapon state. BJP established itself in 1980s as a right-wing Hindu fundamentalist party in the Indian political spectrum. The political ideology of BJP is based on Hindu nationalism. The BJP along with the Jana Sangh have made the development of an Indian nuclear deterrence as the most important election issue and often cited it as a 'Hindu Bomb' as against 'Islamic Bomb' of Pakistan (Sharma 1998: 30). Previously, Congress continued to get support and BJP was unable to form a government. In 1984, BJP obtained only two seats in the 543 member lower house of Parliament. However, in 1998 election, it became the single largest party in the lower house with 180 seats, and it headed an eighteen party politically heterogeneous coalition government. The BJP strongly believed that nuclear tests would consolidate its political power and are capable of creating dramatic effects that could silence critics both inside and outside the coalition (Bidwai and Vanaik 1998: 51). BJP also exaggerated the nuclear weapons threat posed by China despite the fact that its relationship with China was not adversarial.

It has been stated that India decided to test nuclear weapons under the leadership of PM Narasimha Rao's government in 1995 (Richelson 2007: 431). However, the US satellites detected the preparations and put pressure on the Congress led government to not to test. In December the US government sends a demarche to the Indian government expressing 'grave concerns' about the possibility of a test in 1994. At that time, Ambassador Frabj Wisner met with the principal secretary of PM Rao, AN Varma, who showed him satellite images of the test site and warned that the test might 'backfire' against India. In mid-Dec, President Clinton called Rao and said that India would act 'responsibly'. Therefore, the various nuclear experts claim that link between the BJP led government and nuclear weapons is weak, because if the US satellites had not detected the preparations, the case would have been different. In contrast, it is not clear whether the Congress led government bend to the US pressure. The Congress led government's focus was mainly on the economic issues as Rao was conscious of the economic effects of the nuclear tests on India (Komireddi 2012).

Therefore, it is important to note that two dominating parties in India-BJP and Congress had marked differences over policies. The Congress stresses more on favouring economic policies and is credited for having 1991 liberalisation process while BJP is more marked by the aggressive nationalist stand and provocative foreign policies. The declaration of India as a nuclear weapon state was taken under the rubric of BJP in 1998. BJP was sure that such a thing will divide the history of India into 'pro-nuclear' period and 'post-nuclear' period giving all credit to BJP. Although, the act was widely applauded in media and public, the government, lost the next election due to economic reasons and the failed 'India shining' policy (Bagga 2013). Therefore, Congress government again tried to focus on economic policies and act smartly in linking the economic policy to nuclear issue in the way of India-US nuclear civil deal. It managed to secure a second term, mainly because of the Civil Nuclear Deal. However, it lost 2014 elections due to corruption and soft stance against Pakistan and China.

Similar, is the case of Pakistan where there are not only the changing democratic parties but also marked by changes from democratic to military takeover in every 5 to 10 years span time. The talks about Pakistan's nuclear weapons do appear in 1950s but the final decision to embark on the programme of nuclear weapons came in the wake of 1971 Pakistan's defeat and its division led to the formation of Bangladesh. The decision to build the bomb was taken in the Multan Meeting of 1972. Munir Ahmed Khan, the PAEC chairman said:

On 20th Jan 1972, he (Bhutto) called a meeting of the scientists in Multan and asked them how they could contribute towards the security of a country to meet not only a major conventional threat but also a looming nuclear challenge from India. At this gathering Mr Bhutto endorsed the idea of seeking nuclear capability for Pakistan and decided to completely reorganize the Atomic Energy in Pakistan.

The political party of Pakistan in power tries to gather support from the people by publicising anti-Indian sentiment and the need to strengthen itself by development of nuclear weapons. This is the reason for the Pakistan's continuous support of the nuclear weapons programme despite international pressure and economic hurdles.

Another case of the periodic shift in power having an impact on the nuclear weapons decision-making is the case of Argentina. The military rule of Argentina had

preference for nuclear weapons. Under military rule, the government pursued the nuclear weapons programme ¹⁰and also achieved the substantial economic progress (Paul 2000:105) . However, the course of the policy has changed over 35 years as the military government was replaced by the civilian government of President Raul Alfonsin. The civil government of Alfonsin adopted the policy of improving relations with the neighbouring countries of Brazil and Chile and therefore, decided to give up its nuclear weapons programme (Mares 2009: 7). The preference from nuclear to non-nuclear was mainly rooted in the economic aspects. The economic reasons of Argentina were also responsible for taking away of the nuclear weapons programmes. The economic problems forced the civilian government of Argentina to make budgetary cuts making it difficult to complete Argentina third nuclear reactor project. The financial problems resulted in shut down of the nuclear power plant and halted its nuclear construction projects. (Crinicole 2007: 80). After that, there are the periodic shifts in the Presidential power, as there are only two dominant parties. This led to the question that why has Argentina not adopted a policy on the development of nuclear weapons. The answer to this is firstly, Argentina represents a unique case where there is a two-party system at the presidential level, a predominant party system at the senatorial level and a party system of limited pluralism on the deputy level (Pareda 2006: 7) . All these parties exert pressures during decision-making at the presidential level, therefore, representing a kind of decentralisation where one factor cannot decide an outcome. Further, although there is the two-party system PJ and the UCR have alternated in the presidency accumulating more than 80% of the Senate and more than 70% of the lower house seats, PJ had scored more victories and registered a more stable performance and therefore, dominating the decision-making process resulting into continuity in foreign policy. Second, Argentina does not face any kind of threat from other which can be exaggerated or downplayed accordingly by the party in power. Their relations with Brazil are peaceful since the coming of the civilian government.

Taiwan interests in the nuclear weapons programme dates back to 1950 and many officials in Taiwan admitted of having a covert nuclear weapons programme during that period. Taiwan's nuclear weapons programme was so developed that US Central

¹⁰ The formal decision to develop nuclear bombs was never taken in Argentina. However, Argentina defended its right to develop any atomic technology, including weapons and refuse to ratify Treaty of Tlatelolco which bars nuclear weapons in Latin America and sign NPT.

Agency Officials believed that it could have built the nuclear weapons within five years (Huntley 2006: 194). According to the intelligence report, it is believed that the Government of the Republic of China initiated an ambitious programme for the procurement and operation of nuclear capabilities of Taiwan. (1) The report also states that the programme was the result of China's nuclear weapons programme. (3) (Special national intelligence estimate 1987). Taiwan's interest in the nuclear weapons programme was also influenced by the first nuclear test carried out by China. Taiwan doubted the US capability to defend Taiwan. President Chaing-kai-shek met with the senior embassy officials of the US and said that military actions should be taken against China's nuclear installations, urged for the formation of Asian anti-communist defence organization and possibly the formation of a common defence force (Department of State 1964: 2). Later, US pressure brought an end to Taiwan's nuclear weapons programmes and presently there are no nuclear weapons programmes currently being carried out by Taiwan (Alagappa 2008: 45). It is important to note that, non recognition as an independent state; Taiwan cannot be party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, there are no international restrictions imposed separately on Taiwan against its pursuit of nuclear weapons. China signed NPT treaty in 1971, and these safeguards are applicable to Taiwan also. Taiwan has also concluded a trilateral agreement with the US and IAEA and 'Programme 93+2 safeguards are applicable to it.

The Taiwanese preference changed after fall of KMT rule. Although, it has multi-party system, only two political parties are currently dominant in Taiwan- KMT and DPP. The nuclear weapons programmes basically reflect the KMT rule (Sutter 2013: 1). The first nuclear reactor of Taiwan was built during the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in 1956 who belongs to KMT (Albright and Gay 1998: 54). However, things begun to change after the death of Chiang Kai-shek. Although, Chiang Ching Kuo declared that Taiwan would not carry out the nuclear weapons programme, there were again statements about Taiwan's nuclear weapons programme in 1999 under Lee Teng Hui who belonged to KMT party (Stone 1999). However, the monopoly of KMT party was broken in 2000s when DPP came into being. Since then, there are no reports of Taiwan carrying out any nuclear weapons programme. DPP has adopted the policy not to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons.

Table 5: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Preference

South Africa	Changed preference from nuclear to non-nuclear. Presently a non-nuclear country
North Korea	Preference for nuclear weapons under totalitarian regime
South Korea	Changed preference from nuclear to non-nuclear
Argentina	Non-Nuclear preferences
Taiwan	Non-Nuclear preferences
India	Nuclear preferences.
Pakistan	Nuclear preferences

Conclusion

The above case studies and explanations clearly show that nuclear weapons decision-making of a state is clearly influenced by the domestic-political environment rather than external factors (US allies' commitments and security threats). Therefore, the realist and constructivist commitments to explain the decisions of a state to acquire nuclear weapons are somewhat inadequate and require re-examination. Obviously, this study is not a new one in explaining the role of domestic politics in the nuclear weapons decision-making of a country. However, the debate is that factors of domestic politics have been most influential for the study of the international relations and foreign policy, whether it is bureaucratic politics, public opinion or personality cult of the individual leader. The most famous attempts to study the role of domestic factors in the nuclear weapons decisions are done by Scott Sagan, Solingen and Jaques Hymes. But, these studies often forget the role of party politics and their dependence on various other domestic factors, which play an important role in their decision-making.

Also, the stress that only the US nuclear policy or that of extended deterrence played an important role in the decision-making is a faulty one. In fact, whether one accepts the 'allies system' of the US depends very much on the domestic politics and political party preferences based on domestic stability and instability. The party in power can

even make or unmake the norms accordingly and can even exaggerate and downplay threats faced by the country.

Therefore, the role of domestic politics is important for the study of the nuclear weapons decision making, and these factors are independent of the US policy of NFU, extended deterrence and non-proliferation. The next chapters analyse the case studies of France and Japan in detail to exemplify the role of domestic politics in the nuclear weapons decision-making. These two case studies are chosen carefully as France represented the case of a state which opted to develop nuclear weapons programmes despite being a member of NATO, and Japan represented the case from a state which chose to be non-nuclear despite the threats posed by China and North Korea.

Chapter 4

Nuclear umbrella and decision-making: Analysing the case of France

Introduction

The concept of extended deterrence has influenced the US nuclear strategy in a significant manner. The US has often stated that its nuclear weapons have played an important role in reassuring the allies, to reduce the incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons. And so, the adoption of No First Use (NFU) policy will reduce the credibility of US and will affect its commitment to convince the allies. It will further encourage states like Japan and South Korea to have their own nuclear weapons programme (Rhule 2009:12). The pertinent question is whether the first-use policy of the US has really prevented the proliferation among allies? For instance, France and Britain are the two states that have opted for nuclear weapons despite of enjoying the status of the US nuclear allies. However, the case of France is different from Britain because it has initiated its nuclear programme in peace time and it was remained oriented towards peaceful usage for almost a decade.

The other reason which makes the case of France interesting is the difference of approach between Britain and France regarding their nuclear weapons. While the British nuclear programme was focussed on allying with the USA so as to set the base for US nuclear defence in Europe; the nuclear programme of France became the symbol of independence and means to escape America's alliance system (Mendl 1965:40). Therefore, the question is why France opted for nuclear weapons despite enjoying nuclear umbrella of the US and despite the US first use policy of nuclear weapons.

4.1 Reasons behind France's nuclear weapons programme: The realist explanation

The realist theory offers explanation that why states develop their weapons. Classical realism has dominated the debate of nuclear proliferation since 1950s. This theory is based on the assumption that states are unitary actors who seek to maximise their power in order to survive in a competitive international system. States acquire nuclear weapons in order to protect their interests, since security represents the ultimate challenge to a state's survival (White 1996:45). On the other hand, Waltz said that

anarchic structure of state forces them to acquire nuclear weapons. The absence of a sovereign to provide order and arbitrate disputes force states to rely on themselves, referred by Waltz refers to as "self-help" (Walt 1993: 617). This compels states to seek and build their own power, over other states thereby defining their interests in terms of power. Though this pursuit of power can sometimes become an end in itself, it is mainly caused by the insecurity of states, condemned to existence in an anarchic international order (Waltz 1993:617). This explanation could be applied to the case study of France to explain why it opted for nuclear weapons.

According to realist theory, the France decision to develop nuclear weapons was mainly to escape from the threat of Soviet Union. As said by De Gaulle (1963):

With regard to defence, until recently the Americans, thanks to their nuclear weapons, were in a position to assure the free world almost complete protection, but they have lost this monopoly, while continuing at great expense to strengthen their power. Owing to the fact that the Russians also now have the wherewithal to destroy the world and particularly the new continent, it is quite natural that America is seeing its own survival as the principal objective in a possible conflict and is not considering the time, degree, terms and conditions of its nuclear intervention for the defence of other regions, particularly Europe, except in relation to this natural and primary necessity

The credibility of the US extended deterrence declined as soon as Soviet Union developed its nuclear weapons. According to this explanation, decision of France to develop nuclear weapons came due to event that occurred in Suez Canal. The crisis in Suez Canal forced France to withdraw from Suez under the pressure of the US after a nuclear threat from USSR. As mentioned by David Yost (1984) 'The Suez humiliation of 1956 was decisive as it was felt that a nuclear capability would reduce France dependence on the US and her vulnerability to the Soviet Union blackmail'. Soviet Union gave nuclear threats to Britain, France and United States and accused them of being 'irresponsibly and playing with fate of its own people....which puts in jeopardy the very existence of Israel as a state. The issue of the Suez Canal begins with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal crisis by Egyptian President Nasser, which was otherwise jointly operated by British and French enterprise so as to oppose the decision of the US to stop the fund of Aswan Dam (Klapholz 2000: 1). He declared:

The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian Joint Stock Company) is hereby nationalized. All its assets, rights and obligations are transferred to the nation and all the organizations and committees that now operate its management are hereby dissolved. (Decree of Gamal Abdel Nasser on the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company: 1956)

During that period, France was already dealing with the rebels of the Algeria and saw the loss of Suez Canal as a sign of the end of its colonial positions in Asia and Africa. France reacted to this by stating:

The Egyptian government unilateral decision on expropriation without notice and in violation of concessions of the Suez Canal Company, affects the rights and interests of many countries. The French Government shall maintain close consultation with other governments that affects immediately the serious situation created. These consultations will focus on all issues raised by the arbitrary decisions of government Egyptian and in particular on the navigation in the channel. The French government is taking all measures to ensure the protection and respect of nationals and French interests. (The French Foreign Ministry 1956).

The Suez Canal was strategically very important part at the time of crisis. Approximately 1.5 billion barrels of oil transit per day out of which 1.2 million barrels were meant for Western Europe. About two-third requirement of oil for Western Europe was full filled by Suez Canal (McDermott 1962: 137). Therefore, loss of a canal meant rise of oil prices for Europe. As a result, Britain France and Israel launched a combined attack on Suez Canal. The military and political leaders of these three countries met and framed The Protocol of Serves which stated:

The result of the conversations which took place at Serves from 22 to 24 October 1956 between the representatives of the Governments of United Kingdom, the State of Israel and France are as follows:

1. On the evening of 29th October 1956, the Israeli forces launch a large scale operation against the Egyptian forces with a view to reaching the Canal Zone the following day.
2. On ascertaining these events the British and French governments during the day of 30th October 1956 and simultaneously address to the Egyptian governments and Israeli governments two appeal following guidelines:

- A. To the Egyptian Government:
 - a. To cease all military action
 - b. To withdraw all troops to distance of 10 miles from the Canal
 - c. To accept temporary occupation of Anglo-French forces of key positions along the Canal in order to guarantee freedom of passage through the canal for ships of all nations until a final settlement.
- B. To the Israeli Government:
 - a. To cease all military action
 - b. To withdraw all its troops to the distance of 10 miles from the East of Canal (Protocol of Sèvres 1956)

However, the US had different goals, and it refused to cooperate with the allies. Instead, it forced withdrawal of the France and Britain.

The representative of Israel stated that his Government agreed to an immediate ceasefire, provided that a similar answer was forthcoming from Egypt. On the same day, the Egyptian Government informed the Secretary-General that it would accept the call for a ceasefire on the condition that military actions against Egypt were stopped. The Secretary-General immediately notified Israel, France and the United Kingdom of Egypt's position and called upon all four parties to bring hostilities to an end (UN 1957).

The withdrawal has been regarded as the end of great-power status of both France and Great Britain. During this crisis, the US actually turned against the French in UNSC and joined USSR in condemning the Anglo-French venture. It raised doubts in the minds among the French people that whether the US as an ally should be trusted (Wisda 1987: 31). For them 'it was a question of what the future held for France if she always had to bend to be atomic blackmail when French and American interests did not coincide' (Scheinman 1960:171).

The scholars like Avery Goldstein and others have insisted that the refusal of the US to help France in Indo China war led the French leaders to doubt the credibility of the US extended deterrence. However, this was not the case. The US refusal to internationalise the issue of Indo-China was a blow to French supporters of war and not to those who hold the power in France. In fact, Mendes's France actually caused the fall of the government by revealing the intention of bringing the US and atomic weapons in the conflict (Goldstein 2000: 192). As put by him:

In the absence of (peace) negotiations, talks you had a plan....that involved the massive intervention of American air power, risking Chinese intervention and general war. For facing disaster that one can no longer hide, the temptation is great to integrate them into a world conflict without pausing to consider the danger of major catastrophes, a sort of unconscious raising of the stakes in this infernal poker game where the fate of millions of human lives hangs in the balance...I do not know myself of any other case in which French government has taken such responsibilities in such a secrecy, and in such scorn of Parliament.

Therefore, Mendes France has never shown any disappointment over the decision of the US to not to intervene in the conflict. In fact, he believed that the US has shown much sense in handling the situation than its own government. Similarly, there is no logic why France would consider developing of nuclear weapons due to the Suez crisis as Britain was also forced to withdraw from Suez despite being the nuclear weapon state. Further, it is interesting to note that of all the states who doubt the US extended deterrence credibility (West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden) restrained their nuclear weapons programme. However, France was the only country to decide in favour of nuclear weapons (Hymns 2006: 182). The Soviet Union also said that it is capable of deploying nuclear armed missiles (Soviet Protests canal blockade 1956). To this, the Eisenhower also reacted, saying that:

The boys are both furious and scared. Just as with Hitler, that makes the most dangerous possible state of mind. And we better be dam sure that every intelligence point and every outpost of our armed forces is absolutely right on their toes. We have to be positive and clear in every step and word. And if those fellows start something, we may have to hit 'em-and if necessary everything in the bucket (Watery 2014: 34).

It was further stated that the Soviet Union threat may result into third world war. In view of the threat contained in the letter addressed by Marshall Bulgarian to the governments of UK and France, the French government to not exclude the possibility that an attack can be addressed by Soviet Union against both countries, in a way which is obviously impossible to foresee. It is essential that the US government should make known its attitude by confirming in a non-equivocal way that the provisions of the NATO would apply immediately after Soviet attacks directed against the United States ally.

The nuclear weapons threat to the France and Britain was done deliberately to seek the US interpretation. In response, the US forced its allies to have withdrawal from the region.

However, the realist explanation does not stand very well against the logic or evidence. The decision to develop nuclear weapons by France predated to the Suez Canal crisis which is clearly reflected in the decision taken by France to develop five years plan for atomic energy development. The major aim of this programme was development of large amount of plutonium which is generally meant for development of nuclear weapons. In fact, certain sections of military had started claiming for the need to develop nuclear weapons in 1954 only, even before the Suez Canal crisis (Central Intelligence Agency 1959: 3). In 1954, the councils of Defence Nationale sponsored a series of conferences on atomic problems and head of three services were consulted about an atomic national defence programme. In the same year of October, Comite des Explosifs Nucleaires was established by the military and its members were attached to CEA in the anticipation of atomic weapon programme (Zoppo 1962: 5). Prime Minister Mendes-France's decision to develop nuclear weapons under CEA dated to 1954 and decision to transfer funds to CEA for the development of nuclear weapons dated to 1955-much before the Suez Canal crisis happened. Further, it is interesting to note that the US credibility was quite robust in mid-1954 when France decided to develop its nuclear weapons. In mid 1954, the US adopted the policy of New Look¹¹, which means automatic, instantaneous and massive automatic reappraisals against Soviet incursions in West. As a part of this policy, the US asked France and other European States to host its nuclear weapons on their territory. According to NSC 162/2 which was the founding document of the doctrine, New Look Policy sought to combine a greater reliance on nuclear deterrent with the optimal deployment of alliances (The Executive Secretary 1953:10). The French perceived this as a major increase in the credibility of the US extended deterrence. However, they feared that the policy was so robust that it might provoke Russian attacks (Hymns 2006: 82). There were lot of political and strategic problems in the US New Look Policy. First, the Europeans were unhappy due to the prevailing

¹¹ The main elements of the New Look were: (1) maintaining the vitality of the U.S. economy while still building sufficient strength to prosecute the Cold War; (2) relying on nuclear weapons to deter Communist aggression or, if necessary, to fight a war; (3) using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to carry out secret or covert actions against governments or leaders "directly or indirectly responsive to Soviet control"; and (4) strengthening allies and winning the friendship of nonaligned governments

war scenario, as it would be under the harmful effects of radioactive materials. Second, it was not clear whether the US would use nuclear weapons to save the European cities when retaliation itself could put America in danger. As remarked by Gaulle, 'who can be sure that in the hour of peril...a President of the United States would...risk having New York or Chicago destroyed in order to save Hamburg or Copenhagen' (Fontaine 1972: 33). Therefore, the issue was not the loss of the US credibility but the fear of loss of France's influence in the Atlantic Alliance.

The realist explanation further argues that the experience of France in Indochina and Suez Canal as the reason behind its decisions to develop nuclear weapons. One of the reasons which are given for the decision of France to develop nuclear weapons is its defeat in Indochina war and its experiences in Suez Canal crisis (Meyer 1984: 121). Indo-china represented the most formidable challenge to France of all the colonies. During war, Japanese compelled the French colonial authorities to let them use the territory of Indochina for the military purposes. Later, Japan occupied it directly in March 1945. Later that year the empire of Japan collapsed and a nationalistic movement led by the Communist Ho Chi Minh (and aided by American government, which was highly critical of French imperial pretensions) took control over the country. In order to restore the colonial regime in the southern part of the country hostilities between France and the Viet Minh nationalistic movement escalated into full-scale war (Popkin 2001: 256). Both the sides (Indo-China and France) want the United States to interfere in the issue to their advantage. A letter was sent to the US by President Ho Chi Minh that:

From 1941 to 1945 we fought bitterly, sustained by the patriotism, of our fellow-countrymen and by the promises made by the Allies at YALTA, SAN FRANCISCO and POTSDAM. When the Japanese were defeated in August 1945, the whole Vietnam territory was united under a Provisional Republican Government, which immediately set out to work. In five months, peace and order were restored, a democratic republic was established on legal bases, and adequate help was given to the Allies in the carrying out of their disarmament mission.

But the French Colonialists, who betrayed in wartime both the Allies and the Vietnamese, have come back, and are waging on us a murderous and pitiless war in order, re-establish their domination. The security and order in the region can be established only with the help of the meditation of the other powers. (Ho Chi Minch 1945)

The US never replied back and rather opted to have policy of non-interference in the issue.

From 1945 to 1953, French troops from the professional army, and the foreign legion fought a frustrating struggle against the Viet Minh guerrillas. However, later US decided to give because of following reasons:

1. It is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.
2. The neighbouring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard.
3. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defence should prepare as a matter of priority a programme of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in Indochina (Office of the Historian 1950).

On May 1, 1950, President Truman approved the allocation of \$10 million to the Department of Defence to cover the early shipment of urgently needed military assistance items to Indochina (The Pentagon Papers 1956). However, American financial aid made the war completely unbalanced, and it proved to be a huge drain upon the resources of the French government. From 1948, French conceded the eventual freedom of Vietnam, recognising a native government headed by a non-communist regime (Popkin 2001: 256). However, the French army in its quest to restore its prestige and reputation in the area set a battle on a fortified outpost called as Dienbienphu in 1954 and determined to annihilate the guerrillas with their air power and artillery. In reference to , the Viet Minh's troops overwhelmed the French with the Chinese supplied cannons and forced the French army to surrender in May 1954 (Popkin 2001: 257).

As a result, of the defeat faced by France, it asked the US to provide more direct support especially with air power which the US refused. "The French pleaded for arms intervention...warning of ominous consequences to the war in Indochina and to Franco-American relations if nothing were done' (The Pentagon Papers 1971a) But

still Eisenhower and Dulles rejected the French proposal. Dulles advised the administration that because the security of the US was not directly threatened, there was no logic for the US to take such a political risk (George and Immerman 1984:359). The US favoured diplomacy at Geneva over unilateral intervention at Dien Bien Phu, even if it means sacrificing such interests which the US considered as most vital. The reason mentioned by Dulles to Eisenhower for non participation of the US in the Indo-China war, as:

If the United States send its flag and its own military establishment –land, sea or air-into the Indo-China war, then the prestige of the United States will be engage to a point where we want to have success. We could not thus effort to engage the prestige of the United States and suffer a defeat which would have worldwide repercussions (Office of Historian 1954).

