

**CHALLENGES TO CHINA'S LEGITIMACY IN TIBET: ISSUES OF
HEGEMONY AND CONTESTATION, 1995 – 2013**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "Challenges to China's Legitimacy in Tibet – Issues of Hegemony and Contestation, 1995-2013" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


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CERTIFICATE


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ABBREVIATIONS

ATPD – ASSEMBLY OF TIBETAN PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES

CC – CENTRAL COMMITTEE

CCDI – CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION

CCP – CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

CTA – CENTRAL TIBETAN ADMINISTRATION

CPPCC – CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

CYL – COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE

CMC – CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION

DIIR – DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

EU – EUROPEAN UNION

GNP – GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

GPCR – GREAT PROLETARIAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION

GMD – GUOMINDANG

GMD – GUOMINDANG

HRW – HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

ICT – INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET

NPC – NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS

NCNA – NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY

NGO – NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION

PBSC – POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE

PLA – PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

PAPF – PEOPLE’S ARMED POLICE FORCE

PRC – PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

PCART – PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION OF TIBET

PSB – PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU

SOE – STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES

TAR – TIBET AUTONOMOUS REGION

TIN – TIBET INFORMATION NETWORK

TPI – TIBET POLICY INSTITUTE

TAP – TIBETAN AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE

TCHRD – TIBETAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

TPPRC – TIBETAN PARLIAMENTARY AND POLICY RESEARCH CENTRE

TWA – TIBETAN WOMEN’S ASSOCIATION

TYC – TIBETAN YOUTH CONGRESS

USA – UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UN – UNITED NATIONS

USSR – UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

UFWD – UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT

CHAPTER – INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Legitimacy can be termed as the validity to rule by a regime/state where the latter has the right to exercise political power; to enact, apply and enforce laws as well as the subject/populace has a general obligation to obey the laws. It grants the right to exercise sovereignty but however in many cases it is an issue of contention. Derived through numerous ways it forms the crux for the justification to exercise control by the state. In international law it is also highly significant as the absence of legitimacy of a particular regime can be seen as a cause for challenging its existence. In Tibet, for China the issue of legitimacy becomes more important due to the “Tibet Question”. Prior to its incorporation into the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Tibetan regions had de facto independence. The erstwhile traditional government of Tibet in Lhasa, the Ganden Phodrang, ruled over the diverse region through Tibetan Buddhism and other socio cultural links. However, it did face challenges and it was only in the latter half of the 19th century that the Lhasa government tried instituting certain modern modes of garnering legitimacy through the insertion of ideas of a nation state upon Tibet. Hence, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) encountered this primordial form of legitimacy when they first entered Tibet.

For the PRC, their mode of legitimising was based upon the historical notion that Tibet was always a part of China and that it was peacefully liberated from serfdom, feudalism and imperialism. Hence, the PRC does not view Tibet as a national issue but more of a class issue. It is also through a process of cooptation of the Tibetan elites by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), done through the United Front that legitimacy has been boosted by the PRC. There are also other legal rational institutional modes of gaining legitimacy such as the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) which maintains linkages between the CCP and its minorities including the Tibetans. With the 1978 reform and opening up phase, economic/performance legitimacy has emerged as a fundamental means of garnering legitimacy by the CCP in China and its extension in Tibet can be seen in its emphasis of a state driven modernisation. However the reforms have also had a serious impact on the socio political fabric of China, seen in Tibet in the

slow flourishing of Tibetan Buddhism, which the CCP also takes as a mode of improving its legitimacy in Tibet as along with granting the right to worship, it has also provided funding for the restoration of religious institutions and practices albeit for commercial purposes. The process of incorporation of elites has also mostly seen the induction of the “Living Buddhas”, reincarnated lamas who traditionally represented the charismatic form of legitimacy in Tibet. This has been done by China to circumvent the authority of the Dalai Lama who poses a major challenge to China’s legitimacy in Tibet. Through the inculcation of nationalism, the CCP has tried to bolster legitimacy, which is done through the Patriotic Education Campaigns. The Tibetan issue has vexed China for decades and as it forms the frontier for the Chinese nation state, security and stability also become important for strengthening legitimacy especially towards its larger population, even though it has a negative effect.

The year 1995 is chosen as a starting point because of the Panchen Lama issue and the tussle between Beijing and the Dalai Lama, over their reincarnation. The role of the Panchen is significant both spiritually as well as politically. The former Panchen was seen to be groomed by the CCP and held immense legitimacy among Tibetans. Thus the control over his lineage is of much significance to boosting legitimacy over Tibet. It is here that newer aspects of legitimacy of the Chinese state come up especially in context of the reforms when numerous contending ideologies have risen. These are seen in the form of policies, constitutional legislations and institutions which will influence religion and other cultural aspects of the Tibetans, seen in the form of the 2007 decree, “Order number 5” from the State Administration for Religious Affairs which stated that all reincarnations of *tulkus* of Tibetan Buddhism had to seek approval from the state otherwise they would be deemed illegal or invalid. Beijing had also organised World Buddhist Forums as a way of strengthening its legitimacy over Tibet especially with regard to curbing the influences of the Dalai Lama. The Chinese nominated Panchen is seen to be harping on China’s rights over the Tibetan regions. For lay Tibetan officials and cadres there are also the irresistible incentives for cooperation which are used to boost China’s legitimacy over Tibet. The issue of the Karmapa Lama is interesting as his recognition was approved by both the Dalai Lama as well as Beijing. He was also partially groomed by Beijing, which received a major setback when the young

reincarnate decided to escape to India in 2000. Also the 2008 pan Tibetan protests followed by the series of current self immolations are challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet. As the display of the banned Tibetan national flag and the slogans for a "Free Tibet" by protestors and self immolators suggests, the uprising was against what the locals perceive to be the fundamental illegitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet. To boost legitimacy in Tibet, a "Love the Motherland" campaign was launched in which Han Chinese cadres were sent to the Tibetan regions after the 2008 protests, reminiscent of the 1950s when numerous upper class patriots and other Tibetans were sent to visit different parts of PRC as well as appreciate the modernity that the party had brought in the country. This will be further elaborated in the chapters. Xi Jinping, the newly appointed General Secretary of the 18th Party Congress of the CCP visited Tibet in July 2011, reemphasising on the strategic importance of the region to the stability of the PRC which brings legitimacy to the forefront of Sino Tibetan relations.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature on the challenges to China's legitimacy can be divided into three sections. The first deals with a general introduction on Legitimacy, the Weberian ideas on legitimacy which forms the base for understanding legitimacy, liberal and revolutionary understanding and the idea of legitimacy by David Beetham. The next section deals with legitimacy in China seen through the writings of Tony Saich, Robert Weatherley and Willy Wo Lap Lam who have written the ways through which the CCP has tried to garner it through numerous means. The final section deals with how the CCP and the PRC has tried to bolster legitimacy in Tibet especially in the reform period, the challenges faced by them as well as the responses that has emerged.

Max Weber was one of the pioneers in the understanding of legitimacy and in his essay "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule" he has outlined three major forms of legitimate authority that are Traditional, Charismatic and Legal Rational, which are all ideal types. The traditional form is based on the sanctity of tradition derived mostly from feudal or patrimonial sources. It was seen as being mostly irrational and inconsistent. The traditional Confucian statecraft can be an example of Traditional legitimacy. Charismatic legitimacy is based upon the perceived extraordinary characteristics of an individual who

was able to inspire and move masses. Weber terms them as playing important roles in the traditional structures. An example of charismatic legitimacy can be that of Mao Zedong in modern Chinese politics. Legal Rational legitimacy is the one which is based on the belief in the content of law or natural law. For Weber, the best example of this was modern day bureaucracy. In such a case, commands are given in the name of an impersonal norm. Thus the belief in legality or the readiness to conform to rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedures is also a basis of legitimacy. In China, this can be seen in the form of the law of democratic centralism as followed by the CCP. Even though Weber termed the authority types as being ideal and pure, there can be a transition from one type to another. However, Weber also notes that power can also be exercised through coercion in the absence of legitimacy.

Legitimacy is also seen by the liberals as the modern state adhering to the rule of law whereby the government institutions and its associated judicial practices are conducted in a reasonable way. Thomas Hobbes saw the state to be legitimate if it maintained its social contract with its citizens. The modern period also shows that legitimacy can also be derived through elections by majority decision which becomes a source of legitimacy. The act of taking part in elections secures the obligation of citizens in principle to obey it. In communist societies, the Party in power derives its legitimacy from the ideology of Marxism and the movement towards the goal of communism. It is through a revolution that power is generally secured and in which the capitalist bourgeois class is overthrown and there is the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is led by the Communist Party. It is also the revolutionary credentials which provide the Party the legitimacy to rule over the populace. The Communist Party is seen as the final voice regarding the interpretation and dissemination of the ideology of Marxism and communism which provides it the legitimate authority over the masses.

David Beetham looks at legitimacy in terms of it being a complex multilayered concept occurring at different levels. He attributes three important notions to legitimacy. Firstly, legitimacy is acquired and exercised in accordance to the rule of law. Secondly, the rules of law embody an acknowledged principle of political authority, in terms of which they can be justified and thirdly that there is evidence of expressed consent to authority on the

part of those qualified to give it. Hence power being non legitimate can be understood. Beetham also constructs legitimacy of a state from legality whereby a state is legitimate in so far as it acquires power and exercises it in accordance with established rules. He emphasises much on the consent that the “ruled” grants to the “ruler” as a form of legitimacy. Thus he brings about the electoral mode of legitimacy which is present in a multiparty system which is a part of the liberal tradition of understanding legitimacy. He also looks further into the mobilisation mode of legitimacy, derived through the direct involvement of the masses in the implementation of a particular policy or political objective which is designated by and ultimately supportive of the government. This is mostly used as a legitimising tool by single party systems, for example the mass line under Mao. There is the assuming by the ruling party of a vanguard position and are seen as the representatives of the people as a whole and their activities in the regime’s cause as a demonstration of the continuing support of society at large. A critique of Weberian notions of legitimacy is provided where he emphasises on legitimacy much on the consent granted by the ruled to the ruler as well as the presence of certain elements of legal rational legitimacy even in the justification of a traditional mode. Thus Beetham also questions the pure types of legitimacy.

The ideas of legitimacy in China acquired by the CCP through the period since the formation of the PRC, assumes importance as a background regarding the issue of legitimacy in the Tibetan areas. Tony Saich and Willy Wo Lap Lam provide an overview of the way through which the CCP leadership derives legitimacy. While Saich mentions about issues of legitimacy in the PRC since the Maoist days, the reform period is also emphasised, whereas Lam mentions the regime of Hu Jintao and the Fourth Generation leadership. Tony Saich writes about the fact that in the post 1989 scenario it was the economic reforms pursued by Deng and not the centrally planned economy which would strengthen the party’s legitimacy which was challenged by the protests of 1989. However, this has also led to the growth of problems such as regional, ecological disparity and corruption which have challenged the legitimacy of the CCP, which has been tackled through putting economic growth on a firmer footing and also strengthening authoritarian rule. He also sees China in the reform period as being in a state of transition

where the decentralisation of the economy has led to serious changes at the political level affecting notions of legitimacy in China.

The CCP's unitary nation state project has to a certain extent been relaxed as due to the emergence of numerous realities which however does not mean China's decline or it turning into a federal structure. It is in these tensions that ideas of legitimacy are changing which Saich brings out. For instance he mentions about how legitimacy is bolstered by Beijing in Tibet through its dabbling in Tibetan Buddhism through the control of religious elites. It is through the stress on economic reforms and the absence of political reforms which are seen by him as challenging the legitimacy of the CCP. He believes that at present it is through the capacity to deliver economic goods and the leadership looking into other alternatives such as nationalism and neo Confucianism and stability that there is a garnering of legitimacy. A more democratic system would provide residual legitimacy as that would aid the regime in the difficult transition ahead. Marxism is also seen becoming redundant by him and the Party trying to bolster it through modes such as "Theory of the Three Represents", whereby there is the co-opting of the new social and economic reality in the CCP.

Willy Lam mentions about how the Fourth generation leadership of the CCP inherited a strong legitimacy crisis due to the intensive emphasis on unbridled economic growth in China. Through the Theory of the Three Represents, Jiang Zemin tried to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP, which was to strengthen the Party. For Hu Jintao the legitimacy lied in economic growth but a need to improve the welfare standards for the working people, farming classes and reducing the gap between the rich and the poor in China, which was on the rise and was a cause of social instability was much required. The author mentions about the idea of "scientific socialism" along with a scientific model of development. It meant economic and social development that are comprehensive, well coordinated and sustainable keeping the welfare of human beings in mind. The environmental problems were also seen as a cause of lowering the legitimacy of the CCP. There was an increase in the wealth divide between the Eastern coastal regions and the interior provinces which had led to an immense wealth gap, thus increasing social tensions, protests and demonstrations and thus threatening the legitimacy of the CCP.

There has also been an emphasis on the strengthening of administrative institutional legitimacy especially the rule of law. The strengthening of legitimacy has also been seen at the macro level in the launching of the “Open up the West Campaign” in 2001 and also a reemphasis on the North eastern regions which were the earlier centres of mega industrial growth. As a mode of lowering corruption and bolstering legitimacy, the regime provided citizens with the right to rectify seek compensation and challenge government decisions.

Factional politics is also a major reason for uneven development challenging legitimacy in China. For instance, the domination of the Shanghai clique in Chinese politics from 1989 to at least 2003 had led to the region’s tremendous growth. With the ascendancy of Jiang Zemin as well as Zhu Rongji, both from Shanghai, led to the growth of the Shanghai clique, which changed when the new administration of Hu and Wen would not emphasise on the development of Shanghai which was seen in the macro level adjustment control campaign of 2004. The author believes that the Fourth Generation leadership can be termed as political survivors; there is not much scope for drastic reforms to arise especially in the political sphere.

Robert Weatherley provides us with a chronological account of legitimacy which is a proper study of the principle methods of legitimacy employed by the CCP as a single ruling party since 1949. He looks at the Weberian ideas of legitimacy for understanding it in the context of China. All three notions of legitimacy are present, Traditional, Legal Rational as well as Charismatic in the rule of the CCP in China over the period. For instance, Mao and Deng had employed their charisma to garner legitimacy in the PRC during their leadership. Legal rational legitimacy is seen in the form of institutions as well as the principles of democratic centralism in China, Traditional modes are seen in the form of the revolutionary tradition of the CCP and the harking at traditional aspects of statecraft by the CCP leading China to its position as a superpower drawing heavily from the ideas of the Middle Kingdom. Furthermore, the CCP has tried to boost legitimacy through the ideology of Marxism/Communism, with its own variant in China and also earlier through mass mobilisations as seen in the case of Mao’s mass line and mass campaigns. The author also talks about the boosting of legitimacy through nationalism

and stability causing more problems to the CCP. What is significant is that every policy undertaken by the CCP can be taken as a mode of increasing its legitimacy among the Chinese. Performance based legitimacy is also seen by the author as boosting their legitimacy, which however has led to the unleashing of newer problems denting its legitimacy. In the post 1989 phase there are also cases of strengthening of legal rational legitimacy as seen in the smooth transfer of power. Efforts have also been made to develop an electoral mode of legitimacy in the village areas. The sprouting of stability as a basis of legitimacy is a new phenomenon claiming CCP rule as the only guarantee for political stability and safety. There has been an enhancing of anti foreign nationalism as a form of legitimacy by the CCP along with revisions in Marxism. Even with impressive economic growth there are still major social and economic disruptions which have become extremely high profile giving rise to corruption, unemployment and social unrest.

It is performance legitimacy that is illustrated widely in the official documents from the PRC pertaining to the development and modernisation of Tibet which includes the White Papers brought out by China. The Tibet Work Forum lays down the work that the state has primarily set for Tibet, thus seen as the basic foundation for developmental projects as well as recounting the phase of modernisation that Tibet has undergone. The China statistical yearbooks as well as the local provincial statistical yearbooks, all provide the primary sources on the development strategy that the Chinese government has with regard to Tibet. These are extremely strong in data, statistics presenting modernisation as the answer to all of the problems faced by Tibet. Hence, the economic growth and development in the Tibetan regions is seen as a tool to consolidate the PRC's legitimacy over the Tibetans. A strong assertion of the idea that Tibet was always a part of China which had been liberated from its dark feudal past forms a strong basis of legitimising China's rule over Tibet. Hao Shiyuan, Rong Ma, Zhang Yun and Xiong Kunxin are strong supporters of the view that Tibet was liberated by the CCP and that serfdom had been ended by the CCP. Most of them are also positive of the view of the local budget in the Tibetan regions being fully dependent on funds from the central government.

Rong Ma is of the view that the nation state is a Western construct along with ideas of race, tribe, class, ethnicity which have been imposed upon China. He supports the view

that Tibet was always a part of the Chinese empire and in the 19th century had been swayed by the Western powers, thus giving roots to ideas of liberation of the Tibetan regions. Hence securities of the minority regions which are mostly at the frontiers are equally important. The Tibetan regions are also placed under the Confucian world order which further justifies Beijing's rule over the region. Ma Rong further disapproves of the idea of granting the status of "nationalities" to the ethnic minorities and stresses on the fact that there is a strong need to culturally assimilate them into the dominant Han culture. It is through the citizenship of the Chinese nation that assistance can be provided to the ethnic minorities. An institutional mode of gaining legitimacy among the ethnic minorities is also mentioned by him such as through representation in the National People's Congress as well as through regional autonomy. More importantly he also emphasises on the massive socio economic development that has occurred in the minority regions under the PRC, which is also laced with a wealth gap between the Hans and the minorities, thus calling for a modernisation of the minorities which is required for bringing about stability of China. However, there is a need to strongly adhere to the local characteristics while implementing development and that modernisation of the traditional activities needs to take place. Furthermore, an overdependence on funds from Beijing in the minority areas such as Tibet has led to negative effects. However, Ma Rong emphasises on a process of acculturation and assimilation in the long run to resolve the ethnic issues in China.

The performance based legitimacy of the CCP in Tibet is also taken up by Andrew Martin Fischer who accepts the fact that massive development prospects have been brought about in Tibet but which he terms it as the exclusionary dynamic of growth, completely controlled by Beijing and totally subsidy driven. It is termed as fuelling an ethnic exclusionary division. He terms the Tibetan economy being wholly dependent on subsidies which are mostly driven to the service sector in the economy, which consists of government and Party agencies and other social organisations related to the state. There is also the funding of major infrastructural projects which are again contracted to state owned firms and companies based in the Eastern coastal regions. Thus, subsidies meant for Tibet returns to Beijing or the provincial government which is termed by him as "boomerang funding". Hence, legitimacy drawn through economic performance in Tibet

has not led to a growth for support among the Tibetans for China. He also brings to the forefront that China's economic development serves a dual purpose, civilian as well as military and is geared more to the latter. Therefore, the economic growth trumpeted in Tibet by China has widened the gulf between the majority of the locals and Beijing. Jin Wei criticises the aid program of Beijing towards the Tibetan regions which is seen as having a disappointing effect on the local economy. According to her, the process has failed to create a foundation for sustainable growth and a need has come for policies to be adapted in accordance to local conditions and participation from local communities.

However, scholars like Yang Minghong, Lobsang Zandui from Sichuan University have disagreed with Wei's and Fischer's argument as they believe that the critics have solely taken the income of the Tibetans as a variable to reflect the absence of economic growth in the region, but have failed to consider alternative forms of income such as animal products, machinery and stored crops. Yang and Lobsang are also of the view that the subsidies have been injected much in social welfare including education of the Tibetans, which has aided in the growth of legitimacy for China. Legitimacy and sovereignty form a core issue in Dawa Norbu's work on Sino Tibetan relations. He sees history between the two as one of contestation over sovereignty and legitimacy especially religious interactions where the lamas of Tibet used to provide legitimacy to numerous successive dynasties over the nomadic tribes of Central Asia. Furthermore, with the coming of the modern nation state, the PRC's legitimacy claims over the Tibetan regions have been strongly affected, changing it from indirect to direct rule.

The changing language in the Tibet Work Forum reports brought out by the PRC with regard to Tibet are indicative of a stress on stability as a requirement for legitimacy. The first Work Forum was held in 1980, in the aftermath of the nation implementing the policy of reform and opening up. It was much liberal with regard to the Tibetan areas and was geared towards development by taking into strong consideration the uniqueness of the Tibetan circumstances and emphasised on recruitment of more Tibetan cadres for development. However with the protests and demonstrations by Tibetans in 1988-89 and China facing much flak from the Western world as well as the Dalai Lama's initiatives for Tibet in the West changed much of this. This is seen in the report of the Third Work

Forum which was held in 1994, which emphasised on achieving development as well as stability in the region. The economic development was geared towards stifling the separatist activities of the Dalai Lama. Hence, stability from economic development was a major mode of gaining legitimacy.

It is from the Third Work Forum that a massive fund from the central government was to be invested in Tibet which has continued till date. Tibetan Buddhism was also seen as a roadblock to Tibet's modernisation and was seen as challenging China's legitimacy in Tibet. The Fourth Work Forum was held in 2001 and emphasised on the need to strengthen the legitimacy of the Communist Party which could be garnered through accelerated "leap frog" development. The traditional institutions as well as Tibetan culture were attacked in the Fourth Work Forum and were seen as boosting separatism. In the post 2008 pan Tibetan protests, the Fifth Tibet Work Forum was held in Beijing from January 18-20 and it called for the inclusion of all the Tibetan inhabited regions in the neighbouring provinces of Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai into the ambit of the Work Forum. The report reflects China's concerns over its legitimacy in Tibet by emphasising on growth in the rural areas, implementing certain social welfare measures like providing free education to the rural sector. The castigating of the Dalai Lama as well as the need to control Tibetan Buddhism is seen as a requirement for enhancing the legitimacy of the CCP in the Tibetan regions. Thus, the Tibet Work Forums can also be termed as an institutional, a mode of legal rational legitimacy which the CCP has instituted to bolster its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas.

Another form of legal rational legitimacy instituted by the CCP is the national regional autonomy towards its national minorities which includes Tibet, enshrined in the Constitution of the PRC. Under this the PRC is a unified multiethnic state with 56 ethnic groups and 55 national minorities. It provides the unified leadership of the state regional autonomy which is practised in areas where people of ethnic minorities live in compact communities, enjoying self governance. The Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy also provides clear provisions such as the formation of autonomous regions and the composition of self governance. This law adopted in 1982 provided a link between the central government and the ethnic areas. In certain areas where the minorities are

scattered there is also the provision for formation of ethnic townships. The right to their own people's congresses and people's government which should also include an appropriate number of members from other ethnic groups living in the area is also provided. It is formalised in Section Five, Chapter Three of the Constitution.

The Ethnic Minorities have the right to independently manage their own affairs in the autonomous area achieved through elections to the local congress and people's government. Furthermore freedom of religious beliefs, retaining of local cultures and folk beliefs as well as use and maintenance of their languages are provided. Education is also to be promoted as according to their local situations. The central government also provides economic development and aid in the growth of the autonomous regions. It is on the basis of this institutional legitimacy that China further justifies itself in Tibet. Lin Feng strongly believes that large degree of autonomy has been granted to the Tibetans and he strongly criticises the Dalai Lama's proposal on the "Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People" made in 2010 as a disguised attempt towards seeking Tibetan independence. He states that the demands made by the Dalai Lama of the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau and of a greater Tibet is seen as challenging China's sovereignty over Tibet.

Michael C. Davis argues that the Chinese have extended this promise of autonomy in a much limited form especially in the case of Tibet, as the contestation of Chinese sovereignty by the Tibetans has limited the working of this autonomy. He mentions about the Tibetan government in exile seeking genuine autonomy to the Chinese especially with the "Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People" which mentions about provisions which are in line with the Law on National minority Autonomy. However this was rejected by the Chinese government. He also mentions about the overarching control imposed by the CCP over the autonomy provided in Tibet through legislation of laws and the appointment of a Han Party Secretary. However for China as a responsible rising power it needs to conform to its national and international obligations, autonomy to its indigenous population being a primary one. Stephanie Roemer and Fiona McConnell have provided a detailed analysis of the Tibetan government in exile, the Dalai Lama and a general representation of exile. What is extremely important are the alternative modes

of legitimacy as propounded by the exile community over Tibet and its population. The Tibetan Government in exile also claims legitimacy from the wider cause that it represents- that of restoring freedom of Tibet. Its legitimacy is boosted further with its practice of non-violence. Hence an ideological form of legitimacy in the form of nationalism and non violence boosts the institutional legitimacy that the government in exile is. As a nation in rehearsal it is a source of alternative nationalism for Tibetans, which is pre dominantly, described through Tibetan Buddhism. The nation is being understood in the realm of the sacred which in turn gives a material basis to the spiritual underpinnings of the pre exiled nationhood. Thus, in the performance of the rituals that Roemer mentions, we have the nation being performed. This performance marks it as historically distinct from China.

Ming Xia, Sun Wenguang, Wang Lixiong and Yao Xinyong believe that the protests and demonstrations in Tibet are mostly against China's policies and the demands for freedom are direct challenges to China's legitimacy. One of the most significant and highly volatile protests has been the pan Tibet protest of 2008, which drew repression and a major security clampdown of Tibet. However this has not stopped the Tibetans from expressing their rejection of some Chinese policies and they have resorted to various peaceful tactics, non cooperation movements, boycotts and the White Wednesday or Lhakar during which people eat Tibetan food, speak Tibetan and wear Tibetan clothes; vegetarianism, abandonment of monasteries by monks and nuns to escape from the new rules, demonstrations and support of the Tibetan language, coded radical poetry and also self immolations.

Tsering Shakya terms the self immolations as galvanising the Tibetan diaspora community with a particular political force and significance. He mentions about history playing an important role where with the coming of the PRC and the Communists the earlier high degrees of self governance was completely shifted to centralised administration. The protests by the Tibetans and the Uyghurs in China are strongly ethno nationalistic and are not centred on a set of particular rights and grievances. The socio-economic disparity can only be seen as a small factor in the protests and conflict carried out by Tibetans.

It is the primordial linkages which are the basis for the protests and thus such protests and demonstrations completely challenge the fundamental structure and legitimacy of the state, with demands that are often taken outside the authorised channels setup by the state for dealing with contentious claims. Through protesting, the individual shows that the state and its laws are typically inaccessible, arbitrary and alien and thus illegitimate. These protests are not motivated by policy grievances but are “separatism” in nature. The Chinese government has blamed the outside world, mostly the Dalai Lama and exile organisations for instigating the protests inside Tibet, thus making the outsiders a serious challenge to China’s legitimacy in Tibet. In the case of the self immolations, the authorities generally tried to douse the fires and take the immolator to the hospital or to quickly carry out funerals which led to massive protests. The notion was to regain legitimacy over the body of the dead Tibetans and then offer the appropriate funerals. Beijing has also tried to put the Tibetan challenges to its legitimacy over Tibet through the arousing of anti Tibetan, anti Dalai and anti foreign nationalism as seen in the aftermath of the 2008 protests and the protest during the Olympic torch relay.

Another significant manner through which legitimacy has been garnered by the CCP in Tibet is through the gift of development, which is aimed at eliciting gratitude from Tibetans. Emily T. Yeh looks at it as a hegemonic process that aims at transforming not only the land but the people, which is still an ongoing process that has deep political and cultural repercussions. Rich in ethnographic research, she brings about a new understanding to the Sino Tibetan issue through deploying the ideas of hegemony as propounded by Antonio Gramsci, where hegemony is rule through consent, a process where the subordinated groups accept the values propounded by the ruling powers. This is seen in development brought about by China in Tibet, where we witness Tibetan consent and participation. Hence, her book “Taming Tibet” looks at the hegemonic projects in which Tibetans were recruited at specific periods which later became sites of resistance and struggle.

Development is a government project which is all encompassing and one that aims at creating a certain subject, through formation of governable subjects and spaces, which for Tibet, a frontier region of China assumes importance. However, this project is seen to be

confronted by a set of socio-cultural and historical factors, creating an interaction that can be deemed hegemonic. Coercion however provides support to this hegemonic project of economic development, which is elaborated in the first chapter. In this, the author looks into how the Chinese state exercises spatial authority over Tibetans through exerting disciplinary modes of power, for instance wielding authority over Tibetans during certain legal and illegal anniversaries. Control is seen over Tibetan religious practices such as circumambulations and pilgrimages, which are embodied practices of place making for Tibetans, ones that shape their worldview, creating a common Tibetan identity across the plateau in the absence of a strong centralized state. Yeh looks at how spaces are turned into the exclusive domains of the state, controlled to enable a form of territorialisation of Tibetans into the PRC. Tibetans are dubbed as “special cases” and are placed in a “state of exception”, which is witnessed in the form of spatial partitioning, segmentation, registration and control over mobility but also through the heightened visibility of the state’s capacity for violence. Self surveillance is also indulged upon by Tibetans due to the pervasiveness of the Chinese state.

Rest of the chapters are divided into three sections titled Soil, Plastic and Concrete, invoking the three specific ways through which landscape transformation has occurred. Soil covers the period from 1950s to 1980s, looking into state farms, wasteland reclamation projects, communes and mechanized agriculture as ways of incorporating Tibetans into PRC. It specifically looks into how labour on these projects were a key component, especially the recruitment of female labour as a form of surrogate proletariat, hence turning them into citizens of the communist state. The July First and August First State farms were the first to be established in 1952, playing an important role in sustaining the PLA troops stationed in Tibet, as they cultivated vegetables which were much required in the diet of the Han Chinese soldiers. The Maoist slogans of “conquering nature” became a rallying cry for establishing more state farms after reclamation of wastelands. These lands were portrayed as being barren and empty, even though they had embodied social relations, and were lived landscapes. By 1954, around 2600 hectares of wasteland had been reclaimed for agriculture mostly by the PLA. The July First State Farm was also hegemonic as it was the site of scientific agriculture brought to Tibetans. Through elements of consent forged in part through the promise of gender mobility, these

farms brought about state territorialisation for China. The chapter also covers the period of the communes and collectivization implemented in the 1960s which was not well received by Tibetans that continued till 1984 when the Household Responsibility was implemented granting farmland user rights to individual households.

Reforms brought the second major landscape transformation and a new form of state territorialisation through Han migrants, while Tibetans were portrayed as “too lazy” or “backward” and hence in need for development brought by China. The section on Plastic alludes to the greenhouse vegetable cultivation participated by Han Chinese migrant farmers in the peri-urban regions of Lhasa on land subleased from Tibetan peasants, majority of them hailing from Sichuan province especially from Mianyang and Shuangliu counties. The party state’s policies of encouraging Han migration into Tibet for economic development is seen through their “aid Tibet” projects and the “aid Tibet” cadres, who would transfer their skills and expertise which has not occurred. Contrarily official policies such as improving infrastructure and freeing of restrictions on Chinese doing business in Tibet are seen to have encouraged more migration. The author invokes socio-cultural elements, seen in the form of networks of kinship and native places that are advantageous to Hans. The idea of “*suzhi*” or high quality becomes important as Tibetans are termed as having lower quality; to increase which the Han Chinese migrants are required. She also looks into how Tibetans are seen as being spoiled by massive subsidies from the Chinese state when in reality it favours the Han Chinese migrants.

Although vegetable cultivation is highly lucrative, the Tibetans are seen to be not practicing it. This is explained through the Gramscian analytic of ‘overdetermination’ which bears in mind the intertwining of the political, economic and cultural practices. This is seen in a moral economy where Tibetans do not rent their land to their neighbours to prevent commodification of their social relations and their refusal to participate in vegetable cultivation which is dubbed a female activity. The idea of “lazy” Tibetans that can be overcome through economic development is emphasised upon by the state. However laziness as a trope is historically and culturally constituted, informed by gendered notions of what constitutes as work and what does not or what sorts of work are worth doing. Hence, these are contradictory ways of negotiating development as a

hegemonic project. The idea of laziness opposes the hegemonic idea of self cultivation; hard work which the Chinese state through development has brought to Tibet. This is further negotiated by Tibetans through the trope of spoiled Tibetans, especially spoiled by the city. This becomes important as the third section of the book termed “Concrete” looks into urbanization as an important process of territorialisation.

The Western Development Campaign launched in 2000 was to increase the economic development of the western regions of PRC, in which the process of urbanization assumed importance. The urban has been valorized as the site of modernity, progress and development. Hence, much of the peri-urban and rural areas of Lhasa were amalgamated into the project of urbanization. The villagers were to be shifted to new concrete settlements built by the state that was generously subsidized but requiring contributions from the family. Urbanisation is also a tactic of diluting the ethnic autonomy system of the Tibetans. Emily Yeh elaborates on the emergence of a booming real estate industry in Tibet which caters to retired cadres and others, with land grabbing for such purposes being rampant that is termed as state generosity. The houses for the rehabilitated Tibetans are seen to be culturally and socio-psychologically incompatible. Termed as comfortable houses, a part of the New Socialist Countryside aimed towards the upliftment of farmers and nomads, they are meant to evoke sentiments of gratitude towards the party state. However, the author portrays them as a hegemonic project as it tries to create a desire for more material improvement among Tibetans. Through urbanisation, the Tibetans are turned into rational economic actors, integrated into the market and also becoming self cultivated, consumerist society. However in reality, the housing project has led to the incurring of debt among Tibetans.

In the Conclusion, development is termed as a political project between states and subjects. It is an important way of gaining legitimacy by China and to consolidate the Tibetan geographical space as territory. The party state is seen to be indulging in a cultural and spatial mode of domesticating Tibetans or taming them. In an afterword, Emily Yeh mentions about the hundred self immolations that took place mostly in eastern Tibet, incorporated in Sichuan and Qinghai provinces. The self immolations are seen as a fiery reclamation of sovereignty over one’s self, of the possibility of being human which

had been much curtailed by the disciplinary gaze of the state. Furthermore, the act of self immolations has been criminalized, which reaffirms the omnipresence of the state as being the final arbiter of life in Tibet that has however failed. The self immolations are an act that displays the failure of the state in Taming Tibet, which is a challenge to China's legitimacy over Tibet.

The anthropologist Charlene Makley in her pioneering book "The Violence of Liberation – Gender and Buddhist Revival in Post Mao China", looks into how Tibetan Buddhism has remained an important ideology of gaining legitimacy for Tibetan ruling elites, both secular and religious. Her research looks into the great monastery of Labrang, in Gansu and the authority exercised by the monastery and its reincarnates in the region. According to Makley, the process through which the monasteries and tulkus have gained legitimacy in the Tibetan areas can be termed as "mandalisation" a process where the tulkus and monasteries are able to tame the land, its people and the local deities binding them to serve Tibetan Buddhism. The process through which this mandalisation takes place is through the exercising of masculine authority of the tulkus and the monasteries, which occurs through a number of ways.

The author also looks into how the authority of the monasteries and tulkus were a form of hybrid authority, which was a combination of the masculine authority of the tulkus and the earlier Mongol rulers or the Qing rulers and later Nationalists rulers of China. However this is seen to have been altered with the arrival of the CCP in these regions who initiated a modern nation building project which led to the challenging of the authority of the tulkus and the monastery. The strongest opposition to the authority of the tulkus and monasteries is seen to have emerged from the mid 1950s till the late 1970s especially the demise of Mao and the implementation of liberal reforms by Deng Xiaoping, which led to the revival of Tibetan Buddhism and the resurgence of the earlier institutions of monasteries and the tulkus, enabling the re-emergence of the legitimacy of the masculine authority of the tulkus. Hence, Makley looks into the period of the reforms and its impact on the revival of Tibetan Buddhism, placing it in the context of legitimacy in Tibet.

A number of memoirs and books recollecting the memories of the early periods of Chinese rule such as “My Tibetan Childhood – When Ice Shattered Stone” by Naktsang Nulo, a former government official in Tibet, which was published in 2007 inside Tibet and widely read by many Tibetans forms an important source of inspiration which challenged China’s legitimacy over Tibet as it presents a strong counter narrative to China’s ruling discourse on Tibet. The memoir is replete with strong suffering and pain which the Tibetans underwent during the “peaceful liberation” brought about by China. Although the book does not directly challenge China’s legitimacy over Tibet, it truly forms an important source for collating solidarity among Tibetans, united by a common legacy of suffering under the PRC. Hence, the childhood memoirs of Naktsang Nulo can be termed as a form of “speaking bitterness” inside Tibet which was much acclaimed by Tibetans and formed one of the sparks for the 2008 pan Tibet uprisings.

As Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony is used in this research, there is a need to introduce and elaborate on the notions of hegemony as propounded by Antonio Gramsci. The Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci is credited for theorising on the concept of hegemony as a tool of social analysis and political strategy. It is in his Prison Notebooks, that ideas of hegemony have been much elaborated. Hegemony can be seen as the ability of the ruling power to derive consent from the ruled where the dominating power’s values live in the minds and lives of the subalterns as a spontaneous expression of their own interest. It transformed into the idea of “common sense”. Gramsci was much concerned with the absence of a socialist revolution occurring in the developed industrial nations of the west during the early periods for which he looks into the aspect of culture and hegemony. He saw hegemony as a relational concept of power which is derived through consensus by the state/ruling power and is backed by the coercive state apparatus. It is also a case where the dominated also contribute to and participate in their domination through the actions which are informed through their worldview, which in many cases is also shaped by material realities.

According to Gramsci, hegemony is exercised mainly through the civil society and is much stronger in the developed Western nations. He further uses the analogy of the “War of manoeuvre” and “War of position” to explain how hegemony works, where it is the

latter which corresponds closely to hegemonic practices. It was the intellectuals who played a central role in mediating hegemony of the exploiting classes, via the ideological systems of which they were the organising agents. However, he also elaborated the idea of counter hegemony; where the ruled were not condemned to perpetually reproduce the hegemonic consensus that maintains their subordination. These classes could also overturn hegemony which was done through the “war of position”, using civil society, which turned into the terrain upon which resistance to hegemony was built but also a counter hegemony was produced.

There is a massive array of literature on the notions of legitimacy and the challenges that China especially CCP is facing mostly after the reforms. The issue of China’s legitimacy over Tibet has also been dealt extensively and is the key in understanding the Tibet Question. It is the single most important factor which affect’s China’s relationship with foreign nations especially the Western countries, as a major criteria for enhancing relations with China is to recognise its claim over Tibet as being legitimate which indicates that China is still facing challenges on its legitimacy in context to Tibet. The foreign policy and diplomatic angle should also be seen as Tibet garners popular support in numerous nations especially due to the Dalai Lama and a vibrant exile community, thus garnering legitimacy plays an important role in silencing its critics. Although this support to the Tibetans may not be political, numerous non state actors and transnational groups are seen to be supporting Tibet.

A gap which can be seen is in the absence of a study of the challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet from the perspective of a security analysis where maintaining genuine popular legitimacy for China in Tibet in the form of winning the support of the locals is secondary and what matters is stability in the frontier regions. What is also needed is the study of the economics of security as coercion and control are big business in the Tibetan areas for China; hence coercion works rather than garnering legitimacy. Another lacuna in the literature can be seen in the need to understand how legitimacy is derived by the traditional institutions in Tibet especially in the reform period with the revitalisation of Tibetan Buddhism, thus the emergence of new modes of legitimacy.

Lastly there is also a need to understand the different perspectives on legitimacy by the Tibetans and the Chinese, where the former is stressed more on a traditional, ethno nationalistic charismatic belief while the latter is based more on economic, legal rational modes of legitimacy. There has not been a proper understanding of China's legitimacy over Tibet in terms of the CCP and its local branches in the Tibetan regions. The actions of the cadre-officials as well as the local policies implemented by them become an important tool in understanding how on the ground China tries to establish its legitimacy over Tibet. In most cases it is seen that the local cadre-officials have been pursuing a more hard line policy than what Beijing wants in its remote restive region of Tibet.

DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Legitimacy forms an important issue for nations, especially post colonial nation states that are on the process of nation building, where there is a move from the "civilisation" to the modern nation state. China is seen to be indulging in such a process and in the reform period is in a state of transition where everything is in flux. In Tibet, it is extremely important as it is seen to be one of the restive regions of China, where demands of independence have not disappeared with more than five decades of China's rule. Furthermore, it becomes a priority as the 2008 pan Tibet protests is symptomatic of the fact that the legitimacy of the PRC has been seriously challenged. Furthermore, Tibet is a major diplomatic hassle for the PRC, as it enjoys popular support among the majority of the world's population, especially seen in the support given by Western celebrities, which however has strong drawbacks. The Dalai Lama assuming international popularity is seen as a major embarrassment for the Chinese government which reduces its legitimacy over the Tibetan regions. Hence legitimacy is a constantly evolving and contentious process. With China's rise and its ambitions to be a responsible world power, there is a strong need to maintain stability and peace especially among its minorities, the Tibetans being a top priority as due to the massive international support it enjoys. Hence its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas needs to be strengthened and emphasised on lines of it trying to secure popular legitimacy among the Tibetans.

With the reforms and opening up, modern modes of communication has improved and increased in the Tibetan areas, thus opening up these remote regions to other parts of the

world, bringing the exile community closer to the Tibetans inside Tibet. This rise in the linkages between Tibet and its diaspora has also challenged the legitimacy of China as there has been the opening up of new spaces for its contention. However, the PRC has also been utilising space(s) as a tool to legitimise its rule over Tibet, seen in the case of the World Buddhist Forum organised in 2006 by Beijing in Zhejiang province in which the Panchen Lama participated along with a host of other senior Tibetan lamas. On similar grounds the Dalai Lama was also invited to a Buddhist meet in New Delhi in 2012, protested by China as it reflected a challenge to China's legitimacy over Tibetan Buddhism and Tibet. The notion of a legitimacy of space can be further emphasised with thousands of Tibetans coming from Tibet to receive the Kalachakra initiations from the Dalai Lama as well as from other high ranking Buddhist masters, which is a challenge to China's legitimacy as there is direct acceptance of the teachings of the Dalai Lama.

The very act of fleeing from Tibet by scores of Tibetans prior to 2008 is symbolic of a lack of faith and a denial of legitimacy to China over Tibet. The high profile escape of the Karmapa to India in 1999-2000 can also be termed as a denial of legitimacy over Tibet. The thesis has examined the notions of China's legitimacy in Tibet and how there are challenges posed towards it. More importantly, it has also traced the numerous modes of garnering legitimacy in the Tibetan areas by China in a period when the PRC is undergoing massive transformations especially through the non coercive state apparatuses. There will also be the factor of ethno nationalism which plays an important role and acts as an alternative to the legitimacy that China emphasises over the Tibetan areas. Legitimacy is also required for stability and security of the Tibetan regions but however the latter is also seen to be antithetical to China acquiring positive legitimacy over Tibet as much of the Tibetan issue is handled through coercion and force. Legitimacy in Tibet could also be quantified through numerous indicators of human participation in different activities instituted by the state such as healthcare, education, post-telecommunication and also commercial activities. The challenges can be seen in an absence of participation.

The time period is from 1995 to 2013 as the former marked the Chinese state's involvement in the selection of the Panchen Lama leading to a protracted struggle with

the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans over the future of Tibetan Buddhism. This needs to be seen in light of the Chinese state's emphasising on garnering legitimacy through an appointment of their own lama. The latter that is 2013 is chosen as the concluding year for research as it marks the beginning of this doctoral research as well as the recently elected fifth generation leadership of the CCP is set to take up official responsibilities in the PRC hence expectations regarding their outlook and subsequent policies towards Tibet are many. There has also been a rise in the number of protests through self immolations, crossing a hundred which does create newer dynamics in the field of research. The limitations to this research will be the lack of knowledge of Chinese language but still knowledge of Tibetan will aid in the research. There will be an emphasis on the challenges to China's legitimacy over Tibet through the primordial ethno nationalistic elements of Tibetan Buddhism which forms an alternative mode of legitimacy inside Tibet as well as in exile. It has also looked at the numerous ways through which the Tibetans have tried to recreate legitimacy especially through cultural practices, idioms and religion such as the Lhakar movement, language protests, protesting for proper funeral rites, religion etc. In the research a Gramscian understanding of hegemony and counter hegemony is useful in understanding the legitimacy that the PRC has tried creating in Tibet where it tries making large part of the subalterns' worldviews its own, making Tibetans as part of China. What is significant is the notion that through exerting numerous ways of legitimising itself in Tibet, China has tried to live in the minds and lives of its subalterns. The challenges to it can be seen as leading to the rise of an alternative legitimacy from the Tibetans which is counter hegemony. Hegemony is seen in terms of power contestation between the state and a group over which the state exercises its power.

Some of the research questions which are formulated in this thesis are as follows -

1. What are the various ways through which China has tried to garner legitimacy in its Tibetan regions?
2. What has been the impact to China's legitimacy in Tibet with the reforms and especially with the embracing of the "Open up the West campaign"?

3. How have the local cadre - officials of the CCP, especially belonging to the Tibetan nationality, tried to gain legitimacy for Beijing?
4. Has China's garnering of legitimacy in Tibet lead to the opening of other informal structures of power?
5. What is the role of ideology in garnering legitimacy in Tibet for China?
6. How have the exiled Tibetans challenged China's legitimacy in Tibet?
7. Can the role of language be seen as a mode of garnering legitimacy in the Tibetan areas by the PRC?

This PhD thesis is also impinged upon two hypothesis which are as follows -

1. Tibetan ethno nationalism is an outcome of China's mode of strengthening its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas but is seen to be antithetical to each other.
2. China's legitimacy over Tibet is seen as being subsidiary over its concern for maintaining its security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion.

This thesis is also based on a deductive method for understanding China's legitimacy claims over Tibet. The approach will be a Gramscian understanding of hegemony and counter hegemony in which we will try to quantify both the modes through which China claims its legitimacy in Tibet and the ethno nationalistic practices within the Tibetans in Tibet and exile. The independent variables are protests and self immolations with strong Buddhist connotations to them, while the dependent variable is legitimacy over the period of 1995-2013 and intervening variable is the rising ethno nationalism in Tibet. There is also a study of the policy texts brought out by the PRC with regard to Tibet, analysis of secondary source materials and also an ethnographic method of interviewing the officials

in the Tibetan Government in exile in Dharamsala, Tibetans born in Tibet who are in exile and also if possible the Karmapa, a high reincarnate who had fled into exile in 1999 and was being groomed by the PRC inside Tibet.

There are four core chapters in this thesis, followed by a conclusion. These are the following chapters with a small description of each chapter -

CHAPTER ONE: CHINA'S DISCOURSES ON LEGITIMACY IN TIBET – THE VIEW FROM ABOVE

This chapter shall explore the discourse in the CCP documents and other party state instruments in countering and contesting the challenges that has emerged from the traditional elites especially the “Living Buddhas”, the monasteries and monastics. It will also look into the modes of co option of these elites which forms a major crux of the new modes of garnering legitimacy by the CCP in Tibet. Furthermore, it will also look into the coercive and the non coercive measures through which the state tries to control Tibet and the Tibetans, with much emphasis on the non coercive institutions.

CHAPTER TWO: GAINING LEGITIMACY IN TIBET – MODE OF ACQUIRING HEGEMONY BY CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

This chapter will elaborate into the institutions of the party state inside Tibet, especially focusing on the party as the communist party is termed as a part of the civil society by Antonio Gramsci, dubbed as the “Modern Prince” which supplements hegemony. Hence, the chapter will look into how the CCP is directly indulging in gaining hegemony from Tibetans. It elaborates into the role of the party state, administrative divisions in Tibet and the role of the cadres along with the role of education brought about by the CCP to gain some mode of hegemony for the CCP.

CHAPTER THREE: EMERGENCE OF A CHALLENGE TO CHINA'S LEGITIMACY – THE ROLE OF TIBETAN BUDDHISM, THE DALAI LAMA AND CTA

The chapter looks into the role played by the reincarnates, and the traditional role of monasteries and religion in the lives of the Tibetans and how it has emerged as a serious counter to China's legitimacy. There is a focus on the role of the Dalai Lama and the

Panchen Lama as well as other important religious figures in both gaining legitimacy as well as posing a challenge to legitimacy. It also delves into the role of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) or the Tibetan Government in Exile as an alternative source of legitimacy for Tibetans inside and in exile. Furthermore, the chapter looks into how through songs, literature and also through other mediums, there has been the formation of a counter narrative to China's legitimacy inside Tibet.

CHAPTER FOUR - RESISTANCE AND REVOLT IN TIBET – RE-CREATING POPULAR LEGITIMACY FROM BELOW

As a direct challenge to China's legitimacy the chapter looks at how the increasing protests and especially the series of recent self immolations in Tibet have not only challenged China's legitimacy over Tibet but also has created an alternative discourse on legitimacy brought out by the Tibetans which has further fuelled ethno nationalism among the Tibetans.

CHAPTER - CONCLUSION

The chapter deals with the understanding of whether if a challenge is there to China's legitimacy and how China's legitimacy is challenged especially in its far remote restive region of Tibet, a region which is extremely important for China as it is linked to its legitimate claim as an upcoming superpower. The conclusion looks into the testing of the hypothesis in each chapter.

CHAPTER ONE - CHINA'S DISCOURSES ON LEGITIMACY IN TIBET – THE VIEW FROM ABOVE

INTRODUCTION

This research is based on a dual hypothesis; firstly that Tibetan ethno nationalism is an outcome of China's mode of strengthening its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas but is seen to be antithetical to each other. Secondly, China's legitimacy over Tibet is seen as being subsidiary over its concern for maintaining its security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion. China's garnering of legitimacy in Tibet can be traced on different levels, the central – Beijing level and the regional – local level. Much of the legitimacy of China over Tibet can be elaborated or traced through the discourses which are present in the form of policies that the Chinese state has implemented over the years or through the statements issued by the CCP, hinting towards a particular line that the Party has followed in the case of Tibet. This includes a huge corpus of materials in the form of documents, policy papers, speeches by leaders, work reports, white papers by different branches of the Party state and also the legal constitutional provisions on Tibet and national minorities. It is from these that a particular discourse on legitimacy is formed. China's mode of gaining legitimacy can also be seen as a historical project, where claims to Tibet are traced from the earlier dynasties. This is engraved in a Confucian world system, whereby the CCP is seen as inheriting this historical discourse on legitimacy over the Tibetan areas and its population.

With regard to the CCP, through its discourse on national minorities, its process of gaining legitimacy can be divided into four phases. The first phase is the early phase (1921-49) when the CCP after its formation underwent revolutionary struggle against the GMD as well as the Japanese invaders and subsequently gained victory in the civil war, forming the PRC in 1949. During this period, their presence among the national minorities was minimal, almost absent in many cases and thus the discourse on legitimacy in these areas are mostly in the form of party pronouncements which are initially idealistic; driven by strong Marxist/Leninist overtures of self determination and freedom for the nationalities, which slowly gravitated towards notions of nationalism and autonomy under a federal Chinese republic for the nationalities. The second phase is

from 1949-59, a period marked by the CCP's consolidation of power in China and the extension of its rule in Tibet. This period is marked with the CCP trying to directly gain legitimacy in the Tibetan regions which is reflected through the 17 Point Agreement signed in 1951 between the Central People's government and the local government of Tibet. An important mode of garnering legitimacy in this period was seen in the form of co-option; of a united front with the upper strata of the Tibetan society and pursuing a policy of gradualism regarding Tibet, which subsequently failed with the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the fleeing of the Dalai Lama to exile.

The period 1960-1980 can be deemed as the third phase, where the high point in the garnering of legitimacy in Tibet by the CCP was through institutionalisation with the formation of the TAR in 1965 and the carrying forward of the democratic reforms. However, from 1966 till 1980, Tibet along with the rest of China was subsumed in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, when radical Maoist policies were implemented in all aspects of Tibetan life, which was seen as a threat to the Tibetan identity. During this period, the earlier degrees of autonomy and gradualism were done away with and Tibet underwent a process of sinification. The fourth and last phase is from 1980 till present, when legitimacy has been intertwined with the phase of economic reforms that China is currently undergoing. This is visible in China's policies in Tibet as well as the reestablishment of a number of institutions which were linked to gaining legitimacy in the earlier periods. Starting from the liberal policies and discourse set by the Communist leader Hu Yaobang in 1980, much of the legitimising process of China in the Tibetan regions has been interposed with phases of incorporating Tibet through force and coercion. The division of China's mode of gaining legitimacy in Tibetan areas in phases and in forms of discourses can be termed as oversimplification, which is justified. However, the classification adopted here with regard to China's legitimacy over Tibet does correspond to the change in CCP's policies with regard to Tibet, which is strongly marked with great degrees of continuity.

Furthermore, the discourse on legitimacy emerging from the central level on Tibet can be seen as a process of integrating the peripheral region into the Han nation state, a project of nation building; where the discourse was much steeped in the earlier periods in the

socio-economic and political trajectory that the CCP had initiated for PRC. For instance, the legitimacy discourse related to Tibet in the 1950's and 60's corresponds to the socialist transformation and the Great Leap Forward policies that the CCP Eight Party Congress had adopted. From 1966 to 1980 in Tibet along with the rest of China, the policies of the GPCR was underway, launched by Mao, which emphasised on class struggle, destruction of the “four olds” and creation of a socialist man through the cultural revolution. It was a period when greater degree of sinification was pursued in Tibet.

The period of 1980-87, the central mode of legitimising China's rule over Tibet reflects the outcome of the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress of 1978, when Deng's liberal policies especially in economic aspects were initiated in China and its extension in Tibet was in the form of Hu Yaobang's liberal policies, which provided greater autonomy and overturned the harsh policies of the Cultural Revolution in Tibet. From 1987 onwards the discourse on legitimacy has entailed large scale economic growth and major infrastructural development in the region, with cooption of the regional elites seen in PRC's recognition of the Panchen Lama and policies related to the “Living Buddhas”. Furthermore, this legitimacy is also entwined with the CCP's emphasis on social and political stability; themes which are embedded from the 14th till the recently concluded 18th Congress of the CCP. Thus, the party state is seen to be attempting to gain legitimacy on the plank of bringing prosperity to the Tibetans.

FIRST PHASE – PRE REVOLUTION PHASE

The CCP was established in 1921, with the First Party Congress meeting on 23 July 1921 in Shanghai, which was attended by 12 delegates. It can be termed as the percolation of the revolutionary Marxist/Leninist ideas that had emerged in China along with other ideologies during the intellectual fervor of the May Fourth Movement of 1919. It was strongly influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which created the first ever socialist state that propounded the dictatorship of the proletariat under the CPSU. It offered an alternative to individuals like Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong who saw that Communism could bring about the desired change in China. Marxism/Leninism was to provide the answer to China's problems especially a salvation from its national

humiliation. The internal and external disorder in China was linked to imperialism and feudalism (Saich, 1995). However, along with a socialist mandate, the CCP also emphasised immensely on national rejuvenation of China and thus eventually adopted a stronger rhetoric of nationalism in its discourses. A major tool of garnering legitimacy by the CCP was through bringing about a dictatorship of the proletariat and overthrowing international imperialism, thus gain complete independence of the Chinese nation. A project of nation building was inherently present in the CCP's manifesto that crystallised more in the coming years. It is in the manifesto of the Second Party Congress (16-23 July 1922) that the national minorities including the Tibetans appeared in the official narrative.

During this period cooperation with the GMD was on the cards as the CCP was under the influences of the Comintern. It would soon initiate a United Front strategy with the Nationalist Party, a strategy which would have subsequent impact on the CCP's relationship with the minority nationalities. The United Front tactics were one of the important tools of legitimising the CCP among the minorities. The CCP however did not have any physical presence in many of the national minority regions especially in Tibet. These areas in the traditional Chinese geo polity have been termed as peripheries in the Confucian world system, which in the past had variety of connections with a number of Chinese dynasties. The CCP in 1922 started creating a vision of a common destiny between China and these regions in the future.

During this period, the CCP was influenced by the principles propounded by Lenin and Stalin formulated for the case of the minority nationalities present in China (Norbu, 1988:323). Hence, the CCP called for the establishment of autonomous rule in Mongolia, Tibet and Muslim Xinjiang to turn them into democratic autonomous republics (Saich, 1995:42), granting them partly the right to national self determination. This can be termed as a base of registering their legitimacy over areas where in 1922 their presence was almost zero. Furthermore, a free federal system to unify China proper, Mongolia, Tibet and Muslim Xinjiang in order to establish a Chinese Federal Republic was apparently made (ibid,42). This right by the CCP in 1922 was in tune with the strong anti imperialist and rising anti colonial movement in the first half of the twentieth century, as

propounded by Lenin. This remained so in the mindset of the CCP till at least 1934, when with the ascendancy of Mao Zedong; national self determination was relegated to the background and replaced by self government and autonomy. With the CCP suffering major setbacks in its programs in large parts of China, seen in the failure of the united front with the GMD and also the failure of the insurrectionist Li Lisan line, the CCP had concentrated around the rural soviets. These had been created in Jiangxi, Anhui, Hunan and Hubei forming the three major bases of the Jiangxi Central Soviet, the E-Yu-Wan Soviet (Hubei-Hunan-Anhui) and the Yang-Exi Soviet (West Hunan-Hubei).

In November 1931, to bring unity and order to these scattered bases the First All China Congress of Soviets was held, where the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic was outlined (ibid, 509) where the emphasis was primarily on defeating imperialism and the overthrow of the GMD (ibid, 552). However, in the resolutions that had been incorporated in the Constitution, individuals of any nationality including Tibetans were to be given equality before the law and were termed as citizens of the Soviet Republic. Hence, through a medium of equal rights based on citizenship, the CCP tried garnering legitimacy among the minority nationalities, posing itself as being more democratic than the GMD (Norbu, 1988:326). A significant manner of increasing legitimacy among the minority nationalities was much at display in the CCP's discourse of 1931, in which the Communists are seen as recognising the right of self determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China and the formation of independent states for each nationalities (ibid, 325).

They were also given the further right of choice between joining the Union of Chinese soviets or seceding from it and forming their own state as they prefer. Furthermore, the CCP also declared their assistance to the nationalities in liberating themselves from the yoke of the imperialists, the GMD warlords, the nobility, the lamas, the tribal headmen of the national minorities (*tusi*) and others in achieving complete freedom and autonomy. This stand on liberation of the national minorities from their ruling classes would be an important mode of gaining legitimacy in the later periods. They also emphasised on the need to develop the national cultures including languages of the minorities (Saich 1995:555). Much of these can be deemed as being derived from the Soviet Union's

policies on minority nationalities, which however was radicalised further by the Chinese Communists so as to compete with the GMD in winning mass support from the constituency of the minority nationalities. With China being in much disarray in the 1930's, the CCP and GMD were at loggerheads to gain influence and legitimacy from various sections of the Chinese population, including the minority nationalities.

A significant manner of gaining legitimacy in Tibet by the CCP arose in 1934, with the Party emphasising on the overthrowing of the imperialists from China and liberating the minority nationalities. With regard to Tibet, this was seen in the form of British imperialism, which was mentioned by the CCP leader Zhang Guotao in his Political Report to the Conference of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army on Party and Political work in 1934 (Saich 1995:576). There is also a hint towards self determination for Tibet and other nationalities in the report by Zhang Guotao. Significantly, Tibet was portrayed by CCP as a playground for the Western imperialists, who had installed puppet regimes in the region and were seen to be attacking Sichuan and Qinghai and thus increasing the carving up of the Chinese melon (ibid, 610). Thus, the importance of Tibet to China's security is much reflected in the emerging discourses. Furthermore, the aspect of bringing liberation and freedom for the minority nationalities from imperialists, warlords and "inner imperialism" has been a constant tool of legitimacy deployed by the CCP (ibid,595).

In this particular discourse, the Party seeks to create a hegemony based on notions of liberation, autonomy/freedom for the minority nationalities and aiding them in the development of their language and cultures. The Tibetan regions along with Manchuria and Mongolia were also termed as special regions (ibid, 575) which however was a part of China. With the Zunyi conference of 1935 and a new military strategy proposed by Mao led to the consolidation of his position in the Party. This was held in a period when the Communists and their Red Army were undertaking the Long March. It was a strategic retreat from the military onslaught launched by the GMD. During the Long March, the Chinese Communists ventured into the north-west traditional borders of China; encountering the Tibetans for the first time. In most cases they faced stiff resistance from

the locals and monasteries while also did receive cooperation from a few, which is seen to be of importance in the post 49 period (Carole Mcgranahan, 2012:214).

Mao in his interviews to the American journalist and sympathiser Edgar Snow had said that the Communists will always be indebted to the Tibetans. Much support and assistance came from Beri monastery and its head Geta *Tulku*¹ who had earlier allied with the GMD and local warlords in a conflict against Lhasa and a neighbouring monastery (Mcgranahan, 2012:215). While Mao and his troops moved away from the Tibetan areas, the Fourth Front army under the leadership of Zhang Guotao had withdrawn to the Sichuan-Xikang border area. He had strongly criticized Mao's military policies as enunciated at the Zunyi conference. He had subsequently established the Northwest Special Committee of the CCP on 15 May 1935 and on 30 May he proceeded with the foundation of a Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic (Saich, 1995:656). This was one of the moments in CCP's history when dissension in the Party had come out in the open. The areas that the new Communist dispensation would administer had a sizeable Tibetan population belonging to Eastern Tibetan regions of Kham and Amdo.

Hence, the Chinese Communist Soviet Republic also entailed in its jurisdiction population belonging to the Tibetan nationality. It is here that the policies proposed by Zhang Guotao are seen to be less radical than the government form that had been envisaged by the Party centre (ibid), as the policies adopted were conducive and embraced the local realities. The declaration makes it evident that the revolutionary movement had come to the national minority areas in the Northwest, to liberate all the nationalities in the region (ibid, 675). Zhang Guotao proclaimed the North West Federal Government to be the true government for the poor in Northwest China. It is on lines of protecting the interests of the working class, the people from all nationalities and expelling the imperialists that the Communists tried gaining legitimacy in the Tibetan regions. Zhang elaborated on a socialist project of land and wealth confiscation from the rich and redistribution to the poor, to be extended to national minorities in the region. There is also a call made to the Tibetans to fight against the GMD, the Japanese and other

¹ Reincarnated lama.

imperialists. However, calls for the taking back of Xikang (Kham) and Tibet along with the other lost territories were made by Zhang Guotao in an effort to set up a new Soviet Northwest and a new China, built on principles of freedom, independence and territorial integrity. However, he stressed that the new government would practice self determination and help Tibetans in becoming independent, granting them the right to organise their own government. This corresponded much to the ground realities then and thus on the lines of self determination, freedom and the right to choose their own governments, the North West Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic tried to garner legitimacy among the Tibetans (ibid, 676).

The relationship in 1935 between Mao and Zhang Guotao were much strained and by December 1935, the latter wanted to establish a new Central Party apparatus to challenge the Party centre (ibid, 660). Prior to that, after the flight of Mao and his First and Third Army corps from Baxi on 11 September led to Zhang convening a conference at Aba (Ngaba), a historic Tibetan region in Amdo, where he criticised Mao and subsequently established a new Party centre (Ibid). However, by 1936, Zhang and his troops were much defeated by the GMD, forcing them to enter deeper into the ethnic Tibetan regions of Kardze on the Tibet-Xikang border. Here, they faced an inhospitable natural condition, and unfriendly local nomadic communities (ibid, 661) subsequently defeating them.

On 5 August 1935, a resolution was passed by the Central Committee of the CCP when the First and Fourth Front Armies converged. It is here that the struggle against imperialism for the minority nationalities was championed. The areas in Northwest China were termed as ones where the reactionary rule and imperialists forces were the weakest. It is in the resolution that the Party's Basic policy concerning National Minorities is outlined. As the Red Army of Workers and Peasants were dominant in the CCP their role in the future among national minorities were stressed. A policy of bringing the national minorities under the CCP was also underlined along with an inclusion of them in the Chinese Soviet government. However, the policy of self determination was theoretically granted, with a political right to be independent and free from the oppressor nationality; the Han. This can be dubbed as the central theme of gaining legitimacy in the initial periods by the CCP among the national minorities, including the Tibetans.

The idea of granting aid to the nationalities is strong, especially liberating them from the imperialists, the GMD, traitors, collaborators, headmen/lamas and other exploiting classes. The resolution is remarkable in its study of the socio political and economic setup of the various national minorities in the region and thus the need to follow policies that can be deemed accommodative of such differences (ibid, 682). This acceptance of diversity is seen as a method of gaining legitimacy among the national minorities. The policy of United Front can be seen as a mode of gaining legitimacy which was also encouraged with a few minority nationalities in the resolution. However, during this period the basic Soviet policy was termed as aiding nationalities in their independence movement, setting up independent states. In the aftermath of the setting up of such independent states, the CCP gave the right to the nationalities in accordance with the principle of self determination to either join the Chinese Soviet Republic to form a Chinese Soviet Federal government on the basis of genuine equality and unity of all nationalities (ibid). This was an important tool of gaining legitimacy in the early days of the CCP from minority nationalities especially from Tibet.

By 1935, Japanese expansionism had increased in North and North Eastern China, which the Nationalist government in Nanjing failed to curb. Thus, the CCP Central Committee in its message to compatriots on Resistance to Japan to save on the nation on 1 August 1935 (ibid, 692) also included the members of the oppressed nationalities which included the Tibetans to rally around the Chinese soviet government and the CCP to defeat the Japanese and traitor Chiang Kai Shek (ibid, 696). Furthermore, to resist the Japanese the CCP also called for the formation of a national defence government, which would be a product of negotiation. It would be composed of delegates from all walks of life and background including the minority nationalities who would be elected in accordance to democratic principles (ibid). Hence, through the struggle against Japanese aggression and the overthrowing of the traitorous Chiang Kai Shek government, a common bond was to be formed between the CCP and the minority nationalities; where the Party is deemed as the leader of the national defence against Japan, rallying forces and thus gaining considerable degrees of legitimacy over the various nationalities. Nationalism and Patriotism are also mechanisms of deriving legitimacy by the CCP, which is elaborated in the 1938 document by Mao Zedong termed as the New Stage (ibid, 813).

This document emerged during a period when the second United Front with the GMD was underway in China. Mao terms this cooperation to be one which would be of a long term nature and this national united front was extended to the national minorities (ibid, 815). The same has been emphasised by the CCP in the resolution which was adopted in the 6th Plenum on 6 November 1938 (ibid, 820). The war for the Chinese nation against the Japanese invaders was held to be primary, but also now through upholding a united front policy with Chiang Kai Shek, the Nationalists were to be supported. The CCP called for the unity of all nationalities in China including the Tibetans against Japanese aggression (ibid, 822). Hence, the Tibetans along with the other non Han nationalities through a discourse on the war against Japan were made into a part of the Chinese nation opposing Japanese fascism. Through, the rising discourse on patriotism and nationalism, the CCP under the leadership of Mao Zedong was able to place all minority nationalities including Tibetans under the rubric of the Chinese nation. They emphasised on the leadership provided by CCP to quell the imperialist Japanese threat among the national minorities to further legitimise themselves in these regions. Hence, the earlier policy of granting the right to self determination to the various nationalities by CCP was much diluted. It has been adopted as mentioned earlier from the teachings of Lenin/Stalin and the experiences in Soviet Russia (ibid, 900). However, Mao and the CCP emphasised on the need to do away with the right to self determination to the minority nationalities in China.

The major justification provided by the CCP of a separate line with regard to the issue of self determination of nationalities in China was that the notion of self determination was only applicable in the context of an imperial/colonial system. This according to the Chinese communists was seen to be earlier the case with Russia being under an imperialist Tsarist system, while China was a semi colony (Norbu, 1988:331). Thus, for the CCP as well as other socialists, the right of self determination should only be recognised in a colonial or imperialist context. For CCP, Tsarist Russia was an imperialist country where there was strong antagonism and enmity among the nationalities, thus the principle of self determination was only applicable to Russia (ibid). The CCP also took history as a tool to legitimise their stand in not granting a right to self determination to its national minorities as unlike Russia, in China there was close

relations between the Han and minorities. There was also an emphasis on the minorities in Russia being numerically the same and in many cases more than the Russian population. In contrast, in China the Han were in an absolute majority and were more developed and politically more conscious than the national minorities (ibid). Hence, the national minorities in China were “ill prepared for separation” (ibid, 332). Furthermore, the Han and the nationality minorities were termed as suffering under the same imperialist burden and hence shared a common destiny, which brought them together under a strong feeling of nation hood, where the nationalities were to be provided equality and national regional autonomy (ibid). This equality was reflected in a granting of representation and suffrage to the minority nationalities in the border region of Jin Cha Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei), where the CCP had set their local government. In the current administrative proposal which was passed on 13 August 1940, where a call for common strife against the Japanese was made, there was the implementation of universal suffrage to be granted to all for democratic elections (Saich, 1995:936). Through an accommodative method which included universal suffrage and representation, the CCP tried to gain legitimacy among the national minorities.

By 1944 it was clear that the Japanese would be defeated and thus attempts were made to bring the CCP and the GMD together through negotiations to form a coalition government, which was mediated by the United States through the Dixie mission as well as through Patrick Hurley, the official representative of President Franklin Roosevelt (ibid, 1186). However, the attempts for reconciliation between both parties fell through and led to the sharpening of the civil war. It was during the period of negotiations that Mao Zedong drafted “On Coalition Government” in the Seventh Party Congress of 1945. Mao stated that that it was necessary to unite representatives of all political parties and groups as well as those without any affiliation to establish a provisional coalition government which would bring democratic reforms and struggle against Japan. It is here that Mao mentions about the problems of the national minorities. He strongly criticised the minority policy as being adopted by the GMD, terming it as an extension of the reactionary policy of the Qing dynasty and of the northern warlords, which smacked of Han chauvinism and led to exploitation and oppression of the minorities. Mao however is seen in deriving the CCP’s policies towards national minorities as being partly derived

from Dr. Sun Yat Sen's policy on nationalities. This is seen to be in line with the norms that were underway in the period when the "On Coalition Government" was being written. It was also a ploy to assume the mantle of being true inheritors of Dr Sun's legacy in China. Mao states that the policy formulated by Dr. Sun Yat Sen with regard to nationalities in China was based on the principle of self determination and that of a free and united republic of China, which would be established. The CCP would provide help to the nationalities to fight for their self determination and in the process include the leaders of the minority nationalities who had ties with the masses to fight for their emancipation and also to establish their own armies which will safeguard the common interest of the masses. The CCP would also respect the spoken and written languages and culture of the nationalities.

This position by Mao and the CCP can be deemed as a strong mode of gaining legitimacy over ruling China as well as over the national minorities, including Tibet. Furthermore, in their mode of gaining legitimacy, the CCP is seen to be emphasising on a process of cooption or accommodation of the local elites among the national minorities and also providing aid to liberate themselves. This policy can be traced to the policy of "power management" which was pursued by the Communists in certain Soviet areas, such as in the Jin Cha Ji base area, through which there was the accommodation of earlier elites into the power structure achieved through the administrative three thirds system, where one third of the administrative posts were granted to the earlier elites (Saich, 1995:iii). The ensuing civil war saw major wins and losses on both sides, with eventually the CCP by 1948 gaining victories against GMD in North east and North China. Victory came to the CCP in 1949, prior to which Mao and the Party emphasised on the need to bring about a political consultative conference in the liberated areas to prepare for the formation of a People's Republic. The policies that the Party followed in the liberated areas were liberal and adaptive to the local conditions, so as to whip support for the Communists and capitalise on the disillusionment with the Nationalists. This was reflected in the toning down of the radical land reforms which Liu Shaoqi wanted to introduce in the liberated areas. On 1 October 1949, with gaining victory in the civil war against the GMD, the CCP and its leader Mao proclaimed the formation of the People's Republic of China. The new state that Mao presented was based "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship". It

was a coalition of four classes under the leadership of the working class; whose vanguard was the CCP. Thus, the first phase of garnering legitimacy by the CCP among minority nationalities can be seen to entail discourses of granting the right of self determination and political right to be independent to them, which specifically after the ascendancy of Mao in 1934, changed to an adoption of national regional autonomy and liberation (Norbu, 1988:327). This was due to the insertion of strong sense of nationalism among the Chinese Communist, interjected especially by Mao and the notion of carrying the burden of liberating them.

SECOND PHASE – 1949-1959

With the CCP clinching victory in the civil war, the CPPCC played a highly important role in gaining legitimacy for the Communists. It was through the Consultative Conference and its first plenary session held on 29 September 1949 that a Common Program was adopted, which can be highlighted as a social contract formulated between CCP and the masses in China. The CPPCC as a body was constituted by communists, democratic parties, PLA, national minorities, overseas Chinese, religious groups and other patriotic democratic elements. It was seen as the symbolic representation of the will of the people of the Chinese nation and thus gave the legitimacy for the formation of the PRC which was to be based on New Democracy (p35).

Hence the CPPCC was and still continues to be an organ through which a cooption or cooptation of non communists were done to bring about legitimacy for the Party. It was also on the basis of the wide platform of CPPCC that the Common Program was formulated. It can be termed as a contract which derived the needed legitimacy for the Party from the masses in China. The Common Program is a legal and institutional framework on which the Party justifies its legitimacy over the Chinese nation and its diverse population. It also brings about the needed unity and solidarity among China's population which is reflected in Article 1 of the Program where the people's democratic dictatorship under the CCP is based on an alliance of workers and peasants; uniting all democratic classes and nationalities in China. Thus, the nationalities are appropriated in the project of legitimising CCP's rule over PRC.

Article 2 of the Common Program called for the need for the Central People's government of PRC to wage the people's war of liberation to achieve unification of China. This had direct repercussions on the issue of legitimacy in Tibet as subsequently in December 1949, Mao on his way to Russia directed the politburo to liberate Tibet from western imperialists (cctv.com, 2013). It is through the idea of liberation of Tibetans and Tibet from imperialists and their indigenous supporters that the Communists have tried garnering much legitimacy, which still continues in present period. However with regard to National minorities, Article 9 of the Common Program grants equal rights and duties to all nationalities in PRC. Moreover, in a stronger manner of gaining legitimacy and acceptance from the nationalities, a separate section on policies towards them had been formulated in the Common Program. Among these, Article 51 has a deeper and stronger theme of generating legitimacy for the Communists as it calls for the granting of regional autonomy in areas which had a sizeable minority nationality population. It also granted representation to the different minority nationalities within the local organs of power (p52-53).

