

**ARMENIAN MILLET SYSTEM DURING TANZIMAT ERA OF
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1839-1923**

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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
DECLARATION


I declare that the thesis entitled "Armenian Millet System during the Tanzimat Era of the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1923" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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

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Glossary

This glossary includes Ottoman Turkish words that occur more than once in the text.

alum	metal used as a clarifier or purifier in various trades, especially in the tanning industry; important in early modern Mediterranean commerce.
apostasy	repudiation of a faith, usually to embrace another.
Ashkenazim	German Jews; that community of Jews whose vernacular and customs reflected centuries of settlement in German lands.
Askeri	Ottoman ruling elite, administrative, military, and religious.
Bailo	envoy or ambassador; often specifically referring to a Venetian or Dubrovnikan representative in Istanbul.
Bertone	sailing ship of a type developed in the early modern period and used especially by Atlantic seaboard states.
Bey	honorific title; Ottoman military commander.
Bostanci	member of the imperial guards, powerful particularly in the city of Istanbul.
Cacophony	many dissonant voices or viewpoints
cadastral survey	measurement of land for purposes of taxation and, in the Ottoman case, for division among the Ottoman.
Caique	small, oared vessel used to transport people or goods over short distances.
Caliph	successor to the Prophet Muhammed; often titular ruler over the community of Muslims .
Capitulations	commercial agreements, usually between the Ottomans and foreign governments
Catechism	a book summarizing the essentials of a particular faith gavuf. An Ottoman pursuivant or messenger, often granted extraordinary authority on a particular issue
Cizye	annual head tax taken from non-Muslim subjects in an Islamic state
Concubine	woman living with a man without being married; female slave in an imperial or wealthy household
Converse	a convert; often refers to a reluctant convert in Iberia during and after the

	Christian reconquest
Corvee	forced labour as a form of taxation; usually associated with serfdom
damad	husband of an imperial Ottoman princess; son-in-law
<i>dar al-harb</i>	abode of war; lands controlled by non-Islamic governments.
<i>dar al-Islam</i>	abode of Islam; lands controlled by Islamic governments abode of the Covenant: lands ruled by non-Islamic governments, but paying tribute to Islamic states.
devşirme	method by which usually Christian Ottoman boys were "tithed" into imperial service
diaspora	scattering from its historical location of a religious or ethnic group
Divan	congregation, evening congregation.
Doge	elected leader of government in Venice
Dragoman	translator and interpreter in the Ottoman Empire
ducat	a gold coin; formerly were several types including the Venetian and the Spanish
ecumene	region where the principal faith claims universality
emir	ruler of a small state; prince or governor in the Middle East
entrepot	place, usually a city, where goods are exchanged and transferred
eschatological	concerned with last things, such as death or the end of the world
Eurocentrism	belief in the political, economic, and intellectual superiority of European civilization
Exogamy	marriage outside of a particular family, society, or group
Extraterritoriality	exemption from legal jurisdiction; right to live in a foreign land according to one's own laws
fetva	a written opinion by a religious authority in Islam
fondaco	place in a Mediterranean port city where an alien community, usually of merchants, lives and trades
Franks	term for western Europeans in the Islamic Middle East; associated with crusading and other armies

Fratricide	killing one's siblings
gaza	warfare on behalf of Islam
gazi	a Muslim warrior who is fighting for his faith
grand vizier	most important imperial minister of state in the early modern Ottoman world
hajj	pilgrimage, usually to Mecca; one of the five "pillars" of Islam
harem	area of house reserved for the family; sultan's household
Hasidim	sect of Jewish mystics founded in eighteenth-century Poland
Hegemony	situation in which one state dominates over others
Heterodoxy	having religious beliefs that a particular faith does not accept as orthodox
Hierocracy	government by a clergy or religious elite
Hinterland	lands contiguous to a town or city, from which it draws its food
Historiography	historical literature and its interpretation
Imam	prayer leader in Islam, often in an official or governmental post; successor to Muhammed in Shi'ism
Inquisition	Catholic tribunal authorized and instructed to ferret out heresy
Interregnum	period between monarchs, often of turmoil
Isthmus	a sliver of land connecting two larger land masses
janissary corps	Ottoman infantry army, consisting at first of the sultan's slaves or servants and subsequently more generally recruited
kadi	religious judge or municipal commissioner in Islamic states
kadizadeli	member of an Islamic reformist movement in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire
kanun	sultanic law, in the Ottoman Empire used to complement and at times replace Islamic law
kapikulu	anyone who is a servant of the sultan
kapudanpaşa	Commander of the Ottoman fleet; member of the imperial divan

Karaite	Jewish sect that accepts only the Torah as religious law and repudiates all Talmudic commentaries
Khan	an often fortified resting place for merchants and other travelers
Latin	the Catholic church, especially in contrast to the Greek Orthodox church
Latitudinarianism	favouring freedom of thought; act of pushing the limits of religious orthodoxy
Levant	Syrian or eastern-Mediterranean coastal regions lingua franca: hybrid language, principally Italian but mixing other languages and used for communication in the early modern eastern Mediterranean
Lurianic Kabbalah	form of Jewish mysticism formulated by Isaac Luria and popularized in the seventeenth century
Marrano	Spanish-Jewish convert to Catholicism; derogatory term for a crypto-Jew
Maskalim	Jewish intellectuals who carried the ideas of the Enlightenment to eastern Europe in the nineteenth century
Medrese	Islamic religious school
millet	a non-Muslim community in the Ottoman Empire; before the nineteenth century, the term was used loosely
monotheism	belief in a single God; usually refers to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
oligarchy	rule by a few, a faction, or a small group of families
Orientalism	the idea that Western scholars long have studied and constructed the East or "Orient" in Western terms and using Western models to maintain Western hegemony
Ottomancentrism	viewing the world from the perspective of the Ottoman state, society, interests, and history
Padishah	monarch; sultan
Pasha	military commander; Ottoman high statesman
Pastoralist	herdsman, especially of sheep
Patois	particular language of a special class or region; substandard speech
Patriarch	spiritual and political leader in the Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and other eastern Christian religions.
pax ottomanica	"Ottoman peace"; region under Ottoman control within which commerce

	and travel were relatively secure
Phanariot	group of Greek Orthodox Ottomans associated with the district in Istanbul known as Fener; rose to economic and political prominence in the 18 th century
Polygyny	the taking of more than one wife at once
Primogeniture	system by which the firstborn child (usually son) inherits wealth and/or status
Proselytization	conversion, or endeavor to convince others to convert to one's faith
Reaya	flock; subjects of the Ottoman Empire who are not part of the ruling elite
Romaniot	that part of the Ottoman-Jewish community whose ancestors had lived in the Byzantine Empire
Sephardim	Spanish Jews; Jews involved in the Iberian diaspora of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
Serenissima	state of Venice
Seyhulislam	highest religious functionary in the Ottoman state; a political appointment whose possessor sat on the Imperial
Shamanism	religion in which good and evil spirits are believed to infuse nature and can be called upon by priests
Shariah	Islamic law; usually based in the Qur'an, the pronouncements of Muhammed (hadith), and the mores of the community of believers during Muhammed's lifetime (umma)
Shaykh	a religious leader, often associated with Sufism
Shi'ism	branch of Islamic belief, considered heretical by the Ottomans, that believed that blood descendants of Muhammed should lead the community of Muslims
Signory	group of signers who constituted the Venetian government
sipahi	an Ottoman cavalryman and provincial administrator
Sublime Porte	Ottoman government; associated with the grand vizier and his bureaucracy
Suet	animal fat used in cooking and making tallow for candles
Sufism	Islamic mysticism; many versions usually associated with particular holy men

Sumptuary	restricting personal behaviour or dress in accordance with religious or moral codes
Sunnism	leading branch of Islamic belief, espoused by the Ottoman state; often juxtaposed with Shi'ism
Syncretism	combination into new forms of differing systems of belief or customs
Taife	any group or community
Tekke	Sufi house of worship and communal gathering place
Templars	a militant crusading order founded in twelfth-century Jerusalem
Theosophy	religious philosophy based upon mystical insight
Turkoman	nomadic peoples from Central Asia and speaking a Turkic language
Ulema	masters of Islamic jurisprudence
Unigeniture	system by which a single child (usually son) inherits wealth and/or status
valide sultan	mother of the Ottoman sultan; often a towering political presence in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
vizier	Ottoman statesman, especially one with a seat on the Imperial Divan

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Chapter I

Introduction

The Ottoman Empire was founded in the early 14th century in the north-western part of Anatolia to the east of Byzantine Empire. Earlier the Ottomans were one of the principalities that rose in the territory that belonged to the Byzantine Empire. In the early time, called as Seljuks they later transformed as the Ottomans. The people and their warlords who were residing in the Anatolian region were Muslim Turks thus, Turkish migration not only altered the sovereignty but also restructured its demographic nature. Hence, the majority population of the Ottoman Empire was Muslim Turks. However, at the same time, other religious groups also lived in the Empire. From the 14th to mid-15th centuries, the Ottomans expanded the empire through military conquests in all the four directions and due to these new territories with non-Muslim populations came under the Ottoman rule. These new people accepted Ottoman Sultan's leadership and formed a significant segment of non-Muslims (*millet*) communities. At its heights, the non-Muslim population was estimated at 4,245,873 (1893 census) out of the total Ottoman population of 17,388,562; of this, Greek Orthodox Christians were 52.08 per cent, Armenians 33.58 per cent and Jews 14.34per cent.

The word *millet* comes from the Arabic word *milla* meaning community and is Aramaic in its origin, and has been used in the Quran meaning religion. In the Ottoman Empire, it came to be applied to the organised religious communities legally recognized by Islam as *Ahl al-Kitab* (People of Book) such as Greek Christians, Armenian Christians and Jews. Further regarding Islam's approach to non-Muslims, Kemal Karpat says,

Islam gave tacit recognition to tribal, ethnic and national groupings, provided that these conformed to the principles of family law and recognized the supremacy of the *umma*. Moreover, the pronouncement "and we have made you into peoples and tribes" (Quran 49:13) can be interpreted as a tacit recognition of the existence of ethnic, linguistic and tribal diversities within the community of believers (Karpat, 2002: 621).

The first legal arrangement concerning non-Muslims were made during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II, the Conqueror (1432-1482) in 1453, when the non-Muslim communities were given the right to open their religious buildings including, places of worship and operate their own

schools. Consequently, in the 16th and the 17th centuries, churches, synagogues, and foreign non-Muslim schools were opened in towns and cities where minorities and foreigners were living.

The basic Ottoman function was to preserve the Islamic nature of the state and to rule and defend the empire. By Ottoman theory, the main attribute of the Sultan's sovereignty was the right to possess all resources of wealth in the empire together with the authority necessary to exploit that wealth for the benefit of the sultan and his state. The Ottoman state encompassed organizations and hierarchies developed by the ruling and subject classes to carry out their functions in the society.

In the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan was not only the supreme commander of all the forces such as army, navy and cavalry but was also the supreme leader of Muslims, the Caliph. Reflecting toleration, Sultan Mehmed II guaranteed security for Greek communities and brought the Armenian communities from eastern Anatolia to show the European cosmopolitan nature in the metropolis of Constantinople. Sultan Beyazid II (1481-1512) received the Sephardic Jews from Spain and Portugal. Thus, from the 16th century early Sultans strived for the multi-cultural nature of the city of Constantinople.

From the 18th century onwards, the Empire's began a gradual fall of prosperity largely attributed to increasing external pressures, weakening of its institutions and decentralization of power of the Ottoman Sultan. In the 18th and 19th centuries, a series of wars were fought between the Russia and Ottoman Empires. Due to its weakness in military prowess, in the mid-19th century Europeans called the Ottoman Empire the "sick man" (VanDuinkerken, 1998; 1). However, it was not until the reign of Catherine the Great of Russia (r.1762-1796) that forced Abdülhamid (r.1774-1789) to sign the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, that the cruelty of the decline in the Empire was truly felt. This Treaty, which marked a decisive defeat of the Ottoman forces forced Abdülhamid to realize that if Western military technologies and techniques were not immediately introduced, the Empire would face an uncertain future.

The Ottoman Empire was forced to reconsider its military technology and training due to a series of drawbacks it faced in the wars with European powers during the 18th century. The understanding that the west had overtaken the Muslim East in scientific and technological advancement led Ottoman reformers to introduce changes to the traditional educational system,

especially to the curriculum. However, what the reformers soon realized was that the military superiority of Europe was not a spectacle but an indicator. Instead, it was through these new institutions that the Western ideas of equality, rationalism and liberalism were introduced into the Ottoman Empire.

This resulted in the realization of the importance of modernization and social rejuvenation of the antiquated Ottoman system to compete against Russia and European powers. One of the most serious problems faced by the army was the lack of adequate number of soldier and officers, which resulted in the enlistment of non-Muslims. This however, created anger among the Muslims and caused protests but they remained subdued. Imparting of modern education to officers and soldiers became essential and to facilitate the minority integration with the majority, a grand reform became inevitable. Subsequently, Russia strongly supported the development of and sought equality for the Armenian Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire.

The efforts towards to Ottoman military reforms began with Selim III (1789-1807) who made the first major attempts to modernize the army along European lines. Reactionary movements, partly from the religious leadership, however, disadvantaged these efforts, but primarily from the antiquated and ineffective Janissary corps. Jealous of their rights and firmly contesting change, they created a Janissary revolt. Selim's efforts cost him his throne and his life, but were pursued in a brilliant and bloody fashion by his successor, the dynamic Mahmud II, who massacred the Janissary corps in 1826.

However, a new era had begun for the Ottoman Empire with the Tanzimat declaration. Tanzimat, or 'Regulation', is the name given to the programme of reforms that was inaugurated with *Hatt-i-Gulhane* (Imperial Reform Edict) in November 1839. Its architect, Mustafa Resid Pasha, was a well-read and farsighted diplomat who had served as Ottoman ambassador in London and Paris. The Imperial Rescript proclaimed by Resid in the Gulhane Court was a charter whereby the Sultan apportioned a part of his authority to the Council of Judicial Ordinances, which henceforth would have the power to make laws, subject to the Sultan's approval. It also envisaged that no one was to be punished without a public trial and Muslims and non-Muslims were to receive equal treatment before the law. Although dependent on the Ottoman Empire, the minorities were organised in the form of semi-autonomous institutions that,

in some ways, replaced the Sultan's authority. The second *Hatt-i-Humayun* (Rescript of Reform) issued on 18 February 1856 went further in stipulating the rights of non-Muslims. Henceforth, abusive and derogatory references to non-Muslims were to be banned from official usage. The *Hatt-i-Humayun* accorded non-Muslims, the right to repair religious sanctuaries and communal buildings and indirectly guaranteed their right to build new houses of worship with the approval of the Sublime Porte.

Both the Tanzimat declarations sought to establish a social order that would guarantee modern rights of citizenship and remove the inferior treatment of the non-Muslims with Muslim and non-Muslim subjects enjoying same personal rights. Furthermore, the declaration which put forth the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims under the law with regard to personal rights and citizenship dealt a destructive blow to the basic order of the state which was based on Islamic principles. The latter did not rest on views such as equality, as well as deflation a social structure that existed since the early days of the Empire and developed over centuries. Indeed, the irony was that the execution of the Reform Decree 1856 which conceded political rights to the non-Muslims under the principles of equality, fortified their situation and turned them against the majority Muslim Turks.

The 1856 edict influenced in the Armenian communities and newly educated intellectual groups were formed across Armenian millets. A large number of Armenians sent their children for higher study in France and those students imbibed the French Culture and modern revolutionary thoughts. Their return to the Ottoman lands coincides with Tanzimat reforms and they even asked for their own Armenian millet reformation like secularization and internal autonomy within the Sultan's administration. Some of the Europe educated Armenians joined and were active in Young Ottomans movement in 1860s and they argued for a representative government within their own millet system as well as in the larger Ottoman society. Around same period, some educated Armenians were supporting for an independent Armenia in the eastern part of the Empire which was strongly opposed by the wealthy Armenian merchants who prospered under the Sultan and Armenian Gregorian Patriarchate in Constantinople. However, the seeds of the communal clashes begun to grow after the proclamation of the 1856 edict in the six *vilayets* of eastern part of the Empire (Shaw, 1977: 202). An Armenian priest, Y.Q. Jark, describes the state of Armenians as follows: "I believe that it won't be a mistake to consider that is the Tanzimat to

be the golden age of Armenians. During this period, which we regard as the most bountiful and favourable one of all, Armenians advanced in every field and could reach higher positions by showing themselves and earning confidence and trust of the Government” (Binark, 2002:8-9).

The main objective of Tanzimat objective was to treat all religious people equally and attract them into the Ottomanism and hence the state wanted non-Muslims to leave the idea of regional autonomy or independence. Therefore, the Sublime Porte treated all *millets* separately according to its historical ethnic and linguistic relations with the Ottomans not based on the religiously defined single unified Dhimmi community (Shaw, 1997: 124). Kemal further argued that “the status of the non-Muslims, while theoretically based on Islamic principles including the Dhimmi concept, in practice came to be determined by the individual’s relation to the state” (Kemal, 2002: 622).

Furthermore, the majority Muslims occupied four major professions in the Empire, such as administration, army, agriculture and judiciary and the Armenians practiced commerce and technical professions. Thus, the Armenian *millet* got a large number of concession from the Tanzimat when compare to majority Muslims. Giving more rights to the religious minorities to profess their own religion, to build their own places of worship and to enjoy considerable level of internal autonomy to collect taxes and jurisdiction did not mean that Ottoman Empire had become a model federal state. It still imposed a number of restrictions upon the non-Muslim population. Moreover, *millet* system was not similar to the feudal system where the king was supreme lord to other property owners or fiefdoms. However, the *millet* system had provisions for Greek and Armenian Patriarchs and a Jewish Chief Rabbi who were responsible for relations of their respective community *vis-à-vis* the Empire. These were supposedly similar, state-wide structures with well-defined hierarchies, controlled from Constantinople by their respective ecclesiastical leaders, namely, Greek and Armenian Patriarchs and the Jewish Chief Rabbi. Moreover, unlike the feudal system, the Ottoman Empire had not allowed non-Muslim to maintain their own army and cavalry forces. As historian Kemal explains, “The *millet* system emphasized the universality of the faith and superseded ethnic and linguistic differences without destroying them. The Tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman government profoundly affected the political, social, and economic life of the community but did not alter its cultural and religious life” (Kemal, 2002: 613-614).

Therefore, the *millet* system was different from the Ottoman *Timar* system (Tax Collection System) and European feudalism. At the same time, due to Tanzimat reforms *millet* started to aspire for a separate nationhood from being a common non-Muslim community. While Tanzimat reforms helped to modernize the decaying Empire, through dissemination of modern ideas such as nationalism, secularism, equality to all citizen and rationalism, they also encouraged particularistic ambitions of the *millet*. In other words, the introduction of Tanzimat reforms had not met its prime objective of developing the Ottoman identity based on equal duties and privileges of all Ottoman subjects under the Ottoman Empire or the Sultan. Instead, it served to strengthen the potentially divisive forces thereby further weakening the Ottoman imperial political structure. Stating this both Fatma Muge Göçek and Bernard Lewis quote Ottoman statesman Ziya Pasha as saying: “if from 1592 to 1839 the domain had progressed making a course for decrease at the pace of a two-steed carriage, from 1839 to 1869 it had surged with the velocity of a railroad train” (Göçek, 1996:50, Lewis 1979: 172).

More importantly, the process of emulation of the Western ideas and thoughts gave rise to the modern idea of nation or statehood among the minorities without the interference of the Ottoman administration. The contact of these ideas had serious repercussion on the political and ideological part of the *millets*. The process of Ottoman integration, which began originally as administrative centralization, was broadened later as political loyalties. At the same time, the Muslim *Ulema* (religious scholars) opposed the process of emulation of the West and superimposition of an alien culture because it led to religious divisions within the Empire. Alarmed by the gradual penetration of Western ideas among the *millet*, Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909) posed himself as the champion of the traditional order and waged an ideological battle, popularly termed as Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism. The concept of equality interpreted by Ottomanism was apolitical tool through which the Sultan wanted to overcome the ethnic and religious loyalties of the various *millets*. The Sultan’s attempts towards integration failed because for most of the non-Muslim minorities the idea of Ottomanism or Turkism lacked the emotional attachment that was carried by *millet*.

During the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II Armenian radical movements were also highly active such as Armenian National Dashnak Party and Hunchakian Revolutionary Party and both wanted an independent Armenia from dominance of Ottoman and Russia. Within the Armenian *millet*

only small percentage supported their causes but seeds of suspicion sown between two beliefs. In 1909, Committee of Union and Progress revolutions made the Sultan dysfunctional and re-introduced a parliamentary form of government. With the beginning of the second constitutional committee rule in 1909, the CUP and Armenian relations became normal, but after the Balkan War 1912 once again the Armenians and majority Turks became suspicious of one another and confrontation became inevitable (Masters, 2009: 53).

At that moment Turkish nationalism and Turkism were became the main policy of the CUP government. This was largely because the latter enabled them to follow their own nationalism based on separate religions and languages. Thus, situation led to two different ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic communities living side-by-side for many centuries claiming same territory. the Armenian wanted to secure the eastern six *vilayets* as their home, but part of their homeland was Anatolian high land. For the Turks the Anatolian high land was the heart of Turkish nationalism, therefore they were ready to go to any extent to stop the partition of the Ottoman territory.

At the middle of the First World War main leaders of the CUP wanted to wind up the Armenian issue and began the Armenian deportation programme and to re-locate them from the six eastern provinces to the southern border of the Ottoman territory. During the programme, around 1.2 million people perished due to various reasons. Thus, the Young Turk movement of 1908 swept away the autocracy of Sultan Abdülhamid but the Unionists (Young Turks), like their Tanzimat counterparts, failed to prevent the disintegration of the Empire precipitated by the nationalist uprisings among the non-Muslim ethnic minorities.

Review of Literature

The literature available on the subject has been divided into three themes; formation of *millet* system, Armenian *millet* system during the Tanzimat and the impact of *millet* system on the Ottoman Empire. The first theme deals with the influence of Sultan and religious authorities on the traditional *millet* system of the Ottomans and its impact on the Ottomans political and social life. The second section covers the literature pertaining to the *millet* system reforms attempted by the Tanzimat bureaucrats taking into consideration the compulsions for introduction of these reforms. The responses of the Sultan as well as non-Muslims to these reforms make an important

aspect of study of these reforms. The third and final section highlights the extent to which changing patterns of *millet* system in the Ottoman Empire contributed to the upsurge of nationalist stirrings leading to its disintegration.

Formation of Millet System

The Ottoman Empire was located strategically between the West and East for centuries. Hence, there is a considerable amount of research by scholars regarding the Ottoman history particularly its polity, economy and society reflecting various issues such as trade, tribes, interest of the West and Islam and state formation. These writings (Don, 1971; Fisher, 1979; İhsanoglu, 2002) have contributed to the understanding of the region especially the formation of states and the Ottoman Empire, while referring briefly to the historical background of the region.

The *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire is considered to be derived from an extension of the Islamic notion of Dhimmi, which was applied in different ways and to varying degrees by many Islamic empires. Dhimmi can be characterized as a contract through which the Islamic community granted the members of the *People of the Book* (Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians in the case of Iran) protection and right to practice their religion, under the condition that they recognize Islamic sovereignty (Esposito, 2003; Kumaraswamy, 2007). In the earlier period of the Ottoman Empire, at the top was the Islamic *millet* as the ruling *millet-i-hakime*, while the members of other communities constituted the *millet-i-mahkume*, those who were ruled. In the course of the 19th century, additional *millets* were established (Lewis, 1984; Reinkowski, 1997; Quataert, 2000) for Greek Orthodox and Armenian Christians and Jews living in the Ottoman Empire.

The Dhimmi communities had their own chiefs and judges to administer their own family, personal and religious laws. Until the rise of European secularism and separation of Church and the State, the Muslim tolerance of “non-believers” was better than anything available in Christendom. The Ottomans generally established garrisons outside towns in the conquered territories and had little interaction with the local Dhimmi population other than for tax collection. Like other non-Muslims, the conquered Armenian Christian community was left to lead their lives as before (Lewis, 1961, 1963, 1980, 1984; Stillman, 1979; Ye’or, 2002). Between the 15th and 17th centuries, the Ottoman Empire practiced the Dhimmi system, whereby the non-

Muslims must obey to the Muslim Empire as well as Muslim faith and *sharia*. However, under the Tanzimat reforms the *millet* system came into existence whereby the people of other faiths were considered subjects of the Empire but not subjects of the Islamic faith (Lewis, 1984).

Prior to the Ottoman conquest, there was no Armenian Patriarch in Constantinople and probably there were only a few Armenians. The two important Armenian ecclesiastical centres were in Etchmiadzin and Cilicia both beyond the Ottoman boundaries of that period. During the reign of Sultan Mehmed II measures were taken to curtail the potentially hostile influence of these foreign centres on Ottoman Armenians as well as to develop and strengthen the Ottoman capital. Thus, Armenians were forcibly settled in Constantinople and its environs and the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople was created. Their presence grew noticeably in the capital and other important urban centres where they specialized in a variety of commercial and manufacturing enterprises and established themselves as intermediaries of the European trade with the East (Gibbons, 1916; Levy, 1994; Hovannisian, 1997; Quataert, 2000). The financial trades and banking were the main business to the Constantinople Armenians or *amiras* and this community had connections from Manchester in the west and Madras (Present-day Chennai) in the east (Eliot, 1965).

The *millet* system has been sometimes praised as model of just administration for a conqueror and at times has been criticised for being opportunistic. Even at the early stage, there were flaws in the Ottoman system, which later made the position of Armenians quite intolerable (Runciman, 1965). In the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman rule expanded to include additional Armenian centres and the latter were recognized as autonomous entities, not dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Thus, the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople was initially one of the several Armenian ecclesiastical leaders. In time, however, the growing importance of the Armenian community of the capital, its proximity to the central Ottoman government and its activities as an intermediary between the Ottoman government and the outlying Armenian communities enhanced the position of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. By the 18th century, although it continued to be regarded as the spiritual subordinate to the Catholics of Etchmiadzin and the Catholics of Sis, in effect, the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople became the administrative head and representative of all the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the creation of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople in the 15th century and its evolution over

time represented a compromise between the Ottoman imperial imperative on the one hand and Armenian traditions and changing power structure within the community, on the other (Lewis, 1960,1984; Inalcik, 1973; Mesrob, 1977).

Until the promulgation of the *Hait-i-Sherif or Gulhane* 1839, the Armenian *millet* or patriarch and his clients within limits possessed penal authority over Armenian people. In the capital, the patriarch had his own jail, and maintained a small police force. His authority over his clergy being absolute, he could imprison or exile them at will and while he was compelled to secure the consent of the Sultan to imprison or exile laymen of his community and the necessary *firman* was very easily obtained. The system of government, in placing civil powers in the hands of high ecclesiastics, was because the Sultan made no distinction between church and community, and often lent the weight of his authority to maintain the integrity of the Church (Davison, 1963; Mesrob, 1977). The Armenian patriarchate of Constantinople was thus a creation of the Ottoman authorities, not of the Armenian Church. Its jurisdiction overruled the establishments created by the Church itself, the catholicosates of Sis and Aghtamar and the patriarchate of Jerusalem. It was a political appointment, but since the Ottoman Empire was a theocracy, it was expressed in ecclesiastical terms (Christopher J, 1980; Shaw 1977).

Under the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian society was broadly divided into four major segments such as rich men in Constantinople or Smyrna, who sometimes had close relationship with the Sublime Porte itself. This class is also consider as the *amiras*. At this stage this people had less contacts with the provincial people or *Kavaragan*. Secondly, there were traders and artisans in towns and interiors of the Empire who had contacts with foreign officers and travellers. Regarding this community, the British officer Sir Mark Sykes recorded in his *The Caliphs' Last Heritage*. Thirdly, there were the villagers, the peasantry who made a precarious living out of soil and from their flocks in the eastern provinces. Among all the classes the village Armenians were the largest and inhabited in the plains of Erzurum and Moushin in the eastern provinces. Finally, there were the Armenian mountaineers who lived around Zeitum and Samsun districts in the Cilicia provinces (Christopher J, 1980; Eliot, 1965; Runciman, 1965).

The Jews constitute the second *millet* and those who immigrated to the Ottoman Empire before the Spanish Inquisition in the 15th century were divided into two communities, the Rabbanites

and Karaites. The third group were the Ashkenazim or Jews from Germany; the fourth was that of the Jews from Spain, the Sephardim. It was the latter group, because of their skills and language abilities that soon became dominant within the Jewish *millet*. The Sephardim settled largely in Istanbul, Salonika, Adrianople and Nikopolis in the Balkans and in Bursa, Amasya and Tokat in Anatolia. Istanbul had the largest Jewish *millet* community in the world and Salonika became a predominantly Jewish city (Oslan, 1979). Because of the skills they brought from Spain and Portugal, they were able to serve the sultans as influential financiers, merchants, customs agents, tax farmers, arms manufacturers, and physicians. Until the 17th century, the Ottoman Jewry was able to support a wide range of community activities in the religious, legal, educational, and welfare spheres, while maintaining a vigorous intellectual and spiritual life. For the most part they functioned without well-defined structures and a strong executive leadership beyond the level of the individual congregation. These fluid and decentralized structures were chaotic in appearance and sometimes were unmanageable (Levy, 1994).

The conquest of Constantinople 1453 was the first territorial contact for the Ottomans with the Greeks. After the conquest, Mehmed II strengthened the Greek element in Constantinople, but weakened it in the provinces. Many of the nobilities fled to the Christian states of Europe, and wars and misfortune reduced the Greek population of Constantinople and one-third of the spaces enclosed by the walls remained uninhabited. To fill this void, Mehmed II forced 15,000 Greeks from the provinces to settle in Istanbul (erstwhile Constantinople), and reorganised the Greek *millet*, or nation, with the Greek Patriarch as the head who had the rank of a Vizier, and administered justice for the Greek Christians. On the other hand, in commerce and trade, the Greeks were dominant from the 15th to the mid-17th centuries. Particularly, the patrician (ruling class or elite class) Greek families of the Phanar district of Constantinople were prominent merchants, bankers, and government functionaries, and the higher clergy of the Orthodox Church and were part of the Ottoman elite society (Eliot, 1965; Shaw and Shaw, 1977).

In the 'Golden Age' (from the 15th to the end of 16th centuries) of prosperity and scholarly achievements, the Ottoman authorities were able to maintain peace between various religious groups through the *millet* system (Shaw, 1991). One of the earliest examples of the occurrence of a gradual ideological metamorphosis among the different *millets* in the Ottoman Empire was the introduction of the first Turkish (and Muslim) printing press. Although Jewish refugees

introduced press to the Ottoman Empire from Spain in 1492, and later by other non-Muslim communities like the Armenians (1568) and Greeks (1627), the ban to print books in Arabic and Turkish remained effective until the early 18th century. In 1727, an Imperial *firman* was issued giving permission for Turkish press and of printing of Turkish books “in the high, God-guarded city of Constantinople” (Davison 1963; Farooqi, 1999; Göçek, 2010).

Armenians Millet during the Tanzimat Era

Even though the separation between Muslims and non-Muslims was the social basis of Ottoman stratification, this became a religious-ethnic separation as the cultural elements identifying these minority groups were combined with the religious ones. The sumptuary and legal codes and codes on the use of space defined and reflected this basic separation. Minorities had to obey restrictions regarding their dress code and how they interacted in society. These restrictions prevented them from developing social ties with Muslims through marriage, inheritance, or attending the same places of worship and bathhouses. Instead, they developed social ties with other non-Muslims, who were either members of other Ottoman minorities or foreign residents of the Empire, who were often connected to European embassies. It was this religious divide in the society that made the Ottoman bureaucrats introduce the communal equality through 1839 and 1856 reform edicts, to avoid the gradual fragmentation of the Empire (Gibbons, 1916; Göçek, 1996; Ye’or, 2002).

In addition to the socio-cultural and political circumstances within the Ottoman Empire, some external factors also forced the introduction of Tanzimat reforms. An important factor was the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74, which ended with the Treaty of Kucukkaynarca in 1774. Under the Clause Seven of this Treaty, Russia had acquired the right to protect the Orthodox Church throughout the Empire. This gave Russia a pretext to intervene in the Ottoman internal affairs, since religious rights could easily acquire a political significance. In this connection, Britain, France and Russia, the great powers of that time, took up issue of the Empire’s non-Muslims or minorities and pressured for their equal rights on par with the Muslim subjects of the Empire. The Christian subjects of the Sultan interpreted the reforms as liberation from Turkish rule. The Muslims largely regarded it as an opportunity to unite all races and creeds round the Star and Crescent. As the 19th century wore on, the recognition of the failure of this idea resulted in

general disillusionment and the strengthening of the reactionary elements among the Muslims and outbursts of fanaticism (Miller, 1934; Price, 1961; Peretz, 1971; Lewis, 1974).

Beginning in 1839, the Ottoman government implemented the Tanzimat reforms to improve the situation of minorities, although these proved largely ineffective. In 1856, the *Hatt-i-Humayun* promised equality for all Ottoman citizens irrespective of their ethnicity and confession and widened the scope of the 1839 *Hatt-i-Gulhane*. The reformist period peaked with the Constitution, called the *Kanun-i-Easi* meaning 'Basic Law' written by the members of the Young Turks, which was promulgated on 23 November 1876 (Ortayli-Ilber, 1985). It established freedom of belief and equality of all citizens before the law. 'Firman of the Reforms' gave immense privileges to the Armenians, which formed a 'governance in governance' to eliminate the aristocratic dominance of the Armenian elites by the development of a political strata in the society (Lewis, 1966; Karpat, 1972; Stillman, 1974; İhsanoglu, 2002).

The result of the 1856 *Hatt-i-Humayun* decree was the approval of Armenian National Constitution in 1863. It was in a form of the 'Code of Regulations' comprised of 150 articles drafted by the Armenian intelligentsia, which defined the powers of the *millet*. The newly formed Armenian National Assembly issued a decree, permitting women to have equal voting rights along with men and asking them to take part in all elections. Armenian National Assembly had wide-ranging functions. Muslim officials (Turks, Kurds and Arabs) were not employed to collect taxes in Armenian villages, but were collected by Armenian tax-gatherers appointed by the Armenian National Assembly. The Armenians were allowed to establish their own courts of justice for to administer justice and to conduct litigation among Armenians, and for deciding all questions relating to marriage, divorce, estate, inheritance, etc., pertaining to the community (Davison, 1963; Lewis, 1974; Braude, 1982; Karpat, 1984; Hovannisian, 1997).

In the cultural sphere the Armenians were also prominent in the 19th century Ottoman capital and their activities showed the way Turko-Armenian relations might have developed had they not been strangled by despotism and ideology. It was in the imperial capital that the Armenians of the *amira* class distinguished themselves in a wide variety of activities and some acquired considerable importance in the running of the empire. Many Armenians worked in high positions; the Duzian family worked as superintendent of empire mint, Dadian family worked as

manager of gunpowder and his son acted as director of empire's paper mills. The Balian family dominated the Ottoman architecture and the family head Krikor Balian was considered as 'architect of the Ottoman Empire.' The Armenians living in the capital never considered the welfare of their fellow Armenians in the eastern provinces where they occupied significantly low positions in the administration. Typical posts held by them were those of inspector of forestry, municipal engineer, provincial translator, and assistant to the deputy governor. When the telegraph was introduced, one frequently found the Armenians managing it and with the spread of elementary health care, the Armenians often appeared as doctors and pharmacists. In short, they were present in almost any venture which brought progress and improvement (Christopher J, 1980; Runciman 1965).

According to some scholars the demographic heterogeneity of the Ottoman Empire was its characteristic feature since its inception. Its large minority communities included Greeks, Armenians and Jews for whom reforms meant independence and secession from the Ottoman Empire. However, for the state, reforms meant an all-embracing democracy, placing Christians, Jews and Muslims on a footing of equality. The Ottoman Tanzimat bureaucracy throughout the 19th was hampered by this fundamental difference between Muslim and non-Muslim opinions. Moreover, the latter was supported by foreign powers for their own imperial ends. The *millet* system giving autonomy in ecclesiastical matters to Christians and Jews of the Empire, and the capitulations, designed to assist foreign trade proved a serious hindrance to stability of the Empire (Price, 1961; Eren, 1964; İhsanoğlu, 2002, 2004; Berk, 2004).

Impact of Millets upon the Ottoman Empire

Ottoman Sultans Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) introduced modern ideas and thoughts into their medieval society in the hope that they could achieve the strength of European countries without going to the extent of westernizing the society and polity (Eangalhardt, 1999). However, the reforms resulted in the westernization of the society contrary to their hope and took firmer hold within the empire. The reforming bureaucracy of the time was particularly eager to create a society that treated all subjects equally regardless of creed and believed that to maintain this new equality, a concept of patriotism or Ottomanism has to be introduced (Feroez, 1969; Claude, 2001). The basic goal was the creation of a new identity for Ottoman subjects and their loyalty to its government. It envisaged a new concept of the *vatan*

(fatherland) aimed at creating a new form of identity to supersede religious, ethnic and local divisions. The recognition of Ottoman identity for all inhabitants regardless of religion, equality of all the *millet* subjects and introduction of the general military service (which had been in practice limited to Turks) prepared the ground for the successful dissemination of the new political culture. The *millet* loyalty and identity were basically matters of inner commitment, which could not be achieved without an emotional experience capable of linking one's values to the new political entity, the modern state (Karpas, 1972; Berkes, 1981; Shaw, 1977).

The growing wealth and prestige of the *amira* families especially the Duzians, Dadians and others led to them acquiring almost dictatorial powers within the community, and most importantly, being able to control the patriarchate. Against them, were a movement made up partly of young men educated abroad (especially, in London, Paris and Venice), who had become imbued with democratic ideas, and partly of members of the trade guilds, or *esnafs*. Hence, the need for a written regulation for the election of the Patriarch was recognised. A draft, considerably more restrictive, received the approval of all classes of Armenian society in the capital in 1860, and was ratified by the Sublime Porte three years later (Christopher, 1980).

In Constantinople, the Armenians attempted to work out a political future for them within the Ottoman framework. However, 500 kilometres away, in Cilicia, another relationship was emerging between government and Zeitun Armenians. In the succeeding years, the people of Zeitun showed a militant spirit towards the government. They challenged it when it seized some of their lands to settle Tatars from Russia and they refused to pay the higher taxes that were demanded. In 1860, the governor of nearby Marash in Aleppo district despatched an armed force to demand the higher taxes and to his consternation, it was forced to beat an ignoble retreat. Here, Turkish soldiery was no match for the brave Armenian fighters from Zeitun (Eliot, 1965; Shaw, 1977).

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 ended with the Treaty of Berlin and the Treaty demanded that the Ottoman Sultan must recognize equality of rights for his Christian subjects before the law. If it had stayed at this, there would have been no harm. However, Russia used the right of protection of the Christian subjects of the Ottomans and went further. Encouraged by Russia, for the first time, the Armenians set forth a petition to the Congress of Berlin and outlined a plan for

Armenian territorial autonomy under a Christian governor. Though other European powers did not support this, this contained the idea of separatism for the Christian minorities of the Empire. This move struck a further blow at the ideas that stood behind the Tanzimat reforms (Price, 1961; Richard, 1997).

The constitution also elevated the office of Patriarchate to that of national leader with immediate responsibility in representing the concerns of the Armenian *millet* with the Sublime Porte. That proved a heavier burden than intended as the flock in the distant corners of the Empire began to appeal more to the Patriarch for relief from their woes at the hands of corrupt administrators and officials prone to violence. The Patriarchate catalogued these problems and appealed to the resident diplomat of the great powers to plead the Armenian case with the Sultan. This problem of enhanced responsibility in the face of increasing unrest in the provinces while being powerless to persuade the Sublime Porte in political matters seriously compromised the Patriarchate. The Sublime Porte, in turn, closely scrutinized elections and appointments to contain the rising tide of Armenian nationalism (Karpas, 1972; Braude and Quataert, 1982).

While Britain and France supported the Armenian Protestant millets Russia backed Armenian Orthodox *millet*. Besides its political support, Russia expanded its role by giving weapons and military training to fight against the Ottoman Empire. The most tragic aspect of this situation was to be seen in Eastern Anatolia, and then called Turkish Armenia. When the First World War broke out, the Armenians of these regions made secret contract with the Czarist authorities in the Caucasus, and an underground network was created which enabled recruits from these Turkish provinces for the Czarist Army. The Turkish authorities had to deal with this situation, and in the winter 1915-16 they struck. The complete Armenian population from the provinces was deported to Syria and Mesopotamia (present day Iraq) and very large numbers of them perished on the way. The Armenians consider this as 'genocide' something that the Ottomans and their successor Turkish Republic vehemently contest. Thus, if the Balkan War settled the Macedonian question by cutting that province off from Turkey, the Armenian deportations settled the Armenian question in a terrible way. Turkey was becoming a one nation-state without the Christian minorities through a policy of 'blood and iron' unify the Turkey and to hold its sovereignty (Price, 1961; Feroez, 1969; Karpas, 1972).

The literature reviewed above provides useful insights into understanding the *millet* system prevalent in the Ottoman Empire prior to the Tanzimat in the mid-19th century, and the politico-military compulsions for undertaking reform concerning non-Muslims or *millets*. Most of these studies have however, highlighted the linkages between preserving the already decaying Ottoman Empire and the imperatives of *millet* system in a bid to cope with the external challenge and to develop a common Ottoman identity. What is not sufficiently analysed is the extent to which the introduction of Tanzimat reforms and modern ideas and thoughts among all the Ottoman subjects contributed to the growth of forces detrimental to the unity and integrity of the Empire. Using the Armenian *millet* as the illustration the proposed study aims to fill the gap by attempting a critical analysis of the consequences of the Tanzimat reforms in mid-19th century on the *millet* system upon the Ottoman Empire.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of Study

The proposed research aims to study the reforms introduced by the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period (1839-1923) which proclaimed equality to all citizens. Following the proclamation reform edicts *Hatt-i-Gulhane* 1839 and *Hatt-i-Humayun* 1856, the *millet* system acquired greater control of its internal affairs and in least in theory reduced discrimination against the non-Muslims. Of all the three *millets* namely, Orthodox Greek, Armenians Christians and Jews, the Armenian *millet* was located at the very periphery of the Ottoman Empire or the modern Turkey.

The second biggest *millet* after the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian *millet* was one of the wealthiest minorities among the non-Muslims of the Empire and had a greater impact on the Empire. The Armenians were second biggest non-Muslim community in the Empire after Greek Orthodox and had lived within a specific historical territory. During the heydays of the Ottomans, the Armenians had very good relation with the Ottoman Empire or Sublime Porte and at times dominated commerce particularly the Tanzimat period. However, they had very bitter experience towards the end of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, this research focuses on the smaller non-Muslim *millet*, namely Armenians during the Tanzimat era of the Ottoman Empire 1839-1923. Above mentioned review literature clearly make platform for rationale of the study analyses Tanzimat reforms awaken non-Muslims in which they were entitled for, particularly Armenian *millet*, they began to claim that for their autonomy in practice.

After Congress of Berlin 1878 and during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II the Armenian fight for self-government had severe implications upon the decline and the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. Thus, scope of this research is to analyse the Armenian *millet's* role after the proclamation of Tanzimat reform, and to study the consequences of its internal and external relations upon the Empire from 1839 to 1923.

Research Questions

1. What was the nature of *millet* system in the Ottoman Empire prior to the Tanzimat proclamation in 1839?
2. What were the reasons leading to the introduction and implementation of Tanzimat reform?
3. What were the nature and condition of Armenian *millet* system following the reforms of the Tanzimat era?
4. How did the *millet* system affect the stability of the Ottoman Empire?

Hypotheses

1. Introduction of the Western ideas through Tanzimat created, social stratification between Muslim and non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire which in turn led to failure of the Tanzimat.
2. The *millet* contributed to an upsurge of nationalist stirrings among the Armenians and had severe repercussion on the Ottoman Empire's stability and sovereignty.

Methodology

The Ottoman Empire declared the Tanzimat reforms in 1839 and 1856 and Armenian *millet's* internal and external reactions are studied through historical deductive-analytical method. The Ottoman Empire reforms, particularly those pertaining to *millet system* or non-Muslims are studied and analysed through various texts published at that time. The following works published that time would be considered as primary sources (Abbott G.F. 1909; Arpee, 1909 Aslan, 1920; Bryce J. 1916; Eliot, 1900; Gibbons H.A, 1916; Goodsell, 1922; Hertslet, 1891; Moltke, 1893; Odysseus 1900; Rieu, 1881; Ubicini, 1855). The research sought to understand the political, and social, economic conditions of the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire mostly through the secondary works books, articles, internet sources, concerning the status of the Armenians during the Tanzimat era.

The research has few hurdles which are important to address. This research based on the books that published in and around the end of the 19th century and first two decades of 20th century. The researcher could not undertake a field trip to Turkey due to different circumstances but utilised most important workers covering the Turkish, Armenians and European perspectives. Furthermore, the simplified transliteration for Turkish words has been used. Except for Tanzimat all Turkish words and terms are italicised without the capital case. References follow the SIS-manual of in-text citations

The second chapter elaborates historical concept '*millet*' and highlights the differences between Dhimmi and *millet*. Following that the capture of Constantinople and settlement and the migration of the non-Muslim to that city were described. The non-Muslims who lived under the Ottoman Empire such as Greek Orthodox, Armenians and Jews and their situation prior to the Tanzimat era are briefly discussed.

The third chapter discusses the condition of non-Muslims and internal and external causes that led to the introduction of Tanzimat and various reforms pertaining to non-Muslims. It also analyses the impact of Tanzimat on the *millet* system in general and the Armenian Christian *millet* in particular. It also narrates about Russo-Turkish War 1768-1774, which led to traditional reforms that were the backdrop of the Tanzimat reform.

The fourth chapter examines nature of the Armenian *millet* during the Tanzimat period, the response of the Armenian *millet* to the Tanzimat reforms and its internal and external structural changes within the Empire. This also simultaneously discusses on Armenian *millet's* relations with external powers, particularly Russia, especially in the wake of the Congress of Berlin 1878 and their implications.

The fifth chapter looks the Armenian *millet* during the reign of Abdülhamid II and the emergence of Armenian revolutionary movements. The efforts by the Sultan to suppress it during 1894-96 and the resultant Armenian massacre of 1896 are analysed in details. Simultaneously the efforts by Western educated Turks to spread the knowledge of the Ottomanism also elaborated.

The sixth chapter examines how the adoption of Western-style ideas and thoughts introduced by the Tanzimat edicts influenced the Armenians *millet*. It also examines the role played by *millet*

system in creating hiatus between the majority Muslim Turks and the minority westernised Armenian *millet*. Further, it elaborates the way in which the concept of nationalism was expressed through different term like Ottomanism, Turkism and Turkish nationalism as experienced by Muslim Turks and their impact upon the Armenians. It also analyzes the Armenian experienced one of the horrible deportations during the First World War and the rise of divisive forces that eventually challenged the stability and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Findings of the study are summarised in the seventh chapter while testing its hypotheses.

Chapter II

Dhimmi System during the Ottoman Expansion

This chapter is deals with the approach of Prophet Muhammad and Islam towards non-Muslims or the Dhimmis in the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century. It also discusses the differentiation of Christians and Jews from the newly formed Islamic religious practices. During, the post-Prophet period, the status of the Dhimmis and their treatment under his authority are elaborated. During the expansion of Islam, its approach towards the non-Muslims was dominated by levying of taxes upon those who were resisting conversion into Islam and wanted to follow their faiths. This chapter also examines the Dhimmi transforming into an Ottoman subjects at the early 13th century in the Anatolian highlands. During the Ottoman expansion and construction of the Constantinople after it was captured by the Sultan Mehmed, was characterize by the condition of non-Muslims. Later the chapter narrates the Ottoman authority's changing approach in its treatment of from being Dhimmis to *millets* and the social transformation of the non-Muslim. Finally, it discusses various *millets* groups such as the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews under the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman era.

Since its founding in the early seventh century Islam has been distinguished itself from the non-Muslim and under Islam, the presence of non-Muslim and their treatment existed at different levels according to time and space of a particular Caliphate. In addition to that, the Islamic jurisprudence framed specific theoretical approach towards Dhimmis that was maintained by both sides. The writing of Islamic jurisprudence and Dhimmis personal and community documents by various European personal and travellers gives authentic evidence about the rights of Dhimmis as the Islamic Empire gradually developed from the Arabian Peninsula to the Anatolian heartland under the Ottomans. Even though the status of non-Muslims or *millets* was officially recognised by the Ottoman Empire even before reform period, they were given certain rights to live under the Muslim ruler during the Tanzimat era. The Tanzimat reform degrees, *Hatt-i-Gulhane* 1839 and *Hatt-i-Humayun* 1856 were important edits that altered their conditions and secured a minimum level equality at least in the theoretical level in the Muslim Empire. In

the 19th century the Ottoman Empire granted equality status due to pressures from the European powers, especially Russia.

Origin of Dhimmi

From the beginning, the Islam has to deal with the believers of the Prophet and non-believers like Christians and Jews in its milieu. As he was preaching the new faith, the Prophet faced problems with the latter and in the seventh century Arabian Peninsula, Christians lived in Najran in the south and Jews in Medina and Hijaz north of Mecca where the Prophet was living and was giving sermons to his followers. Even the Quran the holy book of Islam and Hadith (Prophet's sayings) acknowledged the presence of the non-believers during the time of Prophet Muhammad. He accepted other Semitic people under the authority of the Islam, that is, non-believers must choose from embracing Islam, death or submission. Thus, in the Prophet's period itself the non-Muslims began to practice their own religion under the suzerainty of the Islam after paying taxes to his authority (Lewis, 1984: 10; Ye'or, 1980: 36).

The concept of Dhimmi emerged from the Prophet's words and Quran, that confronted the early stage of Islam in the Prophet's territory. Three important factors played a major role in spread of the Islam such as revelation of Quran to Muslim people as a rulebook for their daily life which the non-Muslims had not accepted. Second was the formation of first Islamic society at Medina that has accepted only believers in Islam and differentiated others. Third and very particular reason was the spread of Islam to other territories in later centuries and the establishment of Muslim Empire spreading from Spain in the West to Indus in the East which had considerable non-Muslim population (Ahmedov, 2009).

The word Dhimmi originates from the Arabic root *dm* and it also has relations in Aramaic and Hebrew meaning law. The Islam and Judaism had problems in differentiating religion and law because mostly both are intermingled in the Semitic religions (Lewis, 1984: 12). Quran shows that the non-believers have been separate communities and says that *dm* describes law and religion. Thus, the Muslims follow their own religious laws and non-Muslims practice their own religious laws and customs. According to some, "From the very beginning, Islam encountered and cohabited with non-Islamic subjects who were not willing to discover, convert to, and adopt the new religion. For doctrinal as well as historic reasons, Islam evolved a framework to deal

with the problem posed by the presence of sizable nonbelievers” (Kumaraswamy, 2007:95). Further, the every religious community followed their law through the mirror of the own religion. “For this reason if there was the law of religions or rituals of religions, then it would be correct to render *dm* as religion and also the law” (Lewis, 1984: 13).

Prophet Muhammad and his experience of law making process went through various intra-religious disputes and Quranic provisions were combined to frame the idea of the Dhimmi or non-Muslims at that time (Ahmedov, 2009:online). In the early stages, under the Prophet the authority of Jews and Christians were respected because both had received their own valid revelations. Quran says that the non-Muslims should not be forced to convert into the Islam unless they were willing to accept the suzerainty of Islam. The followers of other two Semitic religions—Judaism and Christianity—were called as *ahl al-kitab* or the People of the Book, because they also have their own holy texts that narrate their religious law and traditions, customs (Armstrong, 2002:10). The followers of pre-Islamic Zoroastrianism are also accorded the same privilege in Iran.