After a month, a similar kind of issue was raised by the President Eisenhower, who said that ‘if we were to put one combat soldier into Indo-China, then our prestige will be at stake, not only in area but throughout the world’(Hagerty Dairy 1954)

After this, France clearly felt that by endowing nuclear weapons, they can accomplish great things without being dependent on its allies. Therefore, realist theory does not offer complete explanation regarding why France decided to develop nuclear weapons.

The way in which the war in Indo China affected the nuclear thinking of France is more in the indirect way than in the direct sense. After the war, there emerged the theory of revolutionary warfare, which saw the principle Russian threat to the West as a kind of outflanking movement via Asia, Africa and Latin America, rather than a direct cold war confrontation in Europe itself. After this, the attention of France was shifted to Algeria. That shifted the primary focus of the army to Africa and not in Europe. It was felt that the vacuum was created in Europe, which can be filled by nuclear weapons only. The other effect of this war was the loss of morale on the side of armed forces due to the repeated defeat of army in the war. 'The military felt seriously out of touch with the nation and unable to exercise its civil prerogatives; a genuine inferiority complex has set in' (Kelly 1960: 293) It was also noted by the US. ‘That a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien Phu the morale of the French Union received a severe blow (The Pentagon Papers 1954). It was felt that nuclear weapons

will help to raise the moral of the armed forces. Therefore, these events do play an important part in triggering the nuclear decision making of France, but these are not in the terms of lack of credibility of the US.

This research will consider the various international and domestic factors which are responsible for the development of France's nuclear weapons. The factors are independent of the US nuclear weapons policy or its policy of extended deterrence.

4.2 France and Nuclear Weapons: The other approach

France quests for nuclear weapons were influenced by the preferences of the state. In fact, to a large extent the nuclear policies of France was shaped by the preferences of a state to not to adopt nuclear weapons. However, it is important to mention that people at large were not interested in analysing the foreign affairs of the country. As mentioned by Kulski (1966: 64):

The French public takes hardly any interest in foreign policy. Domestic problems, in particular those relating to the standard of living, attract the attention principally....Beside, the public is inadequately informed on foreign problems and is hardly capable to follow their complex and rapid evolution....The population taken as a whole.....reacts emotionally rather than intellectually, conditioned as it is by education, traditional myths and instinctive preferences. Moreover, it manifests its existence only intermittently and makes itself known at difficult moments. On the one hand, an active opinion is represented by a small number of men who keep themselves informed and follow the development of problems, reflecting, criticising, predicting, working out programmes of actions and proposing solutions. This minority is based of high officials, journalists, publicists, politicians and businessman. It acts through the press or by forming pressure groups. The press did not represent the interest of the general public but reflects this minority, which wants to influence general public by their opinion.

The people were largely concerned with only the domestic problems which affect them directly.

As a result, when it comes to the question of whether France should have nuclear weapons, most Frenchmen were concerned about the financial difficulties in carrying out such a programme. The percentage of people who doubted such was 45 percent and only 29 percent of people thought that France could pay the cost of nuclear

weapons (Kulski 1966: 66). Similarly, when asked whether France should become a big power at international level, 42 percent said yes, 42 percent was satisfied with a more modest place at an international place, and 16 percent expressed no opinion (Kulski 1966: 65). Therefore, while Frenchmen have the ambition to achieve world powers they were not very positive in the development of the nuclear weapons programme which will impose more costs and burden on them. As a result, the scientific community and politicians at large decided in favour of a peaceful nuclear programme which would help France to industrialise and to raise its status at the international level.

The few public opinion polls were conducted to judge the people's views on the nuclear weapons programme. One such poll was conducted in 1946 in which the pollsters simply asked 'Should France have its own nuclear weapons?' Given the experience of France in war and given the efforts to write the history of France - more than half of the responders replied 'yes.' Still, the third of the responders replied 'no.' In 1956, the question was changed little bit, and it was asked 'As you know, France conduct atomic science research but does not build atomic bomb. Do you think that France should develop atomic bomb? The majority of people here said 'NO' and the reasons for their reluctance for the development of nuclear weapons were 'we have no money, it would mean wastage of money and levy new taxes.'" 'If it is made, it would be used against our neighbour and same i did not agree.' Those who were in favour of atomic bomb gave reasons associated with the question of prestige. After the Reggan test, a poll was conducted asking 'Do you think France should have its own force de frappe?' The issue here was not a single boom but complete nuclear arsenals. The answer here was yes. However, later the number weaned out. The results of public polls are described below Table 5

Table 6: France public opinion on nuclear weapons (Hecht 1998: 243).

	Yes (%)	Nos (%)	No Answer (%)
Jan 1946	56	32	12
Jan 1955	33	49	18
July 1956	27	51	22
Dec 1957	41	28	31
July 1958	37	38	25
March 1960	67	21	12
July 1962	39	27	34
Jan 1963	62	31	27
July 1963	37	38	25
Aug 1963	34	37	29
Nov 1963	39	37	24
April 1964	39	40	21
Jan 1967	23	50	27

It is important to note here that every time, 20-30% of people choose not to respond to nuclear questions. The possible reasons were indifference and confusion. Therefore, polls were also conducted to see how well the public is informed about nuclear weapons. In 1949, 36% of the people gave answers and fit into the category of well-informed and in 1957, these figures dropped to 18%. This shows that people were not well informed when the decisions were taken to explode the atom bombs (Hecht 1998: 244). In 1957 -58, it was questioned that how French thought of its atomic energy. The question asked was when you hear of atomic bomb, what uses came into your mind?(Hecht 1998: 255) The answers given are mentioned below:

Table 7: France's Public Opinion on possible use of nuclear weapons (Hecht 1998: 246).

Bomb, Weapons	35%
Destruction, War	20%
Energy Source	17%
Peaceful Uses	14%
Industrial Uses	10%
Medical Uses	7%
Scientific Uses	3%
Interplanetary Uses	3%
Means of Transport	3%
No Response	13%

If classified, the educated, professional and industrialists gave the answer of peaceful uses of energy. Women gave answers of weapons, destruction and war or choose not to respond. The same poll also tried to find out how the French compared civilian and military uses of energy. The questions asked were whether it is more urgent for France to intensify the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy or to proceed with nuclear weapons (Hecht 1998: 246). The answers given are mentioned below:

Table 8: France's public opinion on possible use of nuclear weapons (Hecht 1998: 247).

Peaceful Uses	64%
Weapons	15%
Both	3%
Did not know	18%

Those who opted for peaceful uses of nuclear energy mentioned that 'It is better to work for peace than for war.' 'French had always been a peaceful nation', 'for better living conditions economic independence; great industrial development is important

which will make France a great power.' Those who said yes for weapons mentioned about getting equal status and respect at the international level.

It is important to note that Frenchmen at large were concerned about the economic problems of the state and therefore, were against the development of nuclear weapons at large. The economic problems of France's shaped the preference of civil society to not to develop nuclear weapons they were also ignorant of the atomic energy and its uses. However, given the fact that atomic energy programme will raise the level of industrialisation and thus its economic status, it was later supported by the people at large. Furthermore, it was the educated class and professionals who were more interested in development of nuclear weapons. As a result, the government decided to link the development of nuclear programmes to modernisation, industrialization and raising the status of France at international level. This can be termed as a way of the French government influence in changing the preference of the civil society in favour of nuclear weapons.

France started its nuclear programme under CEA mainly for the peaceful uses whose energies will be devoted to industrial and technological advancement. As mentioned in French Nuclear Programme of 1964:

In its early stages, the French nuclear energy programme was directed towards peaceful uses, but about 1954, certain factions of French military were claiming that France needed nuclear weapons to establish adequate strength for national defence. France had reached upto a point in its economic and technological advancement by 1956 whereby the actual development of nuclear weapons became feasible.

Therefore, prime motive of CEA was to develop peaceful nuclear programme which could boost industry and economy of a country. It is important to consider the fact that after the Second World War, France faced lot of economic problems and instability of regimes. For people at large, it was significant for France to develop economically and to take an important part in the affairs throughout the world. As a result, the stress was earlier on the peaceful development of nuclear energy rather than on the military uses of nuclear weapons, which caused additional tax burdens on the people at large. Here, the technological development of France was also related with the concept of grandeur, which will restore the lost glory of France in the international affairs and would establish France as one of the great powers.

The people of France were devastated by the economic problem and military defeat after the Second World War.

Therefore, the nationalism of France has been particularly self-conscious owing to recurrent struggle for identity in its face of defeat, partition and occupation by enemies during the past hundred years. The defeat in war is always followed by the new regime which promised to restore the lost pride of the nation. However, the French people felt betrayed by the promises made by the regimes.

As a result, the insecurity of the Frenchmen along with the political instability has resulted into patriotic feelings becoming inseparable from the support or rejection of a particular regime. The state is seen as having a specific role to play in world affairs and is always on trial. The people of France wanted state to play a role in the international affairs, and it is always an ally or an enemy in the eyes of different sections of society, but never a neutral or an isolated being. Some Frenchmen may judge it in accordance with the economic and military interests, some may judge it in accordance with the ideological pursuits, and others may demand that France should have political role to play in the outside world.

Besides this, World War II led France to question the foundations of their economic and military life. France at large felt that military performance was in abysmal, and it was mainly due to economic weakness of France. The condition was due to the 'malthsians' who run the industries throughout the Third Republic. These men tried to preserve the status quo of the country, and therefore, the economy has stagnated, and French industries had fallen behind the German counterparts. The solution for this was rethinking the role of the state in directing the economy (in general) and in directing industrial, scientific and technological development (in particular). By modernisation and expanding, the industry, the state would accomplish the dual aim of restructuring economy and restoring France to its rightful place among the ranks of a great nation.

Therefore, in order to achieve France's radiance at home, and abroad it was realised that it is important to develop a nuclear energy programme of France. Gilliard has mentioned in a radio broadcast that:

Those nations which did not follow a clear path of atomic development would be 25 years hence, as backward

relative to the nuclear nations of that time as the primitive people of Africa were to industrialised nations of today. (Hecht 1998: 62)

The nuclear energy provided two main advantages. First, it proved the technological capabilities of France abroad and second, resulted into overall industrial and scientific development of France thereby improving the economic conditions of France.

The importance of such a technical power was easily grasped by the French scientists and various other experts. In articles based on lectures and modernisation plans, experts' repeatedly linked the technical development of France with its radiance. Industries, scientists and technological development would not only lead to economic upliftment but will also restore the place of France in the international affairs (Hecht 1998: 63). At the end of the Second World War, Fedric Jolliot-Curie and Raul Dauts convinced De Gaulle that a nuclear programme would elevate the status of France within the world and will accelerate the industrial and technological developments of the France. De Gaulle said that 'We are in the epoch of technology. A state does not count if it does not bring something to the world that contributes to the technological progress of the world.' Following the recommendation of De Gaulle, the National Assembly approved the creation of CEA in 1945. However, the stress to date was only on the peaceful uses of atomic energy rather than the military usage of atomic energy. (Hecht 1994: 665)

The other reason for the focus on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was the communist affiliations of CEA creating problems both at abroad and at home. It is important to remember that CEA began its life as a post-resistant institution, the product of the common vision of wartime communists resistant's and Charles de Gaulle. These communists' affiliations of CEA proved embarrassing for France and was severely criticised by the US. In April 1950, Fedric Curie mentioned that he would never opt to build nuclear weapons as it will target Soviet Union. Later, Fedric Curie was dismissed by PM Bidault in late April (Hecht 1998: 168)

Later, the CEA committee decided to adopt five-year plans (1952-1957) and accordingly build two reactors powered by natural uranium and moderated by Graphite. Gaillard decided to take this matter to Parliament for approval. He warned that nations without nuclear energy will be as backward as the primitive societies of Africa. However, the communist's deputies felt that Gaillard was hiding its military

agenda, which was otherwise embodied in the proposal. On the other hand, right-wing parties felt that France might need a bomb in a future to 'safeguard its independence and security' and therefore, they also decided to vote against this amendment. Gaillard, managed this problem diplomatically. He said that France could rule a bomb priori. He assured the right that plutonium production will take place in a separate division of CEA and should subject to special security measures. He also said that the cost of building one nuclear bomb would be ten times more than the funds he has requested. After this, both the parties were satisfied and decided to vote in favour of this amendment (Hecht 1998:169)

Three main things come in this analysis. First, the people of French were devastated by the previous defeat and need to improve their condition for which development of nuclear energy would prove fruitful. Secondly, French people were longing to achieve their status in world affairs for which development of nuclear energy became necessary. Thirdly, there were political problems associated with either denial or acceptance of a military programme of nuclear energy. Therefore, political parties kept this question open and decided to focus for the development of nuclear energy for the peaceful purpose only.

Furthermore, it is important to note here that in 1950s, the French nuclear policy was not made by the people in power or by the government officials. The political instability of the fourth Republic made it to preclude the deep consideration of the nuclear policy. As a result, the heads of the state, the government officials gladly allowed the state technologists to make the nuclear policy of France. There were two branches of the atomic programme of France, which were in a constant struggle with each other over various scientific matters, therefore, making it difficult to reach any kind

France's Quest for Grandeur

The France's quest for its grandeur was clearly manifested in its colonial policy, which is sometime referred as a 'colonial grandeur.' In contrast to Britain, the quest of France for colonisation was much focused on the gain of its grandeur as against the material and political gains. As said by Giradet:

Colonisation is a nation's expansionist force, it is power of reproduction, it is its expansion (dilation) and

proliferation across space, it is the submission of the universe or a large part of it to its language, its morals, its ideas and its laws. A nation that colonise is one that lay foundation of its future grandeur and supremacy..... (Notwithstanding where one stands intellectually and philosophically) here is an indisputable truth: the nation that colonise the most is the foremost nation; if it is not today, it will be tomorrow (Charbonneau 2008: 52).

It is important to note here that French colonisation did help France economically from the period of 1880-1930 when French was modernising its economic structures. However, after 1930s and particularly after the Second World War, French capitalism was retreated from the colonial market, and public investments took over by the private investments. Besides this, the economic expansion and importance to the empire for the French capitalism did not apply to sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, it seems that French colonialism has more to do with the concept of grandeur rather than getting economic benefits from the colony (Charbonneau 2008: 52). As mentioned by Stanley Hoffmann's:

No economic drive explains the spread of French colonisation. France exported little capital to her colonies and was much concerned with their economic development. France's colonisation was not much concerned with their economic development. France's colonisation was triple: military, peasant and administrative. The French civil servant rather than merchant become the symbol of French rule. France would not easily disengage from an empire acquired as a means towards rank and as a way of spreading France's universal values, rather than as a source of wealth; an empire subjected to the French instinct of centralisation, applied to areas where central authority found or brooked no limits to its command (Cerny 1980: 76).

The analysis of Henri Brunschwig also state that the motivation of the British imperialism might be economic but this cannot be applied in case of France. French overseas expansion resulted from prestige rather than their search for economic interests. The argument that the French imperialism is influenced by economic interests is nothing more than a myth. 'The real cause of French colonial expansion was the spread of nationalist fever, as a result of events which took place in 1870 and 1871' (Dreifort 1991: 3) .

The other possible reason of colonisation was to spread the cultural values and language of France to other parts of the globe. As mentioned by Rosenblum 'France

did not colonize, it civilised' (Charbonneau 2008: 82). The Republicans followed the tradition to make France a place that embodies liberty, equality, fraternity, human rights and civilisation in the context of colonial expansion. France's embodiment as the Republic with all its virtues, its great history and also claims to have revolutionised the world had remained unquestioned. France believed that those who are not French could only wish to become so. In other words, colonies wish to become 'French' and were the manifestation of France's successful civilisation mission.' As mentioned by Jaures in 1884:

When we take possession of a country, we must bring the glory of France with us. And be sure that it is welcome, for it is as pure as it is great, filled as it is with justice and goodness. We can tell these peoples, without any trickery, that we have never harmed anyone voluntarily or harmed their brothers; that from the outset we have brought the liberty of whites to men of colour, and have abolished slavery. Where France goes, she is loved. She is missed in the places she passes through. Everywhere her lights shine, she has left behind a long and sweet evening where gazes and heart remain attached (Blanchard et al 2014: 36).

Therefore, French policy is always characterised by the cultural element which puts cultural values-their protection, development and extension before a search for economic and political power. The idea was that France was one of the leading nations around the world and was the centre of western civilisation which possessed the special mission to civilise the remote and isolated areas of Africa, the Far East, the Caribbean (Blanchard et al 2014: 12). Even such views were put forwarded by the De Gaulle. De Gaulle considers that control over the colonies is the best way to establish the political legitimacy of France. After the war, he was convinced that only by maintaining its presence in the colonies. France could regain her rank among the major powers of the world. He said 'For us, in a world like this and with things that are, to lose the French Union would be a reduction that could cost to our independence (Blanchard et al 2014: 7).

De Gaulle further stressed the importance of French colonies towards the maintenance of preserving the unity and integrity of France. De Gaulle maintained that France has not yet defeated as long as she maintains a large colonial empire, despite the occupation on the part of its metro pole by the military forces of the continental enemy. De Gaulle argued that as long as major portion of the national territory

remained within the hands of France, it should continue to struggle. As he mentioned in a speech on 18th June 1940: 'France is not alone! She has a great empire behind her. Together with the British Empire, she can form the bloc that controls the sea and continue to struggle' (Dreifort 1991:220). He further said that there should be a role for France in the creation of new balance of power- a role that can be achieved only when France retains its colonies. Dreifort (1991) further mentioned:

It is perfectly clear to me that in order to conduct such a policy in Europe, we must have our hands free from the seas. If the overseas territories detach themselves from the metropole, or if we allow our forces to become hung up there, how much will we count for between the North Sea and the Mediterranean? Should they, or the contrary, remain associated with us, why then the way should be open for our action on the continent-secular destiny of France!

Therefore, the unity between the metro pole and colonies was a prerequisite for achieving the rank of France among the world and for the preservation of France's grandeur.

Algeria was one of the important colonies for France which it obviously did not want to lose. As Philip Naylor pointed out:

France often identified its power and potential, its grandeur and independence, in relation to Algeria. This profoundly differentiated Algeria, even with its obvious strategic geopolitical significance, from the metropole's other overseas territories. Algeria particularly appealed to France's imagination of itself as a great power, an acutely sensitized national identity (Naylor 2000: 12)

Therefore, loss of Algeria was a big blow to the community of France as people in France at large did not wish to compromise Algeria. The French public too wished to take control over the colonies. Fourth Republic, reflecting the sentiments of the people at large, tried to take hold of the colonies and to state off decolonisation. However, it failed in its mission, and colonies gained independence (Nuelist et al 2010: 18).

The colonisation policy of France explained above has two main features. The first is to maintain grandeur and second was to spread French ideas abroad to achieve national integration later. However, this policy of France failed and all its colonies achieved independence. Even the most important colonies of France achieved

independence, like, Indo-China and Algeria. After independence of Algeria, France thought it was important to depict itself as a strong power but logical enough to grant independence to Algeria (Gaulle 1972: 21). Therefore, it decided to develop nuclear weapons, which will not only preserve its grandeur but will also depict France as a great power.

Therefore, there were also profound changes in the international system by the end of World War II, which threatened the power and prestige of French empire. The locus of power of the international system shifted from Europe to two superpowers: the US and Soviet Union. At the same time, the host of smaller states was asserting claims upon the attention of large powers through the establishment of United Nations. All these factors affect the power and prestige of France. Previously, France played an important role on the international affairs and dominated the affairs of the small neighbours. Suddenly, she found herself under the rank of modest continental power in the world systems dominated by the two giant peripheral states. France wished to mediate in the affairs of East and West, but that did not happen. Therefore, France sought to acquire nuclear weapons programme to raise its stature in international relations.

The decision of the France to develop nuclear weapons has been influenced in part by the Algerian crisis. The De Gaulle was faced with two main problems after coming into power. The one was the Algerian problem, and the other was the nuclear question of France. The fourth Republic offered development of nuclear weapons test but could not implement it due to the Algerian crisis (Kolodziej 1993:394). The Frenchmen at large did not want to lose Algeria, which stands as an important colony for them (Silverstein 2004: 44), and also they were against the development of nuclear weapons. France has invested 2 billion dollars in Algeria and 90,000 Frenchmen were living in Algeria. Beside this, France has important bases in Algeria, like the Sahara where the nuclear testing was planned. On the other hand, De Gaulle wants to develop nuclear weapons to make France independent and to gain international status, and he wants to solve Algerian problem to gain international status. The main aim of the de Gaulle was not to hit the morale of the armed forces which was all-time low during the war in Indo-China and other colonial pursuits. De Gaulle wants a negotiated settlement, but at the same time it should not be at the cost of military failure. He mentioned that 'in Algeria the French army has fulfilled its task with courage and

honour.' Further, he mentioned that there are three main tasks. First, the French forces must be equipped to fight in 'our time' and especially be equipped with nuclear weapons. Second, given the globalisation of conflict, the French forces must concentrate on whole region rather than on one part on the world. Thirdly, the forces must assume 'our immediate defence' and thus be based on home territory (Rynning 2002:34). Therefore, nuclear forces are to play an important part in the development of three major important factors in the defence of France.

As a result, the non-nuclear preference of the civil society began to change. As Strasbourg said that 'De Gaulle plan was to give the fractious child a shiny toy to keep it quiet namely the nuclear weapons- and then to press the quiet child to behave and use its toy in a certain way-De Gaulle way.' The aim and motive of De Gaulle was to make the military of France a disciplined force and to minimise the civil-military clash by development of nuclear weapons. It would serve another purpose of showing in the world, and to Frenchmen itself that the end of Algerian crisis was not due to the failure of the France military or due to its defeat. De Gaulle overwhelmed the nuclear decision by taking a lot of legislative powers in its own hand to curb the political and public opposition to nuclear weapons and too pursue its own ambitious programme.

Another reason behind the development of nuclear weapons was the conflict of the international community over limited resources to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear programme which again framed the nuclear preference of a state. It is a well-known fact that conflict will occur once there are different fundamental beliefs, conflicts over scarce material resources and inequalities in political power. France at that time faced all the above-mentioned problems and was at conflict with the US and was therefore inclined to develop nuclear weapons.

Coming first to ideological conflicts, the US and France had different views of colonies, of NATO and its role and also to the role of nuclear weapons. This difference of opinion was clearly reflected in Suez Canal crisis and Indo-China crisis. The French government perceived Suez Canal crisis not just an issue limited to an area but an attempt by Nasser to restore balance of power within the region. French also considered Nasser as responsible for assisting the anti-colonial uprising in Algeria (Risse 1995: 85). Therefore, France and Britain did not hesitate to use force in the area. On the other hand, the US objected to the use of force in the area until and

unless Egypt interferes in the navigation of canal or did not threaten foreign nationals. (Risse 1995: 152,153). Charles Kupchan rightly said that France saw its post-world war role as a great power inextricably linked to preserving a modernised version of the old empire. In his words

France's war in Indochina was driven, first and foremost, by a powerful strategic image equating the autonomy and sovereignty of the metropole with the preservation of imperial commitments. As the overseas territory most threatened by nationalist resistance, Indochina emerged as the litmus test of French power in the postwar era. French elites saw in Indochina the opportunity to rebuild the domestic legitimacy of the state. Imperial success would restore public confidence in the discredited institution of governance. The defence of Indochina thus become associated with the independence and autonomy of France itself (Kupchan 1994:278)

On the other hand, France maintained that the US colonial policy is double faced. France maintained that 'the US is against all colonialism, except its own.' France also suspects that the US is making its colonial policies in order to gain access to certain bases. This shows clear cut differentiation between the US and France over the colonial issues. Similarly, the two diverge on the issues of role of NATO. France wants the role of NATO and scope to be extended to other regions also like Asia, Africa, etc. while the US wants to limit its position to only Europe. These ideological differences showed that the interests of France, the US and NATO collide with each other leading France to gain access nuclear weapons to gain independence from the US.