Provisions were made through which greater nationalism and Han chauvinism would be opposed, which is seen through Article 53 that granted the national minorities the freedom to develop their own dialects, languages and religious customs/beliefs. It is also on the basis of economic development of the minority nationalities, that the CCP has tried to gain higher degrees of legitimacy among them. Much of the proposals and the Common Program of the CPPCC get reflected in the later provisions of the Chinese Constitution as well as the policies implemented by the state. The Common Program of the CPPCC was accepted as the policy of the government (www.marxist.org), thus enabling the widespread legitimacy of the CCP among the disparate Chinese population.

The first direct attempts on garnering legitimacy by the PRC in Tibet can be seen with the signing of the 17 Point Agreement and the negotiations that had preceded the signing between the Central government of Beijing and the local government of Tibet. Prior to this, the Communists had intended to liberate Tibet and on 6-7 October 1950 had crossed into Chamdo; the Tibetan garrison town in eastern Tibet and on 19 October 1950 had defeated the Tibetan army (Shakya, 1999:39). With this, to legitimise and gain

international acceptance for their actions the CCP invited the Tibetans for a negotiation on a peaceful liberation of Tibet. The negotiations yielded a historic document termed as the 17 Point Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, signed on 23 May 1951 in Beijing. It is a document of historic significance and can be deemed as a quasi-legal instrument by which the Chinese Marxists missionaries sought to legitimate their takeover of Tibet and to integrate it systematically with China in the name of Marxism (Norbu 2001: 179). Hence, 17 Point Agreement can be understood as a legitimising device for the Party as well as PRC; one which still has much practical relevance and utility (ibid). However, after the declaration of Communist victory and the formation of PRC, the CCP leaders made their intentions clear of liberating Tibet and Taiwan, which could be done through “peaceful liberation”, negotiations or armed intervention (ibid, 180). As mentioned earlier, the revolutionary activities of the CCP did not penetrate into the Tibetan areas except in eastern Tibet during the Long March, especially with Zhang Guotao, who had established his North West Federal government, encompassing areas having a sizeable Tibetan population. However indigenous growth of communist ideology was present in Tibetan areas as propounded by Baba Phuntsog Wangyal and the Tibetan Communist Party established in 1940’s in eastern Tibet.

However, prior to the negotiations of the two parties, a major event had led the Tibetans to come to the negotiating table, which was the invasion of Chamdo. The Tibetan government had sent a three member delegation headed by Tsipon Shakaba to India in December 1949, to hold talks with the Chinese representatives. The US government then had showed interest in helping the Tibetans, which was perceived as a grave threat by CCP that enacted them to a full scale invasion in October 1950 (ibid, 2001:182). Significantly, the 17 Point Agreement is a testament to the fact that Tibet was completely different for the CCP and hence the need for strong legitimisation, which could be brought through the signing of the agreement. Much of the provisions present in the Agreement bear witness to the fact that the CCP also understood pre-1950 Tibet to be a separate political entity, having symbols of sovereignty and nationhood. This feature of Tibet has made the 17 Point Agreement a major stipulation between the central government and local government of Tibet. With no other minority nationalities has CCP signed such an agreement, thus making it a source of China’s legitimacy in Tibet. The

fact that Tibet posed a unique situation to the Communists can also be seen from the directives issued by the top ruling leadership of CCP to the PLA. Mao had instructed his troops to earnestly carry out the Party's nationality policy, especially towards religion, to do United Front work properly by winning the support of the upper strata, influencing and rallying the masses, protecting patriotic and law abiding lamas and monasteries and respecting freedom of religious beliefs and local habits and customs (ibid, 183). The PLA was further deemed as propagators of the image of a benevolent Han, who would not even take a needle, nor thread from Tibetans but were there to assist them (ibid, 184-85). The distinctive feature of Tibet called for the need to garner legitimacy which would not be derived simply from their revolutionary ideology of liberation.

The policy that was initially dictated was directed more towards cooption or accommodation of the local elites. However, the revolutionary discourse of CCP was present with Mao also emphasising on the need to "concentrate on dealing blows to imperialism and its faithful lackeys – the pro-imperialists secessionists" (ibid, 183). Moreover, prior to the negotiations in Beijing, the CCP had already outlined that three preconditions were not negotiable which were that Tibet is part of China, Tibet's defence will be handled by PRC and Tibet's foreign relations and external trade relations will be conducted through the Chinese government (ibid, 191). The Tibetan government had rejected these demands, deeming Tibet to be free and also asserted the Chinese troops should not venture into Tibetan territories. Lhasa further termed Sino Tibetan relationship as based on priest-patron relationship. However, with the attack on Chamdo by PLA and the defeat of Tibetans, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme under pressure decided to accept the two preconditions. This was of much importance as it mitigated Tibet's defacto independence and sovereignty to PRC bolstering their legitimacy over Tibet.

Much of the provisions in the 17 Point Agreement have its origins in the Common Program that had been adopted by CPPCC on 29 September 1949. This is also clear from the Preamble of the Agreement, which however was not open to discussions (Goldstein, 1989:765). The provisions related to the national minorities in the Common Program have been highlighted in the Preamble, which are major modes of legitimising Chinese rule in Tibet. However, through the Preamble there is also a strong assertion that Tibetans

had not opposed the imperialists deceptions and provocations, hence had adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the motherland (ibid, 763), thus terming the defacto independence of Tibet as being null and void.

It further gives an impression that a major objective of liberation was to create “national unity” through forceful integration of Tibet into China (Norbu, 2001:187). It is mostly on lines of autonomy, self governance and no alterations to existing socio economic political system of Tibet that Beijing attempted to derive legitimacy from Tibetans. On grounds of granting much freedom to religious beliefs, practices and customs and especially retention of the status of the Dalai Lama, the CCP tried co-opting religious elites of Tibet; whom they knew held the reins to power. Along with the Common Program, a source for the provision in the 17 Point Agreement comes from a six paragraphed poster that had appeared in Kham on 9 November 1950, within a month of the PLA entry into eastern Tibet (ibid, 188). Through the contents in the poster, it is clear that the CCP wanted to win over the local elites and population and thus gain legitimacy. The discourse present is the same as that of the Common Program and later of the 17 Point Agreement. However, the presence of the discourse for the Tibetan regions in two different forms displays the policy variations that PRC had and still retains as a whole for Tibet. With regard to Kham and Amdo; eastern Tibet, the revolutionary Communists followed a policy of their disposed predecessor the GMD, dividing Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet. This division was brought out during the Simla Conference of 1914, where the Tibetans, British and the Republican Chinese met technically on equal grounds. Inner Tibet had been placed under minimal Chinese control which in reality has always been characterized by diffused authority and relative freedom from Lhasa or Beijing rule.

Ethnically and culturally the region shared strong affinity with central Tibet. Even though, these areas during the PLA campaigns in Tibet did not fall under the jurisdiction of Dalai Lama’s government in Lhasa (ibid, 189), for the majority the Dalai Lama was held in high esteem and Lhasa was their Vatican. The provisions present in the discourse applicable to the Tibetan regions further act as means of justifying the coming and stationing of PLA troops in Tibetan regions. The stress on the military is much visible in the 17 Point Agreement, where five of the seventeen points occupy the subject on

military. The entry of PLA itself was an important precondition on which no negotiations could take place. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists felt it was imperative that the PLA troops would not merely liberate Tibet but would station themselves there for a long time (ibid, 188). This contradicted the Tibetan authority's determination to retain a higher degree of autonomy, which was a major zone of dispute during the negotiations of 17 Point Agreement.

Even though CCP promised a guarantee of not disturbing the existing order and also granting much regional autonomy, Article 15 of the 17 Point Agreement calls for the establishment of a Military and Administrative Committee and a military headquarter in Tibet (ibid, 196). The emphasis on the military in the Agreement which could not be questioned by the Tibetan delegates reveals an important aspect of CCP's policies in Tibet, which gives more precedence to securitisation of the region and people. Thus, the need to garner legitimacy in Tibet many a times was seen as being subsidiary over its concern for maintaining its security and control over Tibet. Hence, "the liberation" that is present in China's discourse on Tibet is one with a strong military dimension, which was concealed by the 17 Point Agreement (ibid). Thus, the whole notion and formalities that the agreement was embroiled in, demonstrates the wish of CCP to legitimate their military actions (ibid, 197). The military angle constitutes a major part on the issue of Tibet's earlier defacto independence and sovereignty as the Tibetans as a separate political entity had its own army (ibid, 188). Hence, it was specifically on matters related to military that there were major debates in the negotiations between the representatives. Point 8 of the 17 point Agreement called for the disbanding of the Tibetan army and its reorganisation by stages into the PLA, thus providing national defence (Goldstein, 1989:767). This was much objected to by the Tibetan delegates, and hence led to the Chinese accepting a token compromise which however was to be signed in a separate agreement which would not be published as it would mean a dilution of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.

Under this secret agreement, more than 3000 troops of the *Gyajong* regiment (the Drapchi and Bodyguard regiments of the Dalai Lama) would continue to exist after the rest of the Tibetan forces would be disbanded (ibid). The agreements also constituted that

the *Kashag* could appoint a Deputy Commander of the PLA troops stationed in Tibet. The Lhasa government could also retain 500 bodyguards for the Dalai Lama and 1000 soldiers to maintain law and order in Tibet (Norbu, 2001:202). Going beyond the dimension of security and military in the Agreement between China and Tibet, a major emphasis of the 17 Point Agreement as mentioned above is also a pursuit of a united front policy in Tibetan regions, as seen through the provisions present in the Agreement. The status, powers and functions of the Dalai Lama would not be disturbed as well as it was maintained that the central authorities would not bring about any change in the income of monasteries and also guaranteed religious freedom which was present in the Common Program (ibid, 195). Hence the CCP were eager to co-opt and accommodate the Tibetan ruling elites, try imbibing their values in them and thus gain legitimacy. The local government of Tibet was also given the liberty to carry reforms of its own accord and thus we witness the presence of gradualism dictated by local realities. Much of these were policies, the CCP had followed in other minority nationality areas and also in regions where Communists did not have much influences. Under this, a three third system was implemented administratively of which one third of the positions were given to the local elites (Saich, 2002). This process is referred to as power management and it is on somewhat similar grounds that could be observed in the Tibetan regions. It can also be understood in terms of CCP trying to gain hegemony in Tibetan regions, where values such as development, liberation and autonomy were to be accepted by Tibetan elites and the population as an “expression of their own interests” (Jones, 2007: vii).

CCP also through the agreement tried to reestablish the status, functions and powers of the Panchen Lama (Norbu 2001:195). The Tenth Panchen and his supporters were in exile as there had been strained relations between Lhasa and Tashilhunpo; seat of the Panchen. The inclusion of the issue of the Panchen was much opposed by Tibetan delegates, which however was sidelined. The CCP’s key interest in and resolute support for the young Panchen may be connected with their future plan of real politic in post 1951 Tibet as they understood that the Panchen could be used as a countervailing force against the Dalai Lama and Tibetan nationalism (ibid). However, the Panchen can also be seen as a tool of garnering hegemony by CCP in Tibetan regions, whereby he was deemed as an advocate for the policies of the CCP in Tibet (Norbu, 1997: xxv). This is

elaborated further in the pages below, where the Panchen was seen as supporting CCP's policies in the aftermath of the crushing of 1959 rebellion in Tibet. On 6 August 1949, Mao had instructed Peng Dehuai, commander of the PLA's first field army to pay special attention to Panchen Lama and Tibetans in Gansu, which was required for solving the Tibet issue (Chen Jian, 2006:56). The Chinese authorities sought to gain cooperation and support of Panchen to confer legitimacy on CCP's liberation of Tibet (ibid, 59). Therefore the 17 Point Agreement can be termed as a legitimising tool adopted by the CCP with regard to Tibet. It is highly significant and historical as it is the first policy document which grants legitimacy to CCP over Tibet and also explicitly gives up Tibetan sovereignty to China.

During the first phase of understanding China's discourse of legitimacy in Tibet, one needs to look into the pronouncements of Chairman Mao Zedong, who in his speeches had elaborated eloquently on measures to be adopted by CCP to increase one's legitimacy among minority nationalities and specifically with regard to Tibet. This is seen in his talk on the "Ten Great Relationships" written in 1956 and "Ten Contradictions" written in 1934. In his Ten Great Relationships and also the Ten Contradictions, Mao Zedong pointed that contradictions had arisen in relationships between Han nationality and national minorities and also in the relationship between parties; both cases constitute Tibet and issues of legitimacy for CCP. On a lesser degree, the contradiction present between centre and regions also can be linked to policies that CCP was adopting in Tibetan areas. With regard to the contradictions present between centre and regions, Mao emphasises on the need to let the regions be given more freedom to run more projects (Schram, 1974:71), with the full support of the centre. He also emphasised then to give further extension to regional power especially in law making as it did not have earlier.

However, the regions had to follow the Constitution. Mao also mentions about the problem of bureaucratisation, especially the centre meddling much in regional affairs without knowing ground realities of the regions. He emphasised on the need for the central ministries to consult the regions. He states that the independence sanctioned by the centre must be proper independence. It cannot be called separatism. Mao calls for the

need for the provinces to give opinions to the centre and also which had to percolate to the grassroots level. Hence, he encouraged on the idea of granting a degree of autonomy which however was to remain within the ambit of the Party (ibid, 73).

It is in the contradiction present between the national minorities and Han nationality that aspects of legitimacy of China with regard to Tibet becomes more apparent. Mao states that the policy the CCP is following in the national minority areas was correct and stable. However, he sees a danger lying in Han chauvinism and a need to decrease it. For this, Mao emphasises on the need to carry out widespread education in proletarian nationalities policy among the Han. Furthermore, Mao also points out that the land in which the national minorities resided are rich in natural resources; as is still the case with Tibet and which was needed to build socialism. He also points to the fact that a socialist economic and cultural construction was to be built among the national minorities, through assistance from the majority Han population and CCP. Thus, this can be deemed as a hegemonic idea of how the socialist construction was good for the national minorities.

Mao Zedong also writes about a higher degree of autonomy to be given to national minorities with regard to the systems of economic management and finance that would be appropriate to the minority areas (ibid, 74). Even in the essay “On the Ten Major Relationships” written by him, Mao emphasised on the need to prevent Han chauvinism and also help the nationalities. Furthermore, their policies with regard to minority nationalities should not go the way of Soviet Union. With respect to Tibet, Mao can be seen to emphasise on garnering legitimacy through a policy of a united front which he advises his Party members in the provinces to follow (ibid, 76). On the relationship between the revolutionaries and counter revolutionaries, Mao emphasised on the need to reform the counter revolutionary through labour, hence emphasises on transformation. This was a major policy that the CCP followed with regard to Tibet especially reform through labour. More specifically on Tibet, Mao writes that the contentious issue of democratic reforms in Tibet was to be postponed as the timing was not ripe. He also invokes the “17 Article Agreement” reached between Central people’s government and the local government of Tibet (Shandaliya, 1998:301), which stresses on reforms that will

be carried out subsequently in Tibet. This has to be however decided by the majority of the Tibetan population and also the local leading public figures in Tibet (ibid). Thus, Mao tries to garner legitimacy in Tibet and among national minorities through a process of cooption and granting much autonomy to the Tibetans to decide on their fate. On a different note, Mao and CCP saw the reassertion of China's sovereignty in Tibet as a critical test case for the new Communist regime's credibility and legitimacy before Chinese people and the world. Owing to the special characteristics; internal as well as external, the CCP employed both measures of coercion and diplomacy to legitimise their liberation of Tibet (Chen, 2006:5).

The view from Beijing and CCP Party centre becomes important with respect to legitimacy and the issue of Tibet. This is revealed as mentioned earlier through the discourses emerging from the CCP's Party Congresses, which gained more prominence after the Party gained power in China. The Party Congress in itself is an important political event, when the entire organization assembles, discusses and decides the future course of action for PRC for next five years. The political report of every Party Congress reflects the creativity, intellectual horizon and development program of its leadership on the one hand and the organizational rise and fall of factions on the other. With PRC being under a Leninist Party system of CCP, the political reports of the Party Congress becomes extremely important (Sharma, 2003: x). The Constitution of CCP adopted at the Eighth National Congress on 26 September 1956, in its general programme emphasises on CCP adhering to a Marxist-Leninist world outlook of dialectical and historical materialism and opposed the world outlook of idealism and metaphysics. It is through Marxism-Leninism that CCP deems to bring the much needed change to society. This was to be done through democratic reforms, the socialist transformation of agriculture and industrialisation, which were implemented in eastern Tibetan regions. It is victory in revolution, being the vanguard of proletariat, victory in Chinese revolution and the correct knowledge of bringing development by CCP, which are deemed as ways through which it garnered legitimacy.

This is reflected in the section on national minorities, who constitute a part of the multinational state of PRC. The CCP is seen to be deriving legitimacy through aiding the

national minorities in their development, which according to official discourse was historically hindered. It is on such lines that development has acted as a value through which the CCP tries to create hegemony in Tibet, as development of the minorities would have a strong impact on their socio cultural system, bringing about a change, which eventually would be welcomed by the population. However, the Party also stresses on autonomy of national minorities with regard to the implementation of various social reforms, which was to be carried out by the respective nationalities themselves. This policy framework can be linked to the Common Program adopted in 1949. Furthermore, the CCP also committed to the prevention of the rise of Han chauvinism among the Party members and government workers in national minority areas. This is further restressed in a political report laid down by Liu Shaoqi, who had emphasised that the major contradiction in China was between the people's need for rapid economic and cultural development and the inability of present economy and culture to meet that need. In other words, he stated that the contradiction in China was between the advanced socialist system and the backward social productive forces, which could be resolved through adopting policies which would transform the backward agricultural economy to an advanced industrial one (ibid, 159).

The CCP through granting the right to regional autonomy to the national minorities and the right to equality has tried to gain greater legitimacy among them. There is also further training of cadres from the national minorities so as to co-opt them further and enable the spread of CCP rule in these areas. Furthermore, the notion of autonomy as a tool of legitimacy is seen stronger in the right given to national minorities in the undertaking of democratic reforms and socialist transformation which was to be done in accordance to their own wishes and timeframe, through the public leaders of the national minorities. This was supposed to be implemented in a peaceful manner (ibid, 169). This policy during 1950's was adopted by CCP in Tibetan regions through the 17 Point Agreement. In the proposal for the second Five year plan for development of the national economy (1958-62), the CCP emphasised on development of industries as being an important mechanism of socialist construction and overall development of China; an important tool of gaining legitimacy, which is also extended to Tibetan regions especially through intensifying the geological prospecting in Tibet and paving the way for its industrial

development (ibid, 181). However, in the national minority areas the development of industries was to be done in a manner taking into consideration the special characteristics of the minorities.

The CCP through improving the material, cultural and social spheres of national minorities also tried gaining legitimacy among them. It is granting of autonomy to people and leading public personages of the different nationalities in gradually carrying out their social reforms that CCP had legitimised their rule during this period (ibid, 192). This is reflected in the policy that the CCP adopted towards Tibet as they have emphasised that carrying out reforms without the consent and support of the elite and the masses was politically passive and militarily not worthwhile in the long term, which had to be avoided. In Tibet, in accordance to 17 Point Agreement a PCART (Preparatory Committee for Autonomous Region of Tibet) had been established in 1956 along with a Tibet Work Committee so as to usher in democratic reforms which would aid Tibet to transform into a socialist society. The PCART and other institutions in 1957 had stated that people from all walks of life had demonstrated that it was not the right time to carry out democratic reforms in Tibet (Arpi, 2014). This non acceptance of reforms by Tibetans is seen to be due to a number of historical and social causes such as the independent and semi independent status of its relations with China which also distinguishes it from the other national minorities in PRC. The CCP also believes that centrifugal tendencies of Tibetans were due to the handiwork of imperialists (ibid). For them it is through social progress of Tibetans, the gradual acceptance of reforms that legitimacy can be obtained; which however was to be pursued through peaceful ways.

The CCP also stressed that the banners of ethnic difference and religion were used as tools by the elites in Tibet to influence the masses and thus prevent reforms. Hence to gain stronger legitimacy the CCP emphasised on cooption of the elites. The CCP understood that elites in Tibet held the banner of ethnic nationality and of religion which held much sway over the masses. Hence, there was the need to co-opt them and hegemonise them further. The forceful implementation of reforms was termed as a last resort. However in the case of Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo which had been integrated in Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, the reforms

were to be implemented, which led to violent reactions from ethnic Tibetan populations. This was blamed on the local elites by CCP who according to them had colluded with reactionary GMD and western imperialists. The negative response from the population in eastern Tibet posed a serious challenge to the CCP's legitimacy in these regions. The legitimacy crisis was further accentuated in 1959 when tens of thousands of Tibetans demonstrated against Chinese rule in Lhasa, which was followed by the Dalai Lama going into exile in India. However, much earlier in 1952, an inner party directive was drafted by Mao on the "policies for our work in Tibet", after demonstrations broke out, where he emphasised on the need to gain legitimacy in Tibet through a highly pragmatic policy of gradualism and making the much needed concessions to the Dalai Lama and the *Kashag* (Chen, 2006:63). He links framing of such a policy to the ground realities in Tibet and the different historical conditions of Tibet from the other minority nationality areas. It was through a delay in agrarian and social reforms in Tibet and leaving everything as it is that CCP intended to legitimise their rule in Tibet (Mao, 1952).

Furthermore, through activities such as production, trade, road building, medical services and united front work, the CCP geared to position itself more favourably in Tibet. Thus, the reforms were to be delayed and were to be in accordance to the wishes of masses. Mao understood that while the CCP had military strength in Tibet, the local elites had an advantage over them in social influence. Hence for them their main criteria was to gain legitimacy from the masses through co-opting the local elites and hence peacefully implement the reforms. However, options for a military solution was also kept open by CCP in Tibet (ibid) if rebellion occurred in Tibet.

Such a situation was termed as being advantageous to CCP as it would also allow them to introduce political and social reforms at an accelerated rate (Chen, 2006:64). For Mao, the transformation of Tibet by CCP was much required as then they would be termed as liberators, forming the basic line on which China emphasises its legitimacy on Tibet (ibid, 65). This generally does not take into account Tibet's history and culture. In 1956, with the launching of "high tide of the socialist transformation" in rest of China, the Tibet Work Committee stated that neighbouring Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo were all preparing to conduct reforms and hence there was a need to extend it to central Tibet. For

this, the Tibet Work Committee had sent a report to CCP CC dated 1 July 1956 proposing reforms to start soon in Tibet (ibid, 64).

To facilitate the reforms, the Tibet Work Committee asked for the establishment of a public security force of 4000-6000, an increase in regular “People’s police” and economic police force by 2400, the raising of 40000 to 60000 cadres from local Tibetans, the recruitment of 20,000 – 30000 Tibetans in the CCP and 30,000 – 50000 Tibetan youth in CYL (Communist Youth League) and transfer of 6000 Han communist cadres into Tibet (ibid, 64). With the impetus on reforms and growing rebellion by Tibetans in 1956, the CC of CCP issued the “September Fourth Instruction” emphasizing that democratic reforms was to be implemented in peaceful ways and was to take into confidence the Tibetan ruling elites. The CC is seen to be stressing that democratic reforms should not be introduced in the First Five Year Plan, nor in the Second Five Year Plan and also postpone it to the Third Five Year Plan (ibid, 65). Hence, it is through a gradualist policy that the CCP intended to bring about reforms. However, this was not to be termed a “passive policy design” as greater legitimacy was to be gained in Tibet through a strengthening of their united front with the upper strata, increasing the number of Tibetan cadres and also CYL members. Furthermore, through increasing production, democratizing the political regime and improving the lives of masses, the CCP tended to gain legitimacy in Tibet (ibid). The same is further reflected in the “remarks on the Tibet Work Committee’s Decisions on Future Work in Tibet” which had been adopted by CCP CC in 1957. In this, the conditions for carrying out democratic reforms in Tibet were seen to be nonexistent and it was to be much delayed. This was interpreted as giving concessions to local elites, which however was not to hinder the work of CCP in Tibet that was divided in five areas (ibid, 67).

Much of these policies can be termed as a way of creating hegemony by CCP in Tibet especially through the united front work of co-opting the elites, recruiting and educating Tibetan cadres. They also wanted to send a few young Tibetans inland to study and thus ideologically make them conducive to CCP. Also, through patriotic education among Tibetans, the CCP intended to win over them. Lastly to have a strong impact on the masses and especially to spread their hegemony, the CCP also emphasised on the need to

operate cultural and economic enterprises which will sway the locals to their side (ibid, 67). However, with the situation deteriorating and the full implementation of reforms in eastern Tibet, the CC of CCP geared for resolving of issue in Tibet through war. The process of increasing hegemony of CCP did bear much fruit with the absorption and training of a total of 6128 Tibetan cadres, 1190 Tibetans joining the party and 1934 joining CYL. They had also successfully established and developed many patriotic organizations as well as took into confidence a number of “progressives” among the political and monastic elites. These would consolidate the democratic reforms for PRC in Tibet (ibid, 70). The CCP strongly believed that the rebellion in Tibet was the handiwork of a few reactionary elements, which could be easily isolated. This discourse by CCP was a mode of gaining legitimacy in Tibet, where the majority Tibetans is deemed as being liberated by CCP. The situation in Tibet during 1950’s was handled directly by CCP CC who had directed that the rebellion in Tibet should be seen as an opportunity to proceed with the long delayed democratic reforms and also the PLA should be on the defensive.

Mao further exclaimed that the “Tibet Work Committee should adopt a strong strategy of remaining defensive militarily while taking the offensive politically so as to divide the upper stratum and educate the lower” (ibid, 74). The need to legitimise their rule over lower groups is emphasised much by CCP along with the need to “win over” the Dalai Lama (ibid, 75). With the revolts in March 1959 engulfing Tibet, the CCP stepped up the process to suppress the rebellion, the basis on which they legitimised the imposition of democratic reforms in Tibetan areas. However, still a policy of cooption was implemented by CCP especially with regard to the Dalai Lama; who was not termed as a leading traitor but was to be termed as being kidnapped by the traitor’s clique (ibid, 78). The importance of the Dalai Lama in legitimising CCP’s rule in Tibet is reflected in the series of letters that were written and forwarded between the Dalai Lama and General Tan Kuan San, the acting representative of the central people’s government in Tibet. This reflects the desire of the CCP to bring about legitimacy to their reforms through the local elites. Following the revolt of 1959, the Panchen Lama was made into the acting Chairman of the PCART. Moreover in an enlarged CCP Politburo meeting in Shanghai on 25 March 1959, attended by all top leaders of CCP, Deng Xiaoping on the first day of the session, which was devoted to the Tibetan issue emphasised that the CCP and PLA

units in Tibet had faithfully abided by 17 Point Agreement (ibid, 79) which had been violated by the upper stratum rebellious clique, but which had also opened the gates for initiating reforms in Tibet, bring social justice which would bring legitimacy from the people. The PCART was deemed as the highest administrative organ for carrying out reforms in Tibet, which was to have a sizeable number of Tibetans both secular and ecclesiastical headed by Panchen Lama, through which there would be the deriving of legitimacy (Zhou enlai, 1959).

The revolt of 1959 has been strongly portrayed by the CCP as an act committed by a few from the reactionary clique of the upper stratum, termed as a handful few who had colluded with imperialists and had no support from masses. On the other hand, the PLA and CCP who had put down the rebellion are termed to be assisted by people of all sections of the population in Tibet, both ecclesiastical and secular (Xinhua, 1959:4). The reactionary clique is further termed as being against the reforms for the Tibetans. Thus a dichotomy is seen to be created by CCP in their discourse on 1959, which has remained as an important way through which the CCP exerts legitimacy in Tibet. This was also much required so as to bring “democratic reforms” in Tibet, which was termed as a demand made by the local Tibetans themselves. The CCP also evoked strong notions of the quick implementation of regional national autonomy in Tibet which will replace the military control after the rebellion would be stifled. However, the military control commissions in various parts of Tibet having the representative of the PLA will also have representative of local patriotic people; thus bringing a sense of legitimacy (ibid, 12). The PLA and thus Chinese security is deemed to play highly important roles, which also elaborates the importance of the army. Furthermore, the CCP through a historical discourse also tried legitimising their policies in Tibet, which had to be liberated so as to consolidate the motherland (People’s Daily 1959:8). The CCP is also termed as bringing in an internal unity between the Dalai and the Panchen Lama and also the PLA is seen to be assisting in the economic and cultural development of the region.

The “democratic reforms” are necessary for the prosperity of the Tibetan people. It is on lines of such benevolence that CCP tried garnering legitimacy in the 1950’s, which has continued in their discourse on Tibet. The policy of gradualism and patience that the CCP

adopted in Tibet can be termed as modes of gaining legitimacy in a region which had no significant Communist presence earlier. Thus, through cooption and accommodation of the ruling elites, especially consulting on reforms can be seen as hegemonic policies adopted by CCP to legitimise their rule, which would be alien to the common Tibetan. Even after the curbing of rebellion in 1959, the Central People's Government, with regard to democratic reforms emphasised on consultation with patriotic people of the upper and local strata and others to carry out reforms (ibid, 23).

After the crushing of the rebellion to legitimise their stand the CCP and PLA also organised a number of meetings and mass rallies of locals expressing full support for the dissolution of the local government and crushing of rebels. In these meetings, the people, secular and ecclesiastic strongly expressed their hatred of the seditious Tibetan reactionary clique and their warm love for their motherland and Chairman Mao (Xinhua, 1959:48). For instance, in the border town Yatung with India, a meeting was held with more than 400 representatives from all walks of life who volunteered to undertake transport jobs with their several hundred pack animals to help the PLA to put the rebellion down (ibid). On 15 April 1959, a massive rally attended by 10,000 citizens from all circles and nationalities was organised to condemn the rebellion and also give legitimacy to the Lhasa Municipal Military Control Committee of the Tibet Military Area Command of the PLA to completely quell the rebellion (ibid 59-60). In these rallies and meetings, members of mass organizations such as Association of Patriotic Youth and the Patriotic Women's Association, which were informally affiliated to CCP, gave their support along with individuals from the Religious Affairs Committee of PCART who spoke in support of crushing of the rebellion. The inclusion of these diverse groups and opposition to the rebellion can be termed as legitimising modes adopted by CCP in Tibet.

In response to March 10 revolts in Tibet and the subsequent uprisings, Premier Zhou Enlai in his Work Report delivered to the first session of Second NPC on situation of Tibet in 18 April 1959 elaborated on the measures taken to quell the rebellion especially through the military actions of the PLA which had wide spread support from the ecclesiastical and common masses. In the report, he essentially legitimises the actions undertaken by Beijing and CCP through acknowledging widespread support from

masses. This is emphasised through terming the rebel population to be of 20000 while over 1,10,000 labouring people demanded reforms, including the upper social strata that supported reforms (Zhou enlai, 1959:64). It is the people who are termed as demanding for national regional autonomy which is present in the Chinese Constitution; which forms a major mode of gaining legitimacy by CCP. Furthermore, he also invokes the 17 Point Agreement and its violation by the local Tibetan government as well as the reactionary clique of the upper social strata. He terms them as wanting to uphold the feudal serfdom system, “terming it as hell on earth” and obstruct reforms (ibid, 62). The CCP is seen as promising National Regional Autonomy and also various positive measures to help the economic and cultural development of Tibet region.

With regard to Democratic Reforms, the Premier comments on the need to consider the special conditions of Tibet and also taking into consultation the local voices especially of patriotic people of all walks of life. Hence, a policy of consultation and gradualism was adopted by CCP to legitimise itself in Tibet. In the same session of the NPC, a large number of deputies condemned the rebellion and upheld the legitimacy of China over Tibet. Among them, the significant Tibetan deputies such as the Panchen Lama, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme and Ngawang Gyatso who had been appointed as vice President of Chinese Buddhist Association and was also vice head of Kardze Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan spoke strongly supporting the suppression of the rebellion and the policies implemented by the CCP in Tibet (Xinhua, 1959: 82-90). These voice from the elites (secular and ecclesiastical) in NPC from the Tibetan nationality themselves were important ways through which China aimed at legitimising itself in Tibet. This is further seen through statements made by individuals such as Li Chi-shen, chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of GMD, Shen Chun-ju, China Democratic League and Huang Yen-pei of the China Democratic National Construction Association, who all affirmed on the policies, adopted by CCP in Tibet and condemned the reactionaries. These constituents of the united front policy adopted by CCP were much employed to gain greater legitimacy for their policies in Tibet (ibid, 85-89). Much of these deputies and also members of CPPCC belonging to 15 different nationalities (ibid, 92) raised notions of imperialists and expansionists especially Indians taking advantage of the rebellion and also fostering it to break the unity of PRC.

In the course of the speeches, one made by Lobsang Tsewang; vice governor of Gansu and the head of the South Gansu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture also emphasised on the Tibetans becoming an advanced nationality due to aid from the Han nationality and CCP, which had brought strong unification and thus provides legitimacy to China. Historical legitimacy for China with regard to Tibet was also elaborated by the Panchen Lama (Panchen, 1959:100). He also harks to the granting of national regional autonomy and the delay in implementing of reforms in Tibet by the Party along with a protection of religion and religious institutions by CCP as positive aspects of CCP's rule in Tibet. Furthermore, he also called for the implementation of democratic reforms for the betterment of Tibetans; thus granting more legitimacy to future policies of CCP in Tibet. Ngabo Ngawang Jigme in his speech also mentioned about the CCP pursuing correct policies towards Tibet since the 1951 liberation and also bringing in economic construction in Tibet in the form of highways, hospitals providing free medical services and also setting up of primary and middle schools in Tibet (Ngawang Jigme, 1959:111). The monk scholar Sherab Gyatso, president of the Buddhist Association of China in his speech gave popular support to CCP which according to him was also derived from the general Tibetan population towards the crushing of the rebellion by the PLA and the dissolution of the Kashag by the central government.

Through the condemnation of the rebellion in Tibet and support shown to the liberation of Tibet by China, with future prospects of democratic reforms by the elites both ecclesiastical and lay of Tibetan nationality, the Party tried creating the needed legitimacy for its policies in Tibet. Much of the Tibetan nationality deputies also gave further legitimacy to CCP through emphasizing on the bringing in of cooperation and unity between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, who according to them had been estranged on accord of a discord sown by reactionaries, both in Tibet and abroad. Thus the CCP under leadership of Mao was termed as protector of Tibetan Buddhism (Sherab Gyatso, 1959:135). On 28 April 1959, the First session of the Second NPC; the highest law making organ of PRC adopted a number of resolutions on the question of Tibet, which legitimised central government's and CCP's crushing of rebellion in Tibet and also the dissolution of local government in Tibet. It also called for the implementation of national regional autonomy in Tibet under the leadership of PCART and also called for the strong

need to bring an end to serfdom in Tibet, through imposition of democratic reforms, while keeping in mind the unique local conditions in Tibet especially the preservation of religious freedom. Hence, NPC through passing of such resolutions on Tibet granted legitimacy to China to carry forward its policies in Tibet (ibid, 175-78). A discourse that was present in China's mode of gaining legitimacy for the quelling of rebellion was through dismissing its claims to be a national uprising by the Tibetans through a cooption of local elites, who spoke and supported the policies brought by CCP especially the idea of Tibet's liberation and termed the rebellion as a handiwork of a few reactionaries from the upper class and local government of Tibet. These individuals belonging to all sections of society harped and supported the values and ideas brought by the CCP to Tibet as spontaneous expressions of interest of Tibetan people.

The cooption of earlier ruling elite is also seen in the narrative the CCP and Beijing has adopted with regard to the Dalai Lama, who was termed as being kidnapped by the reactionaries and imperialists. More importantly, the Dalai Lama was elected in 1959 after his flight to India as one of the vice Chairmen of the Standing Committee of NPC (Panchen, 1959:183). This is significant as CCP through such a policy wanted to accommodate/co-opt the Dalai Lama and thus further its policies in Tibet through hegemony. The crushing of the rebellion by PLA was also justified and supported by the Panchen along with the army indulging in just and fair activities such as maintaining social order, allocating interest free agricultural loans and helping the locals to carry out production thus laying the groundwork for democratic reforms which is termed as being demanded by people and also by the Panchen himself (FBIS. 1959:CC3). In this speech made by the Panchen on 7 July 1959 he also gives further legitimacy to Beijing's policies in Tibet, which had led to greater economic development and prosperity to the Tibetans that had been absent prior to 1951. He cites development in infrastructure, public health, education and industrial construction. For instance, he mentions the construction of 7000 kilometers of highways in Tibet linking it to the inland areas of China, thus bringing about economic and cultural development between Tibet and the rest of China.

There was also the opening of flight services between Beijing and Lhasa in 1956 and construction of power plants in Lhasa and Shigatse mentioned by him as brought about

by CCP. It had also set small industrial units in Tibet which would be the base for further industrial production for Tibetans. Interest free loans amounting to 1,553,000 yuan were also granted to peasants and herdsmen (ibid, 1959:CCC8) and with the entry of Han doctors and medical personnel and civilians into Tibet, three hospitals were established in Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo along with health centres and mobile medical teams spread everywhere, which had been absent earlier (ibid, 1959:CCC7). The CCP had also brought modern education for the Tibetans benefiting the masses, thus granting them legitimacy. Furthermore the Panchen had termed the rebels, the reactionary upper class clique and also the local government as being opposed to all these developments (ibid, 1959:CCC8). An important legitimacy granted by the Panchen to the CCP was his strong criticism of the existing social system in Tibet; serfdom which was deemed as being highly exploitative and ruthless which was to be replaced through democratic reforms (ibid, 1959:CCC9). Thus the earlier social system and associated ideology was deemed redundant by the Panchen himself which needed reforms which the CCP was bringing to Tibet. His calls for democratic reforms were termed as having the support of the broad masses of Tibetan people.

However, the Panchen further terms the democratic reforms to be implemented in Tibet as being peaceful reforms and one which will still pursue a policy of “buying out” (ibid, 1959:CCC11) towards the upper strata who had remained patriotic thus pursuing a policy of gaining legitimacy through co-option of the earlier elites. The presences of feudal exploitation by the religious institutions were to be reformed without harming religion. Thus, the Panchen’s support for democratic reforms in Tibet which is termed as a call from the liberated masses adds to the legitimacy of China over Tibet post 1959 revolts, which was a serious challenge to Beijing’s legitimacy in Tibet.

The Panchen in his speech to the tenth enlarged session of the Standing Committee of the Second NPC in Beijing made on 14 October 1959 also termed the resolution of NPC on Tibet and the instructions given by Chairman Mao to be absolutely correct which was to be implemented by PCART. He further stated that the resolutions from the NPC and CC to initiate democratic reforms in Tibet had the backing of the masses and was fully implemented by PCART (FBIS, 1959:BBB3). This was done by following a “mass line”

with regard to the democratic reforms as was instructed by the CC and Chairman Mao; whereby it was through going among the people and standing with them that the reality was known especially regarding the crimes of the three groups of big manorial lords and the need for democratic reforms. Hence, through this policy, a sense of deriving legitimacy is understood (ibid). The Panchen also provided the legitimacy to CCP by justifying the unity of the motherland brought about by CCP, which rejected the notion of Tibet being an independent nation. The policy of democratic reforms which were implemented in a peaceful manner in Tibet can be seen as a way of gaining legitimacy by CCP as the Panchen mentions about the mass popular support for it which was due to the cruel exploitation and oppression by the earlier social order (ibid, BBB2), which had been replaced by the CCP. The democratic reforms were carried out in two stages, which consisted of “the three oppositions” and “two reductions”. The former opposed rebellion, unpaid corvee tax and slavery, while the latter entailed reduction of rent and interest (ibid).

The second stage was the abolition of land ownership by feudal lords and ownership to peasants and distribution of land to peasants. This policy was directed to dilute the preexisting social system and also undermine the power relations that had marked the earlier society, replacing it with a socialist democratic system in Tibet. Furthermore, the Panchen also terms the full participation by the emancipated masses in bringing democratic reforms; who constituted 95 percent of the total population in Tibet (ibid, BBB4) granting it strong resemblance of legitimacy. There was also the continuation of the policy of united front with the patriotic upper strata and the respecting of freedom of religious belief along with providing certain subsidies to monasteries (ibid, BBB5), hence furthering legitimacy.

The land reforms which constituted a significant aspect of democratic reforms were aimed at gaining major support from rural masses; who were mostly the majority in Tibet. The Panchen states that 360,000 serfs and 20,000 slaves had been emancipated, becoming masters in the rural areas, gaining political power through the Peasant Associations (ibid, BBB6). He also states that through three oppositions and two

reduction campaigns, 1.5 million *ko*² of land had been distributed to the emancipated serfs, where the practice of harvest to the tillers was followed. For the land of those serf owners who had not rebelled, there was rent reduction, thus reducing the earlier extraction from the peasantry from the earlier 70 percent to 20 percent (ibid). This also led to an increase in production which according to the Panchen Lama was granted directly to the producers. There was also a rise in ideological and political consciousness of common Tibetans for which they were deemed as being extremely grateful to CCP and Chairman Mao, who is deemed as the new “Living Buddha” (ibid, BBB7).

THE THIRD PHASE – 1960-1980

The challenge to China’s legitimacy in Tibet in 1959 especially after the March revolts was also seen in the form of international pressure, mostly from the West, especially USA, which had raised the issue of violation of Tibetans’ human rights in the UN. This was however termed as being wrong by the Panchen Lama, who termed it as a blatant interference of the internal affairs of China (ibid, BBB8). The CPPCC plays a significant role in Tibet and aids in deriving legitimacy for CCP in the nationality minority areas including Tibet as it accommodates non communists, soliciting their views and advising the CCP. However, it is also an important tool through which the Party disseminates its policies to the people (Shakya, 1997:13). Much of the members of the CPPCC in all levels – national, regional, prefectural and county are mostly former elites belonging to secular and ecclesiastical class. Through the policy of united front with non communist members of Tibetan nationality, the CCP intends to co-opt and legitimise their policies in Tibet through the CPPCC. The membership to CPPCC is seen as a gift granted by CCP to individuals who are said to exercise some degree of influence in society (ibid) and thus would aid in bringing about an ideological domination for the party among the population or group they hail from. This in turn enables the CCP to hegemonise over national minorities or non communist groups, thus gain stronger legitimacy.

The CPPCC had an important propaganda work to carry out during the early years in order to show that the CCP was accommodative towards non-communists (ibid) as well

² A *ko* is a plot of land on which 27 pounds of seed can be sown.

as to implement its policies in regions which had not undergone the Communist revolution in 1949. It is through the work reports of CPPCC that one can gauge the activities performed by it which has aided in gaining of legitimacy for CCP. This is much visible in the report made by Chen Shutung, the vice chair of CPPCC on 29 March 1960, whereby he clearly outlines the embracing of policies of the Great Leap Forward and socialist transformation brought about by CCP and also how CPPCC has enabled a rise in socialist consciousness among members of various democratic parties and groups through political and ideological studies. This was in line with CPPCC embracing the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress on CCP (FBIS, 1960). Through this, it enabled a process of legitimacy for CCP among sections of those populations who were ideologically not inclined to communism.

An important activity reported by the vice chair of CPPCC was to organise ideological study classes and assist the democratic personages of various circles to undergo political and ideological transformation (ibid). Thus, the CPPCC was much involved in a project of political transformation through ideological education which was also offered through the CPPCC built institutions/ socialist colleges and in 1959 the total number of political schools and socialist colleges operated by them increased to 274, enrolling a total of approximately 50,000 students (ibid, 3). Significantly, Mao's Thought was an important component that was to be taught and this teaching and education was held in great esteem by the CPPCC. In 1957, a Tibetan high ranking official who headed the industry and commerce department under PCART named Bando Yanbe also raised the need for a university to be built in Tibet especially by the CPPCC (FBIS, 1957:BBB10). Moreover it had also sponsored individuals to ideological study forums where members hailing from different backgrounds were given ideological training and taken for tours to view the socialist transformation underway in PRC.

This was in line with the socialist education movement that was launched by Mao in 1963 to increase ideological transformation. This would also enable CCP to hegemonise itself over the disparate non communist groups and thus rule through consent; increasing its legitimacy. The regional branch of CPPCC in Tibet was formally established in 1959 and with regard to matters related to Tibet, in October 1959, the National Committee of

CPPCC and Beijing Committee condemned the illegal resolution passed by USA on Tibet in UN, thus bolstering Chinese legitimacy on the Tibetan issue (FBIS, 1960:5). The CPPCC also disseminated its ideas through its official publication which had a number of liaison committees, including a historical materials research committee. Under this, members of the national Committees and personages were urged to put down in writing their experiences and views as materials for the study on contemporary history (ibid, 6).

This was seen as important for gaining legitimacy by China over Tibet as this has been seen in the case of the publications of historical materials and memoirs in Tibetan and Chinese by a number of historians and former aristocrats especially on the issue of Tawang and McMahon line in the late 1980's. In most of these writings on Tawang, the Indian sovereignty over the still disputed region has been criticised and efforts have been made to trace Tawang's sovereignty in the hands of the Tibetans; hence the Chinese. These were published by the Tibet branch of CPPCC, and included the writings of individuals such as Chabel Tsetan Phuntsog, Lhalu Tsewang Dorjee and Thubten Chopel. Much of the writings were critical of Indian takeover of Tawang and also stressed on strong Tibetan ties to the region (Sperling). This deployment of Tibetan voices/narratives by CPPCC in conjunction to the policy followed by CCP is an important way of garnering legitimacy by PRC over Tibet.

The CPPCC boosting the legitimacy of CCP in Tibetan regions was further reflected in the speech of the 14th Dalai Lama which was made on 7 July 1958, when he as the chair of PCART, called for a resolution to establish a Tibet committee of CPPCC. The need for CPPCC in Tibet was termed by him so as to enable the participation of patriotic and public figures of all religious groups, monasteries and people's organization in China's political life. This can be constructed as a way of incorporating the non communist elites, thus legitimising the CCP further (FBIS, 1956: AAA13). It also created the united front that the CCP pursued with respect to the earlier elites of the national minorities. Much of resolutions passed by CPPCC sought to grant legitimacy to the reports on the work of the government made in the NPC sessions and also; in 1960's emphasised on various circles of all nationalities to take an active part in the socialist revolution, construction and socialist education movement (FBIS, 1963:CCC13). The CPPCC can be deemed as

strengthening the people's democratic united front, led by the proletariat and based on worker peasants alliance (ibid, CCC14). The People's Democratic Dictatorship is the essential form on which the CCP has legitimised itself in PRC. Hence, the major activity of CCPCC was also to gain consensus for the CCP among groups and personages who were not inclined to communists ideology but were deemed as patriotic and hence the need for united front policy with them.

On 1 September 1965, the first session of the First People's Congress of TAR began which proclaimed the founding of TAR (FBIS, 1965:DDD1). The formation of Tibet Autonomous Region can be termed as final integration of Tibet on an administrative level with PRC and extension of national regional autonomy in Tibet by CCP. The granting of autonomous status to Tibet which had been promised in the 17 Article Agreement signed in 1951 can be termed as garnering legitimacy through institutional means, where much autonomy would be given to the Tibetans, a physical manifestation of which was the establishment and meeting of the First People's Congress of TAR, which in the words of Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, executive chairman of the session and acting chair of PCART was the result of emancipation of millions of serfs in Tibet by CCP (ibid). The Vice Premier of PRC and the representative of the Central Delegation Hsieh Fuchen termed the convening of the Congress as a major milestone in the revolution in Tibet. He also termed the emancipation of Tibetans and their walking the path of a socialist society as only being possible due to the leadership provided by CCP and Mao, thus legitimising the role of Party in creating a new history of Tibet (ibid).

However, he does term the revolution being launched by the people themselves and it is they who have accepted CCP and Mao as their redeemer (ibid, DDD3). Legitimacy was to be much derived from the emancipation provided through electoral representation as 301 delegates had made up the Congress. From this, 226 were Tibetans who were mostly emancipated serfs and slaves who had no voices earlier. The Congress also had representation from the Han, Loba, Monpa and Hui nationalities in Tibet. Hence, the granting of equal representation to the minorities such as Lobas and Monpas in the Congress were important modes of gaining legitimacy in CCP as these disparate groups were deemed to be non represented in the earlier socio political system (ibid, DDD2).

The Vice Premier also tried to link the struggle of nationalities to Mao's understanding of it as a class struggle, which could be resolved only through a revolutionary situation. This legitimised the suppression of the rebellion which was deemed as one led by the counter revolutionary Dalai traitorous clique and also the purging of the Panchen, which was termed as a rightful condemnation of the reactionary serf owner clique (ibid, DDD3). This provided the justification for the dismissal of the Panchen, who had posed a serious challenge to CCP's legitimacy over Tibet, through his 70,000 Character petition. These actions by CCP in Tibet were in tune towards consolidating the unification of the motherland and its socialist construction, for which the Tibetans were participating wholeheartedly.

The rebellion and the activities of the Panchen were termed as acts aimed at splitting the motherland and undermining the unity of nationalities; which overall had to be preserved (ibid). Thus, the emphasis on maintaining security and control for unity by CCP is emphasised in the speech. This was also an attempt to legitimise CCP's policies of socialist construction which emphasised on economic results especially through the Mutual Aid and Cooperation movement and through promoting production. There would also be the development of agriculture and animal husbandry and industry and communication, ones which would take into consideration the local conditions but would also turn Tibet into a strong socialist bastion (ibid).

Hence, the mode of deriving legitimacy by CCP through the establishment of TAR and also through holding the People's Congress was strengthened, through emphasizing on emancipation carried forward by it of the millions of serfs who had suffered immensely earlier. This also justified Maoist notions of nationality struggle being linked to class struggle as in the case of Tibet, the socialist transformation in the form of the Democratic Reforms had emancipated the millions of serfs, who had been exploited much earlier. The culmination of the emancipation of serfs was seen in the formation of TAR and convening of First TAR People's Congress where all decisions were to be made by the serfs (Tibet Reform Proves Mao Correct, 1965). The Nationality Committee of the Second NPC had held its enlarged session from 9-14 April 1960 where matters related to national minority areas were discussed, especially on the different ways through which

the PRC and CCP tried garnering legitimacy from them. Although the TAR was yet to be formed, the speech made by Wang Feng, the Vice Chair of Nationalities Affairs Committee reported on the policies implemented towards those Tibetan national areas of Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and Yunnan, where democratic reforms and socialist transformation had been carried out from 1957-58 onwards. This entailed the adoption of people's communes systems as well as cooperativisation in agricultural production which would boost the overall productivity (FBIS, 1960:BBB31).

The national minority regions of PRC were termed as being economically and culturally backward, which had been eliminated rapidly and thoroughly. Moreover, through the implementation of the rectification campaign and anti rightist struggle which had been extended to minority nationality areas, there has been the ushering in of socialist thinking and development among the minorities (ibid, BBB29). The Vice Chair also mentions about the rise in industrial and agricultural production in national minority areas and also terms the adoption of change among nomadic communities, whose movements had been reduced and they had also accepted other sideline activities such as agriculture along with animal husbandry (ibid, BBB30). The Vice Chair also links the need for Tibet that is central Tibet to complete the democratic reforms which were currently underway so as to liberate the masses, start the development of Mutual Aid Teams and cooperation and increase production (ibid, BBB31). This socialist transformation, development and liberation of masses from feudal exploitation was the base on which the CCP tried garnering legitimacy in the late 1950's from its national minorities; it was also expanded to the realm of initiating a struggle against feudal oppression and exploitation in the religious sphere especially in minority areas where Islamism and Lamaism were much prevalent (ibid, BBB32). Through the interlinking of Mao Zedong Thought and Socialist construction emphasised through the Great Leap Forward, the CCP deemed to legitimise itself among the national minorities.

From 1966 onwards, Tibet along with the rest of PRC was engulfed in GPCR. The cultural revolution was the culmination of the two lines that had been present in CCP; the radical line espoused by Mao which emphasised on the principle contradiction in China to be in the form of a struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat which could be

resolved through class struggle/revolution and the line followed by Liu Shaoqi and his supporters which emphasised on contradiction in China being between an advanced socialist system and a backward factors of production which could be resolved through economic development. Many have also interpreted GPCR as a power struggle between Mao and Liu Shaoqi, which was played out in the aspect of an ideological/cultural field. Eventually, the Maoist line grew supreme especially through the Cultural Revolution. According to Lin Biao, in his report to the Ninth National Congress of CCP delivered on 1 April and which was adopted on 14 April 1969, he terms the GPCR as the inevitable result of the protracted and sharp struggle between two classes, two roads and two lines in socialist society (Sharma, 2003:230). It was a continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat (ibid, 225) and included the radical policies forwarded by Mao which emphasised on economic policies such as the commune, Great Leap Forward, democratic reforms as well as creation of a socialist man through a cultural revolution. The GPCR can be deemed as officially beginning from the circular of 16 May 1966, worked out under personal guidance of Mao, which laid down the theory, line principles and policy for GPCR.

It was under the guidance of and was steered by the Cultural Revolution Group under CC of CCP (ibid, 232-33). It was a mass movement, where almost all sections of Chinese population were invariably involved. It was carried forward by the young Red Guards who were high school and university students and were fanatically devoted to Mao. More importantly, the Cultural Revolution was also a revolution in the realm of the superstructure, where Mao and his supporters emphasised on the need to seize power especially in the spheres of culture. In 1962 at the Tenth Plenary session of the Eight CC of CCP, Mao had emphasised that to “overthrow a political power, it was always necessary first of all to create public opinion, to do work in ideological sphere. This is true for all revolutionary class as well as for counter revolutionary class” (ibid, 231). It was through seizing ideology and superstructure that the revisionists could be extricated. For Mao, much of the power had been usurped by capitalist roaders in power or in the hands of former capitalists, while majority of masses were still backward. This had occurred due to the powerholder’s emphasizing on the idea of economism and grasping production, which had ideologically suppressed the masses. It was under his leadership,

who emphasised the masses on the ideological level, which is seen through the launching of GPCR. It can be termed as a mode of bolstering legitimacy by CCP especially Mao, who truly wanted the ideological emancipation of masses through the GPCR. It also entailed the destruction of the “four olds”, constituting old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits, which were all deemed of being a part of the decadent feudal, capitalistic and counter revolutionary past. The Tibet Revolutionary Committee was set in 1968 and likewise with the other national minorities’ areas, the Tibetan regions were drowned in the tumult of GPCR. Unlike the Han areas, the GPCR in minority areas became a policy of radical assimilation of these groups into revolutionary Han China. Under GPCR, the numerous symbols, institutions and markers of Tibetan identity were termed as remnants of decadent feudal period and were destroyed.

The Cultural Revolution was a project of sinification of Tibetan areas. This was especially seen in the context of language, when Tibetan as a language was completely banned and only Mandarin was in use for official and educational purposes. However, large number of Tibetans especially the youth participated in the GPCR, involving themselves in the wanton destruction of the old and also participating and monitoring struggle sessions of earlier aristocrats and religious personages who were the class enemies. The traditional system were all destroyed and communes and cooperatives were instituted everywhere (Shakya, 2008). It was the deep fracturing of the self caused by GPCR which attempted to erase every trace of Tibetan identity (ibid, 2008). The Red Guards had succeeded in destroying about 90 percent of the material manifestations of Tibetan religious life (Norbu, 1997:279). However, a major garnering of legitimacy by CCP was on the aspect of truly liberating the masses especially the labouring and peasantry classes in Tibet through ideological emancipation which GPCR would bring. In Tibet, by 1975 more than 1900 people’s communes were established in the rural and pastoral areas and also according to CCP regional Party Secretary during 1976-77 Ren Rong, the past nine years had seen a growth of 26.6 percent in agricultural, industrial and animal husbandry production. The revolutionary Tachai spirit was implemented in overall production in Tibet. He also emphasised on Tibet becoming self sufficient in grain production in 1974 and livestock increasing by 80 percent over 1968.

With regard to industries the number of medium and small factories and mines in 1977 doubled to that of 1968 (Rong, FBIS, 1977:J2). Much of these were termed by him as being undertaken by the revolutionary committee and thus coming under GPCR. Ren Rong also terms the Revolutionary Committee and its leading groups being filled with cadres of Tibetan and other minority nationalities which was around 64 percent of total (ibid, J3). This narrative tries to legitimise the GPCR through its achievements and its inclusiveness. This is also in line of the 11 Party Congress of CCP, where the emphasis was slightly shifted to economic development, the partial embracing of Zhou enlai's Four Modernisations. However in Tibet unlike many parts of PRC, the revolutionary zeal continued with the non repudiation of policies of GPCR, which was however a policy followed in the 11th Party Congress. There was also an apparent increase in the regions medical and health services which had increased by a total of 380 medical organizations and 200 percent in hospital beds (ibid, J3). The Cultural Revolution is deemed as having the full participation of masses thus legitimising it further, whereby the people had repudiated the remnants of feudal serfdom, traditional beliefs, capitalism and reactionary tendencies. The latter is represented by the Dalai clique who had been thoroughly criticised (ibid, J2).

However, the GPCR is also seen as being a carefully orchestrated affair in Tibet as the Party was in full control (Shakya, 2002). This was due to the strategic location of Tibet and the CCP did not want any disturbance in such a military sensitive area especially during the heights of the Cold War and with much strained ties with India and China after 1962 conflict, Beijing did not want any chaos in Tibetan regions (ibid). This reemphasises the primacy of security and stability as being important for CCP in Tibetan regions, thus the revolutionary liberation of Tibetan masses as a legitimising tool is termed to be secondary in nature during GPCR in Tibet. However, in 1977, the Party chief Ren Rong emphasised on the need to continue revolution in superstructure and to consolidate and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat in superstructure, including all realms of culture (Rong, FBIS, 1977:J6).

For instance class struggle sessions continued till late 1982-83 in many remote areas (Goldstein, 1999:25). Hence, till late 1979, radical rhetoric and discourse of GPCR was

still strong in Tibet along with the implementation of radical policies. This is reflected further in religious matters, where it was termed that the counter revolutionaries and reactionaries were using religion to carry out their activities, which was against the wishes of the masses (Rong, FBIS, 1977:J7). Party Secretary Ren not only reemphasised on the strategic location of Tibet and the need for revolution and modernizing PLA units, but also the duty of every individual to protect China's borders, thus the exclamation of strengthening security (ibid). Thus, the CCP legitimised itself in Tibet during GPCR on the basis of emancipating masses on an ideological level, through subduing the reactionaries and counter revolutionaries that had emerged within the Party and society.

Through a forceful dominating mode of bringing revolution to the superstructure, the CCP believed it could gain the support of masses, who had been dominated earlier. The GPCR also legitimised the role and leadership of Mao Zedong, whose thoughts had in reality led the PRC and liberated the downtrodden masses and who had sinicised Marxism (Biao, 1969:246). It was further legitimised in the Ninth Party Congress of CCP held in 1969 where Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line was to be carried forward by all nationalities (Sharma, 2002:277). The Cultural Revolution was deemed as a necessary stage of bringing stability in a highly unstable world, where the two global hegemon; US and USSR were trying to outdo each other. It is with respect to the latter that in the Tenth Congress of CCP through a report delivered by Zhou Enlai, mentions about the mistreatment of the nationalities by the Soviet Union (ibid, 295), while terming China's nationality policy as being the best. All nationalities were to be immersed in class struggle in the superstructure including all spheres of culture which did not conform to the economic base (Zhou Enlai, 1973:298). Thus, in the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Party Congress, the central discourse of Party was on furthering the revolution and on class struggle. Throughout the GPCR, the Party in the areas of minority nationalities sought to legitimise itself on lines of defeating revisionism that had crept into the ranks of the Party and also to free the subdued masses among the national minorities.

It is in the report delivered by Hua Guofeng in the 11th Congress of CCP in 1977 that the minority nationality areas and work among them is stressed. In the previous Party Congresses the nationalities are mentioned but are overshadowed by the need for

revolution among them. In the Eleventh Party Congress, an emphasis on the need to do work among them and in border regions is mentioned. To gain legitimacy there was an emphasis on lowering Han chauvinism while at the same time opposing local nationality chauvinism. The CCP would also carry forward the extensive proletarian education among them (Hua, 1977:377). However, the GPCR had led to a stifling of local cultures and identity of national minorities and brought strong social turbulence in their everyday lives, thus alienating them much from the CCP, which had actually diminished its legitimacy. Hence in 1982, in the report to the 12th National Congress of CCP, Hu Yaobang emphasised on the reverting to an ideology of Socialist Modernisation and putting an end to years of social turbulence and bringing stability, unity and liveliness (Hu, 1982:429).

Furthermore, criticism was made against Mao and GPCR. The Cultural Revolution was termed as a “left” mistake, which could be shattered through an acceptance of the Third Plenum of the 11th CC of CCP. The earlier theory of “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of proletariat” was drubbed by CCP with embracing of the socialist legal system and democracy and restoration of united front work (ibid, 431). However, falling back on the Four Cardinal Principles, there was also the emphasis on arresting work to bringing an upsurge to the socialist economy and on improving the people’s living standard. In the context of the nationality question, the report by Hu Yaobang mentions about the need to promote socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all nationalities. He also terms the number of “left” errors committed during the GPCR and before it, which had been resolved much by CC among national minorities. Hu also termed the policies implemented towards nationalities as being going back to providing them with the right to regional autonomy and helping them in economic and cultural development. He also called for the cadres to have a better understanding of nationalities question, to oppose Han chauvinism and also oppose local nationality chauvinism. These were deemed as means through which the legitimacy of the Party would increase among the minority nationalities, which had eroded much in the duration of GPCR.

With the endorsing of reforms and opening up by Deng Xiaoping in the Third Plenum of the 11th CC in 1978, economic modernisation gave precedence to politics. The earlier Four Modernisations was given prominence and the issue that came to the forefront was the line that Liu Shaoqi had promulgated of contradictions being present in China between an advanced socialist system and backward factors of production, which could be resolved only through economic development and growth. Hence, class struggle and GPCR took a backseat. Huo Guofeng's "two whatever" policy was abolished and seeking truth from facts was reestablished. A shift to economic construction and opening up was much embraced (People's Daily online, 2008). This was visible in Tibet from 1980's especially with Hu Yaobang's visit to Tibet and his formulation of the six tasks facing Tibet (Yao, 1996:287).

FOURTH PHASE – 1980 till present

The Fourth phase in the discourse on China's legitimacy in Tibet can be said to have started with the 1980 visit of Hu Yaobang and the set of liberal policies which were implemented in the Tibetan areas. The strand of reform and opening up was implemented at a slower pace in Tibet as seen in the radical rhetoric and policies followed by the Party Secretary Ren Rong. With the inspection tour by Hu in 1980 and understanding the ground situation, he replaced Ren with Yin Fatang, who also admitted that Tibet was suffering from extreme poverty. Hu Yaobang further proclaimed that Tibet must return to the level of living standards that had been achieved before the CCP had ousted the Tibetan government in 1959 (Cao, 1998:13). However, the discourse from the CCP CC on Tibet can be gauged from the six points outlined by Hu Yaobang which was to determine future work in Tibet as well as gain legitimacy from Tibetans for the Party. The six tasks reflect the atmosphere in China and are seen to be immersed deeply in the outcome of the Third Plenum of 1978. Another policy that the CCP under Deng initiated to bring greater legitimacy to Tibet was through starting a dialogue with the Dalai Lama and in 1979 receiving the Dalai Lama's representative in Beijing (Wang, 2002:100). The major emphasis was on to persuade the "self exiled" Tibetan leader to "return to the motherland", which would also boost the policy of reform and opening up that Deng had initiated (Gyal, 2012).

The visit of Hu Yaobang took place from 22-31 May 1980, who was accompanied by a working group of the Party CC. It was composed of five people – Hu Yaobang, Wan Li (Vice Premier of State Council), Ngabo Ngawang Jigme (Vice Chair of NPC), Yang Jingren (Head of State Committee of Nationalities Affairs) and Zhou Zhengqing (Vice Minister of Organisation Department). They reached Tibet on 22 May 1980 and 23 May, the 39th anniversary of 17 Point Agreement was observed (Yao, 1996:286). This act reaffirmed the importance that the CCP emphasised on 17 Point Agreement that they had with Tibet. It was on 29 May that Hu elaborated on the six point directive on Tibet. They are as follows -

1. To exercise nationality autonomy in the region fully – that is to let Tibetans really be the masters’ of their own lives.
2. A commitment was made by Beijing to relieve and reduce burdens on the people, exempting them from agriculture and animal husbandry tax over the next three to five years in order to allow the Tibetans a chance to recover.
3. To adopt a special policy to revive Tibet’s economy including the adoption of a system of private economy in line with Tibetan circumstances. Nationwide this policy was in form of the Responsibility system.
4. To make great efforts to develop agriculture and animal husbandry as well as the manufacture of consumer goods in order to promote economic prosperity and enrich people’s lives.
5. To make efforts to develop Tibetan science, culture and education and to prepare the establishment of Tibet University.
6. To implement the policy on minority nationality cadres correctly, to strengthen unity between Han and Tibetan cadres and to transfer a large quantity of Chinese cadres who had worked in Tibet for many years back to the interior (ibid, 287-88).

These directives can be understood as modes of garnering legitimacy in Tibet by CCP, which had lost much ground. Hu Yaobang himself had emphasised that “living standards in Tibet had gone down” and also “thirty years of work by CCP in Tibet had not improved the lives of people” (ibid). It denotes clearly that the CCP were

concerned with regard to their legitimacy in Tibet. Furthermore, much of the directives dealt with the economic sphere of Tibet and Tibetans, which was in tune with the ideological inclination which the CCP had started undergoing from Third Plenum of 1978, which gave precedence to the economic. The role of economic development, growth and prosperity has ever since become the dominating discourse on gaining legitimacy by PRC/CCP in Tibet, which has been emphasised more in the present. The Fifth Plenum of 11th CCP CC in February 1980 ordered its Secretariat to work out a detail of some economic concessions (Norbu, 1997:286).

The six point directives by Hu are reflective of a liberal policy that the Party wanted to pursue in Tibet. The first point which stresses on regional autonomy was part and parcel of a standard narrative on Tibet, while now it simply emphasised on making it more flexible. This is also seen to be in consonance with the directive on greater Tibetan participation in administration, whereby two thirds of all government functionaries in Tibet were to be full time Tibetan cadres (ibid, 287). Along with this, there was a directive specifically aimed towards preserving and protecting Tibetan culture, which meant a renewal of Tibetan Buddhism as well as traditional medicine, music and performing arts. However there was also the need to develop Tibetan culture by keeping it under a strict socialist orientation (ibid, 286). The economic policies were geared towards improving the life of Tibetans especially the rural agricultural and animal husbandry sector was to increase consumerism and boost capital building in Tibet.

Along with this, massive Chinese investment was also to be injected in the Tibetan regions, bringing prosperity and development in the region. The CCP and the post Mao leadership emphasised on economic growth, development and prosperity in Tibet to be modes of winning legitimacy for Beijing and the Party State. The liberal tendency towards Tibetan culture which was initially restricted to individual religious expression in Tibet and other parts of China was also a way of gaining legitimacy by the new leadership; of showing signs of reform. Furthermore through the six directives mentioned above, the Han cadres in Tibet were to learn the spoken and written languages as the lack of it lead to a divorce from the masses. The Tibetan

people's habits, customs, history and culture were to be respected (Goldstein, 1999:27).

This liberal policy towards Tibetan culture and religion was a zone that the Party treaded carefully, with an emphasis on freedoms given to not go against socialist orientation as well as national unity. The freedom that was granted and reasserted in the Chinese Constitution of 1982 of freedom of religious belief was a way of gaining stronger legitimacy from the population. This led to resurgence in religious practices in Tibetan areas even though the GPCR had suppressed all overt practices of Buddhism in Tibet, it could not obliterate such practices on a cognitive and an emotional level. The new People's Proletarian culture was widely hailed by not genuinely created in the sense of being felt and believed (ibid, 10). This can be linked to a failure of China to bring about hegemony in Tibet, among Tibetans whose value system based on religion and culture acted as a countervailing measure to the attempts made by CCP. Furthermore, the Tibetan value system based on ethnicity and religion constructed a strong counter hegemony. Hence in Tibet it was the superstructure; the primordial linkages among Tibetans that has emerged as a rallying point for counter hegemony. The liberal policy adopted in the 1980's created a major revival in traditional Tibetan culture which was much shaped by Buddhism (which also contained many other aspects) (Blondeau and Buffetrille, 2008). The freedom given to religion and traditional culture is also reflected and legitimised through the Constitution of PRC, where under the section on Fundamental Rights and Duties of citizens, Article 36 calls for the freedom of religious belief of the citizens of PRC. Furthermore, no state organ, public organisation or individual can compel citizens to believe or not believe in any religion, nor discriminate.

Normal religious activities were to be protected by the state but also it could be turned into a tool to be used to engage in activities that would disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Lastly, religious affairs and bodies were not to be subjected to any foreign domination (Gov.cn, 2004). Along with this Article Four which deals with minority ethnic groups, there was also a reassertion of their right to use and develop their own

spoken and written language and to preserve or reform their own folkways and customs (ibid). This freedom can be termed as a way of obtaining legitimacy by the CCP, which however is restricted to the clause of the need to adhere to socialist orientation and strong emphasis on loyalty and patriotism towards the Party and State. Furthermore, the state is deemed to be protecting only “normal” religious activities and only recognises four religions viz, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Islam, everything else is outlawed (Blondeau, 2008:159).

This has also been due to the organizational activities of Falun Gong, which was perceived to be a threat to CCP during Jiang Zemin’s tenure as President of PRC. The qigong practitioners were termed as a problem to security and stability due to their ability to organise a sit down protest outside Zhongnanhai complex in Beijing in July 1999. Hence, this also stems from the emphasis on political and social stability that the 14th Party Congress of CCP emphasised on in 1992 to smoothly carry out reforms and economic development (Sharma, 2002:93). For CCP, economic development and reforms are the primary driver for legitimacy in PRC, hence religious and cultural activities are to be tailored in accordance to the economic needs, else are termed as challenges to its legitimacy. Moreover in the 12th Party Congress held in September 1982, talks about the need to tackle ideological and social evils through a “spiritual civilisation” were discussed. These measures were in response to growing corruption, nepotism and social evils but also aimed at controlling value systems and ideologies, such as religion which was making a comeback in Chinese society. In 1982 itself, the CC of CCP issued Document number 19 entitled “The Basic Viewpoint and Policies on the Religious Question During our Countries Socialist Period”, where the Party’s attitude towards religion is clearly outlined, one which continues till date.

It primarily defines religion as a social construct, immersed in Marxist rhetoric, the Party terms religion as a tool of oppression utilized by the upper classes and one which will disappear eventually from human history (CC CCP, 1982). Hence in lines of historical materialism religion is termed as an ideology which will soon disappear. However, it also reports that it will remain for a certain period and cadres who rely on administrative decrees or coercive measures to wipe out religious thinking and

practice are wrong (ibid). It affirms to the fact that religion exercises immense influence in society; thus exercising hegemony. In the earlier periods, the CCP also termed religion to be a medium through which oppression and imperialism was practiced by domestic actors as well as foreign imperialists. This was much rectified post 1949 and CCP is seen to have abolished the special privileges and oppressive exploitative system of feudal religion, attacked and removed the reactionary classes who hid behind the cloak of religion (ibid). A policy of religious freedom was implemented, which is a source of legitimising themselves in the Tibetan regions. The destruction and curbing of religious activities during GPCR was blamed on leftist errors and on Gang of Four. These had been corrected through carrying out its policy of freedom of religious belief, which however was to be entailed in patriotism and socialist construction.

Hence, the legitimacy with regard to freedom of religious belief by CCP was that the religious practice was given the needed liberty, which however was to be divorced from external control, imperialist tendency and superstition. Thus, on these lines the CCP tried winning consensus from its citizens. Furthermore, through divorcing religion from external domination and domestic oppression for the masses, it did try to further legitimise its role in China. This policy document was not directly related to Tibet. With religious revival in Tibetan regions and Buddhism forming the core value system in Tibet, it made a major difference. However, there was a strong emphasis on religion not meddling in the affairs of the state, nor intervene in schools or public education. Furthermore, the system of enrolment into religious institutions was fixed at the age of eighteen for Chinese citizens. Most importantly, there was the forbidding of using religion to oppose CCP's leadership or the socialist system and destroy national or ethnic unity.

For the Party, religious freedom was to unite all and bring about the fruition of a modernized, powerful socialist state (ibid). The Party is also seen to be deriving legitimacy from religion through a cooption of religious professionals which had increased in number and through which society could be benefitted. The Party understood the major influence they had over society and hence the need for them to

be geared towards socialist modernisation. To turn them into fervent patriots, supporting the socialist path and safeguarding the national and ethnic unity. Hence, post 1978 with the focus shifting to economic growth and politics especially ideological revolution taking a back seat, the Party tolerated the rise of religious ideologies, under certain conditions. For instance, majority of the accepted religions were placed under the Patriotic Religious Associations that followed the directives of the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council of PRC. The emphasis on control and cooption of religious professionals through institutional and legal means can be seen as a form of trying to create hegemony by CCP, through interjection of the Party's values and beliefs among them and hence gain legitimacy.

With regard to CCP members especially in ethnic minority regions, like the Tibetans, CCP stresses on notions of atheism to be practiced by its members. However, in these areas it mentions the inability of its cadres to completely shake off religious influence. This is seen in the case of Central Tibet where a Tibetan secretary of the local Party organisation was organizing yearly festivals of the local god (Blondeau, 2008:161). For such, the CCP then adopted a liberal policy of letting the cadres undergo ideological work to acquire a dialectical and a historical materialist world view and gradually shake of religious fetters. Also the CCP emphasised on the need to its cadres to follow the aspect of finding truths from facts and getting closer to the masses, through respecting and participating in religious practices.

Religious practices were permitted to the extent of not infringing and destroying the national unity of PRC, of not carrying out counter revolutionary activities and criminal actions by religious personages which were termed as not being "normal religious" activities. This formed the basic line of religious freedom granted by CCP in China and extension of which to Tibet was seen in the 1980's. However, in context of Tibet, the revival activity of Buddhism, which was one of the core constituents of Tibetan nationalism and identity eventually led to posing a challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet. It formed the point of hegemony in Gramscian perspective in Tibet, which acted as one of the nodes on which a counter hegemony was created by Tibetans.

