


**A STUDY OF PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND
EUROPEAN UNION IN AFGHANISTAN**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2016**



Date 16/05/2016

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "A STUDY OF PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND EUROPEAN UNION IN AFGHANISTAN" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


Madan Meher

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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CONTENTS

Acknowledgment	iv
List of abbreviations	v
Chapter I: Introduction	1-17
Aim of the Study, Review of the Literature, Rationale and Scope of the Study, Hypotheses, Research Questions, Research Methods, Chapterization.	
Chapter II: NATO and EU as International Organizations	18-83
NATO: Origin and Development, EC: Origin and Development NATO: Structure and Functions, EC: Structure and Functions NATO: In the post-Cold War <i>NATO: Expansion of Structures and Functions, NATO: Expansion of Role and Functions</i> EC/EU: In the post-Cold War <i>EC/EU: Expansion of Structures and Functions, EC/EU: Expanding Role and Functions</i>	
Chapter-III: NATO’s Growing Cooperation with the EU	84-111
NATO-EC/EU Relations in the Cold War period NATO-EU Relations in the post-Cold War period Manifestations of Cooperation <i>Crisis Management and Peace-Keeping Operations, Terrorism, Non-Proliferation of WMD, Anti-Piracy Operation, Narcotic Drugs</i>	
Chapter IV: NATO’s Mandate and Resource Capabilities in Afghanistan	112-156
NATO led ISAF’s Mandates Role, Functions and Resource Capabilities <i>Military Field Civilian Field</i>	
Chapter V: NATO-EU Partnership in Afghanistan in Civilian Sector	157-196
Economic Reconstruction Tasks Alternative Livelihoods Political and Administrative Reforms Police Training Humanitarian Assistance Democracy Promotion Social and Educational Field	
Chapter VI: Conclusion	197-215
References	216-235

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(MADAN MEHER)

List of Abbreviations

ACE:	Allied Command Europe
ACLANT:	Allied Command Atlantic
ACO:	Allied Command Operations
ACT:	Allied Command Transformation
AEWCF:	Airborne Early Warning and Control Force
AFSOUTH:	Air Forces Southern
AIHRC:	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
AIMS:	African Union in Sudan
AMIS CIVPOL:	AMIS II Support for the Police
ANA:	Afghanistan National Army
ANP:	Afghanistan National Police
ANSF:	Afghan National Security Forces
ARTF:	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASFF:	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
AU/DITF:	Darfur Integrated Task Force
AU:	African Union
AWACS:	Airborne Early Warning and Control System
BiH:	Bosnia-Herzegovina
C2:	Command and Control
CARD:	Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development
CBRN:	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFC-A:	Command–Afghanistan
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHOD:	Chiefs of Defence
CIMIC:	Civil-Military Cooperation
CINC:	Commander-in-Chief
CJTF-101:	Cominbind Joint Task Force-101
CME/CMX 03:	Joint Crisis Management Exercises ()
CMPD:	Crisis Management Planning Directorate

CNPF:	Counter Narcotics Police Force
CoE:	Centre of Excellence
CoS:	Chief of Staff
CPCC:	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSC:	Community Safety Councils
CSCE:	Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP:	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSTC-A:	US Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CSTC-A:	Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan
DF:	Deployable Forces
DPC:	Defence Planning Committee
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSACEUR:	Deputy Supreme Commander of Europe
DSCE:	Deputy Supreme Commander Europe
EADRCC:	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
EAPC:	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC:	European Community
ECHO:	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Department
ECJ:	European Court of Justice
ECOSOC:	Economic and Social Committee
ECSC:	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA:	European Defence Agency
EDC:	European Defence Community
EEAS:	European External Action Service
EEC:	European Economic Community
EMU:	Economic and Monetary Union
EMU:	European Monetary Union
EP:	European Parliament
ESCB:	European System of Central Banks
ESDP:	European Security and Defence Policy
ESI:	Environmental Security Initiative

EU NAVFOR:	European Naval Force Somalia-Operation
EU:	European Union
EUCE:	EU Command Element”
EUCS:	EU cell at SHAPE
EUCS:	European Union Cell at Supreme Headquarters
EULEX:	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMC:	European Union Military Committee
EUMS:	EU Military Staff
EUMS:	European Union Military Staff
EUPM:	EU Police Missions
EUPOL:	European Police Forces
EUSR:	EU Special Representative
EXBS:	Export Control and Border Security
FLR:	Forces at Lower Readiness (FLR
FRONTEX:	Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
FRY:	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FSB:	Forward Support Bases (FSB
FYROM:	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product (GDP
GFAP:	General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP
GIRoA :	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPI:	Good Performers Initiative (GPI
GPPO:	German Police Project Office (GPPO),
HILG:	High Level Group (HLG
HQ SACT:	Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation ()
HQ:	NATO Headquarters
HR/VP:	High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP
HRF:	High Readiness Forces (HRF
IBA:	International Board of Auditors (IBAN
ICRC:	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC
IDP:	Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs

IEC:	Independent Election Commission (IEC).
IFOR:	Implementation Force (IFOR)
IMS:	International Military Staff (IMS)
IPE:	In-Place Forces (IPF)
IS:	International Staff (IS)
ISAF:	International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
JCMB:	Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB)
JFCCs:	Joint Force Component Commands
KFOR:	NATO led Kosovo Force
KLA:	Kosovo Liberation Army' (KLA)
KOGG:	Committee for the Protection of the State Border'
LOTFA:	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
LPSC:	Local Public Safety Committees
LTBF:	Long Term Build-up Forces
MB:	Military Budget
MC:	Military Committee
MCD:	Ministry of Counter-narcotics
MCG:	Mediterranean Cooperation Group
MEU:	Expeditionary Unit
MilReps:	Military Representatives
NAC:	North Atlantic Council
NACC:	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAEW&CF:	NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force
NAT:	North Atlantic Treaty
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC3A:	NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
NCRS:	NATO Crisis Response System
NDCS:	National Drug Control Strategy
NIWS:	NATO Intelligence and Warning System
NLA:	National Liberation Army
NNEC:	Network-Enabled Capability

NPG:	Nuclear Planning Group
NPLT:	NATO Permanent Liaison Team
NPT:	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC:	NATO-Russia Council
NRF:	NATO Response Force
NRF:	NATO Response Force
NSIP:	NATO Security Investment Program
NSIP:	NATO Security Investment Programme
NTM-A:	NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
O&M:	Operations and Maintenance
OMLTs2:	Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams
OSCE:	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAPT:	Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism
PC:	Political Committee
PfP:	Partnership for Peace
PMTs:	Police Mentoring Teams
PRTs:	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSC:	Political and Security Committee
RC:	Regional Commands
RML:	Revolution in Military Logistics
RPPB:	Resources Policy and Planning Board
SACEUR:	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT:	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SAO:	Security Assistance Office
SC:	Strategic Commanders
SCEPC:	Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
SFOR:	NATO-led Stabilization Force
SFRY:	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SHAPE:	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SILK:	NATO Virtual Silk Highway
SPS:	Science for Peace and Security

SSF:	Science Security Forum
UN CTC:	UN Counter-Terrorism Committee
UN:	United Nations
UNODC:	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC:	UN Security Council
UNSCR:	UN Security Council Resolutions
WB:	World Bank
WEU:	Western European Union
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WW:	World War

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed by the United States, Canada and some of the Western European countries in 1949. It is a well-equipped and structured international military organization and called as a collective defence organization. Its purpose was to provide security to its member states from any external threats in general and the Soviet Union and its allies in particular. After formation of NATO, the Eastern bloc formed the Warsaw Pact in an attempt to achieve parity of power with the Western bloc. During the Cold War, NATO tried to protect the security of its members through maintaining role of deterrence (Smith 1990: 90). Due to various reasons the Soviet Union was collapsed and the Eastern bloc got disintegrated. These events brought to end the Western bloc's fear of war and threat from Soviet Union and its allies. It was expected that NATO would wind up as it was no longer relevant. Due to growing new security threats in the larger World, the United Nations found difficult to handle them by itself alone and for that reason, it was seeking cooperation from regional organizations. During this period, NATO was also searching the way to continue its relevance in the post-Cold War Era. NATO decided to expand its role and functions to deal with different issues such as crisis management and peace keeping operations, fight against global challenges like terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and narcotic drugs, cyber attacks and pirates problems etc. NATO's growing role in various peace keeping and crisis management operations has strengthened its relevance in the post-Cold War period.

As a military organization, NATO could contribute its military resources for the peace keeping and crisis management operations and also for fight against other global challenges. To fight against all these global challenges, NATO needs both the military and civilian resource capabilities. It is not the civilian or economic organization who can contribute civilian resources in operations and due to its lack of civilian resource capability, NATO seeks cooperation from other civilian organizations in Europe. NATO realized the significance of soft power to address socio-economic and political reconstruction in the post-conflict states and regions. Therefore, the North Atlantic

Council (NAC) of NATO at London in 1991, decided to develop its strategic relations with other regional organizations of Europe like the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC) for its broader approach to promote international peace and security (NATO 1991: 01).

In the “Rome Declaration” of NATO in 1991, the NAC declared that member states of the alliance agreed to make framework of interlocking institutions for new European security architecture, in which NATO, CSCE, EC (present European Union), Western European Union (WEU) and Council of Europe would complement each other (NAC 1991: 01). On the basis of developments mentioned above, all these regional organizations (NATO, CSCE, EU and WEU) of Europe had decided to co-operate with each other. The 9/11 terrorist attack at the World Trade Center of U.S, compelled the international community to take effective actions towards fight against global terrorism. With the leadership of U.S and the EU, the ‘Bonn Conference’ was held in 2001 where the UN Security Council (UNSC) mandated the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Its objective was to provide secure environment to the Afghan government through which the newly established Afghan Government can re-build its socio-economic-political and military systems. The 9/11 terrorist attack was compelled U.S and NATO to counter attack its advisory group as Article V says that-any external threat to any member states will be considered as a threat to all and at that circumstances each of member states would exercise the right of individual or collective self defence. The terrorist attack was not from Soviet Union or its allies but from the Al-Qaida linked terrorist groups which are basically based in Afghanistan. The UN mandated ISAF had engaged in 2001 and had been operated in Afghanistan. But, in 2003 the UN realized the lack of military power to carry out Afghanistan operation. And finally in 2003, the UN decided to take help from the NATO as well equipped and structured international military organization. During that time, the UN authorized to NATO to lead the ISAF in Afghanistan. Here, the NATO led ISAF’s primary responsibility was to provide security and assist the Afghan Government. But, to carry out civilian activities NATO needs civilian resources which compelled it to extend its cooperation and partnership with other civilian organizations and during that time NATO realized that the EU is the best organization to assist it.

Both NATO and the EU are two different regional organizations of Europe and had their origin in the post-World War-II to bring stability in Europe. NATO was a collective defence organization, whereas the EU (formally known as the European Community) has been regarded as a political and economic organization of Europe. While NATO has strong military power, the EU has strong economic and political power. The EU has only European countries as its member states, and does not have US and Canada as its member states like NATO. NATO and the EU have some common factors like overlapping members states, geography, interest to promote and strengthen democracy among its member states and fight against growing global challenges such as terrorism, WMD, narcotic drugs and to establish peace and stability in the crisis region (Bensahel 2003: 24). During the Cold War period, NATO concentrated solely on deterrence role against the Soviet Union and its allies. In this period, the EU's role was to bring economic integration and political stability in the Europe. Due to lack of civilian resources, NATO sought cooperation of the EU in the post-Cold War to successfully establish peace and stability in the various crisis situations and also to fight against other global challenges (Goldgeier 2010: 16).

The NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency have exchanged their letters for the first time in 2001 and defined the scope of cooperation between NATO and the EU and their formal declaration for partnership in peace keeping and crisis management was finalized on 11 March 2003 through the 'Berlin Plus Agreement'. It paved the way to use single military force and allows the EU to access NATO's capability, Headquarters, structures and mechanism to carry out peace keeping and crisis management operations (Reichard 2006: 273; NATO 2003b). This was an important milestone for formal cooperation between NATO and the EU. This agreement on single integrated military force was discouraged the EU to doesn't develop its own military power under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as initially intended to do. Both the organizations have developed their institutional connections such as formation of the European Union Cell at Supreme Headquarters (EUCS) of the Alliance's Operational Headquarters and NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) at the European Union

Military Staff (EUMS) for military matters and information sharing (NATO 2003b; Lindley-French 2007: 116). NPLT has been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and EU Cell was set up at SHAPE, Belgium in March 2006 (NATO 2009c). Both the EUCS and NPLT have developed proactive approach to their task and have contributed to the increased transparency and interaction between these two organizations (Council of the European Union 2009: 21). Under the Berlin-Plus framework, both the EUCS and NPLT have provided support to Deputy Supreme Commander Europe (DSACEUR) of NATO, for full transparency between NATO and the EU at Macedonia in 2003 and Bosnia since 2004. DSACEUR was also appointed as a European operational commander of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU as authorized through the Berlin plus agreement to look into the matter of NATO-EU cooperation.

The 'Berlin Plus Agreements' also gave rise to the creation of the EU-NATO Capability Group in 2003, which aims to ensure the coherence of NATO and the EU capability development efforts. Though this was not a permanent structure, it worked in the field of information and intelligence sharing during peace keeping and crisis management operations of both the organizations such as in Macedonia and Kosovo. Regular dialogues between NATO and the EU are conducted to ensure consultation, cooperation and transparency particularly by holding meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO, and ministerial meetings as well as meetings between NATO and the EU Military Committees at the request of either organization on the basis of specific agendas. There are regular staff to staff contact among International Military Staff of NATO and the Council Secretariat, Military Staff and European Defence Agency of the EU. Another cooperative model is embodied by the Joint Crisis Management Exercises (CME/CMX 03) which first took place in November 2003 as Its main purpose was to concentrate on the EU plans at the strategic political and military levels of operation (EU Council Press Office 2003: 02).

Both NATO and the EU have had experiences of working together in various situations such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Afghanistan has taken as a case-study. It is the first “out of area” operation beyond Europe for both the organizations. The NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan can be categorized into civilian and military aspects of cooperation. In the civilian field, the EU has been contributing financial and political tools to carry out various civilian reconstruction works in Afghanistan (Reichard 2006: 22; International Crisis Group 2005: 5). The NATO led ISAF is also helping the EU to carry out its economic and political reconstruction works by providing security. Both the organizations have been given training to Afghan police forces. ‘This training provides sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements for appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under Afghan ownership in accordance with international standards. Another area of cooperation is counter-narcotic drugs. Both the organizations have strong commitment and cooperation to end production of narcotic drugs (heroin and opium) in Afghanistan as the most important earning source of terrorist groups in Afghanistan (Ginsberg 2007: 315; European Union 2009: 01; Kamp 2007: 06). In the military fields, common member states as well as non-member states of both the organizations have contributed troops to NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The NATO led ISAF has provided military training to the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), and some of the common member states of both the organizations have also provided logistical support such as small arms, ammunition, and uniform items as well as larger equipments to include tanks and helicopters to the ISAF (NATO 2010:). In this way, the NATO led ISAF has been provided security to the EU officials for its successful implementations of the civilian tasks.

The chapter explores the NATO’s expanding role and functions in the field of peace operations and examines its growing partnership with the EU in general and in Afghanistan particularly. This chapter begins with statement of aims and objectives of the study. It includes research design consists thematic literature review, rationale and scope of the study, hypotheses to be tested and research questions to seek answers, research methods to be adopted. It ends with the outline of the chapterization.

Aim of the Study

The 'Aim' of the proposed study is to analyze the expanding role and functions of NATO and its growing relationship with the European Union (EU) in the post-Cold War era from the organizational perspective. It specifically analyses NATO-EU partnership in the peace operations and for empirical input to the study, Afghanistan has taken as a case study. The study has addressed the NATO-EU partnership in civilian sectors to re-build Afghanistan's socio- educational-economic and political sectors.

Review of the Literature

The expanding role and functions of NATO in the post-Cold War period is one of the most important debates among the scholars and academicians. It is of great academic interest to look into the evolving relationship between NATO and the EU. This literature is reviewed under the following major themes.

NATO's Origin and its Expanding Role and Functions

After end of the World War II, Western European countries were worried for their security because of emerged power of the Soviet Union and its ideological influence over them. Although, the United Nations (UN) was formed in 1945 to maintain international peace and security still, fear of conflicts between the US and the Soviet Union was there in international affairs. The Soviet Union tried to expand and strengthened its communist ideology in both the Eastern and Central European countries which compelled to five European countries such as Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK to develop a common defence system and in 7th March 1948, the Foreign Ministers of those respective countries signed Brussels treaty to strengthen the ties among them which enabled them to resist ideological, political and military threats (NATO 1948: 01; English 2001: 305; Holden 1989: 25; Schmidt 2001: 306). The North Atlantic Treaty was subsequently signed at Washington D.C in 4th April 1949 by the representatives of five former members of Brussels treaty and Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the U.S. This treaty entered into force on August 24, 1949 and established NATO in September 1949. It was a collective defence alliance and its purpose was to provide security to its member states with intention to keep the US in, Russia out, and

Germany down (NATO 2006: 17). During the Cold War period, NATO maintained its deterrence role against the Soviet Union and its alliance. Because, NATO's members states were expected external threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. Therefore, in this period NATO concentrated on its deterrent role against the Soviet Union and its alliance. The NATO has been the dominant Western security institution throughout the Cold War period and demonstrated close relationship between US and the Western Europe with providing political frame work for the presence of American troops and weapons in Europe. The Western Europe and North American countries were considered that the role of US in the making of NATO was an essential element in defence of the Western Europe (Smith 1990: 47).

After disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO has expended its role from the deterrence to peacekeeping and crisis management operations through the help of other international organizations and non-member states. It has been transformed into a peace enforcement organization of the UN. NATO has developed its cooperative arrangements with The UN, CSCE and the European Community (EC). The UN framework enables NATO to justify its actions as consistent with the will of "the international community". The UN needs cooperation from NATO because of its strong military resources, expertise, skills, and capacity. NATO's 'capacity' resides not only in its military capabilities but in its experience in preparing and leading states to work together in complex multinational and multi-service operations (Kaplan 2010: 4; Yost 2007: 41). In managing crisis and peace keeping operation, NATO has developed its relations with the EU and OSCE at Macedonia operation in 2001 (Yost 2007: 116). NATO has developed its role on fight against terrorism and proliferation of WMD, making effort for environmental and energy security, and adjusted to new international and domestic political and security realities in the post-Cold War period. NATO has also changed its structure in the 1990s with its shifting strategy and developing connections with other international organizations in the contemporary world order (Duignan 2000: 119; Moens 2003: 55; Collians 2011: 104).

NATO-EU Relations

The NATO-EU post-conflict reconstruction operations are promoting more effective teamwork in legal, political and military contexts with peacekeeping operations in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan. NATO's growing relations with the EU and the UN are necessitated by the need of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in solving global challenges in the post-Cold War Era, where high level of political initiatives have been taking place in the various peace keeping and peace enforcement operations. It has observed that in the various NATO-EU peace keeping operations such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Macedonia both the military means of NATO and civilian means of EU are necessary to effectively carry out those operations. It tries to avoid harmful rivalry or unnecessary replication of attempts between NATO and the EU. NATO was a legitimate mechanism of American participation in the affairs of Europe as to guide and influence military, economic and political developments that could favor American vital interest in Europe (Dokos 2008).

However, some of the EU members are in favor of coming out of the shadow of US. Due to the US invasion of Iraq, just after signing of the Berlin plus agreements the relationship between the EU and US was smashed as splits between the EU Member States. The US administration was surprised on ESDP as EU send its own independent peacekeeping force to Congo in June 2003. In this time the US administration had take for granted that-'NATO had the 'Right of First Refusal' on all possible EU peacekeeping missions, and was shocked when the EU Government send out soldiers to Congo without conferring their plans at NATO first. The US administration was also shocked on draft of the EU constitutional treaty. It was on mutual assistance clause which showed the potentiality of the EU to turn out to be a collective defence organization to opponent NATO' (Grant 2003: 02).

Some of the EU Member States were desired to build up separate European Defence System beneath the ESDP to weaken NATO. In September 2003, Germany, France, and Britain meet in Berlin to sketch out a new compromise on ESDP and its relationship with NATO. That was finalized and allowed EU would have a small unit of

operational planners in the EU military staff to help with autonomous EU military operations, and also clarified that EU would not become a military alliance and NATO remained the foundation for collective defence in Europe and forum for its implementation (Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009: 129). In 2008, UK Government goes up against the progress of a complete EU operational headquarters for independent EU missions, at variance that existing 'National Headquarters' are completely sufficient for the work, and pointed out that the EU can use Headquarters of the NATO under the 'Berlin Plus Agreement'. The love-hate relationship between the EU and NATO under leadership of US is a perennial phenomenon.

The NATO-EU partnership has had past experiences in various crisis situations such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and Macedonia. BiH was the first crisis response operation of NATO in 1992. It agreed to assist the UN in monitoring compliance with sanctions established under the UN Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) and 757 (1992). 'NATO launched its first air support mission on April, 1994 bombing several Serb targets at the request of UN commanders and initiated its air campaign and deployed forces to implement the military aspects of the 'Dayton Peace Agreement' which replaced a year later by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). In June 2004, under the Berlin plus agreements NATO decided to end its Stabilization Force (SFOR) in BiH and transferred this operation to EU for security burden sharing. Similar experience of NATO-EU partnership was witnessed in the case of Kosovo' (Kim 2008: 04).

In the year 1999, 'NATO launched military operations in Kosovo as it felt that the diplomatic track was not delivering a solution and the humanitarian situation on the ground had worsen to such an extent that outside intervention became essential in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. 'The NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was launched in March 1999, to stop hostility and to demilitarize the Kosovo liberation army; to support the international humanitarian effort; and coordinate and support the international civil presence. Some of the countries like Russia, China, India, Namibia, Iraq condemned NATO's intervention in Kosovo and argued that this was violation of

international law, because NATO intervened in Kosovo without formal authorization from the United Nations' (Kritsiotis 2000: 348). Thus, NATO's KFOR did not command a universal base of support. The NATO and EU have shared the common objective to support and assist the Kosovo authorities in developing a stable, peaceful and multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and KFOR have worked closely to support United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. In 2003, the EU and NATO announced the "Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans" to enhance their cooperation to prevent conflict and establish peace in the Balkan region and also continue to meet regularly at all levels.

Another experience of NATO-EU partnership had seen in the case of Macedonia. With the support of NATO the 'Ohrid Agreement' was signed by the Government of Macedonia and ethnic Albania representatives in 2001 to stop armed conflicts among the National Liberation Army (NLA) and the Macedonian security forces. NATO launched its operation to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy the weapons collected from them. In 27 August 2001, NLA fighters began handing over weapons to the NATO-led Task Force in FYROM (NATO 2009: 04). On 17 March 2003, NATO transferred this operation to the EU as EU wanted to share the burden of NATO by managing the crisis in its periphery. It was the first time that NATO transferred the operation to EU and worked together on the ground. In this mission NATO supported the EU on strategic, operational and tactical planning. This cooperation of NATO and the EU has played an essential role to end dangerous internal conflict before it developed into full-scale civil war. The management of this conflict was the perfect example of transatlantic cooperation. Macedonia today is more stable and secure than it was at the time of the EU and NATO deployments (Hughes 2010: 108; Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009: 127).

From the past experiences in peace keeping and crisis management operations, both NATO and EU have realized the need of formal institutional cooperation, and developed institutional coordination like PSC of EU and NAC of NATO, Berlin plus agreement of 2003, EU cell at SHAPE (EUCS) and NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) at EU military staff, Deputy Supreme Commander of Europe (DSACEUR) and

EU-NATO Capability Group etc. All these formal institutional relations have significant impacts over the NATO-EU partnership and playing effective role in carry out peace operation in Afghanistan (Ginsberg 2007: 315; Reichard 2006: 22).

NATO-EU in Afghanistan

Initially the UN mended ISAF was created at the Bonn conference in 2001 to help the newly formed Afghan Government in rebuilding socio-economic-political and military systems. But due to lack of military resources of UN, it authorized NATO to lead the ISAF in 2003. After getting authorization from the UN, NATO-led ISAF has been conducting its operation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is regarded as a NATO's first 'out of area' operation beyond Europe. This peace operation is a multi-faceted task which needs both military and civilian resources. NATO is a military organization and can contribute its military resources but, not civilian resources for rebuilding socio-economic and political system. So, due to lack of civilian resource capability it seek cooperation from other international organization in 2003 as it couldn't bear the entire burden of civilian and military resources and welcomed efforts by donor nations and other international organizations to increase their support and coordination in the civilian activities and to support the Afghan Government. During this period, the EU was a only single political and economic organization of Europe which show its interest to assist NATO in civilian reconstruction activities in Afghanistan (Lindley-French 2007: 116). The NATO-EU formal partnership was already finalized on 11 March 2003 through 'Berlin Plus Agreement (Reichard 2006: 273; NATO 2003b). Both the organizations have followed that agreement and also show their partnership in Afghanistan with their respective military and civilian capabilities. In this operation, the EU has committed to provide civilian resources for reconstruction of the socio-educational-economic and political systems of Afghanistan, and NATO led ISAF has committed to provide security in the time of civilian reconstruction activities of the EU in Afghanistan (Ginsberg 2007: 315; Kamp 2007: 06).

Both the organizations have coordinated each other in different areas such as police training, counter-narcotic drugs, economic reconstructions, humanitarian aid, socio-educational development etc. in the field of police training, NATO was conducting

police training operation through ‘NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan’ (NTM-A). In 2007, NATO realized that the EU can train the ANP (Afghanistan National Police), so in the same year the EU accepted a request by NATO to take the leading role to train ANP. The European Union Police (EUPOL) training mission began in June 2007 with the addition of some 120 EU police trainers who joined the 41 German trainers that remained in the program. Aim of this mission is to provide effective civilian police system with the wider justice system under Afghan ownership (European Union 2009a: 01; NATO 2006: 09, Dufourcq and Yost 2006: 10; EU Council Secretariat 2009).

In regard to the humanitarian aid, the EU has given EUR 8 billion aid to Afghanistan for the period of 2002-2010. Both the organizations have also strong commitment and cooperation to end production of the narcotic drugs in Afghanistan. In this field, EU has provided economic assistance to Afghan Government to make alternative model for the economic development instead through narcotic drugs. For the period of 2002-2006, EU has given EUR 236 million for rural development, alternative livelihoods and food security (EU Council Secretariat 2009, EU Council Secretariat 2006). With the help of ISAF, Afghanistan government has established Afghan National Drug Control Strategy in May 2003 to combat the drug trade. NATO led ISAF has also more proactive role in conducting joint planning with Poppy Eradication Force and Inter-agency Operational Coordination Centre to end narcotic drugs (Ginsberg 2007: 31; Dufourcq and Yost 2006: 36). In the military field, the UN Security Council passed a resolution in 2003 which not only authorized NATO led ISAF to expand its mission throughout Afghanistan but also authorized NATO to lead ISAF. The purpose of the ISAF is to provide peace and secure environment to Afghanistan, through which Afghanistan government can rebuild its state. Common member states of both the NATO and EU have provided military training through the ISAF to the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and also provided military equipments and logistical support such as small arms, ammunition, and military uniform items, tanks and helicopters to ISAF (NATO 2010: 02). The NATO led ISAF have increased from time to time like 3,000 (three thousands) in 2001; 5,000 (five thousands) in 2002 and 10,000 (ten thousands) in 2005. In the year 2006, 23 EU member states have provided 15,800 numbers of troops to ISAF, and in the

year 2010, 25 EU Member States (including non-NATO members) have deployed 27, 000 troops to the ISAF (EU Council Secretariat 2006: 01; EU Council Secretariat 2009: 01). While EU conducting its civilian reconstruction tasks in Afghanistan like voter registration for elections, dams reconstructions and livelihood programs for economic development of Afghan people, NATO led ISAF is providing security. In this context, military power of NATO is necessary for the economic and political development programmes of EU in Afghanistan (NATO 2009b: 01).

Although, there is rich and valuable literature on NATO's expanding role and functions and its growing partnership with the EU in the post-Cold War period, still there is gap in literature on their evolving partnership in peace operation in general and in Afghanistan in particular from the organizational perspective. This research is an attempt to fill up this gap.

Rationale and Scope of the Study

The study deals with the expanding role and functions of NATO and its evolving partnership with the EU in the peace keeping and crisis management operations and for fight against global challenges in the post Cold War Era. This study is significant as it analyses how through the acquisition of new role and functions in the new context shape, not only relations between international organizations but also transforms the organizational structure and process.

The study has taken Afghanistan as a case study to examine NATO's growing partnership with the EU with addressing various reasons behind it. Although there are other out of area operations of NATO like Kosovo and Darfur, Afghanistan is the first "out of area" operation beyond Europe for NATO as well as for EU. Apart from this reason, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan is the first operation where its allies invoked Article-5 of the North Atlantic Treaty after the terrorist attack on World Trade Center of New York in September 11. This involvement has been legitimised by adoption of resolution 1386 at the United Nations Security Council on 20th December 2001, which launched International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with a peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In 2003, UN Security Council authorized

NATO to lead ISAF. Its main purpose is to promote peace and secure environment through which Afghan Government could re-establish as a stable sustainable state (Sloan 2010: 36). Due to lack of civilian capability, the NATO seeks cooperation from the EU and as a political and economic organization the EU can provide civilian resources in rebuilding Afghanistan. This is the first time where NATO involved in rebuilding civilian systems or non-military activities beyond Europe. At the same time in this operation both the organizations have contributed their respective resources capabilities to reconstruct socio-economic-political and educational systems of Afghanistan. This study examines the institutional and doctrinal adjustment made by NATO to launch its operation and also analyse how different and difficult for NATO-EU cooperation is and how this partnership in Afghanistan impacted other states and the region. It is also intend to discuss what difference this partnership has made in Afghanistan and what lessons these two organizations can draw from this experience. The study is limited to time period of 2001 to June 2011. June 2011 is selected as US President Barack Obama on 22 June 2011 declared that US/NAO will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Research Questions

The study is seeking to answer the following research questions such as:

1. How unique are NATO and EU as international organizations?
2. Under what conditions NATO has changed its role and functions in the post-Cold War period?
3. How does NATO's past experiences in the crisis response impacted over its response to Afghanistan crisis?
4. Why does NATO need the cooperation of EU in peace operations in Afghanistan?
5. What are the ways in which both cooperate and complement each other.
6. What are the challenges encountered in the NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan?
7. What lessons could be learnt from NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan?

Hypotheses

The study has two important hypotheses such as:

1. The lack of civilian resources to carry out reconstruction activities in Afghanistan influenced NATO to enter into partnership with EU.
2. NATO's operation in Afghanistan with EU partnership aims at proving its relevance in the changed international context.

Research Methods

The inductive method has adapted to deal with NATO's expanding role and functions and its evolving partnership with EU in the post-Cold War period. This study has employed Ernest B. Haas' "Managed Inter-dependence Model" as one among three models of organizational change as its frame work. His three models of organizational change are incremental growth model, turbulent non-growth model and managed interdependence model. NATO was originated with incremental growth model after the end of World War II, later it turned to turbulent non-growth model during the Cold War period. But after the end of Cold War, it has been moved to manage interdependence model with adapting/expending new role and functions which didn't adapted in its formation time or in the Cold War time. The Manage Interdependence Model states that when various international organizations feels dissatisfaction on their old structures, processes, roles and functions in the changing international circumstances, then they try to redefine their objectives and adopt new role and functions. This model is best suitable and appropriate theoretical approach in understanding the expanding role and functions of the NATO and its growing partnership with the EU in the post-Cold War period. Afghanistan has taken a case study to draw empirical evidence of the NATO-EU partnership. The study proposes to refer both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources will be the official documents of the NATO, EU, UN, ISAF and Government of the Afghanistan. The secondary sources include books, journal articles, newspapers, internet sources, and other relevant published materials.

In chapterization of the study, 2nd chapter entitled "NATO and EU as International Organizations" addresses on the origin, development and purpose of both the NATO and

EU and also highlights on their respective structures, functions and roles. The further throw light on their structural expansion or transformation with examining various reasons and deals with greater detail about the adaptation and changes of both the organizations in the post-Cold War era with examining various challenges such as terrorism, narcotic drugs, WMD, cyber attack, crisis management and peace keeping operations etc. It ends with addressing some undergoing adaptation and learning processes of the NATO and EC/EU in the changing international circumstances in the post-Cold War period.

The 3rd chapter entitled “NATO’s Growing Cooperation with the EU” highlights the factors which propelled NATO to develop partnership with the EU in the post-Cold War and how they complimented each other. The chapter explores the cooperation between NATO and EEC/EC/EU in the Cold War as well as in the post-Cold War period. The chapter examines NATO-EU partnership by addressing Berlin plus agreements. It further addresses various crisis management and peace keeping operations such as Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Darfur to provide empirical evidence for growing partnership of NATO and EU. The chapter further highlights various other global challenges for which both the organizations are cooperating in the post-Cold War period. The chapter ends with highlighting various challenges which are arising from their partnership in various peace keeping and crisis management operations.

The 4th chapter entitled “NATO’s mandate and Resource Capabilities in Afghanistan” attempts to explore the aim and resource capability of NATO to pursue peace operation in Afghanistan. The chapter explores about the NATO led ISAF’s involvement in Afghanistan, its Aim, Role, Functions and its mandates. It also discusses on its military role with examines its Military Personals, Equipments and Weapons, Transportation, Logistic Supports, Intelligence, Support Staff and Financial Resources to Meet the Expenditure Relating to Military. The chapter further provides its Civilian role with highlighting its civilian resources in engaging in civilian reconstruction activities, police training. The chapter also throws light on its challenges or constraints on civilian resources capabilities of ISAF in Afghanistan.

The 5th chapter entitled “NATO-EU Partnership in Afghanistan in Civilian Sector” empirically examines NATO-EU partnership in the civilian sector of Afghanistan peace

operation. The present chapter analyses the theoretical and practical level of cooperation between NATO led ISAF and the EU in civilian sector in Afghanistan. The chapter addresses on NATO-EU partnership in different civilian sectors such as Economic Reconstruction Tasks, Counter Narcotic Operation, Alternative Livelihoods, Humanitarian and Development aid, Democracy and Rule of law, Police Trainings and Socio-Educational Development etc. The chapter further throws light on different achievements and challenges encounter in their partnership for re-building Afghanistan.

Concluding chapter briefly summarises the major findings of the proceeding chapters. It critically evaluates the partnership between these two organizations and what impacts this partnership has on other states in the region and other international organizations. It provides the answers of the research questions and hypotheses of the study and it ends with lessons the two organizations could draw from this partnership.

CHAPTER II

NATO AND EU AS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and two European organizations, European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) (since 1993 known as European Union) are two different regional organizations that had their origin in the post-World War-II to bring peace and stability in the Europe. Because, most of the European countries' were affected by the World War II, they wanted to concentrate on economic and political development. It compelled them to form European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) the European Community. At the same time after great devastation of the World War II, getting security was the another important concern for the European countries in general and Western European countries in particular, and NATO was the result of that. While NATO is a military organization and ECSC and EEC were mainly concerned with economic and political matters. Both the NATO and other regional organizations such as ECSC and EEC had gradually expanded their respective structures and functions with accommodation of new member states and concentrating their respective roles and functions in the whole Cold War period. Both had some common factors like overlapping member states, geography, and interest to promote and strengthen democracy among its member states and so on in the Cold War period. Since the formation of the NATO, its name remained same still date but, the ECSC and EEC were renamed as European Community (EC) and in 1993 it was once again renamed as European Union (EU). (After collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the international system has changed, and influenced both the NATO and EC to expand their common roles and functions such as fight against growing global challenges like Terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Narcotic Drugs, Crisis Management and Peace Keeping Operations which they didn't adapted during their formations and also in the Cold War period (Bensahel 2003: 24). In this context, the EC has only European countries as its member states, whereas NATO consists not only of European countries but also has US and Canada as its members.

The present chapter provides the backdrop to the subsequent chapters by discussing the origin, development and purpose of both the organizations. The chapter also addresses the structures, functions and roles of NATO and the EC/EU with analyzing their structural and functional similarities and differences in the Cold War period. At the same time this chapter further, throws light on their structural expansion or transformation with examining various reasons. After discussion of that, the chapter deals with greater detail about the adaptation and changes of both the organizations through which they had expanded their roles and functions in the post-Cold War era. The chapter further highlights the common challenges they encountered due to expansion of role and functions.

NATO: Origin and Development

After end of the World War (WW) II, there was a great worry over the security of the Western Europe particularly in light of the rising power of the Soviet Union over Central and Eastern Europe. Immediately after the formation of the UN, the US-Soviet contention was appeared and intensified. The Soviet actions in Eastern Europe created extensive anxiety in the West. These two inclinations came simultaneously to timely deliberations and negotiations of a defensive alliance among Western European countries, Canada and the United States. The drive for the progress of the North Atlantic Treaty had showed the incapability of the UN to do its assigned tasks of maintaining international peace and security (Holden 1989: 25; Meher 2010: 05).