Quran and Hadith elaborate the confrontation between the Prophet and Jews and imposition of the dominance of the Islam over Jews created uneasy situation and Jews opposed conversion to Islam through compulsion or forceful and they were asked like convert to Islam or exile or death (Motzki, 2004:285-286). In 629, the situation led to fights between the Jews living Oasis of Khaybar and the followers of Prophet over forceful conversion to Islam. Both fought a month-long conflict that ended with domination of the Islamic power. The Jews were forced to accept the terms and conditions of the Islamic suzerainty and became submissive to Prophet’s authority. Furthermore, they also gave their nod for paying tribute to Islamic authority with one-half of their produce as Jiziya or head tax (Khanam, 2011:185; Lewis, 1984: 10). Quran explains the methods in dealing with the Dhimmis regarding make them to accept Islam or follow other beliefs, “Fight those from among the People of the Book who believe neither in God, nor in the Last Day, nor hold as unlawful what God and His Messenger have declared to be unlawful, nor follow the true religion, until they pay tax willingly and agree to submit”(Khanam, 20011:185). At the end of conflict, the Jews and the Prophet came to an agreement that was considered *locus classicus* for future dispute with non-Muslims in Muslim states (Lewis, 1984: 10).

Under the Prophet's rule, the Christians were not as suspicious as the Jews. The Christians and the Prophet balanced a fair and mutually agreeable relation between two. The Christians in Najran also inked a special Treaty that allowed them to follow Christianity and worship Jesus, the Messenger. The Christians were permitted to stay in Najran, after they give a tribute, and reverence to the Prophet as guest at their areas. The Christians also assisted the Muslim forces while they were passing through Christian quarters and agreed that they would not collect or charge interests from the Muslims. Thus, the Prophet and Muslims considered Christians as more loyal and trustworthy than the Jews and Quran and Hadith also refer same about the Christians (Lewis, 1984: 12). According to Quran the people who were not accepting the Islam and the Prophet as messengers were treated as "you will find that the bitterest in their enmity to the faithful are the Jews and the polytheists; the nearest affection to them is those who say, We are Christians" (Khanam, 2011:116).

In the early Islamic period, the religious leaders re-structured and arranged all legal treaties between the Muslim and non-Muslims. Further, Islamic legal system had granted rights of internal autonomy to Dhimmi to manage their religious activities under the control of the Muslim authority in the Arabian Peninsula and the neighbouring areas. It is important to note that the Islamic laws were framed to differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims and measures of submission and discriminatory humiliation against the Dhimmi under the Caliphate rule (Franke, 2004:452).

Caliphate and Dhimmi

After the death of the Prophet, the expansion of Islam was very fast in all the four directions under the leadership of the Caliphs or successors of the Prophet. New Muslim Empire brought huge non-Muslims like Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians under the Caliphate rule as a Dhimmi or (Protected People) thus they were not plundered or assaulted by the Muslim forces. During the Caliphate rule the Dhimmi practiced same religious rule like paying head tax or poll tax in return from exemption for the military service and for religious freedom to follow their own beliefs under the Muslim government as mentioned in Quran (Armstrong, 2002:30-31). The Caliph wields authority on the basis of Quran and Islamic traditions and Hadith. He reminded that all Muslims are to be deemed as brothers in a Muslim community and that there should not any conflicts between the brothers who beliefs are the same. The Caliph also acknowledged that

the Dhimmis' religious freedom and individual customs are to be guaranteed under Islam based on Quran and Hadith (sayings of the Prophet) (Motzki, 2004:285-288).

Under the Umayyad (661-750) and Abbasid Caliphates (750-1517), the Muslim Empire covered a large portion of the West Asian region. The Islamic scholars describe the conquest-separating world into *Dar al-Islam* (the House of Islam) which would be in a perpetual conflict with *Dar al-Harb* (the House of War). After the classical Caliphate period, (786-1258) the Muslims rulers and scholars accepted that the Muslims Empire attained its territorial zenith. The Muslims had also experienced a lively neighbourly life with non-Muslims throughout the Muslims Empire (Armstrong, 2002:30). Karen Armstrong explains that in the early stage of the Caliphate understanding of the Dhimmis in Arabian land

the Quran does not sanctify warfare it develops the notion of a just war of self-defense to protect decent values, but condemns killing and aggression. Furthermore, once the Arabs had left the peninsula they found that nearly everybody belonged to the *ahl al-kitab*, the People of the Book, who had received authentic scriptures from God. They were not, therefore forced to convert to Islam; indeed, until the middle of the eighth century, conversion was not encouraged. The Muslims assumed that Islam was a religion for the descendants of Ismail, as Judaism was the faith of the sons of Isaac. Arab tribesmen had always extended protection to weaker client's *mawali* (Armstrong, 2002:30).

Umayyad Caliph Umar ibn al Khattab (634-644) asserted all the religious rights that the non-Muslims are entitled to enjoy under the Muslim rule. The Pact of Umar regulations were executed during the Umayyad rule such as construction of Church buildings and repairing religious buildings belonging to Christians and Jews. However, these were later curtailed and other new restrictions were imposed upon the Dhimmis (Franke, 2004:452).

Even under the liberal Umayyad and Abbasid rules, the Christians and Jews not allowed to build new Churches and Synagogues near a Mosque or Muslim locality. The non-Muslims cannot repair their dilapidated Churches and religious building without the prior authorization from the Muslim authorities. Sometimes the Dhimmis have to provide extra taxes or bribery to particular authorities to secure their approvals. While constructing or re-building old Churches and Synagogues by Dhimmis after a Muslim invasion, the Muslim judges came and evaluated any law against evasion that was practiced in particular cases. Local Dhimmis personal and commercial building also occasionally needed the permission from the authority but they decide according particular possession but do not challenge or richer than to the Muslim property. The

Caliphate followed the non-Muslim policy based on their utility to their government and Christians enjoyed normal relations with the government than others (Martin, 2009: 33).

Author Patrick Franke says

according to Islamic law, a Muslim could marry a Dhimmi woman, but a Dhimmi could not marry a Muslim woman; a Muslim could own a Dhimmi slave, although the reverse was not allowed; at the frontier the Dhimmi merchant would pay double the tariff rate paid by the Muslim 10percent and 5percent, respectively) and in criminal law it was commonly considered that the blood-wit (*diyya*) for a Dhimmi was less (one-half or two-thirds) than that for a Muslim finally, the Dhimmi had to wear distinguishing clothing, in particular the zunnar belt, and there were various limitations on the outward expressions of worship such as processions, the use of bells, and the construction and repair of religious buildings (Franke, 2004:452).

The Muslim tax collectors while collecting from the Dhimmi, have to or could hold the Dhimmi's scruff of the neck and ask him to pay Jiziya. Once Dhimmi gives his tribute he has to slapped on the nap of his neck as a reminder of his submissiveness. There are other practices the Dhimmi must do and do not in front of the Muslims; for example, the Dhimmi has to bent back and bowed his head in front of the Muslims. The Jiziya collectors refrained from violence while collecting taxes, but the Dhimmi can be slapped in cheeks for not listening. Some places mention the behaviour of the Dhimmi while paying the tax and that his hand should be below and Muslim hands should be above while a transaction is held. Jurists of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence believe that above the mentioned acts or rules of humiliation practiced in public against the non-Muslims may be joyful for other Muslim spectators and that "Perhaps in the end they will come to believe in God and His Prophet, and thus be delivered from this shameful yoke" (Lewis, 1984:15).

There are certain rules that the non-Muslim are not permitted in Islamic heartland of Arabian Peninsula, but the restrictions were not severely followed other Muslim Empire. The non-Muslims could wear same standard of dress like Muslim but they should not imitate Muslims. Further non-Muslim cannot be buried near Muslim cemeteries. The non-Muslims houses should not be higher than their Muslim counterparts. Dhimmi were not allowed to maintain a slave who was earlier under the Muslim control. Non-Muslims were barred from occupying political offices or ride on a camel in front of the Muslims. The non-Muslim witness cannot validate in Islamic court in criminal issues (Martin, 2009: 24). The Dhimmi were prohibited from selling pork,

alcohol, and possessing dead animals in their house. Bruce Master define rule of attire for non-Muslim “non-Muslims must wear the girdle over their cloaks and were to differentiate themselves from Muslims by their headgear, mounts, and saddles. This was expanded later to prohibit non-Muslims from riding either horses or camels, limiting them to mules and donkeys.” (Masters, 2001: 21-22).

During the classical period of Islam, killings of the Dhimmi were occupationally upheld. Among one such event, Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim (996-1021) ordered the demolition of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in 1009. Further the situation was tightened by the Middle Ages against the non-Muslim in the Muslim Empire. In Spain and West African regions Almohads Caliphate (1147-1269) inducted a bigotry view of religions perspective and in the East in Cairo the Mamluk Empire (1261-1517) adopted an intolerant policy against the Dhimmi. Renounced Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) pressured the government execute a stricter religious policy against the non-Muslims and according to his interpretations certain Quran verses and Hadith were venomous to the Dhimmi (Master, 2009:500-501). In the 14th century the Ottoman Empire brought the Caliph and Islamic jurisprudence while expanding their legal system at their foundation period. In the early period, the Ottomans were concerned about the Dhimmi system to strength their Empire. After capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Dhimmi system was converted into the *millet* which existed until the 19th century. The classic non-Muslim status existed until 1839 Tanzimat proclamation and the new reform happened due to European diplomatic pressures to change the domination of the Islamic law over Christian subjects and to treat them as equal citizen of the Empire (Franke, 2004:451-452).

Introduction of Dhimmi to Turks

Since the 13th and 14th centuries in Anatolia and Balkans regions experienced the spread of Islam simultaneously as in other parts of the West Asian regions. In 1290, Osman (1290-1326) was a *gazi* or a frontier commander of *bey* (Military leader) founded the Ottoman state in the district of the Sogut, which was widely accepted by major historians as the foundation of the Ottoman history. Osman imposed a holy war against the non-Muslims that gave him opportunity to create a respect for him as a pious Muslim ruler who sought to widen the *Dar ul-Islam* by defeating the Byzantine Empire (324-1453) and other European Christian rulers who represented the domain of *Dar ul-Harb* (Kia, 2011; 1-3). The early the Ottoman rulers intentionally stayed away from

invading south and eastern Turcoman Principalities but their core policy was to spread Islam to the Byzantine Empire and the Christian states of the Southeastern states of Europe. They also knew that their Muslims subjects would be easily available for a campaign against non-believers if validated under the name of a holy war against infidels (Kia, 2011:1-3).

From the Arabic perspective non-believer such as Jews and Christians called Dhimmi under the Islamic ruler and the term was called in Ottoman Turkish as *zimmi* meaning “people of the Books” (Shaw, 1976: 19). In Ottoman Empire, the Sultan belongs to Sunni sect of Islam and under his reign, the non-Muslims—Jews and Christians—resided as neighbours. Every non-Muslim peoples were managed their own communities’ religious, cultural and legal affairs. All the religious groups such as Greek and, Armenian Christians and Jews were under control of Greek Patriarchate, Armenian Gregorian Orthodox Patriarchate, and Chief Rabbis respectively. The Ottoman Sultan assigned responsibilities to those non-Muslims religious head and this religious set up maintained the peace and harmony of the Empire for seven centuries (Kia, 2011:112).

The Ottomans campaign against the Byzantines and the European Christians might be justifiable under ideological differences or war against infidels but there were other reasons for their westward invasion against the non-Muslims. According to Ottoman historian Mehrdad Kia,

The war against infidels could only succeed if it provided material incentives and promised profitable gains for those who participated. Some may have justified their actions under the banner of religious holy war, but in reality the promise of material gain and upward social mobility motivated them. Thus, the *gazis* not only waged *jihād* but also launched raids against non-Muslims, allowing the raids to plunder rural and urban communities and amass booty and slaves. They also acted as the front line shock troops plundering enemy territory, spreading fear in the hearts and minds of the population who were about to be invaded and conquered (Kia, 2011; 36).

From the district of the Sogut, the original home of Seljuk state began to widen its territories in western Anatolia and along with larges it inducted new peoples under its control. Further, every invading territory incorporated along with the new populations inhabited in those territories began to strive for the Seljuk state economic development and cultural diversity that led to Seljuk state transforming into the great Ottoman Empire (Shaw, 1976: 20-21).

Since the beginning, the Ottoman Empire understood its ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences that remained for many centuries. The Ottomans non-Muslims communities had have their own history, culture, language, religious customs and traditions which were different from one another. Apart from the majority Muslim Turks, the Empire included Orthodox Christians (Rum), Armenian Gregorian Orthodox Christians, Jews, Kurds, Nestorians, Monophysite Jacobites and Suriyanis and others lived peacefully under the Sultan (Somel, 2003:190-191). For about seven centuries the non-Muslims preserved their religious and cultural uniqueness and lived a better life than their non-Muslim counterparts in Europe. The Sultan had broad idea of state which was preserved from the 12th century until end of the 19th century with the help of non-Muslims who were given the rights to maintain their own religious administration. Their political rights, however, were very limited until the early 19th century (Kia, 2011:111-113).

Since early period of the Seljuq Empire, the Ottomans had promoted the Sunni sect of Islam and its related jurisprudence under the Sultan's administration. The government supported this through the building Sunni schools, colleges and other religious constructions for the Muslim Turks. They patronized Islamic theologians—the *ulema*—and Sufi scholars in the new land and allotted them buildings to run their religious services (Lapidus, 2002: 201-02). During the Seljuk period education was mostly imparted through madrasas and the Seljuk Sultan patronized the Qadis who were given financial support through Waqfs endowments and they were also involved in disseminating education. The Seljuks' main income came from the taxes levied upon the non-Muslim and every ecclesiastical clergy head submitted to the government as representative of respective *millet* (İhsanoğlu, 2005:266).

After the invasion of Anatolian territory in 11th century, the Seljuk Sultan reduced the importance of the Greeks Orthodox Patriarchate in political, social, and economic sections. He cut down Greek Patriarchate's land holding to a minimal level that earlier prospered and functioned like a semi-government institution. Thus, the Sultan promoted Sunni Islam and reduced the importance of the Christianity at a very early stage. However, the Christians were not ill-treated like previous Muslim Empires and this made a huge difference for the Ottoman administration (Lapidus, 2002: 202).

During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Ottoman Empire supported the Sunni Islam in a full-fledged programme in the Anatolian high land that became part of the Turkish religious and cultural identity and remains so this the present day. In the Anatolian Turkish land, the new Turkish Muslims were people settled down by removing the Anatolian Greeks Christian, Armenians, Georgian and Syrian agricultural communities. Around the 15th century 90 percentage of population in Anatolia were Muslim Turks, but a large number were Christians who converted into Islam and this increased the Muslim population many folds (Lapidus, 2002: 250-51). About the conditions of the Christians at that time, Ira M. Lapidus says that “the demoralized Christians saw its defeat as a sign of punishment from God or even of the end of history, and Muslim holy men appealed to it by presenting Islam as a syncretism of Muslim and Christian beliefs” (Lapidus, 2002: 251-252).

In the intermediate era between the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires, Sufi saints provided guidance for the rural Turkish people and other communities. They helped all the Seljuk subjects in cultivation of newly acquired Anatolian territory. They built community medical centres, helped farmers in orchards, constructed schools and guided travels for new migration people. They were also the arbiters for land and financial disputes at that time. Thus, Sufi babas (Sufi holy man) acted as the guide for the fragmented warrior society at that century. In many villages Sufi saints followed a benevolent policy and were friendlier in their approaches towards the Christians and also assisted the Greeks and Armenians to settle down in the Anatolian land (Lapidus, 2002: 249).

Ottoman sultans had good knowledge of about necessary to preserve the welfare of the non-Muslims people in order to maintain a healthy social structure. They also freely allowed the majority of Muslim Turks, non-Muslims, and nomadic peoples to practice their business interest or profession and to live in newly acquired territories for development and prosperity of the Empire. The Sultan planned for guarding the social and economic system without destabilizing the Empire thus, in the early stage the Sultan was largely avoided interrupting the functioning of the non-Muslims. Even though the Sultan was Caliphate he did not imposed the *ahl al-dhimma* laws and regulations that were practiced in the earlier Muslim empires upon the non-Muslims. The Ottoman Empire elaborately covered all the religious details regarding all non-Muslims people who were striving hard for the Empire’s prosperity along with their own interest personal

development. The Sultan never run the government through the advice of the political elites but saw the interests of the large non-Muslim masses over the interests of the few in the imperial court. Through such an attitude he was able to preserve such huge Empire's unity and sovereignty with the assistance of big and diverse non-Muslim and non-Turkic populations. The Ottoman Empire controlled different ethnic and religious heterogeneity community in an area of geographical diversity and were administrated through a policy of unity and cohesiveness between all the communities of the Empire (Aboona, 2008: 136-140).

Since the early 16th century, the Seljuk Sultan expanded administrative system to strengthen the daily activities and requirements. He also began restructuring new economic measures by framing and standardizing land-tenure system. The Sultan granted land as the salary to army officers particularly to the Janissary Corps an institutional arrangement by which the Ottomans front line warriors became loyal to the Sultan. By this time, the Anatolian territory was filled with orthodox Sunni Muslim Turks, thus erstwhile the Christians land became the heartland of Turkish identity or the core place where the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire laid for upcoming centuries (Ágoston, 2009:398-400; Goffman, 2004: 47).

Settlement of Dhimmi in the Constantinople

In Ottoman Empire history its military capacity was measured by the capture of the Constantinople from the Eastern Byzantine Empire. In 6 April 1453, the Ottoman army under the command of the Sultan Mehmed II led the battle against the Eastern Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos. Both the kings fought for around 53 days and War finally came to end on 29 May with the Ottoman victory. Thus, Sultan Mehmed II came to be called the *Conqueror* for his successful capture of Constantinople (Ágoston, 2009:141-143).

After 1453, the Constantinople became centre of the Ottoman politics and administration and the Empire and Sultan felt that they were taken Islamic tradition to the seat of Eastern Roman Empire. The Sultan had taken Islamic ideology to new heights by establishing its Caliphate seat at the European territory. The City of Constantinople fort located at the middle of the huge territory became the guardian of security and the gateway for future military invasions into European territories. Now Sultan aspiration of *Dar ul-Islam* was reachable by declaring *Dar ul-Harb* or House of War against the European Christian Empire. Constantinople turned into a great

financial and trading centre for the inlands of the Balkans states and the Western Anatolia benefited and became the centre for maritime trade activities in the administration. Through such economical transactions the Ottoman treasury profited a lot. The city had become the main livelihood provider for a large number of working force. After its capture, Constantinople became deserted and the Mehmed II's invasion resulted the depopulation most part of the former the Byzantine capital. But the Sultan took this situation as a opportunity to re-constructs and reform the city freshly through the image of the Ottomans. The Sultan brought population by force and then people preferred to flock into the city and thus new people such as Greeks, Armenians, Jews and foreigners and Muslim Turks from different parts of the Empire formed multicultural metro city which strived like a non-Ottoman city located at Mediterranean and European territories (Goffman, 2004: 54; Heywood, 2009:367).

After capture of the Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II had began the restoration of the city's previous standard. As a consequences of the occupation, most of the town was emptied and a small number of people of around 60,000 to 70,000 people dwelled in small domestic and commercial areas. Sultan Mehmed II tried to stop people's departure from the Constantinople to other part of the Empire as were scared of the Muslims invasion that led to rumours about forceful conversion and city looked like it was prone to any epidemic diseases. Later while the Sultan was re-constructing the city, it consisted merely around 10,000 people. Thus, Mehmed decide to re-flourish the city with large population like earlier Byzantine period. Through *ferman* to his people, the Sultan proclaimed that irrespective race and religion he assured safety and security of the people's lives and property for those who paid taxes to his government (Heywood, 2009:367; Shaw, 1976:59).

Sultan Mehmed II planned Constantinople, as a new multicultural and multiethnic metro city. However, his idea did not impress the people and they were scared to shift to new capital, and the Sultan also understood about mere policy would not populate the city. Therefore, he executed a policy of forceful migration and colonization of his subjects from different parts of the Empire. People as diverse as Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Slavs from Balkans and other Muslim Turks were brought to Constantinople with gifts and tax exceptions and were settled in and around the city in the new settlements. Particularly the Jews from the Western Europe migrated to the Constantinople to escape from the cruel treatment and persecution of the Spain Empire,

especially the Inquisition in 1492 (Lapidus, 2002:318-319). Further the Sultan sent circulars throughout the Ottoman Empire, the wider Muslim world, and other neighbouring states about his welcoming situation whereby people of any race and religion who were ready to accept the Islam dominance could come and live the Ottoman capital. Sultan also permitted the war prisoners to work in new capital city and attain their freedom by assisting in road construction. To supply the daily needs of the capital and royal houses, Balkans peasants were brought to capital and were settled down in suburb of the city. These farmers planted orchards, fruit gardens, wheat, and other cereals production and were motivated by the needy assistance supplied the government. These farmers work resulted the food chain becoming very strong to supply in capital population and people from other parts also began to spontaneously influxes into the Ottoman capital (Lapidus, 2002:318-319; Master, 2001:61-64; Shaw, 1976:59; Somel, 2003:179-180).

In the Ottoman history, the construction and development of Constantinople was an integral part of the Empire's development and strength. Therefore, the repopulation of the city was practiced along with the rejuvenated construction throughout the city. During the siege of Constantinople, thousands of houses, large number of factories, bridges, market buildings, main streets, and walls were destroyed and all buildings were reconstructed under the Ottoman Sultan. The city sewage system was also affected by the siege and brought back to service. Sultan Mehmed II understood all these basic necessities and rigorously repaired all services of the city. Many army units became civic units and were employed in restructuring duties like construction or repair of a large number of homes, aqueducts and bathing house, city roads, and streets. In Constantinople the building of a grand bazaar or covered main market was centre point of the City and served as the financial hub from 1455. Sultan Mehmed built his palace in the middle of the old city, near present day Bayezid Square and University of Istanbul also called as Old Palace. His successor built new imperial Topkapi Palace in middle of new Constantinople along with other elite living areas surrounding the Sultan's residence. The Topkapi Palace was constructed in high point of city from there the Sultan can watch the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and Golden Horn (Heywood, 2009:367; Somel, 2003:141-142; Shaw, 1976:59-60).

In 1470, Sultan Mehmed II built the great Faith Mosque to commemorate the capture of Constantinople, called the Mosque of the Conqueror and following that other Islamic and other

religious building were constructed. Like previous Islamic Empire where the Islamic organisations played an important role in development of Muslim towns, many Islamic endowments and Waqfs (religious board) played a major role in the development of the Constantinople. Along with the administration, religious endowments also took part in the construction of public properties such as schools, mosques, water fountains, medical centres, bath houses, hotels and other public utility places. These building were maintained at the expenses of the Sultan and through private contributions from by rich and pious Muslims. Finally at end of Mehmed II's rule, Constantinople transformed from being a ghost like city to one of the most populated and modern city of that time. The city consisted of 16, 324 houses and more than 100,000 people. While the majority were Muslims, it also had other people such as Greek Orthodox, Armenians, Jews and European who lived in separate quarters/locality (Heywood, 2009:367; Somel, 2003:141-142; Shaw, 1976:60).

After the capture of Constantinople, the prestige of the Ottomans and Sultan Mehmed II reached new heights, their fame reached throughout the world, because the Muslim Caliph was seated in the erstwhile Eastern Byzantine Empire. The Sultan experienced absolute power in the centralized authority that reached all the Muslim Empires and European Empires and thus Ottoman power impacted in the region. The absolute Sultan and his royal families were able to cut down the elites who were eager to capture power, and their domination in political affairs of the state was reduced. Now the Sultan also wanted cooperation from other religious people and appointed Gennadius Scolarius as Greek Orthodox as the head to support his administration. Sultan permitted the Greek clergy to maintains his religious policy internally and clergy could also maintain contacts with Roman Catholic head in Rome and this religious freedom confirmed the Greeks loyalty to Ottoman government (Shaw, 1976:58).

By granting special permission to Greeks, the Sultan formed a new stage for autonomous rule to the non-Muslim communities. The non-Muslims autonomous bodies were governing their community's works under their own religious clergymen or head. Same religious or internal autonomy privilege was granted to Armenians and Jews because they were also big non-Muslim communities in Constantinople and in the Asian part of the Empire. Sultan's social policy paid well in return, because the *millet* leaders were very loyal to Sultan. Because the religious heads were the sole representatives of their respective community, the position gave them enormous

power over internal autonomy. The Christian clergy head had not enjoyed the same even under the Christian Byzantine Empire. The Ottomans expansion in the Eastern Europe affiliated all the Christian populations under the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate as religious head and thus, the Greeks clergy man profited more than other groups and even ran an administration parallel to the Sultan administration. The Greeks were biggest *millet* under the Ottomans (Show, 1976:59).

The Empire's territorial expansion, brought about a sense of confidence and maturity for the Sultan. Its diversity comprising of areas of Persian, Arabian, Mughal and Byzantine empires helped the Ottomans ruling elite to formulate their own customs and traditions for the Turks. The Ottoman uniqueness was its language and though grammatically Turkic, it became rich in literature after its blending with the Arabic and Persian languages. The new language vocabularies formulated by well-educated elite and bourgeois came the same social background of the Anatolian land. These urban elite belong to different religion and ethnic background such as Greek, Armenian, Jews, Bulgarian, and Slav other minority sections. They were very assertive about their manners, and did not differentiate Muslim and non-Muslims when dealing with common issues but maintained a conservative position with regard to high standard of urbane culture (Goffman, 2004: 51).

During Sultan Mehmed's reign economic development was wide spread and new income was accumulated and utilized for military campaign in the Balkans and Europe and for internal political activities. The administration boosted the progress of village industry and commerce and Muslim Turks, Greeks, and Armenians were the major sections that participated. Areas were specified for particular production; western Anatolia was involved in cotton industry, ulan or mohair cloth was made in Ankara and Kastamonu; Bursa and Constantinople became famous for silk manufacturing, Edime for famous footwear and Salonika and Constantinople for wooden products. In previous Byzantine Empire trade was favourable to the Europeans imports but the Sultan promoted domestic business and commerce therefore native workers could earn more profit by exporting their products. Sultan Mehmed's rule made way for surplus production and opened the gates for international export from Constantinople, Bursa, Edirne, and Izmir and other small ports. Thus, under Sultan Mehmed II, it was a real Empire, where the state economy and military are patronized at same levels which in turn made the Ottoman Empire powerful and proposers (Shaw, 1976:60).

Meaning of *Millet*

The word *millet* originates from the Arabic word *milla*, meaning nation (*millat al-Nasara*, Christians). From the perspective of the Ottoman Empire, *millet* means notifying the non-Muslims in general who were different from the Muslim majority and there is no specific reference about any particular community. The *millet* communities worked under their own representative who was appointed by the Sultan (Lewis, 1968:352; Master, 2001:61-62). The Ottoman State had recognised non-Muslim community as *millet* communities. The Sultan and his administration followed old traditions of granting special status for *ahl al-kitab* or the People of Book to Christians and Jews because Islam traced its roots to both the religions and were grounded on the Hebraic traditions of monotheism (Master, 2009:383-384). According to Bruce Masters “study of the Ottoman Arab provinces has drawn attention to the paradoxical character of religious privilege and political subordination for Jews and Christians. The *ahl al-dhimma* acquired a measure of autonomy to form their distinct communities that ran parallel to the dominant Muslim one. This communal organization prefigured the more strictly controlled *Millet* system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (Master, 2001: 31-33, 61-66; Martin, 2009: 34).

Elaborating the historical transformation of the *millet* historian Nicola Migliorino observes:

In the context of the Ottoman Institutional system and practice, the adoption and assimilation of the *ahl al-dhimma* principle is traditionally described by the term and concept of *Millet*. It is generally agreed that the establishment of the *Millet* system was the result of a complex process of evolution which, starting from earliest times of the empire, was only completed in the nineteenth century. What is important here is that the Ottomans, without significant breaks in relation to Islamic tradition, engaged from the start in the establishment of a system by which the state recognized some religiously defined communities as subjects of rights and duties. Disregarding ethno-linguistic or territorial differences, the Ottoman Empire would define *Millet*, or ‘nations’ and distinguish its subjects on the basis of religious faith. The approved leadership of the recognized non-Muslim communities, which included since early history the Orthodox Greeks, the Jews and the Armenians, entered some form of agreement with the Muslim ruler, playing an important mediating role between non-Muslim citizens and the state. On the one hand, the community submitted to the Muslim rulers and accepted paying a *Jiziyah* poll tax, on the other, the state at least in principle guaranteed protection and granted a fairly substantial autonomy in a significant number of community sensitive areas (Migliorino, 2008:13-14).

Under the Ottoman Empire, each *millet* community was governed by its respective religious head who had legal and administrative authority over the members of that *millet*. The main duties of the non-Muslims religious head or Patriarchate were to represent the *millet* in the Sultan court and to be guardian of the community's normal life. The *millet* autonomy has dealt with the following issues, namely, problems related to religious customs and traditions, personal issues, disputes related civil and penal laws, community's education programme and maintaining *millet* autonomy. The *millet* head was sole representative for levying and collecting taxes from the community people and submit the collection to Sultan's treasury and he was particularly playing function of the Sultan's administrative officer (Master, 2009:383-384; Migliorino, 2008:14).

The Christian *millet* under the Ottoman Empire enjoyed internal semi-autonomy which reflected more on deciding their community issues internally, particularly religious related issues and annual membership amount was decided by the community. Among all the *millet* communities, the *ahl al-Dhimmi* or the People of the Book enjoyed more rights and freedom than other non-Muslim communities as pagans. However, the Christians and Jews did not have property inheritance rights and further they cannot be witnesses against the Muslim Turks in the penal case. Thus, in common place they act according to their *ahl al-Dhimmi* duties and rights (Martin, 2009: 29).

When the *millet* was working under stipulated semi-autonomous framework, the erstwhile Dhimmi attained certain level freedoms that were absent earlier. The Turkish testament of non-Muslims was not cruel and now they were deemed a part of the Ottoman Empire and were merely treated as secondary subjects. However, there are difficulties like a judicial dispute between members of two different *millet*s means that the injured person's law prevails and both could go for higher jurisdiction under the *sharia* court. Further, the case between a Muslim and a non-Muslim could be adjudicated under the *sharia* even if the victim was a Dhimmi. Nevertheless, the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire consider themselves as legally recognised because the *sharia* court also deemed them as legal subjects of the Ottomans but only religious rules make differences among them. The non-Muslims regularly filed cases against other non-Muslims and complained to Sultan about their ill-treatment by the corrupt officials of their

millet. Therefore, a large number cases show that non-Muslims believed that the *sharia* courts were honest in arbitration (Martin, 2009: 35).

Though the non-Muslim to some certain extent lived a comfortable life, the Ottoman Muslim Turks believed that they were superior to the Dhimmi people. Islamic historian Karen Barkey describes about the non-Muslim treatment under the Ottoman Turks as “Separate, unequal and protected” (Barkey, 2008:120). However, the non-Muslim experienced interfaith relationship with the Muslim Turks and practiced their own religious identity they were explicitly treated as People of the Book and as submissive to the Muslim authority and state (Barkey, 2008:120; Martin, 2009: 26).

Mark Westcott differentiates the *millet* and Dhimmi and says,

The Islamic *sharia* provided law for the empire’s Muslim population, the *Millet* system historically provided it for the empire’s Christians and Jews. *Millets* were confessional communities of Dhimmi, who were granted, in accordance with *sharia*, a considerable degree of legal autonomy, and criminal matters remained under jurisdiction of the *sharia* courts, *Millet* s could self adjudicate in personal, social, and economic affairs. As well as Jews, Christian confessions including Greek and Syrian Orthodoxy and the Armenian Apostolic Church were organized as *Millet* s and so were able to exercise their own law. However, parties could also choose to have their disputes heard by *sharia* courts (Westcott, 2013: 7).

In Ottoman history, the existence of the *millet* system got a name for Turks as a pre-modern social structure in a multicultural society. The *millet* communities elected their religious heads among the members who were educated and well versed in religious traditions and laws. The elected candidate must get the approval of the Sultan and on a few occasions non-Muslims blocked a particular person from entering chief clergy position and therefore they have to give bribes to the Sublime Porte officials. The Patriarchate and Chief Rabbi reported directly to the Sultan in matters relating to community affairs and he held the office at the discretion and pleasure of the Sultan. There were a occasions non-Muslims Patriarch elected by the community acted as an intermediary between the Sublime Porte and his own *millet* people. The most important religious duties for the Patriarchate was run the *millet* administration as an institution and to deal with the government as the sole guardian of the particular community in the ecclesiastical-political relations. Thus, in Ottoman Empire the church or synagogue acted explicitly as the representative of the non-Muslims in public affairs and as a separate national

identity and broadened its role in constructing and administering its own schools and handling certain domestic administration of that particular *millet* (Martin, 2009: 39).

Finally, in the Ottoman Empire the *millet* system the Dhimmi was more a subject than submissive and not a modern citizen. Since the 18th century, the non-Muslims started to question the Sublime Porte's different approach among its own people. Due to the Ottoman competition with the Europeans on the military and commercial fronts, the Sultan realized the need for social reforms to tackle new problems that arose out of external challenges. Consequences of such a serious of problem also led to external powers to interfere in the internal Ottoman affairs particularly the British, French, and Russian Empires. The non-Muslims regularly contacted those European powers for the welfare of their *millets* and specifically the Greek Orthodox had strong contacts with Russia to support their ailment under the Ottomans. In the 19th century the meaning of the *millets* were upgraded with claims of full rights through the Tanzimat reforms 1839 and 1856. In the later part of the same century, the non-Muslims started their struggle for autonomy or self-government and finally to independence against the Ottomans. For his part the Ottoman Sultan also tried mitigate the situation through Tanzimat reforms but he could not stop non-Muslim from aspiring for independence from the Empire(Martin, 2009: 38).

Different *millets* under the Ottomans Empire

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Bulgarian, Nestorian, Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics *millet* groups under its sovereignty and out of them the following Greeks, Armenians, Jews were important non-Muslim communities (Aboona, 2008:140; Luke, 1955:9). After the 19th century, the non-Muslims were called *millet* with a very distinguish meaning that was *al Nasara* or the Nation of the Christians. The Sublime Porte related every Church with their respective *millets* thus every non-Muslim were identified for administrative, religious and cultural purposes. After capturing Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II acknowledged three main non-Muslim communities based on *ahl al-Dhimmi* namely, Greek Christians, Armenian Christians, and Jews. Initially the Sultan allotted them a place in the capital city and in 1454 the Sultan recognised Greeks Orthodox as representative of Greeks, and the Armenian and Jews were recognised in 1461 (Master, 1978: 5).

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate or Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople was the largest the *millet* at the end of the 15th century. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate headquarters' was located at Fener District in Constantinople from there he administered and executed all *millet*- related domestic and external affairs. The Greek Patriarch was awarded a rank of grand vizier or army general with three horsetails and he practiced law on matters related to religious and secular disputes. The Sultan appointed the Greeks Patriarch and many Greeks religious rituals needed the presence of the Emperor presence and therefore somebody from the Sublime Porte represented during such programmes (Master, 2009:239-240; Shaw, 1976:151-152).

The Greek Orthodox Christians had a direct contact with the Sultan and Sublime Porte regarding community-related issues (Somel, 2003:106). The Greek *millet* included Bulgarian, Slavic, Serbian, and Rumanian groups because during the same time period the Ottomans invaded the Balkans and Eastern European territories. Therefore, Slav and Rumanian folks became a part of the Greeks Patriarchate. Even though the Balkans were under the Greek Patriarchate they also established their own patriarchate. The Bulgarian formed their Patriarchate in Ohrid and Serbs Patriarchate at Ipek. Thus, all the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate included many ethnic groups under its authority (Shaw, 1976:151-152). The Greek Patriarchate was nominally controlled the Bulgarian and Serbian Patriarchates but they could practice their doctrinal rituals and even though most of the rituals were the same throughout the Greeks Patriarchate administration, the language were different. The Greek Patriarchate Constantinople was loyal to the Ottoman Empire and supported the Sultan for bestowing such a privilege positions as the head of all Greeks and Balkans subject under one religious authority (Master, 2009:239-240; Shaw, 1976:151-152).

The Armenian *millet* has had been following the monophysite and this created tussle between the Armenian Gregorian and Catholic Catholics Armenians from Etchmiadzin and the disputes was settled by the Council of Chaldean in 451. The Armenian Gregorian Orthodox became sole representative of the Armenians. During Sultan Mehmed's II rule, like other people the Armenians also initially forced to and then voluntarily migrated to Constantinople. Armenian Gregorian Patriarchate from Bursa also relocated in Constantinople in 1461 under Mehmed patronage. The Armenian Patriarchate was given same rights that were bestowed upon the Greeks and Jews like highest official to represent the Armenians in the Sultan court. The most of

the Orthodox Armenian community lived in the erstwhile Armenian land or eastern part of the Ottoman Empire particularly in six *vilayets* of the eastern provinces. The Armenian population first migrated during Seljuk and Byzantine War periods in the 12th century and the Ottomans and Persian fights in the 16th century. Thus the two waves of migration occurred in the Armenian history. Armenians *millet* was very slow in progress in economic and social life until the 18th century but situation changed in the 19th century and Armenians became very vibrant in the Empire especially in the economic, political, and cultural lives of the Ottomans. Even though Armenian Catholic Patriarchate actively practiced traditions and rituals alongside of the Gregorian, but they got Sultan's recognition in 1830. The Armenian Catholic Patriarchate established its head quarters at Cilicia and Armenian Protestant Patriarchate was recognized on 1831 under modern reform period. Both Armenian Catholics and Protestant Patriarchate were active in the Armenian struggle for autonomy in the 19th century and in the independence protests in the 20th century. In addition to that the Armenian Gregorian Patriarchate also acted as Patriarchate or religious head to some minor Christian sects such as Lebanese Maronites, Assyrians (Nestorian), Chaldeans, and Syrian Catholics communities (Master, 2009:53-54; Migliorino, 2008; 11; Shaw, 1976:152).

The Jewish *millet* was the third important non-Muslim community under the Ottoman Empire and acknowledge by the Sultan Mehmed in 1461 along with Armenians. The Jewish *millet* was administrated by the Chief Rabbi or Hahambaşı of Constantinople. The rabbi was also granted similar authority over his community. A large number of Romiote or Greek Jews were brought to Constantinople during the reign of Mehmed II for repopulating the city. Further, the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal resulted in around 20,000 Jews migrating to the Ottoman Empire and they were settled around Constantinople and Salonika. They were also called Sephardic Jews due to their Spanish-influenced dialects. These Sephardic Jews were involved in trade and became affluent wealthy maritime traders. This made them influential figures among the court officials and some were even close to the Sultan Selim II and Murat III (Master, 2009:300:302; Shaw, 1976:152). At various times, when they were persecuted in Europe the Jews always opted to migrate to the Ottoman Empire particularly from Poland, Austria, Bohemia (Czec-Hungary region), Russia, and Germany. These European Jews were called as Ashkenazim due to their fairness compared to Jews from other regions. They also brought with them highly experienced

technical knowledge and mercantile and banking knowledge which helped them to establish third important *millet* community of the Ottoman Empire (Shaw, 1976:152).

As the Empire did not have any data on its population, the administration began plans for population census in the early 19th century. Even though the Muslims and non-Muslim lived side by side for many centuries, the Sublime Porte not interested in collecting census data and the population census of the cities was not collected. When the Empire was to work for a structured census in the 19th century the US, Britain and France had framed a manual for census counts (Shaw, 1978:325).

After abolishing the Janissary due to their opposition to reforming army on European standard, Sultan Mehmed II he wanted young men to enrol in the army and urged the Sublime Porte to conduct the population census. Thus, in 1826 first the Ottoman census was conducted under Sultan Mahmud II who strived for a systemic collection of data. However, as mentioned above the primary reason for the 1826 census was to enrol young people to army and therefore, it only counted men who can earn and hence pay taxes. The Russo-Turkish War 1828 interrupted the next 1826 census and was completed in 1831. Details of many army personal were later included. The census was conducted throughout the Empire in all administrative units such as each sancak (district), kaza (county), and nahiye (locality). It also collected census of Muslim and non-Muslim population of the Empire (Shaw, 1978: 324). Further details of the pre-Tanzimat census data are discussed in chapter Three.

***Millet* system before the Tanzimat**

According to Douglas A. Howard, people of the *millets*

had always lived under conditions of simultaneous official state toleration and official state discrimination, community life among Jews and Christians evolved into a symbiotic relationship between community religious and commercial leaders and Ottoman State officials much as it did among Muslim communities. Christian and Jewish Peoples related to the Ottoman state and its officials through the semiautonomous institutions of their *millet*, their religious-national communities (Howard, 2001: 62).

From the early 17th century, non-Muslims began to claim their rights to the Sultan or Sublime Porte. The *millet* communities freely practiced their religious rituals like, baptisms, weddings, funerals, printing the holy texts of their religion and freedom to build churches or synagogues after obtaining permission from the authorities. The granting of permission from the Ottoman

administrative system was unlike earlier Islamic Empire. The *millet* system freely opened education institutions in major cities and distance village and thus every *millet* contributed to their people welfare who were living throughout the Empire. The non-Muslims symmetrically permitted to follow their community laws all the part of the Empire and thus *millet* people enjoyed a certain level of loose independence throughout the Empire. Every *millet* maintained a common approach in dealing with the local authorities and local non-Muslims maintained a normal relationship with the Ottoman officials of that region. Thus, Greeks, Jews, and Armenian communities exercise their own internal semi-autonomy bas the Ottoman Empire gave maximum relaxation to non-Muslims (Howard, 2001: 62).

Every *millet* systematically organized its functions ranging from domestic religious programmes dealing with the Sultan to arguing for their communities' benefits (Aboona, 2008:141; Master, 1978:61). The *millet* transformed them from being mere religious-based identity to secular identity which in turn led the European powers to enter and interfere in the Ottoman domestic issue in favour of the those non-Muslims and their rights and disputes. Thus, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Bulgarian *millets* were easily formed relationships with the European Christian states (Fortescue, 1913: 20).

Even though all the *millets* experienced most of rights and traditions related to internal autonomy in certain areas, the Ottoman establishment kept them away and treated them as not eligible to enter into state system. The non-Muslims were barred from enrolling in military service in frontline officers' level, judicial system, or in high posts in the Sublime Porte. There were exceptions and Armenians experts were part of the Ottoman cannon production and firearms industry and one Armenian Dadian family served as chief in coin minting offices. At times the *millet* people acted maliciously to attain benefit from weak Ottoman officials by giving them bribes. Through such practices, some government serviced functioned without extra funding and later on the bribe were converted as special taxes. (Aboona, 2008:136).

While Europe was experiencing social reformation and industrial reformation, the non-Muslim of the Empire began to challenge the dominance of the Islamic attitude and Muslim Turks. The Ottoman non-Muslims were also inspired by the European reformation, modernization and industrial revolution which in turn stimulated the idea of self-government at primary stage within

the Ottoman sovereignty. In the end of the 18th century the nationalist aspirations began a debate among the non-Muslims particularly Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. All the three major *millet*s had strong maritime trading connection with the Europe to Asia and this gave them knowledge of the world at that time. Therefore, the Ottoman Sultan Selim III (r.1789-1807) began his traditional reform which were maintained by Sultan Mahmud II (r.1808-1839). However, Mahmud II began Ottoman modern reform under the title of Tanzimat reforms. In the Tanzimat era, two reform decree were proclaimed in *Hatt i-Gulhane* in 1839 and *Hatt-i-Humayun* in 1856. These reforms were basically aimed at incorporating non-Muslim into the mainstream of the society by disregarding all the religious and ethnic differences (Brentjes, 1997: 30). The Ottoman Sultan also wanted to preserve the Ottoman integrity and sovereignty and therefore proclaimed Tanzimat reforms which granted equality to non-Muslim in all government job and promised a fair justice system to all the Ottoman subjects. However, external factors and various historical events led hitherto submissive non-Muslims to raise for their own national hood in later centuries (Quataert, 2005: 60-65).

Ottoman historian Donald Quataert Ottoman examines the conditions of *millet* from capture of the Constantinople until the beginning of the 19th century and observes: “Stereotypes present distorted pictures of Ottomans subjects living apart, in sharply divided, mutually impenetrable religious communities called *millet*s that date back to the fifteenth century. In this incorrect view, each community lived in isolation from one another, adjacent but separate. And supposedly implacable hatreds prevailed Muslims hated Christians, who hated Jews, who hated Christians, who hated Muslims” (Quataert, 2005:175). He further says that that “To begin with, the term *millet* as a designator for Ottoman non-Muslims is not ancient but dates from the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, in the early nineteenth century. Before then, *millet* in fact meant Muslims within the empire and Christians outside it (Quataert, 2005:175-176). When the non-Muslim wanted to come into the Ottoman society the old stratification was shaken which continued in the remaining history of the Ottomans. Though in the Tanzimat era the Armenians were comfortable, later during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II the Ottoman treatment became the reasons for future agitation of non-Muslims against the Empire Ottoman and Armenians became the major victims of such a mutual hatred.

Chapter III

Pre-Tanzimat and the Millet System

Since the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, the existence of Dhimmi or religiously recognised non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire gradually started to become structured thereby transforming the millet system. This, however, did not mean a change in the policies of the Empire towards the non-Muslims from the indifferent approach of the Sultans and Muslim Turk population during the pre-Tanzimat period. Subsequent to the changes occurring in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, the non-Muslim communities started to mingle with the majority Turks. Three major millets, namely, Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians and Jews existed throughout Eastern part of the Empire.

After the Ottoman Sultans lost vast territories in the Balkans, and Crimea to European powers, the Empire wanted to avert a similar situation in the Eastern part. At the same time, the Russian Empire was also expanding its influence in Balkans in the West and Caucasus in the East. Therefore, from the 19th century onwards, Ottoman Sultans focused their attention on the Asian parts of the Empire that were considered the heart of Ottoman seat of power, particularly the Anatolian region. Further, the Sultan also wanted control over traditional territories such as Armenia, Iraq, Levant and the Arabia Peninsula.

The 1821 Greek War of Independence made the Sultan suspicious of the motives of the Greek Patriarch leading him to view the latter to be disloyal and hostile and eventually resulting in the downgrading of his position (Karpas, 1985: 51; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 126-27). The second largest non-Muslim religious community during the Tanzimat era was the Armenian Christians who were primarily concentrated in the Eastern part of the present day Turkey and Armenia (Shaw, 1978: 326). After the Greeks were ousted from important administrative and technical posts in the Sublime Porte due to the Greek War of Independence, talented Armenians filled the vacancies. The latter were generally considered loyal and hardworking and they lived adjacent to Muslims throughout the Eastern part of the Empire. Due to internal schisms and marginalisation, armed struggle was pursued by some Armenians against the Sultans, which were regularly suppressed by the army and resulted in massacres in 1878 and 1895. However, Armenians in

cities like Constantinople and Izmir enjoyed a very different lifestyle than their Eastern counterparts (Masters, 2006: 278). Under the Young Turks (1908-1918), relations with Armenians deteriorated leading to turmoil and culminated in the great tragedy of internal displacement in 1913. The Armenian-Muslim clashes became inevitable even though the Muslims majority and Christian's minority had lived amicably for a long time.

Armenian population

Information regarding the demographic distribution in the Ottoman Empire during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, when the Empire was expanding and was in a constant stage of war, is not available as there was no population census. Later, in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries the Ottomans were pursuing wars with the Austrians and the Russians in the Balkans region, which made it difficult for the Sultans to maintain the data on the subjects. At the same time, the Sublime Porte regulated details regarding agricultural production (*mufassal defter*), internal and external trade taxpayers and region-wise and guild-wise religious taxes. These were the only documents related to census (Hütteroth, 2006: 19). The Ottoman officials maintained these documents throughout the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries and this practice is maintained even in present day Turkey. Thus, the demographic data in the Ottomans Empire was not available until the modernization of the administrative system that began in the late 18th century as in other parts of Europe (Hütteroth, 2006: 19).

After dismantlement of the Janissaries Corps in 1826, the Sublime Porte needed to count all male population of the Empire to induct them into the army (Karnal, 1943: 24; Mutulu, 2003: 4). In 1831, under Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) population census, land survey and establishment of a permanent office for population register began as a new administrative measure. The Empire's relationship with the non-Muslims was based on population of specific millets and their socio-political status during the 19th century. The increase in the number of registered Armenians, large-scale internal mobility of the Armenians to the different parts of the Empire, increase in their birth rate and their knowledge of modern medicine differentiated them from other religious communities (Karpat, 1978:237).

Table 3.1: Population in the Ottoman Empire, 1831

Millets	Rumelia Province (European side of the Empire)	Anatolia Province (Asiatic side of the Empire)	Millet people in total number	Percentage of Each millets in total Ottoman population
Muslims	513,448	1,988,027	2,501,475	66.64
Greek Orthodox	811,546	366,625	1,178,171	31.38
Armenian Gregorian	3,566	16,743	20,309	0.54
Gypsy	29,532	7,143	36,675	0.97
Jews	11,674	5,338	17,012	0.45
Total	1,369,766	2,383,876	3,753,642	99.98

Source: Adopted from Karpas 1978; 1985: 21; Shaw 1978: 326

The first census in the Ottoman Empire was conducted under Sultan Mahmud II in 1831 (Howard, 2001:59) (**Table 3.1**) but census registration was conducted only at important places not throughout the Empire. The 1831 census of adult males put the Muslim population of the Empire at 2.5 million or 66.6 percent. Among the non-Muslims, the Greek Orthodox Christians were the largest minority and made up 31.38 percent of the population, and were followed by the Armenian Gregorian with 0.54 percent. Though both are Christian communities, the census identified the Greeks Orthodox and Armenian Gregorian as distinct religious groups (Karpas, 1978: 244). The Empire also had a small number of Gypsies and Jews who made up 0.97 and 0.45 percent of the population respectively.

The census registration were primarily conducted by *kazas* (County), a low level administration unit in the Sublime Porte, and the data collected were counter checked by the officials of *sancak* (District) and *villayet* (Province) (Karpas, 1985: 19-21). The enumeration was carried out with the assistance of Muslims and non-Muslims, millet leaders gave name of scribes who were well versed, and they were appointed as local administrative officers to assist in information or local data collection. All males who could earn for themselves and their family were issued an identity card and were asked to gather at a notified public place to provide their family details, which were collected in a Turkish language, register (Mutulu, 2003: 3; Shaw, 1978: 329).

Table 3.2: Regional distribution of Armenian Millet, 1831

Region	Muslims	Greek Orthodox	Armenian Gregorian	Gypsy	Jews	Total	Percentage Armenian Gregorian in total Ottoman population
Rumelia	513,448	811,546	3,566	29,532	11,674	1,369,766	0.3
Anatolia	1,988,027	366,625	16,743	7,143	5,338	2,383,876	0.7
Total	2,501,475	1,178,171	20,309	36,675	17,012	3,753,642	0.5

Source: Adopted from Karpas 1985: 21; Shaw 1978: 326

According to the 1831 census data (**Table 3.2**), the size of the Armenian population in the cities of Rumelia and Anatolia was 0.3 percent and 0.7 percent respectively. The Armenians made up a very small number in the Ottoman Empire and made up only 0.5 percent. Ottoman historian Kemal Karpas says that the 1831 census was conducted merely to enumerate available male population who could serve in the Ottoman army rather than as a general statistical exercise (Karpas, 1985: 20-21). Certified permanent residents were given identity cards and others were strictly identified as outsiders. Muslims and non-Muslims were registered separately and the lists were sent to provincial military authorities for their review and induction in the Sultan's army (Karpas, 1972: 243; Shaw, 1978: 329). Prior to Tanzimat reforms 1839, the capacity of government and its functioning were inadequate but Mahmud II started a new approach to

convert old city governor office into municipal administration after the census (Neumann, 2006: 62, 130-131).

Besides, Sultan Mahmud II also utilised the census data to regulate tax levy and collection. To manage the census system, local mayors (*muhtar*) or lieutenants (*kdhya*) were selected for Muslims and non-Muslims in every *sancak* and *kazas* of the Empire. They worked under the administration of *ihtisap agasi* (chief tax and market regulator) in Istanbul who registered all working male population of the Empire (Darling, 2006: 130; Shaw, 1978: 330). The census system underwent new changes during the reign of Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909), who made it efficient than his predecessor. Significantly, scribes used to compare old census data with the new ones (Karpas, 1972:246; Neumann, 2006:62).