Much of the major protests in 1987-89 and 2008 have been seen to be spearheaded by the monastics, which are serious challenges to China's legitimacy. Furthermore, the protests in Tibet in the form of self immolations starting from 2009 onwards were initiated by monks from Kirti monastery in Ngaba TAP, Sichuan. These protests and demonstrations were seen as destabilizing for the PRC in Tibet, especially for development and national unity. Hence, the subsequent steps that were taken by the Party can be termed as securitization and a roll back of the earlier liberal policies. More importantly, with CCP's legitimacy taking a beating due to their handling of the pro democratic student protestors in Tiananmen 1989, which received global denunciations, the Party's overall policies took a more conservative turn in the 1990's. This is reflected in Tibet with the Party rejecting the exiled Dalai Lama's candidate of the Tenth Panchen Lama and installing their own candidate.

However according to Arjia rinpoche, the abbot of Kumbum monastery in Amdo, present day Qinghai, in his memoirs "Surviving the Dragon" he mentions about the Party in the immediate aftermath of the Tenth Panchen's death, seeking to collaborate with the Dalai Lama to seek the reincarnation of the Tenth. According to him, after the Tiananmen incident of 1989, the stand of the CCP hardened with regard to the process of selecting the reincarnation of Panchen Lama and thus the Dalai Lama was deemed problematic. With the CCP selecting the Panchen, there was need to legitimise this action, which was done in lines of terming this as a continuation of the historical responsibility of Chinese central government from the dynastic period onwards and which was carried forward by CCP (Xinhua, 1995).

More importantly, the discourse on the legacy of the Tenth Panchen Lama as being a patriotic religious personage in China's Tibet, who had contributed immensely to safeguarding the unity of all ethnic groups and the unification of the motherland is emphasised and to a certain extent juxtaposed against the activities of the Dalai Lama who was deemed as creating mischief and harming the unity of China with his actions. There is also the mentioning of how the process of reincarnation selection was done by following the historical and ritual systems of Tibetan Buddhism and also taking into consideration the wishes of the masses, hence gaining the required

legitimacy. The activities of the Dalai Lama are also termed as being instigated by outsiders, to achieve their own goal. The Party however does mention the fact that the Dalai Lama has strong religious influence in Tibet which was misused by him (ibid). This also reveals the fact that the CCP understood the strong sway of Dalai Lama in Tibetan areas which has ever increased in the present period and thus is deemed as a challenge to Beijing's legitimacy in Tibet. The activities of the Dalai Lama is termed as being running counter to what is good for the population, one that will jeopardise the status of religion in Chinese society and its prospects for development. Hence, the need for bringing stability was felt to achieve economic growth and development; a source of legitimacy for CCP which was termed as being harmed through the activities of the Dalai Lama.

Moreover a parallel can be drawn in the policies that were implemented by the CCP in Tibet with regard to gaining legitimacy in the second phase (1960's onwards) and the current phase where in the former the reactionary upper strata clique, counter revolutionary elements of Tibetan local government had colluded with the foreign imperialists and GMD to undermine the liberation of masses which is seen to be done by the Dalai clique in the present third phase, whereby they are termed as undermining stability in Tibet, thus harming economic development, a tool of garnering legitimacy in PRC. More important, the linking of patriotism and religion by CCP termed the Dalai clique as separatists who were aiming to split the nation. This was termed as an attack on Tibet's economic development and the harking to making Tibet into a vassal of the west and turning it back to serfdom (Lhasa Xizang Ribao, 1995:2).

On lines of liberation of Tibet from serfdom and the economic development, the CCP garnered legitimacy over its policies in the Tibetan regions. However, a different mode of gaining legitimacy by CCP in Tibet can also be seen in the process of selecting and appointing the new reincarnation of the Eleventh Panchen Lama. This mode of coopting the process of reincarnation and subsequent accommodation of the reincarnated being in the system is deemed as an important way through which China legitimises its rule over Tibet. Through the process of granting recognition to the

“Living Buddhas” the CCP is seen to be carrying forward the legacy of the past dynasties who had been partially involved; thus strengthening the historical legitimacy over Tibet. This process will also entail them control over the multitude of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnates that had strong influence over society as even accepted by CCP and to subsequently inject with pro-CCP ideology, thus starting the process of CCP’s hegemony over Tibet.

This is also seen in the formulation of the policy of “Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation Management Approach” which was approved by SARA Bureau Works meeting on 13 July 2007 and promulgated by Ye Xiaowen on 18 July 2007 (Xiaowen, 2007). It was aimed specifically at Tibetan Buddhism as it is in the system of Tibetan Buddhism that the process of reincarnation is present and well established. Through selecting a rebirth of a high lama, rather than through a process of accession of the monastic throne by a kin, reincarnation of “tulkus” and “rinpoches” was widespread throughout Tibet. The process also epitomized the un – importance of hereditary status and represented a third kind of lineage: the lineage of reincarnation (Kolas, 1996:54). It is based on a highly complex mechanism which involved both metaphysical and material processes.

The selection through a process of reincarnation also gave an aura of legitimacy to the individual and monastery including the community to which he/she belonged. This was perfectly understood by CCP, who in the early periods had deployed a united front policy to coopt high reincarnates like the Panchen Lama, Geda tulku of Beri monastery and Paghbala Gelek Namgyal of Chamdo. Order number 5 can be thus understood as a process of legitimising CCP’s authority among the reincarnates in Tibetan Buddhism. It has 14 articles and draws much of its provisions from the 1982 promulgated Document Number 19 issued by the CC of the CCP which had basically set the Party’s views on religious affairs. For Order number 5 of 2007, the justification and legitimacy sought is on lines of stability and unity of the state and the minorities. The normal religious practices which were raised in 1982 are restressed in 2007 as it stresses on the living Buddhas to protect the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism. Furthermore, the notion of foreign interference is strictly

prohibited and banned in the process and the reincarnation is to be managed by the state. This is evident from Articles 5,6,7,9,10 and 13, where reincarnating Living Buddhas carry out application and approval procedures to the local Buddhist associations which in turn had to report to the local religious affairs department at the level of People's government above county level which in turn further reported to their superiors.

The order clearly states that the reincarnates who have relatively large impact had to be reported to the Provincial or Autonomous Regional People's government for approval; those with a great impact was to report to SARA, while those with a particularly great impact was to report to the State Council for approval (ICT, 2007). This also reveals the importance of the reincarnates in Tibetan society as they exercised considerable legitimacy through traditional and charismatic means. The monasteries and other visible aspects of Buddhism was incomplete without the presence of the "tulkus" and rinpoches as they were the lineage holders; the living tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. Held in extremely high esteem, they formed value systems of the common masses through their teachings and interactions. Hence, on similar lines to the role of the church in perpetuating hegemony for Western capitalist states, the Tulkus/Rinpoches perpetuated hegemony in Tibetan society, where in pre 1951 Tibet the state and religion was but one. The discourse present in the order promulgated by SARA understands the degree of legitimacy that these tulkus have in the Tibetan society and the need for the Party to control them.

Through Order number 5, the Party has also attempted to bring a sense of legitimacy to the reincarnation process by inducing it within a framework of a statist legalist discourse which is reflected in Article 10 and 11 which states that on the installation of a "Living Buddha", a representative of the approving authority was to read out documents of approval and also the Chinese Buddhist Association would issue a Living Buddha permit, which will be kept on record in SARA. Article 11 terms harsh punishment for the ones who contravenes the means and measures with regard to the "Living Buddha" reincarnation affairs (ibid). Even with regard to the training of the "Living Buddha", it was to be reported to the local Buddhist Association which

would report to the higher authorities for approval. More importantly, the new regulation by SARA can be deemed to be bringing about certain ways of delegitimising the role of the Dalai Lama and Tibetans in exile, who is in reality the apex institution for selection of reincarnations of tulkus and rinpoches. It is further a strategic move to control the future reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. However, over all a major aspect of the new regulation is also to co-opt the Tibetan reincarnates and thus derive legitimacy from their allegiance to the Party State. The CCP further understood the importance of legitimising its stand over Tibetan Buddhism as it formed the core of the Tibetan political system. Through the process of monitoring and thus permitting the process of reincarnation, the Party is also seen as offering patronage to religion and thus increasing legitimacy (Kolas, 1996:56).

Furthermore, as the national identities of Tibetans are interlinked to Tibetan Buddhism the need to gain legitimacy through religious discourse becomes important in Tibet for CCP. This is also due to the fact that from a Tibetan perspective, religion provides a more legitimate set of values than Communist doctrine (ibid), hence the need to gain legitimacy through a process of cooption as well as coercion becomes the order of the day. It is also on lines of granting economic aid for the rebuilding of monastic institutions and temples by the central government that the Party state has tried generating legitimacy in Tibet. In 2001, the Chinese government had allocated more than 36 million yuan to rebuild and renovate monasteries that had been destroyed during the GPCR (Blondeau, 2008:160). Moreover, the state has also granted financial help to the monastics especially the elderly ones who were given welfare aid under the nationwide “safety net” program of the five guarantee household program (Goldstein, 1999:36).

The importance of legitimacy for China in Tibet is also reflected through the Tibet Work Forums, institutional discourses organised by the central government in Beijing which emphasises on future work for Tibet. From 1980-2010, five Tibet Work Forums have been held. It truly denotes the importance that the Party places on Tibet and the need to gain more legitimacy for the party state in the region. The holding of such Work Forums also reveal the high degree of centralization that is

present in China's policies in Tibet. The greater thrust of the discourse on the Work Forums on Tibet deals with the economic aspect in Tibetan regions. It is through economic development or performance legitimacy that the CCP and Beijing has tried to gain consensus in Tibet. According to Zhao Dingxin, the shift from an ideology based revolutionary regime into a performance based authoritarian regime in China occurred with a legitimacy crisis that PRC faced with liberalization and opening up (Zhao, 2009:422). It was on similar lines that legitimacy was extended to Tibet with stress on economic development. However, ideology as a base for legitimacy is still strong in Tibet. The First Work Forum was held on 14 March 1980 in Beijing under the leadership of the General Secretary of CCP Hu Yaobang. The minutes of the meeting was forwarded to CCP CC.

In these minutes, it was stated that "the central departments were to strengthen the correct guidance to the work of Tibet and aid the Tibetans" (China Tibet Network, 2014). The visit of Hu Yaobang was to implement these policies which came in the form of the six points but also an annual subsidy was fixed at 496 million yuan, 90 million yuan of various earmarks. Also to increase the modernisation drive a huge chunk of funding was earmarked for infrastructural development (ibid). Moreover with the setting in of aid to Tibet by China, greater degree of legitimacy was built by the Party State. These economic liberties were also accompanied by liberties in socio-cultural spheres of Tibet. The Second Work Forum was held in 1984, which marked a nationwide project for development of Tibet. This forms an important mode of garnering legitimacy in Tibet by China whereby the central government along with local governments from multiple provinces such as Shandong, Fujian, Tianjin and others were involved in the building of 43 small and medium sized projects. This "turnkey" mode of reconstruction also involved a total investment of 480 million yuan and which was aid to Tibet that boosted CCP's legitimacy in Tibet.

However, the specificity of reality in Tibet and the special situation in Tibet were taken into consideration. The First Two Forums were termed liberal and heralded more liberalization in socio cultural aspects of Tibet. The Third Work Forum was held in Beijing from 20-23 July 1994. It was held after a gap of ten years primarily

due to the revolts of 1987-89 in Lhasa, Tibet which seriously challenged the legitimacy of CCP and also due to the 1989 Tiananmen protests. These incidents hardened the stand of CCP which was also seen in Tibet, reflected in the Third Work Forum. The major notions that emerged in this was to take Deng Xiaoping's theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and the Party's basic line as a guide in Tibet, stress on Tibet's development and stability and also increase the ideological work in Tibet. For economic development there was a re-emphasis on local and central government departments' aid in construction of Tibet; especially the financing of 62 major work projects in Tibet, which would exceed 4.68 billion yuan. Hence, legitimacy was to be derived through massive infusion of economic development but also stressing on the need for stability in Tibetan regions (ibid). The policy of "aid Tibet" as raised by the Premier Li Peng then was to be a long term goal, which was multifaceted and aid in the safeguarding of motherland and national unity, hence further boosting performance legitimacy for CCP.

The Third Forum, like the previous two saw strong participation from the Party as well as the state. A total of 190 participants were present who hailed from all districts of TAR and also from PLA, PAPF and CC along with members of the State Council (FBIS-CHI, 1994:96). The speech given by CCP Party Secretary Jiang Zemin in the Third Work Forum on Tibet sets the discourse of China on Tibet. He legitimises the role played by CCP in Tibet and stresses on the Third Plenum of the 11th CC of CCP which had ushered in reform and opening up in PRC; the manifestation of which was the economic development and modernisation construction underway in Tibet (ibid). He stated that the "two major issues of development and stability and all round social progress as well as its long term order and stability and the continuous improvement of its people's living standards was needed" (ibid). He also linked the development of Tibet; of reform and opening up to bringing stability and thus national unity.

The specific conditions of Tibet had to be kept in mind with regard to economic and social development, which meant emphasizing on growth in agriculture, animal husbandry but also development of infrastructural facilities, so as to strengthen the capacity for self development. However, President Jiang also mentioned that the

latent superiority of Tibet in natural resources had to be tapped for benefitting the whole of China. Tibet was to establish a socialist market economy with the growth of a socialist new culture that had been the result of an amalgamation of Tibet's fine traditional culture and the culture of other nationalities.

More importantly, Jiang Zemin also invoked the idea of the Tibetans having a glorious tradition of safeguarding national unity and unification of the motherland. For him, Tibetans and Tibetan cadres were the basic force and guarantee for safeguarding national unity and stability. This is of much significance as Tibet's stability was a prerequisite for sustained development and stability, especially linked to the country's reform, development and stability. The factor of instability was primarily from the Dalai Lama who according to Jiang would be stopped by Tibet's masses. Hence stability was a prerequisite for development and growth, which in turn would bring about more stability. Thus, national unity became the legitimising tool for CCP, harking on stability and economic development in Tibet. The Policy of National Regional Autonomy was deemed as being correct and also seen as a way to legitimise China's policies in Tibet. The objective requirement and inexorable trend of economic, social and national progress in Tibet lay with the need to increase exchanges and cooperation both among the Han and other nationalities. The all round aspect of unity of the motherland, stability and socialist construction were the legitimising principles on which President Jiang Zemin stressed on the need to protect religious freedom but also to step up ideological and political education on socialist ideas and education on science and general knowledge among Tibetans.

Furthermore, for monks their education and management was to be in line with socialist construction and national unity. To increase reforms in Tibet, Jiang further emphasised on the role of the party and government organizations which had to be strengthened. It was legitimised on lines of bringing stability and economic development in Tibet for all Tibetans. A further boost to CCP's legitimacy in Tibet was also seen through Jiang's assertions that 70 percent of the 60,000 cadres in Tibet were Tibetans which is a sign of success of the Party's nationalities policy and cadre policy.

Hence, the promotion of Tibetan CCP cadres is deemed as an important way of gaining consensus from Tibetan nationality, who would lead the anti splittist campaigns in Tibet (ibid). He further stressed on the continuation of central and other provincial aid to Tibet. Thus, aid and an emphasis on development of Tibetans were the primary means of deriving legitimacy by CCP in Tibet, which was set in the Third Work Forum. Also social stability was termed as the need for socialist modernisation and the growth of a socialist market economy in Tibet, which also meant curtailing the activities of the Dalai Lama and monitoring religion which was justified on terms of need for economic growth which would bring legitimacy for CCP. Premier Li Peng also reemphasised on the need to increase Tibet's economic and social development which was in consonance with socialism. He also set a goal of doubling the 1999 GNP and achieving higher economic growth of around 10 percent. This would be done through providing massive central assistance to Tibet. The CC of CCP considered the stabilization of development of Tibet from the high vantage point of the Party and the whole nation, which primarily moots to a form of enjoying performance legitimacy by CCP in Tibet and also in PRC.

Tibet's economic development and stability was also to legitimise the CCP's unity of the motherland, as Tibet was strategically and security wise relevant for CCP (TIN, 1994). It was termed as a site of struggle with imperialists, thus economic development and stability was required. By 2000, the CCP hoped to achieve grain production to reach 10 million kilograms, rape seed production to 5000 million kilograms and the income of individual peasants and herdsmen must reach 1200 Yuan in average per annum (ibid). Thus, a major mode of gaining legitimacy was through this emphasis on growth especially among rural households that had been badly hit. The Third Forum also used strong Marxist rhetoric in describing the activities of the Dalai clique and further termed them as being a tool in the hands of western imperialists, who were involved in counter revolutionary activities. Furthermore, the report also emphasises that the Dalai Lama had involved in recognition of lama reincarnates and had also tried controlling monks and monasteries. Terming the Dalai Lama's activities as splittism and being against socialism, the CCP through being defenders of national stability and bringing forth

the revolution in Tibet, tried forging strong legitimacy. The fight against the Dalai Lama was equated with a fight against imperialism (ibid). The Fourth Tibet Work Forum held from 25-27 June 2001 was a basic continuation of the policies of the Third Work Forum. More importantly, it came about at the aftermath of the implementation of the Western Development Campaign by PRC. This was a policy to boost economic development, prosperity and growth in China's western regions, including Tibet which had lagged behind the affluent eastern seaboard of China. Much of the discourse in the Western Development Campaign was on the infrastructural development in these regions. Hence, in the Fourth Work Forum, the discourse remained fixated on accelerated economic development and comprehensive social progress with need for peace and stability in Tibet.

It also reemphasised on the legacy of the Third Work Forum, terming it correct and the right way of gaining legitimacy in Tibet. Economic growth as a way of generating legitimacy is much stressed through the mentioning of the completion of the 62 "Daqing projects" amounting to 4.8 billion yuan that had started from the Fourth Forum. Furthermore, there was emphasis on preferential policies and supportive measures for Tibet in the eight aspects of financial taxation, banking, investment and fund raising, price subsidies, foreign trade, social security, enterprise reform, agriculture and animal husbandry (People's Daily, 2001). Moreover, since 1995, the central government, various provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities were involved in giving counterpart aid to Tibet, sending 1,268 outstanding cadres in two groups to work in Tibet, putting in nearly 31.2 billion yuan of funds and carrying out 716 aid Tibet projects (ibid). As economic development and prosperity is the need in Tibet, through which legitimacy is sought by CCP, the emphasis on stability in economic development and economic growth is termed as a must. Hence, the continuation of policies geared at stifling separatism especially in activities of the Dalai Lama in Tibet was to be strengthened and continued. This was to be done through increasing the reach of CCP organisations in Tibet and through strengthening ideological and political construction.

The importance of economic growth in Tibet as a way of increasing legitimacy is seen in the major stress given to economic development in the future. It was deemed as resolving all problems in Tibet. Infrastructural development had been boosted along with a 93.3 percent increase in GDP over 1994. The Work Forum also highlighted large number of social undertakings that had been instituted in Tibet; these were 956 schools with a student body of 381,500 and attendance rate being 85.8 percent. There was also a remarkable rise in people's living standards with grain output hitting 962,200 tonnes, livestock reaching 22.66 million head and the percapita income of farmers and herdsmen and urban residents reaching 1331 yuan and 6448 yuan respectively with respective increases standing at 62.9 percent and 93.6 percent respectively over 1994. These figures formed important discourses in China's legitimacy in Tibet.

The Fourth Work Forum stated to “earnestly strengthen party building, promoting the advancement of the Tibetan economy from accelerated development to a leaping development and the advancement of the situation from basic stability to long lasting peace and tranquility” (ibid). It decided to build 117 projects under direct state investments, totaling around 31.1 billion yuan. The Tenth Five Year Plan also allocated 37.9 billion yuan of support and subsidies to Tibet. There was also the extension of the “aid Tibet scheme” and inclusion of SOE's in the aiding of Tibet. Hence, economic aid and development were ways of establishing legitimacy for CCP in Tibet (ibid).

The Fifth Tibet Work Forum was held on 18-20 January 2010 in Beijing and the discourse was a continuation of the Third and Fourth Work Forums. What is important is that the Fifth Work Forum was being held after the 2008 uprisings in Tibet which had covered political Tibet and ethnographic Tibet and also self immolations protests had already begun on the plateau. Both events can be termed as serious challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet; hence the discourse from the Fifth Work Forum becomes relevant. It emphasised on continuing with a rapid economic growth of the Tibetan region, terming it as “leap forward” development to build a well – off society in Tibet (Tibet.cn, 2010). This was required to bring prosperity and

stability in Tibet and also thwart the splittist activities of the Dalai clique. There was also the acceptance of the fact that in Tibet, the primary contradiction still remained between ever growing material and cultural needs of people and the backwardness of social production (ibid). Hence, in the Fifth Tibet Work Forum, there is the mentioning of a need to improve the living standard of farmers and herdsmen as well as pursue development which is sustainable and one that is ecologically viable. The progress that had been made from the Fourth Work Forum of 2001 is reaffirmed in the report of the Fifth.

The regional investment in fixed assets had amounted to 163.3 million yuan during the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-10) and also during this period, the state investment totaling 137.8 million yuan had supported 188 key projects in Tibet which involved transportation, energy, water conservancy, agriculture/ animal husbandry, education, healthcare and many others (crieng.com, 2011). There was also the launching of 33 projects with an investment of 27 billion yuan for improving the living standard of the rural population, who formed 80 percent of Tibet's population. However from 2005-10, the percapita net income of rural population doubled to 4,138.71 yuan from 2078 yuan (ibid). In the Fifth Tibet Work Forum, President Hu Jintao also mentioned about a "special contradiction" formed between the Party and Dalai clique and to resolve it through emphasizing on national unity and stability.

Hence, the major discourse that emerges in China's attempts to garner legitimacy in Tibet comes from the stress on prosperity in Tibet and an emphasis on growth of livelihood of Tibetans, with an equal emphasis on maintaining stability in Tibet especially through disrupting the activities of the Dalai clique and focusing on an ideological buildup through CCP organisations in Tibet. This is also seen with the further investment of 26 billion yuan in Tibet as well as the starting of the extension of the Lhasa Shigatse line of the Qinghai Tibet railway and the Qinghai Tibet plateau power grid interconnection project (ibid). Under this, "tourism, Tibetan medicine, mineral product, farm and livestock product were to become pillar industries in the region" (Tibet.cn, 2010). Hence, the Fifth Work Forum has also been hailed as one

that focused on an improvement of the general livelihood of the people so as to regain consensus and build legitimacy from them. It also included the other Tibetan populated prefectures and counties in the neighbouring provinces in its ambit, thus extending the notion of furthering its legitimacy over them.

From 1992 till present the State Council of PRC has brought out seven white papers on Tibet, dealing with various aspects of the region. These white papers are official discourses from Beijing on the right to legitimacy that they exercise over Tibet. This is also an exercise directed more to the outside world, especially the exiled Tibetan establishment who are seen to be challenging the legitimacy of China. The first was brought out in September 1992 and was titled “Tibet-Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation”, which is termed as a presentation of the real development of Tibet especially the modernisation that it has undergone, which is to be presented to its detractors who blame PRC for human rights violations in Tibet. It reemphasises on the historical legitimacy that the Party state has over Tibet by tracing Sino Tibetan ties to the earliest especially the period of the Tang dynasty and the Tubo kingdom in Tibet, which had become subservient through a process of matrimony to China. Moreover, Tibet is termed as being officially incorporated into China from the mid 13th century; the period of the Yuan dynasty and since has remained under the jurisdiction of the central government of China (State Council, 1992). Hence, history has been deployed effectively to legitimise China’s rule over Tibet.

The claims to legitimacy by the Dalai Lama and exiled establishments are all termed as being instigations from imperialists who had also turned China into an informal colony and now through instigating a notion of Tibetan independence are trying to dismember China. Hence, the activities of the Dalai Lama and exiled government are termed as being illegitimate which had fomented the 1987-89 protests to undermine the central government. It is in terms of harking of patriotism and unity as well as maintaining a consistent policy with the Dalai Lama that the Party has tried garnering legitimacy. There is also the portrayal of old pre 1951 Tibet as being dark and Tibetans being exploited immensely by the three manorial estates, who were granted liberation with the coming of the CCP. This emancipation of Tibet is termed as an

important mode of gaining legitimacy by China, where with the coming of the CCP the teeming Tibetan masses enjoyed political rights for the first time, along with freedom of religious belief and an overall development and improvement of living standards. The 1994 white paper also terms the policy enacted by the CCP of bringing in special aid for Tibet's development which were for the benefit of the masses, thus a way of gaining legitimacy. The second white paper on Tibet was brought out in June 2000, which looks at the issue of development of Tibetan culture. In this, Beijing tries addressing the question of cultural extinction of Tibetans in Tibet through its policies which were raised by exiled institutions, the Dalai Lama as well as by other organisations. This was also termed as a challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet as much of the Tibetan issue is impinged on culture. However, PRC terms the preservation of Tibetan culture in China through various means and measures, but also justifies the fact that modernisation and opening up had done much good to Tibetan culture and society (ibid, 2000).

A white paper on "Tibet's March towards Modernisation" was brought out in November 2001, a few months after the Fourth Work Forum, where development, growth and prosperity were earmarked as modes of gaining legitimacy by China which is reemphasised in the white paper. Modernisation is a platform that Beijing had used to further its legitimacy in Tibet as it was the party state which had brought about modernisation to Tibetans. The hallmarks of modernisation in Tibet are all highlighted further along with a protection of Tibet's culture and tradition. This white paper was also brought out to commemorate the 50 years of Tibet's liberation, and hence legitimise the CCP rule in Tibet by placing the CCP's project of modernisation in lines of a global march of modernisation.

In March 2003, another white paper on "Ecological Improvement and Environmental Protection in Tibet" was brought out. This was in line with the recently concluded Fourth Work Forum on Tibet which had stressed on Tibet to undergo development but one that was based on a model of sustainability. Furthermore, with the 2000 launching of the Western Development Campaign which covered the entire Tibetan regions and emphasised on massive infrastructural development, which critics have

termed as harming the pristine ecology of the region. Thus, to bring about legitimacy to the policies especially on economic development in Tibet as being not harmful to the environment and being sustainable; Beijing brought out this white paper. It also mentions about how the pre 1951 Tibetan systems had no mechanisms to preserve the ecology in the past and it was with the coming of the CCP and liberation of Tibet that ecological improvement and protection of the environment took place through scientific ways (State Council, 2003). Furthermore, the reforms and opening up have been termed as a step through which legal modes have been granted for ecology protection. More important, the ecological protection of Tibet is seen as an important mode of boosting its legitimacy in China as the CCP and Beijing strongly believe that the ecology of Tibet sustains the ecology of the whole of China. There is also the justification of the numerous large scale projects in Tibet such as the Tibet railways as being ecologically viable, which had been constructed after immense research on the project, as well as taking effective measures on minimizing the pollution that the railway would cause. Lastly, the white paper is also a means to legitimise China's development practices in Tibet as being sustainable in the long run.

A year later, the State Council brought out a white paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet (State Council, 2004) which emphasised on the right to self governance being granted to Tibetans under the system of regional ethnic autonomy through which the CCP tried gaining legitimacy from amongst Tibetans. It also marked 40 years of the establishment of TAR which is also seen as the manifestation of regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet, whereby the local oppressed masses were liberated and made into masters of their own fate. Hence, the power and right granted to the common people is seen as the Party state's mode of gaining legitimacy in Tibet. To celebrate the 60th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the State Council brought out a white paper on it in July 2011, which further reemphasised the legitimacy the PRC claimed over Tibet through the discourse of liberation as well as the signing of the 17 point Agreement.

On 22 October 2013, a white paper on Development and Progress of Tibet was brought out. This along with the previous white paper brought out in 2011 is

significant as it came out in the aftermath of the 2008 pan Tibetan protests and also the increasing self immolations. It further reemphasises on PRC's mode of performance legitimacy in Tibet. It is through progress, bringing in development and prosperity by CCP that they have deemed bringing in a sense of legitimacy from Tibetans. Furthermore, the white paper also emphasises on the instability brought by the Dalai clique who was propped by foreign imperialist forces and who were out to rock the systemic foundations that had ensured the development and progress of Tibet. Hence, stability was a prerequisite for economic modernisation in Tibet, on which Beijing attempted to derive legitimacy among Tibetans.

CONCLUSION

China's mode of gaining legitimacy in Tibet has essentially remained on grounds of a number of factors – revolutionary, historical, legal-institutional and performance legitimacy. These are much visible through the series of formal discourses that have emerged on Tibet from the Party state. It can also be seen as a continuation of a process of legitimisation that the numerous political orders in China over time have tried to emphasise on Tibet, which is important as we thus see a process of continuity as well as change in the present dispensations attempts in bringing legitimacy in Tibet. Gaining legitimacy is important as it gives a right and recognition to particular regimes claims over a territory and its population. The process of gaining legitimacy can also to a certain extent be correlated to hegemony that is a situation where the ruling power's values are accepted as spontaneous expressions of their interest of the ruled, a form of ideological domination. Thus, the Party state through its legitimising process has tried to gain hegemony in the Tibetan regions. This is visible in the discourse on liberation of masses, the granting of national regional autonomy, cooption of ruling elites and finally economic development.

However, much of these attempts at garnering legitimacy by Beijing had led to growth of Tibetan identity and thus the rise of ethnic nationalism. This is seen in the form of an ethnically exclusionary dynamic (Fischer, 2013), which has been perpetuated by China's economic development projects in Tibet which have given more advantages to the Han and sidelined Tibetans. Furthermore, through reforms

and opening up of the Tibetan areas, which is also a way of gaining legitimacy by China over Tibetans; much contact with the outside world and more importantly it led to a slightly free atmosphere in Tibet which brought about a renewal of Tibetan culture and identity especially Tibetan Buddhism, which formed one of the bases of Tibetan nationalism. It is on the lines of the values present in identity and Tibetan culture, that has formed a base for creating a counter hegemony that challenges China's legitimacy. Lastly as much as China's legitimacy over Tibet is based on economic growth and prosperity, political and social stability becomes primary for which there is the heralding of securitization in Tibet by Beijing, legitimised on lines for economic development and socialist modernisation for Tibet. This emphasis on security and control has however led to posing challenges to the Party state's legitimacy in Tibet as it is seen to be alienating the Tibetans to whom the CCP's legitimacy is ironically directed towards.

The hypothesis on which the thesis is based, which states that China's legitimacy over Tibet is seen as being subsidiary over its concern for maintaining its security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion can be thus termed as proven as this is also seen to be applicable in one of the first modes of garnering legitimacy by the CCP in Tibet; in the form of the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951, which emphasised on delaying socialist reforms in central Tibet as well as upholding the existing social order, especially the positions of the Dalai Lama and other elites would be retained. However, five of the seventeen points occupy the subject on military, which emphasised on the PLA entering and remaining stationed in Tibet, which was a non negotiable aspect in the Agreement.

This is also seen to be applicable during the GPCR, when the revolutionary liberation of Tibetans was deemed as the tool of gaining legitimacy, especially from the downtrodden masses. However, security was given much importance in Tibet and there was a prevention of chaos and disorder from descending in the Tibetan regions during the Cultural Revolution.

CHAPTER TWO – GAINING LEGITIMACY IN TIBET – MODE OF ACQUIRING HEGEMONY BY CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist saw the state as a combination of the political society and civil society³. The state includes elements of the civil society which creates hegemony that is protected by armour of coercion (Gramsci, 2009:263). Hegemony can be further equated with consent derived through ideological domination attained by civil society. However, as a concept it includes and goes beyond notions of culture which is deemed as a “whole social process” and that of ideology, which is deemed false consciousness by Marxists. It can be seen as a complex interlocking of political, social and cultural forces which makes it different from simple rule (*dominio*) that is expressed in direct political forms and in times of crisis by direct or effective coercion (Williams, 2010:108). The civil society becomes an important realm for the ruling group to maintain its hold so as to perpetuate hegemony. This is to be achieved through what Gramsci terms as a “war of position”, through which value systems turn into sites of struggle (Gramsci, 2009:108). Furthermore, Gramsci compares the war of position to the concept of passive revolution which emphasises that a social formation does not disappear as long as the productive forces which have developed within it still finds room for further forward movement. This entails the numerous ways through which a state is able to perpetuate and furthermore acquire power, much of which is through ideological domination or through exercising hegemony.

The concept of “war of position” entails a proper relation between state and civil society, where the latter has to be won to gain full power (ibid, 207). Civil society is however not only associational structures but are an all encompassing notion which includes legal apparatuses, formal institutions and also socio cultural and religious institutions which influences an individual’s behaviour, tastes and values (Jones, 2006:32). These in a way help in constituting a sense of reality for most people in society – a form of lived system of meanings and values which brings about a form of conformity, a common sense. Hence, hegemony in the strongest sense is culture, but a culture which has to be also seen

³ The notion of the civil society is not made completely clear by Gramsci in his notebooks. It is as according to Raymond Williams, a sum total of all lived experiences, a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living (Williams, 2010:110)

as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes, brought about by civil society. Significantly, hegemony also entails the modern concepts of leisure and private life thus going beyond simple understandings of culture or ideology but one which has elements of both and which alludes to an internalisation of domination or hegemony (Williams, 2010:110). It is deemed as a process which is rooted in realised complex of experiences, relationship and activities. It has to be continually renewed, recreated, defended and modified. Hegemony is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not all its own, seen in the form of counter hegemony and alternative hegemony (ibid, 110-11).

It is the terrain of hegemony, garnering of consent by CCP in Tibet which will be outlined in this chapter. However due to the immense proportion of the hegemonic apparatuses the chapter will instead focus on the role of the party state, education, economic development, and other institutions of cooption in Tibet which generates hegemony. It will also emphasise and test the two hypotheses on which the research is based, which are firstly that Tibetan ethno nationalism is an outcome of China's mode of strengthening its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas but is seen to be antithetical to each other. Secondly, China's legitimacy over Tibet is seen as being subsidiary over its concern for maintaining its security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion. However, the physical manifestation of the state and the force and coercion that it imposes is also an important factor which Gramsci gives equal emphasis to in his Prison Notebooks, which will also be alluded in the chapter.

Also an equal emphasis is given to economic activity as the ethical political hegemony also has to be economic, which is based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity. The dominant mode of production is under the ruling social group which in turn maintains hegemony by granting certain concessions to the subordinated classes, without disrupting the essential economic order (Gramsci, 2009:161). The importance of the state is also reflected in Gramsci's idea that the state is an "outer ditch, behind which there stands a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks" (ibid, 207). The physical manifestation of the state is thus important for maintaining hegemony and perpetuating it further with civil society. The state is also seen

to be shaping social and political processes along with being influenced by the society surrounding it. Hence the state is potentially autonomous as well as socioeconomic relations do influence state structures and activities (Evans et al, 1984: viii).

THE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION AND STATE IN CHINA'S TIBET

On an administrative level, Tibet was incorporated into the PRC in 1951 after its peaceful liberation⁴. Thus, the modern day political system of China under the CCP is seen to be extended to the Tibetan regions, with slight variations. This is seen in the form of National Regional Autonomy being extended to the Tibetan regions - manifested in the form of the TAR and nine other autonomous prefectures. While the TAR was formed in 1965, the first Tibetan area designated autonomous was the Pari (*Tianzhu* in Chinese) Tibetan autonomous county established in Gansu province on 6 May 1950 and by 1954 most of the Tibetan areas east of the Yangtze had been organized into autonomous counties or prefectures (Shakya, 1997:4). Autonomous regions provide minority nationalities with regional autonomy, through which there is the setting up of organs of self government and also the state guarantees the right of minority nationalities to administer their internal affairs.

An adherence to national regional autonomy also gives effective guarantee for implementing state laws and policies in the light of existing local conditions. However it has to be done after receiving the approval of the state organ at a higher level. The head of the local government of the autonomous region is also to be a citizen of the nationality exercising regional autonomy in the area (China.org.cn). The granting of regional autonomy has been a primary source for gaining legitimacy by the CCP in the areas where the ethnic minorities are present. This was the same strategy adopted by the communists when they arrived in the Tibetan areas in 1950. However the organs of local self government in the autonomous regions are similarly structured in accordance to the rest of PRC. Hence, the following section will have a brief outline of China's political system and its administrative state structure.

⁴ The Marxist rhetoric of liberation by CCP is an important element through which the CCP is seen to garnering legitimacy in Tibet. The purported liberation of Tibetans was primarily from the imperialist western nations and also from feudal serfdom.

POLITICAL SYSTEM IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The PRC under CCP is a unitary state in which the national government has ultimate authority over all levels of government. Furthermore, the essential nature of the state in PRC is that it is a Leninist party state which is guided by principles of Marxism-Leninism and its sinicised variant of Mao Zedong Thought. There has also been the insertion of more guiding principles such as Deng Xiaoping theory, Jiang Zemin's Three Represents and Hu Jintao's Harmonious Socialist Society. The CCP is in full control over the state and they exercise power through people's democratic dictatorship, which is derived from the notion of the CCP seeing itself as a vanguard party and thus exercising a leading role over society, economy, culture and most aspects of life which it directs towards the goal of socialism (Joseph, 2010: 13). The Party State in China is deemed as one that has penetrated into the most basic levels of society, which has been possible through the creation of a highly bureaucratised and centralised structure that seeks to exercise authority over all areas of life.

Although the party and the state in China are technically and organisationally separate, the former has permeated deeply into the latter and is in ultimate control of the state. The CCP formulates policies which are implemented by the state and all levels of the government are occupied by party cadres, with the top leader of CCP being the most powerful individual in the country (ibid, 20). This was the case during the first and second generation leadership helmed by Mao and Deng, who were paramount leaders and exercised immense legitimacy based on a combination of revolutionary zeal and charisma. However, with the third generation and thereafter, there has been the emergence of a collective form of leadership (Beijing Review.com.cn, 2013), with Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping being termed the "core" of the third, fourth and fifth generation of leadership.

The leading party cadres at various levels – provincial, county and township also serve as officials in local government organisations, usually occupying the highest post in the government or local's People's Congress. The top party leader called the General Secretary is the real boss at both the national and local levels of leadership. The Party however is not a stagnant institution, nor is it a monolithic group whose members share

the same political background and policy preferences. Chinese politics is characterised by a system of collective leadership or what is termed as inner party democracy that runs on principle of “democratic centralism” (Li, 2010: 165-66). The CCP has also evolved from a revolutionary organisation designed to seize power and pursue radical objectives to a ruling party managing a complex modern state which is committed to overall economic development (Joseph, 2010:26). From a Gramscian viewpoint, the political party is precisely the mechanism which carries out in civil society the same function as the state carries out as it brings together the organic intellectuals of a given group and its traditional intellectuals. Hence, political parties are a part of the civil society and the organic intellectuals are ones who are involved in guiding or organising the social group that they belong to, which, accentuates hegemony further (Gramsci, 2010:15).

Gramsci calls the political party as the modern prince that is the first cell containing the germs of collective will that strives to become universal and total (Gramsci, 2011: 137). It is the cementing of collective will that attempts to bring about intellectual and moral reform, especially to the question of religion and world outlook, thus creating the basis for a latter development of the national popular collective will, hence exercising hegemony (ibid, 139). It is specifically on the question of religion in the context of Tibet, that the CCP plays an important role in attempting to create hegemony.

Gramsci describes the state more specifically in the west as “an outer ditch behind which stands a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks”, thus emphasising on the physical manifestation of the state which is the outer ditch (Gramsci, 2010: 207). Even in the case of PRC, the Party has ample power in reserve, maintaining a tight grip on the military and security services. The Chinese Communist Party as the “Modern Prince” is seen to be playing the ‘leading role’ in state, society and all aspects of life, which has percolated from the upper echelons to the lowest. It is present in neighbourhood associations, work units, mass organisations (women’s associations, youth association and trade union), schools, research institutes and universities, in the companies of the PLA and also in monasteries in Tibet. The CCP had 85.13 million members at the end of 2012 who hail from various backgrounds of which 20.27 million or 23.8 percent are women and 5.80 million or 6.8 percent, are from ethnic minority groups. The grassroots organs by 2012

had reached 4.20 million and were set up in 7,245 urban sub districts, 33,000 towns, 87,000 urban communities and 588,000 villages (Xinhua, 2013).

The numerous mass organisations and consultative bodies to the CCP serve as a transmission belt or a link between the party and society, providing regime support to the leadership as well as promoting social unity and stability (Guo, 2013:8). Furthermore, as a Leninist party, the CCP is deemed as possessing absolute and universal truth and being in command of a historical destiny of human society. This is seen in the pursuit of socialist modernisation by the CCP for China. This idea is an important source of legitimacy derived by the party in China (ibid, 25). These form important values through which the party tries to generate hegemony in society.

MEMBER	NUMBER	%
Female Members	19.25 million	23.3
Ethnic Members	5.562 million	6.7
Above College degree	31.913 million	38.6
Under 35 years old	20.622 million	25

Figure showing the composition of CCP cadres in 2011-12 (Source - <http://www.chinatoday.com>, 2012)

OCCUPATION/BACKGROUND	MEMBERS
Industrial Workers	7.047million
Workers in Animal Husbandry, agriculture and fishing	24.834 million
Government/CCP employees	6.999 million
Management and Professionals	19.25 million
Students	2.778 million
Retirees	15.182 million
Others	6.513 million

Figure showing the occupational/background of CCP cadres in 2011-12 (ibid)

The CCP, modelled on lines of a Leninist Party emphasises on the communist organisation to be a vanguard party, which is composed of professional revolutionaries, many of them intellectuals who had embraced Marxism. They would guide the proletariat and in the case of China, the peasantry to seize political power. The party would also operate on lines of democratic centralism, where free debate and discussions would be permitted but when a decision was reached by the leadership; all members were bound to follow without hesitation or dissent. The lower levels had to follow the orders of the higher levels and minority had to follow the majority (Joseph, 2010: 133). The figures above show the wide variety of individuals hailing from different backgrounds who are members of the CCP. The party which was founded in 1921 had only 50 members then which at present has grown to be 86.69 million in 2013, making it one of the largest political parties in the world. It is the heterogeneous backgrounds of the members reflective from their occupations and collective identities that form what Gramsci terms as organic intellectuals. They are the “officials” of the ruling class/group which aids them in generating the subordinate functions of social hegemony through deriving consent from the masses (Gramsci, 2011: 124).

The reforms and opening up initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 also led to a change in membership composition in CCP. The principle contradiction in China had shifted from ‘class struggle’ to the idea of filling the gap between the material needs of the people and low modes of production. Hence, Deng’s reforms in China emphasised on the need for economic development and growth which has also affected in the recruitment of cadres with more emphasis being on technocratic expertise thus leading to the entry of large number of professionals and business entrepreneurs and technocrats (technical experts). The earlier emphasis on revolutionary pedigree and on ideological purity was replaced with “expertise” (Li, 2010: 179). The upward social mobility of entrepreneurs can be gauged from the fact that there has been a huge increase in private firms in PRC from 90,000 in 1989 to 5,210,000 in 2007, which has been specifically due to the market reforms. The entry of entrepreneurs into CCP was formalised in 2001 with Jiang Zemin propounding the ‘Theory of the Three Represents’ whereby, the CCP is termed as representing firstly the advanced social productive forces, secondly, the advanced culture and lastly the interests of the overwhelming population (ibid, 181).

These have been the gradual change in the Party with changing times, which have been termed as one that has brought more checks and balances in the CCP. On lines of generating hegemony, the presence of diverse members in the party brings about a form of consent generation from different categories in the Chinese society. Moreover, with economic development and growth being the driving force in PRC, the acceptance of professionals and business entrepreneurs in CCP aids in the creation of a hegemonic dominance of the party in China. Economic development or socialist modernisation is deemed as the single most important value for the PRC citizens to pursue, which is spearheaded by the party state as its legitimacy also depends on it. Thus through a process of cooption of the entrepreneurial social class as well as championing the value of 'the market', the CCP has been able to garner hegemony in PRC. This is also seen in the context of Tibet where there has been the acceptance of party members who come from an entrepreneurial background, which will be elaborated further in the chapter.

The highest body of the CCP is the National Party Congress which is held every five years which is composed of delegates who come from 38 constituencies, from central department of the CCP, ministries, State Owned Enterprises, PLA and PAPF. It also has representatives from large banks and other financial institutions. Invited delegates are the party elders. The National Congress elects the Central Committee and the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). The former in turn elects the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Party General Secretary. However, much of members of the leading organs of the party guide the selection of members to the lower level leadership bodies such as the Central Committee. The CCDI is the disciplinary body of the CCP which monitors and punishes abuse of power, corruption and other wrong doings by cadres. It is also present in the lower level party organisations, who generally report to the level above them.

Under President Xi Jinping's anti corruption campaign launched in 2013, the CCDI has emerged as a powerful disciplinary watchdog, which has further established resident offices in the four CCP central organs, which includes the Organisation Department, the Publicity Department, the United Front Work Department and the General Office. Along with this, there is also the establishment of similar offices in NPC, National Committee of

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and General Office of State Council. Furthermore, resident disciplinary offices have been established in 52 central government organs and which will eventually spread to all 140 central party and government organs (Xinhua, 2014). It is the Party Secretariat which handles the Party's routine business and administrative affairs and is manned by members of the Politburo and also PBSC. It supervises the General Office of CCP that acts as a coordinating body as well as the Party's four central departments – the Organisation Department, the Publicity/Propaganda department, the United Front Work Department and the International Liaison Department (Li, 2010:168-69).

The Organisation Department looks after appointments of several thousand cadre positions in the party, government and military as well as in large business firms, key universities and other institutions. It is through a control of the appointment of cadres that the CCP exercises much power. The Publicity Department looks after media and propagation of propaganda, the International Liaison Department is to establish contacts with foreign political parties and the United Front Work Department deals with issues concerning Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau as well as ethnic and religious issues such as Tibetan affairs (ibid). Both these departments are involved in generation of hegemony as through the Publicity department the CCP brings about their discourse which is disseminated to the public. Through a control over much of the nation's media outlets, the party is able to maintain its narrative over the population, as well as curb counter hegemonic discourses. The Publicity department thus aids in creating about a value which is disseminated and accepted in the Chinese society.

The United Front Work Department is directly involved in a process of generating hegemony for CCP as its primary aim is to create a united front for the party among non communist elites and influential groups in society. Going back to the period of the Communist International in the 1930's, the united front tactics were directed by the Comintern to communist parties in different countries. It primarily entailed a policy of cooperation with nationalist and social democratic parties to oust imperialist forces or simply to bring unity, as was the case with CCP and KMT. In the post 1949 period, united front was termed as the secret weapon of the party by Mao to consolidate power in

China. Through the UFD, a policy of co-option and incorporation is followed by the party, thus generating consent from the others. It is however the Politburo and more specifically the Politburo Standing Committee which exercises true power and its leaders also hold the highest offices of the state. This model of the party is further replicated in the lower administrative divisions, including in Tibet.

The presence of the party at the grassroots level of Chinese society is an example of how the party state has tried to derive hegemony and thus exercise legitimacy from society. The neighbourhood and community Party organisations are the foundations of all the Party's work and its militancy in neighbourhoods and communities and the leadership core of all types of organisation and kinds of work there. The end of 2009 saw 130 new neighbourhoods having community Party Organisation with 12.5 percent of all Community Party Organisation secretary being under 35 and 43.9 percent having an associate degree. The same year in the Party and State Offices saw an increase in the number of members by 388000 of which 85.6 percent of them had an associate degree or higher and 26.6 percent of them were 35 years or younger. An increase was also seen of Communist Party organisations and members in the non public owned enterprises with 190,000 such enterprises, of which 181,000 or 95 percent had Party Organisations. There was also the presence of 2.346 million small and medium sized non public owned enterprises of which 257,000 or 10.9 percent had Party Organisations.

In the rural areas, the party has also followed a policy of appointing members who were outstanding village cadres, self made millionaires, farmers with managerial expertise, heads of farmers' specialised professional organisations, demilitarised soldiers or returning migrant workers to the positions of village Party Secretary. This reflects the larger change that has occurred in the PRC with adoption of reforms and opening up which has led to the inclusion of "technical expertise" and quality personnel into CCP. The adoption of the Four Modernisations and emphasis on economic development in China being embraced as part of their ideology; 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics', the party state has tried to garner hegemony through such measures. Furthermore, in 2007-08 the party also recruited nearly 200,000 graduates to work in villages with around 49,000 college graduates being members of the village party branch or party committee

(eg.china-embassy.org). The inclusion of professionals and intellectuals is an important step undertaken by the CCP as it is through them that a social group can generate consent and thus become truly hegemonic.

STATE INSTITUTIONS IN PRC

The major state institutions of the PRC are the People's Congress and the State Council. The National People's Congress (NPC) is the national legislature of China with similar congresses being present in the administrative levels below – provincial, municipal/prefectural, county and township. The deputies to NPC are allocated according to the population of a given province, with the representation being equalised between urban and rural areas. In the lowest levels, the deputies are directly elected by the citizens, while deputies in the higher levels are indirectly elected. Hence deputies to NPC are elected by people's congresses from provincial levels. As a legislative body, the NPC drafts laws and regulations and also approves legislative regulations. It is also a venue for policy debates and more importantly elects a new state leadership. On a theoretical basis, the NPC delegates are constitutionally entitled to elect the President, Vice President of PRC, the chairman of CMC, the Chief Justice of Supreme People's Court and Chief of the Supreme People's Procuratorate along with the Premier and State Council (Lee, 2010:174).

However, in reality these candidates are nominated by the NPC's top leadership (The Presidium) which simply passes along to the People's Congress the list of nominees that the Central Committee of CCP had designated for appointment. In the 1990's certain proportion of NPC and its Standing Committee members as well as in local congresses were to be 'set aside' for members of the eight democratic parties, who were to adhere completely to CCP. The Standing Committee of NPC takes responsibility for any issues when the NPC is not in session. The State Council is China's cabinet which is headed by the Premier, a key member of the Politburo. It generally consists of four vice premiers and five state councillors. The daily affairs of the State Council are managed by the Secretary General. It is also authorised to issue administrative regulations, which make up the largest amount of legislation. Almost all the constituents of the State Council are CCP members and the Party is tasked with making all major decisions. There is also the

existence of party leading groups in units of the different state organs that ensures the structural dominance of the party (Guo, 2013: 135-45). With regard to the judiciary, the Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial organ in PRC, headed by the chief justice. The Judiciary is further divided in China into five levels – the Supreme People's Court, the Higher People's Court, the Intermediate People's Court, the Basic People's Court and the Special People's Court, which have their own original jurisdiction (ibid).

In post Mao China, with reforms and opening up, analysts have pointed to a withdrawal of the state and a strengthening of society, which is partly witnessed by the growth of the middle class in China. However, in reality, the party is seen to effectively control the state and society as with reforms the party-state apparatus in post Mao period has been highly institutionalised and strengthened (Guo, 2013:19). The party is seen to be exercising further control over the people's congresses through setting guidelines and policies for the legislative body to carry out. For instance, the CCP since 1979 has issued four major documents about legislative work to strengthen the party leadership at county and *xian* elections, which were subsequently turned into legislations.

The party also directs the NPC or its Standing Committee in matters of legislative bills and important state affairs. This is duplicated at all levels of the party committees and people's congresses. Even the daily affairs of the NPC Standing Committee and those at lower levels are under the direction of the CCP. Along with the organisational aspect of the people's congresses and the leading groups within the legislatures, the CCP is deemed to be in full control over the people's congresses. Also, four fifths of the legislative leaders are former cadres transferred from party or state organs, with the remainder all being politically reliable cadres, intellectuals, workers, peasants, officers, soldiers and minority representatives who accept the contour of CCP regime. The party presence in the congresses at different levels is deemed as being good and people's congresses have sought greater attention and penetration by party committees (Guo, 2013: 142-44). Hence, the people's congresses have been termed more as “rubber stamps”, which are deeply under the control of the party. However, with reforms and opening up, the role fulfilment of Chinese legislative members is seen to have changed from being “hand raising machines” to “supervisors and reflectors” especially since the early 1990's.

However, there is an uneven development of Chinese local legislatures and also significant differences in the dissemination of villagers' democratic elections from region to region. Still, legislatures in PRC have become important political forces, with their status being enhanced, which has been determined through co-operation rather than confrontation with CCP (Cho, 2008:2-6). However, in majority cases the goals of people's congresses and party committees are compatible and both strive to accomplish the yearly "central tasks" assigned by higher authorities and carry out the basic policies (Guo, 2013: 144).

Another state institution that plays an important role is the CPPCC which is a consultative body in PRC, which was revived in post Mao period. It was the CPPCC that had brought out the Common Program in 1949 after the success of the "new democratic revolution" that had subsequently led to CCP victory over the GMD in the Chinese civil war. With its revival, the consultative body has emerged as a platform for the eight democratic parties in China and for non communist elites, through which they can give consultations to the party. For CCP, it is an important institution for deriving united front from non communists and thus maintains legitimacy and further preserves political stability (Guo, 2013: 148). It aids in achieving what is termed as 'multi-party cooperation' and political consultation under the leadership of CCP (Zheng, 2010: 65). It is an important tool of co-option of the so called opposition parties and non communist elites in the party.

By 1994, 65.6 percent of CPPCC Standing Committee members were either affiliates of the eight parties or others. A special 'economic sector' was added to reserve seats for 100 odd economists, SOE managers and private sector entrepreneurs. There have also been instances of these members being appointed to senior positions such as vice ministers in the State Council (Guo, 2013: 149). It is however under the full control and supervision of the CCP. The CPPCC conducts its proceedings through its plenary sessions, standing committee meetings of the Chairmen of the National Committee of CPPCC, discussion meetings of Standing Committee members of CPPCC, special committee meetings of CCP and consultation meetings (China.org.cn). The CPPCC also undertakes democratic supervision with regard to the laws and policies formulated by the party state. They can

also bring to attention the party and other relevant institutions towards certain issues. It is also deemed as an important structure of practicing ‘democratic politics with Chinese characteristics’ which will enable stability and democratic decision making in China (Zhang Gui-hua, 2013:6). It is organised on lines of the National People’s Congress, having a National Committee which serves for five years and holds plenary sessions once a year, generally along with NPC plenary sessions. The Standing Committee presides over the work of the National Committee. Similar structures of People’s Consultative Conferences are present in the administrative levels below and in total there are more than 3000 CPPCC local committees with a total membership of over half a million (Chinaorg.cn).

Through the CPPCC, the Party is seen to be incorporating and co-opting various other social groups, which have also increased in number due to the economic reforms. This is in lines with what Gramsci believed in, that a class cannot achieve national leadership and become a hegemonic class, if it confines itself only to its own class interests; it must also take into account the popular and democratic aspirations and struggles of the people which do not have a necessary class character (Zheng, 2010:66). Hence, through the political consultative conferences, the party state has tried garnering hegemony among the non communist groups and elites and thus furthers its own legitimacy, as an important way of gaining legitimacy has been through shared norms and values, conformity with established rules, proper use of power and consent of the governed (ibid).

The CPPCC and its extension of the policy of united front plays an important role in generating hegemony in Tibet through a co-option of local elites which will be further elaborated in the chapter. Along with these state/political institutions, the state apparatuses which are directly involved in imposing coercion for the party state are the PLA, the PAPF and PSB. The former emphasises on external defence of the nation, while the latter two are involved mainly in handling internal security. They form an important component of preserving CCP rule in China. These coercive institutions are under the full control of the CCP, with party committees headed by a political commissar being present at all levels of the armed and security forces. The armed forces are frequently made to undergo indoctrination in Marxism – Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng

Xiaoping theory, as well as included in policy guidelines of the central leadership, political campaigns, political activities and scheduled political studies thus politicising the PLA immensely. The Political Commissar is deemed to be the highest authority in the military and security unit. The highest level officers are all appointed by the Politburo and the CMC of CCP (Li, 2010: 147).

CHINA'S PURSUIT OF HEGEMONY IN TIBET

The CCP is seen to be employing a dual method in Tibetan areas to gain legitimacy and exercise hegemony – through the presence of civil society institutions in fields of education, religion and through co-option of non communist elites and also through the build up of the communist party and ideology in Tibetan areas. This is generally seen through the recruitment and inclusion of Tibetan cadres and the opening of party branches in Tibet or through series of ideological campaigns. Ideology propagation is also done through the party schools in which Tibetan cadres receive their training. However, communist ideas were present among a few Tibetans prior to the coming of CCP. This is evident from the formation of the Tibetan Communist Party by Phuntso Wangyal in 1939 in Nanjing. He was much influenced by Marxism-Leninism and played an important role in the CCP garnering legitimacy in the Tibetan regions (Wangyal, 2004:31).

As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the first encounter that the CCP had with the Tibetans was during the Long March (1935), when the First Front Army led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong crossed the upper course of the Yangtse, bringing them outside the confines of the Chinese cultural sphere and later in contact with Tibetans. During their time in Tibet, the Red Army was desperately short of food and provisions and was forced to abandon their rules of not taking anything from the people. The army was obliged for the first time to take food and goods from villagers. An inability to communicate with the local people resulted in major conflicts with the Red Army, leading to hardships for the communists (Shakya, 34:1999). While in majority areas of eastern Tibet, the Red Army faced hostility, a few welcomed them. This was seen from Geta Rinpoche; a high ranking incarnate from Beri Monastery in Kham region, who welcomed the communists, providing them with 18 boxes of barley and shelter to Mao and Zhu De (McGranahan,

2012:214). Geta Rinpoche was one of the non communist elites who would eventually be co-opted and would play an important role for the CCP. During this period, Tibetans like Sangye Yeshe (Tianbao) and Sherab Dhundup (Yang Dongsheng) joined the Long March, becoming the first Tibetans to join CCP. These individuals would attain important posts in the party state in Tibet in the years to come. Most of the early recruits were from poor families, who were attracted by the genuine promise of an egalitarian society. The party realised the potential and importance of these Tibetan recruits and many were sent to the Party School in Yan'an.

In 1936, under the guidance of the CCP, these Tibetan communists also opened a first soviet in the Tibetan areas in Kardze, Kham (Shakya, 34:1999). Another soviet was opened in Gyalrong, which is in modern day Rongdrak county in Kham, Tibet. These soviets were established so as to oppose the KMT policy of annexing Tibet and also to bring about liberation of Tibet. The Kardze Soviet had a number of leaders including Geta Rinpoche, who was the Vice President of the Tibetan Government. Local elites/intellectuals such as Jago Tobden, Gompo Tsering, Tashi Wangchuk and Panda Tobden, were also a part of the government. There was also the joint formulation of a programme that included guiding principles, a stress on ethnic independence, the establishment of an independent Tibetan soviet on Tibetan territory (Woeser, 2012).

The CCP then can be seen to be embarking on a path of generating hegemony as during this period they tried taking into account the popular and democratic aspirations of Tibetans in the Kham and Amdo region, who did not have a proper class character. Furthermore, the party as seen by Gramsci as the 'Modern Prince', is a part of the civil society, which exercises leadership of a particular social class. According to him, all parties are expressions of a particular class. It also has the potential to exercise a fine balance between the interests of its own group and those of other groups and succeed in securing the development of the group they represent with the consent and assistance of the allied groups (Gramsci, 2010: 148). This is also seen to be pursued by CCP in the form of the united front with non - communist local elites in Tibetan regions and also through the creation of class consciousness among local Tibetans – who would form the labour that would support the CCP. This was partly attained through the creation of state

farms by the party state in 1952. The land for the first two state farms was purchased from the Tibetan government in Lhasa for 40,000 silver coins. The farms were the July First and August First state farms, which emerged as important ways of incorporating Tibet and Tibetans through a process of territorialisation into PRC. Along with this there was also the process of waste land reclamation, turning land into one of bountiful harvest by the party state in Tibet, which formed an important way of gaining legitimacy. For instance, in February and March 1952, 50 – 70 percent of PLA soldiers and officers stationed in Lhasa were sent to ‘open up the wasteland’ and create state farms (Yeh, 2013:66).

By 1954, land reclamation and formation of state farms had been extended to *Shigatse, Chamdo, Dingye, Kongpo* and *Ngari* reclaiming a total of 26,000 hectares of land. Along with this, the PLA had also planted 150000 trees and dug 110 irrigation canals which were much appreciated by Tibetans, bringing for them bountiful harvests. It was on these farms that Tibetans especially women had joined voluntarily along with prisoners undergoing reform through labour. While, initially the number of Tibetan labourers were lower than the Han soldiers, by 1959, there were more Tibetan workers than Han soldiers. What is important is that through their labour, the Tibetans ‘not only transformed nature but also their own bodies and sensibilities as they produced the landscape’. Their consciousness was altered as they formed the labour class who were involved in modernising Tibet. Hence, through their ‘embodied labour on the farms, they were recruited into hegemonic projects of state incorporation’ (ibid, 69).

It was from these farm workers that the CCP recruited its first party members. Many of the women workers are examples of how the establishment of state power and the process of state territorialisation began with elements of consent forged in part through the promise of gender mobility. The presence of large number of Tibetan farm workers also show that the CCP was quite successful at convincing a number of Tibetans that Chinese presence was a positive improvement. For instance, we see this in the recruitment of Tseyang a Tibetan woman who had joined the July First state farm in 1952 and had been sent to school in China and eventually after 1959, she was sent back to the TAR where she became a deputy Party secretary, a post she held for a decade. Thus, the state farms

were also sites of incorporating Tibetans into the party, many of whom went on to become powerful cadres within the new government (ibid, 90). These sites became important cradles for nursing 'notions of class' within Tibetans, who had already being indoctrinated with the gradual ideas of liberation of serfs, especially in eastern Tibet where the land reforms were introduced from mid 1950's onwards as these areas did not fall under the purview of the Seventeen point agreement between Lhasa and Beijing. From 1954 onwards, the CCP redistributed land to landless peasants and also in certain areas such as *Gyalthang* (Dechen Autonomous Prefecture) the communists started dividing people into different class groups (Shakya, 1999:138). Another important way of creating class consciousness especially post 1959 came with the radical ideological campaigns after quelling of the Lhasa revolts of 1959. Through this the development of class consciousness would sustain the revolution internally but also arm the locals with the correct ideology and class stand (ibid, 248).

The Tibetan regions of Kham and Amdo, which were nominally under the control of the earlier KMT government, but in reality, were under local satraps and monasteries were integrated through the South West Military/ Administrative Committee and the North West Committee. The communists were aware of the fact that much of these regions were populated with ethnic minorities, hence an integration of them into the administrative structure of PRC through the setting up of a number of autonomous prefectures and counties was preferred. As mentioned earlier, large numbers of local Tibetans were recruited into the party, thus enabling the CCP to establish a Party structure in these areas with relative ease. Many Tibetans were appointed to key posts, however due to paucity; individuals had to occupy a number of posts simultaneously. For instance, Sangye Yeshe (Tian Bao) was chairman of Gannan TAP and Ngaba TAP. He was also member of Kham and the Sichuan Provincial People's government until it was dissolved in 1955. The party had also carried out population and other extensive surveys in the region, making a detailed study of the pattern of land ownership and the economy, which would aid them in designing future policies for Tibet (ibid, 137-38).

It was on lines of delaying the collectivisation, which had gained much steam in rest of China and also providing a semblance of autonomy in administrative affairs, that the CCP

tried to gain legitimacy in the Tibetan regions. The process of gaining hegemony or consent was implemented by the communists in the Kham/Amdo regions of Tibet in the early period of 1950's where the local aspirations of the population were taken into much consideration. To gain legitimacy the communists also adopted a united front policy towards the Tibetan aristocrats and other traditional ruling classes, which emphasised on 'developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle of the road forces and isolating the diehards'. It was also from them that the party received majority of their cadres.

The political culture in Tibet under CCP rule can be divided into three phases – 1951 – 1959 when CCP was involved in negotiations of power and authority with the traditional ruling elites, while the second phase from 1960 – 1978 was when the masses were also given much authority, even though it was under the complete control of the party state. The third phase is post 1978 onwards, with reforms and opening up and the emergence of a mixture of united front and involvement of masses. However, these phases are not solid constructs but one which overlaps the other, for instance during the second phase, former aristocrats like Ngabo and Sampho played important roles and the former was not persecuted during the Cultural Revolution either. The party state believed that these individuals had a useful purpose of legitimising Chinese rule in Tibet (ibid, 241). These individuals were also the intellectuals of the earlier social structure, who had mediated between the ruling elites and the masses and in this case themselves constituted the ruling class. However, through cooption, they were acting as bridges between the CCP and the Tibetan masses.

The CCP took strong roots in Tibet in the aftermath of the quelling of the 1959 revolt and subsequent fleeing of the Dalai Lama, which ensured the introduction of social reforms in TAR, especially the democratic reforms, which had already being introduced from the mid 1950s in eastern Tibetan regions. Under this the party state initiated landreforms and struck at the power of the former elites as much of their privileges were withdrawn. Those upper-class groups who had participated in the revolt had their property confiscated, while a more lenient approach was adapted to those who had not sided with the rebels. A number of policies were implemented under the Democratic Reforms –

1) In the agricultural areas, the policy of "the crop to the tillers" was followed as regards to the land of the three kinds of estate-holders — the *kashag*, the monasteries and the manorial landlords — including their agents, who had participated in the rebellion. As regards the land owned by those estate-holders (including their agents), who had taken no part in the rebellion, the rent was to be reduced, with 20 percent of the farm produce given to the landowners and the remaining 80 percent to the tillers. The *nantsam* were liberated (*nantsam* is a manorial slave of a Tibetan feudal manorial landlord. He does unpaid forced labour for the manorial lord and his offspring also work as manorial slaves, without personal freedom). The treatment of persons as chattel was abolished and the relationship changed to that of employer and employed. All debts owed by the working people to the three kinds of estate-holders before the end of 1958 was abolished; the interest rates for the debts assigned to the working people in 1959 by the manorial landlords who have taken no part in the rebellion was reduced.

2) In the livestock breeding areas, the herdsmen and the working livestock-owners were to be united to facilitate the protection and breeding of the livestock, wipe out the rebels and rapidly stabilize social order. Livestock-owners who had taken no part in the rebellion retained their animals. The animals of livestock-owners who took part in the rebellion were to be tended by the herdsmen now tending them and the income thus accrued belonged to the herdsmen. At the same time, the policy of benefiting both livestock-owners and herdsmen was to be pursued. Exploitation by the livestock-owners was reduced so as to increase the income of the herdsmen. The question of debts was to be handled in the livestock breeding areas in the same way as in the agricultural areas.

3) The policy of protecting the freedom of religious belief, protecting the patriotic and law-abiding temples and monasteries and protecting the historical cultural relics' was strictly adhered to in the democratic reform as in the past. A campaign was launched in the temples and monasteries against rebellion, feudal prerogatives and exploitation. The policy of "buying out" was followed in dealing with land and other means of production of patriotic and law-abiding temples and monasteries. The livelihood of the lamas was arranged for by the government. Subsidies were given where the income of the temples and monasteries was not sufficient to meet their proper spending (PCART, 1959). Much

of these were already implemented in Kham and Amdo, where there was also the creation of communes, which were self sustaining communities organised into production brigades and teams, responsible for working in the fields, mines and factories. Also the population, especially the monks were forced to undergo political study sessions (Arjia Rinpoche, 2010:31). It was eventually in the political study sessions that the party state initiated the speaking bitterness campaign, where the patriotic elements and the lower stratum in Tibetan society would start struggle sessions against the former ruling classes. Arjia Rinpoche mentions about “positivist monks” who were receptive to communist re-education, who would indulge in this act of torturing the former elites or individuals who had rebelled against the state (ibid, 34).

The democratic reforms were an important method adopted by the CCP to gain power in Tibet, which can be termed as a shift from a “war of position” to a “war of manuver”. It enabled the party state to deploy the peasants and “incubated” proletariats in Tibet, who under the leadership of the party cadres undertook the process of class struggle against the former elites. Tibet, prior to 1959 was like any society with the presence of sharp class divisions and what the Chinese have termed as serfdom, where most Tibetans before 1959 were bound by written documents to the land on which they were based and to the lord who owned that land (Barnett, 2008:81). However, it has also been seen that unlike the Western notion of “serfs”, the Tibetans had a great degree of autonomy and could pay off their debts, thus becoming free from any bondage. Still, there was the presence of gross inequalities in society, which had been masked through the values of Tibetan Buddhism that exercised ideological domination in Tibet.

However, pre 1959 Tibet saw a number of attempts by local elites to initiate social reforms. This is seen with the 13th Dalai Lama, who brought about a number of social and economic developments in the country, abolishing capital punishment and introducing regulations to prevent exploitation of peasants by the upper classes (Rapgyay, 1977:30). Even the 14th Dalai Lama wanted to initiate land reforms, but was then discouraged by the party state. Still, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother Gyalo Thondup had introduced reforms in *Ramagang* and *Tolung Seshin*, their family estates, which was across the Kyichu river from Lhasa. He also introduced the same in their estates in *Jora* and *Chayul*,

near the borders with India. The land reforms introduced by him were based on the experiences of the KMT Chinese in Taiwan, where there was the implementation of Sun Yat-sen's principle of land to the tillers (Thondup, 2015:140). With the communists, the land reforms became an important mode of gaining legitimacy, which under the Seventeen Point Agreement had to be much delayed in central Tibet. But after the crushing of the revolt by Tibetans in 1959, the PCART through its Second Plenary Session held on 17 July 1959 adopted the resolution to implement the democratic reforms. It further linked the reforms to the Seventeen Point Agreement, which is a key mode of garnering legitimacy by Beijing over Tibet signed in 1951. The party state also blamed the many-sided obstruction and sabotage by the former local government and the upper strata reactionary clique in Tibet in the delaying of the democratic reforms in Tibet (PCART, 1959).

In the grassroots, the reforms were brought through the Peasants' Associations which acted as the arm of the CCP at local level (Shakya, 1999:254). Moreover, when the communists first entered Tibet, their numbers were 877, of which only a few were Tibetans, hence it was difficult for them to bring about socialist reforms to the Tibetan regions in the absence of a dedicated cadre force. To rectify this, the party recruited members, with an emphasis on recruitment of more Tibetans. The following table reflects the number of party members in CCP in Tibet -

YEAR	NUMBER OF MEMBERS	ETHNIC MINORITIES
1959	5846	875
1963	14523	5711
1986	52311	31567
1989	70000	56000
1994	56060	37000

It shows the eventual increase of Tibetans in CCP, a mode to legitimise the party state as well as to carry forward the earlier reforms and the socialist modernisation in the present period. Much of these recruits came from Peasant Associations, the Young Communist Leagues, the latter which by 1964 had produced 50 percent of junior cadres and officials

in charge of mutual aid organisations. These associations were much emphasised by the party to breed more Tibetan members, who were needed to manage the system. However, there was also the strong need for cadres and party members who would be well versed in Marxism (ibid, 256). The early recruits especially from the peasantry and poorer sections were also not 'conscious of their class' and hence to raise the social and political consciousness of the Tibetans, the party state undertook major education and mass mobilisation campaigns which were aimed at transforming the superstructure of the Tibetan society. It was a call for overturning the old system to introduce socialist transformation of Tibet.

There was also no dearth of Tibetans who were willing to join the party, but the only issue was their ideological education (ibid, 257). The crushing of the revolt of 1959 enabled the party state to focus on the creation of a well versed party apparatus in Tibet. For this, there was also the calling back of Tibetan youth who were sent to China for higher education. They were seen as being deeply steeped in CCP ideology and Marxism and termed as 'a backbone of strength in carrying out Party's policies' (Shakya, 1999:256). As the party is deemed as a central organ of civil society, there was much need for local intellectuals to support and also be members of the party. This was seen to be relevant during the democratic reforms implemented in eastern Tibet during the mid 1950s, as the authorities wanted Tibetan students studying in the minority nationality institutions to return and aid in the democratic reforms, especially in the formation of communes (Aten, 1986:99).

The process of creation of local intellectuals for the CCP in Tibet will be elaborated further in the section on education and intellectuals in Tibet. Tibetans in the party can be divided in terms of them joining the CCP during different periods – the first group consists of those who joined the party during the 1950's, the second are the ones who reached maturity during the Cultural Revolution, while the last are the ones who emerged in the period of reforms and opening up. Formally the CCP opened its branch organisation in Tibet in September 1965, with 48 percent of members being Tibetans. As the liberation of Tibet was undertaken by the PLA, especially the South West and North West Military Bureau, the military has played an important role in Tibet's political

affairs, with mostly veteran military officers occupying the post of the First Party Secretary of TAR till the 1980's (Barnett and Conner, 1997). The most important and powerful figure in Tibet is the Party Secretary, with a Tibetan never occupying the highest post. The only period when an ethnic Tibetan had nearly become the Party Secretary of TAR was with the case of Phuntsog Wangyal in the 1980's (Wangyal, 2004). It has only being occupied by party members from the Han ethnicity, except for Wu Jinghua, member of the Yi nationality who had been appointed a Party Secretary in 1985 in TAR (Barnett and Conner, 1997:9). This was during Hu Yaobang's implementation of liberal policies in Tibet. The following table denotes the names and ethnicity of the Party Secretary of TAR from 1965 onwards –

Zhang Guohua (Han)	1965-1967
Zhou Renshan (Han)	Acting Party Secretary in 1967
Zeng Yongya (Han)	1968-1971
Ren Rong (Han)	1971-1980
Yin Fatang (Han)	1980-1985
Wu Jinghua (Yi)	1985-1988
Hu Jintao (Han)	1988-1992
Chen Kuiyuan (Han)	1992-2000
Guo Jinlong (Han)	2000-2004
Yang Chuantang (Han)	2004-2005
Zhang Qingli (Han)	2005-2011
Chen Quanguo (Han)	2011 onwards

The Party Committee in the Tibetan regions are structured on similar lines to its counterparts in the rest of China, with the local organisation of the CCP being the Party Congresses and the Party Committees located at three levels – the provincial, autonomous regions and municipalities. The local Party Congress meets once every five years and is convened by the corresponding Party Committee. Apart from discussing the work reports of the Party Committee and also of the Disciplinary Inspection Committees, they also elect their corresponding party committees. The Party Committees, which are

also elected for a term of five years consist of regular and alternate members, who meet in plenary sessions at least twice a year. It is also in terms of democratic centralism and principle of collective leadership that the party committee functions. However, the lower level party bodies are under the full control of the higher congresses/committees (eg.china-embassy.org, 2010). The list of TAR Party Secretaries points to the dominance of ethnic Han CCP members, which can be termed as a practice which is in accordance with traditional Chinese custom of the “law of avoidance” that prohibited imperial officers from being stationed in their home provinces, to reduce localism (Li, 2010: 168). The following figure shows the names of the Standing Committee members along with their ethnicity of TAR CCP from 2012 onwards –

Chen Quanquo (TAR Party Secretary)	Han
Wu Yingqie (Deputy Party Secretary)	Han
Pema Trinley (Deputy Party Secretary)	Tibetan
Lobsang Gyancan (Deputy Party Secretary)	Tibetan
Deng Xiaogang (Deputy Party Secretary)	Han
Gonpo Tashi	Tibetan
Che Dalha (Party Secretary of Lhasa Municipality)	Tibetan
Norbu Dhondrup	Tibetan
Do-Thok	Tibetan
Wang Ruilin	Han
Wang Yun jun	Han
Deng Yasheng	Han
Dong Yunhu	Han
Liang Tian Geng	Han
Xiyun	Han

(Source – TPI, 2013:2)

The majority of Standing Committee members are Han Chinese, for whom a posting in the Tibetan regions is deemed as a platform for a lucrative career in the future especially in Beijing. Through the implementation of certain policies as well as the adept handling

of sensitive issues, numerous Party members have been either promoted or demoted through their tenure in Tibet. This has been most prominent with the former General Secretary and President of PRC, Hu Jintao, who had served as Party Secretary of TAR from 1988 to 1992 and had imposed martial law in Lhasa during the protests of 1989. Functioning on lines of democratic centralism and collective leadership, the Standing Committee of TAR CCP is under the authority of the Party Secretary who is appointed from Beijing. In the post 1978 period, a younger generation of Tibetan leadership is seen to be emerging which includes well educated men and women with strong ideological and class backgrounds (Barnett and Connor, 1997:10). The emphasis on education especially “technocratic” emerges with the stress on economic reforms and development in Tibet, which has brought notions of “quality” to the forefront of the party state’s policies in the region, which is also a tool of generating hegemony.