Having fulfilled their own wartime undertakings to reduce their defence establishments and to demobilize forces, Western governments became increasingly alarmed as it became clear that the Soviet leadership intended to maintain its own military forces at full strength. Moreover, in view of the declared ideological aims of the Soviet Communist party was to strengthen and expand the Communist ideology in the Eastern Europe countries, it was evident that appeals for respect for the United Nations Charter and for respect for the international settlements reached at the end of the war would not guarantee the national sovereignty of independent democratic states faced with the threat of outside aggression or internal subversion (English 2001: 305; Meher 2010: 06). The imposition of undemocratic forms of government and the repression of effective

opposition and of basic human and civil rights and freedoms in many Central and Eastern European countries as well as elsewhere in the world, added to these fears. The Western European countries viewed with great concern the expansionist policies and methods of the Soviet Union. On 7th March 1948, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK signed the Brussels treaty to develop a common defence system and to strengthen the ties between them in a manner, which would enable them to resist ideological, political and military threats to their security (Meher 2010: 06). These countries pledged themselves to build up a common defence system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties. Article IV of the Brussels Treaty states that should any of the contracting parties be the object of an “armed aggression in Europe”, the other signatories to the treaty would afford the attacked party “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”(Henderson 1982: 75; Meher 2010: 06; NATO 1948: 01).

That treaty was signed when the Russians in progress to blockade of West Berlin in 1948 to 1949 as the first major international crises of the Cold War. During the multinational occupation of post–World War II Germany, the Soviet Union blocked the Western Allies’ railway, road and canal access to the sectors of Berlin under Allied control. Their aim was to force the western powers to allow the Soviet zone to start supplying Berlin with food and fuel, thereby giving the Soviets practical control over the entire city. In response, the Western Allies organized the Berlin airlift to carry supplies to the people in West Berlin. Aircrews from the United States Air Force, the British Royal Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force, and South African Air Force flew over 200,000 flights in one year, providing up to 4700 tons of daily necessities such as fuel and food to the Berliners (Gary 2008: 828). This blockade last for 323 days and was only countered by the organization of an air-lift by the Western Powers. The Berlin blockade hastened the setting up of Western defence. On April 30, 1948, the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of the five Brussels Treaty signatory powers met in London to discuss their countries’ military equipment needs, to see how far they could be met from their own production resources, and how much additional aid would have to be requested from the United States. From July, 1948 onwards, United States and Canadian experts attended these meetings as

observers. During that time the ‘Western Union Defence Organization’ was created and its headquarters were set up at Fontainebleau, France. G L Tassigny (France) was appointed as Commander in Chief for the Land Forces; Air Chief Marshal Sir J Robb (United Kingdom) for the Air Forces; Vice-admiral Jaujard (France) for Naval Forces. Gradually, it was realized that the Brussels treaty powers could not possibly pose an adequate counterweight to the Soviets without the aid and assistance of the US and within a month, the Brussels powers had commenced negotiations with the US and Canada for an enlarged collective defensive arrangement (NATO 2006: 17).

On April 11, 1948, the United States Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall and the Under Secretary, Mr. Robert M. Lovett opened preliminary talks with Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally on the problems of security in the North Atlantic area. On April 28, 1948, the idea of single mutual defence system superseding the Brussels Treaty was publicly put forward by Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons. But it was essential that the United States should be able constitutionally join the Atlantic Alliance (Schmidt 2001: 306). To this end, in consultation with the State Department, Senator Vandenberg drew up a resolution which recommended in particular “the association of the United States by constitutional process with such regional and other collective arrangements which are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid” and its “contribution to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter should any armed attack occur affecting its national security” (NATO 1949).

The North Atlantic Treaty was subsequently signed in Washington D.C in 4th April 1949 by the representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US, forming the Atlantic alliance. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 turned out to be one of the most important political events of the early post-War years, restoring confidence to the Western world by means of the continuing assurance of the US to the security of Western Europe (Meher 2010: 07). The treaty entered into force on August 24, 1949. It was to create a collective defence against a potential threat resulting from the policies and

growing military capacity of the Soviet Union. The NATO was established in September 1949 to implement the North Atlantic Treaty. It is the principal defence alliance linking North America and Europe. The original intention behind NATO was to keep the US in, Russia out, and Germany down to ensure Western Europe's security (NATO 2006: 17).

NATO's essential purpose was to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter. NATO also embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests (Meher 2010: 08). The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and cooperation among sovereign states based on the indivisibility of the security of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in political, military and other spheres, ensures that no member country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them to realize their essential national security objectives through collective effort (NATO 1949: 01; Meher 2010: 08).

NATO was designed to provide strong military forces to balance the threat from the Soviet Union. Article 5 reads that (which is unchanged till today): *“the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the party or parties, so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action, as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”*(NATO 1949:01; Meher 2010: 09).

For the nations of Western Europe most defenseless to Soviet assault, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, this meant that US military power including nuclear weapons would defend against foreign attacks. Formed as a bulwark for political stability

and anti-communist defense on the European continent, NATO's military functions became most prominent in its early years, particularly after the outbreak of the war in June 1950 on the Korean peninsula. The alliance prepared intensely to deter, and if necessary to prevent, any possible Soviet sponsored aggression around West Berlin (NATO 2006: 17). During the 1950s and early 1960s, NATO continued to allocate the share of its resources to containing communism. It also concentrated on managing a series of recurring East–West crises in Central Europe and more distant areas, including the Caribbean Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Further complicating NATO's ideological claims, the alliance included a number of countries with questionable democratic credentials at the time, notably Portugal and Turkey. Developments, during this period did not alleviate the inconsistencies in the application of NATO's democratic expression. As the scope of West European political and economic integration deepened, however, the alliance's affirmed democratic mission became crucial. NATO promoted a consensus on political values among members that permitted for the further development of the Common Market and its ties to the United States, despite the various domestic and international challenges during the period (Wenger and Nuenlist 2006: 19).

Even during the darkest days of the alliance when de Gaulle withdrew French military forces in 1966, when each of the member countries confronted growing domestic unrest, and when the Vietnam War opened up a deep crack between the United States and the European nations the North Atlantic Council continued to function as a political body, bringing leaders together for consultation and the moderation of offensive public expression. It centered simultaneously on integrating West Germany into Western Europe, on recalibrating British and US commitments to the Continent, and on forging a firm sense of West European identity. Member states continued to differ on crucial issues, but their differences became far less significant than their points of common understanding. The Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia in the year, undermined much of the optimism in Western Europe and the United States about Moscow's intentions. It now appeared that the communist leadership might embark on a new wave of aggression in Europe. In these difficult circumstances, NATO coordinated the security policies of the member states to allow the protection against Soviet aggression (Wenger and Nuenlist 2006: 25).

In this period, NATO served a wide range of purposes, and was a traditional defensive alliance in its coordination of collective security. It was also an unprecedented alliance that promoted democracy through the assurance of responsible West German participation in European politics, the maintenance of an American and British commitment to Continental affairs, and the promotion of a legitimate West European identity. These characteristics emerged most clearly in the 1960s. During a time when key elements of the strategic impetus behind the creation of the alliance came under attack and the democratizing consensus and consultative mechanisms of NATO preserved this unique community. During the Cold War, the accomplishment of a new NATO doctrine of flexible response was adopted in December 1967 with strong US urging, promised that the alliance would deploy a wider range of conventional and limited nuclear options for effective deterrence, and war fighting, if necessary. This was a crucial decision for the operational strength of the alliance and its ability to serve as a regional defense force in light of US concern elsewhere.

On 11 March 1959, France withdrew its Mediterranean fleet from NATO command; three months later, in June 1959, De Gaulle (President of France) banned the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on France's soil (Lawrence 2004: 30-31). This caused the United States to transfer two hundreds of military aircraft out of France and return control of the ten major air forces bases that had operated in France since 1950 to 1967. Though France showed solidarity with the rest of NATO during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, De Gaulle continued his pursuit of an independent defence by removing France's Atlantic and channel fleets from NATO command. In 1966, all French armed forces were removed from NATO's integrated military command and all non-French NATO troops were asked to leave France. This withdrawal forced the relocation to the supreme headquarters allied powers Europe (SHAPE) from Rocquencourt near Paris to Casteau, north of Mons, Belgium, by 16 October 1967. France remained a member of the Alliance, and committed to the defence of Europe from possible communist attack with own forces stationed in the federal republic of Germany throughout the Cold War. France was a member of the Alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure and didn't participate in the collective force planning (Lawrence 2004: 33).

The EC: Origin and Development

The European Community (EC) has developed all the way through the route of integration in numerous phases and structures. In 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman was the first to propose to integrate Western Europe through creating the common market of steel and coal industries with the aim of organizing to involve the yielding of a degree of state sovereignty to a supranational authority with free movement of coal and steel, and free access to sources of production which leads to the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (Meher 2016a: 01). ‘The treaty took effect in 1952 and created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with six member states namely Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The ECSC was the product of a combination of integrationist impulses and ideas, national self interest and international circumstances as the first international organization to be based on supranational principles. Its objective was to the standard of living within the Community and boost employment. The common market was also planned to increasingly downsize the allocation of high level production at the same time as ensuring immovability and employment (Meher 2016: 02). It eliminated tariffs and quotas on trade in iron ore, coal, coke, and steel within the six-nation economic union. This choice for making organization was not only economic but also political, as these two raw materials (Coal and Steel) were the basis of the industry and power of the countries. The underlying political objective was to strengthen Franco-German solidarity, banish the specter of war and open the way to European integration’ (Meher 2016a: 02; Pinder and Usherwood 2007: 10).

The overall achievements of the ECSC were positive. ‘The Community was able to deal with crises, ensuring balanced development of the production and distribution of resources and facilitating the necessary industrial restructuring and redevelopment (Meher 2016a: 01). Steel production increased fourfold as compared to the 1950s, with better, cheaper and cleaner. Coal production declined, as did the number of people employed in the sector, but it reached a high level of technological development, safety and environmental quality. The ECSC’s systems of social management (early retirement, transitional allowances, mobility grants, training, etc.) were of great importance in

dealing with crises. It laid the foundation for the future stability and prosperity that would become possible in a unified Europe' (Meher 2016a: 02; Peterson and Usherwood 2007: 14).

In the security front, the French government proposed a European Defence Community (EDC), modeled upon the ECSC, which would establish a Western European army that would include military units from all the member states, including West-Germany. However, the exercise failed when the French national assembly refused to take a decision to ratify the treaty to make EDC in 1954. The failure of the EDC contributed towards a discrediting of the sectoral strategy and threat ended to destroy the whole process of integration. The collapse of the EDC was a setback but, confidence in the community as a framework for peaceful relations among the member states had grown and there was a powerful political impulse to re-launch the idea (Meher 2016: 02; Pinder and Usherwood 2007: 13). 'Dutch were ready with a proposal for a general common market, for which the support of Belgium and Germany was soon forthcoming. Although there was the reason to fear that the effort undertaken by the ECSC was doomed to fail, the six members of the ECSC took a decisive step forward. The meeting of their foreign ministers at Messina in Sicily in June 1955 took the 1952 Dutch proposal as their core text and agreed to launch 'a fresh advance towards the building of Europe'. This set in motion progress towards plans for a customs union and ultimately a common market, plans which culminated in March 1957 with the treaty of Rome and the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC)' (Meher 2016a: 02). 'The treaty enjoined its signatories among other things to establish a common market, defined as the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital to approximate national economic policies and to develop common policies, most specifically in agriculture. Although the objective of the treaty were expressed in economic terms, as the preamble implied a political purpose lay behind them. After the formation of the EEC by the Rome first treaty, again European atomic energy community 'Euratom' also set up in 1957 by the second treaty of Rome to promote collaboration on the development of nuclear energy for peaceful economic purposes' (Meher 2016a: 02; Pinder and Usherwood 2007: 04). In 1967, the institutions of EEC, ECSC and EURATOM were merged to form a single set of institutions: the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament. In

1968, after the ratification of the Merger Treaty, the EEC also became known as the European Community (EC). The membership of the organization at this time remained largely static.

In the context of origin and development, both the NATO and EEC/EC organizations had originated in the aftermath of World War II with their respective different purposes. NATO was established for deterrence role against the Soviet Union or East bloc and EEC/EC for economic and political integration. While the NATO is an alliance and organization in the North Atlantic area of 28 states from North America and Europe with treaty agreement to assist each other on the basis of “one for all and all for one”, where as EEC/EC was a political and economic organization of the only European countries to tie countries together by forging closer industrial and economic and political cooperation. Both the organizations have had common membership but, USA, Canada, Norway, Turkey and Iceland were only members of NATO not EEC/EC.

NATO: Structure and Functions

Any international or regional organizations constitute certain type of structures through which the organization carries out its functions. Likewise, NATO as a collective defence organization consisted with both the civilian and military structures. Although its civilian and military structures are different with each other with their respective functions still co-related or inter-related with each other. For the better understanding of the civilian and military structures with their respective functions, the study has address them in the different sections which has been given below.

Permanent Representatives and National Delegations

Each NATO member country has a delegation at the NATO’s Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The delegation has the status similar to an embassy and is headed by an Ambassador or Permanent Representative, who acts on the instructions from his or her capital and reports back to the national authorities. With all the delegations in the same building, they are able to maintain formal and informal contacts with each other as well as with NATO's international staff and representatives of partner countries, each of which are entitled to have a mission at NATO Headquarters. The responsibility and task of each delegation is to represent its member country at NATO. The authority of each delegation

comes from its home country's government to which it reports back on the NATO decisions and projects (Meher 2010: 15).

The Ambassadors are supported by their national delegation composed of advisers and officials who correspond to their country on different NATO committees, subordinate to the NAC. Each member country is represented on every NATO committee at every level and sometimes also supported by experts from capitals on specific matters. The central function of the delegations at NATO Headquarters is the discussion or consultation process which take place in many forms from the exchange of information and opinions to the communication of actions which governments have already taken or may be about to take with bearing on the interests of their allies. It enables member countries to enter at mutually acceptable agreements on the collective decisions by the Alliance as a whole (NATO 2012e; Meher 2010: 16; NATO 2010a).

NATO Headquarters


The NATO Headquarters in Brussels is the political headquarters of the Alliance and the permanent home of the North Atlantic Council. It houses Permanent Representatives and national delegations, the Secretary General and the International Staff, national Military Representatives, the Chairman of the Military Committee and the International Military Staff, and a number of NATO agencies (Meher 2010: 14; Jordan 1967:67). NATO Headquarters is where representatives from all the member states come together to make decisions on a consensus basis. It also offers a venue for dialogue and cooperation between partner countries and NATO member states, enabling them to work together in their efforts to bring about peace and stability. With permanent delegations of the NATO members and partners based at Headquarters, there is sufficient prospect for informal and formal discussion on an uninterrupted basis, a key element of the decision-making process at NATO. Meetings at NATO Headquarters occur all through the year, creating a location for dialogue along with member states (NATO 2010b).

Civil Structure and Functions

In the NATO's civilian structure, the most important institutions are the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as the highest decision making body, Defence Planning Committee (DPC), Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), Committees Coordinated to the Council,

Secretary General, the NATO Headquarters (HQ) and International Staff etc, play their significant role in the civilian activities. Each of these plays a vital role in the consultative and decision-making processes that are the bedrock of the cooperation, joint planning and shared security between member countries that NATO represents. The decisions taken by each of these bodies have the same status and represent the agreed policy of the member countries irrespective of the level at which they are taken. This committee structure provides the basic mechanism that gives the Alliance its consultation and decision-making capability, ensuring that each member country can be represented at every level and in all fields of NATO activity. The detailed about the different institutions of the civilian structures have been discussed below:

Table No 02.01: NATO'S Civil AND Military Structure



Sources: NATO 2001:517

North Atlantic Council:

It is the most senior political governing body of NATO established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It has effective political authority and powers of decision, and consists of Permanent Representatives of all member countries meeting together at least once in a week. The Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of Government, but it has the same authority and powers of decision-making and its decisions have the same status and validity at whatever level it meets. The Council has an important public profile and issues declarations and communiqués explaining the Alliance's policies and decisions to the public and to the governments of countries which are not the members of NATO. The Council is the only body within the Alliance, which derives its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council itself was given responsibility under the Treaty for setting up subsidiary bodies. Many committees and planning groups since they have been created to support the work of the Council or to assume responsibility in specific fields such as defence planning, nuclear planning and military matters. The Council thus provides a unique forum for wide-ranging consultations between member governments on all issues affecting their security and is the most important decision-making body in NATO (Cook 1989:18; Meher 2010: 10).

All member countries of NATO have an equal right to express their views round the Council table. The Decisions are the expression of the collective will of member governments arrived at by common approval. All member governments are party to the policies formulated in the Council or under its authority and share in the consensus on which decisions are based (Huston 1984:332; Meher 2010: 10). . When the Council meets in this format, it is often referred to as the "Permanent Council". The NATO decisions are taken on the basis of consensus after deliberations and consultations among member countries. This implies that when a NATO decision is taken, it is the expression of the collective will of the member states of the alliance (NATO 2006: 33). This decision-making process gives strength and credibility to NATO. But, when there is differences, discussions take place until a decision is reached, and in some circumstances agreement is not achievable. However, mutually acceptable solutions are normally found,

and the process will rapid since member discuss with on an incessant basis and therefore regularly knows and recognizes each other's positions in advance. Therefore, consultation is regarded as a very important part of the decision-making process. It makes easy for communication between members whose main objective is to guarantee that decisions taken collectively are reliable with their national interests (Meher 2010: 11; NATO 2006: 33; Lawson 1958: 163-179). While the Council normally meets at least once a week, it can be convened at short notice whenever necessary. Its meetings are chaired by the Secretary General of NATO in his absence by his Deputy. The longest serving Ambassador or Permanent Representative on the Council assumes the title of Dean of the Council. Primarily as ceremonial function, the Dean may be called upon to play a more specific presiding role, for example, in convening meetings and chairing discussions at the time of the selection of a new Secretary General.

At meetings of the Council at any level, Permanent Representatives sit round the table in order of nationality, following the English alphabetical order (Meher 2010: 11; Munk 1964: 199). The same procedure is followed throughout the NATO committee structure. Items discussed and decisions taken at meetings of the Council cover all aspects of the Organization's activities and are frequently based on reports and recommendations prepared by subordinate committees at the Council's request. Equally, subjects may be raised by any one of the national representatives or by the Secretary General. Permanent Representatives act on instructions from their capitals, informing and explaining the views and policy decisions of their governments to their colleagues round the table. Conversely, they report to their national authorities on the views expressed and positions taken by other governments, informing them of new developments and keeping them abreast of movement towards consensus on important issues or areas where national positions diverge (Meher 2010: 12; Nicholas and Weidenfeld 1982: 149).

Defence Planning Committee (DPC):

It was established in 1960 as the senior decision making body on matters relating to the integrated military structure of the Alliance. In ministerial sessions Defence Ministers or Secretary of Defence can participate. Although it consists of Permanent Representatives but, it meets at the level of Defence Ministers at least twice a year and deals with most

defence matters and subjects related to collective defence planning. All member countries were represented in this forum which provides guidance to the NATO's military authorities within the area of its responsibilities as it has the same authority, functions and attributes as the NAC on matters within its capability (NATO 2006: 36; Meher 2010: 12). A number of subordinate committees with specific responsibilities prepare the work of the DPC and in particular, by the Defence Review Committee which oversees the Force Planning Process within NATO and examines other issues relating to the Integrated Military Structure.

Nuclear Planning Group (NPG):

The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is the principal forum for consultation on all matters related to the role of nuclear forces in NATO's security and defence policies and also regarded as the ultimate authority within NATO with regard to nuclear policy issues as is the North Atlantic Council or the DPC on matters within their competence (NATO 2001a: 01). It discusses on the series of nuclear policy subjects including the safety, survivability and security of nuclear weapons, communications and information systems as well as deployment issues (NATO 2006: 36; Madan 2010: 13). It also covers wider questions of common concern such as nuclear proliferation and arms control. Its role is to review the Alliance's nuclear policy in the light of the ever changing security challenges of the international environment. It provides a forum in which member countries of the Alliance can participate in the development of the Alliance's nuclear policy and in decisions on NATO's nuclear posture irrespective of whether or not they themselves maintain nuclear weapons (NATO 2006: 36; Meher 2010: 13). The policies and decisions are taken by consensus within the NPG as is the case for all NATO committees. Members participating in NATO's integrated military structure are part of the NPG with chairmanship of the NATO Secretary General. Its works are prepared by an NPG Staff Group composed of members of the national delegations of all participating member countries (NATO 2001a: 02). The Staff Group prepares meetings of the NPG Permanent Representatives and carries out detailed work on their behalf. It meets once in a week and at other times as necessary. The senior advisory body to the NPG on nuclear policy and planning issues is the NPG High Level Group (HLG) which chaired by the United States and is composed of national policy makers and experts from capitals (NATO 2006: 37;

Meher 2010: 14). It meets several times a year to discuss aspects of NATO's nuclear policy, planning and force posture, and matters concerning the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons. It meets when necessary at the level of Ambassadors and twice in a year at the level of Ministers of Defence.

The Secretary General:

He is the Alliance's top international civil servant and responsible for routing the process of consultation and decision-making in the Alliance and ensuring that decisions are implemented. He is regarded as a chairman of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which is the highest and supreme decision-making body in NATO. He serves as the leader of the NATO's staff and as its chief spokesman, and also maintains close relations with the Head of State of all NATO member country. He works both formally and informally with other diplomats to deal with issues facing the alliance. He is nominated by the member states' governments for the period of four years. Although there is no formal process for selecting him still the member states of NATO reach a consensus on who should serve next with the procedure of informal diplomatic channels. Usually, an international statesman who has ministerial experience in the governments of any member state of NATO is appointed as a Secretary General, who plays a very significant role in the process of consensus-building and decision making in the alliance (Meher 2010: 14; Jordan 1967: 307).

He may propose items for discussion and has the authority to use his good offices in the cases of dispute between member countries. He is regarded as the Chairman of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), NATO-Russia Council, NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). He is the principal spokesman of the Alliance and represents the Alliance in public on behalf of the member countries of NATO with reflection of their common positions on political issues. He is also the senior executive officer of the NATO international staff with responsibility of making staff appointments and overseeing their works. His role allows him to exert considerable influence on the decision making process while respecting the fundamental principle that the authority for taking decisions is invested only in the member governments

themselves. His influence is, therefore, exercised principally by encouraging and stimulating the member governments to take initiatives and where necessary to reconcile their positions in the interests of the alliance as a whole. The Deputy Secretary General assists the Secretary General in the exercise of his functions and replaces him in his absence. As the organization's senior representative, the Secretary General speaks on its behalf not only in public but also in its external relations with other organizations, with non-member country governments and with the international media (Meher 2010: 15; Jordan 1967: 308).

The International Staff:

The International Staff (IS) comprises the Secretary General and his/her office with seven division of functions (such as Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, Defence Policy and Planning Division, Operations Division, Defence Investment Division, Defence Investment Division, Emerging Security Challenges Division, Public Diplomacy Division and Executive Management Division), each headed by an Assistant Secretary General, and a number of independent offices headed by directors. These seven divisions are headed by an Assistant Secretary General, who is supported by one or two Deputy Assistant Secretary Generals and independent offices are headed by Directors. The Secretary General is a member and also head of the IS (NATO 2012a: 02). The IS members are employed through the organization or by their governments and each selection is command by the Secretary General. The primary role of the international staff is to provide advice, guidance and administrative support to the national delegations at NATO headquarters.

The main functions of the IS are to follow up on the decisions of NATO committees and supports the process of consensus-building and decision-making. The IS makes policy papers, reports, background notes and speeches on issues applicable to NATO's political and military list of items. It holds up and directs committees, and organizes and follows up on their dialogues and judgments, consequently facilitating the political discussion process. It also communicates closely with NATO's International Military Staff (IMS) situated in the similar structure in Brussels (Meher 2010: 16; Jordan 1967: 201; NATO 2012b). The International Staff accomplishes a number of roles

through seven divisions of NATO. First is the ‘political affairs and security policy division’, which gives political advice and policy guidance. It plays a very significant role in the political aspects of NATO’s core security tasks, including regional security and economic affairs. It also provides its role in NATO’s relations with other international organizations and partner countries (NATO 2012b: 01). Second is ‘Defence Investment Division’, which is accountable for developing assets and capabilities aimed at enhancing the Alliance’s defence capacity, including armaments planning, air defence and security investment. Third is ‘Operations Division’, which provides the operational capability to meet NATO’s deterrence, defence and crisis management tasks (NATO 2012b: 01). Fourth is ‘Defence Policy and Planning Division’, which increases and executes the defence policy and planning aspect of NATO’s fundamental security assignments. Fifth is ‘Public Diplomacy Division’, which communicates with wider public through the media, the NATO website, multimedia and print products, seminars and conferences. Six is the ‘Executive Management Division’ which manages staff, finances and security standards and provides support to all elements operating at NATO Headquarters, including support and conference services, information management and NATO’s human and financial resources. Seven is the ‘Emerging Security Challenges Division’, which deals with a growing range of non-traditional risks and challenges such as on nuclear issues, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, energy security and cyber defence as well as NATO’s Science Programme (NATO 2012b: 02).

Military Structures and Functions

Like the civilian structures of the NATO, it has separate military structures, and the main bodies are the Military Committee and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Allied Command Atlantic and Canada-US Regional Planning Group.

The Military Committee (MC):

It is the highest military authority within the Alliance. The Military Committee is made up of senior military officers from the NATO member countries who serve as their country’s Military Representatives to NATO or representing their Chiefs of Defence (Meher 2010: 18; NATO 2012c). The Committee’s principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. It provides guidance on military matters to the

NATO strategic commanders as well as military advice to the NATO's civilian decision-making bodies such as NAC and NPG. The committee also develops military plans at the request of NAC and represents an essential link between the political decision-making process and the military structure of NATO, and is an integral part of the decision-making process of the Alliance. It meets frequently at the level of Military Representatives (MILREPs) and three times in a year at the level of Chiefs of Defence (Meher 2010: 18; NATO 2001: 240; NATO 2012c).

It is responsible for recommending to NATO's political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area and for the implementation of decisions regarding NATO's operations and missions. Its recommendation is required as a subject of way prior to approval by the NAC of NATO military actions.. Its meetings are chaired by the Chairman of the Military Committee, who is nominated by the NATO Chiefs of Defence for a three-year term. He chairs all the meetings of the Military Committee and acts in an international capacity (Meher 2010: 19; David and Charles 1985: 14; Bland 1991: 48). In his absence, the Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee takes the chair.

Regional Commands

To successfully carry-out military operations, NATO has basically three regional commands such as Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic and Canada-US Regional Planning Group. These have been discussed below:

(A) Allied Command Europe (ACE): The ACE was a major strategic Headquarters of NATO and its commanding officer was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACUR), who is responsible for the overall command of NATO military operations with the authorization of the NAC and direction of MC. He also formulates approvals for political and military authorities of NATO on any subjects related with military matters. General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe in December 1950 and the other members of the multinational SHAPE Planning Group were established Allied Command Europe (ACE) which divided into three regions: the North (the North Sea and the Baltic regions); the Center with Western Europe regions, and the South covering Italy and the Mediterranean regions. As for the organizational

structure, each region has its own Commander-in-Chief (CINC) as well as there were separate Land, Air and Naval Commanders for each region (Meher 2010: 20; NATO 2013a).

(B) Supreme Allied Command Atlantic: It was established after the three years of signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C in the year 1952. This combined command is the only major NATO military command headquartered in North America and was the first allied maritime command to be established on that continent. At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO's military command structure was reorganized with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient and renamed as Allied Command Transformation. Details have been given in the section of structural changes of NATO in the post-Cold War (Meher 2010: 20; NATO 2013 b).

(C) The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group: It is a regional planning groups that was set up in 1949 by the NAC of the NATO. The purpose of it was to develop and recommend to the Military Committee, through the Standing Group, plans for the defence of their respective regions. It works in Washington and also survivor of NATO's other Regional Planning Groups. It is accountable for creation of plans for the defence of the North American continent and for making suggestions on military necessities The Group's assignment comprises arrangements for the basing and defense of strategic nuclear forces in this area; early warning and air defence; protection of industrial mobilization and military potential; and defence against military actions which pose a threat to the security of the region.

International Military Staff (IMS): It is headed by a General /Flag Officer, selected by the military committee from candidates nominated by member nations for the position of director of the IMS. The IMS under his direction, is responsible for planning assessing and recommending policy on military matters for consideration by the MC as well as ensuring that the policies and decisions of the committee are implemented as directed (NATO 2001: 242). With its supports military and civilian personnel of the MC work in an international capacity for the common interest of the NATO rather than on behalf of any particular country (NATO 2011b). Coordination of staff action and controlling the flow of information and communications both within the IMS and between the IMS and

other parts of the NATO headquarters is the responsibility of the executive coordinator located within the office of the director of the IMS. The executive coordinator and his staff also provide secretarial support to the military committee as well as procedural advice (NATO 2001: 242). Its plans and policy division develops and coordinates the military committee contribution to NATO defence policy and strategic planning. This includes contributing to the development of political and military concepts, studies, assessment and related documents, NATO force planning, the force goal process, the annual defence review, the PfP planning and review process. The plans and policy division also participates on behalf of the military committee in NATO's overall defence planning process and develops and represents the view of the MC and of the NATO strategic commanders on military policy matters in various NATO bodies (NATO 2001: 242). This staff holds six functional areas such as plans and policy, operations, cooperation and regional security, logistics and resources, intelligence and NATO consultation, command and control (NATO 2012a).

Types of Forces:

There are two types of forces within the NATO structure, first is Deployable Forces (DF), available for the full range NATO missions, deployed everywhere and other is In-Place Forces (IPF), defence forces within or near the territory of the nations providing them. Deployable Forces are those forces available for the full range of NATO missions. They can be fully deployed throughout Alliance territory and beyond (Boland 1999: 26-28). They can provide the capability for rapid reaction and reinforcement of In-Place Forces in the case of any Article 5 operation, as well as rapid reaction and rotation of such forces in the case of non-Article 5 crisis response operations. In-Place Forces are predominantly those required for collective defence within or near the territory of the nation providing them. Such forces need not be fully deployable but will be held at appropriate readiness levels. The majority of such forces are provided by individual nations (Meher 2010: 21; Moss 2002:22).

The readiness levels affecting both types of forces, to which reference is made above are: High Readiness Forces (HRF) consists of a limited but military significant proportion of land, air and maritime forces, capable of deploying rapidly or immediately,

either for Article 5 collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Forces at Lower Readiness (FLR) are forces that would provide the bulk of the forces required for collective defence for further reinforcement of a particular region and for the rotation of forces needed to sustain non-Article 5 operations whether within or beyond Alliance territory. Long Term Build-up Forces (LTBF) is provided a long-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case scenario of large-scale Article 5 operations. They would enable the Alliance to build up larger forces needed to undertake specific tasks and to respond to any fundamental changes in the international security environment. Individual nations are responsible for establishing the reinforcement plans needed to provide this long-term capability in accordance with their constitutional procedures (Meher 2010: 22; Norton 1978: 172).

The forces available to NATO are further delineated between those which come under the operational command or operational control of a NATO Strategic Commander when required, in accordance with specified procedures or at prescribed times; and those which member states have agreed to assign to the operational command of a Strategic Commander at a future date, if required. In assigning forces to NATO, member nations assign operational command or operational control as distinct from full command over all aspects of the operations and administration of those forces. These latter aspects continue to be a national responsibility and remain under national control. In general, most NATO forces remain under full national command until they are assigned to the Alliance for a specific operation decided upon at the political level. Exceptions to this rule are the integrated staffs in the various NATO military headquarters; parts of the integrated air defence structure, including the Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (AWACS); some communications units; and the Standing Naval Forces as well as other elements of the Alliance's High Readiness Forces (Meher 2010: 22; Lawrence 2007: 86). Its collective enemy 'the Soviet bloc' has vanished in 1989 and therefore NATO's "life expectancy" has, by many, been expected to be limited as well. However, the Atlantic partnership has proven to be more adaptable to the changing international environment than anticipated.

Budget and Financial Control

Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities. The greatest part of these contributions comes through participation in NATO-led operations and missions, and in efforts to ensure that national armed forces are interoperable with those of other member countries (NATO 2013c). Member countries incur the deployment costs involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in NATO-led operations. With a few exceptions, member countries also pay for their own military forces and military capabilities. Direct contributions to budgets managed by NATO are made by members in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on relative Gross National Income. These contributions represent a very small percentage of each member's overall defence budget, and finance the expenditures of NATO's integrated structures. Direct contributions generally follow the principle of common funding, that is to say, member countries pool resources within a NATO framework. There are three budgets (the civil budget; the military budget, and the NATO Security Investment Programme) that come under common funding arrangements (Meher 2010: 17; NATO 2013c).

In the context of common funding of NATO, when a need for expenditure has been identified, countries in the Resource Policy and Planning Board discuss whether the principle of common funding should be applied, in other words whether the requirement serves the interests of all the contributing countries and therefore should be borne collectively (NATO 2013c). The criteria for common funding are held under constant review and changes may be introduced as a result of changing circumstances, for instance, the need to support critical requirements in support of Alliance operations and missions. Common funding arrangements principally include the NATO civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). These are the only funds where NATO authorities identify the requirements and set the priorities in line with overarching Alliance objectives and priorities, where military common funding is concerned the military budget and the NSIP (NATO 2013c; Brady and Kaufman 1985: 59).

Each of the civil and military budgets are prepared under the authority of the head of the respective NATO body, reviewed and is reviewed by the Budget Committee composed of representatives of contributing member countries, and approved for execution by the NAC. Implementation of the NATO Security Investment Programme starts from capability packages. These packages identify the assets available to and required by NATO military commanders to fulfill specified tasks. They assess common-funded supplements (in terms of capital investment and recurrent operating and maintenance costs) as well as the civilian and military manpower required to accomplish the task. They are reviewed by the Resource Policy and Planning Board then approved by the NAC. The expenditures are undertaken by the various departments under the supervision of the Financial Controller who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the budgetary regulations and the provisions of the financial rules and procedures drawn up by the council.

An independent International Board of Auditors (IBAN) for NATO is responsible for auditing the accounts of the different NATO bodies. Its principal task is to provide the NAC and member governments with the assurance that joint and common funds are properly used for the settlement of authorized expenditure and that expenditure is within the physical and financial authorizations granted. The Board's mandate includes not only financial but also performance audits, which extend its role beyond safeguarding accountability to the review of management practices in general. IBAN is composed of officials normally drawn from the national audit bodies of member countries. These officials are appointed by and responsible to the NAC. The Board of Auditors' reports are examined in the presence of the financial controllers concerned by the budget committees, which forward them to the Council with their view on the comments contained therein (Brady and Kaufman 1985: 56-60). From above it is clear that NATO has clear-cut structures, their identified role and functions in the system. Over all the task of providing security through deterrence and collective defence remains a fundamental responsibility. During the Cold War, NATO's defence planning was primarily concerned with maintaining the capabilities needed to defend against possible aggression by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.


The possibility that NATO might be used in support of the UN arose, albeit fleetingly, on two occasions during the Cold War. The first occurred in the context of the various efforts that arose from the Korean War experience and the Uniting for Peace resolution (Boulden 2001: 07, Cook: 1989:80). One of the products of the Uniting for Peace Resolution was the creation of the Collective Measures Committee. The Committee was charged with developing ways of strengthening the UN's ability to deal with international peace and security issues. Within the Committee, the United States argued that NATO should be given a role in aiding the UN in carrying out its enforcement measures (Boulden 2001: 08, Smith 1996: 56-73).

The second instance occurred during the early stages of the Cyprus crisis in 1964. In response to the deteriorating situation on the island, Britain proposed that a NATO force can be used as a peacekeeping force to ensure peace while political efforts to resolve the dispute occurred. The US supported the proposal as did Greece and Turkey. The Greek Cypriot leader refused to agree, however, even after a revised plan was created. The proposal was dropped and the issue went to the Security Council. It is not evident that the force would have been used even had agreement been achieved. The Soviet Union was very against the idea and other NATO states were not particularly enthusiastic (Boulden2001: 08). Throughout the Cold War, NATO's military role was essentially static: to prevent an attack against the territory of its member countries. NATO could accomplish this objective by deterrence alone .

The EC: Structure and Functions

The structure of the EC consists of the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European court of auditors and various consultative and advisory bodies. All these institutions are different from each other with their respective role and functions.

Table No 02.02: The European Community Institutions



European Council

It was created in 1974 and since its creation, it has been played a fundamental role in development of political process of European integration. Although it is not exercising legislative functions, still provide the impetus and general political guidelines for the development of EC (Peterson and Shackleton 2006: 48). The EC foreign minister takes part in its work as all the foreign ministers of the EC get a proxy presence in this Council, or foreign ministers and finance ministers of the EC would be called upon to take part in the discussion of agenda points relevant to their competence. It gives political guidance and impetus to the EC; takes the most important decisions; guidance the open method of coordination; gives high visibility to external policy positions and declarations and also plays a major role in amending the treaties. The functions of the EC include strategic guidelines, decision making, open method of coordination, foreign policy, amending the treaties and simplified treaty revision (Peterson and Shackleton 2006: 49).

The Council of Ministers

It was originated in 1951 by the treaty of Paris which established the ECSC. It was made up of representatives of the Governments of the Member States with decision-making powers. It was assisted by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER),

which prepares the Council's work and carries out the tasks conferred on it by the Council. The Council was required merely to exchange information with and consult the high authority, while the 1957 treaties of Rome provided that this Council was ensured coordination of the general economic policies of the member states and have power to take decisions (Peterson 2006: 61). It was responsible for taking the major policy decisions with the role of passing laws, Coordinates the economic policies of member countries. At each Council meeting, each country sends the minister for the policy field being discussed. It works with the European Parliament to pass new laws and approve budgets, and it also finalizes international agreements and makes decisions that involve international security (Cini 2007: 155; Peterson 2006: 63).

The European Parliament

The European Parliament (EP) was also another important political body of the EC, where Members were directly elected every five years by the citizens of the member countries. Any citizen of the member states of the EC may be a candidate for it and also had the right to vote. The elections to choose Members of Parliament were held every five years, and the President of Parliament is chosen every two and half years.

It is made up of 785 members EPs elected every five years in elections across the 27 member states. It reflects the voice of the people in the European decision making. It began life as a consultative assembly and was only directly elected for the first time in 1979. The MEPs sit in political groups representing over 200 national parties and most of the parliament's activities are structured around these groups. The large groups are comprised of identifiable political families such as the Christian democrats or socialists, other groups are more ad hoc such as the identity, tradition and sovereignty group. They bring together in loose coalitions parties and MEPs seeking to obtain the advantages such as resources and speaking time that membership of a group brings. The leaders of the party political groups along with the parliament's president set the EP's agenda. The power of parliament can be divided under three headings such as supervisory, legislative and budgetary. The parliament exercises supervision or control over the commission and council through its right to question, examine and debate the large number of reports produced by these two bodies. Its power directly to control the council is weak but, its

assent is required before the council and approves the accession of any new members (Peterson and Bomberg 2008: 59). When the new commission is appointed by member governments, the EP must approve the council's nominee for commission president. In the legislative matters parliament only had the right to give an opinion on a commission proposal for legislation prior to adoption by the council. When it comes to budgetary matters, the annual budget only comes into force once the president of the parliament has signed it and also it has last word in areas such as spending on the religions, social policy, culture and education. It worked with the Council of the EC to pass laws and approve the budget. It had three main roles such as debating and passing European laws, with the Council, scrutinizing other EC institutions, particularly the Commission, to make sure that they were working democratically, debating and adopting the EC's budget, with the Council (Peterson 2006: 106).

High Authority/European Commission

The predecessor of today's European commission was the 'High Authority' of the ECSC. The provisions in the 1951 treaty of Paris, gave the 'High Authority/European Commission which was significant for independent powers to regulate markets for coal and steel (Peterson 2006: 82). The high authority was headed by nine senior officials, two from France and West Germany and one from all other member states. Thus, a precedent was set for national representation in what was meant to be a supranational administration (Nugent 2001: 21-2). It supervised the modernization and improvement of production, the supply of products under identical conditions, the development of a common export policy and the improvement of working conditions in the coal and steel industries. It took decisions, made recommendations and delivered opinions with assistance of Consultative Committee made up of representatives of producers, workers, consumers and dealers.

But, in 1967 the name High Authority was changed into the European Commission. The Commission, an independent college of the Governments of the Member States; appointed by common agreement, represents the common interest. It had a monopoly on initiating legislation and proposes Community acts to the Council of Ministers. As guardian of the treaties, it monitors the implementation of the treaties and

secondary law. It was a wide assortment of measures to police the Member States and the business community. In the framework of its mission the Commission has the executive power to implement Community policies. It also oversees on the representation the community in external trade negotiations and most importantly proposing new policies. It functioned independently from the EC member states, and it meets in Brussels. Only the Commission had the power to propose legislation with the responsibility of implementing, monitoring and controlling the enforcement of EC law and policy. It was bringing a Member State before the Court of Justice for failure to enforce EC law. It controlled the EC budget. In addition, the Council may authorize the Commission to implement the legislation through subsidiary legislation. There was one appointed commissioner from each member country, and they were serving for five years. They were acted only in the interest of the EC and each member had responsibility for one or more policy areas (Cini 2007: 140; Peterson 2006: 95).

The European Court of Justice:

The rule of laws had have key to the success of the European Community. Increasingly, in its fields of competence a framework of law rather than relative power governs the relations between member states and applies to their citizens. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a creature of the treaty establishing the ECSC which was signed by six European states. It was consisted of seven judges nominated for six years by common agreement between the governments of the Member States. It was located in Luxemburg. The Court consists of one appointed judge from each member country, and the judges serve for renewable terms of six years. There are also eight advocates-general to assist the judges (Cini 2007: 190). The Court powers were further expanded in 1957 when the same states signed two new treaties in Rome.

It was given the task of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of this treaty in the interpretation and application of this treaty and of rules laid down for the interpretation thereof, the law is observed. It ensured that the law was observed in the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty. The Court was given the task of serving all three communities namely EEC, EC and Euratom. Thus, the Court emerged as a supranational court which had compulsory jurisdiction covering all areas falling within

the scope of the three treaties such as Treaty of Paris of 1951, Rome Treaty of 1957 and Merger Treaty of 1967 (Pinder and Usherwood 2007: 12).

The Court's jurisdiction covered such issues as interpretation of community law and determination of rights and obligations. Its decisions were binding on community institutions, member states and individuals. This is the "supreme court", which makes sure that EC laws are correctly interpreted. It also settles legal disputes between EC governments and EC institutions. Individuals, companies or organizations can also bring cases before the Court if they feel their rights have been infringed by an EC institution. Because so many cases are brought before the Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance was created in 1989 to hear certain types of cases (Pinder and Usherwood 2007: 13).

The Court of Auditors

It was set up in 1975 at Luxembourg. It comprises 12 members who are appointed by a unanimous decision of the Council after consultation with the European Parliament. This institution is also located in Luxembourg and consists of one member from each EC country. The members are appointed to terms of six years, and their appointments must be approved by Parliament (Nugent 1996: 41). It monitors the EC's financial activities or its responsibility is to make sure whether all EC funds are received and correctly spent. It audits EC finances. Its role is to improve EC financial management and report on the use of public funds and to ensure that EC taxpayers get maximum value for their money, the Court of Auditors has the right to check ('audit') any person or organisation handling EC funds. The Court frequently carries out on-the-spot checks. Its findings are written up in reports submitted to the Commission and EC national governments. It monitors all organization that use EC funds, and must report illegal use of the funds to the Court of Justice.

Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC)

It was established in 1957 through the Rome Treaties in order to absorb economic and social interest groups in the concern of the common market and to present institutional machinery for meeting the European Commission and the Council of Ministers on the EU/EU issues. It is a consultative body of the EC/EU. It is committed to European integration and contributes to intensification the democratic legitimacy and efficiency of

the EU by enabling civil society organizations from the member states to articulate their views at European level.

The establishment of the EEC and the creation of the Common Market had two objectives. The first was to transform the conditions of trade and manufacture on the territory of the Community. The second, more political, saw the EEC as a contribution towards the functional construction of a political Europe and constituted a step towards the closer unification of Europe. They began removing trade barriers between them and moved towards creating a 'common market' as the aim of the EEC was to establish a common market based on the four freedoms of movement of goods, persons, capital and services and the gradual convergence of economic policies, and aim of the EURATOM was to coordinate the supply of fissile materials and the research programmes on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The EEC had institutions and decision-making mechanisms which make it possible to express both national interests and a Community vision. The institutional balance was based on a triangle consisting of the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament, all three of which were called upon to work together. During the Cold War period, the EC's role was to bring economic integration and political stability in the Europe. Until the 1990s, EC was trying to bring political stability with the process of its institutional or structural development, and also seen as an important economic power, more clearly one of the three biggest economic powers in the world the other two being the US and Japan.

The Committee of the Regions

The composition and appointment of this body is similar to that of ECOSCO, except that the interests to be represented are specified as those of regional and local bodies. This committee was to be consulted by the council and the commission. From the institutional point of view EC structures indicate that they were basically meant to political and economic activities whereas NATO is different because, its structure is totally based on the military activities as collective defence purposes. But, in both organizations the main political body or decision making body is the PSC. Thus the EC structures reflect the political and economic purposes of the organizational whereas NATO's structures concentrate on the military purposes.

NATO: In the post-Cold War

The Soviet Union was dissolved in 1990 which impacted over the international politics and relations. This change had affected the purposes, structures, functions, role and objectives of NATO. NATO was made for the purpose of providing security to its member states and it could accomplish this objective by deterrence against Soviet Union throughout Cold War. It means NATO's role was essentially static during that time. In 1990 NATO lost its fear of threat from the East bloc because of disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was expected to lose its relevance after the end of Cold War (Wallander 2000: 725). On the one side, NATO was expected to lose its relevance but, on the other side United Nations (UN) was unable to carry out its peace keeping and crisis management operations because of its lack of military capability. It influenced UN for its seeking cooperation from NATO as it holds effective military capability as a collective defence organization. It means lack of military resources compelled UN to develop cooperation and coordination with the NATO to carry out various peace keeping and crisis management operations in the world affairs. Among all the international organizations UN holds the highest political authority in the world as it is regarded as a collective security organization. According to the North Atlantic Treaty provision and also the Charter of the UN, without UN authorization NATO could not carry out its first separate or independent peace keeping operation which might be effect to the international peace and security. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the sole authority with the ability to legitimize the use of force in international relations. However, the "inherent right" to self-defence of the NATO remains unaffected 'if an armed attack occurs' and until the UNSC takes the 'necessary measures to maintain international peace and security' (Art. 51 UN Charter). Referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty constitutes the legal basis for military action of the collective defence alliance (Schmidt 2001: 42). It means if NATO gets UNSC authorization to pursue its peace keeping operation then it can do, unless it can not. Therefore, UN's seeking cooperation from the other regional organizations was an opportunity for NATO to expand its role and functions as well as strengthen its relevance in the world affairs with adapting new tasks such as peace keeping and crisis management operations and fight against global challenges (terrorism, narcotic drugs, weapons of mass destructions

and cyber attacks etc.) which were not became visualized in the Cold War period. But, to pursue all these activities in the effective way, NATO was keen to transform its structures.

NATO: Expansion of Structures and Functions

The London Declaration of July 1990 was a decisive turning point in the history of the Alliance and led to the adoption of the new Alliance Strategic Concept in November 1991, reflecting a broader approach to security (Dawdon and Nicholson 1967: 585). In essence, the Cold War command structure was reduced from 78 headquarters to 20 with two overarching Strategic Commanders (SC), one for the Atlantic, and one for Europe, with three Regional Commanders under the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) and two under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). As such, in 1999, NATO heads of State and government agreed to construct a new headquarters to meet the requirements of the Alliance in the 21st century. In November 2002, at a signing ceremony held during the Prague Summit, the Belgian Government transferred to NATO concessionary rights for the construction of the new buildings, opposite the present site.

The NATO's military command structure had divided into two main geographic areas, with one strategic command covering Europe is called Allied Command Europe (ACE) and the other the North Atlantic area is called Allied Command Atlantic (ACA) in the Cold War period. But, in the post-Cold War period, these commands have been replaced by one operational command is called Allied Command Operations (ACO) and a functional command is called Allied Command Transformation (ACT) (NATO 2006: 21). The ACO is a strategic command for all NATO operations whereas ACT is responsible for the continuing transformation of NATO's military capabilities and for promoting interoperability. The military commands have transformed to ensure that the Alliance has the capabilities to carry out its new tasks with new commitments in the post-Cold War era.

Allied Command for Operations (ACO):

During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO's military command structure was again reorganized with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient. The former Allied Command Europe (ACE) became the Allied Command for Operations (ACO). It is located at SHAPE as its Headquarter, and responsible for Alliance's operations wherever it may be required (NATO 2009a). It is one among NATO's two strategic military commands which is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is responsible for all Alliance military operations with support of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and the Chief of Staff (COS). SACEUR's position is always assigned to the US, while DSACEUR and COS posts are permanently assigned to Britain and Germany respectively (Dawson and Nicholas 1967: 370-375). The command structure of SACEUR is functionally based rather than geographical. It provides three tiers of commands such as strategic, operational, and the tactical or component level. In the strategic level command, SACEUR basically commands ACO with dual-hatted as the commander of the US European Command, which shares many of the same geographical responsibilities. At the same time the operational level also consists of two standing Joint Force Commands (JFCs), one in Netherlands and one in Italy (NATO 2009a). Both are conducting operations from their static locations and provide a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Headquarters. The component level command consists of six Joint Force Component Commands (JFCCs), which provide service-specific land, maritime or air expertise and support, to the operational level (Boland 1999).

Allied Command Transformation (ACT):

The ACT is leading at the strategic command level the transformation of NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. It is enhancing training, particularly of commanders and staffs, conducting experiments to assess new concepts, and promoting interoperability throughout the Alliance (NATO 2013B; NATO 1989). Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT) is located in Norfolk, Virginia, is the physical headquarters of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and houses the command structure of ACT. HQ SACT directs

ACT's various subordinate commands including the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway), the Joint Forces Training Centre in Poland, the NATO Undersea Research Centre in Italy, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Greece, various NATO schools and Centres of Excellence (NATO 2013b).

There are direct linkages between ACT, NATO schools and agencies as well as the US Joint Forces Command, with which ACT Headquarters is co-located and with which it shares its double-hatted commander. This gives it a link into US transformation initiatives and fosters a two-way street between the United States and Europe (NATO 2013b; Jordan 1987: 229). Allied Command Transformation was initially formed as Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) at Norfolk, Virginia, in 1952. During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO's military command structure was reorganized with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient. One Strategic Command was focused on NATO's operations Allied Command Operations (ACO/SHAPE) and the other on transforming NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT). HQ SACT is the only NATO command in North America and the only permanent NATO headquarters outside of Europe (NATO 2013b).

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

Another important structural development was the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 as a political body including NATO and nine central and eastern European countries from the former Warsaw Pact members of Soviet Union. And gradually in 1992 participation in the NACC was expanded to include all members of the commonwealth of independent states including Georgia and Albania. Therefore, NATO's Strategic Concept provides the scope for growing dialogue and partnership with Cooperation Partners as the creation of the NACC established a framework for dialogue and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states emerging from the former Soviet Union.

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC):

With a view to raising political and military cooperation among their countries to a qualitatively new level, foreign ministers of the NACC and Partnership for Peace (PfP) had created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997 as a forum for discussing political issues arising from 'Partnership for Peace' (such as political authorization for military missions) and for considering the political side of security partnerships in Europe for non-member states (Wallander 2000: 722). It was a successor of NACC. Those Ministers of NATO member states and non-member states reaffirmed their joint commitment to strengthening and extending peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to cooperate to this end on the basis of shared values and principles, notably those set out in the Framework Document of the PfP (NATO 1997). It brings together to all the allies and partners countries in a forum providing for regular consultation and cooperation. It meets periodically at the level of Ambassadors and Foreign and Defence Ministers (NATO 2012d) . The EAPC activities complement PfP programmes which are based on two year action plan which focuses on consultation and cooperation on a range of political and security related matters, including regional issues, international terrorism, peace keeping operation, arms control, civil emergency planning, defence economic issues and scientific and environmental issues. An important achievement of the EAPC has been the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre EADRCC at NATO Headquarters, following a proposal by the Russian federation. This centre was inaugurated in June 1998 and was called upon immediately to support the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in relief efforts in Albania for refugees fleeing from Kosovo (NATO 2001: 41).

In 2010, the decision was taken to conduct a far-reaching reform of the NATO Command Structure as part of an overall reform of NATO. At their meeting defence ministers agreed that a report should be presented to make a consolidated recommendation in time for the Lisbon Summit meeting (NATO 2012d). Subsequently, the recommendation was approved at the Summit as the framework for the new Command Structure. The reform was conducted with the development of the Strategic Concept 2010 firmly in mind and has focused on ensuring that the Alliance can confront

the security challenges of the 21st century effectively and efficiently. The new Command Structure is forward looking and flexible, as well as leaner and more affordable. In comparison to the previous structures, it will provide a real deployable, multinational, command and control capability at the operational level. It also offers a more coherent structure that will be understood by other international organizations and partners(NATO 2012d). .

NATO: Expansion of the Role and Functions

During the Cold War period, NATO was maintaining its static role of collective defense but, with the end of the Cold War, it expended its role of collective defense due to collapse of the Soviet Union, and jumped to other areas like conflict prevention, crisis management. The greatest and most visible expansion in NATO's role since the end of the Cold War is collective security tasks with involving in ending conflicts, restoring peace and building stability in crisis regions. Created to protect post-War Western Europe from the Soviet Union, the Alliance is in the post-cold War seeking to bring stability to other parts of the world. In the process it has been extending both its geographic reach and the range of its operations. In the 1990, NATO attempted to halt genocides in the Balkans. In recent years, it has played role of peace keepers and peace enforcer in Afghanistan, trained security forces in Iraq and given logistical support to the African Union's mission in Darfur. It assisted the tsunami relief effort in Indonesia and ferried supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and to those of a massive earthquake in Pakistan (Gulnur 1999: 08).

Since 2004, NATO has been involved through its NTM-I (NATO Training Mission-Iraq) to help Iraq in security sector in accordance with international standards and the rule of law. The NTM-I's objective is to assist, equip, train and mentor Iraq's fledgling police and military. It has worked at the direction of the NAC with the cooperation and partnership of Government of Iraq to establish and develop peace and stability in Iraq (Worner 2005: 04). At the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO declared that terrorism together with the spread of WMD is likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years. By contributing to the international community's efforts to combat terrorism, NATO helps ensure that citizens can go about their daily lives

safely, free from the threat of indiscriminate acts of terror (Riga Summit 2006). NATO has made great progress in transforming the Alliance's capabilities and can best response to the new security environment by building on its strength. It has mostly streamlined its command structures, made progress toward the development of a rapid response force and led the way in efforts to promote international consensus on the nature of the threat (Gulnur 1999: 08). Above all those factors are closely related with the functions and objectives of the United Nations by which one can observe that- NATO has been working like a collective security organization in the Europe as well as out of Europe.

Terrorism:

It is one of the most significant areas of NATO's expanding role in the post-Cold War era through various means. NATO's contributions to the campaign against terrorism have included sending Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft to the United States, deploying naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and conducting preventive action against terrorist groups acting within or from the Balkans. Other measures taken by the Alliance include adoption of a new Military concept for defence against Terrorism and a Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, strengthening the nuclear, biological and chemical defence and civil protection and better cooperation with other international organizations, etc (Meher 2010: 80). The NAC is the NATO's main political decision making body in overall role on terrorism (Faber 2005: 67).

The NATO's has developed its role to fight against terrorism with its specialized bodies like: Conference of National Armaments Directors, Counter Terrorism Technology Coordinator, Counter-Terrorism Technology Unit and NATO Counter Terrorism Technology Development Programme (Meher 2010: 81; Kuzmanov 2006: 36). Immediately after the terrorist attacks in the evening of 11 September 2001, the North Atlantic Council declared that the United States can rely on its 18 allies in North Atlantic allies in North-America and Europe for assistance and support. Less than 24 hours after the attacks and for the first time in NATO's history, the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective defense clause. The terrorist attacks were surprising and shocking, their enormity and barbarism were sobering for all and the success of the attacks against the strongest NATO member revealed the vulnerability of

each state and its institutions. The perception of vulnerability, the solidarity with the United States and the anger and indignation at the brutal terrorist acts unified NATO allies and their partners in their resolve to support the United States in the response to the challenge of terrorism. In response to the U.S. request and in fulfillment of the NAC decision of 4 October, the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) deployed seven Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft (AWACS) to the United States from their main base in Geilenkirchen, Germany. Within the operation, in which 830 crew members from 13 NATO nations took part, the NATO AWACS aircraft flew nearly 4300 hours in over 360 operational sorties (Meher 2010: 81).

In order to provide support to the new government and to create conditions for the post-Taliban recovery of the country, on 20 December 2001 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1386 to launch the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with a peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Despite ISAF was established by UN, it was not an UN force. ISAF was manned by the coalition of the willing, supported by NATO and financed by the troop-contributing nations. On 11 August 2003, NATO took over command of the ISAF with a schedule to continue the operation until 2007. In fact, this was the first Alliance mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area (Meher 2010: 81; Lukov 2005: 39). The NAEW&CF provided airborne surveillance over more than 30 special events, including the funeral of Pope John Paul II in Rome, the Spanish Royal Wedding in Madrid, the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece, and the European football championship in Portugal, as well as the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin, Italy.

On one hand, sending naval vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean could be considered as a warning and expression of resolve against states sponsoring terrorism. However, at that time it was unclear about what kinds of operations these ships would be able to perform against diverse international terrorist organizations. In March 2003, NATO expanded Operation Active Endeavor by providing escorts to non-military ships from Alliance member states through the Straits of Gibraltar and after one month, the operation scope was further expanded to include systematically boarding suspect ships.

These boarding take places with the compliance of the ships' masters and flag states in accordance with international law. In March 2004, the Operation Area of Responsibility (AOR) was expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism is the main platform for joint efforts by Allies and Partners in the fight against terrorism. It provides a framework for cooperation and expertise sharing in this area through political consultation and practical measures, such as: Intensified consultations and information sharing, Enhanced preparedness for combating terrorism, Impeding support for terrorist groups, Enhanced capabilities to contribute to consequence management and Assistance to partners' efforts against terrorism (Meher 2010: 82; Gordon 2002: 36).

In June 2004, additional measures to increase the Alliance contribution to the campaign against terrorism were approved at the NATO Summit in Istanbul. These measures included: enhanced intelligence sharing, mechanisms for more rapid response to member countries' requests for support in case of terrorist attacks, threat, and a research and technology programme of work for better forces' and populations' protection against terrorist acts (Meher 2010: 83; Kuzmanov 2006). At the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO recognized that "terrorism, together with the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years". At that Summit, NATO accepted the Russian and Ukrainian offers to support Operation Active Endeavour (Lukov 2005: 49).

The decision to create the NATO Response Force (NRF) was approved at the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002. It has to achieve full operational capability not later than October 2006. NRF could be used not only for collective defence but also for implementation and enforcement of decisions of the United Nations Security Council directed towards neutralizing threats posed by terrorism. NATO needs a much greater transformation of its structures and procedures if it is to serve the common security interests of the allies and others. The new types of threats to allied security and proposes alternative strategies to reform NATO so as to enhance international security (Meher 2010: 83; Bruno 2008: 23).

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):

At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed the implementation of five chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) initiatives to enhance the Alliance's defence capabilities against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (NATO 2008b). The North Atlantic Council in June 2003, decided to further enhance and take forward these initiatives by forming a Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion. The Battalion is just one part of a far-reaching transformation of NATO to ensure it remains able to deal with new security threats amongst them the problem of the proliferation of WMD (Meher 2010: 83; NATO 2008b, Joyce 2005: 45). The mission of the CBRN Defence Battalion is to provide rapidly a credible Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) capability, primarily to deployed NATO joint forces and commands, in order that Alliance freedom of action is maintained in an NBC threat environment. The CBRN Defence Battalion will be capable of conducting the following tasks: NBC reconnaissance operations; Provide identification of NBC substances; Biological detection and monitoring operations; Provide NBC assessments and advice to NATO commanders and NBC decontamination operations (Meher 2010: 83; Schmidt 2001: 105). The Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion will be under the operational control of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The NATO Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion is a high readiness, multi-national, multi-functional Battalion, able to deploy quickly to participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions wherever NATO requires (Meher 2010: 84; Tanner 2006: 55).

After the Washington Summit in April 1999, it was believed that the threat of WMDs was extremely serious not only from sovereign states such as North Korea and Iran but also from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups (Meher 2010: 84; Schmidt 2001: 105). This strong belief led to the launch of NATO's WMD centre in 2000, which deals with the threats arising from the potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear assets. The Centre includes a number of personnel from the International Secretariat as well as National Experts. The Centre's primary role is to improve coordination of WMD related activities, as well as to strengthen consultations on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament issues. The other role the centre provides is

three-fold, to improve intelligence and information sharing on proliferation issues, to assist allies their means of delivery. Starting that the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were keen on laying their hands on nuclear weapons, Mr. Obama (U.S President) vowed to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists (Meher 2010: 84; Gordon 2002: 37). So to end the terrorist activities and nuclear threat from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, he announced 30,000 more troops into the Afghanistan (New York 2009: 01).

After the Prague summit in 2002, NATO launched three broad initiatives in an effort to modernize and to ensure that the Alliance is able to effectively meet the new challenges of the 21st Century. The first was aimed at addressing the increasing threat of missile proliferation and the threat on Alliance territory. The second initiative is in the area of defense against CBRN weapons. Within this field states also agreed on implementing immediately five initiatives that can be categorized in the area of response in countering the threat of WMD attacks. One was to constitute an event response force to counter different types of threats (Meher 2010: 86). The second was to set up deployable laboratories to assess what type of agents one could be dealing with and the third was to look at the creation of a medical surveillance system. The final two initiatives in this response category was to create a stockpile of pharmaceutical and other medical counter-measures to reacts to any attack and finally to improve training within this area as a whole. The Prague summit also called for an implementation of the civil emergency plan of action for the threat of WMD terrorism (Meher 2010: 86).

Climate Change and Energy Security:

The Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme fosters collaboration between NATO nations and Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to help address their security issues and provide solutions. At the same time such cooperation enhances trust and confidence and improves capacity building, with the overarching aim of mitigating conflict and contributing to sustainable peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region (Meher 2010: 87; NATO 2012g; Egenhofer 2001:82). In January 29, 2009, the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer addressed a Seminar on Security Prospects in the High North, underscoring that the Arctic ice cap melting causes changes that will affect the whole international community, and suggested that NATO could contribute to

addressing this problem through its participation in relief operations and utilizing the opportunities inherent to the NATO-Russia Council (Meher 2010: 87; Hanusova 2009: 22). Environmental security has been identified as a key priority for NATO's Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries and in 2008, NATO nations concurred that the Science Security Forum (SSF) has addressed this issue in-depth by bringing together internationally recognized experts from NATO member, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries (NATO 2011f; Mohaghan 2008: 62).

At the Strasbourg NATO summit in April, 2009, U.S President Obama, said that "To truly transform our economy, protect our security, and save our planet from the ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the National Priority" (NATO 2009). Along with the working with a broad network of experts within NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, the SPS programme extends this cooperation through ongoing collaboration with other international bodies such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Environmental Security Initiative (ESI) (NATO 2011C; Hanusova 2009: 21).

He has insisted that the alliance must look to a new "strategic horizon" where dwindling water and food supplies, global warming, and mass migration cause international tensions. He was adding that NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) has the equipment, resources and experience to coordinate relief efforts and support search-and-rescue operations. The potential to discover and extract energy and mineral resources has oil and mining companies chomping at the bit, and governments looking to ensure that their respective nations get a share of the pie. Even if temperatures do increase, the Arctic will remain an inhospitable and relatively isolated region, however, he asserted that companies, and governments, would need to invest large sums to discover and bring them to market (Meher 2010: 89; Egenhofter and Cornillie: 2001: 04). NATO's involvement in energy security in the past was limited to ensuring security of energy supplies for the purpose of military operability. In recent years, daunting developments have shaken energy markets and indeed international affairs, causing energy security to become an issue of greater importance to the members of the alliance (NEA 2008). NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop

Scheffer admitted in a 2008 speech to the 'Security and Defense Agenda' that the renaissance of civilian nuclear energy poses its very own proliferation problems the debate about NATO's role in energy security has so far remained limited to CEIP and has successfully avoided growing civilian nuclear risk (Meher 2010: 90; Scheffer 2008: 22).

Cyber Attacks:

The protection of NATO's key information systems in general, and cyber defence in particular, are integral parts of the functions of the Alliance. There have been strong indications of a growing threat to such systems, including through the Internet. NATO has a valuable role to play in complementing members' capabilities in cyber defenses and electronic warfare. The Bucharest summit paved the way for the establishment of the Tallinn-based NATO cooperative cyber defense Centre of Excellence (COE), which concentrates on protecting vital systems and countering cyber attacks similar to the attacks on Estonia in 2007 (Meher 2010: 91; North Atlantic Council 2008: 47).

Protecting NATO's infrastructure from cyber attacks was initially placed on the agenda at the Prague summit in 2002, and NATO has since concluded that the alliance has a vital role to play in adding capacity and increasing members, cyber defense interoperability (Meher 2010: 91). Cyber attacks on Estonia in the spring of 2007 heightened general awareness of the issue. NATO has therefore developed new measures to enhance the protection of its communication and information systems against attempts at disruption through attacks or illegal access. In January 2008, it approved a policy on cyber defence which aims to ensure that the Alliance can efficiently and effectively deal with cyber aggression. It provides direction to NATO's civil and military bodies in order to ensure a common and coordinated approach and contains recommendations for individual countries on the protection of their national systems. In 2008 NATO also established the Cyber defense Management Authority, which has prior authority to deal with rapidly unfolding cyber defense crises. In addition, NATO is exploring the potential for incremental, practical cooperation on cyber defense with Partner countries (Meher 2010: 92).

The established Centre of Excellence on Cyber defense in Estonia will serve as a valuable conduit and focal point for NATO's efforts in this field. U.S secretary of

Defense, Robert Gates announced in November 2008 that the US fully supports the COE initiative, which gained full accreditation in early November 2008. America and European countries should demonstrate their support by contributing a small number of specialists and becoming sponsoring nations of this valuable intergovernmental initiative. Cyber defense is being made an integral part of NATO exercises. It shall be further strengthened to the linkages between NATO and Partner countries on protection against cyber attacks. In this vein, we have developed a framework for cooperation on cyber defense between NATO and Partner countries, and acknowledge the need to cooperate with international organizations, as appropriate (Meher 2010: 92).

Crisis Management:

It is also one of the most important security tasks of NATO in the post-Cold War period. It has had involved military and non-military measures to respond to a threat in the various crisis response situations. A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian and can be caused by politic of armed conflict, technological incidents or natural disasters. NATO's operation in this field goes beyond military operations that may include humanitarian disaster operations and protection of populations against technological and natural devastations. In this field, North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision making body, supported by a number of specialized committees. The NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), NATO's Operational Planning System and NATO Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management arrangements are designed to underpin the Alliance's crisis management role and response capability in a complementary and synergistic fashion, as part of an overall NATO crisis management process (Meher 2010: 48; Katharina: 2007: 24).

In reaching and implementing its decisions, the Council may be supported by specialized committees such as the Political Committee (PC), the Policy Coordination Group (PCG), the Military Committee (MC) and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC). The crisis management process is designed to facilitate political consultation and decision making at a sufficiently early stage in an emerging crisis to give the appropriate NATO committees to coordinate their work and submit timely advice to the Council. It also allows the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACE) as the

Strategic Commander responsible for Allied Command Operations (ACO) to undertake preparatory planning measures in a reasonable time frame (Meher 2010: 49).

Expansion of Democracy:

Contributing to democratization wherever possible is therefore a new functions of NATO after inclusion of member of East-European countries as its members. After 1990 the Western decision makers regarded the liberal democratic values of the transatlantic community as universally valid, the concept of promotion of “good” institutions of domestic governance came to be synonymous with the projection of liberal democracy into the former communist countries of Europe (Meher 2010: 45; Lebovic 2004:63). Some philosophers argued, the early 1990s witnessed the process of a collective writing of Europe’s “new constitution”, which established democratic pluralism, human right, and the rule of law as the key pillars of legitimate domestic governance. Since 1990, NATO has established a wide array of programs and institutions for dialogue and cooperation on security issues, most notably the North Atlantic Cooperation council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) through which it assisted the fledgling regimes in reshaping their defense policies, structures and planning processes. It is the best long-term step that may help the continent’s security because it provides the most effective framework for resolving conflicts between regions or among ethnic group within states. A democratic form of government is also the most reliable guarantee that a state will adopt prudent and peaceful behavior in its external policies (Meher 2010: 45; Rebecca 2007: 23).

Growing Partnership With Other Actors:

During the Cold War the Alliance had no significant interactions with the other international actors. They may be other organizations and non-member states, and only it focused on collective defense and deterrence as the basis for diplomacy with their adversaries to the East. But at the end of the Cold War in 1990-91, the Allies were farsighted enough to recognize that in the new circumstances NATO would need to work more closely with other major international security organizations and non-member states. The Balkan conflicts since 1991 and NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan since 2002-03 have been the main drivers of the alliance’s increasingly extensive cooperation

with other international organizations (Meher 2010: 56; North Atlantic Council 1991). It works with many bodies, including national and non-governmental organizations, non-member states as well as intergovernmental organizations.

Relations with the United Nations: NATO works closely with the United Nations (UN) as its Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO's major peace-support operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan and also provide the framework for NATO's training mission in Iraq. More recently NATO has provided logistical assistance to the African Union's UN endorsed peacekeeping operation in the Darfur region of Sudan, support for UN disaster-relief operations in Pakistan, following the massive earthquake in 2005; and escorting merchant ships carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies off the coast of Somalia (NATO 2012f). Close cooperation between NATO and the UN and its agencies is an important element in the development of an international "Comprehensive Approach" to crisis management and operations. Over the years, NATO-UN cooperation has been extended beyond operations to include consultations between NATO and UN specialized bodies on issues such as crisis assessment and management, civil-military cooperation, training and education, logistics, combating human trafficking, mine action, civilian capabilities, women and peace and security, arms control and non-proliferation, and the fight against terrorism (NATO 2012f; Hummer and Schweitzer 2002: 823; Meher 2010: 58). NATO and the United Nations (UN) share a commitment to maintaining international peace and security.

The relationship between the two organizations has been steadily growing at all levels conceptually and politically as well as institutionally. In this context, the UN needs NATO because, the alliance has resources, expertise, skills and capacity. NATO's capacity resides not only in its military capabilities but in its experience in preparing and leading states to work together in complex multi-service operations. In September 2008, building on the experience of over a decade of working together, the Secretaries General of the two organizations agreed to establish a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation. This includes regular exchanges and dialogue at senior and working levels on political and operational issues. Increasing cooperation will significantly contribute to addressing the threats and challenges that the international community faces. Within this

framework, cooperation will be further developed between NATO and the UN on issues of common interest, including in communication and information-sharing; capacity-building, training and exercises; lessons learned, planning and support for contingencies; and operational coordination and support (NATO 2009f; Meher 2010: 57; Duffield 1995: 772-75).

Cooperation and consultations with UN specialized bodies go beyond crisis management and cover a wide range of issues, including civil emergency planning, civil-military cooperation, combating human trafficking, action against mines, and the fight against terrorism. NATO contributes actively to the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC) and participates in special meetings of the Committee bringing together international, regional and sub-regional organizations involved in this process. NATO and the UN conduct reciprocal briefings on the progress in the area of counter-terrorism, in their respective committees (Meher 2010: 57; NATO 2012f; Deffield 1995: 773).

NATO and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): Both the organizations have complementary roles and functions in promoting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region in areas such as conflict prevention and crisis management. The two organizations have cooperated actively in the field in the Western Balkans since the 1990s, and regularly exchange views and seek to complement each other's activities on issues of common interest such as crisis management, border security, disarmament, terrorism and initiatives towards specific regions. Practical NATO-OSCE cooperation is best exemplified by the complementary missions undertaken by the two organizations in the Western Balkans. In 1996, after the signing of the "Dayton Peace Accord", they developed a joint action programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO has also cooperated closely with the OSCE in Europe in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Meher 2010: 84; Miller and Kagan 1997). A NATO Task Force was set up in September 2001 to provide additional security for EC and OSCE observers monitoring the implementation of a framework peace agreement. NATO-OSCE cooperation has also contributed to promoting better management and securing of borders in the Western

Balkans. Both are working together to build security and promote stability in the Euro-Atlantic area at both the operational level as well as in political level (Meher 2010: 85).

Growing Cooperation with Non-member States and NGOs: After involving in global issues and problems, NATO needs support and cooperation of its members as well as non-member states to handle effectively those global problems like terrorism, nuclear disarmament and arms control. Specially after the event of terrorist attack of September 11, on World Trade Center of U.S, NATO has been working with its non-member states like Russia and Cooperation with other countries in the Mediterranean region and Middle East. Formally NATO has enhanced its relations with Russia since 1991, at the inaugural session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), and in 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace programme a major programme of practical security and defence cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries (Lindley-French 2007: 06; Meher 2010: 86; Braun 2008: 125). In 1997, NATO and Russia set up the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a forum for regular consultation on security issues of common concern aimed at helping build mutual confidence through dialogue. The Permanent Joint Council was replaced with a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the creation of NRC on 28 may 2002 was a key milestone in NATO history and a decisive turning-point in NATO-Russia relations (Meher 2010: 86; Lindley-French 2007: 06) .

NATO is also developing closer security partnerships with countries in the Mediterranean region and the broader Middle East. This marks a shift in Alliance priorities towards greater involvement in these strategically important regions of the world, whose security and stability is closely linked to Euro-Atlantic security (Meher 2010: 69). There are several reasons, why it is important for NATO to promote dialogue and foster stability and security in North Africa and the broader Middle East. One key reason is that a number of today's security challenges like terrorism, the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), failed states and transnational organized crime etc. are common to both NATO member states and to countries in these regions (Schmidt 2001: 169). Consequently, they require common responses. Moreover, in addressing these challenges, NATO is becoming more engaged in areas beyond Europe including a

security assistance operation in Afghanistan, a maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean and a training mission in Iraq (Meher 2010: 70).

Energy security is another concern because as much as 65 percent of Europe's imports of oil and natural gas pass through the Mediterranean. A secure and stable environment in the Mediterranean region is important not only to Western importing countries but the region's energy producers and to the countries through which oil and gas transit (Meher 2010: 70). NATO's Mediterranean dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council in order to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding and dispel misconceptions about NATO's policies and objectives among dialogue countries. Over the years, the number of participating countries has increased: Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia joined in 1994, followed by Jordan in 1995 and Algeria in 2000. The dialogue reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It has formed an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment and has been an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. Measures to strengthen cooperation with Mediterranean dialogue countries were introduced at NATO summit meetings in Washington (1999) and Prague (2002) (Meher 2010: 70; Worner 2005). At the Istanbul summit in 2004 the dialogue was taken one step further with the aim of elevating it to a genuine partnership. The overriding objectives of the Mediterranean dialogue remain the same, but the future focus is on developing more practical cooperation. Specific objectives are to enhance political dialogue, to achieve interoperability (that is, to improve the ability of the militaries of dialogue countries to work with NATO forces) to contribute to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate in the area of defence reform (Meher 2010: 70). At the Summit meeting of June, 2004 the Alliance launched an Istanbul cooperation initiative and invited interested countries in the broader Middle East region to take part, beginning with the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Of these, Bahrain, Kuwait Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had already accepted the invitation by mid-2005; the alliance hopes that the others will also do so. The objective is to foster mutually beneficial bilateral relations with the countries of the region as a means of enhancing regional

security and stability with a particular focus on practical cooperation in the defense and security fields (Meher 2010: 70; Zyla 2005: 05).

Due to emerging global problems, NATO needs the cooperation of both the Inter-Governmental Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations to work efficiently in the world affair. Especially in the situations like crisis management, disaster relief operations, protection of human rights and enforcement of international laws and democratic principles etc. are most important factors, where NATO and NGOs are working in a very cooperative way to maintain better international peace, security and development in the world. NGOs and NATO come in to contact in the theater of operations in emergency relief operations and in complex crisis, including armed conflicts. Experience in stabilization and reconstruction operations has shown the importance of the relationship between military forces and civilian actors including NGOs. In the NATO's Riga summit declaration of November 2006, it emphasized on the practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organizations, Non-Governmental Organization and local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations wherever appropriate. NGOs have been invited to visit NATO HQ and to attend NATO conferences and seminars (Meher 2010: 71; Pursley 2008: 5-8). Improving the relationship between NGOs and military forces is therefore difficult, but necessary. Even the UN Security Council (UNSC) has invited NGOs to discuss the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. NGOs are an integral part of civil society that had few opportunities to contact with NATO before the alliance engaged in crisis management and disaster relief operations. Consequently NGOs and NATO share common fields of action, making dialogue essential (Meher 2010: 71; Borgomano 2007:15).

One of the most significant Non-Governmental Organizations with which NATO cooperates is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is an impartial neutral and independent organization exclusively concerned with humanitarian action to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and international violence and to provide them with necessary assistance (Meher 2010: 72). This NGO basically directs and coordinates international relief activities conduct in situations of conflict. Relations

between the two organizations have focused on *ad hoc* cooperation, with occasional informal exchanges of views between staff and high level meetings when required. Another important NGO is the Atlantic Treaty Association, who supports the activities of NATO and promotes the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT). The main goals are to carry out explore the different rationales and activities of NATO and their expansion to Eastern and Central Europe countries and also for its Mediterranean dialogue, to promote democracy and to develop the solidarity of the people of the North Atlantic area and of those whose countries participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (Meher 2010: 72; Borgomano 2007: 48).

In the new world arising after the Cold War, NATO's main task has shifted from deterring war between East and West to crisis management, peacekeeping and support for collective security. Through all these expanded role and functions, NATO has not only survived, it has been playing active role in peace-keeping, peace enforcement and crisis management fields.


The EC/EU in the post-Cold War

After end of the Cold War, EC has also expanded its structures, functions and role. At that time, it was clear that even the bigger countries in the EC have only limited capabilities to affect situations with instrument of their national foreign policy when they act on their own. Many long standing problems on the international agenda like the situation in the Balkans, rise of WMD, the stalled middle east peace process or even global warming have provided the same argument for pooling resources and speaking with a unified voice in order to be able to influence international events more effectively (Jain 2002: 12). At the same time, interest to develop or internal pressures for evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was an ambitious growing vision of the EC members, and also another fundamental change was introduced at the European intergovernmental conference in Maastricht. For the first time, member states of the EC incorporated in a treaty the objective of a common foreign policy. Since the Maastricht treaty's entry into force in 1993 created CFSP and European Union (EU) (Jain 2002: 12). The EU developed its structures and functions suitable to handle new tasks which were not given emphasized in the Cold War period.

The EC/EU: Expansion of Structures:

The collapse of the Berlin Wall, followed by German unification on 3rd October 1990, liberation from Soviet control and subsequent democratization of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, transformed the political structure of Europe. The 1986 Single European Act, which committed the Community to adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing an internal market by December 1992. The Member States determined to strengthen their ties and negotiated a new Treaty, the main features of which were agreed at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991. The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 gave the process the formal title of the European Union, which came into force in November 1993.

Table No 02.03: European Union



Sources: *European Union* (2002). URL: http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm

By virtue of the Maastricht Treaty, the activities of the EU were divided into three areas or 'pillars' such as the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. The first pillar 'Economic Community' covers internal market policies as well as agriculture and completion policy. It also covers most immigration and protection policies and economic and monetary union. In this pillar, the EU's common institutions such as commission, council and parliament can act largely (but not entirely) independently of the national governments. The second pillar 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' addresses about the attempt of EU member states to forge common positions and take joint action on foreign and security affairs. Decision making is primarily intergovernmental, neither the European parliament nor the court of justice have much influence. The third pillar 'Justice and Home Affairs (formally called Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) addresses on the growing cooperation in the area of internal security including the fight against international crime and drugs trade (Peterson and Bomberg 2008: 05). Both the 2nd and 3rd pillars are 'inter-governmental' in nature. Although the European council was created in 1974 still, it got a formal status in the 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht. After getting a formal status in 1992, it has been considering an important institution of the EU which consists of the Heads of State or Government together with its president and the president of the Commission (Peterson and Shackleton 2006: 48).

EU's enlargement of member states was an important change in its membership as has been changed in many times after the end of the Cold War. Until the third enlargement in 1986, it had 12 member states and in the fourth enlargement in 1995, three new member states were added namely Austria, Finland and Sweden and reached to 15 member states. Another most important enlargement in the post-Cold War period was in 2004, when ten new member states were joined. Those member states were Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia as the largest and historic enlargement of the EC which increased from 15 to 25 member states. They signed their accession treaty on 16 the April 2003 in Athens and officially joined in EC on 1st may, 2004. All ten members were joined because they see their natural place within the EC and they share its goals of freedom, democracy and

prosperity. On 1st January 2007 the membership increased to 27. So, in the post-Cold War period, the number of member states increased from 12 to 27 in about two decades. This led to the spread of the EC/EU geography to new areas like Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe and to the Eastern Mediterranean. This development also meant that the EC/EU has become neighbor to Middle East and became closer to Caucasus.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 further broadened the Parliaments powers with the introduction of a co-decision procedure which together with the Council, allows the Parliament to adopt regulations and directives on an equal footing in specific areas. In other areas, noticeably with regards to agriculture and prices, the Parliament has only a consultative role. Together with the Council, the Parliament has the power to approve the budget and to dismiss the Commission. On certain questions (e.g. taxation) the European Parliament gives only an advisory opinion (the ‘consultation procedure’). In some cases the Treaty provides that consultation is obligatory, being required by the legal base, and the proposal cannot acquire the force of law unless Parliament has delivered an opinion. In this case, the Council is not empowered to take a decision alone. Parliament has a power of political initiative. It can ask the Commission to present legislative proposals for laws to the Council (Peterson 2006: 105). In order to enable the EU fully to assume its responsibilities for crisis management, the European Council at Nice in December 2000, decided to establish permanent political and military structures which have been discussed discussing below:

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) absorbs as a permanent composition of the EC (European Council) which contributes to the framing and executing of the CFSP and CSDP. It is an important body of the Council which deals crisis situations and examines all the options that might be considered as the EU’s response (Meher 2016a: 04). ‘It proposes cohesive set of options for resolving the crisis to the Council, may draw up an opinion recommending to the Council that it adopts a Decision on the action to be taken. It also work outs political control and strategic direction in the event of a crisis for EU and monitors the international affairs in the parts covered by the CFSP such as delivers opinions to the Council for policies, scrutinizes the draft conclusions of the General Affairs Council and supervises the work led by the different Council working

groups in the area of the CFSP. Article 38 of the EU's Maastricht treaty authorizes the PSC to decide and control the duration of the crisis management operations' (Meher 2016a: 04; European Union 2001).

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) regards as a premier military body which set up within the Council and advises to the PSC on all EU military activities. 'It consists of the Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) of the EU Member States who regularly represents by their permanent Military Representatives (MilReps). It has one permanent Chairman who is chosen by the CHOD of all the member states and appointed by the Council. He advises to the High representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy on all military matters. In this concern, the EUMC and PSC are advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management' (Meher 2016a: 04; European Union 2001).

European Union Military Staff (EUMS) was established in 2001 and works under the direction of the EUMC. It also functions under the authority of the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) as multi-disciplinary military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Meher 2016a: 04). 'It is an integral component of the EEAS's comprehensive approach and coordinates the military instrument, with emphasizing on military operations and missions. The EUMS has three main operational functions such as early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. The EUMS provides strategic suggestion in order to make sure that EU activities under the CSDP agenda are in line with the political goals of the EU' (Meher 2016a: 04; European Union 2001). The EUMS also acts as a crucial role in the improvement of military capabilities and the initiation of military missions.

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was established in 2007 as part of the EEAS, under the strategic direction of the PSC and overall authority of the High Representative, it ensures the proper planning and performs the civilian CSDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks (Meher 2016a: 04). 'It is the permanent structure which is responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian CSDP operations. Its command is to plan and conduct civilian CSDP missions in the areas of police, border assistance, rule of law and security

sector reform including the supervision of each national contingents' (even if the overall command remains to national authorities). At the same time, he is also the general Commander of all civilian Heads of mission (Meher 2016a: 04).

In December 1991, the Maastricht treaty of the EC provided the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to conduct single monetary policy of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The ECB and the Central Banks of the member states are together called the European System of Central Banks ESCB (Pinder and Usherwood 2007: 73). In this context, EMU has been an integral part of the European integration process since the early 1970s which consists of a single monetary policy, a single monetary authority, a single currency and coordinated macro-economic policies, and European Central Banks were considered as completely independent bodies (Meher 2016a: 04; Cini 2007: 325). The six members of the ECB's executive board together with the governors of the other central banks comprise the governing council of the ECB. The primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability through subject to that overriding requirement. It also supports the community's general economic policies. The ECB has the sole right to authorize the issue of notes and to approve the quantity of coins issued by the states mints.

The Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) was created in 2009 which is a part of the European External Action Service and at the core of the EU CSDP as part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (Meher 2016a: 05). 'It helps in the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management and developing CSDP partnerships, policies, concepts and Coordinate the development of civilian and military capabilities. It cooperates and develops the Strategic Planning, Reviews of CSDP missions and operations. The CMPD also assists the High Representative of EU Council bodies, but under control and strategic direction of the Member States in the Political and Security Committee, acting under the responsibility of the Council and the High Representatives for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in EU' (Meher 2016a: 05; European Union 2001).

The EU: Role and Functions

The EC/EU in the post-Cold War period is one of the most unusual and widest-ranging political actors in the international system. The capacity of it has gradually expanded to encompass foreign policy initiatives towards nearly every corner of the globe, using a full range of foreign policy tools: diplomatic, economic, and now limited military operations related to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This capacity, however, was neither included in the original Treaty of Rome, nor was it predicted by many knowledgeable observers of European integration. Increasing role of the EC/EU after the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc since the EC achieved more maneuvering space.

Economic Player: Despite the political aims of its founding fathers the EC/EU achieved its integration first of all in the economic realm. Especially with the conclusion of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 and the introduction of the Euro paper and coins in 2002, the EC achieved to realize its project of economic and monetary integration (Barber 2001: 143; Hosli 1998: 168). The economic policies now mark the most supranational area within the EC. In order to have an idea about the EC's economic power comparative statistical data are needed. 'In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the EC/EU is the biggest economic power in the world. It produces goods and services more than at the total value of 10.793 trillion Euros that is ahead of the US by a slight margin. The GDP of the US is 10.035 trillion Euros. The accession of 10 countries in 2004 and two countries in 2007 contributed to the total GDP. In other words, the EC/EU owes its leadership position to the new members. Japan's GDP, meanwhile, is much lower. It is 3.674 trillion Euros. Since the 1990s, the EC also presents itself as a leading actor in international trade. The Union is one of the key players in the World Trade Organization (Commission 2005), and is one of the driving forces behind the current round of multilateral trade negotiations. The establishment of the EMU and a common currency 'Euro' symbolized a great step forward in the European financial integration. It tried to deepen its integration and enlarged its member states by accepting new members' (Meher 2016a: 05; Whitman 1998: 15).

Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management

With the end of the cold war and the end of a bi-polar constellation in world politics was the challenge for the European countries to formulate their own common position with regard to change in the outside world become much greater. At the same time, the 1990s saw a proliferation of civil conflicts in many countries of the world, which affected European trade relations and demanded a reaction from Europe. These conflicts called for a contribution to conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-keeping and conflict resolution. The treaty on European Union signed in 1993 in Maastricht brought foreign policy coordination more prominently into EC structures and the 'common and foreign security policy' established as the second pillar of the EC. From then onwards, the competences of the EC in the field of foreign and security policy-making have increased in many small steps. This process accelerated towards the turn of the century as a reaction towards concrete crisis situation. To meet their military capabilities as the EU's international commitments for common European defence, the agreement of the British and French governments at St Malo in December 1998, created an overwhelming momentum towards a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It demanded by the all EU member states. The ESDP is composed of three elements such as military crisis management, civilian crisis management and conflict prevention (Cini 2007: 245). It has both the military and civilian dimensions which developed at the Nice in 2001 with the other institutional structures that supported the policy. Those institutional structures are PSC which is assisted by a politico-military working group, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, the EU Military Committee and the Military Staff (Established in 2000). At the same, time other four institutional arrangements were created such as police cooperation, rule of law, civilian administration and civilian protection to fill the gap of soft security issues.

In April 2001, the commission of the EU adopted a "communication on conflict prevention" which set out a new strategy for its efforts in the field of conflict prevention and civilian crisis management. This was part of a broader strategy; the EU opted for a strategy that shifted attention from crisis management to prevention. In December 2001, the European council recognized that the EU is now capable of conducting some military crisis management operations. The presence of military forces in Macedonia has been

under the direct command of the EC since 31 March 2003 and not its member states or NATO. The operation makes use of NATO capabilities, which was made possible by the completion of work on EU-NATO arrangement.

After the establishment of the ESDP the Union carried out military missions in Macedonia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Georgia. It has been operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine and Iraq. It has police missions in Macedonia and the Republic of Congo (Whitman 2002: 287). Some of the previous NATO operations in the Balkans have been taken over by the EC. Hence, the EC started to replace the role of the NATO and the US in this region. Although these EC missions could not be considered as operations of great scale, nevertheless, they are still important as they are taking place for the first time in the history of the Community. An important development for the EC's military capability was the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) that is responsible for "helping the member states to develop their defence capabilities for crisis-management operations under the European Security and Defence Policy" (Schnabel and Rocca 2005: 63). The EDA helps the member states to exchange views on their defense policies. Another factor emphasized was the increasing expectations from the Union by other international actors. The United States especially wanted the EC to share more of the burden concerning the conflicts in the neighborhood of the EC (Christopher 2003: 07).

Terrorism: Another most important expanding post-Cold War role of EC is on fight against international terrorism. 'The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York lifted counter-terrorism to the top of the European security agenda. The bombings in Madrid of March 2004 and in London of July 2005 proved that Europe is also a target of the new forms of international terrorism (Meher 2016a: 07; Wilkinson 2005: 29). Immediately after the terrorist attack in September 11, in order to express European solidarity with the US, Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission said that "In the darkest hours of European history, the Americans stood by the US. We stand by them now". Moreover, European leaders immediately convened to release a joint declaration as an expression of unity with American people, as well as condemnation of the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the terrorist attacks' (Meher 2016a: 07; Akgul 2002: 02). The EC has become

more decisive in order to fight international terrorism and in response to that, Belgian EU Presidency at Laeken Summit announced that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was operational and that the EU would provide up to 4000 troops for the peace-keeping force in Afghanistan (Meher 2016a: 08; Smith 2003: 04). The tragic events of September 11, the EU has acted on several fronts to reinforce its existing and nascent capabilities to combat terrorism, but, again on March 11, 2004, exactly two-and-a-half years after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, a series of blasts killed more than 200 train passengers in Madrid (Meher 2016a: 08; Bures 2006: 71).

As the implications of an Al Qaeda-linked terror attack on their own home soil sank in, the EU Member States began with a much needed critical questioning of all measures they have taken to combat terrorism so far. The European Commission proposed a number of ways for further enhancement of operational cooperation in the fight against terrorism at the EC level and also several EC Member States attempted to enhance the EC counterterrorism policy in the area of intelligence sharing (Meher 2016a: 08; Bures 2006: 69; European Commission 2005: 09). ‘The most relevant institutions in EC counter-terrorism are the European Commission, Europol and Eurojust. In fact these three institutions play a major role at a legislative level (the Commission) and at the operational level (Europol and Eurojust), these two latter having as top priority in their mandate is the fight against terrorism. Other institutions like the European Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX) and the European Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) etc, are also under architecture of EC counter-terrorism’ (Meher 2016a: 08).

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is a growing tangible threat in the 21st century. Easy access to these weapons through black markets and the willingness of some states to cooperate with terrorist, extremist, or organized crime groups increase the concern that such weapons might end up in illegal hands (Meher 2016a: 09). ‘At the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, the European Council adopted its first draft Strategy against the proliferation of WMD. Since then the EC has started to fight against the

spread of nuclear weapons within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and highlighted the proliferation of WMD as potentially the greatest threat to security. It remarked that although the international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems, the world was entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. In recent years, the need for the EU to enhance its role as a non-proliferation actor has increased dramatically. Firstly, the US has effectively relinquished its leadership in arms control and adopted alternative methods to avert the spread of WMD (Meher 2016a: 09). This makes it as necessary for other actors willing to uphold the existing regime to upgrade their efforts. Secondly, particularly in the aftermath of terrorist attack in September 11, the proliferation threat is no longer seen in terms of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states, but also by terrorist organizations. Although the September 11, attacks did not involve the use of WMD, claims by Al-Qaida to be in possession of nuclear weapons have put this concern at the centre of the international agenda. For example, the EC has repeatedly voiced its concerns over Iran's intention to develop WMD and their systems of delivery, in particular long-range missiles, and has prompted Iran to conclude the strengthened safeguards regime with the IAEA' (Meher 2016a: 09; Portela 2003: 19).

Environmental Protection: In 1986, a comprehensive legal basis for an environmental policy was introduced by the European single act, and turned the subject from a cross sectional to an independent field of policy. 'Since 1993, a comprehensive legal basis for an environment of economic activities, the promotion of a high level of environmental protection and the imperative of improving the quality of the environment where laid down as the tasks of the community, in Article 2 of the Maastricht treaty. At the same time article 174 (1) of the Maastricht treaty of the EU says about the preserving , protecting and improving the quality of the environment; protecting human health and rational utilization of the natural resources and promoting measures at an international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems' (Meher 2016a: 09; Kumar 2007: 102). The treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 finally gave the environmental protection a status equal to that of the other tasks of the European commission. Keeping in mind the objectives and principles behind environmental protection and sustainable

development, as laid down in article 174 of the Maastricht treaty, and going much beyond them, several initiatives have been taken by the EU (Meher 2016a: 09; Kumar 1998: 103). ‘The creation of the European environment agency was designed to provide a unified facility in this area and there has also been a realization of the critical importance of an independent earth observation capability for effective participation in global environmental governance. Since 2000, the EU has developed a space policy through the coordination of national efforts and working in partnership with the European space agency. The significant outcome for environmental policy is the global monitoring for environment project. GMES, which was implemented in 2008, provides an information infrastructure, coordination, disparate European remote sensing resources in ways that support EU decision making and participation in multilateral agreements’ (Meher 2016a: 09). ‘The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, championed by the EU, provides for a 5.2 % reduction in developed world greenhouse gas emissions. By forging on alone the EU has abandoned its previous stipulation that all industrialized countries must be engaged in making emission reductions and ensured that, in the first phase at least the costs of the climate regime will be mainly borne by its member states’ (Meher 2016a: 10).

Peace-Keeping Operations: The EU’s military enterprise was formally launched by the 1999 when the European council meeting at Helsinki announced its headline goal of 60,000 troops available to the ESDP and initiated its new decision making structures the PSC, the EU Military Committee EUMC and the EU Military Staff EUMS. Within only three years of its initiation, the ESDP was to undertake its first operations. The most visible are the EU Force deployment in Macedonia (Concordia, march-December 2003), the democratic republic of Congo (Artemis, June-September 2003) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Althea, December 2004). Their scale has varied from 350 lightly armed troops in Macedonia, 2000 in the Congo to a 7000 forces in Bosnia. On the civilian side there have been the EU Police Missions (EUPOL); with 554 personnel police mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2003. In the case of ‘Operation Althea’ there was a EUPOL unit included within the military deployment (Meher 2016a: 10).

EU's Growing Relations with Other Actors

The European Union is constructing a role in the international system, represented through an identity as the conveyer of certain values and principles, a supporter of multilateralism, important contributor of economy, promoter of democracy and the rule of law, and the defender of a multilateral world order. Cooperation and Participation with the various international organizations like UN, NATO and WTO as well as other actors is one of the crucial ways to promote its values and principles and at the same time necessary for effective performance of its role and functions. More detail cooperation between NATO and EU would be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Conclusion

Both the organizations have originated just after end of the World War II as both are different organizations in term of purpose and structures. In the cold war period both the organizations had emphasized on their respective role and functions. NATO was concentrated on deterrence role and the EU was on economic integration. Both the organizations have structural evolutions but the EU's structural evolution was seen in the different stages of its evolution than compare to NATO. After the success of the ECSC in 1952, again European countries were created the EEC and Euratom in 1957, and then jointly all three institutions came into a single set of institution called the EC in 1967. At last, by the Maastricht treaty, the EC renamed into the EU in 1993. In this concern the EU has been developed with emphasizing on its political and economic role and functions. Therefore, the EC structure was totally based on civilian form and NATO remain as military form. But, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO lost its fear of threat from the East bloc and anticipated to go down its significance. Growing numbers of global challenges such as terrorism, WMD, narcotic drugs, cyber attacks, crisis management and peace keeping operation etc were needed more military and civilian resources as the UN didn't have that resources capabilities to operate in the larger world. So, the UN was seeking cooperation from other regional organizations, and the NATO and the EU were best for that purpose for the UN. So, all these factors influenced UN to provide its authorization to various regional organizations such as NATO and EU. After the end of the Cold War, both the organizations have given importance on the expansion of their respective structures and functions. Although both the organizations are different

in terms of structural formation and functions, still both the organizations holds some similarities and differences in structural and functional expansion in the post-Cold War. The NATO was transformed its military structure from ACE to ACO and ACA to ACT for expanding its operations to the multi areas or issues. And not only transformed its military structures but also civilian structures like NACC and EAPC to develop its dialogue and partnership with central and eastern Europe countries to focus on range of political and security issues may be regional and international issues. The EC/EU had also expanded its structures and functions such as PSC, EUMC, EUMS and CPCC in the post cold war period. The EC/EU has also adapted new tasks like fight against global challenges and establishing peace and stability in the crisis response regions and climate change etc, which were disappeared in the cold war period. Like NATO, the EC has developed the concept of CSDP and also three pillars (such as the European community, common foreign and security policy and police and judicial matters in criminal matters) through Maastricht treaty for its keen interest to expand its role and functions in both the civilian and military sectors. From the structural point of view, the EU remains as a political and economic organization because of its civilian capabilities and NATO remain as a military organization because of its military based of structure. But in the context of expanding role and functions both the NATO and EU, both the organizations have been involving in peace keeping and crisis management operation, to fight against global challenges, and another most important change is 'out of area' operation which they didn't assert in the cold war period. It means, in the post-Cold War period both have developed their active involvement in solving global challenges in their limited geographical boundary and also beyond geographical boundary. On the one side, the NATO expanded its role and functions with transforming of its structures to carry-out its peace-keeping and crisis-management operations and in the other side EU also expanded its role and functions to the peace-keeping and crisis-management operations, and also has been involved in fight against global challenges which didn't stressed in the Cold War period. Although it was necessary for the NATO to make relevance in the post-Cold War era with adapting all those new tasks and functions but, still it has been criticizing for pursuing 'out of area' operations beyond Europe. Therefore, through the peace-keeping

and crisis management operations and to deal with other global challenges, both the NATO and EU have been playing significant role in the world affairs.

CHAPTER III

NATO'S GROWING COOPERATION WITH THE EU

During the Cold War, NATO focused only on deterrence role to deal with its adversaries and meant to operate within its allies' territory. In this period, there was no significant interaction of NATO with the other international organizations. NATO had very limited role and functions as stated in the previous chapter. But after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it realized that in the new circumstances of world affairs it would need to work more closely with other major international organizations to carry out its expanded tasks such as peace-keeping and crisis management operation and fight against other global challenges (North Atlantic Council 1991: 01). These expanded role and functions have necessitated NATO to enter into extensive cooperation and partnership with other international organizations like the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) (Brenner 1998: 07).

The chapter starts with tracing the relationship between NATO and the EEC/EC/EU in the Cold War era. Then it discusses why and how these two organizations enter into partnership to deal with their common challenges. It discusses how these two organizations addresses various crisis management and peace keeping operations such as Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Darfur to provide empirical evidence for growing partnership of NATO and EU. The chapter further highlights various other global challenges such as terrorism, Weapon of Mass Destruction, piracy and narcotic drugs for which both the organizations cooperated and coordinated. The chapter ends with highlighting what lessons the two organizations learned from their past experiences of cooperation.

NATO-ECSC/EEC/EC Relations in the Cold War

The European countries were the victims of tremendous destruction in economically, politically, militarily and socially in the World War II. The Europeans' greatest fear, soon after the end of war, was the spread of communism and this fear was accentuated by the Soviet Union's activities to strengthen communism in the Eastern European countries. At the initial stage the U.S. did not want to be tied down in European affairs. The U.S

realized that economically strong European countries would be able to produce a strong self-supporting military structure, which could effectively resist outside aggression without a need for a long-term US commitment to maintain a large military force in Europe.

The U.S feared that the unemployment and poverty of the post-World War II period were reinforcing the appeal of communist parties to voters in Western Europe. The US assisted the Western European countries through huge economic support to Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan (Douglas 2008: 10). It was an enormous economic program planned to speed the revitalization of Western Europe from the consequences of war. It was also known as the European Recovery Program (ERP) which adopted the liberal ideas of cooperation, elimination of protectionism, and easy conversion of currency. The Marshall plan contributed greatly to develop Western European chemical, engineering sectors and also helping to restore industrial and agricultural production with establishing financial stability through expanding trade among the European countries. This way, the US assisted to Western European countries to get recovery from the war destruction through re-building economic and political systems.

In order to address the security concern of the Western European countries, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK signed the Brussels treaty in 1948 to develop a common defence system and to strengthen the ties between them in an effort to resist ideological, political and military threats from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc (NATO 1948: 02). The importance of threats to European security was amplified by the Soviet Blockade of Berlin. The French also designed the European Defence Community (EDC) to integrate and control the military contribution of Western Germany for the defence of Western Europe and to ensure that no new military threat could be emanate from the Federal Republic of Germany. West German military was expected to combine with military units of the European army in the EDC. The concept of an EDC had the support of the US but, rejected by the French Government. The failure of the EDC meant that an alternative way had to be found to integrate Germany into the Western security system.

The six Western European countries such of UK, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands created WEU in 1954 as a new international organization and encouraged Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to join and after some years four other countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain were joined. The purpose of the Western European Union (WEU) was to provide collective defense and to facilitate cooperation in economic, social, and cultural matters among its member states. It was inactive for the first 30 years because it was not given a chance to develop itself into a fully-fledged security organization, and at the time minimal use was made of it (Bloed and Wessel 1994: XVII). WEU was reemerged in 1984 and had developed as the defence component of the EEC/EC/EU. The WEU had the most significant role in different areas such as providing assistance to its member states in relation to accepting any policy of aggression, to generate a solid base for European economic recovery in Western Europe, to encourage the unity and evolution of integration of Europe, the reinstatement of self-confidence among Western European countries by pretentious responsibilities for arms control, consultation between the founding Member States of the European Community (EC) and the UK, and the integration of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance (WEU 1954: 01). However, the Western European countries failed to bring about their own effective military organization. They relied on NATO to provide security.

The European countries wanted to tie the U.S formally into the defence of Western Europe but, as stated above, initially the United States was reluctant towards this. The Europeans found the North Atlantic Treaty appeared to be a good way to get United States committed to their defence. The US continued to work on strengthening the capabilities of NATO while prodding and encouraging the most European countries to build their own security organization. Due to the chief guarantor of U.S to European security through NATO and massive assistance for recovery and reconstruction of the war devastated Europe, the European countries concentrate on to the economic dominion and established ECSC/EEC/EC for post war economic take off, its social wellbeing, European economic and political integration. The establishment of European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 through signing the Treaty of Rome provided an opportunity for the next stage in European political and economic integration. The EEC facilitated

free movement across national borders, coordinated policies, and a single external tariff (Galbreath and Gebhard 2010: 100). The European countries could achieve rapid socio-economic development and regional integration mainly due to the protection provided by the NATO.

Throughout the Cold War, stern division of functions and roles between NATO and the ESCS and its institutional heirs were present there. The NATO's purpose was to provide collective defense for the United States and its European allies to counter-balance the probable threats from the Soviet Union. The U.S possession of atomic bombs and aircraft with the capability to deliver them was seen as the only real deterrent to a Soviet attack at the time. The U.S needed military installations in Western Europe from which to operate these aircrafts and the countries of Western Europe had an interest in providing them. It was a real transformation for post-war Europe and the US to move from an anti-German to an anti Soviet stance so quickly. The presence of 'Red Army' of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Europe seemed a threatening to the Western Europe and during that time Soviet Union have no intention to withdrawing the red army from Eastern Europe (Koops 2010: 47). During the Cold War, NATO focused solely on its defense role for the protection of Western Europe from the external threat in general and the threat from Soviet Union in particular. The member states of NATO such as the U.S, Canada, and the Western Europe were feared on a massive Soviet military buildup and the ideological challenge of communism which considered as a main reason for its maintaining deterrent role against Soviet Union (Koops 2010: 47). Thus, the European states could pin down the reluctant United States in defense of the Western Europe through NATO. There was not much of formal interaction between the two organizations during the Cold War. Whatever the EEC/EC/EU did in the realm of low politics moved to the rhythm of NATO's tune and any European overtures aimed at revising NATO's mandate were in the end downplayed by the spectrum of the Soviet Union's military muscle. Absenteeism from high politics gave the Western Europeans, through their regional organization, a free ride to economic development, social welfare and the feeling of moral superiority that resulted from their lack of direct involvement in power driven geopolitical games (Galbreath and Gebhard 2010: 100).

NATO-EC/EU Relations in the post-Cold War

The end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union created a situation of fundamental reshaping of the transatlantic security agenda. NATO's fear of conflict and threat from the Soviet Union and its allies came to an end. It was expected that NATO would lose its relevance in the post-Cold War period but, NATO has expanded its role and functions as discussed in the earlier chapter. As the international organizations always try to adjust their relevance and importance with the changing international politics, similarly NATO tries to adjust to the new situation in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, after end of the fear of threat from the Soviet Union, NATO tried to redefine its role and functions to make itself relevance in the post-Cold War era. Instead of emphasizing on its traditional deterrence role, it look on new issues such as internal dispute, religious and ethnic conflicts within the states or among the states, and other new kinds of non-traditional threats. To carry out its new roles and functions, NATO required the military and non-military resources. It required military resources such as military troops, weapons, intelligence and its logistical support and non-military resources such as political, technical and economic tools which are called civilian resources (Goldgeier 2010: 16).

Although NATO has sufficient military resources as it is regarded as the most powerful military organization, it lacks civilian resources as it never felt the need of them during the Cold War era and therefore, it had not build up civilian resources capability. NATO realized the significance of soft power to address socio-economic and political reconstructions in the post-conflict societies, and management of various crises in the world. Since it did not have them, NATO felt the need to depend on otherinternational organizations for civilian resources to carry out its new tasks. For this reason, the NAC of NATO at London in 1991, decided to widen its strategic relations with other regional organizations of Europe like Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), EC for its broader approach to promote international peace and security (NATO: 1991a: 01). In the "Rome Declaration" of NATO in 1991, the NAC declared that member states of the alliance have the same opinion to make framework of interlocking institutions for new European security architecture, in which NATO, CSCE, EC/EU,

Western European Union (WEU) and Council of Europe would complement each other (Goldgeier 2010: 16).

Cooperation at Initial Stage

After the Rome Declaration and London summit of NATO in 1991, NATO sought support of the EC because, during that time EC was a single political and economic organization which hold strong civilian resource capability in Europe. Therefore, mainly due to the lack of civilian resource capabilities, NATO was keen on cooperation with EC to carry out its new roles and functions effectively (Goldgeier 2010: 16). Among others, NATO sought the cooperation of EC who had proven capabilities in civilian resources. Due to some similarities in both the NATO and EC/EU like common membership (overlapping membership), common geography, common vision to fight against global challenges such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), narcotic drugs and strengthening and widening democracy among the member states, they had the possibility of cooperation among them. At the same time, the EC/EU also had realized benefit to seek cooperation of the NATO as EC/EU could use military expert, intelligent and logistical support of NATO which EC/EU didn't possess, to carry out its peace keeping and crisis management operations. It means both have realized the need of cooperation and coordination of each other to use comparative strengthen of each other to deal with global challenges.

Apart from the cooperation, undercurrent of tension between the two organizations was developed in their relationship. NATO remains the preferred security partner of U.S and it tends to use NATO as vehicle for projecting American influence. The Europeans worried that close EC/EU-NATO cooperation could lead to the U.S gaining excessive influence over European Foreign and Defence matters. They argued that the U.S might use NATO missions as a means for getting European troops to serve American strategic interests. The EU Member States, which had been in opposition to the Iraq war of 1991, desired to build up separate European defence system. At the same time, EU members have taken steps toward political integration with decisions to develop a common foreign and defense policy to improve EU member states' abilities to manage

security crises. There was a growing realization of the need for European countries to assume greater responsibility for their common security (Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009: 129).

Britain played a vigorous role in supporting NATO's leadership role in European security matters and restated NATO supremacy as a decision making body on the key alliance decisions. On the other hand, France was concerned about the possibility of diffusion of the conflict all over Eastern Europe and anxious by the EC's ineffectiveness, and France desired a more aggressive UN role in the crises in Europe. French believed that EU member states must reduce their reliance over the U.S. French was of the new that the US could not be counted on to support all European security. France strongly supported the WEU's leadership and had not been cooperative in supporting NATO's initiatives. Germany was fearful of a possible explosion of the crisis beyond its borders and assumed only a non-armed role in Bosnia, and in fact did not ground any troops, though it contributed with ships in the Adriatic. Germans wanted to develop European defense and enhanced its ties with France. At the same time it wanted to protect their relationship with the U.S. At the beginning, the U.S. supported an EC leadership role in the Bosnian conflict and later, when the EC failed, the U.S. supported UN stronger measures, and tried for having NATO's important role as a regional security organization in Europe, and later in February 1992, the U.S abandoned its reticence about the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and opted to support Bosnian independence (Caruso 2007: 44).

The NATO's growing partnership with the EC/EU was seen since the past experiences in various crisis situations such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo. BiH was the first crisis response operation of NATO in 1992 where it agreed to assist the UN in monitoring compliance with sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council Resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992). Similar experience of NATO-EU partnership before 'Berlin plus agreement' with more effective division of labor was witnessed in the case of Kosovo. In January 1992 the EC started talking with Bosnian leaders who were aiming to find a way for Bosnian independence. EC may also committed themselves to the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, German unification and the end of the Cold War. Initial policy of the EC was aimed at keeping the Yugoslav federation

together and attempted to arrange cease-fire agreements between the warring parties, and sent unarmed observers to the field. These, however, failed to produce the desired effect, as it did not prevent the continuation of fighting, and did not decrease the level of violence (Caruso 2007: 45). The UN Security Council supported the efforts already undertaken by the EC/EU and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia. At the beginning of the conflict the UN preferred not to take the leadership role, and furthermore the position of Russia and relative use of veto power to block a more aggressive UN effort in the country was considered as the possibility. But, when the EC was unable to resolve the conflict, the UN was called to assume control by France and the US (Caruso 2007: 45). The war in Bosnia began after the EC recognized Bosnia as a sovereign state on April 6, 1992 and after one month of it, the UN sent United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) with primary mandate to assist in creating conditions for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and establishing reliable 'supply routes' by road and by air, and enhancing security for humanitarian personnel (Ghoniem 2003: 07).

In May 1992, despite all diplomatic efforts by the European Community, the Secretary-General's representatives and UNPROFOR to negotiate a lasting cease-fire, the conflict between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats on the one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other intensified. During the expansion of UNPROFOR in July 1992, the UN requested NATO to provide a command and control structure for UNPROFOR, but France blocked the action in the NAC (supreme political decision making body of the NATO). Finally, NATO expanded its naval ships and provided aircraft to monitor the ban on military flights and ships in order to monitor the UN embargo on Yugoslavia (Caruso 2007: 45). NATO air strikes were authorized to defend UNPROFOR troops and deter attacks on the safe areas. After two million former Yugoslavs were homeless and 200,000 had been killed. The U.S has finally decided to take the lead in resolving the conflict and that was also supported by Germany, France and Britain. At the same time they decided to withdraw of UNPROFOR forces and the establishment of a multinational military implementation force (IFOR) composed of ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO states to help ensure

compliance with the Peace Agreement. Between 1993 and 1995, UN and NATO launched a series of air strikes in response to Serb aggression on safe areas. The United Nations made the decision to pull all UN peacekeeping personnel out of Bosnia and allowed NATO to take over. UNPROFOR's mandate was terminated on December 20, 1995 (Ghoniem 2003: 08-10).

NATO launched its air campaign, and deployed its forces to implement the military aspects of the 'Dayton Peace Agreement' which replaced a year later by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). The mission was to secure an end to hostilities; to separate the armed forces of the war-torn country's newly created entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska; and to transfer territory between the two entities (NATO 2012a). SFOR's mission was extended to include support for civilian agencies involved in the international community's efforts to build a lasting peace in the country. The NATO decided to end its SFOR in BiH and transfer this operation to EU for security burden sharing (Kim 2008: 04).

In the context of NATO-WEU cooperation, on 8 June 1993, the WEU and NATO Councils met on 8th June 1993 to approve a combined concept for a joint operation in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 820. The agreement established a unified command for "Operation Sharp Guard", which was to begin on 15 June 1993. In the course of that operation, WEU deployed four ships and some six maritime patrol and early warning aircraft. The January 1994 NATO Summit launched the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), which was a mechanism to permit forces and headquarters made available to NATO to be deployed in some circumstances under European control. This was intended to provide a mechanism for effective cooperation with WEU. WEU had made a significant contribution for maintaining peace and stability in Europe and also for promoting consultations and cooperation in the field of European security and defence architectures (Kim 2008: 04).

In the year 1999, NATO launched military operations in Kosovo as it felt that the diplomatic track was not delivering a solution and the humanitarian situation on the ground had worsen to such an extent that outside intervention became essential in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. The NATO launched in March 1999 military

operation in Kosovo without authorization of the United Nations. Its intention was to stop hostility and to demilitarize the Kosovo liberation army; to support the international humanitarian effort; and coordinate and support the international civil presence as justified by the US and NATO at the UN (NATO 2011: 02). Kosovo was not an independent state and the use of force by the FRY against the population in Kosovo was not an armed attack upon a State. The FRY did not attack any of the NATO States or the neighboring States of Albania or Macedonia before the NATO operation commenced. The NATO action cannot, therefore, fall within the scope of the right of self-defense (Greenwood 2008: 146). NATO's operation in Kosovo was regarded as its 'out of area' operation. Some member states of the EU such as Britain and France were against of that operation. At the same time, some EU member states also desired to stay away from influence of the US at any form. The formal existence of the ESDP was just only weeks after the end of NATO's 78-day bombing campaign in Kosovo.

After the stabilization, the NATO and EU have shared the common objective to support and assist the Kosovo authorities in developing a stable, peaceful and multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and KFOR have worked closely to support United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Elizabeth 2008: 99). In 2003, the EU and NATO announced the "Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans" to enhance their cooperation to prevent conflict and establish peace in the Balkan region and also continue to meet regularly at all levels (NATO 2003d: 02). Both the organizations had worked in the area of police training with the partnership of OSCE in Kosovo. Their main purpose was to develop a joint venture with the public and carry out community-policing activities. They tried to create a more secure environment in municipalities by the support to the improvement and exertion of municipal Community Safety Councils (CSC) and Local Public Safety Committees (LPSC), which deal with public matters or problems with special focus to minority people (Dursun-Qzkanca 2009: 22).

Kosovo episode showed the NATO and EU adjust their organizational structures and their rules of conduct. And this was the best platform for both the organizations to interact with each other. These organizations were basically motivated by survival

instincts, in other words they wanted to prove that they are still relevant in a post-Cold War world. This creates competition and rivalry between these organizations. There was considerable overlap between the missions EU and NATO on the ground, which leads to bureaucratic competition between these international organizations as well as to incoherent peace-building efforts. Even Solana, the EU High Representative of CFSP, admits that “The EU and NATO are fishing from the same pool of resources in terms of personnel and capabilities (Dursun-Qzkanca 2009: 23). Another problem was that some NATO and EU member states have not yet internationally recognized the Republic of Kosovo.

Gradually differences developed between the U.S and European countries and some of the European countries were apprehensive of U.S dominance in NATO (Grant 2003: 02). The EU Member States which had opposed the Iraq war, desired to build up separate European defence system. In June 1999, the EU governments formally agreed to create the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The formal existence of the ESDP was just only weeks after the end of NATO’s 78 days bombing campaign in Kosovo. It was regarded as the major initiative on EU’s common foreign and security policy which covers all the defence and military aspects including its civilian crisis management operation. It was the initiative to develop EU’s own independent military capabilities which can be used in some military operation. At the same time, EU members have taken steps toward political integration with decisions to develop a common foreign and defense policy to improve EU member states’ abilities to manage security crises, such as those that engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s. There was a growing realization of the need for European countries to assume greater responsibility for their common security.

At the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO member states recognized that its relation with EU could be no longer afford to remain artificially aloof from one another. 'Real life' experience in the Balkans and elsewhere demonstrated that these two powerful institutions needed to consult, work together and solve problems using their respective strengths to the best advantage. At the first formal meeting between the NATO and EU in may 2001, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, set the tone of American attitudes

to ESDP, with her '3 Ds' statement, which outlined that the US welcomed an EU defence policy as long as it met three conditions: no De-coupling of the US from Europe; no Discrimination against Turkey; and no Duplication of NATO assets (Albright 1998: 22). Here decoupling means NATO is the expression of the indispensable transatlantic link and it remains as an organization of sovereign allies, where European decision-making is not unhooked from broader alliance decision-making. Duplication means defence resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate command structures, and make procurement decisions twice once at NATO and once more at the EU. And discrimination means no discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members.

After the Bosnia-Herzegovina operation as well as from the Kosovo episode, both the NATO-EU had realized the need to develop formal cooperation with formal agreements. The NATO and EU had also broader approach to deal different crisis management, peace keeping operations and fight against other global challenges. The EU regarded as a political and economic organization and it can contribute civilian resource to deal those new challenges. But, those new challenges are multi-faceted tasks which need military-economic and political tools. At the same time the EU also realized to develop its formal cooperation with the NATO to draw its military asserts and capability to successfully deal to emerging new challenges.

NATO-EU Partnership

NATO-EU cooperation had also seen after the terrorist attack in 11th September 2001, where both organizations have demonstrated that their mutual cooperation is necessary to handle counter terrorism along with other global challenges, and accepted to cooperate and coordinate to end that type of terrorist activities in future. After this terrorist attack, it took the unprecedented step of invoking NATO's collective defense provisions for the first time in its 52-year history. The EU also declared its solidarity with the U.S on the day after the attacks, and its members pledged both their individual and their collective support for any counter-terrorism efforts. This attack was immediately made terrorism a top priority for NATO and EU. This terrorist attacks compelled both the organizations to adopt a range of measures to fight against terrorism. The NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU High Representative Javier Solana meet for the first time at NATO

Headquarters on 30th April 2001, to discuss cooperation and coordination between both the organizations which was followed by another meeting on 25th June to discuss contribution of both the organizations towards the global war on terror. The EU and NATO foreign ministers meet in Iceland on 14-15 May 2001, to discuss the use of alliance assets and capabilities of NATO by the EU (Lindley-French 2001: 12). On 21 September, 2001 the European Council, during its extraordinary meeting, stated that “Terrorism is a real challenge to the world and to Europe, and that the fight against terrorism will be a priority objective of the EU” (Council of the European Union 2001: 03). That terrorist attack made EU more active to take decisive actions and to support the NATO’s vision to stop terrorism in the world, EU foreign and defence ministers meet in Brussels in 19th November 2001 to discuss all important military capability improvements and created European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). Although it was separate from NATO’s defence capabilities initiative, still it has common members and worked with the common assets and vision to combat terrorist activities in Europe. In their Responses to Terrorism, the security relationship between NATO and the EU is least developed. The Euro-Atlantic area is generally vulnerable to terrorist attack, and perhaps even to terrorist use of CBRN (Chemical-Biological-Radioactive and Nuclear weapons). Since terrorists are usually proficient at identifying and exploiting political differences and divisions, the rift between NATO-EU could invite the attention of terrorists (Bensahel 2003: X).

Berlin Plus Agreement:

They realized to make broader approach to deal different crisis management and peace keeping operations and fight against other global challenges. But, these new challenges are multi-faceted tasks which need military-economic and political tools. So, the EU realized the need to develop its formal cooperation with the NATO to draw its military assets and capability to successfully deal to new challenges. Similarly, NATO feel the need of EU to use its soft powers and economic resources to address some of the ground challenges. That first formal meeting was moving from the theory of European defence to practical cooperation on common concern relating to security, defense and crisis management. A draft on NATO-EU Security Agreement was fundamental which

emphasized on four areas of cooperation such as working on equal footing, Coherence in defense planning, no unnecessary duplication, Participation of non-EU European allies and Capabilities. After a year of negotiations, NATO member states were willing to sign the NATO-EU agreement. But, Turkey desired to have the right to block autonomous EU operations in an area of strategic importance to Turkey. Ankara ultimately backed down in return for guarantees that the EU would not carry out a military operation against a non-EU NATO member (such as Turkey), and arrangements whereby the EU would seek advice from Turkey in any crisis. Turkey was willing to accept this deal in December 2001, but Greece then rejected it as too great a concession to Turkey. At their summit in Prague in November 2002, NATO members declared their readiness to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which NATO was not engaged militarily (Albright 1998: 22).

The NATO-EU formal joint declaration for strategic partnership in peace keeping and crisis management was finalized on 11 March 2003 which was known as the ‘Berlin plus Agreement’, which contain following provisions:

1. *“Assured access of the EU to NATO planning capabilities with a view to effective use in the context of military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;*
2. *Post of Deputy to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) - who will command EU-led operations (and who is always a European) - and NATO European command options;*
3. *Assured access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities (communication units, headquarters, etc.) for EU-led crisis management operations;*
4. *NATO-EU agreement on security (exchange of classified information under the rules of mutual protection);*
5. *Procedures to follow for the management of NATO assets and capabilities (release, monitoring, return and recall);*
6. *NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation calling on NATO assets and capabilities;*

7. *Integration in NATO's longstanding defence planning system of the military requirements and capabilities which may be needed for EU-led military operations, in order to guarantee the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations.*" (European Union 2003: 01)

The "Berlin Plus" arrangement provides the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing EU to access NATO's collective assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations. The provisions of Berlin plus agreement paved the way to home single military force and allows EU to access NATO's capability, headquarters, structures and mechanism to carry out peace keeping and crisis management operations (Reichard 2006: 273; NATO 2003b). This was an important formal cooperation between NATO and EU, which created single integrated military force and also discourage EU not to develop its own military power under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which it initially intended to do. This agreement also provides that NATO's Deputy SACEUR will be authorized as an Operation Commander of EU led operations, and also pave the way for the consultation arrangements between NATO and EU during the peace keeping or crisis management operations. In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged (Meher 2016a: 10; NATO 2003c: 01). Based on this 'Berlin Plus' agreement, the NATO-EU cooperation has evolved, especially in military to military contacts and expert consultations between civilians from their respective headquarters. In the Berlin plus agreement both the organizations have covered the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules and also they can consult together in the crisis management and peace keeping operation.

However, the constructive spirit that could have arisen from that experience had already been shattered by splits between the EU Member States over the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which began only three days after the EU-NATO framework was signed. As a result, at the end of April 2003, four EU governments which had opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg proposed that the EU should create its own operations planning staff in the Brussels. The Bush administration initially maintained essentially the same stance on ESDP as the Clinton administration

and many Americans saw ESDP primarily as a defence or military project (Hunter 2002: 128). The U.S thought that if NATO will not allow forming ESDP, then may be in future the EU will compete and undermine the NATO in regard to peace keeping and crisis management operations. The Bush attitude to ESDP further soured when EU governments sent an autonomous peacekeeping force to Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2003. The Bush administration had assumed that NATO had the 'right of first refusal' on all potential EU peacekeeping missions, and was surprised when EU governments dispatched soldiers to the DRC without discussing their plans at NATO first. The Bush administration was also surprised that the draft EU constitutional treaty, which was presented in July 2003, included a mutual assistance clause, which implied the potential for the EU to become a collective defence organization to rival NATO (Medcalf 2003: 103). Following are the discussion of NATO-EU partnership in various global challenges:

Peacekeeping Operation:

The case of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was the most important experience of NATO-EU engagement in crisis management operation on the basis of Berlin plus agreement. With the support of NATO the 'Ohrid Agreement' was signed by the Government of Macedonia and ethnic Albania representatives on August 13, 2001, to end armed conflict between the National Liberation Army (NLA) and the Macedonian security forces. NATO launched its operation to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy the weapons collected from them. In 27 August 2001, NLA fighters began handing over weapons to the NATO-led Task Force in FYROM (NATO 2009c: 04). On 17 March 2003, NATO transferred this operation to the EU as EU wanted to share the burden of NATO by managing the crisis in its periphery (Pop 2007: 02).

It was the first time that NATO transferred the operation to the EU and worked together on the ground after signing the Berlin plus agreement. In this mission NATO supported the EU on strategic, operational and tactical planning (Hughes 2010: 108). NATO leaders stressed that NATO would nevertheless remain committed to the stabilization of the country and would maintain a residual military presence through a NATO headquarters in Sarajevo. This headquarters is responsible primarily for providing

assistance in the defense reform process and other tasks including counter-terrorism and support for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2005b: 22).

The NATO experts have provided military and technical advice for both the initial preparation and the subsequent implementation of the EU's European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), which was created in November 2001 to continue improving their (member states of EU) military capabilities with a view to boosting development of European crisis-management capabilities. The ECAP has been addressed in the 'NATO-EU Capability Group' for capabilities planning of the EU and its cooperation with NATO in Macedonia operation. This cooperation of NATO and the EU has played an essential role to end dangerous internal conflict before it developed into full-scale civil war. Close cooperation and coordination with regard to the planning and implementation of the EU mission was facilitated through Berlin plus agreement and also institutional linkages during this operation such as appointment of the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) as the EU Operation Commander, an EU-Operation Headquarters (OHQ) was set-up at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, to assist the Operation Commander. In adding up, an "EU Command Element" (EUCE) was established at Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH), in Naples, Italy, which was the NATO Joint Force command for this operation. At the time, the Chief of Staff of AFSOUTH also became Chief of Staff of the new EU Command Element, assisted by an EU Director for Operations. These dual NATO-EU posts guaranteed the linkage between the European Union's and NATO's operational chain of command during Concordia.

The Action Plan was made to enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of European military capability efforts. Coordination between EU Member States and cooperation with NATO is essential to target specific shortcomings, avoid wasteful duplication and ensure transparency and consistency with NATO and also for a "bottom-up" approach to European defence cooperation. Member States' commitments would be on a voluntary basis, with due regard to national decisions. The management of this conflict is the perfect example of transatlantic cooperation (Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009: 127).

Macedonia today is more stable and secure than it was at the time of the EU and NATO deployments (Ginsberg 2007: 16).

Although the Berlin Plus agreements quickly led to EU's first peacekeeping operation using in FYROM, replacing the NATO operation in FYROM (UACES Student Forum 2012: 02: Mace 2007: 474). All in all EU-NATO cooperation seemed to work very smoothly for the FYROM operation. However, the constructive spirit that could have arisen from that experience had already been shattered by splits between EU Member States over the US invasion of Iraq, which began only three days after the EU-NATO framework was signed. As a result, at the end of April 2003, four the EU governments which had opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg proposed that the EU should create its own operations planning staff in the Brussels. The Bush administration's attitude to ESDP further soured when the EU governments sent an autonomous peace-keeping force to Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2003. The Bush administration had assumed that NATO had the 'right of first refusal' on all potential EU peace-keeping missions, and was surprised when EU governments dispatched soldiers to the DRC without discussing their plans at NATO first. The Bush administration was also surprised that the draft of the EU constitutional treaty, which was presented in July 2003, included a mutual assistance clause, which implied the potential for the EU to become a collective defence organization to rival NATO (Medcalf 2003: 103).

In May 2005, the African Union asked both the European Union and NATO to provide assistance to the AU's peacekeeping mission in western Sudan (Segell 2008: 15). Specifically, AU President Alpha OumarKonore requested help in moving troops from various contributing countries in Africa to the theater of operations. Both the NATO and EU responded positively. The EU provides military assistance in the form of technical, planning and management support, and works closely with NATO in a joint strategic air transport cell in Addis Ababa (Council of the European Union 2006: 21). NATO has provided training for AU personnel in command and control and other areas (NATO 2013b: 02). The EU had significant role in this through various activities such as reinforcement of the African Union in Sudan (AMIS) II support for the police (CIVPOL)

through the deployment of EU police officers throughout the chain of command, training for all categories of AMIS CIVPOL personnel through the establishment of training courses conducted by EU trainers. While the NATO and EU military staffs and working-level experts have been able to cooperate in their respective area of activities. Their tasks have been made much harder by the failure of the political leadership to direct the two institutions to work together (EU Council Secretariat 2006a: 02).

Different stumbling blocks were emerged in the episode of NATO-EU partnership at Darfur in 2003, such as the EC/EU members have taken steps towards political integration with decisions to develop a common foreign and defense policy to improve its capabilities to manage security crises. There was a growing realization of the need for European countries to assume greater responsibility for their common security. In September 2003, Germany, France, and Britain meet in Berlin to draw up a new conciliation on ESDP and its relationship with NATO. That meeting allowed the EU to have a small unit of operational planners in the EC/EU military staff which works under the direction of the EU Military Committee and under the authority of the High Representative and Vice-President. It is an integral part of the European External Action Service (EEAS)'s comprehensive approach. It coordinates the military instrument with particular focus on operations for both the military and its logistical support and for the creation of the military capability. Some of the EC/EU member states were opposed to the Iraq war of 2003 and desired to build up separate European defence system through the ESDP to undermine NATO. They believed that the US might use NATO missions as a means for getting European troops to serve American strategic interests (Grant 2003: 02). NATO recognized the need to develop a "European Security and Defence Identity" within the organization that would be both an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and military structures and an important contributing factor to the development of European defence capabilities. NATO recognized because it didn't want the EU as a defence organization like NATO and NATO cleared that it has the first right to intervene in the crisis response region and if NATO refuses to involve in, then the EU may engage at there. Therefore all these matters have influenced NATO-EU partnership in Darfur. The limitations of Berlin Plus, along with the failure of NATO and the EU to agree to cooperate in the Darfur operation, demonstrate the weakness of continuing in the current

mode of NATO-EU relations, or of making only minor, incremental adjustments. Continuing down that path will lead to further drift across the Atlantic as NATO and the EU jostle for primacy and the United States looks for decisive partners to help with its global agenda. Both the organizations were unable to decide on a single command center for the strategic airlift, with the EU proposing to use the European Airlift Centre at Eindhoven, and NATO seeking to use SHAPE. In the end, they agreed to disagree, and two separate airlifts were established, with the expectation that they would be coordinated by the African Union.

Counter-Terrorism

To address the problem of terrorism with the additional efforts, at the Riga summit of NATO in 2002, NATO and its Partnership for Peace (PfP)¹ members including EU member states made Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAPT)² for cooperation and coordination among them. It has provided five areas of cooperation such as intensified consultations and information sharing, the need to impede support for terrorist groups, to enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management, enhanced preparedness for combating terrorism and assistance to partners' efforts against terrorism (Forster 2012: 42). In between period of the NATO-EU engagement in Afghanistan for counter terrorism operation, another big terrorist attack has shown at Madrid in March 2004 and after this attack the NATO and EU had set and shared the common objectives to fight against terrorism such as:

¹ The PfP was launched in January 1994 as a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries. It allows Partner countries to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. The essence of the PfP programme is a partnership formed individually between each Partner country and NATO, tailored to individual needs and jointly implemented at the level and pace chosen by each participating government. Based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the PfP is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries (Schmidt 2001: 270).

² PAPT is a framework through which NATO's Allies and partner countries could work together in counter terrorism operation through political consultation. It facilitates greater intelligence-sharing and cooperation in areas such as border security, terrorism-related training and exercises, the development of capabilities for defence against terrorist attack and for managing the consequences of such an attack. It is also protecting fundamental freedoms, human rights and upholding the rule of law in combating terrorism. In this regard NATO's Allies and partners consult regularly on their shared security concerns related to terrorism in the EAPC and to exchange views and experience in seminars and workshops held under EAPC/PfP auspices.

- *“Capturing Bin Laden and all other members of Al Qaeda and bring them to justice.*
- *Protecting the citizens of the NATO and EU member states as well as of other countries from terrorist attacks,*
- *Destroying terrorists infrastructure and save havens wherever they are.*
- *Destroying lines of support and communication of terrorist organizations.*
- *Winning the hearts and minds of non-western peoples, especially but not exclusively in the Arab world,*
- *Promoting democracy and free markets as the best long term tool against terrorism.” (Irlenkaeuser 2006: 02).*

The Riga Summit of 2006 and also the Lisbon summit of NATO in 2010, gave a firm impetus to developing NATO-EU relationships in a concrete manner on fight against terrorism (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2006: 02). In the Riga summit, the member states of both the NATO and EU had re-emphasized the common values and strategic interests which cover a broad range of issues relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism and the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities (NATO 2006b: 41; Riga Summit Declaration 2006: 175). This summit was acknowledged a new maturity in growing partnership between NATO and EU with special commitment to develop different mechanisms which will address different issues in Euro-Atlantic Community. Another important decision in this summit was to make bi-monthly meetings between NATO Secretary General and EU counterpart to address different issues and challenges. At the same time NATO’s member states took decision to create joint contingency planning with EU to address range of issues such as terrorist attack, natural disasters, several energy shortages and territorial conflicts, and also adopted a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Agreement which opened the door to all the NATO and EU member states to discuss on various political and security issues including terrorism. This summit also declared about the establishment of NATO Response Force (NRF) which has been playing a vital part in the Alliance’s response to a

rapidly emerging crisis. NATO's rapid reaction force is capable of performing missions anywhere in the world, as well as across the full spectrum of operations (Riga Summit Declaration 2006: 171).

At the Lisbon summit of NATO in 2010, its member states have declared that both the NATO and EU are committed to combat terrorism in the contemporary world affairs (NATO 2010a: 01). At this summit, member states declared that terrorism is no longer an operational or tactical dimension of asymmetric warfare. It has become a "direct threat to the citizens of NATO and EU countries and also to international stability and prosperity". Collective defense blends with the broader concept of collective security, opening new perspectives for both the organizations in the fight against terrorism and placing new emphasis on the need to define the Alliance's role and contribution. At the same time in this summit NATO also emphasized its long term cooperation with the EU for counter terrorism (NATO 2010b: 10). The Responses to Terrorism is the best developed security relationship between NATO and the EU is least developed. The Euro-Atlantic area is generally vulnerable to terrorist attack, and perhaps even to terrorist use of CBRN (Chemical-Biological-Radioactive and Nuclear weapons). The relative lack of co-operation between NATO and the EU in this area is more than merely inefficient, however. Since terrorists are usually proficient at identifying and exploiting political differences and divisions, the present state of affairs between NATO and the EU could invite the attention of terrorists. The EU is limited in its military and intelligence capabilities, but it has undertaken a number of important initiatives in Justice and Home Affairs. Measures such as adopting a common European arrest warrant, strengthening Europol, and harmonizing policies on money laundering and other financial crimes may prove extremely valuable for counter-terrorism efforts (Bensahel 2003: X). With the 2010 Strategic Concept agreed at Lisbon in November 2010, NATO has completed its intellectual and political evolution vis-à-vis the terrorist threat (NATO 2010b: 10).

Although cooperation between both the organizations has had observed the most significant factor for counter-terrorism, still there are some challenges like reluctant to provide military resources to NATO by its member states. The EU is uniquely positioned to coordinate its members' efforts to analyze data and to identify emerging trends

throughout the continent. Multilateral cooperation with an increasingly strong EU's capability may enhance the ability of states on both sides of the Atlantic to prevent terrorism and to prosecute those involved in terrorist activities. However, if this mission of NATO in Afghanistan fails, then it will lose its military credibility in the world (Tanner 2006: 04).

Non-Prolifération of WMD

Like terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is regarded as the great threat to the world. Possessing nuclear weapons by greater numbers of states is regarded as a greater risk of accident and may use or will fall into the hands of non-state actors with catastrophic consequences. Both NATO and EU have had worked in different ways to stop the proliferation of WMD, and NATO and EU developed non-proliferation strategies and approves against WMD problems. They have exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against Chemical-Biological-Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks (Pilat and Yost 2007: 108). They have the common view on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts and an essential basis for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament (Bennett 2003: 08). From an institutional viewpoint, the EU's European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and NATO's Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre are working towards this problem with necessary coordination like through information exchanges on their respective activities, contacts at expert and staff level, consultations and joint meetings, (NATO 2006c: 251). The two organizations also cooperate in the field of civil emergency planning by exchanging inventories of measures taken in this area (NATO 2009e: 01).

In the context of North Korea in 2003, when it withdraw its membership from the NPT with the aim to possess nuclear weapons, member states of both the NATO and EU condemned North Korea's launch of ballistic missiles in 2006 and called upon Pyongyang to completely and verifiably eliminate its nuclear weapons and also its related programmes (Pilat and Yost 2007: 108). At the Istanbul summit of NATO in 2004, NATO declared its commitment to reinforcing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and ensuring the full compliance with it by all states party to the NPT. For this NATO

emphasized its cooperation with the EU through active pursuit of consultations and exchange of information between them. At the Lisbon Summit of NATO in November 2010, the Allies emphasized on their determination towards its cooperation with EU to combat terrorism and non-proliferation of WMD (NATO 2010b: 10; NATO 2006c: 179).). Both the organizations are currently preoccupied with raising awareness among their respective member states of the need for and the benefits of working together. The EU is looking for new ways of getting the member states to work together, as it is faced with limitations in resources available, and the rejection of the European Commission's suggestion of central stockpiling of vaccines (Pop 2007: 02). At the Copenhagen meeting in 12th March 2012, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen was speaking to the chairpersons of the foreign affairs committees of the EU that proliferation of the WMD is one of the most important threat to the world and to confront these threats, we need to work together successfully, and we need a stronger NATO-EU relationship (NATO 2012b). The EU and NATO have been sharing information and expertise and putting a greater focus on risk management. Member states of both NATO and the EU have condemned any WMD proliferation by other than five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

In the current post-Cold War era, states like India, Pakistan and Iran have developed nuclear weapons. These developments of the armaments show the failure of NATO and EU to stop proliferation of the WMD. Although both the organizations are working on the counter proliferation of WMD, still there is no formal joint agreement. Both the organizations have emphasized that proliferation of WMD is as one of the great threats to the society or the world at different NATO summits, but in the operational level both the organizations do not have any joint exercise or operation till now.

Cooperation in Anti-Piracy Operations :

The Piracy problem in the sea, basically in the Gulf of Aden region is a raising issue since 2005 where Somali pirates are very active to make threat for merchant shipping using the Suez Canal. In the maritime security, NATO has been involved with other partners such as EU and African Union (AU) in order to contribute to the maintenance of a secure and safe maritime environment which is challenged by the transnational crime such as piracy,

illegal trafficking of humans, narcotics, weapons (NATO 2008: 01). Through support of the UN Security Council resolutions, EU and NATO operations have been launched to deter, prevent and repress piracy off the coast of Somalia. Both the organizations have held joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden with frequent exchanges of visits, day-to-day intelligence sharing and through exchange of their respective observers (NATO 2008: 01).

In the context of NATO-EU Partnership, one of the coordination mechanisms between NATO and the EU was Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) which met on a monthly base in Bahrain for anti-piracy operation and provided coordination of activities between maritime industry, NATO, EU, US-led Coalition Maritime Force and individual nations with assets in the region. It has included China, Egypt, India, Jordan, Australia, Arabia, Seychelles, Bahrain Pakistan, Saudi South Korea, Singapore, Ukraine and Yemen (Ferreira 2011: 25). NATO responded to counter piracy operation which was first short-term operation (Operation Allied Provider (OAP) in 2008 where it has taken the responsibility to provide naval escorts to WFP (World Food Program) vessels and also patrolled the waters around Somalia to deter acts of piracy. It was a short-term counter-piracy operation that was requested by the UN in 2008 (UNSC Resolution 1814, 1816 and 1838) in coordination with the EU and other international actors. But, in December 2008, that responsibility was handed over to the EU, because NATO wanted to deploy a new and longer-term naval force operation for the maritime security called 'Allied Protector' under its Standing Maritime Group 1 (involving ships from Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Portugal and the U.S). This was the first naval operation in Somalia (NATO 2013a: 01). For the counter-piracy operation, the EU has launched European Naval Force Somalia-Operation ATALANTA within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International Law. Up to 12 EU ships from the Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Greece were involved (Andrew 2010: 04).

Both the organizations have also used coalition communication system like effective internet service to reduce Somalia pirates activities, and the joint naval co-operation in the Gulf of Aden appeared to be successful. Since 2005, piracy problems in

the Gulf of Aden has been growing which threatens merchant shipping using the Suez Canal as it is regarded as the most busiest sea lanes in the world. In this area of sea, Somali pirates hijack different world food program ship. In the Gulf of Aden, both NATO and EU have been cooperated each other with their respective naval forces. NATO responded in October 2008 and EU in December 2008. The EU and NATO have found ways to cooperate in the innovative use of the Internet as a coalition communication system is one example, provide a common link between the systems of different ships, conducted helicopter surveillance missions to trace and identify ships in the area; prevent and disrupt hijackings and to suppress armed robbery. Although NATO transferred its operation to the EU and showed its coordination with EU on the basis of Berlin plus agreement, the challenge is that still now both the organizations don't have joint formal or structural mechanism to carry out their joint anti-piracy operation (NATO 2010b: 10). However, due to NATO-EU engagement in Somali pirates operation, now less numbers of ships being boarded by pirates. Before the operation Somali pirates were very much engaged in hijacking world food program ships and also threatening merchant shipping using Suez canal (Andrew 2010: 03). According to the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance at the Lisbon submit in 2010, with regard to the anti-piracy joint operation between both the organizations especially on political dialogue has improved which could eventually allow planning of joint operations, with military and civil components.

Narcotic Drugs :

NATO has operated its Counter-Narcotic drugs operations and training in the different states such as Afghan, Pakistani and other central Asian countries, namely Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and NATO-Russia Council. There are other states like Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, where narcotics consumption and smuggling are also high. NATO and the EU have shown their mutual cooperation and coordination for counter narcotic drugs with the spirit of complimentary partnership in Afghanistan (EU Council Secrétariat 2009 : 02).

Under Berlin plus agreement, NATO agreed to provide intelligence and expertise service to the EU from NATO and with the help of those services, the EU has also

engaged on counter-narcotic operation with its Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) and Border Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA) as these programmes are very effectively working on drug addiction prevention and treatment, and provides trainings with its European expertise, and helps to make effective policy through seminars and study tours for Central Asian institutions on drugs. The CADAP and BOMCA have been fully funded by the EU with the help of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and basically operating in the central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan (Gavrilis, G. 2009: 02).

Conclusion

After the end of the Cold War, NATO has been involved in the different peace-keeping and crisis management operations, Cooperation and coordination between both the organizations have had appeared in the various crisis management and peace-keeping operations which have been witnessed in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Darfur and Afghanistan, within its territorial boundary of the member states and beyond its territory of member states. Due to lack of civilian resources capability, NATO has developed its relations with the EU who holds civilian resource capability. From the past experiences of NATO and the EU partnership in different peace keeping and crisis management operations as well as for fight against global challenges both have realized some achievements such as institutional coordination between PSC of EU and NAC of NATO, Berlin plus agreement of 2003, establishment of the EU cell at SHAPE (EUCS) and NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) at EU military staff, Deputy Supreme Commander of Europe (DSACEUR) and EU-NATO Capability Group.

Both organizations have a global outlook, and both have aspirations to act in a wide variety of political circumstances. The NATO has not only developed its institutional coordination and cooperation with the EU, but also in the practical field of operations (such as fight against global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and anti-piracy operation etc) it has increasingly evolved its cooperation with the EU. Although both the organizations have developed potentially complementary role and the practice may be quite different; especially given the political difficulties that hamper the

development of any meaningful dialogue on anything much except Bosnia-Herzegovina (due to the fact that the EU mounted a follow on operation to an earlier NATO led one). The overarching political log jam, in the form of the Cyprus problem, is the most visible manifestation of the difficulties faced by the organizations. The ongoing Cyprus problem is often cited as the key impediment to not only the future development of EU-NATO operations but also to the implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangements. The most significant NATO-EU problem is the existence of parallel sets of capability and equipment procurement lists. NATO has its Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) while the EU has the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). The differences are certainly significant if not massive but the competition undoubtedly weakens defence capability, and often governments fearful of domestic level political backlashes against defence spending use the existence of two competing lists as an argument to comply with neither, fearing that compliance with one would bring questions about why compliance with the other was not forthcoming. These basic facts make NATO-EU relations quite difficult. The prospects are inclining, therefore, of finding a straightforward division of labour between NATO and EU, whether geographical or functional. The NATO's military capability and its ISAF mandate have analyzed in the next chapter to address its resource capabilities to rebuild socio-economic-political system of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER IV

NATO'S MANDATE AND RESOURCE CAPABILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

During the Cold War NATO didn't pursue peace keeping and crisis management operations and only concentrated on deterrent role against Soviet Union and its allies. But, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO expanded its role and functions to other areas like peace keeping and crisis management operations. In the post-Cold War, NATO has been engaged in different out of area operations like Kosovo, Darfur and Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the first 'out of area' operation beyond Europe and also the first operation where its allies invoked Article-5 of the North Atlantic Treaty after the terrorist attack on World Trade Center of New York in September 11. NATO's involvement in Afghanistan has been legitimised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 20th December 2001 and launched International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with a peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Due to lack of military resources in UNSC, it authorized NATO to lead ISAF to promote peace and secure environment in Afghanistan in 2003. The purpose of ISAF was to help the Afghanistan Authority maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Later it was mandated to provide security to other parts of Afghanistan. NATO took over the charge of ISAF in 2003. Under its leadership, ISAF not only had to look after the security but also had to take upon the task of stabilizing and rebuilding the country. It had to support the Afghan government in counter-narcotics efforts and to provide alternative economic development programmes, develop a market infrastructure; and suppress the Taliban. It means to carry out these tasks in Afghanistan NATO led ISAF not only needs military resources but also civilian resources to re-build socio-economic-political and educational systems in the state. NATO is a military organization and it doesn't have enough civilian resource capability to carry out this mission and for that reason NATO seek cooperation of other organizations. In this regard NATO seek cooperation from the EU as being a political and economic organization EU holds a civilian capabilities which can fill the gap of civilian capabilities in NATO led ISAF.

Afghanistan has a long history of turbulence, during the period of 1747; Ahmad Shah Durrani integrated the Pashtun tribes and formed the Durrani Empire. And in the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state between the British Indian Empire and the Russian Empire, and after the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919, Afghanistan get backed full independence from Britain. A short incursion keen on democracy ended in a 1973 and then Communist counter-revolution, after this the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to support the frail Afghan Communist regime with destructive war. After ten years the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 under persistent stress from internationally supported anti-Communist mujahedin rebels. Subsequent to series of civil wars, Afghanistan fell into the hands of Taliban in 1996. After the 9/11 terrorist attack the US and its allied military action toppled the Taliban and at the same time the UN mandated the ISAF (International Security Assistant Forces) at the Bonn conference in 2001 for political reconstruction and to support the afghan government in state re-building activities.

The present chapter starts with the development in Afghanistan and then discuss on the international response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on USA. The chapter further explores on the NATO led ISAF's aims and objectives in Afghanistan with specific focus on its evolving mandates. Then it discusses on NATO led ISAF's role and functions relating to the military and civilian aspects. In the military field issues like security and training have addressed and then it discusses on its civilian role and functions like counter narcotic operation and engages in reconstruction and development activities with highlighting on its civilian resource capability to carry out civilian aspects of reconstruction.

Development in Afghanistan

Decades of war, foreign intervention, economic mismanagement and political instability deprived Afghanistan of benefiting from global economic growth as it was one of the most impoverished and underdeveloped country in Asia. Afghanistan had become the hotbed of geopolitics since the 19th Century. It has been faced challenges from various ways such as poverty, drought, drug production and the simultaneously ubiquitous, incoherent international presence in the country, poor governance, inadequate linkages

between central and local authorities, lack of safe drinking water, inadequate sanitation systems and electricity etc. With over 80% of the Afghan population living in rural areas, rural development is seen as a crucial sector for the development and the stability of the country. Agriculture and livestock, in particular, are expected to play an important role in promoting economic growth and the agriculture sector accounts for 35.5% of Afghanistan's GDP and about 80% of the Afghan population are directly or indirectly involved in the agriculture and livestock sectors and lives mainly in rural areas. After years of conflict, agricultural exports, which constituted the backbone of the economy before the war, are now virtually nil although there are significant market opportunities in the region. Similarly, productivity levels of rain-fed and irrigated farming as well as livestock husbandry are low compared to regional averages, indicating there is considerable potential for productivity improvements. According to the United Nations, Afghanistan produces almost 90 percent of the world's illicit opium (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007: 37). The drugs trade threatens Afghanistan's development and security, fostering endemic corruption in the country and financing the insurgency. Afghan drugs are also of direct concern to the international community as the drug-financed insurgency poses security risks for troops deployed in Afghanistan, and the drugs exported end up on the streets of cities across the world, causing serious health and social problems and violent crime. Here the risk of famine is remaining high with keeping 44 years of average life expectancy. Education system is also very bad in Afghanistan, in the year 2006 more than 70% of schools need repairs with having grave shortage of teachers. In the same year enrolment levels for primary education were 20% for girls and 50% for boys and for secondary education the figure was 20% and 5% respectively, even more than five thousands schools have no building etc. After the Taliban's rise to power, the economic and social conditions of women and girls deteriorated throughout the country, in particular in areas under Taliban control. Women and girls continued to be severely restricted in their access to education, health care facilities and employment or in the other words their freedoms, rights, and quality are under control of men. Afghanistan's transport network is in woeful condition as Kabul is Asia's poorest capital.

At the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919, the British influence declined, the Afghans were able to gain control of their own foreign affairs and in the aftermath emerged as a fully independent state. The British also made some political gains, most notably the reaffirmation of the Durand Line which had long been a contentious issue between the two nations as the political boundary separating Afghanistan from the North-West Frontier, and the undertaking that the Afghans made to stop interference on the British side of the line. The British were defeated and Afghanistan gained full control over it. The Durand Line was reaffirmed as the political boundary between the Emirate of Afghanistan and British India and the Afghans agreed not to foment trouble on the British side. In the aftermath, the Afghans were able to resume the right to conduct their own foreign affairs. The UK acknowledged Afghanistan's independence in 1919 and in the same year the Afghans and the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship, which was the first international agreement for Afghanistan since its gaining independence. But later in 1934, the US formally recognized Afghanistan. Afghanistan maintained neutrality in the World War I and World War II. After the end of the World War II and formation of the UN in 1945, Afghanistan decided to be a member of the UN. Afghanistan is not a founding member of the UN but later it joined the UN in 1946. In the ensuing Cold War Afghanistan brilliantly demonstrates the power of a non-aligned country to derive benefits from the major players on both sides of the USA and the USSR as didn't member of any side of the USA or USSR, wanted to stay away from conflict and focused on cooperation and development like India were .

There was an attempt for major constitutional reform in Afghanistan by Zahir Shah as an important leader of Afghanistan and finally the constitution put in place in 1964 which transformed Afghanistan as a constitutional monarchy. It was drafted by a committee of foreign-educated Afghans appointed for the task by M.Z Shah. The primary goals of the Constitution were to promote democracy and develop the socio-economic condition of the state. A Loya Jirgah as ostentatious council of notables had approved its innovations, which included a bill of rights for all Afghans, explicitly including women. After public review the constitution was put into effect in October 1964. The economic and political condition was not good in the early 1970s due to drought, famine and death of more than 100,000 Afghans. 'Mohammed Daoud Khan was the prime minister of

Afghanistan from 1953 to 1963 and also the first president of Afghanistan as an important political leader of Afghanistan returned to power in 1973 with military support in an almost bloodless revolution. A new constitution in 1977 promotes Daoud to the role of president.

The 1977 constitution of Afghanistan attempted to regularize the status of the government that came to power on July 17, 1973 in a coup that overthrew the constitutional monarchy. Mohammed Daoud, a member of the royal family, led the coup and ruled for three and a half years by decree without an interim constitution. On March 20, 1976, Daoud appointed a 20-member Constitutional Consultative Committee consisting of five cabinet members, two generals, legal specialists and academics to develop a draft constitution based on proposals advanced by the Ministries of Justice and Interior. This committee, working in secret, finished the draft constitution in approximately nine months, and a draft was published in late January 1977. While the committee was preparing the draft constitution, Daoud announced that a Loya Jirgah would be convened in early 1977 to debate and ratify the new constitution. Afghan monarchs occasionally called Loya Jirgahs, or Grand National Assemblies, to decide matters of national importance. The Daoud government was overthrown in a coup on April 27, 1978; the new regime abrogated the 1977 constitution two weeks later.

Since 1978, the Soviet presence has been gradually increased in Afghanistan and after a year, a resistance group called 'Mujahidin' (Islamic Unity of Afghan Warriors) of Afghanistan declares a 'jihad' against the godless regime in Kabul. In 1986, the Mujaheddin as called Afghan freedom fighters were well armed with US-supplied surface-to-air missiles, rockets, mortars, and communication equipment, won many confrontations with the Soviet army. As successful ambushes of Soviet convoys became a daily phenomenon, the number of Soviet casualties mounted, the number of disabled soldiers seen in Soviet cities grew substantially. In the same month more than 100 Soviet citizens living in Herat are seized and killed. In the same year Moscow decided to take a more active role and its troops moved into Kabul. The warfare between Russia and the Mujaheddin not only devastates but also depopulates like people/refugees run away into Pakistan and Iran. The UN Security Council met to consider a response to the Soviet

intervention in 1980, but due to the negative vote of the USSR that draft resolution was not passed. Again the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution ES-6/2 on ‘Situation in Afghanistan’ and called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and also asked to its member states to contribute humanitarian assistance (United Nations 2011: 02). By late 1986, the Afghanistan war had significantly impacted on Soviet domestic politics. Anti-militarism became strong in the non-Russian Soviet republics. For non-Russians, the war became a unifying symbol of their opposition to Moscow’s rule. The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan signaled Soviet military weakness and demonstrated that the army was vulnerable. By 1988, the war had changed the perceptions of Soviet leaders regarding the efficacy of using military force to hold the disintegrating country together. Subsequently Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 under persistent stress from internationally supported anti-Communist mujahedin rebels.

By mid-1995, the Taliban had grown to more than 25,000 fighters and controlled most of southern and western Afghanistan. Subsequent to series of civil wars, Afghanistan fell into the hands of Taliban in 1996. The Taliban captured Jalalabad and Kabul in late 1996. The Taliban Government comprised twenty ministries, which worked to implement Sharia Law in all spirit and soul. The women fully denied to enjoy their right, liberty and equality and even men were made subject to strict dress code as western clothing. The Islamist orientation was the inspirational and guiding force in Taliban’s governance. A unique feature of Taliban governance was that there was no line of demarcation between Military commanders and Ministers, as the same person had to go for fight in the battlefield and head an administrative department. The US initial stance towards the victories of Taliban was based on an optimism that finally a force would be in the position to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan, and initially the US asserted that nothing objectionable about their version of Islam. The traditional teaching in Islamic educational system (Madrassas) is always based upon Islamic Law. Madrassas became Religious schools and popular with Afghan refugee populations which funded largely by ultraconservative groups in Saudi Arabia and conservative Pashtun religious leaders in Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of Soviet Forces in 1989, a few of the Mujahedeen leaders, once the symbol of most sacred tenet of Islam “the Jihad” were found involved into some heinous and unsocial activities. The massive funding

from the US, Saudi Arabia and parallel support from government institutions of Pakistan to knock down Soviet Union in Afghanistan instrumented in spreading radical Madrassas in Pakistan. The curriculum was drastically altered by USAID and new version of textbooks based on violent Islam were issued to the elementary school children in both the camps and Pashto border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Osama Bin Laden had been the prime suspect of attacks of the US embassies at Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. The US attacked on August 20, 1998 at Khost, Ghazni and Jalabad to destroy the camps. The US officials also started pressurizing Pakistani and Saudi governments to influence Taliban for handing over of Osama bin Laden. UNOCAL also backed out from the pipeline project; President Clinton visited South Asia in March 2000, where he expressed US concern over the plight of Afghan people and human rights violations. Until then Osama Bin Laden had fully become the main irritant for US officials. Finally, in 9/11 when America was attacked by invisible enemy from the Air, but soon the invisibility was dashed, and the US Intelligence Agencies identified the attackers and their connection with Osama Bin Laden's al Qaeda organization.

International Response to 9/11 Attack

The U.S had realized and confirmed that Taliban regime is directly and indirectly linked with Osama-Bin-Laden's terrorist network which is called Al-Quada. At the same time it was also clear that Al-Quada and other like-minded terrorist organizations are provided financing, training, and personnel to the Taliban and other entities who attempt to destabilize the constitutional government in Kabul. Establishing and maintaining long-term security in Afghanistan therefore depends on dismantling the Islamic terrorist networks and their influence in Afghanistan and the region and denying them the means to support anti-government elements. After the 9/11 terrorist attack the U.S decided for military intervention in Afghanistan because, that attack was considered as an attack over all the member states of NATO and the Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty 1949 also says that "*the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of*

individual or collective self defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the party or parties, so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action, as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”(NATO 1949: 05).

After the five weeks of U.S.-led counter terrorism operation in Afghanistan, the UNSC endorsed an urgent meeting of Afghan political leaders to form an interim, post-Taliban governing regime for socio-political-economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. The meeting was held at Bonn (Germany) in early December 2001, brought together Afghan leaders, U.N. officials and other members of the international community to discuss to establish the stable democratic and representative political system and also the Bonn conference sought international help to establish and train new national security forces. The Bonn conference gave birth of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) which was made up of 30 afghan members, headed by a chairman. It was inaugurated on the same month with a six-month mandate to be followed by a two-year Transitional Authority (TA), after which elections are to be held. On the basis of the Bonn Agreement, the UNSC Resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001 authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding areas. After the fall of the Taliban, Hamid Karzai's political status began to rise. During the 2002 Loya Jirga (a traditional Pashtun political meeting held to select a leader) a new constitution was approved creating a presidential government and Karzai was selected to serve as interim president during the two-year transition.

In the context of UN response to r the 9/11 terrorist attack, the UN Security Council (UNSC) responded in an unusual manner, by declaring a situation under Art-51 (S/RES/1368) as well as Art-39 (S/RES/1373) as a threat to international peace and security, and invoking Chapter VII measures of the UN Charter. This was the first time that the UNSC recognized a terrorist attack constituting matter of self-defense. And at the same time the US reacted according to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The US administration took immediate and unquestioned action against the counter terrorist

operation in Afghanistan. At ‘the Bonn Conference’ in November 2001, the UN mended ISAF (International Security Assistant Forces) to support the Afghanistan government. United Nations’ response could be discussed in the context of resolutions. There are two general resolutions i.e. resolutions 1378 (2001) and 1383 (2001), and there are Eighteen UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions (UNSCRs) related to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1817, 1833, 1890, 1917, 1943, 2011, 2069, 2096, 2120, and 2145.

The UNSC Resolution 1386 provided the authority to ISAF with following Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all necessary measures and implement its mandate. The UNSC Resolution 1386 authorized ISAF to assist the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) in maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the AIA and the UN personals could operate in a safe and secure environment. At the same time the US led operation called ‘operation enduring freedom’ had already conducted in the same place which focused on basically against Al-Qaeda and Taliban, so the ISAF operated separately from that operation to prevent overlap. But, the UN realized the need of more military power which it doesn’t hold, for that reason UN decided to transfer this task to the NATO as a collective military organization. Due to growing number of crisis management and peace keeping operations in the world affairs, the UN didn’t able to handle all those problems because of lack of military resources capabilities, and for that reason the UNSC authorized NATO to lead the ISAF in Afghanistan in 2003 in accordance of UNSC Resolution S/RES/1510(2003). NATO led ISAF, as part of the overall International Community effort and as mandated by the United Nations Security Council, had worked and created the conditions whereby the Government of Afghanistan was able to exercised its authority throughout the country (NATO 2010b: 39). To carry out its mission, ISAF conducts population-centric counter-insurgency operations in partnership with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and provides support to the Government and International Community in Security Sector Reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

In the context of commands of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, under HQ of the NATO led ISAF, it has five Regional Commands (RCs) such as RC South, RC North, RC East, RC West and RC Central, which incorporate with 26 PRTs and several Forward Support Bases (FSB), and those RCs have been commanding to all ISAF units in their area of responsibility and coordinate all regional civil-military activities conducted by the military elements of the PRT. Each RC is assumed by a lead nation and is composed of a Command and Control (C2) HQ and a Forward Support Base (FSB) which provides a supply, medical and transport hub in each region (NATO 2009f). The RC West comprises four provinces: Herat, Farah, Badghis and Ghor. The population of RC West is 3,156,000 people. RC West borders Iran and is slightly larger than the state of Georgia, with an area of 160,319 square kilometers (61899 sq. miles). The four PRTs in the RC West are located in Herat City, Herat (led by Italy); Chaghcharan, Ghor (led by Lithuania); Farah City, Farah (led by the United States); and Qala-e Naw, Badghis (led by Spain). The RC West is headquartered in Herat City under the command of Italian Brigadier General Paolo Serra. There are roughly 3,000 ISAF troops in the RC West, most of which are Italian (NATO 2009f: 02). In this RC East, under the leadership of US and through a two star Headquarters, Combined Joint Task Force-101 (CJTF-101), built around the 101st Airborne Division and ISAF Headquarters for this command is located at Bagram Air Base, North of Kabul. The US contributes most of the troops in the region, while some small contingents from seven other nations, including France, Poland and Turkey, are also deployed. Each province in RC East has its own PRT with the exception of Parwan and Kapisa, which share one. The United States leads all PRTs in RC East, except for Logar (Czech Republic), Bamyan (New Zealand) and Wardak (Turkey). This RC-East includes the provinces of Bamyan, Bagram, Ghazni, Kapisa, Laghman, Khost, Kunar, Logar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Nangarhar, Panjshayr, and Wardak. This US leding command covers 43,000 square miles and shares 450 miles of border with Pakistan. Currently, more than 26,000 Coalition Forces and 73,000 ANSF are operating in the command's area of responsibility (Department of Defence 2012: 21; Institute for the Study of War 2007: 01). The RC West comprises four provinces: Herat, Farah, Badghis and Ghor. The population of RC West is 3,156,000 people. RC West borders Iran and is slightly larger than the state of Georgia, with an area of 160,319 square kilometers

(61899 sq. miles). The four PRTs in the RC West are located in Herat City, Herat (led by Italy); Chaghcharan, Ghor (led by Lithuania); Farah City, Farah (led by the United States); and Qala-e Naw, Badghis (led by Spain). The RC West is headquartered in Herat City under the command of Italian Brigadier General Paolo Serra. There are roughly 3,000 ISAF troops in the RC West, most of which are Italian (NATO 2009f: 02).

Expanding Roles Functions and issue of Resource Capability

Here the study has addressed on both the military and civilian role of the NATO led ISAF like the expanding mandate of NATO led ISAF for providing security of Kabul to rest of the country and also it looks upon the task of provincial reconstruction, counter narcotic operation and police trainings, and also highlights on the military and civilian resource capabilities to carryout above addressing tasks.

Military Role:

In the context of military role, NATO led ISAF in Afghanistan had been assigned the role to provide security with its military resource capabilities³ in different fields such as conducting election, reconstructing Afghanistan forces and providing intelligence services and logistic support during Afghan military and police operation in the state.

Security:

The NATO led ISAF has been assisted the Afghan authorities and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in providing security and stability. On the request of the Government of Afghanistan the United Nations authorized NATO to led ISAF operation by Resolution 1386?. Since then the NATO became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the ISAF. The ISAF consists of all 28 NATO member states plus 11 partner countries (Henry L. Stimson Center 2002: 02). NATO led ISAF operates under peace enforcement mandate pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Headquarter of ISAF is located in Kabul and serves as NATO's theatre level command for the operation and the ISAF's Headquarters was headed by U.S. Army General and

³ Military resource capability is the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. Force Structure constitutes its numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings. Modernization implies about technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments.

works under the authorization of NAC of NATO which provides political direction in Afghanistan operation, at the same time SHAPE (NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe) and SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) provides strategic command and control. During the operation NATO's Joint Force Command Headquarters reports to SHAPE and presents on the whole operational control. In this regard ISAF also provides all the statements to SHAPE through its Joint Forces Command (Bowman and Dale 2010: 16). Initially the ISAF was commanded by the UK Major General John McColl as the UNSC resolution S/RES/1413(2002) recognized and welcomed the United Kingdom's offer to organize and lead ISAF and called on U.N. member states to provide personnel, equipment and resources for the operation, and after Major General Hilmi Akin Zorlu of Turkey was commanding till Feb 2003 and then it was commanded by Germany from Feb to Aug 2003 by the Lieutenant General Van Heyst.

During the providing security, ISAF have gone through the five phases in Afghanistan , the first phase was "assessment and preparation", including initial operations only in Kabul, the second phase was ISAF's geographic expansion throughout Afghanistan completed in 2006, and the final three phases would involve stabilization; transition; and redeployment. At the start of 2009, ISAF was operating in Phase III, "stabilization", and NATO officials were reportedly discussing when to announce commencement of Phase IV, the "transition" of lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Some ISAF officials have expressed the concern that an announcement that ISAF has entered "transition" could trigger a rush by some troop contributing countries to Phase V-"redemption." They caution that in practice, the shift from stabilization to transition is likely to vary geographically across Afghanistan as the abilities of various ANSF to execute and then lead missions increase, and to take place in fits and starts, rather than at a clear single point in time. NATO led ISAF's operation in Afghanistan has revealed serious gaps between political rhetoric and actual commitment. Member countries have not always matched political commitments with necessary resources. Although NATO Allies unanimously agreed on a greater role for the Alliance, the allocation of troops and equipment dragged considerably. Lack of consensus on how best to adapt funding for joint operation, is also limited NATO's effectiveness in

Afghanistan. NATO's funding arrangements no longer make sense in an era in which NATO has more than 49,000 troops deployed on three continents. It is not only inefficient and unfair; it is a disincentive for nations to participate in the NRF and other on-call forces. Decision making problems is also regarded as a big problem for providing security in Afghanistan, for example Germany says that police as a civilian law and order force whereas US regarded it could play counter insurgency role. Training efforts of Afghan police under German and American leadership are not only partially overlapped but also contradict one another on account of their different approaches to policing. Some member states like France, Britain and Belgium are against of NATO's operation in Afghanistan because of it's 'out of area (Gross 2009: 28).

The ISAF has been provided military trainings to Afghanistan National Military Forces and police trainings to Afghanistan Police Forces which requires long term economic resources in Afghanistan and military resources are required for the counter terrorist activities, operation in end production of narcotic drugs, conducting elections and other political developmental works in Afghanistan. However, counterterrorism experts relying on the experience of other places and countries suggested "that in a country of 30 million, like Afghanistan, as many as 600,000 soldiers and police officers would be required". Civilian resources are necessary for the stability of the future Afghanistan and its security, and in this regard approximately \$3.5 billion cost require per year to increase ANSF force structure, and then \$2.2 billion per year to sustain it (Scheffer 2008: 08; Neumann and Hanlon 2012: 19).

On 23 July 2004, the North Atlantic Council approved detailed military advice on ISAF to support for the presidential election. The plan was configured to provide additional forces at two levels in theatre. A first level was located at the NATO-led PRTs to reflect the local security situation. A second level in theatre consisted of one battalion provided by Spain and one battalion provided by Italy, with supporting elements. The Spanish battalion provided the ISAF Quick Reaction Force as well as the Italian battalion provided the in-theatre Operational Reserve Force. These additional forces deployed to Afghanistan in September 2004 and remained for about 8 weeks, covering the election period. At the same time on 31 August 2005, the NATO-led International Security

Assistance Forces have completed the deployment of additional forces in support of the National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan. They will also stand prepared to assist the Government forces in responding to unforeseen situations in order to enable an environment conducive to the successful conduct of National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections. (NATO 2005b: 01; NATO 2009b: 22). Brigadier General Jörg Vollmer, Commander Regional Command North of ISAF, pointed out the enormous importance of the democratic development for Afghanistan and successful elections mark an important step in this direction and also emphasized the leading role of the Afghan Security Forces in these elections. He said that *“We, ISAF here in the North, will do whatever is needed to support our Afghan friends in preparing and conducting this event of particular importance to Afghanistan”*(ISAF Public Affairs Office 2009: 01). The NATO led ISAF through its PRTs, is helping the Afghan authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. The teams’ principal mission in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures, and promoting an environment within which governance can improve. At the local level, PRTs support capacity-building activities and programmes by providing mentors and training, and by facilitating effective linkages between the development community and the Afghan authorities.

The table no (04:3) shows that country like UK, Canada, Netherlands and US have their more active forces in Afghanistan than compare to other member states of NATO. The table shows that among the all the member states of NATO, UK has big percentage of active forces in Afghanistan. Britain, Canada and Netherlands were the first to pledge forces for Stage Three. Canada was one of the first allies to recognize the need for combat forces. By a close vote in the Canadian parliament in May 2006, the government designated 2,300 troops for Afghanistan until February 2009, most of which have been sent to Kandahar province. Britain initially promised to send 3,600 troops to Helmand province by the beginning of Stage Three operations in July 2006, and has steadily increased its contribution to its current 8,300 troops. In early 2008, Germany agreed to send 200 troops to replace a Norwegian contingent in the north. In February 2008, the U.S. deployed the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to southern Afghanistan. The debate in the Dutch parliament over assigning troops to ISAF was also

contentious. The Dutch population initially opposed sending forces into a combat operation. Ultimately, the Netherlands designated 1,700 troops for duty in ISAF's Stage Three and Stage Four operations. Despite these pledges, the upturn in violence in 2007 and 2008 led U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan to conclude that they needed about three more brigades (20,000 troops) to be able to stabilize the still restive southern sector.

For the intelligence service in Afghanistan, NATO has created its NATO's Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) which provides timely, appropriate information to improve NATO's situational alertness and operational efficiency and also facilitates the giving out and synthesis of intelligence, filling intelligence gaps which indispensable during the planning and implementation of operations. It provides intelligence support to Combined Joint Task Force headquarters, and also shared with NATO's partners during the operation. The NIFC is a technologically skilled military institution which consists of over 200 multi-national civil and military intelligence professionals from the NATO member states and it is chartered and directed by NATO's Military Committee (NMC) (NATO 2013f: 03). The NIFC experts work in partnership with different partners such as military experts of EU and all NATO PfP (Partner for Peace) countries to make intelligence assessments to develop NATO's situational responsiveness and works in 24/7 hours basis. It supports to ISAF and Government of Afghanistan on daily basis and maintains liaison officers with in ISAF to optimize its contribution (NATO 2013f: 02). Another institution is 'Joint Planning Operation Centre' (JPOC), which has been delivered a joint and shared working environment to enable and enhance the joint intelligence and information exchange services for operational effectiveness of ISAF in Afghanistan and Pakistan borders. The JPOC is financed by the U.S and fitted out by joint NATO and U.S sponsored equipments. But, it is permanently manned by the planners of Afghanistan National Security Forces, and assists/works with ISAF for getting effective intelligence service in Afghanistan operation (Arnli 2010: 41). The JPOC under the leading role of Military Intelligence Sharing Working Group (MISWG) supports the UN and NGOs in different developmental activities in Afghanistan and located within the limited area of ISAF's Headquarters in Kabul. This is one of the joint collaborative efforts of Afghanistan-Pakistan which works on four areas such as

Intelligence, Operations, technical exchange and Information Operations in the Afghanistan and Pakistan border areas. But, here ISAF technical and intelligence experts also have worked with Afghanistan and Pakistani counterparts to develop intelligence capability in border areas which help 24/7 hours to both the Afghanistan and Pakistani security forces as well as ISAF (NATO 2007a: 01).

In regard to the challenges of the intelligence services, the crowd of diverse information systems and acquaintance security markings create insecurity among intelligence personals tasked with sharing and partnering. Problem of circular reporting is something that dilemmas intelligence personals in their expedition for validation of developing intelligence products. And also the inadequate mechanisms for precluding such inputs from the intelligence cycle so confuse production which limits the appetite for intelligence sharing. Other challenges are like ethical questions related to intelligence sharing do not figure prominently among analysts' expressed concerns, lack of education and training opportunities for ISAF personnel, Trust and confidence between the partners and Internal Afghan cooperation and integration etc, also have seen in regard to intelligence service between ISAF and Afghanistan forces (Arnli 2010: 54).

Logistics⁴ is a collective responsibility of all the 41 Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), Regional Commands (RCs), and the divisions of HQ ISAF which requires information flow, good cooperation and coordination, and de-confliction among them (Bowman and Dale 2010: 61). Afghanistan is basically a landlocked country and due to poor infrastructures of the state. When equipments and logistics supports came from the outside of the country, the supplies shipped by air and ISAF depends heavily on strategic and tactical airlift. NATO led ISAF's Logistic support in Afghanistan crisis refers to its efforts to deliver vital fuel, hardware, food, clothes, small arms and equipments, helicopters, mortars, ammunition, field telephones and generators etc, are generally delivered through using a combination of air transport and a series of overland supply routes. NATO led ISAF has its own multinational logistics division called 'CJ4' which

⁴ Logistic means the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces, where the military operations deal with design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel, transport of personnel, acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities, acquisition or furnishing of services, and medical and health service support.

works basically in three fields such as Logistics Plans (Log Plans), Joint Theater Movements Staff (JTMS) and Logistics Operations (Log Ops). (Shelia 2010: 01; GOTCA 2012: 119). Some member states of NATO have contributed their equipments and logistic support in Afghanistan, as follow show in table 04.5.

Table 04.5: Equipments and Logistical Support, 2006:

S.N	States	Equipment Donation	Member states of NATO
1	Bulgaria	Mortars and Ammunition	Yes
2	Canada	Small Arms, Ammunition and Equipment, Airlift	Yes
3	Czech Republic	Helicopters	Yes
4	Estonia	Small Arms and Ammunition	Yes
5	Finland	Field Telephones and Generators	No
6	France	Airlift	Yes
6	Germany	Airlift, Blankets, Clothing and Equipment	Yes
7	Hungary	Small Arms and Ammunition	Yes
8	Lithuania	Ammunition	Yes
9	Luxemburg	Body Armour and Helmets	Yes
10	Montenegro	Small Arms and Ammunition	No
11	Norway	Sealift	Yes
12	Slovenia	Small Arms, Mortars and Ammunition	Yes
13	Spain	Airlift	Yes
14	Slovakia	Airlift	Yes
12	Switzerland	Fire Trucks, Spares and Training	No
13	Turkey	Howitzers and Ammunition, Clothing, Airlift	Yes

Sources: NATO 2006d: 06-07

For instance, during the election of 2005 in Afghanistan, Troop's deployment and logistical support of the ISAF was based on the rotation basis where various NATO members have provided different logistical support and military troops for the successful conduction of the Afghanistan election. France had provided 2 refueling aircraft to the force, based out of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, and ensuring effective liaison with air operations staff in Kabul. France has deployed 6 mirage fighter jets, to be based in Dushanbe, Tajikistan which operated throughout Afghanistan in support of Election security (NATO 2005b:02). Italy also deployed 3 Chinook CH-47 support helicopters based in Herat in support of operations in the Western Region. Belgium has agreed to extend the tour of its Hercules C-130, based in Kabul, to help cover the requirements of the election period. The Netherlands has deployed the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, sending its 3 infantry companies, engineers and support troops to Mazar-e-Sharif, in support of the Northern Region Area Command. It also committed 1 Chinook CH-47 support helicopter for med-evac purposes based out of Mazar-e-Sharif and have agreed to dedicate sorties of its C-130 Hercules based in Kabul for election support. Romania's 26th Infantry Battalion, "the Red Scorpions" had deployed with 3 companies, engineer and support troops. The Battalion was based in Kabul, forming the Election Response Force, which can be deployed quickly to where they are needed throughout ISAF's Area of Operations. Spain's Airmobile "San Quintin" Battalion was committing its 3 infantry companies to Herat, in support of the Western Region Area Command, where Spanish soldiers already form part of the PRT in that Province. Another member state of NATO, the U.S was committed a company of infantry to augment the ESF reserve forces in Kabul (NATO 2009b: 22). German led the airlift group in Afghanistan assisted by other countries namely Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Hungary, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey. To strengthen airlift capability at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, defence ministers of above all these countries signed MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) for king-size cargo. And in the case of Sealift, Norway leads the Multinational Sealift Steering Committee (MSSC), which includes Canada, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. All the Defence Ministers of MSSC member states were signed sealift agreement in December

2003 to provide necessary assistants to ISAF like the residual capacity of four British ships two ships, on full-time charter from Denmark and one ship available on an ad hoc basis from Norway etc (NATO 2006d: 06).

Military personal resource capability could be attributable to NATO's own budget rules. When a member state agrees to deploy troops to a NATO operation, that nation must pay the costs associated with that deployment. With establishment of ISAF, the U.N. authorized the creation of a trust fund to support ISAF and the countries participating in the operation. While the countries participating in ISAF were expected to bear the burden of their participation, all U.N. Member States were encouraged to contribute to the trust fund (Henry L. Stimson Center 2002: 02). NATO led ISAF's expansion across Afghanistan was undertaken on the basis of a consensus decision within NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 2004, individual member nations ultimately determine the nature and quantity of resources contributed to the mission. The Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) gets financial support from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), NATO and U.S fund for projects, equipment, training, transportation and salary payments. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) are managing to use these funds. For example in between 2008 to 2012, \$31 billion have transferred to the ASFF by the U.S. Another NATO run trust fund is ANATF (Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund) for support to ANA. Since 2007 to April 2012, nearly \$620 million have contributed in this fund. In this field, the UN also assists through its UNDP-managed Law and order Trust Fund (LOTFA) and in between 2008 to 2010, it has funded nearly \$870 million to the Afghan Ministry of Finance which provides salaries and payment to its defence personals in operations (Solmirano and Hallgren 2013: 08). Thus, there is a built in disincentive for nations to agree to commit any troops to a mission or to increase the number of troops already deployed. This problem complicates attempts by leaders of fragile governments or coalition governments to convince their legislatures and publics to support a deployment and the costs associated with that commitment (ISAF 2011b).

In 2008, the Canadian government threatened to withdraw its forces by the end of 2009 if a commitment of at least 1,000 new combat troops was not made by the allies. Former President Bush, at the time, pledged to increase U.S. forces in Afghanistan by 5,000 additional troops by the end of 2008 (NATO 2008b: 04). France agreed to send 720 combat troops. Germany agreed to deploy an additional 1,000 troops to the northern sector pending approval by the German Parliament in October when the current German mandate was to have expired. Poland, the Czech Republic, and several other allies pledged smaller contingents, allaying Canadian concerns to some degree. The Obama administration in 2009 quickly committed an additional 17,000 U.S. troops which have already begun to deploy. Initially, the ISAF had only a very limited strength of 5,500 troops. The small initial size contrasted with the 60,000 troops of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and the 50,000 troops of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployed in Kosovo. But, gradually the size of the ISAF reached about 55,100 troops as of January 2009, with reinforcements continuing to arrive. On 23 May, the UN Security Council extended ISAF's mandate for an additional six months with the adoption of Resolution 1413 and welcomed Turkey taking the role of lead nation from Great Britain (Henry L. Stimson Center 2002: 02) . Gradually number of troops had been increased under Turkish General 'Zorlu' from 700 to 1,400 in ISAF, and during this time the Bush Administration also supported to Turkish leadership and encouraged to expand its troops with funded \$228 million to the emergency funding for the successful operation of ISAF. The largest contributor of troops is the U.S with 23,220 troops, which account for over 40% of the total number, and the ratio of U.S. servicemen continues to increase. Following the United States are Britain (with 8,910 troops), Germany (3,405), France (2,890), Italy (2,350), the Netherlands (1,770) and Poland (1,590) (ISAF 2009: 02). If we see the following given table then there is the clear picture on the contribution of troops of both the NATO member states and non-member states to ISAF in Afghanistan.

Table-04.1: Force strength of ISAF in Afghanistan, 2009.

S.N	Name of country	No of troops	Member states/non-member states
1	Albania	140	Member states
02	Australia	1090	Non-Member states
03	Austria	02	Non-Member states
04	Azerbaijan	90	Non-Member states
05	Belgium	450	Member state
06	Bosnia and Herzegovina	02	Non-Member state
07	Bulgaria	820	Member state
08	Canada	2830	Member state
09	Croatia	280	Member state
10	Czech republic	580	Member state
11	Denmark	700	Member state
12	Estonia	140	Member state
13	Finland	110	Non-Member state
14	France	2780	Member state
15	Georgia	01	Non-Member state
16	Germany	3465	Member state
17	Greece	140	Member state
18	Hungary	370	Non-Member state
19	Iceland	8	Member state
20	Ireland	7	Member state
21	Italy	2350	Member state
22	Jordan	7	Non-Member state
23	Latvia	160	Member state
24	Lithuania	200	Member state
25	Luxemburg	9	Member state
26	Netherlands	1770	Member state

27	New Zealand	150	Non-Member state
28	Norway	490	Member state
29	Poland	1590	Member state
30	Portugal	30	Non-Member state
31	Romania	860	Member state
32	Singapore	20	Member state
33	Slovakia	230	Member state
34	Slovenia	70	Member state
35	Spain	780	Member state
36	Sweden	290	Non-Member state
37	Macedonia	170	Non-Member state
38	Turkey	660	Non-Member state
39	Ukraine	10	Non-Member state
40	United Arab Emirates	25	Non-Member state
41	United Kingdom	8300	Member state
42	United States	26215	Member state
	Total	58,3 90	

Sources: (ISAF 2009: 02), ISAF MIRROR JUNE 2009, URL: www.nato.int/isaf

Table 04.2: Growth of ISAF's number of troops from 2009 to 2011.

Country	Number of troops in 2009	Number of troops in 2011
USA	32,500	90,000
UK	8,330	9,500
Germany	3,310	4,998
France	2,720	3,935
Canada	2,500	520
Italy	2,350	3918
Netherlands	1,770	183
Poland	1,130	2,580
Turkey	800	1840
Spain	780	1,523
Denmark	750	750
Romania	725	1,948
Bulgaria	460	602
Norway	455	428
Belgium	420	521
Czech Republic	415	622
Hungary	240	433

Sources: NATO 2011e: 02

The table no (04.2) provides the information and data about the increasing number of troops from the year 2009 to 2011 and in this regard the US is in the top most position and Germany in the second position and Canada in the third position. They have shown their gradual development of troops in ISAF and also proved their military capability in the ISAF's peace building operation in Afghanistan. The table no 04.4 is addressing on ISAF and its troops contributing nations of 2011, then we may see that the US has more military contribution nearly 90,000 (largest contributor to ISAF) than other member

states and UK has contributed 9,500 as the second largest contributor of troops to ISAF in Afghanistan.

Table 04.4: ISAF Troops Contributing Nations in 2011.

S.N	NATO Countries	No of troops in Afghanistan	Non-NATO Partner Nations	No of troops in Afghanistan
1	Albania	286	Armenia	216
2	Belgium	521	Australia	1,550
3	Bulgaria	602	Austria	3
4	Canada	520	Azerbaijan	94
5	Croatia	317	Bosnia and Hezgovina	55
6	Czech Republic	622	El Salvador	24
7	Denmark	750	Finland	156
8	Estonia	159	Georgia	937
9	France	3,935	Ireland	07
10	Germany	4,998	Korea	350
11	Greece	158	Macedonia	136
12	Hungary	433	Malaysia	46
13	Iceland	4	Mangolia	114
14	Italy	3918	Montenegro	36
15	Latvia	173	New Zealand	188
16	Lithuania	235	Singapore	38
17	Luxemburg	10	Sweden	500
18	Netherlands	183	Tonga	55
19	Norway	428	Ukraine	23
20	Poland	2,580	United Arab Emirates	35
21	Portugal	140	Total ISAFs (Both	130,670

			member and non-member states of NATO)	
22	Romania	1,948	Total ISAFs (28 Member states only)	125,429
23	Slovakia	309	Total ISAFs (20 Non-Member states only)	5,241
24	Slovenia	78		
25	Spain	1,523		
26	Turkey	1840		
27	United Kingdom	9.500		
28	United States	90,000		

Sources: NATO 2011e: 02

The above table shows that among the troop contributing nations to Afghanistan the U.S is the first and the UK is the second largest troop's contributor to ISAF and mainly deployed in Helmand province of Afghanistan, and also deployed in Kabul in support of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and Headquarters of ISAF. At the bringing of 2010, the UK provided approximately 10,000 numbers of British forces to ISAF in Afghanistan, and its Royal Air Force, Royal Navy and Army were all involved in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban. Apart from the U.K, Germany is regarded as the second-largest European contributor to ISAF which based in the northern provinces of Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, and Badakhshan of Afghanistan. German Armed Forces haven't permission from its Bundestag (German Parliament) for combat operations against the Taliban, excluding in exceptional circumstances. In this case German forces have also other restrictions like troops not allowed to operate more than two hour's distance from a medical facility and pilots not being allowed to fly at night. Land and naval forces of French supported Operation Enduring Freedom since

2001, and conducted operations against the Taliban with the cooperation of the US. French forces took control of the Kabul regional command in August 2008. French forces have also reinforced and working with Canadian forces at Kandahar province of Afghanistan. Italian troops have lead Regional Command West of ISAF and based in Herat province in western Afghanistan and contributed 3918 number of troops to ISAF as provided in the above table. Like German forces, Italian forces don't have permission to engage in combat with the Taliban insurgency other than in exceptional circumstances as order was given by the Italian Parliament. Therefore the UK, Germany, France and Italy are the most important military contributing nations to the ISAF of NATO (NATO 2011e: 02).

In the year 2011 total number of ISAFs are 130,670, and from this military forces NATO member states are contributed 125,429 number of troops and another 5,241 number of troops are from non- NATO member states. For the maintaining regional peace and stability some non-member states have contributed military troops such as Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Ireland Korea, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mongolia, United Arab Emirates, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Tonga, Ukraine and Montenegro. Fifteen non-NATO nations have sent troops to join the ISAF, and in particular Australia, which deploys 1,090 troops in the south and east where the security situation is fast deteriorating, contributes more than the average of NATO member states (Tomonori 2009: 97).

Due to lack of availability of all the financial information in publicly, it is very difficult to provide the accurate total costs of ISAF operations in Afghanistan. But, still there are some data regarding the financial expenditure in military operation in Afghanistan which needs to address in this regard. Table 04.6 shows the military expenditure in Afghanistan like the U.S has increased almost double the budget from 2009 to 2010 and also almost two times more budget (52,000 to 100,000 \$millions). Like U.S, Germany also had a substantial raise between 2009 and 2010, and the budget was from 843 to 1,339 \$millions but, shockingly other nations like the U.K. and Canada have their financial donation throughout the same period. If we see among the all member

states of NATO then evidently the main or largest contributor was U.S, who funded almost 90% in Afghanistan security purpose (Solmirano and Hallgren 2013: 07).

Table 04.6: Cost of ISAF in million \$ (Military Expenditure in Afghanistan):

Country	2011	2010	2009
Australia	1,261	1,033	962
Canada	811	1,269	1,304
France	721	639	538
Germany	1,426	1,339	843
United Kingdom	5,542	5,838	5,952
United States	113,000	100,000	52,000
Others	5,319	5,341	4,621
ISAF common costs	621	460	416
Total	128,701	115,919	66,636

Sources: Solmirano, C. and J Hallgren 2013: 07

In the context of challenges of military field some of the small member states of the NATO were not provided sufficient troops for the operation and also member states like Canada, France German and Britain etc were not increased much of their contribution in terms of military expenditure where the US has increased much than other member states of the NATO. Logistic challenges have emerged during the operation time like lack of effective video teleconferences, continuous joint operational planning groups and staff-assistance visits throughout the regions and headquarters which need to strengthen further for the effective Information sharing as indispensable for the proper logistic support for this Afghanistan operation. There are some member states of the NATO, who were not provided enough logistic support due to lack of national resources. Lack of sufficient engineering in the ISAF, lack of local contractors in Afghanistan and limited qualified personal in logistic support during operation were regarded as the

challenges of ISAF in Afghanistan. Another problem was that the U.S. forces in ISAF were generally relied on lines of communication (LOC), and it was running across Afghanistan's downward to the port city of Karachi and hilly eastern border into Pakistan. At the time of increased forces, ISAF demanded to increase LOCs which considered as a big challenge in terms of capacity and security.

Military resources difficulties in raising troops is one of the great challenge which faced by NATO. Since the beginning of the ISAF mission, NATO officials have consistently experienced difficulty persuading member governments to supply adequate numbers of forces. U.S. Defense Secretary Gates had been critical of the allies at times for not providing more troops, although he has softened his tone (House of Representatives and Committee on Armed Services 2009: 59). Due to domestic political problems in some of the NATO member states, they were preventing some allies from increasing their force levels in Afghanistan. Allied government officials stated privately that their populations were reluctant to follow the Bush Administration, largely due to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent criticism of the United States in Europe and the Middle East. The German Marshall Fund poll noted earlier found that while 64% of those polled supported the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, only 30% supported combat operations against the Taliban (Morelli 2009: 14). The reluctance of the NATO allies to commit additional troops to the ISAF mission has been driven in part by the opposition of many of Europe's citizens (NATO 2009a: 02). Little progress in Afghanistan and in part by budget realities now magnified by the global economic crisis which currently has a negative impact on several member nations' national budgets. Because, NATO and the EU member states were directly or indirectly involved in global trade, where their national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), labour market and inflation influenced through up/down of the global trade. Deploying troops to the volatile provinces of southern and eastern Afghanistan is necessary for ISAF success but requires acceptance of a certain amount of risk. The United States, Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands have borne the burden of this deployment thus far but need more extensive support from allies such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain. These nations all have significant numbers of troops in Afghanistan but have refused to station them in areas of intense fighting. France has

recently conceded that it will allow its troops to be sent anywhere in Afghanistan if requested, but the others have agreed to do so only in ill-defined 'emergency' situations (Dombey 2006: 01).

Although the ISAF had provided security to the ANSF (Afghanistan national security forces), still the ANSF was not capable to dealing with the situation during operation, disarming the illegal armed groups in the country. The security also required by ISAF during the various post-operations assistance like in permit reconstruction and developmental activities of the EU personals and their humanitarian assistance, providing security during political and administrative governance, and for counter narcotic operations which is carry out by the ANSF, EU and different counter narcotic institutions in Afghanistan. Providing security to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) during their operations, assisting the Afghanistan authority to reform the security sector through mentoring, training and equipping the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Disarming Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG), and also provide security to international personal engaged in reconstructing infrastructure, Roads, Education, Health, Agriculture, Electricity and so on in Afghanistan.

Civilian Role:

Although NATO is regarded as a military organization till it has been engaged to rebuild the civilian systems with effective civilian resource capabilities⁵ as the ISAF's civilian role is to re-construct the socio-economic and political systems of the Afghanistan like counter narcotic drugs operation and providing alternative livelihood programmes, conducting periodic elections, providing tanning to the ANP, establishing and strengthening democracy and rule of law with rebuilding political and administrative institutions etc.

⁵ Civilian elements are non-military which may include socio-political-economic-educational and cultural elements. In the civilian field, NATO led ISAF have engaged in counter narcotic operation, alternative livelihood programmes, various economic reconstruction and developmental activities, political and administrative reconstruction through policy and institutional reforms and educational developmental programmes in Afghanistan. Like military role and functions it also holds civilian role and functions with its civilian resource capabilities.

Provincial Reconstruction


Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are the part of NATO led ISAF mission, and the key instruments through which NATO and the international community are delivering assistance at the provincial and district level. It supports the governance, reconstruction and development of Afghanistan through the supervision of ISAF. PRTs are mix of civilian and military personals, the military component focuses on building security sector capacity and increasing stability and on the other side civilian component focuses on political, governance, economic, humanitarian and social aspects (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005: 03). ISAF's PRTs are at the leading edge of the alliance's commitment to reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan. They consist of teams of civilian and military personnel working together to help extend the authority of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan throughout the country by providing area security and supporting the reconstruction and development activities of Afghan. PRTs typically consisted of experts in engineering, agriculture and foreign affairs, and also include civilian specialists who work shoulder-to-shoulder with the various Afghan partners to help train, educate, build capacity and create an environment within which governance can self-sustain.

The PRTs were not mandated by the UN Security Council. Some PRT groups are consisted and executed by a single country; some are jointly consisted by several different countries or member states of NATO and here they contribute civilian and military resources jointly. Therefore, if single country is leading any PRT group then that single country will contribute its both military forces and civilian personnel where as multinational PRT group gets military and civilian resources from several different countries. Like the UK-led PRT in Mazar of Afghanistan stands out with three objectives such as promoting economic development, support to institution building and security sector reform (SSR)(Save the Children 2004: 18). In addition to providing area security, PRTs also use their diplomatic and economic capabilities to support security sector reform, encourage good governance, and enable reconstruction and development. In June 2005, twenty PRTs were functioning thirteen of which were operated by the U.S.-led coalition for Operation Enduring Freedom, the Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A). Both the CFC-A and ISAF PRTs are also authorized by UN Security Council

Resolutions 1386, 1413 and 1444 and also operate at the invitation of the Afghan government the other seven PRTs fall under the control of ISAF, led by the NATO. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are responsible for the ISAF PRTs (the UK originally established a coalition PRT in Mazar-e Sharif that was later transferred to ISAF command). Some countries such as Canada, Lithuania, and Spain have agreed to either take over an existing PRT or establish a new one. (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005: 04).

The table no 04.7 says about on information related with the humanitarian donors to Afghanistan in 2011, then individual member state like U.S has provided largest amount of fund (339.52 US\$ millions) than compare to other individual member states of NATO. After U.S, Canada was the second largest financial contributor (46.5 US\$ millions) and UK is the third largest financial contributor (27.3 US\$ millions) in 2011.

Table 04.7: Humanitarian donors to Afghanistan 2009-11 (in US\$ millions).



Sources: (Solmirano and Hallgren 2013: 10)

But, surprisingly non-member states of NATO like Australia has funded more financial assistant than compare to member states of NATO like France. At the same time if we see the decreasing rate of financial assistance, then country like France was initially provided nearly 8.1 US\$ millions in 2009 but, it has decreased gradually for example 4.6 US\$ millions in 2010 and 3.8 US\$ millions in 2011. Germany was also initially provided 38.2 US\$ millions in the year 2009 but reduced its contribution gradually and at last provided 17.8 US\$ millions in 2011. In the same way some of the member states have shown their reluctant to provide financial assistant in ISAF operation in Afghanistan. In the context of all other section for the humanitarian donors there are non-member states and other international organizations like UN and EU have contributed 542 \$ millions in 2009 and gradually increased to 447.5\$ millions in 2011. It can clearly visible in the following pie chart where the study provided that information or data on 'Humanitarian donors to Afghanistan' from 2009 to 2011. The scope of the study is limited to 2011 so, the data of the table is limited to still 2011.

From the above pie chart on humanitarian donors to Afghanistan of 2012, it is clear that Afghanistan got maximum financial support from the other sources (from EU, WB and UN etc,) than NATO or NATO member states for the rebuilding of the civilian activities. While the PRTs' civilian components take the lead on the political, economic, humanitarian, and social aspects of the teams' work in support of the Afghan government's national development priorities, military components focus on increasing security and stability in the area and building security sector capacity. Its military components are also in charge of directing assistance to the civilian elements, in particular at the levels of transport, medical assistance, and engineering. Overall, various kinds of projects are underway, facilitated by the PRTs. Schools are being rebuilt with the mentoring or assistance of ISAF engineers, allowing children to resume their education; irrigation ditches, pipelines, reservoirs, and wells are being constructed to bring water to the local population and farmers; infrastructure is being repaired or built to facilitate mobility and communication; and local people are being provided with greater access to medical assistance. Till 2011, there were twenty-six PRTs operating throughout the

country and led by individual ISAF nations. Some consist of military forces and civilian personnel from a single nation; others are multinational, with contributions from several different countries. The RC South Combined Team enables the Government of Afghanistan and Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) as they conduct security operations and strengthen good governance to defeat the insurgency, retain and expand security in key terrain, ensure transition progress, and improve conditions for economic growth. This RC South includes the provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul and Daykundi of Afghanistan. RC South is the stronghold of the Taliban, led by Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura, and a center for the opium trade. Insurgent activity in RC South was higher in 2008 than any year since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Five of the six primary Taliban infiltration routes are located in the south because it shares the long border with Pakistan (Filkins 2009: 02). The unmonitored border allows the smuggling of opium to Pakistan and Iran and permits the flow of weapons, fighters, and leaders into Afghanistan. One main concern for ISAF forces in the region is the connection between the narcotics trade and networks responsible for launching attacks involving improvised explosive devices which account for 70 percent of military casualties in the region. RC south leads by Netherland and UK with keeping 22,830 numbers of troops in 13th April 2009 (NATO 2009f: 01; Department of Defence 2012: 23). The ISAF RC North supports ANSF in close coordination and collaboration in providing security and disrupting insurgent activities in order to protect the population and secure the highways. It also supports the Afghan Border Police operations in the border areas and crossing points in order to set the conditions for economic, social and cultural development in key terrain districts. This RC North includes the provinces of Baghlan, Badakhshan, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Balkh, Faryab Samangan, Sar-e Pul and Takhar. Among the member states of ISAF, Germany led this RC North operation with 4730 number of troops in 2009 (Department of Defence 2012: 25). The RC-West, working in full partnership with Afghan National Security Forces and relevant organizations, continuously conducts population-centric, comprehensive operations within its area of responsibility to support security, increase stability and assist with building actions while focusing on governance and development in order to establish a secure environment for sustainable peace (International Security Assistance Force 2012; Department of Defence 2012: 25). With the

full partnership of the Government of Afghanistan, the RC East of ISAF is operating joint- interagency, helping multinational organizations to carry-out their works, secures the population through combined action to neutralize insurgent elements while increasing ANSF capability, grows the sub-national governance capacity and credibility, neutralizes criminal patronage networks to increase stability and security by extending GIRoA influence through ANSF assumption of security primacy, and credible SNG with improved quality of life for the Afghan people.

However, their military components come under the ISAF command and are coordinated by the relevant regional command. PRTs have had assisted the Afghan government and international actors with humanitarian relief. In particular, ISAF soldiers have launched several relief missions, distributing medication, food, and winter supplies to help villagers cope with severe weather conditions in different parts of the country, and in this way helping to PRTs. An ISAF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund was established in 2006 to provide quick humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of significant ISAF military operations. This assistance includes the provision of food, shelter, and medicines as well as the repair of buildings or key infrastructure. Such assistance is provided on a short-term basis, and responsibility is handed over to civilian actors as soon as circumstances permit. The fund, established under the auspices of the commander of the ISAF, consists entirely of voluntary donations from ISAF troop-contributing nations. In February 2005, moreover, the PRT Executive Steering Committee (comprising the Afghan Ministry of Interior, UNAMA, coalition and ISAF commanders, NATO's Senior Civilian Representative, and ambassadors of the lead PRT nations) promulgated Terms of Reference which are collectively agreed upon guidelines to create a common operating concept for the PRTs. As coalition PRTs transition to NATO/ISAF control, achieving a common orientation will become increasingly important for facilitating working relations with key governmental, tribal, religious, NGO, and UN leaders in the provinces. They have been engaged in various kinds of projects which are underway such as schools are being rebuilt with the mentoring or assistance of ISAF engineers, allowing children to resume their education; irrigation ditches, pipelines, reservoirs, and wells are being constructed to bring water to the local population and farmers; infrastructure is being repaired or built to facilitate mobility and communication;

and local people are being provided with greater access to medical assistance etc. The PRTs' civilian tasks are based on the political, economic, humanitarian, and social aspects in support of the Afghan government's national development priorities, military tasks are based on the establishing security and stability in the area or building security sector capacity. Its military components are also in charge of directing assistance to the civilian elements, in particular at the levels of transport, medical assistance, and engineering. However, military components of all the PRTs come under the ISAF command and coordinated by the relevant regional command. Afghanistan is the first case where the NATO led ISAF has been working for the socio-economic reconstruction activities with PRTs and the EU, and before this case the Afghanistan the NATO didn't led in rebuilding civilian activities. So, in Afghanistan the NATO led ISAF are providing security to the EU officials as well as PRTs officials during the rebuilding socio-economic-political reconstruction tasks.

In the context of the largest share of aid to Afghanistan, the United States is the largest donor by a clear margin, having provided 40.9% of the total aid between 2002 and 2009. There are top five donors to this Afghanistan operation such as the United States, the EU Institutions, the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada collectively provided 64.9% of the total aid to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2009. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s member governments have provided a growing share of the total volume of aid to Afghanistan, from 72.5% in 2002 to 80.4% in 2009. Moreover, donor contributions have shown an increasing concentration, with the share of the United States growing from 27.0% of the total in 2002 to 48.7% of all aid contributions in 2009 (Poole 2011: 07). The funding is channeled through foreign military actors, via two NATO managed trust funds and 27 joint civilian and military managed PRTs, or channeled directly to aid projects and implementing agencies by foreign military actors. The NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund received donor contributions of US\$224.7 million between January 2007 and April 2010. NATO also manages a relatively small Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund, which received US\$3.5 million in donor contributions in between 2007-2010, and in the same year PRT also contributed more than US\$545 million (Poole 2011: 06).

The United States and the international community provides funding to support Afghanistan relief and reconstruction effort and the most of the international funding provided is administered through trust funds. The two main trust funds are the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)⁶ and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)⁷. The largest share of international contributions to the Afghan operational and development budgets comes through the ARTF. From 2002 to March 19, 2012, the World Bank reported that 33 donors had pledged more than \$5.35 billion, of which more than \$5.17 billion had been paid in. The United States and the United Kingdom are the two biggest donors to the ARTF, together contributing nearly 46% of its total funding. Contributions to the ARTF are divided into two funding channels the Recurrent Cost (RC) Window and the Investment Window (USAID/Afghanistan 2013: 02).

The international community also provides funding for ANSF through the NATO ANA Trust Fund and the LOTFA. Twenty-two nations have contributed to the NATO ANA Trust Fund for support and sustainment of the ANA and ANP; totaling more than \$570M fund. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) administers LOTFA to fund police salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior. Between 2002 and 2012, the United States donated roughly \$759 million to LOTFA, while the international community has pledged approximately \$2.3 billion. During the reporting period, a team from the UN Office of Audit and Investigation (OAI) conducted an investigation into the allegations of misuse of funds and corruption within the small administrative budget managed by LOTFA. There are no allegations relating to the \$50M per month LOTFA

⁶ ARTF is a partnership between the international community and the Afghan government for the improved effectiveness of the reconstruction effort which is administered by the World Bank. ARTF's support for national priority programs, for costs of government operations, and for the policy reform agenda is contributing to the achievement of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy goals. For more details please see USAID/Afghanistan (2013), Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/200/Afghanistan_Reconstruction_Trust_Fund_

⁷ LOTFA is a multi-lateral Trust Fund set up in 2002 as a mechanism for coordinating contributions from partners, as part of the international community's support to build the Afghan national police force. In recognition of the need to build the police force, in May 2002, at the request of the Afghan Government and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), UNDP established LOTFA, and it is nationally managed as per National Implementation Modality (NIM) through the MoI, and is governed by UNDP's financial rules and regulations. For more details please see United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan (2013), Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id

allocates to support Police remuneration. Since there were no allegations relating to LOTFA support to Police Remuneration, the investigation did not include this pillar of LOTFA (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan 2013: 01). NTM-A solicits and tracks infrastructure, equipment, and weapon donations, and tracks overall international monetary donations, including bilateral donations. In the first nine months of 2011, the LOTFA had transferred more than \$356.35 million to the Afghan government to cover ANP salaries, nearly \$11.60 million for Central Prisons Directorate staff remunerations, and an additional \$6.67 million for capacity development and other LOTFA initiatives (Cordesman 2012: 12).

The NTM-A also solicits equipment and munitions through the NTM-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) to fill ANA and ANP requirements. During this process, NTM-A evaluates equipment or munitions to verify technical specifications and quality and works with donors and Afghan government to coordinate shipping, receipt, and accountability of all equipment, material, and munitions. The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) provides the resource foundation needed to train and equip ANSF and ALP by providing funding to train, equip, and sustain the ANSF (Department of Defence 2008: 02). At the same time in the process of rebuilding Afghanistan various Nations also approach the Afghan government directly to negotiate a bilateral donation, of which NTM-A may not always notified. When the Afghan government and the donor nation advise NTM-A early in the process, NTM-A is able to track these cases and provide assistance as necessary. Since 2002, nearly 50 nations, NATO, and six international funding agencies have contributed more than \$2.9B in assistance to the Afghan government. Future solicitations will focus on literacy materials, equipment, infrastructure, and monetary donations for both the ANA and ANP. Monetary donations are particularly critical due to the need for contracted institutional training centers, medical facilities, and standardized equipment. The United States, as well as NTM-A, continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage Allies and partners to continue providing assistance for the sustainment of the ANSF.

Counter-narcotic operation:

According to the United Nations, Afghanistan produces almost 90 percent of the world's illicit opium. The drugs trade threatens Afghanistan's development and security, fostering endemic corruption in the country and financing the insurgency. Afghan drugs are also of direct concern to the international community as the drug-financed insurgency poses security risks for troops deployed in Afghanistan, and the drugs exported end up on the streets of cities across the world, causing serious health and social problems and violent crime (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007: 37). The NATO led ISAF has no authorization to directly participate in counter-narcotic operations and its involvement with counter-narcotics is limited to logistical support, intelligence sharing, and training of Afghan police forces (Sean and Khan 2007: 168). The NATO led ISAF assists Afghan government to explain its counter-narcotics policy to its people and when Afghan counter-narcotics officials come under attack, ISAF provides military support. With the US leadership, there are certain counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan which highlighted on five basic pillars such as poppy eradication, drug interdiction, judicial reform measures, public awareness campaigns and economic and agricultural development assistance. Gradually the US observed that eradication of narcotic is not possible until providing alternative livelihood programs with focusing on developing agricultural sector job creation and crop substitution in 2009 (UNITED STATES SENATE CAUCUS 2010: 20).

It has been providing support to Afghanistan government to carry out its primary responsibility through its institutions, like its Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) defines four priorities: targeting the trafficker; providing alternative rural livelihoods; reducing demand and developing state institutions. ISAF also provides indirect assistance to the counter-narcotics operations of the Afghan government through training, intelligence and logistics. Apart from the immediate threats posed by the insurgents, the greatest long-term challenge facing in Afghanistan is probably that presented by the production of illicit drugs and the criminal networks that surround it. NATO's role in poppy eradication continues to be questioned. NATO is obliged to support the Afghan government's anti-drug missions when requested by Kabul. But, ISAF's role is limited and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has rejected

the call by Antonio Maria Costa, the head of the UNODC, for "robust military action" by NATO forces to destroy the opium industry in southern Afghanistan. An effective Afghan counter-narcotics policy needs to focus on sanctioning drug barons, not farmers. To this end, any eradication programme needs to be targeted and conducted in conjunction with sustainable alternative livelihood programmes. These gains remain fragile, however, as cultivation and trafficking levels are closely connected to broader economic opportunity, security and the ability of GIRoA to project the rule of law. As U.S. and NATO troop levels decrease, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will take on greater responsibility for security in key drug cultivation areas. Future counter narcotics efforts will be linked to ANSF success in carrying out these new responsibilities. Continued robust international assistance to the GIRoA will be required to maintain and build the institutional capacity of key ministries to address illicit narcotics cultivation and trafficking. The GIRoA's willingness to pursue politically-connected major traffickers and cultivators is also crucial to Afghanistan's future narcotics control efforts Both the NATO and EU have accepted that the illegal narcotics trade is one of the biggest threats to the recovery of Afghanistan in the foreseeable Union agree future.

The aim of the NATO led ISAF is to be achieved a sustained and significant reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics with a view to complete elimination. Essential elements include improved interdiction, law enforcement and judicial capacity building; enhanced cooperation among Afghanistan, neighboring countries and the international community on disrupting the drugs trade; wider provision of economic alternatives for farmers and laborers in the context of comprehensive rural development; and building national and provincial counter-narcotics institutions (NATO 2010b: 23). NATO led ISAF supports the NDCS (Afghan National Drug Control Strategy) and provides assistance to the Afghan authorities' counter-narcotics operations through training, intelligence and logistics, and in-extremis support, as appropriate. It also helps the Afghan government to explain its counter-narcotics policy to its people through PRTs and other means. ISAF also helps the Afghan government to explain its counter-narcotics policy to its people. When Afghan counter-narcotics officials come under attack, ISAF provides military support. It has been providing support to Afghanistan government to carry out its primary responsibility through its institutions, like its NDCS defines four

priorities: targeting the trafficker; providing alternative rural livelihoods; reducing demand and developing state institutions. ISAF also provides indirect assistance to the counter-narcotics operations of the Afghan government through training, intelligence and logistics. In this counter-narcotic operation other international organizations like UN and EU also have accepted that the illegal narcotics trade is one of the biggest threats to the recovery of Afghanistan in the foreseeable future (EU Council Secretariat 2009a: 01).

NATO's counter-narcotics operations can be found in ISAF Operation Plan 10302, which notes ISAF can support the Afghan government counter narcotics effort because "facilitating Afghan institutions and security forces in a long-term national counter-narcotics strategy is consistent with ISAF's role to support the Afghan government extend its authority across the country.". ISAF has been also supported its Afghan partners in taking action against drug laboratories and traffickers providing material support to the insurgents within the existing operational plan. ISAF 'Operation Plan 10302' supports the Afghan government and Afghan institutions for counter narcotics effort, provides the scope or mechanism for intelligence sharing and training of Afghan police forces counter narcotics effort. ISAF assists the Afghan government to address its counter-narcotics policy and programme to its people, and during the counter-narcotic operation ISAF also provide security to Afghan counter-narcotics officials, support the institution like National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) which provides alternative rural livelihoods and targeting the trafficker (Sean and Khan 2007: 168). The drugs trade in Afghanistan fuels corruption and undermines the rule of law. The allies are struggling to combat Afghanistan's poppy crop. With the help of other national and international actors, ISAF also active in Counter-narcotics operation in Afghanistan and providing alternative livelihood programme and projects (Scott 2007: 03, ISAF 2014: 01). In the Humanitarian and Development Aid sectors the PRTs of ISAF have had assisted the Afghan government and international actors with humanitarian relief. In particular, ISAF soldiers have launched several relief missions, distributing medication, food, and winter supplies to help villagers cope with severe weather conditions in different parts of the country. An ISAF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund was

established in 2006 by the NATO member states to provide quick humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of significant ISAF military operations. This assistance includes the provision of food, shelter, and medicines as well as the repair of buildings or key infrastructure. Such assistance is provided on a short-term basis, and responsibility is handed over to civilian actors as soon as circumstances permit. The fund, established under the auspices of the commander of the ISAF, consists entirely of voluntary donations from ISAF troop-contributing nations. The North Atlantic Council is regularly updated on its use through NATO's senior civilian representative in Afghanistan.

It was not until October 2008 was the ISAF authorized to take direct military action against insurgency-linked narcotic targets, such as traffickers and processing facilities. Domestically, the Afghanistan government has attempted to combat the narcotic industry with the establishment of the Ministry of Counter-narcotics (MCD) which has coordinated direct eradication and interdiction campaigns while the campaigns were enforced by the Ministry of the Interior (Blanchard 2009: 37). The NATO led ISAF supports the NDCS and provides assistance to the Afghan authorities' counter-narcotics operations through training, intelligence and logistics, and in-extremis support, as appropriate. NATO-ISAF also helps the Afghan government to explain its counter-narcotics policy to its people through PRTs and other means. For control over the poppy cultivation in southern Afghanistan, NATO led ISAF took an effective role through its 'NATO's Operation Plan 10302' which was adopted in 2004, and through this plan NATO led ISAF has played an important role in *logistic support, sharing information and intelligence*. In April 2006, the NAC issued an Execution Directive for operation plan 10302-Rev1 and approved the associated rules of engagement, thereby authorized the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to execute the plan (UNSC 2006: 02).

Police Training:

NATO's mandate includes the training and development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) via the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A). This is by far the largest training mission in Afghanistan, with an annual budget of US\$9.5 billion. NATO's two most important member states such as Germany and the US, were the two first actors involved in the reform of Afghan police

and army forces. The reforming of Police system in Afghanistan, initially Germany (common member state of both NATO and EU) had provided its police training and tried to reform the police system in Afghanistan since November 2001. But due to lack of resources to provide effective recruitment and performance in Afghanistan police sector, Germany didn't get success in this mission, and as a result the U.S started the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) mission in 2005. Afterward at the same year, the resources contributed from U.S were much more than that of German effort which deprived the German mission of its legitimacy and political authority (MacKenzie 2012: 01). The largest police training operation in Afghanistan is conducted by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). The US Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), previously the most significant bilateral police training mission, was brought under the command of NTM-A in 2009. NTM-A was a mixture of contracted (retired) civilian police officers and military officers. The NTM-A's mission allowed several allied forces to join the effort to address the demands and complement the EU efforts and coordinate the bilateral efforts that are going on outside of EUPOL (Gaylord 2011: 37). NTM-A's training curriculum is designed mainly by military officers or military police with input from civilian advisers. The curriculum is delivered through a mixture of contracted (retired) civilian police officers and military officers. The NATO-led coalition was essentially building up the police as a counter-insurgency force, "as the US forces put it, putting boots on the ground, such that you have someone in the line of fire against the insurgents" instead of training recruits to protect the population and uphold the rule of law, which should be the purpose of the police. The US and NATO's prime concern was rapidly to build an anti-insurgency force where numbers and speed were important, using a basic six-week NTM-A training course. Therefore, the NATO mission allowed several allied forces to join the effort to address the demands. The Mission has supported the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works in accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights". The mission trains Afghan police officers in basic criminal investigation techniques, such as crime scene investigation, interview techniques, developing a police training curriculum, maintaining an adequate balance between different ethnicities, and getting of trust and support among

the population. Assisting the ANP is one of ISAF's key supporting tasks. This mainly consists of the provision of niche training of non-police specific skills (such as counter-IED training), mentoring, and joint patrolling. Much of this assistance is provided through the regional security committees and the regional operations coordination centre.

The NTM-A have given police training to the ANP within means and capabilities like at the tactical level, with military support to operations, advice, shared information, and informal mentoring and guidance. The NATO led ISAF works in coordination with and in support of the United States as well as the EUPOL in Afghanistan. Local support involves training of non-police specific skills provided by ISAF units, and indirect support, mentoring, and joint patrolling. Much of this assistance is delivered through the medium of security committees and coordination centres. But after the project suffered from poor recruitment and performance, NATO asked the EU to take control and established EUPOL in June 2007. EUPOL has been involved in training and developing an ANP capable of providing intelligence, urban security, training its own forces, mobilizing troops, fighting corruption. The police training program of the ANP is at the heart of the counter-insurgency strategy, and for this reason that developing and having a national police force capables to enforce the rule of law is central to state-building (MacKenzie 2010: 158). In addition of training, EUPOL mentor high ranked officers, staff of the Ministry of Interior, and regional chiefs of police.

But the major problems in the providing police training are basically multi-ethnic imbalance and high rate of illiteracy among the ANP. In this field build-up of the ANP is maintaining an adequate balance between different ethnicities, which have to be fairly represented within this national institution in order to ensure an adequate level of trust and support among the population. The buildup of the ANP has proven to be a more difficult task as a part of the judiciary system, including also prosecutors, judges, courts, prisons, and the whole legal and institutional framework necessary to ensure law enforcement. This framework is not yet in place in Afghanistan. The ANP is considered to be much more corrupt and the international community for several years has underestimated this problem, and only recently has initiated to devote sufficient resources to it. For example on June, 2011 NATO has decided to deploy a Rule of Law Field

Support Mission to provide transportation and security support for civilian law officials, i.e. by organizing airlift and convoys, and to support construction and upgrade of infrastructures such as tribunal buildings. Lack of literacy in the Afghanistan police has been hindering its development (NATO 2011: 01). The decision making problems among the member states of NATO is also another major challenge for an effective police training because Germany says that it operates in the civilian purpose and the US says that it can operate in the counter interagency purpose.

Conclusion

The NATO led ISAF's resource capability in its Afghanistan peace building operation, not only depended on its member states but also non-member states and also from the EU, UN and World Bank (WB) and others for financial burden sharing. However, there is an evident lack of political will on the part of those civilian international actors to commit considerable resources over a sustained period. This puts ISAF into a difficult position. The table no 04:7 says that more than 50 percent humanitarian donors and financial resources are coming from the outside of the NATO member states and other international partners like the EU, the UN and WB. Not only in humanitarian donation but also in the military costs are also assisted by the non-member states like Australia. According to table no 04:6, non-member states of NATO like Australia and others have contributed significant amount in relations to the military expenditure. It means NATO is also depending on the other non-member states and other international organizations like UN, EU, WB etc. Although NATO has the capability for military resources, still it doesn't have the civilian capability for ISAF's peace building operation in Afghanistan.

The NATO led ISAF has been provided security in Afghanistan in different fields such as reconstructing Afghanistan forces, conducting election, and providing logistic support and intelligence services to Afghan military and police operation in the state, and at the same time provided security during rebuilding political systems, counter-narcotic operation, Reconstruction and Development (R&D) activities and supporting Afghanistan in humanitarian assistance efforts. Although NATO has involved since 2003 in Afghanistan, still now it has not bring stability in the local level capacity building due to lack of civilian resources. Some member states of NATO are reluctant to contribute their

financial resources in ISAF's operation. Countries like France, Canada and Germany etc, were initially (in 2008) provided more financial resources than compare to next two three years later. It means gradually reduced their financial contribution in Afghanistan operation which impacts over the long-term sustainability of ISAF. And also without economic resources ISAF operation is not possible, because for the military operations and its logistical support require economic cost. Economic resources are required for developmental programmes and projects, providing alternative earning sources instead of production of narcotic drugs, building infrastructures, roads and also providing all the necessary developmental activities. According to the UN, Afghanistan produces almost 90 per cent of the world's illicit opium, and its trade generates revenues equivalent to about 30 per cent of Afghanistan's total economy. It is difficult to eradicate of poppy crops in Afghanistan until there will be no comprehensive alternative livelihood schemes. Another problem is tackling the issue of the production and trafficking of narcotics, which increasingly threatens the Afghan government's authority, is one aspect of this. To provide empirical inputs on NATO's seeking cooperation from other international actors in Afghanistan, in the next chapter the study has addressed on NATO's growing cooperation and partnership with the EU in the civilian sector.

CHAPTER: V

NATO-EU PARTNERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN IN CIVILIAN SECTOR

Introduction

Afghanistan is NATO's first out of area operation beyond the Europe. The NATO led ISAF has been mandated by the United Nations (UN) to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. To undertake multi-faceted tasks, NATO led ISAF needs economic, social, political and military tools. But, as evident in the previous chapters NATO led ISAF could handle with resource requirement relating to military matters. However, it confronted with challenges to meet resource requirements to carry out its civilian tasks. Therefore, the NATO led ISAF realised the significant of soft power to address socio-economic and political reconstruction in Afghanistan (Goldgeier 2010: 16).

The present chapter analyses the practical level cooperation between NATO led ISAF and the EU in civilian sector in Afghanistan. The chapter addresses on NATO-EU partnership in different civilian sectors such as economic reconstruction tasks, political and administrative reforms, Alternative Livelihoods, Humanitarian and Development aid, Democracy promotion, Police Trainings, and Socio-Educational Development. The chapter ends with highlighting the achievements and challenges encounter in their mutual cooperation for re-building Afghanistan.

Economic Reconstruction Tasks

Afghanistan is regarded as the most insolvent state than compare to other country in Asia. In addition to long period of internal instability and conflicts, Afghanistan has so many problems such as drought, poverty, low literacy rate, corruption, gender injustice, political instability and poor governance, economic mismanagement, narcotic drugs production, foreign intervention and decade of war and so on. An estimated 07 million Afghans are susceptible to hunger and the risk of famine remains high, only 6% people are accessing electricity, 13% have access to safe water and average life expectancy is 44

years etc, all those problems make Kabul as a poorest capital in Asia. With over 80% of Afghan population living in rural areas as rural development is seen as a crucial sector for the development and the stability of the country. After years of conflict, agricultural exports constituted the backbone of the economy before the war and now virtually nil although, there are significant market opportunities in the region. Similarly, productivity levels of rain-fed and irrigated farming as well as livestock husbandry are low compared to regional averages, indicating there is considerable potential for productivity improvements (Reichard 2006: 22).

The NATO led ISAF has been provided security to the EU when its officials engage in economic and political reconstruction tasks in Afghanistan. The civilian means of EU are necessary to effectively carry out this peace building operation (Lindley-French 2007: 116). Initially the ISAF have provided security in very limited areas such as Kabul and Kandahar but, gradually it has been expended to different parts of the country. Table no 05.1 is highlighted how year by year the ISAF has been expanded its operation to the different parts of the country. Table no 05.1 says that in the year 2003, the ISAF was limited to Kabul and Kandahar, in 2005 extent to Balkh and in 2006 it extended to Heart province etc. In the year 2011, finally the ISAF operated in almost all the part of the country such as Baghdis, Logar, Kapisa, Balkh, Farah, Kapisa, Wardak, Ghazni, Paktia, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kabul and Kandahar.


The NATO-led ISAF dedicated itself mainly for the providing security whereas, the EU pursued its civilian developmental activities. Both the organizations have co-operated with each other with their respective resource capabilities. The EU's developmental economic reconstruction projects and programmes were dependent upon the security provided by the ISAF in Afghanistan and its civilian fields are complemented by the EU activities. As discussed in the previous chapter, initially the NATO-led ISAF was mandated by the United Nations to provide security in Afghanistan. The map no 05.1, asserts that the ISAF has its strong hold of operation in South-East provinces of Afghanistan than compare to North-West provinces. Through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the ISAF have effectively engaged in above addressed provinces to carry-out economic reconstruction works as PRTs is a combination of both

the civilian and military persons. The NATO led ISAF's PRTs have played a very significant role in the alliance's commitment to reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan. They are consisting of teams of civilian and military persons as working together to help extend the authority of Afghan Government in the country by providing area security and supporting the reconstruction and development activities.

Table No 05.1: NATO led ISAF's Expansion in Afghanistan:

Year	ISAF's Gradual Expansion in Afghanistan
2003	Kabul, Kandahar
2004	Kabul, Kandahar
2005	Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar
2006	Herat, Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar
2007	Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar
2008	Paktia, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar
2009	Kapisa, Wardak, Ghazni, Paktia, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar
2010	Balkh, Farah, Kapisa, Wardak, Ghazni, Paktia, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar
2011	Baghdis, Logar, Kapisa, Balkh, Farah, Kapisa, Wardak, Ghazni, Paktia, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar

Map No 05.1: ISAF's Deployment in Afghanistan



Sources: (Dodge and Redman 2011: IV)

The PRTs are basically combined of civil-military unit working at the provincial level and led by the NATO led ISAF member states. Map no 05.2, says about the different location of the PRTs in Afghanistan. There are 27 PRTs operating throughout Afghanistan. NATO-led ISAF's effort in PRTs to reconstruct socio-economic filed have been supplemented by the EU's major role in reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan with providing alternative livelihood instead of producing narcotic drugs, reforming political and administrative system with its political and policy experts, contributing development aid, providing police training etc.

Map No 05.2: Location of PRTs in Afghanistan:



Sources: (United State Agency 2006: 09)

Road construction has been USAID's largest project category and accounting for about \$2 billion in U.S. spending since the fall of the Taliban. Among other major projects


completed are a road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt (Uruzgan province) built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; a road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul; and a Salang Bypass Road through Bamiyan province. In several of the most restive provinces, U.S. funds, including CERP, have been used to build small roads linking farming communities to the markets for their products. The October 2014 DOD report states that completing the Khost-Gardez highway is one of four high priority infrastructure projects for USAID. In the Map no 05.3, the data has provided the details about the major donors of both NATO and the EU member states who have been provided their significant contribution towards the road infrastructures in Afghanistan. In this regard, not only NATO and the EU have provided financial contributions but also Asian Development Bank, World Bank, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Islamic Development Bank, Iran and Pakistan etc are the most important donors. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was one financial instrument used by the EU to re-establishment of rule of law and civilian administration and the planning of economic reconstruction in Afghanistan (EU Council 2006). Through the recurrent window programme, the EU also contributed to financing civil servants' salaries. It also supports to different investment programmes include the National Rural Access Programme (NRAP), Afghanistan Justice Sector Reform Project and the National Solidarity Programme (NSP).

In 2011, the EU provided € 60 million to support the National Priority Programmes and make effective to Afghan Government. The EU is supported to the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and Afghanistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In 2009, through the EU Action Plan different initiatives like Rural development, policing, and justice have been highlighted as areas for further EU commitment in Afghanistan. The EU is involved in dialogue on the strengthening of Public Finance Management, with a view to paving the way for budget support in specific sectors. Based on the "principles of effective partnership" discussed at the Kabul Conference, a Public Finance Management (PFM) Road Map was prepared to improve budget execution, formulation, transparency and accountability. The EU supports the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to make the New Deal for Fragile States operational through

the development of a new Aid Management Policy. Afghanistan endorsed the New Deal and committed to undertake the necessary reforms to ensure trust.

Transport infrastructure condition is very bad which prevents the progress of export oriented industries in Afghanistan. In between 2003 and 2008 nearly 20,000 km of roads were built, but still in that period approximately 85% of the country's 130,000 km of roads was drastically degraded. The country depends on the insecure ring road, highway. Poor security has plagued reconstruction of the Kabul-Kandahar road and put the project back by several months. The NATO led ISAF have been provided security during building road projects in Afghanistan like during the time of Kabul-Torkham road programme. At the same time the EU, through its commission strived to develop a portfolio of the EU-wide programmes with its member states. There are different member states of the EU who have been engaged in making road project with the help of European commission such as the Kabul-Jalalabad-Torkham road project in co-operation with Sweden, the electricity rehabilitation of Kabul with Germany (Gross 2008: 2). For the period 2007-2010, the European Commission allocated funds €610 million and under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) allocated €1030 million for Afghanistan road projects for the period 2007-2013 (EC CSP 2007-2013). The U.S as the most important member of NATO and funded for the Kabul-Kandahar Road project which extending 482 kilometers (300 miles) to the South of Afghanistan. It was funded through the USAID as regarded as the part of a massive infrastructure initiative. Despite facing different problems during the making of road such as killings, attacks, helicopter crashes, and supply shortages etc at the end of 2003, USAID and LBG completed the road project and handed it over to Afghan government which was estimated nearly about \$311 millions.

Map No 05.3: Major Road Projects in Afghanistan



Sources: (Dodge and Redman 2011: VI)

In the map no 05.3, for the Kabul-Jalalabad road project the EU had donated \$66m and the length of the road is about 142 km. This road project was completed in 2004 with the successful help and support of the ISAF because, in the entire road project the ISAF had played a very significant role to provide security during constructing road in Afghanistan. In this context, the member country of NATO, the U.S had also assists \$311m for Kabul to Kandahar (Section B to F) road project which is about 309 km long and completed in 2004. Again in the year 2007, the U.S assists \$181m to Afghanistan for Kandahar to Herat road project which is about 324km long road. There are other non member states of NATO and the EU and also the other intergovernmental organizations donate funds for the same purpose in Afghanistan as map no 05.3 clearly highlighted the road project in Afghanistan.

Transport infrastructure is an impediment in particular because, it prevents the development of most export-oriented industries. Although nearly 20,000 km of roads were built or repaired between 2003 and 2008, it was estimated that by the end of that period approximately 85% of the country's 130,000km of roads were significantly degraded. Many bridges were reportedly close to collapse. The country therefore remained dependent on the insecure ring road and highway. Like bad transport infrastructures, corruption is also the most important obstacle for the economic Reconstruction mission of both NATO and the EU. Although the NATO led ISAF forces and the EU have worked for anti-corruption with their respective resource capabilities like ISAF works with individuals and anti-corruption institutions such as Building Integrity (IB) programme⁸, High Office of Oversight, Ministry of the Interior and the Anti-Corruption Tribunal with government offices to develop reforms that can prevent corruption practices. At the same time activities are also reported through intelligence agencies and police. Like NATO, the EU is also working for anti-corruption with its EUPOL, Strategy for Security and Development programme, and judicial reforms activities in Afghanistan. The map no 05.2, highlights on the location of PRTs, which are effectively engaged for economic reconstruction activities with 27 PRTs in various provinces such as Baghdis, Logar, Kapisa, Farah, Kapisa, Wardak, Ghazni, Paktia, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kabul and Kandahar. But, still Afghanistan is a very poorest country of the world and its human development index was 172 out of 187 countries in 2011.

Alternative Livelihoods

Afghanistan's rural people are extremely poor and often mired in debt. The agriculture sector accounts for 35.5% of Afghanistan's GDP and about 80% of the Afghan population are directly or indirectly involved in the agriculture and livestock sectors, and lives mainly in rural areas. Therefore, coercive measures, such as eradication, must be

⁸It was originally established by the Euro-Atlantic partnership council in November 2007 to raise awareness, promote good practice and provide practical tools to help nations enhance integrity and reduce risks of corruption in the security sector by strengthening transparency and accountability. Initially this programme supported south east European countries but has also been implemented in Afghanistan to enhance transparency and integrity in afghan police and army to reduce corruption.


combined with both short and long-term economic incentives in order to alter the risk/reward calculus of rural households to favor licit crop cultivation. Only a strong private sector can provide the jobs and drive the economic growth required to provide these incentives. Economic growth provides employment opportunities in both on and off the farm, in rural areas as well as cities and also in order to counter the rapid mobility and elasticity of opium poppy cultivation. Increasing employment opportunities is also important in order to reduce the amount of surplus labor available during the poppy harvest season. Economic growth and job creation must be sustained over time given that Afghanistan's workforce is expanding rapidly; 70 percent of the country's population is under the age of thirty. The Alternative Development (AD) programme targets the most significant poppy-producing provinces in Afghanistan to establish economic alternatives to the cultivation of the opium poppy for rural households. These efforts align closely with the agriculture and rural development piece of the Reconstruction and Development line of operation and focus on the short-term incentives to rural households, including improvements to livestock health, cash-for-work opportunities to rehabilitate rural infrastructure, and the provision of inputs to spur the production of high-value products, and also focus on long-term comprehensive development programs, including pre-planting assistance (such as credit, agricultural input delivery, and training) and post-production assistance with harvesting, sorting, grading, packaging and marketing. Targeted products include high-value nut and fruit crops. The AD supports to agribusinesses and agro-industries, including marketing, planning, credit, and other business development assistance.

In the case of Afghan opium going to Europe, over 90% of the profits are made in Turkey and Europe. UNODC calculations suggest that Afghan farmers earned \$440m from opium in 2009, whereas traffickers took \$2.2bn and Taliban gained \$140m-170m. It is the most dangerous things for the Europeans and for that reason the EU has played an active role in supporting counter-narcotics efforts of NATO-led ISAF from the outset of the reconstruction process, not least because 90 per cent of the heroin in Western Europe originates in Afghanistan and also because the growth in corruption and crime associated with the burgeoning opium economy poses a grave threat to the success of the entire

reconstruction and stabilization process. On the other hand, the EU has provided economic assistance to Afghan Government to make alternative model for the economic development instead through narcotic drugs (EU Council Secretariat 2009 : 02).

Table No 05.2: Major Donors in Afghanistan in 2011 (\$ Millions):

DONORS	US \$ Millions	NATO Member	EU member
US	10926	YES	NO
EU	2093	Xxx	xxx
UK	1835	YES	YES
GERMANY	1283	YES	YES
CANADA	1181	YES	NO
NETHERLANDS	771	YES	YES
NORWAY	666	YES	YES
SWEDEN	426	YES	YES
ITALY	410	YES	YES



The table No 05.2, highlights on Major Donors in Afghanistan, then obviously the U.S is in the highest rank in donation, then following by EU, UK, Germany, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Italy. In this regard, NATO members and the EU are provided their contribution to Afghanistan. Although NATO has not provided fund collectively like the EU, still it helps in security sectors and its individual member states like UK, Germany, Canada and Netherlands etc are providing their full support in the alternative development programmes.

The AD program also provides financial incentives to proactive provincial leaders that eliminate or prevent poppy cultivation through the Good Performers Initiative (GPI). The GPI may target provinces that are not covered by the AD programmes and thus


demonstrate the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIROA's) concern for such provinces and rewards local initiatives to reduce poppy cultivation. The ANSF and ISAF have delivered a new turbine to Kajaki Dam in Helmand province for electrical generation capacity. At the international Paris conference in June 2008, Government of Afghanistan, member states of ISAF and the donor states to Afghanistan had agreed to provide necessary needs for the development of Afghanistan. There have been some positive developments in 2008. According to UNODC 2009 Opium Winter Rapid Assessment, there has been a 19% reduction in poppy cultivation in 2008 and further decrease is anticipated in 2009. Poppy cultivation is confined almost entirely to the south. The South and South-West region now account for 98% of Afghanistan's poppy cultivation. The NATO led ISAF supports the NDCS and provides assistance to the Afghan authorities' counter-narcotics operations through training, intelligence and logistics, and in-extremis support, as appropriate. It helps the Afghan government to explain its counter-narcotics policy to its people through PRTs and other means. It has been also supported its Afghan partners in taking action against drug laboratories and traffickers providing material support to the insurgents within the existing operational plan.

Table No 05: 3: The post 2003 Opium Surge in Afghanistan:

Year	Cultivated Area (Hac)	Output (Metric Tonnes)	Yield (Kg/Hac)
2001	8,000	185	24.3
2002	74,000	3,400	45.9
2003	80,000	3,600	45.0
2004	131,000	4,200	32.1
2005	104,000	4,100	39.3
2006	165,000	6,100	37.0
2007	193,000	8,200	42.5
2008	157,000	7,700	48.8
2009	123,000	6,900	56.1
2010	123,000	3,600	29.2
2011	131,000	5,800	44.5

Sources: (Dodge and Redman 2011: 113)

Bar chart of table no 05.3 on Opium Surge in Afghanistan




Sources: (Dodge and Redman 2011: 113)

The Table no 05.3 addresses that in the year 2007, Afghanistan had produced highest amount of opium, cultivated area is 193,000 hectors and its output was also high 8,200 metric tons. Then, in 2006, Afghanistan had produced second highest amount of opium production, its cultivated area was 165,000 hectors and, 2008 was third highest year where Afghanistan cultivated in 157,000 hectors and produces outcome was 7,700 metric tons. This opium cultivation has shown in the bar chat, red color is highlighting cultivated areas and light green color is highlighting output metric tonnes of opium in Afghanistan. Year is showing in the systematic number, like 1 is 2001, 2 is 2002, 3 is 2003 likewise 10 is 2010 and 11 is 2011.

In Afghanistan counter narcotics operation with the help of the NATO led ISAF, Afghan Government has established Afghan National Drug Control Strategy in May 2003 to combat the drug trade. The ISAF has also more proactive role in conducting joint planning with Poppy Eradication Force and Inter-agency Operational Coordination Centre to end narcotic drugs.

Map No 05.4: Opium Production Places in Afghanistan



Sources: (Dodge and Redman 2011: VII)

The Map no 05.4 highlights about the opium production place in Afghanistan. The red color is about the strong hold provinces for the opium production (more than 50% of the opium production), those provinces are Farah, Nimroz, Nangarhar and Kabul. Then, soil color provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar and Bagdihi etc are also producing opium but, little less than red color provinces. Gut the green color provinces are generally decreased their production and adapting alternative livelihood programmes provided by

donors' countries and organizations. In those green color provinces, through their respective resource capabilities both the NATO led ISAF and the EU have been effectively engaged to stop opium production like in those areas EUPOL of the EU and ISAF/PRTs are efficiently worked to reduce that opium production. For the period of 2002-2006, the EU has given EUR 236 million for rural development, alternative livelihoods and food security (EU Council Secretariat 2006a: 02). Indeed, development and security are correlated with each other as in Afghanistan while ISAF is providing security through its military power for the EU's different alternative models for the economic development instead of narcotic production in Afghanistan. In the year 2006, the EU provided EUR 236 million for the development, food security, alternative livelihoods, EUR 106 million for development of the economic infrastructure including reconstruction of the Kabul-Jalalabad road (jointly with Sweden), EUR 393 million for rebuilding government institutions and EUR 393 for health sector reforms.

The U.S Aid programme (USAID) had completed 1,000 developmental projects and initiated 780 more developmental projects in July 2007. Through this programme the U.S also disbursed \$800 million in 2006-2007 for developmental activities. The drugs trade threatens Afghanistan's development and security, fostering endemic corruption in the country and financing the insurgency. The most important NATO member state the U.S has been involved in this through its various programmes like USAID's programme. The purpose of USAID's Alternative Development programmes is to create licit alternatives to poppy production by promoting and accelerating rural economic development. The goal is to increase commercial agriculture opportunities, improve agricultural productivity, create rural employment and improve family incomes. So far, the individual programmes have succeeded in introducing a series of technological (new crops, new varieties and crop production practices), organizational (trade associations and farmer organisations) and institutional innovations. Through this programme over 100,000 people trained in agricultural sector productivity; More than 3.2 million trees planted; and over 30,000 farmers are now under contract with local food processing firms and wholesalers.

The EU has supported different sub-sectors like agriculture and local development. In this sub sectors different components were also assisted by the EU

namely water and natural resources management, seed and horticulture, animal health, the strengthening and development of rural local communities etc. Since 2004, the EU has contributed some € 93 million to this subsector. In coordination with the Government and other donors, the EU has concentrated in six sub-basins of the Panj-Amu River in Northern Afghanistan, which represent 40% of the Afghan water resource. The EU Programme in the water sector, the first pilot project addressing all components of the Integrated Water Resource Management approach, has also targeted about 40 upper catchments (watersheds) which have been extensively protected by community based actions. Since 2004, the EU support to animal health amounts to some € 23 million and includes technical cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) for institutional reform and building service delivery capacity in epidemiology surveillance and animal health service provision: rehabilitation of two border inspection posts, sub-national public veterinary offices and diagnostic laboratories, a Central Veterinary Diagnostic & Research Laboratory (CVDRL) and privatization of over 200 veterinary services providers. From 2001 to 2008, over € 92 million assistance from the EU was disbursed to improve the food security situation of the most vulnerable. During 2010, grants with a total value of € 7.5 million were awarded to link food security relief programmes to rehabilitation and development.

The EU assisted € 51.5 million to Afghanistan with technical cooperation of MAIL for horticulture policy reform, dissemination of quality planting, government research farms, support to farmers and nursery growers in different provinces for tree nursery, completion of National Collection of Fruit and Nut Varieties and support to different professional associations like nursery growers' associations and National Almond Industry Association. The EU also provided for enterprises to produce foundation seeds existing and newly released varieties and for the establishment of a system to commercialize quality certified seeds to farmers.

Political and Administrative Reforms

The Afghan Government lacks the technical capacities and political experts, and particularly the human resources, to adequately provide basic services on policy and administrative reforms such as conducting periodic elections and establishing democratic

norms and principles etc, those reasons influenced the President Karzai's government in Afghanistan to welcome the NATO's involvement and its cooperation with other national and international actors in re-building Afghanistan's economic, political and military systems. In 2010 only one third of the state budget was spent, while the remaining funds were not because of the state's inability to plan and implement its investments. The ISAF also assists the Afghan authority through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTS) to strengthen the political institutions through establishing good governance with building capacity, governance structures, rule of law in the states and to promote human rights, administrative reforms. The ability to hold free and fair elections is a crucial milestone in the development of Afghanistan's emerging democracy. In the political context, with the help of the EU, NATO has been establishing rule of law, governmental institutions, conducting election and improving political participations of both men and women, improving human rights practices, policy formations and implications. The ISAF is promoting effective Afghanistan governance system as symbol of inclusive, accountable and acceptable to the people. At the same time, it is also helping economic resources to Afghanistan with the cooperation of the EU, who has committed to provide civilian resources for reconstruction of the political and economic system of Afghanistan (Reichard 2006: 22; International Crisis Group 2005: 05). Winning over the local population with rapid and easily identifiable development and governance improvements was and is still considered Vital to facilitate the garnering of valuable intelligence information to defeat the insurgency (Stapleton 2007: 12). In addition to enhancing counter-insurgency objectives, quick impact projects were also designed to extend the reach and legitimacy of the Afghan central Government to the country side (Gauster 2008: 22). In practice, such projects have Included the construction of government buildings, schools, hospitals, as well as the rebuilding of transportation and communication infrastructure. Delivering services to the population in these forms was seen as a mechanism which could Reinforce favorable Afghan sentiments in regards to the U.S. presence, the local administration and by extension, to Kabul (Runo 2008: 10; Sedra 2005: 01).

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Alliance announced that it was entering a new phase in the ISAF mission and decided to transfer the responsibility for

maintaining security in the country to the Afghans. The aim of transition in 2014 is on the conditions based, not calendar driven and not equate to the withdrawal of ISAF troops. The Alliance has been keen to stress that transition does not mean exit, but moving into a supporting role with long-term partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014. (NATO 2010: 04). Over the last few years, public support for the ISAF mission in the majority of the NATO member states have plummeted, specifically in relation to the continuation of a combat role. Since then as public disapproval of the war has risen the coalition has become increasingly anxious to test Afghan force capabilities, US Defence Secretary Leon E. Panetta and others have indicated that the 'transition' outlined in Lisbon would be accelerated, and that all of Afghanistan will be under Afghan security by the end of 2013, while the coalition continues to provide assistance for another year until the withdrawal of NATO troops (Burki 2012:02). With this in mind, the announcement undoubtedly marks the beginning of the end of NATO's combat role in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Study Group argued, "Burden sharing among NATO allies is critical to the mission in terms of both available resources and public perceptions an increasingly unilateral mission as will be politically vulnerable in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of the ISAF/US coalition forces from Afghanistan, there may be endanger to the peace and stability of the south and central Asia. Still now the Afghanistan government doesn't have enough capability to fight against Taliban. Afghanistan government doesn't have effective military and air forces (including logistical support like arms and weapons) to carry out combat operations against the Taliban. Although, counter terrorism is not the mission of the NATO led ISAF, still directly or indirectly influences to this operation to reduce terrorist activities in Afghanistan.

The EU has been also actively involved in supporting capacity building and administrative reform. Institutional support has been provided to the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission for human resource organisation, public sector reform at provincial level, and its training. The EU also helped to define several options for civil service reform and assisted the Government in its priority to support ministries' reforms through reform implementation and management units, including by focusing on those institutions dealing with focal areas of the EU assistance

such as health and justice. The EU supported to Public Administration Reform (PAR) in Afghanistan which was completed in 2011 with the cooperation of its member states and presence of other major donors and international organisations. The EU is also contributes €40 million in support of the WB implemented Capacity Building for Results Programme (CBRP). This programme aims to draw the Government and international community together around a coordinated, five-year response to Public Administration Reform needs. A rational pay structure is at the core of the CBRP, which intends to increase the budget execution rate and service delivery capacity of certain key ministries through support for reforms and harmonized salary top-ups for major posts.

Police Training

The police training is also directly or indirectly supporting to Afghan government to fight against terrorism. NATO and the EU have been using their respective military and police forces to detect and eliminate terrorist networks in Afghanistan, and in this regard NATO military forces have been provided military training to Afghanistan national military forces whereas the EU police forces have been engaged themselves to effective police training to the Afghanistan national police forces for counter terrorism. Both the organizations have shown different field of coordination for counter terrorism operation in Afghanistan. For example, the EU has had conducted its EUPOL mission in Afghanistan to upsurge the capability of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and through this mission EUPOL have been giving training for capability-building to the Afghani police for counter terrorism.

At the request of Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, in 2010 EUPOL introduced the concept of "community policing" for building a trusting relationship with the community. It prevented violence and crime by being present in the community, advising its citizens, mediating disputes, or consulting community leaders. But due to various reasons such as weak social relations, low literacy and reactive approaches, low understanding of community and lack of knowledge of what constitutes professional, Violent and Discriminatory behavior and Misuse of power etc, the community policing has failed to

bring trusting relations between police and the community in Afghanistan (Ministry of Interior 2013: 11).

The EUPOL's objective is to establish sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy advice and institution-building work of the Union, Member States and other international actors. The EUPOL mission is based on the program 'Train the Trainer' which is supposed to develop an autonomous Afghan police training program. Providing support to the Afghan National Police within means and capabilities is also one of the ISAF's key tasks. In this sphere, the ISAF works in coordination with and in support of the United States as well as the EUPOL in Afghanistan. The EUPOL was authorized to deploy 400 police officers, but had 301 international staff and about 172 local employees as of November 2010. Initially the EUPOL has provided capability-building to the ANP in Kabul as the capital of Afghanistan but, later on the EUPOL has extended its mission to other cities including Herat, Maza-e-Sharif and Kandahar. The EUPOL mission has provided training of over 1,000 policemen in criminal investigation techniques, 675 police trainers, and over 300 inspectors in Afghanistan (MacKenzie 2010: 158). The EUPOL was staffed from 20 to 264 international members in August 2009.

Map No 05.5: EUPOL in Afghanistan:



Sources: EUPOL Afghanistan 2005, URL: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/lddecom/87/8705.gif>

The EUPOL's mission in Afghanistan is to support the reform process in order to develop a police forces and service working with the framework of the rule of law and respecting human rights. Six areas of activities have been identified: intelligence led policing; criminal investigations; police chain of command control and communication; anti-corruption; linkages between police and prosecutors and gender and human rights (EU Council Secretariat 2009a: 02). The EUPOL has established the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office staffed by specialized prosecutors who develop cases against high-profile public officials suspected of corruption, and trains inspectors within the Ministry of Interior in basic anti-corruption investigative techniques. In Afghanistan 59% of

people believe that corruption and public dishonesty is the most important problem surpassing even unemployment (52%) and insecurity (54%) as the President Karzai says that fight against corruption as the key priority of the Government of Afghanistan. At the London and Kabul conferences in 2010, the U.S President Obama also made anti-corruption is one among other important issues on his Afghanistan (CANAS 2011:10).

The NATO led ISAF assists the ANP primarily at the tactical level, with military support to operations, advice, shared information informal mentoring and guidance. The EU Member States plus Croatia, Canada, Norway and New Zealand have conducted mission under the leadership of a Danish commander, Kai Vittrup, it was deployed in Kabul and latter in 15 provinces, with a focus on civilian police training; criminal investigation mentoring; intelligence-led policing and anti-corruption programmes. The EU is engaged in the rule of law sector in Afghanistan at a number of levels. The European Commission and a number of Member States support the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) which funds the running costs of the Afghan National Police. The Commission along with certain Member States are also major donors in the justice sector, specifically funding to the Afghan National Justice Programme.

The U.S has been involved in police reform in Afghanistan since 2003. The U.S realized that training an ANA without having a strong ANP will limit the success of the operation. As opposed to the German's long term approach, the U.S implemented a short term/rapid training program. The U.S employs its soldiers and private security companies, such as DynCorp, in order to train in an 8 week period future police officers. Afghanistan remains a US-led war through the NATO led ISAF operations. The EUPOL on the other hand aimed to form a force which would undertake a traditional policing role over the longer term. The Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), adapting mission in accordance with the U.S, encompasses all the areas of police reform counting over 2.500 personnel in charge of police reform, plus the assistance of private contractors especially Dyncorp. The U.S budget on such area was approximately \$5.9 billion from 2005-2008 (International Crisis Group 2008: 09).

The member states of the EU have had difficulty during providing police training to ANP because, at a time extensive numbers of European police officers were also serving in Kosovo and Bosnia. 'In this mission, NATO and the U.S's six-week NTM-A training course covered the use of weapons. On the other hand the EUPOL aimed to form a police force with the traditional policing role over the longer term' (House of Lords and European Union Committee 2011: 23). It means during providing the police training to the ANP among the NATO, the EU and the U.S, some extent they vary from each other in terms of method, process, numbers and speed. In 2009, 'only 14% of ANA/ANP recruits were literate. Mandatory literacy courses have been established for recruits since 2010, but resolving this problem requires time and in the meantime the ANA's quality suffers' (House of Lords and European Union Committee 2011: 17). The Decision Making Problems is the big challenge for the smooth functioning of NATO-EU cooperation in providing police training to ANP, for example Germany says that police is a civilian law and order force where as U.S regarded it could play counter insurgency role. Training efforts of Afghan police under German and American leadership are not only partially overlapped but also contradict one another on account of their different approaches to policing (Gross 2009: 28).

The EU has provided funding for the construction of two police training centres, the Staff College in Kabul and a Regional Training Centre in Bamyán, with a special wing for women police officers. The project also includes three EUPOL-run capacity building projects. The first aims to pilot specific community policing units in seven provincial headquarters, while the two others aim to foster links between police and the justice sector. This is being carried out through strengthening specific units of police and prosecutors' ability to deal with crimes of violence against women and through promoting communication between police and legal aid providers in order to ensure that persons deprived of freedom are given legal representation. These activities have promoted linkages between the justice and policing sectors. The EU is an active participant in all policy discussions, including the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) and the LOTFA Steering Committee, EUPOL and Member States to ensure the overall coherence of the EU efforts in police reform. The effective reform of the

security sector needs to take into consideration that police and justice reforms are interlinked.

Italy served as the lead nation for justice reform before the EU got involved in the process. After the London conference of the EU in 2006, its member states had decided to effectively involved to reform the judiciary system of Afghanistan with cooperation of Italy. The EU assisted Afghanistan in a more holistic approach toward all its programmes in the rule of law sector. The EC has embarked on a new justice programme in 2007 aiming to set in place the institutional reform framework for the judiciary and prosecution service, covering pay and grading, recruitment systems and disciplinary procedures for all judges and prosecutors.

The EU has been involved in justice reform in four areas such as technical assistance, supporting the multilateral Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)⁹ justice project, the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)¹⁰ for salaries of personals working in the Ministry of Justice and the UNDP's access to Justice at district level' project (Gross 2009: 41). Map no 05.4 provides some data on the major donors to ARTF, those are Canada, European Union, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

⁹The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is a partnership between the international community and the Afghan government for the improved effectiveness of the reconstruction effort. Since early 2002, 30 donors have contributed over US\$3 billion (as of April 20 2009), making ARTF the largest contributor to the Afghan budget – for both operating costs and development programs. ARTF's support for national priority programs, for operating costs of government operations and for the policy reform agenda is contributing to the achievement of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy goals.

¹⁰The international community provides valued support to strengthen law enforcement in this country through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). In May 2002, at the request of the Afghan Interim Government, LOTFA was established by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to enable the national police to resume their operations. LOTFA acts as a mechanism for coordinating multi-billion Afghani contributions from donor governments with the principle priority of covering the salaries of police and prison guards, as well as building the capacity and professionalism of police.

Table No 05.4: Donors to ARTF (US \$):


DONORS TO ARTF	US\$	NATO member	EU member
US	1,743,234,795.00	YES	NO
UK	994,519,058.30	YES	YES
EU	361,754,245,27	XXX	XXX
Canada	562,146,136,08	YES	NO
Germany	382,917,000,00	YES	YES
Netherlands	382,917,000,00	YES	YES
France	16,407,200,00	YES	YES
Italy	94,334,420,00	YES	YES
Sweden	187,615,446,89	YES	YES

Sources: World Bank Group 2015:01

The table no 05.4 provides data and information on the major donors to the LOFTA such as Canada, EU, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, UK and US. In this donation, the US is the highest donor (\$ 257,074,432) as the major NATO member states. The table and bar chat have highlighted that non-member state Japan is the second highest donor to the LOFTA. Third highest donor is Germany as regarded as common member state of NATO and EU, and the third highest donor is the EU \$51,616,667 to the LOFTA.

Table No 05.5: Donors to LOFTA (US \$)

DONORS TO LOFTA	US\$	NATO Member	EU Member
CANADA	12,337,397	YES	NO
EU	51,616,667	XXX	XXX
DENMARK	6,939,800	YES	YES
FINLAND	2,139,800	XXX	YES
GERMANY	46,511,628	YES	
JAPAN	248,659,805	NO	NO
NETHERLANDS	14,666,667	YES	YES
NORWAY	15,938,297	YES	YES
SWITZERLAND	878,752	NO	YES
UK	11,727,103	YES	YES
US	257,074,432	YES	NO



(Sources: UNDP 2011)

The EU contributed € 20 million in between 2008 and 2010 for support of the justice sector including support to the National Justice Programme (NJP) through the ARTF with the aim of strengthening the centralized state justice system and increasing access to justice for the Afghan people. It also supports on remuneration of uniformed prison personnel at the Central Prisons Department and the UNDP programme 'Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan'. It also makes technical cooperation to continue activities first financed under the EU's Instrument for Stability in 2007 to build the capacity of the different Justice Institutions in Afghanistan like Ministry of Justice, Attorney General's Office and Human Resource Management Reforms and in the management of the national Legal Aid system.

In the context of police training, there are some challenges such as the U.S focuses on militarizing the police, when Germany and now the EU have implemented a civilian approach to it. Both actors have a different approach to reforming security sector. "Whereas the German vision focused on the police as a civilian law and order force, the U.S regarded police as a security force that also could play a counter-insurgency role". Germany, through its German Police Project Office (GPPO) had been working on reforming the Afghan National Police (ANP) with limited success (Gross 2009a: 27-28). The German approach has adopted by the EU as based on "centralization of coordination and training". It is based on a long-term strategy. On the other side, the US approach can be summarized by two concepts: contractors and short term. As lack of the EU agreement with NATO on sharing confidential information has to some extent limited for the EUPOL which was also its challenge in situational awareness and operations. That impact over the security experts on security sector reforms and emerged a question of whether the European "community policing" model would be successful or not in Afghanistan. Another challenge in the police training in Afghanistan is that-when the NATO led coalition police training was fundamentally strengthening the police as a counter-insurgency force which puts it by the U.S forces for fire against the insurgents as an alternative of training recruits to defend the inhabitants and maintain the rule of law in Afghanistan. The lack of literacy in the Afghan police is a fundamental problem hindering its development as literacy is regarded as a prime requirement for civilian

policing in order to take down evidence, keep proper records, read a map or a number plate or the serial number of a gun. Currently the police illiteracy rate is around 70% which regarded as the major obstacle in establishing security and stability in Afghanistan. Therefore it is also necessary for the U.S, NATO and the EU to invest their resources in the field of literacy rate of ANP for old and new recruitment which may enable them for better policing

Humanitarian Assistance

The European Commission of the EU is one of the major donors of official development assistance and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Collectively, the EU and its Member States have contributed €8 billion (nearly 8903.2\$M) in aid to Afghanistan since 2002, including European Commission funding of €1.8 billion (nearly 2003.22\$M). Nearly half of the EU support (47 percent) is dedicated to good governance, rule of law, and security programs. The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)¹¹ also supports Afghans affected by the ongoing crisis as well as natural disasters affecting the region. The ECHO has disbursed €300 million since 2001 to meet the basic needs of the Afghan population, from assistance to cover losses in food, livestock, and agricultural assets for those affected by a severe cold wave; to support that facilitates the return and re-integration of Afghan refugees. It has provided € 493 million (nearly 548.66\$M) of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan in between 2001 to 2011.

The ECHO is one of the few humanitarian donors consistently supporting projects in Afghanistan since 1994. It has allocated funds strictly on the basis of the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality. The ECHO continues to provide humanitarian assistance to conflict and disaster-affected communities in Afghanistan. Projects funded by the EU are providing emergency medical care, food and water assistance, protection, shelter, sanitation, hygiene promotion, and livelihood support to people affected by conflict and natural disasters in general and to the displaced in

¹¹The ECHO is responsible for humanitarian assistance to third countries, bringing support to victims of conflict or disasters, both natural and manmade all over the world. ECHO operates mainly through its implementing partners and manages humanitarian assistance infavour of populations affected by humanitarian crises and promotes disaster preparedness. It assesses humanitarian needs in emergency situations and evaluates and closely monitors the humanitarian situation in the field as well as the implementation of operations, among other activities.

particular. Therefore, the ECHO plays a very significant role on protection, general support to conflict-affected populations including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees and refugees in neighboring countries, responses to natural disasters, and food assistance (in remote areas and in coordination with the EU’s food security thematic programme and the Food Facility). The ECHO also supports the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan, as well as humanitarian flights (PACTEC) and the NGOs safety network (ANSO). The Humanitarian Implementation Plan which was adopted in November 2011, provided € 30 million with focusing on protection, general support to conflict-affected populations including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees and refugees in neighboring countries, responses to natural disasters, and food assistance.

Table No 05.6: Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan (\$Millions)

Major Humanitarian Aid Country	2011	2010	2009	2008	NATO Member	EU Member
Australia	11.9	21.4	5.5	13.1	NO	NO
Canada	46.5	32.6	25.9	45.7	YES	NO
France	3.8	4.6	8.1	6.1	YES	YES
Germany	17.8	32.7	38.2	50.9	YES	YES
UK	27.3	3.5	10	25.3	YES	YES
US	339.5	156.4	58.9	156.8	YES	NO
All other	447.5	479.3	542	286.5	XXX	XXX

(Resources: NATO 2012: 01)

Table no 05.6, provides information and data on humanitarian aid where NATO member states such as US, UK and Canada were given significant contribution in the humanitarian aid programme to Afghanistan. Other international organizations including the EU, WB and some non- member states of NATO and EU are jointly given more amount of humanitarian aid (\$447.5m). Among the individual member country, NATO member state U.S has provided \$339.5m following by UK (\$27.3m) in 2011. In this field, member countries of both the organizations as well as non-member countries are also individually provided their significant aid to Afghanistan.

Democracy Promotion

A successful democratic system in Afghanistan requires democratic electoral system, Protection of human rights, well-functioning and accountable government institutions Rule of law, legislative and judicial institutions, decentralization of government, Checks and balances and Political pluralism. Before 2001, there was no democratic government in Afghanistan but, after the fall of Taliban regime, the UN and other international actors are trying to establish a representative democratic¹² government through which people of Afghanistan feel the right, liberty, equality and justice in every aspect of their life without fear of war, conflict and dictatorship administration. In this field, both the NATO led ISAF and the EU have been played a very significant role in strengthening and promoting democratic form of government in Afghanistan.

Apart from removing Taliban regime, the international community had objective of establishing the democratic government for lasting peace, stability and development in Afghanistan where Afghans feel the enjoyment of right, liberty, equality and justice. At the Bonn conference in 2001, the UN had a very significant role who remove the Taliban regime from Afghanistan and mandated ISAF to help the Afghanistan for newly establishing democratic representative government. Bonn agreement had addressed the following provisions relating with the democracy:

8. *“Promoting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country,*
9. *Reaffirming the territorial independence, sovereignty and of Afghanistan,*
10. *Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice,*
11. *Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been*

¹² Abraham Lincoln said that ‘*Democracy is a form of Government of the People, by the People and for the People.* Democracy addresses about the supreme power of the people where no dictatorship administration will take place, people enjoy their right, liberty, equality and justice, peace-cooperation and stability of the state would be seen, limited and constitutional form of government, various political parties and periodic elections as well as division of functions like legislature, executive and judiciary etc all these norms and principles are together make democracy. Afghanistan has made significant progress in the establishment of democratic process since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

adequately represented at the UN Talks on Afghanistan,

- 12. As interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government,*
- 13. