# Democracy Promotion and International Organizations: A Study of the European Union

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Date: 18.07.2016

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "**Democracy Promotion and International Organizations: A Study of the European Union**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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LIST OF GRAPHS AND TABLES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
ACRI	Association for Civil Rights in Israel
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development
ASEAN	Association of the South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BeNeLux	Belgium, Netherland and Luxembourg
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CEES	Central and Eastern European States
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIPE	Center for International Private Enterprise
CoE	Council of Europe
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG-DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG-NEAR	Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
E5P	Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund
EAD	UN Electoral Assistance Division
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EED	European Endowment for Democracy
EIB	European Investment Bank

EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
FTAs	Free Trade Agreements
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HCNM	(OSCE) High Commission for National Minorities
HR	High Representative
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICAHD	Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IFCA	Investment Facility for Central Asia
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INSC	Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
ICNL	International Center for Not-For-Profit Law
IOs	International Organizations
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IR	International Relations
IRI	International Republican Institute
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISPA	Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-Accession
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCD	Norwegian Center for Democracy
NDEP	Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership

NDI	National Democratic Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
NPAA	National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
OAS	Organization of American States
ODIHR	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OMC	Open Method of Coordination
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSF	Open Society Foundations
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
CBC	Cross Border Cooperation Programme
PI	Partnership Instrument
SAPARD	Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
SEA	Single European Act
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIGMA	Support for Improvement in Government and Management
TAIEX	Twinning, Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
UN	United Nations
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UDHR	Universal Declaration on Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency of International Development
USP	Unique Selling Point
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VP	Vice President

WBIF	Western Balkans Investment Framework
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

An established practice in the contemporary world is the promotion of democracy in regions perceived to be lacking in democracy. Who does this promotion, how is it practiced, how does it relate to other agendas such as peace, human rights, humanitarian intervention, governance, etc. and why is it contested and critiqued –are some of the questions that have attracted academic interest in the concept of democracy promotion. Several contradictions arise in understanding the phenomenon of democracy promotion – there are divergences in the understanding of what constitutes 'democracy', whether its universalization is desirable and how different democracy promotion is from 'intervention' or 'regime change'. Academic interest in, as well as the practice of, 'democracy promotion' have intensified in the post Cold War years, after the end of the bipolar international template.

Democracy promotion has been pursued by individual (usually powerful) states such as the United States as well as by international organizations, both universal and regional. Each actor has pursued its own version of 'democracy promotion', each at its own pace and intensity, and has met its own set of challenges, accolades and critiques in its engagement with democracy promotion. This study examines 'democracy promotion' both as a concept and in practice and focuses on the work of one particular regional organization – the European Union – in promoting democracy within and outside of Europe.

The history of the term 'democracy' is as old as the Greek tradition. But, the notion of a pure and perfect democracy has always remained contested. The term 'democracy' has no definition in particular and has been debated by numerous theories such as the Liberal, Marxist and Social

Democratic theories (Macpherson 1966; Held 1996). These versions of theories of democracy are not only varied in their understanding of the functioning and normative justification of democracy but also in their approach towards whether and how democracy could be or should be 'promoted' (Kurki 2010). Promoting a democratic system of governance in states that are different in their political outlook often results in contradictions, controversies and criticisms – as much related to the concept of democracy itself as to the methodology of its 'promotion'. The debate around the concept and practice of 'democracy promotion' is juxtaposed between the frameworks of idealism and realism, between the notions of good and the evil, between the perspectives of the West and the non-West, and between moral obligations and pragmatism.

'Democracy' as a term has been used both as an 'end' in itself as well as a 'means' to achieve other understated interests such as political, security, and other economic benefits. The actors involved in pursuing these interests are varied – individual countries, most prominently, the United States (US); international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); regional organizations like the European Union (EU), Organization of American States (OAS) and others; and also non-governmental entities both national and international. Since, these actors support democracy promotion externally, the nature and role of these actors gives rise to the question of the extent to which they should get involved in promoting the advance of democracy?

The problematique of democracy promotion is well reflected in the often quoted maxim of Reinhold Niebuhr, "....man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" (Niebuhr 2011: xx). Niebuhr stresses on the understanding or acceptance of the fact that there are certain interests that sometimes precede human ideals and at other times become subservient to the same. In another explanation, Niebuhr referring to human inclination towards self-interest states that,

Sometimes this egotism stands in frank contradiction to the professed ideal or sense of obligation to higher and wider values; and sometimes it uses the ideal as its instrument (Niebuhr 2011: 40).

What is stressed by Niebuhr regarding human nature is also true for actors in international relations. Democracy promotion sometimes becomes a higher end or an ideal to be achieved and sometimes works as an instrument to successfully launch and progress towards other economic, political, and strategic interests.

This thesis does not propagate or carry forward the Realist tradition of Niebuhr's philosophical teachings. Rather, it focuses on various policies adopted by international organizations for the promotion of democracy and the changing trends therein. In broad terms, 'democracy promotion' includes all sorts of attempts that help a non-democratic regime transition to a democratic one (Hawkins 2008: 375; Carothers 1999). Rubén M. Perina defines democracy promotion as, "... any national or multilateral policy procurement, action and activity designed and executed to foster, support, strengthen, protect and defend a democratic regime" (Perina 2015: 53). Another definition of democracy promotion excludes the use of physical coercion in the promotion of democracy. It states that, "Democracy promotion comprises all direct, non-violent activities by a state or international organization that are intended to bring about, strengthen, and support democracy in a third country" (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2013: 4). These definitions, however, are not very useful in capturing the horizons anticipated with the meaning of democracy promotion. This happens mainly because 'democracy' itself is an essentially contested concept and therefore its 'promotion' is open to multiple interpretations.

In a democracy, apart from the *procedural* aspects (mechanisms like free and independent periodic elections), there are some *substantive* elements as well (e.g. socialization of ideals such as liberty, equality, justice, rule of law, and human rights) that are necessary for avoiding the 'tyranny of the majority' – a drawback of the majority rule of democracy that was identified by Alexis De Tocqueville (Magstadt 2011). These different dimensions of

democracy make democracy promotion an umbrella term that includes democracy assistance, consolidation, dissemination and advocacy (Acuto 2008: 464). All these terms differently connote support to democratic ideals and differentiation between them is minuscule rather they are used interchangeably in academic writings.

A fundamental objection to democracy promotion is over the question of whether democracy can be promoted from outside. Democratic transition of states is traditionally understood to involve national forces while international actors play a marginal role (Schmitter 1986:5). Despite the lack of an agreement over the modalities of promotion, democracy is being claimed to be 'promoted' by various international actors specially international and regional organizations.

Theoretically, there has been a contestation between the Liberal and Realist strands of International Relations about the role played by international organizations (IOs) in politics. IOs have been put through debates over whether IOs are 'actors' or 'agents', and the dilemma still persists over whether IOs work for their member states or IOs make member states work towards a greater good (Hawkins et al 2006). These theories are more related to the practical aspects of IOs promoting democracy whereas the conceptual aspect of 'democracy promotion' comes from the liberal theory of democratic peace.

The work of Michael Doyle (1983) in bringing back Immanuel Kant's idea (Perpetual Peace, 1795) that 'sharing of republican constitutions among states perpetuates international peace', is important for building a 'democratic peace theory' (Russett et al. 1995). The theory has been contested by Realists on the ground that structural changes at the state level have no significant influence on the international political system (systemic level) (Layne 1996: 164). Nevertheless, the democratic peace theory (a postulate of liberal foreign policy) influenced the policies of Western developed nations (with greater impact on American foreign policy). The theory, when applied, is defined by the socio-political structures of the time; as Philippe C. Schmitter points out, "there is no apolitical way to

democratize..." (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999: 1). It is in such realizations that elements of the Realist tradition are added to the inherently idealist concept that 'democracy will bring peace to the world'.

Building on the "white man's burden" concept of the imperialist tradition, the US, after the end of the Cold War, assumed a duty to spread the democratic form of governance around the world.[1] "This assumption is quickly expressed in a doctrine of "liberal internationalism" and policies of pacification through political and economic liberalization carried out through diplomacy, international trade, humanitarian aid and eventually military force" (Acuto 2008: 464). The term 'democracy promotion' gained popularity only in the last twenty to twenty-five years. However, along with its growth as a concept, scepticism in large measure has also grown about the methods used for promotion of democracy, mainly because of the unilateral actions of the US and its allies in Iraq (2003, against Saddam Hussein's government) and Afghanistan (2001, after the 9/11 incident) (Melia 2005).

Given the position of power that the US enjoys, its interests also shape and influence the policies formulated at multilateral fora. President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" (1941) formed the basis for the creation of the UN. The acceptance of these freedoms also brings back the debate associated with the role of international organizations as 'actors' or as 'agents' of the nation-states in international politics. Democracy is present in the working of the UN since 1945, not overtly in its Charter but covertly evident in provisions like the self-determination of the newly independent colonies or highlighted in the passage of the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights* (UDHR) (1948) which states that the "will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government". The UN, however, became vocal in its acceptance of democracy as an important ideal only after the 1990s in the various conferences and summits of the UN and in the internationally agreed "Millennium Development Goals" (MDGs). A more politically loaded question is, whether the efforts taken by IOs towards democracy promotion

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[1] A democratic form of governance refers to a government elected by the people and where the authority is subjected to accountability and participation by the people of the country.

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are driven by an ideological preference for a democratic form of governance or by the pressures to meet the larger political and economic ends of major global powers? Critical perceptions abound regarding the politicized actions of actors (like US and international organizations) on the use of democracy promotion as a tool to achieve varied interests.

In the post Cold War years, the end of the ideological divide and the triumph of the liberal democratic state formulation, along with the new surge in globalization brought democracy promotion on the agenda of international and regional organizations in a far more emphatic manner. Not just the UN, but also many regional organizations like the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), and the Council of Europe (CoE), also started sponsoring democratic programs.

In comparison to its counterparts, the EU intensified its focus on democracy promotion as a strategy to promote economic integration (after the end of the Second World War) as well as political integration (after the end of the Cold War). In 1962, the Birkelbach Report of the Political Committee of the European Parliament stated that, "Only states which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of the community" (Grugel 1999: 74). This was firmly established in 1993, in the *Copenhagen European Council*, which prescribed the democratic criteria for the inclusion of 'associated countries' as members of the EU.

The mechanism that the EU uses for promoting democracy within its membership area is the laying of conditions for inclusion of new members through the *Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance* (IPA) by which the EU supports reforms with financial and technical help to the governments at the receiving end of the democracy promotion spectrum. A shift is evident from a mere focus on political and economic aid and conditionality to an emphasis on societal reforms and good governance. The EU's 2004 enlargement which included ten new countries of Central and Eastern Europe represented a successful case of procedural democracy promotion although much remains

to be achieved in terms of substantive democracy (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997: 80).

In recent years, the discrepancies between the procedural and substantive mechanisms of democracy have become more apparent in democracy promotion efforts and outcomes. New instruments have been added by international organizations which mark a trend in greater focus towards substantive democracy promotion by supporting the *demand side* of democracy (the masses represented by civil society or NGOs) along with the conventional support to the *supply side* (the government and administration of the receiving state). Some of the new instruments designed by international organizations for promotion of substantive aspects of democracy include the *United Nations Democracy Fund* (UNDEF), the *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights* (EIDHR), and the *European Endowment for Democracy* (EED).

The instruments used by the EU for promoting democracy outside the EU region include the *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP) and the EIDHR (Ishkanian 2007: 6). The ENP was proposed in order to give greater attention to the new extended borders of EU (after the 2004 enlargement) in the Eastern European region. It was later extended to West Asia and North African countries that are part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) (Johansson-Nogúes 2007). The experiences of the 'Arab Spring' resulted in a new initiative – the *European Endowment for Democracy* (EED) – which will further EU's engagement in this region (Cangas 2012). This instrument promotes the substantive aspects of democracy, especially where direct procedural support cannot be offered (example the Arab and West Asian region).

Within EU policies, there is a distinction between what is being offered to members, candidates and non-candidates in neighbouring regions. This study highlights the distinction between democracy promotion from the 'supply side' (includes governmental bodies) and the 'demand side' (involves civil society organisations and the local communities) in states that are in the transition and consolidation phases of democratization (Rich

2010a: 427). In recent times, EU has broadened its coverage area geographically as well as functionally (by including new mechanisms) to promote democracy, providing therefore a fertile ground for research on this topic.

1.2 Definitions and Scope

In simple terms, 'democracy promotion' refers to the promotion by national governments or international organizations of policies through which democratic ideals (both substantive and procedural aspects) are spread to countries and regions where a representative political system is not in place. The debate on democracy promotion often gives rise to a discussion on the normative justifications of the concept of 'democracy promotion'. This study builds upon the existing theoretical background so as to understand how international and regional organizations are involved in the process of democracy promotion, and the politics behind their involvement. Although the US and the UN are studied as actors in democracy promotion, they constitute a backdrop to the main focus of the study, which remains the EU. This research also takes into account the transition in the working of these organizations from the Cold War to the post-Cold War years with regard to the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy promotion. These two aspects of democracy promotion are essential because a balance between these two determines the comprehensiveness and credibility of democracy both as a form of government and as an ideal to be followed.

EU policies and strategies of democracy promotion – both within and outside Europe – are analyzed. The policies to be studied will include the EU's Accession Policy for Enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the instruments of civil society funding like the EIDHR and the EED. Even though the EU cannot be used as a study from which accurate generalizations may then be extrapolated to understand the role of IOs in democracy promotion in general, the EU, due to its sheer magnitude of experience in the field of democracy promotion provides an apt case to be studied.

Based upon the above mentioned understanding of democracy promotion by international organizations, some questions that undergird this research are:

- What makes democracy promotion a contested concept?
- Why is promotion of democracy by international organizations regarded as a politicized endeavour?
- What changes are evident from the Cold War to the post Cold War years in the working of international organizations towards procedural and substantive aspects of democracy promotion?
- Through what techniques does the EU promote democracy within Europe? Does the accession process of the enlargement policy constitute a successful instrument of democracy promotion within Europe?
- What is the impact of EU's democracy promotion policies upon the non-EU parts of the world? How far are the initiatives of ENP and EIDHR successful in promoting democracy?
- How is EU's approach towards democracy promotion linked to its wider goals of security and regional integration?

1.3 Review of Literature

This literature review reflects on the existing state of debates, research and literature that focus upon 'democracy promotion by international organizations'. The review is divided into four broad themes: (1) The concept of democracy promotion; (2) The practice of democracy promotion; (3) EU's democracy promotion within member states and; (4) EU's efforts at democracy promotion outside the EU region.

I. The Concept of Democracy Promotion

Democracy is one of the core areas of study in political science, and there are numerous scholars who have defined 'democracy' right from the times of the early Greek tradition (Arblaster 2002; Crick 2002; Dahl 2000). A democracy is generally considered as a political system governed by the masses with features like periodic elections, political competition, rule of law and civil

and political rights (Vollmer and Ziegler 2009: 8). A more in-depth analysis of democracy has been done by Robert A. Dahl (2000) in his work "*On Democracy*" which analyses the origins and evolution of the concept with the help of examples from around the world.

Some of the common features of democracy that are universal in its definition are, free and fair elections and a government based upon competition and accountability. These are the procedural aspects of a democratic form of government supported by many scholars of liberal democratic stance (originated in the writings of Schumpeter 1950s; and Robert Dahl's '*Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*' of 1971). However, it is argued that "the substance of the government policies (virtues like civil liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights and other amendments of the US constitution) is the real essence of democracy" (Breton et al. 1997: 212).

According to Carl Gershman and Michael Allen, democracy promotion not only supports regime change towards electoral democracies but also promotes independent media, rule of law, independent judiciary, human rights and growth of civil society (Gershman and Allen 2006: 49). Therefore, promotion of democracy as a concept involves promotion of both procedural and substantive aspect of democracy. Many have also regarded elections as not the true measure of accounting democratization (Zarkaria 1997; Hobsbawm 2004; Levitsky and Way 2010). While distinguishing between the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy is useful for conceptual delineation, in the practice of democracy promotion, the division blurs as the promotion of one aspect is incomplete without the other. Also the promotion of one may automatically lead to promotion of the other without aiming for the same.

The Western industrialized states have tended to combine the prospects of procedural democracy with the promotion of liberal democracy (Kurki 2010: 365, Youngs 2011). Many have referred to the Wilsonian triad – liberal governance, peace and free market – as the rationale behind the promotion of democracy (Madelbaum 2003: 5). The liberal theory of

'democratic peace' attributes the absence of war between democracies to two main reasons. First, to the institutional balances that are embedded in democratic states' domestic political structures and second, to the democratic norms and culture which promote peaceful settlement of disputes to avoid war (Layne 1996: 158). Although it has attracted contestation, such as the Realist claim that international peace is not impacted by the domestic politics of countries, the theory of democratic peace has not been completely denounced.

Another ongoing theoretical debate is over whether the transition to a democratic form of government must necessarily be brought about by domestic actors or whether there is space for external actors to influence this process. In '*Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*' (2005), Jon C. Pevehouse provided a generalized result that international organizations that are highly democratic (like the OAS or EU) have a positive impact on the probability of democratic transitions in authoritarian states attached to these organizations (Pevehouse 2005).

Another theory that explains the changing nature of regional organizations in the post Cold War years is 'new regionalism'. According to Björn Hettne, in '*The New Regionalism Revisited*' (2003), new regionalism is a more comprehensive, multi-faceted and multidimensional process, including not only trade and economic integration, but also environment, social policy, identity, culture, security, and democracy i.e. including issues of accountability and legitimacy (Hettne 2003). This study also locates the case study of the EU within the context of new regionalism.

After the 1990s, many scholars like Whitehead (1996) and Carothers (1999) started emphasizing the role of external actors in democracy promotion. Others like Gleditsch and Ward (2006), and Kopstein and Reilly (2000), formulated the concepts of 'snowballing' or 'diffusion', whereby non-democratic states are influenced by their democratic neighbours (Peksen 2012: 6). The latest edited volume of Dursun Peksen (2012) evaluates the effectiveness of major policy tools and actors in the practice of democracy promotion. However, not many works deal exclusively with the role of

international organizations in democracy promotion and the politics behind these efforts.

II.   The Practice of Democracy Promotion

Till the beginning of the 20th century, universal suffrage and equal civil, social and political rights were not provided for even in democracies like the US and Britain, which today constitute the leading promoters of democracy. Gradually, with universal suffrage, welfare state, decolonization, creation of the United Nations, and adoption of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the gaps visible in Western liberal democracies were filled.

After the Second World War US became the champion of democracy promotion around the world (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi 2000; Carothers 2004; and Smith 1994). Thomas Carothers, in his work "*Critical Missions: Essays on Democracy Promotion*" has given an elaborate account of US democracy assistance and promotion (the cases of democracy promotion in Central and Eastern European states, and after 9/11 in the Middle East, are prominent) along with a comprehensive bibliography on 'democracy promotion' (Carothers 2004). Charles Krauthammer (2004) uses the term 'democratic realism' to describe the US policy of democracy promotion, which he asserts is a disguise for US national interests post 9/11.

As observed by Gerardo L. Munck, "Democracy Promotion was born as an initiative of the US government, but it grew to become a matter of interest of governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations around the world" (Munck 2009: 1). The traditional focus of the UN towards democracy promotion included activities of electoral assistance, conducting referenda and plebiscites, mainly in the context of the process of decolonization during the 1960s. Soon after, the UN articulated international norms in the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966), with inherent features of democratic rights and principles. Therefore, democracy is not merely a political system; other ideals of 'welfare state' and 'human rights' come as supplements of a democratic form of government. "Democratization is now more commonly viewed as

the norm rather than the exception" (Whitehead 2004: 135). The UN refers to democracy as a culture affecting all areas of life, as stated in the *Universal Declaration on Democracy* (1997), "Democracy is both an ideal to be pursued and a mode of government to be applied according to modalities which reflect the diversity of experiences and cultural particularities..." (IPU 1997: 1).

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, international organizations began experimenting with new techniques of democracy promotion involving actors other than states. In 2005, a UN *Democracy Fund* was created for the purpose of assisting countries seeking support for democracy promotion with the help of local civil society organizations. Such attempts are better received as they target democracy while contextualizing it within local variations (Youngs 2011, Kurki 2010).

According to Ish-Shalome, theories are not followed by practicioners in their purest forms but are influenced by *public conventions* and *political convictions* (Ish-Shalom 2006: 572). This holds true for the discrepancy in the conceptual understanding and the practice of democracy promotion. Efforts towards democracy promotion sometimes lead to pseudo-democratic states, for instance, "In much of Africa and former Soviet Union, and in parts of Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Americas, new regimes combined electoral competition with varying degrees of authoritarianism"; they were plagued by "...electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence … In other words competition is real but unfair" (Levitsky and Way 2010: 3). Scholars like Robert Dahl (1999) and Andrew Moravcsik (2004) have also been debating about the visible 'democratic deficits' in the bureaucratic functioning of international organizations which raises a question about credibility of these institutions for democracy promotion.

III.   EU's Democracy Promotion in the EU Region

European Union is a regional organization of Europe, yet, in the words of Richard Youngs, "The EU's model of democratic reconciliation and

development has international appeal" (Youngs 2008b: 1). The tools and instruments of democracy promotion used by the EU include negotiations, political dialogue and moral support, conditionality, financial aid, loans or economic cooperation, peace-keeping interventions, election observation, and the threat of financial and moral sanctions in case of non-compliance. Democracy has grown expansively not only by crossing borders within Europe but has transgressed sectors (political, economic, social and cultural), reconciling the latent contradiction between democracy promotion and sovereign autonomy of states.

The enlargement process of the EU has resulted in a current membership of 28 from the original 6 at the EU's inception. One of the conditionalities for membership imposed by the EU is the acceptance by the candidate state of the *acquis communautaire* which includes "EU's treaties and laws, declarations and resolutions, international agreements on EU affairs and the judgments given by the Court of Justice" (Eurojargon Official Website). In the 1980s, Greece, Portugal and Spain became members of EEC only after their transition from dictatorship to democracy (Hudson 2000: 410-411). Many scholars have noted the political transition of the post-communist states of Europe as outstanding cases of democracy promotion by the EU (Youngs 2010a, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005, Vachudova 2005).

The 1962 Birkelbach Report regarded democracy as a vital aspect of political integration and accession to or association with the EEC (European Economic Community). The '*Treaty on European Union*' [or *Maastricht Treaty*, in effect since 1993, which has been redrafted and amended via the *Treaty of Amsterdam* (1999) and *Treaty of Nice* (2003)] lays down the democratic provisions for the member-states in Article 6, Section I of the 'Common Provisions of the Union' which states that, "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states" (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2002: 11). The *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* also

identifies, in its preamble, democracy as one of the indivisible and universal values upon which the Union is founded (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000: 8).

The Copenhagen European Council (1993) laid down the three pertinent criteria, commonly called the *Accession Criteria* or *Copenhagen Criteria,* which include – "firstly, 'political' stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; secondly, 'economic' existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and lastly, acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union". The *pre-accession strategy* and *accession negotiations* provide the necessary framework and instruments for carrying out these accession criteria (Enlargement 2012).

The 2001 second volume of Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, "*Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transnational Factors*" is an attempt at capturing the transitions in Central and Eastern European states (and the role of external pressures in such transitions). Some scholars have noted that the transformation of post-communist states of Europe has either stagnated or even shows signs of reverting back to an authoritarian frame (Carothers 2002; Ambrosio 2008). Others have analyzed that the literature available on EU and its efforts at democracy promotion are fragmented and "...that this very fragmentation hinders the development of both our theoretical understanding of democratisation processes and specific EU policies that really work" (Simmons 2011: 139). Nonetheless, continuous efforts are being made by scholars working to analyse the growing shift in the functioning of EU in the realm of promotion of democracy especially in context of its neighbours where conditionality and enlargement leverage is effete.

IV.   Efforts at Democracy Promotion outside the EU Region

The working of EU is tied to its goal of maintaining security in the region. Therefore, the principle of 'democracy' mentioned in Article 6, Section I, of the 'Common Provisions of the Union' in the *Treaty on European Union* has also been reflected in the relations of EU with third countries (countries that are not members or candidate states of EU), particularly in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in the Development and Cooperation Policy (EuropeAid) and in the economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries.

Among the EU's democracy promotion policies is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004 as an EU initiative to foster healthy relationship with 16 neighbouring countries to the east and south of the EU (ENP Official Website). Because of the large variations among the partners of ENP (in terms of their cultural, social, political and economic structure), "differentiation" is a fundamental principle of the ENP without compromising with the EU's commitment to promote core liberal values and norms (ENP Official Website). One of the adverse effects of the ENP is on the enlargement policy as the bilateral framework of negotiations under this neighbourhood policy hampers the multilateral regional integration arrangement that the EU seeks to promote (Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 407).

Richard Youngs suggests other mechanisms of socialization and support to civil societies which are helpful in spreading democracy outside (Grugel 2004: 612). An important initiative to support civil society groups is EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) which was launched by the European Parliament in 1994 to support promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries. "EIDHR allows circumventing the governments of the recipient countries and can be used even if other programs have been suspended, e.g. in cases of violations of human rights" (Börzel 2009: 34, Youngs 2008b). The EIDHR budget has increased from 135 million Euros in 2007 to 1.04 billion Euros in the period 2007-2013 (EIDHR Official Website).

EU has tried to promote regionalism, especially in relation with the non-European third countries around the world like the Mediterranean, or the ACP countries (African, Caribbean and pacific countries) (Bicchi 2006: 287-288). The EU's Policies are not limited to political conditionality and also utilize channels of transnational exchange such as trade and investment, people-to-people interaction and information exchange (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008: 192). In 1995, the EU accepted a human right clause as an 'essential element' clause in its agreements with third countries. To date, 47 agreements containing such a clause have been agreed with more than 122 countries. According to Karen Smith, countries like the ones in Africa which are poor and marginalized are the only cases where negative conditionality towards human rights violators is often used. (Smith 2001: 193).

A recent addition to the study of democracy promotion done by the EU outside Europe is the 2015 work called "Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its Neighbourhood". In this book, some of the eminent scholars working upon democracy promotion of the EU have contributed to the volume with a view that leverage of conditionality provision is quite useless for neighbouring states where EU has found the solution in functional cooperation with these states.

1.4 Objectives of the Research

The aim of this research is to analyse the conceptual and empirical aspects of 'democracy promotion', with a focus on the role played by international organizations in this regard. The study is grounded in the understanding that 'democracy promotion' is a contested and controversial concept and it therefore first analyses its theoretical contours and outlines the many ways in which it has been and may be problematized. The study then explores the practical implementation of 'democracy promotion' by different actors – powerful states such as the United States as well as international organizations such as the United Nations – within the overall context of global politics, exploring the changing nature of the concept from the Cold War to the post-Cold War years.

The chosen focus of this study is the role of the European Union (EU) in democracy promotion, as the EU has a strong emphasis on and experience with democracy promotion. This study also marks the shifting focus of international organizations (with examples mainly from the working of the EU) towards substantive aspects of democracy promotion from the conventional emphasis on procedural aspects. Subsequently the research also deals with democracy promoting mechanisms and policies of the EU from supply side view point rather than rationalizing upon the much researched demand side. The study analyses the policies and activities of democracy promotion of the EU (i) within the EU region, i.e. amongst its members and (ii) outside the EU region (European neighbourhood as well as non-European parts of the world).

The research therefore, includes suitable examples both from within the EU region as well as outside the region where efforts of EU's democracy promotion can be analysed. It needs to be understood that not all democracy promotion efforts lead to democratization. Also by excluding a few other programs that does not cause direct democracy promotion from this study point of view might actually exclude programmes through which donor states intend to promote democracy in a covert manner. This flaw is given in the research because of the wide range of mechanisms now being utilized by international organizations for democracy promotion in one form or the other. Examples of evident change of policies from procedural to substantive form of democracy promotion are stated in the text.

This study aims to offer a value addition by attempting a synthesis that includes the following aspects: (1) the gap between the concept and practice of democracy promotion, (2) the changing contours of democracy promotion from the Cold War to the Post Cold War era with respect to a shift from procedural democracy promotion to greater substantive democracy promotion, (3) the role of EU in democracy promotion both within and outside Europe. As the survey above indicates, individual components of these issues have been dealt with in the existing literature. A comprehensive

analysis based on the inter-linkages between these components, however, is not currently available and has been attempted in this study.

Based upon the study of the literature available on the topic, the research works upon two hypotheses that will provide new perspectives to the theme of democracy promotion by international organizations. These are:

1. Increasing instances and intrusive nature of unilateral democracy promotion by countries like the US have adversely impacted the credibility of multilateral efforts at democracy promotion undertaken by international organizations.

2. The EU's involvement with democracy promotion has intensified in the post-Cold War years, both in terms of covering new regions and in terms of promoting the substantive aspects of democracy as well.

1.5 Methodology Used in Research

The research adopts a critical viewing of democracy promotion, highlighting the politics attached to this concept. While discussing the first hypothesis, the research is deductive in nature as general attitudes of international organizations like the working of the UN in the field of democracy promotion are being studied to analyse particularly how US as a global power influences such activities of IOs and what impact that influence has on the concept of democracy promotion *per se*. But while discussing the second hypothesis, the research turns inductive. It analyses particularly the working of the EU in the field of democracy promotion to research upon the general shift in the working of international organizations from procedural to substantive aspects of democracy promotion in the post Cold War years.

Though the research focuses on the working of international organizations – specifically of the European Union – in the field of democracy promotion, yet multiple actors (nation states, international and regional organizations and civil society entities) have been studied throughout this research. This will capture the broader meaning and working of democracy promotion not just from the level of systemic research analysis by also from the national and unit level of analysis as well. A 'case study'

research method has been used in which the policies and working of the EU have been extensively studied with a special focus on EU's democracy promoting mechanisms like the ENP, the EIDHR and the EED. This study has been then empirically tested by using suitable examples of democracy promotion by the EU both within and outside the European boundaries.

A field trip to the EU institutions in Brussels was carried out with the benefit of getting first hand information about promotion of democracy through its various mechanisms. Questionnaire based interviews were carried out with experts on democratization policies of the EU. Policy officers and advocates from various EU departments like the Directorates-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), the European External Action Service, the European Endowment for Democracy and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights were interviewed for authenticating the work of this thesis. The inferences developed in this research have been examined by using primary material (like the official archives and documents of the organizations, histories, records of the political system and the economic and trade statistics of the countries concerned) and secondary sources as well, so as to deal with research questions and to test the hypotheses.

1.6 Chapterization

The chapterization of the research is proposed on the basis of literature done for this research. Other than an introductory chapter (**Chapter 1**) and a concluding chapter (**Chapter 6**), there are four substantive chapters which try to include various aspects of the theme of democracy promotion by international organizations.

Chapter 2: The Concept of Democracy Promotion – starts with a critical focus on understanding the meaning and usage of the term democracy (both procedural and substantive) in the study of politics. Some basic questions have been asked in this chapter such as: What is democracy promotion? Can democracy be promoted? These questions are raised before analysing the theoretical aspect dealing with the concept of democracy

promotion. Two types of theories have been described in the chapter for the two different variables that the research deals with – namely democracy promotion and international organizations. The chapter mentions firstly, the theories of democracy promotion which lately became prominent in the subject concern of the study of International Relations (IR). Much of the attention in this section has been given to the 'democratic peace proposition' which belongs to the theoretical stream of liberalism in IR. Critiquing the democratic peace theory and mentioning of other theories that have salient features of democracy promotion as a concept in IR comes under the scope of this section.

The second theoretical section explains what the theories of IR have to say about the role of international organizations as interveners in the domestic affairs of nation-states. Since democracy relates to the internal affairs of nation-states, involvement of external actors like international organizations for democracy promotion requires theoretical explanation. The chapter sceptically analyses the theories of democracy promotion and problematizes the concept of democracy promotion.

Chapter 3: The Practice of Democracy Promotion – The chapter begins by summarizing the status of democracy across the world. Several countries project themselves as democracies but are being governed undemocratically. For analysing the practice of democracy promotion, the work of various international actors has been studied. Amongst the international actors that are engaged in the process of democracy promotion, the leading name is that of the United Nations (UN). As a primary agency engaged in maintaining peace and order in the world, the UN has interwoven the concept of democracy promotion with other themes of human rights and humanitarian interventions. Though not overtly promoting democracy, the UN promotes democracy as a normative ideal.

Another crucial actor engaged in the process of democracy is the US; its influence over the idea of democracy promotion and the latent interest behind the promotion of the same has been studied in the chapter while also critically analysing American influence over international organizations in

the process of democracy promotion. Other external actors discussed in the chapter are regional organizations and the role of NGOs and civil society groupings in the promotion of democracy. The choice of these actors also provides a distinction between democracy promotion done through the unilateral attempts of the US, and multilateral engagement by international organizations including the UN, regional organizations, and NGOs. The chapter also discusses the politics involved and the changing nature of activities under democracy promotion from the Cold War to the post Cold War years.

Chapter 4: Democracy Promotion by the European Union in the EU Region – For the purpose of this study, 'within Europe' includes only the member states, the candidate states and the potential candidate states. The chapter starts with a historical background as to how EU, with time has evolved its concept of democracy and implemented it through its membership criterion. It also critically analyses how an economically oriented organization gradually shifted its attention towards aspects of human rights and democracy promotion. In the Post Cold War years (in 1992), the EU came out with the Copenhagen Criterion, explicitly projecting itself as a 'club of democratic states'.

The Chapter then discusses democracy promotion by the EU through its accession process and through other financial and technical aid within the European continent and the requirements imposed on its member states, candidate states and potential partners for greater democracy promotion and good governance. The analysis also shows the changing trends with the accession policies of the EU to fill gaps in democratic deficit by giving greater autonomy to the European Parliament.

Chapter 5: Democracy Promotion by the European Union beyond Europe – illustrates the working of EU and its various mechanisms of democracy promotion that it uses for countries and regions outside Europe. The chapter first explains the democracy promotion done by the EU within European Neighbourhood Policy which includes the Mediterranean region and those countries which experienced the Arab Spring. The chapter

then studies the changing nature of EU's democracy promotion from procedural to the substantive aspects of democracy promotion and from top-down to bottom-up mechanisms. The mechanisms under study in the chapter are the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EIDHR and the EED. The chapter also explains EU's approach to democracy promotion in countries and regions outside Europe and mentioned the role of other actors which help in democracy promotion apart from the EU in the wider European region. And lastly the chapter discusses some of the successes and failures of democracy promotion done by the EU.

Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter which puts together the main findings of the research. Conclusions arising out of the testing of the hypotheses are presented in this chapter. The chapter summarizes the learnings from the case study (EU) on the general practice of democracy promotion.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

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2.1 Introduction

Unprecedented changes have occurred in political systems of nation states around the globe in the last century. There have been ups and downs since the post Second World War years in the emergence of democratic regimes around the world, constituting what Samuel P. Huntington refers to as 'waves of democratic transition'. With the passage of time, the boundaries between democracies and non-democratic states have become porous, with pure form of authoritarian government disappearing. Governments, in their quest for achieving what the dominant order of the day demands (whether globalization, free market, liberalization, privatization and democratization), have lost their original appearances. With time authoritarian countries have transformed due to increased transactions and interconnectedness resulting from the processes of globalization.

So rapid are the changes at the global level that maintaining a single form of government (whether democracy, monarchy, dictatorship, or any other authoritarian regimes) is difficult. For some scholars democracies in the West have become impure, specially with respect to their declining public participation, public awareness, unfocused civil society and media, and many other issues related to party politics (Barber 2001: 295; Putnam 2000: 45). Apart from the West, which has deep roots of democratic governments, the rest of the world where democracy is nascent and where authoritarianism is at decline (like Tunisia and many more), are more vulnerable in this context. Democracies like Venezuela, Thailand and Hungary are facing recessions in their democratic state structures.

Democracy, since time immemorial, has existed as a system of government and has been defined by numerous political theorists. Apart from various forms of democracies like liberal democracy, social democracy,

participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, radical democracy and many more, there are also variations in the functioning of a democratic form of government. A democratic government can be presidential (US, Brazil, Mexico, etc.); or can be parliamentary (Britain, India, Canada, Pakistan, New Zealand); or it can be a constitutional republic or constitutional monarchy, representative (indirect) democracy or direct democracy. With the emergence of new kinds of hybrid regimes that are neither fully authoritarian in nature nor have adopted democracy whole-heartedly, the variations in democracy have increased (see map in Annexure I, for to understand democratic, semi-authoritarian and authoritarian countries in the world). What is to be examined is whether there is a consensus on how one can define democracy as a universal value, if at all it is to be viewed as a universal value.

After the end of the Cold War, democracy became the dominant form of government in the international system based upon which relationships between nation states and the norms and standards of international organizations were commenced thereafter. The wide acceptance of democracy as the legitimate governing system by the international community at large can be viewed from a realist perspective as the triumph of a democratic United States over the communist USSR (where the victor is trying to impose its ideology and democratic practices on the rest of the world). An idealist perspective would suggest that a democratic form of government is compatible with other ideals of international peace, cooperation, and security and therefore to achieve those ideals, it is necessary to spread the gospel of democracy to the world at large. The demarcation between the idealist and the realist perspective of democracy promotion is porous and either of the two or sometimes both the realist and the idealist reason are espoused to argue the utility of democracy promotion as a principle to be adopted by international actors.

International organizations play a significant role in the promotion of democracy, which itself is complex, and value laden and therefore, provides a huge scope for the study of democracy promotion (Burnell 2005). Before discussing the promotion of democracy by international organizations, it is

important to get a clear picture of what is being promoted because there is no stipulated or internationally configured standard structure of democracy available for reference. Generalizations about democracy are difficult because of the variations that exist and also because of the capability of a democratic form of government to become accommodative of the local requirements. Also, it is difficult to categorize those governmental systems that are yet not stable democracies but have passed the stage of being dictatorships. Added to the non-existence of a standard definition of 'democracy' there are no standard measures for promotion of democratic principles which are cherished by powerful states of the West along with many international and regional organizations. It is therefore not surprising that the perception often is that what is being spread as 'democracy promotion' is certain sets of ideas that are linked to political, economic, and other benefits.

2.2 What is Democracy Promotion?

Both the 'meaning' and working of democracy have been politicised to an extent that all means of neutrally defining the term have been rendered exhausted. The words of Bernard Crick that, "democracy is perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs," stand validated due to a persistence of vagueness and volatility in the term 'democracy' (Crick 1993: 56). Historically speaking, democracy never before attained a paragon status, as it did after the triumph of the liberal democratic state – the United States *vis-a-vis* its communist counterpart – at the end of the Cold War.[1]

A democratic form of government has been defined as a "government by the people" or "rule by the people". This notion of democracy is most often stated in President Abraham Lincoln's famous 'Gettysburg Address' (1863),

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[1]Plato condemned the Athenian democracy and Aristotle kept "democracy" in the list of perverted forms of governments. Even in the 19th Century there was debate about democracy being the 'the tyranny of the majority' which pointed to the fact that democracy comes with its own flaws. For the historical controversies surrounding the growth of democracy see John Hoffman and Paul Graham (2013), *An Introduction to Political Theory* (Second Edition), Abingdon: Routledge.

It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth (Schneirov and Fernandez 2014: 183).

The last line of this address is the most used and explored definition of democracy and the entire essence of this address is that there is a need for preserving democracy around the world – "...and that government.... shall not perish from the Earth". This is perhaps an early instance of an expression of American interest in democracy promotion. This definition has generated a myth that a democratic government cannot turn despotic since it is created 'by the masses' and 'for the masses'. But Tocqueville referred to the "tyranny of the majority" as a black spot on the face of the American democratic model.[2] Tocqueville, in his work *Democracy in America*, said that, "Despotism then, which is at all times dangerous, is more particularly to be feared in democratic ages" (Tocqueville 1840: 109). What Tocqueville feared was the triumph of majoritarianism under the garb of democracy, where the majority takes absolute decisions surpassing the law and become inconsiderate about the sentiments of the minorities. This idea of majoritarianism has come to be associated with democratic rule in America and Britain.

Since, democracy was linked to the demerits of an 'absolute majoritarian rule', therefore, many scholars tried to configure democracy in procedural and substantive terms. The features of a democratic form of government are not constant and the 'will of the people' is interpreted and implemented differently in different forms of democracies. In practice, a state can be non-democratic in nature even if while it is formed democratically, or has democratic institutions or uses democratic jargon to describe itself.

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[2] The idea of democracy as a majority rule came to be critiqued by many eminent thinkers of the 19th century like John C. Calhoun, Tocqueville, James F. Cooper and John Stuart Mill.

Several totalitarian states have included the word "democratic" in their formal nomenclature; for example, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Laos People's Democratic Republic, and the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany). After the Second World War, many socialist regimes started adopting the words 'People's Republic' in order to signify a unitary state structure where people and state are in relation with each other. For Susan Marks, "The world's most repressive regimes joined their more representative counterparts in claiming a title that has become synonymous with praiseworthy and justified politics" (Marks 2006: 471). The word 'democracy' was added to North Korea simply to distinguish it from the People's Republic of South Korea and the People's Republic of China and not on the grounds of being truly democratic in principles. Given the totalitarian structure of these regimes, there is an obvious contradiction between the real democratic structures of the state and usage of the term 'democratic' in addressing these states (Lapidos 2009).