Through analysing a speech of Ragdi, a prominent Tibetan communist party member who had been elevated to the position of the executive deputy party secretary of TAR during the 1990s and also the chair of the TAR People’s Congress in 1998, the importance of economic development in Tibet is reflected. In his speech delivered on 15 November 1998, he stresses on the importance of reforms and opening up especially in the rural and pastoral areas, which for him was the key to maintaining stability especially in the Tibetan rural areas (TIN, 1999:46), where the Dalai Lama’s influence is seen to be increasing during this period. He also called for the need to transform the mindset of the rural population, altering them to embrace the socialist market economy and modernise themselves. They were to not only connect themselves to the domestic market in China but also the global market. Ragdi is also seen to be stressing on the need to establish commodity production and market economic awareness and also equally rejecting the old conventions. Through an emancipation of the mind, Ragdi believed there would be an intensification of reforms and opening up.

The then highest ranking Tibetan communist member also believed that the Tibetans lacked commercial awareness and Tibetan economy lacked vitality and self development, which could be overcome through taking a socialist market economy road. His speech emphasises tremendously on the need for commodity production and the raising market

economy awareness (ibid, 47). Furthermore, he believed in the need for many of the party officials to change their mindset at various levels as many were termed to be having a narrow mindset and participate more strongly in economic construction as well as in local development. Hence, the new generation Tibetan communist leaders are seen to be harping on the importance of economic development, which for them was an important way of gaining legitimacy in Tibet. More importantly, Ragdi's speech indicates the significance of the economic reforms aiding in the altering of the mindset of the population and thus enabling a form of consent derived by the party state from the people. It also reveals the importance of economic reforms to garnering hegemony by the party state, which will be further elaborated in the chapter.

The statements of the Tibetan communist party members also reflect the issue of an ideological struggle within the membership of the Tibetan CCP, which is due to the influence of the Dalai Lama. This is clearly reflected from a speech made by Ragdi on 10-11 January 1998, where he stated that problems among cadres were caused as some "sympathised with and supported the Dalai Lama's secessionist statements and activities in their minds" (TIN, 1999:43). During the 1990s the top leadership in Tibet called for a purification of the ranks of the party in Tibet. Under this in 1998, the homes of the Tibetan officials in Lhasa were searched for shrines and photographs of the Dalai Lama and there was also the renewal of the requirement for the children of the party cadres and government workers to be withdrawn from schools in India run by the Dalai Lama's government in exile. This policy was seen to be implemented at the grassroots level by the Leading Party Group of the Lhasa Municipality Party Committee for Environmental Protection in Urban and Rural Construction, which had authority over neighbourhood committees and also the various work units. They emphasised that "if it is discovered that there are party cadres who hang the Dalai Lama's images, they will be expelled from the party and those who are non party members, but have government jobs will be investigated and punished severely"(ibid, 44). This is also seen under Xi Jinping's anti corruption campaign, launched after he came to power in 2012, specially having a similar dimension in the Tibetan areas, with those cadres being punished who are deemed to be secretly participating in religious activities and sympathise with the Dalai Lama (Sydney Morning Herald, 2015).

Ragdi, the chair of the TAR People's Congress in 1998 on 9 January mentioned that there was a strong need to increase the power of the grassroots organisations especially through patriotic education campaigns. He stated that "after encountering repeated defeats, the Dalai Lama has in recent years changed the tactics of its scheme by shifting its focus of separatist activities to the vast agricultural and pastoral areas" which had become the frontline in the struggle against separatism. Thus, through his speech, there is an acknowledgement of the failure of the grassroots policies of the party state in Tibet especially in the rural context as well as it alludes strongly to the presence of consent for the Dalai Lama from the common rural masses. There had been the launching of policies against the Dalai Lama in the rural areas in the early 1990s which had however failed, as evident from the example provided by Ragdi in his speech of Kyimshi township in Gongkar county, Lhoka prefecture where there had been an outbreak of unrest in May 1993 which involved the whole community including the local monastery of Sungrabling. It had led to 35 arrests and was termed as "a typical example of the Dalai clique's infiltration into the grassroots area" (ibid, 43).

This clearly shows the influence of the Dalai Lama in the rural regions of Tibet, which had not dissented much earlier during the late 1980s when pro independence protests broke out in Lhasa and a few Tibetan towns. However, from 1992 there was an increase in the number of protests and nationalist activities in the rural areas, including in remote monasteries. This was seen in the context of Rongpo Rabten monastery in Sog, Nagchu whereby in 1992, 69 arrests took place in county towns small villages and remote Tibetan monasteries where Tibetans put up pro independence posters and carried out protests (ibid, 43). Hence, to stem further dissent the party state undertook a rectification campaign whereby massive transfer of local cadres in rural Tibet took place. In a report in the People's Daily on 15 July 1998, in Panam county in Shigatse the rectification had taken place and also since 1995 the TAR had rectified 650 townships and town party committees and 3602 village party branches, installing loyal cadres in key political positions in the rural areas (ibid, 42). What is also known from this report is that a number of rural areas did not have party branches which were however subsequently rectified as was the case with Panam county where 113 administrative villages had built party branches (ibid, 42).

To decrease the influence of the Dalai Lama, there was also the launching of the patriotic education campaign in the rural areas, for instance in the Lhoka region which according to the Tibet Daily dated 28 November 1997 was quite successful with the masses writing 4466 articles of criticism and 273 representative of the masses having made keynote speeches at exposure and criticism meetings and the temples in the county having held 111 meetings to expose and denounce the Dalai Lama (ibid, 43). Ragdi on 29 July 1998 emphasised that the anti Dalai Lama campaign was to protect the “unity and security” of China. For Beijing, Tibet is the south-western gate of China and its stability was essential for defence and strategic purposes. He further mentions that “Tibet holds a crucial status in the overall order of China’s political, economic and cultural development, being one of China’s key defence outposts and strategic points, with the Himalayas being a natural defence” (ibid, 44). This statement is significant and to a larger extent sums up the core of China’s policies towards Tibet and the Dalai Lama, that places security and stability on a higher priority than gaining legitimacy for the party state among Tibetans. A similar sentiment is also seen in the statements of the TAR PSB Secretary Zheng Peizhong, who on 2 December 1998, called for a need to focus on social stability in farming and pastoral areas and especially to thwart the reactionary nature of the Dalai clique (ibid, 55). The anti Dalai Lama campaign is termed as originating from Beijing and Ragdi in his speech as mentioned above further states that “communists may not be religious believers and this has to be stressed in an in depth fight against separatism as it is a major requirement in the party constitution for every member” (ibid, 45). This pertains to a significant way through which the party state is seen to be trying to gain ideological domination in Tibet with an enforcement of atheism on its members and the eventual propagation of atheism among the masses.

Atheism is an important ideology which is propounded by the party state, which also becomes an important method of gaining hegemony, witnessed from a meeting organised by the Propaganda department of TAR Party Committee on 8 January 1999, which stressed on the need to increase atheism in Tibet, which is also linked to the overall important ideology of development, social advancement and socialist spiritual civilisation in the region (ibid, 50). The party also saw the need to increase atheism to strengthen the struggle against separatism, especially the Dalai clique and to free peasants and herdsmen

from the negative influence of religion (ibid). Hence for the CCP atheism becomes an important platform for gaining hegemony as harping on atheism is seen to be an important way of promoting economic development in the region, which aids in the gaining of legitimacy for the party state from the masses.

The mode adopted by the CCP in Tibet to accelerate atheism, is also through linking atheism to modern science and technology and disseminating them through official media. There is a vigorous publication of scientific knowledge in newspapers and through radio and television stations. These would form the basic tool through which science would be disseminated (ibid, 51). Hence, science is seen to be an important tool of creating ideological domination of the party state in Tibet, which is also seen to be encouraging the practice of atheism among the general population, which will further weaken the influence and authority of Tibetan Buddhism in the lives of the people. The importance of the linkage between science and technology aiding in the spreading of atheism was also seen through a strong stress on it by the 4th enlarged plenary session of the 5th regional party committee of TAR (ibid, 51). Atheism would be the tool through which the influence of the monastic community and the Dalai Lama over the Tibetan population was to be reduced. With the linking of atheism to modern science and technology, the party state wanted to draw a line between the practice of atheism and economic development in the Tibetan regions. Hence, atheism can be seen as an important mode of garnering hegemony from the masses as economic reforms and opening up becomes the significant driver for gaining legitimacy from the Tibetan population. The importance of which was also enumerated by Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin to the TAR delegation to the Ninth NPC in 1998 (ibid, 52).

In urban areas especially at the grassroots, an important way through which the party state was present was through the neighbourhood standing committees. They not only maintained political ideology in the area but also encouraged economic development. For instance, in 1999 one particular standing committee of a neighbourhood established a contract between itself and the inhabitants of that neighbourhood, whereby individuals or families would gain or lose points and had to achieve a required percentage of marks, otherwise they were fined. An example was that if individuals failed to participate in

meetings and educational programmes organised by the neighbourhood committees, then they would be punished with a deduction of between one and two points. While immense stress has been laid on loving the motherland, opposing splittists and solidarity of nationalities, there has also been an equal stress on the spiritual wealth and development of the community (TIN, 2000:19).

Through this, there has been the formation of models of excellence, such as the creation of a “model compound”, “model street” and “model family”. The fulfilment of these would generally lead to the awarding of cash prizes; such as a “model family” would secure 300 yuan as prize. This points system was adopted for defending the security and stability of the nation as there was also the need for the members of the neighbourhood to report suspicious persons and not aid them. Furthermore, through the points system there was the enforcement of the logic of market economics among the members in the neighbourhood, with a target of 3300 yuan set as the average annual per capita income and those who failed to earn this were punished with a fine or a deduction of points (ibid, 20). Finally, the total points which could be accumulated was 100 and those who scored more were awarded 50 yuan for each extra point scored, while the qualifying point was 90 and failure to score this would lead to the imposition of 20 yuan as a fine for each point short of the target. Hence, we see the logic of market competition being imposed by the party state upon the members of the urban Tibetan neighbourhood, which also fits in the scheme of the policies of opening and reform which had been implemented from the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress of 1978 under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping. The policies which emanated from the above mentioned plenum was also stressed by the then deputy party secretary Ragdi in 1998-99, whereby he emphasised on the importance of the formulations, which emerged from the third plenum and that it could be further strengthened through building more stronger party organisations (ibid, 21).

He further exhorts party members in Tibet to study Deng Xiaoping theory and also to comprehend the fact that Tibet was on the frontline of the anti splittist struggle, hence it was necessary to fight splittism through criticising the Dalai Lama and establish correct views of the motherland, nationalities, religion and culture and more importantly establish these as the important elements of the party’s ideological constitution. Hence,

Ragdi in his speech gave much importance to the party schools at all levels, terming them as the battlefield positions for training party cadres and hence its importance in gaining hegemony. He also mentions about how through a number of methods there had been an improvement in the grassroots organisations in TAR as seen through the participation by 80,000 members in the “learning in two areas” activities which constituted 80 percent of all party members as well as from 1997-1998, a total of more than 25000 cadres of the TAR had been appointed as members of work teams, which had worked hard to rectify grassroots party organisation in agrarian and pastoral areas. Ragdi also emphasises on the importance of constructing a pool of cadres who would form a strategic buffer to promote long term stability (ibid, 22).

Furthermore, stability is seen to be emerging as an important discourse in the ruling narrative of the CCP in Tibet (ibid), which is linked to economic construction. Therefore, through economic development there is the maintenance of stability, which is moreover a prerequisite for economic development. Hence, the party is seen to be assuming a significant position in the context of gaining hegemony in Tibet, as they are the drivers of economic growth in the Tibetan areas which aids in legitimising their rule and also helps maintaining stability in the region. The party state through its cadres is seen to be forming the nucleus of the civil society in Gramscian terms, with cadres propounding the dominant ideology of the CCP in the form of a “common sense” among the local population. They form what is termed as the crux of the strategy of the “war of position” for generating hegemony in Tibet. The party cadres in Tibet are also a section of the organic intellectuals who are in the process of organising the Tibetan society in lines of the visions of the CCP, which is termed as receiving a major boost with the inclusion of further ethnic membership in the party. Hence, by the end of 1998, there were more than 51,000 ethnic cadres accounting for more than 75 percent of cadres in the region (ibid, 25).

In 2013, the latest figures of the CCP in Tibet was released by the Organisation Department of TAR Party Committee, whereby the end of the year saw 14,865 grassroots organisations, which had been built with over 130,000 cadres, of which 49 percent are herdsmen. The presence of 80 percent of Tibetans in rural areas, and the implementation

of “one village, one branch”, “a community, a branch” project in all 5464 villages in Tibet is to gain full coverage in Tibet of the party. Furthermore, since 2008, 5700 herdsmen have been trained to be outstanding leaders, while 5800 farmers have been trained. The emphasis on party building work in rural Tibet especially the strengthening of grassroots party organisation was stated by TAR party committee Organisation Department deputy Minister Li Xiaoning (Chang, 2014). In the strategically located Nyingchi prefecture, which is near the disputed borders with India, the local party committee organisation released the figures for the number of party members in 2012, whereby the total members were 20,236 of which 10,635 are farmers and herdsmen. The target of growth of membership to the local party committee had been set to 8 percent in the prefecture, which had been achieved. Hence, the growth in number of party members in Tibet, especially in the rural areas, is indicative of the party state trying to generate hegemony. As prior to 2007-08, the numbers of CCP branches in rural areas were low and the rise was partly facilitated by the pan Tibetan protests that had also spread to Tibetan rural areas.

An analysis of the local party branches in Tibet is also helpful in understanding how the party state functions in Tibet. In the Communist Party of Lhasa Municipality (now city) we see Che Dalha, a Tibetan appointed as the secretary of the Lhasa party branch with 17 deputy secretaries, of which only six are ethnic Tibetans, while 10 are Han Chinese and one being from the Yi ethnicity (TPI, 2014:67). Many of them are seen to be holding dual positions in the local people’s congress or government as well as also in the people’s consultative conference. For instance, the mayor of Lhasa is Tang Yangcheng, a Tibetan who is one of the deputy party secretaries (ibid, 69). The chair of the local people’s congress in Lhasa is Lobsang Tenpa, a Tibetan who is also a deputy party secretary, while the chair of Lhasa People’s Political Consultative Conference is Wang Maoxung, a Han deputy party secretary of Lhasa CCP (ibid, 70). There are also four standing deputy party secretaries who are also in the standing committee of the people’s government of Lhasa (ibid, 69). Majority of these party members had earlier served in other Tibetan townships and prefectures, for instance, Sonam Nyima, a Tibetan deputy party secretary of Lhasa CCP was the former head of Chamdo prefecture’s local people’s government from 2004 to 2012 (ibid, 72). In Ngari prefecture, located in far western Tibet, the

secretary of the local branch of the communist party is Peng Zhou, a Han Chinese, while there are six ethnic Tibetans as deputy party secretaries and six Han deputy party secretaries (ibid, 77). They are also seen to be members of the local legislature, peoples' government and the political consultative conference.

The party secretary of the CCP branch of Lhoka prefecture is a Tibetan named Chime Rigzin and there are only four Tibetans as deputy party secretaries out of a total number of 13 deputy party secretaries, with the rest being all Han Chinese (ibid, 85). In the communist party of Nyigtri/Nyigchi prefecture, the party secretary is an ethnic Han and out of 12 deputy party secretaries, there are seven Tibetans and five Han Chinese. However in Nyingtri's people's congress there are no currently serving deputy party secretary of the local party branch in the legislature, while the head of the local government of the prefecture is a Tibetan named Wangdue who is also the deputy party secretary of the local party committee (ibid, 96). In Shigatse prefecture, the party secretary of the local party committee is Tenzin Namgyal, a Tibetan, who is also serving as one of the vice chair of the TAR People's Congress. Out of a total of 12 deputy party secretaries, there are only four Tibetans while the remainder are Han Chinese (ibid, 103).

Chamdo prefecture's party secretary is Norbu Dhondup, a Tibetan, who is also one of the standing committee members of the TAR CCP and who is assisted by 14 deputy party secretaries, of which only four are Tibetans, eight Han Chinese, one is a Hui Muslim and one from the Tuijia ethnicity (ibid, 112). In Ngari prefecture, the secretary of the local party branch is Dhothok, a Tibetan who is also a standing committee member of the TAR CCP and is assisted by 11 members in the local standing committee with 5 Tibetans and 6 Han Chinese as deputy party secretaries (ibid, 121). In the Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, located in Yunnan province, the secretary of the local CCP is a Han Chinese who is assisted by 11 deputy party secretaries, with six Tibetans and four Han Chinese and one from the Lisu minority (ibid, 134). In the Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture CCP branch, the secretary is a Han Chinese, while there are 14 deputy secretaries in the standing committee, with six Tibetans, seven Han Chinese and one Hui Muslim (ibid, 150). In the adjoining Ngaba Qiang and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the secretary of the local branch of the party is a Han Chinese with 13 deputy secretaries

in the standing committee, which has 4 Tibetans, 8 Han Chinese and 1 Qiang as deputy secretaries (ibid, 160).

In the Tsolho TAP, the party secretary is a Tibetan and there are four Tibetan deputy secretaries, one Hui Muslim and six Han Chinese in the standing committee of the local CCP. In the Tsochang TAP the local party secretary is a Tibetan, with two Tibetan deputy secretaries and five Han Chinese deputy secretaries. In the Tsonub Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the party secretary is a Han Chinese, while there are two Tibetan deputy secretaries, one Hui, one Mongolian and nine Han Chinese deputy secretaries. Mahlho TAP has a Han Chinese as its party secretary, with three Tibetan deputy party secretaries, seven Han Chinese and one Hui Chinese deputy party secretary. In Golok TAP, the party secretary is a Han Chinese, while there are five Tibetan deputy party secretaries and eight Han Chinese deputies in the party committee. In Yulshu TAP, there are five Tibetan deputy secretaries and six Han Chinese deputies in the party committee (ibid, 11). These are mostly the Tibetan prefectures in the Qinghai and Gansu provinces; the erstwhile Amdo province of Tibet. As is seen in the information provided above, most of the party secretaries in the highest authority in the region are Han Chinese and also majority of the deputy party secretaries are also of the Han ethnicity.

There is also the presence of a number of ethnic Tibetans in the Central Committee of the CCP and in a number of important positions at higher levels of the party state, for instance Padma Choling, currently the chair of the TAR People's Congress is one of the members of the 18th Central Committee of CCP, while Losang Gyaltsen; chair of the TAR People's government, Danko; head of the Qinghai United Front Department, Li Changping from Sichuan, Gonpo Tashi; head of the Tibet United Front Department are the alternate members to the 18th Central Committee of CCP. In the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) October 2007, the Tibetan members were Lekchog (*Legqog*) from Gyantse and Jampa Phuntsok (*Qiangba Puncog*) from Chamdo, while alternate members of the 17th CPC Central Committee were Tenkho (*Danko*) from Tsolho and Dorji (*Doje Cezhug*) from Gyatsa. The Members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China (CPC) elected at the 17th CPC National Congress were Rinchen Gyal (*Rinqengyai*) from Amdo and Guru

Tsego (*Ou Zegao*) from Ngaba. In the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Nov 8-14, 2002 they were, Lekchog (*Legqog*) from Gyantse, Dorjee Tsering (*Doje Cering*) from Labrang and Ragdi (*Raidi*) from Nagchu, while the alternate members of the 16th CPC Central Committee, 2002 were Jampa Phuntsok (*Qiangba Puncog*) from Chamdo, Rinchen Gyal (*Rinqengyai*) from Amdo Guru Tsego (*Ou Zegao*) from Ngaba.

During the same period the Tibetan members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China (CPC) elected at the 16th CPC National Congress, 2002 were Bhuchung (*Bu Qiong*) from Chongye, Pema (*Baima*) from Yushu TAP. In the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) September 12-18, 1997, the Tibetan members were Ragdi (*Raidi*) from Nagchu and Dorjee Tsering (*Doje Cering*) from Labrang. The Alternate members of the 15th CPC Central Committee, 1997 were Lekchog (*Legqog*) from Gyantse, Tenzin (*Danzim*) from Nagchu and Guru Tsego (*Ou Zegao*) from Ngaba. In the 14th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Oct 12-18, 1992 the members were Ragdi (*Raidi*) from Nagchu and Dorjee Tsering (*Doje Cering*) from Labrang. The Members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China (CPC) elected at the 14th CPC National Congress, 1992 were Passang (*Ba Sang*) from Lhoka and the alternate members of the 14th CPC Central Committee, 1992 were Tenzin (*Danzim*) from Nagchu and Gyaltsen Norbu (*Gyalcan Norbu*) from Bathang. In the 13th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) October 25 to November 1, 1987, the Tibetans were Ragdi (*Raidi*) from Nagchu and Dorjee Tsering (*Doje Cering*) from Labrang.

While the Tibetan Members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China (CPC) elected at the 13th CPC National Congress, 1987 was Passang (*Ba Sang*) from Lhoka. In the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Sept 1-11, 1982, the Tibetans were Ragdi (*Raidi*) from Nagchu and Passang (*Ba Sang*) from Lhoka. While the Members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China (CPC) elected at the 12th CPC National Congress, 1982 were Dorjee Tsering (*Doje Cering*) from Labrang. In the 11th

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Aug 12-18, 1977, the Tibetans were Passang (*Ba Sang*) from Lhoka and Sangye Yeshi (*Tian Bao*) from Kham. The alternate members of the 11th CPC Central Committee, 1977 were Ragdi (*Raidi*) from Nagchu. In the 10th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Aug-24-28, 1973, they were Passang (*Ba Sang*) from Lhoka and Sangye Yeshi (*Tian Bao*) from Kham and in the 9th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) April 1-24, 1969 was Sangye Yeshi (*Tian Bao*) from Kham (Sonam, 2012).

Furthermore, the TAR is administratively divided into 6 prefectures, Ngari, Chamdo, Lhoka, Shigatse, Nagchu and Nyingtri. On 25 December 2014, Shigatse was upgraded to become a third prefecture level city after Lhasa and Chamdo in TAR (Wang, 2014). The conversion of Shigatse into a prefecture level city is termed as a way of increasing the pace of administrative work so as to boost greater economic development of the area, which has proximity to the trade routes into Nepal. Along with Chamdo, Shigatse also plays an important role in the garnering of legitimacy for the party state. It has the seat of the Panchen Lama; Tashilhunpo monastery, which played an important role in traditional Tibet as well as provided much consent to the CCP in numerous occasions. The same can be denoted of Chamdo, which was deemed as liberated by the PLA and placed under the authority of the Chamdo Liberation Committee in the 1950's. Both areas and its local elites had equal powers along with the Lhasa government in the PCART (Preparatory Committee for Autonomous Region of Tibet).

The PCART was the first administrative institution established by the party state which incorporated the traditional elites in Tibet and was based on the principle of the united front. It was formally inaugurated on 22 April 1956 and the Tibetans in the meeting were divided into three separate groups – the Tibetan government group, the Panchen Lama group and the Chamdo Liberation Group (Information and Publicity Office of His Holiness, 1976:8). It consisted of 51 members, fifteen representing the government of Tibet, ten from the Panchen Lama group, ten from the Chamdo Liberation Committee, five were Chinese representatives and the remaining eleven were scholars and distinguished people. It had one executive office with thirteen departments. The PCART had established eight regional zones with a number of districts to be administered by a

Commissioner, which had a number of offices, which handled a number of programmes (ibid, 9). The formation of such an institution was a major victory for Mao's gradualist strategy, as it provided the party state with the much needed legitimacy over Tibet from the traditional ruling elites (Goldstein, 2014:282). The Panchen and his followers had been co-opted by the CCP, through a restoration of his estates as well his former position, while a large number of progressive Tibetans and prominent religious leaders such as Phagpala Gelek Namgyal and Dagyab Rinpoche Loden Sherap from Chamdo were incorporated into the ruling structure (Shakya, 1999:128). It is through these elements that the party state has tried deriving a form of hegemony whereby the interests of these social groups have been co-opted by CCP, thus deriving consent to their rule. This form of deriving consent will be elaborated later in the section on Tibetan Buddhism and Institutions of Hegemony.

With the crushing of the uprising of 1959 in Lhasa and other cities, the former administrative structures were transformed as seen through the narrative of Lobsang Tempa, a monk who had escaped into exile in 1966, originally hailing from Kham and was residing in the Ramoche cathedral in Lhasa when the 1959 uprising took place. According to him, there was an administrative division of Lhasa city, which had been divided into four sections. Each section had an administrative office, the *Mimang Sezhung*, which had a *Dhunjoey*, which was further subdivided into three small offices known as the *Wu Yun*. In the northern section of the three *Wu Yuns*, one was run by two Tibetans known as Chimi Wangdu and Ngawang Kesang. However they were completely controlled by the Chinese officer of the *Dhunjoey* who was Tan Fu Tang (Tempa, 1976:99).

During the period of the Cultural Revolution, with the establishment of communes there was the creation of a different administrative structure, which is well elaborated in the narrative provided by Passang Wangdu who hailed from Dhingri, southwest Tibet and had come into exile on 25 November 1973. He provides an elaborate description of the administrative setup of the Dhingri district, which had five sub districts – Damtro, Shalshol, Khata Yulbar, Khadug Gara and Dhing Gang. These were further subdivided into 37 villages. One of the Dhing Gang villages had four divisions. The first was headed

by Tsewang Namgyal, aged 28 and a women's leader *Turing* Tan. The second group by Sonam Tsering, aged 31 assisted by Phuntsog aged 45, the third group was led by a woman named Nima aged 37 assisted by Kyizom aged 32 and the last group was led by Tsering Dorji, aged 35 assisted by Tsamchoe and Tsering Thakchoe. He mentions that in the Dhing Gang village, a commune had been established named "United Association of People's Commune", whose members were trained in the modern techniques of farming (ibid, 147). The highest official in Dhingri district was chairman Wang, aged 40, vice chairman Wu, aged 56 and a Tibetan lady named Dawa Dolma, aged 40 from Shigatse who was the secretary. In the Dhing Gang village, the chairman was Wangpo, aged 37, assisted by Damtso Norzing, aged 40, *Uyon* Dawa, aged 37, secretary Tsewang, 40 and Wangyal, aged 25. The village militia had a hundred members and was led by Sonam Tsering, 30 and Dorje, a 30 year old female political advisor (ibid, 149).

In the post Cultural Revolution period the visible structures of state and governance in Tibet are similar to that of the provincial governments in China. The most powerful organ of the state is the regional people's congress which is invested with the power to modify national law, to enact local legislations and to appoint government, judicial officials and procuratorial officials. Under the National Regional Autonomy Law, the chairman of the government and of the congress of each region and province must be a member of the majority indigenous ethnic group of that region or province, with a Tibetan always occupying the post of Governor and Chairman of the People's Government and Congress respectively since 1965 (Barnett and Connor, 1997:11). This system is deemed as lifting Tibet out of the old state of feudal serfdom under theocracy and making the people the true masters of the country, society and their own fate. It is through a system of socialist democracy that the Tibetans have been able to participate in forming the legislatures and people's government.

Although, direct elections are present at the county and township level only, whose deputies in turn elect deputies to the regional people's congresses and to the NPC. In 2012, the voter turnout rate at the four levels (Provincial, Prefectural, County and Township) exceeded 94 percent (China Daily, 2013). The party state also terms the system of government in Tibet as being more representative and being democratic as

denoted by the deputies from other ethnic minorities in Tibet. The inclusion of ethnic minorities such as the Monpa, Lhoba, Naxi, Hui, Zhuang and also female deputies in the TAR governing system by China can be seen as a way of legitimising the party state. Through this the CCP is seen to be manufacturing consent from these ethnicities as well as attempting to create a new discourse; one which is more diverse, tolerant and encompassing from the past, hence trying to generate legitimacy in Tibet. Since 1979, the People’s Congress of TAR has worked out 21 legal decrees and 14 decisions bearing the nature of legislation. A primary decree that has been passed by the legislature has been on the resolution to study, use and develop Tibetan language and writing (Beijing Review Press, 1989:61). According to the 2013 White Paper on Tibet by PRC State Council, around 290 local laws and regulations have been made and also a number of flexible implementation of state laws have been made so as to suit local conditions, which is a right provided by the constitution for ethnic minorities (Xinhua, 2013).

The following table contain names of the chairmen of TAR People’s Government and the chair of the local legislature (all ethnic Tibetans) from 1965 onwards –

Ngabo Nawang Jigme	1965 – Cultural Revolution
Tian Bao (Sangye Yeshe)	Post Cultural Revolution – 1981
Dorjee Tsetan	1981 -1985
Dorjee Tsering	1985 – 1990
Gyaltzen Norbu	1991 – 1997
Legchok	1997 – 2003
Jampa Phuntsog	2008 -2010
Padma Choling	2010 – 2013
Lobsang Jamcan	2013 – onwards

Source – Thierry Dodin, 2008: 202

List of chairmen of TAR People’s Congress from 1965 onwards

Ngabo Nawang Jigme	1965 – Cultural Revolution/1983-1993
Ragdi	1993-2003
Legchok	2003-2010

Jampa Phuntsog	2010 – 2013
Pema Trinley	2013 – onwards

Sources – Thierry Dodin, 2008:202, TIN, 2013:4

The current 10th People’s Congress of TAR is constituted of 445 deputies from 4 prefectures (Ngari, Lhoka, Nyingtri and Nagchu) and 3 prefecture level cities (Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo). Around 44 deputies are from the PLA. The municipal city of Lhasa sends a total of 69 deputies of which 46 are ethnic Tibetans, 18 are Han Chinese, and three are Hui Muslims, one each from the Hor and Zhuang ethnicity while 18 from the total are female. Most of them are party members and also cadres who are in charge of a number of mass organisations and institution bearing a nature of civil society, such as the deputy Penpa Lhamo (female) is chief magistrate of Lhasa Municipal judiciary. The *khenpo* of Drepung monastery, Jampel Lhazang who is the vice chair of the Democratic Management Committee of the monastic university is also a deputy to the 10th People’s Congress of TAR.

Sonam Dekyi (female), a deputy is also concurrently serving as a President of the regional branch of the All China Women’s Federation in Medrogongar county, Lhasa, TAR. Karma Chomphell, a monk from Sera Monastery is also a deputy to the 10th People’s Congress TAR, while the Principal of the Lhasa City Secondary School Dickyi Dolkar (female) was also elected to the People’s Congress. The newly formed prefecture city of Shigatse sends 84 deputies to the TAR People’s Congress of which 55 are Tibetans, 27 are Han Chinese and one each from Mongol and Sherpa ethnicity. They also come from a number of occupational backgrounds, being party members as well as in charge of mass organisations including journalists. For instance, Penpa Tsering is a reporter with the Xinhua news agency and is an elected deputy from Shigatse. Dawa Dramdul representing Shigatse is a businessman and also there are judges of the local courts, school headmasters and also leader of incense manufacturing enterprises. The Chamdo prefecture city sends 78 deputies of which 56 are Tibetans, 20 are Han Chinese, one each from Zhuang and Hui ethnicity. Lhoka prefecture sends 48 deputies, with 33 Tibetans, 13 Han and 2 from Monpa ethnicity. Nyingtri prefecture has 38 deputies in the TAR People’s Congress, with 16 Tibetans, 18 Han Chinese, two from Deng ethnicity and

one each from the Monpa and Lhoba community. It is from the Nyingtri prefecture, that apart from deputies representing the PLA we have a majority of Han Chinese elected to the TAR People's Congress.

Nagchu prefecture sends 58 deputies, of which an overwhelming majority of 46 are Tibetans and 12 are Han Chinese. The prefecture of Ngari which lies to the western most region of Tibet sends 26 deputies of which 18 are Tibetans and eight are Han Chinese. From the 44 deputies representing the PLA, 17 are Tibetans, 23 are Han Chinese, two are from the Tui community, while one each are from the Zhuang and Dong ethnicity (TPI, 2013 – 5-16). There is the strong presence of CCP members irrespective of their ethnicities as elected deputies in TAR People's Congress. In a Gramscian context, the party being an important component of civil society especially undertakes the role carried out by the state in political society (Gramsci, 2010:15). Hence, the party through its members in the TAR legislature tries to generate consent for the party rule through formulating policies which will be conducive to the ruling group's interests. Furthermore, the presence of individuals who represent certain mass organisations or aspects of the civil society is also an important way through which the party state has tried to co-opt them and thus initiate a process of generating hegemony.

According to a White Paper issued on Tibet by China's State Council in 2013, in 2012, among the 34,244 deputies elected directly and indirectly, 31,901 were from the other ethnic minorities apart from the Han, accounting for more than 93 percent and among the present NPC deputies, 20 are from TAR, of whom 12 are ethnic Tibetans and one each are from Monpa and Lhoba ethnicity (Xinhua, 2013). The Standing Committee of the People's Congress presides over functions of the People's Congress when the legislature is not in session. In the 10th People's Congress of TAR there are 44 Standing Committee members, 25 are from the Tibetan and other ethnic minorities and of the 14 chairpersons and vice chairpersons, eight are Tibetan and other ethnic minorities (ibid, 2013). The TAR People's Government functions as the executive branch of government which is elected by the deputies of the People's Congress TAR. The constitution and National Regional Autonomy Law stipulates the Governor or Chairman of the People's government in an ethnic region to be from the majority ethnicity. The current chairman of

TAR People's government is Lobsang Gyamcan, who is also a deputy secretary of Party Committee of TAR CCP and thus being a party member. He is assisted by 14 Vice-Chairpersons, in which seven belong to the Tibetan ethnicity, while remaining seven are Han Chinese, with only one woman chair being currently present (TPI, 2013:17).

Another important organ through which CCP tries to garner hegemony is the CPPCC especially through its regional branches. While, the consultative conference is deemed as a powerless assembly of non party elites who offer consent to the party state, it has played significant roles in the past. For instance, individual members can be quite assertive as well as make hostile criticisms. This was seen during the height of the pro independence demonstrations in Lhasa in the late 1980's; the members of the CPPCC submitted a document criticising the Party's handling of the demonstrations. In recent years, one of the most difficult issues discussed in the forum was the recognition of the Dalai Lama, where many members refused to comment, while many were critical of the party state's position (Barnett and Connor, 1997: 13). This is seen to be much evident in 1998, when a number of members were forced to take retirements while a couple of them were expelled. In the 7th CPPCC of TAR, three members Chaba Kesang Wangdu, his wife Sonam Drolkar and Gonpasar Thubten Jigdrag or Gonsar Rinpoche were forced to retire due to them being suspected of harbouring pro Dalai Lama sentiments (TIN, 1999:43). Along with them, on 27 April 1998, the CPPCC Regional Committee had expelled Dorjee Dramdul and Phuntsog for indulging in activities which were deemed harmful to Tibet's stability and being in serious violation of the CPPCC constitution (ibid, 41).

In a similar manner on 22 May 1996, Chadrel Rinpoche was expelled from the 6th TAR CPPCC and removed from his position as vice chairman due to his involvement of the exiled Dalai Lama in the reincarnation process of the Panchen Rinpoche (ibid, 42). Thus in a number of instances, the incorporated members of the traditional elites in the CPPCC are seen to be involved in activities which are seen as challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet. However, the platform of the CPPCC is also seen as an important way of co-opting the ruling elites by the party state, through which they gain a degree of legitimacy. For instance, in the 7th CPPCC, the appointment of Drupkhang Khedrub Rinpoche, the head

of Zhabten monastery in Amdo county, Nagchu is significant as he had emerged since 1995 as an important public critic of the Dalai Lama. Along with this, the CPPCC is an important medium through which senior semi retired party cadres are provided positions and prestige as understood through the appointment of Chen Hanchang in 1998, who was a former deputy party secretary of the CCP in TAR (ibid, 39).

The appointment of the ethnic Tibetan Samdrub during the same period can also be understood to be similar as she was a former standing committee member of the TAR Party Committee, a former secretary of the Shigatse Prefectural Party Committee and was also posted as the director of the party's UFWD (ibid, 39). However, the consultative conference is a major tool through which the CCP has tried to co-opt influential individuals and gain consent to their rule. The current TAR 10th People's Consultative Conference has 615 members, headed by a chair and assisted by 16 vice chair persons. The chair of the TAR CPPCC is the reincarnate high ranking lama from Chamdo Phagpala Gelek Namgyal, who has played a continuous role in China's garnering of legitimacy in Tibet since the 1950's. Among the vice chair, 12 are Tibetans, while four are Han Chinese. The CCP has a strong presence in the political consultative conference with 65 party members, 32 are Han Chinese, 32 are Tibetans and one is from the Monpa ethnicity. It is in the political consultative conference of TAR that the mass organisations and other constituents of the civil society have their representation. For instance, the Central Committee of TAR trade and commerce has eight members, of which six are Tibetans, one each from Han ethnicity and Dong ethnicity. The TAR Tibetan Women Federation Committee has 14 members of which five are Han Chinese, eight are Tibetans. The Peasantry Association has 24 members represented, of which 17 are Tibetans; six are Han Chinese and one from the Sherpa ethnicity. The Cultural Development Federation Committee has 34 representatives in the TAR CPPCC, of which 30 are Tibetans, two Han Chinese and one Lhoba ethnicity (TPI, 2013:18-24). The inclusion of these mass organisations which bears resemblance to a form of civil society in PRC are a way of gaining consent and thus exercising hegemony by the party state.

The party state has also ensured the implementation of community level democracy in Tibetan regions covering both farming and pastoral areas, through the self governance

system and formation of peasant associations. The first peasant association was created in Khesum village in Shannan region by 443 peasants on 5 July 1959. In 1993, the Measures for the TAR Implementation of the Law of Organising the Villagers' Committees of PRC enabled the election of villagers' committees around the region, with over 95 percent of the villages in TAR being covered at present. During the seventh general election of village committees of Tibet, 1,686,800 people registered and 1,495,000 voted, making a turnout rate of 88.7 percent; and 26,335 were elected to village or community committees (Xinhua, 2013). The village democratic elections also form a mode of garnering legitimacy by the party state, as it also aids in generating consent for the ruling group from the subalterns as the latter seem to exercise a degree of rights through electing their own village leaders. Hence, the CCP is deemed as instituting a form of "passive revolution" to co-opt the subaltern and hence exercise hegemony. However, these attempts to gain hegemony have been corroded in the recent years by the party state itself, which will be elaborated at the end of the chapter. There has also been the implementation of the "mass-line" campaign, under which 60,000 cadres have been sent to 5459 administrative villages and 1877 temples in TAR. According to Chen Yuejun, chief of the Organisation Department of Lhoka prefecture, the cadres who are mostly Tibetans are ones with an average age of 28.5 years. Under the mass line education campaign, the CCP officials and members are to prioritise the interests of the people and persist in representing them and working on their behalf.

A Deputy Director of the Weather Bureau in Lhoka prefecture named Tenzin had worked for seven months among locals in the Douyu Lhoba township and aided the locals in constitution of water channel, renovate the aging electric wire and build the countryside marsh gas. Through living with the locals in the rural areas, the cadres are seen to be bringing development to these areas, building roads and infrastructure, where still a population of 583,000 live below poverty line, which represents one fifth of the total population of TAR. It is on these lines, that cadres are to be sent to rural areas and undertake the mass line programme. Moreover, with reforms and opening up, an emphasis on quality and technical education has been given more precedence, making the need for more well educated cadres to develop the economy (Lin, 2013). This brings into action the intellectuals, professionals in the form of the cadres who are linkages between

the party state and masses, aiding in the generation of consent for the ruling elite in Tibet. What is significant is that the economic development in PRC has emerged as a *raison d'être*, a “saturation of the whole process of living” (Williams, 2010:110), that forms common sense which enables the exercise of hegemony by the dominant group. The role of economic development as a tool of generating hegemony by party state will be emphasised further in the chapter.

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION, CREATION OF INTELLECTUALS AND CHINA'S HEGEMONY IN TIBET

Gramsci gave much emphasis to education as it created intellectuals, especially the organic ones who for every social class aided in the generation of hegemony. While he was interested in the creation of intellectuals from the working class, the role of education becomes important as through education, there is the expression of an entire social complex (Gramsci, 2010: 25). This was in the case of Gramsci, the capitalist bourgeoisie system which was expressed through education. He further mentions about the two elements in the educational formation of children where they are taught rudiments of natural science and the ideas of civic rights and duties. Through the former, the student is inserted in the world of things, while through rights and duties; the civil society is brought upon the individual. The school is seen to be combating folkloristic tendencies and also aids in the heralding of modernity (ibid, 34). It is on these lines that education in Tibet under the party state becomes highly important as through education, dual purposes/goals of generating hegemony and legitimacy are achieved. In Tibet, education is provided by the state and the state sets a syllabus for the students coming from the Tibetan population. The schools and other educational institutions form a major component of the civil society which is akin to the “war of position” in western nations. For instance, in the west, as according to Gramsci during his period and also currently, a major subject taught is Latin and Greek. This according to Gramsci was done so as to know the civilisation of Greece and Rome – a civilisation that was a necessary precondition of the modern western world. Hence, in the west according to Gramsci, these languages were learnt by its people in order to know themselves consciously (ibid, 37).

The same can be somewhat traced in the party state in China bringing about the study of the mandarin language among Tibetans and other ethnic minorities as a way to bring them into the folds of a Han Chinese culture. The providing of education by China to Tibetans irrespective of their backgrounds and introduction of secular education in the post 1951 period onwards are seen as important ways of gaining legitimacy by the party state in Tibet. As according to them, “old Tibet” was one where education was religious with a few government run and private schools in Lhasa, Shigatse and Gyantse where 2000 monks and children of nobility studied, while 95 percent of population were illiterate. Hence, the introduction of more secular education in Tibet by CCP has been termed as emancipating Tibet. The first modern school was set in Chamdo in 1951 and many were established in 1952 in Lhasa. By 1959, the total number of primary schools had increased to 462 with 16,300 students along with the opening of a secondary school and a specialised school. The schools are seen as the instrument through which intellectuals are created (Gramsci, 2010:10).

From 1951, the Chinese had made it mandatory from every district to send atleast fifty people annually to China for studies mostly to the National Minorities Institution (Aten, 1986:90). In the classes they were mostly lectured on the party communiqué, resisting imperialism, remembering Norman Bethune, learning the correct handling of contradictions (ibid, 92). They were also lectured on the Chinese constitution and explained on democratic centralism while in many cases the teachers used to demean the Tibetans and the other nationalities (ibid). Lessons were also given on the idea of the rights of the national minorities, in which the instructors stressed invariably on the idea of the superiority of the Han Chinese and their duty to aid the other ethnic minorities (ibid, 96). The local traditions and cultures of the Tibetans were denigrated by the instructors, which needed to be reformed. Tibetan Buddhism was deemed as a major hindrance to social advancement (ibid, 98). This is seen even in the current context, as the standard curriculum in Chinese schools emphasise on the idea that local ethnic identities is to be subordinated to national unity and conveys the message that the “minorities” are backward compared to the Han (Kolas and Thowsen, 2005:93).

Furthermore, the education policy of CCP in Tibet can be traced to the Seventeen Point Agreement signed in 1951, which stated that “the spoken and written language and the school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions of Tibet” (Jiao, 2010). By 2013, according to the Education Department of TAR, it had raised the primary school enrolment ratio to 99.59 percent and also reduced the illiteracy rate among the youth to 0.63 percent, with an average regional education years of 8.4 percent. By the end of 2013, Tibet had established 1598 schools and 496 educative sports. In 2012, Tibet had achieved a 15 year free education from preschool to high school, while in 2007 the nine year compulsory education was achieved in Tibet. Ma Shengchang, head of Education Department TAR also termed a total amount of 11 billion Yuan on education in 2013 and an enrolment of over 600 thousand students (Xinhua, 2014). Moreover, around 19,600 students also took part in the “*gao-kao*”, the national college entrance exams in June 2014 (Chinatibetnews.com, 2015). This reflects the presence of a vast network of civil society institutions in the form of education provided by the Chinese state, through which the Tibetans are co-opted and their consent gained by the party state.

The central government and provincial governments have also provided many funds to improve the infrastructure of primary and secondary schools and emphasis has been made to create more boarding schools. This is also to attract Tibetan nomadic children and incorporate them further through the education system. Special emphasis has been made in education in rural areas, on teachers’ training and also special priority has been given to counties on the border and pastoral areas. With the popularisation of basic education, the state has also intensified the phasing out of community teachers and the recruitment of young teachers and graduates from inland schools. By 2008, Tibet had 1017 schools of various kinds of all levels. It included 884 primary schools, 117 regular secondary schools, 10 secondary technical schools and six colleges/universities. All 73 counties in the region had completed the six year compulsory education with a 100 percent coverage rate. There has also been the insertion of modern education in the form of smart classrooms. Due to the provision of good facilities and trained teachers, Tibet has been placed in the capacity to conduct more experimental programmes and improve the quality of learning environment.

The Education Bureau of TAR has also promulgated specific educational measures to suit TAR's special characteristics. Two examples of this can be seen from the "Three Guarantees" and "Inland Tibet Schools". In the former which was initiated from 1985 onwards, it consists of free food for children who board at school, living accommodation for boarding school children, school wear and bedding for boarding school children and tuition waiver and free text books. Since 2009, the amount spent by the state on this policy has increased eight times and from 2010 onwards, it has been extended to senior high-school students (Jiao, 2010). The schools especially in the post 1978 period are deemed as basic institutions for Tibetan households aspiring for a higher standard of living which is the basic aim of the education programmes. Economic growth and development in Tibet with the reforms and opening up have emerged as important tools of garnering hegemony and legitimacy by the party state.

An important way through which hegemony is generated by the state via the civil society of educational institutions is also through the "Inland Tibet Schools". It has been termed as an overall mechanism to improve education in Tibet or of the Tibetans. Under this, primary school graduates from Tibet are sent to inland secondary schools across China. The TAR government selects and recommends primary school graduates of 11 to 12 years old for these inland schools. In 1985, there were 1300 primary graduates from the seven prefectures of TAR who were sent to sixteen classes or schools in inland China. From 1985 to 2005, more than 25000 primary graduates were sent to study in 20 provinces and municipal cities. In 2006, there were 28 junior and senior middle schools and teacher training schools that had inland Tibetan classes. More than 90 universities have admitted Tibetan students. For these inland Tibetan class projects, the state had invested 180.5 million yuan and the regional governments had invested 500 million yuan. The end of 2007 saw the fostering of 18,000 qualified personnel for Tibet, who are seen to be geared towards bringing about socialist market system in the Tibetan regions. A major zone of contention for the party state has been with the teaching of Tibetan language, which as an ethnic marker has been viewed with strong suspicion. However, the inland schools for Tibetans are deemed as providing Tibetan language training and thus aids in the preservation of language. The Five Provinces Tibetan Learning Materials Leadership Group is seen to be facilitating the production of Tibetan language learning

resources, thus enabling the teaching of the Tibetan language by China, which in itself is seen as garnering legitimacy by the state (ibid).

Education in Tibet has also undergone various stages. Moreover, there are significant differences in the educational policies implemented in the TAR and other Tibetan areas incorporated in neighbouring provinces. The shift in education has taken place with shifts in political climate. The shift has taken place between one strategy that makes quality in education a priority and another that puts emphasis on quantity that is meeting the mass educational needs of workers and peasants (Bass, 1998:3). Also emphasis on quality stresses on academic and technical education, while quantity emphasises on ideological revolutionary training. The emphasis on quality was seen during the early 1950s, the early 1960s and the 1980s onwards, while quantity was much emphasised during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, all aspects of Tibetan culture came under attack including Tibetan language. These shifts reflect the slight variations in the ideological stand of the party state in China and thus the subsequent change in the degree of hegemony of the ruling party. For instance, with reforms and opening up, education has been geared towards the hegemonic values of wealth and economic development.

Furthermore, in the case of Tibet education has an important purpose of instilling a sense of commitment to the unity of China and encouraging patriotism to it, thus becoming directly hegemonic. With the shift to emphasis to quality in education due to economic reforms and opening up in China, the party state has further tried to garner consent from the Tibetans through an emphasis on technical education for Tibetans, which will equip them towards economic growth. Also with an emphasis on economic development in China, funding and investments took place in the more developed eastern regions of China. The early period of the reforms and especially with the visit of Hu Yaobang to Tibet in 1980's, led to a reemphasis on Tibetan language education. One of his famous liberal six point reform program partly emphasised on 'education not progressed much in Tibet. There was a need to set up universities and middle and primary schools in the region'. He also remarked on the need to preserve and study the Buddhist scriptures and for Han cadres working in Tibet to learn the Tibetan language, which was to be a

required subject, to prevent them from being divorced from the masses (Wangyal, 2004:287). However, the re-emergence of post independence demonstrations in TAR, in late 1980's, the primary political role of "minority education" was reasserted. The consequence of this was that the concessions made in the early 1980's to Tibetan language education and to a culturally relevant curriculum were partially eroded (Bass, 1998: 4).

Intellectuals as mentioned earlier play an important role in maintaining hegemony. They are the medium between the ruling group and the subalterns. Gramsci terms them as valuable agents who shape "common sense" by representing their groups and classes, to others as well as themselves. Furthermore, he saw the importance of both traditional and organic intellectuals as they are involved in production, in culture and also in public administration. Moreover, with reforms and opening up, the "technical" intellectuals, ones who have specialisation in certain areas such as entrepreneurship becomes highly important to aid in creating hegemony. Without them, the state will be isolated and its apparatus and supporting industry unable to function (Groot, 2009:16). Hence the ruling group needs to maintain the intellectuals. In the case of Tibet, the party state through education is seen to be progressing towards maintaining intellectuals for supporting the party. For the party, the intellectuals have a bridging function which aids them in creating a better atmosphere for its growth. It is with the intellectuals that the party has entered into a war of position to build hegemony and isolate opponents to its domination (ibid). The intellectuals are the tools to garner consent from the masses and thus generate legitimacy by the party state in Tibet. The CCP through the policies of the united front has been able to assimilate intellectuals of the earlier ruling order; the traditional intellectuals. This is seen with the support the CCP has received for its policies in Tibet from numerous sections of the religious clergy.

A prominent one was Geshe Sherab Gyatso; a renowned monk scholar and former abbot of Sera monastery, a monastic university which was also a centre of power in pre 1951 Tibet. He was eventually co-opted by CCP easily as his ties with the Tibetan government prior to 1951 had been much strained, making him live a life of exile in China. As an intellectual, he was primarily responsible for the coining of new terms in Tibetan

language that would befit the ‘liberation’ brought about by the Chinese communists to Tibet. He had also made an important radio broadcast on 6 May 1950, as an appeal to the Tibetan people and Dalai Lama, implicitly warning them that the Chinese would use force if necessary to liberate Tibet. However, he also had emphasised on the fact that the Tibetan people would be treated equally and religion would be respected, through a granting of regional autonomy to them (Shakya, 1999: 38). Traditional intellectuals like him played an important role of generating consent from the Tibetans as well as creating legitimacy for the party state in Tibet. They have also played a direct role in legitimising the party state’s policies in Tibet, which is seen especially in the 1980s with regard to the contentious issue of the border town of Tawang with India. Historians and aristocrats such as Chabel Tsetan Phuntsog, Lhalu Tsewang Dorjee and Thubten Chopel etc were assigned to write about the Tawang area, perspectives which were critical of the Indian takeover of land and also the lining of the areas to the Chinese nation since historical times. In all of these writings, they have been portrayed as strong, patriotic and nationalistic figures for China (Sperling, 2008). These intellectuals are seen as mediators through which the party state tried to legitimise its claims over territory through the usage of Tibetan voices.

Intellectuals in Tibet such as Tsetan Zhabdrung Rinpoche, a high ranking reincarnate was also instrumental in translating the Chinese constitution in Tibetan in 1954 and also teaching at various levels in the Qinghai Nationalities University prior to his incarceration and later in the Tibetan Studies Department of the Northwest Minorities University in Lanzhou, Gansu province in 1978. His conceptions of Buddhism, modernity, and Tibetan identity continue to inform discourse in the PRC and beyond (Lin, 2012). Secular intellectuals such as Tashi Tsering, a former member of the Dalai Lama’s opera troupe also welcomed the modernity brought about by CCP to Tibet but also vociferously campaigned for the teaching of the Tibetan language and also built elementary schools in Tibetan languages, along with compiling a Tibet – Chinese – English dictionary (Tsering, 1997). He exemplifies to a certain extent the category of an ‘organic intellectual’ in the Gramscian sense, one who organises the new social order. As a former peasant, Tashi Tsering was ‘liberated’ from the old society, which had oppressed him and taken away his will. However, his emphasis on Tibetan education and

values is also an important aspect which is commonly present among most Tibetan intellectuals under the party state in Tibet. This is also seen among the four “national level scholars” as termed by Beijing in 1987 from Tibet, Muge Samten, Tsetan Zhabdrung, Dungkar Rinpoche and Jampa Trinley. All of them were steeped in both the traditional system of education as well as much influenced by the modern.

For instance, Dungkar Rinpoche was a high ranking reincarnate recognised in pre 1951 Tibet by the old regime but who was also deeply steeped in Marxism. This occurred with him being sent to the Nationalities Institute in Beijing prior to 1959 where he tried to cross fertilise Tibetan Buddhist thought and Marxist analytical method. His work ‘The Merging of Religious and Secular Rule in Tibet’ is seen to be critical of the old system and he was also termed as a party loyalists by others even during the Cultural Revolution, when he had been incarcerated, but still praised and termed himself as doing good for the party. He was also a former Vice Principal of Tibet University and a renowned historian. In the post 1978 period he occupied all the important positions available to Tibetan scholars – the vice Principal of Tibet University and a Professor, Honorary President of Tibet Academy of Social Sciences, Professor at the Central Institute of Nationalities in Beijing and also Vice President of Chinese Institute of Tibetology in Beijing. He was also a member of CPPCC and of the Chinese Buddhist Association. However, Dungkar Rinpoche also strongly championed the Tibetan language terming it as the only way to improve the educational standard of the nationality and also a key to Tibet’s development. He also emphasised on the need to establish educational institutes which would promote Tibetan as well as fluency in Chinese. As a member of the Committee for Tibetan language which is responsible for implementing language policy in the region, he vociferously emphasised on the need for departments in Tibet University to specialise in Tibetan language and culture. His students are important personages in modern Tibet who are intellectuals in the “organic sense”, who would organise and lead the social group that they belonged to (TIN, 1997).

There is also the presence of scholars who use a materialist approach to Tibetan studies, being much critical of the spiritual and the esoteric aspects of Tibetan Buddhism. They are seen to be fuelling the legitimacy process for the party state, being active in the

creation of a “common sense” among the subaltern for the party state in Tibet. An example of such is seen in the case of Tragyal, author, philosopher and intellectual from Qinghai province where the historic Amdo province of Tibet is present. He was also a former editor of the Qinghai Nationalities Publishing House in Xining and was much critical of the earlier reigning philosophy of Tibetan Buddhism, terming it as an impediment to the region’s modernisation, development and integration with the rest of China. He has also authored several books and was a regular contributor to the Party’s newspaper, the Qinghai Daily (TCHRD, 2010:44-45). Moreover, in the Leninist schema the vanguard party is composed of former workers and former professional intellectuals of bourgeois origin who are fused into a single cohesive unit, with the revolutionary party being of paramount importance (Gramsci, 2010: 4). However, Gramsci emphasises on the capacity for development of organic intellectuals of the working class or the subaltern group, which is seen in the case of Tibet. These intellectuals as recounted above are seen to be providing a link between the party and the masses to which they belong to and aid in the advancement of hegemony for China.

TIBETAN BUDDHISM, CO-OPTION AND HEGEMONY BY CCP IN TIBET

Tibetan Buddhism forms the core value of the Tibetan way of life, with Buddhist precepts and principles guiding society. Furthermore, pre 1951 Tibet was a theocratic state with the Dalai Lama; a religious figure holding temporal and spiritual power over Tibet. In his absence or during his minority period, the reins of power were effectively in the hands of a regent, chosen from one among the major monasteries in Lhasa. The monastery and other institutions of Tibetan Buddhism acted as an alternative power centre as prior to 1950, these were the sovereign rulers in Tibet; the true sites of power. They had a semi autonomous status within the Tibetan state and also had some judicial power over its subjects. They also exercised a veto power over the Lhasa government as members of the erstwhile local Assembly in Lhasa were abbots and former abbots of the three great monastic universities of Sera, Ganden and Drepung. There were 175 ecclesiastical officials led by the chief abbot in the former Tibetan government (Peteck, 2013: 441). Moving beyond the sphere of the political, Tibetan Buddhism is seen to be saturated in the whole process of living of its followers, affecting the whole identities and

relationships of individuals, to such a depth that it transformed into common sense (Williams, 2010: 110), forming a pattern of hegemony for the earlier ruling class in Tibet. It was this complex interlocking of social, cultural and political by Tibetan Buddhism in the lives of the subalterns that the CCP encountered when they 'liberated' Tibet.

Furthermore, Gramsci gives much importance to the ecclesiastics' intellectuals, who for a long time held a monopoly over a large number of important services: religious ideology, which was a philosophy and science in societies like Tibet prior to the 'liberation' by PRC. They also controlled schools, education, morality, justice, charity, good works etcetera. Gramsci's analysis further links the ecclesiastics to the landed aristocracy as their organic intellectuals, with which it shared the exercise of feudal ownership of land, and the use of state privileges connected with property, which was also present in pre liberation Tibet. However, it is the monopoly held by the ecclesiastics in the superstructural field which is important as it is here that a struggle could take place, leading to the emergence of new categories of intellectuals that could challenge the religious order (Gramsci, 2010:7). This is seen much in the case of Tibet as elaborated above and it is this hegemony that the party state aims to contend, co-opt and dominate. The relationship between the CCP and religion in the rest of China is also an issue of contention as the party state is seen be strictly monitoring religious activities of its population, even though the state constitution provides freedom of religious belief. However, the ambit of 'acceptable' religious behaviour and one that does not challenge its legitimacy is emphasised by CCP towards religions in China (ICT, 2013:5).

The party state is seen to be co-opting religion especially the ecclesiastic intellectuals to further gain consent from society. This is also seen in CCP's policies towards Tibetan Buddhism, where Tibetan Buddhist masters and monastics have been incorporated in numerous structures of the modern state. Moreover, this process of incorporation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders has strong historical precedence which is seen with the Tibetan Buddhists' orientation toward patrons from outside Tibetan regions that date back to the time of the Western Xia state (1038 – 1227), followed by numerous Buddhist schools receiving patronage from the Mongol tribes and the subsequent Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties of imperial China. These dynasties tried gaining legitimacy from religious

authority of Tibetan Buddhism. Furthermore, during the early twentieth century, Tibetan Buddhist masters played an important role as a few influential and powerful lamas were driven to Republican China due to the modernising tendency of the 13th Dalai Lama, which emphasised on more centralised control under him (Tuttle, 2013:562-64). It was the Ninth Panchen Lama, the head of Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse and the second important hierarch in Tibetan Buddhism, who had been alienated by the Lhasa government's policies, forcing him to flee to China. Another important lama who had to go into exile in China was Norlha Khutugtu from eastern Tibet, Kham area who was also incorporated into the process of garnering legitimacy for the then Chinese regime (ibid). This was done in the case of the Panchen Lama through the creation of "Office of Panchen's Resident" in Nanjing on 11 January 1929 by the Nationalist government which would further increase the legitimacy of KMT claims over a united China that would include Tibet. On the other hand, the Norlha Khutugtu was made a member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, and an "Office of the Khutugtu Resident" was established in Nanjing, with branches in Chongqing, Chengdu and Dartsedo. His incorporation was important as he was deemed influential to secure KMT control over Xikang province/ Kham region of Tibet (ibid, 573). Furthermore, his presence in Nanjing could also counter Tibetan claims that the contested Tibetan region of Kham belonged to Tibet if they had a spokesperson from that region in their own government (ibid, 573).

In post 1949 China, we see an emergence of change as well as continuity in the policies adopted by CCP, which is much visible in respect to the party state and its relationship with Tibetan Buddhism. As mentioned earlier much of the former religious elites were co-opted by the party through the policy of united front. It was the united front, termed by Mao as the party's magical weapon through which the CCP tried to form alliances with the religious heads of Tibetan Buddhism, primary among them being the 10th Panchen Lama, whose relationship with Lhasa was one of discord that had been sown during the previous Ninth Panchen's period. The CCP provided support and recognition to the 10th Panchen Lama, who gave the much needed consent to the party's policies. It was the Panchen and his supporters who had supported the party and urged for the PLA to liberate Tibet and to unify it into the motherland (Shakya, 1999:36). His role became more important in the post 1959 period with the Dalai Lama going into exile, as he was

now promoted as a ‘national leader’, who had criticised the rebellion. The estates of the Panchen Lama had not rebelled against the Chinese in 1959 (ibid, 242). The Panchen Lama remains an important figure for PRC, especially for the party state to legitimise its role in Tibet as well as reflects a policy followed by the ruling group to gain hegemony. As through the co-option of the Panchen Lama, the party state has tried to gain the consent of the other social classes and social forces, which the Panchen represents (Groot, 2005: Introduction).

However, the Panchen Lama’s role and the CCP’s attempts of gaining complete consent from him and thus create a form of hegemony for the party state also has failed which will be elaborated further in the next chapter. The Communists tried generating consent through Tibetan Buddhism in the early 1950’s when they allowed as well as aided in a major religious ceremony to take place at Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery in Amdo, for the installation of the new incarnate of the abbot Jamyang Zhepa, which was attended by around 20,000 Tibetan Buddhists, marking it as an important mode of gaining legitimacy by the party. The monks from Labrang were also recruited to translate communist documents into Tibetan, especially the ‘Eight Point Contract’ which outlined all the policies of the CCP after it gained victory (Shakya, 1999:35). The gaining of consent from influential Buddhist masters like Geta tulku from Beri monastery during the early years of communist consolidation in eastern Tibet is also significant as well as has been mentioned earlier. A process of winning hegemony by the CCP towards Tibetan Buddhism is seen as the party state is seen to be cooperating with them, providing them the much needed space for allowing the existence of religious practices and social order, thus winning their consent to rule. The Tibetan Buddhist masters are the traditional intellectuals, who had exercised strong hegemony, the consent from the Tibetan masses to rule. This was encountered by the party when it entered Tibet and which still remains. This is the “residual” in society, one which was effectively formed in the past but is still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present (William, 2010:122).

Tibetan Buddhism and the historical sedimentation that it forms in Tibetan society is the residual cultural element which is different from the dominant culture introduced by the

CCP, but however some parts of the residue of Tibetan Buddhist social matrix remains in some areas which in most cases have to be incorporated by the dominant culture if it is to make sense in these areas (ibid, 123), which is seen through the process of institutional incorporation of Tibetan Buddhism by the party state. This is through the CPPCC, the consultative body through which the party state co-opts non communist elites. For instance, in the 12th CPPCC National Committee, the election of the Chinese Panchen Lama as a member of the Standing Committee, the election of the 12th Samding Dorje Phagmo as a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC, the election of the Dupkang Tupden Kedup as a member of the CPPCC Standing Committee (all these during the March 2013 session of the 12th CPPCC National Committee), and the nomination of the 7th Reting Rinpoche Lodro Gyatso as a member of the Tibet People's Political Consultative Conference Committee took place, which is seen as a major step by the CCP with regard to the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, as all of the nominated personages are high ranking reincarnates in the Buddhist world. They are seen to play an important role in the reincarnation process of the Dalai Lama in the coming years (Das, 2013). The residue is also seen to be in action in resolving grassland conflict between nomadic communities in Tibetan areas. As new state territoriality assigns historic grasslands and regions into new territorial landscapes, it has eventually led to conflict among nomadic communities which have been resolved by religious leaders, whose historic authority in the regions are the still active residue, utilised by the modern state to resolve these issues (Yeh, 2010: 515). The active residual element in the form of the authority of Tibetan Buddhism is partly neutralised by making religious officials a part of the state apparatus, through incorporating them into the CPPCC (ibid, 518). However, at certain points the dominant culture cannot allow too much residual experience and practice outside itself, at least without risk (Williams, 2010:123) which to a larger extent is seen in the case of Tibet, which will be further elaborated at the end of the chapter.

The party state also deems itself as the rightful authority in recognising Tibetan Buddhist reincarnates, an age old practice in Tibetan Buddhism. In 2007, the State Council of PRC announced a new measure termed as the State Religious Bureau Order Number Five, under which as a mode of guaranteeing the citizens' freedom of religious belief, the party state emphasised on regulating and managing living Buddha reincarnation (ICT, 2007).

This can be termed as an attempt by the state to generate legitimacy by the CCP in context of Tibet, especially with regard to the future reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. The importance of the Buddhist reincarnates in Tibetan society is well known as they are the traditional seats of authority, thus making it important for PRC to co-opt the process of reincarnation of living Buddhas for exercising hegemony. Furthermore, the party state is also seen to be trying to gain historical legitimacy over Tibet's living traditions as historically there have been a couple of instances where recognition to living Buddhas have been given by the Chinese imperial state.

According to Qin Yongzhang, an ethnologist with CASS, from the early 18th century the right to supervise, regulate and make the final decision about reincarnation have been transferred to the central government through the golden urn (Qin, 2014). In the present period, over 358 incarnated living Buddhas have been confirmed through religious rituals and historical conventions (Xinhua, 2013). With reforms and opening up, some degree of religious freedom was granted to the Tibetans, which had been forbidden during the Cultural Revolution. The liberalisation eventually led to a resurgence of Tibetan Buddhism in the Tibetan regions, making the role of the monastics once again important in Tibetan society. Furthermore, the local population is also seen to be providing financial and other material aid to the growth of Tibetan Buddhism, which reveals the importance of religion in the lives of Tibetans and thus the desire for the party state to further incorporate it to exercise hegemony. Hence, this has led to party officials maintaining close ties with the Tibetan clergy as seen in Ngaba TAP, where more than 2000 government officials had made effort to establish communication with some 1500 senior monks at the 252 monasteries in the prefecture.

Liu Zuoming, the then Party Secretary of the prefecture had stated that regular communication was conducive to ironing out misunderstandings and broadening agreements. This had come about due to the reincarnates/rinpoches from Kirti monastery, Nyigeme Rinpoche and Ngawang Khenrab Phuntsog Rinpoche from Choje monastery in Dzoge county Ngaba TAP bringing up the problems of tuberculosis spreading among the clergy which was quickly responded to by the authorities. According to Khenpo Tsultrim Lodro of the Larong Wuming Tibetan Buddhist Institute in Serthar county of Kardze

TAP, communication has been significant in facilitating social harmony. The problem is seen in the issue of different views between Buddhism and the CCP, which the clergy attempts to bridge the different views (China daily, 2012). This is an important way through which the party state tries to generate consent from the Buddhist clergy to further its goal in the Tibetan regions.

This is also seen in the context of religious institutions in Tibet having emerged as sponsors of private schools, particularly of those that use Tibetan as a language of instruction. In the Kardze Tibet Autonomous Prefecture, a number of private primary schools are seen to have been initiated and sponsored by local tulkus. These schools are seen to be following the national standard curriculum and several do not charge for tuition. The major emphasis of schools opened by monasteries and religious personages are to aid in the preservation and championing of Tibetan language. They are placed under the regulation of the state, having to fulfil a number of conditions, including the usage of recent and approved study materials and also administered by the local education department. However, it is seen that authorities not only approve the establishment of private Tibetan schools funded by religion, but also relied on these private initiatives to provide education in Tibet (Kolas and Thowsen, 2005:112). This is seen as a part of the residual at work in the Tibetan regions. A telling example is the ROKPA foundation, a charitable organisation based in Britain and run by the Tibetan tulku Akong Rinpoche, who was murdered in late 2013 in Sichuan (Branigan, 2014). His NGO funded bilingual schools and also Tibetan students who wanted to pursue higher studies. For instance since 1997 it provided annual scholarships for 60 poor students at Kangding Tibetan Middle School and funded two schools in Dechen Tibet Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan (Kolas and Thowsen, 2005:109).

There have also been religious figures and institutions bringing in modern health care facilities and other welfare measures to far flung communities in Tibet. It has not only being the religious figures but also former elites and aristocrats of the pre 1951 Tibetan government who were coopted by CCP and who have strongly advocated Tibetan language education in the Tibetan regions as a constitutional right. A number of eminent Tibetan public figures such as the Panchen Lama (religious figure) and Ngabo Ngawang

Jigme along with Tibetan scholars in China such as Dungkar Lobsang Trinley, Dherong Tsering Thondup and Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog have raised voices for Tibetan education in Tibet. Majority of them were members of the national or regional branch of the Political Consultative Conferences, through which they have been able to wield influence benefitting the local communities (Norbu, 2008: 163). In most cases the dominant culture that is the party state is seen to have incorporated the residue in an attempt to create hegemony in Tibet.

Buddhist ecclesiastics have also been used as a tool to criticise the party state's critics on Tibet. For instance, Lorong Rinpoche the abbot of Bore monastery in Kardze TAP emphasised on the need for maintaining national unity and for the region to serve the people, the nation and county (China Tibet Online, 2014). Statements in support of the party state were also emphasised in the past by the 10th Panchen Lama, who nonetheless did pour much criticism against CCP's policies in Tibet in numerous occasions. There have also been criticisms hurled at the 14th Dalai Lama by a number of reincarnates inside Tibet, whether it has been the female rinpoche Samding Dorjee Phagmo, a member of CPPCC and a vice chair of the current TAR People's Congress or Shingtsa Tenzinchodrak a living Buddha and also vice chair of the Standing Committee of TAR People's Congress, who dubbed the announcement of resignation by the Dalai Lama in 2011 as a farce, terming the Dalai Lama as someone who spreads disturbance in the Buddhist order (ANI, 2011). The aspect of gaining consent and exercising hegemony by the party state towards Tibetan Buddhism, can also be seen with the CCP especially the United Front Work Department emphasising in the late 1980's in taking into confidence the Dalai Lama, inviting him to preside over the prayer event for the Panchen Lama at Yong He Gong monastery in Beijing as well as requesting him to participate in the search for the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama (Arjia Rinpoche, 2010: 166).

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TIBET AND CHINA'S PURSUIT OF HEGEMONY

With reforms and opening up initiated by Deng Xiaoping, the CCP embarked on a path which has emphasised on economic development as a goal for PRC. Economic growth and the accumulation of wealth have emerged as a strong discourse of legitimacy for the party state in China, which is also extended to its ethnic minority regions, including

Tibet. The reform and opening up drive is deemed as further leading Tibet into the path of modernity, forming an important tool for gaining legitimacy by PRC. The Four Modernisations launched by the party state is seen to have uplifted Tibetans and other ethnic minorities from their poverty and enhancing their living standards. The Gross Regional Product of Tibet rocketed from 129 million yuan in 1951 to 70.1 billion yuan in 2012, representing an annual growth of 8.5 percent on average. The per capita net income of farmers and herdsmen in Tibet has maintained double digit growth for ten consecutive years, reaching 5719 yuan in 2012. For urban dwellers the per capita disposable income was 18,028 yuan (China Daily, 2013). The material consumerism of Tibetans has also increased substantially which has been primarily through the process of giving subsidies to the Tibetan regions by the party state. This policy of economic development in Tibet is also termed as the policy of “Aid Tibet” which was started from 1984 onwards. What is significant is that the party state emphasises on the idea of Tibetans as being agents who are desirous of the economic development being brought upon them by China. This is significant as economic development is a value system, towards which Tibetans are to aspire and pursue. The project of economic development that the state is seen to be implementing for Tibetans, which are of different forms are also a mode of incorporation of Tibet through territorialisation and landscape transformation (Yeh, 2013: 61). The creation of a new landscape through economic development has been achieved partly through the consent of Tibetans, thus turning it into a mode of garnering hegemony for CCP.

Development brought about by the party state to Tibet has been imposed upon a landscape which has its own sedimented histories and the levelling of landscape in the name of development was also a levelling of traditions. Through this there was a dismantling of meanings and social relations that had existed earlier as seen in the form of sacred geographies – holy lakes, groves and mountains. The erasure of earlier socio – natural histories and replacement of it with new relationships brought about by modernisation is a form of establishing hegemony in Tibet (ibid, 63-64). The change in the economic base in Tibet was deemed as changing the superstructure of the Tibetan social group. Furthermore, through economic growth and development, the state has tried

to gain consent of the Tibetans towards itself, which is also seen with the ethnic population participating in the economic structure in Tibet.