Table 3.3: Ottoman Censuses, 1831-1914

Year	Muslims	Total Population	Armenian Millet	Percentage Armenian Millet
1831	2,501,475	3,753,642	20,309	0.5
1844	12,800,000	35,350,000	2,400,000	6.8
1881	12,587,137	17,388,604	1,001,465	5.7
1894	21,507,304	27,208,683	994,065	3.6
1906	15,508,753	20,884,630	1,031,708	4.9
1914	15,044,846	18,520,016	1,161,169	6.3

Source: Adopted from Karpas 1985: 21, 54,149,155,169; McCarthy, 1983:75; Mutlu, 2003: 29-34; Shaw 1978: 326; Ubcini, 1855: 18

As shown in **Table 3.3**, between 1831 and 1914 when the World War I broke out, the Ottoman Empire conducted six censuses. According to Kamel Karpas, a census was held in 1877 but no data is currently available on this. Furthermore, the 1831 census was confined to adult men eligible for enlistment but the next census held in 1844 also included women and children (Karpas, 1978: 244). During the first nationwide census, all people were included and everyone

was issued a new identity card, officially called as *mecidiye*. During the Tanzimat era census was more organised than previous ones (Karayan, 2000: 104-105). This expanded enumeration accounted for nearly ten-fold increase in the population of the Empire; that is, from 3.75 million in 1831 it jumped to 35.3 million in 1844. There was a substantial increase in the number of Armenians between the censuses of 1831 and 1844. Besides natural population growth, the inclusion of women and children contributed to the increase. However, while the Muslim population increased by over five folds, the Armenian population increased by nearly 100 folds; that is from just over 20,000 in 1831 to 2.4 million in 1844.

According to Kemal Karpat, during the Second Ottoman census in 1844, most of the ethnic groups had participated in the counting process and it was the largest census in the Ottoman history as the Empire expanded from Romania in the west to Yemen in the South. Subsequently the Empire lost significant territories in Europe and other parts. After the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, the Ottomans had lost Balkan territories such as principalities of Bulgaria, Romania, Montenegro and Serbia following that, the Austria-Hungary Empire occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina unilaterally. In the Eastern part of the Empire, cities as Batumi, Kars and Aradahan were captured the Russian forces (Karpat, 1985: 51). Even though the accurate number of Armenians was not available during that period, Armenians mostly populated these three cities and the loss of these territories along with its people reduced the overall Armenian population. The Empire had not only lost territories but also its people who had lived under its suzerainty of the Ottomans for five centuries (Karpat, 1985:26, 116). Thus, the third census conducted in 1881 reveals considerable drop in the overall population of the Empire, that is, it dropped from 35.35 million to 17.38 million.

Since 1844, however, the number of Armenians declined rapidly and from 2.4 million it dropped to just over a million when the next census was conducted in 1881. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 led to large number of Armenian deaths and migration. Though data on periodic migration is not available, evidence suggest towards substantial numbers (McCarthy, 2001:68-76). Further, the Kurdish nomadic bands harassed and forced Armenians to flee their villages in the Eastern part of the Empire. Thus, halving of the Armenian population was the direct result of the 1876 massacre in Asiatic part of the Empire. Sultan Abdülmecid II wanted to subdue the Armenian rebellion groups and therefore sought help of mountainous Kurdish tribe and granted

special power to this irregular army to control anti-Sultan forces in areas bordering Russia. In the Hamidian massacres between 1894 and 1896, the Sultan's army in the Samsun province killed an estimated 150,000 Armenians. This earned Sultan Abdülhamid II the notorious title of "red Sultan" by the European powers and led to irrevocable damage to his and the Empire's reputation (Fortna, 2008: 55; Howard, 2001: 70; Karayan, 2000: 104-105).

Between the censuses in 1831 and 1844, the Armenian population rose from a mere 20,000 working males to 2.4 million. Subsequently as per the 1881 census, half to nearly one million drastically reduced it. Many historian states that the periodic Wars between the Ottoman, Russian and Persian Empires led to continuous mass exodus of the Armenians in the border areas located between these Empires, which were generally regarded as home of Eastern Armenians. The change of borders between these Empires was not very large but the Wars created a situation of mass migration particularly during the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1728 and 1878. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828 ended with signing of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, which led to migration of Armenians towards Bitlis, Trabzon, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Van and Kharput in the Anatolian lands. This change clearly reflected through the sudden rise of Armenian population by 20 folds in the 1844 census (Aslan, 1920: 115; Nalbandian, 1963: 25).

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, the Russian forces reached up to Diyarbakir and Van districts of the Ottoman territory and Armenian living in these areas helped the Russian armies. The War ended with the Treaty of San Stefano signed of 3 March 1878. According to this Treaty (Article XVI), the occupied Ottoman Armenian territories of Kars, Erzurum and Bitlis were restored to Sublime Porte with the condition of well being of Armenian Christians and safety from the killings by the Kurds (Aslan, 1920: 125; Karayan, 2000: 104-105). After the War Russians felicitated the Ottoman Armenian who helped the Russian forces during War with the Ottoman were appointed as officer in high rank in Caucasus region, which instigated the Ottomans to revenge the Eastern Armenians and teach the lessons for anti-Sultan activities. Therefore, Ottoman officials with the help of the Kurds torched and pillaged Armenian villages in Diyarbakir, Bitlis and Van districts. Because of the 1878 War, the Ottoman Armenians migrated to Russia and other parts of the world to save their lives from the Ottoman army and marauding band of Kurds (Dennis, 2008: 53-57; Nalbandian, 1963: 27).

In 1873, Europe and United States of America suffered from international economic panic, which affected the Ottoman Empire also, particularly the Eastern Anatolia farmers, which resulted in large-scale migration to Russian fertile lands in Caucasus region (Quataert, 1997: 790). Historians suggest that pre- and post-Tanzimat period fluctuations in Armenian population in the Eastern part of the Empire were common phenomena but point to a lack of reliable sources to explain this fluctuation. American historian Justin McCarthy states that the sense of fear and insecurity among the Armenians following the 1878 massacre partly contributed to their emigration to the US and Europe (McCarthy, 2001: 73-74).

The Tanzimat reformers wanted a detailed survey of the Empire therefore; they prepared to register as much information as possible. The only census conducted during the Tanzimat era was in 1844 that listed the number of Armenians in the Empire at over 2 million or 12.46 percent of the population. At the time, the population included 6.23 percent Greek Orthodox Christians, 0.93 percent Jews, 6.23 percentage Kurds, 5.60 percent Arabs and other minor percent of Assyrians, Druses, Tatars and Turkmens (**Table 3.4**).

Table 3.4: The Ottoman Population in 1844 (Asiatic Part)

Millets	Millet people in number	Percentage of Each millets in total Ottoman population
Muslims	10,700,000	66.66
Greek Orthodox	1,000,000	6.23
Armenian Gregorian	2,000,000	12.46
Jews	150,000	0.93
Tatars	20,000	0.12
Arabs (Asiatic)	900,000	5.60
Syrian (Assyrian and Chaldeans)	235,000	1.46
Druses	30,000	0.18
Kurds	1,000,000	6.23
Turkmens	85,000	0.52
Total	16,050,000	100

Note: The 1844 population census excluded ethnic people living in the European part of the Empire such as Albanians, Gypsies, Romanians, and Slavs.

Source: Karpal 1985: 116

The **Table 3.4** indicates a rise in the Armenian population during the Tanzimat era when they enjoyed cordial relations with Ottoman Turks but the phase ended with tragic events of their

massacres in the Asiatic part of the Empire and a sudden drop in their numbers. Many western educated Armenians lived amicably with the Sublime Porte and maintained warm relations with the Sultans. The Tanzimat reforms were considered by many Armenian families as an opportunity to establish lucrative maritime trading network extending from Singapore to London through which they wished to strength their religious autonomy (Eldem, 2006:325). Many Armenians worked in various departments of the Empire including in the Census department under the authority of an Armenian Migirdich Efendi who was responsible for sending more Ottomans official to Britain and France to learn modern techniques of census collections (Shaw, 1978: 333).

Internal Conditions of pre-Tanzimat Armenian *millet*

The Gregorian Armenian Church, called the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate under the Ottoman Empire, was considered as the national church of the Armenian people. The Armenian Church claims that the apostolic church was the oldest national church in the Empire and that it was different from the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches. In early 3rd century AD, Armenian King Tiridates III (circa 287-330 CE) became the first emperor in the world to embrace Christianity and the first to accept Christianity as religion of the Empire. He did so through Saint Gregory the Illuminator (Gregory of Nyssa). Hence, it is officially called Gregorian Armenian Church because the Armenians consider St. Gregory as a true apostolic of Christ who converted his relatives to the Holy Spirit. Thus, Gregorian Church means to elevate the human qualities above the God's expectation (Bardakjian, 2014: 87-89; Masters, 2009: 53).

As historian Bruce Master elaborates:

... the main theological difference between the Armenian Church and Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches was that rejection of the doctrine of the nature of Christ established with the Council of Chalcedon in 451. This council elaborated the belief that Christ had two natures, human and divine, which coexisted in one being. The clergy of the Armenian Church chose to emphasize Christ's divine nature, while not denying his humanity. The dominant Christian tradition, represented by the Orthodox and Catholic churches, labelled that diminution of Christ's humanity as heresy and those who believed in it as heretics. The relationship between the Armenian Church and the Orthodox Church of Constantinople was often troubled, especially in the seventh century when the Kingdom of Armenia came under direct Byzantine rule and Armenian Church leaders were persecuted by the Orthodox clergy (Masters, 2009: 53).

After the Armenian kingdom lost the battle of Manzikert in 1071 against Seljuk Empire (1038-1194), the latter bestowed equal rights to the Armenian Church like other Orthodox Churches. Thus, the Armenian Church always enjoyed a special status during the pre-Ottoman era. After the capture of Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmed II wanted to transform it into an international multi-ethnic city equalling other modern Italian cities. Therefore, the Sultan invited all religious sects to Constantinople but Greek Orthodox monk Gennadios who was the head of the Orthodox Church declined. Armenians accepted the invitation and attended the meetings and this became the founding stone of the separate Armenian millet system (Masters, 2009: 54).

After this, Mehmed II, the Conqueror (r. 1451– 81), reformed the religious affairs and placed various non-Muslim religious communities under their respective ecclesiastical leaders; the Greeks came under Greek Patriarchate, Armenian Orthodox Christians under Armenian Patriarchate and Jews under Rabbinate. The Armenian communities came under leadership of Father Hovakm I (r.1461) the archbishop of the city of Bursa. In 1461, the Patriarchate moved to Constantinople and came under the command of the Sultan. Thus, the Armenian patriarch of Constantinople became deciding authority for the Armenians affairs internally and their relations externally and this transformed into a political authority like Armenian nation or *ermani milleti* in the latter centuries. The Armenian Patriarchate also represented the smaller Nestorian and Jacobite Christian communities in the Sultan's Council. This structure existed until the Tanzimat era (Sarkiss, 1937: 29).

Thus, from 1461, the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople was given autonomy by the Sultan and presided over the Armenian millet whose educational system, social practices and relations with the Ottoman government were governed by the Patriarchate (Sarkiss, 1931: 35). The Ottoman government did not intercede in internal affairs of the millet and while the Sultan decided the total amount of tax to be levied, tax collection was under the control of the Armenian Patriarchate. This arrangement was followed until the beginning of the traditional reform period under Sultan Mahmud II (Sarkiss, 1931: 40).

In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, the Armenian Christians constituted an important Christian community in the Ottoman Empire. They were mostly small peasants and petty urban traders who lived in Constantinople. The transformation in the Armenian life varied from the

previous centuries and the life of the Armenian began to improve economically. Since the 17th century, many Armenians climbed the socioeconomic ladder to become maritime traders and bankers in the Ottoman capital and regional towns at the cost of the Jewish trading community. In Constantinople, Armenian merchants and bankers were known as *amiras* and elite Armenian families spent their finances for the development of their community and lobbied with the Ottoman officials to get sympathetic approach to the Sultan for betterment of their millet (Barsoumian, 2014: 133-140).

Armenian aristocracy or *amira* class reached the higher echelons of power through their individual skill. Historian Johnson Goodsell observes, “As a class, the Armenians were clever, industrious, adaptable, and eager to receive and promote Western ideas in industry, commerce, and education” (Goodsell, 1922: 41). He further points, that since the 18th century, banking sector gradually came under Armenian control along with other non-Muslims millets. In Constantinople, Armenian merchants and bankers were concentrated in a town-street named Karavanserai, which became the centre for financial activities in Constantinople. Armenian financiers were responsible to maintain the Empire’s economy during the War and campaign periods. They were tasked with financial responsibilities of the Ottoman military campaigns. Through financing such a huge War campaigns they earned huge profits as interest and acquired great wealth (Goodsell, 1922:38). They were given large responsibilities in connection with the financial side and included many Armenians.

In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, many Armenians settled in Venice due to prosperity and ambience offered by the city but maintained their trade in Constantinople. Further, Venetian Armenian traders learned Italian and it became most sought language for trading at the time. Thus, most of Constantinople *amria* started to send their sons to Venice for modern education and this led to the Armenian trading becoming fluent in three languages, that is, Armenian, Turkish and Italian (Goodsell, 1922: 38). Armenians enrolled their teenage children as apprentices in the family businesses of goldsmith, tailoring, stonecutting, masonry or blacksmith. The Armenians excelled in these industries for centuries. Armenians goldsmith work was famous among Constantinople people and Ottoman officials and their printing handworks on thin muslin (*Kalemkiar work* or *yazmajilik*) was impressive and popular (Goodsell, 1922:40).

The Eastern Armenians were brought to Constantinople for skilled works such as goldsmith, blacksmith, Carpentry, tailoring. In the food industry, Armenians began to supply bakery items to the palace. In the luxurious Ottoman palaces, many staff members assigned for day-to-day activities were mostly Armenians who were brought from Van and Erzurum *vilayets*. Further, sizeable number of Armenians worked as officers in Janissary Corps. Thus, the number of Armenians in Constantinople increased and they settled mainly at Armash, Chengiler, Kourdbelen, and Baghchejik towns and they belonged to various parts of the Empire like Sivas, Kemakh and Moush regions (Goodsell, 1922: 36).

Armenians were well versed in architecture science therefore, they were appointed to build many important monuments in Constantinople. Sultan Mahmud II commissioned reputed Armenian *amira* family known as Baliyan family to build the *Osmanie* mosque in 1748 and Suleymanie garrison (Goodsell, 1922: 38). Another Armenian family, the Duzians, maintained the Imperial Mint service for Sultan for two hundred years. The official goldsmith for the Sultan family and palace officials belonged to Catholic Armenians. The Ottoman Empire's "gunpowder master" belonged to an Armenian family known as Zadayantz and was responsible for introducing modern methods for blasts in weaponry system.

During the industrial revolution (1760-1840), Armenian communities entered into foreign trade with European powers and forged trade links with British India as intermediaries in Madras and Calcutta provinces. As the Armenians were exposed to the West and Western education methods since the 18th century, their elites within and outside the Ottoman Empire established modern secular education system for their millet. During the same period, Armenian millet was equally advanced like Greek Orthodox and Jewish communities through education financed by its wealthy merchants who preferred secular and modern education system than a religious one (Master, 2006: 273).

The Patriarch was administrator for the millet and the schools emphasized in promoting Armenian language, history, culture and tradition. These helped the community as many Armenians who could speak Turkish or Arabic began to use Armenian for their daily use. Many Armenians sent their sons to the Armenians Catholic and Protestant schools where Armenian was the medium of instruction. Due to these developments, compared to students in other millets

system, the Armenian students learnt new technologies such as medicine, engineering and printing press in the Constantinople (Barsoumian, 2014: 140-144, Masters, 2009: 56).

During the pre-reform period, the Armenian millet did face political problems both due to infighting within the millet and tensions with other millet communities but usually these problems were settled amicably. The trading and modern education system created a struggle for power and hegemony in the Ottoman capital. Even though the Christian community was economically wealthier than majority Muslims, the social status of the latter was higher than others. In Constantinople, the Armenian Apostolic Christians had overwhelmed other internal sects in the 'millet wars' by exercising their authority with the support of the Sultan's decree (Master, 2006: 279). The Patriarchate's success in claiming power over all Armenians complicated more issues with the Eastern Armenian centres. The new problem came in the 19th century as rhetoric of Armenian nationalism proved to be a litmus test for the Armenian patriarch (Master, 2006: 273).

Modern education paralleled with history of Armenian national awakening. The nationalist thoughts encouraged general education of the millet throughout the Empire. Further, Armenian eastern Orthodox philosophy played its parts in the contemporary politics or issues of the period. The Armenians also were interested in learning about their history and foreign languages for economic and political purposes, which opened gates to new political ideas coming from Europe. The relations between Gregorian Orthodox and Catholic Armenians was largely frosty but became amicable during times of common good of the Armenians as a ethnic group. During the French Revolution, the growth of nationalistic feelings among Armenians in Constantinople further filled the sectarian consciousness.

The western educated Armenian traders and their modern approach with the millet throughout the Empire made their community similar to other non-Muslims millets and these developments later increased the prominence of the Armenians. Under traditional reform period, Mahmud II issued new decree in 1834, which reformed the internal administrative structure of Armenian millet and regulated apostolic hierarchies. Thus, the Patriarch's political power was reduced by the Sultan with the rise of Armenian nationalism in the later part of the 19th century. The Ottoman's hostility to the nationalistic movement of the Greeks and Balkans states ignited a

similar suspicion over Armenian people (Sarkiss, 1937: 446). The European influence and general Armenian nationalistic literature eventually signalled the cessation of four centuries friendly Ottoman-Armenian relations (Sarkiss, 1937: 446).

Eastern Armenians

In the Armenian millet structure the community was the basic elements of whole organisational unit and without which the existence of or structure of Armenian millet was inconceivable. The millet community comprised of people practising the same faith. A millet possessed important social and administrative status as much as it was the authority over or congregation of religion was concerned (Kemal, 2002: 612). During the pre-modern era, the Eastern Armenians living in the ancestral lands practiced agriculture as their primary occupation and all religious powers were vested with the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate. The Eastern Armenians Apostolic Patriarchate never accepted any higher ecclesiastical authority above their Patriarchate. The earlier the Armenian equivalent of a bishop resided in Etchmiadzin, near Yerevan, the capital of the present day Republic of Armenia. Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451– 81) shifted the Eastern Armenian power centre from Etchmiadzin to Constantinople in 1461. This move resulted in Constantinople Armenian Patriarch asserting their religious authority over all the Armenians residing under the Sultan rule, including the Eastern Armenians (Arpee, 1909: 11; Masters, 2009: 56).

The Armenian Patriarch was the sole representative of and authority over the Orthodox Christians living in the eastern part of the Empire and was the final authority on all internal affairs of the Armenian millet. Armenian authorities had maintained their separate millets system and they maintained their schools, clergy, family law and even taxes collection throughout the Empire. The Patriarchate acted as connecting point for a common identity and transcended from the Constantinople to wherever the Armenians lived (Masters, 2009: 57).

The main occupation of the Eastern Armenian was agriculture but at the beginning of the 18th century, the Armenian communities left the hilly regions and migrated to cities and small towns in the plains. In the 1831 census, Armenians millet was the prominent millet in the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire and numerically second largest after Greek Orthodox. However, according to census in 1844, the Armenian millet became more significant and their population

was higher than the Greek Orthodox. Armenians were two million as against one million Greeks in the Asiatic part of Empire (Table 3.4). Therefore, a large number of Armenians settled at six main eastern provinces of the Empire, namely, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Kharput, and Sivas (Masters, 2009: 51-53).

Background of Russia- Armenians relationship

The Ottoman capture of the Crimea in 1475 created hardships the Armenians, especially in the well-established trading centres and Armenians in the towns in the Crimean Peninsula, and particularly from district of Kaffa or Theodossia Armenians were forced to migrate to the different parts of the world (Aslan, 1920:113). A large number of Armenians emigrated to Europe and Constantinople and those living in Djoulfa and Ispahan went up to Java in the Southeast Asia. Some had settled in the British India provinces such as Bombay, Madras and Calcutta Presidencies and engaged in trading activities. They had constructed Armenian quarters in all three cities (Bombay, Madras and Calcutta) and by the 19th century, around 12,000 Armenians were living in these three provinces. These traders had contacts with London and were generous in establishing educational institutions wherever they dwelled. The first Armenian newspaper published from Madras in 1794 (Aslan, 1920: 117, Hovannisian, 2004: 167).

The Armenian relation with Russia goes back to the Peter the Great (r.1689-1725) in the early part of the 18th century. The Tsar realised the rare qualities of the Armenians trading skills that would bring prosperity to the Empire and offered Armenians a place to settle down in the Russian territory. Following Peter's footsteps Tsarina Catherine II (r.1762-1796) pursued the same benevolent policy towards the Armenians and the latter who had suffered under Crimean Khanate rule left for Russia. The Armenians entered Russia from the banks of River Don and founded a new city Novo-Nakhtchevan. Russian army also included the Armenians experts in their modernization process and Armenians excelled in military talents and distinguished themselves (Aslan, 1920: 117, Hovannisian, 2004: 170).

The Eastern Armenians suffered from the conflicts among the three Empires, namely, the Ottoman, Russian and the Persian. The Russian intervention into the Caucasus in 1828 affected the Ottomans eastern frontier. The disagreements began with Catherine II offering to help the Kingdom of Georgia adjacent to the Persian Empire (Kia, 2011:119-120). Shah of Persia Āghā

Mohammad Khān (r. 1789- 1797) sought to punish Georgia and in 1795 ravaged Tiflis for three days and captured thousands of Christian children of both sexes (Cronin, 2013: 54, Nalbandian, 1988:22). Therefore, to help the beleaguered Georgian ruler, Russian forces entered Georgia and defeated the Persians. While pursuing the Persians the Russians got help of Armenian Meliks in 1798. In 1813, the new Shah Fath Ali (r. 1797-1834) ordered his son Abbas Mirza to recapture Georgia and other territories lost earlier but the Armenians at Karabagh repulsed him. The Russian Army pushed the Persian forces beyond River Aras, and the Russian commander in chief Ivan Fedorovich Paskievitch invaded the province of Yerevan, captured Etchmiadzin and finally he was stationed at Urmia Lake in Persia (Aslan, 1920: 118, Bournourtian, 2004: 202, Hovannisian, 2004: 171; Nalbandian, 1988:23).

The Armenian volunteers bravely fought under Nerses, the Bishop of Ashtarac, along with the Russian commander Paskievitch and helped Russia establishing a strongly foothold in the region (Nalbandian, 1988:24). Finally, Shah of Persia Fath Ali concluded the Treaty of Turkmen-Tchai in 1828 with the Russian forces and under this Treaty ; Russia got Khanates of Yerevan and Nakhtchevan. The Russians asked all the Armenians in the Persian territories to come and live in the annexed territory. Thus, a large number of Persian Armenians became part of the Russian Empire and settled at the doorstep of the Ottoman Empire. This emigration from Persia to Russia was supervised by Armenian Colonel Lazarew and left only a small number of Armenians within the Persian territories. Thus, the Russian invasion and War with the Persian Empire brought the Georgian and Armenian territories under control of the Tsar of Russia and became an integral part Russian Empire (Aslan, 1920: 118, Bournourtian, 2004: 204, Hovannisian, 2004: 172).

The Ottoman and Russian Empires had direct conflict in two fronts the eastern frontier of the Caucasian region and in the western east-European side. The Russian forces were under the leadership of able commander Paskievitch who captured Kars, Ardahan and Toprak-Kale. In 1829, renewed attacks were concentrated at Erzurum. The agreement between two Empires was signed at Adrianople and Russia returned most of occupied areas except Akaltchik and Poti (Nalbandian, 1988:25). The Adrianople Treaty of 1829 further stated that the Ottoman Armenians also have the right to emigrate to the Russian side and undertake Russian nationality, as was the case with the Persian Armenians earlier. Under the guidance of Bishop of Erzurum a large number of Armenians migrated to the Russian territory. As a result, a large number of

Armenians were leaving along the Ottoman-Russian eastern border in the Armenian regions. Thus, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II and grand vizier Resid Pasha reasserted their promises through “new ordinance set forth new guarantees safeguarding the life, honour and fortune of all subjects of the Empire and specifically provided for absolute equality before the law” (Aslan, 1920: 116-117; Hovannisian, 2004: 174; Bournourtian, 2004: 204).

Under the Tsar rule, the Armenians experienced safety of their life, security for their properties and equal treatment by the government, which were not available under the Ottomans (Aslan, 1920: 116). After Armenians accepted Russian nationality, they began to work for benefits of Russia and to improve their material welfare. The Armenians living under the Russian Empire started engaged in agriculture and trade and began to prosper. Thus, Armenians began to visualise a ‘Russian Armenian autonomy province’ (Nalbandian, 1988: 23).

In early the 19th century, the Russian Armenians became an inspiration for the Ottoman Armenians through their new way of life like the development of art and crafts and new technologies in agriculture production (Aslan, 1920: 119). In 1818, the institute for Oriental Languages in Moscow, founded by the Lazarian family became the centre for Armenian political activities and drew many Ottoman Armenians who came there secretly. Many new colleges were established in Tiflis, new libraries were opened and books were printed, which were smuggled into the Ottoman territory to inspire the Armenians. The Armenians prominence in the Russian politics created knowledge of renaissance and inspired the Ottoman Armenians to join hands with them and their political aspiration was the cause for future turmoil for the Armenians living under Russian and Ottoman rules (Aslan, 1920: 119).

Meanwhile the French Revolution and its modern ideas spread into the Armenian Patriarch and the influence was strengthened after the Balkans national struggle. The Sublime Porte understood that the Armenians were inculcating Western thoughts, which was not good for the stability of the Empire. Thus, the Eastern Armenians national aspiration became the focal point of the Ottomans-Armenian contention. The Eastern Armenians regularly conducted the cross border entries from Russia into Ottoman and vice-versa. A mutual mistrust began to emerge between the Ottoman and the Armenians, which reflected through the remaining period of the history. The Eastern Armenians had strong relations with the Russian Armenian radical

movements (McCarthy, 1995: 34-49). The Sultan and Ottoman officials saw that as threat to Ottoman sovereignty and later Sultans followed strict measures against the Eastern Armenians. As a result, the census of Eastern Armenian were rigorously registered and maintained, partly to identify the Russian Armenian intrusions into the Ottoman Empire.

Even modern reforms in 1839 and 1856 were not sufficient to incorporate the Eastern Armenian minorities into the Ottoman national ideology. For the first time, the Armenian Patriarch took the Armenian issue to multilateral state conference like Congress of Berlin in 1878 towards seeking attention to the Armenian Question.¹ Later Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) brutally suppressed the Armenian national fighters in 1878 and 1895. Eventually, in the name of security and sovereignty, the regime under the Young Turks or Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) internally deported half of the Eastern Armenians to the Syrian Desert and many of them died due to natural causes or were tortured to death (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 314-317).

Russo-Turkish War 1768-1774

Since the second Siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire was facing a number of military defeats and reversals against principal European powers of that time, namely, Austria, Russia, France, Portugal and Britain. These not only limited the expansion of the Empire but also underscored the limitations of its military capabilities. Four centuries of expansion policy of the Ottoman Empire ended at the gates of Vienna in 1529. From then onwards, the stagnation of the Empire began and there were no big military campaigns against any European powers except for a small conquest against Create in 1699. The Ottoman Sultans began to lose swaths of Eastern European territories to the Austrian Habsburg Empire and Crimean territory, Black Sea, and Balkan area to the Russian Empire. The final stroke of Austrian-Ottoman tussle ended with the Great Turkish War of 1683-1699 in which the Holy league alliance among Austria, Holy Roman Empire, Polish-Lithuanian and Russia joined hands with all European states against the Ottoman Sultan forces and the War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz 1699. In the 18th century, the Austria and Ottoman fought a small War in 1781 that ended inconclusively. However, wars between the Ottoman and Austria were far away from the main lands and the

¹ Armenian Question refers to European states (particularly Britain, French and German) perspective or understandings of Armenians problem with the Ottoman Administration and Armenian nationalistic struggle with the Ottoman Empire. Armenian Question term was used in Congress of Berlin 1878 until the end of the Ottoman Empire. Later, this term juxtapose with Armenian killings in 1915.

defeat of the Ottoman Empire and increasingly began losing territories to various European powers.

On the other hand, challenges posed by the Russian Empire to the Ottomans were far more severe and since the late 16th century, both fought wars with different outcomes. The Russo-Turkish War of 1735-39 ended with the Treaty of Nis and in the next few decades, the Russian Empire developed and funded its military technology and modern transport system and began competing with England, Germany and France. Following improvements in its administration Russia began a military expansion policy, which accelerated with the ascendance of Catharine II. Driven by political and commercial considerations, the determined Tsarina started her southward expansionist policy. Due to the geographical reasons, Russia wanted an all weather seaport and the Black Sea became a viable choice. The Russian plans did not aim at temporary occupation rather a permanent and integral arrangement and hence initiated a number of small wars with the Ottoman Empire. By 1771, the Russian army fully controlled the Crimean capital Bakhchisari (Davies, 2011: 271).

The Ottoman Sultan Mustafa III (r. 1757-1774) recognised the Russian policy of expansion and he stretched out a hand of peace. The Austrian Hapsburg Empire too feared Russia expansion in Wallachia and Moldavia at its expense and Austrian Emperor Joseph II asked for Ottoman alliance to counter the Russia invasion. However, this did not materialise due to mediation of the Frederick II of Prussia and the division of Poland in 1772 between Austrian and Russian Empires. After the successful partition, the Tsarina Catharine-II once again turned to the Ottoman Empire to punish it for its anti-Russian alliance and sent her forces to fight against the Ottomans in the Black Sea and Crimea region. The Russo-Turkish War was fought in two phases, the first during 1768 to 1772 and the second phase in 1774.

In 1768, both armies entered War without much preparations and the outcome was not different, but in 1770 the Russian Baltic fleets was sent to the Aegean Sea with the help of the British under the command of Aleksii Orlov the Ottomans had an upper hand initial stage of conflict in the Aegean Sea. In preparing navy on a War footing, the Ottomans experienced an accidental naval retreat, which led to some confusion, and the Russians utilised the situation and on 6 July 1770 set fire to the Ottoman fleet at the port of Cesme. That fire incident caused deaths of around

9,000 Ottoman sailors and the destruction and sinking of 23 ships of the Ottoman navy (Aksan, 2006: 102-03, Şakul, 2009: 493).

On the other side, the Russian army was waiting for the Ottoman army across to the Danube River and the strategy of the Russian commander Field Marshal Rumiantsev was to trap the Ottoman army which was hurriedly marching northwards on barges. The Seven-Year War (1756-1763) introduced many innovative weapons and lightweight canons were inducted by the power-hungry Russia to strengthen its territorial expansion (Şakul, 2009: 493, William J.J, 1895: 154-155). The Ottoman army was literally trapped between the Russian army on the north and the Danube River on the south and lost tens of thousands of soldiers and this was considered as huge humiliation by the mighty Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, in 1770, the Ottomans lost Moldova and Crimea to the Russians in 1771 and the Russian army crossed Danube and built fortress on the west bank of river (Aksan, 2006: 150-51).

After such a huge defeat, the Ottoman Empire's grand vizier and Field Marshal Rumiantsev signed an armistice agreement in April 1772. During the negotiations, Russia claimed rights over Crimea and Ottoman fortress in Kerc as War indemnity and compensation. The Ottomans, however, vehemently opposed the Russian claim over Crimea and its fortress (Aksan, 2006:158-159). The armistice was broken after continuous urging from religious leaders who opposed the idea of Muslim-inhabited areas of the Empire being ceded to the Christian Russian Empire. This resulted in Sultan starting a War against Russia and besieging lower Bulgaria Varna and Silistra on the western shores the Black Sea. In response, the Russians cut off supplies between Sumnu the Ottoman military capital and the Varna region and led to the crushing defeat of the Ottoman army (Şakul, 2009: 493).

Meanwhile Rumiantsev wanted to give one final blow to the Ottomans under distressful circumstances during which Russians suffered from War related deaths of 150,000 soldiers. The sudden Ural countryside rebellion in 1773 under Yemelyan Ivanvich Pugachev diverted part of Russian forces to suppress the rebels (Şakul, 2009: 493). Final stage of the Six-Year Russian War (1768-1774) against the Ottoman Empire began under the command of Major General Alexander Suvorov and both armies met at Turtukai 1773.

The Ottomans were completely defeated on 20 June 1774 at Turtukani and Kozluji. In the final stages of the campaign Ottomans retreated to the army head-quarters in Sumnu (Shumen) in the present day Bulgaria, thereby forcing the Ottoman grand vizier to seek the peace under Russian terms and a peace agreement was signed in Küçük Kaynarca (Şakul, 2009: 493).

Because of the War, Ottoman Empire lost Southern Ukraine, Crimea and the upper northwestern piece of the North Caucasus to the Russian Empire. Russia was not only able to take advantage of the weakening Ottoman Empire but also able to secure “the withdrawal of France as the continent’s primary military power due to financial burden and isolationism” (Schroeder, 1994:35). Correspondingly, even though the territorial losses were not substantial, the Ottoman “losses were diplomatic in nature” and marked its decline as “a threat to Christian Europe” (Schroeder, 1994:35).

The downfall of the Ottoman Empire began due to the delay in introduction of modernisation in science and technology and absence of social reforms. When Europe was in the industrial era and was struggling with reformation, the Sultan and Ottoman officials believed that their cavalry was still superior to the new artillery of Europe. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottoman military campaign frightened the European states and the latter to invent modern advanced weaponry to compete against the Ottoman warriors and to halt them before they could capture main parts of the Europe. Thus Ottoman invasion to Europe gave an opportunity for development of science and technology and the European states to form alliance against the Turks campaign which in turn became a new beginning of diplomacy against the outside the enemy (the Ottomans).

The Six-Year War had heavily affected status of the Ottoman army and it was reduced from being march-warriors to safeguarding the Empire. The Ottoman defeats are mainly attributed to lack keeping pace with the technology and scientific advancements that were taking place in Europe. The attitude of the Sultan was not different from the Luddite movement in the 7th century Britain opposed to modernization of the cotton industry with the introduction of new technology. Warriors of the Ottoman janissaries came under severe domestic criticisms and the War clearly exposed the ill-prepared nature of the Ottoman army against the newly developed Russian army (Agoston, 2011: 315, Davies, 2011: 272-73). The Ottoman control over the Black

Sea that was considered 'Lake of Ottomans' since the 1475 capture of Azov in Crimea and mouth of River Don, came to an end after the Russo-Turkish War (Ostapchuk, 2011: 90).

After the War of 1768-74, the Russians felt that militarily they were equal to other European powers and the success of War not only encouraged the eminence of the Russian modern warfare and strategy but also proved to be beginning of its aspiration for greater power (Davies, 2011: 272-73). In European politics, the status of Tsarina increased and her role in any international Treaty in Europe became inevitable. The geopolitical importance of Russia expanded towards the Balkans after the War and thereafter Russia emerged as a residential power of the region (Somel, 2003: 305-307). The Russo-Turkish made Russia to claim as a de-facto shareholder of northern shore of Black Sea, Crimea and made way to interfere in the Balkans politics.

Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774

Historically it is rare that a Treaty would change the course of historical narration or path. One such occasion was the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed by Russia and Ottomans in 1774 at the end of the Six-Year War. Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid I (r.1774-1789) came to power in April and he understood the need to sign a Treaty with Russia in the wake of the military defeat of the Ottoman army and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was signed on 21 July 1774. The obscure Bulgarian village, where this Treaty was signed came to symbolise one of the most stupendous acts of Turkish folly. During the Treaty, Field Marshal Rumiantsev represented Russia and the Ottomans were represented by Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha who was a former Ottoman Commander-in-Chief and grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire (Aksan, 2006:158).

The text of the Treaty was written and signed in three languages, namely, Turkish, Russian and Italian and in case of confusion or misunderstanding, the Italian version was agreed as final. The Russians were clever not to include French or English versions as they diplomatically sought to deceive the Ottomans. The Treaty later caused more trouble in international relations as its deliberate misinterpretation provided a pretext for the future Russian claims of being the protector of Ottoman Orthodox Christians, one of the motivating factors for the Crimean War (1853-56) (Şakul, 2009:318)

The Treaty contained 28 articles (Davison, 1990: 29). Under this agreement, both sides recognized the independence of Crimea, with Ottoman Sultan acting as the 'supreme Muslim leader' for its Muslim inhabitants. In return for this titular recognition of the Caliph, Russia gained the territory between Dnieper and Bug Rivers as the ports of Azov, Kerch, and Enikale, on the mouth of Dnieper. This acquisition granted Russia greater foothold over the Black Sea and enabled a comprehensive assertion of Russian suzerainty over the Black Sea. The capture of Black Sea by the Russians gave it not only geo-political advantages but also religious importance. The Ottomans lost the territories around the Black Sea where the majority inhabitants were the Muslims and who under the Treaty came under control of the Christian power. This was of huge political significance for Russians than receiving War reparations (Neumann, 2006: 57, William J.J, 1895: 154-155).

The capture of Black Sea was spectacular victory in the Russian history, because Russia not only controlled the erstwhile Ottoman territory but also had a say in the Ottoman politics pertaining to the Black Sea region. For long, the Black Sea played a vital role in the survival of the Ottoman Empire as it thrived on the food supplies from the fertile regions of Crimea and Balkans. The Black Sea region was famous for its dried fish, potato, sheep meat, and minerals and main iron ore supply came from Mingrelia of the Black Sea region. Hence, all the Ottoman weapons were manufactured from the iron produced from this region. The 14th century Islamic traveller Ibn-i-Battuta observed that in the Black Sea, the city of Kefe and its market were huge in the world and most of the ships in the city were registered in Constantinople (Celik, 2010: 21, Ismail, 2011: 99). In the following centuries, the Constantinople fed its half-a-million people with help of supplies from the Black Sea region imported throughout the year. According to Ibn-i-Battuta, Constantinople imported 500,000 kilograms of wheat daily. The annual livestock imports from Black Sea included four million sheep, three million lamb and two million cattle from that region.

As a result, of the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty, the crucial lifeline of the Ottoman Empire was cut off. Thus, the Ottoman were left out off the Empire's feeding ground and from then onwards the Sultan has to look for other region to strengthen Empire but nothing was comparable to the Black Sea and Crimea regions. Even the Balkan region could not meet the Empire's food supply due to the Russian expansion and with internal affairs within Empire came under stress over protection

of Orthodox Christians granted to the Russians (Celik, 2010: 21; Inalik, 1997: 271- 273; Ismail, 2011: 99).

The Ottoman subjects that were multi-ethnic and multi-religious (Celik, 2010: 21, McGowan, 1994: 703) practiced the Black Sea trade. In Constantinople, sea-porters and rowers had labour guilds for import and export of goods from the Black Sea region. The Golden Horn specific area called Unkapani in Constantinople was the location where the ships sailing from the Black Sea region halted. Hence, a large number of guilds workers lived in the suburb areas and worked for this port and goods were registered in government office (Faroqhi, 1995: 193). Historian Fernand Braudel says that “the Black Sea was the supplying region without which the mighty capital couldn’t survive” and raw materials at the doorstep of the Black Sea shores waited for entry into the Constantinople (Braudel, 1995: 110, Celik, 2010: 21). Thus, the contribution of the Black Sea and the region’s mineral resources were vital for the consolidation, expansion and survival of the Ottoman Empire and its army expedition. The transportation of weapons during the European campaigns of the Ottoman Empire was transported from Black Sea and Crimea.

The Russian Empire established a new permanent embassy in Constantinople under terms of the Treaty and this facilitated Russia to look after its merchant’s vessel in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Under the 1774, Treaty Russia obtained trade concessions (Capitulation) from the Sublime Porte. The English version was published by Britain in 1854 (Great Britain, 1854). Article 7 of the Treaty says,

The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in Article XIV, as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly Power.

Article XIV says,

After the manner of the other Powers, permission is given to the High Court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the Minister's residence, to erect in one of the quarters of Galata, in the street called Bey Oglu, a public church of the Greek ritual, which shall always be under the protection of the Ministers of that Empire, and secure from all Coercion and outrage.

These Articles became controversial as they granted certain religious rights to Russia. Under the Treaty , the Russian Tsarina was given the right to build and protect a Dosografa Orthodox church at Galata in Istanbul. This provision was subsequently interpreted to signify Russian protection over all Orthodox Christians in the Empire as well as the Christian population of the Crimean and Eastern Europe (present day Romania and Bulgaria). This provision subsequently enabled Russia to intervene in the internal Ottoman affairs in furtherance of its interests (Great Britain, 1854, 72:171-9).

In addition, the Sultan agreed to pay a substantial War indemnity to the tune of 7.5 million *akges* over a three-year period, a substantial sum for the impoverished Ottoman treasury. Above all, the limited privilege granted to the Ottoman Sultan as a protectorate over the majority Muslim population ended in 1784 with the abolition of Crimean Khanate (Şakul, 2009: 318). The end of the longstanding military usefulness of Crimea for the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by Russia emerging as a powerful military force that could threat many other European Empires including Austria. These meant that it would not be long before Catherine or her successors would take advantage of their new gains to advance further at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (Davison, 1990: 70; Miller, 1913: 9; Shaw, 1976: 276; William J.J, 1895: 151-153).

The fatal clauses of the Treaty were those, which gave Russia the right to represent the Greek Church in Ottoman Empire and provided the pretexts for constant and periodic Russian interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman authority. The clause relating to the Orthodox Church opened the scope for foreign interference in the Empire's relations with its Christian subjects. The defeat also posed a basic problem in statecraft, and threatened the Ottoman's traditional self-confidence, while Russia and Tsarina Catherine II received immense praise from the Greek Orthodox Christians of Constantinople. The increase in Russia's influence because of the new church paralleled the increase in the territorial, commercial, and diplomatic status accorded to Russia under the Treaty (Davison, 1979: 51).

Later, the Crimean Khan Devlet Giray (Devlet IV r.1769-1777) appealed for extension of his dependency to the Ottomans. However, the Russian forced him to abdicate the Khanate and sought to appoint Şahin Giray (r.1777-1787) a favourable person as the Crimean Khanate. This

diplomatic row led to the Convention of *Aynalı kavak* in 1779 signed at Istanbul and reaffirmed the provisions of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (Miller, 1913: 9, William J.J, 1895: 151-153).

The Ottomans could not swallow the defeat of 1774 and the Sultan lost Crimean protectorate rights to a Christian state and this generated severe criticisms in Istanbul thereby compelling the Sultan to launch an untimely war against Russia in 1787. This began with the arrest of the Russian ambassador in Istanbul and provided an excuse for the Tsarina to launch a campaign against the Ottoman authority on Crimea and initiated the next Russo-Turkish War of 1787-1792. This resulted in Russia managing to secure larger control over the Black Sea and their march towards the Balkans (Neumann, 2006: 56-57). The War ended with signing of the Treaty of Jassy on 9 January 1792 under which the Ottoman Sultan completely lost his authority over the Crimea region. The Treaty once again reaffirmed Russia's freedom of trade and navigation in the Mediterranean Sea and Ottoman Empire and as a protectorate (guardian) over Orthodox Christians within the Empire. Thus, the capture of Crimean Khanate in 1792 ended the 260-year Muslim rule in that region and encouraged the Russian forces to advances towards the Ottoman Empire (Davies, 2011: 271).

The Russo-Turkish War of 1787-1792 and the Treaty of Jassy that followed was a terrible blow to the Ottoman prestige, and turned out to be a major milestone in the emerging ascendancy of the European world over Islamic civilization. The Ottoman Sultan felt that ceding territory to a Christian Empire was a humiliation and sought to reinvigorate the idea of the Caliphate to counter the Russian reign over the Muslims in the Black Sea region. The Caliphate was merely a political entity until 1774 but after the Jassy Treaty, the Sultan started to play his religious role along with political title. For the first time, the Sultan officially included title of Caliph in the Empire's Treaty and this practice was continued until the Turkish Republic abolished this office of Caliph on 29 October 1923 (Neumann, 2006:58). In the pre-modern era, the Ottomans generally portrayed their military nature of the Empire vis-à-vis the European powers but the spate of defeats at the hands of the Russians resulted in them emerging as a subordinate power and came to known as the 'Sick man of Europe' (during Crimean War Russian Tsar Nicolas I called the Ottoman Empire as 'Sick').

Historian Roderic H. Davison says that the 1774 Treaty was not example for “Russian Skill and Ottoman imbecility but missing various better situations and led humiliated Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca” (Davison, 1990:29-50). In addition, finally Russia established itself as major power in the European politics through a series of wars with the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 2002: 29).

Pre-Tanzimat reforms

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 1774 was not only an imprint watershed in relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers but also marked the beginning of internal crumbling. The prolonged wars with different European powers weakened the Ottoman sprit and soul. The Sultan and people were ready to give their lives towards saving the Empire from the continuously loosing large territories but this was impossible due to the prevailing socio-economic conditions of the Empire. Thus, the Sultan begun to observe and marvel at the powerful European powers and identified modernization of military and warfare as the key to their success and was ready to incorporate suitable reforms in the Ottoman army (Lewis, 1968: 37-50).

The Ottoman court officials were willing to introduce modern military techniques, which gave supremacy to Europe. They were ready to incorporate them into the traditional Ottoman system without disturbing the existing military organisational structure. The Sultan wanted to maintain the old methods of military structures while introducing new reforms and modern higher education for officers through new western methods of education. However, those small reforms after such a heavy defeat at the hands of European powers evoked strong opposition from the religious leaders who were suspicious of Western innovations and modern science as a challenge to their position and feared that it could change social structure in the Empire. Therefore, towards the end of the 18th century the reform only had a limited success, though providing an impetus for later ones (Shaw, 1976: 241).

From the last decade of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire began to accelerate the modernisation of state and society. Reforms began under the aegis of Sultan Selim III (r.1789–1807) who sought to follow the European state as model to strengthen the Empire. The Russo-Turkish War 1768-92 and its aftermath were stimuli for reform and were continued by Sultan Selim III and Mahmud II (r.1808-39). The Sultans studied areas to reform and the consequences

of the changes. At the same time, they anticipated protests and opposition from the ulema and janissaries towards maintaining the status quo. Sultan Selim III realised that to compete against deceptive diplomacy and intrigue relations of Europe, he needed a top-to-bottom approach to transform the Empire into state of centralised power. While he was seeking reforms, a power struggle between reformist and Islamic conservatives started. Further, Sultan Selim III was under pressure to distinguish the Ottoman military modernisation and technology development from those European and Russian powers whose social structure and cultural identity were different. His brother Mahmud II followed the reforms started by Selim II (Aksan, 2007: 180).

The power tussle between Selim III and Mustafa IV (r.1807-1808) arose in 1808 and ended with assassination of the former. Following that, the grand vizier supported Selim's cousin and reformist Sultan Mahmud II (r.1808-1839) to capture power because he intended to reform the Empire and upgrade military administration like the West (Howard, 2001: 57-58; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 01). Mahmud II initiated his reform cautiously because he was sceptic of power tussle within the Empire and sought to reform within the Islamic structure and maintenance of status quo of the society. He also avoided any direct conflict with the Janissaries Corps and tried rapprochements with the regional governors and top officials towards smoothly running the Empire. Through this method, his reign lasted for 20 years (Howard, 2001: 57-58).

To avoid internal opposition, the Sultan camouflaged his reform policy until he succeeded in creating an army under the title of *Nizam-I Cedid* that consisted of loyal officers to fight against all opposition to the Sultan. The old-fashioned Janissaries Corps located at Constantinople were abolished on 4 June 1826 and those who fought against the Sultan were hanged or executed. Following the dissolution of the Janissaries Corps the Sultan formed a new western style army under the new command of post *Saraskar* and a new-armed force called *Ordu* (Aboona, 2008: 118; Shaw and Shaw, 1977, 22-23).

Military Reforms

After the Seven-Year War (1756-1763), the major European powers were busy developing modern warfare technology and changing the military administration but the Ottomans were absorbed in medieval system of military methods and administration. The rise of the Russian Empire was a turning point in the Ottoman history and both Empires had periodic conflicts that

always ended in favour of the former. Regular defeats against Russia were seen shameful to Ottoman military. In addition, other European powers also wanted to defeat and isolate the Muslim Empire from the European territories. Ottoman loss of territories to the Austria and Russia in Crimea and Balkans resulted in them being reduced to a subordinate power in Europe. Even in Ottomans African territory, French Napoleon Bonaparte's expedition of Egypt during 1798-1801 was deemed atrocious to Ottomans because no European powers condemned the invasion (Neumann, 2006:57). During the rule of Selim III, the Ottomans were devoting most of their knowledge and means to the modernisation of military technology and defend the Empire (Aksan, 2007: 7-8). During 1793-1838, the Ottoman Empire revolved around the Eastern Question² and modernisation of civil and military administration against internal and external threats (Aksan, 2006: 112).

The immediate Ottoman aim was to defend the Empire from the Russian and other external powers. He formed a newly trained army called as *Nizam-I Cedid* to safe guard the central authority from Asiatic part of Empire's non-Turkish and non-Muslim regional groups, who were threatening to challenge central authority. The ulema and majority Islamic groups under the Ottomans condemned efforts of non-Muslims revolt (Aboona, 2008: 119; Quataert and Inalcik, 1994, 776).

In the 18th century, the Ottomans were inspired by the Russian military victory in Crimea and the Balkans and the Ottoman high officials were eager to induce "Russian model" of military development. The Great Russian army began its modernisation from Peter the Great (1682-1725) and progress continued during the reign of Tsarina Catharine the Great (r. 1762-1796). On the other hand, the Russians followed other European states in advancing tactics and importing military manoeuvres throughout the century that yield victory over the Ottoman Empire (Zurcher, 2003:49). The European were advanced in the field of structured regiments, movable artillery with rapid fire power troops and group of small-calibre cannons and covered bayonet to fight against cavalry forces.

² From the words of historian Zurcher explain "the question of how to satisfy competing Greeks Balkan nationalisms and the imperialist ambitions of the great powers without causing the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, or, if this destruction was inevitable (something of which the majority of European statesmen were convinced), to dismember it without upsetting the balance of power in Europe and causing a general War, was known throughout the nineteenth century as the Eastern Question"(Zurcher, 2003:49).

Sultan Selim III maintained diplomatic contacts with his French counterpart Louis XVI (r.1774-1794) and in 1795 sent a list of officers and technicians requesting training under the French military. Many French officers volunteered to train the Ottoman force in Paris and among them were Napoleon Bonaparte (Berkes, 1998: 75). Following the Ottoman defeat in the 1774 War with the Russians, the French sent many military advisers and among them was the Hungarian-born French officer Baron François de Tott who is recognised by many including Selim III's military adviser Abdullah Molla Efendi as a major influence in the modernisation of the Ottoman military (Aksan, 2004: 113-116; Lewis, 1968: 48-49).

Sultan Selim III created a post for his new army called as *Serasker* or commander-in-chief in lieu of the traditional *agas* and created a new army called *Askiri Muntazama* along with the traditional *Mansure army*. The new army was desperate for financial support for bringing army specialists from France, train soldiers and procure equipments from Europe and all of which made Selim III to create a new *Land-i Cedid* or the New Fund Treasury to finance military reforms (Aboona, 2008: 117; Shaw, 1977: 42). The artillery modernisation began in March 1793 and by 1796, the reorganised regular army consisted of 2,875 cannoneers and 115 officers in 15 companies and the number of regular soldiers increased to 4,910 in 1806. Additionally, Sultan wanted to reform the cannon-wagon and mortar corps and powder fires (Shaw, 1971: 122-137). The numbers of the new army rose to 23,000 regular soldiers and they were paid individually through newly formed treasury office (Shaw, 1971: 134; Virginia, 2004: 126).

The young Sultan Mahmud II who came to throne in 1808 cautiously continued with the reforms. Initially Sultan Mahmud II could not challenge Janissaries but gradually developed the new army established by the Selim III and cleverly put some of his men in Janissaries to peek into their views and plans thus placed trusted officials like Halil Rifat and Said Mehmed and easily evaded suspicious eyes (Ágoston, 2009:297; Shaw, 1977: 36).

In 1826, when the Sultan felt that his new army was sufficiently strong to suppress any revolt by the Janissaries, he started reforming the army administration and expanded the number of modern soldiers. On 6 January 1826 the Sultan's new army went to Janissaries camp with full strength, fought and suppressed the Janissary officers. The new army and its 12,000 men went along with their cannons, fired at Janissaries barracks, and executed around 6,000 Janissary

officers and those who ran away were killed later. In provincial towns, the Janissaries a group of new army soldiers with the help of local people killed officers because people were frustrated by the traditional officers' act of tyranny. The abolition of Janissaries called as *vaka-ı hayriye* or "Auspicious Incident" as the freedom from those old-fashioned military tyrants and this gave the Sultan a free hand to implement his ideas in state and society (Ágoston, 2009:297; Shaw, 1977: 36).