True democracies must have the two indispensable and universal assets that Robert Dahl mentioned in his work "*Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*" (1971) – 'contestation' and 'participation'. Though the holding of free and fair elections and the participation of the masses on the basis of universal suffrage are crucial for establishing a democracy, its sustenance is dependent upon effectuation of certain ideals and principles of democracy (like liberty, equality, justice, rule of law, political, economic and social rights). Many scholars of democracy who have tried to study democratization by using quantitative data, such as, Huntington (1991), Gastil (1991), Jaggers and Gurr (1995), and others have been critiqued on the ground that their analysis of democracy only involves reference to the contestation aspect of Dahl's *polyarchy* ignoring the inclusiveness and civil liberties aspect of participation. If democratization is seen only through a political lens then it may end up in creating an illusion of what scholars' term as "electoralist fallacy", which solely emphasises the role of elections in consolidating democracy in a transitional state (Karl 1986, Linz and Stepan 1996). This is indeed a fallacy because there have been instances of the rise

of illiberal democracies (as identified by Fareed Zakaria) which are grave threats to the liberal values related to freedom and so, elections alone may not set an appropriate standard for judging democratic consolidation or for that matter democracy promotion (Zakaria 1997).[3]

On the other hand, the risk of ignoring the political dimension of elections in calculating the democratic setup of a nation may end up in the trap of "anti-electoralist fallacy" as termed by Seligson and Booth, i.e., ignoring elections completely. Even though elections are not the sole criterion for making of true democracies, a middle path is required because, "It is meaningful to study elections for the simple reason that, while you can have elections without democracy, you cannot have democracy without elections" (Bratton 1999:19). Michael J. Sodaro has given four essential "faces of democracy", popular sovereignty – the notion that people have the right to govern themselves; rights and liberties – freedom and rights guaranteed by the law to citizenry; democratic values – namely tolerance, fairness and compromise; economic democracy – involves various criteria of fairness and equality as social and economic components of democracy (Sodaro 2004: 164). He further describes conditions for democracy these are, state institutions, elite's commitment to democracy, homogeneous society, national wealth, private enterprise, a middle class, support of the disadvantaged for democracy, citizen participation, civil society, democratic political culture, education and freedom of information and a favourable international environment (Sodaro 2004: 207-220). These are the criteria upon which the foundation of a modern democracy is based and further promotion of it is carried out around the world.

For the convenience of understanding, political theorists usually try to understand 'democracy' (as a concept) through two main aspects, commonly known as the *procedural* and the *substantive* aspects of democracy. Though the two aspects are distinct, they are often studied in

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[3] Various terms have been used to describe illiberal democracies like 'minimal democracy' and 'formal or electoral democracy' as in Alex Hadenius (1994) "The Duration of Democracy: Institutional Vs Social-Economic Factors", in David Beetham (ed.) *Defining and Measuring Democracy*, London: Sage Publications.

combination for a better understanding of a proper functioning of democracy. The procedural aspect of democracy refers to the mechanisms of 'how a democratic form of government can be 'just' by following procedures like universal suffrage, majority rule and accountability of the government'(Dahl 1979). The proponents of this aspect refer to these procedures as the sole ingredients of a successful democratic government.

The substantive aspect of democracy gives leverage to democratic ideals such as the rule of law, equal rights and political and civil liberties which are essential in maintaining the 'majority rule' concept of democracy without endangering the rights of minorities and thereby ensuring healthy democratic government. Building on Dahl's notion Michael Saward (1994) says, "It should be remembered that there is substance in procedures" (Saward 1994: 14). Therefore, the mechanisms that are used for democracy promotion are based on a mixed approach focusing both on procedural and substantive aspects like promoting the process of elections, just and responsible government, supporting open media in non-democratic states, spreading awareness about human rights, rule of law and encouraging a robust functioning of civil society entities.

Samuel Huntington recognizes that democracy "implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, or organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns" (Huntington 1991: 7). This definition actually combines the individual freedom aspect of liberalism with the political freedom aspect of democracy. Yet, the three "waves of democratization" distinguished by Huntington were reckoned on the procedural aspects of democracy, mainly elections, completely ignoring other liberal democratic features. Mark Twain famously mocked the electoral system thus, "If voting made any difference they wouldn't let us do it". It is the substantive aspects of democracy related to rights and the rule of law that makes it a weapon for the people against majority rule and any other form of tyranny.

The *Universal Declaration on Democracy* adopted by the Inter-parliamentary Council in 1997 defines democracy as:

> Democracy is both an ideal to be pursued and a mode of government to be applied according to modalities which reflect the diversity of experiences and cultural particularities without derogating from internationally recognised principles, norms and standards. It is thus a constantly perfected and always perfectible state or condition whose progress will depend upon a variety of political, social, economic and cultural factors. (IPU 1997: 1)

Irrespective of the variations in the content of democratic systems around the world, democracy is now widely accepted as a universal value (Sen 1999). "Democracy bestows an "aura of legitimacy" on modern political life: policies and strategies appear justified and appropriate where they are democratic" (Held 1993: 273). This legitimacy attained by democracy at the end of the ideological divide after the 1990s led to vigorous promotion of the concept to countries as well as to regions that were non-democratic. This promotion has not been accepted with equal enthusiasm in all parts of the world and with the varying degree of acceptance, there has been corresponding variation in the degree of promotion (and the methods adopted for the same) on the part of actors promoting democracy (both sate and non-state actors). The literature that is available on the study of democracy promotion has interpreted the concept in different ways and with different terms, such as 'democratic support', 'democratic assistance', 'democratic consolidation', 'democratic transition', 'exporting democracy', etc. There is a thin line between these concepts and they are often used interchangeably.

Another much used term – 'democratization' – refers to a process of transition of a state or the government of a state from a non-democratic regime towards a democratic one. It is a dynamic concept and an open-ended process held with the interaction of internal forces of a state (general masses, civil society organizations, media) and the external (international) forces (interaction with democratic countries, international organizations and international media). Whereas, democracy promotion exclusively refers to those policies, strategies, and other activities, that are used, supported and adopted by external actors (whether state, international organizations, or non-governmental organizations) to push political liberalization and democratization in non-democratic states (Schmitter and Bouwer 1999: 12).

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A working definition of the term 'democracy promotion' has been offered by the report of the European Council of Ministers (2006), *The EU Approach to Democracy Promotion in External Relations: Food for Thought* which describes the term democracy promotion as "to encompass the full range of external relations and development cooperation activities which contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy in third countries," i.e., "all measures designed to facilitate democratic development" (European Council of Ministers 2006: 1).

Democracy promotion aims at facilitating democratization and therefore is a precursor to democratization. On the other hand, by studying the process of democratization one can analyse the working of the policies adopted under democracy promotion. Therefore, the two concepts are often studied simultaneously. Another aspect with which democracy promotion is commonly confused with is 'democratic assistance'. The latter is often limited to financial and material assistance more in the form of technical support for establishing and consolidating democracy. Whereas, the former is much wider is scope involving all kinds of strategic instruments like "...diplomatic pressure, the linking of relevant political conditionalities to financial, commercial, or political agreements" (Burnell 2008: 3).

The search for clarity on the concept of democratization by political scientists, especially in the wake of the transformed global scenario in the late twentieth century brings out the limitations of the methodological aspects of measuring concepts like democracy. Two common characteristics of democracy promotion make the study of the concept troublesome. First, the term 'democracy' consists of various attributes (combining both procedural and substantive aspects) and thus can be promoted in various ways. Second, the process of democracy promotion is a gradual one and proceeds at different paces in different places. Democracy promotion may also require huge investments on the part of donors (whether international organizations or individual states) yet immediate results cannot be expected unless direct methods of military interventions are used. These features of

democracy promotion make computation and generalizations on the subject extremely difficult.

The practice of promoting democracy in other states has grown enormously after the 1990s and has now become a common feature of foreign policies of developed Western democracies, of those developing democracies that imitate western ideologies and has also become an integral part of the working of many international and regional organizations. The changed world order after the 1990s was conducive to the promotion of liberal democratic systems accompanied with the promotion of a liberal economic order as well. The transitions in political systems that occurred in the post Cold War years with the fall of communism also demanded a simultaneous transformation in economic systems of the nations that were kept distant from the flourishing market economy order (Fleiner and Fleiner 2009: 493).

A liberal state structure has certain specific traits such as, respect for rule of law, separation of powers, or "...a political system where state institutions and democratically elected rulers respect juridical limits on their power and the political liberties of all citizens" (Vachudova 2005: 3). In the 'End of History', Francis Fukuyama famously claimed that in the ideological world no real contradiction or challenge to the concept of 'liberal democracy' has been left after the demise of communism in the post 1990 period. Considering the relevance of the ideology of liberal democracy in 1989 he stated that:

> The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war…. The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism (Fukuyama 1989: 1).

He also explained his use of the phrase "end of history", as:

> ....the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal

democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama 1989: 2).

The union of liberal thoughts with democratic structure of the state has become in recent times a universal feature as the two mutually co-exist in the efforts of democracy promotion. But the union is not always beneficial as pointed out by Milja Kurki, that "Increasingly 'implicit' liberal assumptions...., provide the backdrop for democracy promotion, support and assistance, and delimit the nature and extent of 'debates' that can be had over democracy's meaning in democracy promotion" (Kurki 2013: xii-xiii). Moreover, the concept of democracy promotion has often been apprehended from the viewpoint of its practice and the various strategies used in promotion of democracy with meagre attention given to its conceptual delineation (Chandler 2006: 5).

For Lins and Stepan, "Democratization entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political concept" (Lins and Stepan 1996: 3). So, if the two concepts (liberalization and democratization) are detached, then the number of electoral democratic states in the world might increase and the concept of 'illiberal democracies' or 'flawed democracies' (as mentioned by Zakaria 1997) will become irrelevant. But will those democracies be 'true' democracies? Also, the concept of electoral democracy is narrower in meaning than liberal democracy, which involves both the procedural and substantive aspect of democracy. A consensus seems to have been emerged for the promotion of certain liberal procedures – openness of media, favoured movement of civil society activities, rule of law, rights and liberties – as part of the broad scheme of democracy promotion. The increasing attachment of liberal principles with democracy has made the two intertwined, so much so that, promoters of democracy have now started ignoring the difference between the two.

Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin (2001) point out that there is a striking difference in the development process of democratization of the

countries of the first wave and of the third wave.[4] The first wave democracies, according to them, like Britain and Sweden were first developed as modern states "...establishing the rule of law, institutions of civil society and horizontal accountability to aristocratic parliaments" [the term 'modern state' is used as characterized by Weber with rule of law and multiple institutions of civil society (Weber 1947)]. Whereas, third wave democracies such as Russia, the Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea have started democratization backward as they have developed electoral systems, yet they are far from reaching the levels of being either pure democracies or modern states (Rose and Shin 2001: 332-333).

Similarly, Laurence Whitehead mentions the difference between the democratization of the 1970s and the 1990s in terms of stable nation-state structures which were one of the reasons behind successful democratization during the 1970s. Most of the cases of democratization in the post 1990 years happened in newly created, institutionally fragile nations which did not help in the formation of stable democracies (Whitehead 2008: 8).

Though the spread of democracy has been defined in quantitative terms, scholars recommend more focus on the quality of democracy. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2004) have offered a three-fold quality structure as: "quality of results", "quality of content' and; "procedural quality". Within these three, Diamond and Morlino mentioned eight dimensions of democratic quality – rule of law, participation, competitions, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness. These eight dimensions are an extension of Dahl's two dimensions of 'contestation' and 'participation' which shows a conceptual shift from mere electoral democracies to more liberal substantive democracies (Diamond and Morlino 2004: 22-23). Another emphasis on

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[4] The 'waves', referring to Samuel Huntington's work are "…a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time" (Huntington 1991: 15). The three waves described by Huntington are: the first spanning 1828-1926, and the second short wave from 1943 till 1962. The third wave started in 1974, after the democratization of Portugal (Huntington 1991).

checking the quality of democracy by bringing in substantive measures is found in the writings of Guillermo O'Donnell who gave stress on "Human Development" and "Human Rights" (O'Donnell 2004: 13). Human Development refers to the basic socio-economic conditions that enable an individual to act, which not only necessitates measuring the quality of democracy but also justification of accounting both the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy promotion (a broader concept of democracy). All these measures of democracy those are inclined towards the quality of democracy see democracy as more than mere procedures and therefore stresses on the substantive dimension of democracy.

The study of democracy promotion is often done at both the international level as well as the domestic level simultaneously. Therefore, the study is interdisciplinary, linking international relations, comparative politics, and democratization studies to some extent. However, the core question that comes to mind while thinking about democracy promotion is 'Can democracy be promoted or must democracy be an internally driven process with no input from external actors?'

2.3 Can Democracy be promoted?

Answering this question is complex in that democracy is a mechanism of governing a state, a domestic political process, much less concerned with outside interference. Any external inputs pushing democracy within non-democratic state structure are understood within the context of 'regime transformation'. Most democratization studies initially gave minimal emphasis on the role of external actors in the transition of regimes whereas internal structural and contextual forces were placed at the centre of regime change in a state (Pevehouse 2002: 517). Scholars like Philippe Schmitter asserts that external actors usually play an indirect and marginal role in the transition of states from authoritarian rule to a democratic one (Schmitter 1986: 5). By the early 1990s, studying the role of external actors became a new outlook in contemplating the democratization process. Geoffery Pridham in 1991 mentioned the international influence aspect as the "forgotten dimension in the study of democratic transition" (Pridham 1991:

18). Also, studies on the "waves of democracy" pushed some scholars to look into the role of international influences in democratic transitions (Huntington 1991; and Ray 1995).

Linkages between the internal and the external factors have recently emerged as significant in both international relations and comparative politics. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward (2006) argue that "...international factors influence the prospects for democracy, and ...transitions are not simply random but are more likely in the wake of changes in the external environment" (Gleditsch and Ward 2006: 912). In *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization* (2005), Jon C. Pevehouse refutes the assertion of P.C. Schmitter (1986) that domestic politics has the sole proprietorship of influencing transition of authoritarian states to democratic regimes and that external actors play a marginal role in this transition. One of the generalized results of Pevehouse's work is that international organizations that are highly democratic [like the OAS (Organization of American States) or EU (European Union)] have a positive impact on the probability of democratic transitions in authoritarian states attached to these organizations (Pevehouse 2005).

Laurence Whitehead uses the three Cs of '*consent, control* and *contagion*' to explain how external dimensions impact upon internal dimensions in bringing about democracy. 'Consent' refers to the willingness of a non-democratic state to accommodate democratic features but this usually happens because of the environment generated by external actors for that state either through interfering in internal affairs of the state for stabilization of national boundaries or through encouraging a national democratic actor whether political parties, NGOs or other civil society entities. 'Control' is more direct and refers to the use of hegemonic power through direct investment, aid or military intervention. However, Whitehead stresses on the last of the three i.e., 'contagion' which works in a non-materialistic fashion, referring to influences (mostly unintended and non-threatening) of a neighbouring liberal democracy or a democratizing country on a non-democratic, authoritarian state (Whitehead 2001: 4). In contagion,

the external influences motivate internal actors of the authoritarian states mainly due to geographical proximity with a liberal democratic state. For instance, the contagion effect from Poland was strong enough to be seen in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in the late 1980s. Even Philippines had a contagion effect on student demonstrators supporting democracy in Seoul from 1985 to 1987 (Saxer 2002: 24).

Philippe Schmitter added a fourth 'C' to Whitehead's classification by referring to 'conditionality' as a significant external dimension of democracy promotion separate from the other three (Whitehead tried to include conditionality in the dimension of consent). He see conditionality as a tool in the hands of regional integration processes powerful enough to not only make the target states concede to their demands consensually but also feeding the multilateral institutions with coercive and controlling power over those states. Schmitter observed a difference between the 'conditionality' that was practiced by financial organizations like IMF since the end of the Second World War and the one which has lately been started by regional organizations specifically EU. The EU has linked policy provisions under conditionality more to the political aspects of a target country and the instances of use of conditionality have also been increasing (Schmitter 1996: 30-42). While promotion of democracy is more influenced by the role of external actors, the role of internal actors becomes eminent when promoted democracy strives to be consolidated as well.

Certain other factors which work in favour of promotion of democracy through contagion and conditionality are globalization and the inter-linking of concepts of democracy promotion with issues of security. The globalization of the late twentieth century impacted the spread of democracy to regions which were earlier less prone to external influences on transition of their political systems. The impact of globalization upon strengthening of economic linkages between nations also helped in opening up the economic, social and political interactions among states that led to decentralization of authoritarian power over markets and also led to liberalization of states' policies. In short, globalization helps in opening up

borders and a democratic form of government is more obliging in doing so. With globalization there also emerged overlapping among various sectors that led to promotion of democracy not just by electoral processes but also through various other channels.

Democracy is also spread in order to maintain security in the world, especially in the post Cold War period, when aspects of 'human security' have gained importance parallel with issues of 'national security'. 'Human security' like human rights has opened the domestic governance portal of states to international actors so as to maintain peace and security *within* as well as *between* states. In recent times, a broader definition for 'security' has been accepted by the international community. The Organization for Security and Cooperation of Europe is a security organization which does not limit itself to 'hard' security concerns of conflict resolution and prevention but extends to the fostering of economic development, along with sustainable use of natural resources and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms (OSCE Official Website, URL: http://www.osce.org/ node/108299). This is how most international organizations, including the UN, deals with security in contemporary times.

The 9/11 incident provided a more robust reason for promoting democracy related to enhancing 'security' in the world or fighting against the threat of terrorism. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq and others were viewed as innkeepers of these terrorist activities, to counter which the United States (self-proclaimed – 'apostle of democracy') under the Bush Administration drew up the "Freedom Agenda" for the National Security Policy. Security is cited as one of the main reasons for the perceived need for the spread of democracy by the European Union as well. Extending the European Neighbourhood Policy to Mediterranean states was part and parcel of securing the European borders and for the spread of democracy to that region. The general goal of maintaining security and the goal of democracy promotion are often combined by policy makers in the belief that promotion of one will reflect promotion in the other as well.

The aspect of case-sensitivity highly affects the promotion of democracy which means that every nation works upon the process of democratization at its own pace and at its own will. "The pathway to any democracy is idiosyncratic, beset by a host of domestic political and cultural concerns particular to the nation in question." (Rich and Newman 2004: 4). This also means that internal forces of a nation such as the economy, the governmental structure, civil society, the media, the demography and the geography, play a significant role in democracy promotion (World Savvy 2008). Another aspect that is raised by Gleditsch and Ward (2006) is that, "...providing generalization on circumstances that have been favourable for democratic transitions requires one to see beyond the idiosyncrasies of individual changes" (Gleditsch and Ward 2006: 911). Since democracy promotion will be different in different countries and no two cases are the same, therefore studies in this field are more related to the policies that are constant in the promotion of democracy.

2.4 Theories of Democracy Promotion

Theoretical explanations in the discipline of International Relations (IR) do not sufficiently explain the existence of democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective of many western states and multilateral organizations. There is as such no theory of democracy promotion (*per se*) in the discipline of International Relations. In this section, various ideas related to democracy promotion by international organizations have been systematically put together in order to understand how the European Union (EU) as a regional organization is engaged in the field of democracy promotion within its prospective members and neighbouring states.

Until a few years ago, the discipline of IR inadequately dealt with the concept of international democracy promotion (Pridham 1991: 1; Schraeder 2002: 7; Wolff and Wurm: 2010: 2). Early works on democracy promotion were focused on analysing the role of the United Sates (US) in the promotion of democracy, especially in the South American Continent (Carothers 1991; Smith 1994). There was an uneven concentration of work on democracy promotion in certain regions than in others in the Post-Cold War period.

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"External democratizing pressures, in the form of diffusion, diplomatic and military pressure, multilateral political conditionality, democracy assistance programs, and the activities of transnational human rights and democracy networks, were more intense and sustained in some regions (Central Europe, the Americas) than in others" (Sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union) (Levitsky and Way 2005: 21).

The focus on external democracy promotion has now gained momentum, with a spotlight on various aspects like, views on 'donor' and 'recipient' countries, the role of governments, civil society and multilateral organizations, etc. (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Newman and Rich 2004; Youngs 2004; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Strategic studies on policies of democracy promotion are also available with edited volumes carrying out comparative studies with respect to different parts of the world (Burnell 2000; Magen et al. 2009; Schraeder 2002; Brown 2005; Asmus et al. 2005; Burnell 2004).

In order to understand the theoretical emphsis of International Relations upon democracy promotion by international organizations, one has to first analyse the three core paradigms, namely, Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. In Realism, the democratic governance of a state is not given much importance because the Realist argument deals more with the effects of the international system on the working of foreign policies of states rather than dealing with the internal governmental aspects of states. Neo-Realists like Kenneth Waltz believe that states are in an innate competition with each other because the international system is anarchic (Walt 1998: 31). Little importance is given to the working of international organizations because for Realists, they act solely for national interests and power of the states and are not able to effectively constrain powerful states (Mearsheimer 1994-95).

The only branch of Realism that is remotely linked to the concept of democracy promotion is "neo-classical Realism", the proponents of which like Giddeon Rose gave significant attention to systemic pressures, especially "relative material power capabilities" of the state along with

importance of intervening variables at the unit level of analysis (that is, at the state level) (Rose 1998: 146). Realists like Randall Schweller do not rely on democracy as the main criteria for elimination of war; yet as a security study analyst he realizes that "Inasmuch as the spread of liberal democracy creates shared values, common interests, and, most important, greater transparency of state motivations, it should lower threat perceptions and increase cooperation among such states" (Schweller 2000: 43). Another lesser known stream of Realism which gives some worth to a democratic form of governance is "motivational realism". Its advocate Andrew Kydd considers that there are many mechanisms in a democratic form of government – like, election process, inter-governmental politics and bureaucratic manoeuvring to manipulate the policy process – that make democratic polities reveal the policy preferences of the actors involved. This helps in lowering the threat perceptions of other states and builds up confidence among security seekers who value transparency (Kydd 1997).

However, the Realists were never fully convinced with the argument of the democratic peace proposition that since democratic states do not fight each other, the promotion of democracy can eliminate war throughout. Again in the words of Schweller, "The spread of democracy promises to dampen potential conflicts but it will not affect a major 'qualitative change' in international politics, which will remain much as it has always been: a struggle for power and influence in a world of, at a minimum, moderate scarcity" (Schweller 2000: 43). Some democracy promotion scholars see such a security based approach towards democracy as important in formulating the national interest of a nation, especially the US foreign policy and its approach towards democracy promotion (Smith 1994). But for Realists, a country will only promote democracy in its interest (whether economic, geostrategic, political, etc.), especially if that interest supports the security and relative power position of that nation (Wolff and Wurm 2010: 10). This is true of the US support to democracy promotion during and after the Cold War as greater democracy in the world also sustains supremacy of the US as a powerful democratic nation.

This is also true for 'commercial liberal' scholars who replace the interest of the state from security to that of economic benefits (Moravcsik 1997: 528-530; Doyle 1983). According to David Baldwin, there are four variants of liberal stream of thought that influence international relations, namely, republican liberalism, commercial liberalism, sociological liberalism and liberal institutionalism. The 'democratic peace theory' belongs to the republican branch of liberalism, which states that "democratic states are more inclined to respect the rights of their citizens and are less likely to go to war with their democratic neighbours" (Baylis et al. 2011: 121).

The theory of democratic peace has been widely regarded as the base theory for the concept of democracy promotion. The theory simply states that democratic states rarely fight war with each other. It finds its origin in the 18th century work by Immanuel Kant's "*Perpetual Peace*" (1795) (Kant 2010), but since then the theory has passed through various interpretations and has gained a popularity that made Jack S. Levy remark that the "absence of war between democratic states comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (Levy 1989: 88). The folklore of democracy being a peaceful form of governance was reiterated by the 'Wilsonian Liberalist' or the 'idealist' (as they are commonly called) after the end of the First World War. The theory of democratic peace is old enough, but it was reborn in the 1980s (again in the American literature) by the influential works of R. J. Rummel and Michael Doyle from the ashes of Immanuel Kant's work (Doyle 1983 and Rummel 1983). Strong statistical evidence is provided by Rummel's work that between the periods 1816 to 1974, around 350 pairing of nations fought international wars, yet none occurred between two democracies. However, Rummel gave more emphasis on libertarian principles like civil liberties, political rights and economic freedom along with democratic structure of the countries examined (Rummel 1983).

The theory of democratic peace addresses the connection between democracy and peace. Sceptics say that the two concepts are not eternally connected; rather there are certain specific conditions under which the

correlation between democracy and peace is most likely to happen. For instance, there are scholars who contemplate upon the degree of economic development of a state or modernity in social and economic context acting as a catalyst for democracy's impact upon peace thereby diluting the democratic peace argument that democracy is the sole condition for maintaining peace among nations (Mousseau 2009; Gat 2005). Some others believe that it is more of a "liberal peace theory" than democratic peace (Doyle 1997; Owen 1997). Though the liberal tradition of international relations considers the international system to be anarchic yet it has always been optimistic and is inclined towards peaceful coexistence of states. Other factors that promote peace can be spread of the idea of free markets and economic interdependence, creation of international laws and international organizations which are necessarily liberal in character and which reinforces peace and vice-versa. The question arises that if these conditions are sufficient for maintaining peace in the world, then 'why democracy is preferred to be pushed to regions having authoritarian regimes'. This is because a democratic form of government complements the creation of such conditions in a state and these are difficult to achieve in an authoritarian set up.

The theory of democratic peace has two main variants – the structural and the normative. The former holds that representative governments which are accountable to their electorate are less likely to go to war for the sheer reason of avoiding the costs and risks attached to war that affect a large section of the population i.e., domestic institutional structures put a restraint on the war efforts of the state (Russett 1994: 38-40). The democratic and liberal values or norms that promote peaceful means of conflict resolution form a part of the normative explanation of the democratic peace theory (Elman 1997: 11-12). There is also a "democratic norm of bounded competition" that makes democracies less aggressive towards one another because for dispute settlement they use mechanisms like negotiations, mediation and compromise (Dixon and Senese 2002: 548).

This normative stance of democratic theory correspondingly implies that "democratic governments and societies have a "natural" normative affinity to democratic (opposition) forces and movements in other countries –a moral impetus that suggests supporting them against oppressive governments" (Wolff and Wurm 2010: 7). It is this stand of the democratic peace theory that explains the support of western democratic nations and international organizations towards promotion of democracy in non-democratic states of the world.

Another term used is "liberalism of imposition" which calls for universal validity of liberal values and which allows any means required for the spread of liberal principles. However, this is in contrast to the "liberalism of restraint" which emphasises non-intervention, pluralism, moderation, respect for others and peaceful cooperation on equal terms (Sorensen 2011: 2). There has to be an equilibrium between the two and the dividing line disappears when a country is itself attempting consolidation of democracy or where the promotion of democracy is not in conflict with the self-determination principle of democratic government.

This normative aspect of the democratic peace theory is also close to the Constructivist approach in international relations, which "prefers to study preference formation of actors, resulting from the context in which they are operating, rather than to analyse their struggle for power" (Dijkstra 2013: 8). For the *actor-centered constructivism*, the significant element that constructs foreign policy is the national preferences of a nation which are embedded in the socio-cultural ideas and identities of that nation (including political culture and national identities) (Duffield 1999). Therefore, the American support for democracy promotion is due to its liberal values which are integral to its national and political culture (Peceny 1997). In the realm of international relations as well, the Constructivists are more concerned with the social construction of world politics in which ideational factors such as norms, rules, identities and forms of representation play a significant role, thereby building a bridge between the actors at the domestic and the international level (Jackson and McDonald 2009: 19). Attempts are ongoing

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towards the emergence of a proper and unified theory of democracy promotion by successfully reconciling the claims of various theories of international relations but the movement in the realm of conceptual formation of the concept is lagging in comparison to its practical implementation.

Much of the work on democracy promotion comes from American academia. The work of American scholars can be divided into four general theories for democracy promotion which have influenced the foreign policy of the United States at various times. These, according to Malcolm MacLaren, are firstly the 'universalist approach', that sees the world with one prism and believe that democracy is the desired universal structure for states to follow, that is, democracy is the requirement of nations at large, regardless of historical and contemporary conditions. The scholars of this approach include Dankwart Rustow (1970).

The second approach is the sociological or cultural approach of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba "The Civic Culture" (1989). They stressed on the prevalence of a culture that is conducive to the existence and sustenance of democracy. Testing cultural variables in the democratization processes of countries of the Central and Eastern European region (CEE) and of the Middle East and the North African region (MENA), P. C. Schmitter observes that "The more the society is dominated by a single religion, the less likely it is that its polity will make progress towards democracy!" He further states that "With a large number of societies and a greater range of religious affiliations, we might eventually be able to test for the alleged propensity for the more "Westernized" and secularized Christian societies to be more democratic that "Easternized" Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or Confucianism" (Schmitter 2008: 42-43).

The third approach is that of 'rational choice approach' prominent in the works of Adam Przeworski (1991) which stresses on those theories that consider democracy a result of different interests of political actors. The theory also stresses on the interdependence of political and economic interests that together converge to form interest for democratic government.

The last is the 'sequentialist' approach which appeared in the 1960s first in the writings of Seymour Martin Lipset (1963), who mentioned a sequential pattern of occurrence of democratization, mainly following economic advancement or accumulation of state power before occurrence of elections. This approach suffered a setback with the rise of the Universalist approach in the early years of the end of the Cold War when countries abandoned communism to become democratic primarily to join the order of the day. However, with the appearance of failed democracies and illiberal states (stressed by Fareed Zakaria 2003), the sequentialist approach was revived, positing that a few conditions are necessary to be fulfilled before holding elections. The debate about whether or not preconditions for democracy are necessary or whether democracy is a 'means' or an 'end' in itself, was followed in the *Journal of Democracy* by scholars like Thomas Carothers, Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder, Amartya Sen and many more and the debate is an ongoing one.

The end of the colonial rule, the end of the cold war and globalization turned nations interdependent and interconnected. Some of the economic theories point at the role of globalization in avoiding war even when countries remain non-democratic, giving a direct blow to the democratic peace theory. Thomas Friedman in 1999 gave the 'McDonald's Theory' which claims that 'no two countries having a McDonald's has ever fought a war with each other'. The theory has deep implications for the role of global trade and the rising standards of living which prevent war (Friedman 1999). But the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and the recent 2014 invasion in Crimea have falsified the theory. In the year 2014, it was reported that a Russian Burger chain 'RusBurger' will replace McDonald's in Crimea (IBN Live 2014). A development that is likely to have economic, ideological, political as well as symbolic implications.

However, in 2005 itself, Friedman in his work "*The World is Flat*", upgraded the McDonald theory to formulate a 'Supply Chain theory", which explains that "no two countries that are both part of a major global supply chain like Dell's, will ever fight a war against each other as long as they are

both part of the same global supply chain" (Peng 2011:41). The Dell supply chain involves a group of democratic and non-democratic countries in a healthy relationship of global trade. These countries are China, Costa Rica, Germany, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States (Peng 2011: 41). No single political issue can bring these countries together, as they stand together now for economic progress.

2.5 Role of International Organizations: What Theories Have to Say?

Stephen M. Walt has rightly pointed out that, "No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics" (Walt 1998: 30). Since the number of actors (both national and international) in the process of democracy promotion has augmented over time, the conceptual understanding of the process also needs to be broadened. It is commonly understood that democracy promotion is an endeavour of Western liberalized, democratized and developed nations; however, since the two decades after the event changing 1990s, new actors, new prospects and new dimensions have been added to democracy promotion by international organizations. Formal international organizations have gradually attained a vital position in the working of global politics so much so that, understanding burning global issues is inconceivable without factoring in the role played by international organizations. In the words of Jon C. Pevehouse, ".... democracy promotion has become a foreign policy goal for many existing democracies, with international organizations (IOs) as an important vehicle for achieving these ends" (Pevehouse 2002: 515-516).

International and regional organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU), etc., are some examples of intergovernmental organizations that are involved in the process of democracy promotion. These organizations are multifaceted and multidimensional in terms of their objectives, members, the diverse sectors of their working, their policy implementation, their linkages with other actors at local, regional, national and international levels; and the impact of their working.

Traditional IR theories are mainly rationalist and institutionalist – Realism, Neo-realism, Liberalism and Neo-liberal Institutionalism – which are more concerned with the outcome of interaction among states in terms of conflict and cooperation. The Realists consider international institutions as dormant actors docile and obedient to the actions of the state. John Mearsheimer, relying on the Realist primacy of 'state' (power seekers) and neglecting the significance of international organizations, states that, "...Institutions have a minimal influence on state behaviour, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world" (Mearsheimer 1994/95). Those Realists who gave some importance to institutions referred to them only as mechanisms to achieve states' interests (Neo-realists like K. Waltz) and never recognised them as independent actors.

The Liberals judge the working of international organizations through a cost-benefit analysis. They are different from the Realists in that they consider that cooperation among states is possible in an anarchical world order because states are in a state of complex interdependence and institutions (like international organizations) are intended to attain mutual welfare gains (Keohane 2005: 80-83; Keohane and Nye 1977). Both the Realists and Neo-liberal Institutionalists have given an 'agent' status to international organizations without recognising their autonomy as actors (independent of interests of nation states) and thereby considering them only as, "an epiphenomenon of state interactions" (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 704). However, elements of autonomy of international institutions in influencing the behaviour of states has been given modest yet overt recognition by rational choice institutionalists like Abbott and Snidal (1998) who mention 'centralization' and 'independence' as the two defining characteristics that distinguish IOs from other international institutions.[5] And it is because of independence of these IOs that they are able to "...shape

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[5]Abbott and Snidal have distinctly defined 'centralization' as "a concrete and stable organizational structure and an administrative apparatus managing collective activities" and 'independence 'as "the authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres" (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 9).

understandings, influence the terms of state interactions, elaborate norms, and mediate or resolve member states' disputes" (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 9).

A Social Constructivist view of the international system is perceptibly different as it considers the ideas and identities of the actors as significant factors in forming the structure of the international system and also in mutually constructing the concept of international organizations (Wendt 1992; and Hopf 1998). The social constructivists believe that since created, international organizations have their own ideas, identities and a set of knowledge similar to the nation state and therefore, the two mutually constitute each other. These assumptions give autonomous actor status to international organizations. These are the two popular yet contradictory images of the international organizations (as actors or agents) explained in metaphoric terms in the edited volume '*Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*' which contemplates that international organizations are like Frankenstein monsters who either have defied their masters and are running loose or they have been really trained well to follow their masters' diktats. This is not always true, rather international organizations for the most part take a counter-balancing stand between the role of an 'actor' and an 'agent'.

International organizations, since the end of the Second World War, have remained an effective mechanisms of statecraft providing a platform for discussion of issues of global concerns with the participation of developed, developing and least developed countries alike. A certain level of legitimacy has been acquired by international organizations since they are constituted by the nation states after good faith is reposed in them that they will achieve aspirations that need collective efforts. Therefore, international organizations will have to continue maintaining equilibrium between their role as an 'actor' and as an 'agent'. Dominance of either one of these roles would mean loss of credibility and legitimacy on the part of the international organization.

There are also contradictions related to the principles and norms to be followed by international institutions. "In international relations the most notable difficulty arises over the idea of a universal right to national self-determination, which recognises the legitimacy of identifiable communities ruling themselves". National self-determination was highlighted after World War I along with other ideas of President Woodrow Wilson but was often contradictory to the creation of order in international politics using principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention (Williams 1996: 54). The UN Charter, (formulated in the wake of end of the Second World War and decolonization period) that was adopted gave privilege to the central ideas of the Treaty of Westphalia that were, "...sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-intervention, reciprocity in respect of the recognition of rights and duties, and the territorial integrity of states" (Williams 1996: 57). Later on, with the growing recognition of the norms of human rights which made 'intervention' a vital and easy approach to influence a country's political system, the ideals of the Treaty of Westphalia were openly flouted.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War popularised the norm of 'democracy' much promoted by external actors (states, IOs and International NGOs) (Franck 1992; McFaul 2004, Rich 2001). Although, the norms of democratic governance have gained popularity in the post Cold War period, much evident by the increase in the number of democracies around the world, yet the proponents of authoritarian regimes find democracy promotion as illegitimate, illegal and imperial and seek asylum for survival in the international norm of state sovereignty. Talking about the use of the norm of sovereignty for non-democratic states, Michael McFaul states that, "It still works as a normative defense, but much less persuasively than fifty years ago" (Mcfaul 2004: 13). Scholars like Vladimir Rudnitsky are of the opinion that international institutional frameworks like United Nations are conducive to formulating a balance between norms of self determination (by addressing issues of human rights, development and security) and state sovereignty as the two should not be limited to legal prescriptions (Rudnitsky 1996: 76-77).

Even scholars of international law believe that "... democracy has today become globalized" (Marks 2000a: 533). With the "worldwide liberal revolution of the end of twentieth century", many are of the opinion that democracy and its external promotion has also become an international norm (Marks 2000b: 3, McFaul 2004, Teixeira 2008: 3). For the liberal democratic countries of the West the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace paradigm became a political objective (specially, after the end of the Cold War) reflected in their foreign policies and their support for shared democratic norms (Wolff 2013: 4). These democratic norms are spread through various institutions of international importance. "States have increasingly adopted binding and specific international norms and rules to regulate their interactions and have delegated authority to international organisations to monitor or enforce agreements and to adjudicate disputes" (Hawkins and Shaw 2008: 459). It is therefore, important to explore the role of international organizations as a source of external democracy promotion, more interestingly, the methods adopted by IOs to maintain an equilibrium between all the international norms (sovereignty, human rights or democracy promotion).

However, to talk about international organizations as a whole is like talking about 'human being' with no difference of culture, place, ethnicity, gender and civilizations. According to the 'Yearbook of International Organizations', there are around 66,000 international organizations in the world including both inter-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations along with 1200 organizations roughly being included in the list each year. Like no two individuals are same, it is inaccurate to assess international organizations through one single outlook. "The seemingly incompatible perceptions of IOs persist in part because international organizations themselves vary widely in their range of activities and autonomy" (Hawkins 2006: 4). To analyse the activities of a single organization is more promising than to focus on all actors of democracy promotion. This is also because the last ten to fifteen years have seen both conceptual and practical shifts in the work towards democracy promotion

and therefore, a single organization study will provide the necessary analytical depths to study this phenomenon.

2.6 Problematizing Promotion of Democracy

Promotion of democracy by international organizations is not always a welcome step. Much of the recent literature is critical of this concept. Is democracy promotion of any help for the creation of a peaceful world order? This question arises because, "Although almost half of the world countries can be considered to be democracies, the number of full democracies "is relatively low". Almost twice as many are rated as "Flawed democracies" i.e., those democracy which are created through elections but function as authoritarian regimes (*The Economists* 2008). Related to this argument is the view backed by numerous scholars (and which stands against the democratic peace proposition) that 'stable non-democratic governments function more effectively than those states which are under democratic transitions' (McFaul 2007).

Scholars like Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995) are of the opinion that transitional democracies (for example Russia which is a partial democracy) are more prone to indulge in wars (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Besides, removing an authoritarian government and establishing a democratic one has hardly ever been a peaceful affair. Pretension is another solution adopted by authoritarian regimes that are suspicious of American led democracy promotion. Tyrants and despots pretend that they are democratic or are moving towards democratization (Ishkanian 2007). When democracy is imposed in countries that are ill prepared to be democratized, the results are dangerous – "illiberal leaders or extremists in power, virulent nationalism, ethnic and other types of civil conflicts, and interstate wars" (Carothers 2007: 12). The most recent example is the 2011 'Arab Spring' in which democracy swept within West Asian countries, but a proper consolidation of democracy in the region is still a distant dream. The 'Arab Spring' did not bring practical political solutions and left the governments of countries like Lebanon, Egypt and Syria in a state of political impasse and

plagued by terrorist outfits like ISIS [*Islamic State of Iraq and Syria* or *al-Sham* also known as the *Islamic State of Iraq and Levant* (ISIL)].

The promotion of democracy by western liberalized and democratic states (mainly US) with the involvement of aid agencies, NGOs, and international organizations, is not new and has matured considerably in the last twenty years. The working of institutions for the promotion of democracy is bound by a set of standardized norms and procedures which have been tried, tested and internalized both by the promoters and the receivers. These norms and procedures have however been critiqued for their bias towards western liberalized ideologies and its liberal economic order. It is also apparent that, there is a parallel learning process going on between the promoters of democracy and the countries at the receiving end of democracy promotion. More and more transitional states are now resulting in only formation of flawed democracies because authoritarians at power (with time) have learned to protect themselves from democratic attacks. They have come to impose a new system of governance that helps them to be pseudo democratic so as to dodge the constraints of democracy on their absolute power. Burma sets an example; the country was praised by Obama, two years ago for its successful democratic transition from years of military dictatorship. But, when the country faced elections in 2015, the fear of losing power made the government curb the country's media and also the opposition party whose leader Aung San Suu kyi remained barred from presidential elections (Gowen and Nakamura 2014). This is an example of how transitional states become flawed democracies and revert back to their authoritarian past now and then especially when democracy does not consolidate itself substantially.

Freedom House's annual report on the state of global freedom 2014 points at a decreasing trend of freedom in the world for the eighth consecutive year.[6] 54 countries showed overall decline in political rights and

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[6] Freedom House is a US based independent organization. Founded in 1941, the organization was one of the first of its kind to research on matters of freedom and democracy around the world. Their analyses frame the policy debates in the US and abroad on the progress and decline of freedom

civil liberties compared to 40 countries that showed some gains. Freedom House has also recorded a worldwide decline in internet freedom. Some of the countries where serious setbacks to democratic rights were witnessed were Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Venezuela, and Indonesia. Whereas, positive advancement towards democracy was viewed in countries like Tunisia, Pakistan, Togo, Madagascar, Rwanda, Senegal, Zimbabwe and others bringing the number of electoral democracies in the world to 122. Some of the lowest ranking countries in the democratic rights index were Somalia, Sudan, Central African Republic, Syria, Eritrea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Equatorial Guinea (Freedom House 2014).