In the first quarter of 2014, the GDP of TAR was estimated at 17.23 billion yuan, which was up by 9.2 percent year on year. Of the total GDP, added value of primary industries was 1.23 billion yuan, increasing 2.4 percent; the value of secondary industries was 2.16 billion yuan, an increase of 14.7 percent and its tertiary industry was 13.85 billion yuan, up nine percent. Much effort has been placed on infrastructural construction, with later state approved projects increasing to 236. The total planned project investment from 2011- 2015 was 221.7 billion yuan. The TAR in the first three months also achieved a cumulative fixed asset investment of nearly 5.5 billion yuan, an increase of 23.4 percent. The total retail sales volume of social consumables was nearly 7.3 billion yuan, an increase of 12.4 percent. In 2013, the GDP of TAR was 80 billion yuan with per capita income of urban residents reaching 22,561 yuan and an average per capita disposable income was 20,023 yuan (Nyima and Daqiong, 2014).

In 2013, the TAR economy grew by 12.1 percent reaching GDP of 80.768 billion yuan, which was double of 2009. According to Liu Baicheng, Tibet has maintained double digit growth for 21 consecutive years. The net income of farmers and herders in the region hit 6,578 yuan in 2013, up 15 percent year on year. The per capita disposable income of urban residents increased 11.1 percent to reach 20,023 yuan (ibid). A significant factor in bringing about this high rate of economic development in Tibet is also due to the policy of ‘Aid Tibet’ as well as the policy of “paired assistance”, which is a part of the former. Under this, economically developed provinces were required to pair up with Tibetan counties, cities or prefectures and support local development. Around 17 central and eastern provinces as well as 17 SOE’s, government ministries have provided 7600 assistance projects, sending a total of 5965 cadres in seven batches to work in Tibet. The earlier focus was on infrastructure development, which has now being shifted to other initiatives to boost farmers and herders income and increase their livelihood. This project has spurred economic growth in TAR, raising GDP from 5.61 billion yuan in 1995 to 80.2 billion yuan in 2013 after a 13 fold growth.

The presence of Zhejiang Middle School in Nagchu prefecture by Zhejiang province, constructed with an amount of more than 76 million yuan, was opened on 20 August 2013. It has 568 students enrolled of which 70-80 percent come from nomadic background. Earlier, quality education could only be received through the “*neidi*” schools. However, the quality of teachers is still an issue. According to Du Jiangong, Deputy Director of Education Department of TAR states that through paired assistance to Tibet an investment of 295 million yuan to develop Tibet’s education by the year 2000 has taken place. Incomplete statistics reveals that a total of 1823 assistance projects have been carried out under which 6829 people in Tibet have received training, 3585 people have been offered education assistance in Tibet and 530,000 square metres of educational facilities have been constructed.

Beijing municipality invested 182 million yuan in building Lhasa Beijing Experimental Middle School which opened on 1 September 2014 with a total construction area of 47,000 square metres. The headmaster Zhang Zhihong states that the school plans to enrol about 3000 students and hire 268 faculty members including outstanding teachers from Beijing (Wenhui, 2014:31). Under the Aid Tibet project (1994-2009), around 3747 cadres were sent to Tibet in five batches. The sixth group sent after the Fifth National Work Forum in 2010 included more personnel dedicated to political, religious and ethnic affairs and united front work. Therefore we see an emphasis on ideological work in the Tibetan regions of China (Yeh, 2013: 101). Those Tibetans who are fluent in Mandarin and have created the much needed linkage (formal and informal) in the economic system are also seen to be participating in the economic growth induced by China. For instance, a group of enterprising Tibetan youths had opened a grape wine factory in Kham, Tibet after receiving financial aid from the state (Field Trip interview, 2016). Even in Dartsedo/Kangding, the seat of the Kardze TAP in Sichuan, Tibetan businessmen are seen to be involved in the construction of huge hotels, due to favourable financial incentives such as tax free and interest free loans being provided by the state to them. The locals are also involved in the real estate business, with them building and selling apartments in Kardze and Ngaba TAP (ibid).

CONCLUSION

Economic development and progress brought about by the party state to Tibet is termed as an important tool of garnering hegemony by China, which is unable to attain its goal. This is because majority of the Tibetans remain outside the ambit of this economic development as the Han migrants who are termed as vectors of modernity, bringing in growth in Tibetan regions are the first beneficiaries of this economic largess that the party state has brought into Tibet (Yeh, 2013:186). As mentioned earlier, the absence of language skills and formal/informal linkages act as barriers for the Tibetans in the economic system, as Chinese language has become the medium of economic transactions in Tibet. The economist Andrew Martin Fischer terms it as the disempowered development of Tibet in China, which is characterised strongly by ethnic marginalisation. This has accentuated the ethno-identity among Tibetans; the “we” feeling which is much directed against the Han and Hui population and the party state, the “them”.

Development is also termed as not being balanced in the Tibetan areas, for instance the TAR has higher economic development than the other Tibetan areas in China. There is also the issue of lopsided development within the same region, as seen in the context of the “three river valley” area in TAR being more developed than other regions. Even in traditional Tibetan areas of Kham, which have now being incorporated in Sichuan province, the Ngaba/*Aba* TAP is termed as being more developed than Kardze TAP (Yang, 2016). Hence, economic development which is an important mode of generating legitimacy by China, has also led to the growth of opposition towards it from the very population towards which the economic growth is targeted.

The mode of generating hegemony through a co-option of local elites is also seen to be leading to these elites exercising the “residual experience and practice outside the dominant culture”, where the elites/residual elements are seen to be exercising agency, which is deemed as an overall threat to the party state’s sovereignty and legitimacy in the region, leading to it to exercise much coercion and force. Hence, the hypothesis “Tibetan ethno nationalism is an outcome of China’s mode of strengthening its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas but is seen to be antithetical to each other” is partially proved through the understanding provided above, as we see many of the incorporated elites providing the

space for the growth of a Tibetan identity, whether it is through their educational institutions or through a number of social welfare activities carried out. In most cases, the locals are seen to be adhering to the authority of these local elites, providing them with a sense of legitimacy, although it is the party state that has provided them the required space. This will be elaborated in the next chapter. The same is seen with educational policies implemented in the region, with Tibetan language teaching seen with much scepticism by the party state as it is a marker of difference, which can lead to growth of ethno nationalism and thus challenge the state's legitimacy over Tibet.

CHAPTER THREE – EMERGENCE OF A CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S LEGITIMACY – THE ROLE OF TIBETAN BUDDHISM, THE DALAI LAMA AND CTA.

Tibetan Buddhism is the overarching ideology in the lives of the Tibetans, which has deeply permeated into every aspect of the Tibetan society. It has shaped the Tibetan consciousness so much so that it is the defining feature of the Tibetan identity. Buddhism can be termed as having hegemony over the Tibetans. This has been accelerated by the fact that Tibet was a working theocracy till 1951, at least the Tibetan areas, which were under the direct administration of the Lhasa government. The head of the Tibetan state since 1642 have been the Dalai Lamas, reincarnated lamas deemed as the emanation of the patron deity of Tibet. Even in Kham and Amdo, which were not under Lhasa, religious figures and the monasteries held strong political sway over the local populations. Monasteries in these regions have been important administrative centres. In Kham, for instance, there was the presence of both the *chosi sungdrel* and the alliance between secular powers and religious elites, example being of Derge. The king is termed as having close ties with the numerous monastic heads. The other form of polity was where the secular ruler and the monastery shared authority. In many cases the monasteries became more powerful as seen in the case of the establishment of the Thirteen Great Monasteries by *Hor Choje* Ngawang Phuntsok (Tsomu, 2015:9).

The political system was epitomised by the crucial status of the Dalai Lama as a political leader and in his sacred role, as the protector deity of Tibet. Hence, the ruling elites maintained hegemony over the Tibetan people through the perpetuation of the Buddhist ideology. It was also Tibetan Buddhism which brought about a sense of unity and cohesiveness among Tibetans in the three historical provinces of Kham, Amdo and Utsang that were politically separate. The local Buddhist population in Kham and Amdo considered the Dalai Lama to be their religious leader and Lhasa was their most sacred site meant for pilgrimages. Monks from Kham and Amdo and also from the adjoining Himalayan region, Mongolia and Kalmykia also came and studied in the great Buddhist institutions in Central Tibet, with many assuming high positions in them in the future.

Hence, Tibetan Buddhism formed the crux of a civil society in a Gramscian sense which along with the political society formed the Tibetan State. The latter was also deeply immersed in the ideology of Tibetan Buddhism but was visible in the institutions of the legislature (*Tsongdu*), the executive (*Kashag*) as well as an army and a police force. The Tibetan state was still relatively blurred as the lines between secular and religious were unclear. However, taking a cue from the Gramscian analysis of a state, the traditional Tibetan state had a well entrenched civil society behind the structures of the state, which was exposed when in 1950s, the PRC decided to liberate Tibet and which was seen also on a number of past occasions, for instance, it was seen thwarting the process of modernisation that the 13th Dalai Lama wanted to bring.

More important, the living embodiments of Tibetan Buddhism are the institutions of the monasteries, the clergy and the reincarnated beings (*tulkus*) who are at the apex of the ruling system. This was understood by the CCP as in a White paper from the Chinese government on the development of Tibetan culture, they emphasise on the emancipation of the people from a dictatorial system of feudal serfdom and theocracy that had dominated the entire spectrum of socio-political life in Tibet (Info Office of the State Council, 2000). This chapter will look into the role played by Tibetan Buddhism, how it forms a core of Tibetan identity, fuelling Tibetan nationalism and thus forming a source of counter hegemony against China. It will further elaborate on the legitimacy exercised by the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lamas and institutions like the monasteries. The two hypotheses on which the work is based are as follows “Tibetan ethno nationalism is an outcome of China’s mode of strengthening its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas but is seen to be antithetical to each other” and “China’s legitimacy over Tibet is seen as being subsidiary over its concern for maintaining its security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion” which will be tested in the chapter.

Monasteries, Power and Hegemony-

The Tibetans in exile have placed the number of monasteries, nunneries and temples to around 6000 inside Tibet prior to the “communist liberation”. Around 10-15 per cent of Tibet’s male population were monks as the focus in Tibet was on mass monasticism (Goldstein, 1999:16). Prior to 1949 in Labrang monastery, in present day Gansu

province, one of the largest monasteries in north eastern Tibet, had 15 percent of the local male population as monks (Makley, 2007: 150). Furthermore the monasteries were huge institutions that mirrored the western universities. They were the traditional institution of education in Tibet. The monasteries were shaping the superstructure of the Tibetan community through their ability to provide education to the society. Hence, the general opinions and values prevalent in the Tibetan community were formed by the monasteries and by the Tulkus. It is in the field of education where the monasteries had absolute monopoly, where the education offered was based not only on Tibetan Buddhism but also in the teaching of the Tibetan language. The huge monastic institutions such as Sera, Ganden and Drepung in Lhasa were further divided into monastic colleges or the *dratsangs* which specialised in certain aspects of Buddhist education. However in these monasteries only a handful of monks were deeply immersed in scholarly training, working towards the attainment of the highest degree in Tibetan Buddhism, the title of the *Geshe* (ibid,16).

In the pre 1951 period, fearing losing their influence, the monasteries prevented the proper functioning of schools that had been opened for secular education preventing the coming in of modernisation. The Tibetan government in the 1920s had invited the British educationist Frank Ladlow to establish a school in Gyantse which ran for only three years. In 1944, Mr Parker started a similar school in Lhasa which was closed after 6 months due to pressures from the clergy (Bass, 1998:2). During this period there were nine old style official schools and a few family training programs in Tibet which however followed a curriculum deeply immersed in Tibetan Buddhism (Ma, 2011:282). However according to the accounts of Tubten Khetsun, a lay official in the pre 1951 Tibet he mentions about how education consisted of writing, arithmetic as well as in his school learning Tibetan medical science (Khetsun, 2009:10). The school also accepted all irrespective of their social backgrounds. Significantly, the monasteries also were the hub of intellectuals especially the site of traditional intellectuals who give the Tibetan community a form of awareness and a sense of homogeneity (Gramsci, 2010:5). This is seen in the form of the Tibetan Buddhist culture which is seen to be acting as a cushion for the ruling elite in Tibet. The monks as intellectuals produced in the monasteries represent the ecclesiastics, who according to Gramsci held a “monopoly over a number of

important services: religious ideology, education, morality, justice, charity, good works etc. This category of intellectuals is deemed as being organically bounded to the landed aristocracy” (ibid, 7) which was the case in Tibet, where the monastics also shared similar feudal privileges connected with property. As the monks were the traditional intellectuals they were seen to be maintaining the ruling discourse; strengthening it further, forming the core of the state in Tibet, which was a combination between the political society and civil society. Majority of the laws formulated were ones with a strong Buddhist flavour.

This mechanism enabled the Buddhist ruling elite to maintain a form of hegemony inside Tibet. As traditional intellectuals, the monks maintained the status quo inside Tibet. The monasteries were also economic power houses with them indulging in a variety of economic activities including owning land, peasants and also participating in commercial activities. The three great monasteries of Sera, Ganden and Drepung in the outskirts of Lhasa depended economically on manorial estates, endowment funds, grants from central government and donations from the faithful (Goldstein, 2007:34). Between 37 and 50 percent of the arable land in Tibet, in fact, was held by monasteries and incarnate lamas (Goldstein, 1999:19). As a matter of fact large number of families sent their sons to monasteries to have a better life and to escape from bitter poverty. Drepung monastery held 185 estates, 20,000 serfs, 300 pastures and 16,000 nomads (Goldstein, 2007:34). Much of the traditional state’s economic actions were also geared towards supporting the monasteries and propping the religious ideology. For instance, the Monlam Chenmo or the Great Prayer Festival was financially aided by the Lhasa government. Commercial and trading activities were carried out mostly by the reincarnate lama’s “*Labrang*” or corporation that owned property which was transferred from one generation to the next or from one reincarnate to the next. The financial affairs were handled by the “*chandzo*” or manager (ibid, 36). The monastic *Labrang* indulged in trade and commercial activities with neighbouring countries like India and China. They also acted as informal banks providing loans for their faithful followers (Thondup, 2015:5).

The wealth of the reincarnates’ *Labrang* was also of great benefit to the families of the *tulkus*. One of the wealthiest *Labrang* in Tibet was the one belonging to Reting Rinpoche,

the former regent of Tibet who was a key figure in the search and recognition of the current 14th Dalai Lama. His *Labrang* was involved in the lucrative horse trading business (ibid, 36). Thus, the monasteries and the *tulkus* were equally responsible for controlling capital inside Tibet, allowing the constant flow of capital in a number of forms. Hence, the CCP encountered the powerful and authoritative monasteries when they liberated Tibet in 1951. Initially the CCP followed a moderate policy towards religion in Tibet which was marked by the United Front policies of co-option and incorporation of non communist elites into the ruling system. Under this a number of high ranking lamas played important roles between the communists and the Tibetan population. This however changed with the democratic reforms, which was imposed on Tibetans in Kham and Amdo from the mid 1950s, leading to the confiscation of much of the wealth and property of the monasteries. The land of the monastery was re-distributed among the local population. However patriotic monasteries like the Panchen Lama's monastery in Shigatse escaped much of the persecution of this period.

A major fear among the Tibetans was the notion of the communists being enemies of religion; however these incorporated lamas allayed the fears of the local population and the monasteries. Individuals such as *Geshe* Sherab Gyatso, the Tenth Panchen Lama, *Geda Tulku* and the *Sera Khenpo* played important roles in consolidating legitimacy for China in Tibet. The Chinese authorities from 1950 onwards were keen in establishing friendly relationship with the government of Tibet as well as with the chief abbots of the Lamaist churches of Sakya and Drepung (FBIS, 1950). Hence, religious individuals like *Geshe* Sherab Gyatso, from Qinghai in 1950 through his radio broadcasts appealed to Tibetans to support the Communist Party and its liberation of Tibet. In his broadcasts, he emphasised on how Buddhism teaches freedom from misery, which is seen to be absent due to the present feudalistic fetters in Tibet and which could only be broken by Mao Zedong (FBIS, 1950). He was subsequently appointed as a vice chair to the Qinghai Provincial Government (FBIS, 1952).

Around 1956-57, Sherab Gyatso was seen to be criticising the growing rebellion against Chinese authorities especially in the eastern Tibetan areas, where democratic reforms had been implemented and the earlier privileges and power of the monasteries and other

ruling groups were curbed. Hence, the rebellion that had taken place was occurring in the name of defending religion. In response to this, Geshe Sherab Gyatso criticised Tibetans who were termed as using Buddhism to further political ends and create hostility to the CCP, articulating the view that it would lead to the destruction of Tibetan Buddhism, not its advancement. He strongly believed that religion was being used by the reactionary upper classes and the KMT agents to foment opposition against the party state. However, later in a speech delivered on 22 June 1956 in the NPC, Sherab Gyatso criticised officials of the CCP for trying to constrain Tibetan monasticism in ways that are incompatible with its foundational norms (Goldstein, 1999:8). In his speech, he makes a highly important point whereby he emphasises on the need to understand and respect the values of Tibetan Buddhism, which made it difficult for the monks and monasteries to survive in the aftermath of the Democratic Reforms and especially when collectivisation was imposed upon the general population including the monks and monasteries. Geshe Sherab Gyatso was subsequently appointed as chairman of the Buddhist Association of China in 1961 and had also worked towards the maintenance of autonomy of Tibetan culture. He was later tortured and passed away while under house arrest (Arjia Rinpoche, 2010: 257). Sherab Gyatso exemplifies the Buddhist figure that was co-opted by the communists which enabled some form of legitimacy for them from the Tibetans. Other significant Buddhist elite who garnered legitimacy for the communists in Tibet was the Getak *tulku* of *Beri* monastery situated in current day Kardze Tibet Autonomous Prefecture. He had links with the CCP from 1935 onwards when he had supported the Red Army making their way through the Kardze area to the north, providing them with supplies and shelter. He had subsequently organised the local Tibetan people's government to supply food and transport for PLA. In 1950, he was appointed a member of the South West Military and Administrative Committee and Vice Chairman of the Provincial government of Sikang (Kham).

Getak Tulku was to act as an important medium between the CCP and the Lhasa government for which he had left his monastery on 10 July 1950 for Chamdo, arriving on 24 July 1950. Here he wanted to persuade the Tibetan people, monks and other elites to accept the people's government and also explained further the policies of the party state. He also called for close unity between the Tibetan people and the PLA and had gained

support from the people. However, he was reportedly murdered by the British radio operator Robert Ford who was in Chamdo then, which is an issue of much debate. According to the CCP, as the main objective of Getak *tulku* was to go to Lhasa and act as an intermediary between China and Tibet, which was a dangerous proposal for the imperialists that got him killed (FBIS, 1950). Getak *tulku* remains an important figure for Beijing till date as he remains an important tool of gaining legitimacy for China and for exercising hegemony over the Tibetans. This is seen in the 21 episode television show released by China's state owned broadcasting network dedicated to his life and also the establishment of a memorial hall for Getak *tulku* (Woeser, 2011). The Sera *Khenpo*, Ngawang Jaltso was also a monk who formed an important tool for legitimacy for CCP in Tibet. He was a high ranking lama of Sera monastery who fell out with the Lhasa government as he had supported the Reting *tulku* in the 1940s. Hence he had been excommunicated from central Tibet.

His speech to the NPC on 22 April 1959 is important because as a deputy to the NPC he condemned the Tezpur statement of the Dalai Lama, which for him was not directly from the Dalai Lama but was made by him under duress, thus emphasising on the idea that the Dalai Lama had been kidnapped by reactionary forces. The rebellion of 1959 is blamed on the "reactionary upper class strata who had colluded with the imperialists and Chiang Kai shek bandit clique". He further criticised the whole idea put forward by the rebels of protecting religion which is termed as a facade to protect their criminal activities. He narrates his own personal and somewhat antagonistic dealings with the upper strata reactionaries especially in 1947, when the regent Reting was disposed and killed by them. Reting is termed as a patriotic living Buddha who was murdered. This was followed by more arrests and killings of Reting's supporters including himself; the Sera *Khenpo* who however could escape. However his younger brother Trinley Gyatso was killed. As Sera had supported Reting, the government troops attacked the monastery and killed or injured 100 innocent lamas and sacked the 13 *khamtsens* (residential quarters). He also further reiterated the murder of the patriotic Getak *tulku* by the imperialist forces and the upper strata reactionary clique which he considers as un-Buddhist acts (FBIS, 1959).

Hence, religious individuals such as Sera *Khenpo* buttressed the legitimacy of the party state in Tibet especially in the aftermath of the crushing of the failed uprising of 1959, when the Tibetan masses had challenged the legitimacy of the party state. What is also seen is how the three great monasteries near Lhasa, which to a certain extent formed the nucleus of Tibetan religious power; saw the PRC as being a Buddhist country. This idea stemmed from the fact that the nationalists' had earlier welcomed Tibetan lamas in the 1930s and 1940s and had also sent lay Buddhist envoys to Lhasa. This was beneficial to the CCP who took this up in their propaganda and the united front work in Tibet. Furthermore, the Chinese communists were quite successful in convincing atleast some Tibetans that they were not enemies of Tibetan Buddhism (Tuttle, 2004:2).

However in 1950, Mao had remarked that the Buddhist monasteries were centres of feudal system of exploitation, where the slaving agricultural workers were seen to be working on the agri estates of both the monasteries and the nobility and hence they were to be liberated (FBIS, 1950). This stand was changed which is evidenced from the more liberal approach of Mao and the other communists towards religion which is reflected in the provisions on religious freedom in the Seventeen Point Agreement to liberate Tibet signed on 23 May 1951 in Beijing between the Central government and representatives of the Tibetan Local Government, under which the traditional political system in Tibet would not be altered and also the policy of religious freedom laid down in the Common Program of the CPPCC will be carried out along with respecting and protecting the religious beliefs and customs and habits of the people and the monasteries. More important, there was also an assurance that the income of the monasteries would not be changed (Arpi).

The Common Program emphasised on the protection of the rights of the national minorities, with Article 53 emphasising on all national minorities to have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs. Also the People's Government would assist the masses of the people of all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work (CPPCC, 1949:52). Even Article 5 provided every citizen of the PRC with the right to religious belief (ibid, 36). Hence, through these two provisions, the party

state was expressing its desire to protect and preserve the religious freedom of the national minorities, which in the case of Tibet becomes an important means of garnering legitimacy. This was also initially stressed upon by Mao, who had instructed his troops marching into Tibet to carry out the Party's nationality policy and policy towards religion, especially respecting the religious rights of the Tibetans (Norbu, 2001:183). This is also seen to be reflected in Li Weihang's report titled "Summary of the Main Experiences of the Party in Working in the National Minorities Areas in the Last Few Years" which criticises party cadres based in the national minority areas rashly implementing reforms to dilute religion among the population, which had a rather opposite effect as instead of weakening religion, it strengthened the religious belief of the minorities. The report was praised by Mao as it especially emphasised on the idea that force could not be used to eradicate religion and like any other ideology religion would eventually disappear on its own. It is from Li's formulation that in 1958, the theory of the five characteristics of religion emerged at the Fifth National Conference on the Work on Religion (Ye, 1996:117).

The liberal policy of the party state towards Tibetan Buddhism is also seen in the meeting between Mao and the head of a Tibetan delegation Liushar Tubten Tharpa who visited Beijing in 1952, whereby Mao had emphasised to the Tibetans on protection of temples and monasteries and respecting the religious culture of Tibetans (FBIS, 1952). In response to this overture from Mao, news reports carried out a series of comments made by Tibetan religious elites. For instance, the junior tutor of the Dalai Lama; Venerable Trijang Rinpoche who later was appointed as head of the Religious Affairs Bureau in 1956 (Goldstein, 1998:8) positively endorsed the guidance given by the Chairman. Another high ranking monk from Drepung monastery expressed joy and remarked that the idea of the communists destroying Buddhism were all rumours spread by the imperialists. They were overjoyed with the fact that a clear guidance was set by Mao for protecting religion (FBIS, 1952). To attract the religious elites, the party state also organised a number of visits of these individuals to Beijing and other Chinese cities. For instance, in a year after the liberation in 1952, a group of 30 delegates from the Chamdo area, Sikang (Kham) province arrived in Beijing. The group included *Hsieh-wala*, the Living Buddha of the Chamdo Lama monastery; *Kang-ku*, the Living Buddha of Chaya

County, *Kungpu*, acting commander of the ninth regiment of the Tibetan local army, lamas of various sects in Chamdo and representatives of the Tibetan population. The Living Buddha of Lungwu monastery, *Hsia Jihtsang* in Tungjen County, Qinghai and six other Tibetans also arrived in Beijing on 24 March 1952 to pay respects to Chairman Mao (FBIS, 1952). The communists also claim to have created harmony in Tibetan Buddhism through uniting the Dalai and the Panchen Lamas which is also termed as their historic responsibility (FBIS, 1952).

This is seen as the continuation of a legacy from the Qing period onwards which was also carried forward by the Nationalists. The role of the Panchen becomes important for China's legitimacy in Tibet as the Tenth Panchen was the figurehead of co-optation by PRC of Tibetan Buddhism. The relationship between the Dalai Lama's and the Panchen Lamas is that of a teacher student relation, whereby the elder one is responsible for the education of the younger and more importantly for recognition of each other's reincarnation. However, relations between the two reincarnates have been strained from the time of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Ninth Panchen Lama, especially due to the former's attempts at a modern nation state building, alienating the latter which led to his departure from Shigatse (the seat of the Panchen) to China, where the Nationalists had supported him at a later stage.

The Tenth Panchen was born in Amdo and recognised by the Chinese but not accepted by the Lhasa government. It was only through the Seventeen Point Agreement that the Lhasa government and the Dalai Lama accepted the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The importance of the Panchen Lama is seen during the course of the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement when the chief Tibetan negotiator Ngabo Nawang Jigme argued that he did not have the authority to deal with the issue of the Panchen Lama's reincarnation, which was exclusively under the authority of the Lhasa government (Wangyal, 2006). Subsequently, the Dalai Lama and the traditional government accepted the Tenth Panchen Lama, who along with the Dalai Lama assumed a number of official positions. In 1953, on the eve of the second anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the Panchen Lama sent a report of progress to Chairman Mao where he emphasised the need to uphold the importance of the Seventeen Point Agreement for the

liberation of Tibet. In the report, the Panchen is seen to using a Marxist understanding, whereby he emphasises that for long the Tibetan nationality had been long oppressed and exploited by imperialist aggressive forces, which had been overcome through the liberation of Tibet. Under this, the Tibetans have been provided with the right of equality of nationality and the freedom of religious belief. He also underscores the fact that the Tibetans have been at the forefront of consolidating the national defence of China. The PLA officials and other cadres are deemed as developing a spirit of unity and democratic consultation and having faithfully executed the agreement and the policy of nationalities and religion (Panchen, 1953). He also mentions about how religion, culture and tradition of Tibetans are being protected and preserved.

The PLA is termed as showing great respect for monasteries, monks and customs and religious activities are seen to be permitted in full swing. What is most important is also a point stressed immensely by the Panchen, whereby the Liberation brought about by the PLA and by Mao is seen to have led to stronger unity among the Tibetans as historical differences have much melted and the ecclesiastical and secular officials of the *Kashag* and the Panchen *Kanpo Lijia* (private office) are seen to be enjoying an amicable relationship. On the economic, cultural and health front, the Panchen Lama praises the strides that had been brought especially the hospital and the school set up in Lhasa was of prime example and similar institutions were soon to open in Shigatse. On the cultural level, Tibetan language publications had increased much. He further mentions about the Tibetan nationality suffering under imperialist aggression, the Manchu and KMT aggression and had finally received liberation through the Seventeen Point Agreement (ibid).

This report by the Panchen in 1953 to Mao is definitely written by one of the Panchen's aides as the Panchen Lama was only fifteen years old then. This report needs to be compared with the 1962 petition sent by the Panchen to Zhou Enlai, which is dubbed as the Seventy Thousand Character petition which will be discussed later in this chapter. However, the 1953 report by the Panchen was a major bolster to China's legitimacy in Tibet and also was an important tool of gaining hegemony by the party state as a sense of consent from the Tibetan ruling elite for China's policies in Tibet can be understood. The

communist state's respect towards Tibetan culture and religion is also seen from the toleration towards the celebration of the Great Prayer Festival held in Lhasa in 1953 which also included the Dalai Lama giving teachings to the general public, whereby he stressed on the idea of the unity between Han and Tibetans and how there is a sharing of culture and religion and the need for unity between them. Thus, the *Monlam* was also a platform for achieving certain political ends favourable to the Chinese government (FBIS, 1953). A similar strategy was adopted by the party state in the late 1980s in Lhasa, when the region was rocked by a series of anti Chinese protests. Hence to quell the dissent and also to bring about a semblance of normalcy, the party state called for the organising of a *Monlam Chenmo* (Great Prayer), which however turned into a platform for the Tibetans to protest against China.

Even after the departure of the Dalai Lama into exile in 1959 and the crushing of the national uprising in Lhasa in March 1959, the Panchen supported the Chinese authorities and strongly condemned the rebels. He was soon appointed as the chair of the PCART. Through the position of the Panchen, the party state attempted to gain legitimacy for its policies in Tibet especially with the departure of the Dalai Lama into exile. In the aftermath of the failed uprising of 1959, the Panchen Lama assumed a critical stand against the rebels, terming it to be a handiwork of a few reactionary upper class clique who had embraced imperialism. The Panchen Lama is the second highest hierarch in Tibetan Buddhism and in pre 1959 Tibet was an alternative power centre in the Tibetan polity, with him having strong control over the Tsang region and Shigatse. The relationship between Lhasa and the Panchen Lama had not being much smooth in the past, especially with the 9th Panchen, who was forced into exile in China in the 1920s as Tashilhunpo had refused to pay more tribute. This was also a result of the centralising tendency adopted by the 13th Dalai Lama, through which the nationalistic sentiments of the Lhasan government wanted to curtail the power of the Panchen Lama (Norbu, 1997:299). The KMT government had provided the needed support to the Ninth Panchen and this was extended to the Tenth Panchen Lama by the CCP. More significantly, the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama have the authority to recognise each other's reincarnation and tutor the one who is younger. Hence, the Panchen Lama plays a highly important role in the reincarnation process of the current Dalai Lama, which the party

state is seen to be understanding and thus controlling the current 11th Panchen Lama inside Tibet. It is through the institution of the Panchen Lama that the CCP is seen to be attempting to enhance its legitimacy in Tibet especially in the post Dalai Lama scenario.

However in 1962, the Panchen Lama compiled a report titled “On the sufferings of the masses in Tibet and other Tibetan regions and suggestions for future work to the central authorities through the Respected Premier Zhou Enlai” also known as the Seventy Thousand Character Petition, which was the result of his wide travels in the Tibetan regions of China especially in the aftermath of a severe famine that had resulted from the failure of the Great Leap Forward. In his petition, he mentions about the bitter circumstances in which the Tibetan population were in and which was a result of a failure of policy. The Panchen employs a Marxist understanding of the situation in his analysis and also in his discourse especially emphasising on the leadership of the CCP and the historic importance of the Chinese revolution. He also remarks on the peaceful liberation of Tibet being an important achievement and more importantly the Tibetans embracing the motherland. The material achievements brought about by the CCP is well elaborated by him along with remarking on the fact that the communists have always respected religion, which the Tibetans are termed as loving as their life itself (Panchen, 1996). The report also emphasises on how a small group of rebels belonging to the upper strata were responsible for scuttling the process of liberation of Tibet and instigating the uprisings which were crushed by the authorities which is justified by the Panchen. He terms the thorough elimination of the feudal serf owning class from the Tibetan plateau as an important event which has entered the history books (ibid). He also mentions about supporting the democratic reforms in 1959, especially the implementation of the “Three Antis” and “Two Reductions” along with the redistribution of land which also raised the consciousness of the lower classes.

The positive aspects of the democratic reforms are well elaborated which are all due to the benefit of the CCP and Chairman Mao. However, the Panchen Lama brings out a series of criticisms against the party state in the field of suppressing the rebellion whereby a more moderate policy was to be followed towards those who surrendered which was not done. The cadres were seen to be enacting vengeful methods on the rebels

and subsequently religion was severely targeted especially through the Democratic Reforms. The Panchen mentions how arbitrarily the Democratic Reforms were imposed upon the masses especially with regard to land redistribution. There is also the strong criticism levied upon the United Front and on Democratic Centralism of the party and also on the party's policies towards religion. Furthermore, the document also elaborates on the death of innumerable Tibetans due to starvation resulting from the policies of the Great Leap Forward. The Panchen is seen to be writing about the deaths being abnormal deaths all caused by the lack of food (TIN, 1999:5). In response to this petition, the Panchen Lama was stripped of his position and his petition was termed as a "poisoned arrow" shot from the feudal reactionaries. He was to be brought down as his concerns were termed as attempts to resurrect "the zombie of feudalism" (Shakya, 1996:28). The Panchen was denounced and placed under arrest. Subsequently he was struggled against which reached the zenith during the Cultural Revolution when Red Guards from the Minority Nationalities Institution in Beijing subjected him to his first struggle session in Beijing (ibid, 26).

The Seventy Thousand Character Petition was seen as a major challenge to the Party State's legitimacy in the Tibetan regions even though it reaffirmed the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet by the CCP and emphasised on the unity of Tibet with PRC. However for Mao and the other communist leaders, the Panchen Lama's humble petition was seen as a dangerous weapon aimed at the party especially during a period when Mao had been challenged by Peng Dehuai in 1959, hence leading to a rise in intolerance towards criticisms and challenges to party rule. The Seventy Thousand Character Petition was also seen by the party as an attempt by reactionary feudal groups to raise the issue of freedom for minority nationalities in PRC, hence deemed as subversive and problematic. Therefore the petition lays the seeds of a counter hegemony for Tibetans, with the Panchen emerging as an organic intellectual of the Tibetan nationality, who through his petition is seen to be upholding the welfare of the Tibetans within the framework of the Chinese communist system. Significantly, the petition also acts as a reminder to the Chinese communists about the primary reason for them "liberating" Tibet, which is seen to have been forgotten by them. Furthermore, the subsequent denunciation of the Panchen for the petition forms an important crux for the creation of a counter hegemony for

Tibetans as the punishment meted to the Panchen becomes the source for consolidation of Tibetan solidarity and identity as well as the emergence of the Panchen as a “national hero” for the Tibetans.

This role of the Panchen came into prominence with his eventual rehabilitation after the death of Mao and the ascendance of Deng who brought about reforms and opening up in PRC. Till the time of his death in 1989, the Panchen worked for the welfare of Tibetans especially the preservation of Tibetan language and culture. Through his visits to a number of Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai, large number of monasteries and temples were rebuilt and received government funding. The Panchen Lama was also involved in the opening of a number of educational institutions for laypeople as well as was responsible for the establishment of the High Level Tibetan Buddhist Institute of China in Beijing, which was set up in 1987 and headed by him till his demise (Kolas and Thowsen, 2005:77). The efforts by the Panchen have led to the reflowering of Tibetan culture especially in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, hence leading to a strengthening of Tibetan identity. He was also appointed to a number of government positions which made it easier for him to carry out more welfare activities for the Tibetan community. Hence, the Tenth Panchen Lama emerged as an important source for legitimacy by the PRC in the Tibetan regions with much of the policies implemented by the Panchen receiving strong support from the Chinese authorities. However, these policies did add to a growth in Tibetan identity and especially Tibetan Buddhism. The Panchen also criticised the developmental policies adopted by the Party in Tibet, which is seen to be eroding the Tibetan culture. Hence the Panchen Lama remains an important figure for the party state to gain legitimacy within Tibet as well as he remains significant to the Tibetans as the Tenth Panchen Lama can be seen as an organic intellectual who laid the seeds for the development of a counter hegemony against China.

TIBETAN MEMORIES AND ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE IN TIBET – CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S LEGITIMACY

The role of memories in creating a challenge to the legitimacy of the party state inside Tibet is highly important. The formation of a counter narrative which challenges the discourse of the ruling authorities in Tibet is seen to be flourishing. While the PRC terms

the Tibetans entering into a “golden age”, with their liberation in 1951, many Tibetans inside Tibet especially in the post Mao period have challenged this discourse. For the Tibetans, the period from 1958 till 1978 marks an age of suffering and fear. The year 1958 especially for the Tibetans in eastern Tibet was a rupture as the democratic reforms were implemented by the party state in these areas. These reforms included the confiscation of land and property of the former elites, redistribution of it to the peasantry and also the inversion of power and authority of both the monastic and local elites. This was done through the “speaking bitterness” campaigns and eventually the struggle sessions against the traditionally ruling authority by the lower classes. For instance in an account by Naktsang Nulo, in 1957-58 he remembers the public lynching of *Sera Lama*, *Ganden Wula* and a lay elite Ragshe Jadog, who were formerly co-opted by the communists under the united front but were now targets of public struggle sessions under the democratic reforms. The lynching was carried out by local Tibetans. From 1958 till at least the death of Mao, the Tibetans remember the period as one of great fear (Makley, 2007:104). Even though during the Maoist period a large number of Tibetans had indulged in the speaking bitterness campaign or were targets of it, the death of Mao and Deng’s reforms led to the emergence of a bitterness campaign against the party state.

The Tibetans through a number of forms have remembered the early period of Chinese rule forming narratives that challenge the ruling discourse of China. However much of these has been subdued by Tibetans out of fear from the party state. During Mao’s rule there was the implementation of the commune system and the formation of the collectives which had confiscated all wealth and private property. Furthermore, the state had permeated into every aspect of people’s lives in a repressive way which had reached its zenith during the period of the Cultural Revolution. While with Deng’s ascendance and the reversal of the earlier radical policies, a more liberal approach is adopted by the party state which was also extended to the Tibetan region. While this liberal air provided a space to its citizens to vent their anger towards the early periods, it was still much controlled in Tibet. However the Tibetans were indulging in the act of remembering, of venting out the scars in their early memories of Chinese rule. Much of these have been in the form of “hidden transcript”, spoken about only among a few, which however forms a

crux of further resistance and strongly challenges the domination of the ruling power (Scott, 1990:4).

Still this remains hidden and does not become an outburst. However, in one of the early instances when the hidden transcript of the Tibetans came out in the open turning into what Scott terms as the “infra-politics” of the subordinates was when tens of thousands of Tibetans mobbed the first fact finding delegation from exile headed by the Dalai Lama’s elder brother Lobsang Samten and expressed their grief as well as their concern for the Dalai Lama who till then had been branded as a feudal reactionary among the Tibetans by China (Avedon, 1997). In the visit of the last delegation by the exiled Tibetans which was led by the Dalai Lama’s younger sister Jetsun Pema on their visit to Lhasa were also welcomed by a crowd of enthusiastic people who through sheer joy shouted for Tibet’s independence and also for the long life of the Dalai Lama, which made the Chinese authorities to stop the delegation from continuing (Arjia Rinpoche, 2010:124). These were only a few rare instances when Tibetans in large numbers came out and produced a counter narrative to the Chinese discourse on Tibet. On the other hand with regard to the delegation’s visit to Tibet, the party state believed that the Tibetan masses would hold the CCP and the People’s Government in reverence and love socialism and hence would not give an enthusiastic welcome to the exile delegations (Khetsun, 2009:287).

The hidden transcript in Tibet is seen to be present in the general forms of backstage talk, gossip especially in tea shops and in the confines of the family where the people can be critical of the Chinese government. However, much of these areas have been termed as sites where the intrusion of the ruling powers have taken place and where much of the Tibetans practice the art of self surveillance (Yeh, 2013:45). Even while conversing with their relatives, many of whom are in exile, the Tibetans inside Tibet have been known to have imposed self surveillance upon them or in a few cases utilised coded language. On a similar note, the recently released filmmaker Dhondup Wangchen, a resident of Amdo, PRC in his documentary “Leaving Fear Behind” in which he has recorded candid conversations of around 108 common Tibetans mostly from Amdo region. These Tibetans expressed their views on a range of issues, from the Dalai Lama and the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing to the human rights situation in Tibet, majority of which

were deeply critical of the Chinese government. The 25 minutes documentary was premiered on 6 August 2008 to a selected group of journalists in Hotel G, Beijing. This documentary provides a rare insight into the hidden transcripts that is present among the Tibetans, the counter narrative which challenges the public narrative of the party state.

On similar lines, a counter narrative against China's ruling discourse over Tibet is produced in a book written by a former government official in Qinghai, Naktsang Nulo, whose book "My Tibetan Childhood – When Ice shattered Stone" brought out inside Tibet in 2005 was read by many, until it was banned. It is an act of remembering and record keeping, one which scrapes into the not so distant past of the 1950s (Barnett, 2015: xv). The book is a recollection of the author's childhood in his homeland Golok, present day Qinghai and about life in general in Tibet. However it also remembers the atrocities committed by the Chinese army especially from 1957-58 onwards, especially the forcing of the monks to destroy the religious scriptures and other items, emptying of the monasteries and surrendering of the monks. The author terms the "time of revolution" as a period of deep sadness which contradicts the CCP discourse on a peaceful liberation (Nulo, 2015:152). Naktsang Nulo presents the reality of life in Tibet prior to the coming of the Chinese which was filled with struggle and harshness, thus providing for a balanced view of the situation then. His accounts challenge the reality portrayed by the Chinese and especially the PLA with regard to the peaceful liberation of Tibet, which was filled with much suffering and displacement of families and communities. These accounts read by many invoked memories of a past of a people who had much suffered and which were enforced by the party state to be forgotten. More importantly, he mentions about the stiff resistance offered by the Tibetans in Qinghai against the Chinese authorities which is not much known as the resistance offered by Tibetans have tended to be focussed on the region of Kham.

These memories form an important source of a counter narrative to the Tibetans in Tibet especially Amdo, forming an important element that may have catapulted to the 2008 uprisings. My Tibetan Childhood also presents information on a number of public struggle sessions of traditional Tibetan elites as well as the conditions of the prisons in which the Tibetans were incarcerated. The author also mentions about Tibetans fervently

believing in the revolutionary ideology offered by the communists and indulging in punishing other Tibetans. Naktsang Nulo also provides a first hand account of the area being struck by a famine leading to the deaths of numerous Tibetans in his school and also for survival the Tibetans indulging in cannibalism (ibid, 246). He also states the fact that the government had tens of thousands of sheep in their grazing commune and hence they were not affected by the famine (ibid, 250). Thus, this narrative becomes an important source for an alternative discourse for Tibetans, one which is based on a shared suffering and pain, leading to a strong sense of solidarity amongst them against China. These memories have led to the further emergence of a strong form of literary and cultural resurgence.

LITERARY AND CULTURAL RESURGENCE IN TIBET

The protests of 2008 and the repressive response from China led to the growth of a strong undercurrent of cultural nationalism which was best seen in the form of writings, songs, poetry and other arts which have led to the growth of a strong Tibetan nationalism and sharpening of identity. Most of the writers or artists were born in a Tibet which was already under Chinese control and many were even born after the tumultuous period of the Cultural Revolution in a period characterised by Deng's reforms. They are also seen to be fluent in both Chinese and Tibetan and are techno savvy, using the internet to disseminate their views. In a number of cases, these Tibetans were close to the Chinese Communist Party and were working in the state's publishing houses or as editors for official magazines. There are also a few who were members of the CCP (TCHRD 2010:23).

However, majority of the known literary figures and public intellectuals have criticised the policies of the CCP especially its handling of the 2008 uprising. Most of the writings of this period are seen as a strong need to propound difference as against the narrative of the state. These works are seen as the alternative version of events which took place in 2008 in Tibet and have risen in the aftermath of the state's brutal crackdown which was disillusioning for a majority of them. More importantly, the aftermath of the protests saw the plateau being shut to the outside world and the state was the sole voice regarding the events in Tibet (Topgyal. 2011:190). The Tibetans were blamed as rioters and attacking

the Han immigrants, which was not taken lightly by other Chinese in the rest of China. They saw the Tibetans as being ungrateful for its benevolence. The Tibetans were also subjected to racial profiling in their own land and were targeted in China. This was a major catalyst for a strong outpouring from the Tibetan cultural figures. In many cases the writers and the singers could voice their opinion to the outside world through the internet or other forms of telecommunications which frustrated the authorities more (TCHRD, 2010:22).

A deep impact was marked in the psyche of the Tibetans through the events of 2008 which led to an increase in the national consciousness of all Tibetans irrespective of their backgrounds. What is significant is the chasm created between Tibetans and the Han through a strong subversion of the truth regarding the protests by the authorities. The policies implemented after 2008 especially the Patriotic Education Campaigns in almost all spheres of life led to a further sharpening of Tibetan identity and consciousness which have been popularly expressed in the writings and songs which emerged then. The works of the scholars, popular writers and artists have an important phenomena of being the medium through which the angst as well as aspirations of a common Tibetan is highlighted, thus creating a popular form of nationalism (ibid, 2010:49). This is best seen in the song titled 'Unable to Meet' sung by Tashi Dhondup a popular singer from Malho TAP Qinghai province who was arrested on 3 December 2009 for singing "reactionary songs" and made to undergo "re-education through labour" for 15 months (ibid, 2010:58). The lyrics of the songs are a dedication to the Dalai Lama, which are as follows.

Unable to Meet

When I think about it I am unfortunate

I am unable to meet the Precious Jewel

Even though I wish, I have no freedom

If I think about this I am unfortunate

When I think about it I am unfortunate

I am unable to wave the Snow Lion Flag
Even though i wish, I have no freedom
If I think about this I am unfortunate
When I think about it I am unfortunate
I am unable to sing a song about loyalty
Even though I wish, I have no freedom
If I think about this I am unfortunate
Even though I wish, I have no freedom
If I think about this I am unfortunate (TCHRD, 2010:57)

In the lyrics above the Precious Jewel is a direct reference to the Dalai Lama, whose return to Tibet was a major demand made by the protesters in 2008 and afterwards. The Snow Lion Flag is the banned national flag in Tibet, which was unfurled by many during the protests. Therefore the song above voices directly the lack of freedom especially the lack of freedom of thought in China's Tibet and the anguish in the singer for freedom for Tibet. This song with its bold lyrics was highly popular in the region and 5000 copies were promptly sold (Jane Macartney, 2009). The song featured in the album "Torture without trace" can be seen as a direct result of the events which occurred in 2008. There have been numerous other songs which are subtler in their interpretation of the lyrics such as "The Sun, the Moon and The Stars" or "*nyidakarsum*" in Tibetan sung by the famous singer Kunga in the album titled 'Waiting in Hope' released much earlier in 2004 (Youtube,2010). The heavenly bodies are a euphemism for the Dalai Lama (sun), the Panchen Lama (moon) and the Karmapa (stars) and the singer longs for the return of the trinity.

On the other hand the creative writings and other artistic efforts emerged with the growth of nationalism as the Chinese suppression was also perceived by them in lines of ethnicity and the state furthering the increase of this perception through a propaganda overdrive in the official media. The brutal crackdown on many a peaceful protests as well as the cultural imperialism which was imposed on Tibet after 2008 led to the Tibetans raising their voices of dissent. A large number of writers and public figures were active in criticising the state prior to 2008. Among them, one of the most vocal and powerful

voices has been that of Wooser, the daughter of a Tibetan PLA commander, who was born in Tibet but lost her mother tongue Tibetan due to the Cultural Revolution. Her background provided her with a good education after which she started working as an editor for a leading Tibetan literary magazine. It was her brush with Tibetan literature that she discovered her strong Tibetan roots (ICT, 2009:9).

Significantly she started writing critically on China's policies in Tibet and in 2004 her book 'Notes on Tibet' was banned and she was made to undergo political re-education. This made her shift to Beijing where she married the Chinese dissident writer Wang Lixiong, who is equally critical of China's policies in Tibet and emphasises that the Dalai Lama is the key to resolving the issue of Tibet. Wooser wrote extensively on the effects of massive immigration of Chinese, unbalanced economic development and on religious repression in Tibet. In 2008, she emerged as the sole unofficial source for events occurring in Tibet and through her blogs kept an almost daily updates of the situation in Tibet, thus keeping a proper chronicle of an event which was of utmost importance when information became a valuable commodity. However she was placed under house arrest in Beijing and her blogs were shut as well as came under a series of attacks from state backed hackers (ibid, 2009:10). Apart from her, there were several others who were arrested in the early periods of the protests such as Jamyang Kyi, a prominent Tibetan television personality, singer and song writer, blogger and women's rights activists who was arrested on 1 April 2008 (International PEN, 2008). Numerous intellectuals such as Go Sherab Gyatso, Arig Dolma Kyab, Golog Palchen Gyal and Norzin Wangmo were arrested. Norzin Wangmo was arrested and imprisoned for 5 years, which was simply for communicating with people abroad while the rest were arrested for their roles in the uprising (Topgyal, 2011:191). What can be analysed from such acts is the desire to curb the Tibetan intellectuals and thinkers who can be and to a greater extent were the organic intellectuals of Tibetan nationalism. They were the foundation on which Tibetan nationalism would be propounded hence needed to be stifled.

On the other hand there were a multitude of Tibetan scholars, intellectuals and writers who were aroused by the events of 2008 to produce works which were highly critical of the Chinese. Prominent among them is the case of Tragyal who wrote under the pen name

Shogdung which means Morning Conch. He was an editor at the Qinghai Nationalities Publishing House in Xining and was closely associated with the CCP. Tragyal's earlier works were highly critical of Tibetan Buddhism as he blamed it as an impediment towards Tibet's modernisation, which clearly places him on lines of being a traditional intellectual for the party state, who is seen to be bolstering hegemony for the communists in Tibet. However after 2008 in his work 'The Line between Sky and Earth', he describes Tibet as a 'place of terror' and directly challenged the party's views on the representation of 2008. His work is illustrative of the increased amount of restrictions imposed on Tibetans in the post 2008 Tibet by China and is critical of the ethnic discrimination faced by the Tibetans which displays a perverted form of racial superiority by the Chinese. He also notes that the repression in 2008 has its roots in the 1950's and sees the Chinese as 'conquerors'. What is significant is that he is most critical of the Chinese policies in the monasteries, thus reaffirming faith in Buddhism. This act of defiance by him led to his eventual incarceration on 23 April 2010 (TCHRD, 2010:44). He was one of those who emerged critical in the aftermath of the events of 2008 and the Chinese state's handling of the situation. Tragyal also elaborates on a non violent tactic which is needed for opposing the Chinese state (ibid, 2010:47).

In the post 2008 scenario, the intellectuals and the writers began to express more distinct political views. This period saw the emergence of a strike hard policy against writers and cultural figures that were earlier seen as moderate and secular but were now seen as reactionaries and thus endangering state security. As a response apart from the arrests, the authorities had also launched a campaign whereby restrictions were imposed on businesses providing photocopy services through issuing permits on them (Sharon LaFraniere, New York Times, 2010). This was seen as a policy to circumvent the production of illegal literature and dissident articles. Apart from literature, songs became an important medium through which the turmoil faced by Tibet in 2008 was much highlighted. This has led to a lot of singers like Tashi Dhondup being detained from producing such songs as well as a lot of people from keeping such songs in numerous forms. For in the aftermath of 2008, CCP officials in a high school near Shigatse banned 27 popular Tibetan language songs including the Hope of the Son of the Snow Lion and the 5 Coloured Prayer Flags (TCHRD, 2010). Xin Yuanming, the Deputy Director of the

Lhasa City PSB confirmed on 23 December 2008 press conference that his unit had initiated a crackdown on “rumour mongering” and “rumour spreading” in the form of reactionary songs (TCHRD,2010:55). Songs are an important part of Tibetan culture and heritage, one that is available to all which the state has tried to circumvent and dub it as being reactionary.

However, especially under the Cultural Revolution, Tibetan songs were banned, termed as being decadent and bourgeois by the CCP. There was a slow revival of Tibetan performing arts in the post reform periods, which however faced much flak during the emergence of hard line policies after the protests of 1989, thus songs which spoke of strong Tibetan identity as well as glorified the Dalai Lama was banned, which made a strong return during the post 2008 period (TCHRD, 2010:55). There is an abundance of songs deemed as reactionary in Tibet which also like the dissident writings brings about a strong sense of nationalism among the Tibetans, for instance these few lyrics taken from a song sung by a nomad who was arrested speaks about the atrocities committed during 2008 by the Chinese. The lyrics are translated by Lamajabb (ICT, 2009:36) and are as follows -

The year 2008

The year 2008 when innocent Tibetans were tortured

The year 2008 when citizens of the earth were killed

We live in terror of the year

The nomad was eventually arrested, but what is important here is the pain and suffering highlighted of Tibetans during 2008 and equating them as being citizens of the earth which as according to the translator stands for the universal human rights which are getting trampled in Tibet. In this song as well as in almost all the protest literature emerging from Tibet after 2008, there is an equating of the events of 2008 with the 1950’s when the Chinese had first come to Tibet and the Dalai Lama had eventually fled (ibid, 2009:36). Songs like these tend to bind the natives together and thus create a strong sense of unity and nationhood among themselves. There is also a strong referencing to the Dalai Lama in them who is seen as a ray of hope for the Tibetans in Tibet. The affirmation of a stronger faith to the Dalai Lama also arose due to Beijing vilifying the

Tibetan leader to the extreme and condemning him for all the turmoil in Tibet. In the Fifth Tibet Work Forum 2010, the Dalai Lama was termed as a “special contradiction” by President Hu Jintao, thus intensifying the attacks on the spiritual leader more (US Congressional on Executive Commission on China, 2010).

As mentioned earlier most of the writers and public figures were fluent in Chinese and many wrote in Chinese. This can be perceived as a major blow to the leadership in Beijing as their writings can be now accessed by the greater Mandarin speaking public. On a more ideological level, it emerges as a new challenge to the state as the language of the ruler is employed by the ruled to criticise. Thus, Mandarin which was a language of liberation for the Tibetans; a gift from the centre to the periphery has been effectively used as a language of dissent. Through the employment of appendages present in the dominating structure, modern Tibetans have been successful in subverting the political space to voice their angst against it. There has also been the flourishing of dissident magazines and newspapers in Tibet; *Shardungri* (Eastern Snow Mountain) being one of the most famous ones, which was banned in mid 2008 when its last publication carried articles which were highly critical of the state’s handling of the 2008 protests and squarely blames the government for the failure in its Tibet policy over the past 50 years. The editor Tashi Rabten, a prolific writer and student of the Northwest Minorities University in Lanzhou in Gansu was arrested on 6 April 2010 (TCHRD, 2010:48). He had brought out a book ‘Written in Blood’ in 2009, recounting the events of 2008, the Chinese brutal repression and had also written on democracy.

The last edition of the Eastern Snow Mountain had articles which stressed on numerous western liberal ideas such as democracy, equality and human rights. It also analyses the National Regional Autonomy Laws and termed it as nominal, subverted by the Chinese to meet their own ends. There is an extensive criticism of the Communist state through the deployment of Marxist ideas and lexicon, making it more potent as it can be termed as the reclaiming of a sense of justice through the strategic usage of Marxism, which the CCP is blamed to have forgotten (ICT, 2009:33). In another article, the writer quotes extensively the ideas of Will Kymlica, a Canadian political theorist and a strong proponent of multiculturalism. Kymlica is used to vouch for linguistic freedom through

institutional protection as well as through limiting migration. The contributors of the Eastern Snow Mountain are not only critical of the Chinese leadership but show their strong disapproval of all form of established authorities especially the Tibetan ones, who are seen as colluding with China. They include few senior Buddhist clergy, Tibetan officials and Tibetologist scholars who are seen as collaborators of China, aiding in the creation of the official discourse regarding Tibet (ibid). Therefore, most of the contributors along with the editor Tashi Rabten are young Tibetans, many who are still in university and are recipients of an education which is distinctly Chinese and are highly internet savvy, however in the aftermath of 2008, there has been a flourishing of voices through numerous mediums which are highly critical of China and its policies in Tibet.

There is also an increase in the reclaiming of the events of 1950 by the Tibetans which were earlier spoken of only in private circles, but now there is an open comparison between the events of 2008 and the one's which took place in the 1950's, which is highly crucial from the sense of nationalism, as 1950 is generally marked as the year when the Tibetans lost their de facto independence with the coming of the PLA and the CCP. This period also saw the numerous uprisings in Eastern Tibet and the National uprising in 1959 in Lhasa which eventually led to the flight of the Dalai Lama. Hence the equating of the events of that period to 2008 is an affirmation of Tibetan nationalism which is given a form through the writings, songs as well as other art forms of the present period. Therefore a strong surge of Tibetan nationalism is witnessed which percolated to all sections of the Tibetan society. Benedict Anderson saw the growth of print capitalism as an important factor for the growth of nationalism or the idea of a nation state where literature and the press play an important role in the growth of nationalism. This can also be seen in the context of Tibet, where through written literature as well as the writings posted online a strong sense of national solidarity among Tibetans have increased.

Some of the other important figures who were arrested in the aftermath of the protests in 2008 are – Kunchok Tsephel, a former official in a Chinese environmental department and founder of a Tibetan Cultural Website, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison for charges on passing information regarding 2008 to the outside world. Dhondup Wangchen, a filmmaker who along with Jigme Gyatso a monk from Labrang Tashikyil

his assistant had directed the documentary “Leaving Fear Behind”, which had a series of interviews of local Tibetans voicing their opposition against China’s policies in the backdrop of the Olympics in 2008. The documentary was eventually sent out of Tibet and the filmmaker and his assistant were arrested in 2008. While Jigme Gyatso was released after seven months, Dhondup Wangchen was imprisoned for six years; released on 5 June 2014 (ICT, 2014). Apart from this, the state has also targeted individuals who are considered to be non political but are prominent members of the Tibetan community. The case of the philanthropist, antiques dealer and environmentalist Karma Samdup who was noted as a model Tibetan citizen, and was recognised as China’s “philanthropist of the year” by the state run CCTV(TCHRD, 2010:70). He was also considered close to the CCP and had built schools as well as provided financial support to the poor housings in Chamdo. However on 24 June 2010 he was arrested on charges of robbing graves in Xinjiang, an earlier charge which was had already been denied but was revived now. It was the direct defence of his two brothers who had accused local officials for killing endangered animals and their eventual arrests which made him a prime target of the authorities. There can be numerous other reasons such as his offering of ideas to people from his home village in Eastern Tibet to petition the government in Beijing over grievances related to low compensation for farmlands which may have angered the local officials as well as his environmental activities may have also acted as a reason for angering businesspeople whose investments in an ecologically fragile yet rich Tibetan region could suffer (ibid, 2010:71).

What is of major importance is that the local officials in Tibet were amply using ideas of “separatism” and “endangering state security” to meet their own ends. This led to a strong feeling of ethnic discrimination among the Tibetans who could be arrested for asserting their civil rights. It was seen in the case of the numerous Tibetans who were arrested on grounds of “splittism” for protesting against mining activities in their region. In another case, on 26 June 2010, a Tibetan tycoon Dorjee Tashi who is also a member of the CCP was arrested for offering money to the Dalai Lama (Topgyal, 2011:191-192). Thus, under the context of the 2008 uprisings in Tibet, more violations of the basic civil rights of the Tibetans took place as any form of angst or disagreement against any policy of the state was coded as endangering state security. This led to a further alienation of the

Tibetans from the idea of belonging to the motherland China. Although, the Chinese state denies the issue of 2008 as an ethnic issue and blames it on outside forces led by the Dalai clique, through their harsh policies it has led to an ever increase in the gap between the Chinese and the Tibetans and a sharpening of Tibetan identity.

In most of the dissident work emerging from Tibet, there is a strong emphasis on ideas such as 'human rights', 'equality', and 'democracy', which are immersed more in the fashion of a liberal modernity which has emerged from the West. Whether it's the song '1958 and 2008' sung by a Tibetan nomad (ICT, 2009:36) or 'Unable To Meet' sung by Tashi Dhondup, they exhibit strong tendencies to embrace ideas and values as mentioned above. More importantly the articles which came out in the last edition of '*Shardungri*' edited by the prolific Tashi Rabten who was subsequently arrested, focuses majorly on such ideas of democracy, rights and freedom. Writers like Woenser, Tragyal and Kunga Tsayang in their post 2008 writings have stressed on ideas which can be linked to liberalism emitting from the West. There is also a genuine appreciation of the Middle Way policy initiated by the Dalai Lama, along with the dialogues between Dharamsala and Beijing which is rejected by the Chinese and thus seen also as a reason for increasing dissent among the Tibetans. However, this affirmation of liberal values which are western as well as shaped by Tibetan Buddhism acts as an important factor in understanding the psyche of the Tibetans. The writer Tragyal who was close to the CCP and criticised Buddhism in his writing 'The Line Between Heaven and Earth' also apologises for his earlier comments on Buddhism and stresses on the need for a non violent approach to counter the policies of the state, which can be seen as emerging from Buddhist principles (TCHRD, 2010:44-45). Human rights are a major bone of contention between China and the Tibetans and their supporters.

Most of the Western nations are critical of China's handling of its human rights towards its national minorities. Beijing officially does "advocate full consideration for and application of existing United Nations laws, human rights documents and supervision mechanism, full respect for the internal laws of all nations and their functions, and at the same time, due consideration for the protection of human rights and the preservation of the normal judiciary functions of nations" (Information Office of the State Council of the

PRC, 2005). It has also “acceded to 21 international human rights conventions, and has taken every measure to honour its obligations under those conventions” (ibid). More importantly Article 35 of the Constitution of the PRC provides citizens with the right to “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration” (TCHRD, 2010:13). Article 33 of the Constitution was amended in March 2004 to include “the state respects and preserves human rights” (TCHRD, 2010:14). However in most cases, the state through numerous provisions is able to undermine rights and freedoms of individuals as seen in the case in Tibet. These are generally done under the ambit of preventing the breaking up of China which is placed under Article 52 of the Constitution to safeguard “the unity of the country and the unity of all its nationalities” (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1982). Article 53 is more explicit regarding upholding this principle as it states the “Citizens of the People's Republic of China must abide by the constitution and the law, keep state secrets, protect public property and observe labour discipline and public order and respect social ethics” (ibid).

Under the guise of protection of state secrets numerous rights and freedom of the citizens are curbed as seen in the case of Tibet during and after the protests of 2008. What is also significant is China’s stressing on collective human rights as well as a stronger emphasis on ‘survival and development’ (Xinhua 2005). This provides for the idea that political rights can wait as subsistence is primal and needs to be fulfilled first. China strongly believes in the universality of human rights but also the local characteristics of a nation needs to be kept in mind thus ‘the specifics of the human rights vary from one country to another’ (ibid). Therefore, the universality of human rights as propounded by the west is seen as advocating the imposition of western ideas of human rights on China, which needs to be resisted. There is also an undue importance given to state sovereignty which is seen as the ‘guarantor of human rights’ and thus needs to be uplifted. Therefore, a gap is seen between the Chinese concepts of human rights and the Tibetan demands for it as for the Tibetans, human rights are a combination of political, economic as well as religious rights which are fashioned more on lines of ideas emerging from the liberal west.

This has been accelerated more with the Dalai Lama championing human rights on a global level where his standards of rights are seen as being opposite and challenging the notion of human rights in China. He emphasises strongly on the link between human rights and democracy and the need to strengthen it for preservation of human rights. In a message delivered by him on the 60th anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights which coincided with the protests in 2008, the Dalai Lama strongly suggests on the need to avoid a difference of views regarding the universality of human rights (Tenzin Gyatso, H.H the 14th Dalai Lama, 2008) which stands in strong contrast to the views of the CCP. What is also important is the fact that especially in the post 2008 scenario, there has been the emergence of the Tibetan intellectuals, many of whom were earlier incorporated by the party state and thus formed what is called the organic intellectuals, the important constituent of the civil society, which enables a semblance of hegemony. They provided the much needed legitimacy to the CCP in Tibet. Many of them defended the state's policies and were highly critical of Tibetan traditions, which were termed as being feudal by them. However, their criticisms of the party state in the aftermath of 2008, has centred much on blaming the government for the usage of excessive force and also bringing in the idea of ethnic discrimination is somewhat similar to the criticisms levied by the Panchen Lama in his Seventy Thousand Character Petition in the early 1960s. Hence, these intellectuals can be seen as creating the necessary foundation for the creation of a counter hegemony and the formation of alternative narratives to the ruling ideas, which is a major challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet.

THE ROLE OF THE DALAI LAMA AND THE CTA IN CHALLENGING CHINA'S LEGITIMACY IN TIBET

In 1995 the Chinese authorities selected Gyaltzen Norbu as the 11th Panchen Lama, rejecting the exiled Dalai Lama's candidate Gendun Chokyi Nyima. However the party state had "apparently been willing to allow the Dalai Lama some role in the selection processes in order to legitimate the candidate" (Warren W Smith, 2009:167). Prior to this when the 10th Panchen had passed away on 28 January 1989 the party state had invited the Dalai Lama to preside over a prayer event for the Panchen Lama at the *Yong He Gong* monastery in Beijing, which was however declined by the Dalai Lama (Arjia Rinpoche,

2010:166). Hence, the party state was willing to solicit the Dalai Lama's opinions (ibid, 200). This was an important way of gaining legitimacy from Tibetans, a strategy that had been adopted as a part of the united front in the 1950s, when the current Dalai Lama along with the tenth Panchen was appointed as vice chair of the Standing Committee of the NPC in 1954 and which was also followed by the former's appointment as the chair of the PCART in 1956 till his departure in 1959 after the failed uprising in March in Lhasa. Even in the Seventeen Point Agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet, a document signed between the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on 23 May 1951, it provided for the non alteration of the established status, powers and functions of the Dalai Lama.

The Seventeen Point Agreement, in itself remains an important tool of garnering legitimacy by Beijing over Tibet and Tibetans. It provided the Communists with the option of sending its troops and cadres to Tibet peacefully, hence aiding in the achievement of its paramount goal in Tibet – the legitimization of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet (Goldstein, 2014:3). It was the initial foundation for the Sino-Tibetan relations (ibid, 4) which focused on winning over the traditional elites in Tibet and was based on the process of co-option and gradual incorporation of Tibetans, a process that resonates with gaining hegemony in which the role of the Dalai Lama became significant to the Chinese state. The institution of the Dalai Lama since 1642 has occupied the spiritual and temporal authority over Tibet. Termed as the human embodiment of the Bodhisattva of compassion *Avalokiteshwara* (patron deity of Tibet) and from whom the Tibetans trace their lineage, the Dalai Lama has combined the traditional and charismatic forms of legitimacy to derive authority from the Tibetans.

With religion being the overarching ideology in the lives of the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama eventually becoming the supreme head of Tibetan Buddhism, the faith based ruling ideology provided the much needed authority to the institution of the Dalai Lama. This is seen to be well comprehended by the communists who in the 1950s wanted to win over the Dalai Lama and eventually get the latter to bring about the socialist reforms. This policy of the "united front" was also extended to other religious elites including the Panchen Lama which has been covered in this chapter as well as in others. The

communists tried to influence the monks and the religious elites by showing respect to them and also giving generous alms at religious ceremonies (ibid, 9). The gradualist policy of Mao emphasised on the need to delay reforms and directed the PLA to “go to Tibet with one eye open and one eye shut” (ibid, 5). This policy initiated by the communists was geared towards garnering legitimacy in Tibet and thus peacefully incorporate Tibet in the long run (ibid, 11).

This policy can also be dubbed as following a strategy that resembles a “war of position” where initially there is a need to gain victory over the complex array of political groups and institutions and the values that it perpetuates before launching a full frontal “war of maneuver” that will topple the old regime and bring in the revolution (Jones, 2007:31). Even though, Tibet in the 1950s was an undeveloped society in the Gramscian Marxist sense, still the Chinese Communists were attempting to gain a form of hegemony. They had started to build a new “civil society” in the form of new youth and women’s associations in which members who were mostly from the local elite were educated about socialism and its benefits and were also sent on trips to inland China so as to expand their horizon and thus desire modernisation and development in Tibet (Goldstein, 2014:10). For instance the first formal Tibetan Women’s Organisation was set up by the PLA, which was an extension of the All China Democratic Women’s Federation, a united front organisation that still acts as a link between the central government and women. The Lhasa Patriotic Women’s Association was inaugurated on 8 March 1953 (Butler, 2003:34).

The idea of a women’s association was mooted by the wives of the Chinese generals from 1952 onwards which became a reality in 1953 after the *Kashag* and the Dalai Lama gave their assent. With a preparatory meeting, a committee was to be created, which eventually had the Dalai Lama’s elder sister Tsering Dolma as the Chair, the senior Chinese general Zhang Zingwu’s wife and four Tibetan minister’s wives as vice chairs and Rinchen Dolma Taring and Thangme Kunchok who became general secretary and the assistant secretary respectively (ibid, 36). The members also travelled to China on several occasions as part of official Tibetan delegations and to attend women’s meetings and conferences. For instance in 1957, a delegation of 12 women were sent to attend the

All Chinese Women's Conference in Beijing (ibid, 37). In 1953 the elder sister of the Dalai Lama Tsering Choedon had attended the Vienna Congress, which as according to the statement given by her to a journalist of the New China News Agency was that it was the first time that Tibetans had been represented at any international gathering. In the meeting she also tried to dispel the false ideas that had taken roots in the foreign media regarding Tibet, whereby she emphasised on how a strong unity had developed in Tibet under Chairman Mao especially between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama (FBIS, 1953:037).

Tsering Choedon is seen to be criticising the imperialists and reactionaries for creating a false picture of Tibet. Hence her participation in the Vienna Congress is seen as an important public relations event for Beijing as during this period, they were facing some flak on the issue of Tibet. Hence, a Tibetan woman representative especially from the traditional ruling elite class brings about a degree of legitimacy to the PRC with regard to Tibet. Moreover, with regard to Tibet, she is seen to be embracing the gradualist policy in bringing economic development as propounded by the communists. She is also seen to be emphasising on the need to bring education especially raise the literary levels among Tibetans, due to which a new school was opened in Lhasa and more schools were to be opened in every major town within a couple of years (ibid). The Dalai Lama's elder sister also mentioned about the need for Tibet to be connected further to China, through roads as well as the need for Tibetans to be trained as cadres. The role of Tsering Choedon and the women's association becomes relevant in lines of gaining legitimacy by the party state in Tibet as it exemplifies the co-option of ruling elites, who is seen to be bolstering a positive image of China outside the world, especially justifying the idea of liberation of Tibet.

In 1952 on occasion of the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference held in Beijing, the Dalai Lama had sent a statement supportive of the event emphasising on how the conference confirmed with the interests of the various nationalities in China. The message provides an insight into the support he gave to the ruling discourse which was currently underway, that remarked on Tibetans suffering under imperialists' oppression and the only safeguard to freedom and happiness being opposition to imperialist aggression, racial

discrimination and national oppression. He also mentions about the Tibetans receiving full rights of national equality under the leadership of Mao and the Central People's government. The letter mentions about how Tibet as it is on the frontiers of the motherland, thus becomes an important base for national defence and that the Tibetans would defend the motherland. He terms Tibetans being against national oppression and war expansion of the imperialists and also pledged support to Chairman Mao (FBIS, 1952:190). Such a letter from the Dalai Lama, adhering to the ruling narrative in China displays the process of co-option being practiced by the party state towards the traditional elites in Tibet. Another important process of co-option was the inviting of delegations from the various religious elites in Tibet – the Dalai Lama, the Panchen and the Sakya Lama. The Dalai Lama's delegation was headed by Liushar Thubten Tharpa, the Panchen's delegation that comprised of 10 members was led by Tenpa Rinchen while the Sakya delegation was led by Dorje Dradul who left on 3 September 1952 for Beijing (ibid, 1952:180).

The co-option of the traditional ruling elites as a gradualist strategy by the Chinese communists was much focused on the incorporation of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. This is witnessed during the visits of the Dalai Lama to Beijing and other parts of China in 1954-55. During his stay in China, the Dalai Lama had become highly enthusiastic about the possibilities of association with the PRC. For the Dalai Lama, the ideology of Marxism was a solution to much of the problems in the world as it stressed on justice and equality (Dalai Lama, 1998:98-99). Even prior to the Dalai Lama's visit to China, Mao in a speech given to the Constitutional Draft Committee in Beijing emphasised on the need for the Dalai Lama to manage Tibet and that his position would be equivalent to his having being elected by the people. The Chairman also stated on how Tibetans' faith in the Dalai Lama is immense and hence there was need to respect this faith of the Tibetans (Goldstein, 2014:20). Mao's gradualist strategy can be seen as a way of gaining consent from the Tibetans through their ruling elites, creating in the process "organic intellectuals" who would eventually bring the much needed reforms to Tibet.

Both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama termed their trip to China as of being great significance as it was evidence of the unification of China and the great unity existing

among nationalities. It also strongly reflected the unity among the Tibetan people (FBIS, 1954: 137). Moreover, their visit to Beijing was also to attend the first session of the NPC, where the draft constitution of the PRC was adopted. Their participation in the first session of the NPC and specially in the deliberations leading to the adoption of the draft constitution of the PRC is highly significant as it bolstered the idea of the Tibetan people participating in the nation's "large scale construction under the leadership of Chairman Mao" (ibid), as well as providing legitimacy to the system of governance which was to be implemented under the draft constitution of 1954. The Dalai Lama in his speech expressed the warm support of the Tibetan people for the draft constitution of the PRC on the second day meeting of the first session of the NPC. Addressing 1,119 deputies present in the NPC, he stated that the constitution was a summary of the achievements and experiences in carrying out the policy of national equality and unity as directed by Chairman Mao. He blamed the earlier reactionary government and more importantly the foreign imperialists in alienating Tibet from the motherland. The return of the Panchen Lama to Tibet is termed by him as strengthening internal unity within Tibet. The Dalai Lama also rejected the idea of the communists' destroying religion in Tibet. Furthermore, he also thanked the People's government for helping in the economic and cultural development of Tibet especially the building of the Sikang Tibet highway and that under Mao's leadership Tibet would eventually become a land of joy and prosperity (FBIS, 1954:118).

The participation of the Dalai Lama and his speech in the first sessions of the NPC especially during the promulgation of the draft constitution is highly significant as it denotes the importance given by the party state to the Tibetan leader but also an attempt to portray him as an ethnic leader, someone who adheres to the party line and aids in the consolidation of the CCP's legitimacy in the Tibetan areas. Although it is not sure whether these statements made by the Dalai Lama was written by him or dictated to him by the party but still the appearance of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama in the NPC and their participation in the formulation of the draft constitution of 1954 can be seen as an important event which aided in the boosting of legitimacy of the party state over Tibet. Their participation and visit to China was an important way of gaining consent by the

CCP over Tibetans. Most of their statements allude to the idea of consent being given by the Tibetans to Beijing.