After abolition of Janissaries, the Sultan turned his focus in grading and expanding his army. In 1827, the Sultan raised the number of soldiers to 14,000 artillerymen and increased wagoners to 4,414. Though the number increased, the quality of warfare methods were still not impressive and the Sultan soon realized the problem when he met with the Egyptian force under the command of Muhammad Ali in 1829 (Levy, 1971:15; Virginia, 2004: 127). The Ottoman problem with Muhammad Ali of Egypt had begun during the reign of Sultan Mahmud-II. The Egyptian leader wanted to depose the inefficient Sultan and his army marched towards Constantinople but was stopped by the Sultan at Konya in 1831. The Ottoman Sultan received military help from the Russia and saved his throne from the Egyptian challenge. Ali's invasion instigated the Sultan go for further modernisation of the army and to avoid defeat from the fellow Muslim than being defeated by the Europeans. In addition, the Ottomans army official demanded modernisation of army because they saw the developments of Egyptian army with the French assistance (McCarthy, 2001: 14-15; Shaw, 1977: 45).

The invasion of Muhammad Ali made Sultan Mahmud II to reckon that reforms in the Empire were inevitable but avoided the French assistance due the Ali connection. Regarding the British, the Sultan did not have much impression and doubted their diplomatic trivial. Finally, the Russian help during the Muhammad 'Ali's invasion created goodwill and the Sultan requested the Russian Tsar to send their artillery officers to train the Ottomans soldiers. The new army Commander in Chief *Serasker* Husrev Pasha appointed Lieutenant Cavaloff in charge of training the *Mansure* infantry at Constantinople in 1834.

The Sultan also invited the Prussian officers after hearing theirs tactical skill on the training artillery and naval manoeuvre. Therefore, from 1833 to 1839 the Ottoman army got many new Prussian officers to train the Ottoman soldiers. Prussian Lieutenant Helmuth von Moltke (who

later became Field Marshall of Prussia) whose training was famous among the Ottoman soldiers was specializing in improving fortification, new battalions and squadron style and trained Ottoman officers and soldiers in latest weapons practice and new techniques. The newly joined Ottoman soldiers were sceptical of non-Muslims teachings and even though the Europeans had talents, the Ottoman soldiers did not respect or admire them (Lewis, 1968: 82-83).

The Prussian Lieutenant Helmuth von Moltke elaborates, “although the Turks and made great improvement in their artillery, they were still very far behind their opponent... The guns were 3-, 6-, 8-, 12-, and 24- pounders, roughly mounted, and the shot ill cast. The effect of their artillery could never be very great; nevertheless, as the Turks laid great stress upon this arm, it had its moral worth. Elsewhere he notes that the sultan lavished attention on the artillery to the detriment of the infantry, and that the employment of Prussian officers as sergeants as led to the attainment of a perfection far in excess of anything which at Constantinople had ever been thought possible” (Virginia, 2004: 127).

The Ottoman navy underwent only minor changes and the new subordinate directors replaced the traditional officer (*tersane emini*) in charge of dockyards and they commanded the civil and military works. A new undersecretary was installed as officer (*mustesar*) responsible for all administrative works in the naval department and the Grand Admiral was left with only military and naval responsibilities like his European counterpart (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 42).

The Sultan was exercising Islamic ideology as an instrument to awake and instigate soldiers from their medieval attitude. On the one hand, Quran and religious edicts were cited to reiterate his legitimacy as Caliph and to wage War against the infidels. On the other, he was arguing that learning new methods and techniques from anybody would not harm to the Islamic way of life (Virginia, 2004: 136-137). Though Sultan Selim III introduced military reforms, there was no prior foundation for Western ideas to take root in the Islamic society. A strong opposition from the religious leaders emerged against reforming the armed forces and the introduction of *Nizam-i Cedid* model of new army. The *ulema*'s agitation against those reforms was a clear indication that the Ottoman society was not ready for modernisation. Thus, many historians describe *vaka-i hayriye* or Auspicious Incident as new beginning of the great era of reforms (Lewis, 1968: 40-64; Neumann, 2006: 60-61; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 02-50).

Non-military Reforms

Reforms undertaken by the Sultans in the non-military arena were equally significant. Since, the Seven-Year War (1756-1763) all European states began to modernise their diplomatic approaches and the Ottoman Empire started to reform its diplomatic practices and competed with the West. During the reign of Sultan Selim III, permanent Ottoman missions were established in France, Austria, Prussia and Britain therefore, the scribal officers played vital role in Ottomans foreign affairs. The Empire introduced a separate scribal bureaucratic system in the foreign affairs towards maintaining regular political and diplomatic contacts with European states.

Sultan Mahmud II wished to establish a centralised authority and monitored all the activities of the Empire. In addition, Sultan's reformist ministers³ were willing to work for honest administration and provide all administrative assistance for the development of the trade and commerce (McCarthy, 2001: 16). In the 18th century, the grand vizier office of the Ottomans was gradually developed as a power centre. Sultan Mahmud II adopted cabinet administration system for the smooth running of his government. The grand vizier office was called *Bab-i ah* or *Bab-i Asafi* (Sublime Porte) and operated from Topkapı Palace in Constantinople. The main function of the grand vizier office outlined in the Imperial Council (*Divan-i Humayun Tercumani*) was to manage all petty issues that do not require the attention and consideration of the Sultan's court (Shaw, 1976: 264). Along with Sublime Porte, *reis ul-kuttap* (Chief of Scribes) the other administrative office was developed and its duty was scribes the government documents. In terms of its importance *reis ul-kuttap* was next to the grand vizier office and enjoyed powers equal to military leaders, *agas* and imperial treasurer. Indeed, *reis ul-kuttap* was more powerful due to his regular contacts with the Sultan for reading communications written in foreign languages and his office was coordinating works between different departments of the Empire, and trained other office regarding the methods of scribes (Shaw, 1976: 264). The chief of scribal corporation conducted its power through all sections of society and he extended his powers even into the ruling class. Even though *reis ul-kuttap* worked under the power of the grand vizier, he also influenced the Sultan in appointing and dismissing higher officials of the Empire, which in later years irked many high-ranking officials in other departments (Shaw, 1976: 265).

³ Mustafa Reşid Paşa (1839-1858), Mehmed Emin Âli Paşa (1852-1858), Mehmed Fuad Paşa (1861-1867) were three main personalities of drafting the Tanzimat reform and served as Grand Vizir of the Ottomans in different times in Tanzimat era. They held various important positions during same time.

The scribal works mainly consists of translation of documents and discussions of meetings of higher officials with foreign officials. This enabled non-Muslim Greek Christians trading community occupying high offices until the Greek War of independence of 1821. Later Armenian trading communities entered the scribal system because of their contacts with the European counterparts. Gradually these scribal officers interceded the foreign policy of the Empire and interfered on behalf of the non-Muslims communities (Shaw, 1976: 281). In first half of the 19th century, the chief of scribal office sought to supervise the Ottoman military organisation and even curbed salaries and grocery supplies and thereby explicitly got involved in the day-to-day business of the military (Shaw, 1976: 265).

Since 1793, Sultan Selim III concreted on new economic policy to support the modernisation of military and naval forces. At that time, the Ottoman Finance Minister Mehmed Şerif Efendi began his reform programmes like changing level of collecting taxes from *timars* system and age-old tax farming methods of Malikâne system without completely abolishing them. Further, he wanted the government to liquidate its domestic liability for the economic stability of the Empire (Hanioğlu, 2008: 45). A new economic body called “New Revenue Treasury” was formed in 1793, which became the sole authority for meeting the expenses of the new military. That new treasury gradually expanded its function through collecting *timars* of deceased persons and in Malikâne system. Sultan Selim III also gave permission to levy taxes on all products of the Empire through new treasury offices. In 1813, the same treasury started monetarisation policy through which it distributed soldiers’ salary directly as cash as was done in Europe thereby reducing the corruption of mediators (Hanioğlu, 2008: 44-45; Shaw, 1976: 262). Sultan Mahmud II wanted a favourable balance of trade deficit and hence started to curb the dragomans trading business as well as scribal works in foreign embassies because as mediator they were evading taxes. The dragomans were mainly composed of non-Muslims particularly the Greek and Armenian minorities. Henceforth, the entire Ottomans traders faced equal levies without any religious importance or privileges (Aboona, 2008: 121; Hanioğlu, 2008: 44-45).

Under Sultan Selim III, the methods of tax collection were harsh on peasants and hence a large number of them migrated to cities and other parts of the Empire, but they were brought back and compelled to stay in their original houses (Shaw, 1976: 264-265). The Sultan only focused on trade and commerce and not on agriculture and this created a widespread dissatisfaction against

the Sultan in rural areas and villages. Those who failed to pay their taxes had their lands confiscated by new treasury and were forcefully evicted from their fields (Shaw, 1976: 265). The Sublime Porte also developed the cities administration through the appointment of *mukhtars* or mayors in all part of towns inhabited by any religious communities. Under the head of *ihtisap* in Constantinople, population counting started and the enactment of sumptuary laws in the cities was considered as 'pre-metro' administration of modern period (Aboona, 2008: 121).

Modern Turkish historians consider the accession of Selim III as the dawn for reforms in the Ottoman Empire. During his era, the reform in millets system led to changes in administration school, community jurisdiction and religious and social services. The millet communities' activities were more effective than the government. Non-Muslims communities cooperated with their trade guilds related to needs of the masses, thus, the relation between guilds and millets was termed as nuclei of proto-local governance (Shaw, 1976: 283-284).

In the latter half of the 8th century, conservative sections mainly composed of the ulema and Janissaries ferociously opposed to any reforms. Any social advancements and modern education, which could alter the status quo of the society, were objected as degrading the prestige of Islam (Aboona, 2008: 116; Ma'oz, 1968: 2). Sultan Selim II and his reform associates carried out radical changes as those reformers too grown up in the same social milieu of the Empire. However, the Sultan reforms were restricted to military and administrative reforms even reforms affected the Muslims and non-Muslims millets (Aboona, 2008: 116; Ma'oz, 1968: 2).

When the Sultan was suffering from military defeats brought by the scientific and technological advancements of the European powers, the Islamic leaders tightly monitored against any changes to the status quo. The ulema wanted to continue with the old classic educational methods. Muslim soldiers with such an educational background joined the Ottoman armed forces and were expected to fight and win against the non-Muslim European soldiers who had better education and scientific skill and knowledge (Aboona, 2008: 124; Howard, 2001, 58; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 47). Sultan Mahmud II was urged by Islamic scholars to suppress those who do not accept Islam, particularly 'atheists' and 'heretics' (Abu Manneh, 2001:68). The Sultan's reforms not only agitated by the Muslims but also angered the non-Muslims as disappearance the rights of the Christian and Jewish communities ensured under the traditional millet structure. Thus, all

religious communities were opposed to any form of the European-style reforms (Aboona, 2008: 124; Howard, 2001, 57-58). As Prussian officer Helmuth von Moltke states, “What was required to modernise the Empire was a generation of reformers of Muslim background” (Virginia, 2004). In addition to these reform, a new social class originated and a small number of western-educated and trained Muslim soldiers formed new ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’; these new bourgeoisie and mistrust of the non-Muslims gradually led to the worst part of the Empire’s history (Göçek, 1996: 44; Moltke, 1893: 293).

During, the era of traditional reforms (1789-1826), the Armenian millet in Constantinople was continuing its business through guilds system. The Armenian community perpetuated its relations with Eastern Armenians through ethnic and family relationships. In Constantinople, members of the Armenian millet began to establish contacts with the Sublime Porte, which they used for the upliftment of the community (Bardakjian, 2014: 89-99). In the 18th century, the Ottoman-Persian War expanded the trade avenues for the Armenians and many new Armenians began trading in the new land route between Constantinople and Persia (Göçek, 1987: 122; Mantran R, 2014: 133). The Armenians from Constantinople lived a lavish lifestyle and sent their sons to the European universities for higher education and many of them returned with business motives and in latter stages, they also returned with new ideas and influences especially from the French revolution (Walker, 1980: 50-51).

European companies and embassies that were operating in the Ottoman Empire preferred Armenian to Jewish translators because of their religious faith and this increased opportunities also enhanced the Armenians standard of living (Göçek, 1987: 122; Lewis, 1968: 62). In 1815, the Eastern part of Armenia embarked closer ties with the Russian Empire through the Caucasus route and in the same year, Eastern Armenians established the Lazarian Academy in Moscow with the help a prosperous Armenian family. The Academy later became Armenian higher educational centre and assumed the title of Armenian Institute of Oriental Languages. This institute played vital role in later years as the Armenian political centre (Walker, 1980: 51-52). Thus, Armenians community gradually inculcated the new ideas of knowledge of a nation and self-awareness along with the Western ideologies, which came to affect the future of Ottoman and Armenian relations.

Ottomans and the European Powers since 1774

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 1774 created the “Eastern Question”, a political controversy in European politics concerning the future of the Ottoman Empire. The cardinal powers of this issue were Britain, France and Russia who sought to use the Ottomans as pawns in their diplomatic disputes. The Eastern Question mainly related with three interrelated affairs with the Ottomans; Britain wanted undisturbed trade facilitation with India, opening of the Dardanelles and Black Sea for all European powers. For commercial and strategic reasons Britain and France were anxious about the influence and expansion of the Russian Empire over the Balkans and both wanted to halt the Russian imperial aspirations at the expenses of the Ottoman Empire (Aksan, 2007: 10; Neumann, 2006:57; Şakul 2009: 191-192).

This scenario emerged when the Sultan sought outside (European) help even to protect the Empire from regional challenge in the form of Muhammad Ali of Egypt. Therefore, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia were regularly intervening into the internal Ottoman affairs to maintain the status quo (Fisher, 1979: 297-98, Lewis, 1968: 24-39, Luke, 1955: 25, Miller, 1923: 146-149). The fragile Ottoman Empire loosened its rigid control due to free movement of the Europeans throughout Asiatic part of the Empire. Since 1831, Sultan Mahmud II granted permission to European individuals to work and travel to any parts of the Empire. Further, he also allowed European powers to open new Consuls along with military attaches all the major important port cities Izmir, Samsun, Erzurum Trabzon (Russia), and towns like Ankara, Sivas, Diyarbakir Trabzon (Britain), Van, Diyarbakir, Sivas (France), Ankara, Izmir (Prussia). Thus, many European companies started their businesses in many towns of the Empire. These permissions enabled a large number of European travellers as well as missionaries and others to visit the land of Troy, learn Islamic culture and observe the functioning of the Empire (Aboona, 2008: 156; Ghassemlou, 1965: 42, Jelavich, 1995: 69; Longrigg, 1925: 255).

The Sultan also granted free hand for missionary services among religious minorities to profess their religious tradition and customs. The Armenian apostle got permission to rejuvenate its old millets buildings in Eastern part of the Empire. Under the new situation, any religious minority could build its religious, cultural and educational institutions to disseminate secular and western education systems. The Muslim society too began to modernise like other communities after long

years of pressure from within and outside (Longrigg, 1925: 255, Pitcher, 1972: 109). Earlier, Russians Tsar was primarily concerned with the well-being of the Greek Orthodox Christians but after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828 Russian also gave voice to Armenian millet development in the Eastern, part the Empire and began its dialogue with the Sultan for the commercial developments and strategic ambitions in Black Sea and Caucasus (Davison, 1979: 51).

Europeans Influence Upon Tanzimat reforms

From the 18th century onwards, the European powers, particularly Britain, France, Germany and Russia, regularly pushed the Ottomans to introduce modern reforms. After every War and during the signing of post-War treaties with the Ottoman Empire the Tsar of Russia expressed concern over the conditions of Christian minorities. Since the rule of Selim III, European powers began to test their powers over the Ottomans in the name of reforms pertaining to various religious minorities and the modernisation of the Empire. The idea of millet system was reintroduced in 1839 as a response to pressures mounted upon the Sultans. The Sultan on the other hand wanted modernisation of the state and society without giving up the Muslim way of life because he was also convinced that without new ideas, and developments the defeats and downfall of the Empire could not be stopped. The Europeans powers were eager to seek opportunities to influence and claim right to protect the Empire for the safety and stability of Europe. For its part, through its continuous contacts with the European powers, the Ottoman Empire too sought “the Europeanization of Ottoman diplomacy” (Aboona, 2008: 139; Hurewitz, 1961: 142-143).

France was a long-standing friend of the Sultan and expressed its interest in the Catholic Christians of the Empire and holy sites in Jerusalem. Further, on many occasions the French interceded into the policies related the patriarchate of Constantinople. The Armenian Catholics of Sis and Aleppo also sought the help of the French at various points in the 18th century. Those supports gradually gave strength to Armenians and other religious groups to request the Sultans for more powers to religious minorities (Master, 2006: 276).

The Christian minorities ardently pursued the European Christian powers to change their ailing society due to harsh levies on non-Muslims through head tax *cizya* and taxes on sheep and other animals (*agnam resmi/sheep tax*) imposed by the Ottomans upon the Eastern Armenians (Shaw, 1975:422). Many Ottoman Christians joined the European Church administrations to escape

from maltreatment of the Muslims administration. These requests resulting in the European powers reaching the gates of the Empire to protect the interests of the Ottoman Christians. On the other hand, the Muslim majority saw such moves as an encroachment and humiliation of the Caliph and a betrayal of the Empire (Aboona, 2008: 140). The non-Muslim communities enjoyed semi-autonomy within limitations, and there were no compulsions between the two religions to dominate one another in public domain (Aboona, 2008: 140; Davison, 1954: 845).

In Europe, the Sultan's adversaries were divided into two blocs; first, one was to strengthen the Ottoman Empire and Sultan under the protection of Britain, France and Germany. On the other hand, Russia and Austria were seriously seeking for the weakening and eventual downfall of the Ottomans. Hence, both these powers buttressed those who were opposed to reforms and modernisation of the Empire as they felt that halting those measures would be debilitating for Ottoman armies thereby making it easier for them to defeat the Ottomans in wars. The Britain, France and Germany were trying to prevent the Ottoman decline by developing Ottomans armies and maintaining a balance of power in Europe and by curtailing the Russian ambition in the Balkans and Caucasus regions. French nobility facilitated assistance to the Ottomans and wanted to maintain dominance over other European powers over the Christian holy sites through personal rapport between the French King and the Ottoman Sultan. Further, the French economic interests in Syria and Lebanon and deep-rooted anti-Muslim hatred among the French masses wanted humiliation of the Sultan. England too craved to perpetuate its dominance over Egypt and India by securing rights of Armenian Orthodox Christians and Jews who were living under the Ottomans (Shaw, 1976: 256).

The European powers listed some of basic social discriminatory practices against the Christians living under the Sultan rule such as non-Muslims dress should not of higher standard than Muslims, Christian and Jews should wear black colour ribbon along with *fez*. Further, Sublime Porte treated various Christian sects differently for issues like granting permission to repair their Church and the European powers demanded their termination (Davison, 1954: 854-855). These included even after the practicing of the modern reforms under Sultan Mahmud II the Ottoman Christians faced particularly ill-treatment in their public space from Muslim majority such as the Christians were prohibited for higher post in Sublime Porte. The non-Muslims communities were stopped from entering into the armed forces of the Ottomans but they had to pay exemption tax

to government, and their testimony in the Islamic court not recognised due to *sharia* law (Davison, 1954: 845).

At the same time, it is essential to recognize that generally the non-Muslim lived better under the Ottoman rule than non-Christians in Europe (Lewis, 1984:62). The non-Muslims were not persecuted or killed until the rise of nationalist upsurge among the religious minorities. Under the Ottomans, tax collectors treated both Muslims and non-Muslim alike while levying taxes and both the communities were treated harshly in many circumstances. Irrespective of the religious background, both Muslims and non-Muslims faced coercive tax collection measures (Davison, 1954: 845; Hanioglu, 2008: 44; Karpat, 1972: 245).

The Sublime Porte maintained its relations with each ecclesiastical sect based on their political, economical and social importance in the Empire, which created tensions among millets. Britain regularly asked about the development and security of the Armenian and Jews millet, the Russians were concerned about Greek and Armenian millets and while the Christian Catholics were the French concern (Holding, 2011:20).

On a few occasions, the Sublime Porte granted permission for the renovation of Churches belonging to the Greeks and Armenians but not for the Catholic churches. This partiality was due to the Sultan's recognition of the classical ecclesiastical status. The Christian minorities were prohibited from holding high government positions except *reis ul-kuttap* (Chief of Scriber). During the traditional reform era non-Muslim were denied access to the army and in the legal system non-Muslims witnesses were not considered valid by the Islamic courts (Hanioglu, 2008: 46; Karpat, 1972: 246-247). As historian Roderic H. Davison states "neither the concept nor the practice of citizenship, involving equal rights and duties, existed in the Ottoman Empire before the Nineteenth century" (Davison, 1954: 845).

At various occasions in the 19th century, the European powers demanded equality of the Christians living under the Empire. The non-Muslim community began to inculcate many Western thoughts and ideas of nationality, liberty and equality inspired by the French Revolution. As these ideas were spreading in Europe, their spontaneous expectations of similar rights being granted to non-Muslim communities. After the French revolution, other European

Christian states executed their power politics by advocating humanitarian issues of the Christians in their regular approaches with the Ottomans. On the other side, the Ottoman reformers also wanted to check the notorious approach of the European powers to interfere in the internal affairs of the Empire and linked the internal decline of the Empire with modernisation and westernization of education and society. These two diverse forces brought equality of different religions to the forefront and the Ottomans were in position to adopt or adapt European political, social and educational methods (Davison, 1954: 846, Hanioglu, 2008: 46; Karpas, 1972: 247). Europe's traditional Christians attitude towards the Muslims community got new boost from French intellectuals who deemed that the Christians were being ill treated under the "enlightened despots" (Shaw, 1976:266-268). The Russians also used the French revolution as an inspiration to fight for the rights of non-Muslims communities living under the Ottomans. Other European powers were against the rising Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire, Balkans and the Black Sea through non-Muslims causes.

As a result, the Ottoman *ulemas* were suspicious of the reformers because of the antagonistic approach explicitly expressed by the French. Ottoman Reformer "Halil Hamit who was closely associated with and accepted French assistance, with the effort to supplant Ottoman with Christian rule in the Middle East, an association that was utilized by the opponents of reform throughout much of the Nineteenth century" (Shaw, 1976: 256).

The trading families among the non-Muslims communities also began their political activities through their European contacts for wider political rights to convert them into separate legal entities or millet system. Therefore, the development and autonomy of Ecumenical patriarch of Greek and Armenians relied on their respective trading families involved in maritime trades. Orthodox Armenians merchants who were dwelling in areas around the Ecumenical patriarch capital were called Phanariotes. Because those merchants wanted to build their homes nearby the patriarchate, they supported and maintained the patriarchate buildings and other buildings of the community and in the process reached higher offices of the communities. Many in the Armenian trading community settled in different parts of the Empire and began to influence the Armenians cultural and language developments. The merchants from the British Indian territory particularly,

the Armenians communities of the Madras Presidency⁴ played a vital role in the formation of early Armenian national consciousness and ideology. The Armenians of Madras were influenced by the British support to the Armenians causes or rights for Armenian millet (Walker, 1980: 49-52).

From the 19th century, the Armenian ethnic and national consciousness increased due to conflict between the Armenian Orthodox and Armenians Catholics. Many Armenians submerged their language and cultural identities among the locals wherever they lived; in the Turkish majority areas they spoke Turkish, wrote in Armenian script, and in the Eastern part of the Empire and Arabic dominated area they spoke Arabic. Armenians Catholics followed the mother Church language policy and they were asked to provide religious services in Armenian by the Armenian patriarchate. This naturally created space for one language policy for Armenians throughout the Empire. These methods of language politics created parallel autonomy for the Patriarchate alongside the Sublime Porte (Walker, 1980: 49-52).

The Armenian Catholic missionaries' and its religious practice and duties confronted with doctrine of Islamic jurisprudence of the Ottomans but France pressurized the Sultan to be less harsh to the Catholics sect. Since 1830 onwards, France consistently patronized the Armenian Catholics forcing the Sultan to recognise the Catholic as separate millet. The Sultan approved the Catholic millet in 1847. However, in practice the Armenian Patriarchate remained the sole leader of the Armenians millets. (Master, 2006: 277).

Need for modern higher education

The beginning of traditional reforms was to initiate the Ottoman youth into modern educational methods thereby making them adapt to reforms introduced in the army, administration and other aspects. Religious communities mostly controlled education while the Muslims students were learning through ulema, other religious students pursued education under respective religious endowments. In addition, the Muslim educational methods were not enough for producing students with modern understanding, which influenced the ability of the Empire to reform the old

⁴ Shahamr Shahamirian printed first work of Armenian political philosophy in 1772. Another author called as Moyses Bagharamian, who had settled in Madras town from Karabag and his work *Nor Tetrak Vor Kochi Hardorak* (A New Tract, Entitled Admonishment) and aim of the book is making awareness of Armenian national ideas. This book was brought to Eastern Armenia later period.

administrative structure. During Sultan Selim's reign, there were no major educational reforms but his follower Sultan Mahmud II understood weaknesses of the Empire. In the pre-reform era students who wanted to pursue higher education after their *madarasa* education studied subjects like arithmetic, science and foreign languages while French was widely learned. Sultan Mahmud II craved for the introduction of secular education system without challenging or antagonizing *ulema*. Therefore, he did not want any amalgamation in existing structure but decided to introduce secular education simultaneously along with the traditional education. Thus, dual education methods were practiced in the remaining period of the Empire (Acer. 2009: 189-190; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 47).

Sultan Mahmud II cleverly averted *ulema* resistance by not starting beginner school called as *mekteps*⁵ in the first phase but instead established *Ilmiye* schools⁶ for students who wanted to shift from traditional to modern education system. Thus, in the *Ilmiye* schools (Second level) the students were given tutelage in new modern language, basic science and mathematics for the development of those newly transferred students with special care for modern education. Third, level, adolescent education school called as *Rusdiye* were opened, where student between the ages of 12 to 16 were enrolled. Two *Rusdiye* school were opened in 1826 in Suleymaniye and in Ahmed mosques in Constantinople. Turkish grammar, history, and mathematics were the main subject imparted for the students who were prepared to go for military services. For those inclined towards administrative services for the state, different school education system, such as *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye* (School of Education for bureaucracy) and *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Edebiye* (School of Literary Education) were established where the main subjects were Arabic and French languages, geography, history, politics and mathematics. Students who learned these subjects became part of the Ottoman state bureaucracy at various levels. There was another school for scribes of the Porte called as *Mekteb-i Irfaniye* (School of Knowledge) meant for officers who were already in service of the Empire but were given the opportunity to learn more about modern education system, which spread to all sections of the state in future, reforms periods (Ergin, 1939: 77; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 47).

⁵ Ergin states that women were allowed only at level of *mekteps* schools in Muslims millet and non-Muslim women were still basic education for living in household level. Ergin O Nuri (1939), The History of Education in Turkey: Schools and Institutions of the Islamic Period (*Turkiye Maarif Tarihi: Islamic devir mektep ve muesseseleri*), 5 vols. Istanbul.

The pursuit towards higher technical education also began under Mahmud II with the establishment naval engineering school *Muhendishane-i Bahri-i Humayun*. This maintained small number of faculty and students were dispersed modern naval education. An army engineering school *Muhendishane-i Berri-i Humayun* established in Kasimpasa was destroyed by fire in 1821 but a few faculty and students were regularly produced after it was re-established. These both military institutions taught the basic areas of their respective subjects (Findley, 1989: 54; Levy, 1971: 32).

The new army engineering school under the direction of Hoca Ishak Efendi (Kamay, 2012:40-41) a Jewish converted officer revised the curriculum, increased the quality of teachings, and increased the number of enrolment to about 200 in 1828. The old naval engineering school too was expanded and a new office was opened at Heybeli Ada, an island in the Sea of Marmara. A new imperial school of music *Muzika-i Humayun Mektebi* for the army was established in 1836, which was divided on regimental basis. A new military science institute *Mekteb-i Ulum-u Harbiye* established to increase number of officers and sharpening their skills. In 1836, the military science institute enrolled about 200 officers. The director of imperial guards Namik Pasha was behind the development of many new institutes, and these new institutions were placed under the control of the Hassa or Special Forces of the Sultan not under the regular army of *Serasker* command (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 48). All these institutions were located in Constantinople and it was only during the Tanzimat era that the Empire began locating military training and other institutions in different parts of the Empire.

Sultan Mahmud II sent eligible students to Europe for further studies and when they returned they became better officers and well-versed in their fields. In medical field the Sultan initiated fresh medical school *Tibhane-i Amire* (State Medical School) in 1827 which taught subjects of medicine, surgery, and anatomy. Following that a new medical science institute for surgery was opened as *Cerrahhane* in 1832 and *Mekteb-i sahane-i Tbbiye* was built at old Galatasaray in 1839. During those initial periods, the Empire faced huge shortages of equipments and urgent demands for specialised textbooks, which were written in French and German, and hence those books were translated into Turkish, mostly done by the Armenians (Niyazi, 1964:177). On other hand, the Islamic conservatives were against bisecting the human anatomy for research. Hence, the medical field was mostly dominated by non-Muslims because they were the ones who

learned modern education from their childhood through their millets communities and in particular Armenians surgeons were the personal consultants for Sultans for long (Ergin, 1939: 78-80; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 48).

During the reign of Mahmud II many latest technical educational organisation began to function and around 1,000 students entered these institutions annually. However, there were limitations; the institutions' buildings were periodically shifted, which affected the consistency of classes and classroom were poorly maintained. These new office bore more political knowledge unlike the earlier officers. Many important textbooks in all the subjects were in foreign language and they had to be translated, and copied for teaching and research purposes. While Ottomans teachers were devoted, they were unable to guide the students in new areas of research. Hence, European instructors were appointed more in the army than in any other educational institutes and teachers wholly devoted for research were allowed to stay in same field without changing their area of research. A large number of second-generation students of modern education easily followed the subject and learning process. Thus, Mahmud II rule consider as the beginning of introduction of modern education system (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 48).

The Armenian Patriarchate began to build up their own religious schools with wealthy Armenians contributing to millet and education and was not expecting any help from the government other than permission to run the school. The wealthy non-Muslims wealthy sent their sons to attend foreign schools established by the European powers in different parts of the Empire. In addition, large number of wealthy maritime businesspersons sent their sons to educate in Europe directly and they returned with new western knowledge, which would, impacted the state and their religious community in future. Even the few foreign schools in the Ottoman Empire ran its administration through the endowments of wealthy non-Muslims communities' contribution for betterment of their own patriarchates (Ergin, 1939:110; Göçek, 1996: 74).

Elaborating modern education approach towards the rule of Sultan historian Fatima Muge Göçek observed:

... the introduction of Western-style education into the Empire brought with it a significant epistemological disjuncture between Islamic knowledge as it had been practiced in the Empire and the new 'scientific' knowledge that was being interjected. Whereas the former had been embedded in the moral system of religion emphasizing the

significance of the community, the latter was founded on scientific thinking and organized around the rational individual. Legitimation in the former was based on the sacred authority endowed upon the Ottoman sultan as the protector of the believers; legitimacy in the latter hinged, at least in theory if not in practice in some parts of Europe, on the implementation of justice and equality for all individual participants of the system (Göçek, 1996:73).

Those ideas were practiced through new social approaches in modern-style of educational institutes. The modern educational system created changes and discontent and implementation of these policies created divisions between conservatives and reformists latter (Göçek, 1996:73).The new perspective of modern education brought about a social transformation and created equal opportunities for the all students irrespective their religious background. This new style undermined the old Ottoman social system at least in the educational field. Sultan Mahmud II initiated merit-based appointments and recruitments in military academic institutions, which broke the old system (Mardin 1983: 57-58).

Tanzimat Reforms

In the 19th century, the rationale of the promulgation of the Ottoman's Tanzimat reforms was based on the concept of modernisation, which the high echelons of the Ottoman offices like the grand vizier wanted to implement. The modernisation of the Ottoman bureaucracy was to be similar to the European model and was political in nature. The officials were interested to implement such modernisation to the Sultan's armed forces. The Sublime Porte felt that the traditional Sultan's armies, namely, the Janissaries and Sipahi, were not match their European counterparts. Since the 18th century the European forces displayed their superior level of organization, modern training and techniques, therefore to revive the Ottoman greatness modernisation became mandatory (Lewis, 1966: 107).

In Turkish Tanzimat means 'reform', 'rearrangement', and 're-organization', and those officers who carried out reforms were called as 'Tanzimatlar' or 'reformers'. In the history of Ottomans, the 'Tanzimat era' is referred to as westernization or modernisation of the Empire from 1839 to 1876. Even though, a number of reforms were initiated by previous Sultans, major reforms began with the announcement of *ferman* or imperial decree promulgated by Sultan Abdümeçid I (r.1839-61) in 3 November 1839. This was called *Hatt I Gulhane* 1839 or Gulhane Imperial Rescript. In 1856, another reform decree was issued known as *Hatt I Humanun* or Imperial

Rescript of Reforms *Islahat decree* and was announced after the Crimean War 1853-56 (Agostan, 2009: 554; Lewis, 1966: 104-110).

Both these decrees were declared in Constantinople in front of large audiences and in extraordinary ceremonies held in the Gulhane or Rose garden close to the Sultan's Topkai Palace where Prophet Muhammad mantle is preserved. The order was read out by grand vizier Mustafa Resid Pasha (1839-1858) and in the presence of Sultan Abdülmecid I, the *Seyhulislam* (Lewis, 1968:108). The *ferman* declaration function was witnessed by other officials of the palace, representatives of different guilds, well-known statesperson and other religious leaders, representatives of Armenian and Greek Patriarchates, chief rabbi of the Empire and ambassadors of Europe and Russia. Subsequently to its promulgation, the Tanzimat order was published in the official state newspaper *Takvim-i Vekayi*, the erstwhile gazette of the Empire and the French translations were sent to foreign emissaries located at Constantinople (İnalçık, 1964: 116). The new imperial edict of 1839 was largely influenced by Sultan Mahmud II who introduced traditional reforms, which are often seen as a precursor to the Tanzimat reforms and were continued with the inspiration of grand vizier Mustafa Resit Pasha (r.1839-1858) who worked under Sultan Abdülmecid I.

Hatt-I - Gulhane 1839

The Tanzimat reforms of 1839 were drafted from previous decrees like the *Nizam-i Cedid* reforms of 1792-93. Those decrees were largely connected to the military reforms but also included some minor administrative and financial reforms. While issuing the 1836 edict the Sultan stated that, the Empire was on the verge of downfall and hence it was necessary to prepare for imperial Rescript. Tanzimat *ferman* describe the core content of the decree and dealt with basic doctrine and topics such as, “the right of all subjects to life, property, and honour regardless of their religion or sect; the tax farming system (*iltizam*); military conscription; the safety and security of all subjects in the empire; and the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law” (Hanioglu, 2008: 72). The reforms sought to introduce a rule of law, which was very much against the prevailing Islamic jurisprudence. Following reforms those basic reforms, the decree also explained the plans of implementing these clauses (Çakır, 2009: 554; Hanioglu, 2008: 72; Shaw, 1977: 59).

The Tanzimat laws were secular in nature and did not include references to or verses from Quran or *sharia*. They stated that the new law would guarantee simple administrative system and prohibit bribery and regulate conscription to all the Ottoman subjects. In the legal section, Tanzimat promised to frame new laws to stop execution without judicial trials, non-confiscation of non-Muslims properties without the due process of law and stop violations of individual honour and respect (Owen, 1981: 98). Old tax collecting methods *kul* was abolished in which properties used to be confiscated by the government in lieu of debts. In addition, the new decree vowed to abolish abhorrent taxation methods and introduced equal taxes being levied upon all religious sects but they also maintained head tax for the non-Muslims (*cizye*). New penal code was also discussed and the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances and Military Council drafted the Tanzimat legal sections. The abovementioned law treated all the Ottoman subjects, Muslims and non-Muslims, equally (Hanioglu, 2008: 72; İnalçık, 1964:116).

The Tanzimat decree considered as main source of modernisation of administration and instigated the centralization and bureaucratization of the Empire (Kaynar, 1954: 37). The western-educated officials of the Sublime Porte framed it. During Tanzimat era, they held office of grand vizier or *sadrızam* from 1839 to 1876. Tanzimat reforms were completed with the participation of three famous grand viziers⁷ who influenced even the late Ottoman politics (Çakır 2009: 553-555).

Grand Vizier Resit Pasha (r.1839-1858) formed a group of like-minded western educated officers to support him in his endeavour to transform the administration and society like their European counterparts. He served six terms as a grand vizier of the Sultan and was followed Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha (r.1858-1867 and 1869-1870) and Mehmed Faud Pasha (r.1867-1869) (Çakır 2009: 553-555). Each personality had sufficient knowledge of the European administrative structure and felt that it was necessary to implement similar administrative structure in the Ottoman Empire. These reformers were opposed to bigotry and majority fanaticism (Lewis, 1968: 105, 115-118). The three reformers fought against traditional administrative system of the Empire and recognising the importance of modernisation of the administration and the society (Davison, 1954: 850).

⁷ Mustafa Reşid Pasha (Grand Vizer, 1839-1857), Mehmed Fuad Pasha (1861-1866), Mehmed Emin Aali Pasha (1867-1871)

The Ottoman reformers observed and developed methods through their experience within and outside the Ottoman Empire and framed essential reforms to strengthen the Empire. The Tanzimat reform consisted of two sections; the first was Sultan's statement of authorization or called as *irade*, whereby he assented for creation of new administrative structure to implement Tanzimat promises. The administrative protocol or *mazbata*, was second to prepared under Mustafa Resit's supervision at the Porte with help of a consultative council (Shaw, 1977: 110).

The Tanzimat reform started a new economic policy, which was also part of the modernization process. The Sublime Porte drafted a modern financial statement (budget) under the Tanzimat reform era and the Sultan applied for the monetary assistance from the European powers (Inalcik, 1994: 158). Economic reforms opened the gate towards free economic practices, which was new to the Islamic Empire (Owen, 1981: 98). The reframed framework specifically focused on three major areas such as the imposition of fair collection and evaluation of tax evaluation system, methodology to alleviate informal tax institution, and concretely develop a separate operational cost which was justifiable. This led to formation of new financial system that would have cohesive impact on the subjects. Sublime Porte realised that alleviate informal or traditional tax institution was the most immediate need. The administration drew guidelines of taxation that were useful for tax collection. This led to the abolition of old taxation practices and formed a new *muhassilliki* taxation system (Agostan, 2009: 555, Perry, 1997: 137).

It was believed that *Hatt-i Sherif* had significant non-Islamic and secular influence, which made the Muslims of the Empire furious. To strengthen modernisation the Ottoman officials introduced the new judicial institutions, which would regulate the Islamic law and regulated religious harmony like security of life, honour and property new feasible taxation methods and the need to grant military service to non-Muslims. The secular reformist gave the assurances of life, liberty and security for the non-Muslims religious endowment properties and this was major fulfilment of the Tanzimat reforms. This led to the most remarkable affirmation of the edict like equality and religious freedom for different sects (Davison, 1990: 133; Thompson, 1993:462-465).

The modern reform disseminates Ottomanism among all the subjects of the Empire because 1839 reform argues for equality before law irrespective of their race and religion. To reassert such

rights the Ottoman grand vizier recommended to the Sultan to enact 1841 and 1842 *ferman* (Inalcik, 1978: 12). The 1839 edict ended prohibition on non-Muslims to enter conscription. However, the Sublime Porte also allowed those who were not interested to join the army to pay their head tax and conscription tax to get exception. During reform period, the non-Muslims were admitted in the government schools and those who learnt in secular or millet school were allowed to join the bureaucracy. The Gulhane reform met with staunch opposition from all section of society due to equality terms, that created huge stir in the majority Turks particularly the *ayans* (lord) were not ready to accept the non-Muslims *reaya* (peasants) as equal citizen in the affair of state. The millets leader also believed that Tanzimat reform may be easy to proclaim but the possibility of exercise were grim (Inalcik, 1978: 10-12; Shaw, 1997: 127).

The 1839 edict was mainly concerned with liberation of masses from the harsh treatment of *ayans*, and made them follow modern government structure rather than relying on the traditional social hierarchical system (Inalcik, 1943: 237-63). It also talked about the importance of banking system to protect the value of the Ottoman currency and develop its wealth. The first Ottoman bank was established in 1840 at Constantinople with investment of the Ottoman traders like Armenians, Greeks and Jews, and foreigners and a new commercial code system framed in 1850 with the assistance of France; thus Ottoman transformation entered new age (Karpas 1972: 245).

During the Tanzimat era, all the millet communities developed their language printing technology and the Armenian Patriarchate circulated their millet's related information in printed text format. From 1839, many secular recreation programmes arranged in major towns and new culture progressed. In the Ottoman capital four new theatres were built, where foreign circus events were conducted regularly. In the 19th century, Ottoman theatre were mostly dominated by the Armenians, especially female actors (Hanioglu, 2008: 99-100).

Finally, the Tanzimat reforms hugely influenced the modern secular educational system and many new school were established in various parts of the Empire and new army training based on the Prussian methods were established. The reforms produced a large pool of modern and educated government workers from top-level officers to clerical workers. Further, the Sublime Porte controlled the newly introduced provincial representatives system. All the new laws introduced were scrutinised by the Sultan court (Pamuk, 1987: 138). Less than two decades

another of *Hatt i-Humayun* of 1856 were initiated by the Sultan, which marked the next phase of the Tanzimat reforms.

Conclusions

Tanzimat reform decree forbade tax on farming because of the hardships faced by the farmers in Eastern parts of the Empire. During the traditional reform period, all non-Muslim farmers paid their taxes despite crop failures and the tax collectors showed no leniency. After 1839, the tax levy or collection was confined to one-tenth of the Ottoman subject, which was universal tax level at that time. In addition, many Muslim landowners objected the heavy tax burden when the non-Muslims enjoy special status and they felt that after 1839 reform they were levied exacerbated level of taxes. Ottoman officials felt that they could centralize the authority after the 1839 proclamation but due to lack of modernisation and financial shortfalls, this could not be realised. To raise enough finance to run the government the officials re-levied conscription taxes in 1841 on non-Muslims, which was cancelled by the 1839 decree. Armenians notables complained that in the Eastern provinces Armenian farmers were treated by Kurdish landlords as slaves even after the proclamation of equality by the Sultan of the Empire. Thus, the Eastern Armenians felt that Sultan and Sublime Porte are unable to control all these inhumane practice against them (Inalcik, 1978: 10-11; Milan 2011: 24).

Under the Ottoman Empire all non-Muslim millet had, its protector from Europe like Armenian had English, French, Russians, Greeks had Russians, and Jews had English and French. These powers always intervened in the internal affairs of the Ottomans whenever the millets complained about the Sublime Porte. Thus, many Ottoman nationalist link the Armenians with Russian Empire and as traitor to the Sultan. The Armenians orthodox complained about any attack from tax Kurdish collectors or mistreatment in the hands of Turks to the Russian resident officer in Erzurum. Majority Turks, however, felt that Tanzimat was main the reason through which the West and Armenians millet were influencing the Sultan. Thus Gulhane Edict of 1839 created unnecessary friction between Muslims and Christian Armenians in different parts of the Empire and led to beginning of the mistrust between the majority Turks and Armenians. The history of Tanzimat and its secular ideas ironically became reason for the Armenians millet to lose its control over millet population (Shaw, 1997: 128).

Chapter IV

Armenian Millet during Tanzimat Era

The chapter delineates condition and nature of Armenian *millet* system during the Tanzimat era (1856 to 1896). The Ottoman Empire's reform decrees during the Tanzimat era pertained to religious minorities, in general, and Armenian *millet*, in particular. In 1839 and 1856 two edicts were issued by Sultan Abdülmecid and through the office of the grand viziers, Mustafa Reshit Pasha and Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha respectively, who guided the Sultan to bring the reforms and were instrumental in their formulation and implementation. As a result of these edicts, social and economic differences within the Armenian *millet* became more pronounced.

The Ottoman reform decree *Hatt I- Gulhane* 1839 received strong support from the western educated Turks as well as from European states. However, the initial euphoria over Tanzimat reforms gradually waned and different millets attempted to explain the decree according to their convenience. The majority Muslims farmers who were following old *ilitizam* (tax farming) methods along with other trading and intermediate communities opposed new tax collecting methods based on Tanzimat reform because the traders thought that it would lead them to pay more taxes. They were further worried that in future increases in taxes would cause them to lose profits. Muslim traders related their financial losses with Tanzimat reforms, which was perceived as against the *sharia* law, and complained that new regulations and rights given to non-Muslims were not in conformity with Islamic law. Thus the displeased Muslim trading groups began to spread fictitious information against religious minorities that these new rules have been drafted by *kafir* or infidels for their convenience (Agostan, 2009: 555; Inalcik, 1978:4-6).

The non-Muslims on the other hand deemed Tanzimat reforms to be inadequate to meet their expectations. Muslim ulema criticized that they have been given rights of conscription in lieu of tax. The Greek patriarchates enjoyed more privilege pre-1839 and were dissatisfied with Tanzimat reforms because it stripped their prime position in the Sublime Porte and Empire. Further the Greek special status among the Christian communities also weakened. The Tanzimat reforms were supposed to treat all subjects of the Sultan, namely, Greeks, Armenians, Jews and

other distinct communities equally and they were seen as detrimental to a lot of people (Agostan, 2009: 555; Inalcik, 1978:10).

The Tanzimat reforms gave equality to all subjects of the Sultan, which in turn was considered as a radical thought by Muslim religious leaders and a departure from the dhimmi system, which had been practiced since the early years of Islam. In the dhimmi system, the non-Muslim communities were not considered as equals and were given protection in lieu of *jiziyah* tax and the change proposed in the Tanzimat reforms providing full rights stirred the Muslim society. The non-Muslim communities welcomed the reforms for allowing conscription but many sections did not want to serve in the Sultan's army, instead were ready to pay *jiziyah* (Davison, 1990: 123-124). The Sublime Porte collecting extra tax or special taxes for exemption from training was seen as anti-Islamic under the protected people concepts and this antagonized majority of the Muslim community. Further the European reactions to slow implementation of the reforms were considered as humiliating by the Turks and seen as interference in the Sultan's sovereignty (Agostan, 2009: 555, Perry, 1997: 137).

After end of the Crimean War, on 18 February 1856, the European powers particularly Britain and France forced the Sublime Porte to grant more rights for non-Muslim communities of the Empire because the 1839 edict did not serve well the millets. The Ottoman Empire response to such requests led to proclamation of new Tanzimat decree called as the Imperial Rescript or *Hatt-i Humayun* in 1856 and this edict further reformed existing laws and regulations. Thus, the Sultan and his Sublime Porte officials drafted much secular and modern reforms which were based on Napoleonic and other European penal codes unlike the early reform which had references to *sharia* laws for any interpretation (Hussain, 2011:9).

In 1876 Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909) came to power and the nature of his reign and policies towards the other religious communities, especially Armenian *millet* is discussed in this chapter. The harsh treatment of Armenians by Sultan Abdülhamid II and their reactions to the behaviour of the state and complaint to European powers to save their Christian Armenians from the Muslim empire has been discussed. Following that the Russian interfered to support the rights of Orthodox Armenian Christian minorities and the latter were treated as Russian tutelage. It further delves into the Russo-Turkish War of 1876, the Treaty of San Stefano and its

implications upon the Ottoman internal politics and of Christian's people and their religious rights. Finally, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and its consequences for the internal affairs of the Empire and the reactions of the Armenians to that Treaty are discussed.

Hatt- I - Humayun 1856

The second Tanzimat edict *Islahat Fermani* or *Hatt I Humayun* or The Rescript of Reform was proclaimed on 18 February 1856 by the grand vizier Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha under Sultan Abdülmecid I. The edict was an immediate after effect of the Crimean War 1853-1856 when European powers France and Britain assisted the Ottomans in their war against Russia. The War ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The edict proclaimed rule of law and equality in education, government jobs to all Ottoman subjects, Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Creasy, 1877: 543; Hussain, 2011:9; Lewis, 1966: 104-110).

The following is the passage in the Hatti-Humayun which had a direct bearing upon the subject communities of the Ottoman Empire⁸:

All the privileges and spiritual immunities granted by my ancestors in the beginning, and at subsequent dates, to all Christian communities or other non-Mussulman persuasions, established in my empire under my protection, shall be confirmed and maintained.

Every Christian or other non-Mussulman community shall be bound, within a fixed period, and with the concurrence of a commission composed as heretofore of members of its own body, to proceed, with my high approbation and under the inspection of my Sublime Porte, to examine into its actual immunities and privileges, and to discuss and submit to my Sublime Porte the reforms required by the progress of civilization and of the age. The powers conceded to the Christian patriarchs and bishops by Sultan Mohammed the Conqueror and his successors shall be made to harmonize with the new position which my generous and beneficent intentions insure to these communities.

The principle of nominating the patriarchs for life, after the revision of the rules of election now in force, shall be exactly carried out, conformably to the tenor of their firmans of investiture.

The patriarchs, metropolitans, archbishops, bishops, and rabbis shall take an oath on their entrance into office, according to a form agreed upon in common by my Sublime Porte and the spiritual heads of the different religious communities. The ecclesiastical dues, of whatever sort or nature they be, shall be abolished, and replaced by fixed revenues for the patriarchs and heads of communities, and by the allocation of allowances and salaries

⁸ English translation of Hatt i- Humayun 1856 extracted from Arpee, Leon (1909), *Awakening of Armenia- A History of the Armenian Church, 1820-1860*, pp. 184-185.

equitably proportioned to the importance of the rank and the dignity of the different members of the clergy.

The property, real or personal, of the different Christian ecclesiastics shall remain intact; the temporal administration of the Christian or other non-Mussulman communities shall, however, be placed under the safeguard of an assembly to be chosen from among the members, both ecclesiastics and laymen, of the said communities. (Andrea, 2015:321-323; Arpee, 1909: 184-185)

The edict proclaimed equal citizenship to all Ottoman subjects, which was necessary to fulfil a legal and constitutional vacuum not filled by the *Hatt-i Humayun* of 1839. Historian Davison Roderic observes

1856 edict refers to the Ottoman subjects as “*tabaa-yi saltanat-i seniye*,” or Subjects of the High Majesty. The terms “*tabaa*” or “*tebaa*” or “*tabiyet*” literally mean “*subject*” and “*subjection*.” In Turkish today they mean citizen and citizenship. However, in the 1840s these terms signified the attempt to reconcile the Ottoman concept of the nationality stemming from the millet experience with the European idea of citizenship. The term “*tabaa-yi saltanat-i seniye*” expressed only once in 1839 was repeated in various forms three times in the edict of 1856 after the concept of citizenship had gained wider acceptance in the eyes of the government (Davison, 1963: 53; see also Kemal, 2002:640).

The new reform policy *Hatt-i Humayun* asserted equal treatment of all subjects of the Sultan irrespective of their creeds. It proclaimed equality in educational institutions, appointment for the Empire’s services, works in administration of Sublime Porte and military services. *Hatt-i Humayun* declared an anti-defamation clause that forbid distinction in any form in work place against any particular “religion, race and language”. Any discrimination accordingly could be taken for legal proceedings in the court against any private or public officials who cause “any injuries or offensive term” or calling anyone in derogatory language (Davison, 1990: 114).

The *Hatt-i Humayun* of 1856 established equality for non-Muslims millets in all spheres of life and gave them strong legal support within and outside the Empire., These changes created antagonist attitude among Muslims who saw the reforms as “ a day to weep and mourn” (Suny, 2015:26). The 1856 edit created stir among millets communities. The Greek patriarchate thought that their privileges were degraded. At that time in the words of the Greek patriarch, “the state has made us equal with the Jews. We were satisfied with Muslim superiority” (Fairey, 2015: 170; Suny, 2015:26). Every millet leader preferred individual relations with the Sultan and millets like to be identified separately rather than as Ottoman subjects. The each millet also wanted to distinct itself from the others while being conferred additional rights. They promoted

welfare of millets and did not to dilute privileges conferred upon them. The Armenians and Greeks considered themselves equal to Turks based on their historical existence (Hanioglu, 2008: 76).