The data provided by Freedom House is mainly based upon a country's 'freedom', which many scholars and academicians use for describing the state of democracy in the world. Apart from the data by Freedom House, the study of democracy has seen various measures being used to understand the state of democracy in the world. However these measures are not only different in there sample size of selecting the number of countries in the world, but also are different in referring to the dimensions upon which democracy of a nation-state is being measured (Högström: 2013: 33). The problem is also related to the lack of a proper universally accepted definition of democracy (See Annexure X, to understand different measures of democracy).

Also these various democratic indexes have differentiated countries on the basis of 'Two-fold, Three-fold or a continuous' scale of classifications. The two-fold classification indicates that countries are either democratic or nondemocratic in nature. The three-fold classification divides countries into democratic, semi-democratic and non-democratic. A continuous scale makes more division in the above mentioned categories like

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around the world. The organization believes that, "freedom is possible only in democratic political environments where governments are accountable to their own people; the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, and belief, as well as respect for the rights of minorities and women, are guaranteed" (Official Website: https://freedomhouse.org/about-us)

semi-democratic, hybrid, semi authoritarian, anocracies, authoritarian and then non-democratic. Discrepancies and critiques of these data sets have been found, firstly related to the differences in the number of democracies in the world and also discrepancies in the number of other categories (semi-democratic and non-democratic countries) as well. Also often they have been critiqued on the ground that they are region-biased and will therefore favour the region that they support for example the Freedom House data is biased towards Western Europe, as the Polity IV data is biased towards North and Central America (Högström 2013: 53).

Much of the problem related to democracy promotion comes up first, in relation to the idealization of the concept of "democracy" which itself has not been defined clearly and universally and second, its promotion by the United States (US) which has a history of attaching democracy promotion with other unstated strategic, political and economic national interests. It is significant that foundation of democracy promotion in international organizations (especially UN) after the Second World War was majorly due to the dominance of the American supremacy and its adoption of democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective. It is because of this reason that the image of international organizations is also being tarnished as they are considered to be nothing but an instrument of the United States and other Western powers.

Two challenges recently proposed by Milja Kurki to the promotion of democracy are: the de-legitimization of democracy promotion after the Iraq war because of which the target countries became sceptical of the working of Western democracies in the area of democracy promotion (Gershman and Allen 2006; Whitehead 2009, 2010). Second, the more recent financial crisis of 2008 which weakened the position of the US and brought out the fallibility of the Western economic and political system. Beside this, the growing importance of BRICS nations and increasing confidence of non-liberal states has put a question on efficient democracy promotion policies (Kurki 2013: 5).

It is not just the United Nations that is being intimidated by power politics; organizations in other spheres like trade and finance (WTO, IMF and the World Bank) are also facing limits on their autonomy due to forum shopping practiced by powerful states. The global pie of economic advancements has been of the same size yet the contenders for its share has now increased – including China, European Union, Russia, Brazil, India, and many more small but influential players – to a level that "...the number of fundamental national interests that can only be achieved through international organizations expands" (Stone 2011: 3).

Even if democracy is the order of the day, does it mean that democracy is the solution every nation requires to mitigate its grievances? Headly Bull rightly pointed out, "... to show that a particular institution or course of action is conducive of order is not to have established a presumption that that institution is desirable or that that course of action should be carried out" (Bull 1977: 98). No matter how much democracy has turned into the 'order' of the day in international politics, it cannot avoid the struggle with alternatives. Democracy promotion has been successful in some cases but in others, the phenomena also had backlashes and reverses. One of the major concerns of the promoters of democracy is its proper consolidation as well, because fledgling democracies like Thailand, Bolivia, Russia, Georgia and many more still face the threat of a slide back (Converse and Kapstein 2008: 127).

The transition of authoritarian states to democratic or semi-democratic forms of governments starting from the late 1970s and early 1980s (or the Third Wave) onward have several reasons to discard their authoritarian state structure, apart from the influential role played by the democracy promotion policies of the American state. The changes in the world scenario in the last decade of the twentieth century such as the end of the Cold War, the triumph of liberal democratic institutions vis-a-vis communism, globalization and the pressures from the Western European Democracies for opening borders for greater economic cooperation along with radical advancement in information and communication technologies,

are some of the push factors responsible for steady advancement of democracy in the twenty-first century. So, if the US policies are critiqued for portrayal of national interest more than genuine concern for democracy promotion, then what about these push factors. They can be critiqued on the ground that these factors do not function independently or impartially and have effectively been used by the West to make a web of democratic entrapment without genuine concern for the transforming state.

The glorious successes that democracy achieved in the form of Southern Eastern European countries becoming democratic after the end of the Cold War (like Poland, Hungary, and the Balkan states) can also be critiqued as easy cases. Their attachment to the democratic Western European region was more intense than to their Eastern communist counterpart. The more difficult regions where there are not just differences of political system but also attachment of political with cultural aspects of society, like West Asia and China, they are the ones, that if democratized, will provide the true essence and achievements of the working of Western democratic states and international organizations in the field of democracy promotion.

Charles Tilly (2007) on "Democracy" says that there are no necessary laws that underpin democracy. According to Tilly, there are no standard sequences, only many different paths that can lead to democracy. "Conversely, since there are no meta-historical guarantees of the survival of democracy – its destruction is always and everywhere possible". He has also emphasized the interdependence of contention and democratization. One of the thought that emerges while studying democracy promotion by international organizations is the feasibility of policies and mechanisms adopted by international organizations for the promotion of democracy and whether those policies and mechanisms are context specific and can be sensitized to the needs of the countries at the receiving end.

Repercussions sometimes happen in the form of countries having coups after democratic transitions like Mali and Maldives in 2012. However, this has not greatly impacted the democracy promotion industry and the

work is still continuing in the name of Western democratic support or aid (both economic and political) to the non-democratic parts of the world. But, the belief that the promotion of democracy and human rights by the West is simply due to a moral faith (visions of the idealists) has been completely shattered. "In addition, hypocrisy – true or perceived – is immensely damaging to democracy promotion efforts. It is generally thought that those doing the promoting must keep their own democratic houses in order as well as mitigate, or at least be transparent about, ulterior motives and conflicts of interest" (World Savvy Monitor 2008). Real democracy promotion happens when the promoters are genuine, when their motives are genuine, when they are called for help instead of forceful intrusion, and when their policies are not like 'one size fits all' rather based on the rationale of 'right medicine for the right kind of disease'.

Due to the use of democracy promotion for interests specific to actors externally promoting it, democracy promotion has been often associated with 'regime change'. Regime change and democracy promotion are linked together when, toppling of existing governmental structure of a country happens along with establishment of a new regime favourable to the authorities promoting democracy. The association of the two terms happened with the US invasion of Iraq (2003), when America under the leadership of George Bush toppled Saddam Hussein's rule in Iraq in the name of promoting democracy to that country. Before that the two terms were considered separate and independent of each other and the negative connotation attached to the term of 'regime change' was also kept far from 'democracy promotion'. But in the post US-Iraq war (2003) period democracy promotion has been critiques widely, by scholars and policy makers, especially of the methods introduced by the US i.e. military interventions for promoting democracy (Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 48-49). Since the use of military is an important factor in converting democracy promotion to regime change, the relation between the two is highly dependent upon the methodology used by the promoters of democracy. Another related aspect is that, democracy promotion is perceived as regime

change specifically from the receiving countries point of view, as countries (at the receiving end) are sceptical of the intensions of the donor states.

This chapter was concerned with the conceptual frameworks of the term 'democracy promotion' and how the existing literature perceives about the promotion of democracy by international organizations. The politics involved in the practice of democracy promotion and its use for achieving regime change and other strategic interests will be discussed in the next chapter, along with the discussion about various actors involved in the process of democracy promotion.

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CHAPTER 3

THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Chapter 3

The Practice of Democracy Promotion

3.1 Introduction:

Out of around 195 world polities, the Freedom House says, only 26% of the countries are 'not free', 30% are 'partially free' and 44% countries out of 195 are 'free' (Freedom House 2016).[1] Going by the data, more than half of the countries of the world claim themselves to be democratic (whether free or partially free) (see map in Annexure I). Democracy is eternally attached to notions of peace and order in the world and was seen as having stood victorious after the Cold War in the struggle against communism. Western states and international organizations believe in the causal linkage between democratic states and a peaceful existence and therefore work towards the promotion of democracy.

A glimpse of some recent events might change the perception. The Russian intervention in Crimea and the international condemnation of the same; the abduction of Indians in Iraq by the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) militants and the spread of terrorism by the ISIS throughout the world; the immigration problems at the US-Mexico border as well as the increasing migration problem in Europe; attacks on members of religious minority group in Southern Sri Lanka; the deterioration in the Human Rights record of Egypt due to arbitrary arrest and custodial deaths by the police; civil unrest in Thailand; a general increase in Islamist extremism in countries of Africa like Mali, Algeria, Nigeria, Nairobi, Somalia, and a growing genocide in the

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[1] "*Freedom in the World 2016* evaluates the state of freedom in 195 countries and 14 territories during 2015. Each country and territory is assigned two numerical ratings—from 1 to 7—for political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The two ratings are based on scores assigned to 25 more detailed indicators. The average of a country or territory's political rights and civil liberties ratings determines whether it is Free, Partly Free, or Not Free" (Freedom House 2014: 2).

Central African Republic.[2] These events give rise to questions over the efficacy of the democracy promotion activities of states and international organizations.

Although, 70% of the countries of the world are electoral democracies yet there is a general decrease in the level of civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House 2014). There is a clear discrepancy between implementation of procedural and substantive aspects of democracy. Scholars have noted this decline in democratic values worldwide. In the 1990s, Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis regarding the triumph of the liberal democratic order after the end of the Cold War was critiqued thoroughly. Yet, it is also a fact that democracy is being endorsed by diverse actors – United States, other Western nations and, countries of non-Western origin like India, Japan, South Africa, Brazil, and newly formed democracies (those European States that turned democratic after the 1990s); United Nations, regional organizations (specifically, the European Union); and many NGOs and private sector organizations. These actors can be seen as either individual attempt makers to promote democracy or followers of a wider democracy promotion spirit. These attempts are not free from allegations of motives other than democracy consolidation across the world.

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[2] Invasion of Russia in Crimea happened in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, for more information see, Hall Gardner (2015), *Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Most of these events have also been covered by media around the world. Like the 'New York Times' report of March 2016 by Karen Yourish, Derek Watkins and Tom Giratikanon, on "Where ISIS Has Directed and Inspired Attacks Around the World", accessed on 12 April 2016 [Online: Web] URL: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/17/ world/middleast/ map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html?_r=0. For analyzing the situation of immigration problem in America and Europe see reports and publications of Pew Research Center [Official Website: http://www.pewresearch.org/ topics/immigration/]. To understand the general increase in Islamist extremism in various African nations, one has to acknowledge the contacts of the Arab nations with the North African countries and the rise of extremist groups like Boko Haram in Northeastern Nigeria. For deeper understanding please refer, Jakkie Cilliers (2015), "Violent Islamist Extremism and terror in Africa", Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper - 286: 1-32, [Online: Web] URL: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ Paper286-1.pdf

Over twenty-five years ago, the liberal democratic order emerged victorious after the end of the Cold War, having won the ideological battle against communism. The quarter-century since has witnessed several successful transitions to democracy (with Eastern European countries joining the EU). But there have also been unsuccessful and long ongoing cases of 'democracy promotion' and transitions of authoritarian regimes, providing ample ground for studying the nature and role of international organizations in democracy promotion.

Political systems in the world can be categorised in terms of the level of democratization, with many types of 'semi-democratic' and 'hybrid' regimes along the spectrum. There are no universally adopted features of a democratic government and even international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) perceive democracy more as an idea rather than an ideology. The UN General Assembly Resolution 2005 on World Summit Outcome states that:

> We reaffirm that democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. We also reaffirm that while democracies share common features, there is no single model of democracy, that it does not belong to any country or region... (Yearbook of the United Nations 2005: 62).

3.2 The United Nations and Democracy Promotion

In the study of international relations, one can trace how promotion of democracy became significant after the end of the First World War, when democracy was mentioned in the fourteen points of President Woodrow Wilson.[3] For Wilson, the entry of the US in the First World War was justified for making 'the world safe for democracy'. With this, the President also opened the gates for US intervention in affairs of other nations (Powell

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[3] President Woodrow Wilson gave his 'fourteen points' on 8 January 1917 to a joint session of the Congress for to attain a peaceful world after the end of the First World War. The only element of the fourteen points which reflects an association with democratic principles is the 'self rule' or 'self determination' of peoples, including the colonies. This principle of 'self-determination' however, was not accepted by the League of Nations but was an integral part of the UN (Cogen 2016: 125).

2007: 1). Although the genesis of the idea of democracy promotion can be traced to this point, overt promotion of democracy actually started after the end of the Second World War. The victors, which were all democracies except for Russia, engaged in changing or transforming the regime types of the vanquished (democracy was brought in Germany and Japan) (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999). This interventionist nature of bringing democracy can be compared to the act of imposition of political institutions during colonial times, often referred as 'civilizing mission' by the colonizers. Explaining this kind of institutional imposition by the victors over the vanquished or by the colonizers over their colonies, David H. Kamens says:

> Political hegemony leads to the imposition of innovation on the basis of coercive power and law. Rogue states, subordinate countries or client states are forced to change their forms of governance and other institutional arrangements under threat of boycott or military intervention (Kamens 2010: 62).

The hegemonic nature of the US as the victor of the Cold War times was one of the main reasons behind visible promotion of democracy in the post Cold War years. The hegemony of the US helped in using both coercive powers on the one hand and support from international laws and organizations on the other for fulfilling its agenda of democracy promotion worldwide.

In the 1950s, many post colonial states were internally driven towards a democratic form of government due to the 'domino effect' which was triggered with the transition of the authoritarian states of Germany and Japan to democracy along with their transition to major economic centres of the world. The end of colonialism also resulted in a recourse to democratic state structures for maintaining self rule of the newly independent states. The wave of democratization after the end of the Second World War was therefore caused by multiple factors. Also this was the time when new IOs were being created (specially the UN), which led to a natural proximity between the two phenomenon (democracy and the IOs). The creation of IOs like the League of Nations or the United Nations was premised on the objectives of maintaining order, peace and security in the world. The

perceived link between these objectives and democracy as a form of government helped the concept of democracy gain patronage and endorsement of international organizations.

Whether it was the self-determination principle (as a significant facet of the League of Nations) or the aspect of international peace and security and human rights (as the keystone of the UN), a democratic state structure was seen as proffering the environment for realization of such objectives in a way that no other system of government was capable of doing.[4] This by no means implies that democracy has no flaws and once a state become democratic all its problems come to rest. But the advantages of a democratic state structure of being compatible with international principle of the IOs are higher vis-a-vis non-democratic state structures. In the words of Kirsten Haack, "The Kantian idea of free trade, rule of law and collective security, all in the context of international institutions, should serve to secure, maintain and enhance peace and international cooperation. In this framework democracy is the means through which these aims could be achieved" (Haack 2011: 36). Therefore, democracy promotion became an essential part of the working of IOs towards their objectives of establishing and maintaining international peace and security.

For international organizations that work at the global level – such as the former League of Nations or the current United Nations – democracy has never been a precondition for membership. Nor is it "...one of the stated purposes of the United Nations to foster democracy, to initiate the process of democratization, or to legitimize other actors' efforts in this field" (Rich and Newman 2004: 5). Yet, the promotion of democracy has been an unstated

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[4] The principle of 'self-determination' remained a basic component of treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations for the protection of minorities and was not the part of the Covenant of the League of Nations *per se* (Cassese 1995: 27). This principle was given due importance in the Charter of the UN in Article 1(2) and in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 1(1) of which states that "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." (UN Official Website, URL: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf)

goal of the UN, which its member states – whether democratic or non-democratic – are aware of. A vital question raised by Tom J. Farer (2006), is what legal authority does an international organization like the UN possess to promote democracy?

Like the constitutions of many Nation-States, the Charter of the UN also starts with the words "We the People", casting light on the democratic aspirations of the organization, "... that the will of the people is the source of legitimacy of sovereign states and therefore of the United Nations as a whole".[5] This provides some legal basis for functioning of the UN in maintaining peace in the world for which it considers democracy to be a necessary good. Another source of authority for the UN in the sphere of democracy promotion is contained in the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights* 1948 (UDHR). Article 21(1) of the UDHR clearly states that:

> Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

and Article 21(3) says that:

> The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 29 of the UDHR gives due importance to the creation of a 'democratic society' by stating that:

> In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society (UDHR 1948).

This language of the UDHR makes a democratic form of society a precondition for the proper functioning of human rights and freedoms. It entrusts democratic society with a role of an arbiter between community and

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[5] UN Official Website, Global Issues, "*Democracy and the United Nations*" Accessed on 28 January 2014, URL: http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/democracy/democracy_and_un.shtml

individual rights (Rich 2001: 22). The adoption of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR) in 1966 gave a legal standing to democratic principles through Article 25 which entrusts the right to citizens:

> to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors (UN 1994).

The word 'genuine' used in the phrase "genuine periodic elections" was explained in the 1996 *Human Rights Committee's General Comment* 25 (57), adopted by the Committee in its 1510th meeting, which lays down the procedure for conducting elections and protection of 'right to vote' of the citizens (UN Doc. 1996). It also explained that the rights under Article 25 are related to, yet distinct from "the right of peoples to self-determination" [Article 1(1)] by explaining that:

> By virtue of the rights covered by Article 1 (1), peoples have the right to freely determine their political status and to enjoy the right to choose the form of their constitution or government. Article 25 deals with the right of individuals to participate in those processes which constitute the conduct of public affairs.

Giving significance to a democratic form of government the General Comment states that:

> Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

This enshrines the principle of democracy within the larger working of the UN, especially in relation to aspects of the right to self-determination and human rights. Both these rights acted as the early shelter houses for democratic values during the Cold War times, when international organizations could not take a clear stand between the Capitalist West and the Communist East. The open adoption of democratic values by international organizations, especially the UN, would have unbalanced the

situation. Scholars like Archibugi claim that it was on Soviet insistence that the word 'democracy' lost its space in the UN Charter (Archibugi 1995: 244). Explaining the situation during the Cold War times, Roland Rich states that "Since democracy conferred a certain degree of legitimacy on regimes, it was a contested concept and both sides claimed to be its true interpreter" (Rich 2001: 22). During the Cold War era, political openness was also limited due to the dominating effect of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which gives precedence to state sovereignty and non-intervention over the spread of democratic values and human rights (UN Charter).[6]

In the post Cold War period, UN's assertions about democracy being as an integral aspect of the working of its various mechanisms became more assertive and frequent. In 1993 the *Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action* adopted by the *World Conference on Human Rights* combined the aspects of democracy, development, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as interdependent and mutually reinforcing (OHCHR 1993). Thereafter, various resolutions adopted at many sessions of the *Commission of Human Rights* embedded democracy in human right laws, for example, the 55th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights held in 1999 in Geneva was titled "Promotion of the Right to Democracy" which reinforced most of the provisions adopted in the Vienna Declaration (UN Commission on Human Rights 1999).

In 2000 the Commission recommended legislative, institutional and practical measures to consolidate democracy (resolution 2000/47 titled "Promoting and Consolidating Democracy"). In 2002, essential elements of democracy were defined in the resolution 2002/46 of the *Commission of Human Rights*. This resolution also welcomes the adoption by various

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[6] Article 2(7) of the UN Charter states that, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Chapter VII of the UN Charter is about UN's enforcement actions with respect to 'threat to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression' (UN Charter, online source, URL: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf)

regional, subregional and other organizations of "the mechanisms designed to promote it (Democracy and Human Rights), to prevent situations which affect or threaten democratic institutions, or to implement measures for the collective defence of democracy in the event of a serious disturbance or disruption of the democratic system" (OHCHR 2002: 2).

In the period after the Cold War, democracy has emerged as a crosscutting issue in various other conferences and summits of the UN. In 1994, the UN sponsored *International Conference of New or Restored Democracy* was held in Nicaragua in the backdrop of the UN's claimed success in helping Nicaragua's transition to a democratic state structure. Here the member states and their delegates "called for an increased role of the UN in promoting democracy as a regime system globally and to encourage dictatorships to politically and economically liberalize" (Peksen 2012: 166). In 1996, the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented the *Agenda for Democratization* to the 51st session of the UN General Assembly. Lombardo, points out that this was the first time that crucial questions about UN support for national democratization processes were raised at such a level involving significant aspects of international law (Lombardo 2001). In 1997, the *Inter-Parliamentary Council* at its 161st Session adopted the *Universal Declaration on Democracy*, paragraph two of which states that:

"Reaffirming also the calling and commitment of the Inter-Parliamentary Union to promoting democracy and the establishment of pluralistic systems of representative government in the world, and wishing to strengthen its sustained and multiform action in this field" (IPU 1997).[7]

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[7] IPU or the Inter- Parliamentary Union is one of the oldest multilateral political organizations in the world. It was founded on 30 June 1889 by a group of parliamentarians with the goal of maintaining peace in the world. Since 1990s both the IPU and the UN are closely working together. For more information see the Official Website of IPU, URL: www.ipu.org and Official Website of IPU for the International Day of Democracy, URL: www.ipu.org/dem-e/idd/overview.htm

The current Secretary General, Ban-Ki-moon provided a '*Guidance Note on Democracy*' in 2009 which states that "Democracy, based on the rule of law, is ultimately a means to achieve international peace and security, economic and social progress and development, and respect for human rights – the three pillars of the United Nations mission as set forth in the Charter of the UN" (Ki-moon 2009: 2). From time to time, UN has consciously let the world know that it stands in full support of a democratic form of government, no matter whether its Charter is explicit about this or not.

The most prominent of the UN efforts was the attaching of democracy with the much cherished *Millennium Development Goals* (MDG). With its deadline in 2015, the MDGs were set to look into concerns at the grassroot level mainly poverty eradication, education, health issues, high standard of living and good governance. The last two were distinctly attached to the establishment of a just and democratic society, which it is asserted will lead to development. For Amartya Sen the traditional dogma of development as a precondition for democracy has changed with the growing times and necessity. He argues that democracy's position from being an 'end' to advancement in the economic process has been substituted by being a 'means' for greater economic and social development (Sen 1999). On 8 November 2007, the UN General Assembly proclaimed 15 September (corresponding to the adoption of *Universal Declaration on Democracy* by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in September 1997) as the *International Day of Democracy* (Resolution A/62/7), a day for reviewing the status of democracy in the world each year. In 2008, seventy parliaments around the world participated in activities to mark the International Day of Democracy. This number reached 162 in 2013 (IPU Official Website).

It is imperative to also examine the practical aspects of how UN promotes democracy. What are the mechanisms used by the UN for promoting democracy? Is it unilateral or with the consent of the concerned state? Why, in recent times, has democratic assistance by international organizations been viewed suspiciously by the countries at the receiving end?

Since democracy has been linked to various other functions of the UN, its promotion has been done in different ways using the diverse agencies of the UN. The range of activities which fall under the purview of democracy promotion are more related to the broader aims of peace, security, human rights and development. Some of the major work of the UN done in these fields are: parliamentary assistance and decentralizing local governance structures to enhance checks and balances for democracy to thrive properly; creating and strengthening impartial and effective mechanisms of national human rights and judicial systems; strengthening legislation and media capacities to ensure basic rights of expression and access to information; electoral assistance in terms of organizing and conducting elections along with the extended support for electoral-management bodies, and promoting women's participation in political and public life.[8] These activities of democracy promotion by the UN are essentially related to the procedural aspect of democracy and are therefore more concerned with the supply side or the policy making side of democracy establishment (working with governments at the receiving end). Apart from technical support, financial support in the form of aids is also given.

Other areas of democracy assistance are related to the development of civil society and political parties; strengthening the rule of law and security; infusing accountability, oversight and transparency; enhancing civic education and awareness for the masses. Through these functions, the UN tries to provide democracy support at the policy demanding side which also implant seeds of substantive democracy i.e., working towards the demands for democracy based on principles and not just procedures. Undoubtedly, this working of UN also involves the interconnectedness of this huge network of democracy promotion with other networks of economic development and societal advancement (Newman 2006: 190). However, along with such open democracy promotion by the UN, there are also doubts regarding the potential clash of this goal with the notions of state sovereignty, often raised

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[8] UN Official Website, "Democracy and the United Nations", Global Issues, [Online: Web] Assessed on 26 March 2014, URL: http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/democracy/democracy_and_un.shtml

by non-democratic regimes which build up counter arguments under the fear of being toppled.

The entities of the UN that are engaged in this work are diverse: *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP), the *Department of Peacekeeping Operations* (DPKO), the *Department of Political Affairs* (DPA), the *Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights* (OHCHR). Through these mechanisms, UN has been engaged in the process of democracy assistance, maintaining security and peacekeeping in post-conflict societies along with conflict settlement and peace-building. These mechanisms not only help the UN in spreading human rights norms but also help in direct assistance in conducting elections if a country so request. The first electoral mission of the UN was send to Nicaragua in 1990.

During the 1990s, the UN organized or observed elections and popular consultations in Timor-Leste, South Africa, Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia. More recently, there has been a mild change of functioning on the part of UN and instead of electoral observation more technical assistance is being asked from the UN. The UN has provided crucial technical and logistical assistance for elections in many countries like Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Sudan.[9] Since, electoral observation has been no longer a common function of the UN; the organization has been often asked to validate or to assess the credibility of electoral results. Example of this is 2010 Côte D'Ivoire demand to the Head of the peacekeeping operation (of the UN in the country concerned), to certify their presidential elections.

Between 1992 and mid 1994, the period after the Cold War, nearly fifty-two member states asked for technical assistance in terms of conducting elections (Burnell 1998: 4-5). For to ensure transparent and credible elections the UN works with other organizations as well as other parts of the UN such as the *UN Electoral Assistance Division* (EAD) and the *Department*

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[9] From the official website of the UN – Department of Political Affairs, "Electoral Assistance – Overview", [Online: Web] accessed on 12 January 2015, URL: http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections/

of Political Affairs (DPA). From 1995 onwards, more than hundred countries have been provided electoral assistance by the UN (United Nations Peacekeeping).[10]

UN has often linked its conflict-resolution objectives with democracy promotion. Of course the conflict-resolution activities involve not just peace-keeping but also peace-building, and therefore, democracy promotion as a long term process aligns well with the peace-building process of conflict-resolution. However, sometimes, democracy promotion comes in clash with the peace-making process. For this reason, UN has in certain cases like Angola in 1999, had to terminate its democracy promotion mission. The plans of conducting elections for peace-making without proper democratization of the society at large created more instability leading to failure of the United Nations mission in Angola.[11] This is few of the examples where democracy promotion using substantive aspect of democracy at the societal level becomes apparently significant in establishing a procedural setup of elections and democratic mechanisms in a country.

A new mechanism for democracy assistance the *United Nations Democratic Fund* was created in 2005 by the UN. It was created for the purpose of assisting countries seeking support for democracy promotion with the help of local civil society organizations. It provides funding to all agencies whether governmental (at all levels of governance national, state and provincial) or non-governmental. Such attempts are better received as they target democracy while contextualizing it within local variations (Youngs 2011, Kurki 2010).

This also point towards a new trend witnessed in the working of the UN with the fall of the Berlin Wall, especially in the area of democracy promotion. International organizations began experimenting with new

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[10] The United Nations Peacekeeping (Official Website), URL: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/electoralassistance.shtml

[11] Human Rights Watch Report, "X. The United Nations", [Online: Web] accessed on 18 May 2014, URL: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/Angl998-10.htm

techniques of democracy promotion involving actors other than states. In terms of functioning, along with the use of the top-down approach of assisting and coordinating with governments or the formal institutions in order to strengthen democracy, international organizations are now using bottom-up approaches involving civil society entities and other non-governmental actors as well.

Using Ronald Rich's classification, the functional agencies of UN (related to democracy promotion) can be categorised in support of "supply side" of democratization, more engaged with the governments and their institutions of policy making, and "demand side" of democratization, example of which is UNDEF which gives equal focus on civil society as partner in democracy promotion and therefore, does not duplicate the work of other UN organs (Rich 2010: 427; UNDEF Official Website). The funding of UNDEF is utilized in educating the non-democratic regions. For example, cascading leadership and citizenship skills among youth in Costa Rica, building a media-civil society watchdog to curb corruption in Moldova, project on women's rights, participation and political education in Tunisia, protecting the rights of internally displaced Kosovo women in Serbia, helping women in Nepal for greater participation in local governance, working with six Governorate Councils to strengthen civil society participation in democratic processes in Iraq, and many more (UNDEF Official Website).

For Carothers, "Democracy promoters' growing emphasis on civil society is itself part of the learning curve; they are seeking to go beyond elections and state institutions, to turn democratic forms into democratic substance" (Carothers 1999: 337). With the changing international context, a more comprehensive and all-encompassing approach towards democracy is an indispensable need because of which movement of UN's functioning from procedural to involvement of substantive aspect of democracy is being witnessed.

Carothers (2009) in his seminal work "Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental", emanates a clear distinction between two kinds

of approaches to democratic assistance. Political approaches are short term and give out immediate results in terms of elections and political liberties and target core political institutions and processes – political parties, election processes and politically oriented civil society groups – in order to change a non-democratic regime into a visibly democratic one. In contrast the developmental approach formulates incremental and long term changes not only related to democracy in politics but also in economic and social sectors, focusing on substantive values like equality, justice and welfare, which helps in consolidating democracy in a non-democratic setting to its core. Of late agencies for democracy promotion (whether states like the United States or international organizations) have started using all kinds of strategies and diplomatic mechanisms to infuse democratization in the world at large. This effort has blurred the dividing line between the political and developmental approaches to democracy assistance and promotion. This is the category of work done by international organizations studied under the procedural aspect (political approach) and the substantive aspect (developmental approach) of democracy promotion in this research.

The role played by the UN in the last decade has also been affected by the 9/11 incident because of which the issue of security and geopolitical strategies emerged to the surface diverting the theme of democracy promotion from the developmental approaches towards a more strategically oriented political approach. The UN adopted a backseat in comparison to the direct democracy promotion endeavours of the United States (in Iraq and Afghanistan). The then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2004 mentioned in a BBC interview that that Iraq war was "illegal" and the action of the United States was "not in conformity with the UN Charter" (UN News Centre).[12] External democracy promotion sometimes takes hard measures like naming and shaming and military actions as a resort to support the already existing internal movements in a country for democracy. But these measures are not always conducive for the growth of the concept of

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[12] UN News Centre, "Lessons of Iraq War underscore importance of UN Charter - Annan",[Online: Web] Accessed on 15 May 2014, URL: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11953&#.U7jdqLHc1IQ

'democracy promotion' and usually give a negative connotation to the usage of the term as equal to internal intervention or diplomatic intrusion or simply a mechanism which is anti the process of state sovereignty.

3.3 Other Actors Practicing Democracy Promotion

Europe has always been a breeding ground of democracy. "By 1930, 18 full democracies and three male democracies (since universal suffrage was not extended to women) existed, 15 in Europe, six outside: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, Costa Rica and Uruguay" (TenDam 2010: 160). However, any discussion about democracy promotion in the contemporary international scenario is incomplete without mentioning the role of the United States (US). As an active advocate of democracy promotion, US has been lauded and loathed for the same. Since, the time the US entered the main frame of international politics (mainly after the Second World War), its foreign policies have been engaged in the process of propagating democracy whether during the Cold War in order to contain communism or after the Cold War to pursue other political, economic and strategic gains. The relative position of the US as a global power made its ardent believe in the principle of democracy also global.

Apart from the US, international financial institutions are also moulding their policies towards promotion of democratic values among countries where loans, grants and funding are given by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Wold Bank's loan programs and IMF's funding are now conditioned upon involving clauses like fighting corruptions and promoting individual rights, rule of law, transparency and accountability in their state political structure essentially referring to the components of 'good-governance'(Perina 2015: 52). Since economic and political sectors of a state are quite interlinked therefore democratic norms are desired in both the sectors by financial institutions yet, they were not directly involved in promotion of democracy.

Three actors important actors engaged in democracy promotion are: the US, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations.

- Democracy Promotion by the United States: Policies and Perspective

- Working of Regional Organizations in Democracy Promotion

- Non-governmental Organizations and other Civil Society Groupings

I Democracy Promotion by the United States: Policies and Perspectives

Commenting about the faith of Americans in the system of democracy, Mark Lilla in his recent essay offers an ironic remark that,

> They (The Americans) are generally unaware that democracy in the West went from being considered an irredeemable regime in classical antiquity, to a potentially good one only in the nineteenth century, to the best form of government only after World War II, to the sole legitimate regime only in the past twenty-five years"(Lilla 2014: 4).

So fervent is the support of the US for democracy promotion that questioning the viability and applicability of democratic rules for the world at large results in confrontation with the superpower itself. Since the last century, most of the military interventions carried out by the US were done in the name of 'national interest' which with time got exchanged with 'democracy promotion'. This not only makes the intervention internationally acceptable but also spares the US from the condemnation of being a 'selfish bully'. The Monroe Doctrine against European intervention in the Western Hemisphere (1823), to the Truman Doctrine (1947) for the containment of Communism, to the Washington Consensus (1989), to the 'Bush Doctrine' (2002) clause of pre-emptive war and the 'Freedom Agenda' (2007) of the Bush administration were all means of re-instating American supremacy in the name of democracy promotion at a time of grave threat to its hegemonic position.

Whether it was the Mexican War (1846-1848, fought for 'Texans' right to self-determination and democracy), the Spanish-American war (1898, for the rights of Cubans), or the World War I (where Woodrow Wilson entered "to make the world safe for democracy"), all were done for

the sake of democracy. Other than wars, the US military interventions of Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Haiti, Iraq and Afghanistan, have all been claimed by successive Presidents of the US (who were in office at that time) as a quest to establish democracy in the world (Meernik 1996: 391).

With each successive intervention of the US criticisms of American policies have also became louder and have started resonating not just in anti-American states of the West Asian region but also throughout the world specially after the US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. David Brooks, providing a realist perspective, states that, "Democratic vistas give way to laissez-faire fatalism: History has no shape. The dream of universal democracy seems naïve. National interest matters most" (Brooks 2014:1). The economic interests of the United States in relation to the massive oil reserves in the region of the Middle East have now been an open phenomenon. The 1973 OPEC oil boycott, invasion of Iraq in 1990s, and the recent Iraq war of 2003, were all related, according to many analysts, to the oil and fossil fuel needs of the US for maintaining its superpower position (Pelletiere 2004; Price 2003).

The US is not the sole Western power that has historically involved itself in war over the resources of the Persian Gulf. In 1914 even Britain led some oil expeditions in Iraq. But American involvement with the region has led to militarism and a never ending war like situation (Jones 2012: 208-209). And this might have been the reason for President Obama to refuse US direct military involvement in the recent Syrian crisis i.e., mainly to avoid another war (Clemons 2014). Out of all the countries involved in the 'Arab Spring', only Tunisia has emerged with a little hope of consolidation of democracy (with the first phase of constitution formation for the country being a success). This has been attributed by many to the little amount of attention paid to the country by the outside world. For Yasmin Ryan, the Westerners were not interested in the nation because Tunisia is a small North African nation which does not possess huge oil and gas reserves and neither has a shared border with Israel (Ryan 2014). This explains that

democratization from within has altogether a different flavour, which gets lost with too much involvement of external intervention.

Apart from showcasing America's aggressive power of democracy promotion through military means, the US after the Second World War, was also engaged in the spread of democracy through economic means. The Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Western Europe helped the United States by not only widening and deepening democracy but also benefitted by opening up markets for trade with the US, along with containing communism (Marshall Plan 1948).

Similarly, for diplomatic gains and to further retain strength against communism, in the 1970s, the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy perspectives for the appeasement of non-democratic or dictatorial governments in the South American states of Chile, Cambodia, Brazil, and Argentina, was adopted by the US. The cause of genuine democracy promotion completely lost its relevance during the Cold War times, when democracy promotion by the US was abandoned many times for the sake of containing communism through any means possible. Bass's work, *The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide*, explains the consequences of US appeasement of dictators in South Asia, specifically Pakistan, that led to the India-Pakistan War over Bangladesh in 1971 (Bass 2013). Thus, the United States is not necessary the flag bearer of democracy, neither is it the guardian of this universal virtue. Rather democracy is the solution to all its ills and also an excuse for all its sins. In other words, democracy is essential to maintain US power position.

Building on the "white man's burden" concept of the imperialist tradition, the US, after the end of the Cold War, assumed a duty to spread the democratic form of governance around the world. "This assumption is quickly expressed in a doctrine of "liberal internationalism" and policies of pacification through political and economic liberalization carried out through diplomacy, international trade, humanitarian aid and eventually military force" (Acuto 2008: 464). However, scepticism is growing about the

promotion of democracy, in large measure because of the unilateral actions of the US and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan (Melia 2005).

Given the position of power that the US enjoys, its interests also shape and influence the policies formulated at multilateral fora. President's Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" (1941) formed the basis for the creation of the UN. It was under NATO's supervision that the US democratization drive was carried out in countries like Italy, West Germany, Portugal and Spain. After the Cold War, NATO was joined by other organizations of Europe (European Union, European Community, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and many more) that helped in democratization of Central and Eastern European States.

Although the interests of the US, are apparent, the linkage of their economic and strategic motives with other significant global issues of terrorism and democracy promotion have brought it sympathy and support from different quarters of the world. For Laurence Whitehead, "However, since September 11 in particular, the liberating dimension of regime change has been downgraded, replaced by a new emphasis on security" (Whitehead 2008: 16).

Many experts like William Easterly, have concluded that coercive interventions or military meddling (like the one used by US in Iraq) hinders the development of democratic values regardless of the true nature and aim of the democratic actor. He analysed and studied the Cold War period and observed that the effect of military intervention of both US (democratic) and USSR (non-democratic) had a similar kind of de-democratizing impact on the countries at the receiving end. He then applied the theory to the intervention of US in countries in the name of terrorism and said that the military intervention will again be more de-democratizing rather than being helpful in democratization. After about nine years of war with Iraq, the US troops vacated the country in 2011, only to come back after three years to help the fledgling democratic government to fight the growing terror of the ISIS militants. If this is the situation then, what kind of democratic solutions were offered to Iraq through its military invasion in 2003?

Apart from direct military interventions, what other methods of democracy promotion are available to the US? Of course military means have been critiqued widely, yet they can sometimes be used as a method of last resort like in the case of genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Another way of democracy promotion is through the multilateral institutions where the US has the capacity to arm-twist the decisions of these organizations to its own strategic interests. Besides, the US is also engaged in democracy promotion with the help of semi-governmental organs like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) [under which comes the work of National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI)] and the USAID (Unites States Agency for International Development, 1961), which are working with civil society organizations around the world. These civil society organizations take democracy promotion with a bottom-up approach and any attack on working of these organizations is considered as an attack on the voice of the people.

The image of US has been tarnished due to occasional hiccups in its economic structure (like the recent financial crisis of 2008) and also due to the strong measures it took for instant and forceful democratization. Criticism have been on the rise both at home and abroad at US anti-democratic policies of treatment of terrorist suspects in Guantanamo Bay, and in Abu Gharib and other detention centres in Eastern Europe. This overall has given a bad name to the concept of democracy promotion as well. It seems that there is an eternal bond between propaganda of democratic values by the United States and the relative positioning of the US as one of the top players of global politics in the current scenario, so much so that, decline in popularity of democracy is considered to be proportional to decline in the status of the US and vice-versa. But, is the power of the US on the decline?

In the words of Immanuel Wallerstein, "Over the two hundred years, the United States acquired a considerable amount of ideological credit. But these days, the United States is running through this credit even faster than it ran through its gold surplus in the 1960s" (Wallerstein 2003: 19). In 1945,

after the end of the Second World War, the US was at the peak of its power with its industrial growth quadrupled and actually acquiring fifty percent of the entire wealth of the world. This continued till 1970s when economic power of the world became tri-polar i.e., it became diversified creating three economic centres United States, Germany and Japan (Kelly 2013). The present times are of globalization creating varied centres of power including China, European Union, and other regional and sub-regional powers. This undermines the US hegemonic role as the bearer of neoliberal democratic values. The 2014 Russia's occupation of Crimea reflects another dent in the United States global agenda of democracy promotion.

Even, the US funding to civil society organizations of various countries is not acceptable to many governments at the receiving end. After the green revolution of Iran the then government in Tehran barred some sixty NGOs including NED, IRI, NDI, Freedom House, the open society institute, and the Human Rights Watch (all US based) on charge of forming instigative attitude of the public towards the native government. In 1997 the then Belarusian government charged the NGO Open Society institute with tax fraud and seized its bank account. Countries like Venezuela and Russia have attacked these US based NGOs (specially NED) on account of unnecessary intervention of the US channelled through these organizations targeting civil society groupings of non-democratic states (Berger 2013: 290). Critics of this NGO based democracy promotion claimed that this mechanism creates more social unrest and can often lead to non-democratic states having greater political instability or a situation of social and political impasse.