The Tenth Panchen Lama in his speech in the 17 September 1954 session of the NPC expressed joy and honour which he along with the Dalai Lama felt in passing the first people's constitution of PRC, which for the Panchen gave full expression to the vital interests and common aspirations of all nationalities throughout China. It is termed by him as protecting the equal rights of the minorities and consolidating the fruits of the revolution (FBIS, 1954:183). He is also seen to be emphasising on the great achievements during the past 3 years since 1951 with large interest free loans been extended to Tibetans, peasants and herdsmen and many new irrigation projects having been constructed. Schools were opened and Tibetans also enjoyed free medical care. The freedom of religious belief and the customs and habits of Tibetans as according to the Panchen Lama was respected by the party state (ibid, 1954:182). The participation of the Tibetan leaders in the NPC was also hailed by the representative of the local government of Tibet, who termed it as a "great honour" for both to have supported the constitution as well as participate in the election of the new leaders (ibid, 1954:192).

The emphasis by the official media on the visits by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to Beijing is directed mostly at gaining consent from the Tibetans and securing legitimacy. Both leaders are seen to be undergoing a process of co-option and being transformed from their earlier statuses of "Tibetan" leaders to leaders of China's "minority nationalities". The co-option process is seen to be implemented through both the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama attending courses at the People's Universities in Beijing as well as through visiting numerous places in China (FBIS, 1954:207). For instance the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were termed as touring the northeast of China arriving in Harbin from Anshan on 13 February 1955 (ibid, 1955:033). Other places which they visited were Nanking on 4 January 1955 (ibid, 1955:003) and Shanghai on 18 January (ibid, 1955:014). These tours by the Tibetan leaders are significant as they form an important way of displaying the phase of modernisation which China was undergoing, which after witnessing would be desired by the Tibetan leaders for their regions. The Dalai Lama in his autobiography mentions about how "impressed he was

with what the communists had managed to achieve in the field of heavy industry” and wanted a similar development to happen in Tibet. He wanted to modernize Tibet in line with the People’s Republic. (The Dalai Lama, 1998: 105-108).

In the month of October 1954, the Dalai Lama made a statement on Sino Soviet friendship which is a reflection of the party state providing a platform to a leader from the Tibetan minority nationality as well as indicates a process of the CCP garnering legitimacy from the Dalai Lama even in matters of foreign policy. In his speech, the Dalai Lama applauds the friendship between China and the Soviet Union as being highly beneficial to the daily growth of the world forces for peace and democracy, the increasingly close unity between China and USSR and the development of China’s economic and cultural enterprises. He constantly emphasises on how on behalf of the monks and laymen of Tibet he expresses his complete support. Furthermore the people of USSR and China are termed as desiring world peace and democracy, with also both countries’ foreign policy being geared to the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. The Dalai Lama also said that if countries in the world observe these just and reasonable principles, world peace would undoubtedly be insured and also “that the great unselfish aid to our country (China) by the Soviet Union will bring about substantial development of the nation’s economic and cultural construction and strengthen further the unity between the Chinese and Soviet people” (FBIS, 1954:201). The Dalai and the Panchen Lama also signed the ‘World Peace Committee’ petition against the use of nuclear weapons (*bDen-rGyab Writers’ Club*, 2015:75).

While the authenticity of the statements made by the Dalai Lama on Sino-Soviet ties is debatable, its publication in the NCNA is symptomatic of the idea of the party state grooming the Tibetan leader(s) as leaders from the minority nationalities, which is akin to the creation of organic intellectuals in the Gramscian sense, ones who will aid in the process of “war of position” for the party state. This is evident from the statements made by the Dalai and the Panchen Lamas in a banquet organised by them in celebration of Tibetan New Year in Beijing which was attended by the ‘big four’ of the CCP- Mao,

Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De (The Dalai Lama, 1998:107). The Dalai Lama made a statement which praised the nationality policy of the CCP, terming it as a correct nationality policy of Chairman Mao, which had fundamentally changed the relations between all nationalities and also enabling them to rise. He further remarked on how they participated in the NPC which adopted the Constitution, electing a number of officials which were all done on the basis of equality. This is termed as the coming of new and friendly relations under the leadership of the CCP. The Dalai Lama also elaborated on the experiences of his trip to east and northeast China where they marveled at the greatness and splendor of PRC and also witnessed firsthand the presence of religious freedom for all nationalities. Significantly he stressed on the need for help from the advanced Han nationality towards Tibetans and others, who are relatively backward (FBIS, 1955:039).

This statement provides the needed legitimacy for the party state especially for their purported idea of liberation of Tibet and bringing modernisation to it. The Dalai Lama's desire for Chinese aid for industrializing and developing Tibet is not only a major plank for gaining legitimacy by the CCP but also the consolidation of a process of creating organic intellectuals for the party inside Tibet; in the form of the Dalai Lama, which is significant for building a strong civil society for gaining hegemony. The same can be stated of the Panchen Lama, who in the same banquet mentioned how it was only under the leadership of Mao and the CCP that the customs and traditions of minority nationalities could receive respect. He also emphasised on bringing about more internal unity among the Tibetans and also among other nationalities. Under the CCP the national minorities were termed as truly becoming their own masters and also having embarked on the path of industrialization (ibid).

The party state during the 1950s understood the importance of the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama as well as the other reincarnated lamas in the context of gaining legitimacy in Tibet, hence the gradualist policy of gaining consent from these religious elites is witnessed. These reincarnated lamas enjoyed strong devotion, faith and political support from the Tibetans as well as from other ardent followers which included Han Chinese. For instance, during their visit to Beijing, several thousand Mongolians came to get an audience from the Dalai and Panchen Lama (The Dalai Lama, 1998:104) and also a large

number of Chinese officials came for getting blessings from the Dalai Lama in Chengdu (ibid, 111). In 1954, the 16th Karmapa, another important Tibetan Buddhist master had also visited China as a part of a delegation to witness the development that had taken place ([www.karmapa.org/life-16th Karmapa/](http://www.karmapa.org/life-16th-Karmapa/)). The visit of these reincarnated lamas to Beijing and participation in the political process of the PRC is also important from the aspect of institutional buildup in the Tibetan areas, seen in the form of the establishment of a unified preparatory committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region. This would include the local government of Tibet, Panchen Kanpo Lijia and the People's Liberation Committee of the Chamdo area, all three regions under the leadership of religious elites (FBIS, 1955:049).

The PCART was a novel set up which would bypass the Military-Administrative Committee that had been implemented in other regions of China and instead create an autonomous region, with the Dalai Lama as the head and the Panchen as the deputy head (Goldstein, 2014:19). This would remain in consonance with the PRC's constitution that gave much precedence to the protection of the rights of the national minorities. Hence, the reforms that were implemented in other parts of China was to be delayed in Tibet, with the need for gaining much consent from the Tibetan ruling elites to bring in the communist reforms at a later period. The party state is also termed by Zhou Enlai, who in a farewell address to the Tibetan leaders as resolving the historical and outstanding questions between the local government of Tibet and the Panchen Kanpo Lijia. He also remarked that all the achievements that had been gained since 1951 was due to the unity between the Dalai and the Panchen and the arduous struggle of the PLA and other cadres (FBIS, 1955:049). The creation of harmony between Lhasa and Tashilhunpo by the communists as commented by Zhang Jingwu, Beijing's representative in Tibet is an important way of generating legitimacy inside Tibet, as the party state is termed as bringing peace to Tibet through creating the amicable atmosphere for the cooperation between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, hence also uniting the two important figures of Tibetan Buddhism (FBIS, 1955:050).

The Dalai Lama during the farewell hosted by Zhou Enlai also praised Chairman Mao and the party for strengthening China and also pledged that on his return to Tibet, they

would strive for unity between the Han and Tibetans as well as work for the decisions implemented in the plenary sessions. Significantly, the Dalai Lama also remarked on the importance of Tibet being located at the border and hence the need to consolidate national defence, which becomes significant as one of the reasons for the liberation of Tibet, was the safeguarding of the motherland (ibid). The Tibetan leaders also spoke at the 7th plenary session of the State Council on 9 March 1955, where the Tibet Military Commission was replaced by a PCART (*bDen-rGyab* Writers' Club, 2015:77). Furthermore, the Dalai Lama also spoke of the 1000 year old relationship between Tibetans and other nationalities of China. He strongly criticised the former KMT government for sowing dissent among the fraternal nationalities as well as among Tibetans themselves; alluding to the earlier internal discord between Lhasa and the Panchen Lama. He also blamed the oppression of the Tibetans by foreign imperialists in the earlier periods which had led to the poverty and backwardness of Tibetans. It was according to the Dalai Lama the strenuous efforts of the PLA and the other working staff that construction work took place in Tibet. Furthermore based on Chairman Mao's great policy of nationalities along with "consulting" the Tibetan elites, much progress had occurred inside Tibet (FBIS, 1955:050).

Hence the Dalai Lama mentions about the idea of consent being sought by Mao and the CCP from the ruling groups in Tibet which is significant as it displays the attempts made by the communists to gain legitimacy through the implementation of "united front" tactics, which was directed to the Tibetan elites who would aid in the creation of hegemony for the CCP. The Dalai Lama emphasises on their participation in the political processes of the PRC through their presence in the NPC and their exercising of national equality with them participating in discussing about the Constitution and electing the state's leadership (*bDen-rGyab* Writers' Club, 2015:71). This can also be seen as denoting the granting of legitimacy by the Tibetan leaders to PRC as they are indulging in the governance of China through the act of deliberations and voting. Both of them affirm the leadership of Chairman Mao, under whom the Tibetans can have a happy and bright future (FBIS, 1955:050).

The policy of co-optation towards the Dalai Lama continued to a larger extent till the failed Tibetan uprising of 1959 and the eventual exile of the Dalai Lama. However even after the Dalai Lama went into exile, the party state and its co-opted figures such as the Sera Khenpo Ngawang Jaltso (FBIS, 1959:080) harked on the idea of the Dalai Lama being kidnapped by the upper class feudal reactionaries, which is proof of the idea of the legitimacy enjoyed by the Dalai Lama in Tibet. Although the Panchen Lama remained in Tibet in the post 1959 period, the power and authority of the Dalai Lama among Tibetans stayed strong. This is due to the fact that Tibetans remain devout Buddhist and the culture is strongly attuned to their faith. It is the Buddhist faith and culture which provided the much required legitimacy to the institution of the Dalai Lama, as a matter of fact; the institution can be termed as an inherent structure in the Buddhist faith and culture of Tibetans. In the Gramscian sense, culture plays a highly decisive role in the making of men and historical subjects and is an essential part of politics (Santucci, 2010:39).

Tibetan Buddhism is seen as the core of Tibetan identity which provided the basis for a stable order and legitimised the power of the ruling group as Buddhism reiterated on the importance of karma or destiny (Roemer, 2008:10). Through the ideology of Tibetan Buddhism, the ruling elites had maintained a hegemony over the subordinate groups, so much so that in 1917 as according to Charles Bell the annual budget of the clergy was twice as large as the government and 8 times larger than the Tibetan army (ibid, 13). The Tibetan Buddhist political system was further propped on the institution of the reincarnated lamas, the system of choosing *tulkus* who were dubbed as the embodiments of the divine and had immense charismatic legitimacy. A primary example of this can be seen to have manifested in the institution of the Dalai Lama. Furthermore, the charisma of the Dalai Lama has been routinised through the combination of the Dalai Lama's mythological authority as patron of the Tibetan people and his traditional authority that gave him the much needed legitimacy (ibid,20). This was well understood by the Chinese communists who wanted to implement the charisma of the Dalai Lama to buttress their own legitimacy among Tibetans in Tibet. This is seen to be much present in the Chinese state wanting the Dalai Lama's initial involvement in the Panchen Lama's reincarnation and also being relevant as evidenced from the 13 July 2007 State Religious Affairs Bureau Order number 5 termed as the management of reincarnation of living Buddhas in

Tibetan Buddhism. It came into effect from 1 September 2007 and emphasised on the need to regulate reincarnation in Tibetan Buddhism so as to safeguard national unity, religious and social harmony and the principles of Tibetan Buddhism's normal order (Hu, 2007).

While the official order on reincarnation does not specify the lineage of the Dalai Lama, it is much a strategy to control the future reincarnation of the current 14th Dalai Lama, who is seen to be enjoying global popularity due to his charismatic legitimacy as well as endured faith and support from Tibetans inside Tibet. The authority of the Dalai Lama is seen to be legitimate even in the case of party members and cadres in the Tibetan regions. For instance, the current TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo through a question and answer published by the local party branch of the CCDI aimed at peering into the thoughts of the party members and cadres who are deemed as worshipping the Dalai Lama. He emphasised that there was a need to “severely punish those party members and cadres who don't have firm beliefs and ideals, who don't share the same mind with the party and the people and who have “two faces” when it comes to the important question of what is right and wrong”(Wong, 2015).

Hence the party wanted to prevent party members from worshipping the Dalai Lama and also prevent them from sending their children to study abroad especially to India or preventing them from going and visiting the Dalai Lama in India for religious purposes. The anti corruption campaign initiated by Xi Jinping from 2012 and extended to Tibet had the imposition of the “six absolutely don't use” brought by the CCDI in Tibet to curb the influence of the Dalai Lama among the cadres and officials. The party state sees the influence of the Dalai Lama from an ideological point of view; hence much of the policies and efforts of the CCP in Tibet has been to curb the ideological preeminence of the Dalai Lama (ibid). This is much significant from the point of view of hegemony and legitimacy as it somewhat reveals the idea that the Dalai Lama does have strong ideological support within the ranks of the cadres/officials inside Tibet. Under the same campaign in 2014 in Tibet, 15 cadres were investigated and 20 cadres in 2015 were charged with violating political discipline (Simon Denyer, 2015). The consent that the Dalai Lama is able to garner inside Tibet is also visible from the statements made by

Tibetans whereby they attest to the fact that it is due to the Dalai Lama that they have decided to forbear and practice non-violence (Yeh, 2013:57). Another important example of the Dalai Lama's enduring legitimacy inside Tibet is witnessed through the practice of Tibetans shunning the wearing of animal skins and burning their animal skin/fur robes.

In the *Kalachakra* religious initiation given by the Dalai Lama in 2006 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, the Tibetan leader emphasised on the need for environmental and wildlife protection and called upon Tibetans from Tibet not to wear illegal animal furs and skins. In response to this, groups of Tibetans from Rebgong, Amdo in modern day Qinghai burned pelts of otter, leopard, tiger and fox on 7 February 2006. Also on 2 February a man in Lhasa burned his wildlife skin chuba (Tibetan traditional robe) as well as Tibetans in the area of Lithang have not been wearing animal skins at several local festivals (ICT, 2006). An estimated six hundred million yuan worth of animal fur were burnt in eastern Tibet. With Tibetans participating in the mass burning of animal fur and skins especially in Rebgong, Lhasa and other Tibetan areas of Sichuan province, the authorities were seen to be clamping down on such acts. For instance in Rebgong, eight people were arrested and charged with "colluding with the Dalai Lama". The Chinese saw the act as a political statement of support to the Dalai Lama which ascertains the idea of strong influence from the exiled Tibetan leader inside Tibet.

There has been a continued practice of the burning of animal fur inside Tibet, seen during the Tibetan new year celebration in 2009 (dalailama80.org, 2015). Even in the 2015 celebrations of the Tibetan New Year in the Drangsung village in Yunnan's Dechen county, the locals vowed to give up the wearing of animal furs and also burnt those in their possession (RFA, 2015). One of the important ways through which the Chinese state has tried to tackle this issue is through the economic plank of tourism, which has been dubbed as one of the core pillars of the Tibetan economy. Under this, the local populations are made to participate in cultural shows, which is generally an ensemble of dance and songs by the locals who are made to wear the animal fur costumes and non compliance is met with force from the authorities. This was seen in the case of Driru county in Nagchu prefecture TAR in 2015 as well as in Nangchen county, Keygudo (Yulshu) prefecture where the authorities ordered ten Tibetan townships to prepare for a

summer cultural show wearing the traditional expensive clothes to show economic prosperity, which was much resisted by them (freetibet.org, 2015).

The mass burning of animal skins and pelts in Tibet came right after the Dalai Lama's appeals in 2006. Even though it has gained its own dynamism as analysed by Emily Yeh, who sees it in terms of the Tibetans practicing a form of "moral economy" and hence a form of resistance against the culture of commodification, which is a prerequisite for modernisation as brought about by the PRC (Yeh, 2012) and also as a part of their religious sensibilities. What is however significant is that it was also the influence of the Dalai Lama among Tibetans, due to which they primarily initiated the animal skin burning movement. This is seen to be among the very first instances where the Dalai Lama's direct appeal to Tibetans inside Tibet has translated into direct action which indicates the strong legitimate authority of the Dalai Lama.

The Dalai Lama has also been turned into the source of legitimacy for the series of protests that rocked the Tibetan areas from 1987-89, 2008 and the series of self immolations from 2009 onwards. This will be elaborated in the final chapter on protests and demonstrations in Tibet against the Chinese state's legitimacy. However as remarked by Ronald Schwartz, the Dalai Lama is also seen to be shaping the discourse of the resistance inside Tibet – from protestors demanding independence of a "free Tibet" to one where their focus has shifted to human rights, autonomy and religious freedom. The majorities of the protestors has also demanded for a return of the Dalai Lama or have appealed for his long life. For instance, according to Wang Lixiong, almost 38 percent of the self immolators' atleast till 2012 have cried for the return or the long life of the Dalai Lama as their primary motive behind their act (Wang, 2012).

In a number of cases the protestors inside Tibet have been partly inspired from the Dalai Lama and his activities to highlight the Tibetan issues in exile. For example in September 1987 the Dalai Lama was invited to address the US Congress where he proposed the Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet, which eventually would pave the way for his demands for autonomy for Tibet and dropping the idea of a "Free Tibet" (Craig, 1999:256). What is important is that Tibetans inside Tibet remained ignorant of these developments and it was the Chinese authorities who made it known to them through the initiation of a

campaign of condemning the Dalai Lama as a splittist and on 24 September 1987, they ordered 15,000 people to attend a mass political rally at which eight dissidents were sentenced to imprisonment and three were executed (ibid, 258). However a similar campaign of weeding out “anti social elements” was implemented in May 1986 where around 250 young Tibetans known to have friends of social relations in Dharamsala were arrested in Lhasa (ibid, 253) and in July 1986, Yulu Dawa Tsering, a prominent Tibetan citizen who was then a member of the TAR Political Consultative Conference and also a formerly rehabilitated political prisoner stated to an Italian journalist over a casual conversation about how the six million Tibetans inside Tibet considered the Dalai Lama to be the only leader for Tibetans (ibid, 254).

Even in the pan Tibetan protests of 2008, the catalyst was deemed to have being the awarding of the US Congressional Gold Medal in 2007 by the US Congress which led to Tibetans both religious and laity celebrating. This was witnessed in the form of fireworks in Labrang monasteries in Gansu province as well as the burning of juniper branches as offerings in different parts of Tibet. A significant act of celebration was the whitewashing of Ganden monastery by the monks, an act which is normally reserved for the new year celebrations and which was stopped by the authorities and the arrest of the monks. It was initially for the release of the monks from Ganden that in March 2008 monks from other monasteries protested that spiraled into the pan Tibet protests (ICT, 2008).

While the idea of terming the Dalai Lama as the sole cause for the protests inside Tibet is farfetched, it is true that the Dalai Lama remains a major source of inspiration and hence a strong source of legitimacy for the protestors and demonstrators. More importantly as mentioned earlier, the party state is also seen to be inadvertently turning the figure of the Dalai Lama into a source of legitimacy for the protests inside Tibet. This is because from 1996 onwards they have created an atmosphere in Tibet in which the Dalai Lama has been turned into a symbol of splittism, who is termed as working towards the breakup of the Chinese motherland. Through this they have also magnified the activities of the Dalai Lama among the local population, which adds or accentuates the Dalai Lama’s legitimacy further, thus ironically turning him into a major challenge to China’s legitimacy in Tibet. In the aftermath of the Panchen Rinpoche’s reincarnation tussle

between the Dalai Lama and Beijing, in 1996 the party state launched a series of campaigns that were aimed at denouncing the Dalai Lama, restricting his influence and curbing his legitimacy.

These were to be achieved through the Patriotic Education Movement, Building Spiritual Civilisation campaign and the Strike Hard Campaign. Much of the features and policies of these campaigns are still relevant in the present period, when the party state has to curb splittism among the Tibetans and subdue the influence of the Dalai Lama inside Tibet. In 1996, the aim of the Patriotic Education Campaign as according to the then Party Secretary of TAR Chen Kuiyuan was to “abolish the feudal, foolish and backward atmosphere poisoned by the Dalai clique” and all the narratives associated with the campaign was to denounce the Dalai Lama. Even the Strike Hard Campaign was linked to the anti separatist struggle, accusing the Dalai Lama “of constantly carrying out violent and terrorist sabotage activities (TIN, 1998). These campaigns were initially directed towards the monasteries and eventually they were extended to the rest of society. Under these campaigns the party state is seen to be launching a severe attack on the Dalai Lama with him being dubbed as the “conspirator, the chief of the splittist movement aspiring for Tibetan independence and the unequivocal tool of the western forces inimical towards China, the main source of all disturbances in Tibetan society and the biggest stumbling block to the establishment of normal religious discipline in Tibetan Buddhism” (ibid). This is from “Patriotic Education Book 1” used by the authorities in June 1996 in monasteries especially in TAR.

While the role of education in gaining legitimacy and the boosting of hegemony has been dealt in the previous chapters, it is of much importance to denote the fact that through the textbooks used by the state a strong attempt has been made to create an ideological bulwark in support of the party state’s eventual hegemony. Moreover as the name suggests, Patriotic Education Campaign was a form of education in which it was carried out through the study of four books published in June 1996 by the “Governing Office for Propagating Patriotic Education in All Monasteries through the TAR” (TIN, 1998:6). While the text centered much on how historically Tibet was always a part of China, it also strongly emphasized on how the Dalai Lama was a splittist who was to be

denounced (ibid, 11). Through these campaigns the Dalai Lama was termed as a major challenge to Chinese legitimacy in Tibet. He is termed as having strong spiritual influence, having immense ideological infiltration in Tibet and which had to be countered (ibid, 61). For instance in a speech on 26 July 1996, Chen Kuiyuan stated that “the main battlefield of our struggles against the Dalai clique is in the spiritual field” (ibid). A major step taken by the CCP to curb the influence of the Dalai Lama in Tibet and which continues till date is the banning of his photographs that was announced on 5 April 1996 onwards (ibid, 43). While the ban was implemented strongly in TAR, it was not much enforced in the Tibetan regions of Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan and Qinghai, where the worship of the Dalai Lama continued with some restrictions now and then.

For instance in 2016 itself, in an order from the authorities dated 4 January 2016 it was mentioned that 40 percent or so of Dranggo county in the Kardze TAP were to surrender the Dalai Lama’s photo to the Dranggo county office of Culture and Discipline (Dharpo, 2016). Also in a variety of cases Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and Yunnan have been celebrating the Dalai Lama’s birthday and also had offered long life prayers for him, especially during the period when he had to undergo treatment in the Mayo clinic in America (RFA, 2016). Even monks from *Ganden Shedrup Thubten Phegyeling* monastery in *Tridu* (Chengduo) county held a week long prayer service for the Dalai Lama. They carried a portrait of the Dalai Lama, the 10th Panchen Lama and Jamyang Tenpey Nyima, the founder of their monastery during the ceremony. On 25 January 2016, thousands of Tibetans including monks and nuns from Chogri monastery in Tehor township of Kardze TAP prayed for the Dalai Lama (Tibetan Review.net, 2016).

While these acts have a strong religious orientation to them, they also reveal the strong traditional and charismatic legitimacy enjoyed by the Dalai Lama in Tibet. The banning of the Dalai Lama’s image in TAR and the sporadic ban on it in the other Tibetan areas has galvanized the importance of the Dalai Lama in the lives of the Tibetans, increasing his legitimacy and turning him into a symbol of resistance against the party state. This is visible in the form of protestors carrying the Dalai Lama’s portrait and protesting individually or in groups as was evidenced from the solo protest on 2 May 2016 by a Tibetan monk from Kirti monastery in the Ngaba Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan

Province. He had carried a portrait of the Dalai Lama (TCHRD, 2016). In this instance and numerous others, the image of the Dalai Lama is seen to be the source of the legitimacy for the protestors. The significant point which accentuates the idea of the presence of the influence of the Dalai Lama is seen from the mass detentions being imposed on Tibetans after returning from attending the Kalachakra religious initiations ceremony in India. This was witnessed in 2012 when hundreds of Tibetans were detained for a number of months after returning from India. Majority were made to undergo Patriotic Reeducation classes and also denounce the Dalai Lama (Edward Wong, 2012). While attending the Kalachakra in India was permitted by the party state in 1985 and onwards (Barnett, 2010:326), with sporadic bans, in 2012 around 8000 Tibetans were termed as attending the Kalachakra (Edward Wong, 2012). The response from the state to the returned Tibetans reflects the idea that the Dalai Lama has great ideological influence over the Tibetans, which needs to be broken through reeducating them.

Thus, the Dalai Lama is seen to be a serious challenge to Chinese legitimacy inside Tibet, who can be termed as exerting influence and garnering a level of consent from the locals. It is precisely to overcome this consent granted by the Tibetan population, that the party state is seen to undertake a process of educating them. It is in this process of reeducating the Tibetan psyche, that the Dalai Lama is much vilified as well as denounced by the state. Also, a requirement from the Tibetan population in most cases has been to denounce the Dalai Lama, which as a matter of fact has accelerated the importance of the exiled Tibetan leader in the lives of the local Tibetan population. Hence in most cases it has been partly the undertaking from the party state towards the Dalai Lama which has increased the legitimacy of the Tibetan leader inside Tibet. However the activities of the exiled Tibetan leader and the institutions which he helped set up in exile should also be seen as attempting to gain legitimacy from Tibetans inside and outside Tibet as well as from other nations and its citizens. The Dalai Lama and his people in exile are seen to be enduring from the beginning to claim legitimacy in the issue of Tibet. With the failed uprising in Lhasa on 10 March 1959 and the subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India, one of the primary steps which he undertook was the establishment of a government in exile.

Initially the Tibetans wanted to establish an exiled government in Lhuntse *dzong*, a stronghold of the Tibetan resistance and near the Indian border. They had hoped to negotiate with the Chinese to withdraw, the safe return of the Dalai Lama and the continuation of his position as head of the Tibetan government (Thondup, 2015:185). However with things degenerating in Lhasa and the party state imposing a major military clampdown the Dalai Lama was forced to seek refuge in India, which took place on 30 March 1959 (ibid, 189). Almost a year later in Bodh Gaya, the site of the historic Buddha's enlightenment, the Dalai Lama announced the establishment of a foundation of democratic rule in exile – the freely elected assembly, the Parliament in exile which governs the community in exile which also acted as a model for Tibet (TPPRC, 2003:9). The Dalai Lama as termed earlier is also seen to be shaping the discourse of the Tibetan movement, galvanizing it further as well as bringing alterations to the narrative. This is seen to be visible from the change of the Tibet question from “Free Tibet” to “Autonomy for Tibet” as well as exerting a democratic transformation of the Tibetans in exile which is deemed to have culminated in 2011 when the Dalai Lama renounced his political authority in favour of a democratically elected leadership.

These acts of the Dalai Lama is seen as a method of gaining legitimacy from Tibetans as well as from an international audience as is evident from the embracing of democracy by the Tibetans in exile as well as the strategic opting for more autonomy by the Dalai Lama for Tibet. Furthermore, through the numerous statements and speeches made by the Dalai Lama, the Chinese state's legitimacy inside Tibet is severely challenged. This is seen through the Tezpur Statement delivered on 18 April 1959 and the Mussorie Statement made on 20 June 1959, both of which severely criticized the Chinese government and also abrogated the Seventeen Point Agreement, terming it as being illegitimate. In both the statements it emphasized on the legitimacy of the government established by the Dalai Lama (Avedon, 1997:70-72). Through the numerous letters sent by the Dalai Lama to the Secretary General of the UN during the early 1960s, there is a strong challenge to Chinese legitimacy in Tibet. In these letters he raises the issue of thousands of Tibetans fleeing into exile in South Asia, hence disputing the legitimate claims by the Chinese of a peaceful liberation (The Dalai Lama, 1998:10).

In a letter to the UN dated 29 September 1960, the Dalai Lama gives strong evidence of how from 1913 onwards Tibet had become an independent country especially through the 13th Dalai Lama's efforts and proclamation of independence. He also emphasizes on how the Tibetans had a good degree of sovereignty which is seen through them participating in the Shimla Convention of 1914 and also various treaties and agreements with other nations (ibid, 13). The stress on an alternative historical narrative by the Tibetan leader is of much importance as it gives a historical challenge to China's legitimacy which the PRC had attempted to gain through its own historical narrative. Through these efforts of the Dalai Lama especially his call for an impartial inquiry, the International Commission of Jurists launched an investigation into the atrocities committed by China and also on Tibet's independence, international legal status. The report which was submitted in 1960 emphasised on how Tibet in reality had been a fully sovereign state, independent nation (Avedon, 79). The report also claimed that the "Chinese were guilty of trying to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such" (ibid, 80). This was a major challenge to Chinese legitimacy over Tibet as it not only questioned China's sovereignty claims over Tibet but also questioned the peaceful nature of its liberation.

While these and numerous other statements made by the Dalai Lama in exile, have challenged Chinese legitimacy in Tibet, it is the statements made by him in commemoration of the Tibetan National Uprising that took place on 10 March 1959 in Lhasa and which is considered to be a watershed moment in modern Tibetan history that led to the exile of the Dalai Lama and the fleeing of tens of thousands of Tibetans. On 10 March tens of thousands of Tibetans from all walks of life had protested against the Chinese. The primary reason was an invitation extended to the Dalai Lama by the Chinese to attend a cultural performance without his personal security, which led to a rising feeling that the Chinese were up to harming the Dalai Lama, which also reveals the importance of the institution of the Dalai Lama to the Tibetan people. Furthermore, the 10 March uprising was also the culmination of a series of factors which will be elaborated in the last chapter. In exile the 10 March uprising have been commemorated annually and has remained an important way of galvanizing and uniting the Tibetan people.

It also acts as an important way of remembering, of encouraging a memory which is needed for garnering nationalism. It is the remembering of the uprising of 10 March 1959 by the exiles which also poses a challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet. On 10 March exiled Tibetans generally protest in front of the Chinese embassies or consulates in those countries where they have a sizeable population. In a way these protests and the remembering of the national uprising is seen to act as a catalyst for the Tibetans inside Tibet to resist the Chinese state. It has been during this period that Tibetans inside Tibet have also demonstrated in a number of occasions which will be dealt with further in the last chapter. The date and day has achieved tremendous significance not only for Tibetans but also for the party state as during the period of the anniversary of March 10 the TAR is closed for outsiders and also there is an increase in security presence within the Tibetan areas. This is done precisely to wade off further protests but also ironically gives more importance to the anniversary hence granting it further legitimacy. The Dalai Lama as mentioned since 1960 has delivered his statement on March 10, which acts as a testament of the Tibetan leader towards his people and also more importantly as a window to the world for a glimpse of the exile leadership's stand on Tibet. For instance, in the March 10 statement of 1961 the Dalai Lama criticizes the PRC for masquerading as a "liberator". As liberation remains one of the major platforms for gaining legitimacy by the PRC, the Dalai Lama is seen to be attacking this very basic legitimacy. Through his statement the Dalai Lama creates an alternative image of Tibet, emphasizing on how the Chinese have been guilty of genocide and they are seen to be destroying Tibetan culture and religion that has increased further as evidenced from the steady and unceasing flow of Tibetan refugees from Tibet (Dalai Lama, 1998:349).

His 10 March statements in the early periods are rife with notions of Tibetans suffering under foreign domination and also imploring the global community to alleviate their suffering. He also mentions about how by 1962 there were around 70,000 refugees seeking asylum, with more pouring in escaping the harsh policies of the Chinese, thus posing a challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet (ibid, 355). He also gives an elaborate idea about the suffering of Tibetans inside Tibet, especially from a famine which resulted in countless deaths (ibid, 356). This famine was in the aftermath of the failure of the Great Leap Forward implemented by Mao in China to surpass the western industrialized

nations. During this period the Dalai Lama's statements on 10 March emphasise on Tibet's independence and also on waging a non violent passive resistance to free Tibet and a preparation for that was in the form of an adoption of a draft Constitution for a future Tibet.

In his statements, the Dalai Lama is also seen to be outlining the events occurring inside Tibet which actually challenges the idea of legitimacy enjoyed by the party state in Tibet. In his 1965 statement the Dalai Lama mentions about how the Panchen Lama had raised his voice against the Chinese and was being punished (ibid, 363). He is also critical of the formation of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) that was created in 1965 as he terms the set up as not including the eastern and north eastern Tibetan areas and furthermore he criticizes the presence of 1/3rd of the members of the TAR as being Chinese and also the recruitment of Tibetans from the feudal landlord classes which for him was an elaboration of the idea that the Chinese had not gained legitimacy from common Tibetans. More importantly, the Dalai Lama also mentions about the resistances being offered by Tibetans who had been trained and educated by the Chinese (ibid, 365). From the period of 1966 – 1976 which coincided with the Cultural Revolution in PRC and Tibet, the statements of the Dalai Lama on 10 March also provides an understanding of the situation inside Tibet especially the excesses committed such as the dismissal of the 301 so called elected representatives of the TAR as well as the dismissal of those Tibetans who had received training in China, who now had been sent to labour camps (ibid, 370). He also gives an example of the destruction of religion and culture in Tibet, for instance in the form of the destruction of an image of *Avalokiteshwara* from the 7th century AD (ibid, 367).

The Dalai Lama in his 10 March statement of 1969 gave further evidence of how a challenge to China's legitimacy is on the rise in Tibet as seen through the movement of resistance spreading to the prisons and concentration camps where Tibetan prisoners have been talking about Tibet being an independent nation and how there had been the violation of sovereignty of Tibet. He also mentions about the criticisms and dislike towards China being raised through songs (ibid, 373). The Dalai Lama also in his statements mentions about the success accrued by the exile community with regard to

rehabilitation and resettlement as well as their commitment to a democratic set up in exile as well as in a future free Tibet (ibid, 374). In his speech in 1970, the Dalai Lama recounts a strong challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet from a violent rebellion encountered by the party state in 1969 when in the areas of Chamdo, Powo, Lhoka, Tolung, Nyemo and Shang there were several violent ambushes and raids by Tibetans on Chinese military camps and ammunition dumps. A number of Chinese officers were also killed and held prisoner by the Tibetans (ibid, 376). Also the Dalai Lama mentions about the failure of the Chinese state to produce a single notable young Tibetan leader in Tibet as majority of the youth who had been trained by them were still deeply Tibetan in their psyche (ibid, 377). In his statement made in 1971, the Dalai Lama reveals the bankruptcy of the Chinese legitimacy in Tibet as he mentions about proof of revolts for Tibetan independence being made by locals (ibid, 378).

As mentioned much of the 10 March statements by the Dalai Lama also emphasises on the success of the exile Tibetan community, whereby he mentioned in 1975 that the exile experiment was a major success and how Tibetans in exile enjoyed more rights and freedoms than their counterparts inside Tibet (ibid, 388). Hence what is clear is the fact that the exile experiment as according to the Dalai Lama has been quite successful and more importantly stands as an important mode of deriving more legitimacy than the Chinese party state inside Tibet. He is also much critical of the specific policies being implemented inside Tibet by Beijing which are mostly indirectly linked to the gaining of legitimacy by the party state. For instance, the Dalai Lama strongly criticizes the policy of sending 6600 retired PLA veterans as well as graduate students from different parts of China, who were sent in 43 separate batches on the pretext of "joining the socialist revolution and socialist construction work in Tibet". Also Chinese brought in the name of skilled labour to Tibet is criticized by the Dalai Lama, which is termed as attempts by the party state to turn Tibet into a Han Chinese colony. He also criticized the extracting of forced labour from the Tibetans especially in the construction of a dam in Lhatse and the forced agricultural cultivation in Taktse. Also in 1976 in a meeting convened to mourn the death of Mao, 300 Tibetans were arrested and several were executed on the grounds that they showed a lack of genuine sorrow and grief at the meeting (ibid, 393).

The Dalai Lama's 10 March statements in the period of the reforms carried out by Deng does reflect the positive attributes of the liberalization that was kick started by the Chinese leader and which was also extended to the Tibetan areas. However the Dalai Lama mentions about how even despite the leniency inside Tibet, the exile Tibetans were better off as they enjoyed more freedoms and a higher level of education (ibid, 401). The stress on the exiled Tibetans doing better and enjoying a more liberal atmosphere than their counterparts in Tibet is an important way of gaining legitimacy by the exiled Tibetan leadership. The liberalization brought inside Tibet is termed by him to be not uniformly implemented and is seen to be temporary, corrupt and inconsistent. He mentions about how in the early 1980s the living conditions in Tibet had not even reached to the pre 1949 period and how the major gap between the Tibetans and Chinese had led to feelings of resentment, fear and suspicion inside Tibet (ibid, 406).

Much of the statements made by the Dalai Lama in commemoration of the 10 March uprising mentions about the life of liberty and openness lived by Tibetans in exile in comparison to their brethren in Tibet. More importantly Tibetans in exile are termed as managing their own affairs (ibid, 412). The economy which is one of the key methods of deriving legitimacy by the party state in Tibet is also criticized by the Dalai Lama who terms the economic policy as being one where Tibet has turned into a major source of economic goods especially natural resources for China which may lead to more ecological damage inside Tibet (ibid, 417). Through these statements, the Dalai Lama is able to deconstruct the picture of happiness and prosperity which was much emphasised by the party state as modes of gaining legitimacy among Tibetans inside Tibet. Furthermore, in these statements, the Dalai Lama terms the Chinese policies as a form of genocide, racial discrimination and colonization. He also emphasises on the idea of demilitarization and turning Tibet into a zone of peace (ibid, 420) which was the main platform on which his later "Five Point Peace Plan" is based on. The Dalai Lama also mentions about the success of the exile community and especially the exile Tibetan government which he was heading then and which is seen as deriving its own legitimacy that has emerged as a challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet.

The establishment of a government in exile, popularly known as the CTA by the Dalai Lama which claims to be the true legitimate government of the Tibetan people both inside and outside Tibet is seen to be posing a major challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet. The CTA at least till 2011 was termed as being a continuation of the erstwhile *Ganden Phodrang* government which had been established by the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1642. Hence, the exile government was seen to be deriving a form of historical legitimacy which is linked to the institution of the Dalai Lama. Furthermore, it has always been the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama that has given the much required claims to legitimacy to the CTA. It was through the efforts of the present Dalai Lama that the exiles had established a representative, democratic institution which would govern the exile Tibetans and also provided a model for their homeland (TPPRC, 2003:9). The embracing of democracy is also seen as an important way of gaining legitimacy by the exiled Tibetan leadership.

Democracy as a legitimising factor is seen to be serving a dual purpose of generating support from the west as well as posing as an alternative to the authoritarian system prevalent in China. This has been emphasised well by the Dalai Lama in his 10 March statements. The CTA and especially the elected Assembly of the People's Deputies (ATPD) are institutions which are based on the principles of self government which is to serve as a model for their homeland (ibid, 10). However the exile community is still seen to be undergoing a process of democratisation which was visible with the devolution of power by the Dalai Lama to a secular leader in 2011. The Tibetan spiritual leader considered this move as an important way of acquiring more legitimacy by the CTA especially in the eyes of the liberal democratic west and also paves the way for a transformation in authority from a charismatic legitimacy one to a legal rational form of legitimacy. The CTA is structured like any other form of government with an executive, a legislature and judiciary, which are independent from one another and which also provides a series of checks and balances to each other, hence trying to fulfil the principles of democracy. In exile the Tibetan democratic system has undergone several hauls with the implementation of the Constitution of Tibet in 1963, the 1991 Charter of the Tibetans in Exile (Roemer, 2009:92), the devolution of power by the Dalai Lama, the two

referendums in the exile community to decide on the future course of action held in 2008 and 2011, much of which were brought through democratic processes.

The institutionalisation of democracy in exile is seen through the adoption of popular elections by the exile Tibetan community which was practiced initially for the elections of the members of the ATPD and which was extended to the direct election of the Prime Minister in exile from 2001 onwards. However the ATPD from its inception in 1960 to the Tenth formed in 1988 could issue only opinions and resolutions but lacked the power to implement it. Furthermore, the seats in the assembly was reserved for the regional electorates and sectarian affiliations, who in turn discussed on issues related to homeland politics while not emphasising on exile communities. The cabinet or the Kashag were directly appointed by the Dalai Lama and had the power not to follow the resolutions of the assembly. The regional and religious divisions of the electorates was much criticised by organisations like the Tibetan Youth Congress who wanted the elimination of such a division. This was much resisted by the minority groups. Hence after lengthy negotiations with no resolution in sight it was decided that the Dalai Lama should choose the Ninth and Tenth Assemblies (Frechette, 2007:111).

It was the Charter of the Tibetans in Exile in 1990 which led to general elections which in 1995 were in the form of a two phase election process; a primary and the final elections, which is being continued till date. There has been an increase in voter participation as well as registration, for instance between the 11th and 12th assembly elections registered voters increased by nearly 30 percent and between the 12th and 13th, the increase was by another 5.8 percent. In 2001 more than 70,000 Tibetan exiles – more than half of all Tibetans in exile casted their votes (ibid, 113). In the 2015 elections for the ATPD as well as the *Sikyong* (political head), there were 88,326 registered voters of which 47,105 votes were casted for the *Sikyong* which is 53.33 percent voter turnout. Whereas 46,890 votes were casted for the members of the Parliament in exile which is 53 percent voter turnout. The preliminary elections in 2015 were conducted in 85 polling venues worldwide, 46 in India, Nepal and Bhutan combined, 9 in foreign Tibetan embassies other than the South Asian nations and 30 in schools and sweater business regions (Monlam, 2015). While Tibetans in Bhutan and Nepal could not vote as in Bhutan the local authorities demanded

their details, in Nepal the pressure from the Chinese authorities have successfully prevented Tibetans from participating in such exercises as it is considered to be an attack on the sovereignty of PRC. Hence, the exiled Tibetan elections can be deemed as posing some challenge to Chinese legitimacy in Tibet.

The CTA is headquartered in the Indian town of Dharamsala and constitutes a set of institutions which oversee and administer the exile Tibetan community. The administration consists of the Department of Religion and Culture, the Department of Home, the Department of Finance, Department(s) of Education, Health, Security's and the Department of Information and International Relations (TPPRC, 2003:50). Through these organs the CTA is able to provide a sense of government to the exile Tibetan population as well as raise the issue of Tibet to the outside world. While no sovereign state recognises the CTA and the host state India terms it more of an NGO, the CTA does operate like a government with even having a number of foreign missions in New Delhi, New York, Geneva, Tokyo, London, Paris, Kathmandu, Moscow, Budapest, Canberra, Pretoria, Taipei and Brussels (ibid). They function like unofficial embassies for the exile government and are involved in the administration of Tibetans present in the host countries but also they are seen to be involved much in lobbying for the Tibetan issue to foreign governments and donors. Hence, through the CTA as well as the foreign missions, the legitimacy of the PRC over Tibet is truly challenged.

The CTA through providing of education to the exile Tibetan students and also attracting large number of Tibetans from Tibet for the pursuit of education in exile is also able to strengthen Tibetan nationalism as the exile schools are seen to be providing an alternative narrative of Tibetan history, one which challenges China's legitimacy. The Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) is equipped with their own publications division which disseminates information and writings on Tibet, which is seen to be in contrast to the Chinese claims. Therefore, the CTA along with looking after the numerous Tibetan settlements in South Asia is also seen to be questioning the various means of gaining legitimacy by the PRC inside Tibet. The CTA which is much a brain-child of the Dalai Lama can be seen as an attempt by him to create a strong "civil society", a hegemonic system which can be dubbed as a "war of position" especially through the

strengthening of the exile government's apparatuses. The CTA is also seen to be deriving its legitimacy from the formulation of "*Cholka Sum*" or the Three Traditional Provinces" of Kham, Amdo and U-tsang, which is mostly well reflected through the elected representatives of the parliament belonging to these historical regions.

CONCLUSION

While the party state in the early 1950s tried to gain legitimacy in Tibet through adopting a gradualist policy, which emphasised on the co-option of the ruling elite especially the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the policy eventually failed due to a number of reasons. However, we do see a continuation of a similar mode of gaining legitimacy especially after the Cultural Revolution when Deng launched his policy of liberalisation. The two hypotheses - Tibetan ethno nationalism is an outcome of China's mode of strengthening its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas but is seen to be antithetical to each other. Secondly, China's legitimacy over Tibet is seen as being subsidiary over its concern for maintaining its security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion is also much proved through the various instances in the chapter. This is especially seen through the party state's policies of religious and cultural freedom being provided especially with Deng's reforms which had led to a further growth of nationalism as witnessed through the songs, memories and literature of resistance.

Also the role of the Dalai Lama is important as he still remains a figure who is deeply venerated by the Tibetans in Tibet as well as in exile, hence his importance was well understood by Mao and the other Chinese leaders, who wanted to co-opt the Tibetan leader. However with the Dalai Lama going into exile and Beijing terming him as a splittist, who is seen as desiring the breaking up of the Chinese motherland, there is no longer the earlier desire to co-opt him which emphasises the idea of the Chinese state giving more preference to security and control over the Tibetan areas. Also their strong attempts at denying legitimacy to the Tibetan leader through vilifying him and enforcing the same upon Tibetans has led to a reversal of sorts with the Dalai Lama receiving more approval from Tibetans as recounted in the chapter above. This has led to a situation whereby the Dalai Lama has become the source of legitimacy for dissent and resistance inside Tibet which will be elaborated further in the last chapter on how protests,

demonstrations and self immolations are all methods of challenging the legitimacy of the PRC in Tibet.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESISTANCE AND REVOLT IN TIBET – RE-CREATING POPULAR LEGITIMACY FROM BELOW

This chapter will look into the challenges to China's legitimacy that have emerged from numerous avenues, which includes direct protests, demonstrations, self immolations and alternative discourses in the form of narratives and literary writings in the Tibetan regions. While the previous chapters have elaborated on the different ways through which the party state has tried gaining legitimacy in Tibet, this chapter will focus on the challenges that Beijing faces to its legitimacy from inside Tibet. The chapters have also attempted to correlate the manufacturing of legitimacy to that of generating some degree of hegemony by the CCP in the Tibetan regions. Hegemony in itself has to be constantly renewed, recreated, defended and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, and challenged by pressures not at all its own. This emerges in the form of 'counter-hegemony' and 'alternative hegemony' (Williams, 2010:112). In this chapter this notion of counter-hegemony will also be elaborated in the case of Tibet. Along with this, the chapter will also test the two hypotheses, which are firstly that Tibetan ethno nationalism is an outcome of China's mode of strengthening its legitimacy over the Tibetan areas but is seen to be antithetical to each other. Secondly, China's legitimacy over Tibet is seen as being subsidiary over its concern for maintaining its security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion. It is this resistance and challenges to the party state's hegemony which will take centre-stage in this chapter.

These challenges and the build up to counter-hegemony in Tibet can be seen to be occurring through direct actions by Tibetans inside Tibet, in forms of protests and self-immolations and through formation of discourses and counter narratives that forms "subjugated knowledge" (McGranahan, 2010:25) and is deemed splittist by the party state. The chapter will trace the earliest forms of challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet as much of these form layers of sedimented memories, histories which has a strong bearing in the present. In the previous chapters, the party state is seen to be attempting to generate legitimacy in the Tibetan regions through implementing numerous programmes and policies and also through incorporating Tibetans into the ruling structure. Economic

growth and the stupendous development that China has brought to Tibet is also an important tool of garnering legitimacy. These modes of gaining legitimacy are important ways of generating a form of hegemony by the party state in Tibet, as seen through the presence of Tibetan consent in the legitimising process. However, this legitimising process has also drawn much contestation from the local population inside Tibet, which will be elaborated further in the chapter.

In the Tibetan regions the CCP encountered the presence of a governing system which drew its legitimacy from socio-cultural and religious formations. Tibetan Buddhism symbolised by the local monasteries drew authority and legitimacy from the local population. While in central Tibet, the Dalai Lama and the Lhasa government had direct authority, Tibetan populations in Kham and Amdo were divided into smaller chiefdoms, kingdoms and monastic authorities who vacillated between Lhasa and Republican China. Both Lhasa and Republican China had nominal control over these areas. However, Tibetan Buddhism was hegemonic in these regions, with the Dalai Lama as the supreme head of the religion. The Tibetan social setup prior to 1959 can be termed as being dominated by Buddhist hegemony, where the monastics and especially the Dalai Lama derived consent from the general population through devotion and respect. An example can be seen in the narrative provided by Aten from Nyarong, who was one of the local chieftains in Nyarong, Kham. He mentions about how in 1933 with the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, the locals from Nyarong and other regions of Kham collected large amounts of gold, silver and precious jewels which were sent to Lhasa as a contribution towards building a mausoleum for their religious leader (Aten, 1986:48).

The party state failed to comprehend the actual state of social relations, the fact that 'their actions appeared in their eyes of the Tibetans as encroachments by atheistic outsiders on ancient traditions and sanctified religion'. Their policies to split Tibet into opposing social classes failed and they promoted an interclass consolidation which prompted anti-Chinese attitudes to spread deeply among the lower classes. The culmination of which was the March 1959 revolt, which was suppressed and Beijing imposed changes in society without Tibetan consent (Rozman, 1985:225). The Gramscian formulation of the 'war of position' and 'war of manoeuvre' can be used to describe the strategies adopted

by both the Tibetan polity and the party state. The united front policies which the CCP adopted in Tibet can be termed as following a pattern which resembles a 'war of position', which however lost out to a revolutionary impatience that demanded immediate national integration and socialist transformation, leading in 1958 to communisation, democratic reforms and rebellion (Weiner, 2012). The latter reflects a 'war of manoeuvre' tactics, which led to open contestation from Tibetans as the CCP had failed to create a sense of hegemony among the Tibetan population.

AMDO, KHAM, GOLOK – THE LAND OF THE UN-GOVERNED

Termed as the periphery of the Sino-Tibetan world, Amdo, Kham and Golok are regions where the Tibetan world meets numerous cultures, Han Chinese being one among the many. The peripherality of the region is a one sided view from Lhasa or Beijing, with the region and its various constituents exercising its own agency. These constituents were seen in the form of numerous localities and micro societies differentiated by custom as by distinctive governments. They were in the form of principalities, chiefdoms or tribal areas ruled by semi-independent chiefs, local kings or princes, lamas, occasional Chinese armies and sometimes Chinese Muslim warlords (Barnett, 2014:xvii). For instance in Nyarong, Kham it was divided into four tribes called the seat of the thousand that implied each tribe consisted of a thousand families, which was further subdivided (Aten, 1986:14). When modern ideas of state and sovereignty permeated in these regions, it encountered a different set of concepts of geo-political space that was based on a multiplicity of state forms and presence of numerous overlapping zones, open zones and locally governed territories, both lay and monastic (McGranahan, 2010:40).

These areas were not consistently ruled by Lhasa after about 1700, although in brief periods up until the 1930s the Tibetan army was able to regain control of one or other border zone in Kham. It was with the defeat of the local ruler Gonpo Namgyel (1799-1865) by the Lhasa authorities that large areas of eastern Tibet were handed to the Lhasa government. Therefore, Nyarong annually paid taxes of 120 *sangs* of silver to Lhasa as well as a large amount of bear gall and wooden bowls and plates (Aten, 27). It was with the expedition of General Zhao Er Feng of the Qing dynasty in 1905-06 that areas of Kham came under the control of China. However, in this period most of the region fell

under the nominal administration of the KMT or the local warlords (Barnett, 2014). Hence, in terms of legitimacy these areas remain fuzzy as both Lhasa and Beijing had nominal control over them. However, through the common strand of Tibetan Buddhism and common customs and culture the people from the region identified themselves more with Lhasa, the centre of their cultural, religious world and the sacred authority of the Dalai Lama (ibid).

At present, Kham, Amdo and Golok has 55 percent of the 6.2 million Tibetan populations in China. These areas have emerged as the melting pot of social, cultural and religious vigour, with famous modern Tibetan writers, poets, essayists and film-makers coming from these regions. The population in these areas was not equal recipients' in the restrictions that had been imposed on Tibetans in TAR from the 1990s, although some restrictive policies were extended to these areas which did lead to dissent from the local populace. Hence, the region has dominated Tibetan cultural history in the modern period. In the recent period the region has also emerged as a major site for protests and demonstrations against the Chinese state. In modern Sino-Tibetan relations, these regions were the first to rebel against the party state, challenging their legitimacy and the discourse of peaceful liberation and emancipation. The Tibetans in these regions were the ones who offered military resistance against the party state. Their frontier status meant that the people in these regions were the first line of defence for the Tibetan state against China. Even though they imbibed a strong sense of independence, it was always tempered by loyalty to the Dalai Lama (McGranahan, 2010:7).

The armed resistance against the Chinese from the region was also not uniform, with some areas rebelling much earlier than the others. For instance, the Amdo region had been brought under the control of the CCP by 25 September 1949 (Dorji Tsering, 1976:13) and immediately in December 1949 people from the villages of Nangra and Hormokha decided to fight against the Chinese under the leadership of *Pon* Wangchen of Nangra and *Pon* Choje of Hormokha, who had 6000 voluntary soldiers and 60 assistants. There were a series of battles between them and the PLA, with heavy casualties on both sides. For instance, in mid 1950, there were a total number of 40 Tibetans and 150 Chinese casualties from a two month conflict and in 1951, they fought with 30,000

Chinese for about three months in Nangra (ibid, 14). Due to the strong armed resistance put up by them, the Chinese communists dubbed them as “Little Taiwan”. The fighters surrendered to the Chinese only after they were promised amnesty which was relayed through Lama Shabdung Karpo and Serti Rinpoche of Dechen monastery. Moreover, the leader of the rebellion group *Pon Wangchen* was taken to Beijing and felicitated by Mao who wanted him to remain a village headman for PRC and work diligently for China (ibid, 19). This also reflects the idea of co-option as a strategy adopted by the party state in the context of Tibet especially during the 1950s.

In a similar manner, the first uprisings against the Chinese began from 1952 onwards in Gyalthang while the rest of Kham rose against the PLA in 1955-56. This gap can be explained as in majority of the region the CCP had instituted a policy of united front, of cooperation and coexistence with the local elites. The PLA soldiers and other officials were forbidden from even taking a needle from the locals and were instructed to respect local cultures and provide aid to Tibetans (McGranahan, 2010:67). The local elites were also consulted by the party state with regard to implementing reforms as mentioned by Gyakar Gompo Namgyal who hailed from Kham Derge and had become a steward in the household of the king of Derge (Namgyal, 1976:22). He mentions about how they were made a part of the Chamdo Liberation Committee, which comprised of 21 districts and to discuss on the issue of whether to implement or not the reforms the heads of these districts were made to undergo a 10 day meeting with the Chinese general Wang Qimei (ibid, 24). According to him, the group was further subdivided into almost three groups, the first headed by the *Karupon* (head of the Chungpo Karu district) who stated that they wanted reforms along with the rest of Tibet. Another group of 40 including the heads of Lhodzong, Shotarshsum and *Hortso Tatukpon* declared that they did not have any objections to reforms while the third group comprising of *Chamdo Shiwalhas*, *Dragyapas*, *Gonjowas*, *Markhamwas* and *Dergewas* totalling around 200 said that Tibet did not require reforms (ibid).

The above example is also indicative of the absence of a single voice among the different groups present in eastern Tibet. Furthermore, in another meeting where heads and members totalling around 210 of the subdistricts of Derge were made to assemble at

Jomda dzong, the authorities stressed that they would initiate democratic reforms which were vehemently opposed by the Tibetans but to prevent that around 5000 Chinese troops had been deployed. The Tibetans were confined to further meetings and were prevented from leaving, however the author mentions about how eventually they escaped into the hills and launched raids on the Chinese camps (ibid, 25). This was much before the actual implementation of the democratic reforms in eastern Tibet in 1956-57 and hence to placate the rebels the authorities sent their emissaries in the form of Ngabo Nawang Jigme and the Karmapa, who sent letters to the rebels through *Yaptsang* Lobsang Kunchok of Derge, who emphasised on Wang Qimei's imploring the rebels that reforms had been delayed for another five years (ibid, 27). This was however not persuasive enough for the rebels.

Hence, two months later, the Chinese sent Derge *Tsunmo* (queen) to persuade them, which was not successful. The queen along with *Yaptsang* Lobsang Kunchok came again, this time with a letter from the Dalai Lama, which was addressed to the rebel chieftain Khardo Chime Gonpo requesting them to surrender and emphasising that no reforms would be implemented. The proposal also stated that the rebels were to negotiate with the Chinese authorities at Derge Ranta, to which they agreed but returned to their hiding place soon after the completion of the negotiations. It was only in the beginning of February 1957 that the queen of Derge, the prince and Pomda Tobgay arrived stressing to them the need to surrender and join the Chinese in *Jomda dzong* or else they had to face severe repercussions, to which they agreed. After their arrival, they were given different posts in *Jomda dzong* (ibid, 27). The author mentions about how the authorities tried to indoctrinate them through classes on communism, which they continued to attend till the implementation of the democratic reforms, after which they deserted their posts and joined the armed resistance against the PLA. The informant Gonpo Namgyal along with Woma Rignam led more than 13,000 Khampas against the Chinese and in the course of the battles and eventual flight to exile the number had been reduced to 110 (ibid, 22).

What is important here is that in some regions of eastern Tibet, the locals challenged the party state even prior to the imposition of democratic reforms, which had lit the spark for mass rebellion against the Chinese. As well as it is seen that in the pre democratic reform

period, the party state had managed to co-opt a number of local religious and lay elites who were aiding them in consolidating their legitimacy as evidenced from the above examples of the Karmapa as the religious elite, Pomda Tobgay, Yaptsang Lobsang Kunchok as the secular elites who tried persuading the rebels on behalf of the Chinese authorities. Hence, the communists tried to gain legitimacy through a process of co-option and consent from the people. This can be understood in terms of the party state emphasising on a 'war of position' in Kham, Amdo and Golok. They initially emphasised on a slow construction of the social foundations of a new state through attempting to form alternative institutions and intellectual resources from the local population.

However, this quickly gave way to a policy of deriving legitimacy through emphasising on national liberation and class oppression in the society by the earlier ruling elites and shifting to a 'war of manoeuvre', where socialist reforms, collectivisation and religious reform system were imposed in the region from 1955-56, which triggered the uprising in Kham (Barnett, 2014:xxviii). This was part of a nationwide policy of reforms initiated by Mao which was however not imposed in the central Tibetan regions as it was under the Seventeen Point Agreement. Through the socialist reforms, the party state sought to legitimise their rule by bringing in a revolutionary change in these areas, ones which would uproot the old system and would empower the peasantry. It included strong attacks on religion which were quite unbearable, leading to the Tibetans terming the Chinese as "enemies of the faith" (McGranahan, 2010: 68).

With the end of the policy of "gradualism" in Kham, Amdo and Golok, the party state's legitimacy rested on socialist/democratic reforms which entailed confiscation of wealth and property of the locals and its re-distribution to the poor, political "struggle sessions" of the ruling elites by the local population, the establishment of communes, disbanding of monks and monasteries, confiscation of weapons and recording of the wealth of each family. These measures were directed towards the creation of a class consciousness among the Tibetans, who would be liberated by the CCP. Thus, the party state had invited 500 poor Khampa families to Kardze, who were from the lower classes and bestowed upon them the title of model citizens. These Tibetans were to be at the forefront of the

struggle sessions and also were to replace the earlier ruling elites. They were also to be sent to thwart attempts by others to rebel against the Chinese (ibid, 80-82).

In a similar manner, in Kham Bathang, the party had created a thousand lower class citizens to disrupt life there and the Chinese authorities had invited the local chieftains to Dartsendo for a meeting and subsequently had them detained. This was an important strategy adopted by the CCP of detaining the local elites, who had earlier been co-opted by them (Jamyang Norbu, 1986:108). The success of the communists towards imbedding class consciousness among the masses can also be traced to the lynching of Sera Lama, Ganden Wula and Ragshe Jadog; former religious and lay elites from a chieftdom in Amdo by Tibetans who were from the same chieftdom. These Tibetans justified their acts as retribution for the past crimes of these three individuals as they were a part of the earlier ruling structure and had exploited the masses (Naktsang Nulo, 2014:203-04). However, the violent attacks on Tibetan Buddhism, especially its institutions and individuals led to strong disenchantment from all sections of the Tibetan population as religion was deeply ingrained in the minds of the Tibetans, an ideology that forms a deep hegemony. During the armed uprisings, the monasteries became the strongholds of the resistance fighters.

Tibetan Buddhism is the dominating value system in Tibet, where the entire civilisational ethos was based on the faith. Tibet was and still is a highly religiously active country, one in which Tibetan Buddhism was the “common sense”. It is the Tibetan Buddhist value system which held hegemonic sway over the country (Norbu, 2001:211). Tibet had a unique form of polity, shaped by religion where the separation of the state and clergy had not taken place. Termed as “*chosinyiden*”, (literally translates as the combination of the religious and the political) the Dalai Lamas since 1642 had held both secular and religious authority in Tibet, which was still operative when the communists decided to liberate Tibet. Dawa Norbu terms that it was precisely the Tibetan value system that marked Tibet and Tibetans different from Confucian China. The communists and the Red Army had encountered the Tibetans during the historic Long March, when they were fleeing from the Nationalist government’s forces and had ventured into the eastern

Tibetan regions. It is here that they faced a population united in their hostility towards them.

For instance, when the Red Army crossed through Nyarong, they were met with armed resistance from Chime Dolma, the female leader of the Gyari Tsang family who took her men and went south to Tawu (Ch. *Daofu*) to engage the communists in a number of skirmishes. She had also threatened dire consequences to all Tibetans giving or selling food to the Red Army (Aten, 1986:52). The other important tribal chieftains who attacked the Red Army were Ako Heshey Gyatso, a nomad leader from eastern Nyarong and *Pon Nyaku Agen* from lower Nyarong, with both leaders harassing the Red Army, killing many of them (ibid, 53). However there were a few supporters of the communists present such as the Geda *tulku* of Beri Monastery, who provided logistical support to them and would play an important role in the 1950s. However through the Long March and their encounters with the Tibetans, the communists realised that the Tibetans had a proper working value system and social structure, hence revolution was quite impossible, unless imposed from above (ibid, 213).

Therefore, the policy adopted by the CCP after coming to power was to follow united front, where all suitable means to win over the Dalai Lama and majority of the upper strata and isolate the minority of bad elements without any coercion was to be achieved. Mao had emphasised that in Tibet, the communists did not have any social base or any material base. In terms of social power, the ruling elite were stronger than the communists, which would not change. Hence, to implement this the communists made no direct contact with the masses, the proletariat, to whom they did not indoctrinate initially as they understood that they were deeply rooted in the Tibetan value system (ibid, 214). The policy of the united front as initiated by the CCP in Tibet can be somewhat compared to following a tactic of “war of position” where the communists aimed at generating rule through consent. One way was through forming associations of leading figures and personalities from each social class who were taken on tours arranged every year to witness the progress made in China since ‘Liberation’ in the building of a new motherland (Tubten Khetsun, 2009:14). The party state also tried to gain hegemony through sending Tibetan children to study in the various National Minority Institutes in

different parts of China. From 1951 the Chinese had made it mandatory for every district in the eastern Tibetan areas to send at least fifty people annually to China for studies (Jamyang Norbu, 1986:90). Hence, the united front can be termed as an important component of post 1949 state building for China, one which derives consent for the CCP from non Party sections of the Chinese society as well as from the ethnic minorities. In the Party's logic of united front, the minorities would remain in the transitional period for a longer time that is from a democratic stage to communism, the upper class patriotic strata would be tolerated while a successor generation of properly proletarian background would be trained (Weiner, 2012:32).

The policy of the CCP can be correlated to the tactics of "war of position" as well as the "war of manoeuvre", which forms the essential basis for Gramscian hegemony. The united front policy shares similarities with the former strategy and can be deemed as a way through which the party state understood its own presence and legitimacy in places like Amdo, Kham and Golok and in a way established its institutional values and practices of sovereignty. It can be termed as a way through which the CCP has tried to lay claim to the legitimacies of its imperial predecessors. For instance in Amdo, the united front strategy was adopted where the Amdo Tibetans were termed as victims of national chauvinism and not as victims of class oppression. Therefore in these regions, class struggle was not imposed and it was exempted from the nationwide socialist reforms that were currently underway. Through united front tactics, the indigenous Tibetan elites who were former local authorities either under the KMT or even Lhasa were made leaders of newly established nationality autonomous governments, forming a medium between the party and masses. The wishes of the elites and masses would be taken into consideration for making the transition to socialism. Therefore, through the deployment of consent, consultation and persuasion the socialist revolution would be brought to these regions. The united front was a way of winning the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people (ibid, 36).

The united front policy was also reflected in the Seventeen Point Agreement signed by the Central government and the local government of Tibet in 1951 as much of the radical reforms were postponed in the areas which fell under the direct jurisdiction of Lhasa.

This was also witnessed in Kham and Amdo, where under the strategy of united front, the Chinese authorities did not attempt to indoctrinate the masses with Marxism but stressed on the fact that they had arrived to liberate Tibetans from the former Nationalist regime and to better their lives. They were, however quick to point out that this would be done by the local chieftains and ruling elite themselves. Hence a year after their arrival in Nyarong, they established a People's government whereby Nyarong was turned into a district which was further divided into four sub districts, on lines of a traditional formulation and appointed Tibetan administrators for each sub district. For instance in the sub district of *WuluChue*, Gyurme of the *Gyara Chipa* family was appointed as administrator, while Aten was an assistant administrator who was paid a monthly stipend of 120 silver dollars (Aten, 1986:80).

However with regard to the eastern Tibetan regions, the policies initiated by the communists were based on a rigid apparent legality as these regions were deemed to be under the Chinese provinces and not under Lhasa. (Norbu, 2001:215). As mentioned earlier, the communists propagated the idea of "self determination" and "self rule" but in Kham and parts of Amdo, from 1953 onwards they were placed under civil administration, under a political commissar but still is seen to be emphasising on the policy of self determination and self rule (Aten, 1986:82). The changes in their policies came about from 1954 onwards when the communists started their plans for "economic change for the welfare of the people" through which fallow land was distributed to the poor and needy along with seeds and farming implements (ibid, 84).

The groundwork for the democratic reforms was laid whereby the co-opted Tibetans were asked to locate those Tibetans who had strong influence and wealth in the community. This was significant as democratic reforms could only be brought about through severing the bond between the masses and their traditional leaders (ibid, 85). Aten mentions about how democratic reforms were initiated through destroying the existing social structure whereby the four subdistricts of Nyarong were divided into *xiangs* which would be under a head who would be aided by an assistant, a secretary and a captain from the People's Militia. These officials were handpicked by the Chinese and were mostly from poor backgrounds (ibid, 86). It was accompanied with a series of political lectures and self

criticism sessions by the former ruling elites. It also entailed the complete nationalisation of all property and the formation of communes. Hence, the communists initiated a “class war” among the Tibetans, pitting the former subordinates against the traditional ruling elites. The strategy had changed from the “war of position” which was symbolised by the gradualist policy of the united front to a direct confrontation in the form of the “war of manoeuvre”. This proved to be a failure as mentioned earlier, due to the eastern Tibetan regions of Kham, Amdo and Golok never being a singular distinct state nor as claimed by exile Tibetans a “province of Tibet”. The region has been subject to a dizzying array of political formations and numerous overlapping spheres of authority, both secular and religious that defies compartmentalisation within modern discourses of sovereignty and nation state (Weiner, 2012:6). There was the exercise of authority by local ruling institutions through an imperial relationship either with China or with Lhasa.

These regions which were at the margins of the Sino-Tibetan world were never under the effective sovereignty of the empires but was always controlled through a process of co-option and incorporation of the elites of the multiple, distinct peripheral polities. There was the presence of intermediaries and local elites who were involved in negotiations between themselves and the imperial elites (ibid, 14). Hence, these regions had been termed as “Inner Tibet” which was under the nominal control of the Chinese, as understood and denominated by the British in 1914-15, when they tried to define the political boundaries of Tibet. However, the eastern Tibetans; Khampas and Amdowas followed the same cultural values followed by the Tibetans in Central Tibet. Their loyalty laid to the Dalai Lama, who was considered to be the supreme pontiff of Tibetan Buddhism which was operative throughout Buddhist Central Asia.

Hence when these Tibetan populations were subjected to a radical policy similar to the one pursued in the rest of China, it proved to be most unsuitable leading to major revolts and armed uprisings against the Chinese state. The communists tried to force social changes on a society which was part of the whole functioning Buddhist society, separated by only an artificial legality. Hence, in terms of a revolutionary legacy, Kham was no more ready than Outer Tibet was for social change. The Dalai Lama and the monasteries were still sacred. They formed the fabric of a value system which had no contestation

from outside. Hence, the suddenness of the Chinese democratic reforms had no time to upset the division of labour and to undermine the traditional value system (Norbu, 2013:216). Hence in these regions, the Tibetan Buddhist value system was entrenched in a manner of a war of position in the Tibetan society, forming a rudimentary civil society, deeply hegemonising the population. Buddhism had an absolute ideological monopoly over the Tibetans and constituted a functioning value system that defined the lived experiences for the Tibetans. It was on these lived values that the political and sacred institutions had been formed, which were challenged by the socialist/democratic reforms, brought by China. Hence the Tibetan rebellion which began from as early as 1952 was a defence of Tibetan Buddhist values and the political and sacred institutions founded upon such values. As according to the memoirs of Adhe Tapontsang who hails from Kardze, Kham, from 1955 onwards the party state started to attack religion especially the institution of monasticism, whereby monks and nuns were termed as “useless” for society and were forced to lead lay lives, in many cases marry, which also led to a number of them committing suicide (Adhe, 1997:60).

The reforms brought by the CCP in the eastern Tibetan areas touched upon the fundamental belief system of the common people, trying to alter it coercively. This was also seen in a highly mundane exercise where with democratic reforms and the formation of farming communes where monks had to participate in cultivation and other manual labour like digging. This activity was seen to result in the killing of small insects which went against the precepts of Buddhism. On a higher level, the monks were further humiliated through forcing them to carry and spread human excrement which served as fertilisers and also they were forced to kill flies, rodents and birds that were deemed as pests and a quota had to be shown to the authorities (ibid, 62). The communists stated that the revolt in Kham and Amdo was carried out by a few from the “upper strata reactionary clique”. However, much of the upper strata had been formally co-opted by the Chinese and the class composition of those who participated in the revolt cut along religious rather than on economic lines. The Tibetans, no matter to which class they belonged were all united in their religious beliefs and supported the existing value system. In the initial rebellion in eastern Tibet in 1952-53 when widespread fighting took place, over 80,000 rebels were involved in the initial rebellion out of which some 12,000

were deserters from the KMT. However, with no aid coming from the outside world and the eastern Tibetan leaders persuading the party from further implementing the reforms, the rebellion subsided. In 1953-54 more rebellion occurred with around 40,000 farmers taking part in an uprising in eastern Tibet which was suppressed by the 18th Chinese Army (Norbu, 2001:218-19).

The Chinese government in the 1950s when faced with an armed uprising from the Khampas, Goloks and Amdowas saw it as a real threat to their legitimacy and suppressed it violently. Furthermore, they justified the brutal counter insurgency in terms of the suppression taking place on de jure Chinese territory. However the party state failed to take into consideration the fact that lived experiences and the value system of the Khampas and Amdowas, Goloks were the same as that of Tibetans in central Tibet (ibid, 220). Armed uprisings took place against the Chinese which were independent and localised, which eventually coalesced into a nationalist movement. These uprisings energised the identities of the Tibetans and gave new impetus to new connections across Tibetan communities (McGranahan, 2010:73). These uprisings which were in the form of uncoordinated pockets gained major momentum with the Tibetans forgetting their earlier blood feuds and old disputes, and hence all the tribes of Kham rose united against the Chinese; the ten clans of Nangchen, from Nagchu and Ragchu *Gonpa*, the *Horpas* of Kardze, the Chatreng herders of the south and the dozen tribes of Markham. In the north eastern region of Amdo around 20,000 horsemen from Golok rose up in arms (Norbu, 2001:220). They were united to defend their faith and in their fight against a common enemy, a new form of cohesion emerged. With the coming of the PLA, a uniform narrative emerged among the Tibetans in eastern Tibet.

In Nyarong, Kham the revolt was led by Dorje Yudon, the younger wife of Gyari Nyima, the chieftain of upper Nyarong. She had gathered all her men and weapons and also dispatched missives all over eastern Tibet urging the people to rise against the Chinese. She along with her men attacked all the Chinese outposts and forced the Chinese to retreat to the castle of the female dragon; headquarters of the district. However, the castle was stormed but due to the impregnable walls of the fortress and the lack of artillery the Tibetan fighters were unable to do much. Furthermore, the Chinese had enough supplies

and were soon aided after a month by 600 troops from the 18th Division who arrived from Kardze but who were soon defeated leading to the death of around 400 soldiers. To prevent the rebels from further emerging victorious, there was the deployment of 15000-20000 soldiers from Drango and Tawu leading to an end of the seize. Heavy casualties were suffered on both sides, with around 2000 Chinese soldiers and 200 officers killed. The rebels were soon driven to the hills from where they initiated a guerrilla campaign (Aten, 1986:106-07).

To create unity in their challenge to the PLA, the chieftains from Lithang; one of the major zones that offered resistance against the Chinese, decided to organise a region wide rebellion against the democratic reforms. Letters were sent to other chiefdoms in Kham which proposed a simultaneous revolt throughout Kham (McGranahan, 2010:81). They termed themselves the volunteer army to defend religion. Around 23 Khampa chiefs had agreed to their initiative. In a major fighting in Kham Nyarong, the Tibetans fought against the 18th Division of the PLA based in Kardze, killing all of them except 43. The Khampas demanded the democratic reforms to be ended (ibid, 83). An instance of rejecting Chinese legitimacy over the Kham region was when the communists emphasised that they would liberate Bathang and impose the democratic reforms, the local population termed themselves to be under the Dalai Lama, to which the party state emphasised on the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951 being signed, which gave them the constitutional right to liberate Bathang.