The reform edict was an act of reassertion to carry out the promises of the earlier edict. It was very important for the welfare of the non-Muslims and made it viable “to see it as the outcome of a period of religious restlessness that followed the Edict of 1839” (Lewis, 1968: 114-120). The Sultan was against the forced conversion into Islam which was made as illegal by the 1839 decree but it did not seize the relentless pressure put on the non-Muslims to convert. Despite opposition, *ulema* tried to curtail the social and religious freedom of the religious minorities. The first secular court was established under the rule of Sultan Abdülmejid I with a mandate to enquire everything based on relevant issues rather than consulting *sharia* law (Thompson, 1993: 456). The 1856 decree reiterated equality among all religious millets and provided full freedom to repair non-Muslims religious buildings and allowed non-Muslims to build religious places of worship, schools, hospitals and cemeteries as per their requirements. The new reform had provisions for preserving non-Muslim monuments and religious architectures and if there was a need to demolish a particular building, the Sublime Porte should get permission from the Patriarchate or religious community leaders who would also monitor any alteration or constructing works (Hussain, 2011:10; Karpas 1972: 264).

The edict granted rights to the entire Ottoman subjects with regard to civil and military training programmes. All the non-Muslim millets were allowed to build their own public schools and frame curriculum in science, technical and language subjects. The appointment of teachers for these secular millets school rested with Mixed Council of Public Instruction Council of the Public and Instruction Education Ministry. *Hatt-i Humayun* approved all commercial, correctional, and criminal cases and disputes between different religious sects like Muslims and Christians or within other non-Muslim subjects. The cases were transferred to a newly formed mixed courts or tribunals and the proceedings were conducted in public (Karpas 1972: 280; Quataert, 2000: 166). Based on the reforms, European powers demanded a greater autonomy for religious minorities who lived under the Sultan. The reforms also helped non-Muslims middle class and increase their economic and political power through bargaining.

Legal Status

The reform edicts of 1839 and 1856 were not constitution of the Empire but were merely a reform process based on the wishes of the Sultan (Shaw, 1977: 70-72). During Tanzimat period, the reforms began with modernisation of law through the Napoleonic code of 1810, which became the basis for Ottoman Penal Code, 1858. The new legal structure began a French style of court system like tribunals of first instance, courts of appeals and a high court of appeals. The French-influenced secular court system existed until modern Turkish republic 1923. Following that the reformers also introduced the Napoleonic Trade Laws in 1858, Property Laws in 1858 and Maritime Trade Law 1864. In 1858, even Homosexuality was allowed or decriminalized (Hussain, 2011: 10). The 1856 edict assured representation to the millets in the local councils, in the district or *sancaks* councils and in the *Meclis-i vala -yi ahkilm-i adliye* (Higher Council for Judicial Affairs) (Davison, 1990:122). Between 1839 and 1878, the Sultan and his government made efforts to implement all promises made in the edicts and other *ferman* through measures. For example, in 1844, the Sultan had decided to impose death penalty upon anyone convicted of apostasy.

As a result of the new edicts, Christians were appointed on several posts and later some of them were elected for the provincial councils (*meclisle*) and a few were elected for Grand Council of the Empire higher council for judicial affairs. In the newly established higher education school *lycee* of Galata Saray in 1867, Christian and Muslim students were jointly enrolled.

The reforms aimed to upgrade status of non-Muslims but lacked proper implementation due to sluggish attitude of the authorities. The majority Turks were not interested in these reform efforts, which also undermined its implementation (Davison, 1990: 115). During the Tanzimat period, the previous demarcations of religion and ethnicity waned and millets leaders served as head of religious and administrative works. The Sultan had recognized three millets, namely, Greek Orthodox (1862), Armenians of the Apostolic Church (1863), and Jews (1865). The Tanzimat reformers disseminated Ottomanism as a secular ideology and to support this idea non-Muslims were assigned various bureaucratic services in the Empire. New reform also diluted traditionally dominated position of the *ulema* and the grand council started to accommodate representative from other religions administrate millet affairs (Davison, 1990: 115-116;

Hanioglu, 2008: 76). In 1876 the Ottoman Empire proclaimed a new constitution. Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909) signed the constitution and quickly reversing all reforms and ushering in an autocratic rule which went against the basic principles of the Tanzimat reforms (Karpas 1972: 267, Quataert, 2000: 165).

Armenian Millet after Hatt- I - Humayun

The census of 1844 was first systematically collected population data in the Ottoman history, which was on par with European model and included all the men and women of the Empire. According to European travellers nearly two million Armenians were living in the Asiatic part of the Empire during the Tanzimat era (Karpas 1985: 116). This figure can be verified with official Ottoman and Armenian millets sources as well (**Table 3.4**).

As evident from **Table 3.4**, in 1844 the total population of the Armenians was two million. During the Tanzimat period, their population increased more prominently among all other millets. In 1878, however, the Ottoman census department registered Armenian population strength at around one million after it started issuing proper identity card for each citizen (Karpas, 1985: 116). Historian Stanford Shaw argues that based on the 1878 census 988,887 Armenian in the Gregorian millet, 160,166 Catholics and 36,339 Protestants in the Empire were identified as Armenians. Based on this statistics, the total Armenian population stood at 1,125,500, which is only 5.5 percent of the Empire's total population of 20,475,225 (Shaw, 1997: 201). From 1881 onwards Armenian population remained around one million for a short period during 1894-96. The Armenian Patriarchate submitted population details at the Congress of Berlin 1878 and put the figure at around 2.60 million in the Empire and 1.85 million on the Eastern part of the Empire but this number were proved false by the British station officer in Van and Diyarbakir *villayets* (Karpas, 1985:51).

Armenian Patriarchate and Hatt i Humayun

History of Armenia goes back two thousand years, and Armenian people who accepted Christianity first and made it official religion in 301 AD. The Armenian Church is also called as Gregorian Apostolic Church. The last independent state for Armenians existed until 1375. Armenians survived the war among the Persian, Ottoman and Russian Empires for power for many centuries. Beginning 16th century, Armenians came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire

due to military conquests. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-81) had brought Armenians to various part of the Ottoman Empire and gave them protection and autonomy as Dhimmi under the *sharia*. Armenians Patriarchate was representative of the Armenian millet to deal with the Sultan for five centuries and were known as loyal community or *sadik milli* and they remained with the Ottomans until the birth of the modern Turkish republic in 1923 (Lewy, 2005: 11).

In the pre-Tanzimat era, the Armenians lived under a single religious authority of the Armenian Orthodox Patriarchate. The Armenian Patriarchate bishop was responsible to control and maintain church, millet school, appointment of clergy and collecting and transferring taxes to the treasury of the Empire. The Patriarchate worked to coordinate the feelings of common identity among Armenians by creating a neutral political thought that communicated the far flung areas in which Armenians lived and connected them to others members of millet throughout the Empire (Masters, 2011: 52). Although the Patriarchate working for common hood of the millet, the seeds discontent with the Gregorian Apostasy led many young Armenians to look for new teachings like Jesuit missionaries in the Empire. Those who joined the new missionaries converted to Armenian Catholics community or millet. The Gregorian Apostasy had a contention with new Catholic millet that led to confrontation and killings of their own ethnic people. Later the Catholics complained to the Sultan but he hesitated to acknowledge the new millet. Thus, the Armenian Catholics requested the French King Louis to support their cause and finally with the help of French, Armenian Catholics millet was recognised in 1830. Simultaneously, during this period many Armenians converted to Protestant movement that was mainly patronized by Britain and United States of America, which resulted in recognition of the third Armenian millet, Armenian Protestant, in 1850. Thus, three millets, namely Armenian Gregorian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, and Armenians Protestent had different Armenian welfare scheme and political support according to their patronizing country which led to indirect interference in the Ottoman Empire (Shaw, 1997: 125).

In the pre-Tanzimat period, the Armenians were treated as protected but secondary citizens who had to pay *cizye* tax to live under the protection of the Muslim ruler based on *sharia*. The Armenians had to wear different colour of hat to be identified in public. It changed in 1856, when the *Hatt-i Humayun* decree abolished the head tax and everyone was considered as equal citizens. Discriminatory practices came to end. For example, testimony of non-Muslims became

acceptable in Islamic courts, which was impossible previously. Similarly, non-Muslim representation in the military which was minimal earlier, increased gradually after 1956. The Sublime Porte welcomed people from all religious communities to serve in the force. However, around the same time, Armenian nationalism started to bud in the Eastern parts of the Empire. Western Armenians lived in the cities like Constantinople and Izmir and mostly maintained their old profession of trade and commerce. Armenian millet was not keen on joining military services and wished to maintain their separate identity and profession and was ready to pay tax (*bedel-i askeri*) in lieu of not joining military service (Lewy, 2005: 11).

Historian Ronald Grigor Suny argues, “despite all discriminations and abuses, for several centuries the Armenians had derived considerable benefit from the limited autonomy made possible by the millet system” (Suny, 1993:102).” Further Guenter Lewy observes that the church remained at the head of the nation; Armenians with commercial and industrial skills were able to climb to the very pinnacle of the Ottoman economic order; and a variety of educational, charitable, and social institutions were permitted to flourish. “Living in relative peace with their Muslim neighbours, the Armenians had enjoyed a time of benign symbiosis” (Lewy, 2005: 11). The Armenian millets promoted the development of modern Armenian language and history of Armenia through printing and publishing activities, which gradually stimulated Armenian nationalism among various sects which later proved to be detrimental for Armenian and Ottoman relations. In 1840, in eastern Anatolia, an Armenian Garabed Otücian had published a newspaper called *Massis* which spread modern secular ideas among the Armenians. Protestant missionaries worked towards spreading modern Armenian language and Elias Riggs, an American Protestant published a book for this purpose (Shaw, 1977: 126). In Venice, Mekhitar’s monastery became one of the learning centres for Armenian language.

Constantinople Armenians and 1856 Reform

In the 19th century, the Constantinople Armenians known as *amira* class, who were bankers, trading merchants or worked in European embassies and consulates located in major cities began to have close contact with high Ottoman officials. They worked towards creating favourable climate for Armenians and together with those Armenians who worked in the government created considerable goodwill among Ottoman officials for benefit of the Armenian Patriarchate. Tanzimat reforms of 1839 and 1856 promoted secular leadership within millets to deal with the

Sultan and European powers. The Sultan also preferred to deal with secular leadership rather than conflict ridden and sectarian clergy of the three Armenian groups, namely Gregorian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics and Armenian Protestant. The *Hatt i- Humayun* also encouraged millets internal governance system which administrates the millet functions (Agoston, 2011: 52).

After the Greek revolution of 1821, the Greek millet's influence reduced drastically and their trade and commerce in Constantinople also declined. The Armenians filled the vacuum created by Greeks. Greeks were reduced to just one of the many communities losing their special status and focused on education and welfare of its millet. Thus, Armenians gained prominence and trade and commerce too went into their hands. In the Tanzimat era Armenian's main occupation in Constantinople was concentrated in regular businesses like money changing, gold-smithing, jewellery, foreign trade, construction, medicine, and theatre. Armenians excelled in learning European languages, finance and internal and external trade and these qualities took them closer to the Sultan and other Sublime Porte officials. In the Ottoman administration, Armenians reached high places in nearly all the ministries specifically Finance, Interior, Foreign, Education, Justice and Public works department postal, telegraph, census and railroad transportation services thereby contributing to the government and the Empire (Shaw, 1997: 200).

In Constantinople Duzian, Dandian and Balian Armenians families were well known for their contribution to the Ottoman Empire. During financial difficulties in running the government these *amira* classes assisted the Sultan through giving large sums of loans. The Ottoman officials were also influenced by Duzian family to appoint important positions in coin mint factory in the Sublime Porte. Dandians were very famous for their weaponry production units of the Ottoman army, particularly in quality cannon production Dandian were competing with European counterparts. For generations Balian family indulged in the constructions of royal palace in the Ottoman Empire and various forts in Constantinople were built by this family. These Armenian families' successes earned them credibility from the Sultan and other Sublime Porte officials and therefore during Tanzimat era they were called as *millet i- sadik* or loyal millet of the Ottomans (Adalian, 2010:267-268).

Prominent Armenian families in Constantinople like gained significant foothold in the Sublime Porte through their trade and business activities and Armenian bankers gave short-term loans to

the Sublime Porte in emergency situations. These local private money lenders charged higher interest rates. Local borrowings from Armenian bankers in Galata had been practiced for some time, but these banks were relatively small and the rates they charged were high (often as much as 16 to 18 per cent a year) (Zurcher, 1992: 64). The complex monetary situation made banking a much needed and very profitable enterprise. The rich Armenian bankers showed a marked reluctance to invest in productive enterprises, which needed long-term investments. This was a serious handicap for the development of a capitalist economy in the Empire (Zurcher, 1992: 65).

In first half of the 19th century banking was a profitable business but after 1850, bankers hesitated to invest in modern industries because it was not fruitful in terms of returns and took longer time. It affected the Empire's development and private sector remained stagnated unlike their counterparts in Europe where private sector was thriving (Zurcher, 1992: 65). From the Crimean War (1856) onwards, European economic involvement in the Ottoman Empire expanded beyond trade into loans (Zurcher, 1992: 63). Within the Armenian and Greek communities the emerging commercial bourgeoisie was getting richer and self-confident. During the 19th century, Armenian merchants expanded their maritime trade from London to Hong Kong and the Crimean War gave new impetus to their entrepreneurship. In 1855 around ten Armenian textile companies were importing clothes from Paris, Manchester and other towns in Britain. The goods manufactured in France and Britain had huge demands from Constantinople, Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore and other Asian markets. Therefore Armenian traders left no stone unturned to hoard wealth from such demand and supply conditions. Now the power of Armenian Patriarchate dominance shifted over from aristocracy to merchants' community and Armenians started learning French and English as business languages while Italian lost its prominence. These maritime trades not only passed goods but also ideas like French revolution, literature and nationalistic thought that became part of exchange. Merchant Armenians helped to translate works of Voltaire, Lamartine, Victor Hugo and other French and German philosophers. Thus these philosophers were introduced to the Armenian community. In Constantinople, the Armenians community started inculcating European ideas, mannerism and behaviour (Johnson, 1922: 43).

In addition to trade and business, the Armenian community was also prominently engaged in arts, literature and theatre fields. The first theatre performance institute called *Tiyatro-I Osmani*

or Ottoman Theatre in Turkish language was founded at Cedik Pasa in Constantinople in 1867. It staged a play directed by an Armenian Agop Vartovyan also known as Gullu Agop (1840-1902). The theatre owner Ali Pasha granted monopoly of conducting Turkish drama for next fifteen years to him in 1870 with a condition that he would open similar drama schools throughout the Empire. A year later in Cedik Pasa Ali Pasha attended repertory drama in Armenian and Turkish plays. Further they also began to practice Namik Kemal's famous and problematic play *vatan Yahut Silistre*. The Cedik Pasa drama school was active until it was destroyed in a fire in 1885. Another Armenian Mardiros Minakyan (1837-1920) was partner with Agop in early years and later Mardiros practiced his own play in a theatre with the same name called, that is, Ottoman Theatre and it remained the leading theatre until the end Abdülhamid II reign (Shaw, 1997: 190). This period also witnessed a thriving literary culture which went beyond narrow communitarian confines. Armenian literature took prominence and in 1887 the first Armenian novel *Anhetatsatz serund me* (A Vanished Generation) was published that gained popularity beyond the Armenian community (Hanioglu, 2008: 99 and 100).

Eastern Armenians and 1856 Reforms

The Eastern Armenians were a predominantly agricultural and mostly lived in the Armenian highlands. In the 18th century, the war among the Ottoman, Russia and Persian Empires led a large number of Armenians to migrate to other parts of the Empire, especially to major cities like Constantinople, Ankara and Izmir as skilled and unskilled labourers. Thus, towards the beginning of the 19th century Armenians became one of the major religious minorities in these cities. In the Eastern parts of the Empire, Armenians were concentrated in six *vilayets* Van, Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Erzurum, Kharput (*Mamuret el-Aziz*), and Sivas. Russia invaded the Eastern part of the Ottoman Empire in 1876 with an intention to occupy the Armenian territories but they could annexe only Kars area on the north-eastern region (Ágoston, 2011: 52).

Since the 19th century Christian missionaries were active in eastern Armenian *vilayets* associated the newly arriving Catholic and Protestant movements. Catholic movement began to establish its own religious and cultural centres particularly at Diyarbakir and started to publish Bible in modern Armenian language rather than classical church language. After Tanzimat proclamation Protestant Christian community became concentrated in Erzurum. Both Catholics and Protestant missionaries built schools adjacent to their churches (Palmer, 1992: 176-177). These activities

prompted new literary ideas in modern Armenian language which were very close to them emotionally. On the other hand, the Gregorian Orthodox reacted through democratising the millet structure due to government pressure to introduce modern education in the millet schools. Armenians in well to do families sent their children to France where they learned modern education, imbibed modern ideas of state and began articulating for strong reforms within the millet (Shaw, 1997: 202).

The Ottomans were dependent primarily on agricultural production and peasantry. Many modern historians emphasise that the Empire's social structure was based on lives stock rearing and village house hold system and it was best sample for the Asiatic mode of production. The main occupation of the eastern Armenian during the 19th century was agriculture, particularly wheat, cotton and cattle rearing. In 1873 world economic crisis affected the eastern Armenian cotton production and exports. Large number of Armenians had left agriculture and migrated to cities for a peaceful life. Many Armenians in Trabzon indulged in the silk worm production, which till then was exclusively practiced by the Muslims (Inber, 2002:02). At this time, Armenians started working in many sectors, except the army. The Armenians in the eastern provinces intermingled with the Muslims peasants and Kurdish nomadic tribesmen but the economic condition of the Armenian was better than Muslims and Kurdish people in the neighbourhood. During the rule of Sultan Abdülaziz I (1861-1876), the condition of millet in eastern provinces was reasonably well because Gregorian, Catholics and Protestant intra-millet problems were amicably resolved within the millet under the guidance of *vilayet* bishop. In eastern *vilayets* Armenian millets fulfilled their own needs and regulated churches, schools and hospitals and were open to all communities without any major incident of intra- or inter-millet tension or violence (Shaw, 1997: 202).

The Crimean War in 1856 gave opportunity for Britain and France to express their concern about the Anatolian Christian millet particularly Armenian community. Simultaneously Sultan exhibited his concerns for the non-Muslims through enacting new Tanzimat decree in 1856, which insisted that all people should be treated equally without any discrimination of race and religion. The new reform edict granted *vilayets* or provincial council system of governance to the millet community, but the provincial councils were mostly filled by government officers and only a few millet representatives were included as member of the councils (Shaw, 1977: 87).

A new Cadastral Department (*tahirir –I Emlak Nezareti*) was instituted under Ministry of Finance in Sublime Porte. This department was tasked with surveying people and property throughout the Empire. It was also assigned to work for provincial cadastral commission under the governors of each provinces working with local officials and millets representatives. The cadastral department was divided into three-member committee and included scribes and engineers to measure all the lands, houses, plots of land, gardens, buildings and its approximate value. The cadastral officials counted every male inhabitant, Muslim and non-Muslim, Ottoman or foreigner and distributed population tax certificate (*vergi nufus tezkeresi*), and this certificate tells about tax obligation of persons and served as the identity card. The collected informations were sent to the *vilayets* headquarters and then to Sublime Porte archives (Shaw, 1977:88).

After 1856 the Sublime Porte abolished *cizya*, sheep tax, and land tax. Provincial Armenian deemed the abolishing of head or *cizya* tax as sign of the Ottoman concerns about non-Muslims. Later Sublime Porte could not maintain its economic burden and since they could not re-introduce *cizya*, they introduced a new tax called as military tax (*bedel-I askeri*) to compensate financial conditions and levied military tax as equal as the earlier head tax. Sublime Porte followed its old taxation policy even after the promulgation of 1856 decree such as sheep tax (*Ağnam Vergisi*), which were applicable to all live stocks and tax levied based on the market value. Land tax was also re-introduced through new law for registration of ownership. Now large government lands (*miri*) were converted to private lands (*mülk*) and were given to newly migrated Balkan Muslims (Zurcher, 1992:60). In 1864, the Provincial Reform Law was enacted which became essence of provincial structure other than Constantinople and this administrative system was practiced until the end of the Empire (Shaw, 1977: 89). The Ottoman new provincial law was drafted based on the French administrative structure and had hierarchical administrative orders like *vilayets* (Province), *sancak* (county), *kaza* (district), *nahiye* (rural community) and *kariye* (village). However this law was further restructured in 1871 (Zurcher, 1992:60).

The Armenians in eastern province dwelled on a mountainous plateau and cohabited with Kurdish nomadic tribes who were Tatar Muslims settled in nearby areas. Since the second half of the 19th century, the condition of Armenians deteriorated in the Eastern provinces and later throughout the Empire. The Kurdish nomads dominated as chieftains of areas and during winter Armenians had to pay portion of their crop production as tax to the Kurds (Issaverdenz, 1874:

397). The Ottoman central authority was powerful to maintain the status quo but some oppression against the Armenians was prevailing. With the declining power of Ottoman Sultan and due to corrupt local officials, the situation started to deteriorate putting Armenian lives in perils (Lewy, 2005: 11).

The Armenians who failed to pay tributes to Kurds, experienced oppression as the Kurds unleashed savage attacks upon failed peasants, captured their lands and kidnapped their women and seized cattle as a punishment. The situation was such that it occasionally led to clashes such in 1862 when Armenians and Kurdish neighbours fought over land occupation in Zeitun *kaza*—a district with ten villages, of which six were pre-dominantly Armenians while the other four were Kurds and Tatars (Issaverdenz, 1874: 397) On other hand, Ottoman officials demanded bribe and during natural calamities, compensations sent by the Empire were swindled by these corrupt officials. Therefore, despite the reform decrees, the living conditions of Armenians, especially in rural areas did not change. During Tanzimat period Armenians patriarchate complained to Sublime Porte regarding extortions and abduction of other Armenians and compulsions to convert to Islam but mistreatments pushed Armenians towards alternative and safer options (Lewy, 2005: 11).

Eastern Armenians Internal social strata

In Ottoman Empire the Armenian millet system was classified based on socio-cultural and economical differences such as the Constantinople Armenians and Eastern Armenians who made separate group based on standard of life, social status and progress in cultural linguistic developments (Kemal, 2002: 612). Until the 19th century, Armenians lived amicably with the majority Muslim population even though they were treated as protected people based on *sharia*. In the pre-reform period, Armenian Gregorian Orthodox enjoyed unchallenged authority over Armenian millet; the Patriarchate acted as the sole representative of the Armenian people to decide their religious and cultural affairs. During the 19th century Eastern Orthodox Armenians had steadily converted to Catholic and Protestant millets. This led to frictions and emergence of factionalism within the millet and led to abduction of Armenian Gregorian Patriarch in Paris by Catholic missionary members to establish a dominant position among Armenians and with the Sultan. After this incident the Sultan recognised Catholics and Protestant in 1841 and 1850

respectively and their social and religious activities in those regions gained momentum (Kemal, 2002: 641).

Each Armenian millets had its own patronage from other countries, for example Catholics always reported oppression and sought help from France. Likewise England and United States of America patronised the Protestants who also faced safety and security issues. Russia was concerned with Orthodox Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Armenian Gregorian Patriarchate authority over Armenian population was greatly reduced (Davison, 1963: 96).

Since the Tanzimat reform period the Armenian moneylenders, artisans and merchants of Constantinople confronted the dominant of old Orthodox Armenians oligarchy. The 1841 *ferman* notified that the elected member of laymen council should manage the administration of millet community but it was challenged by the aristocracy due to their economic strength. Later a separate secular council was established to look after affairs of issues of common people, which was managed by elected notables, merchants and artisans. The old aristocratic Armenians separately controlled the religious affairs of the millet (Shaw, 1997: 125). Until then, Patriarchate had been controlled by the Constantinople aristocracy who had maintained close relationship with the Sultan and Sublime Porte and at reform periods merchants and traders had influenced Patriarchate. The 1856 decree and Provincial Council Law of 1861 provided wider democratic rights to all Eastern Armenian bourgeois to express their opinion on the issues related to Armenians at national level, a new social stratification started to emerge among Armenians dwelling the cities.

In 1870, Armenian Patriarch Mugerdithc Khrimian had approved the national consciousness among the Armenian communities. Before coming to Constantinople, bishop Khrimian was spreading ideas on the ancient glories of the Armenian Empire and its prosperity at Van *vilayet* among young Eastern Armenians. He compared ancient Armenian poet Alishan and tried awakening Armenian nationalist feelings. In Constantinople, school children of Shahnazar Noubaryan High School in Haskeyu visited the Patriarch for his sermon which was famous and ideal of Armenian national life and which promoted common hood among Armenian millets. Thus, Armenians consider the 1856 to 1876 two decades as “golden age of the hope” (Johnson,

1922: 44). During this period many Armenians went to Europe to study modern governance and state system and large number of famous French literature were translated into Armenian language. In the Ottoman Empire Armenian school were considered to be equal to European schools which produced many future Armenian leaders. The Armenian millets became liberalized and westernised compared to other religious people, with a consciousness of nationalism and desire for independence (Arpee, 1909:190-192; Johnson, 1922: 44).

Educational system of Armenian millet

The Ottoman Empire promoted secular and scientific education during Tanzimat period considering education as gateway to modernisation. In the 19th century, the Ottoman education system was divided into four main categories. One constituted of traditional Islamic schools or *medrasa* and *mekteps*, both were primary level schools, the former was purely religious and was run by religious endowments while the latter was semi-religious and was state funded. Second were the Tanzimat-era schools with a secular curriculum and they continued to function until end of the Empire. Graduates from these schools played a major part in formation of the modern Turkish state. Third type of schools was those funded and administrated by the millets and non-Muslims population. Fourth were foreign missionary schools that were run groups such as Catholics, Protestant and Jewish Alliance Israelite groups. A sizeable number of students in these missionary schools were Turkish Muslims (Somel, 2003: 80-81; Zurcher, 1992: 63).

After the promulgation of the 1839 *Tanzimat* decree, the Sultan ordered for a temporary committee for education (*Meclis-i Maarif-i Muvakkat*). This committee was to frame secular education and produce able students to serve the Empire. After 1856 decree a new ministry was formed in 1866. Thereafter all the education functions came under the control of Ministry of Public Education (*Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti*). This new ministry consisted of six Muslims, two, Greek Orthodox, two Gregorian Orthodox, two Catholics, one Protestant and one Jewish members representing millet (Somal, 2001: 46). As a result, hundreds of reports and documents related to Muslim and non-Muslim education and curriculums were drafted and new rules to grant license to build new institutions by any religious community was issued. The ministry had an objective to promote secular and utilitarian education to develop all Ottoman subjects from medieval education structure to modern education system to compete with European advancements (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 106).

After, the traditional reform period the Ottomans urged and braced technical education to fulfil the urgent need of a professional army. Therefore, many military schools under the patronage of the army and navy as well as schools for medicine were established in Constantinople and other parts of the Empire. In 1859, reformist professional institute policy peaked with establishment of Ottoman Civil Service School *Mektep-i Mülkiye* which produced skilled junior secretaries for the Sublime Porte (Findley, 1980:68; Somal, 2003:52). Those who learned in civil service school were appointed as directors and district or *kaza* officers and financial specialists for the Sublime Porte. Main subjects taught were history, economics, law, statistics and geography. Turkish and French were medium of instruction but trainee had options to choose Armenian, Buglers Greek as elective for provincial administrative purpose (Somal, 2003: 52). The Ottoman Armenian civil servant Sakızlı Ohannes Pasha served as economic professor for twenty years in the institute. This civil service school was deemed as the apex level of educational and professional institute of the Empire and enrolment their became a desired goal for all subjects of the Empire (Somal, 2003:257; Zurcher, 1992:62).

Following professional education the ministry also promoted general higher education. Ottoman grand vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha and education minister with the assistance of the French educational minister and French ambassador in Constantinople founded new modern schools like French *lycee* schools. In 1868, new Ottoman high schools were established and were called *GalataSaray Mekteb-i Sultani*, or Imperial School of GalataSaray, and was housed at former army school building at Beyoğlu district in Constantinople. This was school was administrated by two principal Turkish and French and this became main place for to produce future Ottoman and Turkish officers it also called as “Westernization of the East” (İhsanoğlu, 2002:357-515). Ottoman Sultan bore all financial expenditure of the new *lycee* school and this also enrolled religious children (Shaw, 1997: 108). In its foundation year it began with 147 Muslims, 47 Gregorian Armenian, 36 Greeks, 34 Buglers, 34 Jews, 23 Roman Catholic and 19 Armenian Catholics students and the number was doubled in the following year (Davison, 1963: 247). *Lycee* inducted teachers from all religions background to give international appearance and second rector of *lycee* school was an Armenian teacher (Somal, 2001: 53).

The Ottoman Ministry of Public Education’s finest decision of that time was to legitimize primary education as compulsory and free to all Ottoman citizens through the General Education

Regulation of 1869 (*Maarif-I Umumiye Nizamnamesi*). The new regulation was an equally advanced step their counterpart of Europe (Gök, 2007:247). Ottoman reformers in Sublime Porte tried to execute 1856 reform edict ideas at the administrative level by including all Ottoman subjects into the system. In the same era the education of non-Muslims was also promoted by the state except on few occasions and reformers recognised the importance of the utilitarian educational thoughts at that time.

In Tanzimat era, non-Muslims also advanced their own millet schools, particularly in 1839; the Armenian millet established its own higher school at Scutari in Constantinople. The Scutari School became main educational centre for Armenian national leaders at a later stage. The Armenian aristocracy resisted school curriculum and methods of teaching because they thought students were learning anti-Ottoman attitude. In 1847, Sublime Porte appointed two councils to look after religious and civil works of the school. Thus, the Ottoman government resolved the Scutari school management issue between two groups the Armenian millet. The Scutari school director was also responsible for Armenian national newspaper *Massis* (İhsanoğlu, 2002:507; Johnson, 1922: 42). In 1861, the school expanded as residential school to accommodate excessive number of students (İhsanoğlu, 2002:507). The Armenian millet formed a communal leadership to single authority in 1853 to monitor the Armenian educational system throughout the Empire. The council advocated for secular school curriculum and Armenian as the main language and French as optional language in the secondary education (Müftügil, 2011:35).

Historian Nuri O. Ergin elaborates the role of Tanzimat decree in opening higher education facility in provincial regions too, which also began new Armenian schools in eastern *vilayets* to facilitate the Armenian community. In Anatolia, the Armenian national educational council along with the provincial governments built schools and cultural programs for the millets schools. In 1871, in some regions there were 18 boys schools, 13 girls schools, and 17 mixed school which were only allowed in the non-Muslim millets and totally around 6,000 students were taught in that regions (Ergin, 1940:758). The Ottoman Empire's ministry of education was responsible for monitoring all facilities and arrangements in Constantinople and rest of the eastern part of the Empire. The Ottoman education ministry established provincial educational councils in every province capitals under the authority of *maarif müdürü* with Muslim and non-

Muslim assistance, staffs and district or *kazas* officers entourage all the millet or foreign schools to maintain the condition and enforce standards of schools (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:111).

The ministry also had the responsibility to look after the appointment of teachers for all schools, maintaining standards and ensuring the availability of textbooks. Provincial governments paid the salaries for teachers and staff. Now the government felt responsibility to oversee all state, *millets* and foreign schools that sprang all over the Empire. The ministry also wanted to maintain the activities of schools, so that modern educated youths would fill the vacancies in government and private business (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 108). New policy decision taken was under the leadership of minister of education and with the presence of provincial governors, major millet leaders and judicial and religious leaders. Later the policy was submitted to and approved by the Sultan (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 111).

The foreign missionary's schools also established in mid-19th century, particularly Robert College in 1863 and Austrian, French, English and German too established their school in the Empire. At the beginning missionaries founded only elementary schools but gradually they extended their activities to secondary level. The missionary education institutions were valued more than traditional or *millets* schools and Proselytization was more active among students. The Sultan granted freedom to foreign missionaries to establish institutes and schools where ever they wanted. The Sublime Porte granted permission in administrative part and controlled curriculums, lessons and textbooks of the foreign schools. On the other hand the Armenian millets also provided equal standard of education to its own community, thereby creating a superior school system. Such educational improvements among non-Muslims led to social divisions and mutual suspicions (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 110).

At the same time some Armenians resisted the new equality proposed by Tanzimat reforms in educational methods because they wanted the status quo of their millet schools under their own control and not wish their institutions being inspected by government officials. The Armenians suffered at the hands of corrupt government officials and Kurds at regular intervals in the eastern provinces during administrating schools therefore Armenian use to complain to British and French ambassador about their sufferings (Shaw, 1997: 112; Zengin, 2006: 67). Further, the

Armenians hesitated to send their sons to the Ottoman government schools, some people preferred to learn at Armenian Gregorian, Catholics and Protestant schools (Zengin, 2006: 67).

Though the Tanzimat promoted secular education system, it also permitted everyone to build their religious institution near by the schools. Muslim millet built their mosques adjacent with *medrasa* and likewise Armenian Gregorian, Catholics and Protestant Christians were allowed to construct their own churches nearby their school premises. The Ottoman government provided scholarship or tuition fees for around 300 students every year. Most of the instructors in the millet and government schools were Turks, Armenians or Greeks but in foreign school, foreigners mostly served as tutors. In millet communities the orthodox families were apprehensive of the introduction of secular and modern ideas and feared they would affect traditional structure of millets, especially among the Gregorian Orthodox and Russia was main supporter Orthodox Armenians. France and Britain supported the Catholics and Protestant *millets* respectively and therefore among non-Muslims the Armenians contacts and support with Europe were very high.

Thus, European affairs very much linked with the Ottoman non-Muslims welfare and security. On the other side, Muslim *ulema* were afraid of European educational system because they thought that it would dilute Islamic traditions. Muslim families were also suspicious of the higher education methods and subjects. Finally, the modern education disseminated common rationality to all the students. Those who educated at these institutes later transformed as national leaders of their respective millets that existed until beginning of the Turkish republic (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 109).

In the mid-19th century wealthy Armenians sent their sons to Europe for education they returned with western ideas of nation state and equality in treatment by the state. In the 1860s, western educated Armenians began discourse of Armenian revolutionary and in 1863 the Sublime Porte asked for drafting new constitution for the Armenians, mostly western educated Armenians such as, Dr. Arslanian, Dr. Krikor Odian, Dr. Servitschen, Dr. Rousinian and others participated as main personalities of the Armenian millets. The new constitution mandated the formation of new Armenian National Assembly and new education council also formed to develop common educational policy. The Armenian education council looked after issues such as framing unified

curriculum, common textbooks and standard of among Armenians Gregorian, Catholics and Protestant millets (Lynch, 1901: 445-467).

The Pro-Ottoman historians widely believe that the missionaries had sown seeds of nationalistic, revolutionary, Armenian sentiments against the Ottoman government and the Sultan. Historian Guenter Lewy has mentioned Charles Eliot's view on Armenian and Ottoman relation in the later part of century. Charles Eliot was a well-informed British diplomat with extensive experience in Turkey and argued:

The good position of the Armenians in Turkey had largely depended on the fact that they were thoroughly Oriental and devoid of that tincture of European culture common among Greeks and Slavs. But now this character was being destroyed: European education and European books were being introduced among them-The Turks thought that there was clearly an intention to break up what remained of the Ottoman Empire and found an Armenian kingdom 'Onward, Christian soldiers, marching as to war,' in English is a harmless hymn, suggestive of nothing worse than a mildly ritualistic procession; but the same words literally rendered into Turkish do sound like an appeal to Christians to rise up against their Mohammedan masters, and I cannot be surprised that the Ottoman authorities found the hymn seditious and forbade it to be sung (Eliot, 1900: 420-460; Lewy, 2005: 12).

During reform era, the Armenians had prospered, particularly during reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), Abdülmecid (1839-1839) and Abdülaziz (1861-1876) when compared to the earlier period. They were comfortable in living in Constantinople, Diyarbakir, Van and Aleppo (Arpee, 1909:190-192).

In the early 19th century, Constantinople had a large number of *new amira* or new trading and merchants class Armenians who sent their sons to learn modern secular education to Europe. Those who returned wanted to change the functioning of Gregorian Orthodox church and propagated cultural revival among youths. These western educated youths supported by the Catholics and Protestant *millets* hated and carried a distain towards the oligarchy's domination over the Orthodox millet; thus millets schism became explicit. Sublime Porte felt that it was necessary to intervene in the Armenian internal conflict. Later, grand vizier Fuad Ali Pasha called for all millets and all laymen participation in a conference to draft Armenian constitution. Thus, issue of internal conflict among Armenian was sorted out by formation of a new Civil Council consisting of selected members of all three millets laymen and three patriarchs (Shaw, 1997: 126).

The Armenian Civil Council appointed a committee that composed of western educated Armenian intellectuals such as Dr. Arslanian, Dr. Krikor Odian, Dr. Servitschen, Dr. Rousinian and others. The new committee drafted Armenian provincial Constitution for Armenian community on basis of the reform decree *Hatt i- Humayun* 1856. The draft had one hundred fifty articles which were adopted by the Armenian General Assembly on 5 June 1890. The Armenians approved the draft and asserted the imperial edicts on 29 March 1863, and it was implemented the same year (Arpee, 1909: 192). Other millets such as Greek Orthodox (1862) and Jews (1864) also drafted their own constitutions (Findley, 2008: 28). The Armenian National Assembly wielded its administration at its best with hindering or hindered by any internal or external issues until 1876. The Armenian National assembly was formed during the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid but was promulgated by Sultan Abdülaziz on 25 June 1861 (Creasy, 1877:544).

The collective National Assembly with Gregorian, Catholic, and Protestant representatives assimilated as one nation and was considered as a great union under the prevailing circumstances. All three Patriarchate heads were presiding officers of Assembly (Huntington, 1922:131). Even though the new National Assembly curtailed the power of the Gregorian Orthodox Patriarchate, the patriarch of Orthodox millet was the Chairperson of the new Assembly. The new constitution allowed the Gregorian patriarch as the chairperson of council and he was elected by the general assembly that consisted of both laity and religious leaders. The assembly also held powers to impeach the patriarch and dismiss him if proved guilty. The constitution also allowed forming two new councils to look after issues related to religious and other worldly issues. The Armenian National Assembly had religious councils which included clergies of all three *millets* while remaining councils consisted of common people of the *millet* communities. The constitution also directed provincial assembly for the executive councils. Thus, the new reform left Gregorian Patriarch as head of Apostolic Church and Chairperson of all Armenian *millets* now under the Gregorian Apostolic maintains all administrative system. Under the Assembly law, ordinary citizen of Armenian millet was able to participate in millet administration (Kemal, 1978: 237-274; Masters, 2009: 53).

The National Assembly of Armenians was a proto-type of constitutional government in which 140 members represented all three Armenian millets and among them were 20 clergy representation. This new constitutional committee was approved by the Sultan and served the

Armenians under Orthodox Patriarchate. This new political assembly looked after the basic needs of the millets such as education, medical and other non-political issues. Under new committee it promoted the press development, cultural and philanthropy activities and other millets activities (Arpee, 1909:190-192; Johnson, 1922: 44).

The Armenian constitution ushered in a new horizon in the Armenian history and promoted modern secular education subjects like literature, society, and ecclesiastical and political life. This was first among any millets and hence were called as “Anglo-Saxons of the East” (Anie, 2007:17; Arpee, 1909:192-193). The constitution assembly persistently elevated the standard of Armenian children education far greater than other millets and they decided education should to reach every Armenians. The Armenian *millet* promoted male and female education throughout the Empire and disseminated modern education (Arpee, 1909:192-193). While, the Armenian National Assembly promoted safety and security of the Armenians through 1839 and 1856 edits of Tanzimat and Provincial Reform Law 1861 the Armenians solidarity with the Ottomans could not be reconciled with the idea of Armenian nationalism which in turn undermined Ottomanism. Armenian religious differences and century-old *millet* practice could not stop the modern nationalism which clearly exemplified in the Armenian and Greek cases. Among the Ottoman minority only Jews nationalism or separatism was still irrelevant at that time (Findley, 2008:29).

The Armenian Patriarchate’s participation in Congress of Berlin in 1878 led Sultan Abdülhamid to disrespect the Armenian *millet* rights. Later, in Young Ottomans restored the modern Turkish constitution and also respected non-Muslims rights and particularly of the Armenians. In 1892, Sultan Abdülhamid cast away the Armenian constitution and it practically stopped from functions (Arpee, 1909:194).

Muslim and Armenian approach to reforms

The 1839 reform edit argued for a direct relationship between the Sublime Porte and individual not through *millet* administration but this was only partially practiced through 1856 edict. The 1861 Provincial Law which granted permission to choose representative and citizenship rights was considered as anti-Islam by the *ulema* (Kemal, 2002: 640). The Ottomans learned that Egypt’s Mehmed Ali inducted non-Muslims as soldier and European as advisors. Later, Tanzimat decree 1856 opened gate for non-Muslim to enter military service. But unlike Egypt, in

the Ottoman army Muslims vehemently opposed the entry of non-Muslims into the Sultan's forces. In eastern Armenian territories these discrimination gradually widen the mistrust between different beliefs. Majority of Muslim wanted non-Muslim should pay military tax (*bedel-i askeri*) rather than to serve in the armed forces (Zurcher, 2003:57).

On other side, the Christians too generally felt that it was better to pay military tax than to part of the Sultan armed forces because their aspiration of nationalism did not allow them to join in large numbers. However, in Constantinople Dandian *amira* family worked for Sultan has army as weapons specialist, Armenian from cities worked as soldiers, and a handful of Armenian officers too served in the army. It was also clear that Sublime Porte wanted the non-Muslims to serve in the army majority of Turks opposed this and refused to work under their command. Equality for non-Muslims in army as mentioned in the reform edicts remained in theory and after Congress of Berlin in 1876 the induction of Armenians into army became as a dead issue. The Turks also wanted the Armenian Christian to act as subordinate to them and Armenian nationalistic movement wants use as the cause for their aspirations (Davison, 1990: 123-24).

In the Ottoman society Tanzimat reforms created base for a new bourgeois society with the consequence of new reforms in 1856 and these new middle class also due to modern industrial developments in the Empire. In reform period the rise of working class or proletarian sections in all millets paved ways for secularization of the society. Same 1856 reform affected in Muslim Turks also and the status and importance of Islamic religious leader or *ulema* among Muslims and his relations with the Sultan got reduced. After 1856 reform *ulema's* educational institutions was main target and their revenues were drastically cut down. The Sublime Porte wanted to enlist modern educated Muslim Turks into army to serve the Sultan Further, the 1856 reform re-asserted the equality to all citizens of the Empire through rule of law thus new legal proceedings undermined important of the *sharia*-based traditional system and these two developments severely affects revenue system of the *ulema*. Therefore, the disappointed *ulemas* turned their anger towards non-Muslims and their importance in administration and Ottoman public life. The Sultan also called for Muslim and non-Muslims secularization and institutional changes (Shaw, 1977: 123).

The Tanzimat reforms built an impression among Muslim subjects of weakness of the Sultan against non-Muslim powers. They opposed the idea of equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. This and its economic cost forced the Sultan to re-introduce the head tax that was abolished in 1856 as military tax in 1861 (Hanioğlu, 2008: 90). In the 19th century, European powers helped Armenian Christians to accumulate the wealth which had increased manifold in a short period. In Constantinople, Armenian Galata Street was richest at that time and even Sultan's family and Sublime Porte high officials were regular customers of Armenian traders and merchants. Such a close relations instigated Muslims reaction tremendously which led to a *coup d'état* in the Kuleli barracks on the Bosphorus in 1859 (Zurcher, 1992: 67). The Tanzimat reformers were influenced by the French Civil Code which granted equal citizenship, which *ulema* deemed would undermine the primacy of Islam as the core idea or soul of the Empire and they feared this would lead to the end of Caliphate (Hanioğlu, 2008: 75). It was not only the Muslim orthodox and clergy who were sceptical of the Tanzimat secular reforms but also the Armenian orthodox clergy who thought their position was at stake. On the other side Western educated Armenians were more enthusiastic towards Armenian nationalistic ideology and they were sliding towards armed resistance, which created suspicions among Muslim community. The Muslims also thought that Armenians were getting help from outside powers, namely Britain and Russia against the Ottoman Empire, which was considered as violation of law. Nationalist Armenian also compelled other wealthy Armenians in Constantinople to rise against Muslim and Kurdish treatments that would force European power to intervene in favour of the Armenians (Davison, 1963: 133; Shaw, 1997: 203).

Simultaneously, the Ottoman nationalist ideas were also spreading among the Muslims majority who wanted to keep the Empire integrated, strong and modern. Ottoman historian M. Şükrü Hanioğlu elaborated

The supranational ideology of Ottomanism, perhaps the Tanzimat most significant contribution to the empire presupposed a rapid embrace of rational ideas and the abandonment of religious obscurantism. The Tanzimat statesmen failed to understand that the major rivals of the Ottomanist orientation were no longer religious identities, but nationalist ones (Hanioğlu, 2008:106) .

Rise of Young Ottoman

During the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, separatist movements became active in the periphery of the Empire and they were eager to attain regional autonomy or separate constitutional state. The western-educated Turks wanted to include non-Muslims into the mainstream Ottoman ideology through Ottomanism. The six Ottoman palace secretaries secretly formed an organization called *İttifak-i Hamiyet* (Alliance of Patriotism) in 1865 (Zurcher, 1992: 67). The leading figure of organization was Namik Kemal, Ziya Bey and Ali Suavi. The Western-educated Turkish officers condemned the Sultan's inefficiency in handling reforms. They wanted the Ottoman society to acquire one common identity with respect for all religions. Thus, Kemal and Ziya formed tiny groups within Turkish aristocracy to oppose Tanzimat reform and convert the Empire into a constitutional monarchy. Kemal's movement was not strong; it followed liberal and secular ideologies and Ottoman nationalism as main component (Davison, 1963: 130).

In 1865, Kemal and Ziya started propagating their nationalist ideas through a journal called *mukhbir* (Reporter) edited by Suavi. Kemal's writings severely criticized the Sultan and grand vizier for their approach to the non-Muslims grievances. In 1867, Egyptian Prince Mustafa Fazıl Pasha sent a letter of weakness of the Ottoman Empire in the Asiatic part of Empire that was published and distributed by the *mukhbir*. The Sultan and Vizier began the crackdown on the printing and both rebels were exiled to Paris where they met the Egyptian Prince Mustafa Fazıl Pasha. From there this organization member started to call themselves as *Yeni Osmanlılar* (New Ottomans or Young Ottomans) or, in French *Jeunes Turcs*, the phrase was first used by Mustafa Fazıl (Zurcher, 1992: 69-70). Historian Erick J. Zurcher describes how Young Ottomans drew their idea of nation

To expound his ideas to an Ottoman public, Kemal created a new vocabulary giving old words new meanings corresponding to the terminology of nineteenth-century liberalism. *Vatan*, the Arabic word for one's birthplace, became the equivalent of the French *patrie*, *hürriyet* (being a free man, not a slave) that of liberty, *millet* (community) that of nation. This new terminology would be the ideological instrumentarium for later generations of Muslim liberals and nationalists (Zurcher, 1992:68).

The Ottoman Sultan met Namik Kemal during his visit to France as part of his European tour in 1869. After deaths of Tanzimat reformist grand vizier Mehmed Fuat Pasha (1869) grand vizier Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha (1871) made efforts to seek the return of Namik Kemal Pasha and Ziya Pasha to the Empire. The Young Ottomans actively influenced in drafting a new constitution for

the Empire in 1876 and Namik wanted constitutional monarchy and opposed authoritarian government. He was willing to connect the European liberalism with Islamic tradition to form Islamic modernity that became popular in the following century throughout Islamic world. Young Ottomans also contributed to form new style of politics that was direct replica of the European politics (Hourani, 1962: 40-70). They were considered as the first ideological political movement in Ottoman Empire that originated among the elite of the Empire. These nationalists were intentionally trying to establish *Efkâr-i Umumiye* or public opinion on Ottomanism which was a common idea of the Young Ottomans (Zurcher, 1992:70).

The Young Ottomans felt that Sultan was not willing to cooperate towards establishing a constitutional monarchy and stayed as hurdle for their progress. Therefore they forcibly removed Sultan Abdülaziz on 30 May 1876 but he waited for his chance to re-capture the reign. But he was found dead on 4 June of same year and he was followed by Sultan Murad V on 31 June but he was imbecile and a heavy drinker, which forced him to abdicate the throne in favour of his cousin Sultan Abdülhamid II. Sultan Abdülhamid took the throne on 31 August to 1876 and his reign continued for next 30 years ending on 29 April 1909 (Creasy, 1877: 548).

The Constitution of 1876 (Kanun-i-Easi)

The Ottoman Sultan called grand vizier Midhat Pasha to draft a constitution for the Ottoman Empire. The constitution committee was formed under the chairmanship of Pasha with help of 28 Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals. Among the western educated Armenian Dr. Krikor Odian Efendi was chief advisor for Midhat Pasha and inducted Dr. Arslanian and Dr. Servitschen into the drafting council as members. From Turks Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha and other were part of drafting council (Davison, 1963: 134). During Sultan Abdülhamid II reign, the new Constitution was completed and proclaimed on 23 December 1876 which contained 119 articles in 12 sections (Davison, 1963:13). Many believed the new constitution was not new ideas of Europe rather it was just modified Tanzimat Ottoman reforms. It granted separate powers for millets but it did not reflect in administrative changes (Shaw, 1977: 175). The new Constitution adopted many sections from Tanzimat reforms particularly the Provincial Council Act 1861, where provisions related to millets were included. It incorporated millet council structure in the central, provincial and local administration and in their relations with the Ottoman government.

The Ottoman constitution was much influenced by the Armenian National Constitution thus Armenian millet connected itself with the new social formation (Shaw, 1997: 187).

The European states were apprehensive of the 1876 constitution because it provided special attention to human rights. Ottoman Empire also established a new parliament to assist the Council of State in legislative process, which worked equal to the Sublime Porte. Historian Stanford Shaw comments on how constitutionalists approach to Tanzimat “In structuring modern government out of Ottoman experience, the members of the Constitutional Commission, sharply watched by the new sultan, produced an instrument that was intended to carry on the work begun by the Tanzimat” (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 187). The new Constitution was replica of the European model; therefore, the individual rights were given primary consideration. The new official policy of the state was Ottomanism that was took the Ottomans and millet relations to next paradigm. The Tanzimat reform was incarnate as 1878 constitution that aimed at erase the separatism attitude of the millet community. Therefore, new constitution highly emphasized on individual rights and which they added as law like Europe.

Following articles related individual rights.

All subjects of the Empire are, with distinction, called Ottomans whatever religion they profess (article 8). All Ottomans enjoy individual liberty on condition that they do not interfere with the liberty of others (Article 9).

All Ottomans are equal in the eyes of the law. They have the same rights and duties toward the country without prejudice regarding religion (Article 17).

It was asserted that admission to public offices depended only on ability and on knowledge of the official state language (Articles 18, 19).

Every Ottoman was guaranteed free pursuit of his religion on condition only that ‘no breach of public order or good morals be committed (Article 11).

Nevertheless, Islam remained the official religion of the state. Taxes were to be levied in proportion to the wealth of each taxpayer (Article 20).

Private property could no longer be confiscated, except for public purposes and with adequate compensation (Article 21).

The privacy of the home was declared inviolable: ‘Authorities may not forcibly enter any residence; to whomsoever it belongs, except in cases determined by law (Article 22).

Other articles attempted to eliminate arbitrary treatment of subjects: 'No sum of money can be gathered as a duty or a tax or under any other denomination except in accordance with the law' (Article 25)

The rack and torture in any form are completely and absolutely prohibited (Article 26) (Davison, 1963: Shaw, 1997: 177).