There is another factor for the weakening strength of American democracy promotion. There is a decrease in confidence over the true nature of the US policies because of the revelations made by 'Wikileaks' and Snowden. This has made some of the important middle powers like Brazil, Germany and India suspicious of the activities pursued by the US in the name of national security. Because of this fingers have also been raised on internet giants – Google and Facebook. On April 14, 2011, a news in *The New York Times* stated that, "Some Egyptian youth leaders attended a 2008

technology meeting in New York, where they were taught to use social networking and mobile technologies to promote democracy. Among those sponsoring the meeting were Facebook, Google, MTV, Columbia Law School and the State Department" (Nixon 2011). It was these Egyptian Youth leaders that were actively involved in the 2011 revolution against the Egyptian government.

The unchallenged position enjoyed by the US at the end of the ideological divide in the 1990s has been weakened comparatively. The global as well as the regional order in South Asia has changed with China growing as a major player, hampering the gravitational pull enjoyed by the US in various multilateral forums. Of course, there has also been a constant clash of interests between the United States and other non-democratic big players like China, Russia and Iran who according to Walter Russell Mead are 'Central Powers' (though neither a formal nor a formidable group) creating an "Axis of Weevils" hollowing the American supremacy specially in the Eurasian region where the three exist.[13] These three, resenting the order created by the US, after the end of the Cold War, always look for special opportunities where the 'Status Quo Powers' (Mead called them as maritime powers including the United States, European Union, Japan and their allies) are lagging behind due to mistaken judgements or domestic constraints and where the central powers can grab the advantage (Mead 2013). Examples can be many like the Chinese expanding their horizon in the economic and military spheres, the Russian occupation of Georgia and the recent one in Crimea and Iran making diplomatic gains in the West Asian region as some sanctions against Iraq were alleviated under the garb of its nuclear agreement with the US. An alarming situation exists in the Middle East, first because the region is itself very turbulent and secondly, there are now emerging, claimants of power who were not present a decade ago. How can this effect democracy promotion by international organizations?

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[13] For Mead and for few other scholars like Fukuyama and Naill Ferguson, this also brings back the traditional concept of geo-politics in picture. The Central powers are trying hard to gain power in the region traditionally known as the 'grand chess-board of the world' where struggles for supremacy have traditionally been fought.

Since democracy is connected with the existing order, any harm to the order or degeneration of power of the supporters of democracy in international organizations will change the entire course of action. However, scholars of liberal democratic order like G. John Ikenberry (2014) are still denying any such harm by referring to the emergence of an international creed of 'democratic middle powers', apart from the maritime powers mentioned by Mead. These middle range powers are like Australia, Brazil, India, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey, which are small yet powerful enough to put-off Mead's alarm about central powers. Also new democracies in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa apart from Japan, Australia and Taiwan, are in the race now with new enthusiasm and zest for promoting democracy carrying the baton passed over by the old Western liberal democratic states. Apart from this, many authoritarian rulers foreseeing the changing winds of the time have themselves introduced democratic features in their ongoing political structure.

II Working of Regional Organizations in Democracy Promotion

Most regional organizations follow the foot prints of the UN and acknowledge the significance of a democratic form of government for maintaining order peace and security in the world. As early as 1971, just twenty years after the creation of the UN, Ernst B. Haas, said:

> ... regionalism is the tail that wags the global dog. Of 121 members of the United Nations 109 belong to at least one regional organization not affiliated with the UN; 72 of them belong to several (Haas 1971: 795).

Regional organizations thus, became an important part of global politics, another level of integration amongst nation states. The adoption of democratic values and principles in the working of regional organizations has helped in 'democratic mainstreaming' more so in the post-Cold War world scenario.[14] Yet there are differences in the level of motivation of

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[14] The Term 'mainstreaming' is often used in gender studies, defined as, "Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels" (Official

regional organizations. More than funding democracy, regional organizations are engaged in democracy promotion through norms and laws that are contained in their Charters for the governance of their respective member states (Newman 2006: 191).

Jon C. Pevehouse mentions three important roles played by regional organizations in the democratic transition process of a nation. First, regional organizations in association with some internal forces (civil society groups) can help put pressure on the authoritarian regimes which ultimately can result in liberalization of economy or dispersal of some autonomy to media or to the masses in general. Second, membership of regional organizations is a strong mechanism of carrots and sticks to instigate the process of making a non-democratic country tow the path of democratic governance. And last, assistance can be provided by regional organizations (in terms of aid or technical support) which can help in bringing the transition process to a successful end (Pevehouse 2005:15). These three forms of functioning of regional organizations in the field of democracy promotion have been most actively followed by the European Union (EU) as compared to other regional organizations.

Regional organizations generally emerges from the regional trading agreements (FTAs –Free Trade Agreements) because of this they have a strong economic footing in the region. The cost of not joining these preferable FTA under regional organizations is more than the cost of maintaining an authoritarian state structure in the era of globalization. Pressures from regional organizations for greater liberalization and democratization in authoritarian regimes are more in the form of economic sanctions, political isolation, naming and shaming or public condemnation.

Website of International Labour Organization, URL: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/gender/newsite2002/about/defin.htm. The concept has been borrowed and applied to the working of international and regional organizations in the field of democracy promotion, especially after 1990s, as their association with the concept of democracy has increased in their policy making and legislations. Also working of these organizations toward issues of human rights and good governance are more perceived from the prism of democratic promotion.

In the sphere of democracy promotion, there is also a noteworthy difference between regional organizations of the West and non- Western organizations. The organizations of the West like the EU, OSCE (Organization for Security and cooperation in Europe), European Community, the Organization of American States (OAS), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) are more active in the promotion of democracy in their respective member states and the area concerned. The foremost example in democracy promotion by regional organization is that of the EU (EU). A liberal democratic state structure is a membership criterion for this regional organization. No other regional organization has reached the mark set by the EU in the field of democracy promotion. Many scholars have seen the role of EU in the post-communist states of Europe as the most remarkable case ever of democracy promotion (Youngs 2010, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005, Vachudova 2005). The EU's 2004 enlargement which included ten new countries of Central and Eastern Europe represents a successful case of democracy promotion by using techniques of political conditionality and financial and technical aid. However, much still remains with respect to democratic transition in those countries of Central and Eastern Europe which are not members of EU but are slowly moving towards democratization.

Other regional organizations like the Association of the South East Asian States (ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS), The African Union (AU), the Arab League and many more regional arrangements are not as committed to the democratic liberal order (as the EU), though they are part and parcel of the same liberal order ascending throughout the world due to globalization. These organizations face these lacunas because of their varied composition of member states which are ranging from democratic to semi-democratic and to the non-democratic regimes as well. This shows that there is differential understanding of issues such as democracy and Human Rights among different regions of the world. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2005 upon realizing the significance of regional, subregional and other organizations in the promotion and consolidation of democracy (see Annexure V).

Regional players though set there Charters and principles in accordance to the UN aspirations, yet they are also much consumed with regional problems and issues of concern. Regional politics also play a crucial role in the working of these organizations which sometimes render these organizations inefficient and leads to failure in their efforts. Regional organizations often have to do the work for democracy promotion in collaboration with other players (governmental or non-governmental). Organizations like the Arab League and GCC are more concerned with regional politics rather to the commitment of their organization towards the principle of democracy and Human Rights. Also incidents of political and military interventions in the Middle Eastern states in the name of democracy promotion have led to the dilemma as to which is the correct democratic ideal they need to pursue keeping in mind the religious and cultural allegiances of their member states.

ASEAN is another example of a regional organization which gives due importance to the cultural and religious backgrounds of their member states and is therefore not taking a firm stand upon policies related to adoption of democracy and human rights issues in its Charter. Though, the ASEAN Charter gives due importance to principles of good governance, rule of law, democratic principles, human rights, for the creation of better political order in South Asia, but here there is a huge gap between practice and rhetoric. For example, ASEAN has achieved little in terms of the huge pressure it tried to mount for democratizing regime in Burma (Dosch 2008). Certain liberalization process started amongst the Arab nation after 2000 but this growth stopped after 2005-06 as political Islam emerged increasingly successful in the supposed democratic elections of countries like Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority. All these are the member states of Arab League which adopted a Charter on Human Rights in 2004. In principle the Charter was a democratic step forward by the Arab League member states, but it was not signed by all the members. Rather the League's Human Right Committee is not obliged to publish public reports on member states compliance with the Charter (Huber 2015: 134-137).

The 9/11 incident has also impacted the working of these regional organizations. Like the OAS adopted the *Inter-American Democratic Charter* (2001) to strengthen and preserve democratic government in the hemisphere. In the efforts of democracy promotion by OAS in Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2004) the organization played an active role in bringing together for negotiations the representatives of local governments, opposition leaders and civil society leaders. Whereas, the results in Peru were positive with the removal of President Alberto Fujimori; the results in Venezuela were contrasting with the plebiscite leading to consolidated regime of President Hugo Chávez (Cooper and Legler 2006). *The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights* (IACHR) of OAS is very active as a human rights watchdog because of the kind of political autonomy that it enjoys.

Inter-regional efforts for democracy promotion have also been active among regional organizations for democracy promotion such as the "OAS-AU Democracy Bridge Forum" for to share experiences, practices and to learn mechanisms to strengthen and preserve democracy.[15] In 2007, the United States in the APEC Summit in Sydney, joined hands with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Canada to create a new Asia Pacific Democratic Partnership – dedicated to promoting and strengthening democracy in the region.

Recent efforts of African Union like the 2012 "African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ADC), is a promising start for enhancing democracy and human rights amongst the authoritarian and corrupt governments prevalent in Africa. With the current wave of democratization sweeping in the North African region, whether the instrument will be a useful mechanism to sustain democracy in the continent will be a futuristic comment to be made. But the sheer adoption of the mechanism among variety of semi-democratic and non-democratic regimes is itself commendable. Critics can point that this is mainly due to Western pressures and is highly pseudo in nature.

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[15] OAS Official Website, "Democracy Promotion and Human Rights", United States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States, URL: http://www.usoas.usmission.gov/democracy.html

III Non-Governmental Organizations and other Civil Society Groupings

In recent years (mainly since 1989) civil society organizations have proliferated as the most active actors in the promotion of democracy. In the last twenty years, the number of NGOs has increased exponentially involving actors of civil society which may now is known as 'NGOization of Civil Society' (Lang 2012, Ishkanian 2007). Sabine Lang has described 'NGOization' as, "... the process by which social movements professionalize, institutionalize, and bureaucratize in vertically structured, policy-outcome-oriented organizations that focus on generating issue-specific and to some degree, marketable expert knowledge or services" (Lang 2012: 63-64). The main stress in Lang analysis is on organizational structure and funding sources of these NGOs.

They are referred to as the 'soft' power mechanisms that have proved to be more effective than the use of military interventions for democracy promotion. They function as intermediaries between the international and the regional level on the one hand and the national and the local level on the other. According to Peter Burnell (1998), "during political liberalization, the main motor of change can be social movements, civic associations and forms of non-governmental organization, perhaps bringing about the collapse of an authoritarian regime almost unaided" (Burnell 1998: 2). They help in building transparency, educating masses for their rights, put a check on governmental activities, can help in greater participation in political processes of the nation, and thereby help building democracy with greater rigour and substance.

Many democratic transitions have been instigated with the help of these civil society organizations such as the one in Chile, Philippines, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, etc. Like a factory cannot produce goods without dedicated involvement of workers, similarly, civil society organizations are like workers of this giant industry of democracy promotion. This voluntary sector may include various types of organizations such as, "associations, foundations, non-profit corporations, public benefit companies, development organizations, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations,

mutual benefit groups, sports clubs, advocacy groups, arts and culture organizations, charities, trade unions and professional associations, humanitarian assistance organizations, non-profit service providers, charitable trusts, and political parties" (Defending Civil Society Report 2012: 8). The role of NGOs and civil society organizations are vast and can be dealt as a separate research topic. However, for the purpose of this research, only few civil society organizations which are active in democracy promotion activities for governmental transition will be discussed.

For democracy promotion, often the workings of these civil society organizations are dependent on funding from governmental and non-governmental sources, whether international organizations, regional organizations, international non-governmental organizations or individual countries such as the United States, Germany (Stiftungen) and many more. There are also various cooperation agencies of different countries of the world involved in the process of democracy promotion some of them are –

The United States Agency of International Development (USAID); the Soros Foundation Open Society Institute; the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); Spanish Agency for International cooperation and Development (AECID); the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA); the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD); the Norwegian Center for Democracy (NCD). Certain political parties and their foundations are also active in functioning for the cause of democracy promotion such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the National Republic Institute (IRI) of the US; the Konrad Adenauer, Friedrich Naumann and Friedrich Ebert Foundation of German origin; the Olaf Palme International Center of Sweden; and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) (Perina 2015: 53).

The international law has given due importance to the formation of these civil society organizations and certain protections have been granted to them against the intrusion by the governments. The international principles protecting civil society are: Freedom of association; the right to operate free from unwarranted state interference; the right to free expression; right to

communication and cooperation; right to freedom of peaceful assembly; the right to seek and secure resources; and the state duty to protect. These principles have been already enshrined in the international law, but were enumerated explicitly for the first time in 2008 in the '*Defending Civil Society report*' published with the joint efforts of the *World Movement for Democracy* and the *International Center for Not-For-Profit Law* (ICNL).

Many significant steps have been taken by international organizations as well to enhance the functioning of civil society organizations in the world and to provide them a safe and enabling environment. It was in 2010, that the United Nations Human Rights Council passed the historic resolution on "Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association". In a similar vein, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution in 2011 on "Promotion of the Rights to Freedom of Assembly and of Association in the Americas". NGOs have become more active since the combining of the issue of democracy promotion with that of 'Human Rights'. Human Rights based civil society organizations like Soros foundation (US based) are now the harbingers of democracy in non-democratic regions.

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is the biggest American NGO that is working for promotion of democracy and strengthening of civil societies in non-democratic states. Established in 1983, NED is funded by the Congress and has four affiliates, the *National Democratic Institute for International* Affairs (NDI); the *International Republican Institute* (IRI); the *Center for International Private Enterprise* (CIPE); and the *American Center for International Labor Solidarity* ("Solidarity Center"). Many times NGOs (since they are individual entities) have been accused for supporting the foreign policies objective of their respective governments, depriving NGOs of their main trait that is neutrality. This perception is prevalent amongst all receiving countries by and large. At other times they are accused of not siding with government foreign policies, for example, in Haiti, the International Republican Institute (IRI) was accused of going against US

government policies by supporting the opposition to ousted democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (Silver 2006).

With funding to NGO there is also the problem of understanding the true cause of function of that NGO. Example, German government funds the political advocacy NGOs in Israel and Palestinian authority for the cause of food security, poverty reduction, democracy and human rights, protecting environment, etc. However, the reality on ground shows the alleged involvement of these NGOs in blatant antisemitism by undermining the legitimacy of a Jewish state (NGO Monitor 2014). This can also be explained with the help of Sabine Lang's description of NGOization that, "NGOization describes a culturally and politically mutable tendency rather than a narrowly confined path. Because it is mutable, it might have different iterations and be fuelled by different processes in different global or local constellations" (Lang 2012: 65).

Other important American NGOs that promoted democracy are, Freedom House (formed in 1941), International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Eurasian Foundation (1992), Carter Center (1982), Open Society Foundations (OSF) and the Soros Foundations Network (1993). NGOs like Freedom House and Soros Foundation, were highly active during the 'Colour Revolution' that occurred in various countries of the Eurasian region (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan). Sreeram Chaulia has tried to decipher the role of these international non-governmental organizations from the perspective of realist international relations theory and has argued that "rhetorical homage to democratic ideals and values mask their utilitarian handiness in the superpower's (US) quest to install friendly regimes in high priority areas of the world" (Chaulia 2005).

Some institutional efforts that have been born out of collaboration of regional organizations and civil society are the Commonwealth Foundation; the EU Social Platform; the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council; the OAS Committee on Inter-American Summits Management.

This section of civil society's involvement in spreading democracy also includes all those transnational corporations (TNCs) and think tanks that are working in non-governmental sectors for to promote democracy in non-democratic parts of the world. The neoliberal agendas of these transnational corporations are in sync with democratic ideals of liberal state structures. There is a cycle of events that occur between the structural adjustment programs of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and opening up of nation-states to foreign capital and the product and services of these TNCs.

> The TNCs in conjunction with the nation-state at the center (Unites States and UK predominantly) to dictate the policies and scope of the IFIs to exert various forms of persuasive and coercive tactics (including bribery, sponsoring and supporting coups, and financially supporting pro-free market national elites) on nation states across the globe to force these states to open up to foreign investment and products marketed by TNCs (Dutta 2011).

So, in these cases the political goals of promoting democracy and the economic goals of spread of neo-liberal reforms which support liberalized Western capitals and investments go hand in hand. These TNCs support non-governmental organizations while retaining their basic goal of profit making and liberal market creation. Civil Society as a whole also involves certain groups and organizations that do not impact the spread of democracy directly like sports clubs, scholarly associations, and cultural societies. "Even the non-political forms of civil activity may, however, contribute to generating trust and solidarity among citizens, which are essential for a democratic community" (Raik 2006: 21). The involvement of civil society actors in the goals of democracy promotion has increased in recent years. This has widened the scope of working institutions for promotion of democracy as well has deepened the project of substantive sustenance of democratic ideals in non-democratic regions of the world. Globalization has indeed played a catalytic role in this entire process of transferring knowledge, ideals, working, of either the liberal democratic market or the state structure form region to region and between countries using either the top-down or the bottom-up mechanisms.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter deals with various actors promoting democracy around the world. The functioning of these actors is sometimes found linked and interconnected to certain extent. Example, the impact of US over the democracy promoting efforts of the UN is highly critiqued because it then makes the process an interventionist attempt on the part of the US as a global player to influence regions not accessible otherwise. The omni-presence of the US is quite visible in various sections of this chapter, explicitly stating that democracy promotion came as a brain-child of various policy makers of the US, not just as foreign policy of the nation but also as a policy to be pursued with respect to actors like international organizations, transnational corporations, NGOs, etc.

Both the end of the Cold War (1990) and the 9/11 (2001) were watershed events in bringing about a shift in the working of actors promoting democracy. Due to the former event, the UN got vocal about its commitment to the ideals of democracy, associating it with human rights and good governance and in the later, the UN diversified its approach of democracy promotion by including bottom-up mechanisms like the UNDEF (2005). The influence of the US on activities of other actors cannot be ignored, yet mechanisms adopted by each of the actors to promote democracy is diverse some accessing the supply side (the governmental channels) and others focusing more on the demand side (involving the general public) of democracy promotion.

The post 9/11 strategies of the Bush government used for promotion of democracy in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, brought about association of democracy promotion with regime change (mentioned in chapter1), increasing the scepticism over democracy promotion amongst countries at the receiving end. Though the US has lowered down its military mechanisms of promoting democracy under the Obama administration, still US presence in international initiatives to promote democracy often becomes a critical issue. Whether it is working of the US within the UN or working of

the US based NGOs, all are subjected to criticisms on the basis that such activities only promote US national interest.

The need is to diversify the supporters of democracy, so that US presence is reduced and the concept of democracy promotion becomes non-Western in character. This will happen when countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey play active role in propagating democracy beyond their borders. An initiative like UNDEF was proposed by both India and the US, but India somewhere lagged behind in its commitment to the project. The involvement of these countries will provide a fresh boost to democracy promotion and probably make receiving countries less sceptical of motives behind democracy promotion from external sources.

Also the role of civil society groups is a burning topic for researchers, as its study will reveal the story from the other side i.e. the demand side of democracy promotion. How far the population of a country is involved for genuine democracy promotion in that country is sometimes revealed by studying these civil society groupings and NGOs working with the grassroots level. Actors like NGOs are working towards substantive democracy promotion and not just promoting it procedurally. Critics suspect even the working of these non-governmental actors as instruments of promoting interest of powerful nations or sometimes critiqued for favouring a particular section of the society ignoring people at large. Nonetheless their role is significant in influencing societies and bringing about a change in societal thinking.

Regional organizations are like intermediaries between the national and the international level, engaged in achieving their region specific interests. A visible distinction is there between regional organizations of the Western states which are inclined towards ideals of democracy and its promotion among its member states and in its vicinity (EU, OAS, OSCE, etc.). On the other hand there are regional organizations (like the Arab League, GCC SAARC, ASEAN and SCO (Shanghai Corporation Organization) whose member states are a mix of democratic and non-democratic states and therefore makes the organizations less focused on

democratic ideal (though human rights protection is increasingly being adopted). They are more involved in their pressing regional problems and issues and sometimes struggle to maintain relations between their member states.

The inclination of the UN towards democracy promotion (especially in the post Cold War years) has inspired many regional organizations that are now being sensitive to issues of human rights and good governance. But, EU's name stands out from its contemporaries in the field of democracy promotion. The regional organizations has gone way ahead in its approach towards democracy promotion towards members states, candidate states, potential candidates states as well as among neighbouring states. The next two chapters will deal with the promotion of democracy as pursued by the EU in its various policy mechanisms and also studies about the specific agencies of the EU engaged in this process.

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CHAPTER 4

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE EU REGION

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IN THE EU REGION

4.1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) has always been at the core of the studies related to democracy promotion. The attitude and aptitude that the EU has developed with regard to promotion of democracy through its membership criteria or through its enlargement process, especially in the vicinity of the turbulent Mediterranean and West Asia is far more successful when compared to other regional organizations. The EU is not the sole actor engaged in democracy promotion activities in the Central and Eastern European states; other actors – international organizations like UN, IMF, World Bank, regional actors like the Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO, single state such as the US, Germany, France, Britain, and other transnational organizations like the Amnesty International, Red Cross, Human Rights Watch etc. – are also active. But the EU stands out as exceptional due to its effective use of the 'carrot and stick' approach applied in the conditionality procedures attached to the membership of the organization.

Democracy promotion carried out under the EU has gained credibility in recent years as compared to the US actions that largely rely on the use of military means and therefore face public resentment.[1] In 2004

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[1] A decline in support for promoting democracy is viewed in public opinion polls in the US. On a priority list of top US foreign policy objectives, "promoting democracy in other nations" is placed at the bottom of the list, and "protecting US from terrorist attacks" at the top. The public support for the former came down from 29% in 2001 to only 18% in 2013 (Drake 2013). In the same survey, Drake mentions a shift in public opinion towards more importance to stable governments (especially, after the Arab Spring of 2011) with 63% support as compared to 28% for democracy promotion (Drake 2013). Similar views are present amongst public outside US. It is

G-8 Summit, when the US proposed 'Greater Middle East Initiative', discrepancies between US use of hard power (using military means) policies of democracy promotion and EU's low-profile initiatives (such as Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 1995) became apparent.[2] EU's activities are wide in terms of geographic reach and also 'deep' in terms of nature of its involvement. The EU thus makes for a useful case study. This chapter focuses exclusively on the EU's work on democracy promotion within the European region. [3]

Traditionally, within nation-states, democracy emerged through 'gradualism' that explains the role of demand side actors (growth of a vibrant '*demos*' (public) or an active civil society) putting various pressures for establishing an accountable and responsible democratic government. EU is certainly not a nation-state, but scholars have considered EU a case *sui generis*, or have considered EU "less than a federation, more than a regime" (Wallace 1983), or even the "first truly postmodern international political form" (Ruggie 1993: 140). EU as a multilateral organization acquired democratic values due to a common respect of the member states towards liberal democratic norms, thereby preserving the legitimacy of the integration process at the European level (Schimmelfennig 2009: 2; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). However, the mandate of this chapter exclusively deals with EU's democracy promotion within the European

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probably these sentiments that inspired the Obama administration to keep a low profile while promoting democracy in recent times as compared to George W. Bush years of presidency.

[2] The 'Greater Middle East Initiative 'of the US, refer to a blueprint of actions involving political, military and economic programme to promote democracy in non-democratic states of the Middle East (West Asian region). This initiative of the US was a plea for greater transatlantic cooperation for to tackle problems and political instabilities of the Middle East. The EU agrees to the goal of democratic transformation of the wider Middle East but also makes it explicit that EU's Association with the Middle East is beyond the consequence of September 2001 events and fight against terrorism. Therefore, from the EU's viewpoint, a 'forward strategy of freedom' of the 'Bush Administration' is not required, rather a subtle approach should be adopted supporting reform-minded forces within the country in question and pushing the government towards democratic reforms through dialogue, material supports and forms of conditionality (Perthes 2004: 1-2).

[3] 'European region' as defined in this study includes the current members, candidate states and potential candidate states of the EU.

region and should not be combined with EU's own democratic functioning. Sections about EU's democratic functioning does appear in the text, just to clarify doubts regarding legitimacy of the authority that lies with the EU in spreading democracy within its member states, candidate states and potential candidates. This means that the explanations on EU's democratic functioning, in this study, will not be sufficient enough to elucidate on issues of 'democracy deficit within EU's functioning' or questions related to 'fragmented democracy of the EU'.

International organizations (mostly) work on the basis of the democratic peace theory that 'representative democracies are the fertile soil for sowing the seed of peace, order and security in the world'. For many liberal institutionalists, the EU is an epitome of liberal policies that negates the realist interpretations of the international system (McCormick 2007: 12). Many believe that the EU's working is removed from material concerns, power politics and military forces and is embedded in the spread of rules and regimes of democracy and human rights through peaceful means (Telò 2007: 2). The EU's subtle ways of democracy promotion through negotiations, aid and conditionality have wider influence, acceptance and a greater success rate (roughly measured in terms of the inclusion of ten Central and Eastern European States as members of EU in 2004).

But this given does not mean 'democracy' as a normative value is so significant that it can overshadow the strategic goals of the EU. EU's promotion of democracy is related to its traditional goals of a united Europe with economic and security benefits. Moreover, soon after their inclusion, questions were raised over proper democratic transitions in Central and Eastern European states.[4] Cases such as Greece (economically)

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[4] After the EU inclusion of 10 Central and Eastern European states in 2004 as members, there were seen instances of those states backsliding to their authoritarian tendencies, due to absence of features like checks and balances within governmental functioning, independence of media, etc. For more information see, Rupnik, Jacques (2007), Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backslash, *Journal of Democracy*, 18(4): 17-25.

and Hungary (politically), explained later in the chapter, are constantly straining the already weakening democratic drive of the EU. And, of course, the recent case of 'Brexit' has opened many questions on the 'integration' aspect of the EU which use to act as a big carrot for prospective member states.[5] These are some of the issues that have kept the debate alive on democracy promotion by the EU within the European region.

4.2 EU's Legitimacy for Promotion of Democracy

The original six members of the EU – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – were democratic states pursuing the establishment of an organization that could restore peace and prosperity to the continent, after the two World Wars. The 'essentialist view' of interpreting democracy development in the European integration process argues that, since the EU is created by parliamentary democracies which maintain democratic state structures and human rights, the EU is essentially democratic in nature (Thomas 2006: 1191). According to Schimmelfennig (2012), "...the EU is a liberal democratic community of national communities. Where cultural similarity is not available anymore across the EU's societies, liberal values and democratic institutions (in addition to wealth) generate transnational trust" (Schmmelfennig 2009: 9). The common liberal ideological base and the similar social, political and economic structures of the nations of Western Europe can be a starting point of analysis for the creation of this democracy promoting regional organization of Europe. But the EU was a group of nations coming together for economic interest and no political motive of democracy promotion was thought about at its inception. Liberal democratic Idealism as an ideology to be pursued and promoted was acquired much later by the EU to disguise its core economic interests in reviving Europe's war torn society.

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[5] 'Brexit' refers to the British exit from the EU based upon a referendum occurred in Britain on 23 June 2016. What consequences the exit will hold for democracy promotion by the EU will be a futuristic question. But this has certainly given a blow to the strong integration fabric of the EU upon which enlargement of the EU was carried out based on democratic principles.

Democracy as a normative ideal to be pursued universally was not emphasized during the foundation of the European Union. After the Second World War, revival of the war torn economy of Europe became the driving spirit for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 (predecessor of the EU). In the beginning, the 6 members tried to reap individual benefits out of this union. For France (the only victorious nation involved in the integration process), creation of the EU was a full assertion of its victory in the Second World War along with the establishment of stable ties with perpetual rival Germany through cooperation in the sphere of 'coal and steel' – the lifelines of modern industries as well as of development. For Germany and Italy, it meant joining the mainstream again, regaining their lost honour and power (political as well as economic). And for the 'BeNeLux' states (Belgium, Netherland and Luxembourg), it was time to come out of the shadows of big players and achieve something on their own (Cooper 2000: 32-33). The self interests of each of the founding members were dominant over the benefits that this cooperation could bring for the future of Europe.

Underlying factor of European integration under the EU was the 'idea of integration' itself, supported by the US for the creation of a supranational entity to stabilize Europe against the greater enemy – Communism (Dinan 2004: 25-26). After the end of the Second World War, the US was the only formidable power left that could restore democracy in the world against the rise of communism, as Britain (former big player of the colonial era) was not in position for a Europe wide recovery (Carolan 2008: 56).[6] The United States wanted to create a shield in the Western European region against communism by initiatives like the Truman doctrine and Marshall Plan of 1948 for re-building Europe as a partner across the Atlantic and near the communist Soviet Union. For Western European States, this ideological fight was linked to the strong economic build-up that was necessary against the same enemy i.e. communism.

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[6] With Britain (a strong global player and a huge democracy) exiting out of the EU, after the June 2016 referendum, a question on US role and support towards the functioning of the European Union now emerges against the rise of non-democratic states like China and Russia.

Around 1948, Europe was also integrating through mechanisms like the *Organization for European Economic Cooperation* (OEEC, which later transformed into the *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*, OECD in 1961) and the *Council of Europe*. The structure and functioning of these organizations was a contentious issue, with the French aspiring to creating a supranational structure and the British wanting to keep these organizations inter-governmental in nature.[7] It was the conscious political ambitions of the US against communism and the European economic revitalization dreams of the French Planning Office (headed by Jean Monnet) that finally led to the creation of the ECSC (Carolan 2008: 54; Dinan 2004: 5).

ECSC was essentially a regional economic endeavour of a supranational character with organs like a High Authority, a Council of Ministers, a Common Assembly, and a Court of Justice. The significance of its creation lies in the fact that one of the important issue areas of national polities was now under a supranational organization that demanded the dilution of some national sovereignty in order to create a mechanism above nation states for the first time. This formed the basis of further integration forming a supranational political union in 1957 under the Rome Treaty creating the European Economic Community (EEC) (for common market) and the Euratom (cooperation in nuclear energy).[8]

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[7] According to Clemens A. Wurm (1999), after the end of the Second World War, "For London the Strength of Sterling and the fight against inflation were paramount, for France the important issues were economic and agricultural growth and industrial renewal. Both countries had different planning systems and held opposite views on the type of Europe to be created." (Wurm 1999: 238). The 'Brexit' issue might be the result of this long drawn economic aspirations of Britain, also reflected in Britain not joining 'the Euro' (European Monetary Union) in 1999.

[8] With the failure in creation of a European Defence Community in 1954, the economy of the member states became the focus area for supranational cooperation. "The establishment of the EEC and the creation of the Common Market had two objectives. The first was to transform the conditions of trade and manufacture on the territory of the Community. The second, more political, saw the EEC as a contribution towards the functional construction of a political Europe and constituted a step towards the closer unification of Europe" (EUR-Lex 2010), "Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty - Original Text (non-

When and how did democracy promotion enter the domain of the European integration process? The Treaty of Rome was silent on the criteria for membership of the Community and mandated only, that the applicant should be a European nation-state. Article 237 of the Treaty states that:

> Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission (Treaty of Rome 1957: 78)

Subsequent applications for membership after the creation of the EEC led to a rethinking of the membership criteria. The game changer was the application for membership of Spain that came in 1962. Both France and Germany were in favour of Spain's inclusion as it would boost European trade and advance their project of a common market for Europe. The economic benefits of inclusion of a fascist Spain under the leadership of General Franco (who was committed to economic liberalization of the nation) seemed to outweigh its non-democratic character. But a contrasting viewpoint emerged in the European Parliamentary Assembly of the EEC which was working towards consolidation of democratic and human rights principles. The Assembly, under the direction of Willi Birkelbach (a German Social Democrat and a victim of the Nazi regime, intolerant of non-democratic sentiments) put out a report on the association process of the EEC (Thomas 2006:1197). Stressing the common values of the member states and respecting the membership rule of the *Statute of the Council of Europe*, the 'Birkelbach Report' of the *Political Committee of the European Parliament* came out in 1962.[9] The report stated that, "Only states which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and

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consolidated version)", Access to European Union Law, [Online: Web] Accessed 30 September 2015, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Axy0023.

[9] The Statute of the Council of Europe under Article 3 states that, "Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively..." The statute also clearly states that the principles of freedom, political liberty, and rule of law, constitute genuine democracy (CoE 1949).

respect for fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of the community" (Birkelbach 1962, cited in Grugel 1999: 74).

The 1970s *Davignon Report* or the *Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification* was adopted in order to seek development in the field of political unification by cooperation in foreign affairs of the member states. The Report mentions in *Part One* that,

> A united Europe should be based on a common heritage of respect for the liberty and rights of man and bring together democratic States with freely elected parliaments (Davignon Report: 1970).

With the idea gaining currency within the EEC and amongst the general public, the membership of Spain was held back. Spain was not given membership till 1986 after long talks for its association and membership that started after its transition process towards democracy in the 1970s (Schimmelfennig 2009: 13). The Spain incident set the stage for making democratic governance a rule for entry into the EEC and it was formally established in the Maastricht Treaty or the *Treaty on European Union* of 1992.

One of the problems with international organizations (in general) is that most of them are the products of political elitism and are disconnected with the masses, especially at the time after the Second World War (Berglund et al. 2006: 2). Democratic values, within the EU, were sometimes sidelined in favour of issues related to efficiency enhancement of the organization. Nonetheless, Fabbrini referred to the EU as a "union of states and their citizens" (Fabbrini 2007: 3). People are part of the EU as they are citizens of its member states. Eventually, the role of the masses was recognized and it was acknowledged that legitimacy among the masses is one of the important benchmarks that the EU has to achieve in support of its sustenance.

The European Parliament is a people elected body, yet it does not function in a manner similar to the legislative bodies of national

governments. Before elections to the European Parliament, members were appointed by each of the national parliaments of the member states. In 1976, the Decision and Act on European elections by direct universal suffrage was adopted in Brussels and the first election was held in June 1979. Through this organ, the EU functions in a democratic manner and attain the required legitimacy to ask its member states to spread democracy within their territories. With subsequent enlargements within the EU, number of seats in the European Parliament has increased from 198 in 1973 to 751 in 2014. The distribution of seats is reviewed before every parliamentary election which will next be reviewed before the elections in 2019.

The European Parliament was a subdued organ of the EU till the 1986 'Single European Act' (SEA). The SEA enhanced the European Parliament's power by including the requirement of parliamentary assent for an association agreement to be concluded.[10] The Act also provided a 'Cooperation Procedure' that empowered the European Parliament for the first time to have inter-institutional dialogue and the potential to have two readings of a proposed legislation limited to the cases in which the Council overrules only by a qualified majority. The cooperation procedure takes place in two readings. If the European Parliament offers amendments then the Council of the European Union is bound to oblige when the proposal is taken by the Commission (Rittberger 2005: 167-169).[11] Extension of the application of cooperation procedure happened with the Treaty on the European Union (1992) whereas the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) showed that

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[10] An Association Agreement "are international agreements that the European Community / European Union has concluded with third countries with the aim of setting up an all-embracing framework to conduct bilateral relations. These agreements normally provide for the progressive liberalisation of trade (to various degrees: Free Trade Area, Customs Union…)" (European Union External Action official website, "Association Agreement", [Online: Web] Accessed 26 February 2015, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/association/). Since 1995, the essential clause on human rights and democratic principles has been systematically included in association agreements of the EU.

[11] For more information on the Single European Act 1986, visit the official website "Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation" [Online :Web] URL: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_singleact_en.htm

the cooperation procedure has been used only minimally in the sphere of economic and monetary union. In the majority of other cases it has been superseded by the co-decision procedure.[12]

The above discussion shows that democracy as a normative value was not as much of an explicit objective during the formation of the EU, which today works towards the promotion of democracy in prospective member states through its policies of accession. Eventually, the working of the EU was democratized through the empowerment of the European Parliament. But debates continue over the perceived democratic deficit in the working of the EU institutions. The democracy, reflected within the working of the EU, certainly make the organization more legitimate in its claim of democracy promotion within its members, candidate states and potential candidate states.

Another reason, why democratic functioning of the EU is necessary for to enhance democracy promotion, is its supranational character. Since the beginning, the European Union was unique in that it displayed features of supranational cooperation, especially in fields relating to agriculture, internal market, fisheries, etc. where laws formulated by the EU impact the member states directly. In other areas like police cooperation, legal cooperation and the 'Common Foreign and Security Policy', the organization still acts like an intergovernmental entity wherein only the rules that have been adopted by the nation-states bind those states. Both the

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[12] There are four types of procedures for adoption of legislation within the EU namely – Consultations, Assent, Cooperation and Co-decision. Where most of the important decisions related to international treaties, EU enlargements and certain material decisions (such as decisions on civil rights, on the objectives of the European Central Bank or on the objectives of the Structural or Cohesion funds) are taken by the 'Assent' of the EU Parliament. The most frequently used procedure is the Co-decision procedure (created by the 1992 Treaty on European Union, and simplified and extended to other areas in the subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam and Treaty of Nice respectively) taken usually on matters of internal market, free movement of workers, education, healthcare, consumer policy, environmental policies, culture and research (EU Official Website, "Czech Presidency of the European Union, Decision Making Procedures", Last updated 16.8.2011, [Online: Web] Accessed 12 August 2014, URL: http://eu2009.cz/en/about-the-eu/eu-decision-making/decision-making-procedures-579/.

roles of the EU have been explicitly demarcated in two separate treaties. Where the first one is mentioned in the *Treaty of the European Community* (formulated in 1957 as the *Treaty of Rome* or the *Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union*), the second one is enshrined in the *Treaty on European Union* (Maastricht Treaty 1992). Both 'intergovernmentalism' and 'supranationalism' are present in the functioning of EU, and the EU works both for national interests (through intergovernmentalism) and for superanational concerns.

Since the supranational character of the EU dilutes the sovereignty of member states to some degree, this requires the organization to be democratized as compensation (for the loss of national sovereignty). Scholars have compared democracy within the EU with other liberal democratic nation-states mainly US and its federal structure. According to Thomas D. Zweifel (2004), the democracy deficit that has been found in the working of the EU is no greater than that present in any other bureaucratic structure of a liberal democratic nation state.

But counter arguments have been more prevalent since the early 1990s regarding democratic deficit within the EU with respect to representation and accountability to the European citizens. "The negative outcomes of successive referenda on EU treaties, and the decline in support for European integration and trust in EU institutions documented by opinion polls and voter turnout at European Parliament elections, are all seen as signs of public apathy and growing estrangement" (Emmanouilidis and Stratulat 2010: 1). Even the 2016 referendum in Britain, over membership of the EU, provides a doubt on the working of the EU with growing concerns over EU's handing of issues like economic crises and migration. All this provides a blow to EU's democracy promotion objective as it is linked to EU's development as a regional organization on the whole.

Table 4.1: European Parliament election turnout (%) by country 1979 – 2014

Member states	1979	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
Belgium	91.36	92.09	90.73	90.66	91.05	90.81	90.39	90
Denmark	47.82	52.38	46.17	52.92	50.46	47.89	59.54	56.4
Germany	65.73	56.76	62.28	60.02	45.19	43	43.27	47.9
Ireland	63.61	47.56	68.28	43.98	50.21	58.58	58.64	51.6
France	60.71	56.72	48.8	52.71	46.76	42.76	40.63	43.5
Italy	85.65	82.47	81.07	73.6	69.76	71.72	65.05	60
Luxembourg	88.91	88.79	87.39	88.55	87.27	91.35	90.76	90
Netherlands	58.12	50.88	47.48	35.69	30.02	39.26	36.75	37
United Kingdom	32.35	32.57	36.37	36.43	24	38.52	34.7	34.19
Greece		80.59	80.03	73.18	70.25	63.22	52.61	58.2
Spain			54.71	59.14	63.05	45.14	44.87	45.9
Portugal			51.1	35.54	39.93	38.6	36.77	34.5
Sweden					38.84	37.85	45.53	48.8
Austria					49.4	42.43	45.97	45.7
Finland					30.14	39.43	38.6	40.9
Czech Republic						28.3	28.2	19.5
Estonia						26.83	43.9	36.44
Cyprus						72.5	59.4	43.97
Lithuania						48.38	20.98	44.91
Latvia						41.34	53.7	30.04
Hungary						38.5	36.31	28.92
Malta						82.39	78.79	74.81
Poland						20.87	24.53	22.7
Slovenia						28.35	28.37	20.96
Slovakia						16.97	19.64	13
Bulgaria							38.99	35.5
Romania							27.67	32.16
Croatia								25.06
Average EU turnout	61.99	58.98	58.41	56.67	49.51	45.47	43	43.09

Source: UK Political Info, "European Parliament Election Turnout 1979-2014", [Online: Web] Accessed 17 August 2014, URL: http://www.ukpolitical.info /european-parliament-election-turnout.htm

Table 4.1 shows a downward trend in the country-wise voters' turnout for the European parliament. This indicates a decrease in the legitimacy of the EU through the periodic elections of the European Parliament.

Countries like Belgium and Luxembourg have scored around 90% keeping their voters' turnout stable since 1979. In the 2014 elections for the European Parliament, powerful players like Germany, France, and Britain all showed slight improvements than the last election of 2009. But the broad picture shows that only 35% of the member states have experienced a meagre increase in voters' turnout in 2014 showing otherwise a general decrease in public interest and increasing discontent with the European parliament as a representative body of the EU.