Hence in response to the reforms, the local population decided to revolt against the Chinese, which started from 1956 onwards. Strong calls for unity and a collective resistance against the Chinese arose from numerous places. From Bathang, for instance messages were sent to neighbouring Lithang, Chatreng and Gyalthang requesting all Tibetans to rise against the Chinese. In Nyarong, there was a major gathering of many of the scattered resistance fighters as a single group in the plains of *Bu Nathang* and also in Serta a region between Kham and Amdo, the mountain *Sergyi Drongri Mukpo* (the abode of the golden yak) was transformed into a base for several thousand Tibetan fighters under the leadership of chieftains like Washul Tolho (Adhe, 1997:75-76).

The letter from the chieftains can be seen as a discourse that calls for the unity of all Tibetans to fight against China and save Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan race. Hence, the Chinese communists are termed as the enemies who are out to destroy the Tibetan way of life. It also rejects the Seventeen Point Agreement of Ngabo (the former Governor of East Tibet who was the main signatory in the Seventeen Point Agreement from the Tibetan side) thus rejecting the very basis of China's legitimacy in Tibet. The letter also rejects the communists attempts to create a class divide and raise class consciousness (ibid, 87). It creates a foundation for a counter-hegemonic discourse that emerges, one that calls for striving towards unity and forgetting past differences, thus sowing the seeds of national unity and integrity. The Khampas and others also sent representatives to Lhasa to apprise them of the situation as well as to seek aid. Towards the end of 1956, leaders of Bathang met with their counterparts from Lithang and Gyalthang and signed a 20 Point Agreement in which they primarily agreed to unite and fight against the Chinese. However, due to a barrage of aerial bombings and the superior numbers of the PLA, the resistance fighters in these regions were finally overwhelmed, with many fleeing westwards to Lhasa (ibid, 88).

Through the implementation of the democratic/socialist reforms, the party state desired to gain legitimacy in the eastern Tibetan regions from 1956 onwards. There was a firm belief that with the equitable distribution of wealth and land reforms, the weaker section of the society would benefit and rally towards the establishment of a communist society. The earlier policy of the united front which emphasised on delaying the socialist revolution and implementing a policy of co-optation and incorporation was rejected. This can be understood in terms of a change from a war of position to a war of manoeuvring, which failed as the party state failed to gauge the hegemonic nature of the Tibetan value system that is based on Tibetan Buddhism, which is deeply ingrained in the consciousness of eastern Tibetans. Without understanding this, the communists imposed the reforms upon a population who were not ready for the sudden transition to socialism. The result was seen in the form of armed uprisings against China.

The coercive attempts by the communists further led to the Tibetans from Amdo, Kham and Golok to unite and oppose a common enemy. The earlier divisions within them were

dissolved through the unity brought about by the arrival of the Chinese who through their democratic reforms in the region attacked their faith and way of life. Furthermore, these Tibetans looked towards Lhasa, both in terms of spiritual guidance from the Dalai Lama as well as military help from the Tibetan government, rekindling their bond with the Tibetan government. This new form of cohesion between them also led to a flowering of an ideology of nationalism, which formed an important foundation for the creation of counter-hegemony in the times to come.

The unity among the eastern Tibetans also increased due to harsh responses from the PLA which arose as a result of the Tibetan armed rebellion. The PLA conducted airstrikes in these regions, dropping bombs on monasteries and human settlements. The monasteries were a favoured target as they were the sites of resistance as well as refuge for the Tibetan rebel fighters and also in many instances for the Chinese. For instance, the PLA conducted airstrikes, dropping 167 bombs throughout Chatreng, Kham, while in the monastery the Chinese troops remained safe. In a similar manner, Lithang monastery, Dranggo monastery and Bathang monastery were bombed. Bathang was bombed for twelve days straight, dropping a total of seventy three bombs (McGranahan, 2010:88). The military crackdown by the PLA and the superiority of their firepower eventually led to the resistance fighters to flee to the mountains and make their way as refugees to Central Tibet leading to the formation of a national resistance army termed The *Chushi Gangdruk* (The Four Rivers Six Ranges).

Also in response to the revolts and uprisings, the Chinese launched a special policy called “peaceful suppression of rebels”, whereby the rebels who surrendered would be treated leniently and hence would not incur any punishment (Aten, 1986:107). Another way through which the Chinese were tackling the revolts were through summoning the local religious and lay elites to Dartsedo, the headquarters of eastern Tibet under the pretext of official work but in reality they were hostages (ibid, 108). The policy of deploying local elites who had not lost the favour of the Chinese was also done to placate the rebels and prevent further uprisings. For instance, Aten, Gyashing Tsethar, Pema Tenzin and Ngodup; the latter two being religious elites were sent with troops to an area in eastern Nyarong which was under guerrilla hands, with the local population actively supporting

them and not letting any Chinese pass. The party state had deployed the 3899 regiment with 3000 crack troops to placate the area (ibid, 111).

The party state also tried to gain confessions from the traditionally downtrodden populace against the former elites or the ones who had rebelled against the Chinese (ibid, 115). According to Aten, there were around 100,000 PLA troops in the whole of eastern Tibet and who were mostly armed with a variety of rifles, which were later replaced by a standard Russian pattern semi-automatic rifle. The soldiers also were armed with sub machine guns and hand grenades and had mortars, machine guns and howitzers for use in combat. There was also the deployment of mountain guns, which according to him could be taken to pieces and hauled on the back of mules (ibid, 117). The guerrillas were truly outgunned and in many cases outnumbered, although their numbers had swelled, but they made best use of the knowledge of the terrain and also an important way through which they could harass the PLA was through stopping their movements by creating landslides (Adhe, 1997:75).

Aten in his narrative also mentions that in 1957 there were over 10,000 people in the guerrilla force opposing the Chinese and when these rebels needed supplies they made forays into villages where in a number of instances, they were helped by local officials under the party state (ibid, 128). Hence from here it is important to note that while a number of traditional elites who had been coopted prior to 1956 had participated in the rebellion, there were many of them who are seen to have remained with the Chinese. Along with them, individuals belonging to the lower classes were also incorporated in the ruling structure. But still a great number of them also defected to the resistance fighters. For instance, as according to Aten, an individual Sonam Rinzin who had been a *hsiang tang* in a subdistrict of Nyarong and had earlier being a commoner had decided to revolt against the Chinese (ibid, 124-25). In 1957, Gyari Nyima who was the chieftain of Upper Nyarong and the Chinese appointed chief administrator joined the guerrilla and encouraged others to do the same (ibid, 120). Aten, himself till mid 1958 had been aiding the Chinese, who eventually defected to the rebels. He was one of those Tibetans who had been sent to the National Minorities Institution in Chengdu (ibid, 96), trained and sent back to his land. He is an example of the attempts by the party state in creating

organic intellectuals for the CCP in the Tibetan areas. However his eventual desertion of his responsibilities and him joining the rebels also expresses the failure of the CCP policy then in Tibet.

Another instance of locals aiding the rebels was seen in Kardze in 1956, when with the implementation of democratic reforms; able bodied male members took up arms and fled into the forests from where they carried out attacks against the Chinese. In this the women also helped the resistance fighters as they not only provided them with supplies but also valuable logistical information regarding monitoring the military installations and prison (Adhe, 1997:70). Adhe also mentions about how in Kardze, there was the division of society into five classes; the religious, capitalist landowners, the middle class, agricultural labourers and servants (ibid, 66). The party state was seen to be deploying the downtrodden in the *thamzing* or struggle sessions to humiliate their former masters', which was participated by many. However a number of these newly appointed authority figures remained strong Tibetans (ibid, 68). When Adhe Tapontsang was arrested for colluding with the rebels and was made to undergo a struggle session, it was her servants' from her husband's household named Choenyi Drolma, Bhombi and Sonam Gyurme who were tasked with this. However, they refused to participate in her humiliation (ibid, 91).

In the case of Amdo, as mentioned earlier the armed uprisings took place at different time periods. However, on 5 July 1958, 124 members of Tsekhok's Wongya tribe attacked the district headquarters in Amdo, killing the district Secretary Zhang Daosheng and six of his cadres. Equipped with more arms and ammunition they launched an attack against a PLA reconnaissance squad. This was the first instance of open revolt from the county. However, in 1957 uprisings had already occurred within the Gansu-Qinghai-Sichuan borderlands and in March 1958, Tibetan rebels had moved into Huangnan prefecture crossing Gannan into south east Tongren (Rebkong) county. On 2 April 1958, members of Rebkong's *Dowa* and *Awa Teu* tribes attacked the Tongren's Fifth District administration headquarters, killing 57 cadres, soldiers and militiamen (Weiner, 2012:398-99). The rebellion like in other parts of eastern Tibet arose as a response to the enforcement of the democratic reforms and collectivisation, which eliminated the privileges of the pre liberation secular as well as the monastic elites. However much of

the reforms had been implemented after the crushing of the revolt. This rebellion in Amdo in 1958 is remembered and deemed to be a moment of historical rupture between the old society and the new (ibid). Hence these events have assumed much importance as they have remained deeply etched in the memories of Tibetans in the region that formed an important spark for the protests that occurred in the very same region in 2008.

An important indicator of the challenge that the armed revolt was giving to China's legitimacy can also be gauged from the scale of the suppression imposed by the PLA upon the Tibetan population. The scale of the suppression by the PLA indicates the challenge which the communists perceived in their understanding of the rebellion. Official figures show that something in order of 10 percent of the total population was involved – killed, wounded, captured in military operations during the period of 1956-62. In Amdo, almost 30 percent of the total population was involved in conflict over an 18 month period in 1958-59. To prevent the resistance from spreading further, the PLA had arrested around 20 percent of the population and as a result many tens of thousands died (Li and Akester, 2014). For instance, a larger number of prisoners were incarcerated in Chumarleb county prison, which was in the form of crude underground compartments dug in the ground. Most of the prisoners died due to the unhygienic condition of the prison (Naktsang Nulo, 2014:209).

The PLA would have considered gaining complete victory if they were able to achieve the realisation of the “Three Completes” which was that the “rebels were completely annihilated”, “weapon confiscation completed” and “confiscation of counter-revolutionary certificates” that is letters of appointments issued by the GMD. The realisation of the “Three Completes” was different for different regions. With regard to the number of battles fought by the PLA against the resistance fighters, the numbers vary. For instance, the Sichuan Military Gazetteer counts every military engagement and gives the total number as “over 10,000 big and small battles”. In Central Tibet, the PLA launched 12 military campaigns from March 1959 to November 1961, each consisting of many battles. For instance, the campaign referred to as “The Second Stage Campaign” in Chamdo in August to November 1959 consisted of 840 battles. Around 3639 battles were fought in Qinghai province, while the 11th Infantry responsible for military action against

the nomads in Gannan and also in Central Tibet reported a total of 996 battles fought. With the total number of battles, what becomes equally important are the figures for the Tibetan population directly involved in battles, which consists of number of Tibetans killed, wounded, captured and those who surrendered. It also includes women, children and elderly rounded up in battles who are termed as the rescued masses carried off by rebels. The following table shows the total population involved in battle which are as follows –

REGION/AREA INVOLVED	TOTAL POPULATION AFFECTED
Qinghai /Amdo	127, 000 rebels were annihilated.
Sichuan/Kham	90,800 persons.
Central Tibet	93,000 persons.
Gannan TAP	22,400 persons
Dechen TAP/ Yunnan	13,700 persons

Source – Jianglin Li and Matthew Akester, 14 May 2013, historicaldocs.blogspot.in.

Hence, the total population directly involved on the battleground was around 347,000 persons without taking into account the male population put into jail for the purpose of preventing rebellion. Information from local statistics such as from the Qinghai Military Command and the Party Provincial Committee reveals the extent to which the local population was challenging the party state. For instance, the Qinghai Military Command in a report termed that by the end of December 1958, 623 battles were fought, 60,864 rebels were annihilated, among them 10415 were killed, 2648 were wounded, 21,958 captured and 25,843 surrendered. By end of June 1959, 850 battles were fought, 18,189 rebels were annihilated, among them 2209 were killed, 939 wounded, 7806 captured and 7235 surrendered and 26,810 women and children were liberated. Hence, from April 1959 to the end of June 1959, 105,862 people were directly engaged in battles (ibid). This large scale involvement of Tibetans in the military conflict against the communists is a sign of the strong challenge they faced from the local population.

Another report by the CCP Qinghai Provincial Committee to the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission dated 15 October 1959, gave the following numbers: from April 1958 to September 1959, a total of 1969 battles were fought with the

annihilation of 121,752 rebels and the incarceration of 41,865 counter-revolutionaries and liberation of 76,258 women and children. In 1957, the total Tibetan population of Qinghai was 513,415, of which almost 30.3 percent of the total Tibetan population in Qinghai was involved in war. Hence, the figures indicate that massive involvement of the local population took place which directly challenged the party state's legitimacy in the region. The communists and the PLA also indulged in arresting men between ages 18-60 to prevent rebellion. Quotas were issued to local Party Committees and administrative bodies, but exceeding quotas was normal. For instance, in the Yushu TAP, the quota was 2000 to 2500 arrests but more than 22,780 or 14.3 percent of the 1957 total population of the area were arrested. The total people arrested in Qinghai were 59,183.

The local figures provide a more accurate picture, for example in Juizhu county, Golok prefecture, 1249 people or 13 percent of the total population was arrested. In Maqin County, Golok, 1844 people or 18.47 percent of the total nomadic population was arrested in 1958 and in Qumalai County, Yushu TAP, 21 percent of the total population was arrested. From the CCP Qinghai Provincial Committee's Document 55 states that in 1958, 85,285 people were dealt with, of which 64,347 were from the pastoral areas, constituting around 8 percent of the total population. 899 were killed by mistake and 17,277 people died in detention and collective training. The seriousness of the challenge to the party state's legitimacy in the Tibetan rebellion of the late 1950's can also be measured from the PLA military power used in the war which included 8 divisions of the infantry consisting of 100,000 people, 3 divisions of the Air Force with 2 independent regiments. Along with them three Cavalry divisions, special units and logistics units were also deployed. Hence the total number of combat troops was no less than 150,000 (ibid).

On the local level, the following table shows the involvement of China's military power in suppressing the revolt and uprisings in the Tibetan areas.

Sichuan/Kham	March 1956 – December 1961	80,000 military forces
Gansu/Amdo	March – December 1958	25,000 military forces
Qinghai/Amdo	April 1959 –October 1962	70,000 military forces

Central Tibet	1958 – 1961	60,000 military forces
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(Source - Jianglin Li and Matthew Akester, 14 May 2013, historicaldocs.blogspot.in.)

The number of militia who participated in the suppressing of the rebellion in Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan and Qinghai add up to over 71,000 people. These figures which are quite substantial, reveal to us the fact that the Chinese Communists faced a hostile population, who were not willing to accept the democratic reforms which were being enforced upon them. Furthermore, it was an armed resistance that the party state encountered when they sought to legitimise themselves in Tibet, turning the situation into a war that was fought and which led to innumerable deaths. This is also seen through the population loss in the Tibetan areas, which expresses the severity of the challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet. The following tables show the loss of population in the various Tibetan regions in PRC.

Region	1957	1959	1961
Gansu/Amdo	255,947	188,050	174,581

Hence in Gansu, the total population loss in this period was 81,366 or 31.8 percent of the initial population in 1957.

Region	1958	1964
Sichuan/Kham	686,234	605,537

In Sichuan, a loss of 11.8 percent of the total population took place within the period of 1958-1964.

Region	1957	1964
Qinghai/Amdo	513,415	422,662

In Qinghai/Amdo, the total population loss was 90,753 or 17.7 percent of the 1957 population.

Region	1953	1964
Yunnan/Kham	64,611	61,827

On a prefectural level, the scale of population loss is seen to be disastrous as depicted through these tables

Region	1957	1963
Yushu TAP	159,419	93,483

Hence, the population drop was massive with a loss of 65,936 or 41.3 percent of the population in 1957.

Region	1953	1964
Golok TAP	99,628	56,936

The population loss was 48,753 or 48.9 percent of the total population. The majority of which were nomadic pastoralists.

Region	1957	1960
Chengduo County in Yushu TAP	14,476	10,226

The total population loss was 29 percent of the total.

Region	1956	1957	1962
Serthar County in Kardze TAP	30,600	24,785	17,641

(Source - Jianglin Li and Matthew Akester, 14 May 2013, historicaldocs.blogspot.in.)

CHUSHI GANGDRUK RESISTANCE ARMY AND THE MIMANG TSONGDU – FORMATION OF COUNTER-HEGEMONY.

The resistance from the eastern Tibetans soon coalesced into the *Chushi Gangdruk* National Resistance Army. It was an eventual outcome of the unity that had been brought about among Tibetans who faced the brunt of the Chinese aggression. The resistance force truly assumed a pan – Tibetan character as it had recruits from all regions of Tibet; Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang (Central Tibet). They also had recruits who were former KMT soldiers, a couple of communist spies and also Xinjiang Uyghur Muslims who were fighting against the PLA (ibid). It was a direct offshoot of the resistance which started from 1956 onwards (Aten, 1986:115). However, it was under the leadership of traders and wealthy families and monasteries around whom the common Tibetans rallied. It was a trader from Kham Lithang based in Lhasa Andrug Gonpo Tashi who coordinated such

activities. He was the key founding member of the Chushi Gangdruk. Andrug Gonpo Tashi had remained the centre for anti Chinese activities for a long time, as in 1956 he had sent a message to leaders throughout Kham calling upon them to unite and defend Tibet. In his message, he stressed on the need for the Khampas to initiate an armed struggle against China. He was also involved in organising clandestine military preparations in Lhasa, where arms, ammunition and horses were bought to support groups in Kham and elsewhere who were fighting. Most of his relatives and close aides were sent to India to seek help from the outside world that eventually came from the CIA.

Under this, in April 1957 a group of six men, five from Lithang and one from Bathang were taken to the island of Saipan for five months of training, focussed on radio operations. They were subsequently parachuted in Lhasa, Samye and in Kham, Lithang. From Lithang they could send a radio message to the CIA stating that there were approximately 50000 Tibetans fighting against the Chinese (ibid, 95-96). For the fleeing eastern Tibetans, the Dalai Lama was their saviour, which was one of the major reasons for them to flock to Lhasa escaping persecution and the democratic reforms brought about by the Chinese. In Lhasa, these Tibetans sought religious guidance and teachings from the Dalai Lama. Subsequently all the traders and others from Kham and Amdo came together and requested the Dalai Lama to perform two powerful empowerments "*Lamrim Chenmo*" and the "*Kala-Chakra*", for which they provided all the needed resources. These empowerments are highly important as they are meant for the vitality of all Tibetans and Tibet.

Furthermore, during such empowerments, the idea of a unified community comes through, bonded by religion. During the empowerment, the eastern Tibetans presented a golden throne to the Dalai Lama on 4 July 1957, which was highly symbolic as the easterners were displaying their deep loyalty to the Dalai Lama, thus challenging the party state's assumptions of the eastern Tibetans not being a part of Tibet. It further strengthened the psyche of the Tibetans, bringing about a strong unity as well as providing a cover for carrying out their clandestine activities (ibid, 96). Hence, the empowerments and the presenting of the golden throne to the Dalai Lama also gave the eastern Tibetans strong legitimacy in the eyes of the other Tibetans.

While the Dalai Lama acquiesced to the eastern Tibetans to grant them the empowerments, the Tibetan government did not provide much help to the eastern Tibetans. However this was not uniform as the resistance fighters were drawing much sympathy from the lower rung officials and from the Tibetan army. For instance, in a preliminary meeting held on 18 February 1958, with 42 men and two representatives of the Tibetan government's army, *Gyapon Kelsang Dradul* and *Gyapon Wangden Tashi* in Lhasa, the army officers promised to support the resistance army (ibid, 47). They emphasised on the need to fight against communist China and to defend the religious and political rights of the Tibetans. As mentioned earlier, the inflow of refugees from the eastern Tibetan regions led them to joining the resistance army, which eventually made the Chinese authorities to impose new security measures on April 1958 in the form of a census and identification requirements (ibid). However on the 16 June 1958, the *Chushi Gangdruk* held an inaugural ceremony in Lhoka making their transition from an unofficial unorganised force to a fully functioning army, whose headquarters were based in Driguthang, with 5000 volunteer soldiers. It was a properly organised army with divisions and a strong chain of command being established. A code of conduct consisting of 27 rules, which included prohibitions against stealing, rape, entering houses while on a mission and also protecting local people from bandits, who were paid by the Chinese to imitate the resistance and harass people (ibid, 99).

The *Chushi Gangdruk* was organised into 37 units of varying sizes, grouped by their place of birth. The inaugural of the army hinted towards the transformation of a loosely organised series of village and region based uprisings to a formal and united national resistance army, even though the core leadership of the *Chushi Gangdruk* remained the Khampas. Initially termed as the “*tenshug dangling maggar*” or Volunteers to Defend the Buddhist Faith army, the *Chushi Gangdruk* was able to transcend into a national resistance army, which fought pitched battles against the PLA. For instance, they launched attacks against the PLA at Gongkar, Tsetang and Dranang in Lhoka and at Yangpachen, Markyang, Takdru-ka and many other places. The PLA had dispatched 5 Chinese army divisions against them. They were also able to conduct successful raids on the Tibetan government weapons depot at Shang Ganden Chokor-ling monastery and when they were pursued by the PLA, a terrible battle was fought in the Nyemo area

(Tubten Khetsun, 2009:20). The communists blamed the Tibetan government of secretly supporting the resistance army and demanded that Lhasa government should attack the Chushi Gangdruk. The Tibetan government was divided with regard to the activities of the resistance army as most of the top ranking officials agreed that it was important to be “thoughtful and prudent”, while the lower ranking officials and minor aristocrats wanted to protest against the Chinese and join the resistance (McGranahan, 2010:103). Hence, in the periods of 1957-58, the Tibetan government sent numerous delegations asking the Khampas to lay down their arms. As the Tibetan government were cooperating with the Chinese, they were caught in a deep dilemma due to growing popular sentiments against the Chinese (Norbu, 2001:222-23).

To a greater extent the Tibetan government never fully and openly supported the *Chushi Gangdruk*, with most of the senior ministers and officials being wary of their activities. Hence, the *Chushi Gangdruk* remained a nongovernmental organisation, which is of great significance as the resistance army symbolised a united Tibet, which was visible through its composition with recruits coming from all regions and from all social backgrounds. Furthermore, they emphasised on a solidarity that challenged China’s legitimacy which emerged from a regional to a pan Tibetan resistance movement. Hence becoming a symbol of the Tibetan nation and forming a counter hegemonic structure opposing China. The resistance army was also a citizen led national initiative, a military effort inspired by the need to defend community, religion and the Tibetan state. It signalled a new form of Tibetan nationalism in which citizens rallied around the state without sacrificing other identities, hence recognising region and nation as being complementary (McGranahan, 2010:100). However by early 1960, the resistance force was much neutralised, but still there was the presence of a collective armed resistance against the Chinese as witnessed through the rallying of a 1000 men in the nomad centre of Naktsang to fight against the Chinese (Aten, 1987:152).

An organisation of much political significance and one that attempted to challenge China’s legitimacy in Tibet was the *Mimang Tsongdu*, a popular People’s Party that began in 1954. It was an underground anti Chinese group that came into prominence with demonstrations, pasting of posters with anti Chinese slogans and denunciations of

Chinese interference with the Dalai Lama's power and customs of Tibet. They termed themselves as representatives of the people, who wanted the Chinese to leave Tibet (Norbu, 2001:223). It was headed by Alo Chhonzed, a Khampa from Lithang who lived in Lhasa and had 62 members representing all three regions of Tibet (McGranahan, 2010: 92). The *Mimang Tsongdu* was a culmination of Tibetans' resentment against what they saw to be the erosion of the authority of the Dalai Lama. They were also critical of the traditional ruling elite whom they believed had left the young Dalai Lama to fend for himself. The organisation was strictly against the formation of the PCART. Its members were mostly traders and low ranking officials, who gained much popularity for their activities and also secured the support of influential officials in the Tibetan government. The political organisation also conducted cultural activities such as long life prayers for the Dalai Lama and campaigned for Tibet to be allowed to maintain its army and separate currency. The *Mimang Tsongdu* also wanted to be recognised as a legitimate political group by the Chinese and the Tibetan governments. However, they did not receive open support from the *Kashag*, who were much pressurised by China to curtail their activities (Shakya, 1999:146).

Their first activity can be somewhat traced to 1952, when a public meeting was held in Lhasa and a protest note was given to the Chinese as well as the Tibetan authorities. In this note, they had expressed the following demands –

1. Full support towards maintenance of the status and power of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
2. Protection of all religious institutions.
3. All development programmes for a prosperous Tibet must be executed by Tibetans.
4. No changes should be made to the uniforms or regulations of the Tibetan army.
5. Existing trade relations between India and Tibet must in no way be hampered.
6. With the presence of a large number of Chinese troops in Tibet, a serious food problem had been created and this had inflicted immense difficulties on the people. Since there was no existing danger along the entire border of Tibet, all Chinese civil and military personnel with the exception of some civilians

essentially required, should be withdrawn from Tibet (Information and Publicity Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1976:4)

The local populace in Lhasa were also seen to be expressing their dissent against the presence of the Chinese communists, which was evident from the fact that a number of Tibetans who had gathered to witness the entry of General Fan Ming and his North West Bureau troops loudly applauded when a strong wind blew and smashed the framed pictures of Mao and Zhu De. This greatly offended the soldiers who threatened the public through pointing their rifles at them (ibid, 2). In 1952, the Chinese also forced the Tibetan government to pass a new law forbidding criticisms of communism. They had also established a large civil intelligence force which operated both in and outside Lhasa, arresting and inflicting punishments on Tibetans without the knowledge of the Lhasa government. For instance, one of the members of the *Mimang Tsongdu*, Kharkhang Phuntsog Tashi was abducted from Shigatse and imprisoned and punished in the Chinese military headquarters on charge of conspiracy (ibid, 6-7). Eventually as the *Mimang Tsongdu* gained momentum, the Chinese authorities demanded the halting of their activities and the arrest of their leaders by the Lhasa government that eventually took place.

The *Mimang Tsongdu* had set up an organisation called 'the Welfare of the Poor' which provided services to the refugees from Kham and Amdo who were streaming into Lhasa and central Tibet. They also distributed relief and medical provisions to the poor. Subsequently the Tibetan government had to close the activities of the political organisation as the Chinese enforced it. The *Mimang Tsongdu* can be deemed as the first popular movement in Tibetan history, which received support from all sections of Tibetan society. The ideology and principles of the *Mimang Tsongdu* forms a major source of counter-hegemony, one which emphasised on Tibetans to unite and protect their country in an active and not a passive manner. It also strove for ideas of democracy, political co-operation and participation and of a Tibet which was a sovereign nation state in international terms. Its democratic movement served as a legitimate alternative to the Chinese. It was also to represent as an opportunity for ordinary Tibetans to be active in national politics and defence. The political organisation was a source of inspiration to the

Tibetans especially the Khampas and Amdowas who were streaming into Lhasa escaping the Chinese onslaught in their regions. Hence, the Tsongdu created an alternative institution as well as an alternative ideological source, one that could ideologically challenge the communists (McGranahan, 2010:93).

10 MARCH 1959 – THE CREATION OF A “NATIONAL” UPRISING DAY FOR TIBETANS

By 1959 relations between the Tibetans and the Chinese in Lhasa and other cities in Tibet had already reached a boiling point. The large presence of the PLA along with Chinese civilian officers combined with the eastern Tibetan refugees in central Tibet had led to depletion in food resources, which added to the angst of the local population. The skirmishes between the Tibetan resistance fighters based in Lhoka and the PLA led to increased tensions between the Tibetan government and the Chinese authorities, with the Tibetan masses increasingly voicing their dissent against the Chinese presence in Tibet. Chinese authorities had further complicated the matter by curbing the freedom of the Tibetans in Lhasa through carrying out registration of its residents and also withdrawing the currency notes and postage stamps issued by the Tibetan government. This was employed to reduce the power and legitimacy of the traditional Tibetan government which was still somewhat functional even though much of the power and authority was exercised by the Preparatory Committee for Tibet Autonomous Region (PCART).

Even after 1951 and the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the traditional government of Tibet was operating its own mint department, circulating gold, silver and copper coins and notes in the country. The Chinese did attempt to prevent the further circulation of Tibetan currency, which was however resolutely rejected by the people and the National Assembly of Tibet (ibid, 5) which also included strong representation from the local business communities. The *Mimang Tsongdu* as mentioned earlier also had the presence of the business class among its ranks, who were vehemently opposing the intrusion of the Chinese in the existing monetary system prevalent in Tibet. The Chinese had specific instructions not to use Tibetan currency and initially they were using the silver dollars of the *dayens* which was

eventually replaced with the usage of coupons that could be used only in the Chinese stores (ibid, 6).

Through their periodical “Red Flag”, the communists had also started to launch scathing criticisms of the lamas and Tibetan Buddhism, which increased anti Chinese sentiments among the people (Tubten Khetsun, 2009:19). These policies of the party state were aimed at appeasing the Tibetan peasantry, which came too later as anti Chinese feelings were entrenched among all sections of the Tibetan population. However, during this period a large section of the Tibetan officials as well as high ranking lamas were attending the meetings of the PCART and Beijing also wanted to send many of them to China to study the peoples’ communes as a way to encourage them to introduce reforms in Tibet (Shakya, 1999:186). But it was the majority of the Tibetans from the general population who were denouncing the Chinese and formed the major bulwark of the uprising on March 10.

On 10 March 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama had been invited to attend a performance by a dance troupe by a newly established dance group which had been trained in Beijing and had returned to Lhasa. In fact, the Dalai Lama had been extended an invitation on 5 March 1959 which marked the end of the *Monlam* festival and also the graduation of the Dalai Lama. The authorities wanted the performance from the PLA to be a celebration to mark this event (ibid, 187). This would soon be a trigger for a major uprising against the Chinese in Lhasa as it was strongly believed by Tibetans that the invitation extended by the PLA to the Dalai Lama was a ruse to hold him as their prisoner, as similar narratives were emerging from Kham and Amdo where the high ranking lamas had been invited by the Chinese and subsequently imprisoned. Hence, there had been precedence to such an incident prior to the extending of an invitation to the Dalai Lama. According to Dawa Norbu, what enraged the Tibetan public were the insistent reminders being sent by the Chinese to the Dalai Lama when the latter was participating in a religious ceremony (Norbu, 2001:224).

However, there is also a need to understand that the Tibetan population is a deeply religious community which holds the Dalai Lama in the highest regard. The Dalai Lama represents the core of the Tibetan polity, where he represents the secular as well as

temporal authority of the Tibetans. He is the living embodiment of Tibetan consciousness which has been tempered for ages by the Buddhist faith and hence for Tibetans his well being emerges as the primal concern, one more important than their own lives. The Khampas, Amdowas and Goloks had waged an armed rebellion to defend their monasteries and lamas and the same sentiments ran through the Tibetans in central Tibet, who came out to defend the Dalai Lama and their faith. Even prior to 1959, when the Dalai Lama had been invited by the communists to attend the inaugural session of the National People's Congress (NPC) in 1954, the majority of the local population in Tibet did not want him to attend and had sent petitions to His Holiness as well as the Chinese government for his speedy return (Khetsun Tubten, 2009: 16).

Hence, crowds of Tibetans had gathered in front of the Norbulinka (summer palace) in the morning of 10 March 1959, renting the air with cries of protecting the Dalai Lama and preventing the nobles from exchanging him for Chinese silver dollars (ibid, 25). The Dalai Lama has remained the constant theme for Tibetans in their challenge posed against the Chinese party state, where he has turned into a symbol of resistance and hope for the protestors. However, the Chinese party state has also attempted to co-opt in several occasions the power and position of the Dalai Lama to garner legitimacy inside Tibet. A few instances of this have been mentioned in the previous chapters and it truly deserves special attention with regard to the issue of legitimacy in Sino-Tibetan relations. The Tibetan masses gathered at the Norbulinka derided the aristocracy and higher officials who were seen as colluding with the communists. Majority of them were incorporated into the PCART and held a number of positions within the new dispensation, hence were seen in an unfavourable light by the Tibetans. Also when the communists had arrived in Tibet, they had distributed silver coins freely to Tibetans, among whom the beneficiaries had been mostly the nobility and the aristocracy.

Hence, the emphasis by the protestors on the nobility colluding with the communists can be termed as a rejection of Chinese attempts at gaining legitimacy through co-opting the upper classes. The participants in the crowd were members of the general population from disparate social backgrounds and were led by people who had regular jobs. For instance, Tubten Khetsun in his 'Memories of Life in Lhasa under Chinese Rule'

mentions about a group being led by an individual named Tamdrin, who worked in the palace storeroom in Lhasa. Khetsun himself was one of those who had defended the Norbulinka during this period. He mentions about a strong gathering of ten thousand people outside the summer palace, protesting and remonstrating to protect the Dalai Lama. All the shopkeepers in Lhasa had closed their shops and had arrived to protest (ibid, 26). Even the physically handicapped were participating in protests against the Chinese state, as evidenced from the narrative of a blind beggar named Tsesum, who was actively participating in the burning and destroying of all things which were written in Chinese or the sentry posts built by the Chinese (Tsesum, 1976:65). The crowd was also seen to be distributing anti Chinese leaflets and burning the meeting halls of the Chinese (Tempa, 1976:100-01).

The dissent against the Chinese had also spiralled in the neighbouring areas of Lhasa. For instance, in the accounts of Pema Lhundup who hailed from Lhodrak, Western Tibet, in Sangzong village some Tibetan youths had poisoned the food of the Chinese officials, leading to their deaths. In the village of Lingkhul, led by Wangdrak, the villagers poisoned the food of the Chinese and Tibetan authorities (Lhundup, 1976:105). In the village of Hor Yerthar when two Chinese generals visited on 13 June 1959 to impose the surrendering of weapons from the local population, it was refused and instead around 600 of them left for Damshung, north of Lhasa which was a major site for armed resistance against the Chinese, where around 20,000 people from Trachu, Sokdai, Dhingkhung and other villages under the leadership of Amdo Tashi Tsering, Sokdai Norbu Tsering and others were resisting the Chinese. This continued till early 1960 when much of them were exterminated through bombings dropped on them by jet planes (Dorjee, 1976:79-81). The Tibetan crowd gathered in front of the Norbulinka in 1959 and in later demonstrations against China in Tibet have played an important role as it is them who have shaped history.

However, not all of the protests have emerged as challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet, in many instances; protests can be interpreted as aiding in the increase in the state's legitimacy especially when it has taken the form of petitioning the government for redressing a situation. On the other hand protests for independence of Tibet, for

democracy, human rights are all challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet, which has been much raised by Tibetans. However the protestors are deemed by the party state as having no agency of its own, and are generally presented as the "passive instrument" of outside agents, demagogues or foreigners. The crowd is termed as lacking ideas or honourable impulses of its own, but is seen as a disembodied abstraction and not as an aggregate of men and women of flesh and blood (Rude, 1964:9). This understanding has been closely associated with the response of the state towards protests in Tibet, where the protests are seen to be orchestrated by foreign powers or by the reactionary upper strata of the Tibetan society. The protests and demonstrations by Tibetans on 10 March 1959 as well as in later dates needs to be understood in its proper historical context, taking into consideration the crowd's outlook, objectives and behaviour.

The participants in these demonstrations are seen to be endowed with a many sided phenomena, who are impregnated with ideas (ibid, 23) which provides the platform for the creation of counter hegemony. They form the foundation of a political protest which on occasion turns into a revolution. The protest on 10 March is deemed to be such an instance which helped in the generation of solidarity and unity among Tibetans, setting the stage for the build-up to a Tibetan nation. Significantly, most of the participants in the political demonstrations were well known, with no previous criminal records and most of them were the regular faces in Lhasa. Hence, on that day, they had gathered to defend the symbol of Tibet; the Dalai Lama. The protesters also raised a series of slogans and also attacked a Tibetan cabinet minister *Kalon Samdrup Po-trang*, who had the rank of a vice commander in the army and had a Chinese bodyguard, who were pelted with stones and had to be treated in a hospital. The crowd also killed another official *Khenchung Sonam Gyatso*, who was the elder brother of *Chamdo Pakpala Gelek Namgyal*, the infant head of the *Chamdo Liberation Committee*, who was termed as being close to the Chinese (Tubten Khetsun, 1999: 27). Therefore, the crowd were clear with their objective of protesting against the Chinese government, in which Tibetans who were seen as collaborating with the party state became victims of their aggression.

The Tibetan government was in a bind with regard to the situation as they were still cooperating with the Chinese; hence to pacify the situation, the government invited a 60

member delegation from the crowd inside the Norbulinka. They informed them that the invitation to the PLA camp had been declined by the Dalai Lama and that they should call off their agitation. However, one of the delegates named Sholpa Ta-Tongwa remarked that the Chinese should not be trusted and gave instances of incidents in Amdo and other parts where the Tibetan leaders were invited and subsequently arrested by the Chinese. He further emphasised that the public had to be kept informed and involved with every movement of the Dalai Lama outside the Norbulinka and that the public would form their own security for the Dalai Lama, terming the Dalai Lama as the patron deity and life force of Tibet (ibid, 28). This clearly shows the importance of the Dalai Lama to the general Tibetan public as well as their insistence on protecting the Dalai Lama also points to a lack of faith towards the higher Tibetan officials.

After retreating from the summer palace, the crowd moved towards Lhasa, where they raised cries of Tibetan independence and for China to quit Tibet. The agency of the crowd was also seen on the 11th when a meeting was held in the Norbulinka which was attended by the cabinet and chief secretaries of the Tibetan government as well as by the people's representatives. In the meeting the higher officials emphasised on the need to maintain stability, while the people's representatives and younger officials spoke at length on how Tibet was essentially an independent country with a rich history and how the communists had imposed upon them an unequal treaty. They also mentioned the fact that while an armed response to the Chinese would be foolish, they had to request the Chinese to return to China and if they remained, the Tibetans in central Tibet would suffer the same fate as the Khampas and Amdowas had suffered (ibid). The crowd understood their objectives as well as were driven by their own set of rationality. They also asked Tibetans to draw a line between themselves and the Chinese, especially focussing on those who had been given employment by the Chinese as well as were collaborating with them. Terming the Chinese as the enemy, the crowd created a list where officials signed proclaiming themselves as "*tsampa*-eaters", demarcating the Chinese and Tibetan camps (ibid, 31).

The crowd who had participated in the political protest on 10 March intensified the idea that had already been sown earlier by the Tibetans from eastern and north eastern Tibet,

of a Tibet which was facing a major threat from China thus calling for unity and solidarity among all. There was also the creation of a headquarter for the Lhasa People's Committee in the *Tengayling* neighbourhood of Lhasa, where they collected logistical information as provided by individuals like the blind beggar Tsesum who had earlier on 12 March had visited the Nachen Trang hydroelectric substation near Lhasa and had found out that it was to serve as a defensive outpost for the Chinese. He was also tasked to carry a letter from the protestors to be given to the Khampa guerrillas arriving in Dechen (Tsesum, 1976:67). While the Dalai Lama could escape into exile on 17 March 1959, a series of armed resistance continued against the Chinese, which is witnessed from the accounts of Tashi Palden, a monk hailing from Kham and who was in retreat in the *Tara Tsamkhang* in Ramoche during the period of the revolt. He mentions about how on 19 March 1959, fifty monks had volunteered to defend Ramoche and had decided to attack *Zimbook* house that had been occupied by the Chinese and seize their arms (Palden, 1976:30). He further adds that a group of ten Tibetan policemen had started shooting at the Chinese, which led to the death of an important Chinese official (ibid, 36).

Therefore, the protest on 10 March 1959 and thereafter can be termed as one when the general public rose and opposed China, raising the clarion call for an independent Tibetan nation. It gave shape to the dormant hegemony present in the Tibetans, as the protests were meant to protect the Tibetan value system, which took the form of Tibetan nationalism. This laid the foundation for a counter-hegemony that inspired the numerous protests by Tibetans in the future, challenging China's legitimacy. On 12 March 1959 around 10,000 Tibetan women participated in a major demonstration against the Chinese presence and formed the Tibetan Women's Association (TWA). It was led by influential women of Lhasa. They elected ten women representatives to run the organisation. These representatives led a delegation of their members to the Indian mission, Nepalese consulate and Bhutanese representative to urge them to uphold the righteousness of the Tibetan struggle among the international community and appealed to them to serve as a witness to Chinese repression inside Tibet (Tubten Khetsun, 1999: 31). During the protests in March, the Tibetan traditional institutions especially the traditional government was functional even though there had been much erosion of their power and

influence with intrusions from the Chinese communists and the alternative institutions that they had created such as the PCART.

The Tibetan traditional institutions and the traditional state can be termed as forming a 'war of position' which revealed itself when it faced a perceived threat from the Chinese state. However, due to the overwhelming dominance of the military power of the Chinese state, the Tibetan uprising was eventually crushed. However, one of the most important achievements of the uprising in March 1959 was the escape of the Dalai Lama on 17 March to safety in India, which was facilitated by the rebel fighters. By 20 March 1959 the PLA attacked the Norbulinka shelling it with cannon and artillery, overwhelming the defenders. By the evening around four to five thousand people were arrested at the Norbulinka (ibid, 38). By 23 March, more than 4000 rebel troops were taken prisoners while 8000 small arms, 81 light and heavy machine guns, 27 mortars, 6 mountain guns and 10 million ammunition was captured (Norbu, 2001:225). In the course of the suppression the Chinese had killed 87,000 Tibetans. The 1959 revolt was a defence of a value system based on Tibetan Buddhism which had hegemonised the Tibetan community that had not been united under a single territory. However with the uprisings by the Tibetans against China it led to the formation of an idea of a united Tibetan nation.

CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE NYEMO REVOLT

The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (GPCR) started from 1966 onwards as a result of a power struggle in Beijing between Mao and Liu Shaoqi, which eventually engulfed the entire country including Tibet. It was an attempt to stamp out capitalist tendencies and revisionism that had begun to rear its head during the period of the land reforms. However, the Cultural Revolution can also be termed as a continuum of a 'war of manoeuvre' and 'war of position' to gain hegemony. However, the process was a violent one which was extremely brutal, leading to immense destruction of lives and the cultural heritage of the people. The goal of the Cultural Revolution was to create a new society. Socialist transformation had been brought through institutional transformation, which in the case of Tibet had been achieved through the dismantling of the traditional institutions of governance and with the creation of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This had been obtained by means of coercive persuasion rather than by the voluntary expression of

shared values. Hence, the Cultural Revolution was an attempt to create a new socialist man (Shakya, 1999:316).

This would be achieved through the complete destruction of the 'Four Olds' that is Old Culture, Old Customs, Old Habits and Old Ideas., which was launched in Tibet from February 1966 when the government banned the *Monlam* prayer celebrations as it was deemed a remnant of a feudal practice. In an account from Dhingri, south Tibet, the population were drawn on lines of the need for a "war preparation army", whereby different duties were assigned to the different age groups present in the region. For instance, 18-25 aged locals termed as students were to destroy monuments reflecting the old/obsolete and establish new ones (Tashi, 1976:139). The Cultural Revolution as it encompassed the dimension of a struggle between the two factions in China, the revisionists and the radicals, it eventually spread into Tibet with the formation of the *Nyamdrel* faction that consisted of the conservative party members who wanted to restrict the Cultural Revolution among party members and high offices. The *Gyenlog* faction were radicals who wanted the spread of the revolution to the wider society (ibid, 318). A number of Tibetans also joined the *Gyenlog* faction in Nangchen, Kham and their decision was influenced by the fact that the *Gyenlog* were rebelling against the party state and hence it provided many an opportunity to challenge the Chinese (Karma Tenzin, 1976:120).

Moreover, the Cultural Revolution was specifically a Han Chinese affair which engulfed the Tibetans and other nationalities, attempting to assimilate the Tibetans and wiping out their unique identity. With Tibet's strategic location and its facing the border with India with which its relations had been strained, the leadership in Beijing prevented the Cultural Revolution from occurring in the border regions especially the factional fighting and the revolution was emphasised more on the destruction of the 'four olds' (Shakya, 1999:332). However, the factional fighting between the two groups was quite intense in Tibet, with major conflict breaking out between them in Lhasa and the other cities. Initially the *Nyamdrel* received strong support from the Tibet Military District and were better equipped with weapons. The *Gyenlog* on the other hand was supported by the number 11 army division stationed at Peding to the east of Lhasa (Tubten Khetsun, 2009:

189). One of the important incidents that occurred during this period was the Nyemo revolt. This took place on 13-14 June 1969, where hundreds of Tibetan villagers were led by Trinley Chodron, a young nun who launched a series of bloody attacks against local officials and the troops of the PLA stationed there. Official sources states that they killed 15 PLA soldiers, seven cadres and 32 grassroots officials and activists. They had also attacked a number of local Tibetans who had their arms and legs hacked off by the nun's followers (Goldstein, 2009:1).

The Nyemo revolt led by the young nun has been an issue of major contention, with a number of analysts and scholars terming it as one among the series of major uprisings against the Chinese. It has been termed as an expression of Tibetan anger at Chinese oppression. Painted as a nationalistic affair, the Nyemo revolt has been seen as one of those periods of modern Sino Tibetan history which has been interpreted in various ways. For instance, Goldstein terms the revolt as an extension of the factionalism in Tibet between the Nyamdrel and the Gyenlog (ibid, 7). On the other hand, Tsering Shakya looks at the Nyemo revolt as due to the imposition of the commune system on to the Tibetans, especially the nomadic communities who are traditionally always on the move and which had disrupted this practice. It was this traditional aspect that becomes important with respect to the Nyemo uprising. The revolt in Nyemo was marked with a strong re-assertion of certain aspects of Tibetan culture and the symbolism evoked by the nun was very different from the language of the Cultural Revolution (Shakya, 1999:345).

Trinley Chodron saw herself as an oracle, possessed by a local deity who had started to have conversations with the Dalai Lama and with other gods (Goldstein, 76). There was an instrumental use of the nun by the *Gyenlog* faction in Nyemo, which the nun had joined. However, it can also be seen as the Tibetan's desire to regain some degree of social and cultural freedom. It can be deemed more as a cultural response to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution as the constant attack on Tibetan culture had depleted Tibetan confidence in their own value system. This complete negation of traditional Tibetan cultural and religious authority elicited an extreme response, as seen in the Nyemo revolt (Shakya, 346). While much has been written about the Nyemo rebellion, it is also necessary to understand that there was the presence of other resistances and rebellions

during this period in Tibet. This is evidenced from the narrative of Pasang Tsewang from Phari, southern Tibet, who later escaped into exile. He belonged to the peasantry class and was sent to the town of Gyangtse for attending classes that would give him the training of an official peon, which did happen as he was posted as one in Yatung. What is significant is that he was a member of an underground organisation called the “*Deydhon Tsogpa*” (Welfare Association) that had been set up by individuals like Gashi Thinley Wangchuk, Serpon Tsewang, Rading Topgyal, *Gegen* Chomphel and others during the Sino India war of 1962. Their aim was to aid the Indian forces if they managed to get to Yatung, by burning Chinese military camps, seizing arms and ammunition and cutting off communication lines (Tsewang, 1976:132).

While the results of the Sino Indian war was not as the organisation had expected, the underground organisation continued and in 1967 when conflict broke out between India and China, about 60 Tibetans from Phari were sent to help the Chinese in logistics. Pasang Tsewang was one of those sent, who had been asked by his organisation to disrupt the Chinese efforts, which he did by cutting off the telephone lines (ibid). They also executed a number of other incendiary activities and were finally stopped by the authorities in 1970, leading to the arrest of all twenty one members of their organisation on 25 December 1970. Among the members, Serpon Tsenam and his wife were executed in Shigatse; Gashi Thinley was sentenced to 15 years of hard labour while his wife Kesang got 20 years. Nyima Tsering, Samkhar Tsetan and Dthinkor Lobsang each received 10 years while Gelek was imprisoned for eight years and Damdul for six years. The remaining ten members were taken for re-education, while Pasang Tsewang himself was imprisoned in Phari for 15 months (ibid, 133).

The Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, with the death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four, who were blamed with much of the excesses of the GPCR. The Cultural Revolution which was to herald the birth of a new society had failed especially in the Tibetan regions. This is evident from the fact that in 1979 when a fact finding delegation from the Dalai Lama was invited by China to visit Tibet. The local authorities in the Tibetan areas were confident that the Tibetans inside Tibet would have given a cold reception to the exile delegation as they believed that the Tibetans supported

the party and rejected the Dalai Lama. However, wherever the delegation visited they received a resounding welcome from the local population who thronged in the thousands to catch a glimpse of them and also out of sheer jubilation shouted for independence of Tibet and a long life to the Dalai Lama (Schwartz, 1994: 10).

PROTESTS IN TIBET (1987 – 1992) – CHINA’S LEGITIMACY CHALLENGED

While the protests in 1959 was for defending a value system based on Tibetan Buddhism with its nucleus being around the person of the Dalai Lama, the series of protests and demonstrations that took place inside Tibet from 1987 – 1992 has centred around the Tibetan nation. These protests and demonstrations have galvanised the political discourse of the Tibetans, introducing newer narratives in the political vocabulary of the population. Notions of Democracy, Human Rights, Truth/Justice and Freedom have emerged as important values demanded by the protestors, thus forming the foundations of a counter-hegemony which can form alternative institutions and social values in an independent Tibet of the future. The protests can also be seen as a war of position initiated by the Tibetans inside Tibet which rallied the dormant Tibetan civil society which is based on Tibetan Buddhism.

The protests in this particular period also raised the political consciousness of the Tibetans and equally shaped Tibetan nationalism. They challenged the legitimacy of China over Tibet as these protests were able to channel a counter discourse that formed a legitimacy of its own. Most of the political protests in the future took inspiration from them. There were 140 protests from the period of 1987 to 1992, majority of which were initiated by monks and nuns and were initially non-violent demonstrations, which in many cases turned violent (ibid,1). What is equally significant is the fact that these protests occurred in a liberal period brought about by the economic reforms and opening up that had been introduced in Tibet from the early 1980s.

The reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping was a way through which the party state tried to garner legitimacy from the population it had governed since 1949 which had been depleted from the chaos and confusion of the Cultural Revolution. While the latter had directed the party and society on a path of communes and class struggle, Deng’s reforms

reversed them with land and livestock being divided among the rural Tibetans and communes being disbanded. The party state followed a policy of respecting the right of production teams, workgroups and individuals to make their own decisions regarding production. They were encouraged to involve themselves in sideline and handicraft endeavours, which would raise the living standards of the Tibetans. Hu Yaobang, in his visit to Tibet, also announced a policy of rest and rehabilitation, whereby commercial taxes would be remitted for the next few years, animals were to be returned to private ownership and also the household responsibility system were to be implemented in both nomadic as well as agricultural areas. The locals were free from meeting compulsory state purchases and their products were to be purchased at market values. This led to a marked improvement in the Tibetan living standard which was also accelerated by a rise in their social freedom (Shakya, 1999: 388). The party state also rehabilitated a number of former individuals who had been convicted of being reactionaries and counter revolutionaries during the Cultural Revolution. Even, the 376 participants in the 1959 revolt were freed. Moreover, on 14 March 1980, Hu Yaobang the Party Secretary of CCP made his six point proposal with regard to Tibet, which were

1. Tibet should enjoy autonomous rule and Tibetan cadres should have the courage to protect their own national interests;
2. Tibetan farmers and herdsmen should be exempt from taxation and purchase quotas;
3. Ideologically oriented economic policies should be changed to practical ones, geared to local circumstances;
4. Central government financial allocations to Tibet should be greatly increased;
5. Tibetan culture should be strengthened;
6. Han cadres should step aside in favour of Tibetan ones (Wang, 2009:68).

The reforms permitted the display of Tibetan culture and the practice of religion. This led to the reconstruction and building of monasteries and temples throughout the Tibetan region, which were mostly funded by the local population. The household responsibility system and exemption from taxes for the farmers and herders led to a rise in the living standards of the Tibetans, along with an increase in the disposable income, which was

invested in the reconstruction of monasteries and temples. Only a few monasteries which were of historical importance and which could be turned into tourist sites were given state funding. Hence, the revitalisation of Tibetan Buddhism and its institutions took place through an effort from the common people, who also re-staffed these monasteries with their own children. What is important is that the monasteries represent the reappearance of a Tibetan civil society, which was out of state control and had been subdued for almost two decades. The reforms led to the flourishing of a space in Tibetan society for the recreation of a cohesive institution that Tibetans are able to identify as their own. This Tibetan civil society had not been completely eroded by the party state's war of manoeuvre in Tibet (Schwartz, 1994:19). The monasteries and the clergy represent the survival of Tibetan nationhood and have become the major sites for Tibetan resistance against the Chinese state. Hence, becoming an important site for counter hegemony as it is from the monasteries and the clergy that ideas of an alternative institution and value system emerged which strongly challenged China's legitimacy in Tibet.

This revival of Tibetan identity has been much stronger than before the Chinese took control and this revival has taken place through the apparatuses of the state that was deemed to suppress it. It is on these that Tibetan political aspirations are based, which poses a direct challenge to the party state. However, the monasteries remained under the control of the party state through a number of means and could never achieve the former status they had in the traditional society. It was also the increased restrictions and control exerted by the state which led to the clergy expressing dissent. The role of the monasteries and clergy in providing a challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet has been elaborated further in the previous chapter. However Buddhism has occupied a core position in the protests inside Tibet, where in the post 1980 period, protests have been ritualised and have turned into the medium through which protests have taken place. The demonstrators are seen to be drawing on traditional forms of Buddhist religious practice that ordinary Tibetans value and practice. Political protests have been framed in religious idioms, where familiar religious symbols and practices have turned into major forms of public opposition against China (ibid, 22).

Majority of the protests and demonstrations have been initiated by monks and nuns. With the revival of religion seen as an impediment to modernisation by the Chinese as well as by a couple of Tibetans, this further alienated the clergy in Tibet. This is evident from the statements made by a few Chinese leaders in Tibet, such as Chen Kuiyuan's statement that "Tibet is too deeply tied up and influenced by Tibetan Buddhism as well as old systems, customs and concepts, which are so deep rooted and so hard to change" which clearly sums up the negative attitude towards religion. This is also much present in the articles published in the official newspaper in Tibet, the Tibet Daily which stated "the negative influence of theistic religious spiritualism has clearly become a prominent obstacle to social progress" (TIN, 1998). Awakening of religious sentiments had led to the growing importance of the Dalai Lama among Tibetans as he was the living embodiment of Tibetan Buddhism. The emergence of social institutions independent of the party in the form of monasteries and nunneries were seen as an ideological alternative to the CCP, which had the capacity to subvert public opinion. The demand for change emerged from the religious institutions, which initially began in the form of greater religious freedom for Tibetans and percolated to demands for Tibetan independence.

Even before the pro independence protests of 1987 – 1992, monks like *Geshe* Lobsang Wangchuk was imprisoned for openly arguing that Tibet had the right to independence as well as she had never been a part of China (Shakya, 1999:404). Hu Yaobang's proposal also emphasised on the Tibetanisation of the party state system in Tibet, with more Tibetans to be promoted to higher positions in the party as well as in government. There was also the stress on usage of Tibetan language as the medium of official transaction in the region. These were modes of gaining legitimacy from Tibetans as the party state could garner consent for these measures. However, this liberal policy faced immense resistance from many veteran Chinese cadres as well as from Tibetans themselves, as many older Tibetan cadres had no knowledge of Tibetan language. Furthermore, they also saw many inherent dangers in this policy and tried opposing it, which came from the Tibetan and Chinese leftists who saw it as gross ideological deviation.

The acceleration of reforms in Tibet especially in the socio-cultural sphere of religion, education and politics was seen to be testing the tolerance of the party in China (ibid,

408). The central aim of the reforms was to bring economic development to Tibet, which would aid in generating widespread legitimacy for the party state as economic growth would raise the living standard of the Tibetans. However for achieving this growth, the party state encouraged the influx of Chinese technical and professional labourers into Tibet who would assist the region's development. Even though initially the migrants were to be technical and professional labourers, recently demobilised soldiers and low skilled migrants also flocked to take advantage of the new emerging commodity economy in Tibet. However, the Tibetans were eventually sidelined due to a lack of technical knowledge, linguistic skills and personal ties with China, (ibid, 405) which added to further resentment against China, which was displayed during the protests of the late 1980s.

The protests in the late 1980s started on 27 September 1987 that coincided with a ten day visit by the Dalai Lama to USA, which prompted the Communist Party to term the protests as been instigated by agents of the Dalai clique, with an attempt to disrupt the progress made in Tibet through the reforms and opening up. It was initiated by a group of twenty one monks from Drepung monastery who protested in the Barkhor in Lhasa. They carried the Tibetan national flag and shouted slogans like "Tibet is independent", "May the Dalai Lama live ten thousand years". The monks were joined by 100 people from the streets after completing three circuits in the Barkhor, the crowd of protestors moved to the square in front of the Jokhang and moved towards the People's Avenue and towards the TAR government's offices. They were confronted by police and the monks along with five lay Tibetans were arrested (Schwartz, 1994:24).

An external factor was surely the Dalai Lama's visit to the USA which was termed by China as gross interference by a foreign country in its domestic affairs. Hence, to emphasize the strength of the Party, they organised a mass sentencing rally at a sports stadium in Lhasa where around 15000 Tibetans were forced to attend and were lectured on the need to preserve stability and adhere to the four cardinal principles. Another important protest took place on 1 October 1987 that coincided with China's national day. It was led by 23 monks from Sera monasteries that were joined by 8 monks from Jokhang and 3 from Nechung. They circumambulated around the Barkhor thrice carrying the

Tibetan national flag and shouting slogans for Tibetan independence. Eventually they were stopped by the police, brutally beaten and taken to prison near the Barkhor.

The police station was besieged by a crowd of 2000-3000 Tibetans who pelted stones at the police and also burnt a number of old abandoned police cars and subsequently the police station in an attempt to free the prisoners. The police retaliated by firing at the protestors, including a young boy of age 14. The crowd took the bodies of the older people who were shot around the Barkhor, while the body of the younger boy was carried and placed on a traffic podium in front of the TAR government's compound (ibid,25). On 6 October a group of 50 monks from Drepung protested in front of the TAR government's office demanding the release of their friends who had been arrested earlier. These monks were also beaten, arrested but subsequently released after two days. The party state had already begun a series of political campaigns in the monasteries which had turned into a site of resistance (ibid, 26).

These demonstrations in the autumn of 1987 in Lhasa have spawned numerous other protests which have followed a similar pattern. However, even among the initial three protests, the protests by Drepung monks on 6 October for the release of their fellow monks in front of the TAR government's office can be termed as granting legitimacy to the party state as they were imploring the state to release their friends. On the other hand, the protests on 27 September and 1 October were direct challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet as along with demands for independence and freedom for Tibet, the protest site was the Barkhor, which encircles the Jokhang. For these monks their target audience were the Tibetans and foreign tourists present at the Barkhor and not the Chinese state. By not protesting in front of the visible Chinese symbols of power, the monks were denying agency and thus legitimacy to the party state. On the other hand, the Tibetan protestors have turned the Jokhang, the holiest site for Tibetan Buddhists as the centre of their protests, thus also evoking the symbol of the Tibetan empire when it was at its zenith under Songtsen Gyalpo into a symbol of nationalism. The Jokhang is the yardstick for legitimacy in Tibet for a political entity, which has remained at the centre of the Tibetan part of Lhasa. On the other hand, the Potala palace and the Norbulinka have been assimilated by the Chinese state and turned into a venue for official purposes and for

tourism. These have been turned into sites for celebrating the secular power of the Chinese state (ibid, 35). Furthermore, the protests in and around the Jokhang is also an important way through which Tibetans have reclaimed sovereignty over certain spaces, which evokes a strong degree of legitimacy for them. During the GPCR these spaces had been much desecrated and their Tibetanness was attacked. Hence, during the 1980s there was a strong attempt from Tibetans to reclaim these lost spaces, turning them into important sites of resistance against the state.

Moreover, the language of protests in 1987 was also in the form of circumambulations or the “*kora*”, a religious practice associated with Tibetan Buddhism, where the devotees encircle a sacred site or building. *Kora* is performed by all Tibetans irrespective of their backgrounds and is also done on a communal level. Hence, cutting across all forms of barriers, the *Kora* also unites Tibetans and makes them different from the Chinese. It involves the corporeal self of the individual to be placed in motion with other individuals bringing about a rhythm in unison. The Tibetans performed *kora* on a daily basis, which made it the perfect medium through which the monks and later nuns were able to mobilise the people, transforming the religious action into public protest. The protestors also combined other symbols of Tibetan nationalism – the Dalai Lama and the national flag hence creating a powerful link between the powerful motivation that unites religious ritual and national consciousness. The religious practices that have been transformed into political acts are all deeply etched in the consciousness of the Tibetans, turning into habits. The Tibetans have transformed their practice of religion which is permitted by the party state into a practice which becomes a symbol of nationhood that is an act of rebellion (ibid, 27-29). Hence, these newer forms of protests broke the hegemony of the Chinese, which is seen to be absent in the case of the protest on 6 October, which grants more legitimacy to the party state in Tibet.

Tibetan resistance in the form of the *kora* in the Barkhor eventually drew the Chinese authorities into the very symbolism of Tibetan Buddhism, where they through performing the *kora* in a counter clockwise manner were cast as destroyers of religion and violators of the sacred order. The protests around the Barkhor in the form of the *kora* were a form of resistance which eventually formed a counter hegemonic movement based on Tibetan

Buddhism. Through reclamation of the Barkhor as Tibetan territory, the protestors were producing a symbolic opposition between Chinese and Tibetan communities and thus giving a coherent challenge to Chinese hegemony. Initially the authorities were unable to curb this form of expressing dissent, which however was suppressed in numerous occasions in the near future, which will be covered in the chapter.

In response to the first protests in 1987 by Tibetans in Lhasa which were witnessed by foreign tourists and received attention from the international media, the Chinese state launched the anti-splittist campaigns which included deployment of the coercive as well as non coercive security apparatuses to intimidate and placate the Tibetans. In the early 1980s, economic development was termed as bringing in social stability as well as aiding in the state gaining legitimacy. However, the protests and demonstrations were also indicative of the failure of the CCP trying to gain hegemony through economic reforms. Therefore to prevent further demonstrations the party state emphasised on the need to conduct ideological studies throughout the region, which would be carried out in the work units, government departments, neighbourhood committees and monasteries. There was also the subsequent formation of work teams, whose members consisted of cadres from different departments or work units, who were sent to monasteries as well as to other places to conduct political education and investigations. However, their presence especially in monasteries accelerated the already high resentment against China, as the party state had always tried interfering with the daily life of the monasteries. Hence, in the political education sessions, the work team faced strong resistance and also open defiance against the CCP. They also turned into solidarity building exercises for Tibetans as it pit Tibetans as a group against the Chinese.

The aims of the political and ideological campaigns in Tibet were to gain some form of loyalty from the Tibetans. However, as there had not been the complete subordination of social life of Tibetans during the period of collectivisation, these education sessions remained largely ineffective. This is seen with the survival and resurgence of religious institutions in Tibet during the period of the reforms, which turned into major sites of contention for the party state. For instance, in late November 1987, political workers at Ganden monastery were attacked and their vehicle was set on fire leading to the arrest of

ten monks (ibid, 57). It was in the monasteries that the CCP found it extremely difficult to carry forward their ideological education sessions, as the former were the revived civil society of the Tibetan community, which eventually became a source of counter hegemony for the Tibetans. The party state understood the linkage between monasteries and the community which is deemed as a threat, as the monasteries represent the highest spiritual values of the Tibetan community, which is a source of Tibetan nationalism (ibid,66).

The party state wanted religion to be a private affair, which however strikes at the heart of the traditional relationship between the lay community and the Buddhist clergy. The rebuilding and restaffing of the monasteries have always been a collective project reordering social relations in accordance with the Buddhist clergy. Hence, in Tibet, religion has always been a social act, a community performance, where the community is seen to be granting its consent to the religious authority. This was understood by the communists, who saw the religious institutions and the clergy exercising dominance in the consciousness of Tibetans. It was with the monasteries and the Buddhist faith they propounded that the CCP saw a real challenge to their ideological domination in Tibet. Hence, both coercive and co-option have been adopted as measures to curb the influence of the monasteries, with the former taking precedence over the protests and demonstrations. Furthermore, the monks and later the nuns were seen as embodying moral authority along with spiritual authority that gave them the legitimacy in Tibetan society. The clergy were in an intellectual position to direct Tibetan society, forming an “organic intellectual” in the Gramscian sense. It was them who formulated ideas of Tibetan independence as well as strove for Tibet’s independence that was deemed consistent with benefiting others, which is a part of religion (ibid, 71).

The coercive arm of the state was also extended to prevent further protests, which were through arrests, harsh punishments in the prisons with reports of torture and brutality towards the monks and laypeople who had been arrested in 1987. This strategy of the party state was a failure as on 19 December 1987, six nuns from Garu nunnery, seven kilometres North West of Lhasa staged a demonstration around the Barkhor, performing *kora* and also raising slogans for independence. There were more protests in the Tibetan

areas of Qinghai, for instance in November 1987 two demonstrations took place in Rebkong Amdo, where students from the Nationalities Teacher Training School began pasting posters demanding Tibet's independence, an end to forced sterilisation, need to use Tibetan language in education and improved facilities. On 6 November, a number of secondary school students and local monks staged demonstrations in support for these demands. On 27 November after a meeting of 45 senior secondary students from the school another demonstration took place with them marching to the office of the district leader (ibid, 74). These were strong challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet, which had also been raised by Tibetan populations that were under the official administration of neighbouring provinces. The raising of the demands for Tibetan independence is a strong sign of solidarity and unity among Tibetans residing in the three historic provinces and denotes a growth of Tibetan nationalism that acts as a foundation for a counter hegemony for the Tibetan community. The three decades of CCP rule in these areas had not quashed the nationalistic sentiments of the Tibetans, who were more unified now under the resurgence of a common culture and religious tradition, that had ironically being given a boost by the reforms brought about by the party state to Tibet.

Furthermore in an attempt to gain legitimacy and to placate the religious clergy, the party state decided to organise the *Monlam* festival (Great Prayer) in Lhasa from 24 February to 5 March 1988. It would also relay to the outside world that the Chinese government was respecting the religious freedom of its ethnic Tibetan population. However, they failed to realise the symbolic importance of the *Monlam* festival. Held on an annual basis towards the end of the Tibetan New Year celebrations, the *Monlam* festival was instituted by Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, to which the Dalai Lamas have belonged and who were exercising power before the coming of the communists to Tibet. The prayer festival was a ritual to give spiritual legitimacy to the traditional Tibetan government from the three great monasteries (Sera, Ganden and Drepung).

However, during the *Monlam* the authority of the city of Lhasa is given to the monastic authorities of the three great seats. Also, there is a locus of power shift from the Potala to the Jokhang. Hence, the Tibetan state through shifting their power to the monasteries

during this period, initiates a process which will bring about legitimacy to it. Hence, to some extent the party state in Tibet may have imagined to have taken the place of the former Tibetan government as patrons of religion and fund the Monlam. However as the festival requires compliance from the monks of the great three, the legitimacy of the party state was challenged when the monks refused. The *Monlam* expresses “religious and political affairs combined” and the party state, by assuming the role of patron of religion attempted to insert itself into this dynamic equation, which however had a counter notion to it; that evoked an image of an independent Tibet (ibid, 90). By holding the *Monlam* festival, the Chinese government unknowingly provided an agency to the monks, a space for expressing dissent, where they had a distinct advantage. Initially the clergy had set a precondition for their participation which was the release of all the political prisoners (monks and lay included).

For instance, the monks from Ganden monastery demanded the release of *Geshe* Yulu Dawa Tsering, a scholarly monk who had been charged with political and ideological crimes and imprisoned. Eventually the state did agree but however, with the festival drawing near, only a few monks and other individuals were released, which enraged the clergy to such a degree that any coaxing from religious leaders co-opted by China was unsuccessful. It was through the employment of force especially threats of eviction of the unregistered monks from the monasteries, that the Monlam could be held. However, the state resorting to coercion accelerated the discontentment among the clergy, which eventually led to a major round of protests which was on a much larger scale.

During the duration of the *Monlam*, it went smoothly, except for a sole monk raising slogans for Tibetan independence on 3 March 1988, who was stopped by the other monks. It was on 5 March, the last day of the festival when after the closing ceremony, monks from Ganden rushed forward to the raised platform where the party cadres and other officials were present and demanded the release of Yulu Dawa Tsering and others. This was flatly refused and instead in the commotion a monk threw a rock at the officials. In retaliation guns were fired, killing a Khampa. This enraged the clergy and others who started raising slogans for Tibetan independence, marching around the Barkhor. Among the officials was also Raidi, a senior Tibetan communist member, who along with others

had to take shelter in the Jokhang. The protesting monks were faced with security officials who were armed with sticks and tear gas, but were met with stiff resistance and stone pelting monks. The protesting monks around the Barkhor were joined by many others, swelling their numbers. These monks completed three circuits of the Jokhang, sought refuge inside the temple, which was tightly shut by them.

However soon the People's Armed Police force and other security forces arrived who stormed into the temple, brutally attacking the monks, many of whom were also killed. According to eyewitnesses, eight to fifteen monks were beaten to death by PAP (ibid, 82). What is significant is that the storming of the Jokhang enraged the monks and laypeople who continued to attack the security forces and also wanted to drive away the Chinese in Lhasa. Hence, they burnt a Chinese clinic and a restaurant. These two represented the growing encroachment of the Chinese enterprises into the traditional Tibetan part of Lhasa. This was the first time that Chinese civilians were targeted. However in the riots of 1989, Chinese civilians were protected by Tibetan protestors. The March 1988 protests were the first one in which the PAP force was deployed (ibid, 83-84) whose presence brought about the image of a direct confrontation between Tibetans and uniformed Chinese soldiers, enraging them further. It was sheer public anger that outpoured in the streets of Lhasa in March 1988 with the perceived defilement of the Jokhang by the Chinese and gross injustice displayed by the security forces by attacking the group of non-violent monks who were simply demanding what had been promised by them. This was a direct challenge to China's legitimacy as the participants in the protests and rioting were common Tibetans, who were enraged and were either young students or traders who did not have any past criminal and anti social records but were greatly disenchanted with the party state.

The aftermath of the 5 March 1988 protests by Tibetans in Lhasa was increased state repression in the form of arrests, torture and detention as well as the political and ideological campaigns that were carried outside the prison among the people. The party state wanted to stifle the sparks of Tibetan independence from the minds of the people. These measures did not deter the Tibetans from protesting further as on 17 April 1988; a group of 13 nuns from Garu nunnery staged a small demonstration in the Barkhor. Many

of them had protested earlier in December and were the ones who had been released prior to the Monlam. They circled the Barkhor thrice, distributing hand printed leaflets and shouting slogans for independence. This was followed by protests and demonstrations by nuns from Chupsang nunnery on 25 April 1988 and also by nuns from Shungseb nunnery on 17 May 1988. What is significant is that their protests were not coordinated and were small, unannounced and unexpected, taking place after major incidents of crackdown. These demonstrations by nuns also signalled the first signs of a renewed cycle of protests (ibid, 99).

The protests by the nuns were a way of increasing hope and unity among Tibetans especially after a crackdown. Generally, nuns along with women in Tibetan society are not held in high esteem and are considered to be of low worth, not given an equal footing with monks. Hence, the initiation and participation by nuns in protests were also a mode of gaining honour and self respect by them as they were making the greatest sacrifice for Tibet. They were also the recipients of more brutal torture that included sexual abuse in the hands of the security officials, which however did not deter them from further protests. The nuns would later coordinate with monks and others in demonstrations. The party state also wanted to establish a connection between the protestors and external instigation, thus denying any agency to the protestors as well as refusing to address the issue that majority of the population were unhappy with the communists. It was through political meetings and ideological education sessions that the party state tried to gain the consensus of the population, which however were ineffective. It was in these political meetings that a number of Tibetans had spoken up and had challenged the party state.

Furthermore, the ideological campaigns turned into zones of expressing solidarity by the Tibetans towards the protestors and further contesting the ruling discourse of the party state. The communists expected more demonstrations in the autumn of 1988 as it would mark a number of anniversaries of the previous year. Hence, on 7 September 1988 a group of 7-8 nuns protested, circling the Barkhor and shouted independence slogans. They were from Tsangkhung nunnery and dispersed before the arrival of the PAP troops. Marking the first year of protests outside the Jokhang at the Barkhor by monks from Drepung monastery, a group of nine monks from the same monastery dressed in lay

clothes, carrying a picture of the Dalai Lama and a small Tibetan flag protested on 27 September 1988. However due to an overwhelming presence of the PAP, the protest could not gain momentum and eventually the monks escaped aided by the Tibetans in the area, with whom the security forces had a tense standoff. The overwhelming presence of the security in the Jokhang made it impossible to hold demonstrations by Tibetans, which was also a way to stop any further disturbances in the months to come.

Hence, the Tibetans devised other novel means to protest which was through holding a prayer session by the lay Tibetans near the Jokhang for the ones who had died as well as reciting prayers for the long life of the Dalai Lama. They also managed to collect money from bystanders to purchase food and clothes for the prisoners (ibid, 111). A similar event took place on 3 December 1988, which commemorated the death anniversary of Tsongkhapa, when more than a 1000 Tibetans gathered in the square and chanted the “Prayer of Truth”, which was formulated by the 14th Dalai Lama in the 1960s and which calls for complete freedom of Tibet. The Tibetans were led by the monks of the Jokhang temple (ibid, 132). The large presence of Chinese security forces also forced the Tibetans to adopt novel means of expressing dissent and resistance against the Chinese state, which has been mentioned above and earlier through the *kora* around the Barkhor. These were religious practices that had been turned into political acts by the Tibetans, which constituted a part of the religious freedom in Tibet under China. However much of these acts were banned by the authorities in the later periods which raised the resentment of the Tibetans against them. With most protests being initiated by monks and nuns, the party state deployed work teams to these institutions to carry out political education sessions, but also to seek confessions from the monks in their participation in the events held last year. The cadres also believed that it was the older monks who had organised the demonstrations as the younger monks did not have the capacity to organise (ibid, 113).

The party state wanted monks and nuns with no proper registration to be expelled from the monasteries and nunneries, which however could not happen as the Chinese National Day on 1 October was drawing near and they wanted much stability during this period. The routine functioning of these religious institutions were axiomatic to government policy. These work teams were to be stationed in the monasteries for a longer period,

which however was taken as an opportunity by the monks/nuns to frustrate the cadres and draw them into debates in which the monks had scholastic training. It was their logical reasoning and debating skills that had honed their thoughts on Tibetan independence, whereby the monks emphasised that Tibet was an independent country. Much of the political sessions took place in the monastery courtyard which was reserved for debates between monks. Hence, the clergy had an upper hand as they had transformed the ideological sessions into debating sessions. Furthermore, the arguments of the political workers lacked even ideological substance and were mostly in the form of threats (ibid, 119).

Through the political sessions, the cadres emphasised on the uselessness of protesting and also emphasised that the monks and nuns were protesting to bring back the feudal/serfdom system, which was rejected by the Tibetan monks. In fact, through the debates and the *Monlam* festival, it was clear that the CCP needed the monks to validate its religious policies in Tibet. The monks became the principle spokespersons of Tibetan independence and formed the core of Tibetan nationalism. They saw their contribution in ideological and intellectual terms and were the principle proponents of forming an ideology to confront the Chinese on their own grounds. The ideology that they emphasised upon was on democracy and human rights and also the economic development that had been achieved in Tibet was termed as one achieved from the efforts of the Tibetans themselves. The Chinese also remarked on the idea of Tibetan culture and religion being incompatible to modernisation and economic progress, which was also challenged by the monks who emphasised on the indigenous modernisation that the 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas had attempted in Tibet before it was halted (ibid, 122).

The challenge to Chinese legitimacy in Tibet was also seen through the emergence of an alternative discourse of democracy, human rights, truth and justice; political values that were influenced from the outside world and was seen to be absent in the Chinese political system. The idea of democracy is seen to be manifested in one of the most important political document to have emerged from Tibet during this period; the Drepung Manifesto. Formulated by a group of monks from Drepung monastery, the manifesto is a charter for a future independent Tibet that will be based on democratic principles. These

monks were the first ones to demonstrate on 27 September 1987 and were mostly from rural backgrounds. They can also be termed as organic intellectuals of the community, who provided leadership and guidance to the community. This is visible from the fact that they wanted the spread of political education among the rural masses, especially through the distributing of a Tibetan translated version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through the Drepung Manifesto, the monks wanted to counter the claim of the Chinese that it was the communists who had brought progress and democracy to Tibet (ibid, 125). The manifesto was partly influenced from the principles of the 1963 Constitution drawn by the government of the Dalai Lama as well as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Drepung Manifesto is a secular document which calls for equality without any form of discrimination and emphasises on freedoms that are available in a western democratic system. It remains silent on the role of the Dalai Lama and the exile *Kashag*, but more importantly it rejects the old society and insists that Tibet will take a break from the past. In the manifesto, the monks emphasise on a complete eradication of past practices and hence reject serfdom. This is important as the communists are seen to be emphasising on this point raised by them for describing the protests by monks and nuns. Buddhism is used in a moral context and is seen to be compatible with democracy. The clergy is deemed to enjoy no rights and privileges and also terms the exiled Tibetan government as an ideal democratic system. Nawang Phulchung, the leader of the Drepung monks was given a harsh sentence by the party state and the manifesto was dubbed as a counter revolutionary document, indicating the serious challenge the Drepung Manifesto gave to the legitimacy of the party state in Tibet.

The foundations of a counter hegemony is also seen to be laid by the Drepung Manifesto as it provides a platform for the establishment of alternative values and institutions which can challenge and uproot the existing dominant institutions. The manifesto is a strong critique of the CCP in Tibet, challenging its legitimacy and considering it to be deficient in democratic values with regard to Tibet. Hence, the Drepung Manifesto offers an intellectual foundation against the communist party state in Tibet.

Another significant discourse that has entered into the political vocabulary of the Tibetans inside Tibet is the notions of human rights and freedom. The demands for human rights and freedom have appeared in the number of posters and pamphlets in Lhasa from 1988 onwards. However the human rights that Tibetans have emphasised upon are in a collective sense rather than on an individual's rights. Most of the posters and pamphlets have been signed by groups giving themselves various names, which evokes strong ideas of the Tibetan nation and solidarity within the community. The members of these underground organisations include ordinary shopkeepers in the Barkhor, to monks and nuns, office workers, students and Chinese educated cadres. For instance, on 28 September 1988, a Tibetan employee of the Bank of China was arrested for pasting posters.

Hence, we see even the co-opted Tibetans, who were incorporated in the state apparatuses or were linked through direct economic means, such as the shopkeepers also challenged the legitimacy of China in Tibet. Through these posters, the Tibetans are seen to be bringing a harmonious mix between human rights, democracy and Tibetan freedom, often equating the suppression of their culture as a suppression of human rights. Another significant value that has crept in the political language of the Tibetans is the idea of "truth" or justice. For them, it is truth that gives strength to Tibetans to wage their struggle against China in a non-violent manner. During these protests, there was also the circulation of alternative history in the form of texts that had been smuggled from exile among the Tibetans, through which a strong counter narrative had been formed by them against the CCP.

Most of the value systems laid down by the communists were countered by the Tibetans through their own set of values based on democracy, human rights and independence for Tibet. These formed the framework for a counter hegemony inside Tibet as the Tibetans were creating an alternative view of Tibet, one which was deemed deficient in the Chinese narrative on Tibet (ibid, 131). As the struggle was on the ideological level, the party state intensified the political and anti splittist campaigns in Tibet along with a process of co-opting influential individuals in society and furthering the united front. Around this period, the Dalai Lama had also laid the Strasbourg proposal in the European

Parliament that eventually led to increase in prospects of negotiations with the Chinese government. The negotiations were used as a ploy by the party state to placate the protestors inside Tibet (ibid, 134).

However on 10 December 1988, a major demonstration took place, coinciding with the International Human Rights Day, which Tibetans inside understood to be of much significance. They also came to know of the day through official Chinese media as the Chinese government were also formally celebrating the event. The protest was to gain attention of the world and also to humiliate the Chinese government. It was one of the first protests which were coordinated among the clergy and the masses. The protest was met with brutal repression as the armed forces were ordered to shoot without any warning. The Tibetans, on the other hand wanted the protest to be peaceful and non violent as it marked the International Human Rights Day. However, the provocation from the armed forces led to retaliation from the crowd who threw rocks and stones. A large number of deaths of Tibetans were confirmed on the incident of the 10th with a larger number being injured. In solidarity with the protestors, Tibetan students from the Central Nationalities Institute in Beijing demonstrated in Tiananmen on 18 December 1988 as well as on 30 December around 300 students and staff from Tibet University openly paraded from the Potala to their University premises, which had the tacit support from the authorities. The participants did not raise any anti Chinese or anti state slogans but demanded the reinstatement of Tibetan language and condemned the killings. However, this protest did not challenge the legitimacy of the party state in Tibet, instead acknowledged the legitimacy and their authority (ibid, 143).

In response to the protests on International Human Rights Day, the party state extended the patriotic education and ideological campaigns to the primary and middle schools in Tibet, whereby the students were asked to attend propaganda sessions and also submit a social investigation after every vacation they had spent. However, these measures did not fetch high dividends as students from Lhasa no 1 Middle School took part in protests on 8 December 1989, nine months after the declaration of martial law in Lhasa. Also six students were arrested for the crime of spreading counter propaganda literature and another five were accused of forming a counter revolutionary organisation called the

“Tibet Youth Association” who had made posters and Tibetan national flags. The rise of dissent in schools reflect the Chinese government losing out to the appeals of the monks and nuns and losing the battle of ideas despite its appeals of unity and stability in the name of economic development and prosperity (ibid, 147). More importantly, schools such as the Lhasa Number 1 Middle School and the various Nationality Universities formed training grounds for future Tibetan administrators in the party state. Hence the rise of dissenting voices in the educational institutes is symptomatic of a failure of the party state to gain consent from the masses, which is one of the central functions of educational institutions.

Moreover, it also reflects the fact that the protests and demonstrations of the late 1980s had overwhelming participation from a younger generation of Tibetans, individuals who had not witnessed the pre 1959 Tibet and had gained maturity in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution during a period of reforms and opening up. Hence, protests from them reflect a strong disenchantment towards the policies of the party state in Tibet. This was not accepted by the Chinese who emphasised that the youth were incited to protest by the elders and by foreign forces. On 28 January 1989, the Panchen Rinpoche died of a heart attack in his official residence in Tashilhunpo monastery, Shigatse, TAR. He was the second highest religious figure in Tibetan Buddhism who had remained behind in Tibet and had been co-opted by the party state. However in the 1960s after launching a strong criticism of the party he was purged and imprisoned where he suffered immensely, only to be released after the death of Mao. With the reforms and opening up, the party state wanted him to be a major proponent of liberalisation in Tibet, thus legitimising the rule of the communists. However, he was also seen as one of the genuine voices of the Tibetans in the Chinese state structure who struggled for cultural and religious autonomy for the Tibetans. The role and impact of the Panchen in Sino-Tibetan legitimacy have been discussed in the previous chapters. In 1989, one of the objectives with which he had returned to Tibet was also to persuade the clergy in Lhasa to attend the Monlam festival which the party state had decided to organise in the spring of 1989. His untimely death was a major blow to both Tibetans as well as the Chinese.

Dissent was on the rise in Tibet during the winter of 1988-89, with the appearance of a number of posters calling for unity, independence and freedom for Tibetans. Furthermore, a poster made in the name of the group “Independence Uprising Organisation” called upon Tibetans to forgo traditional festivities during Tibetan new year in 1989 (ibid, 155). A similar call would be given in the aftermath of the 2008 protests when Tibetans gave up on celebrations for Tibetan New Year and with the party state distributing money to the public forcing them to celebrate the festival (RFA, 2013). In 1989 throughout the period of *Losar* (New Year), protests took place in Lhasa. For instance on the eve of 19 February some 200 nuns from three large nunneries north of Lhasa made their way towards the Barkhor with plans to demonstrate but were stopped and turned back. On 20 February, the Tibetan National flag was unfurled in a flagpole in front of the Jokhang and posters and pamphlets were distributed around the Barkhor. On 22 February, a group of ten nuns and four monks raised independence slogans completing a circuit around the Barkhor. However, they were confronted by security but managed to escape (Schwartz, 1994:155). Hence, these were direct challenges to China’s legitimacy as the spectre of the Tibetan nation and nationalism was out on full display.

Throughout the period of *Losar* as well as dates which would have coincided with the *Monlam* festival, monks and nuns protested in the Barkhor. For instance, on 4 March 1989, 13 nuns and several monks began a circuit around the Jokhang, shouting independence slogans and were soon joined by 75 Tibetans from the streets. After the third circuit they left on their own without any untoward incident. It was not to be the same as on the 5th, 6th and 7th March the peaceful protests eventually turned violent that led to the imposition of martial law in the Tibetan regions from the next 13 months. The protest on 5th started like any other protest of the previous days, initiated by monks, nuns and some youths who joined them carrying a hand drawn Tibetan national flag, chanting slogans of Tibetan independence and freedom, but also emphasising that it was a peaceful protest. This changed as after completing the second circuit of the Barkhor, the crowd which had swelled was provoked by the security forces who threw a bottle at them from the roof of a police station, to which the Tibetans threw rocks and stones and in retaliation guns were fired at the protestors without any warning.

This led to the crowd fleeing in panic and the Jokhang square being occupied by the PAPF, who prevented Tibetans from making forays into the square from the alleyways. These Tibetans made their way behind the Barkhor, pouring into Dekyi Sharlam, the road connecting the old Tibetan quarters in Lhasa, where they protested but were soon met with brutal repression. To gain safety, the protestors sought refuge in the homes of the Tibetans, where the PAPF entered and shot the occupants. Most of the demonstrators were Tibetan youths in their teens as well as large number of pilgrims (ibid, 157). The security forces were seen to be further provoking the Tibetans to riot when they destroyed a Tibetan restaurant near Ramoche temple, which enraged the Tibetans who went in a frenzy attacking and destroying Chinese shops and other establishments, however preventing the Tibetans from looting and stealing from these shops. Around 15 small shops were burnt. On the 6th a similar event took place with Tibetan protestors gathering at the Dekyi Sharlam and protesting but also attacking Chinese civilians most of whom were riding bicycles and which were mostly burnt by Tibetans. However many of the Chinese civilians were also protected by the Tibetan protestors themselves.

It was seen that the PAPF were allowing the Tibetans to vandalise public property and it was only later that they shot and fired tear gas at them. On 7 March, around 400 had gathered at the same venue and started protesting with burning of Chinese bicycles. However, a rumour of a military sweep made most of them disappear and by early evening around 2000 PLA troops arrived and took positions throughout the centre of Lhasa as martial law was imposed in Tibet for the next 13 months (ibid, 160). The Chinese government wanted an escalation of violence from the Tibetans to provide justification for a major crackdown on them, crushing the dissent from the Tibetans. However, the very imposition of martial law was a failure as it revealed the weaknesses of Chinese policies in Tibet and its attempts at gaining some modicum of legitimacy from the Tibetans.

Beijing emphasised that only sixteen people had died in the protests of 1989 and that Tibetans were armed with weapons which had been smuggled inside the country. The riots were deliberately termed as the handiwork of external agents especially the Dalai clique and western governments. Hence, the imposition of martial law was justified on

lines of preventing an armed uprising on 10 March 1989, which was anticipated by the party state. Under martial law, there was the crude display of military power through parades and display of military hardware, with the Jokhang and the Potala being targeted by Katyusha rockets and tanks (Barnett, 1996:241). Along with visible coercion, there was also the intensification of political education and anti splittist campaign among the masses. During this period a number of party members were also arrested as dissent had spread among them. For instance, Thubten Tsering an electrical technician at the Lhasa power station and a party member was arrested for printing and distributing the Dalai Lama's "five point peace plan" and his speech to the European Parliament. Also, Tashi Tsering a member of the CPPCC from Shigatse was arrested for distributing counter revolutionary propaganda (Schwartz, 1994:170). Even during the period of martial law, protests and dissent was expressed by Tibetans as seen on 2 September 1989, when nine nuns from Chupsang nunnery protested in the Norbulinka where the Yogurt festival, a traditional Tibetan festival was being organised by the party state. These nuns raised slogans for Tibetan independence and were immediately arrested. They were sent for re-education through labour without a trial, one of the features of martial law.

On 22 September, six nuns from Shungseb staged a demonstration around the Barkhor and in a similar manner a monk demonstrated on 30 September, while four nuns from Michungri nunnery sang songs praising the Dalai Lama before the Jokhang on 14 October and two more nuns tried demonstrating on 15 October. A demonstration took place on 25 October 1989 around the Barkhor by a group of young monks from Palhalupuk, a small monastery on the Chakpori which were mostly housed by young monks who held strong views on independence. These protests were mostly small and solitary, with their target audiences being Tibetans, for whom these represented hope and solidarity in the face of overwhelming odds (ibid, 172).

The 1989 Nobel for peace was awarded to the Dalai Lama, which sent strong waves of joy in the Tibetan community inside Tibet, which however could not be expressed out in the open. However, the Tibetans invented a novel way to celebrate the occasion, which was through religious practices such as the *kora*, burning of incense and juniper, throwing *tsampa* (roasted barley) in the air and also praying for the long life of the Dalai

Lama in the numerous temples in Lhasa. Most of these were permitted religious practices, which were now translated into political acts by the Tibetans. Subsequently, many of these practices were banned by the state as it expressed dissent against the Chinese state that further accelerated the resentment of the local populace against the communist state (Barnett, 1996:249). Hence, the Tibetans were able to transform their religious performances into a political tool, transforming it to convey a political message. Thus, the Tibetans were able to overcome their effective powerlessness by drawing the Chinese into a symbolic competition on Tibetan terms (Schwartz, 1994:173). International and national events also had major repercussions in Tibet as seen through the wave of democratic movements in the communist east European countries and the Tiananmen Square protests by pro democracy protestors in China. The party state started framing the demands of democracy and human rights in Tibet as a part of the world wide conspiracy to uproot the CCP, orchestrated from abroad. Hence, the party state emphasised that the demands for human rights, democracy and freedom were all guises for Tibetan independence. The masses were simply seen as a group which was led by a small group of splittist, thus completely sidelining the agency of the Tibetan masses, not emphasising the popular discontent. The demands of the Tibetans were also considered a result of the influence of foreign ideologies creeping in the Tibetan regions, which had to be stifled. Under martial law, there was a severe clampdown on monasteries and monks and nuns who were not registered were forced to leave the monasteries, which led to much resistance and protests.

The martial law in Lhasa was much a failure as is evident from the fact that after it was lifted, the authorities were unable to receive support especially during the celebrations of the 40th Anniversary of the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet in 1991, an event of great importance as it denotes China gaining legitimacy in Tibet (ibid, 182). Hence, the Tibetans are seen to be enjoying a symbolic victory over the party state. The latter emphasised on gaining legitimacy through stressing on continuities rather than mistakes of the past. Hence reverting to propaganda of the past where the emphasis was on the Chinese being in Tibet to help Tibetans and to safeguard the frontier. This narrative is seen to be continued in Tibet in the present period, where it forms an important manner of gaining legitimacy for China. However

prior to the 40th anniversary of the 17 Point Agreement, large number of posters and pamphlets had appeared calling for people to boycott the celebrations and on the eve of 21 May 1991 some 600 leaflets were scattered in the Shol area of Lhasa and at the rally in the sports stadium on 22 May large amount of leaflets were thrown. Out of fear of protests, the authorities had to reduce the number of days of the celebration and repressive measures were imposed. Demonstrations continued through the summers of 1991 with atleast 31 Tibetans being arrested for putting up posters and flags and three demonstrations occurring as soon as the security was lifted on 26 May and as many as ten occurred during June and July (ibid,186).

The protests and demonstrations from 1987-1992 were major challenges to China's legitimacy in Tibet as it was imbued with strong elements of Tibetan nationalism and independence, the primary demands of majority of the protestors. Furthermore, the Tibetans were able to create newer methods of protesting which were steeped in the nonviolent way, deployed strong Tibetan Buddhist values and also incorporated new values of democracy, human rights and freedom which were seen to be in consonance with Buddhism and the Dalai Lama and being absent in the Chinese political system. Hence, the adherence to these values and the rejection of the party state's narrative over Tibet aided in the creation of a strong counter hegemony by Tibetans, that aimed at creating alternative institutions for a future independent Tibet, one that would be liberated from communist China. These measures by Tibetans have led to further intensification of repressive measures within Tibet by China, accompanied with more economic growth and development. The Tibetan cultural values and religion that forms the core of Tibetan counter hegemony are deemed as being impediments to Tibet's greater economic development especially its embracing of a commodity market. Hence, from 1994 onwards especially after the Third Work Forum on Tibet, the traditional culture and religion has been at the receiving end of repressive Chinese policies that have accelerated further dissent among the Tibetans.

The repression exerted was seen to have a somewhat desirous effect for the party state as there was a decline in the number of political prisoners seen from 538 in 1999 to 266 in 2001, with 81 percent being male and 19 percent being female. While 74 percent were

the clergy (Marshall, 2001:7) and also in the non TAR Tibetan regions from 1996-2000 one third of known political detentions took place, compared to only 6 percent in the period 1987-1991 (ibid). However, with the imbroglio over the Panchen Lama's reincarnation in 1995 and the extension of the Patriotic Education Campaign in mid 1996 from Lhasa to the non TAR Tibetan regions, it stimulated more Tibetan political protests outside the TAR, which led to an increase in detentions linked to political protests from 87 to 197 during the 1987-1994 and 1995-2000 period (ibid, 16). Through analysing the reasons for the incarceration one can also gauge the challenges posed by the arrested towards the Chinese state. Around two thirds or 65 percent of all detentions were due to two popular forms of Tibetan political protests, either staging a protest demonstration (44 percent) or distributing posters or leaflets containing political statements (21 percent). The slogans called for Tibet's independence, long life of the Dalai Lama and for the Chinese to leave Tibet (ibid, 27).

Also with the increase in repressive methods, a decline in political protests have been seen, as evidenced from the reduction in the political detentions from more than 700 political protests (87 percent) before 1996 with only 13 percent after 1996 (ibid). However, political protests through the pasting of posters or scattering leaflets as is seen through the detentions of post 1995 whereby 34 percent of the confirmed detentions have been for such activities, compared to 13 percent for demonstrations (ibid). What is also remarkable is in 1998 pro independence protests took place during the visit to Tibet by an EU delegation made up of the ambassadors of Britain, Austria and Luxembourg. The incident took place on 1 May and 4 May, with the former taking place on the day the delegation arrived in Tibet and also marked a flag raising ceremony marking Labour Day. It was initiated by Karma Dawa, a common criminal and was subsequently joined by the others. Again on 4 May when the delegation visited Drapchi prison, a second protest took place with prison representatives from different units who had been assembled for a meeting by the authorities, started raising pro independence slogans (TIN, 1999:18).

The 1998 prison protests were however not the first of its kind, as in March 1994, Lodro Gyatso a 33 year old member of a dance troupe who was serving a 15 year sentence in Drapchi for murder, had his sentence extended by 6 years after he took part in a prison

protest (ibid, 19). On 11 October 1997 a protest took place during the visit of a UN Working Group to Drapchi, which was led by Sonam Wangdu; a common criminal who raised pro independence slogans in the presence of the delegates (ibid). Pro independence groups also existed in secret in the prisons as evidenced from the execution of two Tibetans serving life sentences for murder at Drapchi on 17 May 1990 as they were charged with joining a secret pro independence group in prison (ibid, 20). The protests during the flag raising ceremony on 1 May took place with around 60 political prisoners being present, but the protest was initiated by a non political prisoner in the prison (ibid), who is seen to be influenced and politicised by the clergy and other prisoners who had been arrested for political offenses. With this, the role of the organic intellectual as understood by Gramsci becomes important as the influence from the political prisoners on the others can be understood as a form of consent derived by the latter from common Tibetans, imprisoned for various crimes and who were now politicised. On the other hand, protests by the clergy (monks and nuns) have been rampant. For instance, fourteen nuns from various nunneries had their sentences doubled or tripled in June 1993 after secretly recording songs onto a tape recorder which had been smuggled in prison. The songs were praises for the Dalai Lama and from among them, Ngawang Sangdrol received a further sentence extension of nine years after she took part in a protest in 1996 about the Chinese choice of the Panchen Lama (ibid, 33).

In 1997, coinciding with the handover of HongKong to China, 23 year old nun Yeshe Choedron staged a pro independence protest and hence was placed in solitary confinement. In her support, five of her fellow nun's went on a hunger strike (ibid, 20). They had been arrested in 1993 for staging a pro independence protest on 10 December 1993 that coincided with International Human Rights Day and the anniversary of a demonstration in 1998. It was also followed by a Patriotic Education campaign in the Shungseb nunnery where they belonged (ibid, 21). In prison, the prisoners took advantage of periods of relaxations provided to them to stage protests, whether it was during the Tibetan New Year or during official functions when prisoners were required to gather in large groups (ibid, 22). In April 1998, a Drepung monk Ngawang Sungrab had shouted pro independence slogans during a prison meeting. He had been arrested after taking part in a pro independence demonstration in Lhasa in 1991 (ibid, 96). Also in

1995, a criminal named Lodroe Gyatso had his sentenced extended for the political offence of distributing pro independence leaflets in prison (ibid, 25). Hence, prisoners who were incarcerated in high security Chinese prisons in Tibet were seen to be launching protests and expressing dissent from within the walls of the prisons. Most of their slogans are directed towards independence of Tibet or the long life of the Dalai Lama, which is seen as a strong challenge to the party state's legitimacy in Tibet. During the 1990s a series of peaceful protests took place in Tibet, such as on 14 June 1994 five nuns from Shar Bumpa nunnery, 45 kilometres from Lhasa carried out a protest demonstration, shouting pro independence slogans on the north west corner of the Barkhor (ibid, 24).

On 20 October 1990, Tsering Dorjee, a businessman and his friend Butrug; a monk were arrested from Lhasa for their involvement in the distribution of pro independence leaflets in Kardze town and raising the Tibetan flag at the *Degopo Lhakang* (TIN, 2000:49). On 14 April 1995, three monks carried out a pro independence protest in the Barkhor, and all of them hailed from Khangmar monastery in Damshung county, Lhasa (ibid, 25). Also on 6 May 1996 a work team with instructions to order monks in Ganden monastery to take down the pictures of the Dalai Lama were forced to leave after the monks refused and started raising slogans calling for a long life of the Dalai Lama (ibid, 23). These peaceful protests were also punctuated by a series of bomb explosions in 1998, which witnessed nine cases of explosions with one exploding near the PSB building near the Jokhang on 24 June (ibid, 21). Even in the Tibetan regions incorporated in the neighbouring provinces, protests against the Chinese state was seen to be present, as evidenced from the appearance of pro independence posters in Serta county, Sichuan on 24 July 1995. Two monks from Kardze monastery, Pasang Norbu and Norbu Dardul were arrested in March 1996 for pasting posters declaring their support for the Dalai Lama's anointed Panchen Lama on their monastery wall (TIN, 2000:49).

Even rural Tibet witnessed a series of protests during this period as seen on 30 June 1992, when Sonam Rinchen, a farmer by profession and three other farmers from Gyama township, 60 kilometres east of Lhasa while attending a political education meeting that aimed at increasing people's loyalty to socialism and to build the grassroots organisation

started demonstrating against the Chinese state. The protestors unfurled a large Tibetan flag and walked towards the platform, shouting pro independence slogans, eventually occupying the stage with the flag, which had a picture of the Dalai Lama in the middle, a Tibetan white scarf and the word “may independent Tibet live for a thousand years” inscribed on the right. When they were arrested, around a hundred people followed them shouting Tibetan independence slogans and extending support through burning of incense and throwing of *tsampa* over the youths (TIN, 2001:71-72).

In 1999 which marked a number of anniversaries in Tibet, both celebrated as well as banned, the 6th National Minority Games were held from 18 to 23 August as a part of the 40th Anniversary of the democratic reform in the TAR (TIN, 2000:14). However the sporting occasion was marked with a series of protests and demonstrations in Lhasa, with a few protests occurring prior to the games. For instance a few nuns and monks shouted pro independence slogans prior to the games. During the sporting event, a man named Tashi Tsering had lowered the Chinese flag and attempted to replace it with the Tibetan national flag. According to Tibet Information Network (TIN), the man had dynamite or some combustible materials strapped to his body and he tried to light it before he was detained but due to the rains he was unsuccessful. After his arrest on 10 February 2000, he committed suicide (TIN, 2001:71). On 20 August during a dress rehearsal for a dance performance to be held on 21 August, a young monk aged 14-15 wearing lay clothing also shouted slogans for Tibetan independence. On the same day around ten monks held a protest in the Potala Square for atleast 15 minutes and also two other monks were seen to be dropping leaflets calling for Tibet’s independence. Also during the cultural performance to commemorate the games, two monks and two nuns shouted slogans at the sports stadium in Lhasa (TIN, 2000:15).

In early 1999 outside the TAR, eleven monks from Dargye monastery in Kardze TAP were detained for painting pro independence slogans on the walls of the monastery (ibid, 48). A year earlier in 1998, five monks from Kirti monastery along with a businessman was arrested for resisting the Patriotic Education Campaign and also for organising a display of the pictures of the Dalai Lama and Kirti *rinpoche*; the head of the monastery who is in exile. They were also blamed for circulating books and speeches of the Dalai

Lama and recognised the Panchen Lama anointed by the Dalai Lama (ibid, 35). The same monastery and its monks would a decade from 1998 become the focal point in challenging the legitimacy of the Chinese state, as it would be one of the first monasteries to protest in 2008 and also the first site for the series of self immolations that would occur from 2009 onwards inside Tibet.

However, on 31 October 1999, a major protest took place in Kardze, Sichuan with hundreds of locals demonstrating outside the detention centre demanding the release of a senior religious figure and two other monks who had been arrested for opposing the state. They were the monk, Sonam Phuntsog, a respected local figure and his assistant Sonam and another monk, Agyal Tsering, who incidentally had already served an 18 month prison sentence in the early 1990s for suspected involvement in distributing pro independence leaflets. The protest in Kardze was the largest protest after 1987-89 in the Tibetan regions and which reiterated the strong form of resistance being expressed by Tibetans towards the party state (ibid, 33). On 26 October 2000, a bomb exploded on the north side of the *Dekyi Sharlam* in Lhasa (TIN, 2001:74). A similar incident had occurred in January 1996 outside the house of Sengchen Lobsang Gyaltzen, a lama and political dignitary who led the Chinese faction in the dispute over the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama. In March 1996 another explosion occurred outside the CCP headquarters in Lhasa and in December 1996, a similar explosion rocked the offices of the Lhasa metropolitan government (ibid, 75).

In 2001, the Strike Hard campaign was renewed with much vigour, whereby under this, 254 people were arrested trying to leave or re-enter TAR with “reactionary propaganda literature”. Furthermore, some twenty Tibetans were arrested and sentenced for splittist activities and in October, three foreign tourists and three Tibetans were detained for displaying the banned Tibetan national flag and shouting pro independence slogans (H.R.W, 2002). The monks Kalsang Dondrub and Nawang Dondrub were sentenced in Qinghai province on charges of “endangering state security” for non violent activities, while on 11 April 2002, Kunchok Chomphell Labrang and Jigme Jamtruk from Labrang Tashikhyil in Kanlho prefecture, Gansu were arrested for possessing booklets containing speeches of the Dalai Lama. On similar lines, Yeshe Gyatso, a member of the CPPCC

and Tibet University student, Dawa Tashi were arrested on charges of splitting the motherland, undermining the unity of nationalities and violating the constitution. In the same year, five monks named Zoepa, Tsogphel, Sherab Dargye, Oezer and Migyur from Khangmar monastery, Ngaba, Sichuan along with an unidentified lay artist received sentences of 1-12 years for painting a Tibetan flag, possessing pictures of the Dalai Lama and distributing materials calling for Tibetan independence (ICT, 2004). Hence, prior to the 2008 protests which engulfed the entire Tibetan world, a series of protests had preceded it in the Tibetan areas, challenging the legitimacy of the party state through a number of ways as enumerated before. However, it was the pan Tibetan protests of 2008 and subsequent self immolations from 2009 which has posed a deeper challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese state.

THE 2008 PAN TIBETAN PROTESTS, SELF IMMOLATIONS AND CHALLENGES TO LEGITIMACY

Cries of Tibetan independence, freedom, return of the Dalai Lama and human rights rent the air in Tibet in March 2008, when Tibetans protested against the Chinese government in TAR as well as in the Tibetan regions of Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and Yunnan. While the protests of the late 1980s had eventually become widespread; the 2008 protests were truly a pan Tibetan uprising. The banned Tibetan national flag was visible in every corner of Tibet and unlike the earlier protests, where Lhasa had remained the centre of demonstrations; the 2008 uprisings had spread far and wide. What is significant is the fact that the protests and the ensuing crackdown were captured through the internet, mostly using mobile technology. The trajectory of the 2008 protests is quite similar to the ones that occurred in the past, with the demonstrations being initiated by monks/nuns and eventually being joined by the lay masses. Another similarity with the protest of the late 1980s is the factor of the Dalai Lama, where the first protest in 1987 was partly influenced by the visit of the religious leader to the United States to attend the Human Rights Caucus, similarly in 2008, the protests were partly due to the awarding of the Congressional Gold medal to the Dalai Lama by the United States.

However, the protests and demonstrations in Tibet in March 2008 were to coincide with the 10 March National Uprising of 1959. Prior to 2008, a number of protests had

occurred, which were mostly small in scale and solitary. For instance, in 2007 at a horse festival in Lithang, Kham, a Tibetan nomad named Rungye Adak, had jumped on to a stage calling for the return of the Dalai Lama and independence for Tibet (Smith, 2010:67). He was sentenced to eight years in prison and a series of patriotic campaigns were launched in these areas, denouncing the Dalai Lama, trying to whip up patriotism in China and rejection of Tibetan separatism. On the other hand on 31 October 1999 a major protest against the Chinese government took place in Kardze county town, Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture when hundreds of Tibetans took to the streets in protest against the arrest of a revered Buddhist teacher and his two companions by the party state. The arrested were charged with bombing a small Tibetan medical clinic in early October, which purportedly belonged to an alleged worshipper of the controversial *Shugden* deity that the Dalai Lama in 1997 had suggested Tibetans not to worship. Around 300 locals joined the protest with the armed forces having to use tear gas and guns to disperse them and also arresting 50 Tibetans. The protests were also in response to the hardline policies that had been followed against the Dalai Lama in the monasteries by the authorities. Even the Buddhist teacher who had been arrested was considered loyal to the Dalai Lama and was deemed highly influential in the area. The monk, Sonam Phuntsog had been involved in teaching Tibetan language to the monks from more than 30 monasteries in the region as well as to local children.

One of his compatriots named Agyal Tsering had earlier been arrested for distributing pro independence leaflets in the early 1990s. Hence, their arrests sparked strong protests from the local population. In the past, more Tibetans have been arrested, for instance on 20 October 1990; Tsering Dorjee a businessman from Kardze was arrested along with his friend for distributing pro independence leaflets in Kardze and unfurling of the Tibetan flag in the Kardze monastery. In March 1996, two monks were arrested and sentenced for putting up wall posters in the monastery declaring support for the Panchen Lama, recognised by the Dalai Lama (TIN, 1999). To a large extent, the 2008 pan Tibetan protests were a continuation of the strong dissent against China by Tibetans. On 10 March 2008 some 500 monks from Drepung monastery attempted to march into Lhasa to protest but were eventually stopped within a few miles of their monastery and were arrested and beaten. On the same day, five similar protests had taken place including in

Lhasa TAR. It had taken place in Ditsa, Lutsa in Qinghai. Monks from Sera were more successful and could reach the Jokhang carrying the banned Tibetan national flag but were soon arrested. Attempts were also made on 11 March to protest by around 600 monks from Sera but who were arrested and beaten.

Monks from Ganden were also prevented from protesting as well as nuns from Chupsang tried protesting but were stopped. The monasteries had been surrounded and barricaded with food and water being stopped. Rumours emerged that a few monks had been killed. These protestors wanted to commemorate the 10 March uprising of 1959, which is deemed as the National uprising day by Tibetans (Smith, 2010:3). However on 14 March 2008, around 200 monks from the Ramoche temple in Lhasa protested and were brutally beaten which enraged the Tibetan bystanders, who in their anger set off a riot that lasted for several hours. Around 3-5 people were injured in the riots and damages of around 200 million yuan took place. The losses included 100 million yuan in shops, 6.5 million in public facilities, 9.05 million in financial services and the rest in government agency buildings. There was also the destruction of 422 shops owned by the Han and Hui migrants, six hospitals, seven schools and 120 civilian residences along with 84 vehicles being torched (Xinhua, 2008). The attack on the Chinese and their business establishments are a result of the brewing resentment against economic discrimination launched as a result of the policies of the party state.

Furthermore, in a similar situation in Lhasa on the eve of the imposition of martial law in 1989, the security forces were seen to be provoking the crowd to riot and not employing proper control techniques, which was also seen in 2008. Significantly on 14 March, in eastern Tibet, in a part of Gansu province a demonstration by 400 monks of Labrang Tashikyil monastery took place which was severely repressed with force by security forces leading to a protest on the 15th by five to ten thousand local Tibetans who burnt the shops of local Han and Hui Chinese in the town adjacent to the monastery. Several Tibetans were killed in the crackdown that ensued after the rioting and protesting (Smith, 2010:3). While the protest in Amdo on 14-15 March is termed as a continuation of the protests initiated in Lhasa, it can be said to have its own trajectory and a different dimension, one that can be traced to the series of rebellions that broke out in eastern Tibet

in the mid to late 1950s (Weiner, 2012:1). In Labrang Tashikyil the protests and riots on 15 March which was participated by around a 1000 monks and laypeople led to the burning of the shops of local Han and Hui Chinese, and a total damage of 4279 shops and houses and 1500 other public facilities being destroyed which equalled to a damage of 230 million yuan (Smith, 2010:14). It was in 1958 when the disparate tribes and chiefdoms had rallied against the Chinese and in retaliation had been violently suppressed. The memories of which are seen to have been evoked through oral narratives but also through writings that had emerged during this period, that formed strong counter narratives against the state led discourse on peaceful liberation of these areas into the motherland.

In Lhasa, on 14 March eventually the security forces were ordered to use lethal force, killing an estimated 50-100 Tibetans and injuring many. Gruesome pictures of the dead were sent outside Tibet through the internet and mobile phones. Protests continued in the days to come with it spreading to almost all Tibetan inhabited regions in PRC. However, the party state has portrayed the protests as the “3.14” incident confining the protests of 2008 to one day of violence and rioting and not mentioning of the peaceful protests and demonstrations, which had happened more. The protests follow a similar trajectory of being peaceful but violently curbed by the security and thus provoking further protests. Eventually, more than 90 places in Tibet, many in eastern Tibetan areas outside the TAR erupted in protests that collectively had the character of a Tibetan uprising. The raising of the Tibetan national flag and of independent slogans was a direct challenge to China’s legitimacy.

Moreover, the Tibetans also challenged the legitimacy of Beijing on an international scale as 2008 was also the year of China hosting the summer Olympics. The PRC winning the bid to host the Olympics was a matter of great pride and also symbolised the coming up of China to the global world stage. Therefore, the protests by Tibetans were meant to humiliate Beijing in the world stage. The Chinese in a similar tone of the late 1980s blamed the Dalai Lama and hostile western governments. They also stoked the embers of Chinese nationalism inside and outside China to curb the growing Tibetan discontent. Furthermore, there was also the intensification of repressive campaigns such

as Patriotic Education Campaigns to stifle Tibetan dissent inside Tibet. Significantly, the 2008 protests reiterated Tibetan rejection of Chinese legitimacy over Tibet and the ensued repressive method sharpened it more (Smith, 2010:8). In the spring of 2008, around 150 protests had occurred which were participated by farmers, nomads, students and monks, making it truly widespread in its scope. Around 95 separate protests took place in Tibetan areas within China in the three and a half weeks from 10 March to 5 April 2008 (Barnett, 2009:8).

These protests also took place after almost a decade of the launching of the Western Development Campaign that had given double digit growth to Tibet, which for the state was a sign that the population was content that was proved wrong by the protest in 2008. From 1987 to 1996 some 213 political protests were reported from Tibet, of which 160 were confirmed, but only five took place outside the TAR. In the 2008 protests 22 of the 95 reported incidents took place in the TAR, including in some remote areas in west and north Tibet, while 75 occurred in the eastern parts of the Tibetan plateau, in Kham and Amdo. Further division shows that Qinghai had 30 incidents; Sichuan had 23 and Southern Gansu had 22. This is significant as these areas have been termed as enjoying more liberal policies than TAR, with more leeway given to monasteries and having more Tibetans in the administration. The area also had strong flourishing of the Tibetan cultural and intellectual activity (ibid, 10). Hence when these areas protested in a simultaneous manner, it was much alarming for the Chinese. Majority of the slogans raised by the protestors are related to the Dalai Lama, calling for his return, or his long life. This is seen to be different from the late 1980s when the demands raised were for independence. This also denotes the ability of the Dalai Lama to transform the issue from independence to demands for autonomy and filtering of ideas into Tibet from the outside world.

Moreover, the protestors have made the Dalai Lama acquire the centre stage as the Chinese government had vehemently attacked the religious leader since 1994 when it decided to transform the Tibet issue into the issue of the Dalai Lama, forcing monks/nuns and the laity to denounce him. Even though the protestors had a plethora of demands, many of which were not direct challenges to the party state's legitimacy, the response

from the state authorities in the form of repression led to more resentment among the people. However, around eleven incidents have involved explicit demands for independence and the carrying of the Tibetan national flag which is banned. Of these eleven, ten of the protests with flags took place in eastern Tibet, mostly in Amdo, where the flag has never been waved before. Thus, this indicates the idea of a common Tibetan nation among Tibetans in Amdo and hence a stronger challenge to China's legitimacy (ibid, 11). The pan Tibetan character of the 2008 protests is also reflected in the class composition of the participants where unlike the late 1980s when over 90 percent of the protests were led by the clergy, in 2008 only around 24 percent of the protests have involved monks and nuns. The 2008 protests have seen involvement of Tibetans from all social and occupational backgrounds. For instance, 30 percent of the 95 reported incidents in 2008 took place in villages and townships; hence farmers and nomadic pastoralists took part, the class that is generally considered to be the traditional support of the CCP (ibid).

This reveals the popular discontent among majority of the Tibetan population as an important way through which the party state had tried gaining legitimacy had been through economic development, whereby support from certain classes were deemed as being guaranteed especially the farmers and nomads in the early periods of the reforms and the Tibetan professionals and service classes in the present period. The protests which are seen as cutting across class divisions are symptoms of a major legitimacy crisis being faced by the party state in Tibet. While the initial protests were led by monks, it eventually became overwhelmingly an affair of the laity, with even the major involvement of the elite, which reveals an erosion of influence and power of the party state. For instance, 17 of the initially reported 95 incidents were staged by students, including from the Nationalities Universities and a number of those that were detained in connection to the 2008 protests were intellectuals, singers and people belonging to the cultural industry, which forms an important aspect of Gramscian civil society. A few of them are Jamyang Kyi (intellectual and singer), writer and blogger Kunga Tsangyang, Kunchok Tsephel, Jamyang Phuntsog, film maker Dondrup Wangchen, singers Dabe, Drolma Kyi, Tashi Dondrup, the educators Palchen Kyab and Sonam, the lama Phurbu Tsering and HIV Aids educator Wangdu (ibid, 13).

These individuals represent the civil society of Tibet under the party state. Many of them were also government employees who had benefited from the party state's policies. However, most of them were also the intellectuals created under the secular atmosphere in Tibet, who to a degree embodied the CCP's attempts at gaining hegemony. However, with them protesting and expressing dissent, the legitimacy of the party state was challenged and there was significant spread throughout Tibet of support for the Dalai Lama and of belief of Tibet as a separate nation in the past. Also, as mentioned earlier all protests are not directed towards challenging the legitimacy of the CCP but are also in response to specific demands of the state. Protests and violence have also had an ethnic angle where the protestors have specifically targeted Han and Hui Chinese business establishments. There have also been sympathy protests mostly in the rural and nomadic areas of Tibet, in solidarity with certain anniversaries or other protests, for instance the commemoration of the uprisings of 1959, which also indicates the rise of solidarity among Tibetans (ibid, 14).

The 2008 protests can also be marked with the radicalisation and politicisation of the dormant classes of lay Tibetans, supported by students from new middle classes, urban elite and by increasingly sophisticated monastic groups. The Chinese government focussed on the riots and the violence that was unleashed, justifying the state violence. Furthermore, they blamed the Dalai Lama for the violence in Tibet, thus sidelining the peaceful demonstrations and the discontent rising among the masses. The protest in 2008 that started from Drepung monks numbering around 300-500 was not a direct challenge to China's legitimacy as they had attempted a march to the centre of the city demanding the release of their fellow monks who had been arrested in October 2007. It was however a demonstration by 14 monks from Sera, most of whom were from Amdo and Kham, whose protests included slogans for Tibetan independence and carrying of the banned Tibetan flag that posed a direct challenge to China's legitimacy. On the same day a similar protest which raised slogans for a long life of the Dalai Lama and independence of Tibet were raised by monks and lay people at two sites in Amdo, outside TAR in Tsolho TAP, Qinghai and also in Jyekundo in Qinghai. Furthermore, on 11 March, independence manifestos appeared in the walls of these towns. In Labrang Tashikyil, the largest monastery in Gansu, police removed independence posters and it was the same in

Kardze. On 12 March when nuns from the Chupsang nunnery demonstrated, they were commemorating the anniversary of 12 March 1959, the day when Tibetan women had demonstrated against the Chinese (Smith, 2010:13).

These were direct challenges to Chinese legitimacy as it questioned China's sovereignty because it not only raised demands of independence, but also there was the commemoration of 10 March and 12 March which were in itself highly subversive as these dates denoted struggle for the survival of the Tibetan nation. It also reflected that even after nearly five decades of Chinese rule, the Tibetans most of whom were of a younger generation had not forgotten about Tibet as a nation. Even on the day of the violence 14 March in Lhasa, protests in eastern Tibet took place especially in Labrang Tashikyil who demanded independence of Tibet and also displayed the Tibetan flag. The Tibetan flag and slogans were raised constantly along with the protestors indulging in rioting and violence. This was seen in the case of the Lhamo Kirti Monastery in Ngaba, Amdo, where the monks were joined by the lay to burn 24 shops and 81 vehicles; the damage which was equal to the county's total revenues for the past ten years (ibid, 15).

Another significant way through which China's legitimacy was challenged in these protests and demonstrations were also through a lowering of the Chinese flags from buildings and the raising of the Tibetan flags. This form of dissent was also witnessed in Golok TAP, where the Tibetan flag was unfurled in the place of the Chinese flag and when Chinese security forces were sent to respond, they were blocked by 350 horsemen (ibid, 16). The widespread nature of the protests in 2008 was also seen through the fact that in Gansu province it was reported that it had affected 105 government organisations, 27 towns, 22 villages and 113 work units in Machu, Sangchu, Chone and Tsoe townships. Hence all the Tibetan townships and county areas in the Gansu province had erupted in protest. Significantly, majority of the demonstrations were peaceful and were also in solidarity to the other protests but the response from the Chinese authorities were the same which was to arrest and brutally torture them and also impose stiff ideological education sessions on the population. The response to such repressive measures have been again protests but also suicides from a personal level (ibid, 19).

Hence, such measures have further increased the disenchantment towards the party state. Another significant measure adopted by the communists was to amplify the propaganda regarding them liberating Tibet from serfdom and bringing about prosperity of the region, with however the target audience being the Chinese, hence whipping up a strong sense of Chinese nationalism, which was much in display at different venues where the Olympic torch relay would pass and also in the cyber-world. Through raising Chinese nationalism, the CCP emphasised on protests in Tibet being a handiwork of the Dalai Lama and his western supporters, thus preventing the Tibetan discontent and problems from gaining importance, which has further increased the frustration towards the Chinese government, turning into challenges to CCP's legitimacy in Tibet especially being unleashed in the form of the self immolations that continues in Tibet.

From 2009 till the time of writing, 141 Tibetans have committed self immolations as a form of political protests of which an overwhelming majority took place outside the TAR in the Tibetan inhabited areas that have been incorporated in the neighbouring provinces. This staggering number of self immolations is a sign of an endemic failure of China's policies in the region and also the emergence of a new form of resistance by Tibetans. From the 141 self immolators, 116 were men and 25 were women and around 24 of them were 18 years or under. It was on 27 April 1998 when the first self immolation in Tibetan society in the modern era took place in exile in Delhi, India, when Thubten Ngodup set himself on fire and died during a hunger strike organised by the TYC, an organisation that demands for complete independence for Tibet (ICT, 2015). In the post 2008 protests which had spread throughout Tibet, the repressive measures and ideological education campaigns had been heavily imposed upon the common people. The campaign to denounce the Dalai Lama was in full swing and the normal religious practices in monasteries had been curtailed. Hence, it was the halting of a prayer ceremony at Kirti monastery in Ngaba TAP that prompted a monk named Tapey who was in his mid twenties to immolate on 27 February 2009, initiating the first of a series of fiery protests that has marked Sino Tibetan relations ever since. The banning of the prayer ceremony was just one of the endless numbers of repressive intrusions that had been exercised by the party state since March 2008 and Tapey's monastery was one of the fiercest sites of

protest throughout this particular period. His self immolation was followed by another on 16 March 2011 from the same monastery by a twenty year old monk Phuntsog.

Kirti monastery soon turned into a site of self immolations with 13 of the 141 being monks from Kirti and another 11 being former monks who may have been expelled by the authorities. Even though the initial protests were started by the clergy, the bulk of the immolators have been lay people. Majority of the immolators have also committed the act in public places, in front of monasteries or government offices where their act can be viewed by the larger population. In many cases, the act of self immolation was also captured live and sent outside Tibet through the internet. There have also been the last testaments and recorded statements of a few self immolators from which the objectives of the individuals performing the act becomes clear. In the case of the reincarnated monk Lama Sobha, who self immolated on 8 January 2012, in Golok (Amdo, Qinghai), in a tape recording stated that his self immolation was an offering to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and all the spiritual teachers and lamas. He also called for the preservation and protection of Tibetan culture, religion and language; imploring the Tibetans to work for this goal. He also expressed respect and admiration for those Tibetans who self immolated. He was the first reincarnate lama to immolate. In his last message Lama Sobha mentions about his inspiration Thubten Ngodup, who had self immolated in 1998, hence acknowledging the fact that Tibetans inside Tibet knew about the incident. Much of his testament is filled with a religious tinge, which emphasises on the aspect of the need to preserve the Tibetan way of life (Tibetan Political Review, 2012).

On the other hand, Wang Lixiong through a statistical analysis has tried to understand the aspirations of the self immolators. Through situating the frequency of the self immolators in accordance to a time line, it is seen that majority of the self immolations took place during the months of March and in November 2012. In March, a reason for the high rate of self immolations has been attested to the fact that the month marks numerous commemorations including the 10 March National Uprising Day. The rise in the self immolations in November and October can be termed to the holding of the Party Congress in Beijing, hence terming the self immolations as a way to induce the Chinese leaders to change its policies with regard to Tibet. In another way of understanding the

motives of the self immolators, the last words by them are also indicative, for instance 54 percent termed their act as an action, to inspire others and for bringing change. Another 38 percent termed it as a prayer for the Dalai Lama, 35 percent saw it as an expression of courage and responsibility, around 19 percent termed their act for demanding Independence for Tibet, along with another 19 percent terming the situation as being unbearable, while 19 percent saw it as a form of protest and raising demands and the last 4 percent are ones demanding attention from the international community (Wang, 2013).

From the last word analysis, it is clear that the self immolators have a diverse range of demands, which from the level of policy making may or may not be a direct challenge to Chinese legitimacy. However, large number of self immolations have also acted as a catalyst which expresses courage and responsibility, thus in a way tries to inspire Tibetans towards unity and solidarity. The factor of the Dalai Lama is also very important with a large number of them calling for his return. The self immolations are a continuation of the 2008 protests, which had been atomised to the individual's level and also proves the power of the individual. The Chinese party state was caught on the back foot and had condemned the self immolators. Initially, the authority termed the self immolators as people who had some illness, for instance the second self immolator Phuntsog was termed as having a history of epilepsy (Xinhua, 2011). The self immolators were also termed as individuals with mental illness and having criminal backgrounds. Furthermore, the state through an article published by a Tibetologist Hua Zi termed the self immolations as an extreme act of violence and terrorism and instigated by the Dalai Lama (Xinhua, 2011).

This discourse of external instigation with regard to self immolations have been much emphasised terming it to be an act of political vendetta being carried out. According to Wu Zegang, the chief of the Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan, the self immolations are acts of separatists to create chaos. Self immolations have also been termed as running counter to the teachings of Buddhism (Xinhua, 2012). In 2013 the state had also emphasised on the fact that no self immolations had taken place in Tibet (Hannah, 2014) and that majority of the immolations had occurred outside TAR. The rise in self immolations has led to more repressive measures being adopted by the party state

such as confiscating the bodies of the self immolators and preventing the traditional rites from occurring and also in many cases halting welfare measures from the state to the family of the self immolator and in a few cases imposing it to the community. The self immolations can be dubbed as a serious challenge to the Chinese state as to a larger extent the resistance has been atomised and it is the individual that is dissenting against the state. The legitimacy of China is truly challenged as the sovereignty of the state over the human body is defied through the act of self immolations. The human body especially in the context of Tibet is the final site of sovereignty as the state provides nourishment through development and hence has jurisdiction over the corporeal self. Thus, through an act of self immolation, the Tibetans are seen to rejecting the benevolent act of the state and hence the agency of the state is denied and its legitimacy challenged.

CONCLUSION

Thus, the chapter outlines the series of protests and demonstrations in various forms as a way through which the legitimacy of China is challenged. It also looks into the aspect of protests that do not challenge China's legitimacy but to a greater extent increases its legitimacy. Also from the protests and demonstrations that have truly challenged legitimacy, a form of counter narrative emerges, steeped in a discourse of democracy, freedom, human rights, support for the Dalai Lama and independence for Tibet which are all counter hegemonic as these form the very basic foundations for an alternative institution. Significantly, the basis of China's mode of gaining legitimacy is seen through the economic reforms and development, which however also grants the space for the expression of Tibetan culture and Tibetan Buddhism that has formed the crux of challenging China over the Tibetan regions.

Furthermore, as Tibet forms the final frontier of the modern Chinese nation state it has always been steeped in a discourse of strategy and security. The economic development and prosperity of the region and its people are also ways of securing the frontier of the motherland. Hence for the party state the need for legitimacy in the Tibetan regions remains secondary as security and strategy takes precedence. This is seen during the 1950s when the communists had no qualms of crushing the revolt and imposing socialist reforms. Also during the late 1980s and after, the party state emphasised more on

strengthening their hold over Tibet rather than achieve popular legitimacy as seen in their attacks on the Dalai Lama and also through terming the protests and demonstrations and popular discontent being the handiwork of the Dalai clique and reactionary foreign governments.

CHAPTER – CONCLUSION

The Sino Tibetan issue can be seen as one where the contestation lies over issues of sovereignty, nationalism, human rights, religious freedom and minority rights, but is primarily an issue of legitimacy. Legitimacy is termed as the validity to rule by a regime/state where the latter has the right to exercise political power; to enact, apply and enforce laws as well as the subject/populace has a general obligation to obey the laws. It grants the right to exercise sovereignty but however in many cases it is an issue of contention. Derived through numerous ways it forms the crux for the justification to exercise control by the state. In international law it is also highly significant as the absence of legitimacy of a particular regime can be seen as a cause for challenging its existence. However, the thesis does not look into this dimension of legitimacy.

For PRC, its legitimacy over Tibet becomes highly important as it is seen to be challenged by a number of factors which have been elaborated in the previous chapters. One of the primary reasons for the issue of legitimacy assuming much importance for China with regard to Tibet is seen in the issue of “China’s Rise” which is seen to be dented by the internationalisation of the Tibet issue, questioning China’s legitimacy over Tibet and thus hampering its rise. Still, the PRC is seen to be attempting to gain legitimacy in Tibet through a number of measures, which have been elaborated in the chapters. In these chapters the party state is seen to be garnering legitimacy in Tibet through a process of co-option and incorporation of Tibetan Buddhist elites into the ruling structure, in which they have been quite successful as indicated in the research present in the chapters.

However, this process of gaining legitimacy has also led to the emergence of a strong challenge to China’s legitimacy as in many cases there has been a sharpening of Tibetan identity through the process of boosting legitimacy by the party state. The discursive space provided to the religious and other lay elites as a mode of garnering legitimacy by CCP is seen to be leading to the emergence of an outlet for increasing the Tibetan identity and nationalism as seen in the form of a distinct form of education, religious freedom and other cultural autonomy provided by the party state to the Tibetans. This has also been seen in the process of loosening and tightening of policies by the CCP in the Tibetan

areas, whereby the phases of moderate policies which emphasised on greater social, political and cultural autonomy for Tibetans have led to them reasserting their identity and challenging China's legitimacy inside Tibet. This has further led to the party state in implementing ultra left and hard line policies which has attempted to curb the challenges to China's legitimacy but has eventually led to a further alienation of Tibetans from the party state and hence a lack of legitimacy for China. China's mode of gaining legitimacy in Tibet has essentially remained on grounds of a number of factors – revolutionary, historical, legal-institutional and performance legitimacy. These are much visible through the series of formal discourses that have emerged on Tibet from the Party state. It can also be seen as a continuation of a process of legitimisation that the numerous political orders in China over time have tried to impose on Tibet, which is important as we see a process of continuity and change in the present dispensation's attempts in bringing legitimacy in Tibet.

Gaining legitimacy is important as it gives a right and recognition to particular regimes' claims over a territory and its population. The process of gaining legitimacy can also to a certain extent be correlated to hegemony that is a situation where the ruling power's values are accepted as spontaneous expressions of their interest of the ruled, a form of ideological domination. Thus, the Party state through its legitimising process has tried to gain hegemony in the Tibetan regions. This is visible in the discourse on liberation of masses, the granting of national regional autonomy, cooption of ruling elites and finally economic development. The thesis also attempts to correlate this aspect of hegemony in the numerous attempts made by China in exerting legitimacy over Tibet. There has been the deployment of a Gramscian understanding of hegemony in the previous chapters – where hegemony can be simply seen from the aspect of a rule through consent as well as can be seen as a complex interlocking of the political, social, cultural forces which makes it different from simple rule that is expressed in direct political forms and in times of crisis by direct or effective coercion (Williams, 2010:108). While legitimacy and hegemony are two different ideas, it can be emphasised that hegemony can be an important tool of garnering legitimacy.

In regard to this, the thesis looks into the role played by Tibetan Buddhism and the religious elites in the process of gaining hegemony in the Tibetan regions as Tibet was a theocratic state till 1951. The influence of Tibetan Buddhism is also seen from the series of campaigns launched by the party state against its own cadres in Tibet. For instance, in 1998, the homes of the Tibetan officials in Lhasa were searched for shrines and photographs of the Dalai Lama and there was also the renewal of the requirement for the children of the party cadres and government workers to be withdrawn from schools in India run by the Dalai Lama's government in exile (TIN, 1999:44). Thus the role of the monasteries and the position of the reincarnated lama become highly important in the context of hegemony and gaining legitimacy for China. The monasteries and monks are seen as "organic intellectuals" who are seen to be forming the ideological setup for the local population. Furthermore, monks and nuns since 1959 have remained at the forefront of protests and demonstrations against the Chinese state. Therefore, the party state is also seen to be directing its authority in curbing the influence of the monastic community either through the patriotic education campaigns or through deploying economic largess on them. The thesis also reflects on the aspect of how much of the strategies adopted by the state towards the religious community have failed and how they are still seen to be challenging the legitimacy of the CCP in Tibet.

One of the significant means adopted by the party state in generating legitimacy in Tibet has been through the rehabilitation of the 10th Panchen Lama and recognition of his reincarnation the 11th Panchen, Gyalsten Norbu. The party state is seen to be attempting to control the reincarnation process of the Tibetan lamas, who are seen to be enjoying immense charismatic and traditional legitimacy from the Tibetan population. Hence, the role of the previous Panchen Lama becomes significant as after the escape of the Dalai Lama, he remained as the senior most Tibetan Buddhist figure inside Tibet. While he was initially termed as a Chinese stooge, his vocal criticisms during the early 1960s against the policies of the CCP in the Tibetan regions, enabled him to occupy a high standing among local Tibetans, but which led to his downfall from the party hierarchy and also he suffered immensely during the Cultural Revolution. After his rehabilitation, he assumed much of his earlier positions and was seen to be engaged in the flourishing of Tibetan religion and culture. Hence, the 10th Panchen stands as a classic example of former

religious elite who was co-opted by the party state but who was able to exercise some degree of autonomy during the 1980s, but also aided in the gaining of legitimacy for China.

On a similar note, the CCP is seen to be extending a policy of co-option to the 14th Dalai Lama during the 1950s as well as in the 1980s, which is evident from the series of statements delivered by the Dalai Lama during the 1950s when he visited inland China and along with the Panchen was felicitated by Mao and the other Chinese leaders. The Dalai Lama had also participated in the constitution making process for the PRC in 1954-55. In the 1980s, the policy of co-option of the Dalai Lama is seen when the 10th Panchen had passed away on 28 January 1989 the party state had invited the Dalai Lama to preside over a prayer event for the Panchen Lama at the Yong He Gong monastery in Beijing, which was however declined by the Dalai Lama (Arjia Rinpoche, 2010:166). While this policy towards the Dalai Lama failed, the party state is seen to be continuing with it in the form of appointments of the religious elites in the CPPCC and other government bodies.

The thesis also dwells much on the role of the CCP in the Tibetan areas, especially the role of the party members in gaining legitimacy for the party state among the local population. The presence of the ethnic Tibetan communist party members is important as they form the “organic intellectuals” for the CCP in Tibet, aiding in the formation of a civil society which acts as the fortress preserving the physical apparatuses of the party state. Hence, in Gramsci’s formulation, the idea of the “war of position” becomes important in understanding hegemony, where the civil society is seen to be aiding in the garnering of hegemony for the ruling groups. The Gramscian idea of the state being a combination of the political society and civil society is also an important theme which has been highlighted in the preceding chapters, with the civil society playing a dominant role in Tibet. Civil society as a Gramscian formulation is also much complex and dynamic and goes beyond the associational notion of the civil society.

For Gramsci, civil society encompassed not only institutions but also socio cultural and religious values which influence an individual’s behavior, taste and values (Jones, 2006:32). These in a way help in constituting a sense of reality for most people in society – a form of lived system of meanings and values which brings about a form of

conformity, a common sense. Hence, hegemony in the strongest sense is culture, but a culture which has to be also seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes, brought about by civil society. Significantly, hegemony also entails the modern concepts of leisure and private life thus going beyond simple understandings of culture or ideology but one which has elements of both and which alludes to an internalisation of domination or hegemony (Williams, 2010:110). It is deemed as a process which is rooted in realised complex of experiences, relationship and activities. It has to be continually renewed, recreated, defended and modified. Hegemony is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not all its own, seen in the form of counter hegemony and alternative hegemony (ibid, 110-11).

Therefore, the process of gaining hegemony by the party state in Tibet is also seen to be leading to the growth of a form of counter hegemony, which in a number of cases has been perpetuated by the religious elites, who formed the former nucleus of the civil society in traditional Tibet. Furthermore, much of the attempts at garnering legitimacy by Beijing have led to the growth of Tibetan identity and thus the rise of ethnic nationalism. This is seen in the form of an ethnically exclusionary dynamic (Fischer, 2012), which has been perpetuated by China's economic development projects in Tibet, which have given more advantages to the Han and sidelined Tibetans. Furthermore, through reforms and opening up of the Tibetan areas, which is also a way of gaining legitimacy by China over Tibetans; much contact with the outside world led to a renewal of Tibetan culture and identity especially Tibetan Buddhism, which formed one of the bases of Tibetan nationalism.

It is on the lines of the values present in identity and Tibetan culture, that has formed a base for creating a counter hegemony that challenges China's legitimacy. Lastly as much as China's legitimacy over Tibet is based on economic growth and prosperity, political and social stability becomes primary for which there is the heralding of securitization in Tibet by Beijing, legitimised on lines for economic development and socialist modernisation for Tibet. This emphasis on security and control has however led to posing challenges to the Party state's legitimacy in Tibet as it is seen to be alienating the Tibetans to whom the CCP's legitimacy is ironically directed towards. What is also

significant is the idea that the religious institutions and personages especially the Dalai Lama is termed as major roadblocks to Tibet's development, hence leading to a virulent anti Dalai Lama campaign inside Tibet from the mid 1990s which had further alienated the local population from the CCP.

Economic development and progress brought about by the party state to Tibet is termed as an important tool of garnering hegemony by China, which however is unable to attain this goal. Majority of the Tibetans remain outside the ambit of this economic development as the Han migrants who are termed as vectors of modernity, bringing in growth in Tibetan regions are the first beneficiaries of this economic largess that the party state has brought into Tibet (Yeh, 2013:186). The economist Andrew Martin Fischer terms it as the disempowered development of Tibet in China, which is characterised strongly by ethnic marginalisation. This has accentuated the ethno-identity among Tibetans; the "we" feeling which is much directed against the Han and the party state, the "them". Hence, economic development, as an important mode of generating legitimacy by China, leads to the growth of opposition towards it from the very population towards whom the economic growth is targeted. The mode of generating hegemony through a co-option of local elites is also seen to be leading to these elites exercising the "residual experience and practice outside the dominant culture", where the elites/residual elements are seen to be exercising agency, which turns into an overall threat to the party state's sovereignty and legitimacy in the region, leading to it to exercise much coercion and force.

This has been elaborated in the chapters. The same is seen with educational policies implemented in the region, with Tibetan language teaching seen with much skepticism by the party state as it is a marker of difference, which can lead to growth of ethno nationalism and thus challenge the state's legitimacy over Tibet. A challenge to China's legitimacy is also seen in the form of protests and demonstrations, the emergence of a form of counter narrative which is steeped in a discourse of democracy, freedom, human rights, and support for the Dalai Lama and independence for Tibet which are all counter hegemonic as these form the very basic foundations for an alternative institution. Significantly, much of these values as mentioned earlier have emerged from the

economic reforms and development programmes launched by the state for garnering legitimacy but which also accidentally generates the space for the expression of Tibetan culture and Tibetan Buddhism that has formed the crux of challenging China over the Tibetan regions. As Tibet forms the final frontier of the modern Chinese nation state it has always been steeped in a discourse of strategy and security. The economic development and prosperity of the region and its people are also ways of securing the frontier of the motherland. Hence for the party state the need for legitimacy in the Tibetan regions remains secondary as security and strategy takes precedence. This is seen during the 1950s when the communists had no qualms of crushing the revolt and imposing socialist reforms. Also during the late 1980s and after, the party state emphasised more on strengthening their hold over Tibet rather than achieve popular legitimacy as seen in their attacks on the Dalai Lama and also through terming the protests and demonstrations and popular discontent being the handiwork of the Dalai clique and reactionary foreign governments.

Another important form of challenge to China's legitimacy in Tibet is seen in the formation of a counter narrative which challenges the discourse of the ruling authorities in Tibet. While the PRC terms the Tibetans entering into a "golden age" (Linder, 2015), with their liberation in 1951, the Tibetans inside Tibet especially in the post Mao period have challenged this discourse. For the Tibetans, the period from 1958 till 1978 marks an age of suffering and fear. The year 1958 especially for the Tibetans in eastern Tibet was a rupture as the democratic reforms were implemented by the party state in these areas. These reforms included the confiscation of land and property of the former elites, redistribution of it to the peasantry and also the inversion of power and authority of both monastic and local elites.

This was done through the speaking bitterness campaigns and eventually the struggle sessions against the traditionally ruling authority by the lower classes. For instance in an account by Naktsang Nulo, in 1957-58 he remembers the public lynching of Sera Lama, Ganden Wula and a lay elite Ragshe Jadog, who were formerly co-opted by the communists under the united front but were now targets of public struggle sessions under the democratic reforms. The lynching was carried out by local Tibetans. From 1958 till

atleast the death of Mao, the Tibetans remember the period as one of great fear (Makley, 2007:104). Even though during the Maoist period a large number of Tibetans had indulged in the speaking bitterness campaign or were targets of it, the death of Mao and Deng's reforms led to the emergence of a bitterness campaign against the party state. The Tibetans through a number of forms have remembered the early period of Chinese rule, forming narratives, challenging the ruling discourse of China. However much of these has been subdued by Tibetans out of fear from the party state. During Mao's rule there was the implementation of the commune system and the formation of the collectives which had confiscated all wealth and private property. Furthermore, the state had permeated into every aspect of people's lives in a repressive way which had reached its zenith during the period of the Cultural Revolution.

While with Deng's ascendance and the reversal of the earlier radical policies, a more liberal approach is adopted by the party state which was also extended to the Tibetan region. While this liberal air provided a space to its citizens to vent their anger towards the early periods, it was still much controlled in Tibet. However the Tibetans were indulging in Tibet of remembering, of venting out the scars in their early memories of Chinese rule. Much of these have been in the form of "hidden transcripts", spoken about only among a few, which however forms a crux of further resistance and strongly challenges the domination of the ruling power (Scott, 1990:4). Still this remains hidden and does not become an outburst. However, in one of the early instances when the hidden transcript of the Tibetans came out in the open turning into what Scott terms as the "infra-politics" of the subordinates was when tens of thousands of Tibetans mobbed the first fact finding delegation from exile headed by the Dalai Lama's elder brother Lobsang Samten and expressed their grief as well as their concern for the Dalai Lama who till then had been branded as a feudal reactionary among the Tibetans by China (Avedon, 1996).

In the visit of the last delegation by the exiled Tibetans which was led by the Dalai Lama's younger sister Jetsun Pema in their visit to Lhasa, were also welcomed by a crowd of enthusiastic people who through sheer joy shouted for Tibet's independence and also for the long life of the Dalai Lama, which made the Chinese authorities to stop the delegation from continuing (Arjia Rinpoche, 2010:124). These were only a few rare

instances when Tibetans in large numbers came out and produced a counter narrative to the Chinese discourse on Tibet. On the other hand with regard to the delegation's visit to Tibet, the party state believed that the Tibetan masses would hold the CCP and the People's Government in reverence and love socialism and hence would not give an enthusiastic welcome to the exile delegations (Khetsun, 2009:287).

The hidden transcript in Tibet is seen to be present in the general forms of backstage talk, gossip especially in tea shops and in the confines of the family where the people can be critical of the Chinese government. However, much of these areas have been termed as sites where the intrusion of the ruling powers have taken place and where much of the Tibetans practice the art of self surveillance (Yeh, 2013:45). On a similar note, the recently released filmmaker Dhondup Wangchen, a resident of Amdo, PRC in his documentary "Leaving Fear Behind" in which he has recorded candid conversations of around 108 common Tibetans mostly from Amdo region. These Tibetans expressed their views on a range of issues, from the Dalai Lama and the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing to the human rights situation in Tibet, majority of which were deeply critical of the Chinese government. The twenty five minutes documentary was premiered on 6 August 2008 to a selected group of journalists in Hotel G, Beijing. This documentary provides a rare insight into the hidden transcripts that is present among the Tibetans, the counter narrative which challenges the public narrative of the party state. It was this outburst, the infra politics which percolated in the pan Tibetan protests and demonstrations of 2008 and the subsequent self immolations by Tibetans from 2009, which have genuinely challenged Chinese legitimacy over the Tibetan areas.

While the 2008 protests have their roots in the uprisings of the late 1950s which were in response to the democratic reforms implemented in the eastern Tibetan areas, there had been a series of protests and dissent which has marked Sino Tibetan relations. Even during the period of the Cultural Revolution, when the party state had deeply permeated in the lives of the Tibetans, there was a series of resistance against the party state. As mentioned in the chapters, the discourse on dissent during the GPCR has mostly revolved around the Nyemo revolt led by the nun Trinley Choedron, it is equally significant to know about the presence of a strong resistance from a variety of quarters, for instance,

during this period strong hatred had emerged from a number of Tibetan cadres, such as Drak Gyalsay, a renowned resistance leader who along with some renegade Tibetan cadres ambushed two Chinese lorries. The resistance leader had also managed to organise a resistance group comprising of fifty members from Chushul and thirty from Trago, who had planned to burn Chinese military camps, pay offices and ammunition depots in Tsethang and also to incite people in Lhodrak to rise against the Chinese (Lhundup, 1976:106-07). Hence, this example and the chapter on resistance and revolt in Tibet clearly show the constant challenges being posed to the legitimacy of the party state in Tibet by the local population. However not all protests and demonstrations are challenges to China's legitimacy and in a few instances, they are seen to be bolstering the legitimacy of the party state.

This has been seen especially in the context of a number of protests by local Tibetans, for environmental protection whereby they are seen to be forwarding petitions to the higher authorities in the provincial level or to Beijing. In most cases, the local protestors are seen to be harping on the constitutional rights being provided to them or invoking statements or slogans coined by the central leadership of the CCP to buttress their position, which is significant as it promotes more legitimacy to the party state due to the fact that the protestors are relying on the CCP to bring about the needed change. However, with security and stability as the primary narrative of the party state, any form of protest is straight-jacketed as a threat to the unity and security of the whole of China and termed as splittism. Furthermore, the dissent and other forms of counter narratives in Tibet is termed as the handiwork of the Dalai Lama and his government in exile, whose activities are seen as a threat to the stability of Tibet, which is portrayed as the south western gate of China and its security is essential for defence and strategic purposes (TIN, 1999:44). Therefore, security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion takes centre stage and its mode of strengthening legitimacy remains secondary.

The role of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile, based in India is important in terms of the issue of legitimacy, as the exiled based leader and the institutional setup that he created after 1959 are an important source of legitimacy for Tibetans both inside and in exile. The institution of the Dalai Lama is seen to be imbued

with traditional, charismatic form of legitimacy while the establishment of a democratic government in exile is termed as a move towards a legal rational form of legitimacy, one which is propped on the institution of the Dalai Lama. The CTA is termed as being a continuation of the traditional Ganden Phodrang government in Lhasa, which however changed with the devolution of power by the 14th Dalai Lama in 2011, whereby he resigned from his temporal responsibilities and remained only as the spiritual leader of Tibetans. This strategy of the Dalai Lama was to strengthen democracy among Tibetans in exile, which has emerged as an important mode of garnering legitimacy from the western countries as well as from Tibetans inside Tibet.

The CTA and the contributions from the Dalai Lama to the exile Tibetan cause is also an important mode of gaining legitimacy from Tibetans inside Tibet as there has been the strong portrayal of exile society as being liberal, free and more democratic than the society inside Tibet. Hence, the Dalai Lama and the CTA forms a strong source of counter hegemony against the party state in Tibet as through a number of ways, elaborated in the chapters, the CTA and especially the Dalai Lama is seen to be deriving strong consent from the population. This is seen from the widespread celebrations of the Dalai Lama's birthday to the change in the discourse of the protestors and demonstrators in Tibet. While during the 1980s, much of the protestors raised pro independence slogans, with the Dalai Lama and the CTA emphasising on autonomy, human rights and freedom, the language of the protestors especially during the 2000s has incorporated these ideas. The Dalai Lama and the CTA's stand on Tibet has undergone fundamental changes, with the earlier demand from Tibetan independence being sidelined for genuine autonomy under the Middle Way Approach as propounded by the Dalai Lama in the late 1980s.

However, the party state has remained firm on its position with regard to Tibet, terming the exile leadership as splittists who are on the course to harm the unity of the motherland. Hence, for the party state, the security and control over Tibet especially through force and coercion is seen to be more important than gaining genuine legitimacy from the public. While, economic development is an important mode of gaining legitimacy in Tibet, which is steeped in the aspect of creating "consumerism" among Tibetans, it has also constructed the spaces, whereby Tibetan identity and culture is seen

to be flourishing, which is also seen to be posing a challenge to Chinese legitimacy in Tibet.

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