The Ottoman Parliament was opened on 19 March 1877 at Dolmabahçe Palace with grandeur reception held for many high domestic and foreign dignitaries. The Parliament General Assembly was called *Meclis-i Umumi*, lower house as *Meclis-i Mebusan* and the upper house as *Heyet-i Ayan*. For General Assembly, the President should choose among the elected deputies who were written in constitution but the Sultan appointed Ahmet Vefik Pasha was President of the assembly (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 182). It allotted equal number of representation to all provinces of the Empire, the Ottomans wanted to expose their equality to European powers by giving more number to non-Muslim population. The ratio of per representative for non-Muslims was overrated like one deputy for every 82,882 for Constantinople males, while in the eastern provinces had one representative 107,557 males (44 deputies), one for every 133,367 Muslim males (71 deputies) and Jews were given one deputy 18,750 for males (4 deputies) (Shaw, 1997: 181). In 1876 among newly elected deputies, Krikor Efendi was appointed as minister in the parliament though he was an Armenian (Davison, 1963: 135; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 183).

The Ottomans granted rights to non-Muslims community only when there was external pressure from the European powers. The reform *Hatt-i Humayun* of 1856 was proclaimed due to Crimean War 1853-1856. Constantinople Conference started on 11 December 1876 all the European diplomats were gathered to discussed resolution on autonomy to Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina but, the Ottoman vehemently opposed the resolution. On 23rd December 1878, the Ottoman grand vizier proclaimed the new Ottoman National Constitution. Thus, new Ottoman constitution of 1878 was also considered as a safety valve for the Sublime Porte to avoid European diplomats visiting the Empire for the support of non-Muslims. Therefore, the grand vizier Midhat Pasha announced that the Empire drafting the new constitution to provide more rights to non-Muslims (Davison, 1990: 117).

Sublime Porte also thought that introducing such radical reforms like constitution would face problems from the Muslims Turks. However, 1876 witnessed three Sultans in quick succession

and the grand vizier utilised the situation to introduce a new constitution. Thus, Midhat Pasha precipitated reform policy and made other higher officials to receive new mode of governments. Midhat Pasha was last Tanzimat diplomats had a fair approach to implement the equality and never compromised his ideas of Tanzimat (Davison, 1990, 117). Even though Sultan Abdülhamid II proclaimed 1876 constitution for equal treatment for all citizens of the Ottoman Empire but at end of year he rejected it by stating to protect sovereignty of the Empire and transformed state into autocratic reign which lasted next 30 years. Armenian nationalistic attitude and revolutionary thoughts became virulent which led status of Sultan Abdülhamid II period. Further Armenian millet condition went down normal to worst at his reign. Therefore, Armenian freedom movement began at foreign soil also later it was intrude into eastern provinces. In the eastern provinces the Protestant millet was active in encouraging radicalization against the dominance of Turks. At that time the Ottoman government and Armenian Gregorian millet also condemned the inflow of foreigners with western ideas and anti-Ottoman attitude growing through different missionaries in those regions (Lewy, 2005: 11).

The relationship between the Armenian millet and Ottoman government degenerated after the Armenian Patriarchate participation in Congress of Berlin in 1878; thereupon Armenian issue became an international issue. European states became more vigilant and consistently pressured Sultan Abdülhamid II to give more rights to Christian subjects (Masters, 2009: 53). The Ottoman Empire's eastern Armenians and Russian government had cordial and protectorate relationship that encouraged the Armenians to aspire for an independent state. In the early state Armenian nationalists were participating in revolutionary activities even though major European power did not heed to their grievances. The Armenian groups expanded throughout the Ottoman Empire particularly Constantinople, Trabzon, Erzurum and Van *vilayets* and in these cities Armenian lived in sizeable numbers. The Armenian revolutionary organizations such as the Goodwill Society 1868-1876 (*Barenepatak Enkerruthiun*), Devotion to the Fatherland Bureau (1874) (*Kontora Haireniats Siro*) and Black Cross Society (1878) followed armed struggles and had regular contacts with Russian government (Nalbandian, 1963: 67-90). Armenians stayed in Europe and from Russia Armenian merchants sent large nationalist periodicals and publications to the Armenian quarters through foreign post offices. In Tiflis, many small Armenian revolutionary groups were formed and they sent rifles and ammunition via Batum to Rize in the Ottoman Empire. From Tabriz the Armenian sent their agents to fight against the Muslims,

Kurds and Circassian tribes who were torturing the village Armenians in those regions. Unlike the Bulgarians or Serbians, Armenians had geographical limitation as they lived in six different eastern *vilayets*, though they were second largest after combined population of Turks and Kurds (Nalbandian, 1963:67-90; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 202).

Russo-Turkish War 1877-78

In the 19th century, Russia was eagerly trying to dominate the South-eastern Europe by occupying the Bulgarian and Serbian territories. The Czar of Russia also wanted through eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire with the help of Armenian Orthodox Christians lives in six *villayets*. However, in eastern part of the Empire Protestant missionary was very active and they were patronised by Britain (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 200). Russia was also waiting to re-take territory lost at Crimean War in 1856 in the Balkans and Caucasus regions. In November 1876, Czar Alexander of Russia said that the Ottoman should respect the life and security of Christian minorities. Further, the Czar asserted that if Sublime Porte did not implement it he would enforce them in Congress (dialogue) with his friendly states or unilaterally use forces (Creasy, 1877:549). Since the Crimean War, the Bulgarians were bitterly waiting for autonomy from the Ottoman Empire and in 1876 Bulgarian conducted a small revolt against Ottoman governments, which the Sultan forces suppressed. In Europe, news spread ferociously attitude and suppress of such anti-Sultan forces depicted as “terrible Turk or Sultan.” Czar of Russia considered Bulgarian incident became deemed as suppression of minority’s rights and Russia taken incident as *casus belli* for to invade into the Ottoman Empire. Russian armed forces prepared for the invasion and started attack on Balkans and Caucasus simultaneously in both border of the Empire. The Czar sent his Caucasus Corps to war with the Ottoman which composed of 50,000 soldiers and 202 guns under the full of command of Grand Duke Michael Nikolaevich, the Governor General of the Caucasus province (Menning, 2000:78). The Russian Caucasus Corps also included many Armenians such as Generals Mikhail Loris-Melikove (his original name was Melikian), Arshak Ter-Ghukasov, Ter-Ghukasyan, Ivan Lazarev and Beybut Shelkovnikov to fight against the Ottomans to show solidarity with their Ottoman Armenian brethren (Allen and Muratoff, 1953: 113-114).

The Russian Armenian commander Ter Gukasov was first stationed near Yerevan later, he entered the Ottoman territory and captured town Bayazid. Further Gukasov progressed and

occupied Ardahan on 17 May 1877(Walker, 2011: 217-220). In May Russian force captured the Kars city but the Ottoman Soldiers re-took it but in November under the command of General Lazarev Russia launched severe attack on Kars and re-occupied it on 18 November (Walker, 2011:217-220). Next year the famous Black Sea town Erzurum was captured by Russia through a siege but the Russian force left the Erzurum to the Ottomans at end of the war. The Czar of Russia occupied the Batumi, Ardahan, Kars, Olti, Sarikamish, and Russian army renamed as Kars Oblast or Kars Province (Melkonyan, 2011: 223-244). The Ottoman Armenians trusted that the Russian would liberate from the Ottoman rule and leave them in an independent or autonomy region. Therefore many Ottoman Armenians guided the Russian force at war period and many worked as informers to Russian army to inform about Sultan's army movement in the eastern provinces. After War the Russian force remained in the region until the Conferences of Berlin in 1878 and in the mean time pro-Russian sentiment was high among the Eastern Armenians (Lewy, 2005: 14).

In the Balkan theatre, Russian forces hastened their advancement towards Constantinople but due to pressure from Britain and France, they halted at San Stefano fort in January 1878. To maintain status quo the British sent fleet to Bosphorus Sea. Russia on both front successfully reached its ambition of controlling the Ottoman Empire but other European timely intervened. Thus Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 ended with Treaty which was signed on 2 March 1878 at San Stefano in Bulgaria. Constantinople Armenian Gregorian Patriarchate urged the Russian government to include subjects related to Armenians. Russia too responded with including Armenian welfare and security from Kurds and Circassian in the Empire through article 16 of the Treaty (Lewy, 2005: 14).

Treaty of San Stefano, Article 16:

As the evacuation of the Russian troops of the territory they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engaged to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians (Official document, *The American journal of International Law*; Edward, 1891: 2686).

The San Stefano Treaty 1878 allowed Russia to occupy major portions of Ottoman territories in the Balkan regions and Caucasus regions. Further, it received Ardahan, Kars and Bayazid and

important port city Batum. The Russians encircled major portion of Black Sea which became a direct threat to Ottoman Empire. The Britain considered expansion of the Russians as threat.

Congress of Berlin, 1878

The Congress of Berlin which happened on 13 July 1878 with the participation of great powers of the period such as Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Austrian-Hungary, and Italy. On the other side was Ottoman Empire to re-negotiate Treaty of San Stefano that was written three months earlier. After European powers constant compulsions Russia had to agree upon the main content of Treaty of Berlin 1878, which cut down major gains of Czar through Treaty of San Stefano. Treaty of Berlin was signed on 13 July 1878; this new Treaty interpreted the Russian grand plan of controlling the Ottoman Empire. According to Treaty, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania got their independence, and Bosnia, Herzegovina were under the joint administration of Austria-Hungary as occupied territories thus Ottomans Balkans territories were lost at the Congress. The Ottoman European neighbour Bulgaria nominally under the Ottoman control because it also got autonomy status in Treaty of Berlin. In Caucasus region, it mentioning that Russian returned Bayazid regions to Ottomans and Batum port now allowed. The Ottomans should not station any military ships in Black Sea region even its own northern shore (Lewy, 2005: 15). Further, the Berlin Treaty said that Russia should call back its military from the eastern side of the Ottoman Empire. In the Congress of Berlin Russia accepted Article 16 of Treaty of San Stefano which was related to the withdrawal of enforcing reform in six Armenian provinces and instead it has followed Article 61 of Berlin Treaty. On other hand, the Ottoman Empire diluted articles related to Armenian rights with support of Prussia's Otto Von Bismarck.

Treaty of Berlin Article 61:

The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassian and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the powers, who will superintend their application (Hurewitz, 1956:190).

At end of the Treaty of Berlin the rival attitude sharpened between the Ottomans and Armenians. The Armenians were expecting change in their condition of life after Congress Berlin in which Article 61 dealt with rights of Armenians under the Ottomans. European powers had Armenian cause as reasons to interfere in the affair of the Ottoman Empire that was tempestuous to Sultan

and Armenians behaved like pawns in the hand of their European supporters. Now Sultan was faced with the core issue of Armenian nationalism, because they claim that central Anatolia was part their motherland or greater Armenian nation. Armenian motherland claim definitely reduced the size of the Ottomans main land that was considered as an identity and basement for Ottoman or Turkish ideology. The Muslim Turks also became aware of the Armenian thought of nationalism that mounted feud between Turks and Armenians (Lewy, 2005: 15). Russia for its part created troubles to Ottomans and encouraged Armenian uprisings or advancement to Mediterranean or Persian Gulf for the next two decades (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 190).

The Armenians expected that their issue would be discussed by the all-European states so; they forced the Ottomans Empire to give off portion of the eastern provinces to Armenians community who were waiting for years. However, the Sublime Porte assured to introduce new religious and civil reforms in eastern province in six *vilayets* where Armenians settled in highest percentage in the Empire after the Constantinople (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 190). The real purpose of the Congress to quote George Douglas Campbell, Duke of Argyll and a former Britain cabinet minister was “What was everybody’s business was nobody’s business?” (Lewy, 2005: 15). The Sublime Porte said at end of the Congress that the Empire would fulfil the promises that it made at Berlin but those remained in words (Lewy, 2005: 15). Great Britain signed separate Treaty with the Ottomans called Cyprus Convention through which Cyprus came under British control. After the Convention, Britain pressured the Sublime Porte to grant equal treatment for the Armenians and to assure their safety from Kurds and others. In 1896, the British officer noted that “If there had been no Treaty of Berlin and on Anglo-Turkish Convention, the Armenians would doubtless have continued to be oppressed as they had been oppressed for centuries” (Lewy, 2005: 15).

The Armenian millets representative at the Congress of Berlin was Constantinople Archbishop Mgrdich Khrimian and he with a petition to lobby for Armenian independence or autonomy from the Ottoman rule. During Congress of Berlin, the Archbishop was prevented from participating discussion related to the Ottoman Empire. After returning from the Congress, the Archbishop in Constantinople at Patriarchate sermons he shouted

where he likened the peace conference to a “big cauldron of Liberty Stew” into which the big nations dipped ‘iron ladles’ for real results, while the Armenian delegation had the ‘Paper Ladle.’ ‘Ah dear Armenian people,’ Khrimian said, ‘could I have dipped my Paper

Ladle in the cauldron it would sog and remain there! Where guns talk and sabers shine, what significance do appeals and petitions have? (Peter, 2003:44).

Hence, Archbishop distinguish speech was direct call for arms struggle international dialogue (Lewy, 2005: 16).

After the Treaty of Berlin, the Armenian *millets* changed their understanding of European politics related to support for Armenian questions. The Serbian and Bulgarian War of Independence 1878 instigated the Armenian to further deepen the struggle against the Ottoman force. During Russian intrusion into the Ottoman territory many eastern Armenian helped Russian army and main officers in the Russian army were of Armenian origin that spread adverse thoughts among Muslims and Armenians. Russian Armenian too wanted to assist their Ottoman Armenian brethren from the Turkish and Kurdish forces. However, *amira* Armenians in Constantinople and other major cities remained loyal to Ottoman government and served it by opposing eastern Armenian revolutionaries. Armenian Patriarch Nerses Varjabedian (1837-1884) tried his best at San Stefano and Treaty of Berlin to secure Armenian rights in the international congress by expressing their plight. European powers supported Armenian autonomy only by words not stern action, and Russian government primarily boosted the Armenian nationalism to weaken Ottoman Empire.

Thus Armenian and Ottoman issue became part of the European discussion (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 202). The Armenian plight continued in through the next two decades and forcing them to form revolutionary movements to force Ottoman and European powers to take serious note of the Armenian question. Diaspora Armenian expressed their support for betterment of Ottoman Armenian that became main problem for the Ottoman government and the Armenian revolutionaries received huge assistance from the Russian Armenians (Hovannisian, 1997: 206-212). Before the Treaty of Berlin, the Sultan had no antagonistic attitude towards the Armenian *millets* communities and majority of Armenians wanted to live in the empire as equal citizens. Even Armenians expected protection of the Ottoman judicial system from corrupt officials and ruthless Kurdish nomads. Later when the Armenians understood they were left out they were turned towards self-identity, Armenians nationalism and finally to clash with Ottoman force. Armenian leaders from all three millets look for mutual understanding in resolving issues (Lewy, 2005: 15).

The Armenians thought that if the Sultan fails to introduce new reform, the European powers would come to the Armenians help proved false. However, those European states were unenthusiastic about the conditions of the Armenian reforms. The Sultan was also annoyed by the reoccurring complaints and therefore he tightened his approach. In a meeting with the German Ambassador Sultan Abdülhamid II told that “He would rather die, he told the German ambassador in November 1894, than yield to unjust pressure and grant the Armenians political autonomy (Lewy, 2005: 16).

Chapter V

Armenian millet during Tanzimat Era

The chapter delineates the conditions and nature of Armenian *millet* system during the Tanzimat era (1856 to 1896). The Ottoman reform decrees during this period pertained to religious minorities, in general, and Armenian *millet* in particular. In 1839 and 1856 two edicts were issued by Sultan Abdülmecid through the office of the grand viziers, Mustafa Reshit Pasha and Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha respectively, who guided the Sultan to introduce reforms and were instrumental in their formulation and implementation. As a result of these edicts, social and economic differences within the Armenian *millet* became more pronounced. Further this chapter discusses the period from the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909), his authoritarian administration and his anti-Tanzimat attitude. Armenian revolutionary movements particularly Dashnaks and Hunchaks were main organisation during Abdülhamid II period and their activities propelled stern measures against the Armenian. The Sultan began his actions against the Armenians in 1890 was peaked at the Armenian massacres during 1894-1896 which took around 100,000 Armenians lives.

Sultan Abdülhamid II Reign

Sultan Abdülhamid II came to the throne in 1876 with a promise to restore the constitutional order with the condition that Sublime Porte should not dominate the political affairs as was the case during Sultan Abdülmecid. Young Abdülhamid II was eager to learn from everyone in the administration particularly from the Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha. He mixed with common people, interacted with them, attended prayers along with common people and regularly called diplomats, bureaucrats, intellectuals and army officers for discussions at his court. The Sultan wished to work together with the Young Turks and told its leader Kemal Bey: “Let us work together, Kemal Bey, let us raise this state and sultanate to a higher condition than before” (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 212). The shift in his idea of the state and rule gradually occurred within a year. After, the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, the Sultan wanted to repay Ottoman debts to the European states but Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha rejected his proposal and argued that it would result in an economic burden. Disappointed, the Sultan rejected the Constantinople Port

Conference of 1878 organised by the Sublime Porte with European economic investors and their state representatives. This led to further misunderstandings between the Sultan and Sublime Porte on financial issues. The Sultan insisted Sublime Porte to re-pay the Ottoman debts to European states and for this the approvals of the newly-formed Ottoman parliament was necessary. The parliament was taking time and this led to misgivings about democratic system of government (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 212-213).

After Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Sultan realized that European powers were more concerned with the Christians of Balkans and Asiatic Ottoman Empire but not interested in the atrocities inflicted upon the Bulgarian and Bosnian Muslims by Christian militias in Balkans. Sultan was surprised by the Armenian Orthodox Patriarchate's participation in the Congress and discussed issues against the Sultan administration. This led him to recognise that all Christian states, even though they speak different languages and belong to different ethnic groups, were united in the name of religion. Thereupon, he decided that to build a strong empire, he needed to preserve the sovereignty of the Empire. Further, he decided that the Ottoman Empire was not mature enough to have democracy and instead an autocratic government was suitable for the conservative Islamic-Ottoman Empire (ibid).

Modern Ottoman historians Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw note the gradual transformation of Sultan Abdülhamid II from being a ruler inclined towards democracy to be an autocratic. They argue,

He developed a structure of personal control that, with the centralized system of administration created by the Tanzimat, made possible a far more extensive and complete autocracy than anything ever achieved previously by the greatest of the sultans. Through this autocracy Abdülhamid managed to restore and defend his shattered empire, revitalize its society, and bring to a successful conclusion most of the reforms that had been threatened after 1871, thus *making himself the last man of the Tanzimat* (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:212).

British historian Sommerville Story notes that Abdülhamid “who had inherited from his forebears a spirit of Oriental absolutism, joined to elaborate cunning and refined hypocrisy, could see in those who surrounded him only enemies and conspirators” (Story, 1920: 255). The Sultan was reported to have said once, “I made a mistake when I wished to imitate my father, Abdülmecid, who sought to reform by persuasion and by liberal institutions. I shall follow in the footsteps of my grandfather, Sultan Mahmud II. Like him I now understand that it is only by

force that one can move the people with whose protection God has entrusted me” (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 213).

The Sultan started loathing the Tanzimat reformers of recent past, especially Midhat Pasha who helped him ascend the throne. He deemed that the Tanzimat reformers consolidated the Empire by declaring secular laws and reformers thought about bringing unity of the Empire through modern ideas like equality and democracy. But the Sultan felt that modern equality and secular democratic government was ruining his individual authority (Story, 1920: 255).

Sultan Abdülhamid II came to power at the peak of the Tanzimat reform period, known for democratic transformation of the Empire and within span of a year, the Sultan pulled off all reforms and kept away reformers from the administration and Midhat Pasha, the last of the advocates of Tanzimat, was assassinated in 1883 (Davison, 1963: 418; Melson, 1982: 500). Even though the Sultan explicitly identified himself as anti-Western, anti-Tanzimat and supporter of Islamic traditions, the first decade of his reign witnessed continuation of some of the Tanzimat reforms, especially in the field of education (Cleveland, 2009: 120). Though he was a pious Muslim ruler, he separated religious education and modern education and established 51 new secondary schools between 1882 and 1894 in the eastern parts of the Empire (ibid: 121).

British historian Sommerville Story, quoting Ismail Kemal Bey (a leading official of Midhat Pasha) notes, “Everything that had been accomplished in the way of reform or high politics during the time of his father and his predecessors he considered to be misfortunes for the dynasty and the Empire” (Story, 1920:255). The government of Abdülhamid II treated the three Armenian *millets* (Gregorian Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants) merely as religious organisations and avoided giving them political importance. The administration directly dealt with Armenian revolutionaries instead of through the Patriarchate, disregarded the Armenian Gregorian Orthodox *millet* and others (Melson, 1982: 506).

Armenians *millet* system under Sultan Abdülhamid II

Since the 19th century, Europe started experiencing benefits of the industrial revolution with advancements in science and technology. On the other hand, freedom, individual rights, equality and fraternity became a part of political culture since the French revolution. These European ideologies were inculcated by the Armenians towards realising their social and political

developments under the Ottoman Empire. Majority of the Armenians believed that their awakening or *Zartonk* era had begun and it was time to claim a distinct Armenian identity from the Ottoman yoke (Arkun, 2005: 72-73). The Sultan also understood the international scenario of the period and hence proclaimed modern reform decrees. The Armenians felt that Ottoman reform decrees *Hatt-i Gulhane* (1839) and *Hatt i- Humayun* (1856) supported the religious minorities of the Empire, but in practice it was not realised because as this was deemed as anti-Islam leading to pressures from the Muslim *ulema* (Arkun, 2005: 72-73; Dadrian, 1995: 67). At the same time, the Armenian question surfaced in the European politics mainly after the Congress of Berlin (1878). Dominant European powers such as Britain, France and Russia became concerned about well being of Armenian *millet* and demanded equal treatment under the Sultan. This in turn was seen as European interference in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire and infuriated the Turks.

Under the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians widely participated in all sectors of the society throughout the 19th century, particularly during Tanzimat era. They became chiefly involved in inland and maritime trade. The Sultan also facilitated all religious communities to take part in internal and external economic activities, which provided a common stage for them to learn about each other. The Ottoman approach towards non-Muslims in the economic field was *laissez faire* and hence the Ottoman *millet* system smoothly contacted and maintained its internal autonomy (Göçek, 1993: 516-17).

Generally, the social structure of the Ottoman Empire was dominated by Muslims but the minorities enjoyed a degree of religious freedom and autonomy. With Tanzimat reforms, most occupations became free from domination of any particular religious community. The classification of jobs based on ethnic or religious identity started to wean; for example, not all Turks were engaged in cereal farming and not all Armenians were silk weavers. In cities, particularly in Constantinople, both Armenians and Greeks were engaged in shoe making. Many other professions like cotton and spice trades were conducted by different *millets* (Quataert, 2000: 182-83). The Armenians were famous in silk production in the eastern part of the Empire but a certain number of the Greeks weavers were also engaged in silk production. In Trabzon province, Armenians and Turks were engaged in silk weaving but later Armenians shifted to carpet making due to competition and profit issues. Thus, there were no restrictions on any *millet*

with regard to choosing occupations and the Armenians were allowed, without any territorial limitation, to do profitable business under Sultan Abdülhamid II. Thus, no Ottoman minorities dominated any single business and they had variety of option for occupation than their Europe counterpart (Ibid).

Sultan Abdülhamid II followed a strong economic policy that affected the Armenian villages in the eastern parts, especially with the re-introduction of *jizya* as *bedel-i askeriye* (substitute for military service). The exemption from military service in exchange of taxes for the Armenians created discontent among the Muslim Turks, who argued that the Turks were fighting for the Empire and dying in battlefield but the non-Muslims were enjoying safety and security only by paying special taxes. As Turkish historian Fatma Müge Göçek elaborates,

... from economical point of view the empire was healthy other than small economic hardship, but only reforms in social hierarchy in nineteenth century deteriorated the empire. The long duration of Ottoman rule (over six centuries) can be explained parts as a consequence of this economic inclusion policy. But it was the Ottoman social-exclusion policy that started to destroy the social fabric of the empire in the nineteenth century (Göçek, 1993: 516-17).

The Muslim Turks always doubted the Armenian *millet*'s loyalty to the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire. They, however, disregarded the fact that modern educated Armenians want equality and fraternity, which Muslims considered as anti-*sharia*.

Under the Ottomans, the Armenians who were living in the six *vilayets* (Sivas, Erzurum, Mamuretulaziz, Diyarbakir, Bitlis and Van), considered that the great Armenian kingdom existed in those *vilayets* and though they were minority, the consciousness about their heritage prompted them to raise the question of Armenian independence. The Armenians expected respite from problems, especially from the harassments at the hands of Kurds after the 1856 decree but it did not materialise. The Turks undermined the Armenian status and did not yield to the claims for equality between Muslim Turks and the non-Muslim Armenians (Deringil, 2009: 347-349, Lapidus, 2002: 496). Gradually, the Armenians understood the problems in implementation of Tanzimat decrees and recognised the lack of intent in the Sublime Porte to treat Armenians equally vis-à-vis Kurds and Turks. The Kurdish intrusions into areas where the Armenians resided created economic and social problems and the latter complained to Sublime Porte and Embassies of European states (Melson, 1982: 498). After Treaty of San Stefano (1878) and

Congress of Berlin (1878), the Russians regularly enquired about the conditions of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Later on Britain and France who wanted to undermine the growing Russian influence also began to interfere in the Ottoman domestic matters on behalf of the Armenians.

Once the Russian troops left the Eastern part of the Empire, particularly Kars and Erzurum provinces after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Kurdish settlers ransacked and destroyed Armenian agriculture and residential settlements. This forced the Armenians to take shelter in Armenian populated areas on the Russian side. This further created suspicion among the Turks and the influx of Muslim refugees from the Balkans where they faced retribution due to wars and conflicts generated more mistrust between the native Armenians and Turkish population (Lewy, 2005: 10). In 1880, British deputy Consul Captain Clayton in a diplomatic note listed the hardship experienced by the Armenians in the Eastern part of the Empire, saying robbery, extraction and oppression by the Kurdish tax collectors were common and the Armenian families were treated as secondary subjects and at times faced misbehaviours by the Ottoman soldiers (Simsir, 1982: 645-655). Therefore, the centuries-old Armenian understanding gradually began to change especially due to constant subjugation under the Turks and Kurds.

In 1889, the signs of the hatred and loathing against the Armenian communities became very visible in the Eastern part due to lawlessness and inaction of the Sultan's administration against Turkish and Kurdish thugs who exploited and looted Armenian farmers and traders. In one of the famous examples of inaction against oppressors, a Kurdish bandit, Musa Bey was arrested after pressures from European embassies but was set free without any conviction after judicial investigation (Eliot, 1900: 444). The Armenian *millet* community now regularly registered its protest against the Kurds in nearby Consulate or Embassy in Constantinople and therefore, British, French and Russian ambassadors were informed about the plight of the Armenians which in turn angered the Sultan. On the other hand, the Armenian elites living in Constantinople and other major towns, specifically the Armenian Patriarchate and wealthy maritime tradesmen, were unhappy with the Armenian rebellion movements fighting against the Sultan throughout the Empire.

The Armenian revolutionaries had incessantly pleaded for financial contributions from affluent and wealthy Armenians to support their political activities. The Constantinople bourgeois were hesitating to assist the rebellion activities against the Sultan as at stake was their family lives and long earned security and wealth. Many rich and religious Armenians did not wish to damage the comfortable equilibrium gained with the Ottomans and Turks over centuries (Suny, 2015:142). Ronald Rigor Suny has detailed the Constantinople Armenian perspective about Armenian revolutionary activities,

... popular Armenian attitudes towards the radicals were marked by ambivalence. A well-placed Armenian told a long time British resident in the country, 'We admit the (Armenian revolutionary) movement is a hopeless one, but what can we say to our poor countrymen at Yuzgat [Yozgat] and elsewhere when they tell us 'Better die once than die a thousand deaths such as we die daily under the present oppression?' (Sultan Abdülhamid reign and Kurdish menace) ' Only with great difficulty did the radicals, always a tiny minority among Armenians, convince some of the more self-reliant of their countrymen, like those of Samsun and Zeitoun, to resist Kurdish taxation and impositions (Suny, 2015:107).

The Armenian Patriarchate supported the Sultan in all possible ways until the 1894 massacre but things started to change soon after. Armenian Gregorian patriarch Ashikian petitioned to the Porte to curb and curtail violence against Armenians in six *vilayets* but did not receive a constructive response unlike the earlier Tanzimat era (Eliot, 1900: 445; Suny, 2015: 107). The Armenian Gregorian *millet* was not comfortable with the new Armenian radicals because they wanted to live amicably with their Muslim counterparts but the Protestants supported armed struggle with the help of Britain and the United States. American missionaries were involved in religious and educational activities in the regions and a tiny group of Armenians were fighting against the huge Ottoman establishment. Common Armenians were not interested in armed struggle but they considered that using large forces and allowing Kurds to quell Armenian movement was against the Constitution. On the other hand, Muslims continued their silence over attacks on the Armenians and repression by the Sultan forces. Thus, the mutual suspicious and hatred between the Turks and Armenians became widespread (Shaw, 1977: 202-203).

Narrating about the Erzurum event in 1890, historian Sir Charles Eliot observes:

... the summer of the same year witnessed an event which may be regarded as the opening of hostilities between the Ottoman government and the Armenian communities. It was reported to the Sublime Porte that the Armenians of Erzurum had stored arms and ammunition in the principal church of the town for the purposes of a revolutionary

outbreak. The church was searched by the troops and brutally desecrated. Nothing suspicious was found in it, but popular passion was aroused; the Turks were alarmed, and the Armenians ready to defend their religion with their blood. The result was a conflict, in which about fifteen Armenians were killed and many wounded. Several foreign houses and missionary establishments were attacked. At the time this outbreak was called a massacre. Five years later so trivial a slaughter would hardly have attracted attention (Eliot, 1900: 445).

The Armenian started to think about nationhood due to continuous disappointments from the Sultan's administration and its failure to safeguard the Armenian *millets* from the marauding Kurds. Early Armenian nationalists got support from European states that wished to antagonise the Sultan.

During the reign of Abdülhamid II, the Armenians were the second largest community after Muslims to serve in the Ottoman administration. The newly formed ultra nationalists wanted to spoil the smooth relationship between the Sultan and the loyal Armenians. The Sultan due to his economic burden to wield his administration gave permission to the Kurds to use coercive methods of tax and arrear collection from the Armenian farmers and forced many Armenians to raise arms against the Empire. The Armenian fringe elements formed guerrilla squads to attack Ottoman postmen and Kurdish tax collectors and asked the Armenian farmers to boycott the Kurds and not sell them grains but the farmers did not heed such radical advises (Shaw, 1977: 201-202). The Armenian radicals realised that majority of the Armenian were loyal and non-political in character and therefore they sought to provoke the Ottoman officials by carrying out assassinations.

Sultan Abdülhamid II understood the intensity of the Armenian radicalisation and their aspirations for the Anatolian land but this was contrarian to the modern idea of Turkish nationalism and this forced him to take action against the Armenian armed struggle. The Sultan wanted to control the Armenian protests by force through the use of army and the Kurdish militias. The creation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881 suggested regulating war expenditures and prioritising strategically important threats to repay its debts to European lenders. Therefore, the Sultan decided to eradicate any kind of social and cultural renaissance among the Armenians and agitation against his authority but such a stance also exposed the Sultan's misunderstanding of social stratification of the Ottoman society (Erickson, 2003:22; Erickson, 2013:41; Melson, 1992: 43).

Armenians Revolutionary Movements

Armenian poet Kamar-Katiba called upon fellow Ottoman Armenians and particularly Russian Armenians “to defend themselves and not to rely upon Europe, which was too far, or upon God, who was too high” (Lewy, 2005: 17). Several small groups of Armenian armed bands began in 1880 in eastern part of the Ottoman Anatolia and they were mostly supported by the Christian missionaries of the region. The despotic government of Sultan Abdülhamid II and its harsh policies were used by the leaders of the armed groups to sow national conscious among Armenians. They propagated that attaining Armenian liberty was viable only through an armed struggle. A group of Armenians called as *Defender of Fatherland* was arrested for attacks on Ottoman national security and police force or *Zabtiye* officials in Erzurum in 1883 and were sentenced for prison terms ranging to 5-15 years. In the same region, another organization called *Patriotic Society* was working from Van province founded by Mekertich Portukalian and when Ottoman officials found about this movement they changed their political ideas and changed its mode of struggle into moderate movement. This Society transformed into *Armenakan* named after Armenian newspaper published at Marseilles in France, the *Armenakan* existed even in 20th century but played restricted level Armenian politics (Lewy, 2005: 17).

It is important to note that after Armenian separatist movement began their activities, a large number of Muslim populations from Russia, Bulgaria and Bosnia immigrated to Ottoman Empire and settled in Eastern Anatolian lands adjacent to the Armenian majority regions. These newly immigrated Balkan Muslims brought with them their own experience of atrocities at the hands of Christian states and the way in which their beloved one were murdered and houses torched, their properties seized and their women humiliated. After listening to their horrific stories the Ottoman Turks were easily stirred up against their Armenian neighbours with whom they had shared life for centuries. Sultan Abdülhamid II too had many Armenian friends during his early life and many loyal Armenians were working in his personal office and official services. After the Armenian attitude changed from being loyal to hostile towards the Sultan, he ordered removal of all the Armenians working in the palace and court and ordered vigilance on Armenian internal and external trade (Shaw, 1977: 203).

Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (Armenakam)

The early Armenian revolutionaries were not very successful within the Ottoman territory, therefore many left for Europe and Russia to organise their revolutionary activities against the Ottomans. They formed a new party called Social Democrat Hunchakian Party or the Bell (*Hunchak*). Also known as 'Clarion', it was founded in Geneva in August 1887. The Armenians wanted to organise their movement in Russia but the Czar of Russia who was already under threat by his own revolutionaries denied any permission to Armenian revolutionaries to organise themselves on the Russian soil. The Hunchakian movement began to operate from Switzerland and their plans was to cross Ottoman territory, attack Ottoman government officials and Armenians alike to instigate killings of each other. Such clashes would provide a reason for foreign powers' intervention which in turn led to Bulgaria and Bosnia like settlement. The Armenian revolutionary movement wanted Armenian majority areas of the six eastern provinces as socialist Armenian republic. Hunchakian thought that after occupying all those six Anatolian provinces, they would be able to exterminate the Muslim population (Shaw, 1977: 203).

Hanchakian became an expert in the Ottoman Empire administration and functioning to deceive them regularly and transfer information among various centres of the Empire such Constantinople Ankara, Erzurum, Harput, Izmir, Van and Diyarbakir. They maintained their relations with other nationalist movements which were active in the Empire such as Macedonian, Cretian and Albanian movements and exchanged information among them against the Sultan administration. Hanchakian sent revolutionary materials of translation of the works of Karl Marx and the Communist Manifesto into Armenian through postal services of the Empire. Since 1880 they began their notorious activities such as bomb blast in public places, murder of Ottoman officials in their offices and postmen on the way their route. The Ottoman administration captured famous Armenian revolutionary poet Zhirayr Poyadjian in Yozgat in central Anatolia and hanged him in 1893 (Erikson, 2013: 13; Nalbandian, 1963: 120; Shaw, 1977: 203).

Hunchakian movement maintained its centre in Constantinople and easily registered a large number of educated Armenians member into its fold. It staged violent protest against the misery of Armenians on 15 July 1890 at Kum Kapu in Constantinople and its members forced all three Patriarchs to participate in the protests (Nalbandian, 1963: 118). The movement created

animosity between Turks and Armenians even though the Sultan administration was very vigilant to curb any unlawful activities.

Armenian Revolutionary Federation

Another well-known Armenian radical movement that existed parallel to Hunchakian movement was Armenian Revolutionary Federation also known as Dashnakians or Dashnaks founded in 1890 in Tiflis city of Russian Empire (presently Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia). Dashnak Federation was formed by a group of European-educated Armenians including Chistapor Mikaelian, Stepan Zorian and Simon Zavarian. Dashnaks became active since 1890 and tried to put together all small movements in the Empire and also planned to safeguard the Armenian villages from extortion and killings by the Kurdish bands (Erikson, 2013: 15-16). They organised *fedayi* (those who sacrifice) groups to protect the Eastern Armenians from armed attacks and to resist the Kurdish entry into Armenian villages. Dashnaks Federation was ideologically inclined towards socialism and its motto was “free, independent and unified” socialist Armenia. It used slogans like “people war against the Ottoman government” which was famous among the eastern Armenians. Dashnak followed pragmatic policy and realistic approach and was ready for internal autonomy of the Armenian region. On many occasions, its members cooperated with Hunchakian and at one point, there were plans to merge both the organizations but Hunchakian felt that Dashnaks was not close to the Marxist ideology and hence dropped the ideas. Dashnaks had its offices in Constantinople, Trabzon, Samsun, and Van and their activities became proactive after the Armenian killings of 1895 (Somakian, 1995: 15).

Sarkis Gogoonian was an Armenian student studying at St. Petersburg and was sympathetic towards the poor living conditions of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. He wanted a separate Armenian territory from the yoke of the Sultan and hence drafted an expedition into Ottoman Armenian areas by crossing the eastern border illegally with his group. Dashnaks after hearing of the expedition, wanted to be part of the event with mutual agreement and the event was named Dashnaktsuthiun (Nalbandian, 1963). The much expected expedition was conducted in September 1890 and 125 members began their journey to the Ottoman border illegally from Russian side of Armenia. The expedition bands had stitched shoulder stickers in their uniform with MH written on it meaning “Mayr Hayastan or Mother Armenia” with other side of shoulder written in Armenian “Vrezhl Vrezhl” or “Revenge Revenge.” This expedition group planned to

settle down at Trebizond, but were caught by Russian Cossacks (semi-military militias) were tried and convicted for acting against the Tsarist Empire in name of “United Armenian” which included the Russian part of Armenia. Hence, the Russian government became vigilant against the Armenian movements in its territory (Nalbandian, 1963: 158-159). Thus, Googoonian expedition did not yield any positive results to Dashnaks and they did not impress the European powers to interfere in the Ottoman affairs but it revealed to both sides about grand idea of the Armenians.

From the beginning Dashnaks was supportive of terrorist methods of its activities against the Turks, Kurds and Armenian ‘traitors.’ In 1892, Dashnaks murdered an Armenian known as Khatchatur Kereksian, the founder of Armenian Protection of Fatherland movement but later admitted that the killing was unnecessary. But Dashnaks revolutionary activities were very limited until 1894 incident and afterwards they became undisputable movement among the Armenian community (Nalbandian, 1963: 170-174).

From 1868 to 1890, many Russian Armenian students and intelligentsia formed different movements, societies and organizations to free Armenian lands from the Ottoman rule. The Russian Armenian radical movement actively engaged to provide safety and security to their brethrens living on the other side of the border and many of these Russian movements also fought against the Ottomans to liberate Armenia from Sultan’s authoritarian rule. After the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Russian interests in Ottoman Armenian question increased manifolds and the success of Bulgarian and Greek revolutions made Armenians to believe that Russia will extend similar help to their aspirations to form an independent Armenia. The Russian Armenian movements functioned from different location of the Russian Empire such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Transcaucasia, Tiflis, Erivan, and Karabagh. A few well-known Russian Armenian revolutionary movements included Union of Patriots (1886-1890), Herald Freedom (1884), Young Armenian Society (1889-1890). There were no major Armenian movement on Russian side but many Russian revolutionary activists influenced the Armenian Revolutionary Federation or Dashnakians and guided them towards a socialist and Marxist ideology (Nalbandian, 1963: 133-150).

Hamidiye Regiments

Since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Sultan Abdülhamid II granted rights to Christian *millet*s under external European pressure. In 1890 the Ottoman Armenia faced continuous clashes between Kurds and Armenian radicals which led Sultan to arrange a force, known as Hamidiye Regiment, to control the situation (Fortna, 2008: 54). The Hamidiye regiment was organised to quell the Armenian radical armed movement. Ottoman and Kurdish historian Janet Klein explains that,

... formation of the Hamidiye was in one part a response to the Russian threat, but scholars believed that the central reason was to suppress Armenian socialist/nationalist revolutionaries. The Armenian revolutionaries posed a threat because they were seen as disruptive, and they could work with the Russians against the Ottoman Empire (Klein, 2011: 140).

Sultan Abdülhamid II was impressed by Russian Cossacks of Transcaucasia and wanted a similar swiftly moving armed force to control the Armenian protests in the six *vilayets*. Sultan also needed to organise relationship with the Kurds and wanted their allegiance and thus choose them to form the new Hamidiye force. The new force was mostly trained in cavalry, and hence came to be known as Hamidiye Cavalry Regiment. There were three types of Hamidiye force based on age of soldiers, that is, *ibtidaiye* (age 17-20), *nizamiye* (age 20-32), and *redif* (age 32-40).

Sultan Abdülhamid II recognised the dangers of Armenian radicals and their activities in stimulating the Armenian population against his authority. His political adviser Sakir Pasa drafted a plan to create the Ottoman Cossacks with the help of Kurdish population of the region, who were historically familiar with the Russian approaches. It was thought that such irregular force with limited state support would protect the Empire from any internal and external threats on the eastern border. But some Ottoman secularist and Armenian *millet* patriarchs were anxious about Hamidiye regiments because they were worried that such special force would lead to further direct conflicts between the two groups (state and Armenians) and would deepen the antagonistic attitude of one another. Hamidiye was directed to occupy as much as land possessed by Armenians because the Sultan wanted to destroy the “internal enemies”. The Sultan and his aide ordered the force to focus on Armenian revolutionaries concentrated in the region and suppress the Armenian movements. The Hamidiye spread rumours like “Armenian Conspiracy”

under which Hamidiye murdered Armenian radical members to strength their illegal act and the government also supported these allegations (Klein, 2011: 5, Erickson, 2003: 13-15).

Hamidiye patrolled the eastern borders of the Empire to control the Armenian cross-border terrorism and also after formation of Kurdish regiments the political, social, and economical improvements lined up and Sultan government directly and indirectly boosted Kurdish community. The Kurds were given free hand to occupy unlimited lands from Armenians once they were driven out or exterminated of their settlement. The Kurds also began their agriculture and they were now protected under Ottoman army and their pastorals life due to them coming closer to the state (Erickson, 2003: 14). The Hamidiye regiments were supplied with latest weapons and were given permission to carry out security measures without any interference from the government.

The Kurdish forces looted many Armenian villages without constraint. Famous Hamidiye regiment leader Zeki Pasha and his marriage alliance with the Sultan made Kurds feel closer to the Ottoman state. Zeki Pasha was assigned to collect taxes for the Sultan and was commissioned to enlist as much Kurds into Hamidiye regiment to defend the Sultan's authority. Hamidiye regiments mostly enlisted poor Kurdish nomads, who due to their nomadic lifestyle, looked unkept and dirty. With the changing situation, the Kurds gained closer association with the Sultan and this gave them immunity from convictions despite numerous complaints of murder, plunder and theft. The other group that was made a part of the Hamidiye regiment in large numbers was the Ottoman Circassians and enjoyed financial support from the Sultan administration (Klein, 2011: 67, Kirakosian, 2003: 69).

The administration was not interested to register complaints against the Hamidiye regiments and they were guaranteed liberty to execute their plans against the Armenians. The Turks treated Kurds as brethren because both communities followed Islam. The Hamidiye regiments did not have a particular guidelines for their work and the only condition was that the Kurds should not turn against the Turks (interestingly Kurdish Question came to haunt Turkey since formation of the republic in 1922). The Hamidiye regiments enrolled common Kurdish youths with minimum physical suitability and they treated Armenians rudely and inhumanely and their only mission was to suppress the newly-developed nationalistic Armenian activities. The Gregorian Armenian

patriarchate continued to complain to European emissaries in Constantinople and this led to European intervention to implement Congress of Berlin. Sultan on his part initiated a façade of prosecution against the Kurdish warlord Moussa Bey but he was soon released and was exiled (Erickson, 2003: 16, Klein, 2011: 70; Miller, 1913: 428; Stavridis, 2008: 46). However, things began to deteriorate and the Armenians faced a series of organized massacres.

Samsun Massacre, 1894

In the summer of 1894, Kurdish forces entered Samsun, an Armenian village in Bitlis *vilayet* for collecting tax arrears but due to high rates, Armenians sought a reduction. But Kurdish force instead of negotiations began looting and murdering and Armenian rebels retaliated and clashed with the tax collectors. Sultan authorities punished Armenian villages rather than the Kurds, which led to Armenians in all six provinces refusing to pay taxes unless the state provides security to their lives and properties. The Sultan was angered by the Armenian boycott (Kirakosian, 2003: 59; Melson, 1982: 487).

Governor of Bitlis declared that Armenians mixed with rebels therefore to distinguish farmers and rebels the governor sent Hamidiye regiment with unrestricted freedom. The Sultan sent its Fourth regular army to assist Hamidiye force under command of Zeki Pasha (Melson, 1982: 487). The Armenian rebels after initial fighting fled to mountains and other provinces, while they ran away they also attacked and destroyed Turkish and Kurdish villages as an act of revenge, which further enraged the army and Kurdish forces which attacked Samsun. The fighting continued for 23 days from 18 August to 10 September during which Kurdish leader Zeki Pasha destroyed around 24 Armenian villages in the Bitlis *vilayet* (Shaw, 1977: 204; Walker, 1980: 70). Zeki Pasha was decorated with gifts and promotion for his loyalty to the Sultan after the Samsun massacre. British Vice-Consul, C. M. Hallward, estimates that roughly 8,000 Armenians were murdered by the Kurdish forces during the massacre (Melson, 1982: 487; Miller, 1913: 428, Stavridis, 2008: 45).

Despite measures to block the flow of information about the massacre, the news reached the European representatives through community messengers. Subsequently, European states through their ambassadors in Constantinople urged the Ottoman Sultan to stop Hamidiye atrocities with the help of Sultan army in Samsun village. After repeated diplomatic pressures he

ordered his army to control the situation (Masters, 2009: 53). Britain, France and Russia sent their consular to Samsun to enquire about incident and after the visit the three representatives pressured the Sultan to implement the Treaty of Sten Stefano and Congress of Berlin without further delays, this, however, did not happen (Melson, 1982: 487-488).

Armenian historian Peter Balakian quotes H. S. Shipley, the British Vice-consul in Constantinople (he was one of the British members of the Samsun investigative commission):

[The] Armenians were absolutely hunted like wild beasts, being killed wherever they were met, and if the slaughter was not greater, it was, I believe, solely owing to the vastness of the mountain ranges of that district which enabled the people to scatter, and so facilitated their escape. In fact, and speaking with a full sense of responsibility, I am compelled to say that (the object was) extermination, pure and simple (Balakian, 2004: 56).

The Samsun massacre “was the first instance of organized mass murder of Armenians in modern Ottoman history that was carried out in peace time and had no connection with any foreign wars” (Dadrian, 2004: 117). Though under pressure, Ottoman Sultan appointed a committee to investigate the incident but this was an eyewash as the Kurdish leader Zeki Pasha was not prosecuted.

Armenian Protest March in Constantinople or 30 September incident

The Ottoman Empire’s 1839 and 1856 Tanzimat decrees proclamation were steps towards treating all the people of the Empire with equality before law without any discrimination on the basis of upon religious and ethnic differences. Sublime Porte was practicing the 1856 decree painstakingly despite opposition from religious *ulema* but suspicious Armenian minority were not interested in serving in any services of the Sultan and maintained a separate educational system. Therefore, the political and social difference led to differences in thoughts and structural polarization between Turks and Armenians gradually drifted towards many small as well big killings of the Armenians (Göçek, 1993: 517).

After the Congress of Berlin in 1878, all three Armenian *millet*s (Armenian Gregorian Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants) in Constantinople and eastern Armenian were approached with suspicion by the Sultan administration and common Turks. Later the Kurds also became part of Turks and behaved with hostility against Armenians, while levying taxes and usurping farm yields and acted like the henchmen of the Turks. To counter such atrocities against the Armenian

farmers the nationalist Armenian chose to defend themselves from these Kurds regiments. Prohibitions on Armenian culture and language by the Ottoman Empire stimulated educated Armenian to look for autonomy as a solution to their hardship. On the other hand, political and cultural autonomy of Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Greece further spurred aspiration among Armenians for freedom from Turks.

Mistrust and small skirmishes between Armenian farmers and the Hamidiye regiments and Ottoman regular army spread in many parts of the Empire. Armenian revolutionaries mixed with common people began revenge of atrocities and the Sultan administration responded with stern suppression of the dissents. The Ottoman police arrested people wherever they protested and took them to police stations, tortured and imprisoned them. The Hamidiye regiments began to realize that their role is to torture Armenians and force to leave their lands which then became available to the Kurds. British Consul of Erzurum Philip Graves says the Hamidiye were “licensed oppressors of their Christian neighbours in the Eastern provinces” (Lewy, 2005: 23). The persistence pressures from European powers like Britain, France and Russia to implement Armenian reforms mentioned in the Congress of Berlin were futile.

The Hunchak party wants demonstrate a protest over Sultan’s refusal to implement reforms for Armenians in the eastern part of *vilayets* and against the harsh approach of his administration towards the Armenians all part of the Empire. Therefore, the Armenian revolutionaries planned a peaceful march called ‘protest-demand’ in Constantinople and Armenian Patriarch Mattheos Ismirlian also gave his consent adding to the credibility of the protest-march. Thus, professed reason for this march was to submit a petition to the Sultan but they also wanted to remind and emphasize on the Armenian demands to European powers and highlight the ailments under the Sultan. A couple days before the procession on 16 September 1895, Hunchaks sent letters to European embassies and Sultan administration. The letter (originally written in French) said,

The Armenians of Constantinople have decided to make shortly a demonstration, of a strictly peaceful character, in order to give expression to their wishes with regard to the reforms to be introduced in the Armenian provinces. As it is not intended that this demonstration shall be in any way aggressive the intervention of the police and military for the purpose of preventing it may have regrettable consequences, for which we disclaim beforehand all responsibility (Nalbandian, 1963: 123-124).

The peaceful Armenian procession began at noon on 18 September 1895 under leadership of Karo Sahakian of the Hunchak party and was joined by 2,000 protesters. The peaceful procession started from Constantinople Armenian Patriarchate's Office to Sultan palace and Sublime Porte. It reached 'Gates of Bab Ali' at Sublime Porte where they protested under Armenian nationalist Karo Sahakian Hunchakian organization (Nalbandian, 1963: 123-124). Hunchaks leader Karo along with few protesters submitted a memorandum to the Sultan about the Armenian demands in Constantinople and six eastern provinces.

The petition, written by the Hunchak Board of Directors, complained against (1) the systematic massacre of the Armenians by the Turkish government (2) the unjust arrest and the cruel punishments of prisoners (3) the Kurdish injustices (4) the corruption of tax collectors, and (5) the massacre at Samsun (Nalbandian, 1963: 124).

It demanded: (1) equality before the law; freedom of the press; freedom of speech; and freedom of assembly; (2) that all persons under arrest be given the right of habeas corpus, and that the Armenians be granted permission to bear arms if the Kurds could not be disarmed; (3) a new political delineation of the six Armenian provinces; (4) a European governor for the six Armenian provinces; and (5) financial and land reforms (Nalbandian, 1963: 124; Stavridis, 2008: 70).

Later, Karo along with other protesters demonstrated at the Gate of Bab Ali. Gradually the protest turned into riots and the Sultan police brutally launched attacks on the protesters. The demonstrations of Gate of Bab Ali were widely reported in Europe through newspapers. Particularly *Times* from London quoted the incident "the affair as one of a most grave character." It went on to say that "the rioters, who were armed, offered a most stubborn resistance," and that "the Armenians, on being arrested, were thrown to the ground, disarmed, beaten, and then bound" (Nalbandian, 1963: 125). The Hunchaks march ended with rioting and resulted in hundreds of deaths. On the other hand, Sultan highly disliked to initiate reforms, therefore he indirectly ordered to launch attacks on the Armenians which led massacre of 1895 (Melson, 1982: 488; Melson 1992: 46).

In response to the September incident, the Ministry of Police and governors of Beyoglu and Uskudar districts in Constantinople exchanged correspondence in which both discussed the social and economic status of victims and perpetrators. Ottoman state appointed a commission to enquire into the incident and the commission pointed that the participants of the demonstrations

were “subversive crowd” which included “the Armenian from all over the city and particularly who those arrived in Constantinople a few days ago from the eastern part”, most labourers from Çukurçeşme where migrant workers stayed. Ottoman Foreign Ministry had reported that demonstrators came from eastern part of the Empire particularly Bitlis, Van and Mus. The report said that due to the 30 September procession around 12 people lost their lives and their bodies were identified by Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople. Most of victims wore “aba’s” the casual dress for Armenian during at their works particularly Armenian migrant workers (Dinçer, 2013: 22).