4.4 Political Inequality in NATO

There was also clash of preferences between the US and France leading to conflicting situation which in turn moved France to develop its nuclear preference. Coming to the issue of political inequality, France was treated unequal as compared to position of Britain in NATO. France realised that it was treated as a secondary power as compared to Britain in its dealings with NATO. France felt that although it has accepted the nuclear weapon's dependence on the US, but it should have a right to consult in the nuclear matters as one of the three principal members of the alliance. France felt it as treated as a secondary power even though it was one of the principal powers in the making of the nuclear weapons during war time effort. France also proposed to introduce a tripartite alliance system which will consist of the US, UK and France. Such a system will help in coordination and direction of the global

policies in the west, will give France an equal power in comparison with UK and the US and would provide a role for France outside the context of the US. However, the proposal was not accepted and De Gaulle declared:

Paris liberated, liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of armies of France, with the support and help of the whole of the France, of France that is fighting, of France alone (Davies 2001: 71).

Therefore, France felt that it is necessary to develop independence outside the framework of NATO and therefore to develop an independent atomic policy of France. However, France faced a problem again as the US refused to help France in its nuclear matters as it has done with Britain due to its non-proliferation policies and also due to inherent political instability in France. France again felt a biased treatment and also felt that it needed to struggle to get hold over the scarce resources required for making nuclear weapon. The basis of such a biased treatment was the MacMohan Act which states that information on the development of nuclear weapons will be provided to only those governments which have manifested the achievement of substantial progress in the development of nuclear weapons (US Atomic Energy Commission 1965). For France, this was an inequality, and it did complain.

France was completely isolated, kept ignorant of the important achievements made by the Anglo-Saxon countries under the stimulus of a gigantic war effort. These countries had a monopoly over the supply of uranium-as far as the west was concerned and moreover most of the results of their scientific research and the major portion of the technical development. The US and Britain met with each other in 1957 in Bermuda to discuss the issue of nuclear cooperation with other countries. On 23rd March 1957, they both agreed with a policy of non-cooperation on military nuclear programmes of France and West Germany (Ellis 2009: 18). According to resulting top secret note:

(t)he two ministries agreed that three possible courses of action were opened to them:

(1) To join together in opposing the development of a nuclear military programme in France or in any other 'fourth' country.

(2) To associate themselves either jointly or separately with any French or Franco/German programme in order to be able to influence it; or

(3) To adopt a neutral attitude of neither actively assisting not actively hindering any such French nor joint Franco/German plan (Office of Historian 1957: 9)

The two ministers agreed that they were not in favour of the French plan as reported to them, but that it would in present circumstances be impolitic to oppose them too definitely, since to do so might arouse nationalist feelings and create political difficulties.

The Ministers also agreed that it would be difficult for either of their two governments to associate themselves at all closely with these plans, both for reasons of policy and of security. Finally it was agreed that in present conditions the best course would be for both Governments to adopt a very cautious policy with regard to these plans and to do very little by way of encouraging or assisting. It was further agreed that the two governments would keep in touch with each other on this matter through the diplomatic channel (Office of Historian 1957: 11).

Later, the US did repeal the atomic act but has mentioned about the substantial clause framework to keep the act limited to only helping UK. This clause mentioned:

The cooperating nation must have achieved considerably more than a mere theoretical knowledge of atomic weapons design, or the testing of a limited number of nuclear weapons. It is intended that the cooperating nation must have achieved a capability of its own for fabricating a variety of atomic weapons, and constructed and operated the necessary facilities, including weapons research and development laboratories, weapons manufacturing facilities, a weapons testing station, and trained personnel to operate each of these facilities (US Congress House 1958).

These clauses were inserted to not to help France for the development of nuclear weapons. The US actually tried to eliminate the need to develop nuclear weapons of France by offering the stationing of NATO nuclear weapons and state that it will be the policy of the US to supply nuclear weapons to France and also an adequate means to deliver them. However, France was not interested in this as the order to use nuclear weapons will remain in the hands of the US of which France was not really interested.

The US has again made the access of the uranium difficult for France as the uranium stores were mainly under the control of the US and UK. The US also secured the right to Congolese uranium stores by making contact with the Belgium government

according to which Belgium has no right to sell uranium to third parties without consulting the US. France was not able to secure an agreement with Canada due to issues related to pricing. Furthermore, there were objections by the US government over the construction of an isotope plant. As a result, France faced difficulty in gaining access to scarce resources which in turn increased its determination to develop nuclear weapons.

What caused France to take decisions to test nuclear weapons only in 1965?

The above analysis clearly shows that events inside the NATO and also domestic issues were taking place as early as 1947. However, France decided to develop nuclear weapons only after the end of Algerian war and coming of the de Gaulle's government. Therefore, there was change in the preference of France from non-nuclear to nuclear. The probable reason for this is the political instability of the French government since the decades. As shown above, the people at large were not interested in nuclear issues but only in the economic issues. Secondly, people were not in favour to give up the colonies and associate it with the greatness of French empire. Third, although there were issues with the US and within the NATO, France until 1966 decided to be a part of NATO. The reason behind this was that there was political instability in the France and political leaders at large refrained from taking question of development of nuclear weapons. They did not wish to go against the wish of the people which can prove fatal to the party in power. In addition, political parties came into power for a brief period of time. As a result, they did not get the opportunity to educate people about the benefits of having nuclear weapons. As a result, the question of possessing or not the nuclear weapon was kept open and was not debated furiously. The nuclear research remains limited only to the peaceful issues only.

It was only after the coming of the President De Gaulle that the question of nuclear weapons was considered seriously. It is important to note here that the first thing which de Gaulle done after coming into power was to stabilises the political system throughout the country by making changes to the constitution. De Gaulle was particularly convinced that the political weakness in the state and more especially of the executive branch bore the responsibility for French lack of preparedness and technical inferiority in 1870s, 1914 and in 1940. The most important reflection of this

was the decision of the France to not to carry out the war from North Africa and instead to seek an armistice which was, in effect, a simple surrender. Therefore, De Gaulle sought to achieve the political change which was also reflected in a speech given at Bayeux in 1946. This was incorporated in the 1958 constitution – the establishment of the strong presidency which could avoid the confusion of carrying out constitutional powers in the defence field. Such an authority will be the only effective way to take strong decisions as it clearly establish a strong executive and embedded the President to be the only legal defender of its national interests.

De Gaulle made an effort to concentrate the power in his own hands to take decisions without the fear of instability. He deliberately made such system so as to prevent the reoccurrence of the situation that arise after the collapse of the Third Republic in 1940s. De Gaulle realized that the constitution has to be which recognised both the ‘rivalry of the parties in our country’ and ‘the present state of the world’ with the ‘opposed ideologies, behind which lurk of powerful states that surround us (and which) do not cease to inject in our political struggle an element of passionate controversy’ (Macridis 1966: 41). Such a system was necessary to save the France from the crisis it was facing at that point of time. He interrupted the constitution so that first; he made Prime Minister responsible before the President. Generally, in the Parliamentary system, Prime Minister is responsible to the Parliament only. Secondly, it is under the prerogative of the President to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister. Therefore, creating the kind of subordination of PM to the President.

The exception of the 1958 constitution to the other constitutions of the France is that it was drawn during the past two centuries which ‘diminished parliamentary supervision of foreign affairs with the help of legislative powers’ (Frans 1964: 52). It is said that this is the only constitution in the world which ‘vest the supreme authority to conduct the foreign relations in the Head of the State again’ (Wahl 1962: 279). The Articles 14, 15, 20, 21 define the power of the President and the advisory capacity of both the PM and the Foreign Affairs Minister with regard to the foreign policy making. These powers were further enhanced by Article 5 which states ‘the President is the protector of the independence of the nation’ and by Article 16 which gave emergency powers to the President when the independence of the nation is in danger.

After solving the problem of economic instability only, he also took the decision to end the long term colonial war with Algeria, which was hitting hard on the financial resources of France. It was well known that such a decision will hit hard on the morale of the armed forces and people at large. Therefore, he associated the nuclear weapons with the concept of grandeur to gain the acceptance of people at large. It was during this time only that France became more vocal about the injustice done to it in the NATO and about the US policies at large. It was only due to the strong and the stable position of the political leader of France that such decisions were taken at that point of time. President De Gaulle felt that such kind of strong government is essential to enhance the strong prestige of France and to project its image at an international level.

President De Gaulle clearly articulated the concepts like independence of nation-states; his promoted views on alliance system and about France's superiority and his philosophy begun to be known as 'Gaullism.' He mentioned that the nation-state had the unique identity, and it cannot be assimilated or merged with any other nation-state, which would have its own individual characteristics. He said:

Certainly very different from one another, each of which has its own spirit, its own history, its own language, its own misfortunes, glories and ambitions; but which are the only entities that have right to order and the authority to act (Mahoney 2000: 132).

He criticised the supranational institutions like those of European Union, UNO as countries are forced to be submitted to the decisions of other 'aero pages.' Similarly, he stood against the alliance systems and said that these were essential to maintain the immediate national interests among the states. Otherwise, all the states are potential rivals of each other. Such kind of ideology was articulated mainly to prepare the people and political elites for the nuclear development and ultimately the complete withdrawal of the France from NATO. De Gaulle clearly articulated the concept of freedom and independence, which gained support both from the domestic and international audience. It appeared as a kind of psychological state of affairs, which gained acceptance from the entire world, even from the countries which were previously colonised.

Also, de Gaulle articulated the concept of freedom and independence so as to gain independence on the foreign economic resources and to develop France materially. As said by the French Political Analyst Hassner:

In her anti-American undertaking, France was conceived to be in competition with the United States in serving as the intercolour of Germany and Russia. In her conception of a desirable international balance, she wished to serve as intermediary and arbitrary between Russia and Germany in Europe and between Russia and United States in the world (Hassner 1968:55).

This clearly shows that France decided to develop nuclear weapons only when it was politically stable and was in the condition either to educate people about the importance of having nuclear weapons or in the condition to deal with the public criticism without having its effect on the political stability. One of the important things to consider is that President De Gaulle clearly linked the economic development at the state to the nuclear weapons development to gain larger acceptance. Therefore, President de Gaulle established such a kind of political system, established such ideologies and policies, which make it easy for it to take a decision to build nuclear weapons, which were earlier not discussed or considered in France. Such kinds of methods were adopted mainly to change the preference of a France civil society from adopting peaceful nuclear weapons programme to nuclear weapons for military purpose.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter clearly shows that although the reasons to develop nuclear weapons were clearly present in France, it took such a long time to develop nuclear weapons. Although the effort to build nuclear weapons were started much earlier by the beginning of CEA, what was lacking was the political will which was later provided by the President De Gaulle of the Fifth Republic. Such kinds of domestic reasons are clearly independent of the US first use policy or extended deterrence. Similar is the case of Japan, which shows that it only the domestic reasons of stability and instability, which make the states to decide upon the question of nuclear weapons.


Chapter 5

Nuclear Decision Making: The Case of Japan

Introduction

Japan represents a unique case for the study of nuclear proliferation to the traditional theories of international relations. It having decided to remain under the US nuclear umbrella and to adopt non-nuclear principles despite the changes in the external environment has continuously relied on the US nuclear weapons and extended deterrence. Japan has maintained that ‘the extended deterrence of the United States with nuclear deterrence at its core is also indispensable’ (National Security Strategy of Japan 2013). Japan possesses all positive factors which can motivate it to develop its independent nuclear weapons programme. As it is well known, Japan has the technological capability to build nuclear weapons, and it is capable to build its nuclear weapons within a short period of time. Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata said in 1994 that “it’s certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not made them” (McCarthy 1994) Currently, Japan has the third largest fleet of nuclear reactors and is spending approximately \$22 billion on building plutonium based nuclear reactor fuel. (Birch, Smith and Adelstein 2014). Japan also has developed various nuclear power plants for peaceful purposes, but these can be converted to military purposes. The figure below shows the presence of nuclear power plants in Japan, which is the proof of the Japan’s atomic technology expertise.

Figure 8: Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (Government of Japan 2010)



This unique behaviour of Japan is studied amply by scholars and is attributable to many factors, like, it is often stated that as Japan is a small island nation, so it will be difficult for it to conduct any atomic tests. As mentioned by Roger Hilsman 'no nation with territory that is less than a continental size can now play the nuclear game' (Hilsman 1990: 5). The reason is that small nations being concentrated, nuclear weapon test could leak radiation, which could spread easily among the local population. Such concerns have been raised by Japan itself in a study which was conducted to find out whether Japan should develop nuclear weapons:

It is important to consider whether nuclear weapons would provide for counter (value) city force. With this view we are faced with a question whether it is possible to balance the terror between Japan which has extremely fragile geographical characteristics, limited area, dense population, concentration of cities etc and other countries. In the case of the US, Russia and China their extensive geographical conditions could absorb nuclear damage and there have been damage limitation measures such as shelters for dealing with nuclear war. In the case of North Korea they have made efforts to put major facilities underground to mitigate their limited area. In case of Israel and Pakistan the possession of nuclear weapons has become a question of life or death due to their relationships with the neighbouring countries. In all these cases the situation is different from that of Japan. In the case of the UK, France, although there is some similarity in terms of limitation in area concentration of cities etc. they also have situations different from that of Japan. They attached the value of having nuclear weapons to that of nuclear deterrence. Thus in case of Japan we cannot avoid being negative about the value of the possession of a deterrent based on mutual destruction (Japan Defence Agency 1995).

Then again, Japan has mastered the techniques of supercomputers through which it could carry out stimulated nuclear tests without actually carrying out physical tests (Laird et.al. 2013: 200).

The theories of international relations have tried to study this behaviour of Japan. One of the dominant theories in the field of international relations is the realist theory. Realist theory maintains that a state in the international systems works under self-help systems and strives to increase its own security. Realist predicts that Japan will become a nuclear power as soon as it achieves economic success. However, Japan's behaviour runs counter to it, as despite being an economic power, Japan has

decided to remain non-nuclear.

Even though, Japan does have an interest in developing nuclear weapons, but it has decided to remain non-nuclear till date. This can be seen from the very fact that Japan does conduct the various studies to know the feasibility of carrying out nuclear tests. There were studies conducted repeatedly to study the possible feasibility of Japan to adopt nuclear weapons. Japan conducted studies in 1969 (Tatsumi 2012: 143), 1995 (Solingen 2007:58) and then soon after North's Korea nuclear tests (Solingen 2007: 58). However, each time it was advisable for Japan not to develop nuclear weapons due to political, geographical and economic costs associated with it. For example, the political scientist of Japan Michio Royama confirmed that a study was carried out in 1967 to study the feasibility of studying the nuclear option for Japan. This study said that there are no 'technical impediments' to the development of an independent nuclear weapon programme of Japan, but the development is undesirable because it would cost too much, would alarm neighbours and would not get the support of the Japanese people (Harrison 1996: 9). At the same time, the study mentioned that it is important for Japan to keep the nuclear option open and to gain support from the people at large

We will educate public that policies concerning nuclear weapons should be based on cost-benefit calculations with regard to international economic and political factors. Thus, we will seek to avoid needless domestic confusion should tactical nuclear weapons be interdicted in a future emergency (Harrison 1996: 9).

The realist theory is not able to explain such behaviour of Japan. Later, the theory of 'mercantile realism' also gave the same kind of arguments to explain the nature of non-nuclear Japan. 'Mercantile realism' talks about Japan's wish to develop itself economically before adopting any aggressive defence posture, including the development of nuclear weapons. As mentioned by Richard Samuels and Eric Heginbotham said:

Japan foreign policy is consistent with the theory of mercantilist realism which recognise primacy of the techno economic interests as central consideration of state policy based on the idea that technology and national wealth are as important as military power in maintaining the state security standing as they increase the state's political leverage and independence (Samules and Heginbotham 1996: 171)

However, despite its big power status since 1970, Japan has decided to not to develop nuclear weapons and remain dependent on the US for its security guarantees. Although, the process of Japan's recovery is now completed and the factor which made Japan's economy dependent on the US has disappeared, yet it has decided not to develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, classical realism does not offer the reasons for the Japan's non-nuclear policy. The reason is that realist theory exclusively focuses on the one aspect only, *i.e.*, on structure and its determinants and ignores other factors like domestic issues, role of ideology, norms and state preferences. It also ignores the role of domestic and bureaucratic politics, which is important in studying while examining the nuclear decision- making in any country.

As mentioned by Chalmers Johnson, the Japan specialist:

Since realism either does not inquire at well into the domestic responses and constrains on foreign policies or else assumes that such responses are homogeneous across all states facing similar international pressures, the cases of prewar and post war Japan directly challenges the realist theory (Johnson 1993: 202-03).

Some scholars have mentioned the Article 9 of Japan's constitution and three non-nuclear principles, which were responsible for the non-nuclear policy. However, these constitutional provisions are only the expression of bureaucratic and domestic politics, which are often ignored. This chapter will look into the reasons which are responsible for the development of non-nuclear identity of Japan and the reasons behind its continuous reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.

The Realist Explanations of Japan's Non-Nuclear Behaviour: Passing the Buck

Realism regards a state as acting in an anarchic world which pursues foreign policy behaviour only on that basis. Realism can be explained as:

Realism encompasses five propositions. First, states are the major actors in world affairs (Morgenthau 1973: 10, Waltz 1979: 95). Second, the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail to protect their vital interest or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; hence, states are 'sensitive to cost' and behave as a unitary-rational agents (Waltz 1986: 331). Third, international anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions of the states (Waltz 1959: 224-38, 179:79-128; Hoffman 1965:27, 54-87,129, Aron: 1973a:6-10). Fourth, states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed toward conflict

and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in face of common interests (Aron 1966:5, Glipin 1986: 304). Finally, international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation only marginally (Waltz 1979: 115-16, Morgenthau 1973: 512, Hoffman 1973b: 50) (Aron 1966: 5).

Japanese policies are not based on the traditional power politics of realism. In fact, it points to the inability of realism to explain the Japanese adoption of the three non nuclear principles¹² (Sato 1967) and their acceptance of war renunciation Article 9 (The Constitution of Japan)¹³. Therefore, Classical Realism and the Neo-realism have been unable to explain the ‘nuclear restraint’ of Japan till the date. Waltz mentioned that being an economic powerhouse would be necessary to become a great power by means of acquiring military capabilities, including a nuclear arsenal, to secure itself and advance its interests in the self-help milieu of the anarchic international system’(Waltz 1993:56). As said by President Abe, ‘As the only country to have ever suffered the devastation of atomic bombings during war, Japan will fulfil its responsibility in the international community, aiming at the non-proliferation and ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons.’ (Abe 2015). Therefore, Japan opts for not developing the nuclear weapons despite being economically developed. According to Waltz, the state opts for nuclear restraint, because ‘there is the absence of the fundamental military threats and proliferation decisions’ (Sagan 1996: 60). Thus, decision to abandon existing nuclear programme came from radical changes or revaluations in ‘external security threats’. The most important example of this is South Africa, which decided to develop nuclear weapons when Soviet Union posed as a threat to it but later decided to abandon the nuclear weapons programme in 1989 as the nuclear threat of Soviet Union ended (Sagan 1996: 60).

The first two assumptions (lack of threat or lack of the regional threats) do not hold true to Japan’s case as it did face the threat in the form of China and North Korea. As mentioned in the Defence paper of Japan:

¹² The three non nuclear principles consist of not to possess, not to produce and not to permit introduction of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory.

¹³ Article 9 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.

North Korea has taken such provocative actions as its launch of the missile, which it called “Satellite” and its nuclear test, China has rapidly expanded and intensify its activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan as exemplified by its intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, and Russia continues to intensify its military activities. (Defence of Japan 2013)

Japan depends on the US security guarantees to deal with such threats. There is no doubt on the US security guarantees but there are questions on its credibility.¹⁴ It has often been asked whether the US will risk its own security to preserve Tokyo. This view was reflected in a study which was conducted in 1966 which states that, it will be highly unthinkable for the US to risk a nuclear exchange with Russia or China for the sake of Japan. The study said that the communist powers could use Japan as a hostage and little will be done by the US to save Japan (Kobayashi 1970: 109). Similarly, it was felt after the Cold War that 1996 Chinese military exercise in Taiwan Strait is an example that the US will do little for the protection of Japan. Again the sense of weakened security here means that when security is weakened by the presence of nuclear weapons. Japan sense of weakening here does not mean that it will become a ‘nuclear target’ but more a ‘political and economic target.’ The last argument of possessing alternative means of defence also does not apply to Japan as it has no clear and proper way to defend itself. . Therefore, Waltz states that Japan represents the case of ‘structural anomaly’ (Waltz 1993: 66) and scholars have since attempted to explain Japan’s puzzle. There are further realist arguments in the forms of offensive and defensive realism. The two offensive foreign policies that emerge due to the anarchic world are to conquest (military expansion to gain hegemony) or bandwagoning (aligning with strong and powerful state to achieve major benefits) (Downley 1995: 36). The two main defensive acts include balancing (building allies, balancing other states by development of weapons) and other includes passing the buck. The buck passers need to balance against the threat but do little and relay on efforts of others (Lind 2004: 103). Balance is costly which involves the maintenance of armaments but buck passing transfer costs to other states and does not involve maintenance of armaments. The buck passer usually tries to maintain the balance of power in the international system. If there is a shift in the balance of power, the buck

¹⁴ For example, during a visit of President Obama to Japan in 2014, the Japan reiterated the extension of the security treaty to include Senkaku Islands. However, the US mentioned that no new security guarantees could be made available to Japan as the US has to maintain good relationship with China also. This caused the Japanese people to question the credibility of the US extended deterrence.

passer will run to the allies for the restoration of balance. If the allies fail in giving assurances to the buck passer, it will retain to development of military capabilities (Lind 2004: 104).

Buck-Passing is usually followed by those states whose geography and technology made them less vulnerable to an immediate invasion. The policy of buck's passing is usually adopted by those states that are not facing immediate threat and has powerful allies who can support them. (Lind 2004: 20). From such a perspective, Japan fulfils all the conditions of buck passers. With the end of cold war and disintegration of Soviet Union, Japan does not face the immediate threat of invasion. The end of cold war also left the US as the sole dominant power which is also the ally of Japan-making it not necessary for Japan to develop its defence.

After the war, Japan has two options- weather to opt for neutralisation' or to go for 'armament.' Japan decided to accept the US nuclear umbrella because 'the only country which lacks strategic value or has armaments powerful enough to protect itself can opt for neutralization.' Japan clearly fits in neither of the categories. Japan also thought it would not be possible for it to opt for the armament as it will be too costly for Japan to maintain itself in the competitive arms' race (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 21). Its economy was already in a bad shape. Therefore, only the US security umbrella could provide for security and opportunity for the economic growth. As mentioned by Sato:

We seem to be unable to possess a complete system of armament in our country, since we were the ones who were 'nuclear-baptized' and the Japanese people have a special sentiment against nuclear weapons. It is regrettable, indeed, but there is where we stand just now....Let me say this so that no one can misunderstand me. I do not regard it as a complete system of defense if we cannot possess the full system of nuclear weapons in the era of nuclear weapons. I will, nevertheless, adhere faithfully to the pledge I have made to the people. We will not possess, manufacture, or permit the nuclear weapons; but this begin so, it is inevitable, then, that, we must seek our security under the US nuclear umbrella (Harrison 2002: 235).

Here comes the explanation of Japan as a 'buck-passer'. However, the realist explanations of Japan do not stand the test of time. As mentioned, the main aim of

buck-passing is to escape from the cost of maintaining a defence. Technically, Japan has always decided to spend only one percent of its GDP for the development of defence. Even though, as noted by Jennifer Lind, the commentator's under estimates Japan military power because they measure it by comparing defence spending as a percentage of GDP. Japan devotes one percent of its GDP to its 'self-defence' which is between 1.5-3% in other states. Lind rightly notes that this measure is inaccurate as large economies can produce large military at a small expense and suggest measuring military powers by comparing aggregate defence (Lind 2002: 20). From that perspective, Japan is among top two or three military spenders, just behind Russia and the US.

Secondly, Japan has maintained quite robust defence forces, which cannot be compared to the country which has followed the policy of passing the buck Japan does have the civilian nuclear power programme which could be converted into nuclear weapons. Not to forget, Japan has the second most powerful navy in the world and the seventh largest defence budget (Johnson 2015). It does have 'special vehicles', which are similar to tanks (Lind 2002:20). Japan also shifted its policies from 'comprehensive national security' to 'Dynamic Defence Force' concept in 2010, which stresses on 'readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability and versatility' and the use of defence forces in 'grey areas' military operations that lie between peacetime and wartime (Takashaki 2012). Therefore, Japan does not really fit under the category of the buck-passer who aligned itself with the US to escape the cost of the armament

5.1 Constructivist Explanation of Japan's Post War Pacifism

Prof Fujiwara said that 'Japan is addicted to pacifism in the same way an alcoholic is addicted to alcohol' (Cooney 2007: 149). The roots of Japan's pacifist policy go back to World War II when it was totally devastated. The defeat in the World War II shattered Japan's pre-militaristic ideology and discredited the political and economic situations that had actively supported it, laying the foundation of new ideology based on anti-militarism (Zagorski 2009: 2). Approximately two and half-million people were killed in the war. Japan became the first country to suffer the atomic bombings, and it was first time conquered by the foreign power. Japan realised that it is in such a miserable condition due to the presence of military and militaristic policy, which

stresses on armaments and war. Therefore, the chief lesson which Japan learned from World War II is that military is a dangerous institution, and it must be kept under control lest it threatens the post-war peace and prosperity. The Japanese people felt victimised by its own army. They feel that they have been dragged into the war by the military which could be otherwise avoided (Berger 1993: 120). The military was held responsible for taking the matters in their own hands and to drag Japan into the destructive war.

Therefore, a saying that some nations live by sword and perish by the sword is completely opposite in case of Japan. Japan took up sword, suffered badly and since then decided not to involve itself in war. Since World War II, Japan has lived by the dove of pacifism and must now choose whether to let its role on the world dwindle, perish by its self-imposed pacifism or to take sword and risk the casualties and enemies which it has avoided since the end of second world war (Cooney 2007: 5). The PM of Japan, Yoshida Shigeru, soon after the war said that ‘Japan having suffered the deleterious effects of war should concentrate on rebuilding her economy and that Japan could be an ill effort to waste her resources on the unproductive exercise of arming.’ He even wrote to Harada Kumao, ‘I thank you...the situation which should occur has occurred. If the devil has a son he is sure Tojo...The military is a cancer in politics and if this is extracted then the latent capability can be released with the help of American Capital.’ (Kesavan 1989: 99). Therefore, Japan decided to transform itself from Meji’s *fukoku kyohei* (rich country, strong army) to *fukoku jakuhei* (rich country, weak army). Japan till date has decided to follow the pacifist policies despite the new security threats which emerge after the end of the cold war period. Beside the three non-nuclear principles, Japan has also mentioned about the 11 benchmarks of disarmament which will promote nuclear disarmament in the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009). This has been explained by Thomas Berger. Thomas Berger has explained the persistent gap in the economic and military capability of Japan which the realist theory has been unable to explain. He said that the reason of the existent gap between the military and economic capacity of Japan is the result of the anti militaristic sentiment that developed after the Second World War (Berger 1998: 4). He notes that:

Japan and Germany share an iron determination to avoid a repetition of past mistakes with each nation developing

the anti-militaristic sentiment that can be best explained by each nation's struggle to militarism which continues to characterize the political systems of both the nations and place a heavy burden on them in their pursuit of more active defensive policies (Berger 1998: 7).

Similarly, Massaru Tamamoto wrote

Remembering what happened last time the nation ventured abroad, the Japanese are afraid of what they might do once they reenter the international political-strategic arena (Tamamoto 1990: 498).

Matake Kamiya argued that

After witnessing nearly two decades of the follies of their own military leaders, the Japanese people developed deep distrust of the military after the war, as well as, strong aversion to anything related to the military as a tool of national policy, including even Japan's national security policy (Kamiya 2002/03: 66).

Therefore, Japan renounced the militaristic and nationalist thinking and decided to give away all the symbols of military, including the development of the atomic bomb. Moreover, Article 9 was inserted in the Japanese constitution, which displayed the representation of this anti-militarist and pacifist norm rather than the response of Japan to any structural change, as mentioned below. The words mentioned in *Italics* have been added by the constructivist theory and are not originally laid down in the constitution:

As the only nation (*identity*) in human history to be bombed with atomic weapons (*realist*), Japan has compiled with its peace constitution and has firmly maintained the three non nuclear principles (*ideas*) with their strong commitment (*interests*) not to repeat the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (*means*). Japan will continue to pursue this stance and lead the international community to promote nuclear non-proliferation (*action*) and devote itself to abolish nuclear weapons (*means and choice*) through its enhancements of efforts to call on government for the easy ratification of the rest (*!interaction and choice*) (Wyk and Kinghorn 2007: 25).

Some scholars mentioned that Article 9 had been imposed on the Japan by the Allied Forces and is not the result of Japan's anti-militaristic thinking, It is also important to note here that Japanese constitution and Article 9 were the result of Japanese people realisation that power should be placed into the hands of the people rather than to

concentrate into the hands of few military personnel (Iseri 1992 : 46). It was not the result of the allied forces occupation and not formed by the US as mentioned by some scholars. This has been mentioned by the Takayanagi:

Shidehara behaved as if Article 9 were imposed by MacArthur, although he never clearly said so. If he had said that the proposal was his and not MacArthur, it might have been rejected by the Cabinet. Shidehara was diplomatic enough to know this. So Cabinet members who attend the meeting, including Yoshida and Ashida thought that the proposal was made by MacArthur and not by Shidehara. After this (Cabinet meeting), Shidehara told a number of close friends that 'Article 9 does not come from abroad' and that it was his proposal (Funk 1992: 371).

Furthermore, the constitution cannot be forced on any country for such a long period of time. The reason being that people will ultimately stand against them once the Allied forces leave the country. This was the prime concern of the US, and the allied forces have mentioned that until the reforms were enacted according to the will of the people, they would be useless after the Allied Forces would leave the country. The polls clearly reflect the mood throughout the country. The poll found that 70 percent of people supported the constitution and Article 9 while 28 percent of people are against it (Funk 1992: 372). Article 9 is so embedded in the minds of Japanese people that it is often said that it is just like what the right to life, property and happiness is to the American people. It is more than a written word in the constitution and has become very essence of Japanese regime and polity (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993 : 119).

It is said that Japanese government needs to adopt such a policy because of the strong public opposition to the development of offensive weapons and the renunciation of war. The same is with the case of development of nuclear weapons. This particular Article has imposed the cult of pacifism among the Japanese people. As mentioned by Fukui:

Pacifism represented and popularized by Article 9 rapidly developed into a popular cult. Pacifism became the object of fervent devotion among large numbers of Japanese. It became deeply instilled in their hearts incomparably faster than did any of the democratic principles of government also proclaimed by the new constitution. During and immediately followed by World War II, the people of Japan experienced hunger, destruction and death directly, physically and personally, not just

abstractly and intellectually. Thus, post wars Japanese were emotionally devoted to the idea of peace at almost any cost (Tsurutani 1981: 119).

Japan's sees nuclear weapons not as the instruments to ensure security or as a means of deterrence. For them, nuclear weapons stand for a symbol of destruction. Therefore

The first entry point of any conversation on nuclear weapons is Hiroshima and Nagasaki – not the role of nuclear weapons in the terms of security and or security, but the atomic devastation which Japan suffered ' (Ruble 2009 : 57).

Just like the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, the people have adopted the three non nuclear principles as an important part of Japan's security policy. Even though, the three non-nuclear principles of Japan are not made into law, they are very much the part of a psyche of Japanese people. These three non nuclear principles are so much rooted in the mind of Japanese people than any attempt to amend it has been met by the opposition. In June 2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda mentioned that:

The three non-nuclear principles are just like the constitution. But in face of call to amend the constitution, the amendments to principles are also likely' (French 2002).

Such a statement caused large scale opposition and even call for the resignation of Minister Fukuda. Later PM Koizumi declared that its government has no intention to amend the constitution or to revise the three non nuclear principles (Ruble 2009:58). Fukuda also delivered the formal apology to Diet. This shows how much rooted are the non nuclear principles in the mind of Japanese elite. The anti militaristic principles of Japan have been adopted by its constitution and in its constitutional polices as shown in the below mentioned table:

Table 9: Japan's anti-militaristic Principles as reflected in constitution and in its policies (Hughes 2009: 242)

Japan not to become a military great power (gunji taikoku to narranal koto)
Japan government has regularly repeated this public pledge
Japan's provides no strict definition of the criteria for this, but stresses that it will not acquire military capabilities above the minimum necessary or that can threaten other states.
Three non-nuclear principles (hikaku sangensoku)
PM Sato introduce three non nuclear principles which states not to produce, possess or introduce nuclear weapons
Japan is to relay on the US nuclear umbrella for its security although it does not consider the possession of its nuclear weapons as unconstitutional
The first two principles were strengthened by Japan's entry into Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The third principle is believed to be breached by the introduction into or transit through Japanese ports of nuclear weapons on US Naval basis
Restrictions on the exports of arms and military expenditure
In 1967, PM Sato's administration first enunciated restrictions on arms exports to communists states, countries under UN sanctions and parties to international disputes
In 1976, PM Takeo Miki's administration ordered restraint in the case of all states, and prohibited the export of weapons related technology
Since 2003, there have been moves to lift this ban for BMD cooperation
Peaceful Uses of Space
In May 1969, the Diet imposed a resolution stating that Japanese activities in space should be limited to peaceful uses.
Japan development of spy satellites and a BMD systems since 1990s have challenged this principles. Japan might seek to reinterrupt this principle changing meaning of peaceful purposes to 'defensive' rather than 'non-military' or it may seek to abandon the principle altogether.
One percent of GNP limit on defence expenditure
In 1976, PM Miki established the principle that defence expenditure should be limited to 1% of GNP
PM Nakasone in effect breached this principle by pushing defence spending just above 1 % in 1986
Successive administrations have kept Japanese defence spending at around the 1% level.

This shows that the policy of pacifism is so much rooted in the minds of the public that it is difficult for Japan to develop independent nuclear weapons programme. This has been mentioned by a 1995 study, which was carried in Japan to study the possibility of development of a nuclear weapons programme:

The view that nuclear weapons are difficult to understand and that in Japan to even study about them was treated as a taboo seems to have come as a result of effects of this kind of thinking about nuclear weapons as well as their experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The public polls of Japan have also shown the preference of the people for the Japan's non-nuclear policy (Japan Defence Agency 1995)

The public polls have always indicated that Japanese people are always against the development of nuclear weapons. These perceptions of Japanese people were framed not only because of the use of nuclear weapons against its people during the second world war but also due to the exposition of Japanese people to the harmful radiation in 1954 when the US tested its nuclear weapons in Bikini Atoll resulting into casualty of 23 fisherman and eventual death of one person (Bleacher 1978). The further disaster of Fukushima 2011 also shows to the Japanese people that nuclear technology is of no good to them even if used for a peaceful purpose (Akira 2012). These opinions are again and again reflected in Japanese opinion polls. A poll was conducted when cold war was receding, and it was found that 75% of the people at large do not favour possession of nuclear weapons. Similar polls were conducted in 2006, and 2013 showed the same kinds of result, although North Korea had developed nuclear weapons by that time. The 1998 Gallup poll indicates that only 16% of the nation believed that Japan could be attacked by another nation and that there is a need to develop nuclear weapons, while 89% of the people feel that there is no need to have nuclear weapons (Gallup Poll on the ownership of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war 1999). The 2011 Fukushima incidents further strengthened the anti-nuclear stance of people, and they forced the government to shut down the nuclear reactors.

Similarly, Japanese public is in favour of maintaining the alliance relationship with the US as the US nuclear umbrella protects Japan from the possible nuclear attacks of North Korea and Japan. In 1969 only 41% of public was in favour of the maintaining the alliance with the US, while 13% stood for withdrawing treaty. On the other hand,

in 2003 there were 72% of people in favour of maintaining alliance with the US while 8% favour independent defence policies. The overall public support for the alliance has increased rather than maintaining independent nuclear weapons and giving away the US alliance system (Gallup Poll 1999).

Therefore, Japanese public is in favour of non-nuclear policy and wants to maintain Japan's alliance system with the US. Rather than developing nuclear weapons and focusing on independent foreign policy, the Japanese, public wants its government to focus more on the economic issues. The recent survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun mentioned that majority among the voters wants LDP to focus more on the economic issues, employment or issues related to social security. However, only 9 percent of the people want Abe to focus on foreign and security policies throughout the country and only 4 percent of people want him to lay stress on the constitutional revision as the priority (Asahi Shimbun 2013). This shows the preferences of the Japanese public for the economic issues rather than focusing on the foreign policy issues. The opposition of public opinion has made it difficult for the government of Japan to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons. Even Gen Mac Arthur has stated that:

Nuclear weapons raised obvious and serious emotional and psychological problems in terms of Japanese public opinion and perhaps opinion had not evolved to the point where there could be change in the present Japanese policy (Ryall 2013).

It is believed that all other debates on pacifism are the basis of the Japan's nuclear policy. However, Japanese people feel that their pacifism or nuclear allergy behaviour is not enough to prove Japan's commitment to non nuclear status. Therefore, they buttered it with other debates also. As mentioned by Mizumoto:

(T)he idea of holding self-evident a non-nuclear policy based on having been a victim of the atomic bomb does not go very well in the rest of the world. Rather, putting forth the idea that Japan has adopted its non-nuclear strategy, rejecting theories of nuclear disarmament after through consideration of military logic, technical feasibility, economic impact and political risk of the nuclear option will be more convincing and more easily accepted explanation. The idea of the Japanese government or at least of the Defence Agency, taking it upon itself, to the study of the nuclear option would, however be susceptible to generating domestic misunderstanding. For this reason, a more desirable approach would be for research institute to make this

study and publish the results, or for scientists and professionals to debate those in Track II conferences or symposia, in such a way as to avoid them to be connected it with the government (Mizumoto 2004: 259).

Besides this, Japan wants to use its pacifist and non nuclear policy to gain international recognition. Japan wants to have a permanent seat in the UNSC for the wish to present itself as a unique nation having non-nuclear identity. Japan is struggling to have permanent membership in UNSC. Japan has been the non-permanent member of the Security Council nine times in a row but has not gotten chance to serve as a permanent member of the Security Council (Kapoor 2011: 175). All the present five members of the council are the five nuclear weapons states which hold the veto power in the UNSC. Japan feels that its non-nuclear status could give it the unique status as a permanent member of the Security Council (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2006). However, the problem is that Japan needs to get the support of all the five members so as to gain the permanent seat in the Security Council. China might veto the resolution to block the Japan's permanent membership, and the US and other western power have supported it (Harris 2014). Japan is currently bypassing the opposition of China by linking its efforts to the so-called G4 nations (Japan, India, Brazil and Germany) all of whom are seeking the permanent membership of the UNSC (Cooney 2007: 48).

Japan is trying to convince the P-5 nations by demonstrating itself as an economic superpower and peaceful nations. Japan has itself advocated that it has maintained the three non nuclear principles while all the permanent members have nuclear weapons programmes. In this sense, Japan could be the only country reflecting and representing the views of the non-nuclear countries and could emerge as the leader of disarmament and non-proliferation in the international arena (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2006). If Japan goes into the development of nuclear weapons, such an advocacy will not make sense. It will further upset China and even the US and would make it difficult for Japan to have a permanent seat of the Security Council. Therefore, Japan till date has decided to not to develop a nuclear weapons programmes.

If Japan wants to move itself from the non-nuclear identity, it would affect the economic and industrial power of Japan. Japan has cooperative atomic arrangement with six countries – The US, Britain, France, Canada, Australia and China. Each

agreement, except with that of China, stressed that everything imported from these countries, including nuclear reactors, fuel cycle and nuclear technology should be used only for the peaceful purposes (Kaneko 1996: 46). If Japan decides to go nuclear, these countries could impose to serve economic sanctions, including return of imported material to the original country. This could cause the serious setbacks to the industrial and economic activities of Japan- a heavy price to build nuclear weapons, unless there is any war emergency.

Therefore, the anti-militaristic policy of Japan is in consistent with the history, people preferences and suitable for its economic and political development.

However, the problem of the constructivist explanation is that it has failed to explain why Japan has been able to sustain the culture of antimilitarism even after five decades of war, despite the generational shift of the country. The people who saw nuclear devastation are not alive and the new generation has come into existence. However, Japan continues to uphold the anti-militaristic thinking. Also, there are other countries also who have experienced defeat after the war but has not adopted the pacifist policies. The examples of such countries include Athens after Peloponnesian War, the Confederate States after American civil war and France after the Napoleonic Wars and Germany after World War I, Italy after World War II (Wyk and Kinghorn 2007: 28). In fact, the countries try to make themselves strong so that history is not repeated.

Japan is not 'purely pacifist' country. Japan does experience the shift in the policies, particularly after the end of Cold War. There have been debates in Japan to make it a 'normal country.' Ryu has mentioned that politician's efforts to turn Japan into a normal country reflect their desire to revive patriotism among the Japanese. There has been a change in security and international ideologies of Japan. The new ideology is adopted after the cold war period which asks Japan to play a more active role in international relations. It is becoming dominant in the policy discourse of Japan (Inoguchi 2012: 141). The end of Cold War was followed by the decision of the Japanese government to send its forces to the UN missions, development of Special Defence Forces SDF for self-defence and the development of military capability to augment the SDF. This has again raised the question, whether the Japan can develop the nuclear weapons by the name of self-defence. Japan has also interpreted Article 9

of the constitution and said that development of nuclear weapons may be permitted in the name of self-defence. Japan does pass the 'three non nuclear principles, but it cannot prevent Japan to maintain nuclear weapons for self-defence. As mentioned by Kishi to the House of Counsellors 'The government intends to maintain no nuclear weapon, but speaking in terms of legal interpretation of the constitution there is nothing to prevent the maintenance of the minimum amount of nuclear weapons for self-defence' (Auer 1990: 178) A week later Kishi's administration issued an official statement that 'In the event that an attack is waged with guided missiles and there are no other means of defence, counter attack on enemy bases are within the scope of self-defence' (Auer 1990: 178).

The decision of the Abe government to deploy the troops abroad under 'collective self defence' is an example of moving of Japan towards normalcy. Abe said that draft was based on the view that Japan "can exercise the right, as guaranteed by international law, to firmly safeguard the lives of the Japanese people" (Kyodo 2016). Also, there is an increase in the defence budget of Japan. The defence budget of the government increased by 2.9 percent in 2014 and 2.8 percent in 2015. In December 2015, the Diet passed an increase of 1.5 percent for 2016, which would bring Japan's total annual defence spending to a record \$42.4 billion

Besides this, there have been episodes when Japan tries to develop nuclear weapons. Atsushi Tsuchida (employee of the Natural Sciences Institutes in Saitama Prefecture) mentioned that work taken in Tokoi Village to develop a nuclear reactor is potentially of a military nature. It consists of the fast-neutron breeder reactors which possibility could become the basis of a national operational nuclear programme. It produces mainly Plutonium (PU 239), which serves as the main component of modern atomic warheads. If enriched up to 98% this could provide for compact weapons like tactical missiles (Golovin: 1994).

There has been a shift in the viewpoints of the policy makers when it comes to developing nuclear weapons. For instance, Nishibe argued in 2010 that it is imperative for Japan to develop nuclear weapons so that it can defend its territories. Some of the politicians have suggested that necessity of developing nuclear weapons to counter the external threats of the region. The conservative politicians in Japan have also tried to raise the argument of developing independent nuclear weapons

programme because of the Sino-Japanese island disputes (Windrem 2014). Although, the view promoting the developing of nuclear weapons has been low but the issue which was considered as a 'taboo' has been touched upon. Therefore, people and politicians at large are moving away from the constructivist thinking of maintaining pacifist nature in the international arena. Japan has developed its defence policies but has been reluctant to develop nuclear weapons. Beside this, Japan has amended article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law which stated that research, development and utilization of atomic energy is limited for peaceful purposes only. The 2012 amendment added 'national security' as one of the reason that nuclear safety should be guaranteed. Also in 2013 Japan declined to join 74 other nations that signed a statement in advance of the next NPT review stating that nuclear weapons are inhumane and should not be used under any circumstance (Kyodo 2013). Further, the constructivist thinking of Japan's pacifist behaviour has its own shortcomings. First is that the constructivism does not pay attention to the fact, on how the public opinion of a particular country is being shaped. The public opinion of a country is the result of intermixing of history, mass media, social and legal institutions and can also be subjected to the manipulation by the government in power. For example, it is the government of Japan that has tried to enforce the pacifist principles on Japan by representing it as a victim of nuclear weapons rather than as aggressors who killed millions of people in Asian neighbourhoods.

Further, constructivist also takes the stand of realist theory as Katzenstein says, 'if Japan is left unprotected by the US, the defence option that institutionalised norms have prohibited could become a fallback option (Katzenstein 1996: 40) .' Similarly, Thomas Berger says, 'if a serious threat to Japan's security arose and if the US is unwilling or unable to guarantee Japan's protection, the Japanese government will be compelled to consider a dramatic expansion of its military capabilities' (Berger 1993: 140).

The constructivist explanation of the public opinion polls to indicate the preferences of people to be non-nuclear does not hold ground. The reason is that there are instances in Japan when the government decides to go against the wishes of the people. For example, Japan revises the treaty of mutual cooperation in 1960 amidst the opposition from the people. Similarly, people were opposed to the idea of Japan signing the treaty of non-proliferation in 1970s. Campbell and Sunohara rightly

mentioned that ‘although public sentiments against nuclear weapons remain strong, its ability to inhibit the decisions of Japanese leaders should not be exaggerated (Campbell and Sunohara 2004: 218).’ The case of ‘secret agreements agreed between the Sato and Nixon to introduce the nuclear weapons in Okinawa also runs counter to the people’s sentiment and also to the three non-nuclear principles (Kuhn 2010)

Therefore, constructivism cannot fully answer the reason behind the Japan’s non nuclear policy and therefore, turns towards realism at the end.’ However, Japan till the date has decided not to develop nuclear weapons, mainly due to the domestic and bureaucratic politics.

Domestic and Bureaucratic Politics: Affecting the decision of Japan to make Nuclear Weapons

Japan’s preference for not going nuclear can be reflected from its public opinion poll (mentioned above). These non-nuclear preferences came mainly due to the economic reasons which stress on the improving economy and first by developing relationship with the US. This strategic relationship which is defined through security umbrella will further tighten Japan’s security environment without having the need to develop security apparatus. The reason for adoption of such a political policy can be seen as a result of circumstances which Japan adopted after World War II. The Japanese economy was in shambles, and it needed to focus on economic development rather than to focus on nuclear weapons or other military programmes. Technological factors are also important to consider. Japan clearly understood at that point of time that it will not be possible for it to develop nuclear weapons for the next twenty years from the post-war period. Therefore, the political parties adopted such policy. However, later the issue of nuclear weapons development has become a debatable issue in the political circles which is difficult to challenge.

This preference was translated by the LDP government by following policy which stresses on (1) the acceptance of new constitution (2) the focus on economic growth (3) a close security relationship with the US. LDP has traditionally worked hard to preserve the domestic support on the Japan-US security alliance and Japan's wider relationship with the US. LDP has advocated the support of the Japan's government to the US client states in East Asia such as the provisions of ODA to South Korea and South Vietnam and is generally opposed to any idea, which could upset its

relationship with the US (Hook et al. 2012: 58). This policy of Japan has often been challenged by other political factions, but Japan's LDP parties have been aware of not worsening its relationship with the US. This has been also mentioned in the National Defence Programme Outline of Japan. With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the US (Ministry of Defence 2013) . The development of independent nuclear weapons by Japan might upset the Japan's relations with the US as US is opposed to the idea of development of nuclear weapons due to its policies of nuclear non proliferation, and the impact which Japan's nuclear weapons might create in East Asia.

The mainstream of policy-making institutions like MOFA, LDP and JDA stressed on securing the pathway towards the normalisation of Japan by development of the military capabilities and responsibility within the framework of constitutional prohibitions and US-Japan's alliance (Mochizuki 1997: 60). The other main opposition parties of Japan like SDP are against the militarization of Japan (Abedi 2004: 57). The development of nuclear weapons is therefore, against the policies of Japan's political parties. They fear two things; first, the one is that the development of nuclear weapons will upset their alliance system with the US (Avery and Nikitin 2009: 1). Therefore, they stress on the development of military capabilities under the framework of US-Japan's relationship (Hughes 2009).Second, the problem is the development of coalitions and factions in the Japan's political system. The Japanese policy makers have constantly tried not to openly transgressing the deep stated anti-militarism of the Japanese public. They always fear that such a violation of deep-rooted anti-militarism may result into public unrest and mass demonstrations, which were seen during revision of US-Japan's security treaty. If they need to secure the vote and confidence of people, they have to take into account the wishes of the people.

The historical experiences of Japan have shown that it is important to diffuse the power to make the system democratic and decentralised. During the Meji era, Japan was run by a small group of centralised bureaucracy. In order to keep the principle of centralisation at the core of the system, Diet was created and minimal power was given for the people. The lack of real power into the hands of the real people led to

creation of a military rule which was followed by disaster faced by Japan during World War II.

The lack of decentralisation and democratic government was regarded as the chief cause of war and disaster leading to the amendment of the Meiji era constitution. The power was decentralised and made democratic so that no part of the government could take arbitrary decisions. This diffusion of power is also reflected in the nuclear policy making of Japan. However, this has prevented Japan from becoming the nuclear weapon state (Department of State 1957:8). This has been explained by the Jacques E.C Hymans in his article 'Veto Players, Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to Japanese Bomb.' He mentioned that Nakasone wished to develop nuclear energy of Japan, which might be converted into a nuclear weapons programme for the future, if the circumstances arrived. However, the main reason which prevented the emergence of 'nuclear Japan' was the diffusion of power to take decisions on this very fragile question of nuclear weapons. Centralisation is the key for the development of a nuclear programme of any country. Even the US Manhattan Project was kept hidden from Congress until after Hiroshima. Therefore, most of the nations always kept the nuclear question out of the normal politics and guard it under the responsible institutional head (Hymans 2011: 162).

In Japan, the institutional system consists of PM, AEC, AEB and Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. The head of the AEC was to be appointed by the PM who will also be the chairman of AEB, which was later upgraded to the STA. The work of STA was to assist the AEC in the formulation of Japan's nuclear policies. It was also the duty of STA to translate the policies of AEC into specific research and development to be carried out by JAERI. The product of JAERI was to be later used by academicians, industrialists and policy makers, etc (Hymns 2011: 164).

The first person appointed as the chairman of AEC was Matsuro Shoriko who put the industry as a full partner in nuclear policy making. Industries in Japan are averse to the idea of development of nuclear weapons of Japan because it will take away some of the advantages of Japan's civil nuclear programme. The other problem is that the appointment of chairman of AEC was the responsibility of the PM. However, it was done in consultations with the various factions thus making the position of PM relatively weak. By 1970, MITI came into the scene and held key powers over

licenses of atomic power plants. MITI, AEC and industry stress upon the primacy of economic vision of nuclear energy programme and put the Nakasone vision of a nuclear weapons programme into a backyard. Further, the prefectural governors also vetoed the development of a nuclear power plants in their areas due to the Fukushima incident of 2011. Therefore, there are many veto powers in Japan over the development of nuclear weapons (Hymns 2011: 166).

The other distinctive feature of Japan's nuclear weapons programme is the holding of plutonium in the hands of private players. Japan has the huge amount of plutonium, which can be used in the development of nuclear weapons, but this plutonium is in the hands of private players. It is the property of the Japan's electric utilities. Indeed, in a spectacular demonstration of their property rights, the utilities decided in mid-1970s to control out of the task of reprocessing to Britain and France. Therefore, the large amount of Japan's plutonium is still present in Europe. Therefore, the PM of Japan is not well positioned to order the sudden militarisation of the stockpiled plutonium.

There is also close association between business community and Japan's political community. The politicians need business community to produce economic performance and to get financial support for parties. Whereas, the business community needs politicians to ensure predictable and stable business environment and to ensure government aids in tax breaks, subsidies and credit finances. The business community is interested only to explore the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Hymns 2011: 165). In mid 1970s, the Japanese economy faced economic crisis because of the oil crisis. During this period, the Japanese business community was more concerned about the energy crisis which could hinder the economic growth of Japan. It was realised that Japan has less fuel and extremely vulnerable to the international pressures which can further create the scarcity of resources. The oil crisis threatened the economic growth of a country. Therefore, it was felt that it is more important for Japan to develop as a energy-rich country rather than aiming to develop as a nuclear weapons state (Hymnes 2011 : 168). As a result, they press government to formulate 'comprehensive energy policy' so that there will be energy sources available throughout the country for the obvious growth. However, today also the Japanese business community is interested more in peaceful uses of atomic energy and fear diverting of atomic resources to the military uses creating scarcity in the economic realm. The Japan's utilities, the wider business community, bureaucrats

charged with the role of economic growth and ties of politicians are likely to oppose the development of nuclear weapons. If Japan decided to go nuclear, its electric power industry could be crippled by a loss of access to nuclear fuel and would possibly be required to return current fuel stocks given that their purchase predicted on peaceful uses. Even the large manufacturers like Hitachi and Mitsubishi could have a shutdown causing economic loss to Japan.


Further, there have been limitations set out for the legislative and executive leadership to limit the military role and decisions to be taken by the PM. The PM of Japan exercises considerable authority for the management of security affairs due to its peculiar authority. However, the process of converting this authority into provocative leadership and change in security policy has been governed by many factors. Firstly, the authority of the PM is not matched with the institutional capabilities in the core executives to carry own decisive top down leadership. Japan's core executive consists of the PM's private office and officials from the Cabinet Secretariat which are traditionally considered as incapable of taking decisions and coordinating security policies. There have been deficiencies in staff levels, information-gathering mechanisms and over-reliance on the bureaucracy for relevant expertise. Secondly, Japanese PM has always been beholden to the factional politics, and the issues related to security have to be taken in close consultations with the senior LDP leaders and factional bosses, the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), and its security focused subcommittees (Downley 1993: 187). Basically, the Japanese politics is consensus-based politics (Clausen 2012: 509), involving so much of actors whom it is difficult to take decisions on important matters, particularly matters related to nuclear weapons. In terms of overall policy designs, Japan's political system stresses on building consensus among multiple policy agents and heavy reliance on the bureaucracy for the formulation and implementation of policies which has made the process more difficult.


Besides this, it has been found that bureaucratic set of structures has created the set of controls, which sharply constrains the institutional autonomy of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) thus further weakening the political articulation of security objectives. The other ministries such as Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Construction (MOC), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery

(MAFF), the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) have more power as compared to security agencies and therefore, attract better personnel (Downley 1993: 187). Calder even went to the extent of saying that defence policy remains an orphan in Japanese distributive politics since there are no visible interest groups representing defence policies and politicians specialised in defence politics are often sidelined. The below mentioned table shows the complex administrative system of atomic energy development in Japan and diffusion of power among various organs of the government as mentioned by Figure 4

Figure 9: Administrative System of Atomic Energy Development in Japan

(Downley 1993: 188)





This clearly shows diffusion of power leading to difficulty in obtaining consensus. The Japanese politics are also maintained by the factional politics which further making it difficult for the decision-making process of the country (Curtis 1999: 22). The faction inside the LDP party is made of the varying number of the LDP politicians and serves as the unit within the LDP for distributing party and ministerial posts. These factions are not necessarily issue-based. The LDP leadership needs to balance the different interests of the factions so that each one gains from the party membership. It is the duty of the PM to manage the coalitions within the party (Kollner 2004: 83). As a result, they do not wish to discuss the policy issues which can divide the LDP such as issues related to defence expenditure, nuclear weapon's development or constitutional revision. Instead, they discuss the issues related to economic recovery more prominently because it will be agreeable to all.

In the current context, LDP's coalition partner, the Komeito, will also act as a brake against the militaristic policies of Japan. The support base for Komeito lay in the Buddhist, Sokagakkai whose members adhered to the pacifist beliefs and are opposed to the increasing defence budget. This has been manifested by the fact that there has been pushed by the LDP hawks to have Japan acquire the capability to strike enemy bases, which might threaten Japan with missiles. However, at Komeito instances, the NDPG interim report of 2013 which mentioned that such an attack capability and referred only to need for 'comprehensive response capability' (Mochizuki and Porter 2013: 29).

Besides the diffusion of power, there have been difficulties in amending the constitution of the country which stresses on non deployment of offensive weapons and asks Japan to renounce war. Article 96 mentions the procedure of the amendment of the constitution which states that only two third of a majority of both the houses of Diet, and a majority of the citizens are needed to pass an amendment (The Constitution of Japan). The current LDP government wishes to change the current position on LDP government so that a simple majority could be used to pass any constitutional amendment. However, Japan's LDP faced difficulty in it due to domestic and bureaucratic politics (Kyodo 2015).

The constructivist theory often maintained that Japan has maintained the non-nuclear weapon status because of its people and nation at large suffered, due to the atomic

bombings during the cold war. As explained above, due to this Japanese person decided to give away the nuclear bombs or any other symbols of military, which could drag them into war. However, what the constructivist theory tends to forget is that it is the political establishment and bureaucrats in command who tend to keep history alive and mould to achieve their policies. History is kept alive with the help of forming 'collective memory' as mentioned by Thomas Berger. Thomas Berger said that collective memory represented and framed with the help of books, textbooks, monuments, museums, etc (Berger 2012: 255). It is important to note that government of Japan has always framed Japan as a victim of nuclear weapons rather than a country which has also caused a lot of atrocities. The cost of being armed with nuclear weapons in turn has been shifted to in the hands of military establishment and therefore, any kind of offensive activities has been shunned. The government of Japan has represented itself as a victim of nuclear weapons in such a way that people at large will stand against its development rather than arousing the nationalist feelings. It is all about the creation and maintenance of history with the development of collective memory among the people. The government often moulds and writes the official historical narrative in such a way that it frames history in the collective memory among the people. There are numerous ways by which the history is evoked by the state-with the help of textbooks or museums, or in the official conduct of the government officials. The official transcripts are important even in the democratic countries in framing the history throughout the country.

Japan has even refused to accept the war guilt which it has done during Second World War (Spitzer 2012) . The Germany was also one of the countries, which has suffered during the Second World War. However, Germany has degraded the suffering suffered by its own people and has accepted the war guilt created by its country (Thomsett 1997: 13). The reverse has been done in Japan where they are portrayed as a hapless person and a victim of nuclear weapons. The main reason for this was that conservatives were not able to accept the war guilt of the Japan and to take responsibility during the war. Nevertheless, when LDP came into power, it also portrayed Japan as a nation which had defensive motives for the expansion, and they too neglected the issue of Japanese colonial past. The reason for doing is to protect the sense of pride among the Japanese people. If the sense of pride is distorted, then a nation may be compelled to take arms and to remilitarise. The Left in Japan also feels

that such a presentation of history is necessary to keep the threat of remilitarisation low and to keep Japan under the US security framework. The Left feels that this could be done by keeping the sense of victimisation alive in the minds of people and to keep the potent symbols of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alive.

Therefore, the domestic, institutional and bureaucratic politics present a unique case of Japan making it difficult to develop nuclear weapons as compared with other countries.

Comparison of Case Studies of France and Japan: Is the Extended Deterrence A Major Determinant in Nuclear Decision Making of Countries?

I have chosen two cases studies in which one country decided to opt for nuclear weapons despite having the US nuclear extended deterrence (France) and the other country decided not to develop nuclear weapons despite possessing all technological capabilities and presence of external deterrence (Japan). Japan does always declare that extended deterrence is an important part of extended deterrence but has also mentioned that it has no right to question the nuclear policies of the US, including the decision of the US to adopt NFU. As mentioned:

It goes without saying that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty forms the basis of Japan's security. The Japanese government is well aware of the fact that Japan is dependent on the US extended deterrent, including the nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, it is necessary that trust in this deterrence be backed up by sufficient capability. On the other hand, the Japanese government lauds the fact that President Obama called for a world without nuclear weapons • and that your government is taking the lead in global nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear abolition. Together with the United States, the Japanese Government also wishes to strive for the realization of this noble goal.

It was reported in some sections of the Japanese media that, during the production of the report of the 'Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States' released in May this year, Japanese officials of the responsible diplomatic section lobbied your government not to reduce the number of its nuclear weapons, or, more specifically, opposed the retirement of the United States' Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM/N) and requested that the United States maintain a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). However, the Japanese Government is not in a position to

judge whether it is necessary or desirable for your government to possess particular [weapons] systems. Hence, although the discussions were held under the previous Cabinet, it is my understanding that, in the course of exchanges between our countries, including the deliberations of the above mentioned Commission, the Japanese Government has expressed no view concerning whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems such as TLAM/N and RNEP.(Okada 2009)

The major difference between the two countries is that of preferences of civil society which are further translated into policies by state establishment which is reflected from the state policies and bureaucratic establishment. France opted for centralisation of power at the time of nuclear decision making, and Japan is manifested by decentralisation of power and consensus politics making it difficult to decide on nuclear factors. There were instability and decentralisation of power before the coming of De Gaulle's presidency. De Gaulle made a major change by amending the constitution of France and opting for making the President a strong head of the state. There were instability and frequent change of government in France. Such centralisation of power was essential to shift the people's preferences from domestic problems to the foreign policy problems. De Gaulle also glorifies the rich past of France and criticises the previous government which was held responsible for various colonial wars so as to make a shift in the preference of the people. It then moved forward to the centralisation of power and gave nuclear weapons to France to glorify it and to 'give proper place of France in the World.'

On the other hand, Japan has a majority of the LDP party since the Second World War. There was only one recent change as the government in 2009 when some other party takes over the LDP and that too only for the brief period which clearly shows that it got the people's support because it reflect the preference of a civil society. It decided to continue implementation of policies of not possessing nuclear weapons and continue to be under the US nuclear umbrella. Japan never presented its defeat during Second World War in a way to spread the nationalism throughout the country. Instead, it presented itself as a victim of nuclear weapons, which has suffered due to the militaristic politics of the previous regime. Therefore, it the government and bureaucratic politics only which framed the collective memory of the country and its ideological politics.

Therefore, based on preferences the state decides its policies. While de Gaulle has adopted the militaristic policies while Japan adopted the concept of Comprehensive National Security to make itself an economic power rather than a military power first. Therefore, the role of the extended deterrence of the US is of no consideration when it comes with the decision taken by its allies to build or not to build nuclear weapons. Instead, it is the bureaucratic and domestic politics which govern the nuclear weapon's decision making of the country.

5.4 Conclusion

There have been flaws in the international relations theory of Realism and Constructivism in explaining the role of Japan in the nuclear decision making. Realism describes it with the help of the 'buck-passing' techniques while constructivism describes it with the help of ideology. However, it the preference of the civil society which in turn decides the domestic and bureaucratic politics which describe best the nuclear decision making of the country. Just like the case of France, here too the extended deterrence of the US has no role to play in the decision making of the country. Japan's decision is more influenced by the bureaucratic and domestic politics which is independent of the US extended deterrence. The main reason for the maintenance of the FU and extended deterrence is to preserve the hegemony of the US which has been explained in the next chapter.

Chapter 6

Nuclear Hegemony and Non-Proliferation

Introduction

Hegemony in simple terms can be understood as the domination of the one actor over other through coercion or consent. It can also be regarded as the initiation of the system where the interests of the dominant actors are considered parallel to the interests of the other classes or actors in the system. It is believed that hegemony is needed to preserve peace and stability of the global system. The advantage of having a hegemonic power in the international system was first noticed in the economic field, and it was felt that the presence of hegemon will stabilise the system through material resources and secure the integrity and of the basic principles of the world system. For example, in 1929-39 when the US was responsible to construct the international economic system (Beach 2012: 192). Later, this was extended to security relations in the international order. It was felt that it is important to have hegemon so that he can provide –(1) Security (2) Economic Prosperity. It is said that in the present international system, a hegemon is responsible for maintaining peace in a number of ways. First, it will deter any renewed military competition by providing its own security over other members of the international system. Second, a hegemon could choose or strengthen international norms or conduct. Third, a hegemon economic power serves as the basis of global lending and free trade regime, providing economic incentives for states to cooperate (Griffiths 2015: 64). It has also been argued that as a system in which there is one predominant hegemon, it is more likely to have a cooperation of state as compared to other states where power is divided.

The US since the end of the cold war has occupied the place of a hegemon in the international relations. Kagan has mentioned that during the period of the US hegemony, the war has been rare, the global economy grows at the unprecedented rate and the number of democracies has been quadrupled (Kagan 2012: 37). In the absence of such a power, the international relations will be in the condition of a bargain where there will be threats as well as promises. Lieber also mentioned that ‘the maintenance of (the United States) leading international role matters greatly. The alternative would...be a more disorderly and dangerous world’ (Lieber 2012: 3).

Therefore, the US hegemonic power has been considered as important to maintain the international system- whether it is in the realm of economy or in the realm of security. The same thing apply thing applies to the question of nuclear weapons. The US from long has framed the rules of the international nuclear order and has unquestionably conferred upon itself the task of maintaining or changing the rules of the international nuclear order. As mentioned by William Walker, the Cold War Nuclear Order consists of two essential elements:

1. A Managed System of Deterrence- whereby, a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly rule - bound and controlled. Among other things, the system of deterrence consists of
 - a. The nuclear hardware deployed by the major powers together with the command and control systems which were building laboriously from 1950s.
 - b. A set of understandings and practices, expressed in the 'deterrence theories' of Brodie, Schelling and others and enunciated in nuclear doctrines, of how military forces of various kinds should be deployed and managed to provide mutual vulnerability and restraint
 - c. The provisions of hotlines, so that leaders could communicate in sudden crises
 - d. The placing of limits on missile deployments through arms control treaties whose negotiations and implementation also served to increase trust amongst political and military elites across the East-West divide
2. A Managed System of Abstinence- whereby other states would give up their rights to develop, hold and use such weapons in return for economic, security and other benefits. It consist of:
 - a. The nuclear umbrella extended over allies of the US and the USSR, including the two Germanies and Japan, which made them feel reasonably secure without their own nuclear weapons.
 - b. The formation of a non-proliferation regime, with the multilateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its heart. The NPT asserted among other things that the five states that had already acquired nuclear weapons by 1967 and only those states had legal rights to possess them. Other states could only join the treaty by renouncing nuclear weapons and having their renunciations fully verified through international safeguard. The NPT ought to draw a line in the sand and to submit states other than the five to a powerful normative pressure to forego the nuclear option (Walker 2000: 706).

The system of international nuclear order was disturbed after the end of the cold war. The two institutions which supported the systems of deterrence, and abstinence were merged into the single system dedicated to the marginalisation of the nuclear weapons in the international politics (Walker 2000: 703). The most important goal of the US has become to stop the proliferation of the nuclear weapons – by force or by consent - to ensure its domination in international atomic order to ensure the stable nuclear order, the US pressed the concepts like extended deterrence and FU policies, which are ultimately linked to non-proliferation. However, the question is whether we need such a nuclear hegemon to sustain the rules of atomic order? How far this system has been successful?

Hegemony in the International Relations and its application in the context of Nuclear Weapons

Various scholars have attempted to explain the meaning of term ‘hegemony.’ Robert Glipin defines hegemony as ‘the leadership of one state (the hegemon) over the other states in the system’ (Glipin 1981: 116). Robert Keohane and Nye mentioned that hegemony is present ‘when one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so’ (Keohane and Nye 1977: 44). Christopher Layne mentioned that ‘hegemony is about will’ (Layne 2007: 2) He said that he if there are more than one powerful states in the international relations, the hierarchical relationship exists in international relations.

1. Hegemony is about raw power, hard power. Militarily, a hegemony’s capabilities are such that no other state has the wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it.
2. In economic term, the hegemon occupies the economic supremacy and enjoys the material pre ponderance over the other states. Economic hegemon is important because wealth is the foundation of military power and is also a source of hegemonic power in its own right and a key factor behind achieving hegemonic expansion.
3. The Hegemon is about dominant power conditions. A hegemon will self interestingly creates a stable international order which will safeguard its own security and its economic and ideological interests.

4. Hegemony is about polarity. Because of its overwhelming advantages in power, a hegemon by definition is a unipolar power.
5. Hegemony is about will. Not only must a hegemon must possess an overwhelming power, but also the will to exercise such power. (Layne 2007:3)

Robert Jervis (2006) notes that hegemon is not equal to any to state but rather different from other states due to the kind of roles attached to it. It is also important to note that the Hegemony and uni-polarity have to be examined as different concepts. Unipolarity refers to a distribution of material capabilities – one that overwhelmingly favours a single state (Jervis 2006: 11) However; hegemony has both power and social relations. Hegemony means that one actor has the power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own interests (Glipin 1981:32). Hegemony needs some kind of consensus on the desirability of the dominated state to seek leadership. In that context, hegemony requires legitimacy to contain. Therefore, it is also different from imperialism, which requires the only formal rules over the political entity (Mastanduno 2005: 179).

Various theories of international relations have tried to explain the context hegemony in international relations. Liberal theories have also explained the context of hegemony by stating that an open or 'liberal' economic order requires existence of a hegemon or dominant power so as to make it stable (Harrison 2004: 19). Realist explanation of hegemony rests on the basic assumptions of anarchy and state survival. It states that the unitary actors are the principal actors in the international politics in which survival necessitates an endless struggle for supremacy and material advantages. Under such condition, the one state tries to have the paramount advantage as compared to other states and allows it to organise political, territorial and economic relations in terms of their respective security and economic interests' (Konrad 2012). For example, the UK and the US assumed dominant position because of their economic and political relationship. The realist school also considers the fact that hegemonic power will try to prevent the rise of other rivals by suppression of their rise of such powers. The Liberal theory of the international relations also gave importance to the context of hegemony in international relations. Charles Kindleberger has mentioned that the

depression of 1930 happened because of the failure of any other country to impose open economic order and ward off the economic policies (Kindleberger 1986: 11).

The most comprehensive explanation of hegemon has been given by Gramsci (Mouffe 1979:184). Gwyn Williams defined the Gramsci's concept of hegemony as:

By hegemony, Gramsci seems to mean sociological institution, in his terminology, a 'moment' in which the philosophy and practice of society fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spiritual taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations (Williams 1960: 587).

The Gramscian approaches to international relations re-introduce the concept of politics into historical materialism (Gills 1993: 186). The Gramscian approach states that it is not only the military and the economic capabilities of the state which are responsible for the hegemonic transitions of the state. However, class alliances are built and how new ideology is employed in order to construct and legitimate a hegemonic order (Gills 1993: 186). Gramsci maintains that in order to be hegemonic, the state has to find the world order which is universal in conception. This means the establishment of a kind of order, which is compatible with the interests of the all other state and not the one in which one-state oppresses the other states. Gramsci believes that such kind of order is brought into fore only by the state which has seen and experienced the political and economic revolutions. In such a condition, such revolutions are extended beyond the borders and made their presence globally (Cox 1983: 57). For example, the French revolution which spread its ideas internationally. In such conditions, the economic, social, political and cultural revolutions became the patterns of emulations abroad. In such conditions, the subordinate countries end up in adopting the model of the dominant country.

Gramsci concept of Hegemony is intended to help in the analysis of the relation between social forces of a particular period. It generally refers to a relation between social classes, in which one class fraction or class grouping takes a leading role through gaining the active consent of other classes and groups. Hegemony is

therefore, not a relation of coercive forces as such (as viewed in the realist theory) but rather primarily one of the consent gained through ‘intellectual and moral’ leadership. In Marxism, a mode of production is commonly believed to have three main levels or aspects- economic, political and ideological. Gramscian added three more to it – ethico political to his idea of the mode of production in the civil society. He also developed the Hegel’s distinction between the ‘private civil society’ and ‘public political society’ (that is state) although the issue is not exactly that of public and private. The issue here is the contrast between the consent (which primarily characteristics the civil society) and coercion (which underpins but does not constitute exclusively, the power of the state) (Gill 1990: 42).

Gramsci has explained both the restricted and the extended concept of state. The restricted concept of state correspond concept of state corresponds to the ‘political society’ which refers to the state’s formal government apparatus (Administrative, legal and coercive). The extended concept of state sees the state as fused with both ‘political’ and ‘civil’ society. In other words, according to Gramsci, the separation between public and private conceptions of state is only methodological and failed to reflect in actual circumstances. This was because organisations on the civil society often have a public aspect: the leaders of the trade union, employers association, church, political party, the media or even freemasons lodge might be drawn into the state either directly or indirectly (Gill 1990: 43). As Gramsci put up:

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructure levels: the one that can be called ‘civil society; and that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called private and that of the political society or the state. ...these two levels correspond to the functions of hegemony which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of direct domination or command exercised through the state and juridical government. He said that there is a proper relation between the state and the civil society (Butler et al 2000: 47)

In the west, there was a proper relation between the State and civil society, and when the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortress and earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next (Powell 2007: 113).

Therefore, 'the state was the entire complex of theoretical and practical activities with which the ruling class not only maintains its dominance, but manages to win the consent of this society, hegemony armoured by coercion' (Nash 2001: 13). Therefore, even a major crisis will not result into political crises.

Therefore, in order to bring change, the worker's party needs to take steps to have political and cultural education of the masses, institution-building, and the creation of links with potential political elites. This he termed as 'war of position' as against 'war of moment.' To explain that how it could be carried out, he explained the concept of a historical bloc

Historic Bloc refers to that situation when there is high degree of political congruence between 'sets of relations of force.' The first relation of force is material, for example, the level of the forces of production, the number and location of cities etc. The second was political, that is relating to the development of classes and their level of political consciousness. The third was military, including domestic uses of military power as well as the geo-political-military forces which configured the development of particular society (Reich 1998: 14).

Further, he identified three moments in the development of consciousness. The first is the economic-cooperative which was manifested when a tradesman 'feels tradesman' 'feels obliged to stand by another tradesman, a manufacture by another manufacture, but the tradesman does not yet feel solidarity with the manufacture (Gramsci 1971: 181). 'The second is the solidarity of economic interests of the same members of the class. This involved posing questions of the state and its reform 'but within the existing fundamental structure (Gramsci 1971: 181).' The third, most important political movement occurred when

One becomes aware that one's own cooperative interests, in their present and future development, transcend the cooperative limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of the other subordinate groups too. This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of complex superstructures. ...bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all questions around which the struggle rages not on 'cooperate' but on a 'universal' plane and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups (Gramsci 1971:182).

A historic bloc is a link between the structure and superstructure. He also mentioned:

Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed-in other words the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-cooperate kind. But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity (Gramsci 1971: 182).

Now coming to world hegemony:

World hegemony is described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be three of all. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms, which lay down general rules for the behavior of states, and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries-rules which support the dominant production of state (Cox 1992:137).

What is meant by the historic bloc at international level?

Following Gramsci, it means a political constellation which reflects an international congruence of objective and subjective forces. At the political level, this would mean the international coalitions of interests. As it should be evident from earlier explanations of the historic block, such a block is a diff from the 'transnational class alliance.' This is because it involves more than one element. Because of its trans-class nature, such a bloc is more organic and rooted in social structure. It is also embedded in the modes of thoughts of key individuals in government and of groups and institutions in various civil societies.

Today, the US hegemony is the fact of international politics. 'The US' as put by Robert Art in 2006, 'the most powerful global actor the world has ever seen.' American position is unprecedented because the US is the only country which has achieved hegemony in its own region and in other parts of world. (Layne 2007: 5). Since the end of cold, the aim of the US has been to develop itself as a hegemonic

power. The first notable example of the US hegemonic ambitions is the Pentagon's Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) which states that the objective of the US is to maintain hegemony by preventing the emergence of new power in Europe and East Asia (Department of Defence 1992: 21). Clinton followed what was mentioned in the DPG and stated that the US is the 'preeminent and the sole power' of the global system. 1997 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) also mentioned that 'US grand strategy is to sustain the American leadership by reducing the chances of the new great or regional powers that could emerge to challenge the US' (Cohen 1997: 5) The National Security Strategy (NSSS) also stated the similar hegemonic conditions as it mentioned 'Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States' (The US Department of State 2002: 30). This policy has been well interrupted by the international affairs specialist John Ikenberry which stated that 'grand strategy (that) begins with a fundamental commitment to maintaining a unipolar world in which the United States has no competitor,' condition that is to be 'permanent (so) that no state or coalition could ever challenge (the US) as global leader, protector and enforcer' (Chomsky 2003: 21).

It is often believed that the US should continue with the hegemonic system as the US provides the 'reassurance' and 'security' to its Eurasian allies by acting as a 'stabiliser' established and 'peacemaker.' The US military interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia show the role of the US as a 'stabiliser' of peace. American grand strategy is based on the belief that if the US abdicated its role as a regional stabiliser, Europe and East Asia will sink back to the days of multipolarity (Layne 2007: 27). It was also mentioned in 1997 QDR, if the credibility of the US commitment to maintain regional stability is questioned that 'in turn could cause its allies and friends to adopt more divergent defence policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which we rely to protect our interests abroad' (Report on *Quadrennial Defence Review* 1997: 31) The importance of the US as a stabilizer has been mentioned by the US defence secretary William Perry. He said that 'that we should pull back our forces....and allow normal balance of power politics to fill the security vacuum.' If the US did this, he claims, historical animosities would remerge and arms race will be triggered, causing instability and will dramatically increasing the conflict.(Layne 2007: 27)

In order to ensure its hegemony, the US relies on 1. Bilateral relationship with another state. The principal bilateral ties in this context are with Japan and South Korea. 2. Multilateral Security networks 3. Extended deterrence (Mastanduno 2005: 180). US hegemony has helped to keep major power at bay and also used to reassure smaller states whose security or autonomy might be threatened by other major players. (Mastanduno 2005: 180)

The US wished to maintain its hegemony from the very first inception of the nuclear weapons. As mentioned by President Truman after the bombings of Nagasaki:

The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be let loose in a lawless world. We must constitute ourselves as the trustee of this new force to prevent its misuse and to turn it into the channel of service to mankind. It is an awful responsibility which has come to us. We thank god that this responsibility has come to us rather than to our enemy (Fousek 2005: 22).

It is important here to note that the US hegemony was built up by the participation of the various countries. These countries came together to deal with the communism which emerged after the WWII, and it has recognised the US as a hegemon. A hegemonic order which was established this way has gained legitimacy because this structure satisfies not only the US interests but also the interests of the subject countries who were loyal to this system at various levels. However, after the conclusion of the cold war, the communism was not considered as the main threat and therefore, the basis of the American hegemony disappeared. As a result, it became difficult for the US to maintain its hegemonic presence due to the disappearance of the Soviet Union threat. As a result, the other countries began to question the presence of the US hegemony (Hinderbrett 2009: 230). Therefore, it became difficult for the US to gain support from its allies and international society in the area of the foreign policy initiative. The US began to search the new vision which will be based on the common interest so as to reconstruct the American hegemony. The incident of 9/11 provided such a justification for the US to maintain its hegemony. The US again tried to build the common threat perception of the terrorism and threat of rogue states who are trying to develop or to take away the nuclear weapons. As a result, the US administration associates its interests with the interests of the other states under the globalised threat of terrorism and rogue states and tried to gain support of the US on the war of terror.

This conception of maintaining the US hegemony has been seen in various policy and official documents of the US. For example, QDR 2014 has mentioned that the US allies and its partners are facing unpredictable challenge from the regimes of North Korea and Iran. The threat to the US and its allies is arising from the violent extremism and sectarian conflict coming from the fragile states. Therefore, to address it, the US has to rely on the economic strength and on the strong network of alliances. Under this framework, the nuclear deterrence of the US is important to protect not only the US homeland, but also to protect the allies against regional aggression. The US needs to project its forces so as to combat terrorism globally in places like Yemen, Afghanistan and Mali (QDR 2014: 3). The QDR also mentioned that ‘the US remains committed to protecting its interests, sustaining US leadership and preserving global stability, security and peace’ (QDR 2014: 55).

Therefore, the US has given itself the role of preserving the international peace, security and order. It is important to note here the US hegemony in the context of the nuclear weapon's realm. The US has been the part of the nuclear weapons policy debate since the 1991. The reason for this is that the US was the first country to invent nuclear weapons and the first one to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. Nuclear Weapons have helped the US to maintain itself as one of the superpowers in the cold war period. The US relied on the nuclear weapons to deter the conventional war of the Soviet Union on the Western Europe by including the countries of Western Europe under the nuclear umbrella. Nuclear Weapons also made the US one of the important countries in the international institutions of the UNSC (Cimbala 2001: 1). As mentioned, the nuclear weapons have been the important part of the US world position since 1945. (Querster 2001: 7). In the nuclear context, the US has publicised the nuclear non-proliferation as the very basis of the nuclear order and therefore, the US has taken itself the responsibility to achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation at the international level. The US mentioned repeatedly that the threat was arising from the attempts of Al Qaeda to develop nuclear weapons and the proliferation of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea. The below mentioned points clearly shows that the possession of nuclear weapons does pose a threat to the US nuclear hegemony: Even the small number of nuclear weapons in the hands of the adversary will definitely affect the nuclear weapons behaviour of the US and its allies in any

regional crises. Clearly, the US cannot dictate its own terms when it comes to nuclear weapons possession by the small regional power, for example, North Korea.

1. The possession of the nuclear weapons by the regional adversary is for no doubt the powerful tool for collapsing regional military coalitions that the US might have developed in future to deal with regional issues. Thus, it will directly challenge the US nuclear hegemony.
2. The US may be faced with the challenge of development and design of the military forces for destroying even the small nuclear arsenals represent a technical and budgetary challenge to the US thus leading to the degradation of the US hegemony and freedom to act according to its own will (Molander and Wilson 1995: 16).

The US said that they needed extended deterrence to protect the allies and to discourage nuclear weapons proliferation among them. Therefore, the US took itself the responsibility to discourage nuclear proliferation and for this, it wishes to preserve its nuclear hegemony.

International Order and International Nuclear Order

It is important to understand that what kind of nuclear order the US as a hegemon is trying to preserve. The most prominent work in the field of nuclear international order is the one done by Hedley Bull. He has defined international order as ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of society of states, or international society’ (Bull 1997: 8). Bull does not specify the proper meaning of the phrase ‘pattern of activity’ and said that order is made by purposive actions, including rule making, power balancing and even recourse to war among other activities, which can entail the previously established order.’ On the other hand, Alagappa defines an international order as ‘a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule governed interactions among sovereign states in their pursuit of individual and collective goals’ (Alagappa 2003: 131) Now, William Walker has applied the definition of the Hedley Bull in explaining the international nuclear order. He defined international nuclear order as:

Given the existence of nuclear technology, the international nuclear order entails evolving patterns of thought and activity that serve the primary goals of world survival, war avoidance and economic development; and the quest for a tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities, practices, rights and obligations of the states (Bull 1997: 183).

Here, it is important to note that presence of an international nuclear order necessitates the presence of a hegemony which could play an important role in preserving the nuclear order to its own advantage and to the advantage of the other states. Here, the US has emerged as one of such 'nuclear hegemon.' As mentioned by Schurmann:

Nuclear policy was the weapon with which America build its empire, for no other policy so clearly stated America's global intentions with ramifications for everything else. Nuclear policy was a pure policy in that its operational consequences were nil or limited to building and deploying nuclear weapons , which, of course could not be used. The operational consequences came in other areas-military, political, economic and even cultural (Schurmann 1974:113) .

However, that does not mean that the presence of the nuclear hegemon weapons means the hegemony itself. There are examples of states that possess the nuclear weapons but are unable to build international orders around it such as China. Further, there are examples of state, which had hegemonic intentions but were unable to achieve it with nuclear weapons like France. What made the US a nuclear hegemon is its ability to construct an international nuclear order around its nuclear policies and to convince other states about the futility of maintaining international nuclear order, which will also be beneficial to it.

Since the advent of nuclear weapons, the US was awakening to the three main fact of the nuclear age. First, there is a difference between the war waged by the nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. The nuclear weapons reduced the time of war, and states could carry an all out attack in minutes. Secondly, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the additional states will result from the creation of security dilemmas. It will also have the capacity to disturb the additional security dilemmas. Third, it is impossible to stop the proliferation of material and know-how. Knowledge to make nuclear weapons will definitely diffuse creating a risk of status-quo. This makes it necessary to maintain and create the international order of nuclear weapons. In order

to escape from the above-mentioned risks of nuclear weapons, a nuclear order was founded, which was based on a system of deterrence and system of abstinence. It is normally believed that possession of nuclear weapons by five nuclear weapons state is considered as legal, and it is a kind of trust, which could be extended to no other states. In the meantime, all the states should work together cooperatively to dissolve the system of deterrence and to install the nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, the US installs a nuclear order where nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat, to the extent, 'it threatens to extend and intensify the arms race and to increase the difficulties of avoiding war' (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1665). The other basic strand based on it was that the possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear weapons is a temporary trust which cannot be extended to the other states. Hence, nuclear proliferation is the norm which would be ultimately replaced by the the nuclear disarmament in the future, and it found its expression in NPT Article VI. The US became the centre of this nuclear order because of its possession of the largest amount of the nuclear weapons and by its ability to change the games of nuclear weapons according to its own wishes. As mentioned rightly by Walker, 'the problem of nuclear order was narrowed to the problem of proliferation, and was further narrowed to non-compliance with treaty obligations and preventing weapons of mass destruction to fall in the hands of terrorist' (Walker 2007: 446)

Therefore, after the end of cold war, the US came up with the concepts of nuclear extended deterrence, which necessitated the existence of first use and therefore, preserve the non-proliferation regime. This will in turn, will maintain the international nuclear order and therefore, will maintain peace and stability in the coming decades. This will also ensure the continuation of the US nuclear hegemony by gaining mutual consent about the existence of the large amount of nuclear weapons in the hands of the US under the pretext of protecting allies and to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the concepts of hegemony and nuclear weapons are related to each other, which were previously not considered during the Gramsci's time. The fact that nuclear weapons shaped the world politics since their existence shows that it could also be in an important ingredient of the hegemonic recipe. This also gave fuel to the fact that American hegemony could be due to the existence of these weapons in its

own hand. The nuclear weapons also reflect the concentration of power in the hand of superior power, which would play a role of hegemony.

Initially, the aim of the US was to maintain nuclear hegemony and nuclear monopoly as it soon test its nuclear weapons or dropped the nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, it is impossible to maintain such a type of nuclear superiority as the rival states will also go for development of nuclear weapons. This condition is similar to the condition where Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons. Here, each state will try to attain nuclear superiority in comparison to its rival so as to maintain superiority. The proponents of MAD stated that such kind of nuclear superiority is fruitless as no country can be sure whether it could completely devastate the nuclear weapons of the opponent state and are therefore, always vulnerable to the nuclear devastation. However, the great powers are never contended with the situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and continuously strive for nuclear weapon's superiority. A great power which can attain atomic superiority will be a nuclear hegemony and will fear no attacks from the rival states. This is the main reason that states try to maintain and achieve nuclear hegemony. Here, the US wants to preserve its nuclear hegemony and to gain acceptance of its large arsenals of nuclear weapons it gave the reason to preserve the nuclear order. The US is totally opposed to the concept of proliferation, and it tries to create the hegemonic non-proliferation order to its advantage. However, this raised the other question that whether we need such a nuclear hegemony to preserve the nuclear order which has adopted different rules for nuclear weapons as compared to other states?

Do we need a Nuclear Hegemon to Preserve an International Nuclear Order?

The problem is that nuclear order which was mentioned and which the US strived to maintain has faced the problem of instability, which has removed the need of having the presence of nuclear hegemony. The question has been raised reputedly about the legitimacy of the possession of nuclear weapons continuously by one state while it is considered illegitimate for the other states, The US has also dramatise the concept of possession of nuclear weapons by the other state while allowing the other states to have nuclear weapons. Furthermore, there are no steps taken either by the international community or by the US to achieve the aim of nuclear weapon's disarmament.

The problem here is that the US has turned down the efforts of making efforts to have atomic disarmament. If observed, the US is more concerned with the technological solutions of the nuclear disarmament as reflected in international proposals of Baruch plan to national missile-defence programme. As mentioned by Maddock, 'American hegemony combined with arrogance and Hobbesian worldview catalyst nuclear nationalism in other states and helped to break the bound of Washington's influence.' The US not only kept the large arsenals of nuclear weapons but has also adopted the policy of nuclear FU to keep the prospect of carrying out nuclear weapons attack in the future. The justification of FU comes from extended deterrence posture, which is again a way of the US to strengthen its hegemonic positions. As a result, the other states are able to see clearly the importance enjoyed by nuclear weapons and try to get it as soon as they have the will and access of the technology. They changed the rules of domestic policy disturbance in the nuclear order is the in unequal treatment of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states at international level and further enhancement of this difference by nuclear weapons modernization modernisation of the US. This argument is often as soon as they have chance to do so.

Therefore, the reason for used and exaggerated by the other states for pursue of a nuclear weapons programme under the cover of attaining domestic-political goals. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan clearly shows that the US hegemony has been unable to prevent the stability of the global nuclear order. The US nuclear arsenals, under such conditions, strive to have one main goal, *i.e.*, the rise of another nuclear hegemony, which could overthrow its hegemony. Consequently, it is busy in modernisation of weapons and even in the development of NMD systems. Also, the reality is that the chair of 'nuclear hegemony' could never be empty because if the US falls, there will be other powers in line to take over and to build an international nuclear orders according to its own rules. The US is quite aware of this fact and is presently striving to maintain and survive its nuclear hegemonic conditions-not to preserve the global nuclear order but to achieve its own aims and objectives from the concepts of extended deterrence, FU and non-proliferation.

Another reason for the failure of the international nuclear order is that the US is unable to maintain and sustain the determinants of the international nuclear order, as explained below:

a. Common Interest

In order to maintain the international nuclear order and hegemonic interests, it is important to evolve the 'common interests' of states. The conception of 'national interests' and 'the interests of states' interrupt the behaviour of the states and help to ascertain that how they will behave in the international system. 'Common Interests' are established from the fact that they will be able to achieve the ends and objectives of security, prosperity and ideological objectives, etc. by following particular interests (Bull 1997: 63). The US when establish the concept of extended deterrence and try to establish the concept of 'common interests' through it by propagating that the states under extended deterrence will be able to achieve both the security and economic interests. The nuclear component is added to provide security to the allies along with the logic of justifying the concepts of FU policy and non-proliferation. However, the problem which arises in the international nuclear order is that some concepts which are beneficial to the one state are not agreed upon by the other states due to different ideologies and concepts of 'national interests.' For example, India will not apply the concept of extended deterrence or being the part of the US ally system due to the concept of 'nonalignment Similarly, there are states like North Korea and Iran, who do not share cordial relationship with the US and have even begun to question the US powerful presence in their neighbouring areas. For example, North Korean fears the presence of the US nuclear weapons in neighbouring South Korea under the pretext of extended deterrence. Similarly, China and North Korea are against the extended deterrence provided to Japan and use it as an excuse to develop their own independent arsenals. Such countries thought the development of nuclear weapons as an important way to get rid of the US pressures on domestic policies and to preserve independence from the US in internal matters.

It is important here to note that the US faces opposition not only from the states who have different political orientations from the US. They have faced opposition from the friends and allies also. The US has faced difficulty in

translating the material power into political outcomes. The problem is that the US allies, and friends have also begun to see American hegemony as troubling. The US allies have also begun to see the concentration of nuclear weapons in the hands of the US, including nuclear weapons, as quite troubling situation. The US allies also increasingly became alarm over the way the US could use its strength and force to translate the world order. As Walt has mentioned, 'while the Americans are debating how to use the power, the rest of the world is occupied with the question of how to tame the American power' (Walt 2005: 106). Therefore, the US is not able to invoke the concept of 'common interest' while accumulating the military power thus creating disturbances in the global nuclear order.

Their domestic politics and domestic public opinion did not stand for being the part of extended deterrence. In fact, the concepts of extended deterrence provided further motivation to the other countries to build and justify their independent nuclear weapons arsenals. Similarly, there are rivals like China and Russia, who have always questioned the concepts of extended deterrence and existence of a large number of nuclear weapons even after the end of cold war. China and Russia consider the concept of 'extended deterrence' as targeted against them and help in further proliferation of nuclear weapons to the 'like-minded' countries to end the US hegemony, and the US based nuclear order. This also reflects the ideological differences between the countries which are generally framed by the domestic-political institutions only. This further creates disturbance in the international nuclear order.

b. Rules

The establishment of 'common interest' is not enough for the establishment of world order. It is important to form the rules of establishing the international order. These rules may have status of international law, of moral values, of custom or established practice, or they must be established practice, or they must be operational rules or 'rules of game' worked out without formal agreements and verbal communications. Here, the rule of the international nuclear order is that of establishment of a non-proliferation regime (Bull 1997: 64). The US, at lengths, has explained the reasons for establishment of a non-

proliferation regime by stating that nuclear weapons are quite dangerous and therefore, should not be spread over the hands of other 'not so responsible' states. The US has tried to convince the other states also that non-proliferation is an important rule to achieve the stable nuclear order. The reason often cited for this is that nuclear weapons are quite dangerous technology and are not easy to get hold with. This means that it is difficult to protect the nuclear technology, and it could lead to the spread of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups or rogue states. Therefore, it is important to protect the nuclear weapons in the hands of few nations who have learned the expertise of protecting these highly dangerous arsenals. To ensure the rule of non-proliferation, the US has followed the policy of both binding agreements in the form of NPT and the coercive use of force as happened during Iraq. For this, the US felt a need to have both the policy of extended deterrence and FU. However, as shown in previous chapter, the domestic determinants do have an important role in decision-making of the nuclear weapons. The policy of FU also ensures that the US ensures the possibility of use of nuclear weapons so as to destroy the efforts of nuclear weapons build-up of any other country, e.g. bunker busting.

However, the problem is that the US has different rules of proliferation for different countries. For example, the US has accepted the nuclear weapons status of India and Pakistan while it imposed continuous sanctions on the nuclear programme of Iran and North Korea. The US has raised no voice of concern against the secret nuclear weapons programme of Israel. Therefore, the US has different rules of proliferation for different countries, which have made difficult to sustain the global nuclear order. Also, the US has often mentioned that the non-proliferation will ultimately lead to nuclear disarmament. However, no steps have been taken to ensure the nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the countries in current world situation are not very conscious of having a nuclear non-proliferation regime. In that sense, the rules of order are not followed, and therefore, it made the stability of the international nuclear order difficult to achieve.

c. *Existence of Institutions*

The establishment of particular rules also requires the enforcement of these rules by the international authority by 'self-help' system of state, by restoring rules by use of war or by establishment of the international institutions (Bull 1997: 68). However, the problem here is that such kinds of enforcement actions are not present in the current international nuclear order. The reason is that self-help system with regard to nuclear weapons is not available. As soon as the domestic priorities of the state shift, the state can decide to go for the nuclear weapons development. Also, the restoration of war was the classical method to ensure the existence of the balance of power. However, this method is now difficult to apply due to destructive nature of the nuclear weapons. The US and other western countries have adopted the method of NPT regime to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the NPT is not the effective way to ensure the regime's non-proliferation because a state can withdraw from it as soon as it took a decision to build nuclear weapons. For example, North Korea withdrew from the NPT to build nuclear weapons. Therefore, there is no way to ensure that rules of the international nuclear order are clearly followed. This led to instability of the global nuclear order.

Further Problem with the US policy of Non-Proliferation and International Nuclear Order

It is important to note here that there are two important schools of thoughts with regard to the policy of the US nuclear non-proliferation. The first one states that all kinds of proliferation are bad. All states aspiring for nuclear proliferation should be discouraged, and nuclear weapons should be the reserve of only few people. On the other hand, the second school of thought mentioned that the US may favour the selective proliferation of the states and may favour nuclear weapons of the states which follow the rules of the international nuclear order. This policy of 'selective proliferation' has been the part and parcel of the US policy since the end of the cold war. However, this has been largely criticised by states. At the time of India and Pakistan's nuclear testing, a question was raised that why should India and Pakistan need to have the US approval to develop nuclear weapons while, on the other hand, Israel could hide its 'nuclear weapons in basement?' Similarly, India-US nuclear deal

was seen as the favoured treatment given to proliferators which was not provided either to Pakistan or North Korea.

Therefore, this selective approach of proliferation shows the hypocrisy of the US non-proliferation regime. It also leads to further proliferation of nuclear weapons because states tried to get hold of nuclear weapons to achieve the economic, political, or other favours of abstinence. The recent example of this is Iran and North Korea. This results in the rise of new nuclear power which shows failure of the hegemony and also disturbances in the present international nuclear order. As shown in below mentioned table:

Table 10: Rising New Nuclear Nations After the end of cold war (Blackwill and Carnesale 1997: 36-37)

Country Name	Nuclear Material	Warhead Design	Warhead Numbers	Means of Delivery	Organization	Doctrine
Israel	Pu, Large Stocks	Fission, Thermonuclear	100+	Missile SRBM, IRBM, Aircraft	Small, Secret, Eventual Separate Command	Deter Nuclear Use, Counter-City Targeting ,
Pakistan	Heu, Pu, Limited Stocks	Fission	10+	Aircraft Missile SRBM Unconventional	Small, Secret, Eventual Separate Command	Counter-City Deterrent, War Terminator via Early Battlefield Use
Algeria	Pu(?)	Fission	1(?)	Aircraft, Unconventional	Small, Secret	(?)
Egypt	Pu(?)	Fission	1-3	Missile Aircraft	Small, Secret	Deter Nuclear Use or Coercion, Political Positioning
Iran	Heu(?) Pu(?)	Fission	1-3	Aircraft, Missile, SRBM, Unconventional	Small, Secret	Counter city deterrent of outside involvement
Iraq	Heu Limited Stocks	Fission	1-3	Aircraft , Unconventional	Small, Secret	Deterrent of outside involvement, Nuclear Coercion
Libya	Heu (Diverted)	Fission	1-3(?)	Missile, Unconventional	Small, Secret	Nuclear Coercion(?), Deter Outside Reprisal
North Korea	Pu Very Limited Stocks	Fission	<10	Aircraft, Missile, SRBM, Unconventional	Small, Secret	Last Resort Deterrent, Nuclear Coercion
Syria	Pu(?) Heu(?)	Fission	1(?)	Missile, Unconventional	Small, Secret	Deter Nuclear Use, Enhance Political Position

Conclusion

The above discussion clearly shows that the global international nuclear order is very fragile and even the presence of hegemon could not stabilise it. After the cold war, the US tries to use the strength at its disposal to frame the international nuclear order as it was the only country left with such a large amount of nuclear arsenals. As Richard Hass has pointed out that ‘the US overreaching objective was to integrate other countries into arrangements that will sustain the world consistent with US interests and values and thereby promotes the peace, prosperity and security.’ However, the problem that was created was that the US nuclear order concepts had created a lot of inequality and therefore, other states also begun to question the concepts of the US order, for example, FU policy. This leads to the point that the maintenance of the US hegemony does not ensure the stability of the international order and therefore, renders the concepts of FU and extended deterrence questionable.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis clearly shows that the US does preserve the FU policy so as to use it in warfare. There is obviously no other reason to maintain nuclear weapons at such a high alert other than to use it first in the conflict. The US could launch nuclear weapons within 5 to 15 minutes, after such an order has been given. In order to justify the FU policy, large stockpiling of nuclear weapons and high alert status of nuclear weapons, the US stressed on the interrelationship between the extended deterrence, non-proliferation and FU. This study analyses three main kinds of relationship established between extended deterrence, non-proliferation, FU of nuclear weapons and hegemony, as maintained from the US point of view:

1. The FU policy is required to strengthen the US extended deterrence posture thus removing the incentive of the US allies to develop nuclear weapons programme and is therefore contributing to nuclear non-proliferation accord.
2. The FU policy, extended deterrence posture and non-proliferation policies contribute to the establishment of the US nuclear hegemony which will in turn help to establish the global nuclear order.
3. The FU, extended deterrence and hegemony are essential concepts in maintaining the global nuclear order which will in turn help in maintaining peace and stability and to prevent the global nuclear catastrophe.

However, the question raised by this study was whether the stated link of FU and extended deterrence is enough to prevent states from going nuclear. If that was the case why France has decided to go for independent nuclear arsenal in spite of being the part of the US security arrangements? On the other hand, Japan has decided not to adopt nuclear weapons despite facing nuclear threats from China and North Korea. This study found that domestic factors as explained by the liberal theory of international relations are more important in explaining the behaviour of the state. The state is influenced by the preferences of the civil society which in turn are translated into policy by the state. The expression of people's preferences is found in the form of

public policy and state bureaucratic and institutional arrangement. This does not mean to apply to only democratic government but also to the authoritarian government which in turn reflects the preference of party or individual in power. The most likely changes in the government policy on nuclear weapons can occur when there is a sudden shift in preferences of the civil society. Such changes in preferences could be due to the reason that the previous preferences of civil society have been satisfied or found wrongly formed and therefore new preferences came into existence. For example, the Iran-US nuclear deal of 2014 happened only when there is a shift in preference of the civil society and this has been reflected in the change in government. Before this, the Iranian government was determined to develop its own nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the preferences of the civil society are an important factor in explaining the nuclear behaviour of the state. The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and FU has been used by the US to fulfil its own political gains. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that although the states possessing nuclear weapons have been grown in numbers, the total number of nuclear weapons decreased, as compared to the Cold War. Therefore, the threat has been reduced, as compared to cold war which has made the condition for NFU more viable.

It is also important to note that states that went for nuclear weapons programme during the Cold War like France, Great Britain, Israel, China and South Africa have nothing to do with the US policies or the Cold War rivalry. The other important events such as decolonisation, tensions in the Middle East, the changing balance of power in East Asia and South Asia were important reasons for states to opt for nuclear weapons (Perry and Schlesinger 2009:7). This further raised the question as why these concepts are then adopted by the US and what is so unique about the concept of 'non-proliferation' for which the states at large accept the US based concepts of FU and extended deterrence.

The US has explained the concept of non-proliferation and the difference of approaches after the Cold War:

During the Cold War, proliferation was strongly inhibited by the relationships of extended deterrence established by

the United States (and also by the Soviet Union) and by creation of the non-proliferation regime. As noted above, there were even instances of successful proliferation 'roll back' during the Cold War, including that of South Africa among others. But since the end of the Cold War, proliferation has also continued, as demonstrated by Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and by nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006. Today, Iran stands at the brink of nuclear weapons capability. Such proliferation is troubling for various reasons. It calls into question, in the minds of some, the viability of the non-proliferation regime. It stimulates interest in further proliferation among neighbouring states. It raises questions about the safety and security of the nuclear arsenals and weapons establishments in these countries. It creates new supplier networks outside of existing international control mechanisms. Proliferation to belligerent states opposed to the United States and/or the regional status quo is particularly troubling for various reasons. It could lead some leaders to believe that they are able to use nuclear threats to coerce their neighbours or to deter the United States and/or international coalitions from protecting those neighbours. This could embolden belligerent states to commit acts of aggression or domestic transgressions that would require very risky efforts to redress. Such proliferation also increases the risk that nuclear weapons will end up in the hands of a terror group.

The concept of non-proliferation is highlighted by the US in the post- cold war period to prevent the spread of dangerous nuclear weapons in the hands of those states which do not have robust command and control structure. Under such conditions, nuclear weapons could either be transferred to terrorist who can then plan a larger adventure that 11 September 2001 or could be fired by the state, either accidentally or intentionally and bring disturbances in the global nuclear order. This necessitates the presence of the US nuclear hegemony so as to stabilise the global nuclear order. Therefore, the US needs to preserve its nuclear hegemony so as to stabilise the global nuclear order. If the US has FU policy, it could not only strengthen the extended deterrence so as to preserve non-proliferation among the US allies but FU could also be used to destroy the efforts of states to acquire nuclear weapons by using the techniques of bunker-busting. Also, since the end of World War II, there are 18 states which opted to give up their nuclear weapons. The US regards this as an example of its own successful policies which certainly makes it necessary to maintain hegemony (Charlmers 2004). The hegemonic theories believe that such kind of hegemony is

necessary so as to maintain the stability at the international level. The use of extended deterrence and nuclear weapons only contribute to the theory of the hegemony as explained by Charles Johnson:

As distinct from other peoples, most Americans do not recognize-or do not want to recognize – that the US dominates the world through its military power. Due to government secrecy, our citizens are often ignorant of the fact that our garrisons encircle the planet. This vast networks of American base in every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire-an empire base with its own geography not likely to be taught in high school geography class. Without grasping the dimension of this globe-girdling Base world, one can't begin to understand the size and nature of our imperial aspirations or the degree to which a new kind of militarism is undermining our constitutional order. Our military deploys well over half a million soldiers, spies, technicians, teachers, dependents and civilian contractors in other nations. To dominate the oceans and seas of the world, we are creating some thirteen naval task forces built around aircraft carriers whose name sum up our martial heritage. We operate numerous bases outside the world so as to monitor what the people of the world, including our own citizens, are saying, facing or e-mailing to each other (Chalmers 2004).

However, the problem which the international nuclear order has faced after the Cold War is that the US is unable to preserve the stability of the international nuclear order. The example of disturbances in the global nuclear order is the development of nuclear weapons by the states such as India, Pakistan, North Korea and also the secret nuclear weapons programme of Israel and efforts of Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Not only, the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, but also the other threats has framed the policy of the US and therefore of NATO. It is thus stated:

Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile and failed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and international security. Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions (NATO 2009).

However, the policies of the US have resulted in further disturbances in the nuclear order. The reason is that the concept of 'non-proliferation' has divided the world into 'haves' and 'have-nots' and have raised the question of equality with regard to

nuclear weapons. The US has often mentioned that it wishes to achieve nuclear disarmament as a goal of the nuclear order (See Appendix 2 and 3) and for this it is necessary first to achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. However, there is no step taken so far to achieve the goal of nuclear non-disarmament. In fact, the US is more or less preoccupied in nuclear weapons modernisation and building of defensive capabilities like that of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems to become number one nuclear weapon in the world. This raised the question of 'legitimacy' by both the US allies and by its enemies. Other states began to question the concentration of nuclear weapons and military capability in the hands of one state only, this could further use force to achieve its own objectives. As a result, these states decide to develop nuclear weapons as soon as their domestic preferences shift in their favour.

The US is also aware of the disturbances of the global nuclear order. This brings us to the question that why the US has not decided against the NFU policy which will make its threat more credible, will bring it closer to the concepts of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The concept of NFU is a more realistic one as it is a way of outlawing the use of nuclear weapons as long as any other state decides not to attack the US with nuclear weapons. However, the US wishes to retain the FU policy and superiority in nuclear weapons affairs to prevent its hegemony, which will benefit it to achieve its foreign policy aims and objectives. As I have shown in previous chapter also that the nuclear weapon's threats are used by the US in both cold war and post-cold war period to attain its political and foreign objectives. Therefore, these concepts are used only to attain the US broader political and foreign policy objectives and have nothing to do with the attainment of nuclear non-proliferation or ensuring the global nuclear order.

This study made an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. Why is it that few states have gone nuclear in spite of nuclear umbrella and others have decided to remain non-nuclear?
2. What is the rationale of nuclear hegemony?
3. What explains the reluctance of the US in adopting 'No First Use' (NFU) in its nuclear strategy?
4. Why did France go nuclear in spite of the nuclear umbrella?

5. Why has Japan decided to remain dependent on the US nuclear umbrella in spite of nuclear threats emanating from North Korea and China?


Towards the end of the study, the following inferences were arrived at:

1. A stable international nuclear order does not require the presence of a nuclear hegemon such as the United States.
2. The decision of France to go nuclear can be attributed to its preferences in terms of domestic determinants that outweighed rational consideration pertaining to the nuclear umbrella.
3. Japan's restraint in terms of not going nuclear could be less explained by extended deterrence and better understood as a preference, which is rooted in domestic consideration.
4. Nuclear decision-making amongst US allies is impacted less by extended deterrence and more by domestic preferences.

Problems in Adopting NFU Policy

There is one main problem associated with the development of NFU policy which is presently not addressed properly in the arms control or disarmament circle. If the US decides to adopt NFU policy and gives away its FU policy, it is likely to develop and modernise its conventional forces. The other countries, particularly China, will be unable to match the US pace on conventional weapons and will rely more on nuclear weapons. It means that other countries will try to develop and modernise nuclear weapons so as overcome the conventional superiority of the US nuclear weapons. So this represents the kind of circle from NFU use to more reliance on nuclear weapons by other states, as depicted below:

Figure 10: Circle of NFU



The Way Forward: NFU policy

The question here is: what is the way out? This analysis clearly shows that the US FU policy does not contribute either to extended deterrence or to non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament. In fact, the US knows that disarmament is an illusion. As asked by Robinson 'I personally see the abolition of nuclear weapons as an impractical dream in any foreseeable future' (Robbinson 2010). Therefore, the US continues to stress on policy of FU, extended deterrence and non-proliferation to preserve its superiority in international relations. However, the decision of any state to either acquires nuclear weapons or not is more influenced by the domestic considerations within the state which are independent of the US nuclear weapons policy.

Such a policy of the US, create gaps between the US as a nuclear power and the other states that have little or no capability to develop nuclear weapons. As a result, it creates further disturbance to the global nuclear order. US nuclear hegemony has more to do with achievement of its own foreign and political objectives creating inequalities in the global nuclear order. As a result, the US should not hesitate to adopt NFU policy, which will not only help to mitigate all the controversial issues surrounding around the US nuclear weapons but will also help in making the US threats more credible and moving forward with the global nuclear disarmament

efforts.

The issues and advantages of adopting NFU policy have been discussed previously by various policy makers and scholars. However, the problem is that if the US adopts NFU policy, and moves forward to the global nuclear order, its 'nuclear hegemony' could be challenged by other powerful states, mainly by China and Russia. Clearly, the US and its allies are in no way willing to give up their 'nuclear weapons' hegemony to any other state, which will have power not only to challenge the US hegemony but will also frame the rules according to their own whims. Another problem that arose with NFU policy is that it will give rise to heavy conventional arms race among the major powers so as to dominate the world scene.

The probable answer to these questions lies in 'global NFU policy by the Nuclear Weapon States along with the permissible limits on the conventional weapons build up' which will resolve the issue of FU and also make an environment for the adoption of the NFU policy at the global level leading to a step towards the attainment of 'global zero.'

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(*indicates a primary source)

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Appendix 1: Statement by President Obama On the release of the Nuclear Posture Review

One year ago yesterday in Prague, I outlined a comprehensive agenda to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to pursue the peace and security of a world without them. I look forward to advancing this agenda in Prague this week when I sign the new START Treaty with President Medvedev, committing the US and Russia to substantial reductions in our nuclear arsenals.

Today, my Administration is taking a significant step forward by fulfilling another pledge that I made in Prague-to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and focus on reducing the nuclear dangers of the 21st century, while sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States and our allies and partners as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review, led by the Department of Defence, recognises that the greatest threat to US and global security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states. Moreover, it recognizes that our national security and that of our allies and partners can be increasingly defended by America's unsurpassed conventional military capabilities and strong missile defences.

As a result, we are taking specific and concrete steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while preserving our military superiority, deterring aggression and safeguarding the security of the American people.

First, and for the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is now at the top of America's nuclear agenda, which affirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have aligned our policies and proposed major funding increases for programmes to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. Our nuclear security summit next week be an opportunity for 47 nations to commit to specific steps to pursue the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years. And next month in New York, we will work with the wider world to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime to ensure that all nations uphold their responsibility.

Second, we are further emphasizing the importance of nations meeting their NPT and nuclear non-proliferation obligations through our declaratory policy. The United States is declaring that we will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non proliferation obligations. This enables us to sustain our nuclear deterrent for the narrower range of contingencies, in which these weapons may still play a role, while providing an additional incentive for nations to meet their NPT obligations. Those nation that fail to meet their obligations will therefore will find themselves more isolated, and will recognize that the pursuit of nuclear weapons will not make them more cure.

Finally, we are fulfilling our responsibilities as a nuclear power committed to the NPT. The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new military missions or new capabilities for nuclear weapons.

As I stated last year in Prague, so long as nuclear weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States, reassures allies and partners, and deters potential adversaries. To that end, we are seeking substantial investments to improve infrastructure, strengthen science and technology and retain the human capital we need to sustain our stockpile, while also strengthening the conventional capabilities that are an important unwavering commitment to security of our allies and partners, and advances American national security.

To stop the spread of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear terrorism and pursue the day when these weapons do not exist, we will work aggressively to advance every element of our comprehensive agenda-to reduce arsenals, to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and to strengthen NPT. These are the steps toward the more secure future that American seeks, and this is the work that we are advancing today.

Appendix 2: Thirteen Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament (Excerpt from the Final Document of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference)

The conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional process, to achieve the early entry into forces of the Comprehensive Nuclear Treaty Ban Treaty.
2. A nuclear moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosion pending entry into force of that treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiation in the Conference of Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of the fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate containing therein, taking into consideration both the nuclear disarmament nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with the nuclear disarmament. The conference on disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed to Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear weapons states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability , and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;

- a. Further efforts by the nuclear weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
 - b. Increased transparency by the nuclear weapon states with regard to the nuclear capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence building measure to support the further progress on nuclear disarmament.
 - c. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
 - d. Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational role of nuclear weapons system.
 - e. A diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policy to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their elimination.
 - f. The engagement as soon as appropriate of all nuclear weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. Arrangements by all nuclear weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designed by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.
 11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objectives of the efforts of States in the disarmament process are general and complete disarmament under the effective international control.
 12. Regular reports, within the framework of NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 © of the 1995 Decisions on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament “and recalling the Advisory Public Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievements and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon free world

Appendix 3:

Transcribed Version of Prof Hans M.Kristensen's Interview

By Neha Kumar, Research Scholar, SIS, JNU

Skype Interview

On 10 July 2015, 7.44 PM-8.30 PM

For PhD thesis titled 'First Use and Extended Deterrence in American Strategy: Analysing Nuclear Decision Making in France and Japan

Q1. How the concept of Nuclear FU is related to the concept of nuclear disarmament?

A. There are two ways to answer this question. From the viewpoint of the strategist, there is no direct link between the FU and Nuclear Disarmament. FU is a strategy that is considered by some of the nuclear weapon states. This strategy was more prominent during the cold war period. As long as nuclear weapons exist and countries use the concepts of nuclear deterrence, they might choose to use the FU option as their main option. It is not necessary or counterproductive to strategic stability and so states must choose other ways with more focus on retaliatory capability. However, if you talk to people in arms control, the issue of FU becomes an indication of war fighting and deterrence mentality. However, the other feel that the more you have nuclear weapons capability, the more offensive you are in spite of having FU policy, the more it strengthened deterrence by creating the fear in the mind of an adversary. On the other hand, some said that FU policy can create the crisis where escalation could occur. Therefore, these are complex issues, There is not necessary a direct link between them. It is more an interactive fact that from having a FU policy creates more doubt about the intention of a country. It also put pressure on a country to have superior nuclear weapons capability, which is against the process of having disarmament.

Q2. NPR and other US documents mentioned about the policy of FU repeatedly. Why the US has still adopted the FU policy despite the end of the cold war period.

A. It is still the US policy that they will not relay on FU of nuclear weapons. The actual planning of FU from a military viewpoint is not very dominant. If you talk to military planners of the US, the FU options have really gone in the backyard. The focus is more on having a secure retaliatory capability. However, there are lines between it. If you look US nuclear posture, it talks about ICBMs that can launch 45 minutes after the launch order has been received; there are a number of submarines that can be launched within 12-15 minutes after receiving launch orders. The question that often arises is why the US has kept these weapons on such a high alert, if they are not planning to strike first? The answer to this is that the US planners see alerts forces as an option so that the adversary does not have to strike first. It is more than the intention to strike first. In reality, the US FU options are in a background despite the fact that US officially refuses to recognise this in the official documents.

Q3. Whom the US wants to target or deter with the First strike. Is the option of first strike is credible?

A. The US nuclear strategy is not on first strike but a capability to strike second. The US deterrence policy designed to deter any countries that have nuclear weapons and is

considered as adversary and any country having WMD and is considered as an adversary. To put name of the countries which the US wishes to target is 1. Russia 2. China 3. North Korea 4. Syria. These are the four countries that the US wants to directly target with its nuclear postures. However, it does not wish to target Pakistan or India as these countries are not considered as an adversary. This means having a nuclear weapon in the hands of any state does not make that country a nuclear target of the US.

The countries against which the US can strike are identified in the Presidential guidance which was last signed in 2013. It is called as Nuclear Employment Strategy of 2013. The unclassified version is available on the defense website, and it describes in general terms that whom the US wishes to deter with its nuclear weapons. It does not have names of the country in it as it is considered as a bad foreign policy to target anyone so directly.

Q4. How much credible is the threat of FU?

A. The FU policy is not regarded as highly credible. There are no serious high-stakes crises that will involve the US nuclear weapons. Even in the new east-west crisis, there is no focus on nuclear weapons but on conventional operations. There is no scenario where the US will think it necessary to carry out its FU strike. The US today is confident about the capability of its nuclear forces to the extent they require to survive a nuclear weapon strike and to have a devastating retaliatory strike.

It is important to note that there is a diff in nuclear policies of Bush administration and that of Obama's administrations. In 2000 they came into discovery of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and after the 9/11. These events have effect on their nuclear weapons thinking. They came up with the quick responses like pre-emption. This affected the nuclear climate to some extent. The Bush administration came up with the scenarios in which there was emphasis on FU. Those were again the small scenarios involving the rogue states. After Bush administration, that trend change and Obama has moved back to such ideas in which FU could be carried out.

Q5. How the US can affect the nuclear policies of the other countries by making changes in its own policies?

A. the US always tries to do that by deploying nuclear weapons. That goes way back in the cold war period. The whole idea of deploying nuclear weapons overseas is not just to hit the adversaries like Soviet Union. The idea was to protect the allies, and so that they will not develop their independent nuclear weapons. The examples of such countries are Taiwan, South Korea. Even there were talks about having nuclear weapons in 1970s by South Korea but again such talks were given away. Also, Germany moved away from the idea of nuclear weapons, which was regarded as a good development in 1960s during Kennedy's administration. It was believed that there would be many nuclear weapons states in the next 25-30 years- a thing which has not happened. So, the effort to limit nuclear proliferation was much better and successful in 1960s and 1970s.

Q6. Do you think that the domestic determinants do play a part in deciding the nuclear weapon's choice of a country?

A. Yes, example of this is Germany. Germany decided to be non-nuclear, not only because the US provided it a nuclear umbrella but also because political sentiment in Germany changed, and military feel that it will not increase their security, if they decide to develop nuclear weapons. In Japan, 1950 there were efforts to develop nuclear weapons but later moved away. So there were debates about the nuclear weapons in Japan, but it is far from the mainstream Japan. If it chooses it has a significant technological and space launch capability combined with plutonium to develop significant nuclear forces.

Q7. The US President started talking about the 'global zero' as soon as it took over the office. However, the focus is still on the modernization of nuclear weapons. Don't you think that it is a double-faced policy?

A. It seems that because as long as you continue to modernise nuclear weapons, you obviously cannot get nuclear disarmament. However, the Obama was not the first US president who talks about the nuclear weapons reductions and disarmament. It goes way back to Kennedy's administration. It was the core part of the US nuclear weapons policy. Having said this, many people forget that the Obama's speech in Prague has two pillars. The speech has two pillars (1) talks about reducing nuclear weapons reliance creating a world where we will not need nuclear weapons (2) while we work for nuclear disarmament, the US will maintain and have nuclear weapons as long as other countries continue to have them. So, the Obama administration is busy in doing that only. They have given the biggest modernisation of nuclear weapons in the last two decades. It is not that the US is putting more reliance on the nuclear forces, but rather it is putting less emphasis. The reason doing is that weapons were developed long back in 1970s and 1980s and are getting old, and so they have to life extend or to replace it. That is the cycle in which the US is in. Russia is also in such a cycle. However, this cycle came earlier in Russia. It does not mean increasing the nuclear forces but will be replaced by the modern system. It is typical for the whole nuclear weapons state to come up at such a time when they have to decide that they have to either scrap nuclear weapons, or they should modernize the nuclear weapons.

Q8. If the US modernise its nuclear weapons continuously, how the nuclear disarmament is achievable?

A. The belief is that the nuclear disarmament process will be begun with the arms control which means limiting capabilities and putting on ceilings on the amount of nuclear weapons countries are allowed to have, having the verification system to monitor the county's agreements. The end of cold war also changes many requirements of having nuclear weapons by the US. This tendency means to eat one bite at a time and sooner to get down to low numbers. These numbers at a time will be so low that you have to think about that how to get to zero. This is what missing from the debates. It is not like that one day the nuclear weapons' states will decide that we will not have nuclear weapons henceforth. All the nuclear weapon's states into the world are in very different stages of national power and military capabilities and in a very threat environment. They have diff idea that what to do before going zero. That process is still going on. The P-5 which is the part of non-proliferation treaty has developed a process that they meet to discuss such things. They will not come up with some nuclear agreements with this process. However, the idea is to understand each other political process and to influence it. Therefore, the idea is to reach towards the common understanding of the problems of the nuclear weapons... For example; the

US has huge conventional weapons. In such circumstances, other states will rely more on nuclear weapons. Chinese will say that we are far from conventional weapons so need nuclear weapons. Same is the case of Russia. It continues to make harder to press the other countries to have nuclear weapons. Same is NPT treaty with India and Pakistan. This is probably the biggest missing piece that how national military power is going to change.

Q9. Does the START and SORT treaty really cut the nuclear weapons?

A. START treaty aims to build down and reduce the nuclear forces. Since 1989 and 1991, the START treaty cut deeper the nuclear forces. The hope of Obama was to make the new START treaty with Russia. This treaty would cut the deployed forces deeper. The arms control treaties focused more on the deployed nuclear weapons. There can be no limit on nuclear warheads a country can have. There are no limits that how many warheads a country have for their delivery system. This requires broadening the arms control agreements to include not only the weapons that are not deployed but also the weapons that are deployed. This is what meant by making the arms control process reversible.

Q10. The US is playing the game of nuclear disarmament but focus on non-proliferation as it gives them more power in the International Relations and preserves their hegemony.

A. As a military superpower, the US is always tried to influence and dominant and to have its voice in the international relations. It is not done in a way. We are very conscious of what the whole world thinks about it. It does not want a world to appear as a hegemonic power. The US is modernizing its nuclear weapons but even in the current round of modernization, the US is also planning to have reductions over the next decade even without arms control. It is taking decisions on how many types of weapons it needs? How much it needs? And the way it is making posturing its nuclear weapons will result into nuclear cuts.

However, it is two faces it believes to have its nuclear weapons but also trying to reduce the nuclear weapons. It wants to dominate, control and want to have nuclear disarmament. The US cannot be a policeman to the world. This was clear in Middle East where the US policies prove to be the economic backfire.

Non-Proliferation-selfish reasons that why it is motivated. We need to because the proliferation is a threat against us and our allies.

Transcribed Version of Dr. Williams Lawrence interview

By Neha Kumar, Research Scholar, SIS, JNU, New Delhi

Skype Interview

On 17 July 2015, 7.30 PM – 8.15 PM

For PhD thesis titled 'First Use and Extended Deterrence in American Strategy: Analysing Nuclear Decision Making in France and Japan'.

Q1. How the concepts of NFU and Nuclear Disarmament are related to each other?

A. NFU and nuclear disarmament are two separate terms and are not directly related to each other. NFU provides kind of indirect catalyst for achieving nuclear disarmament. NFU believes in strategic restraint of a nuclear power, even if it has nuclear weapons to strike an adversary. NFU is like a self imposed restraint, which means not use Nuclear Weapons in first instance. NFU requires having an assured retaliatory capability if attacked by CBW. NFU is a catalyst towards arms control initiative rather than nuclear disarmament, which talks about total reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons, which will lead to global zero. An NFU talk in terms of nuclear balance is managed. Nuclear balance of terror is managed and to see how the Nation-state with conventional weapons reduces their reliance on the nuclear weapons. It also means how the technological methods can be used through which conventional deterrence is achieved.

NFU looks at the issues of Strategic restraint and put breaks on the inadvertent escalation which is coming out of accidental, asymmetric, terrorist attacks, a full conventional war or which could lead to limited nuclear strike. Therefore, NFU is a very important strategic restraint, which prevent inadvertent escalation.

Q2. There are repeated talks that the US should adopt NFU policy. Why the US has been so reluctant to adopt the NFU policy in its strategic posture.

A. The US is only power, which has consistently stressed on FU policy since 1945 despite the fact that it has a huge surplus in all levels of escalation-weather theatre, regional or global. In terms of WMD or conventional capability it has clear cut advantage over other parts. The reasons for this could be:

1. Being the resident superpower, the US believes that it is economical to use nuclear weapons rather than going to war with conventional weapons. The US having fought wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan believes that it has a sense of sensitivity towards the human casualties on its side. However, it does not have any sensitivity of human casualty when it comes to the side of the adversary. It will go ahead and can use non-nuclear weapons, which are as good as nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons and low yield nuclear weapons. So there is a kind of parity between the low-yield nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. The lethality of destruction is basically same. Still it stresses on FU policy because they would like to maintain its superpower status. The only thing which the US has done was to withdraw its nuclear weapons in 1991. The US withdraws approximately 4000 nuclear weapons, including Tomkwak. However, the US has taken these nuclear warheads but put into stewardship stockpiles

(SSB) and where it could protect its fissile materials and many new nuclear weapons could come into place.

2. Russia still relays on nuclear weapons as its conventional superiority has been declines. It too has FU doctrine in 2000, and the US feels that it ought to have FU policy. This brings us to the question of China, which has NFU. In 2005 Chinese nuclear posture is moving from minimum nuclear posture to sufficient posture and therefore, NFU is changing. They are bordering between FU and NFU. Therefore, the US feels that it should also have nuclear FU policies.

3. The third reason is the need to have security assurances as mentioned in the NPR 2002. George Bush has taken a clear stand for the FU and said that the US has active targeting against 50 states which it still wants to maintain.

4. The fourth reason is RMA in the nuclear field. Although RMA has enhanced conventional weapons, Obama has nuclear budget enhanced by 50 million dollars. This shows that the US is still committed to nuclear weapons modernisation. The US has not increased the land-based missiles, but has rapidly been modernizing long-range nuclear tipped cruise missiles. It is also modernizing trident B-5 submarines each carrying 156 nuclear missiles. This shows that the US is moving towards the capabilities not only on the strategic level but also on the theatre clear weapons capability. Although it talks about nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, it continues to modernize its nuclear weapons and maintain FU policy. The US is modernizing its theatre level nuclear forces so that it could deploy its tactical nuclear weapons. One more factor is the Conventional Prompt Global strike-to strike nuclear weapons of the other nations with the conventional weapons which could have disaster impacts. This is particularly targeting against China, which could be taken as a nuclear target. These factors strengthen FU policy, and the US is far from adopting NFU policy.

Global zero is a chimera as the US is still modernizing and increasing its nuclear weapons, it is not taking out its nuclear fissile materials increasing fissile materials stockpile.

Q2. What is the impact of FU policy on the strategic stability, when it comes to the question of US-Russia's relationship?

A. It is meant to have strategic stability. The US is reducing reliance on the land system and more diversified on sea and air. In START level negotiations, the US took 50 % nuclear assets in sea. However, now, it has moved 65% in sea and air. With Russia, the US has a stable deterrence. US-China nuclear posture is more worrying as China is increasing. It can cross 3000 nuclear warheads- both tactical and strategic.

Q3. Which international relations theory could best explain the decision of Japan to not to develop nuclear weapons.

A. It is difficult to point out very accurately specify the International Relations theory but Japan clearly relays on END (Extended Nuclear Deterrence) of the US. This was agreed under the US-Japan Mutual Defence Agreement in 1960. The classical deterrence theory partially explains that why the non-nuclear countries took to refute under the larger nuclear power could always remain non-nuclear. There is cost of becoming nuclear in terms of scientific

technological weapons, economic power, command and control systems, verification systems, whole constellation of satellites. Therefore, developing nuclear weapons require a very elaborate structure.

1. Article 9 of the constitution which imposes constraints on Japan to go for offensive capability, and nuclear weapons are offensive capability. That does not mean that Japan cannot expand conventional weapons. It has most sophisticated naval forces, including fleets and brigades. They are also trying to build helicopter platforms to strengthen their conventional capability. Japan has approximately 44 tons of enriched plutonium and could build 500 nuclear weapons. This 44 enriched plutonium in their stocks which exclude 33 tons of enriched plutonium in France and UK. Japan sends spent fuel to France and UK for reprocessing and tries to bring it back to its reprocessing units through sea. Japan is essentially a nuclear power in the economic sense. Nuclear power also has economic causes, and its conversion to military power can be done within a short notice. It could be done when ENP degrades. That erosion happens if the US cut deeper into its strategic posture or cut its commitments to Japan, particularly conventional commitments to Japan. The US has provided nuclear aircraft to Japan. Okinawa is home to some fleets; Hawaii and Guam provide backup facilities for defence according to 1960 agreements. This prevents them from going nuclear. After 2005, Japan is becoming a normal nuclear power. It will activate the strategic needs if the US cut down in Asia Pacific. This will happen only when there is huge cut into the US budget than only it go nuclear. Under such conditions only, the US could cut its naval forces, air forces and land forces in Asia Pacific. Japan could go nuclear in case of North Korea and China's nuclear weapons.

2. Japan is also a pacific country. There are only 10-15 percent people who are ultra-nationalist and believe that Japan should go nuclear. Japan has rockets, civilian to launch satellites. This provides Japan the ICBM capability which can target China and North Korea.

3. If Japan goes nuclear, it would have an impact on Asia-Pacific. North and South Korea will unite in such a condition. It will also send bad signal to Russia, Korea and China. But this can happen only when withdraw its forces. As long as the US forward deploys commitments are there, they will not go nuclear. The Japanese nuclear option will result into Korea-Japan-China nuclear race.

Q3. How much credible is the US nuclear extended deterrence?

A. The US has withdrawal all forward based nuclear weapons from Korea 600 nuclear weapons. These are low yields tactical nuclear weapons meant for Korean onslaught. However, the US has enough nuclear capability, which can backup defence of Japan. The credibility is not about the US sources but whether it has will if its own territory is on a stake. For example, if China increases its missile range, it can get real target of American increases, then the US credibility will come into question. If North Korea has rudimentary missile capability, or if it carries out electromagnetic pulse attacks in the West Coast, it will hamper the cyber activity of the US. Under such condition, the US is quite vulnerable. This brings credibility loss. This question raised in 2005 as its credibility is decreasing as the strategic and technological powers of challenging power of China, and North Korea is on an increase. This brings the question of credibility of the US extended deterrence.

Q4. Do you think that there are Domestic Reasons for Japan to remain non-nuclear?

A. The Japanese population is a pacifist. The memories of 1945 nuclear attack are not lost. There is the only small amount of ultra-nationalist. Japan being a Parliamentary democracy, and therefore, it has to take the preference of the Japanese public opinion into account.

There has been some resistance by the Japanese population for the US presence in the Japan as it does impose some cost. Japan taxes are actually underwriting the US expenses. Japan was also asked to use its cheque book diplomacy in order to show its commitments to the US. Therefore, Japan has to lot of sensitively about developing nuclear weapons. Still, END commitment is the major factor for not developing nuclear weapons.

Q5. Is it correct to say that the US is playing the politics of nuclear non-proliferation and shunning itself away from the nuclear disarmament?

a. The US will not be interested in global nuclear disarmament. Pentagon will not agree for drastic cuts in nuclear weapons. One document states that Obama wants to have 300 nuclear warheads and destroy the rest of them. However, it will not happen. Nuclear non-proliferation is dead. North Korea achieved breakthrough in six-party talks and developed nuclear weapons. Iran will also not go for the agreement and will renegade all the nuclear agreements. NPT is a dead treaty. There were examples of nuclear roll back like in Brazil. However, in Southern Asia, western Asia where the non-proliferation is dead. So, they are not even serious about the nuclear non-proliferation. This global zero is rhetoric diplomacy. The US stands on increasing the nuclear arms and therefore, the US is not interested in non-proliferation or nuclear disarmament.

Transcribed Version of Dr. James Acton's Interview

By Neha Kumar, Research Scholar, SIS, JNU

Skype Interview

On 18 August 2015, 6.00 PM-6.30 PM

For PhD Thesis titled 'First Use and Extended Deterrence in American Strategy: Analysing Nuclear Decision Making in France and Japan'.

Q1. How the concept of No First Use (NFU) policy is related to the concept of nuclear disarmament?

Ans. NFU is an important step in the way to nuclear disarmament 1. If all the states declare NFU policy, it will make nuclear weapons less important. Those who are declaring NFU are moving in a positive direction of declaring nuclear disarmament 2. The second reason is related to the first reason. Country declares NFU if they feel they are that they are able to protect their vital interest by non nuclear means- weather they will follow the diplomatic means, conventional military means or economic means to protect their interests. This is the main challenge faced by the nuclear weapon disarmament process that how countries will protect their bilateral interests with the help of non-nuclear means. And that is the real challenge that how to secure world if there are non-nuclear means. If the countries declare NFU, it means more or less progress is made on securing interests without the help of nuclear weapons

Q2. President Obama has declared global zero as its aim, than why it has shunned away from declaring NFU policy

Firstly, global zero is a name of a particular movement or campaign. President Obama has endorsed the world without the nuclear weapons. The US has no specific plan to achieve the goal of global zero. It is just a general idea. The 2010 nuclear posture review is a very modest document huge amount of push back of nuclear weapons. There was huge amount resistance to NFU. That resistance is kind of strategic in the sense that there were reasonable fears that the US experts have of conventional dominance. If the US loses the conventional dominance against China, it will be a very difficult condition which will have impact on the extended deterrence. NFU is related to the possibility that the US may lose conventional domination. If the US lose its domination in Western Pacific against China, the US will lose the extended deterrence commitments. So the US allies vary of NFU. It is more kind of bureaucratic policy. The military does not want to limit its possibility. The military wish to have a lot of option. So are lot of reasons why the US does not adopt NFU policy.

Q3. How much credible is the policy of first use policy in protecting the US allies, particularly in relation to Japan?

Ans. I don't think Japan will be the case due to which the US has to use nuclear weapons first. I think the case will be Taiwan. It is highly unlikely that the US use its nuclear weapons first. The US doesn't say that it will use the nuclear weapons first. It said that it is not ready to give up the first use option. But in terms of 20 years from now, china became dominant in Western Pacific and evades Taiwan. And the US does not have capability to reverse the condition. The Question is whether the US will use

nuclear weapons first? There is a probability is that it can. The US may or may not decide to use nuclear weapons under such condition.

Q4. How far the US is successful in curbing proliferation of nuclear weapons by making changes in its own policies?

Ans Difficult question, I supported propaganda and wanted US to be firm on global war on nuclear weapons. I guess, the policy doesn't work out in our own times. The question is again that why it has not been successful? Is it was a bad idea or because it was not properly implemented. There has been no concrete evidence that non-proliferation regime progressed. I believe that if the US is more progressive, i.e., it decided to announce that it will not use nuclear weapons than there will be more difficulty in achieving non-proliferation. A lack of disarmament is the only reason that nuclear non proliferation failed.

Q5. President Obama talks about nuclear weapons disarmament and then stress upon modernisation of nuclear weapons? How can you achieve nuclear disarmament if you are carrying out nuclear modernisation at the same point of time?

Ans. Well, India also said that it wishes to have nuclear disarmament but it is also building nuclear weapons at the same point of time. This is what all states do. The question here is that what do you mean by nuclear disarmament? If disarmament means that nuclear weapons should be completely eliminated than nuclear disarmament and nuclear modernisation are in conflict with each other. The US never meant the simply elimination of nuclear weapons. It was never made clear in the speech given by President Obama. The US means to change the political security condition where the nuclear weapons will be easy to eliminate. The US does not mean by complete physical elimination of nuclear weapons. It is one way or other means to create the new security architect. The US said that while working on the project of nuclear weapons we will keep nuclear weapons safe, secure and effective. It will take long term to eliminate the nuclear weapons, and till that nuclear weapons needed. That is not the reasonable condition. If you are developing new military capabilities, it is against the nuclear disarmament process. However, it you keep working in ensuring that existing nuclear weapons work and safe has nothing to do with the nuclear disarmament thing. I don't have a view that modernisation is good or modernisation is bad. This needs to be judge on case by case basis.

Q6. NPR 2010 talks about reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Has it really happened?

Ans. Yes, very modest reduction in NPR. Previously, The US said that it will not use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear state unless that state is in coorelation with the nuclear state against the US. That was the assumption that is coming from the Cold War period that if east Germany attacks west. The east was having no nuclear weapons but was in correlation with Russia. The US wish to reserved nuclear weapons in this scenerio. In the present context, there has been very modest reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. NPR has carried out was a very modest reduction. Europe security situation is worse. These debates to happen

Q7.Do you think that the US is interested in nuclear proliferation and not on nuclear disarmament?

Ans. This is very extent flied. I think that president Obama supported this, more progress in nuclear disarmament but failed, but it is not an agenda which can be made by the US alone. The Russia is increasing nuclear weapons and modernising, china is not ready to engage, UK and France are not participating in any such agenda, India and Pakistan are developing fissile material and other materials. This is not a US failure but a collective failure. The US wants to judge the entire disarmament agenda. It is a complicated agenda. The US wants to make progress in this agenda but it is difficult due to the current security situation

Q8. Explain the policy of extended deterrence in the present context knowing that cold war is over?

Ans. The US still has allies in Asia, the US grand strategy is based on having allies in the world,. These allies do face real security problems. Russia annexation of cremia, eastern Ukraine war, shows that applies face security threat. Similar are the cases of Taiwan and Japan. Extended deterrence is not just nuclear it is about protecting allies through different means in which nuclear means is one.

I will end my conversation here. Thankful for your time

Transcribed version of Ben Cramer's Interview

By Neha Kumar, Research Scholar, SIS, JNU, New Delhi

Skype Interview

On 11 August 2015, 2.10PM – 3.00PM

For PhD Thesis titled ‘First Use and Extended Deterrence in American Strategy: Analysing Nuclear Decision Making in France and Japan’.

Q1. France organised CEA in 1947 but tested nuclear weapons it in late 1950s? What was the reason for such a gap?

Ans. France decision to develop nuclear weapons was not a political one. Most of the people consider that decision of France to go nuclear is motivated by fifth republic or by Gen De Gaulle. However, the decision of France to go nuclear was taken much before that. It was 1947-49 when decision was taken in a secret way. It is normal to maintain such secrecy as nuclear weapons decisions are not debated publically. Similarly, in France also there was no debate at the national assembly. France did not have public support, any financial means, and logistic support. French nuclear adventurism is linked not only due to cold war but because it wanted independence from the United States. France also thinks that would be a good mediator between east and west, if they have nuclear weapons. France also wishes to oppose the US imperialism. It is an illusion that France needs nuclear weapons for independence. This was not the case to be whether you analyse the case of UK or the case of France today which was invited for reintegration with NATO. There was a real struggle in 1950s. The first struggle was to use themselves the term extended deterrence – a concept which was not much known in the world. The problem was to use them extended deterrence. France in 1950s was willing to help other European countries. As a result, there were Lot of secret military deal with Germany like Geneva Galba. They wish to have connections with Italians and France wanted to make sure that they nobody could resist them. Americans were against the French nuclear programme. The entry of the new country in the nuclear club was not regarded as a good thing by the US. France would not to be able to do it; France would be a security threat because you do not know how rational the people of France are. The connections of France with Germany are also making a case different from the UK. Germany lost the war and France wants to show that we are the exceptional case. France wanted itself to be counted as a real country in the world. France was ready to sabotage all nuclear disarmament process. There was moratorium on the nuclear testing since 1958. In 1962s, France went ahead to have nuclear weapons. It is another image which France's depicted and said that we will not accept the superpowers domination.

Q2. What was the reaction of the People/public reaction of having nuclear weapons?

Ans. France was never against nuclear weapons. They did whole recourse about nuclear disarmament in UN General Assembly. The everybody consider it as something necessary to have. There are many factors coming to account of nuclear decision making-one was internal factor. There were lot of internal factors. General de Gaulle was very afraid of its own armed forces. Military punch in Algeria, or could intervene in political process. To get rid of them, nuclear weapons were important. The CEA were also the important factor in decision making. This was the main game

which Gaulle want to implement. He was eliminating the whole population who will have future in defence policy. Debated between left and right in France. The nationalist feelings were fuelled by anti-American feeling

Q3. Can you please elaborate your point that why De Gaulle was afraid of the military?

Ans. You cannot understand the French nuclear strategy without understanding its connection to France colonial history. France was capable in doing nuclear test in one of the colonies in Algeria. This also implies for France whether they have plans money it implies lot of money to continue war in Algeria. The war in Algeria was also a big threat to French republic. There were many people who were in favour of keeping Algeria no matter in what condition. France was smart enough to have peace agreement in 1962- if u allows us continue nuclear test in Algeria at two places which was debated in 1965. France was one of the few countries that spend more than 50 percent of budget on nuclear weapons only.

Q4. What was the Role of Suez canal and indo-china crisis in France's nuclear weapons decision-making?

Ans. Triggers were present 1956 when France launched a joint military attack to support Israel and to knock down the Egypt. France was against Egypt because Nasser was regarded as an ally of the Algerian national movement. During this war, it was said by Russian side that if France is being used, we have ways to stop them. This was a direct nuclear weapons threat by Russian side. In 1956, it was decided by France that we need to have our own nuclear weapons so as to face such condition. This was not only Algerian crisis, but 1956 also provides a trigger for France's nuclear weapons.

Q5. Has France status was improved after having nuclear weapons?

Ans. It is difficult to say to what extent the nuclear weapons improved its status. There was a huge international outcry against France's nuclear weapons at international level. This was most noticeable after the France carried out its first nuclear weapons test in most of the African republics that were scandalised and opposed to France's nuclear test. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was also opposed to the nuclear weapons test. In 1980s France realised that being criticised at the international level is an assets for France. This was also the part of French identity of which it was very proud of. French are 1 percent of the population of the world and they think they are very important player which is very specifically French. French never devise its imperial ambitions. Testing was just a confirmation that it will remain an important player at international level.

Q6. What was France's relationship to US. Why it was opposed to France nuclear status while it accepted UK nuclear status?

Ans. There were several reasons for this. 1. You make an exception to the UK but not to other 2. If France if accepted, the US also needs to accept Germany. The reason is that France and Germany will compete with each other. Germany was like Japan refuse to recognise NPT. They were also nuclear option spoken 3. There was a whole question of nuclear umbrella. You cannot justify your umbrella, if your allies get nuclear weapons 4. France was trying to convince that Europe will become one power

and that that it will replace the US. France wishes to show that our nuclear bomb might also be capable of protecting Europe. However, it states that it will protect the europe. 5. The US knew the game between nuclear weapons if fragile. New comer in nuclear field and that to outsider could have some problem. You cannot control the whole of the players. Therefore, the US has enough reasons to say no.

Q7. What were the domestic changes make by De Gaulle to make nuclear weapons?

Ans. He was a general and have credibility, he has role played in Second World War. He also has technological fix and he believes that to be in power you need to develop this specific energy, space programmes, in 1970s on nuclear energy. France is number one number of nuclear reactors proportional to its populations. France was a very modest, civil nuclearised country. France has nuclear dimensions of long range missiles; France maintains all this for technological superiority. It spends 20% of the budget on technological development.

Q8. What is the relation between Non-proliferations, extended deterrence, FU policy related to each other?

Ans. Not sure. Extended deterrence was never used by French; the French never questioned the dimension of nuclear proliferation treaty.

Transcribed Version of Joseph Gerson's interview

By Neha Kumar, Research Scholar, SIS, JNU

Skype Interview

On 23 July 2015, 6.30 PM-7.15PM

For PhD Thesis ‘‘First Use and Extended Deterrence in American Strategy: Analysing Nuclear Decision Making in France and Japan’’.

Q1. Which theory of International relations best explains the best the motivation of state to go nuclear?

Ans. It varies from country to country. The US decided to go for nuclear weapons because it fears that Germany might also go for nuclear weapons. So, they should have something in hand to threaten them. However, it was clear by 1943 that Germany is not going to have a bomb. Right before the Mahanhattam project in 1944, it was clear that nuclear weapons are not just for the Germany or for Japan; it was for the Soviet Union. And in fact the call of the bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was meant to bring the early termination of war so the US need not have to share info with Soviet Union, china. Manchurian and Korea. The Russians clearly develop weapons as a deterrent force against the US as they were aware of the progress made by the America. The Britain quest for nuclear weapons is explained in a book Churchill and the bomb which describe British merge get bomb with the collaboration with the US. The British want to have major status in international relations. Same was the case with the France. On the other hand, China need to develop bomb so as to deal with the threats coming from the US and Russia. Israel develops nuclear weapons to reinforce his position in nation of power in Middle East. They had some collaboration with France. The British and French attack Egypt in 1956 to cooperate with Israel and Russians intervene. India's policies are complex. India wants to be major player in the world. At the same time it wants to be a nuclear power while it faced the pressure of NPT, and also faced China threat. Pakistan develops nuclear weapons in response to India. There was no real evidence that Iran was developing bomb till 2007. However, Iran tries to be a regional power and try to compete with Israel in the realm of nuclear weapons. Both deterrence and first strike are for most of these countries were important for all these countries.

Q2. Why Japan decided to be non-nuclear despite of the fact that it faced nuclear weapons threat from North Korea and China? Japan also had some doubts on the credibility of nuclear weapons. What was the reason remaining non-nuclear?

Ans. In 1996, I had a chance to interview the principal author of Japan's defence white paper. He said the interpretation of Japan constitution the Japan has right to develop tactical nuclear weapons but they had not exercised this option till date. The military of Japan had a right to possess the nuclear weapons. Japan is in shackles of past. Japan was destroyed as a consequence of 15 year old wars and became the US protectorate. The terms and conditions were imposed on Japan by the United States. So in terms of condition Japanese try to establish their influence and power in international area through trade meanwhile they have developed their near nuclear

power. Japan is currently moving ahead in the field of nuclear power and could decide to become nuclear weapon state unless the countries move ahead in the field of NPT.

Q2. US have FU policy even after cold war. What are the reasons? Do they intend to use nuclear weapons?

Ans. US govt is not monolithic and military complex is very powerful which has been explained fully in my book the Empire and the bomb with proper citations. The game actually begins 1946 with the Iraq crisis, even before Russia had nuclear weapons. The US and British authorisation, the Russian occupied part of Iran. Russian was in no hurry to leave and the invited Russian ambassador to white house and said that if you don't leave in 12 hours mass casualties cease to exist. Over time more than 40 decades, the US threatens to nuclear war with the expectation that other nations will back down. Danniell albergt-he was a senior nuclear planner under the Kennedy and Johnson administration said that the US has nuclear weapons in the same way a robber use the gun to its advantage. Whether or not he pressed the trigger, the weapon has been used.

Q3. Is it a kind hegemony that the US is playing?

Ans : Yes...it does. It is enforcing its empire. The US wishes to maintain power privilege.