Some are of the opinion that the general decrease in voters' turnout long visible in countries like Britain and the Netherlands (which are developed democracies and are also traditional members of EU) is due to their sceptical approach towards the integration of Europe (Lister and Pia 2008: 88). The domestic and national political considerations of these states have an overpowering influence that can sometimes make the EU's popularity appear shallow. Also the combined strength of political parties that are sceptical of European integration in the EU parliament has approximately gone up from 9% in 2009 to 11-14% in 2014 (Lochocki 2014). This rise in 'Euroscepticism' in recent years is evident of the lack of trust in the EU's ideals working towards a unified Europe.[13]

The Treaty of Lisbon 2009 tried to bring about greater democratic features in the working of the EU by introducing the citizen's initiative for direct popular inputs to the EU law making process through the introduction of 'Yellow card' and 'Orange card', thereby increasing the involvement of national parliaments.[14]

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[13] 'Euroscepticism' has been simply defined by the web as a feeling of 'Anti-EUism' traditionally flourished by the notion that regional integration weakens the nation-state structure. This feeling was prominent in countries like Britain (the fore-runner of Euroscepticism, since the time of its joining the EU in 1973), Denmark and Sweden (The Economist 2016).

[14] Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty 2009 introduced the subsidiarity scrutiny mechanisms by giving the yellow card and orange card privilege to the national parliaments under which they can influence and temporarily block the draft law of the European Commission if a certain majority is reached within a set time frame. The Yellow card has been used twice since introduction, first in May 2012 for the legislative proposal on 'Right to

Graph 4.1: Public opinion on positive image about working of the EU

Graph Showing Public Opinion on Positive Image of the EU

Country	Percentage
Republic of Cyprus	24%
Greece	25%
Austria	29%
United Kingdom	32%
Spain	34%
France	37%
Slovenia	37%
Czech Republic	37%
Finland	37%
Slovakia	38%
Italy	38%
Denmark	39%
Latvia	39%
Sweden	42%
Portugal	42%
The Netherlands	42%
Belgium	43%
Hungary	43%
Germany	45%
Croatia	47%
Estonia	49%
Malta	51%
Luxembourg	52%
Poland	53%
Bulgaria	55%
Lithuania	55%
Ireland	57%
Romania	62%

Source: The graph is made by the author, with the help of the data available in the report of Standard Eurobarometer (2015) "Public Opinion in the European Union: First Results", *Standard Eurobarometer 83*, Spring 2015, [Online: Web] Accessed 22 May 2016, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf

The Lisbon treaty also laid out greater democratization in legislative procedures by making the 'Co-decision Procedure' (adopted by the Maastricht Treaty 1992) the ordinary legislative procedure of the EU. The parliament under this procedure now equals the power of the Council in terms of legislations, and the area within which the co-decision procedure applies has been increased (Article 294 of the Treaty of the Functioning of

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Strike' (Monti II) and second, in November 2012 proposal on establishing a 'European Public Prosecutor's Office' (EPRS 2014).

the EU) (Eurofound, Official Website Europa).[15] These measures were taken so as to improve the EU's credibility and legitimacy through greater peoples' participation but what is being adopted at the institutional level is lacking in impact or its effectuation is weak, as is apparent from the 2014 polls for the members of the European Parliament (see Table 4.1).

The data from the Eurobarometer Report reflects an overall 41% of the Public opinion in favour of a positive image for the EU. This is actually an improvement over the reports of 2014 and 2013 (Standard Eurobarometer 2015: 7). But the larger trend reflected in the graph 4.1 is that, 13 countries out of 28 have less than 40% of their population in favour of a positive image of the EU (which means, the rest approximately 60% of the population, either have a negative or a neutral opinion on working of the EU). Also the countries that are low on their positive opinion are the ones that are facing economic crises like Greece and Cyprus or are under the category of Eurosceptics like Britain and Denmark. The graph shows an overall trend of how member states of the EU nationally perceive the working of the organization, a point essential to be assessed, for sustenance of the EU.

The overall picture is that the state of democracy as a principle of working of the European Union has now become a question of concern as more and more member states are losing their faith in its working. The trend is not new as the fifteen members that were part of the EU before its enlargement in 2004 were also sceptical about the growing size of the EU. Nearly 70% of the then fifteen members worried more about the cost that will be incurred due to enlargement and its impact on their national political and economic health, reflecting a loss of faith on the European integration drive of the organization (Batt 2003: 2). The decline in EU's popularity amongst its member states might lead to decline in EU's popularity amongst the candidate states and potential candidate states as

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[15] Eurofound, "Co—decision Procedure", last Updated 7 February 2012, [Online: Web] Accessed 9 August 2014, URL: http://www.eurofound.europa. eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/codecisionprocedure.htm

well. And this might then overall impact upon democracy promotion capabilities of the EU through its enlargement process.

Economic factors also explain the sudden decline in the voters' turnouts of Greece and Portugal (mentioned in Table 4.1). The 2008 financial crisis of the EU countries showed that the peripheral economies, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland have run into big deficits, due to less tax revenue and greater unemployment benefit payments (BBC News 2013). The litmus test of this crisis has been Greece which drew attention not only for economic reasons but also due to the growing pressure upon the country's democracy, sovereignty and solidarity because of popular discontent among the masses. It was in late 2009 that the Greek crisis became visible, when the referendum conducted by the Greek government in July 2015 showed a 61% 'No' to the austerity cuts of the 'Troika' (for the loan given by the three institutions – the EU, the International Monetary Fund and the European Common Bank). This has been assessed by many scholars and policymakers as a blow to the EU's structure of development and integration itself and also a possible Greeks walkout from the Eurozone (the common currency aspect of the EU) (Sliglitz 2015). Whether the Brexit will be a boost for Greece to follow the same path, (as public opinion of Greece is in decline for a positive image of the EU, see Graph 4.1) will be quite futuristic to assess.

However, opinion over the Greek referendum question – 'whether Greece should accept the austerity measures and reform cuts that comes as conditionality with the funds offered by the Troika' is divided amongst many eminent economists of the world. Some like Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, Thomas Piketty and Jeffrey Sachs in different posts have answered 'No' for the referendum question whereas economists Christopher Pissarides, Vicky Pryce and almost 250 professors at economic schools and universities in Greece urged for a 'Yes' as an answer (Allen 2015). For now, Greece is complying with the Troika's demands after accepting the bailout money, along with facing resentment from public for applying the austerity measures to pay a loan of about Euro 300 billion,

which is 180% of its annual economic output (BBC News 2016; Smith 2016).

It become apparent that the Greek incident led to a clash of interests between the EU's democratic principles and economic interests for which the organization was initially formed. If EU's economic policies toward Greece are not acceptable to the Greek population (in majority) then this might lower the EU's credibility further as an economically liberal and democratic organization. This would also enable Russia to extend support to Greece (like Russia's Euro 2.5 Billion emergency loan offered to Cyprus failing economy in 2011 for five years) which strategically might be unacceptable to the EU. On the other hand, if EU accepts further concessions for Greece, that would mean an opening for other nations such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland to follow suit, which is not economically viable solution for the entire Eurozone group. The EU, after the Greek incident, has to not only restore its own house economically (to stabilize the Eurozone) but also has to reinstate the faith of the European people to sustain as a democratic setup.

This is more of a concern with respect to the Central and Eastern European states that have joined the organization lately. The economic crises made the old member states (members of EU before 2004), except for Finland and Sweden take measures like restrictions on labour markets from countries that joined the EU in 2004 and later, such as Bulgaria and Romania (Zahn 2013: 5).

Thus, a discrepancy exists between the objectives of the EU as an organization endeavouring regional development of Europe beyond the level of nation states and the individual national interest of the members. EU is a global actor which promotes greater democracy with its enlargement process and other aid mechanisms. Therefore, EU also has to keep a check on the democratic deficit at home so as to maintain its credibility as democracy promoter for new member states, for neighbouring states and for other regions of the world.

4.3 EU's Mechanisms for Democracy Promotion Within the European Region

This section deals particularly with the period after the 1990s, as the space created by the end of communism within the European region was an apt occasion for the EU to demonstrate its democracy promoting capabilities. The scope of this section is limited to those mechanisms of the EU that were helpful in promoting democracy in the current member states of the EU and those that are currently undergoing the accession process. One of the architects of the EU, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in his renowned Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 had stated that,

> "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity." (The Schuman Declaration 1950).

The EU of today, a union of twenty-eight member states has undergone different stages of enlargement (See Map in Annexure III). The first step towards enlargement happened almost twenty years after the creation of the ECSC (1952). It was in 1973 that Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom acceded to the then *European Economic Community* (EEC).[16] The inclusion of these matured democracies gave considerable strength to the democratic membership of the EC even without any mandatory membership criteria for inclusion of democratic states only. Since 1973, the *Community* produced a number of declarations to instil the principles of human rights and democratic values within the functioning of the *Community* (European Commission 1991). On 14 December 1973, the

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[16] In the context of the Britain, twice the membership has been rejected in 1963 and in 1967 due to vetoing of French President, Charles de Gaulle. The British application for membership happened due to economic factors (with no democratic values as a base) influenced by the economic crisis and the consequent devaluation of Pound-Sterling in late 1970s. For an official account on what happened between the two nations for the membership of the European Economic Community, refer to, Stephen Wall (2013), *The Official history of Britain and the European Community: Volume II – from Rejection to Referendum, 1963-1975*, Abingdon: Routledge. Britain's relation with the EU, till today, is widely seen as based upon economic factors, with no great ideological attachment for European integration. Therefore, the exit of Britain from the EU is often acknowledged in economic terms, ignoring the impact of exiting of this big democracy on the democracy drive of the EU for other member and candidate states.

then nine member states formulated the *Document on the European Identity* to better define their relationship with other nations and to further define their responsibility and place in world affairs. The nine states pledged to:

> ...defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity (Declaration on European Identity 1973).

This became a milestone to carry forward the enlargement process of the EU on common values shared by the community. Greece entered the community in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 (See map in Annexure III), but only after transformation from an authoritarian state structure to that of a democratic one (Herrmann 2004: 82). EU, at this time (during the 1980s), as the European Economic Community (EEC) was seen as:

> ...a reference point towards which countries should turn for firm support for political change, becoming a key element of the emerging democratic culture and serving to bind the political class together in its aim of restoring democracy, in spite of the fact that it was not without its tensions and difficulties (Pereira 2012: 2).

Despite this democratic spirit prevailing with the EEC, 'democratic government' was not an official criterion for being the member of the EEC as yet; therefore, more credit can be given to internal factors operating in Spain, Portugal and Greece for their democratic transitions. For example, a rise in educated middle class and urban working class in Spain (in 1960s) proves that greater economic development leads to establishment of a democratic society (Linz and Stepan 1996: 112).

The collapse of the Communist regimes in the Central and Eastern European States (CEES) after the end of the Cold War opened new prospects for the European Community to engage with its immediate neighbours and use the opportunity to complete the dream of uniting Europe. The integration with core Western institutions like NATO and the then European Community was also a desire on the part of many CEES (specially the Visegrad states – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – Romania, Bulgaria, Baltic states and Slovenia) due to economic

benefits that can be garnered by being member of EEC and to get secure shelter from turbulent situations of war in Yugoslavia and the coup in Moscow in the early 1990s (Ludlow 2013: 14-15; Cottey and Averre 2002: 10). Enlargement was therefore a mechanism to achieve greater security not only for the CEES but also for the European Community on its Eastern frontier.

On the one hand, the alignment of these states demanded a lot of measures to be taken before their inclusion as member states in the Community. On the other hand, EU at that time could not afford to include these states due to a resource crunch and a lack of mandate to consolidate democracy in the newly emerged CEES. Simultaneously, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as a supporter of EU was also interested in restoring order in the post communist Europe along with an assertion of American supremacy. The time EU was preparing for acquiring greater capability for accession of these states within the community, NATO supported by offering *North Atlantic Cooperation Council* (later known as Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) in 1991 to the post-communist states for initial level dialogues and assistance.[17]

Finally, in the 1992 – *Maastricht Treaty*, the EU came up with a mechanism for enlargement and democracy was firmly established as a mandatory requirement for the membership of the EU. Till now what was an understated rule of the EEC, became the most significant membership rule to be ever pursued by any international organization. The *Maastricht Treaty* signified a new wave in the process of European integration. Also known as the *Treaty on European Union* (TEU), the treaty transformed the 'European Economic Commission' into the 'European Union' (EU) comprising three pillars – *European Community* (EC), the *Common*

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[17] For further understanding about working and implications of the NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a post Cold War security institution for the Central and Eastern European States, see Trine B. Flockhart (1996), "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council: New Chapter in European Security or Dead End for Diplomatic Ambitions" in Jaap de Wilde (ed.) *Organized Anarchy in Europe: The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations*, London: Tauris Academic Studies, pp. 147-162.

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and *Justice and Home Affairs* (JHA) – indicating both economic and political union of the member states. For the first time, the treaty explicitly mentioned the membership criteria, stating that those states which respect the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – commonly cherished by the member states – can apply for membership (see Annexure VI on joining the EU).[18]

From the time membership is applied for in the EU, the candidate country has to prove its allegiance to the above mentioned norms by following the 'Copenhagen Criteria'. In 1993, a set of rules were adopted in the Copenhagen Summit of the European Council which made explicit the EU's promotion of democracy for its member states through a rigorous pre-accession process. The essential conditions mentioned in the *Copenhagen Criteria* or *Accession Criteria* for the prospective member states are:

> Firstly, 'Political' stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; secondly, 'economic' existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and lastly, acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Enlargement 2012).

Much of the democracy promotion efforts of the EU in the early phase of the 1990s was top down in approach, concentrating only on implementation of the *acquis communautaire* which includes "EU's treaties and laws, declarations and resolutions, international agreements on EU

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[18] Mentioned in Article 49 of the 'Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union' [Online: Web] URL: http://www.basiclaw.net/Appendices/ eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf. *Article* 6 of the treaty mentions the founding principles of EU as "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law", Article 49 mention the membership criterion, and Article 7 of the treaty introduces mechanisms to punish serious and persistent violations of human rights by EU member states. The three Articles are the cornerstone of democracy promotion by the EU (see Annexure VI).

affairs and the judgments given by the Court of Justice" (Eurojargon Official Website).**¹⁹** A candidate state for accession to the Community has to adopt thousands of European Laws into its national legislation. Concentration upon implementation of the *acquis* made the European monitoring regimes focus only upon capacity building of the state mechanisms, ignoring improvement and encouragement of other democratic actors of the state which are more connected with the masses like civic groups, political parties or even elections (Kopstein 2006: 90). This push towards institutional set up of democratic structures in accession countries was promotional of the procedural aspect of democracy, whereas substantive aspects of building public awareness (through mechanisms like contacts with civil society and NGOs working in this area) upon democratic principles of justice, equality and good governance were ignored. Democracy promoted in the first half of the 1990s, among newly liberated states of CEES was a mere reflection of EU's interest of creating liberal democracies for economic purposes, for security on the Eastern front and as a symbol of triumph against communist state structure.

In 1995, for the first time, membership criteria were applied in the fourth enlargement of the EU for the inclusion of Austria, Finland and Sweden. The quickest ever inclusion into the EU occurred for these three countries as their foreign policies were neutral and democracy existed (Laar 2010: 209). From 1987-1996, thirteen countries filed their application for

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¹⁹ EU member states are bound by the *acquis* which is the body of common rights and obligations, constantly evolving and includes: the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU; declarations and resolutions adopted by the EU; measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; measures relating to justice and home affairs; international agreements concluded by the EU and those concluded by the EU countries between themselves in the field of the EU's activities. Joining EU means that the applicant country needs to accept the 35 Chapters present in the *acquis* (see Annexure VII) (EUR-Lex, Access to European Union Law, Glossary of Summaries, [Online: Web] Accessed 1 February 2015, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/acquis.html).

EU membership.[20] Seeing the difference in their capabilities the *Luxembourg European Council* of 1997 launched the EU enlargement process with a reference point that the enlargement:

> ... is a comprehensive, inclusive and ongoing process, which will take place in stages; each of the applicant state would proceed at its own rate, depending on its degree of preparedness (Luxembourg European Council 1997).

This has been included in the accession process and going by this principle the financial and technical aid under the accession process varies from country to country.

The EU, for making Europe a monetary whole, had agreements with countries before the 1990s as well, like the *Association Agreement* signed by Turkey in 1963, Malta in 1970 and Cyprus in 1972. After the inclusion of membership criteria the *Europe Agreement* (similar to the *Association Agreement*) was signed by eleven Central and Eastern European States: Hungary and Poland in 1991; Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria in 1993; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1995; and Slovenia in 1996 (EU-Lex 2007: 1). The difference between the two is that the latter involves legal bilateral relations between the EU and the applicant CEES covering trade-related issues, political dialogue, legal approximation and other areas of co-operation including industry, environment, transport and customs. Whereas, in the former case the agreement is of a similar kind but aims to achieve a custom union rather than a political union (Enlargement 2001: 5-6).

EU's 'carrot and stick' policy (visible in the process of EU's accession) starts with the signing of Association Agreement, after which countries are given the 'carrot' of financial and technical assistance for developing their institutions, infrastructure and economies. And the 'stick' in this procedure is that these countries have to abide by the Community's rules and regulations through its pre-accession strategy. Also the 'stick' of taking away their candidate status is always available with the EU.

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[20] Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.

Hungary and Poland were amongst the first to send their application for accession (in 1994), as accession is a time-bound and a condition-bound process. In 1994, the Essen European Council offered three main elements of the pre-accession strategy: implementation of the European Agreements, the various programmes of financial assistance and a 'structured dialogue' for all the member states and candidate states to discuss issues of common interest (Enlargement 2001: 10). Before 2007, this accession strategy was carried out by various EU assistance programmes and financial instruments:

- PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) started in 1989 for Poland and Hungary but after 1994 was expanded to the ten other candidate states as PHARE CBC (Cross Border Cooperation Programme).[21]

- ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-Accession).

- SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development).

- CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation).

- Turkey Pre-Accession Regulations.

Early activities of PHARE were principally 'demand driven' because the high stakes for candidate states ensured their interest in these programme. This resulted in inconsistency between the strength of the programme and the increasing number of priorities and small projects, disadvantageous for the overall development of proper democratic structuring of the post-communist societies (Enlargement 1998).[22]

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[21] From 1990-1993 the PHARE programme was only engaged in activities that were directly related to sectors creating market economies. From 1992 onwards funds were also allocated to cross-border cooperation (Enlargement 1998). Promotion of democracy was no where desired as an objective.

[22] In 2007, the *Instrument of Pre-accession Assistance* (IPA) became the umbrella programme for all these programmes of assistance. The IPA consists of

With the *Amsterdam Treaty* of 1997, democratic changes were brought about in the *Treaty on the European Union* (Maastricht Treaty, 1992), including the increasing of the role of the European Parliament for greater democracy within the EU institutions; along with demands for greater advancement in the accession process; and the idea of 'citizenship' and that of a 'common foreign and security policy' (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). In 1998, the European Parliament anticipated far-reaching democratization of the PHARE programme and called for a proposal from the Commission whereby, "as from 1999 financial year, at least one PHARE country would assume full responsibility for the implementation of its national PHARE programme, subject to regular – including ex-post – checks by the Commission" (Enlargement 1998). Accountability was now added among the candidate states as the first step towards substantial democracy promotion. Perhaps because of these efforts, from 1998 onwards, around 30% of PHARE assistance has been channelled towards institution building, which includes strengthening of democratic institutions and public administration (Enlargement 1998). At the country level each candidate state had drew up a 'National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis'* (NPAA), a time-frame to achieve priorities and objective.

In 1999, out of thirteen candidate states, only four were given political assistance (Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Slovenia) related to mainly institutional development and administrative capacity. The rest of the countries were engaged in the fulfilment of the economic criteria mentioned in the 1993 Copenhagen European Council (Enlargement 2001: 12). The Eurobarometer's (Public opinion in the European Union) 25th anniversary report 1999, observes that 94% of the European public (citizens of EU member states) wants that new countries should join the EU

different components – assistance for transition and institution building; cross-border cooperation; regional development (mainly infrastructural development); human resources and rural development (EU Official Website). The component of transition and institution building had the largest share in the pie of IPA funds and its activities were more driven by immediate needs of the candidate states for transition economies and institutional reforms.

only if they respect human rights and principles of democracy (Eurobarometer 1999). This makes apparent that the EU was stringent in its economic development aspect more than its desire for promotion of democracy and inclusion of more democratic states. This also shows that the principle of democracy is now a people supported norm and EU has been entrusted with its maintenance in the region.

But what sort of democracy? Does the EU have a specific definition of democracy? In the last decade of the twentieth century, these considerations were not central to the mechanisms of democracy promotion, which was predominantly driven by the post-Cold War imperatives such as the end of communism and emergence of new states, along with the vision of stabilizing Europe both economically and politically. However, these considerations are now devalued to some extent and the situation seems to be changing in the new millennium. EU's role in democracy promotion has enhanced with not just focusing on institutional changes (procedural democracy promotion) but also adopting new mechanisms of societal interactions (substantive democracy promotion).

4.4 European Union and Democracy Promotion in the New Millennium

EU is not the sole actor engaged in the promotion of democracy within Europe; the US is active as well. Other regional entities in Europe also work towards enhancing democracy like the *Council of Europe*, *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe* (OSCE) and NATO (they have a huge sphere of influence beyond the CEES, including other regions as well). State led development agencies are also contributing, such as *Britain's Department for International Development*, *Germany's Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development*, the *Swedish International Development Agency* and many more. Explicit assumptions can therefore be made that democracy promoting efforts of one actor interfere with those of the other actors (explained in Chapter 5). In other words, focusing on the democratization of the CEES will demand not just analysis of the policies of the EU, but also a combined study of the policy

outcomes of the above mentioned democracy promoting actors (explicitly mentioned in Chapter 5).

Most studies related to democratization of the Central and Eastern European States focus on the efforts of the EU (Pridham and Tatu 1994; Vachudova 2005; Baracani 2008). EU stands out because of its coherent yet complex system of enlargement which has made democracy promotion a reality using the soft power of negotiations and conditionality. The 2004 inclusion of ten member states within the EU is the point of reference for the above claim. Each candidate country must go through a rigorous process of *formal membership negotiations* which involves stages of *screening* and *negotiating positions* (see Annexure VI). The former involves detailed examination of each policy field to determine how well the country is prepared, whereas, the latter involves setting benchmarks which the candidate country needs to achieve.[23]

The new millennium added new strategies and new dimensions to the pre-accession process. The phenomenon of *widening* and *deepening* became visible in EU's approach towards democracy promotion in the 21st century.[24] *Widening* was visible in the EU's sphere of influence as the prospects of EU membership were extended to the Western Balkans (after disintegration of Yugoslavia) by the *Feira* European Council in June 2000 later confirmed by the Thessaloniki European Council in 2003. The Council provides for the adoption of the *Stabilisation and Association Process* (SAP), specially for the Balkan states (Albania, Croatia, former

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[23] Official Website of the European Commission, "Steps Towards Joining", Enlargement, Enlargement Policy, last updated 27/6/2013, [online: Web] URL: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index _en.htm

[24] The debates regarding widening and deepening were associated with the EU, since its beginning, but specifically with the enlargement process of the EU. "The EU has progressed since its creation in 1958 through a mixture of widening and deepening, in other words it has taken step towards closer integration at the same time as it has enlarged" (Cameron 2004:1). Here, in this study, widening and deepening have been used in relation to EU's functioning towards democracy promotion. The EU has spread democracy amongst various member states, candidate states and its neighbourhood (widening), along with attaching new mechanisms to deepen democracy promotion within those countries.

Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) aiming at stabilization and transition to market economy, promotion of regional cooperation and the prospect of EU accession.[25] The Balkan states were added to the scope of EU's democracy promotion under a new category apart from the candidate states. They are called the *Potential Candidates,* reflecting the greater efforts required by these states to attain EU's membership (See the Map of Europe in Annexure II). EU process of enlargement has a quality of constantly reinventing itself. The principles and prospects are added and changed time and again to reflect the changes occurring in the social, political, economic, geopolitical and geostrategic aspects of the European continent.

Another important step introduced for *widening* was the policy of *Agenda 2000: for a Stronger and Wider Union* which led to the transformation of the PHARE programme from a grant giving mechanism to a fund allocating instrument co-financed by other international institutions like the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EU was expanding not just among clients but also amongst other donor organizations.

In 2001, to indicate EU's growing capabilities of democracy promotion through development aid, the EU and its member states combined, spent around $ 900 million for democracy programmes as compared to $ 633 million spent by USAID for democracy assistance during the same year (Börzel and Risse 2004: 1). In 2002 at the Copenhagen summit, the European Council reached the decision that ten candidate countries (excluding Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania) should join as members in May 2004. This inclusion was not only a political and economic boost for the advancement of EU but also a normative thrust to the strategic position of the Union in world politics. The 9/11 incident was

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[25] Official Website of the European Commission, "Other (non-candidate) Western Balkan Countries", Economic and Financial Affairs, last updated 19/11/2013, [Online: Web] URL: http://ec.europa.eu/economy _finance/international/non_eu/western-balkan/index_en.htm

a major turning point specially for furthering cooperation with CEES in areas of security and counter-terrorism by "...comprehensive attainment of internal security objective and its projection externally" (Norman 2006: 219).

The inclusion of the ten new member states of EU in the European Council of Brussels (2004) – Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta – was an unprecedented success. The impact of American direct democracy promotion in Iraq using military means in 2003 and the EU extension of 2004 is often compared by analysts of democracy promotion to demarcate two separate kinds of approaches to democracy (Magen et al. 2009; Wolff 2013). The EU attempts at promoting democracy are acceptable because of its democratic means of aid and negotiations as compared to the US direct actions. This is quite similar to Robert Kagan's analogy over methods of fighting terrorism, both of the US and of the EU as two different approaches, one from 'Mars' and the other from 'Venus' respectively (Kagan 2003). Even in cases of democracy promotion, "The US invades other countries to further democracy, while the EU nurtures and engages them" (Börzel and Risse 2009: 35). Though the 'ends' of both the US and the EU are same, as furthering of democratic values in non-democratic states, their 'means' are different. The normative aspects and the 'soft power' (Nye 2004) mechanisms of the EU have been referred as 'civilian power' (power that relies more on economic power than military strength) by François Duchêne as early as 1972. Regarding the European Community of the 1970s, he says that:

> Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the 20th-century citizen's notion of civilised politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world's civilian centres of power (Duchêne 1972: 43).

This ideational power of the EU focuses more on capacity building and cooperative mechanisms of influencing democracy promotion within Europe. Coercive mechanisms and negative conditionality (like economic

and political sanctions as taken against Russia for aggression in Crimea in 2014) is rather used reluctantly.[26] Though individual member states do use military capabilities whenever required in their capacities as global players (Example: British full military support to the US for democracy promotion in Iraq in 2003)

In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania acceded as members of the EU followed by Croatia in 2013. Currently, there are currently four *candidate countries* for EU accession – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey (Iceland opted out of candidate state status in March 2015), whereas, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are *potential candidates* (see the map of Europe in Annexure II).

The *widening* of the EU was also accompanied by the *deepening* of the functioning of EU with a change of approach towards bottom-up mechanisms of EU democracy promotion. Often EU has been critiqued for taking a top-down intergovernmentalist approach for its democratic reforms in the CEES. But of late, EU has improved its mechanisms so as to have a fuller construction of democracy amongst candidates and potential candidates. The *Open Method of Coordination* (OMC) (term coined in the Lisbon Summit 2000) is one such mechanism, described as a form of EU 'soft law' (not directives, decisions and regulations).

Though the OMC was introduced much earlier in the 1997 *Treaty of Amsterdam* specifically related to employment policies (European Employment Strategy Article 125-130), its scope was widened in the early 2000s to include areas such as research and development, social protection, social inclusion, enterprise policy, immigration, education, youth and training. The OMC provides greater cooperation between member states because it is an intergovernmental cooperative method whereby member

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[26] Coercive power of the EU is reflected in the 'Common Security and Defence Policy' which provides the 'Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets' (Lisbon Treaty 2009: 34). Operations carried under CSDP do not have peace enforcement mandate and are therefore distinct from NATO's operations such as the one carried out in Libya in 2011. The CSDP operations are more like UN operations, i.e. third party interventions that are not supposed to take sides (Tardy 2015: 23).

states are evaluated by one other (peer review) with the EU's role limited to surveillance by the European Commission. One example is the *Community Action Programme* to combat discrimination, adopted in November 2000 (Decision 2000/750/EC) for the period 2001-2005 (Eurofound).

OMC is a substantive democracy promoting mechanism of the EU as it coordinates decision making at the local, national and at the EU level with its appeal to democratic participatory governance. The unique selling point in case of OMC is that it "... relies on local deliberation, addresses the democratic deficit by not relying on centralised expert deliberation but with local stakeholders" (Szyszczak 2006: 501). A shift is evident from a focus on economic aid and conditionality to an emphasis on political and social reforms as well as good governance.

Efforts at *deepening* also happened with the UN General Assembly Resolution of 2005, "*Enhancing the Role of Regional, Subregional and other Organizations and Arrangement in Promoting and Consolidating Democracy*" (Annexure V) which declares the essential elements of democracy as internationally understood and also recognizes:

> ... importance of all actions taken at the regional and subregional levels that are aimed at facilitating the establishment, development and consolidation of democratic institutions, based on democratic values and principles and capable of responding to the specific needs of the countries in each region (Annexure V).

Often used as the reference point by many regional organizations the resolution provides the definition of democracy and its constituent elements.[27] European Union also acknowledges the notion of democracy

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[27] The essential elements of democracy mentioned in the resolution are, "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association and peaceful assembly and of expression and opinion, and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic free elections by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the people, as well as a pluralistic system of political parties and organisations, respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, transparency and accountability in public administration, and free, independent and pluralistic media;" (Annexure V).

emerging from this UN Resolution in consonance with its objective of effective multilateralism and rule based international order (Democracy Revisited 2009: 29). Lately, EU has become more emphatic of its stand on traditional principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law by adopting the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* in 2000 and then strengthening it further by attaching a 'legally binding' clause to it in the Lisbon Treaty (2009). In June 2012, the EU adopted the *EU Strategic Framework and the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy*, which says that the EU will promote human rights and democracy in all areas of its external action without any exception. The framework also says that:

> Within their own frontiers, the EU and its Member States are committed to be exemplary in ensuring respect for human rights. Outside their frontiers, promoting and speaking out on human rights and democracy is a joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States (Council of the European Union 2012: 2).

Democracy as practiced by the EU today is not the same as and when it was established (Schimmelfennig 2009: 2). Assessing the EU's functioning in the first decade of the 21st century would reveal that the EU has become more emphatic of its normative stand on democracy promotion both in its work and words. This is not a deflection from the original economic cooperation aspirations of the EU; rather an integrated approach to make EU a 'normative power' (Manners 2002: 235). The functioning of the EU for the process of enlargement and the normative aspects of EU's democracy promotion for a peaceful and integrated Europe now seem to become mutually dependent on each other. This also has an impact on EU's position in the world. In the *Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council* of 11 March 2014, it was stated that:

> The enlargement process reinforces peace, democracy and stability in Europe and allows the Union to be better positioned to address global challenges. The transformative power of the enlargement process generates far reaching political and economic reform in the enlargement countries which also benefits the Union as a whole (EU 2014b: 11).

These developments can also be attributed to a general increase in the level of democracy promotion sentiments around the world after 9/11, wherein Western liberal democracies – specially the US and Western European states – are making every effort towards the promotion of democracy. The Western European countries have always stood in solidarity with the US for democracy but have charted their own ways of democracy promotion. The change in attitude for more public oriented measures of democracy promotion; the adoption of more bottom-up approaches for consolidated democratization; developing linkages between democracy and every other policy issue of the organization – whether social, economic, cultural, security; and focusing on procedural as well as substantive aspects of democracy promotion are some of the newly added components of the EU's vision of a unified democratic Europe.

4.5 Debates around Enlargement and Impact over Promotion of Democracy

The Importance of EU has grown over the years, for the European region, resulting from enlargement and the resultant transformation of post-communist countries of Europe to democratic systems.[28]

> The EU's transformation from an exclusively West European organization into the centre of gravity of pan-European institution-building makes it a dominant locus of domestic policy making and transnational relations for the entire region (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 500-501).

But building an argument by merely stating that EU's Enlargement policy and its inclusions after 2004 proves to be the most successful policy tool for the promotion of democracy is not an optimal way of carrying the discussion. This is simply because success of democracy cannot be measured accurately. The US based *National Endowment for Democracy* (an important actor in democracy promotion) also believes that it is "an

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[28] Enlargement has been defined by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) as "…a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms". The process by which EU has been expanding including new member-states and bringing them under the mandates of the organization.

overwhelming, if not impossible, task" to measure the efforts of democracy promotion projects and their affect on democratization (Epstein 2007:17).

The difficulty also lies in the fact that those at the receiving end of the democracy promoting programme can be many intangible entities having different thresholds of democratic functioning like national governments, political parties, NGOs, media, and the general population. Assessing each will be a difficult task as no set standards are there to measure. It is therefore impossible to assess the democracy promoting efforts of the EU. A structural account of the EU for the promotion of democracy does not explain the variations that are involved in various cases. For the purpose of research one can look into the pros and cons of enlargement policy, its current trends and to some level then assess its visible impacts upon promotion of democracy among the current and the prospective members of the EU.

EU traditionally has remained an attraction for non member states of the European region both due to its ideological project of a peaceful and unified Europe and due to the economic advantages resulting from the single market mechanism and structural funding allocated under various schemes. Till date only Morocco's request for membership has been rejected (as it cannot be considered European); the remaining twenty-two applications have been accepted inspite of the scepticism over each enlargement process (Ludlow 2013). With regard to the newly added member states of the EU (post 2004) satisfactory results have not been reaped. As studied by Ehrke, the newly added member states of EU faces problems like:

> The acceptance by the population of its own democratic system is weak, as regularly demonstrated by surveys and most indicators of political participation (election turn-outs, party memberships, citizens' initiatives, NGOs and social advocacy organisations) (Ehrke 2007:4).

The Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that were added in 2004, within the EU were transitioned through a long drawn process, from centrally planned economies to free market economies and from

authoritarian state structures to that of a democratic one. The accession process of Slovakia is of particular interest, as it was the only country among the other CEES (included in 2004) with which EU suspended its accession talks in 1997/98 due to lack of democratic advancements.

After the separation of Slovakia from Czech Republic (breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993) an illiberal nationalist government under Vladimír Mečiar remained in power in Slovakia from 1992-1998. The government under Mečiar ruled non-democratically by breaking constitutional laws, curbing media and disregarding decisions of constitutional courts. Economically, Slovakia was progressive than many other CEECs, but this did not hide the prevalent domestic political polarization in Slovakia (Malová and Rybář 2003: 105). As a consequence, Slovakia's accession to OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) was postponed in 1996. European Commission also pointed out a list of democratic and human rights deficits in the functioning of Slovakian government and left out Slovakia as the only CEEC (amongst the applicant states) that did not fulfilled the Copenhagen political conditions in 1997 (for Copenhagen political conditions, see Annexure VI). EU offered a democratic assistance mechanism for Slovakia in which more civil society groups were supported which resulted in electoral change in the government of Slovakia in 1998 with Mikuláš Dzurinda coming to power (Demeš 2010: 6).

The new government functioned well to restore the rule of law so as to gain back confidence of the EU. A new system of check and balances within the government to restore democratic functioning was introduced, with creation of ombudsman for human rights and a judicial council. With the second term of Dzurinda's government in 2002 elections, a new set of economic reforms were introduced for to make Slovakia competent with other applicant CEES and to be part of the first group of countries to join the EU in 2004 (rather than having delayed membership like that of Romania and Bulgaria) (see enlargement map in Annexure III). Slovakia

also grabbed technical assistance and loans from other sources like World Bank for to bring reforms in health care and social fields (BTI 2006: 17).

> Public administration reform transferred significant jurisdictions from the state to regional level, and to self-governments, during the period of review. This improved the overall level of democracy in Slovakia. Legal reform and a bolder approach of the police helped curb corruption, further improving the quality of democracy (BTI 2006: 17).

Slovakia since then has been progressing well on the road to democracy. The case here shows that, how accession process of the EU helped a fledgling democracy, by giving aid and assistance to improve conditions, so as to grab the 'carrot' of EU membership. The 'stick' of stalling accession process (in 1997) also worked well for Slovakia, in bringing down an authoritarian rule and making people aware of lack of democratic values in their country. After the last inclusion of Croatia in 2013, there have be questions regarding further inclusions within the EU (due to outgrowth of operational capacity), nonetheless procedures for accession is still progressing with candidate states and potential candidate states.

Amongst the five current candidates of the EU membership, Montenegro and Serbia have very recently begun the negotiation process, whereas turkey has always been a sensitive case with accession talks being restarted in 2005. Macedonia due to its ongoing conflict with Greece over its name is lagging in accession efforts and Iceland has been on hold since the change of the Icelandic government in 2013 (which is apparently opposed to EU membership). In March 2015, the Icelandic government requested not to be considered as a candidate country. The government says that, Iceland is already highly integrated with the EU through membership in European Economic Area (EEA), the Schengen Area and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). This makes EU membership no more a lucrative prospect for the Eurosceptic Icelandic government (BBC News 2015).

Another indicator which does not picture greater progress of democracy in the enlargement countries is the socio-economic

developments of these countries. "All enlargement countries have largely maintained overall macroeconomic stability but fiscal risks have increased significantly in a number of them. Modest recovery is continuing" (European Commission 2014: 6). However, this recovery does not transformed into more jobs rather unemployment remained high in candidate and potential candidate states specially, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo. The potential candidate states that mainly belong to the Western Balkan region are far from being close contenders of EU membership (Archick and Morelli 2014:1).

Many debates have emerged within the EU (due to differences in opinion between France and Britain) reflecting in-house incoherence on the issue of inclusion of new member states (Sperling 1999: 184). This is not a new practice as Britain's membership itself was delayed by France. With the 2004 inclusions, EU policy makers again became worried about the strength of policy making procedures to cater to such a large region (Barnes and Barnes 2010: 433). The main argument against enlargement of the EU lies in institutional implications – the enlargement would result in lowering of the efficiency of the EU with more members leading to institutional overload; severe impacts on the consensual decision making capability of the EU; and the pressure mounted over EU budget with weaker economies being added (Bache and George 2006: 553; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 3; Sjursen and Smith 2004: 12). The 'Brexit' (exit of Britain from the EU) issue is also a case to be taken care of as this might make other member states and candidate and potential candidate states become sceptical of EU's working and might consider prospects of not being member of this integration, a thought which was a distant dream a few years back.

The interests of new member states sometimes get in clash with that of the old member states. Areas like the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural and Investment Funds have been a point of dispute amongst members as the Eastern European region has huge and unproductive

agricultural sectors and low levels of income compared to the EU average (Bache and George 2006: 5).[29] EU has also gone liberal in its inclusion of members such as Romania and Bulgaria which were not given membership in 2004 due to their slower growth than the EU accession criteria.[30] But the same states were included in the EU in 2007 even though officials of the European Commission thought that the two states were not yet ready but given a chance they might improve further (BBC News 2007).

Arguments about the pros and cons of the enlargement policies have been categorized into groups. There are scholars who are integrationist in approach and see the 2004 expansion of the EU as essentially against the greater aim of making a unified Europe because with enlargements, divisions have become apparent amongst members jeopardising the future of the organization itself (Nugent 2004: 66) (Phinnemore 2010: 39, 43). Other scholars view enlargement in a positive sense of exporting stability and gaining strength of numbers as representative of a huge population (Avery 2008: 19).

Anticipations were made before the 2004 enlargement regarding uncontrolled migration and paralysis of the structures and budgets of the EU (Koeth 2009: 59). Few problems indeed surfaced (like migration of

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[29] Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was introduced in 1962, with the insistence of France, for provision of agricultural subsidies by the EU. This made European agricultural food prices rising in the world with considerable damage to foreign farmers. In 1990s reforms were introduced in the CAP, still lower subsidies were offered to new member states in comparison to the old ones (BBC News 2013). Similarly, with the Structural and Investment Funds offered by the EU, differentiated treatment was done between old and new member states. These are a set of five funds that work together to support economic, territorial and social cohesion for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth [Eur-Lex, Europa (Official Website), URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/structural_cohesion _fund.html]. In the first year of allocation of this Fund, the new members were provided only 35% of what is given to old member states (Dezseri 2011: 355).

[30] For the 5th enlargement (2004), there were 31 Chapters of the Community *acquis* over which agreements were required from candidate states for their accession as members within the EU. Bulgaria and Romania were not included in 2004 as 7 Chapters for Bulgaria and 14 Chapters for Romania still remained open for discussion. For subsequent enlargements these chapters have been increased and currently there are 35 Chapters for current candidate states (see annexure VII).

Roma population within borderless EU) that impacted public opinion in general and the outlook of politicians of the old member states (leading to situations like Brexit) indicating a plausible decrease in the credibility of the enlargement process. But most problems are now in relation to further accession of candidate and potential candidate states of the Balkan region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo), turbulent character of which (due to internal problems of lack of rule of law and ethnic conflicts), might affect the healthy functioning of the EU (Koeth 2009: 59).

Table 4.2 shows a comparison of the democracy scores of the member states that have been part of the enlargement process since 2004, along with the democracy scores of the candidate and the potential candidate states. The table indicates that out of 17 countries listed, 10 countries have shown a decrease in their democratic score between the period 2005 and 2014.

Calculating on the basis of table 4.2 for the decade 2005-2014, improvement on the democratic score of these countries is less visible than the considerable decrease in the democratic score of a majority of these countries, with Hungary showing the highest negative change in its democratic governance which is -51% (Approx). Hungary is followed by Slovakia (-30%) and Slovenia (-14.8%). The highest increase in democratic score between the two time frames has been recorded by Albania which is 3.4%, followed by Kosovo (3.3%). The percentage decrease in the democratic score card of these states is minuscule with respect to the percentage increase.

Table 4.2: Democratic Scores of the Countries that are Newly Added
Member States, Candidate States and Potential Candidate States of the
European Union.

Democracy Score Comparison			
	2005	**2014**	**% Change**
New Member States of EU Included Post-2004			
Bulgaria (2007)	3.18	3.25	-2.20126
Croatia (2013)	3.75	3.68	1.866667
Czech Republic (2004)	2.29	2.25	1.746725
Estonia (2004)	1.96	1.96	**0**
Hungary (2004)	1.96	2.96	-51.0204
Latvia (2004)	2.14	2.07	3.271028
Lithuania (2004)	2.21	2.36	-6.78733
Poland (2004)	2	2.18	-9
Romania (2007)	3.39	3.46	-2.0649
Slovakia (2004)	2	2.61	-30.5
Slovenia (2004)	**1.68**	**1.93**	-14.881
Candidate Countries			
Albania	4.04	4.18	-3.46535
Montenegro	3.79	3.86	-1.84697
Serbia	3.75	3.64	2.933333
Macedonia	3.89	4	-2.82776
Potential Candidate Countries			
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.18	4.43	-5.98086
Kosovo	**5.32**	**5.14**	3.383459

Note: Countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and
7 the lowest level of democratic progress. Only two member states (Cyprus and
Malta) and one candidate states (Turkey) are not included in the above table
because of the lack of data on the same measuring scale used by the Freedom
House.

Source: Table made by the author from the data collected by Freedom House
"Nations in Transit" analysis of 2005 and 2014 which focuses specifically on
democratic governance in the post-communist world, available online URL:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#.VBdeMRZN-AE

Amongst the current candidate states of the EU the most
controversial has been Turkey. According to the *Transatlantic Trends Poll*,

EU citizens with every consecutive year are downgrading their opinion regarding Turkey's EU membership as a good thing. The responses of EU citizens went from 30% in 2004 to 22 % in 2010; further downgrading happened in 2013 with only 12% of EU citizens considering Turkey's membership as good for the European Union (Koeth 2009: 62; Transatlantic Trends 2013: 7). Similar trends are visible in the Turkish population regarding their opinion on joining the EU. Only 40% (in 2014) of the Turkish population is in favour of joining the EU as compared to the 73% in 2004 (Transatlantic Trends 2013: 7). Freedom House 2014 analysis of 'Freedom in the World' points to a decline in Turkey's levels of democracy stating that the ousted Turkish Prime Minister (in May 2016) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan showed authoritative tendencies due to crackdown on protesters in Istanbul and a campaign against critical voices in the media (Freedom House 2014).

Another drastic change is visible in Hungary with the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban Fidesz in his speech at a retreat of ethnic Hungarian leaders in Baile Tusnad, Romania, on 26 July 2014, showed a lack of trust in the functioning of liberal democratic states in the wake of European financial crises (in Greece and other countries) stating that "liberal democratic states cannot remain globally competitive". He also stated that "I don't think that our European Union membership precludes us from building an illiberal new state based on national foundations" (Mahony 2014:1). Orban went on to comment that China, Russia, Singapore, India and Turkey (excluding India the rest are considerable authoritative state structures) are successful models to be emulated, seeing the kind of development they are garnering.

This is a drawback to the democracy promotion banner raised under the enlargement policy of the European Union. The democratic backsliding in Hungary has been noticeable; Freedom House mentioned in March 2013 that there are some legislative implications which are hazardous to the democratic development of media and the freedom of press under the Hungarian state (Freedom House 2013). But the recent flight of faith

(reflected in the Prime Minister's speech) in the liberal democratic order and its market models of development which EU epitomises in its policies shows a deflection in EU's status as a successful democracy promoter (a success that is relative and can vary from case to case).

This Hungarian case can also be viewed in a different light. The Eurocrisis of 2008 had a detrimental impact not only for the EU economies but, viewed in the larger context of a globalized era, the impact splits across countries and economic sectors. One of the central features of democracy promotion is the liberalization of economies which directly endorses liberalization of political activities as well. Because of the impact on the former, trends of protectionism have mounted in European trade more in terms of "...subsidies, bailouts, 'buy national' injunctions and restrictive conditions on inward investments" (Youngs 2010b). When the EU was economically reversing in its trade and investment, talks of greater liberalization for joining the EU became meaningless. Rather, China constitutes a better example of economic liberalization irrespective of a non-democratic state structure. Maintaining the economic health of Europe is essential for the EU to be able to check nascent democratic outliers like Hungary.

After the inclusion of states in 2004, there has not been a considerable improvement in their democratic score (as mentioned in the table 4.2). Also the decreasing democratic governance in Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia presents a different picture of enlargement which shows that consolidation of democracy with its substantive features is still lacking and needs to be boosted in order to make democratic features of the EU intact as a whole. The incident of Greece and the appalling state of its debt ridden economy is also a challenge that the EU has to be careful about as countries such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland are also closely monitoring the functioning of the EU in order to decide upon their own future course of action.

4.6 Conclusion

EU and its democracy promotion capabilities within Europe amongst the members and the candidates and the potential candidate states has been successful to some extent – ten new member states have been added in 2004 to the EU after their transition to democracy. However, this would be a shallow assessment, as a more indepth analysis of the functioning of EU towards democracy promotion reveals that, apart from democracy there were other factors like economic and security issues of the EU which played a major role in this enlargement. The origin of the EU shows that though it was founded by democratic countries but the basis of its initiation was purely economic in nature and the aspect of democracy has grown gradually with time.

Assessing democracy promoting capabilities of the EU demanded study about the legitimacy of the EU for promoting democracy within the European region. While democratizing the functioning of the European Parliament the EU has improved its credential as a democracy promoter amongst its member states. By granting greater powers to European Parliament (by including many new sectors in the process of co-decision and cooperation procedures of decision making by the European Commission), the EU has taken steps against its criticisms of democratic deficit within the functioning of the organization.

As far as enlargement of the EU is concerned, opinion amongst the EU member states is divided with some of the old member states like UK being suspicious of newer inclusions specially in the wake of the growing economic crisis since 2008. The economic crunch in Greece is also an unfavourable condition for new members or for prospective member states which can pose a setback to democracy promotion done by the EU. UK is opting out of the EU, as a member state through a referendum conducted in June 2016, making another dent upon EU's enlargement.

An appraisal in this chapter about the EU's mechanisms of promoting democracy within the EU region shows that more channels have

been implanted in the working which has widened and deepened the scope of EU's democracy promotion. Mechanisms like the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (introduced in 2000) have been introduced. More deepening of the democracy promotion of the EU is also happening as a push has been given to propagate substantive aspects of democracy such as talks over human rights and good governance with candidate and potential candidate states, along with the addition of the legally binding clause of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Rather than mere top down promotion of democracy as seen in the first half of the 1990s, these bottom up aspects shows a changing tend in EU democracy promotion.

But these efforts are not enough as the challenges to the working of the EU towards the spread of democracy are increasing and presenting obstacles that stand in the way of the growth of this organization. Challenges such as no clearly stated definition of democracy; maintaining its role as a major economic power and as a normative power without an army of its own and therefore the dependence on NATO, the often divided house and democratic deficit within the organization, the economic crisis and EU's dealing with the Greek crisis with prospects of future similar troubles with Spain, Ireland and Portugal, the never ending moratorium on Turkey's inclusion, the deviant non-democratic behaviour of states like Hungary, and the existing of a big democracy like Britain are making the organization weak in its efforts toward stabilizing and propagating liberal democracy within the EU region.

Though EU's belief in democratic ideals are strong and prominent (due to its membership conditionality), yet its association with other strategic interests of the EU – specially economic, political and security reasons – is what makes the focus of the EU sometimes shift from promotion of democracy in a country to stability of that county. Realising this, Štefan Füle, the then European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, in his speech to the round table discussion organized by members of the European Parliament in 2011 (in the wake of the 'Arab Spring') said:

> The EU has always been active in promoting human rights and democracy in our neighbourhood. But it has often focused too much on stability at the expense of other objectives and, more problematic, at the expense of our values. Now is the time to bring our interests in line with our values. Recent events in the South have proved that there can be no real stability without real democracy (Füle 2011).

The realization of the commissioner that 'democracy is essential for stability', is the required change which EU policies also need to realise, not just in times of turmoil as during the 'Arab Spring' but regularly in all EU's efforts toward building relations with other countries (candidate states, potential candidate states and also neighbouring partners of the EU).

The next chapter is concerned, therefore with EU's democracy promotion in neighbouring states or those states that are outside Europe (i.e. excluding members, candidates and potential candidates). Analysing EU's behaviour with states outside Europe will provide a comprehensive picture of how EU manages its external relations vis-a-vis its ideals of democracy promotion, human rights, rule of law and good governance. This becomes an interesting aspect as conditionality provision is absent in relations of the EU with countries outside Europe which then makes promotion of democracy a challenging task itself.

CHAPTER 5

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY THE EUROPEAN UNION BEYOND EUROPE

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
BEYOND EUROPE

5.1 Introduction

Since, the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, Europe has seen both disintegrations (former USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) as well as integrations (the German unification or integration of Europe at large under the EU). According to many constructivist scholars, the boundaries of a region are socially constructed and so a mere geographical demarcation of the region is bereft of ideas and identities that socially construe a region and the regional organization that represents it (Söderbaum 2003: 7). Also, boundaries of a region are prone to change with changing situations. The distinction from the idea of the 'other' is an important criterion for defining one's own self. Therefore, going 'beyond Europe' to understand the democracy promotion efforts of the EU would help in appropriately analysing the shifts in its policies from procedural towards substantive aspects of democracy promotion.[1] In the words of Karen E. Smith:

> The history of post-Cold War relations between the EU and its non-EU European neighbours can be read largely as a history of the EU coping with the exclusion/inclusion dilemma by eventually choosing inclusion (Smith 2005: 757).

The basic question that is being dealt with in this chapter is, 'Is there a difference in approach between EU's democracy promotion within and

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[1] What constitutes within and outside the boundaries of Europe is a controversial issue; therefore for the convenience of this study, the boundaries of Europe have been demarcated in congruence to the membership and prospective membership of the European Union. So, 'Within Europe' means the member states, the candidate states and the potential candidates. Whereas, 'Beyond Europe' means the neighbouring states and others that are not yet part of EU and therefore lie outside the boundaries of the 'European region' as well (See appendix for the map of European Union).

beyond Europe, if so then what is the nature of the difference and what explains it?

Though a regional organization, the European Union (EU) has broadened the reach of its work to a level comparable to the working of a universal organization. In the sphere of democracy promotion, the European Union has earned its own niche along with the other two big players in the field – the US and the UN. International recognition of the EU as a democracy promoter can be attributed to the visible contributions of the EU for support of democracy, not only within Europe but also through external aid, to countries beyond Europe. However, external democracy promotion by the EU is not the same as democracy promoted internally as the level of interference by the EU for democracy promotion via conditionality emphasizing economic liberalization, stability and security is not present with respect to countries that lie in the periphery of the EU.

The mechanisms of democracy promotion by the EU beyond its boundaries involve the work of various institutions of the EU – such as institutions of foreign policy making (the Directorate-General for External Relations merged in 2010 with the European External Action Service), instruments of direct democracy promotion like the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) and also the diplomats (delegates in the third country) engaged in the progress at the ground level. EU's democracy promotion as studied in this chapter, does not include the respective efforts of EU member states; rather the focus is on the activities of EU institutions.

The content of 'democracy' as promoted by the EU has become so broad that it includes not just matters of governance but also issues relating to civil society, human rights and good governance.[2] To account for the

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[2] Good Governance has been explicitly defined by the World Bank, as "… epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of

work done by the EU relating to substantive aspects of democracy becomes all the more difficult because there are no tangible aspects like elections that can be measured and quantitatively analyzed. Also the EU has developed different points of entry for its work relating to promotion of substantive aspects of democracy in the neighbouring states. The broad notion of democracy, according to Thomas Carothers, is the one that includes equality, justice, and a combination of political and socio-economic development for which EU provides aid for incremental and long term changes in anticipation of establishment of a well-functioning state (Carothers 2009: 5).

The substantive aspects of democracy (including efforts in the spread of human rights, rule of law, humanitarian aid, support to civil society and other non-governmental groupings in an authoritarian state) are more promoted with respect to promotion of structural changes under procedural democracy promotion in relation to EU's external associations with countries other than member states, candidate states and potential candidate states. Procedural and direct political involvement for democratic advancement in neighbouring states is less feasible as membership conditionality is not available and inclusion is not an enticement for political democratic developments in these states. The regions that are studied in this chapter are the ones that are part of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, even while some reference is made to EU's support to countries in other continents like Africa, Latin America and Asia (including Central Asia) (See map in Annexure IV – to see partner states of EU Neighbourhood Policy).

5.2 Cooperation with Regions Neighbouring Europe:

With the Eastern enlargement of the EU, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the conception of internal and external Europe emerged as the countries of Central and Eastern European region

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government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law."(World Bank 1994: vii)

were considered as future member states. Today the twenty eight member states of the EU, plus five candidate states and two potential candidates can have an organizational boundary which separates them from those that are strategically important neighbours and are part of the wider European region, yet their inclusion as members is not possible in the near future.[3] In a European Parliamentary briefing of October 2014 regarding EU priorities from 2014-2019 it is stated that, "On-going enlargement negotiation would continue, notably with the Western Balkans, but no further enlargement would take place over the next five years" (European Parliament 2014: 12). The 2004 enlargement of EU brought a number of unstable and non-democratic countries as bordering states which the EU can no longer afford to ignore. This is a possible reason for slowing the process of inclusion and enhancing efforts of democracy promotion for a stable neighbourhood.

The EU has provided a formal 'European Neighbourhood' status to sixteen countries of the Southern and Eastern European region – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Ukraine, Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria (see 'partner states' in the Map in Annexure IV).[4] These are the new neighbours added by enlargement of the EU in 2004 and subsequently in 2007 and 2013 (Croatia) which can be changed further due to future inclusions. The engagement with these neighbouring states has engendered a dilemma regarding EU's capacity – how large should and can the EU become?

Historically, EU was a union of Western European States, which were economically and politically stable and developed in comparison to their Eastern counterparts. In the wake of the changes of the 1990s, the EU had to particularly decide upon inclusion of new member states mainly on the pretext of maintaining security in the region. The issue of security has

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[3] A wider Europe includes around 54 countries involving the member states, candidates and potential candidate states, along with countries of Middle East and North Africa and Russian and the immediate Eastern countries of the former Soviet Union (Wider Europe, "Composition", updated 28 March 2014, [Online: Web] URL: http://www.widereurope.eu/neighbourhood/.

[4] Official Website of the European Union External Action , European Neighbourhood Policy, [Online: Web] URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/index _en.htm

remained a dear dream of the EU, especially because Europe has historically been the battle ground of fierce wars. Till the end of the Cold War, much of the security concerns of the EU were limited to state invasions or the outbreak of another war. But, in the post 1990s globalization years, apart from expansion of trade cooperation, concerns over security became more dynamic in nature with the EU turning more active in this area. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, a proliferation of terrorism activities worldwide, unstable state structures already marred with other organized crime activities, became the new challenges to which EU needed to respond using both military and non-military mechanisms like humanitarian assistance and civic and economic cooperation (European Council 2003: 7). Some of the events that have occurred in the last fifteen years (from 2001-2015), which altered the EU's policies towards its Mediterranean partnership, are the collapse of the Middle East peace process, US attack on Iraq in 2003 [which led to a internal rift in the EU for the use of soft power or hard power (mentioned in Chapter 3)] and the brewing tensions between Israel and Palestine (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005: 18). Another series of events that was perhaps responsible in bringing about a change in EU's policies toward its neighbours was the 'colour revolutions' or a regime change process in the former Soviet republics of Georgia (in 2003) and Ukraine (in 2004) which later on spread to Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan in 2005.

EU's first stabilization process started with the inclusion of the Central and Eastern frontier states (explained in the last chapter). The countries to the South and East of the new member states were in a much worse condition as they were plagued with corruption giving rise to non-democratic practices in their governmental and bureaucratic structures. Therefore, the *European Neighbourhood Policy* of 2004 was formulated in support of the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) adopted by the European Council in 2003 (COM 2004a: 2).[5] For the ESS, "Building security in the

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[5] Seeing the split between the EU member states over the Iraqi invasion of the US forces, there was a need to boost cohesion for common strategic policies. The ESS titled as "A Secure Europe in a Better World" brought about a new

EU's neighbourhood (Balkans, Southern Caucasus, and the Mediterranean) is prioritised as is the goal of strengthening the international rules-based order through effective multilateralism" (reference in footnote 5).

Having friendly relationships in the vicinity is always a strategy for maintaining security at the borders along with other mutual benefits. Seeing the unstable political conditions of states in the near abroad, a neighbourhood strategy is a positive approach towards building trust with the post communist states on the Eastern frontier and the authoritarian states of the Mediterranean region. EU cannot be lagging behind in maintaining relations with these states as most of them have a common border with EU on the one hand and Russia on the other.

Russia, which was considerably weak at the time of collapse of the Soviet Union, is no longer in that situation. The 2008 Russian annexation of Georgia and the 2014 occupation of Crimea are cases to be considered by the EU for furthering cooperation with the neighbouring states. The former European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten stated, "Russia wants weak neighbours and a sphere of influence inhabited by dependent supplicants" whereas for EU, stable and well-off neighbours are in priority (Kelam 2008: 2). The success of the ex-French President Sarkozy's initiative of the 'Rapid – Reaction Mediation' in case of Russia's intrusion in Georgia is appreciable in terms of showing EU's credibility in handling situations of conflict in the neighbouring states (Emerson 2008:1). Yet, much has been left to be achieved through an approach of the EU that focuses on greater cooperation with neighbouring states that can act as a bulwark against Russia's rising expansionist tendencies.

In 2003, the European Commission directed to the parliament its communication on 'Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for

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conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by identifying key security challenges and subsequent policy implications for the EU. For more information see the official website, "European Security Strategy", European Union External Action, [Online: Web] URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/index_en.htm

Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours' (COM 2003: 104). The Parliament soon announced that the *Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy* would draw up an own-initiative report on the subject. The draft European Parliament Resolution stated that this *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood Strategy* could offer cooperation in three areas:

- **Political, Human, Civic and Cultural**: this includes a framework on common policy on human rights, citizenship, democracy and rule of law, development of civil society; along with special attention to media and respect for pluralism, education, research, culture and health care.

- **Security** (Internal and External): for security, the initiative would include common efforts in the field of drug smuggling, subsidy fraud, illegal migration, against human trafficking, fight against terrorism, combating corruption and illegal trade and a policy on conflict prevention and settlement.

- **Sustainable Economic and Social Co-development**: the policy would also help in facilitating free movement of people, goods, services and capital, regulation of macroeconomic and monetary policy for safeguarding social cohesion, regulation of microeconomics to check unemployment levels, introduction of special programmes for technical and financial assistance, along with infrastructure and network policies and Energy cooperation with the resource filled neighbours. Also environmental and social policies were proposed linked to the above mentioned economic policies.

These were the significant areas where cooperation with the neighbouring states was sought by the EU. Though there are different countries with different political structures in the region (Wider Europe), yet points of interconnection and common interests are easily found in the times of globalization. A strategy paper was published by the European Commission in May 2004, which is the core document that states the main

elements of the *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP). The ENP was launched with the objective:

> .... to share the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation (COM 2004a: 3).

The objectives for which the ENP was created are more relevant in times when tensions are brewing in Ukraine with the involvement of Russia, and the war in Syria and other Mediterranean states (neighbouring Europe) due to the involvement of the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) militants. Also the 2011 'Arab Spring' caused a renewal of policies under the ENP with greater focus on civil society rather than focusing on 'top-down' methods of bringing in transformation of authoritarian regimes. A study based upon the 2015 earthquake in Nepal concluded that politically unstable states are less prepared for disaster managements (Domínguez 2015). Substantial progress of these states is less focused on improving the life of their population and disaster preparedness of the states. Politically unstable states are not only a threat to the people of their own states but can also create social and economic disturbances for their neighbours. EUs neighbourhood policy can become long term and sustainable, but what is still to be justified are the means adopted to push for stable democratic governments instead of authoritarian ones.

Under the ENP various financial mechanisms are used to push democracy in the authoritative state structures of neighbouring states. For this purpose, the European Commission imbibed a comprehensive, coherent and effective approach to the functioning of the ENP. But the lacuna is that no comprehensive conditionality mechanism is involved through which progress of these neighbouring states towards democratization can be made accountable by the EU. So, more emphasis on substantive democracy promotion through involvement of civil society and

focus on human rights and other civil rights is being performed by the EU in dealing with neighbouring states.

5.3 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Mechanisms of Democracy Promotion

ENP emerged as a policy tool in 2004 but its origins are deep. Between 1988 and 1992, *Trade and Cooperation Agreements* were signed by the EU with the countries of the Central and Eastern European States. The period from 1994 to 1998, saw a number of *Association Agreements* (under *European Mediterranean Partnership*) and *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* (PCA) with third countries.[6] The *Association Agreements* were signed by Israel and Tunisia (1995), Morocco (1996), Jordan and the occupied Palestinian Authority (1997); Egypt in 2001 and Algeria and Lebanon in 2002. PCAs were signed with Ukraine and Moldova in 1998 and in 1999 with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The ENP came as an initiative of the UK government with the name 'wider Europe' in 2002 especially for Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. The name as well as the members of this initiative changed from 'wider Europe', to 'Proximity Policy', to the 'New Neighbourhood Policy' and finally to the 'European Neighbourhood Policy' (Smith 2005: 759). These mechanisms were the initial steps in building relations with third countries surrounding the EU but they also contained essential element clauses emphasizing on democracy and human rights.

At the time of inception of the ENP it was decided that it would build upon "...existing progress made in co-ordinating the various instruments, while fulfilling existing commitments and obligations regarding the current programming period up to the end of 2006" (COM 2003: 8). The new multiannual programme from 2007-2013 included all previous policies into a new and unified funding instrument to guarantee a coherent institutional structure to support the ENP.

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[6] Third Countries are those that are neither member states, candidate states nor potential candidate states.

The policy mechanisms that precede the formation of ENP in promoting cross border and sub-regional/ transnational cooperation are:

- **INTERREG**: A financial instrument with the framework of *European Union Structural Fund* for increasing cross-border cooperation within the EU and to enhance internal cohesion (Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999).

- **TACIS**: A programme to support the 'Commonwealth of Independent States' through technical assistance for enabling political reforms and transitioning to market economy (Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 99/2000).

- **MEDA**: to support cooperation with Mediterranean states undertaken in the Barcelona Process 1995. "It was an innovative alliance based on the principles of joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation, seeking to create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity".[7] Also efforts were taken under MEDA to create free trade areas through reforms and investments (Council Regulation (EC) No. 2698/2000).

- **PHARE CBC Programmes**: was for supporting 'cross-border cooperation' (CBC) with member states and between candidate states. This was mainly used as a tool for accession process for the Eastern European states involving support and funding to adopt the *aquis*. From 2004-2007, the process was timely phased out after the fifth enlargement (Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2760/98).

- **CARDS**: again an instrument for stabilization and accession process for the Balkan region for economic reforms and political reconstruction (Council Regulation (EC) No. 2666/2000)

In 2002, the then President of the European Commission Romano Prodi in his speech recognized that, "The Balkans, Afghanistan and the Middle East

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[7] For more information about the nature and cooperation under the Barcelona Process please visit the Official Website of EUEA (European Union External Action), the Barcelona Process, [Online: Web] URL: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm

are only three examples of the challenges facing the world community. The EU has to play its part in dealing with them." Since membership was not being offered to the neighbouring states, the President in the same speech called for neighbourhood policies that will involve "sharing everything with the union but the institutions" (Prodi 2002: 2-3). Though lack of membership conditionality was a reason for low influential control over neighbouring states, yet the impact of being attached to a Western democratic regional organization cannot be ignored specially with cooperation in areas of trade, culture, conflict resolutions and other areas of common interests like security from organized crimes, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, illegal migration and environmental challenges. These were the converging points upon which EU's relations with neighbouring states were built.

Democratic values are perennial to the relationship between the ENP and its member states. This was mentioned in the 2004 document laying down general provisions establishing a *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument* (ENPI), that "The privileged relationship between the European Union and its neighbours will build on commitments to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights, and to the principles of market economy, free trade, sustainable development and poverty reduction" (COM 2004b: 11-12). This raises a vital question related to EU's external relations about what the inducements attached to ENP are that can help EU promote democracy.

Since the inception of ENP in 2004, various changes have been brought in its working mechanism and new initiatives have been constantly added to make the cooperation with neighbouring states a success. While lacking the power of imposing membership conditionality, the ENP works in the strength of the principles of 'Joint Ownership', 'Differentiation of Action' and 'Bilateral Action Plans'.

Joint Ownership: This mechanism makes the ENP a non-unilateral initiative and refers to a joint endeavour both of the EU and the partner

state on the basis of partnership and reciprocity. It allows for joint ownership of the process based on the principle of shared values and common interests. Imposition of priorities and conditions on the partners is not in its mandates. Priorities are to be decided by common consent, and therefore, vary from country to country (COM 2004a: 8).

Differentiation of Action: The principle is followed in every aspect of EU's relationship with partner states and means that Action Plans and the priorities set with each partner state will be based on particular circumstances of that partner which might differ in geographical location, political and economic situations, relations with the EU and other neighbouring states, needs and capacities for carrying reform programmes and perceived interests in the context of ENP (COM 2004a: 8).

Bilateral Action Plans: These Plans are based upon the above two principles. EU works towards creating bilateral action plans as a proper mechanism to bring political and economic reforms in neighbouring states with short and medium term priorities of three to five years. EU has referred to these bilateral agreements as "partnerships for reform".[8] The priorities that will be jointly agreed by the partner states and the EU will then be worked upon through 'Action Plans'. The Key areas that the Action Plan covers are: "political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts" (COM 2004a: 3).

Apart from funding the progress of these Action Plans, the other two mechanisms work as a normative pressure and are soft instruments of socialization of third countries because the entire partnership between the EU and neighbouring states is based upon a set of common principles such as rule of law, democracy, good governance, respect for human rights

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[8] Bilateral action plans are the main documents guiding the relation between EU and the partner states (for understanding 'partner states' please see map in Annexure IV).

(including minority rights), promotion of good neighbourly relations, promoting employment and social cohesion and the principles of market economy and sustainable development. Funding mechanism of the ENP was distinguished and acknowledged separately in 2007 with the adoption of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) which is increasingly a policy driven instrument aimed at more flexibility and incentives for partners who perform well. The partner states try to achieve EU standards through closer political links, partial economic integration, support and assistance for social and economic reforms. Financial support to partner states in the period from 2007 to 2013 was Euro 12 billion as grants for achieving projects related to ENP.

On 25 May 2011, further inducements were offered to partner states as the European Commission launched 'A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy' with the idea of greater commitments to "deeper and sustainable Democracy". The elements attached to deeper and sustainable democracy promotion are (MEMO 2011a:1) (See Annexure VIII):

- free and fair elections;

- freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media;

- the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial;

- fighting against corruption;

- Security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.

This 'new and ambitious European Neighbourhood policy' was launched in the wake of the events related to 'Arab Spring' (2011) in the European neighbourhood region. Realizing the changes brought by these

events, Catherine Ashton, the then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Commission, stated that:

> With so much of our Neighbourhood in a process of democratic change, this review is more important than ever. It is vital that we in the EU make a comprehensive offer to our neighbours and build lasting partnerships in our neighbourhood (European Commission 2011: 1).

On the same occasion, of the launch of this new and ambitious European neighbourhood policy, Stefan Füle, the then EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, says that:

> The new approach involves a much higher level of differentiation; this will ensure that each partner country develops its links with the EU as far as its own aspirations, needs and capacities allow. This is not a one size fits all approach. Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU (European Commission 2011: 2).

EU's funding is one of the main mechanisms of supporting the various soft power initiatives of the EU amongst partner states for implementation of policy reforms and inclusion of common values upon which the neighbourhood partnership is based upon. Funding by the EU is usually given as grant and contract as well as budget support and the channels of funding are both top-down and bottom-up i.e., funding is either given to the governments of the partner states or to the civil society organizations and other organizations working at the ground level closer to the masses in general (ENPI 2013: 3).

Practical actions required to be taken over policies and strategies designed by EU external relations for different regions and countries (by EU organs like the European External Action Service – EEAS created in 2011) of the world are carried out by *EuropeAid*.[9] *EuropeAid* is the implementing agency for the ENP policies involved in the entire project

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[9] The EuropeAid formed in 2011 with the merger of *EuropeAid Co-operation Office* (AIDCO) and the *Directorate General for Development and Relations* with ACP states.

cycle right from the selection to implementation and evaluation of the projects and programmes to be taken for funding. The ENPI now known as the *European Neighbourhood Instrument* (ENI) since 2014 is one of the financial instruments of the *EuropeAid* especially for the neighbouring countries of the EU (EU 2014). Russia is part of the ENPI but not of the ENP. Under the new ENI, the Russian federation will contribute and be a part of regional and Cross-Border Cooperation programmes, but cannot contribute to the bilateral cooperation carried out by the EU with different regions of the world under the new Partnership Instrument (PI) (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre 2013a: 6).[10] With the creation of ENI, 40% increase in the budget is proposed from the previous ENPI budget of 2007-2013.

The instruments used by the ENPI for institution building in partner countries are – *Twinning, Technical Assistance and Information Exchange* (TAIEX) and *Support for Improvement in Government and Management* (SIGMA a joint initiative of the EU and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). These are more of 'top-down' instruments of democracy promotion. Where 'Twinning', helps some of the neighbouring states to "transfer, adopt and adapt to EU legislation, standards and practices and to modernise their administrations through capacity building"; short term technical assistance support is provided under the TAIEX for approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation to support partner country's public administration structures (ENPI 2013: 12-13).

There are also some thematic instruments that come broadly under external policy relations of EU, yet have independent standing as either they are not dependent on bilateral or regional cooperation or the goals of

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[10] The Partnership Instrument (PI) is a strategic instrument designed to keep EU's significance in a 'Multi-polar' world order. EU in order to secure its position of a principal global and economic actor is leaving no stone unturned in formulating bilateral and multilateral partnerships through PI. Therefore, the instrument has first and foremost been deployed in areas of strategic interests like, the Asia-Pacific, the America, with Russia, Central Asia and the Gulf (EU Regulation 2014: 1).

these instruments do not overlap with the broader goals of the ENP.[11] Carrying forward the work of ENPI, the ENI was adopted from 2014 to 2020 with a budget of €15.433 billion. In a joint statement, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle and Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs said:

> In our EU Neighbourhood, we will efficiently accompany sector reforms and keep up the efforts of approximation in the East, and boost democratisation and economic and social development in the South (see map for East and South distinction, Annexure IV).[12]

> ...We will focus support to our neighbours even more on our political and policy agenda. It will allow for more differentiation and for giving incentives for best performers who genuinely implement deep and sustainable democracy, including respect for human rights, and agreed reform objectives (European Commission MEMO 2013).

Since the EU does not possess conditionality provisions for to make neighbouring states comply with the values and objectives of the EU, therefore mechanisms like rewarding best performers with greater funding and greater trade relations is the 'carrot' which is attached to bring about democratic reforms in the neighbouring states of the EU.

The ENPI funding for the years between 2007 and 2013 was €11.2 billion. This amount has increased from 2014 to 2020 with the total of around €15 billion proposed for external relations package and divided among six instruments of funding (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre 2013b):

−   Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA): €11,699 million

−   European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI): €15,433 million

−   Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI): €19,662 million

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[11] The instruments of EU democracy promotion can be divided in two categories, the *geographical* instruments like the ENI, the Instrument for Greenland, the Development Cooperation Fund and the European Development Fund and *thematic* instruments like the EIDHR, or Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation.

[12] Neighbours of the South: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia. Neighbours of the East: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine.

- Partnership Instrument (PI): €955 million

- Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IfSP): €2,339 million

- European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR): €1,333 million

Under the ENI 2014-2020, the work of former ENPI (2007-2013) has been compressed under four types of programmes (for priorities mentioned under each programme see Annexure IX). These are:

1. Bilateral programmes for the neighbourhood countries: The programming documents for bilateral cooperation generally offer three priority sectors to be funded (see Table 5.1 for to study priorities set for each partner state) ;

2. Regional programmes for East and the South (See map in Annexure IV , for neighbouring countries of the East and of the South);

3. An ENP-wide programme mainly funding Erasmus for All, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the Umbrella programmes;

4. Cross-Border Co-operation (CBC) programmes between Member States and Neighbourhood countries – these programmes are important not only for the ENP but also for EU's strategic partnership with Russia.

Other EU programmes and instruments (apart from the ENI) engaged in the process of democratizing EU's neighbourhood, are the thematic programmes under Development Co-operation Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, Instrument for stability and the interventions under Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy.

The policy of 'carrot and stick' is also applied in terms of relations with neighbouring states. The funding of the EU for various programmes act as a 'carrot' whereas, an example of 'stick' would be the suspended relations with neighbouring state – Syria.

Table 5.1: EU's Bilateral Programmes with Neighbouring States

Country	Priority Sectors Financed under Bilateral Programmes (2014-2017), with % of financial funding to each sector.	Indicative allocation for the first period from 2014 to 2017
1. **Algeria**	- Justice reform and strengthening of citizen participation in public life (25%) - Labour market reform and employment creation (30%) - Support to the management and diversification of the economy (30%) - Complementary Support for Capacity Development and Civil Society (15%)	€121,000,000 – €148,000,000
2. **Armenia**	- Private sector development (35%) - Public administration reform (25%) - Justice sector reform (20%) - Complimentary support for capacity development (15%) - Complimentary support to civil society (5%)	€140,000,000 – €170,000,000
3. **Azerbaijan**	- Regional and Rural Development (40%) - Justice sector reform (20%) - Education and Skill Development (20%) - Complementary support for capacity development and institution building (15%) - Complementary support for civil society (5%)	€77,000,000 – €94,000,000
4. **Belarus**	- Social inclusion (30%) - Environment (25%) - Local and Regional Economic Development (25%) - Complementary support to civil society (10%) - Complementary support to capacity building (10%)	€71,000,000 – €89,000,000
5. **Egypt**	- Poverty Alleviation, Local Socio-Economic Development and Social Protection (40%) - Governance, Transparency and Business Environment (20%) - Quality of Life and Environment (40%)	€210,000,000 – €257,000,000. (allocation for 2014-2015)
6. **Georgia**	- Public Administration Reform Agriculture and (25%) - Rural Development (30%) - Justice Reform (25%) - Complementary Support for Capacity Development and Civil Society (20 %)	€335,000,000 – €410,000,000
7. **Jordan**	- Reinforcing the Rule of Law for Enhanced Accountability and Equity in Public Delivery (25%) - Employment and Private Sector Development (30%) - Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (30%) - Complementary Support for Capacity Development and Civil Society (15%)	€312,000,000- €382,000,000

8. **Lebanon**	• Justice and Security System Reform (15%) • Reinforcing Social Cohesion, Promoting Sustainable Economic Development and Protecting Vulnerable Groups (40%) • Promotion of Sustainable and Transparent Management of Energy and Natural Resources (20%) • Complementary Support for Capacity Development and Civil Society (25%)	€130,000,000 – €159,000,000 (allocation for 2014-2016)
9. **Libya**	• Democratic Governance (45%) • Youth: Active Citizenship and Socioeconomic Integration (28%) • Health (16%) • Complementary Support for Capacity Development and Civil Society (11 %)	€36,000,000 – €44,000,000 (allocation for 2014-2015)
10. **Moldova**	• Public administration reform (30%) • Agriculture and rural development (30%) • Police reform and border management (20%) • Complementary support for Capacity development and institution building (15%) • Complementary support for civil society (≤5%)	€335,000,000 - €410,000,000
11. **Morocco**	• Equitable Access to Basic Social Services (30%) • Support to Democratic Governance, the Rule of Law and Mobility (25%) • Jobs, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth • Complementary Support for Capacity Development and Civil Society (20%)	€728,000,000 – €890,000,000
12. **Tunisia**	• Socio-Economic Reforms for Inclusive Growth, Competitiveness and Integration (40%) • Strengthening Fundamental Elements of Democracy (15%) • Sustainable Regional and Local Development (30%) • Complementary Support for Capacity Development and Civil Society (15%)	€202,000,000 - €246,000,000 (Allocation for 2014-2015)

Note: This Table does not include Syria (with which EU partnership is suspended since 2011), Ukraine, Israel and Palestine (for them the programming documents are in the form of 'Strategy Paper' and the 'Multiannual-Indicative Programme').
Source: Table made by the author with the help of data available on the official website of European Union External Action Service (EEAS), Financial Cooperation Reference Documents, [Online: Web] URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp /documents/financing-the-enp/index_en.htm

In 2011, EU suspension of cooperation with the Syrian government happened due to government use of military force against peaceful protesters. Restrictions are imposed in order to pressurize the government

to end violence against their masses and to bring about certain political reforms.[13] Similarly, EU has imposed restrictive measures of Russia in March 2014, Due to its illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine. Measures like regular bilateral summits with Russia were cancelled, bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters were suspended; in 2014, Russia was not included in the G-8 summit in Sochi and suspension of negotiations on Russia joining OECD and the International Energy Agency. Certain economic restrictions like the import ban from Crimea and prohibition to supply tourism services in Crimea. In June 2016 these measures have been extended up till 23 June 2017 (European Council 2016).

The entire working of the EU with respect to relations with candidate states, neighbouring states and beyond is engaged in the process of transformations with regard to their political structures to toe the line of democracy, liberalized economy, globalized trade, infrastructure development and social advancement. These goals are related to the goals of democracy promotion by the EU. However, the last funding instrument mentioned above (EIDHR) exclusively deals with the demand side of democracy promoting institutions and is, therefore, a turning point in the democracy promoting efforts of the EU at large. Another mechanism that was created by the European Union for external democracy promotion with more focus on the demand side actors like civil society groups (more on the lines of National Endowment of Democracy of the US) which will be extensively dealt with in this chapter is the European Endowment for Democracy (EED).

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[13] For more information on the kind of restrictions imposed by the EU for countries that are ousted Europe, please see, European Commission (2016), "European Union Restrictive Measures in Force", European Commission: Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, Updated 20.04.2016, [Online: Web] Accessed 4 June 2016, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions /docs/measures_en.pdf

5.4 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

The EIDHR as it exists today was launched in 2006 to replace its predecessor i.e. the *European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights* (2000-2006 formed by Council Regulation 975/1999). The main aim of EIDHR is funding of civil society organizations for greater democratization and spread of human rights. As pointed out by Milja Kurki, the EIDHR, like the USAID and NED (National Endowment for Democracy), is engaged in 'defending the defenders' of democracy (Kurki 2013: 159). Under EIDHR, the EU co-funds the projects already taken by local actors – civil society organizations or NGOs – thereby opening the doors for EU's participation at the grassroots level. The USP (Unique Selling Point) of the EIDHR programme is its characteristic of independently dealing with non-governmental actors without consent of government of the third country.

The EIDHR contributes to the consolidation of democracy and rule of law and helps in achieving greater respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The initial indication for EU's channelling of democracy promotion through human rights issues was established in the Lomé IV Agreement of 1989 with the ACP countries (the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries involving mostly the former colonies of Britain, France and Belgium). The agreement duly recognises and welcomes the multilateral initiatives taken toward establishment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Council of Europe (*Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* of the Council of Europe), by the Organization of African Unity (*Banjul Charter* or the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*) and by the Organization of American States (*American Convention on Human Rights*) (ACP-EEC Council of Ministers 1989: 8).

The recognition of human rights defenders by the international community also became prevalent in the second half of the 1990s. In December 1998, the UN General Assembly, after much deliberation, adopted the *Declaration on Human Rights Defenders* in which Article 13

confirms the right of human rights defenders to receive funding from foreign donors (UN 1999: 6).

For this purpose, the EIDHR functions in support of civil society organizations by actively supporting their role for the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights, promotion of democracy and rule of law as well as supporting local civil society organizations (CSOs) engaged in building confidence and enhancing the reliability of electoral processes, through electoral observation missions (DSW 2014). Before 2005 EIDHR was only engaged in funding for election observation and not electoral assistance. But in 2005 mandate of EIDHR was enhanced to include funding to support voter education, programmes for public awareness, and capacity building for domestic election observers. Since 2007, the EIDHR is helping the EU to integrate issues of democracy promotion and of human rights into all its external policies. However, in retrospect, the growth of EIDHR has been slow since its inception due to its working over sensitive issues of human rights and democracy promotion in non-democratic states.

The 2011 'Arab Spring' marked the beginning of new changes in traditionally functioning authoritarian states in the vicinity of the EU. The Arab Spring started with a popular uprising in Tunisia and Egypt then spreading to other Southern Mediterranean states which were members of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In January 2011, the EU itself claimed that it will change its line of functioning and will adopt a new approach vis-a-vis its Southern neighbourhood (Mouhib 2014: 370). The launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2005 that largely reflected security concerns, now in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, took democracy promotion as a significant agenda for formulating relations with neighbouring states.

A new Neighbourhood Policy was immediately initiated by the EU after the Arab Spring which aimed at rewarding democratic reforms and economic transformations on a 'more for more' basis with greater EU financial support to more committed reformers of the European Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood region. It is basically an incentive driven

approach based on more differentiation (Tömmel 2013). Example for this is the allocation of an additional one billion Euros by the SPRING (Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth) and EaPIC (Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation) assistance programme. Other financial inputs were made by the European Investment Bank and by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (European Neighbourhood Policy 2012).

Apart from funding, the EU was also engaged in promoting negotiations on Association Agreements and 'Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas' with countries like Moldova and Armenia, but much was required to be done for the countries where revolution was at its peak like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and others. Nonetheless, these initial efforts put democratization in the Arab region high on the agenda of the ENP. In 2011, a *Joint Communication* issued by the *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*, titled "A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean" stated:

> We believe that now is the time for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the EU and its Southern neighbours..... The EU is ready to support all its Southern neighbours who are able and willing to embark on such reforms through a "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity". The commitment to democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law must be shared. The Partnership must be based on concrete progress in these areas. It must be a differentiated approach (COM 2011: 2).

The commitments were not new, rather a new thrust was provided to the old idea of democracy promotion. The main areas of EU's work included (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2011: 61):

- Humanitarian aid (Euro 30Million) for immediate humanitarian needs in Libya and of displaced people at the Tunisian and Egyptian borders.

- Facilitating consular cooperation and evacuation

- Frontex joint operations – Hermes 2011

- Drawing on the Euro 25million EU External Border Fund and European Refugee Fund

- High Representative/ Vice President (HR/ VP) visit to Tunisia and Egypt; International Co-ordination meeting in Brussels.

- Support for democratic transitions: involving greater support to civil society; establishing a *Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility*; support social dialogue forum.

Other areas where the EU worked for promoting democracy in the southern Mediterranean region were managing challenges of mobility through *mobility partnership* with partner countries. "They cover initiatives such as visa and legal migration arrangements; legal frameworks for (economic) migration; capacity building to manage remittances and for efficient matching of labour demands and needs, return and reintegration programmes, upgrading of the asylum systems to EU standards etc. In return for increased mobility, partners must be ready to undertake increasing capacity building and provide appropriate financial support for border management, preventing and fighting against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, including through enhanced maritime surveillance; the return of irregular migrants (return arrangements and readmission agreements) and for enhancing the capacity and abilities of law enforcement authorities to effectively fight trans-border organised crime and corruption" (COM 2011: 7).

Analysed by the interviews taken of the EIDHR official and the information available on its official website it is clear that EIDHR funding is not subjected to any political or economic bias. Call for proposals are made for civil society actors to participate in a healthy competition and proper scrutiny is done by Europe Aid officials before assigning funds to civil society groups. Critics, however, are of different opinion. Criticisms against the working of the EIDHR has been put forward by NGO Monitor, claiming that many of the NGOs support by the EIDHR in Israel (such as Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions – ICAHD, Machsom Watch,

Adalah, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel – ACRI, and Yesh Din) were politicized in nature and promoted conflict. NGO monitor also accused the working of the European Commission (as a whole) as non-transparent in terms of information regarding its funds allocation (NGO Monitor 2010).[14]

The success and failure of programmes promoted by the EIDHR is also dependent upon the country on the receiving end. As studied by Vera Axyonova, that programmes initiated by the EIDHR were more successful in Kyrgyzstan than in Uzbekistan (though the two states are in the same geographical region of Central Asia) because the semi authoritarian government was less curbing upon the activities of civil society grouping in the former than the authoritative government in the latter which was sceptical of how sensitive politically is the funding of EIDHR (Axyonova 2014: 131). Another problem with the working of EIDHR is that it works under the control of the European Commission and is closely monitored by European Parliament i.e. it does not act independently and therefore is influenced by the overall budget cuts, delay in political decisions and probably member states politics as well. Lastly, the economic crisis of Europe (2008) has brought about limitations in funding capacity of EIDHR which the EU is trying to overcome.

5.5 European Endowment for Democracy (EED)

The members of the European Union (on Polish initiative) created the European Endowment for Democracy in 2012, in the aftermath of the Arab-Spring. It is an initiative taken under the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy. However, the idea for an EED is not new and was influenced by the working of the US based *National Endowment for Democracy* and its success in the Central European region (Dempsey 2013: 1)

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[14] NGO Monitor provides information and analysis on the activities of NGOs (non-governmental organizations) claiming to advance human rights and humanitarian agendas. For more information see website: http://www.ngo-monitor.org/

Describing the added value of the institution to the existing bunch of EU initiatives for the promotion and support of democracy the European Commission's November 2012 Press Release stated:

> It will offer a rapid and flexible funding mechanism for beneficiaries who are unsupported or insufficiently so, in particular for legal or administrative reasons. Such actors may include: journalists, bloggers, non-registered NGOs, political movements (including those in exile or from the diaspora), in particular when all of these actors operate in a very uncertain political context. This will be precisely the added value of the EED.

The initiative was actually taken up to fill the lacunae faced in the working of the EIDHR, specially with matters where a quick response is demanded by civil society movements and groups in places of political instability. EED was also created to help civil society organizations, even those that are unregistered (with the government of the state) or individual activists that are not taken up by the EIDHR in an urgent manner with minimal bureaucracy. Therefore, the EED work with the motivation of "supporting the unsupported". The grants offered by EIDHR to civil society groups are sometimes meagre (less than Euros 150 thousand) and not sufficient for places where there is a major need for response by the EU. Also the EED sometimes tackles more political activism and political campaigns than the EIDHR does (based on interview with a policy officer of the EED). Therefore, the EED was created as a separate mechanism of the EU for promotion of democracy more deeply and widely by granting support to individuals and groups whose ideas can bring about substantive change in their society for democracy to be well established.

The EED also tries to avoid duplication of financial support with EU's other financial institutions particularly with EIDHR, the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the Civil Society Facility and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). Some of the examples of the working of EED are – in Morocco the EED helped an NGO that wanted to run a voter registration campaign for the youth ignored by the local political parties in Morocco. The grant of the EED helped the organization to develop a video

aired on Youtube that became an instant hit and as a consequence 200 thousand people were registered to vote in Morocco. EED also helped to develop a citizen's radio in Ukraine with a minimal initial funding. EED also helps in graduating such organizations to access greater and long term funding under EIDHR and ENI (Interview with policy officer of EED).

The donor states of the EED funding do not only include some member states of the EU by also countries like Switzerland (who has given significant amount of contribution and has joined the EED member board) and Canada (with significant contribution in Ukraine) which believe in this democracy promotion mechanism. On the one hand, some of the leading member states of the EU are still not a party to the funding of EED like Germany, France, Spain, Britain, Italy (EED official Website). On the other hand, new member states of the EU such as Slovakia, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Lithuania are all contributors to the EED funding. Though the former group is showing interest and will eventually join in future, yet their absence in EED funding for now raise questions about the credibility and faith in this instrument of democracy promotion.

The EED is said to be an independent body but has strings attached to the EU Commission, which sends operational grant for core costs and core operations of EED or for bringing beneficiaries to Brussels and giving them training and coaching. European member states' funds are given as grants to civil society groups with EED having discretionary power in allocating these grants through the EED Board of Governance (Official Website of EED). With this discretionary power, EED brings about uncharted dangers to the EU's democracy promotion efforts as it is a risk taking mechanism specially in funding civil society actors of a turbulent region and acting immediately on their demands with a knowledge that this help might backfire. There is also the possibility that EED's work might damage the EU's bilateral relations with the neighbouring states, as it helps unregistered civil society groups and individuals. An example is the case of Ukraine, where EED funding to Kyiv brought about a split in the ruling

party key personalities, with a few stating that "foreign aid 'provokes unrest' and 'weakens' the country (Gotev 2011:1).

A key assessment of the EED relates to its engagement with more diverse actors acting at the local levels of a state, rather than engaging with "usual suspects" more often helped by other democracy support mechanisms of the EU (Kostanyan and Nasieniak 2012: 5). In 2014, the board of the EED agreed to enlarge the geographic scope of this instrument by not only supporting democracy in the EU Neighbourhood but going beyond that to countries like Russia and a much broader reach in countries of the Arab region and of Central Asia. However, entering into these territories will require more funding, greater expertise and larger experience for which the EED may not yet be fully equipped.

The need for greater EU social investments, especially in sectors like women rights, youth political involvement, displaced people rights was long required. It was the Arab Spring that became the trigger to make EU socially responsive on a fast track basis especially with the working of EED. Also the delayed Free Trade Agreements with countries like Ukraine have called for EU's greater attention to other areas of association agreement apart from the economic sector. Though economic sector cannot be ignored and making Ukraine a liberal market economic model is a necessary step in establishing democracy (Speck 2014). Nonetheless, EU's social involvement with the country was enhanced through mechanisms like EED to counter the delayed implementation of a 'Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement' (DCFTA) of EU with Ukraine on 1 January 2016.[15]

Since the EED is relatively a new instrument of the EU for democracy promotion, its critical assessment is quite difficult to be made. But seeing the popularity with which it is moving ahead it may become a more approachable instrument for NGOS and other civil society groupings

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[15] For more information on DAFTA, see European Commission (2016), "Country and Regions: Ukraine", Trade, last updated 29/4/2016 [Online: Web] Accessed 3 June 2016, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine/

to gather funds on a fast-track basis as compared to the EIDHR which partially functions through the European Commission.

5.6 EU and the Role of Other Regional Organizations in Democracy Promotion:

An overlap in the functioning of regional organizations takes place especially in the European region due to the presence of numerous organizations focusing particularly on issues of human rights, democracy and security. The democratization process of a state is not solely dependent on the efforts of one actor rather multiple factors corresponding to the involvement of multiple external actors play a role. For instance in case of the neighbouring states of the EU, the democratization process is also externally supported by organizations like the Council of Europe, OSCE, individual EU member states and the US (these are a few big names whereas, actors representing single state involvements like German *Stiftungen* are also present in quantity).

The EU always functions in support of or with the support of other regional organizations of the European region. However, much of the literature focusing on democracy promotion efforts of the EU restricts itself to the conditionality aspect of EU's membership and lack insights into the role of other regional actors and their contributions to the same (Schimmelfennig 2012). To understand EU democracy promotion at the wider European level, one must look into the causal linkages between EU's good coordination at the grass-root level (through mechanisms like EIDHR and the EED) and the coordinated efforts of EU with other regional actors especially, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the OSCE.

During the Cold War years, interventions in the name of protection of human rights became the initial entry point for promoting democratic form of governance in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In doing this, CoE (through institutions such as *Commissioner for Human Rights* and the *Parliamentary Assembly*) championed amongst the other regional organizations because of its stated goal of protection of human rights, rule

of law and democracy. At that time, the OSCE was a set of conferences termed as CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) whereas EU was engrossed in economic integration. In the post Cold War years, institutions dealing with matters of human rights and democracy were also created in the OSCE such as the ODIHR (OSCE *Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights* created in 1991 as the *Office for Free Elections*) and HCNM (OSCE *High Commission for National Minorities* established through the *Helsinki Summit Meeting* in 1992) due to a wider understanding of 'security' involving economic, environmental as well as human dimension. Similarly, EU also acquired the overlapping aims of protection of human rights and democratization of neighbouring states in the post Cold War years headed by institutions like the *Enlargement DG* and the *Agency for Fundamental Right* (created in 2007, a successor to the *European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia*) (Gebhard and Galbreath 2010: 174). This has now been enhanced through instruments such as the EIDHR and the EED.

The EU's credibility of democratic membership has enhanced EU's role as the promoter of democracy within the region as compared to other regional organizations. Yet, relations with other regional organizations are usually maintained with an understanding that the region is same for the functioning of these actors, so to optimally utilize the available resources it is essential to work in close coordination to avoid unnecessary undercutting. Some of the main areas where these organizations coordinate their efforts are countering terrorism, protection and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, and also in issues of migration and human trafficking.

Instances where the EU, the CoE and the OSCE-ODIHR have worked together are issues like integration of Roma minority in the Western Balkan states. In 2012, the EU, the CoE and the OSCE-ODIHR jointly launched three projects to promote minority integration in the Western Balkans at an event in Budva, Montenegro. Here the remark of the acting head of the delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, Alberto Cammarata,

explains how promotion of minority rights is attached to the EU overall enlargement policy:

> .....I am convinced that the intervention should reach out to these vulnerable groups so that their situation can be ameliorated in a tangible way, through their involvement and with no further delay. Fulfilling this objective is also key to the success of the EU's enlargement policy overall (OSCE Newsroom 2012: 2).

This is an example of how issues of minority rights, human rights, migration, poverty reduction and many other diverse subjects are linked to the EU's single goal of enlargement and democracy promotion. For this goal to be achieved, it is imperative for the EU to work in close coordination with the CoE, the latter being the oldest watchdog of human rights protection in Europe (created in 1949). The *European Convention on Human Rights* (ECHR drafted by the CoE in 1950) guides the working of both the EU and the CoE activities in the fields of human rights, good governance, rule of law and democracy. The 2007 EU-Council of Europe Memorandum of Understanding was formulated to enhance coherence between the legal norms of both organizations especially on issues related to human rights. This tight knit collaboration is also seen in the *Joint Programmes* carried out both by the CoE and the EU since 1993. According to official data, approximately 180 EC-CoE Joint Programmes have been launched in the last fifteen years. These Joint Programmes help in greater participation of countries especially of the Western Balkan Region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo) and of Sothern Caucasus region (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) in the EU's Stabilisation and Association Process, or the European Neighbourhood Policy (drawing funding from instruments like EIDHR, IPA and the ENPI) (Official Website of CoE on the Joint Programmes – URL: http://www.jp.coe.int/default.asp).

The variations in sectors – like support for art film production, promoting intercultural dialogues, or jointly celebrating European Day against Death Penalty on 10 October each year since 2007 – covered by

these joint programmes indicate the linking of diverse issues within the EU's spirit of promotion of substantive aspects of democracy (especially democracy promotion through issues of greater freedom and human rights). These efforts are not direct initiatives of the EU in the establishment of an electoral democracy rather an indirect connect which not only helps in establishing a procedural democracy with enlightened citizenry but also puts a check on pseudo democratic state structures introduced by authoritarian states.

EU priorities for cooperation with the CoE in 2014-2015 also include a separate section on 'democracy' and its spread across the wider Europe region through promotion of "...a more structured dialogue between CoE and EU in implementing activities in support of democratisation processes" (Council of the European Union 2013: 5). For this purpose, greater linkages of CoE with the European Endowment for Democracy are also sought. In case of Belarus, EU has worked closely with the OSCE Minsk office created in 2003. For information of situations within the country to carry forward EU democracy promotion in Belarus, OSCE office in Minsk was most suitable to work along with, until the office was closed by the Belarusian government for OSCE's criticism of the 2010 Belarus elections (BBC News 2010).

Another country where EU's collaboration with regional organizations, international organizations and its individual member states is visible is Croatia where Germany and Austria, the EU, the Council of Europe (ECHR), the OSCE and the UN were all in sync to push democracy within the country. For opening accession negotiations with the European Council, the EU laid a condition for Croatia to first collaborate with the UN ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia). From March to October 2005, Croatia's negotiation ceased with the EU due to lack of cooperation with the ICTY (Balkir and Akmer 2015: 100). The country was finally included as a member state of the EU in 2013 sharing the same democratic principles and values that the EU follows.

In terms of funding, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD is active in South and East) are actively participating by being co-financers and lending money to partner states to help them implement necessary state programmes. They help in EU funding channels like the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF in 2008), The Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF in 2009), and the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA in 2010). Apart from this, most of the multi-donor funds of the EBRD are managed in cooperation by the EBRD and the EU in the partner states such as the *Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership* (NDEP) *Fund* launched in 2001 and the *Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund* (E5P) initiated in 2009 (EBRD 2014).

In 2009, EBRD, EIB and the World Bank Group launched a Joint International Finance Institute Action Plan (Joint IFI Action Plan) to support banking systems and lending to real economy in the Central and Eastern European states. This was basically built to handle the financial crisis hit Europe and was concluded in 2010 but its spirit was continued by the European financial institutions which redirected their funds to neighbouring regions which wanted their help for transforming their financial sectors (World Bank 2011). Financial institutions also cooperate with each other for funding of various projects in the wider European region.

Cooperation with the US also happens – usually at times of emergency – for instance in recent cases like Ukraine and Libya where both the EU and the US (specially through NATO) are jointly taking measures toward stabilization of these states if not directly promoting democracy. The shaking of EU's credibility in democracy promotion caused by the 2013 Armenian bend towards the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union and Ukraine's early refusal to the European Association Agreement, made the US raise its assistance to not just Ukraine but also to Moldova (with additional financial assistance of $ 8 Million) and Georgia (with additional $5 Million) (all these states are members of the European Eastern

Partnership) (Babayan and Risse 2014: 38-39). This shows the connection between the two actors of democracy promotion – the EU and the US – and also the fact the EU is not the sole actor promoting democracy within its neighbourhood.

Democracy promotion has always been a policy goal of the US as well as the EU but this transatlantic goal is pursued differently by the two. A point of convergence between the US and the EU strategies has been recently pointed out in terms of EU's greater attention of civil society groups rather than s state centric approach. This is much like the US interventions in the name of democracy promotion through USAID and NED, which is now reflected in the working of EED (Babyan and Risse 2014: 37). Also collaboration between the US and the EU is more visible in policy orientation and general interest towards democracy promotion. On the other hand, a lack of joint institutional structures of both EU and the US for promotion of democracy around the world is still a point of divergence.

Though the collaboration of the EU with the US was enhanced in the West Asian and North African region (MENA) in the post Arab Spring times, scholars are critical especially because substantial changes in democratic aspects of these states were not brought about through external democracy support (Durac 2009; and Darbouche and Zoubir 2009). Rather, external support is critically viewed due to the historical cordial relations and support extended to authoritarian states and their dictatorial leaders.

EU's democracy promotion outside the region of Europe, is therefore, not a sole venture rather a well coordinated effort amongst various actors of democracy promotion. Any clash of interests between these actors will hamper the entire idea of spreading democracy as viewed in the case of Iraq in 2003 when use of military intervention was questioned and debated between policy makers of both the EU and the US. There might be no consensus over the meaning of the term 'democracy', but a non-consensual 'working' of different actors towards democracy promotion can prove to be a greater hindrance.

5.7 Democracy Promotion by EU in Other Regions of the World:

The US, through its agencies like the USAID, the NED and its affiliates and its non-governmental funding (Ford Foundation, Soros foundation, Freedom House and others), is an active provider of democratization funds around the world. But the EU is not far behind and the regions in the world where EU is actively involved in the promotion of democracy are areas like Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America. EU's economic and political relations with other regions are bound by a mutual commitment to democracy and human rights. With the diminishing role of the US as a reliable democracy promoter due to its direct methods and predominance of national interest in its policies, the role of EU has been enhanced with the growing confidence of other regions in the economic and socio-political benefits of a European kind of integration. In other words, the normative actions of the EU (through confidence building measure with other regions using bottom-up mechanisms) in the field of democracy promotion instead of using direct military means are more acceptable.

Another thing that makes EU attractive is the coming together of European nation-states to formulate this supranational kind of an entity (EU) which proved to be inspirational for many regions, especially for their political, economic and social advancement. For instance, the African Union (AU created from the Organization of African Unity in 2002) imitated EU while formulating the *African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance* adopted in 2007. Structurally and institutionally as well, the AU imitates the EU (Manners 2006: 76-77). EU integration values have been inspirational for other regions, especially when a region is integrating to formulate a regional organization (example Mercosur created in 1991 in South America). Though ASEAN is known for following the 'ASEAN Way' which emphasizes on sovereignty and non- intervention, in recent years, it seems ASEAN is following EU's integration mechanisms. This is reflected in the adoption of three basic pillars of EU integration (later dissolved in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009) in the ASEAN Vietnam

Integration Programme of 2004 i.e., the economic community, the political and security community and the socio-cultural community. Similarly for greater integration the four freedom principles were adopted by ASEAN in 2007 – freedom of trade, freedom of service, freedom of labour and freedom of capital – quite identical to the four freedoms of the EU (adopted in 1992 along with Single Market Act) (Jetschke 2013). Also EU's assistance for promotion of democracy is usually followed by subtle mechanisms mainly trade and other socio-cultural benefits which are more easily acceptable even though it is a prolonged mechanism to install democracy.

Seeing the difference of regions being handled by the EU in order to maintain long term cooperation, democracy advancement in these regions now takes place with a tailored approach of the EU towards each of these regions. There is no single mechanism being followed by the EU for democracy promotion around the world yet what remains constant is the democratic values buried deep within the EU. Still the question that is often raised relates to prioritizing of various objectives of the EU such as security, stability, economic interest, war against terror and others, which are often given precedence in some cases at the cost of democratic values and human rights which according to some scholars may harm the EU in the long run (Ziadeh 2009; Kausch 2008).

Another contradiction is with respect to EU's promotion of democracy, especially in the Arab world. In the light of recent Arab uprisings, the confidence of the Arab population in external support is shaken due to traditional Western support to the flawed authoritarian governments. Moreover, the Arab region on the one hand is suspicious of direct interventions (as done by the US) seeing the example of Iraq, and on the other hand, a restricted approach (carried by the EU whose democracy promotion is based upon the principle that 'democracy should come from within') is often associated with a lack of commitment. The dilemma of using one mechanism or the other for promotion of democracy always persists while working with such turmoil filled regions as the Arab. Yet,

what is important is EU's persistence in its commitment towards democracy promotion.

According to Ana Palacio (2011), "Although good governance and human rights remained among the ENP's proclaimed goals, official communications of the European Commission show that the policy emphasised security and border control" (Palacio 2011: 2). Democracy and good governance always lag behind in the race for making good neighbourly relations vis-a-vis sectors like trade, counter terrorism or security and environmental issues. The EU's greater focus on areas of trade and security in its neighbourhood Mediterranean region will be more appreciated if equal significance is given to ideals of democracy while formulating relations with these states.

As early as 1984, EU had special relations with countries of Central America launched by the San José Dialogue. This comprehensive relationship between EU and the six Central American countries – El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama – was beyond economic cooperation and included political dialogues with EU, making significant contributions to peace, democratization and socio-economic development of Central America. In 2007, EU launched the process of 'Association Agreement' with the Central American states which concluded in 2010. The importance of this agreement lies in the fact that this is the first region-to-region agreement of the EU which believed in democracy consolidation apart from other goals of regional integration and security management in Central America.

EU as a regional organization of the European region is seen as doing beyond its capacity as compared to other regional organizations of the world. EU can be appreciated for this broad range of activities that it involves under democracy promotion with other regions of the world. But caution has to be maintained as there are variations in the regions being handled. South America may not be a difficult case for building cordial relations as compared to the Arab world. Within the Arab World as well, the kind of advance support that can be offered to Tunisia cannot be the same

of Libya, which is still dealing with state building after the scourge of a civil war. Also the interest of the EU (specially geopolitical interest including economic and security of borders) sometimes becomes so apparent that hiding then under democracy promotion will be difficult and may not be in the best interest of the EU.

5.8 EU's External Democracy Promotion: Success Or a Failed Endeavour?

Going by the official data, EU was the world's largest development aid donor in 2014, providing more than 50% of assistance worldwide (European Commission 2015).

Ferrero Waldner (the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy) in his speech in 2005 repeatedly stated that, "the ENP is not a rhetorical invention of Brussels... but a pragmatic response to the challenges EU faces today" (Waldner 2005: 4). This compromises EU's stand on democracy promotion among ENP member states and their systematic engagement with European activities related to good governance, democracy, human rights and rule of law. For many scholars contradictions abound in the mechanism of ENP "...South vs. East, accession vs. partnership, co-ownership vs. conditionality, worsened by a lack of real incentives as well as prevalent conflict of interest horizontally among EU member states and vertically between EU institutions" (Pänke 2013 :120). Here EU's normative role is overpowered by the strategic and security issues related to European neighbourhood and this damages the greater goal of democracy promotion (as an ideal) done by the EU.

One of the examples of EU's successful implementation of democratic ideals of human rights in its relation with other regions is the Cotonou Agreement with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACPs) on 23 June 2000 which states in its Article 9:

> Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
> including respect for fundamental social rights, democracy based
> on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance

are an integral part of sustainable development (The Cotonou Agreement 2014: 23).

The same agreement in its Article 20 mentions the approach to fostering regional cooperation and integration by:

> Promoting institutional reforms and development, strengthening the institutions necessary for the consolidation of democracy, good governance and for efficient and competitive market economies; and building capacity for development and partnership (The Cotonou Agreement 2014: 38).

This provides an important benchmark in the EU's democracy promotion capabilities in countries that are not immediate neighbours and are neither within the direct ambit of EU's strategic interests of security or trade. Agreements like these are the only successful stories left upon which the EU survives so as to carry forward its ideals of human rights and democracy promotion. But there are shortcomings of these partnerships as well. The EU-ACP partnership calls for equal participation of both the parties for policy formation. But this act is now being carried out only by Brussels due to trade and aid dependency of the ACP states upon the EU. This shift in power structure is indicative of the weakening bond of collaboration and cooperation over the principles contained in the agreement (Banthia 2007: 13-14). ,

The success or failure of democracy promotion is more evident if judged with respect to the ground level works done by the European agencies in the field of democracy promotion. Most election observation missions of the EU have been carried out in countries apart from candidate and potential candidate states and have been sent to countries of lesser strategic importance to the EU in Africa, Latin America, Caribbean, and in Asia (Meyer-Resende 2006: 11-17). The EU has successfully built up this capacity of election observation quite recently as this area was traditionally handled by other European organizations like the Council of Europe with its Court on Human Rights and largely by the OSCE.

Certain flaws are to be found related to the election observation missions sent by the EU to third countries for checking the process of

voting in accordance with the democratic standards set by the EU. EU's lacunae in this field are more related to the technical support of the EU for democracy promotion as the organizations carry out the mission itself rather delegating it to certain NGOs and Civil society groupings as done by the US (Meyer-Resende 2006: 11). Some of the recent electoral observation missions carried out by the EU in 2015 are Haiti, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Myanmar and Uganda in 2016. There are official drawbacks in these electoral observation missions like in 2003 there were a number of EU actors (EU election observation mission, the Common Foreign and Security Policy High representative, the Council Presidency) involved in electoral observation in Rwanda. The result was that there were contradictory statements coming from all the actors involved in election observation of whether the presidential and general elections in Rwanda were free and fair (Smith 2008). In 2010 in Cote d'Ivoire the electoral observation mission that was sent involved only 120 observers to check nearly 1000 out of approx 2000 polling stations. This shows the discrepancy between the work load and the amount of labour done for the same which can provide skewed results.

Another problem is related to the actions taken against those violations and frauds observed during these observation missions. In South Sudan in 2011 a report of observer related to fraud in electoral process hardly made any difference in EU policy towards that state. Even when the EU calls for Joint Assemblies for member of European Parliaments and the member of parliaments of the third world countries for jointly dealing with democracy and human rights issues, the results does not filter through respective parliaments of third countries and actions are not taken accordingly. Similarly, the protection of human rights which is part of the 'essential element clause' agreement with third countries has been often openly flouted yet, penalizations for such breaches occur rarely.

In countries like Ethiopia, EU has adopted a mild diplomatic behaviour instead of strong conditionality measure in order to promote human rights and democratic ideals, mainly because the country is a strategic ally in case

of security of the EU region from terrorism and other threats emerging from Somalia. Also Ethiopia's trade and economic growth was also impressive that restrained EU from being firm in its conditionality. This is one of the examples that show that there has been inconsistency in EU implementation of conditionality principle when it comes to implementation of strategic interests like trade and security (Vines and Soliman 2014: 89-90). This also shows that EU policies are accommodative of changes at the international level and therefore are in a state of constant flux from developmentalism to security to democracy and human rights issues as and when it is dealing with different situations in different parts of the world.

Another failure in following a coherent approach towards democracy promotion is reflected in the words of Richter and Leininger:

> It is highly likely that the diversification of funding sources at European level will result in further fragmentation of democracy promotion at governmental and non-governmental level and obstruct the emergence of a coherent approach (Richter and Leininger 2012: 4).

Much of the Talks related to the success and failure of the spread of democracy by the EU in its external relations started after the 2011 'Arab Spring' which tested the EU in many ways. The entire uprising in Arab countries showed the failure of the working of the European Mediterranean partnership process and the ENP as the two aimed for creating shared prosperity and economic cooperation. But, the persistence of high level of gross disparities and lack of jobs and increasing unemployment were the main factors for this revolt to happen in Tunisia (Othman 2014: 46). Had these policies of the EU worked effectively with greater pressure on the non-democratic governments to reduce economic inequalities and think for overall prosperity, it would have saved an entire region from being into a political economic and social turmoil of such intensity.

Many of the scholars and policy officers at the ground levels working with countries of the Arab Spring are of the opinion that greater emphasis of liberal state structures by organizations like EU along with the American

push for the same might lead to the adoption of weak democratic states. For instance, the hastily created elections in Egypt after the demise of Hosni Mubarak caused the political power to slip into the ambit of staunch Islamic rule under the Muslim Brotherhood. Charles Tripps, professor of Middle-East politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) suggested that EU instead of helping its old mates (other Western Political Powers especially the US) to come to power in countries of the Arab Spring should aid and economically assist those sectors that will help reduce inequalities in these countries (Buchanan 2015).

5.9 Conclusion

EU has been able to sustain its position of normative power not just with EU region but also outside the EU sphere of influence. This is very apparent from EU's working in other regions of the world specially the immediate neighbours and the neighbours of its immediate neighbours. EU is one actor apart from the US which is making the world realize its omnipresence with respect to issues like democracy promotion and human rights. In every bilateral, trilateral and multilateral relations of the EU the policies regarding a clear stand on supporting democracy and democratic endeavours are apparent but fall short in implementation.

Shifts are visible in the working of the EU towards substantive democracy promotion by using non-governmental mechanisms and entities. The workings of both the EIDHR and EED in dealing with the non-governmental sectors to promote substantive democracy are quite impressive and are a huge support for EU's traditional top-down approach with a bottom up push for efficient results. The EU does not use the 'one size fit all' approach and has effectively followed the principle of differentiation in most of its endeavours. But these changes in policy programme are nascent and their results are not as accountable so as to measure their success. Moreover, there is a growing need to analyse the failures at the working level of EU with more ground level approaches to be incorporated with greater people's participation. Lastly, EU's stand on democracy promotion should be concrete enough to develop trust with the countries at the receiving end.

Shadowing economic, political and other strategic interest behind the image of promotion of human rights, good governance and democratization may not provide permanent results.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

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This thesis has attempted to consolidate the understanding of the concept of 'democracy promotion' within its theoretical contours as well as to explore the workings of 'democracy promotion' in practice as pursued by international organizations. Democracy has been accepted as a universal value, due to its recognition by international organizations such as the UN, not overtly in its Charter, but scattered throughout its enterprise with growing inter-linkages with other concepts such as peace, security, human rights and the rule of law. With time, these inter-linkages have grown stronger and newer aspects (such as good governance) have been added so as to diversify the ways in which this unstated goal of 'democracy' could be promoted in regions where it is perceived to be lacking.

This research began by revisiting the question: can democracy really be "promoted"?. It is commonly understood that democracy as an integral system of functioning of a state should involve little external intervention. Long-recognized principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention are in direct contradiction to the idea of 'democracy promotion'. Yet, in practice the promotion of democracy does take place at all the levels of a state structure, including through governmental and non-governmental channels. Democracy promotion has been pursued by connecting the concept with the greater human goals of peace, security and development. It is recognized, even while engaging in 'democracy promotion', that democracy works best where it is internally pursued, i.e., where the initiation of democracy starts from within a non-democratic state structure and external actors merely support the transition from outside with minimal intervention.

In the practice of democracy promotion, challenges emerge with respect to firstly, its meaning. Though intuitively understood to be a universal value, there is no universally accepted definition of democracy. Certainly, 'democracy' is one of the most studied concepts in the social

sciences, with myriad interpretations and definitions, thus making it impossible to confine it to a singular definition. This study, while focusing on democracy promotion, has highlighted the distinction between two common characteristics of democracy namely – *procedural* and *substantive* democracy. Procedural democracy is concerned with practical working of democracy through regular elections on the basis of adult suffrage, reflecting both the 'participation' and the 'contestation' aspects of the working of a functional democracy. Substantive democracy refers to the normative ideals – such as rule of law, justice, equality, fundamental rights, peace and prosperity – which are essential for the working of a true democracy and the absence of which produce what have been referred to as '*flawed democracies*'(The Economist 2008), '*hybrid democracies*' and '*illiberal democracies*' (Zakaria 1997). For a holistic implementation of democracy – both procedural and substantive – the focus has to move beyond the state machinery and include work at the grassroots level.

A second challenge relates to the mode of promoting democracy. At the international level, democracy has been promoted by various actors – international organizations, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and actors, and individual states (most importantly by the US). Democracy promotion through military intervention or through forceful interventions has been vastly criticized, with examples like Iraq and Afghanistan emerging as failed attempts in democracy building. Military intervention to 'promote democracy' usually tends to backfire, provoking opposite contrary reaction. Forceful interventions are often perceived to be carried out with an ulterior motive such as 'regime change' or some other economic or political benefits. Such a mode of democracy promotion might institute a *procedural* democracy, yet substantively that democracy tends to remain bereft of democratic ideals and freedoms significant for the functioning of a truly democratic state structure.

Recognizing that democracies that lack in providing civil political freedoms to its people and proper establishment of rule of law are flawed in nature, international organizations are now focusing on promoting both the

procedural and substantive aspects of democracy. This study captures the changing trend within international organizations – focusing more on the procedural aspects during the Cold War years and then shifting their attention to the substantive aspects in the post-Cold War years. This trend is accompanied by another change wherein democracy promotion is now more often pursued by influencing the 'demand side' using *bottom-up* mechanisms (civil society and direct contact with masses) along with the conventional support to 'supply side' that is the *top-down* mechanism (government, administration and state structure).

Another significant challenge with democracy promotion relates to the involvement of the United States. The US, since the end of the Second World War, has been involved in democracy promotion in its capacity as an individual actor and as an influential actor at international fora like the UN. US as the originator of the idea of the UN (Roosevelt's Four Freedoms), has influenced UN to a level that its working and decisions is often thought to be biased towards US national interest (linked to the notion that IOs work as agents rather as independent actors). Also changing trends during the Bush years of administration in the post 9/11 phase, made the UN more vulnerable to criticism, because of its incapacity to check US' 'selfish bully' behaviour. The Obama administration effectively brought a change not only by curbing the use of military in US democracy promotion (phasing out US troops from Afghanistan and Iraq) but also by giving greater support to the ideals of the UN.

The US promotion of democracy during the Cold War years for the containment of communism, and the post Cold War interventions are viewed as instances of US pursuing its national interest. As a global power, its influence over the functioning of the UN cannot be ignored. The dominance of the US within the UN has also meant that there is greater resistance to the idea of democracy promotion by international organizations as well. Countries such as Russia and some other West Asian countries do not allow UN operations on their soil as they equate them to US intervention. There is also a contradiction in US behaviour, with the US furthering its economic

and security interests in the garb of 'democracy promotion', especially in West Asia, a region where several authoritarian governments were traditionally supported by the US. Democracy promotion, as pursued by the US and the UN is therefore, often viewed as a strategy to achieve national interests (political, economic or security related) of powerful states, to achieve access to regions where intervention otherwise is not possible, and to maintain supremacy at large.

Apart from the argument of ulterior motives and hidden interests, the mechanisms adopted for democracy promotion, especially the military measures taken, after the 9/11 incident, by the US in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, have also come under criticism. The wars conducted in the name of 'democracy' were criticized widely and showed the limitations of international organizations in controlling or countering the unilateral actions of the US. Can democracy be promoted through war? The first hypothesis that this study tested was found to be true:

The increasing instances and the changing nature of unilateral democracy promotion by countries like the US have adversely impacted the credibility of multilateral efforts at democracy promotion undertaken by international organizations.

The UN became more assertive about its intentions to engage in democracy promotion after the end of the Cold War in its various statutes, declarations, conventions, meetings and the much acclaimed Millennium Development Goals. Efforts were increased in the 1990s to promote democracy procedurally through election observations and peace building. Later, the introduction of mechanisms like the UNDEF seemed to change the trend, with support being extended to civil society organizations, NGOs and other non-state actors in order to work upon the substantive aspect of democracy promotion. Critics pointed to the fact that while the creation of UNDEF was pushed by the US and India, the former is controversial in matters of providing funding while the latter became lethargic in its involvement with this mechanism.

Future prospects for democracy promotion lie in greater focus on the substantive aspects of democracy promotion, with active participations not only from the Western developed nations but also emerging nations like India, Brazil, South Africa and others. A more holistic approach towards substantive democracy promotion in terms of wider number of donor states (not just Western nations mainly US and the European States) and greater areas being covered at the receiving end (and not just areas that are strategically important) will democratise the functioning of democracy promotion itself, making it more legitimate and therefore acceptable.

Economic liberalization, which is often linked with democratic political systems, is today being adopted by authoritarian states such as China and Russia. However, the benefits of economic freedoms and openness in markets are not reaching down to the masses in terms of openness of political structures with greater people's involvement and more social, civil and political rights. More revolutions (like those of the Arab Spring or the Colour Revolutions in Central Asia or the Hong Kong's discontent with China) are bound to happen whether externally supported or not, if governments are not socially and politically accountable to their electorates. Internal dissatisfaction is then used by external actors, sometimes for selfish interests (as the US used it against the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussain in Iraq). The redressal lies at the grass-roots level, for which active engagement with civil society and NGOs working with the people is a viable means of externally supporting substantive democracy. The role of international organizations is significant as they try to bind nations to the ideals of human rights, democracy, equality, freedom and justice through the obligations created by various agreements.

In the existing literature on democracy promotion, the distinction is often highlighted between democracy promotion as pursued by the US (which is often direct in its approach) and that done by the European Union. As a regional organization, the EU has carved out its own niche in the field of democracy promotion. Trends show that the EU, like the UN, also became more vocal about its stand on the need for democracy promotion in the post

Cold-War era. The legal requirements for an applicant state to the EU to be a democracy in order to be granted membership of the organization (Copenhagen Criterion) was instituted in 1992, though earlier practice also indicated a move in the same direction (Spain, Greece and Portugal were granted membership upon becoming democratic).

The European Union is a community of states formed on the basis of shared values and interests. Economic cooperation was the foremost reason for the creation of this organization as seen in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. With the passage of time, the realization of liberal democratic values and the inclusion of principles of human rights highlighted the democratic lineage of the organization. This is the idealist perspective on EU's democracy promotion. However, from a realist perspective, this study also shows that the adoption of democracy promotion principles by the EU amongst its prospective members and candidate states and also within the European vicinity (neighbourhood) is driven by its own interest in achieving stability at large. For this reason, the focus of EU towards substantive democracy promotion was less before the start of the new millennium, as top-down methods were adopted and more governmental and administrative changes were expected under conditionality with greater focus on procedural democracy promotion.

During the course of this research, interviews were conducted with officials at various institutions of the EU such as the DG-DEVCO (Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development) and DG-NEAR (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations). These interviews revealed that EU's approach towards democracy promotion has changed, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and is now geared more towards realist considerations rather than being grounded in idealism alone. This transformation has resulted from the growing number of threats that the EU has been facing both within and outside the region.

Some of the internal threats of EU are: the global economic crisis that hit the European continent in 2008 and its after effects seen in cases like

Greece (and also in Spain, Portugal and Ireland); the political deviations seen in the democratic behaviour of new member states like Hungary, which appears to be inspired by the economic progress of non-democratic states; the democratic deficit within European institutions reflected in decreasing voter turnouts at the elections of European parliament; problems related to inclusion of new member states specially of the Balkan region and the long drawn stagnation on the status of Turkey as only a candidate state; and the June 2016 British referendum on exiting the EU may impact the future credibility of the organization (because of the exit of a big democratic nation) for furthering democracy promotion through enlargement or even amongst neighbouring states.

Some of the external threats to the EU include: the growing assertion of power by Russia in places like Georgia and Crimea; the unstable European neighbourhood specially the Mediterranean region after the Arab Spring; the growth of terrorism in Europe's vicinity (in the Middle East and the Arab region specially after coming up of the ISIS) and the increasing terrorist incidents such as in France (Charlie Hebdo) and Brussels; the increasing migration problems that the continent is facing mainly due to an unstable neighbourhood (Roma migration problems).

According to several EU officials, these threats have made the EU vulnerable and cautious in its approach towards democracy promotion. Now the EU's focus is more on the realistic concerns of economic and security issues and objectives of political stability to fight terrorism. EU's approach therefore appears to be a mix of idealistic and realistic concerns when it navigates the tough terrains of democracy promotion. The EU has consciously chosen to use a softer approach to democracy promotion (as compared to the US) which is differentiated according to the needs of the time and space.

Over the years, especially after the Cold War, the EU has moved on from a 'one size fits all approach' to the one which many scholars call – 'learning by doing'. Transitions can be seen in the working of the EU from a greater emphasis on procedural and top down mechanisms to bottom up

approaches for substantive democracy promotion. The EU's mechanisms for democracy promotion within the EU region are mainly its enlargement policy or the terms of the accession agreements which compel a candidate and a potential candidate state to democratize its governmental structure and liberalize its economy for inclusion within the EU.

In the first half of the 1990s, EU's enlargement was largely focused on spreading procedural democracy amongst the newly liberated Central and Eastern European states to achieve multiple purposes: to create liberal democracies for economic purposes (integration with the EU Market); to achieve security on the Eastern front; and to symbolize a triumph against communist ideologies. This changed in the late 1990s when the EU questioned its approach to ask whether democracy was actually 'trickling down' to the people. The EU's efforts toward substantive democracy promotion are related to its work at the grassroots level through measures like – enhancing the power of the European Parliament (the people's representative organ) vis-a-vis the Council in cooperation procedure and co-decision procedure of legislation making. However, candidate states aimed at fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria in a minimalist way to meet the requirements of membership, without taking forward their efforts to entrench substantive democracy.

It was only in the new millennium that the EU's 'widening' and 'deepening' in the context of its function of democracy promotion started. The 2004 inclusion of ten new member states was accompanied with the acceptance of the Western Balkans in a new category of 'potential candidate states'. Financial sources were diversified by adding the World Bank, the European Development Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank as instruments co-financing the PHARE programme of fund allocation under the enlargement scheme.

The democracy promotion efforts of the EU were 'deepened' by supplementing the top down approach with a bottom-up approach of 'open method of coordination', having traits of participatory democracy at the

national and local levels of governance. The EU also adopted the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* in 2000. These efforts of the EU are geared towards gaining recognition for itself as a normative power in the world. As an organization, the EU has attempted to chart a way to pursue democracy that is distinctly different from the US way. The EU's 'carrot and stick' approach to democracy promotion has found easier appreciation and acceptance as a viable tool for democracy promotion within the European region.

In case of democracy promotion outside the EU region, greater aspects of substantive democracy promotion are seen due to the lack of possibility of imposing a conditionality clause. Carrying out the promotion of procedural democracy is tough with authoritarian neighbouring states of the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Russia. The accountability mechanisms and benefits of cordial relations are low in cases of neighbouring states and so their transition towards democracy through external support is also minimal as compared to members or candidate states. Still policies of the EU such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is focused on establishing cordial relations with neighbouring states, mainly with the aim of securing European borders.

The ENP performs this function by building connections with the neighbouring states in three areas: political, human, civic and cultural; security; and sustainable economic and social co-development. The ENP works on the basis of joint ownership, policy of differentiation of action and bilateral action plans. The policy of ENP (created in 2004) is in itself a mechanism of substantive democracy promotion, with the principles of human rights, rule of law, democracy, good governance, market economy, free trade, sustainable development and poverty reduction attached to its very core. In today's globalizing world, where countries are connected in every sphere of life, international pressures can make a big difference. Sanctions of the EU against actions like the one by Russia in Georgia and Crimea, increases the cost on repressive government and makes the masses aware of the situation creating public pressure as well.

The other two instruments of the EU (engaged in external democracy promotion) that are studied in this thesis relate to the demand side of democracy promotion. The 'demand side' constitutes the people, who demand policies and benefits from the government, whereas, the government and its administration that supplies those policies and decisions consist of the 'supply side'. Both the EIDHR and the EED are the two funding instruments of the EU that promote substantive democracy by focusing upon the civil society aspects of a transitioning state. Though the amount allocated to them from the external relations budget is small as compared to what is being offered under the European Neighbourhood Instrument or the Development Cooperation Instrument, yet both the EIDHR and the EED are engaged in opening door for the EU's grassroots level work.

The EED is quicker in its approach and is a fast-track mechanism with less bureaucratic interference than the EIDHR. The EED was created to overcome the difficulties faced by EU institutions in dealing with situation on the ground during the Arab Spring. However, the funds available to the EED are insufficient as compared to the EIDHR. But, EED is able to offer immediate assistance to civil society groupings in times of need, and its spread of work has been appreciated. The low levels of funding indicates EU's cautious approach towards the civil society groupings of a transitioning neighbouring state, as instruments like these usually work outside the knowledge and permission of the government concerned. The EU, unlike the US, avoids being seen as too intrusive and will not prefer direct confrontation with neighbouring governments that will lead to the disruption of the entire neighbourhood relationship building process.

These instruments of the EU show a changing trend in the funding mechanisms by introducing 'more for more' concept in the neighbourhood policy i.e., more funding is allocated to states showing more improvement in democratic functioning. The EU's efforts at democracy promotion have reached the hardest of all regions such as West Asia in the post Cold War

years, more so after the incidents of 9/11 and the Arab Spring. The recent creation of instruments like the EIDHR and the EED stand in support of the second hypothesis that,

The EU's involvement with democracy promotion has intensified in the post Cold War years, both in terms of covering new regions and in terms of promoting the substantive aspects of democracy as well.

The study reflects that the end of the Cold war did intensify EU's role in democracy promotion, but it was only with the start of the new millennium and with the occurrence of events like 9/11 and the US war on Iraq, that the EU thought of relying more on mechanisms of substantive democracy promotion. The 1990s phase was more focused on procedural democracy promotion with aids and technical support to governmental and administrative mechanisms and less focused on grassroots level of working.

Much of the weakness of substantive democracy promotion within the European region is witnessed at the implementation level of programmes and policies of the EU. Punitive and preventive actions have hardly been taken with respect to violators of the essential clauses of the EU's neighbourhood policy or redressal of reports of electoral frauds observed during the electoral observation missions. Also, instruments like the EED are highly risk taking mechanisms which operate on the basis of trust in civil society groupings for effectively promoting substantive democracy. Nevertheless, the EU has become an inspirational force for democracy around the world. It represents a model of economic and political integration for countries within Europe and a beholder of democratic and other social political rights for countries outside Europe. These standards have to be met and maintained by new members for the continuation of EU's inspirational power (Brexit is too recent for its impact to be accurately assessed). The concept of democracy promotion has been diversified in the recent decades to meet the needs of the time. By promoting substantive democracy in the neighbouring states, the EU aims to secure its borders, trying to reduce the cost of social problems and risk of wars both in its own interest and in the interest of the country in which it is working.

The principles of the democratic peace theory are still adopted and upheld by the EU and therefore it aspires to provide lasting peace to its people by guaranteeing them security, freedom, human rights and prosperity that it believes are the hallmarks of a democratic society. Democracy promotion, for its sustenance, has to also fight back other challenges like the growing economic and political self confidence among authoritarian states such as China and Russia and the challenge of maintaining balance between the economic push and pull factors that affect the performance of advanced democracies, especially after the 2008 economic crises and the fault lines visible within European integration thereafter (reflected in the Greek economic crisis and in Brexit).

Though 'democracy promotion' is a widely used term with a wide connotation that includes 'democracy assistance' as well as 'democracy consolidation', yet it has been contested to such an extent that the EU now prefers to use the term 'democracy support', implying that – while external actors can play the role of a 'ventilator' for a short duration, the country concerned must ultimately learn to 'breathe' (democracy) on its own.

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ANNEXURES

MAPS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS

Map: Democratic (free), Semi-Authoritarian (partly free) and Authoritarian (not free) Countries in the World


Note: Freedom House is an independent organization working towards expansion of freedom and democracy around the world. 'Freedom in the World' is the annual survey report of Freedom House, indicating the status of political rights and civil liberties around the world. The Map indicates 'Free', 'Partly Free' and 'Not Free' countries in the world which is equivalent to 'democracies', 'semi-authoritarian' and 'authoritarian' governments respectively. This assertion is made because for Freedom House, freedom for the people is best achieved in liberal democratic societies.
Source: Map downloaded from official website of 'Freedom House' from the report "Freedom in the World 2016", [Online: Web] Accessed 6 June 2016, URL: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world

MAP: European Union's Member States, Candidate States, Potential Candidate States and Members of European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) or Partner States

SOURCE: Made by the Author with the help of cartographic lag at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

*Iceland is no more a candidate states since March 2015.

*United Kingdom has exited the EU as a member states since June 2016.

Annexure III

Map: Member States of the European Union – Chronology of Enlargements

Map illustrating the European Union's changing composition following the successive enlargements of the European Communities, from the six founding countries to the Union of 28 Member States.

Source: CVCE (2015), Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, CVCE.eu. by UNI.in, [Online: Web] Accessed 14 June 2016, URL: http://www.cvce.eu /en/obj/member_states_of_the_european_union_chronology_of_enlargements_and_c andidate_countries_2015-en-a47dfe4f-4c60-434f-80da-43ef28389166.html

ANNEXURE IV

Map: European Neighbourhood or Partner States

This map shows the 16 partner countries that are part of European Neighbourhood Instrument – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

SOURCE: ENPI Official Website, The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), [Online: Web] Accessed 12 June 2016, URL: http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id_type=2&id=402#TheENI_

United Nations

A/RES/59/201

General Assembly

Fifty-ninth session

Agenda item 105 (*b*)

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[*on the report of the Third Committee (A/59/503/Add.2)*]

59/201. Enhancing the role of regional, subregional and other organizations and arrangements in promoting and consolidating democracy

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 55/96 of 4 December 2000 and all relevant resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights, in particular resolutions 1999/57 of 27 April 1999,[1] 2000/47 of 25 April 2000,[2] 2001/41 of 23 April 2001,[3] 2002/46 of 23 April 2002,[4] 2003/36 of 23 April 2003[5] and 2004/30 of 19 April 2004,[6]

Recalling also that all peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of which they can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,

Reaffirming its resolve, expressed, inter alia, in the United Nations Millennium Declaration,[7] to implement the principles and practices of democracy, and recognizing the diverse nature of the community of the world's democracies,

1. *Declares* that the essential elements of democracy include respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association and peaceful assembly and of expression and opinion, and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic free elections by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the people, as well as a pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, transparency and accountability in public administration, and free, independent and pluralistic media;

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2.   *Reaffirms* that the promotion and protection of all human rights is a basic prerequisite for the existence of a democratic society, and recognizes the importance of the continuous development and strengthening of the United Nations human rights mechanisms for the consolidation of democracy;

3.   *Recognizes* the importance of all actions taken at the regional and subregional levels that are aimed at facilitating the establishment, development and consolidation of democratic institutions, based on democratic values and principles and capable of responding to the specific needs of the countries in each region;

4.   *Acknowledges* the importance of better awareness of democratic values and principles in all regions and for all people;

5.   *Reaffirms* that democracy, development and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, that democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives and, in that context, that the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national, regional and international levels should be universal and conducted without conditions attached; the international community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world;

6. *Acknowledges* that democracy contributes substantially to preventing violent conflict, to accelerating reconciliation and reconstruction in post-conflict peace building and, in peacetime, to resolving disputes that may impede economic and social progress;

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[1.]   See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1999, Supplement No. 3* (E/1999/23), chap. II, sect. A.
[2.]   Ibid.,*2000, Supplement No. 3* and corrigendum (E/2000/23 and Corr.1), chap. II, sect. A.
[3.]   Ibid.,*2001, Supplement No. 3* (E/2001/23), chap. II, sect. A.
[4.]   Ibid.,*2002, Supplement No. 3* (E/2002/23), chap. II, sect. A.
[5.]   Ibid.,*2003, Supplement No. 3* (E/2003/23), chap. II, sect. A.
[6.]   Ibid.,*2004, Supplement No. 3* (E/2004/23), chap. II, sect. A.
[7.]   See resolution 55/2.

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7.   *Recognizes* the need for Member States to pay further special attention and contribute to democratic institution-building by including relevant objectives to this effect in the mandates of peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building operations and by providing adequate resources in that regard;

8.   *Invites* intergovernmental regional, subregional and other organizations and arrangements, as well as non-governmental organizations, to engage actively in work at the local, national, subregional and regional levels for the constant promotion and consolidation of democracy and to initiate exchanges with the United Nations system on their experiences, inter alia, by:

(*a*) Identifying and disseminating best practices and experiences at the regional, subregional and cross-regional levels in promoting and protecting democratic processes;

(*b*) Establishing and supporting regional, subregional and national civic education programmes that provide access to information on democratic governance and stimulate dialogue on the functioning of democracy;

(*c*) Encouraging the study, in schools and universities, of democracy, human rights, good governance and the functioning of public administration, political institutions and civil society organizations;

(*d*) Elaborating and widely distributing reports, assessments, training material, handbooks, case studies and documentation on alternative types of democratic constitutions, electoral systems and administration so as to assist populations in making more informed choices;

(*e*) Encouraging the use of democratic consultative mechanisms in disputes as an opportunity for the parties involved to advance their interests within institutional frameworks;

(*f*) Working with the focal point for democracy of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;

9.   *Invites* States members of intergovernmental regional organizations and arrangements to include or reinforce the provisions of the constitutive acts of the organizations and arrangements that are aimed at promoting democratic values and principles and protecting and consolidating democracy in their respective societies;

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10. *Welcomes* the adoption by various regional, subregional and other organizations and arrangements of institutional rules designed to prevent situations that threaten democratic institutions;

11. *Invites* intergovernmental regional organizations and arrangements to institutionalize dialogue among themselves on joint actions to promote and consolidate democracy and democratic practices in all areas;

12. *Encourages* Member States and intergovernmental regional and cross-regional organizations and arrangements, as well as non-governmental organizations, to initiate networks and partnerships with a view to assisting the Governments and civil society in their respective regions in disseminating knowledge and information about the role of democratic institutions and mechanisms in meeting the political, economic, social and cultural challenges in their respective societies;

13. *Urges* the continuation and expansion of activities carried out by the United Nations system, intergovernmental organizations and Member States to promote and consolidate democracy within the framework of international cooperation;

14. *Invites* the United Nations system to identify, develop and coordinate effective policies of assistance in the field of democracy and, in this context, to support programmes of technical assistance to States, upon their request, aimed at:

(*a*) Developing a competent, independent and impartial judiciary and accountable government institutions;

(*b*) Strengthening political party systems, free and independent media and civil society organizations;

(*c*) Fostering a democratic culture;

15. *Calls upon* the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to stimulate dialogue and interaction within the United Nations system and between the United Nations system and interested intergovernmental regional, subregional and other organizations and arrangements on the ways and means of promoting democratic values and principles, on the basis of the present resolution and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Commission on Human Rights, and, to this end, to invite, inter alia, the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, including its Electoral Assistance Division, and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and regional organizations to inform the Commission on Human Rights, at its sixty-first session, of action taken to promote and consolidate democracy;

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16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of Member States.

74th plenary meeting 20 December 2004

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SOURCE: General Assembly (2005), "Enhancing the role of Regional, Subregional and other Organizations and Arrangements in Promoting and Consolidating Democracy", Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2004, A/RES/59/20, [Online: Web] Accessed 24 March 2014, URL: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/59/201

ANNEXURE VI

Joining the EU — The Accession Process

SUMMARY OF:

Treaty on European Union — joining the EU

SUMMARY

WHAT DOES THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (TEU) DO?
Article 49 provides the legal basis for any European country to join the EU.
Article 2 sets out the values upon which the EU is based.

KEY POINTS

Eligibility

The applicant country must comply with the following criteria.
- Be within geographical Europe.
- Respect and commit to the values set out in Article 2 TEU, namely: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law; respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; and respect for a pluralistic society and for non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men.

The applicant country must also satisfy EU eligibility criteria. These are commonly referred to as the Copenhagen criteria as they were defined by the European Council that took place in Copenhagen in June 1993. These criteria are the following:
- stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU;
- the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

The European Council that took place in Madrid in December 1995 added that the candidate country must be able to apply EU law and must be able to ensure that the EU law transposed into national legislation is implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.

The EU reserves the right to decide when the candidate country has fulfilled the accession criteria. Also, the EU itself must be able to integrate new members.

Procedure

1. **Application**

A formal application is lodged with the Council by the European country fulfilling the criteria contained in Article 2 TEU. The Council informs the <u>European Parliament</u>, the Commission and <u>national parliaments</u> of the application.

2. **Candidate status**

A country's status as a candidate country is granted by the European Council following a favourable opinion from the <u>Commission</u> and consent given by the European Parliament.

3. **Negotiations**

<u>Negotiations</u> are opened following a <u>unanimous decision</u> of the European Council and after having received a favourable recommendation from the European Parliament.

Negotiations take place in intergovernmental conferences between the governments of the EU countries and of the candidate country. The body of EU law (<u>acquis</u>) is divided into policy areas each to be negotiated separately. (There are currently <u>35 policy areas</u> or 'chapters'.)

During the pre-accession phase, the Commission monitors the candidate country's efforts to implement the *acquis*. It also assists the candidate countries during the process with pre-accession funding instruments, such as <u>TAIEX</u>.

Transitional arrangements may also apply. The parties discuss whether (and how) some rules can be introduced gradually to allow the new member or existing EU countries time to adapt. This is mainly discussed during the final stages of the negotiations.

4. **Screening process**

Running in parallel with the negotiations is the so-called screening stage. This consists of verifying whether individual items of the *acquis* listed in a given chapter have been transposed into the law of the candidate country. Only when the candidate country shows that it has already implemented a chapter of the *acquis*, or that it will implement it by the date of accession, can that chapter be provisionally closed. The exception is where a candidate country agrees special arrangements with respect to a part of the *acquis*.

The Commission informs the Council and European Parliament throughout the process, in particular by means of annual progress reports. The candidate country also draws up annual national programmes in which it assesses its own progress in implementing the different chapters of the *acquis*.

5. **Accession**

The ultimate goal of the negotiations is to prepare an accession treaty. The accession must be approved unanimously by the Council and must receive the <u>consent</u> of the European Parliament. The treaty is then signed and ratified by each of the EU countries and by the acceding country, each according to its own constitutional procedures.

Last update 10. 11. 2015

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Source: EUR-Lex (2015) Access to European Union Law, Europa [Online: Web] Accessed 16 January 1016, URL: http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URI SERV:l14536&from=EN

ANNEXURE VII

Chapters of The European Union *Acquis*

CHAPTERS	TOPIC	CONDITIONALITY PROVISIONS
Chapter 1	Free movement of goods	It implies that products must be traded freely from one part of the Union to another. In addition, sufficient administrative capacity is essential to notify restrictions on trade and to apply horizontal and procedural measures in areas such as standardisation, conformity assessment, accreditation, metrology and market surveillance.
Chapter 2	Freedom of movement for workers	It provides that EU citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State. EU migrant workers must be treated in the same way as national workers in relation to working conditions, social and tax advantages.
Chapter 3	Right of establishment and freedom to provide services	Member States must ensure that the right of establishment of EU national and legal persons in any Member State and the freedom to provide cross-border services is not hampered by national legislation, subject to the exceptions set out in the Treaty.
Chapter 4	Free movement of capital	Member States must remove, with some exceptions, all restrictions on movement of capital both within the EU and between Member States and third countries. The acquis also includes rules concerning cross-border payments and the execution of transfer orders concerning securities. Provisions are also included to combat financial crimes.
Chapter 5	Public procurement	It includes general principles of transparency, equal treatment, free competition and non-discrimination.
Chapter 6	Company law	It includes rules on the formation, registration, merger and division of companies. Rules are also mentioned for financial reporting and rules for the approval, professional integrity and independence of statutory audits.
Chapter 7	Intellectual property law	It specifies harmonised rules for the legal protection of copyright and related rights. Specific provisions apply to the protection of databases, computer programs, semiconductor topographies, satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission. Protections should also be implied in the field of industrial property rights, biotechnological inventions, pharmaceuticals and plant protection products. The acquis also establishes a Community trademark and Community design.
Chapter 8	Competition policy	It covers both anti-trust and state aid control policies, involving rules and procedures to fight anti-competitive behaviour by companies, to scrutinise mergers between undertakings, and to prevent governments from granting state aid which distorts competition in the internal market.
Chapter 9	Financial services	It includes rules for the authorisation, operation and supervision of financial institutions in the areas of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities markets.
Chapter 10	Information society and media	It includes specific rules on electronic communications, on information society services, in particular electronic commerce and conditional access services, and on audio-visual services. The acquis aims to the establishment of a transparent, predictable and effective regulatory framework for public and private broadcasting in line with European standards.

Chapter 11	Agriculture and rural development	It covers a large number of binding rules for effective functioning of the common agricultural policy (CAP). Running the CAP requires the setting up of management and quality systems such as a paying agency and the integrated administration and control system (IACS), and the capacity to implement rural development measures.
Chapter 12	Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy	It covers detailed rules related to general foodstuffs policy and sets hygiene rules for foodstuff production. Furthermore, the acquis provides detailed rules in the veterinary field, which are essential for safeguarding animal health, animal welfare and safety of food of animal origin in the internal market. In the phytosanitary field, EU rules cover issues such as quality of seed, plant protection material, harmful organisms and animal nutrition.
Chapter 13	Fisheries	It consists of regulations which do not require transposition into national legislation, but requires measures to prepare the administration and the operators for participation in the common fisheries policy, which covers market policy, resource and fleet management, inspection and control, structural actions and state aid control.
Chapter 14	Transport policy	It aims at improving the functioning of the internal market by promoting safe, efficient and environmentally sound and userfriendly transport services. It covers the sectors of road transport, railways, inland waterways, combined transport, aviation, and maritime transport.
Chapter 15	Energy	The energy acquis consists of rules and policies, notably regarding competition and state aids (including in the coal sector), the internal energy market (opening up of the electricity and gas markets, promotion of renewable energy sources), energy efficiency, nuclear energy and nuclear safety and radiation protection.
Chapter 16	Taxation	It covers extensively the area of indirect taxation, namely value-added tax (VAT) and excise duties. Excise duties on tobacco products, alcoholic beverages and energy products are also subject to EU legislation. As concerns direct taxation, it covers some aspects of taxing income from savings of individuals and of corporate taxes. it also requires complying with the principles of the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, aimed at the elimination of harmful tax measures. Measures are taken to prevent intra-Community tax evasion and tax avoidance.
Chapter 17	Economic and monetary policy	It contains specific rules requiring the independence of central banks in Member States, prohibiting direct financing of the public sector by the central banks and prohibiting privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions. Member States are subject to the Stability and Growth Pact on fiscal surveillance. New Member States are to comply with the criteria laid down in the Treaty in order to be able to adopt the euro in due course after accession.
Chapter 18	Statistics	It requires the existence of a statistical infrastructure based on principles such as impartiality, reliability, transparency, confidentiality of individual data and dissemination of official statistics. National statistical institutes act as reference and anchor points for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information.
Chapter 19	Social policy and employment	It includes minimum standards in the areas of labour law, equality, health and safety at work and anti-discrimination. The European Social Fund is the main financial tool through which the EU supports the implementation of its employment strategy and contributes to social inclusion efforts (implementation rules are covered under Chapter 22, which deals with all structural instruments).

Chapter 20	Enterprise and industrial policy	It seeks to promote industrial strategies enhancing competitiveness by speeding up adjustment to structural change, encouraging an environment favourable to business creation and growth throughout the EU as well as domestic and foreign investments. It mainly consists of policy principles and industrial policy communications.
Chapter 21	Trans-European networks	It covers the Trans-European Networks policy in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures, including the Community guidelines on the development of the Trans-European Networks and the support measures for the development of projects of common interest.
Chapter 22	Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments	They define the rules for drawing up, approving and implementing Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund programmes reflecting each country's territorial organisation. Member States must respect EU legislation in general, for example in the areas of public procurement, competition and environment, when selecting and implementing projects.
Chapter 23	Judiciary and fundamental rights	This requires the establishment of an independent and efficient judiciary. Impartiality, integrity and a high standard of adjudication by the courts are essential for safeguarding the rule of law. This requires a firm commitment to eliminating external influences over the judiciary and to devoting adequate financial resources and training. Equally, Member States must fight corruption effectively, as it represents a threat to the stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law. Member States must ensure respect for fundamental rights and EU citizens' rights, as guaranteed by the acquis and by the Fundamental Rights Charter.
Chapter 24	Justice, freedom and security	On issues such as border control, visas, external migration, asylum, police cooperation, the fight against organised crime and against terrorism, cooperation in the field of drugs, customs cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, Member States need to be properly equipped to adequately implement the growing framework of common rules. The most detailed part of the EU's policies on justice, freedom and security is the Schengen acquis, which entails the lifting of internal border controls in the EU.
Chapter 25	Science and research	Implementation capacity relates to the existence of the necessary conditions for effective participation in the EU's Framework Programmes. Member States need to ensure the necessary implementing capacities in the field of research and technological development including adequate staffing.
Chapter 26	Education and culture	A cooperation framework on education and training policies aims to converge national policies and the attainment of shared objectives through an open method of coordination, which led to the "Education and Training 2010" program, which integrates all actions in the fields of education and training at European level. As regards cultural diversity, Member States need to uphold the principles enshrined in Article 151 of the EU Treaty for preserving and promoting cultural diversity.
Chapter 27	Environment	It aims to promote sustainable development and is based on preventive action, the polluter pays principle, fighting environmental damage at source, shared responsibility and the integration of environmental protection into other EU policies. The acquis comprises over 200 major legal acts covering horizontal legislation, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution control and risk management, chemicals and genetically modified organisms (GMOs), noise and forestry.

Chapter 28	Consumer and health protection	Appropriate judicial and out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms as well as consumer information and education and a role for consumer organisations should be ensured. In addition, this chapter covers specific binding rules in the area of public health.
Chapter 29	Customs union	It includes the EU Customs Code and its implementing provisions, the combined nomenclature, common customs tariff and provisions on tariff classification, customs duty relief, duty suspensions and certain tariff quotas, and other provisions such as those on customs control of counterfeit and pirated goods, drugs precursors, export of cultural goods as well as on mutual administrative assistance in customs matters and transit.
Chapter 30	External relations	It results from the EU's multilateral and bilateral commercial commitments, as well as from a number of autonomous preferential trade measures. In the area of humanitarian aid and development policy, Member States need to comply with EU legislation and international commitments and ensure the capacity to participate in the EU's development and humanitarian policies.
Chapter 31	Foreign, security and defence policy	The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European security and defence policy (ESDP) are based on legal acts, including legally binding international agreements, and on political documents. The acquis consists of political declarations, actions and agreements. Applicant countries are required to progressively align with EU statements, and to apply sanctions and restrictive measures when and where required.
Chapter 32	Financial control	It relates to the adoption of internationally agreed and EU compliant principles, standards and methods of public internal financial control (PIFC) that should apply to the internal control systems of the entire public sector, including the spending of EU funds. It also includes protection of EU financial interests and the fight against fraud involving EU funds.
Chapter 33	Financial and budgetary provisions	It covers the rules concerning the financial resources necessary for the funding of the EU budget ('own resources'). Member States must have appropriate administrative capacity to adequately co-ordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources. The acquis in this area is directly binding.
Chapter 34	Institutions	When a country joins the EU, adaptations need to be made to these rules to ensure this country's equal representation in EU institutions (European Parliament, Council, Commission, Court of Justice) and other bodies and the good functioning of decision-making procedures (such as voting rights, official languages and other procedural rules) as well as elections to the European Parliament. The acceding countries need to ensure that they are able to participate fully in EU decision-making by setting up the necessary bodies and mechanisms at home and by electing or appointing well-prepared representatives to the EU institutions.
Chapter 35	Other issues	This chapter includes miscellaneous issues which come up during the negotiations but which are not covered under any other negotiating chapter. Chapter 35 is dealt with at the end of the negoating process.

This table mentions the conditionality provisions mentioned in the *Acquis* to become a member of the EU.

Source: EU Official Website, "Conditions For Membership", Chapters of the Acquis, updates 27/6/2013 [Online: Web] Accessed 24 March 2016 URL: http://ec.europa.eu /enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm

ANNEXURE VIII

Proposal by the European External Action Service and European Commission to Member States and the European Parliament for a New and Ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy

A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy
A number of important principles underpin the new European Neighbourhood Policy:

1. To support progress towards "deep democracy"
A functioning democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are fundamental pillars of the EU partnership with its neighbours. There is no set model or a ready-made recipe for political reform. While reforms take place differently from one country to another, several elements are common to building **deep and sustainable democracy** and require a strong and lasting commitment on the part of governments. They include:
- free and fair elections;
- freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media;
- the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial;
- fighting against corruption;
- security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.
Reform based on these elements will not only strengthen democracy but help to create the conditions for sustainable and inclusive economic growth, stimulating trade and investment. They are the main benchmarks against which the EU will assess progress and adapt levels of support.
It is increasingly important to complement EU engagement at a state level with much closer contact with non-governmental organisations and build a **partnership with societies**. Civil societies organisations are key actors in promoting democratic and market-oriented reforms based on shared values, and a thriving civil society is a barrier against authoritarianism. It also helps citizens to play their crucial role in providing policy inputs and holding governments to account.
We shall:
- establish partnerships in each neighbouring country and make EU support more accessible to civil society organisations through a dedicated Civil Society Facility
- support the establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy to help political parties and non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners
- promote media freedom by supporting civil society organisations' unhindered access to the internet and the use of electronic communications technologies
- reinforce human rights dialogues
-

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and of the European External Action Service, **political and security co-operation** between the EU and its immediate neighbours can shift to a higher gear in a number of areas.
We shall:
- enhance EU involvement in solving protracted conflicts
- make joined-up use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other EU instruments
- promote joint action with European Neighbourhood Policy partners in international fora on key security issues

2. To support sustainable economic and social development

Most partner countries have weak and poorly diversified economies that remain vulnerable to external economic shocks. The immediate objectives is to promote **sustainable economic growth and job creation** and improving social protection. **Trade** is a powerful instrument to stimulate economic growth and support economic recovery. It is therefore essential that we establish with each of them mutually beneficial and ambitious trade arrangements matching their needs and their economic capacities. Finally, **sector co-operation** provides the opportunities to advance economic integration with the EU internal market.
We shall:
- support partner countries' adoption of policies conducive to stronger sustainable and more inclusive growth, to the development of micro, small and medium-sized companies and to job creation
- strengthen industrial cooperation and support improvements to the business environment
- help to organise events to promote investment
- promote direct investment from EU SMEs and micro-credit
- build on the pilot regional development programmes to tackle economic disparities between regions
- launch pilot programmes to support agricultural and rural development
- enhance the macro-economic policy dialogue with partners making the most advanced economic reforms
- improve the effectiveness of Macro-Financial Assistance by streamlining its decision-making process
- enhance dialogue on employment and social policies
- negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with willing and able partners
- further develop trade concessions, especially in those sectors most likely to offer an immediate boost to partners' economies
- enhance sector co-operation, with a particular focus on knowledge and innovation, climate change and the environment, energy, transport and technology
- facilitate partner countries' participation in the work of selected EU agencies and programmes

Mobility and people-to-people contacts are fundamental to promoting mutual understanding and economic development. Labour mobility is an area where the EU and its neighbours can complement each other. The EU's workforce is ageing and labour shortages will develop in specific areas.
The ENP aims to develop a mutually beneficial approach where economic development in partner countries and in the EU, well-managed legal migration,

capacity-building on border management, asylum and effective law-enforcement co-operation go hand in hand. This approach is in line with the three pillars of the EU Global Approach and the recently adopted Communication on migration: The promotion and respect of migrants' rights are also an integral part of the approach.
We shall:
- Pursue the process of visa facilitation for selected ENP partners and visa liberalisation for those most advanced
- Develop existing Mobility Partnerships and establish new ones
- Support the full use by Member States of opportunities offered by the EU Visa Code

3. To build effective regional partnerships within the ENP
To strengthen the Eastern Partnership
We shall:
- move to conclude and implement Association Agreements including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, DCFTAs
- pursue democratisation
- pursue the visa visa facilitation and liberalisation process
- enhance sectoral cooperation, notably in the area of rural development
- promote benefits of the Eastern Partnership to citizens
- increase work with civil society and social partners
To build the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean
We shall:
- Undertake Comprehensive Institution-Building programmes similar to those implemented with the eastern partners;
- Launch a dialogue on migration, mobility and security with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt (as a first step towards a Mobility Partnership);
- Strengthen Euro-Mediterranean industrial cooperation
- Launch pilot programmes to support agricultural and rural development;
- Focus the Union for the Mediterranean on concrete projects with clear benefits to populations of the Mediterranean region ;
- Advance sub-regional co-operation
- Enhance dialogue on employment and social policies

4. A simplified and coherent policy and programming framework
A simplified and coherent policy and programme framework
Bilateral relations between the EU and each of its neighbours have become stronger in recent years. Close and intensive dialogue has developed not only on general political matters but on all specific areas of our co-operation. These very close relationships and a higher level of commitment call for much stronger **political steering** of our dialogue and co-operation.
While ENP Action Plans remain the framework for our general cooperation, the EU will suggest to partners that they focus on a limited number of short and medium-term priorities, incorporating more precise benchmarks and a clearer sequencing of actions. The EU will adapt the priorities for its financial assistance accordingly.
Implementing the new approach of the neighbourhood policy requires additional resources of up to €1242 million until 2013. Financial support will be provided to further reinforce the partnership with people across the region, support sustainable and inclusive growth, cover the additional needs stemming from the democratic transformation of partner countries, and fund the new initiatives stemming from this

review, notably in the areas of partnership with societies, rural and regional development.

We shall:

- Focus ENP Action Plans and EU assistance on a smaller number of priorities, backed with more precise benchmarks;
- Provide additional resources of over EUR 1 billion until 2013 to address the urgent needs of our neighbourhood
- Secure additional loan possibilities by the EIB and the EBRD, including an extension of the latter's mandate to selected Southern partners
- Promote more flexible and simpler aid delivery under the post-2013 successor to the present ENPI;
- Step up efforst of co-ordination between teh EU, its Member States and other key IFIs and bilateral donors

The documents available include:

- The Communication "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood" (Brussels 24 May 2011).
- A medium term Programme for a renewed ENP.
- Individual country reports for 2010 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Republic of Moldova, the occupied Palestinian territory, Tunisia and Ukraine.
- Eastern Partnership report.
- A report on the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity.

Sectoral report: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

For more on the ENP: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

Source: European Commission (2011), "A New and Ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy", MEMO /11/342, [Online: Web] accessed on 12 March 2015, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20110527_4_en.pdf

Annexure IX

Priorities of the EU while Building Relationship with Neighbouring States mentioned under the 'Regulation Establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument' (2014)

ANNEX II

Priorities for Union support under this Regulation

To support the achievement of the specific objectives provided for in Article 2, also taking into account jointly agreed documents as set out in Article 3(2), Union funding may address the priorities set out in points 1, 2 and 3 of this Annex.

Some of those priorities may be relevant for more than one type of programme. Possible amendments to this indicative list of priorities shall respect the principle of shared ownership.

Cross-cutting issues, including deep and sustainable democracy, human rights, gender equality, the fight against corruption and the environment, shall be addressed within those priorities.

1. Union support at bilateral level shall, as appropriate, address, inter alia, the following priorities:

   – human rights, good governance and the rule of law, including reform of justice, of the public administration and of the security sector;

   – institutional cooperation and capacity development, including for the implementation of Union agreements;

   – support to civil society actors and to their role in reform processes and democratic transitions;

   – sustainable and inclusive economic development, including at regional and local level, and territorial cohesion;

   – development of the social sectors, in particular for the youth, with a focus on social justice and cohesion and employment;

   – trade and private-sector development, including support to small and medium-sized enterprises, employment and implementation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas;

   – agriculture and rural development, including food security;

   – sustainable management of natural resources;

   – the energy sector, with a focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy;

   – transport and infrastructure;

   – education and skills development, including vocational education and training;

   – mobility and migration management, including the protection of migrants;

   – confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts, including support to affected populations and reconstruction.

The priorities set out in this point may contribute to more than one objective of this Regulation.

2. Union support at multi-country level shall, as appropriate, address, inter alia, the following priorities:

- human rights, good governance and the rule of law;

- institutional cooperation and capacity development;

- regional cooperation, in particular in the framework of the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity;

- higher education and skills development, students and staff mobility, youth and culture;

- sustainable economic development, trade and private sector development and support to small and medium-sized enterprises;

- the energy sector, including energy networks;

- transport and infrastructure interconnections;

- sustainable management of natural resources, including water, green growth, the environment and climate change adaptation and mitigation;

- support to civil society;

- mobility and migration management;

- confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts.

The priorities set out in this point may contribute to more than one objective of this Regulation.

3. Union support through cross-border cooperation programmes shall, as appropriate, address the following priorities:
- economic and social development;
- the environment, public health, safety and security;
- the mobility of persons, goods and capital.

The priorities set out in this point reflect common challenges. They constitute the framework for the identification of specific priorities with the cross-border cooperation participating countries. Civil society organisations will be involved in the development of the programmes and will be, together with local and regional authorities, their main beneficiaries.

Financial allocations per type of programme

Bilateral programmes: up to 80 %

Multi-country programmes: up to 35 %

Cross-border cooperation: up to 5 %

Source: EU Regulation (2014), "Establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument", Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 Of The European Parliament and Of The Council, 11 March 2014, *Official Journal of the European Union*, [Online: Web] Accessed 2 May 2015, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0232&from=EN

Annexure IX

Priorities of the EU while Building Relationship with Neighbouring States mentioned under the 'Regulation Establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument' (2014)

ANNEX II

Priorities for Union support under this Regulation

To support the achievement of the specific objectives provided for in Article 2, also taking into account jointly agreed documents as set out in Article 3(2), Union funding may address the priorities set out in points 1, 2 and 3 of this Annex.

Some of those priorities may be relevant for more than one type of programme. Possible amendments to this indicative list of priorities shall respect the principle of shared ownership.

Cross-cutting issues, including deep and sustainable democracy, human rights, gender equality, the fight against corruption and the environment, shall be addressed within those priorities.

1. Union support at bilateral level shall, as appropriate, address, inter alia, the following priorities:

– human rights, good governance and the rule of law, including reform of justice, of the public administration and of the security sector;

– institutional cooperation and capacity development, including for the implementation of Union agreements;

– support to civil society actors and to their role in reform processes and democratic transitions;

– sustainable and inclusive economic development, including at regional and local level, and territorial cohesion;

– development of the social sectors, in particular for the youth, with a focus on social justice and cohesion and employment;

– trade and private-sector development, including support to small and medium-sized enterprises, employment and implementation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas;

– agriculture and rural development, including food security;

– sustainable management of natural resources;

– the energy sector, with a focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy;

– transport and infrastructure;

– education and skills development, including vocational education and training;

– mobility and migration management, including the protection of migrants;

– confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts, including support to affected populations and reconstruction.

The priorities set out in this point may contribute to more than one objective of this Regulation.

2. Union support at multi-country level shall, as appropriate, address, inter alia, the following priorities:

- human rights, good governance and the rule of law;

- institutional cooperation and capacity development;

- regional cooperation, in particular in the framework of the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity;

- higher education and skills development, students and staff mobility, youth and culture;

- sustainable economic development, trade and private sector development and support to small and medium-sized enterprises;

- the energy sector, including energy networks;

- transport and infrastructure interconnections;

- sustainable management of natural resources, including water, green growth, the environment and climate change adaptation and mitigation;

- support to civil society;

- mobility and migration management;

- confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts.

The priorities set out in this point may contribute to more than one objective of this Regulation.

3. Union support through cross-border cooperation programmes shall, as appropriate, address the following priorities:
- economic and social development;
- the environment, public health, safety and security;
- the mobility of persons, goods and capital.

The priorities set out in this point reflect common challenges. They constitute the framework for the identification of specific priorities with the cross-border cooperation participating countries. Civil society organisations will be involved in the development of the programmes and will be, together with local and regional authorities, their main beneficiaries.

Financial allocations per type of programme

Bilateral programmes: up to 80 %

Multi-country programmes: up to 35 %

Cross-border cooperation: up to 5 %

Source: EU Regulation (2014), "Establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument", Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 Of The European Parliament and Of The Council, 11 March 2014, *Official Journal of the European Union*, [Online: Web] Accessed 2 May 2015, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0232&from=EN

ANNEXURE X

Table: Different Data Sources and the Measurements used by each to calculate Democracy around the World

DATA Sources for Measuring Democracy	Descriptions
BTI - Bertelsmann Transformations Index	This measure evaluates 129 countries of the World; on the basis of 17 criteria categorised into three divisions – political transformation, economic transformation and transformation management. Countries scored on a scale of 1-7 where 1 represents democratic and 7 is least democratic. Started in 2003.
Global Democracy Ranking	Evaluates 112 Countries of the World; on the basis of two dimensions – Political (include politics) and the non-political dimension (Gender, Economy, Knowledge, Health and Environment). Countries are rated on the scale of 1-100 where 1 represents least democratic and 100 as most democratic. Started in 2008.
Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index	Evaluates around 167 countries, on the basis of 60 factors which are divided into five dimensions – election process and pluralism, civil rights, government capability, participation and political culture; the countries are divided into four categories – full democracies, flawed democracies, Hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes; countries are rated in a scale of 1-10 where 1 is least democratic and the 10 is most democratic.
Freedom House, Freedom in the world report	Evaluates 195 countries and 15 territories; gives rating from 1-7 where 1 represents most free and 7 represents the least free, based upon 25 detailed indicators and divided into categories of Free, Partly Free and Not Free. The average of a country's political rights and civil liberties determine its ratings.

Polity	Cover 167 countries; rating is given between -10 to +10 where 10 represents full democracy and -10 represents autocracy; indicators are – Competitiveness of participation, regulation of participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executive.
Vanhanen's Index of Democracy Or the Polyarchy Dataset	Evaluates 187countries, measure democracy on the basis of two dimensions – Competition and participation; both are calculated using elections data. Scale is 0-100 where 0represents least democratic and 100 as most democratic.
Worldwide Governance Indicators (from the World Bank Group)	Evaluates individual governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996–2013, for six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption

Source: made by the author using data from the official websites of the measuring units and with the help of the Website – Democracy Barometer at a Glance, "Data Sources and Other indices", [Online: Web] URL: http://www.democracybarometer.org /links_en.html

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