Ottoman official newspaper *Tarik* reports that in the 1 October incident, member of demonstration were “Armenian like porters and tulumbaci’s (irregular firemen).” Further it says that Ministry of Police and Constantinople Municipality accused Armenians for first firing shot guns from Armenian inn Galata, Kasımpaşa and Çukurçeşme thus Sultan government falsely reporting to mass to antagonist Muslim community against Armenians. Report said that Kasımpaşa Armenian migrant labourer threw stone at Kurds and Iranians which led to deaths on both sides. European newspaper, on the other hand, reported the incident as peaceful march leading to communal clashes in which Armenian were victimized (Dinçer, 2013: 23).

After Armenian procession incident Constantinople was in flame and the situation was extremely palpable as Bosnian and Bulgarian Muslim were passing through the City en route to Anatolia to settle down there. Some fabricated news were spread like Ottoman policemen are killing Armenian demonstration, which further lead communal massacre at random level. These Constantinople killings had become the cause for future attacks on state property by Armenian rebel movements. Sultan sent the police force to maintain law and order in riot affected areas after Armenian Patriarchate complained to the Sultan. European states ambassadors alleged that procession was suppressed by the Sultan.

The incident was followed with many small skirmishes in Constantinople between the Armenians and Turks and Kurds. Many Armenian business establishments like cafes, bakeries, in different parts of the city were attacked. In reaction to such chain of attacks the Constantinople police ordered citizens to not indulge in any communal clashes and if a person found guilty, his working permit would be cancelled (Dinçer, 2013: 24, Erickson, 2003: 26). Nevertheless,

violence spread to other parts of the Empire particularly in the six *vilayets* (Bitlis, Erzurum, Harpout, Sivas, Diyarbakir and Van) of the Empire's eastern part.

Zeitoun Massacre 1894

Zeitoun, an Armenian dominated town in the Eastern part of the Empire had always enjoyed special autonomy from Armenian Patriarchate due to its location on hilly region. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, the Ottoman administration decided to keep strict control over Zeitoun to curtail the Russian influence and after the Bulgarian War of Independence (1878), Balkan Muslim immigrants were settled around the city. After the October 1895 incident the Armenian and Kurdish conflict reached Zeitoun but since it was an Armenian-dominated city and due its mountainous terrain, it remained immune from bigger conflicts (Barsoumian, 1997: 200).

At the same time, since the first half 19th century, Zeitoun constantly experienced Kurds turbulence and Armenian rebellion. The resistance movement over payment of taxes and lowering of taxes in drought years often ended with assault on Armenians which was became the reason for an armed rebellion. Zeitoun did not have a large-scale presence of Armenian rebels rather they had spread out to all six provinces and they maintained good networks to be able to reach Russia and Persia. The Armenian rebels were increasing their following and in the protests organised in Trabzon and Van *vilayets* hundreds of protestors attended but in the protests in Zeitoun organised by Hunchaks in 1885, people attended in thousands. It was followed with violence from both sides and troubles continued for over a month. In January 1886, Sultan administration negotiated with the Armenian rebels through mediation of external powers. The Armenian revolutionaries' participation in Zeitoun protests reached around 12,000 to 14,000 according to government estimates while nearly 18,000 regular army and Hamidiye force *redifs* (reserves) were used by the Sultan (Salt, 2003:32).

After a month-long siege, both the army and Armenian rebels accused each other of violence and massacre of common people on both sides. The number of death in the Zeitoun massacre became a bone of contention and in mid-1896, the administration declared that a total of 10,135 people died during the siege including, 1,828 Muslims, 7,863 Armenian Gregorian Orthodox, 152 Armenian Catholics and 292 Armenian Protestants (Stavrids, 2008:75). These figures, however,

were disputed and were contested by Armenian Patriarchate who argued that the number of Armenian victims was larger than what was reported by the government (Findley, 2008: 30, Shaw, 1977: 205).

The Zeitoun uprising was one of the occasions when the Armenian revolutionaries overwhelmed the Hamidiye regiment until the arrival of the Sultan's army. During uprising Sultan Abdülhamid II considered giving more autonomy to the Zeitoun administration to slow down the fighting and this was welcomed by European states. The Sultan ordered that Armenians in Zeitoun region gradually to be inducted in provincial administration in larger number and this was *irade* or Sultan order not edicts (reforms decree). Thus, new Sultan order "was enforce existing laws or regulations in harmony with." The edicts, however, were kept secret because if Sultan *irade* regarding Zeitoun came into public domain it would be considered as victory for Hunchaks and Armenian revolutionaries for their struggle against the Sultan (Salt, 2003: 33).

The Armenian revolutionaries were demanding not only safety from the Kurdish militias but also administrative and even political autonomy. It was not only social and legal demands for equality but a political demand for autonomy based on ethnicity like the Maronites of Mt. Lebanon in 1864, Bulgarians in 1878 under diplomatic pressure. Sultan Abdülhamid II realized that granting such autonomy was the starting point for demands for self-determination (Salt, 2003: 33).

Defence of Van, 1896

So far the Van *vilayet* had remained free from communal conflicts but in January 1896 the Hamidiye regiments entered into conflict and massacred many Armenians. The number of Armenian revolutionaries was less in Van and the Sultan was concerned about Van because of its strategic location between the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Van Armenians had contacts with Russian Armenians and therefore revolutionary ideas were easy to acquire (Balakian, 2004: 60).

The Armenian revolutionary party predicted that the Hamidiye regiments and Ottoman army would raid the villages to capture rebels in the name of self-defence or pre-emptive arrest (Balakian, 2004:60). The Ottoman forces reached Moush in Van province in January 1896 and were countered by the Armenian *fedayi* forces comprising 600-700 men at Aikesedan or Garden City neighbourhood in Van. The Armenian defence cleverly planned that the siege might go for months and hence stored basic necessities but fighting ended within a week. The Sultan

requested external powers, especially Britain and France for support to end communal conflict and vowed that he and his administration would provide security to “the lives and safety” to the Armenian in Van (Balakian, 2004: 60-61).

Following clashes, Armenian revolutionaries and combatants reiterated that they acted in self-defence under the threat of massacre by the Hamidiye forces. Since, Sultan had guaranteed safety to Armenians in Van revolutionaries were escorted to Persian border by the Sultan force and Hamidiye regiments and en route “Crème of the Armenian youth of Van” Armenian youth were massacred by the Ottoman army and the Hamidiye regiment belonging to Mazrik tribe. The Hamidiye forces later entered the surrounding areas of Van and torched houses and properties, killed several thousand Armenians. According to estimates by the British Vice-consul who visited the province after the incident, nearly 20,000 Armenians were killed and 350 villages were destroyed including many Churches (Balakian, 2004: 61-62)

Kanshor Expedition

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation was determined to avenge the killings of Armenians in Van and planned the Kanasor Expedition. In July 1897, a year after the incident, around 250 Dashnaks fighters crossed the border from Persia to Ottoman territory and reached Kanasor near Van town where Mazrik Kurdish tribe camped in the Tigris plains. Dashnaks fighters killed several Kurdish tribesmen in a surprise attack and managed to escape without much harm (Tashjian, 1968: 53). The Armenian victory was a result of their surprise attack and this became their *modus operandi* for other expeditions. Author Gunter Lewy points that according to Armenian folklores, in the Kanasor expeditions the Dashnaks managed a huge victory and “a major part of the Mazrik Kurdish tribe was killed,” and “part of the men folk were massacred out-right,” or “entire tribe was annihilated” (Lewy, 2005: 32). Historian William L. Langer says “the Armenians killed or barbarously mutilated men, women and children” (Langer, 1935: 350). The European media also widely covered the incident as a victory for Armenian self-defence leading to the Armenian belief that they could fight the Ottoman army and achieve their independence without the European assistance (Lewy, 2005: 32).

After the Kanasor expedition, confrontations between Armenian rebels and Ottoman forces and Kurdish regiments continued in different locations of the Eastern part of the Empire. Arms

smuggling from Russia and Persia increased and large number of Armenians were engaged in ammunition transfers (Lewy, 2005:32). Kanasor expedition was portrayed as moment of pride for the Armenians and they began to build up the notion of Armenian civilization and modern Armenian republic. Until today the Armenian Revolutionary Federation commemorates the expedition as historical event for the Armenian valour.

Constantinople Bank hostage, 1896

Since the winter of 1895-96, massacre of Armenians broke out in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. In order to avenge the killings, three Armenian nationalist youths, namely, Armen Garo, Papken Siuni and Hratch Tiryakian planned to seize Europeans administrated bank or Ottoman Bank located in Beyoglu in Constantinople (Balakian, 2004: 103-117). On 26 August 1896, the three along with 25 of their supporters took over Constantinople Ottoman bank and planted bombs in different locations of the building. Their supporters also attacked the Sublime Porte injuring many officials. Simultaneous attacks were carried out in many other places in the city including the Aya Sofia mosque where Sultan Abdülhamid II had gone to offer Friday prayers. Many of his bodyguards were killed but the Sultan escaped without any injury (Melson, 1982: 488, Shaw, 1977: 204). The bank could be retrieved from the Armenian rebels through the French mediation and the rebels were allowed a safe passage to Marseilles in France (Balakian, 2004:103-117; Miller, 1913: 429-430).

The incident, however, enraged the Sultan and in retaliation many innocent Armenians in the city were killed by the police and militias for the next two days leading to killings of between 20,000 and 40,000 Armenians (Miller, 1913: 430). The Constantinople massacre of August 1896 is described by the British historian William Miller as follows:

The Armenian quarter was attacked by gangs of men, armed with clubs, who bludgeoned every Armenian whom they met, and forced their way into the houses of Armenians or foreigners who had Armenian servants, in pursuit of their victims. Police officers and soldiers aided, and even directed, this Turkish St Bartholomew; and it was not till the representatives of the Powers, who had seen with their own eyes what had occurred, sent a strongly worded note to the palace, that the order was issued to stop the slaughter. Some 6000 persons perished in this horrible carnage; and, in the words of a British diplomatist, it seems to have been 'the intention of the Turkish authorities to exterminate the Armenians.' The perfect organisation of the shambles was proved by the fact that scarcely anyone who did not belong to that race perished, and that those few exceptions

were due to such accidents as will happen even in the best regulated massacres (Miller, 1913:430).

The massacre of the Armenians in Constantinople evoked serious criticisms of the Ottoman Empire by the British and French leaders. British Prime Minister Richard Gladstone branded Ottoman Sultan as “the Great Assassin,” and many French writers caricatured him as “the Red Sultan” (Miller, 1913:431). Sinan Dinçer mentions that “it was generally believed that this first massacre of Armenians in 1895 here was a bold and carefully devised plan to test the spirit of the European Powers, before entering upon a general slaughter throughout the empire” (Dinçer, 2013: 24).

Debates on Armenian Massacre

The administration of Sultan Abdülhamid II treated the Balkans nationalist movements harshly but he did not feel any sensitivity and affections towards Bulgarian, Bosnian and Greek independence. At same time, in dealing with the Armenian nationalists the Sultan and commonly Ottoman Turks became enraged with the Armenian communities in general and were hostile towards the Armenian rebellion in particular. The Sultan and Ottoman public deemed that formation of the independent Armenian state in the heart of Anatolia was unimaginable. On the other hand, the Armenian revolutionaries too understood that separation of Armenian means not separating Armenian lands from the Turkish but the dividing age old Armenian-Turkish bondage. Therefore, to stimulate mutual hatred, the Armenian rebellions resorted to all sorts of agitation and propaganda against Muslims.

In retaliation, the Ottoman Sultan targeted Armenians without distinguishing the rebels from the common people. In the six eastern *vilayets* the Ottoman forces and the Kurdish militias unleashed a rein of killings and destruction. The administration transformed from suppression of Armenian revolutionaries to massacring the whole Armenian population. The army officials even harassed reputed Armenian traders in Constantinople and thus the Turks created a lifelong panic among the Armenians about their nationhood (Cleveland, 2009: 122). Modern Ottoman historians describe that Armenian killings happened for different reasons. Most authors acknowledge that certain level of violence and killings occurred but they argue that there were different rational or reasons for the massacres.

Robert Melson, a reputed historian on Armenian massacre, defines the meaning of massacre and says that

... by massacre we shall mean the intentional killing by political actors of a significant number of relatively defenceless people. Further, the motives for massacre need not be rational in order for the killing to be intentional. Mass killings can be carried out for various reasons, including a response to false rumours or the satisfaction of ego-defensive needs. They remain human acts, nevertheless, to be understood within the framework of the human, not the natural, sciences. In addition, political massacre, which concerns us here, should be distinguished from criminal or pathological mass killings done by non-political bodies for private ends. As political bodies we of course include the state and its agencies, but also the non state actors such as factions, parties, terrorist bands, fragments of classes, and communal groups (Melson, 1982: 482-83).

Further massacre is sort of violence directed against comparatively vulnerable people who can be classified of “victim”. Victims of violence generally comprise of women, children and civilian men and it can also include war prisoners. In the Armenian issue, the Sultan administration did not try to distinguish between revolutionary fighters and innocent Armenian pastoralists and agriculturalist who were invariably targeted (Melson, 1982: 483).

Others attribute the massacre to the Armenian revolutionary movement’s active engagements in protest against the Sultan government and their pro-Russian sympathies and rebellious activities in Ottoman land. The Armenian revolutionary parties claim for self-autonomy in Armenian majority *vilayets* was main cause for Armenian massacres. The Sultan administration also struggled between two aches such as external powers’ pressures for internal autonomy for his religious minorities. The Empire’s Christian minorities’ revolutionary activities moved from peaceful march to armed struggle for their self-administration and finally to self-determination. The Sultan’s approach to the Balkans issue was merely holding up the territory, but in the Armenian self-administration case it was common ground for both (Turks and Armenian) identity. Therefore, the Sultan was determined to suppress Armenian nationalism for the latter’s alliance with European powers and helps it received from the Russian Empire. The Armenian became a pawn in hands of the Europeans at the volatile situation and thus, the Sultan has decided to subdue or repress “Armenian provocation.” The act of Armenian revolutionaries therefore called as ‘provocation theory’ by historian like Justin McCarthy, Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw and Robert Melson. However, historians William L Langer and Bernard Lewis call it slightly differently as the provocation thesis (Melson, 1982: 485).

Another interpretation of Armenian massacre was German theologian Johannes Lepsius⁹ who argues that “the massacres were initiated by the Porte”, which is to say the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II from Constantinople. He notes that “the Armenian massacres were nothing but an administrative measure, which was ordered by the central government in the name of the Sultan, and was executed with only too great willingness by the provincial officials” (Lepsius, 1897:76; Melson, 1982: 490). Further Lepsius expresses uncertainty about the role of local Muslims population in the massacre, and believes that definitely they were assured and supported by the authorities to act against the Armenian population of the eastern region. Thus, the Sultan administration granted permission or legitimated violence to depredate Armenian people in those regions. Thus one of the motives of Armenian massacre was revenge especially in the wake of the arrival of displaced Balkans Muslims in the neighbouring areas (Lepsius, 1897: 47).

Robert Melson argues that “the lead in the massacre was taken by Balkan Muslim refugee who themselves escaped from the Christian violence in Balkan region and particularly Russian armies. Later, same ‘Million’ Muslim refugees were re-settled near in Armenian *vilayets* adjacent to largest Armenian Christian population territory” (Melson, 1992:48). Richard G. Hovannisian and Lousie Nalbandian describe Armenian perspective of the massacre as a policy of Sultan’s hatred towards the Armenians.

The Armenian Reform Program which he had signed in October, 1895, and Armenian revolutionaries activities only helped to enrage Sultan Abdülhamid II, who already hated the Armenians and feared that they, like the Balkan countries, would obtain their freedom. It was evident that the Sultan had decided to settle the Armenian Question in his own way by the massacres of 1894 and 1895, culminating in that of 1896. Thus, the year 1896 brought one of the blackest pages in the history of the Armenian people (Nalbandian, 1963:128).

The estimates of Armenian killed during these massacres have been varied. historian Roderic H. Davison cautions that “Every writer on the Ottoman Empire selected whatever figures seemed to him most reliable, or else those which he wanted to prove a point about minorities. Often these figures were given on the authority of others; sometimes they were based partly on investigations

⁹ Johannes Lepsius, his work is a major source on the massacres, was a German historian and theologian. He took a life-long interest in Armenian affairs. His famous work was on Armenian history under the Ottoman Empire written under title on *Bericht über die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei* (Report on situation of Armenian people in Turkey). His works related Armenian killings in 1915 consider as major source of evidence for Ottoman involvement in Armenian deportations, title of his book *Deutschland und Armenian, 1914-1918* (Germany and Armenia 1914–1918: Collection of Diplomatic documents).

conducted on the spot” (Davision, 1963: 414-15). Armenian historian Louise Nalbandian put the size of the Armenian massacre between 50,000 and 300,000 (Nalbandian, 1963: 206). Another Armenian historian Richard G Hovannisian recommended number of people died during 1894-96 at 100,000 and 200,000 (Hovannisian, 1967: 28). Johannes Lepsius who toured those *vilayets* in 1896 estimated that there were at least 88,000 victims (Lepsius, 1897: 330-331). Turkish historians Shaws did not mention figures and expressed doubts of over the Samsun Armenian death toll of 20,000 which they believe to be a “great exaggeration” (Shaw, 1973: 204-05). Ottoman historian Kemal Karpat also supports the figure of less than 100,000 victims in the Armenian massacre of 1896 (Karpat, 1985:152-160).

European Response to the Armenian Massacre

The Ottomans society had lived reasonably peacefully for many centuries and differences were amicably resolved by the Sultan. Conflict came up only when there was unavoidable situation of skirmishes and resulted in a limited religious conflict. However, in the last two decades of 19th century, the Ottoman society became very volatile and conflict ridden, particularly in eastern part of the Empire. After 1890 the policies of the European states became unstable and major powers like Britain, France, Austro-Hungary, Russia, Germany and Italy wanted to extract benefits from the Ottoman Empire over the Armenian Question (as a part of great Eastern Question) and Armenian massacre 1894-98 and intricate situation of the Ottomans. The Balkans, and Mediterranean regions were tactful, and spoiling peace of regions that would reflect at European Balance of Powers (Anderson, 1983:38).

At end of 19th century, Britain was in rapid industrial development and its raw materials were exported from India passed through Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, Britain constantly maintained dialogue with the Ottoman Empire regarding condition of the Armenians and religious rights. Thus, it maintained their safety and security from 1882 onwards as it was also controlling Suez Canal that connected British industrial feeding India and Australian colonies (Anderson, 1983: 38). Britain Prime Minister Gladstone was very ferocious over Armenian massacre 1894-96 because offered an opportunity to keep the Ottomans under pressure. Responding to the Armenian killings 1895-96, Gladstone said that Ottoman Empire “deserved to be wiped off the map” (Deringil, 2009: 345).

Sultan Abdülhamid II too vexed hearing the Armenian reforms in six *vilayets* of eastern part of Empire and it became fatal phrase for Armenians and contentious for Muslim *ulema*. For European powers it was common connecting point between the Sultan administration and external powers. During Armenian massacre Britain dominated in Ottoman policies more than any other European powers. The Sultan and Muslim Turks in common hated the European intervention in the internal Ottoman affairs state but external powers also expected him to blunder which cost him heavily. The Sultan and Sublime Porte also deemed that granting autonomy would the first victory for European powers pressure exerted upon him and from there they would seek independence of Armenian people in those provinces (Deringil, 2009: 345).

Russia was another major power sharing southern border with the Ottoman Empire and after the Russo-Turkish War 1877, the Tsarist army was stationed in Kars and Ardahan nearby the Armenian *vilayets* in eastern part of the Ottomans. Therefore, Russia was also an important state to express its willingness to play a role in power struggle in Armenian Question along with Britain and France. Russia was reluctance to support or involve in the Armenian Question after Bulgarian War experience and therefore, Russia through its ambassador Lobanov merely condemned the Sultan administration for the treatment of the Armenian (Deringil, 2009: 345; Miller, 1913:431).

France played a limited role because it did not wish to leave everything to British in the Armenian Question. In 1896, during Constantinople bank siege the French ambassador mediated and intimidated the Sultan for the rebellion departure in a fleet. France posted a resident Consul Gustave Meyrie at Diyarbakir in Armenian province to monitor the situation and report his experiences to higher authorities in France. Thus, the French resident Consul Report became a valuable source for the 1896 Armenian massacre (Deringil, 2009: 345).

Germany and Ottoman became reliable allies since the Congress of Berlin and therefore Germany did not condemn the Sultan's government and the Kurds for the atrocities in eastern part of the Empire against the Armenians. Germany even represent as vanguard of Sultan to mitigate the diplomatic pressures brought upon him by the European states. At that time Austria-Hungary also wanted to expand its influence in the Balkans territory and Eastern Question but due to fears of consequence could not act (Miller, 1913: 430-431).

Under Prime Minister Marquess Salisbury the British Government (1896) explicitly warned the Sultan against mistreatment of Armenians. Salisbury government even strived to receive support from new Tsar Nicholas II (r.1894-1917) for stationing the British navy at Constantinople to coax the Sultan to grant Armenians autonomy for which they were struggling. But new Russian Tsar was scared of the British influence in the Ottomans internal affairs, and joined hands with France to counter the Britain dominance and unilateral intervention in the Armenian massacre. Thus, Salisbury mediation was spoiled and nothing was attained for Armenian communities. The Armenian revolutionaries groups were either suppressed or escaped to Europe or Russia and the remaining Armenians were too frustrated by their politics and internal quarrels which diminished the Armenian struggle considerably at the end of 19th century (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:205).

The United States of America newly entered into the Armenian Question not as a belligerent power interested in geographical dominance or diplomatic quarrels with other regional powers but as humanitarian aid provider. France provided the Ottomans 70 percent security supplies and Britain and Russia struggling for their hegemony in the region but the US remained merely a spectator and assisting Armenian schools and Christian missionaries under the Ottoman Empire (Dadarian, 2002: 61-68, 70-76; Wilson, 2009: 30). In the 1896 Armenian massacre case, America entered into the Ottoman internal affairs under two reasons. The first reason was the long tradition of American Christian Missionaries' links and activities in the Ottoman lands. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) was the representative organisation which had around 150 missionaries runs 112 Churches. All religious works were administrated by 15 mission stations and 268 out stations in all corners of the Ottoman Empire with the help of 47,000 workers or serviceman. It had a budget around four million dollars in property holdings, churches and community buildings and hence the ABCFM was larger than any other European states in the Ottomans administration (Wilson, 2009: 30).

Second reason for the US connection was through presence of Red Cross movement and its service after 1894-96 the Armenian massacres. After Armenian massacre Red Cross worked under Clara Barton which began five different relief units from Constantinople to the far east of the Ottoman borders and Armenian provinces. Three units worked to distribute agriculture equipments for Armenians such as seed, cattle and other farming instruments among Armenian six provinces and the other two units provided medical assistance to villagers like vacancies for

small pox, typhus and dysentery in the Armenian people at Zeitoun and neighbouring areas (Wilson, 2009: 30).

At the end of the 19th century, the enmity between Sultan government and the Armenians mitigated on temporarily due to absence of Armenian revolutionaries' activities and their provocation tactics against the Ottoman administration. The Sultan army also reduced its vigilance and activities in the Armenian vicinity. At some level, a degree of mutual trust was re-established and Armenians were appointed in the administration. Further, Armenian merchants and farmers restored their businesses. After the massacres of 1894-96 some peaceful re-habitations were established but the natural harmony that existed for centuries had vanished on both sides. Many former Armenian revolutionaries, prosperous urban merchants and revolution intellectuals were frustrated by the consistence negligence of common Armenian masses to support or encourage the revolutionary activities (Melson, 1982: 492, Shaw, 1977: 205).

The Armenian Marxist intellectuals migrated out of the Ottoman Empire and settled in different parts of world particularly in the United States, Europe, Egypt and Iran where they strived hard for a new life with their mercantile abilities. By the end of 1897, European powers and the Ottoman Empire were tired of the Armenian Question and did not take up it until the outbreak of the World War I.

Chapter VI

Armenian Millet System and the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire

This chapter begins with an elaboration of the conditions of the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire after the Hamidian massacre of 1894-96. At the end of 19th century, the Ottoman Armenians under influence of industrialization re-inculcated the nationalist ideas. On the other hand, the Ottoman Turks also began to understand the importance of nationalism and experimented with different ideologies such as Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Turkism to strengthen the Empire. Both the Armenians and Turks began to understand the concept of modern nation state and began to think about forming a separate state based on their ideological and religious foundations.

From 1900, the Armenian question re-surfaced and struck like thorn in the throats in the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire. During this period, all three Armenians Patriarchate (Armenian Gregorian, Armenian Catholics, and Armenian Protestants) were politically de-activated and while maintaining their presence they did not play any important role in the Ottoman Armenians social and political life. The Young Turks movement or Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) began its appearance in the Ottoman politics alleging Sultan's inefficiency and corrupt administration (Lewy, 2005). In July 1908, Young Turks movement captured the Sultan administration with the co-operation of Armenian and Macedonian revolutionary movements and from thereupon Young Turks emerged as the de facto ruler of the Empire, and the Sultan was forcefully put under house arrest.

At the end of decade, the Young Turks-Armenian relations spoiled due to ideological differences between the two nationalists, which led differences of opinion and later mistrust. During 1910-1915, the Armenian condition under the Young Turks became suspicious and there were sporadic violence against Armenians in all parts of the Empire. In 1915, the Young Turks entered the World War I which later became the pretext for the CUP officials to harshly suppress

the Armenians in the name of national security of the Empire. The high echelon of CUP wanted end to the Armenian question without further delay and to do before the end of the World War. The CUP's Armenian policy ended with the *Tehcir law* (Deportation law) which led to large scale deportation of the Armenians that began in April 1915 and resulted in perishing of Armenians in large numbers. After the World War I and at the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian community was scattered in the present day Turkish territory and six Armenian *vilayets* became part of the Russian territory. Modern republic of Turkey under Kemal Pasha Ataturk abolished privileges to all the religions and thus remaining Armenians also lost their political importance and rights in modern Turkey.

Rise of Turkish Political Protest against the Abdülhamid rule

Since the last decade of 18th century, the Western Europe was transforming under the French and Industrial revolutions that reflected in Europe's political and economic advancements. These revolutions hugely influenced in political, social, and economic lives of the Ottoman subjects and the Empire. The Sultan and grand vizier recognized those European revolutions and wanted to modernize the Ottoman military and society along the European lines (Owen, 2009: 57).

In the 19th century, the Ottomans were continuously defeated in wars with the Russians which led to considerable loss of territory in the Balkan and Caucasus regions. The European idea of nationalism gradually dawns towards east and connected with the western borders of the Ottoman Empire and inspired all the nationalist communities of the Empire. Since the 1828 Greek War of Independence, the Sultan government, started receiving petitions from communal or religious organisation for a territorial autonomy to govern de-facto their affairs which later transformed into demands for independence from the Empire. Later in 1876, political autonomy Bulgaria successfully transformed into independence from the Ottoman Empire and thus new ideology of nationalism gathered momentum (Gellner 1983: 1). Therefore, to avoid the nationalist aspirations of the minorities, the western educated, the vizier and other high officials of the Ottoman Empire drafted reform edicts that were inclusive of all religious people into the Sultan army and introduction of secular education reflected in those reforms.

As discussed earlier, in the last decade of the 19th century, Sultan Abdülhamid II reign experienced a troublesome armed struggle with the Armenian revolutionary movements in 1894-

96. The Sultan administration successfully repressed Armenian separatist activities with aide of the Kurdish bandits in six *vilayets* of the eastern part the Empire. Following years, there were no revolutionary movements in the Ottoman soil and most of them were either suppressed or escaped to Europe and other countries. Since the end of the 19th century, the Empire experienced a political awareness among the Sultan's subjects irrespective of religions backgrounds and various small intellectuals groups were randomly formed. Sultan Abdülhamid II highly benefited from the Tanzimat reforms, due to modern educational system and a large number of the people entered the administration came in sectors like doctors, bureaucrats, officers, and writers in various newspapers.

During the reign of Abdülhamid II people of different background protested against his inability to control corruption and weak administration due to corrupt officials. Newly educated Young Ottoman officers from the Imperial *Lycee* of Galatasaray, Imperial War Academy at Pangalti, Civil Service Academy, and Army Medical School were severely critical of the Sultan's administration. Due to government pressures and threats of arrest, young intellectuals went into exile in London, Paris, Geneva, Bucharest and other places (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 255). From Paris, the Young Ottoman intellectual Mustafa Fazil wrote an open letter to the Sultan calling for wider reforms in which he called the groups *Grand Parti de la Jeune Turquie* (the Grand Party of Young Turks) and from thereupon critics of the Sultan's administration were termed Young Turks (Hanioğlu, 2009:604-606).

After the formation of the first constitutional government in 1878, both the Ottoman Empire and European powers called the opponents of the Sultan's administration as "the Young Turks" but this term was loosely used to refer to all critiques of the state. In 1889, a large number of Royal Medical Academy students in Constantinople formed a proto-Young Turks organization (Hanioğlu, 2009: 605). Later in 1893, a group of intellectuals were first called as "the Committee of Young Turkey" at Constantinople by Ottoman Freemasons. In the next couple of years, the group popularized the title *Organe de la Jeune Turquie* (Periodical of the Young Turks) in the French journal *Mechveret Supplément Français*. From thereupon, the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress became widely popular among the Ottoman mass (Hanioğlu, 2008: 133-134). During this period, Young Turks movement was under leadership of Ahmet Riza (1859-1930) and Mehmet Murat Efendi (1853-1912) and both were dedicated supporters of liberal

ideas and modernization of the Ottoman Empire regardless of their own careers (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 256). Young Turk activist Ahmet Riza was a staunch supporter of positivism and was influenced by Auguste Comte's famous aphorism. Under Riza, the Young Turk movement was chief organisation to voice against the Sultan government until 1902.

In 1902, Young Turk Congress was held in Paris, in which Sultan's nephew Damat Mahmut Pasha (1853-1903), took part due to his anti-Sultan position. He participated along with his sons Sabaheddin and Lutfullah and later Sabaheddin played a major role in pre-revolution Young Turks movements. During the Congress, Sabaheddin argued for toppling the Sultan's government with help of the British or through revolution with help of Macedonian, Albanian and Armenian revolutionaries because he wanted any mode of action to replace the Sultan and establish a constitutional government. However, this idea was strongly condemned by the Ahmet Riza who was also opposed to any external intervention which he considered as an affront to Ottoman sovereignty and felt that promoting non-Muslim organisation against the Sultan would be treason. But in 1903, after a failed *coup d'état*, Sabaheddin reorganized the movement under the new title of "League of Private Initiative and Decentralization" and this organisation closely worked with other non-Muslim groups (Hanioğlu, 2009:604-606).

A new minority party was founded by Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir in 1905 with the title "Ottoman Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) which became the main Young Turks movement. In 1907, Şakir's CUP amalgamated with Solanika-founded party of army officers, the Ottoman Freedom Society. In 1907, the second Young Turks Congress was held under the title of "Sultan Abdulhamid II Opposition Organizations or Parties" in Paris, in which Ottoman Committee for Union and Progress, League of Private Initiative and Decentralization and Armenian Dashnaktsutiu movement took part. The Congress of 1907 was held primarily to oust Sultan Abdülhamid II and passed resolution calling for an action plan to overthrow the Sultan. Except for Committee of Union and Progress, the remaining two participants had no relevance to the 1908 Young Turk revolution (Hanioğlu, 2008: 204-210; Hanioğlu, 2009:604-606; Shaw and Shaw, 1977:265-266).

On his part, Sultan Abdülhamid II consistently showed himself as a reformer and inclusive to all dissent voices in constructive manner. Therefore, he requested all Ottoman intellectuals to return

to the Empire instead of staying in Europe as vagabonds. He also asked them to participate in the development and security of state in lieu of critiquing his administration. Further, the 1902 Paris Congress and 1903 coup attempts prompted him to push for the execution of his policies (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 257). The Sultan countered the Young Turks activities and to hold his position against the liberal ideas he took religious policies and pampered those policies even with his own personal finance. Historians Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw elaborate that Sultan sought to counter his opponents through the ideas of “Islamism, which emphasized a return to the values and traditions of Islam as a religion and culture and a desire to restore unity among Muslims all over the world, and Turkism, which stressed the Turkish traditions in Ottoman culture and sought to create a feeling of unity among the Turks of the world” (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 258-59).

Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Turkism

The Ottomans Muslim Turkish society also had undergone ideological and social reforms due to direct contacts with the European states in the 19th century. The Ottoman relations with the French introduced the idea of liberty planted in the Ottoman territory and this struck the Turkey at a later period. Many western educated Muslim Turks became sensitized to the importance of the French ideas of liberty, equality, and rule of law. In the same century, a large number Turks visited Europe and America and they realized the underdevelopment and the medieval stage of the Turkish society and its economical disparity within the Empire. Turkish intellectuals were also surprised by the European sophistication, and strong state to control over major colonies in Asia, Africa, and America. Europeans controlled those distance territories through an unlimited self-confidence and aggressive attitude when the Ottoman Empire was struggling even to save and stabilize its own territory. The old question, “Why is the Empire declining?” had now to be restated: “Why are the Empire (Ottoman) declining while Europe advances and progresses, and what is the secret of European success?” (Lewis, 1963: 130; Quataert, 2005: 190-191).

In 1822, Akif Efendi was an Ottoman official scribe or *Reis ul-Kuttab*, who wrote a memorandum about the future Ottoman options for survival as an Empire (Macfie, 2015: 117). Historian Bernard Lewis explains about Efendi’s ideas as:

... the Ottoman of his day-defence, as champions of Islam, of the whole Empire subjection to colonial rule, or retreat to the Anatolian heartland, from which the Turks

had first crossed into Europe. During the century that followed, the Turks unsuccessfully attempted the first, successfully avoided the second, and finally, under the pressure of events more than of ideas, successfully adopted the third (Lewis, 1963: 325-326).

In 1904, Tatar Ottoman intellectual Yusuf Akçura wrote an article on *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Policies) in which he elaborated the ideas or options the Turks had at that time. He raised the ideologies of Ottoman, Pan-Islam, and Turkish nationalism to save and strength the Ottoman state. Nevertheless, among three ideologies, the Young Turks choose to associate with Turkish nationalism during the World War I that turned the Ottoman state into a Turkish ultra nationalist state (Berkes, 1998: 337-340; Lewis, 1963: 326-327; Macfie, 2015: 117). Thus, Turkish intellectuals analyses have been taken by the power hungry Young Turks as a viable choice to unite Turkish land through Turkishness.

Ottomanism

From the first half of 19th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire lost its territory in Balkans and further the Sultan also faced a perpetual political pressure from the European states for rights of religious minorities in the Empire. Therefore, many European-educated Muslim Turks were keen to change political, economic, and social life of the Empire. The Ottoman intellectuals wanted to experiment with different ideas of that time like Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Turkism to save the Empire from falling prey into dissatisfied minorities. The western educated Ottoman intellectuals practiced these ideologies with Ottomanism around 1860s and went on until the World War I.

Tanzimat reformers first practiced Ottomanism as their state policy to integrate the Empire and as the Ottoman society was separated by religious, cultural, and ethnic identities, the reformers wanted a common political platform for all the Ottoman subjects (Bulut, 2009: 448). Ottoman grand *viziers* Mehmed Amin Ali Pasha Fuad Ali Pasha and Ahmed Midhat Pasha were ardent supporters of the strong Ottoman state through Ottomanism. These officials believed that Ottomanism could transform the Empire from being a medieval society into a modern educated society similar to the European states.

Tanzimat *Islahat Fermani* (reform edict) proclaimed in 1856 became a mandatory reform. It assured

the establishment of guarantees for the life, honor and property of the sultan's subjects, the equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion, and the implementation of laws prohibiting the use of any injurious or offensive term, either among private individuals or on the part of the authorities (Somel, 2003: 221; Bulut, 2009: 449).

Thus, 1856 reform edict guaranteed equality to all the Ottoman subjects irrespective of their race and religions. Young Ottomans intellectuals like Namik Kemal and Ibrahim Sinasi also supported goal of Ottomanism and therefore they were advocated for change in legal and administrative structures of the Empire, which was similar to Tanzimat policy of a strong Ottoman state in certain level (Bulut, 2009:449). Hence, in 1876 *Kanun-ı Esasi* or new constitution was drafted based the on transformation from mediaeval to modern state system. The new constitution was supported by the Tanzimat reformers as well as by their critiques Young Ottomans at that time. The new constitution streamed from the 1856 edict and was heavily influenced by it. Therefore, the 1876 *Kanun-ı Esasi* legally defined the Tanzimat ideology like “All elements that are subject to the Ottoman State, without any exception based on religion or sect, are called Ottomans” (Bulut, 2009: 449; Çetinsaya, 2009: 454).

The Young Ottomans were against the classification of people and they considered that it would be a hurdle in reaching Ottomanism. While Tanzimat reform explained Ottomanism by safeguarding the rights of *millet* system and protect their rights through constitution, though non-Muslims following *millet* administration reformers wanted to assert their equality (Bulut, 2009: 448).

The Ottomanism could not raise the nationalist sentiments among the non-Muslim even after providing constitutional security for their rights and the political condition in Europe and Russia created a desire for nationalist feelings among the Armenians and others. The new constitution curtailed the authority of Sultan and the ruler was like paper tiger. Therefore, Sultan Abdülhamid II dissolved the first Ottoman parliament and constitution in 1876. The Tanzimat policy of Ottomanism could not convince the non-Muslims to overcome their desire for their own national state (Bulut, 2009: 449; Çetinsaya, 2009: 454).

After the Armenian massacre of 1896, second wave of new of idea of nationalism spread among the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, and new nationalist feelings of minorities erased their

old dynastic loyalty or allegiance. In the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslims were easily influenced by their co-religionists in Europe than by the Ottomans and thus, religious minorities in the Empire began to themselves as Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians than as Ottomans. The Ottoman officials' feeble Ottomanism could not stand against the strong nationalist thoughts. In the early 20th century, a few Young Ottoman supporters and Armenians had faith in the Ottomanism even though they had minimum chance of victory. The Ottoman Armenians and other minority groups began their armed struggle for their independence, which resulted in the Turkish state also taking up armed repression. Thus new seeds of hatred were sown and mistrust had grown up between the Muslims and non-Muslims of the Empire (Lewis, 1967: 339-40). In 1908, the Young Turks or Committee of Union Progress (CUP) based their idea of state also on Ottomanism but were not very positive in strengthening the Empire. After the Balkan War of 1912-13 and the January 1913 coup d'état by CUP led to the final defect of the Ottomanism (Bulut, 2009: 449).

Pan-Islamism

Since the second half of the 19th, Muslims around the world sought the Ottoman Sultan's help and guardianship from their regional hardship and ailments. In the 1857 Mutiny suppressed by British India halted the Indian Muslims for prayers in the name of the Mughal Empire and they turned to the Ottoman Sultan to save them from the British domination. In Central Asia in 1868, Russia suppressed the Samarkand amirate into a small vessel of the Russian Empire. Around 1880s Africa witnessed the British invasion of the Egypt, the French capture of Tunisia and the German protectorate of Dar es-Salaam (Çetinsaya, 2009: 454; Lewis, 1968: 340-341). These incidents were a clear call for the Ottoman Sultan to take the leadership of Muslims throughout the world.

From the last decade of the 19th century, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II began to play his Islamic card against his external enemies and to strengthen the Empire internally. He practiced idea of pan-Islamism (*İttihad Islam*) in different levels and as an organisation and diplomacy to unite the Muslims within and outside his reign. Now as the Ottoman Caliph, the Sultan acted as the religious leader of the Muslims throughout the world. This new position was the consequences of the interceding of the European powers in the Ottoman Empire and their

oppressed rule against Muslims in colonial territories (Çetinsaya, 2009: 453; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 258).

In the 1870s, Young Ottomans intellectual Namik Kemal had highlighted the European domination in intellectual and political realms of the Ottoman Empire and pressured the Sultan to take stand against it to save the Islamic tradition. Stating about the Namik Kemal's pan-Islamism methods historian Bernard Lewis observes: "His pan-Islamism was...cultural rather than political the way of uniting the people of Islam must be sought, not in political aims or doctrinal disputes, but in the presence of preachers, in the pages of books" (Lewis, 1968: 341). Namik argued for modernization and its links for the spread of pan-Islamism (Ibid).

Further Bernard Lewis quotes Namik Kemal for the Ottoman Sultan being a suitable leader for uniting the world Muslim community:

Since the Caliphate is here, and since in the suitability of the place and the readiness of the people in nearness to Europe, the present home of civilization, in wealth and in knowledge, this country is the most advanced of all the Muslim lands, this union of which we speak will surely have its centre here. When that happens, the light of knowledge will radiate from this centre to Asia and Africa. Facing the balance of Europe, a new balance of the East will come into being, and in that way the scales of justice will come into the world of men (Lewis, 1968: 341).

The 1876 constitution clearly states in Article three about the role of Sultan to act as "high Islamic Caliphate" of Islam. During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II pan-Islamism was practiced as government policy and the Sultan's approach in pan-Islamism mainly focused on his political benefit, which was a deviation from Namik Kemal's idea of Islamic modernization. Pan-Islamism was followed in different versions by the Sultan's official policy to various radical leaders like Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839-97). The Afghani movements choose radical movement opposed to the domination of West (Çetinsaya, 2009: 455; Lewis, 1976: 342; Somel, 2003: 224).

The Pan-Islamists had sought reasons for the decline of Islam, and felt that causes must be located outside the Islamic territories, like the European hegemonic policies to destroy the Muslims and Islamic culture around the world. Further, the Pan-Islamists drew two important issues related to safeguarding the Islam from external powers namely,

... the establishment of foreign political, military, and economic supremacy in the Muslim lands, and the undermining, by foreign intellectual influences, of the basic beliefs and values of Islam. The-task was to drive out the foreign invaders, abolish foreign

concessions and immunities, restore the true Islamic faith-and, some added, to reunite all the Muslims in a single state, under its lawful sovereign, the Caliph (Lewis, 1976: 342).

Attaining Pan-Islamism along those lines was out of the Sultan's capabilities but such a scheme resulted in Sultan Abdülhamid attaining a positive position among Muslim communities throughout the world. The Sultan practiced his power to suppress western educated liberals, nationalists and intellectuals who were arguing for reforms and his religious minorities to garner the support of the Muslim loyalty in the domestic level. In the external affairs, the Sultan raised his voice against the colonial powers and against the suppression of local Muslim population and supported Muslim protest against the European powers in those regions through which he wanted to mitigate any political pressure from the European states (Lewis, 1968: 342; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 259).

The benefits of pan-Islamism extended up to the Committee of Union and Progress and they very cleverly used it to extract the support of the Muslim community during the Balkan Wars which questioned the Ottoman prestige. Later in the World War I period also the pan-Islamism helped Sunni-Shia unity, which facilitated the Sublime Porte in controlling the territories of present day Iraq and Iran. Above all the Ottoman Sultan enjoyed a huge influence over the Indian Muslim population. During, the World War I the Indian Muslims rallied around in support of the Ottoman Empire through the Khilafat Movement against in British Indian government, which exerted huge pressure upon the England (Çetinsaya, 2009: 456). However, the pan-Islamism could not stop the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and this idea vanished with decline of the Ottoman Empire (Çetinsaya, 2009: 456; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 260).

Turkism

In first half of the 19th century, the non-Muslims in Balkans and Armenians in the eastern part of the Empire, were secularizing all the reforms, which were considered as anti-Islamic by the majority Muslim Turks. From this the interest on Turks came into discussions. During the Tanzimat era the development of printing press helped in creating an awareness of "Cultural Turkism" among the Ottoman Turks. Scholars like Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Semseddin Sami Frasheri, and Yazikisiz were strong advocates of cultural Turkism and they were inspired by the pre-Ottoman history and they stressed on Turkism through those historical background (Somel, 2003: 316). During the Tanzimat period, the history of the pre-Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman

Empire was popular among the Europeans and Turcology was studied by many scholars in France and Hungary (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 261).

The Armenian massacre of 1894-96 led the Turkish intellectuals to realize the need to promote Turkishness among the Ottoman Turks. The rise of Armenian nationalism was a clear indication for the Turks to develop their own ideology, which should be a foundation for future Ottoman state. The Turkism was promoted through development of Turkish language and in 1897, a youth from Greco-Turks Mehmed Emin wrote a Turkish poem called *Türkiye Şiirler* (Poems in Turkish). He wrote his in common Turkish syllabic vocabulary not Sultan's court eulogy and parody language. According to Bernard Lewis Emin "adopted a word which, in Turkish usage, had connoted a boorish, ignorant peasant or nomad, and proudly proclaimed himself a Turk-

I am a Turk, my faith and my race are mighty

Emin describes Turkism like...

We are Turks, with this blood and with this name we live.

Even though Emin was a pious Muslim, his loyalty was to his faith, his poem aroused fresh ideas of Turkishness among the Turkish speaking Ottoman Turks and a collective consciousness at that time (Lewis, 1967; Lewis, 1968: 343).

Turkism was prompts by a new journal called *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), which was first edited by Ahmed Hikmet and followed by Ziya Gökalp from 1912. This journal was methodologically used as a mouthpiece for the political propaganda of Turkism among Young Turk intellectuals (Lewis, 1967: 350). Gökalp was an ardent supporter of Turkism theoretician and sociologist and believed that Islam and Turkish ethnicity would synthesis for future the Turkish identity. Further, he proclaimed himself as: "I'm from a Turkish nation, I'm from the Islamic community, and I'm from Western civilization." Gökalp wrote a book on Turkism in 1923 called *Principles of the Turkism* and the later day Kemalist and modern Turkish nationalism were influenced by this book. He describes the crux of his thought through "Turkification, Islamization, Modernization trilogy" (Bulut, 2009: 233).

Turkism garnered its reinforcement from the Russian Turks or the Tater Muslims who belonged to Russian Volga, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Crimea. A large number of Tatars were well educated and were intellectuals well-versed in Russian Turcology, and they developed the pan-

Turkism similar to the Slavic movements. Famous among the Tatar Turks was Yusuf Akçura who wrote lot articles about Turkism at that time (Karpat, 2009: 425; Lewis, 1967: 348).

Even though all Ottoman organisations spoke and supported Turkism in their ideology they were still hesitating to rally publically due to the multicultural and multiethnic nature of the Ottoman Empire. After the Ottomans had lost most of the territories in the European side of the Empire in the Balkan War of 1913, the Young Turks realize the importance and necessary to support and promote Turkism. During the early Young Ottomans phase, intellectuals practiced the Persian form or methods of Turkistan but it was ameliorated during the Young Turks (CUP) government and the Turkish language was named as *Türkiye* which was influenced by Mehmed Emin's poem *Türkiye Şiirler* (Poems in Turkish). Later, Turkism was the official policy of the Committee of Union and Progress during the World War I period (Lewis, 1967: 352; Rae 2002: 151-3 Somel, 2003: 316).

At the downfall of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the idea of Ottomanism disappeared from the public discourse among the Ottoman intellectuals and print media. The Ottomanism maintained its loyalty among the masses and when the dynasty was on the verge of exile the same Ottoman intellectuals began discussing about a successive ideology to Ottomanism and fought between pan-Islamism and Turkism in the early years of the CUP. At that moment Islam and Turkism did not possess any territorial claim and had no government or state patronage (Lewis, 1963: 352).

In the first decade of 20th century non-Muslims believed that Ottomanism was still relevant and they relied on the Young Turks regarding their rights guaranteed during the Tanzimat era. On other hand, the Young Turks ascertained that the Ottomanism was a failed concept. Simultaneously, their attitude towards Islam was continued similar and through a modern version as pan-Islamism it reached certain percentage of Muslim population of the Empire. However, it had less attractive to the Young Ottoman Turks who were tilting towards modernity and were looking to Europe as model for future state formation. Thus, Turkism became very relevant ideology for future Turkish nationalism.

Turkish Nationalism Vatan (Father Land)

According to Benedict Anderson claims of separate nationhood need elements such as people, language, territory, and religion. In the case of Turkey during Young Turks, government began

to think about their nationhood (Anderson, 1983a: 8-16). In the 20th century, Muslim Turks could be categorised as Muslim by faith and legal subjects. Further, they also can call themselves as Turks because they speak the language and being the bona fide or imagined descent of the land of Anatolia. In addition, political scientist Ernest Gellner has elaborated that Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) sought to modernize its politics and societies through the Ottoman and Islamic influences (Gellner, 1994: 81-3).

In the Ottoman Empire, Sunni Muslim Turks always practiced dynasty loyal patriotism from the very beginning of the Empire and this came onto surface at time of Committee of Union and Progress (Somel, 2003: 212). The Young Ottoman Namik Kemal wrote *Vatan yahut Silistre* (Fatherland Silistra) in which he says that it was duty to defend his assigned territory or fatherland (*vatan*) from enemy. Defending Ottoman territory or fatherland was a heroic patriotism and great virtue for Turks (Karpas, 2009, 424).

The Tanzimat reform edit *Rescript of Gulhane* of 1839 used both words *vatan* and *millet*, at times interchangeably and at times in two different meanings. British historian Bernard Lewis vividly differentiates them as

zeal for dynasty and ‘nation’ (*millet*) and love of country (*vatan*), in a context which was intended to refer to all Ottoman subjects irrespective of their religions. Yet a little farther on, the same *Rescript of Gulhane* speaks of the people of Islam and other nations (*millet*) within the Empire, as separate and distinct entities. ‘Other nations’ and ‘foreign nations’ are common expressions in the Turkish administrative and journalistic usages at the time. Both clearly mean nations other than Islam; ‘foreign nations’ mean those not under Muslim rule, and therefore correspond to the ‘House of War’ of earlier days” (Lewis, 1963: 335-36).

In first decade of the 20th century both *vatan* and *millet* meant the same semantic structure in linguistic perspective. The origin of *vatan* is Turcized form of *watan* an early stage of Arabic meaning residence or place of birth. Word *millet* also belongs to Arabic word *milla* meaning nations or belonging to a religious group but was largely used to identify the Islamic community, during Tanzimat era *millet* clearly defined non-Muslims. Finally, *vatan* only mentioning about territory belonging to the Ottomans or Turkish land and the land may be a country, a province, a town, or village based on situation; thus *vatan* became a suitable word to denote nation or Turkish nationalism (Lewis, 1963: 334).

Under the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were the last people to assert their nationalism under the Committee of Union and Progress government (1909-10; 1912). Even though, the rise of Turkish nationalism came into existence after the Crimean War 1853 in a limited level its expansion was struck due to strong presence of Sultan administration. Turkish nationalism was discussed in two journal very regularly *Genç Kalemler* (Young pens) and *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish homeland) and they promoted idea of Turkism or Turkish nationalism among the Ottoman Turks (Karpas, 2009, 425). In 1909, Turkish organisation *Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti* (Turkish Homeland Society) was founded and it patronized *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish homeland) journal, under the guardianship of Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Agaoglu. This journal simplified the modern Turkish language and used most of the vocabulary and dilates of village and native Turkish speakers and they propagandized Turks political and economic concern to outside the world.

Young Turk intellectual Ziya Gökalp also participated in the development of Turkish nationalism through same journal and regularly published his work about idea of Turkishness, role of CUP and its policy regarding future Turkish state. His influence was visible even during the modern Republic of Turkey after 1923. The CUP was a strong supporter of the Ottomanism in up to 1908 revolution and they shifted over Turkish nationalism they realised the need to bring about all religious minorities under same roof as was existed during the Sultan period. About Turkish nationalism, Kemal H. Karpat that “the Turkish nationalism as developed in the Young Turks era embodies in spirit and form the political, cultural, and demographic legacy and the identity of the Ottoman state” (Karpat, 2009, 425).

Until the Balkan War of 1913 a large Turkish common people did not even imagine about separate nation belongs only to Turks or a Turkish nation state. Young Turks formulated school curriculums, which glorified the Ottoman history to the new level and inspired future generations as nationalist citizens. Turkish nationalism grown in the heart of Turks territory called Anatolia high land where rests the historic claims of the Ottoman Empire from Osman vessel or subordinate state. The Committee of Union and Progress also understood idea of Anatolia nationalism and nurtured Anatolian dialectic of Turkish and disseminated to other part of the Empire. Now the Turks were ready to forego from the religious supra-identity to ethnic oriented notion of Turkish nationalism (Akçam, 2006:121; Shaw and Shaw, 1977:263).

Armenian Nationalism and Armenian National Liberation Movement

Author Harry Jewell Sarkiss quoted the words of Abbot Mitchitar, the founder of an Armenian cultural revival movement founder from Venice and says that the Armenian understanding of alternative view on nation “to bring the Armenian nation into contact with Europe without extinguishing the national spirit, to love his nation, and, for that very reason, to borrow from European science and (the) Enlightenment that which might not prove antithetical and injurious to the spirit of the nation” (Sarkiss 1937: 442).

In the Ottoman Empire, the religious minorities expected a kind of society different from the one envisioned by the majority Muslim Turks. The Armenians viewed Ottoman state that would be inclusive of all religions but Muslims wanted only their community members as full members. Thus, the Armenians gradually understood western education and knowledge and began to redefine their political and social boundaries under the Sultan (Göçek, 1993:527).

During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, Britain, French, German and the United States were supportive of the Armenian minorities through their educational institutions throughout the Ottoman Empire. These foreign schools had better standards than the Sultan schools and at the beginning Muslims children were excluded from enrolling in these schools but later they too were included. At beginning, these foreign schools were merely teaching subjects, which were approved by the Sultan government but gradually they stimulated Armenian communities to fight for their rights and well-beings. Subsequently the European powers and the US competed for establishing more schools to disseminate modern knowledge to their coreligionists. These schools became political and economical instruments for the European states to influence the Ottoman Empire and the American Robert College at Constantinople was a fine example. Many Armenian radicals who studied in Robert College participated in fighting the Ottoman and Kurdish forces in the 1894-96 war, which was one of the breeding ground for Armenian radical nationalists (Göçek, 1993: 523).

Further, the Armenians who were education in European and American Protestant missionary schools were resented by the second-class behaviour and treatment of Ottoman Turks. Along with the Armenian *millet*s heads these young people also requested the Sultan government for a decent life and equal rights from administration as well as from the Muslim Turks. The educated

Armenians and *millet* heads came under the banner of Armenian Communal Council and collected signatures from peasants in the six *vilayets* in the eastern part and submitted as an application to the Sultan administration. The petition stated primary grievances of that time, namely looting and murder in the Armenian towns carried out by the Mountain Kurds, improprieties during tax collection, criminal behaviour of the government officials and the refusal to accept Christians as witnesses in trial. The Sultan government after accepting the complaints pledged that it would punish those who were guilty but in practice no concrete actions were taking against culprits (Akçam, 2006: 94-96).

At end of the 19th century, the Armenian nationalism was deeply debated among the Armenian *millets* communities and among Armenian scholars in public domain. The Armenian felt their sentiments of Great Armenian civilization and historical superiority were the main factors for their claims as separate nation state. In addition to that, the Armenians thought that they were an oppressed national entity and they had been politically, economically and cultural deprived and exploited by the Turks. Therefore, the Armenians asked for a separate Armenian nation state at erstwhile Armenian civilizational land, which in turn ironically intersected by Turkish home land (Quataert, 2000: 70). To realise an independent Armenian state, the Armenians linked their causes with their mythologies of Great Armenian Land to sentimentally unite Armenian people to attain their goal (Ibid).

There were other immediate causes for the rise of Armenian nationalism apart from mythologies and historical reasons and those metaphorical reasons were not good enough to argue for forming a nation state. Under Abdülhamid II, the Armenian nationalists suddenly rose to even taking up arms against the Sultan and Muslim Turks with whom the Armenians experienced centuries-old political, social and economical intermingling and interactions. Therefore, the 19th century issues in Ottoman Empire overtook these historical linkages. Among the Ottoman subjects mutual dislikes and hatred were not old practices but the issues of the 18th and 19th centuries were political and administrative shortfalls (Quataert, 2000: 71).

British historian Bernard Lewis who has specialized on modern Ottoman history describes the means of Armenian nationalist awakening and says that “the political and cultural impact of Russian Armenia on the one hand, and the new national and liberal ideas coming from Europe on

the other, powerfully affected the Ottoman Armenians, especially the rising middle class, and stimulated the growth of an ardent and active Armenian nationalist movement” (Lewis, 1968:356).

European states like Britain and France regularly intertwined with the Ottoman Empire’s internal affairs to curtail the Russian dominance in Balkan regions or the so-called as Eastern Question. After Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Eastern Question was overlapped by the Armenian Question in the international arena particularly after Armenian massacre of 1894-96, it become a virulent discussion between the Britain and the Ottoman Empire (Owen, 2009:57).

Conditions of Non-Muslim (Armenians), 1896 - 1908

After the Armenian massacre of 1896, the Ottoman social divide between the Armenians and Muslims had huge implication on the Empire’s centuries-old social fabric. Further, Muslims and non-Muslim relations were only for profession and economic reasons and legal, spatial, and administrative contacts were anonymously restricted (Göçek, 1993: 516). European industrialization and modernity brought nationalist thought among the non-European people and the Ottoman subjects quickly converged themselves with new ideas.

From the mid-19th century, the Ottoman state and society were not only influenced by the western ideas but also modern capitalism spread throughout the Empire and even European products made their marks in Ottoman countryside. The European corporations mostly invested in areas like railroads, foreign banks, ports construction, exporting cotton, and food processing and these provided opportunity for a huge number of Muslim and non-Muslims at various levels. About 13,000 Ottoman workers were involved in the railway constructions and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, a financial organisation run by the European corporations for Ottoman government employed around 5,000 workers (Quataert, 2000: 182).

The Europeans regularly allotted lopsided worker permits to non-Muslims which created circumstances for mutual suspicious between Muslims and non-Muslims. Since the non-Muslims workers and owners of particular company were coreligionists (often Christians), such religious commonalities created doubt to the majority Muslims. The foreigners also discredited the Muslims due to their different approach to outsiders. In major cities like Istanbul, Izmir, Diyarbakir and Van Erzurum, there were trade unions comprising Turks, Armenians, and

Greeks. The trade union leadership was predominantly elected from the Armenian community that later stages was contested and became a major problem. These foreign capitalistic market and labour trade unions leadership were occasionally influenced by the European politics that reflected in private companies too. In the Ottoman Empire foreign companies formulated modern social strata in the companies owned by the Christians from Europe and Turkish citizens became local aides for them to arrange everything locally for investors. The Ottoman Turks were allotted lower level duties due to their education and inexperienced managerial jobs. The Ottoman Turks considered such discrimination by the outsiders as anti-Sultan and against the *sharia*, that was practiced for many centuries (Shaw, 1977: 225-255).

The Europe had begun its intriguing fight against the existing Ottoman social structure and government through its monetary assistance and investments and they also insisted their political, social, and cultural identities upon the Ottoman Empire. As a consequence of this new financial assistance and capital investments, they constructed the modern Ottoman labour society into three sections. In the first stage, the European forced the Sultan to grant more powers to religious minorities and guarantee their security, which reached in the Tanzimat reforms and conformed at least a legal equality and for fair trial to all the Ottoman subjects. Second stage was Europe's development in industrialization and multi-corporation sector, which was reflected in the Ottoman Empire. In pursuing their investments in any Ottoman sectors, the Europeans secured the primary positions. Next intermediary were mostly non-Muslim particularly Greeks, Armenians and Jews and in most industries the lower strata was allotted to the majority Muslims. In the third stage the Europeans compelled that the Sultan government's appointments in the central administrative services should not be based on religious and ethnic backgrounds and that every citizen should be treated equally in front of law (Quataert, 2000: 183-184).

The Ottoman government and society faced new social frictions in cities and towns due to European company's new workers hiring policies, which created difficulty situation for the *millet* system. These companies beget new social stratification among working communities from top to bottom and this became unwritten rules for any European company operating in the Ottoman land (Quataert, 2000: 182).

In the 20th century, the dialogues between the Armenians and Muslims Turks dwellers became very restricted in market place where business was the primary motive than personal contacts that existed for many centuries and it reflected in the villages in eastern provinces also. For a short while during the Young Turk revolution (1906-1908) there was normalcy between Turks and Armenians but after the Adana massacre of 1908 the Turks-Armenian enmity resurfaced. In the second constitutional period from 1908 onwards the Armenian were stopped in Mosques, bathhouse, and coffeehouse from mingling with the Turks due to newly created hatred and mutual apprehensive against each other. After the Balkan War of 1913, the rise of Turkish nationalism became inevitable for Turks to promote which in turn completely segregated the Armenians from the Turks. They began interacting only within their own Armenians *millet*s groups or with the foreigners of the same faith. Thus, during the World War I these demarcations deeply wounded the Armenians and Turkish sentiments that were practiced and enjoyed for many centuries and became worrisome throughout the Empire (Göçek, 1993: 516).

Historian Donald Quataert annotate situation that existed at that time in Ottoman Empire “We will never know whether the new society of equality before the law or the new order of foreigner/non-Muslim superiority that the foreign corporations seemed to predict would have replaced Muslim supremacy. The old Ottoman order was fading but the new one had not yet been born. In sum, Ottoman society in the 19th century was undergoing an evolution; but that transformation remained unfinished because of the destruction of the empire in 1922” (Quataert, 2000: 180-186).

Young Turk Movement and the Armenians

After 1907, Sultan Abdülhamid II was cut off from the state affairs by Young Turks and was confined to seclusion in the Topaki royal palace. The Ottoman Turks were unimpressed with the Sultan’s state policy of Pan-Islamism which did not yield any benefits. The young officers of royal military academy who studied in the schools built by the Sultan Abdülhamid II became the strong critics of his administration. In addition to that the Corps officers felt that the Sultan was a hindrance to progress of a modern state. Thus, Young Turks movement forced him to abdicate his powers to the young officers working under Committee of Union of Progress (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 122). Historian M. Şükrü Hanioglu specifies that the Young Turk movement’s political stand in nutshell: “their political ideas and ideological commitments were nothing more

than a strong nationalism, patriotism, and opposition towards the real or alleged separatism of non-Muslim groups” (Hanioglu, 2001:140).

The Third Army of the Empire from Macedonia camp organized the 1908 revolution under guidance of the CUP. Simultaneously, other garrisons and sizeable number of the Istanbul police force also joined programme, thus the Young Turk captured power in a bloodless coup on 23 July 1908. Following this Sultan Abdülhamid II was compelled abdicate his power and on 24 July he recalled the 1878 constitution written in Tanzimat era and the restoration of the constitution was jointly claimed by the Turks and Armenians as their victory against the Sultan. It was hoped that the cohesiveness between Armenians and Turks would help social reconciliation. The newly-elected Young Turks commanders Mehmed Talât, Ismail Enver, and Ahmed Cemal went to churches and prayed signalling the desire of the new government to maintain the unity of the Empire and mutual trust among different faiths (Lewy, 2005: 34 Palmer, 1992:202-210).

The Young Turk revolution was appreciated by Armenians living in the cities but those in the eastern *vilayets* were not interested in Constantinople (renamed as Istanbul in 1923). With the new government bringing back 1878 constitution the Socialist Armenian Hunchak party made a common cause with the CUP. The loyalists of Sultan Abdülhamid II were executed for the counter-revolution against the CUP government but the latter soon turned towards Armenians (Master, 2011: 53). In 1909, Adana Province in south eastern Anatolia experienced sudden violence carried out by the Muslim Turks and Kurdish bandits against the CUP but the government forces instead of quelling counter-revolutionist also assaulted the Armenians and this caused around 20,000 lives (Bloxham, 2003: 181).

Even after the Adana massacre of 1909 Armenian revolutionary parties like Dashnaks and Hunchaks maintained their relations with the CUP and requested the latter to implement the 1878 constitution. The Armenian movements hoped that the CUP would accommodate because of their strong support for the new government. Further, Dashnak had passed resolution at their annual meeting to stop all its illegal activities (Lewy, 2005, 36).

The Armenians enjoyed their participation in the struggle against the Sultan along with secular force and they celebrated this victory among themselves and with other communities. They also

assisted the CUP and they expected new hopes for the future. The Armenians once again began their business activities and to express their ideas through newspaper and educational institutions. In the eastern part of *vilayets*, the tax collectors did tax collection smoothly. In eastern Anatolia, the CUP has reorganized a gendarmerie under French General Baumann the Army with the headquarters in Trabizone in the Black Sea region. The CUP government began to act based on its promises to pass a new *vilayets* law to protect provincial autonomy from central government. But the CUP measures for sharing powers were limited and temporarily but nevertheless during 1908-1912 new issues were bigger than ever and disappointment over the 1908 revolution became deeper (Davison, 1948: 482).

The CUP also showed its interests to include the Armenians in its high committee board and particularly CUP member Ibrahim Temo and his friends supported the entry of non-Muslim minorities particularly Armenians in the committee. Young Turks and CUP members had ambivalence in this regard and even during second constitutional period from 1908 to 1912, the CUP could not succeed in giving enough membership to the non-Muslim in general and Armenians in particular and this was not case in the Sultan administration (Temo, 1987: 17).

Challenges to Ottoman stability

It was difficult to completely erase the Muslim and non-Muslim bias and both had their own bigotry against one another and therefore it is not possible for any ideology to unite them. Even a common ideology such as Ottomanism and modern reforms including those Tanzimat did not yield the expected results. Since the Tanzimat era, the Armenians and Turks were divided or polarized on structural and cultural modules. Describing this division historian Fatma Müge Göçek observes: “Structurally, the very institutions introduced to reform and reproduce the empire, namely, the Western-style schools, further segmented Ottoman society, as the Muslims were educated in state schools and the minorities in foreign and minority schools” (Göçek, 1993:517). This educational difference definitely inspired the Armenians and Turks for their respective nationalisms and indirectly divided the future generations of the Ottoman Empire when it culminated with the questions of territorial autonomy or independence from the Turks. It can be considered one of core factor which shook the stability and sovereignty of the Ottomans.

The Armenians moved away from being Ottoman subjects and closer to co-religionists of Europe and their Diaspora around the world. The Armenians were striving for an independent Armenia as end goal ever since their first political awareness was spread from the Madras Presidency in the 18th century. From Madras Presidency in 1772, first political philosophy *Nor Tetrak, Vor Kochi Hordorak* (A New Tract, Entitled Admonishment) was written by the Madras-settled Armenian called Movses Baghramian and it was published by another Madras settled Armenian Shahamir Shahamirian. Main content of the book was “to awaken the youth of the Armenians from their sleep and indolence which derived from a weakened condition resulting from their timidity and idleness” (Walker, 1980:50).

In 1773, the work of another Armenian author Hakob Shahamirian with an interesting title *Vorogait Parats* (Trap of Glory) was also published from Madras. He himself says that his book was “an obstacle to evil deeds arising from human self-glorification” (Walker, 1980:51). This book was considered as the manifesto for a future Armenian constitution. All three books were sent from Madras to eastern part of Armenian *vilayets* where it was widely distributed. They also sent copies to Armenian Gregorian Patriarch Constantinople and Simeon, Catholics (in Etchmiadzin) but both religious leaders cursed these books and said that they were ‘*divashounch* (the breath of the devil). However, fact was that whatever the Madras-based Armenian authors predicted towards independent Armenia occurred in the same methods or ways (Walker, 1980:51). Thus, from the beginning the Armenians were ready to face any consequence for their ultimate aim to create an Armenian nation state and realize greater Armenian civilization.

The Armenians were ready to reach out to any limits to attain their independence in the 20th century. They reinterpreted their political and social practices from the Ottoman perspective to European ones and even in education, occupation and ways of life Armenians alienation towards Turks increased. In addition to that, one prime indicator for the Armenian political independence was their regular interactions with the Europeans through various ways. Another indicator was the spread of nationalism and modernization from the Europe. The European states such Britain and France and Russia fostered their imperialist policy by seeking to protect religious minorities living under the Ottoman or Muslim rule. Thus, the European states and the US promoted Armenian nationalism and independence from the Ottoman yoke. The Europeans divide-and-rule approach severely caused stability which reached its zenith in the Balkan Wars of 1913 and the

World War I (Ahmed Cevdet Pasa 1986: 20). Finally, British historian Bernard Lewis expresses how Turks viewed or saw the Armenian demand for autonomy or independence.

For the Turks, the Armenian movement was the deadliest of all threats. From the conquered lands of the Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, and Greeks, they could, however reluctantly withdraw abandoning distant provinces and bringing the Imperial frontier nearer home. However, the Armenians, stretching across Turkey-in-Asia from the Caucasian frontier to the Mediterranean coast, lay in the very heart of the Turkish homeland-and to renounce these lands would have meant not the truncation, but the dissolution of the Turkish state. Turkish and Armenian villages, inextricably mixed, had for centuries lived in neighbourly association. Now a desperate struggle between them began a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland, that ended with the terrible holocaust of 1915, when, according to some estimates up to a million and half Armenians perished, as well as an unknown number of Turks” (Lewis, 1963: 356).

Armenian *Millet's* Drive for Separation

The Armenian communities enjoyed their freedom under the Tanzimat era even though they were also disappointed at being denied of autonomy for the Armenians of the eastern *vilayets*. However, such a liberal situation was worsening during Sultan Abdülhamid II reign which was harsher than any Sultan in the Ottoman history. This led Armenians to raise arms against the Empire. Following that Sultan and his policy pan-Islamism also frustrated the Armenians for their segregation. (Çetinsaya, 2009:454). In the CUP period also the Armenians were denied self-government in the eastern *vilayets* and struggled for implementation of Article 61 of Congress of Berlin that was resented the CUP leaders, Thus, the mutual disrespect between the Armenians and Young Turks became unavoidable after 1912 (Lewy, 2005:34).

Since the 19th century, the Armenian minorities only started to claim communal autonomy during the Tanzimat era. At first, the Armenians sought ‘communal or religious autonomy’ to the Tanzimat reformers. In the second stage due to modernisation and rise of nationalism, they asked and struggled for ‘territorial autonomy’ during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The third stage was to fight for formation of ‘independence of Armenian state’. In the first two stages, the Armenians were unsuccessful but in the third stage they fought with the CUP administration. The Ottoman Empire also realised this strategy especially after the Balkan Christians succeeded from seeking autonomy to independence. The Ottoman Empire used autonomy policy, especially towards those who did not include political independence at the end of their autonomy agenda or

policy. This was not the case with the Armenians at the turn of the 20th century (Göçek, 1993: 532).

After the 1896 killings, the Armenians were obsessed with fear of massacres and scared of losing territory and hence many Armenians migrated to Russia for safety and security reasons. They were also afraid that while the masters changed conditions remain the same. The Armenians from six *vilayets* very strongly supported and sought the Russian assistance but the elite Armenians living in Constantinople and others towns were willing stay with the Turks and for autonomy within Turkey not under Russian. At the end of 1911, Armenian Gregorian Patriarch appealed to grand vizier about safety from the Kurds tax collectors in the eastern part of the Empire. In 1912, fresh attacks happened that further spoilt the situations (Davison, 1948: 483; Hanioglu, 2008: 204-210; Hanioglu, 2009:604-606).

Protest against the Young Turk movement

In the eastern part, the conditions of the Armenians deteriorated when the CUP government seized weapons from the all suspected people; but in reality, they were collected from only Armenians peasants. The Kurds nomads escaped from this and thus real trouble makers were armed while common Armenians were left without any weapons to defend themselves. Other issue for eastern Armenians was that the lower rank Ottoman Turks officials approbated the Kurds as fellow Muslims even if the Kurds were proven guilty. In eastern Armenian provinces the Ottoman railroad was not constructed until 1914, which severely limited the movement of armed forces in emergency situations. During the Balkan War, the army stationed in the eastern region was moved to the European part to fight with Balkan Christians. The Armenian troops stationed in the region were also sent to war front and hence the Armenian peasants were left without army guards. Meanwhile, the CUP leaders soon moved from their revolution promises of equality to Turkism which affected the non-Muslims and particularly Armenian welfare policies were cut down. The privileges of the Armenian Patriarch Arsharouni in Constantinople were restricted and limited to a minimum level. Thus, the Armenians were disappointed by the CUP revolution statements and second constitutional government of 1908-1912 also disregard Armenians hardships (Davison, 1948: 483; Hanioglu, 2008: 204-210; Hanioglu, 2009:604-606).

The alliance between the Armenian revolutionary movement Dashnaks and CUP worked for 1912 the parliament elections based on a common programme. But scene changed when the Kurds lunched fresh were attacks against the eastern Armenians that became a turning point. However, still Dashnaks were keen on getting autonomy and more reforms for the Armenians but in the eastern part the Armenians were desperate for the Russian support. They also accepted Russian dominance due to the Kurdish atrocities and Turkish mistreatments and negligence (Davison, 1948:499). The congress of another Armenian radical movement Hunchaks was held Constanza (Rumania) in September 1913 and it passed resolution to change methods from legal to clandestine. They wanted to begin their programme with the assassination of Talât Pasha who was minister of Interior and one of the important CUP leaders who participated in Young Turks revolution in 1908. Further in 1913, he was dethroned the elected parliament which promised of equality for Armenians and later proved himself as one of the dictators of the CUP World War I government. Thus, the assassination plan was cancelled but other intense plan was drafted that reflected the combined Armenian activities. Now, the Armenian revolutionary movements and all Armenians Patriarchate (Gregorian, Orthodox and Protestants) joined hands. The Armenians Diaspora also wanted to weaken Ottoman position to claim for their decades old 'Armenian Question' with the help of the European states (Dadrian, 1993:190).

On the other hand, the CUP leaders considered the Armenians request for foreign assistance as an anti-Ottoman measure and instigated an anti-Armenian attitude in them. The CUP interior minister told to Mikayel Zaven, Armenian Gregorian Patriarch, that "some two years later, can you find a people which seeks the intervention of foreigners in the affairs or government by running from one capital to another." He further said that "you (Armenians) cannot live peacefully if you (Armenians) were reason of Turkey's defeat in Anatolia" (Lewy, 2005: 37). Many Armenians felt that such a statement was the final indication for Armenians that Turks were going to do something bigger than any had imagined at that time like mass deportation of Armenians from heart of Anatolia to south of east of the Empire or northern borders of present-day Syrian territories (Dadrian, 1986; Lewy, 2005: 37-38).

The Balkan War of 1912-1913 was a decisive battle for the Ottomans, it began from Montenegro War and later other Balkan states like Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, and Greece participated and supported one another against the Turks. At end of the War, the Ottoman lost almost all the

territories in the Europe except for the present-day Istanbul region. Montenegro captured part of the Albania; Bulgaria small territory in Aegean Sea; Serbia occupied the Macedonia; and Greece also benefited from this War by received Crete and neighbouring Islands of Salonika and a part of Macedonia. Thus, end of the War the Ottomans were driven out from around 70 per cent of its territories and this created a strong and deep sorrow among Ottoman Turks. This also created unprecedented refugee crisis in the Constantinople and the city was filled with sick men and women throughout suburban areas. The CUP government was shocked by the new crisis and asked refugee to settle down in south and south eastern Anatolian lands incidentally, the areas dominated by the Armenian population (Bilgiç, 2009:73-73; Dadrian, 1995:192-193).

After the Balkan War started, the Young Turks switch over from Ottomanism to Turkism and even to pan-Turkism that increased tension against each other. They promoted Turkish literature and Turkish educational system and did not worry about the development of non-Muslims education system. The Young Turks doubts about the Armenians minorities and their final claim for political independent was the ultimate fear the Ottoman Turks in general (Agoston, 2011: 53). Armenian authors Peter Balakian and Vankhan N Dadrian mention about the Balkan reforms in the editorial of *Tanin*, a quasi-official voice of the CUP, which declared:

Europe's intervention and Europe's desire to control our internal affairs is a warning to us to ponder the fate not only of Rumelia (Macedonia), but also eastern Turkey, for it will be impossible to spare eastern Turkey the fate awaiting Rumelia. In the Turkish mind, the struggle to keep the Balkans was never far from the Armenian Question (Balakian, 2003:162; Dadrian, 1995:189).

In the Ottoman Empire most of the Muslims Turks thought that revival of Armenian reforms would create a Balkan defects in the Anatolian lands, the heart and soul of Turkish nationalism. Around that time the Ottoman Turks were influenced by the new perspective of Turkish nationalism. After the Balkan War 1913, Pan-Turkism became core ideology of the CUP government. Abdullah Jevdet, a physician for the military and a CUP leader, pointed his finger at the Armenians when he said: "Don't kid yourself that because of our preoccupations in European Turkey, we should not worry about Anatolia. Anatolia is the wellspring of every fibre of our life. It is our heart, head, and the air we breathe." From this point the Turkish warning became a clear-cut to message to Armenians and like "Christian reforms led to disaster in the Balkans, so too might they lead to disaster in the east" (Balakian, 2003:162).

Armenian Reform Agreement or Package 1914

The Ottoman Turks were in deep angst and sorrow over the loss of Balkan Muslim lives and land. Most of Turks felt that they were defenceless and vulnerable as the Armenians were simultaneously persuading European states to force the Ottomans to grant earlier mentioned autonomy which alluring them for years. The European powers agreed to negotiate with the Ottomans and the Armenian Reform Agreement was drafted 8 February 1914 and this agreement initiated by Russia, the archenemy of the Ottomans at that time (Balakian, 2003:162; Dadrian, 1995: 192-193).

In 1913, European powers, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Austrian-Hungary formed a committee comprising of their ambassadors in Constantinople, but they did not include any Ottoman representative . The Turks drew their version of reform plan because they scared of dividing the Anatolian territory; but the plan did not succeed and the European neglected it (Ahmad, 1982:423).

Russian Embassy first dragoman Andre N. Mandelstam wrote the Armenian reform agreement or package 1914 and he was also a reputed international lawyer. The main content of the agreement was to appoint a European or Ottoman Empire Christian as governor for combined administration for all provinces of the six *vilayets* of the eastern region of the Ottoman Empire. The provincial governor would be assisted by an administrative council, a provincial assembly, lastly with gendarmerie units mixed with the Muslim and Christian soldiers. The agreement also stipulated the abolition of *Hamidiye* irregular Kurdish regiments which behaved very notoriously towards the Armenians throughout the years. In accordance with the Treaty of Berlin 1878 all the major European powers guaranteed the implementation of this package (Hovannisian, 2004: 236-37; Lewy, 2005: 38; Sazonov, 1928: 141). The Armenian reform agreements was mostly supported by the European powers but the Germany and Austria-Hungary argued in favour of Turkey due to their strategic relations at that time and both wanted to expand their domination like the other Europeans states in the West Asian regions (Lewy, 2005: 38).

During the discussions over the Armenian reform agreement, a rumour was spread in the eastern Anatolian region that the new agreement would stop the movement of nomadic Kurds in the Armenian administrative areas. Further, the province administrated by the Christian command

shocked most of the Muslim Kurds in those regions, this led to small clashes between these communities (Ahmad, 1982: 161-162; Lewy, 2005: 38).

Meanwhile the Geneva branch of the Armenian Dashnak movement was doubtful about the new reform and its concerns further contemplated future scenario. It worried about this agreement and reaction of the Turks against the Armenians. Therefore, they alerted the Armenian “before placing our trust in diplomatic reforms, the Nation must subject itself to basic renovations; it must extirpate the curse of cowardly passiveness; it must be inspired by the healthy and redeeming principle of self-assistance; it must arm and be prepared” (Lewy, 2005:39).

The Russia and other European powers forced the CUP government to accept the Armenian reform agreement, 1914 and on 8 February Turks signed it under such high compulsion especially when Russia was ready for military attempts. Though they signed it, the Turks were not ready to implement the reform agreement. In April 1914, the CUP granted permission for two European inspectors, namely Dutch Civil Servant L. C. Wastenek and Norwegian officer Major Nicolai Hoff and both reached Constantinople after couple weeks. There were delays in the discussions over authority sharing and transferring and the Ottoman official intentionally delayed the process for a few weeks. In mid-1914, the European representatives Hoff and Wastenek reached Van and Erzurum respectively. Few days later on 28 June Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo and this sparked and initiated the World War I. Next day Germany declared War on Russia and 8 August extensive mobilisation of all units was ordered by Ottoman Empire. In the eastern provinces, both the European representatives were dismissed and with the sudden pre-occupation in the War no European state was interested in the Armenian issue. In October 1915 Turkey joined hands with Germany and the Armenian reform agreement was abrogated (Hovannisian, 2004: 38-39; Sonyel, 1987: 284).

Even though Armenian reform agreement not implemented it played role against the Armenians thereafter and was seen as one of the causes for great Armenian event of 1915. During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the Congress of Berlin of 1878 played a role or instigated the Armenian demand for autonomy that ended with the 1894-96 massacres. In 1914 the Constantinople conference supporting of the Armenians was held in the Turkish capital but without any representation from turkey. Russian was eager to divide the Ottoman Empire that

created fear among Turks. Ottoman historian Feroz Ahmad states that the role of Russia “seemed like a prelude to a Russian protectorate over eastern Anatolia, with eventual Armenian independence” (Ahmad, 1982:424). During Russian Caucasus and Eastern campaign, the Ottoman Armenian aided the Russian force and helped them by giving vital inputs like movement of units other helps. Thus, the Young Turk-influenced CUP government came to near boiling point and drafted a grand plan for the mass deportation or displacement as the final response to the traitorous behaviour of the entire Armenian communities (Lewy, 2005:39-40). The Armenian reform agreement immediately created fear, angered the CUP leaders, and want to ‘settle’ the Armenian issue once for all.

Author Guenter Lewy rightly elaborates the spirit and state of Turkish mind at that circumstances when he says,

... the Armenians had regarded the reform agreement as a kind of down-payment on the eventual complete liberation from Turkish rule. They did not realize that the Turks would do anything in their power, no matter how ruthless, in order to prevent the loss of what they regarded as the heartland of Turkish Anatolia. The strong desire to be free from the shackles imposed by the Armenian reform agreement 1914 may have been one of the reasons that led the Young Turks to sign the secret military alliance with Germany on August 2, 1914, and eventually to enter the war on the side of Germany several months later (Lewy, 2005:40).

Armenian Internal Deportations and First World War

The CUP entered the World War I on 29 October 1914, and next day it issued a public declaration of its motive: “Our participation in the world war represents the vindication of our national ideal. The ideal of our nation and people leads us towards the destruction of our Muscovite enemy, in order to obtain thereby a natural frontier to our empire, which should include and unite all branches of our race” (Toynbee, 1917: 28-29).

Even though Turkey entered the World War I, the CUP-influenced parliament session was conducted and constitutional institution was working smoothly. However, CUP leaders Talât Pasha (Minister of Interior), Enver Pasha (Minister of War from 1914), and Cemal were grappling with their own secret plan to deport the Armenians from six *vilayets* of eastern part to the southern border. Thus, new nexus was formed among them and top Young Turks committee members and like-minded top officials assisted Talât, Enver, and Cemal. During Wartime these

three acted as the triumvirate military dictatorship and ultimate power centre (Dadrian, 1991: 550).

The Armenians episode with the World War I started from Constantinople on 24 April 1915 when eminent scholars, and personalities of the Armenian *millets* members of around few thousands were arrested brutally massacred in large number at suburbs of the city. During the World War I, in May 1915, an Armenian army officer's munity was occurred in Van city. The Central committee of the CUP was afraid of sudden Armenian riots and as a consequence thousands of Armenians officers were massacred near Constantinople that frightened the remaining Armenians. Thus, in the eastern Anatolia large number of Armenian officers and soldiers ran away from the war duty. A sizeable number of them joined the Russian army to fight against the Ottoman to finish their long waited vengeance and liberate their Armenian dominated areas. The CUP first initiated deportation plan at end April 1915 to late May 1916, when the main deportation plan executed. First, they started arrest and carried out small deportation of Armenians in Cilicia region to south-east, near the Gulf of Alexandretta (Bloxham, 2003: 141; Kia, 2008: 145-46).

The CUP began to execute their plan in May 1915 onwards with the deportation of Armenian from their home region of eastern Anatolia to southern border of Turkey. Nevertheless, in realty the CUP started it a few months earlier. The Armenians were thrown out their house in all the six *vilayets* with very dedication. Later deportation was implemented in the western Anatolia and finally it reached Constantinople. The deportation caused for death of few thousands Armenians due to starvation, sickness, heat wave and thousand women and children were treated in inhumane way by the Ottoman armed forces and unscrupulous Kurdish irregular regiments. The Kurdish Hamidiye forces plundered, tortured, and killed the innocent civilians (Bloxham, 2003: 141; Kia, 2008: 145-46).

The Turkish armed forces and Kurds inflicted inhumane attitude included the medical experimentation on Armenian children, brutal raping of Armenian women or burning them in many places particularly near Dayr al Zor town at Euphrates river bed in the present-day Syria. Armenian homes were demolished throughout regions and the empty places were distributed to newly emigrated Balkan Turks (Dadrian, 1986: 180). The CUP leader Cemal Pasha exchanged

telegrams with minister of interior Talât Pasha and stated that around 120,000 Armenians were deported from six *vilayets* and sending them to various parts on the southern border. The CUP leader also warned that neutral Turks, and those Muslim going safe haven to the Armenians would be hanged in front of their homes and the houses of Muslim ‘traitors’ would be pulled down. Further, the CUP leaders sent instruction to all governors regularly and ordered unquestionable implementation of the programme. Those governors who refused to act against the Armenians were sent to lower duties in tough locations (Balint, 2013: 81).

To conduct the Armenian deportation, the CUP leaders formed a special army unit called *Teskilat-i Mahsusa* or Special Organization (SO) whose origin can be traced to around 1908. However, Special Organisation was fully active since the Balkan War and continued its duties during the World War I. This organisation was main operator of April 1915 Constantinople massacre and also supervised the Armenian deportation throughout the Empire. Its loyal officers reports to the Enver Pasha, Minister of War from 1914. This organisation was conducted all clandestine operations like murdering of important Armenian personalities and creating riots in areas inhabited by the Armenians (Lewy, 2005:73-74).

The CUP leaders used the emergency law as part of the deportation programmes. The Armenian deportation was legalized through emergency law called as *Sevk ve İskân Kanunu* (The Temporary Law of Deportation) and drafted in May 1915 but the deportation began a couple of months earlier. The CUP cleverly made deportations as part of national consciousness and received the legal permission for deportation. While drafting the deportation law its leaders did not identify the deportees as Armenians or by any nationality but instead covered the real intention and created security reason in the warfront as the rationale. The CUP leaders did not introduce the deportation law in the parliament but they took it to grand vizier and secured Cabinet assent and kept it out of the purview of parliament.

The Armenian deportation programme caused a toll of around 1.2 million Armenians and this included the Assyrians, Pontaic and Greeks who were living in those areas from 1915-1918 (Walker, 1980; Lewy, 2005; Akçam, 2006). Famous American Ambassador Henry Morgenthau who was posted in Constantinople during that time elaborates his experience “I am confident that the whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this. The great

massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared to the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915” (Balint, 2013: 82).

Post-World War I and the Ottoman Empire

The Ottomans were overpowered by the allies military powers, the Committee of Union and Progress was also dissolved and its members took refuge in different unknown locations. The Armenians vestiges were collected with the help of British army. At the end of 1917 and 1918 the British General Allenby passed through the Palestine and Syria and on the way met the deported Armenians. The CUP leaders ran away to foreign countries for hideout and when Allenby reached the Constantinople on 10 November 1918 no CUP leader was present.

After the World War I the Armenian relations with the Turks were destroyed by the deportation and War period treatment. Thereafter, the Armenians looks down Turks as bloody murderer and with blood on their hand. Until then, the Armenians were waiting for autonomy but after the War the Armenian considered themselves as a separate nation and not *millet* or Ottoman subjects. The long struggle of the Armenians for autonomy finally engulfed major population in the six *vilayets* of eastern Armenia that were under the Russian Armenian control with the help of the British (Walker, 1992: 237). The allied powers who guaranteed security of the Armenian through Armenian reform agreement 1914 but could not stand by their words. According to the Turks, the Armenian reform agreement clearly exposed the European desire of dividing the Ottoman Empire and therefore they took this agreement as pretext to execute the cleansing of the Armenian population during the War period.

Table 6.1: The Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, 1831-1914 (Asiatic Part)

Year	Muslims	Total Population	Armenian <i>millet</i>	Percentage Armenian <i>millet</i>
1831	2,501,475	3,753,642	20,309	0.5
1844	12,800,000	35,350,000	2,400,000	6.8
1881	12,587,137	17,388,604	1,001,465	5.7
1894	21,507,304	27,208,683	994,065	3.6
1906	15,508,753	20,884,630	1,031,708	4.9
1914	15,044,846	18,520,016	1,161,169	6.3

Source: Adopted from Karpas 1985: 21, 54,149,155,169; McCarthy, 1983:75; Mutlu, 2003: 29-34; Shaw 1978: 326; Ubcini, 1855: 18

The 1914 the Ottoman census says the total Armenian population was just over 1.1 million (Table 6.1) but on other hand Armenian Gregorian Patriarchate reports that total Armenian population was around 2.1 million. During 1914, the deportation had started in location without authorization from government therefore census details at that moment was mostly calculated. The Armenians residing in cities were allowed to stay in homes, around 400,000 people from eastern province were deported but data not reliable. Further to escapes from the Turkish murder about 700,000 Armenians fled to Caucasus, Europe, and the US. After the World War I, nearly 100,000 Armenians stayed in Turkey and around 300,000 Armenians perished during deportation (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 315-316-317). On 24 May 1915 when the Armenian deportation was under way the allied powers (Britain, France, and Russia) jointly declared that any inquiry on the Armenian issue should be internationally organized: “In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilisation, the Allied governments announce publicly...that they will hold personally responsible all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres” (European Parliament, 2015).

Post-War Court-Martial in Constantinople

Legal process on CUP war criminals started in the Ottoman Parliament on 1 November 1918 and seven main leaders, namely, Mehmed Talât, Ismail Enver, Ahmed Cemal, Drs Mehmed Nazim and Behaeddin Şakir and police and security chiefs Osman Bedri and Hüseyin Azmi were captured by the British and Ottoman officials. Armenian historian Kirakossian states in his observation of records of speeches published in *Takvim-i-Vekâyi* 20 October 1918 “the Armenian

massacres became the primary topic of conversation in the Ottoman Parliament', with one parliamentarian decrying 'we inherited a country turned into a huge slaughterhouse' (Balint, 2013: 85).

On 2 November, a motion for legal proceedings upon two ministers of Wartime served in the CUP cabinets was presented to the Ottoman parliament by a Deputy Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament which said that the CUP leaders crossed "the rules of law and humanity" (Dadrian, 1995: 319). The motion contained ten allegations against the ministers, like aggression, military inability, political mistreatment and financial fraudulent and allegations five and ten concerned the Armenian massacre. The CUP leaders secretly enforcing Temporary Laws with their loyal officials and enforcing the massacre was declared to be opposite to Turkey's virtue and respect for constitution. Allegation ten described that the CUP ministers formed Special Organisation and supported Kurdish Hamidiye regiments which tortured the lives of innocent, damaged houses and places of worship and hence those CUP minister were guilty of being co-conspirators and participants in the Armenian deportation (Dadrian, 1995: 337; Balint, 2013: 85).

The Turkish Parliament formed two more inquiry committees in November 1918 and the main committee related with Armenian episode was dealt by *Beşinci ube Tahkikat Komisyonu* or (Fifth Committee of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies). Also known as Mazhar Inquiry Commission, it was headed by Parliament Deputy Hasan Mazhar (Kirakossian, 1992:160). This Fifth Committee administrated the oral testimony of eyewitness while the CUP ministers were simultaneously cross-examined. The Mazhar committee mainly dealt with the communication between the military leaders and executive officers while executing the Armenian massacre (Kevorkian, 2011: 730). The Mazhar committee was formed under the Sultan's direction and therefore at that time it has full powers because there was no authority to counter the Sultan's order. Thus, he enquired most of top officials who were part of the CUP government during the World War I period. This Committee also collected rudimentary and vital documents and telegrams order details and pointed 28 provinces as locations for Armenian massacre (Balint, 2013: 85; Kevorkian, 2011: 730). The findings of the Mazhar committee were submitted to the Court-Martial as primary enquiry committee from the Ottoman state (Balint, 2013: 86).

In the Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920 included many articles which guaranteed the trail and punishment for 1915 Armenian massacre. Article 144 stated that “the Turkish Government recognises the injustice of the law of 1915 relating to *Emval-i-Metroukeh* (Abandoned Properties) and outlined measures of restoration, Article 228 stated that the Turkish Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the prosecution of off enders and the just appreciation of responsibility” (Balint, 2013: 83). Author Jennifer Balint identifies the following articles of the Treaty of Sèvres 1920, that are relevant to non-Muslims in the post-World War I Turkey:

Article 145

All Turkish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language, or religion. Difference of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

Within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Turkish Government will submit to the Allied Powers a scheme for the organisation of an electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation of racial minorities.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. Adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

Article 147

Turkish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, and independently of and without interference by the Turkish authorities, any charitable, religious and social institutions, schools for primary, secondary and higher instruction and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

Article 148

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to racial, linguistic or religious minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out

of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational or charitable purposes.

Article 149

The Turkish Government undertakes to recognise and respect the ecclesiastical and scholastic autonomy of all racial minorities in Turkey. For this purpose, and subject to any provisions to the contrary in the present Treaty, the Turkish Government confirms and will uphold in their entirety the prerogatives and immunities of an ecclesiastical, scholastic or judicial nature granted by the Sultans to non-Moslem races in virtue of special orders or imperial decrees (firmans, hattis, berats, etc.) as well as by ministerial orders or orders of the Grand Vizier.

Article 226

The Turkish Government recognises the right of the Allied Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Turkey. or in the territory of her allies.

The Turkish Government shall hand over to the Allied Powers or to such one of them as shall so request all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the Turkish authorities (Sèvres Treaty, 1920).

Article 230

The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914.

The Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the tribunal which shall try the persons so accused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such tribunal. In the event of the League of Nations having created in sufficient time a tribunal competent to deal with the said massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to bring the accused persons mentioned above before such tribunal, and the Turkish Government undertakes equally to recognise such tribunal (Sèvres Treaty, 1920).

The Treaty of Sèvres, however, was not implemented due to various diplomatic hurdles and pressures from the US and other European powers. Following that on 24 July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed between Turkey and the Allied powers. The Lausanne removed all allegations on Turkey (Willis, 1982: 162). After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Ottoman Empire was officially abolished and its six-hundred years history came to end (Budak, 2009: 323-325). Thus, the Kemalist government which came to power in 1923 claimed that it not

responsible for the happenings during the World War I. Britain captured the CUP War criminals and held them in Mudro and Malta islands, but they did not initiate any trails against them. The British says for safety of the culprit, it did not start any judicial proceedings and was high criticized even within the Britain (Walker, 1980). Later due to pressures the Britain arrested some War criminals in consultation with the Turkish Republic (Akçam, 2007: 239). In Turkey there were opposition for the British trying Ottoman citizen on its soils but the Britain acquitted all of them due to insufficient documentary evidence. Later on, the war criminals returned to Turkey on the condition to the government of Kemal Ataturk would initiate a fair trial against them but the reality was different. As Taner Akçam says “most of them moved to Ankara and were given posts in the nationalist government” (Akçam, 2006: 362).

About the post-War court martial, Armenian historian Vahkan N Dadrian says that from the legal perspective it was “found that the deportations were ‘exploited as a pretext for personal gain’ (in that they gained access to Armenian property) and that ‘(t) he deportation was carried out in a manner (so as) to include every part (of the country), in contradiction to the spirit behind the wording of the Law on Deportation’. Law thus, while a tool of the massacre was still designed to set limits” (Dadrian, 2011: 315–16).

This chapter vividly describes that the incomplete implementation of 1839 and 1856 Tanzimat reforms frustrated the Armenians *millet* communities. As a result Armenian nationalism emerged that led to armed struggle against the Ottoman Sultan and the Armenian resistance movement took it to next level. In the 20th century the in the wake of the Balkan War in 1913 and its aftermath, the Ottoman Empire was under constant pressures from the European states for Armenian reform and autonomy that entangled dispute between both sides and created a deep wedge. The Armenian killings of 1915 were fallout of the tensions between the Europeans and Ottomans and the Armenians paid the price. The European states very apparently followed policy of the Christian only continent of Europe and cut off large territory in the Balkan region and thus reduced the Ottoman Empire merely to the Asiatic part of Empire. To accomplish such undercurrent Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary out played the Ottomans. More specifically the Armenian Question among the European states ended up with the Ottoman catastrophe in the World War I and as a consequence the Armenians experienced harsh treatment of deportations. The Turkish failure to understand international and European politics of

provocation and deception since Treaty of Berlin until dissolution of the empire 1923 was also responsible for the wedge created between different millets of the Empire.

Chapter VII

Conclusions

The Ottoman Empire evolved from an Anatolian frontier principality in 1300 to become dominant Empire that extended to Eastern Europe, the Arabian Peninsula and to North Africa. During this expansion, it also included the non-Muslim people under its authority and based on Quran and Hadith treated them as Dhimmi and after the capture of the Constantinople in 1453 it promoted the flourishing of non-Muslims but within the limitations of Islamic supremacy. The Dhimmi were allowed to practice all professions except for those which were prohibited under Islam such as military service and so on. The nature of the *Ottoman millet* was not oppressive as they were during the earlier Islamic Empire but certainly it did not ensure a treatment of equality. The members of the *millet* gradually improved their knowledge about the social reformation and industrial progress that were taking place in Europe and other parts of world which in turn stimulated modern ideas among them. In the pre-Tanzimat period, the non-Muslims were major stakeholders of the Ottoman Empire, particularly Greeks, Armenians, and Jews and in the 18th century *millet* reached a standard organization or system under the Sultan authority. Thus, the condition of the *millet* in the pre-Tanzimat period was not suppressive but its subjects faced with certain discrimination and exploitation.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1774 ended with the decisive defeat of the Ottoman Empire and was forced to sign the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. The Ottoman officials believed that Treaty was the result of military superiority of the Russians. Hence, the Ottomans wanted to modernize their military through modern training and education. They also realised that to include the non-Muslims into the army and other administrative post along with the Muslim Turks, it was imperative to strengthen the Empire in general and militarily in particular. Sultan Selim II's traditional reform policy was strongly opposed by *ulema* which forced him to become cautious but they eventually cost his life. His successor Sultan Mahmud II successfully faced the opponents of the reform, but far reaching new reforms had to wait until Sultan Abdülmecid, his successor. Tanzimat was proclaimed under *Hatt i-Gulhane* (1839) and *Hatt i-Humayun* (1856) to strengthen and unifying the Ottoman society were *main reasons*. Since the 1774 War, external

powers such the Russian and European powers urged the Sultan to grant rights to non-Muslims of the Empire. After the Balkan War of 1856, Britain forced the Ottoman Sultan to proclaim several rights for its non-Muslims subjects, particularly regarding the Armenians autonomy. Thus, Tanzimat reform had many internal and external reasons.

The declaration of *Hatt-i Gulhane* (1839) and *Hatt-i Humayun* (1856) were the primary decrees in defining the Tanzimat *Era*. These edicts were responsible for the introduction of Western notions of equality and subsequently secularism, whose impact led to a pronounced restructuring not only of the traditional Ottoman educational institutions, but also of the Ottoman society. The Tanzimat reform edits, particularly the one issued in 1856 insisted on equality in all opportunities in government posts, and rule of law was a corner stone of the reform proclamation. Thus, by introducing the western notions of equality and legal assurances of equality among all subjects, regardless of religion, the *millet* barriers were broken down and that the concepts of state and citizenship would become increasingly western and secularized.

During the Tanzimat era, Armenians *millet* people enjoyed primary position in the Ottoman politics and economic and social lives and many occupied key positions in the Sultan court and financial institutions. Therefore, *condition and nature* of the Armenians during the Tanzimat era can be described as golden era but at the same time next generation Armenians were ideologically different. The state schools, *millet* schools, and foreign schools gave their students entirely different ways of thinking. The Muslim Turks began to establish idea of the Ottomanism but the Armenians were eagerly learning about European-inspired nationalism. Thus, Muslim intellectuals and European educated Armenians pursued different methods and objectives, and produced educated classes parallel to one another yet hostile, unable to understand or appreciate each other. This process prevented unity and cohesiveness that needed to hold the Empire together. Thus, political awareness of the Armenians led to armed struggles against the harsh torture carried out by nomadic Kurds and tax collectors during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The Sultan army suppressed Armenian protests that led to the Armenians massacre of 1896. Thus, Armenians were transformed from the *milli i-sadika* to a hostile community to the Ottoman sovereignty.

The Tanzimat reform 1839, was introduced to equip the Ottoman army on par with the European

standards in the battlefield. Therefore, the Tanzimat reformers introduced modern education system and European warfare techniques that enabled the Turks to be familiar with the European ideas and thoughts. At the same time, Armenian efforts to promote modern education and European ideas put them in better socio-economic conditions creating social hierarchies in the seat of the Empire. On the other hand, the 1856 decree's main purposes was to provide equality to non-Muslims of the Ottoman subject and the Armenians followed it well to receive most advantages from such a reform decree. Already the non-Muslims were well organised about their community development and therefore they built many modern schools which became the breeding ground for modern ideas and thoughts. The Ottoman Muslim Turks also began to learn and understand of modern ideas particularly nationalism or supporting Ottomanism. The non-Muslims on other hand adopted the idea of separate religio-ethnic nationalism and started demanding autonomy and self-governance. The European, on their part, urged the Sultan for rights and equal treatment of the non-Muslims. The majority Muslim Turks saw this as a failure of the Sultan and deemed non-Muslims as traitor to the Sultan and sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.

Next stage of social division occurred during Sultan Abdülhamid II's rule. After the Congress of Berlin in 1878, many European countries entered Turkey through their financial investments in various sectors of the Empire, particularly railways, mines, port development, and other industries. These European industries created a social stratification between the majority Muslims and non-Muslim minorities through framing a hierarchal ladder with the European as owner of the company, non-Muslims as the mediator of that company and finally the Muslim Turks in the lower level. This hierarchy explicitly was based on educational qualifications but implicitly created a rift between the two communities. After the Armenian massacre of 1896 the antagonism between Muslim Turks and Armenian became widespread even though some unity was noticeable in Young Turks revolution in 1908. During CUP period (1909-1913) and the Balkan crisis of 1913, social stratification was widely practiced and non-Muslims treated very suspiciously and the latter stopped mixing with the majority Muslim Turks in public places which in turn established an enmity. Even though, the Ottoman Empire did not lose any territory to outsiders during the Tanzimat period the reforms laid the foundation for strong social divisions between Muslim Turks and non-Muslims in general and Armenians in particular. This

resulted in a catastrophe for the non-Muslims during the First World War. Thus, first hypothesis— *Introduction of the Western ideas through Tanzimat created, social stratification between Muslim and non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire which in turn led to the failure of the Tanzimat – stands validated.*

The Ottoman Empire's multicultural society remained tranquil for many centuries and the Armenians enjoyed political and economic prosperity until the Congress of Berlin of 1876. Difference arose when the idea of nationalism spread among European states and adjunct region which were related through European by languages, race or religion also witnessed metamorphic changes in societies. Particularly, in the early 20th century the term *millet* formerly denoting the religious communities of the Empire assumed a modern connotation of “nation”, with *milliyet* signifying “nationality”. During second constitutional rule (1912), Ottomans turned from Ottomanism to Turkism and after the Balkan War in 1913 the CUP strongly promoted the Turkish nationalism. The Turks began to exclude the Armenians from non-Muslim to the non-Turkish people and thus the Turks started to separate themselves from the Armenians. The latter were already under the boiling of the Armenian nationalism and Armenian armed movements were also ready to face any situations. Thus, both communities imagined nationalism and their modern nation-state based on single identity and were waiting for the right moment to extract most benefits by separating one another. Simultaneously, with the outbreak of the First World War both sides wished to extract maximum advantages to reach the goal to secure the Anatolian heartland. Both the Turks and Armenians coveted same piece of land and therefore the conflict became inevitable. Further, Turkish suppression of Armenian nationalists created more gulfs between the two communities. However, the Turks and Armenians feud peaked after Armenians armed struggle for nationalism began. Thus, the clash between two religious entities became inevitable and ended up with violence. Thus, the second hypothesis - *the millet contributed to an upsurge of nationalist stirrings among the Armenians and had severe repercussion on the Ottoman Empire's stability and sovereignty –stands validated.*

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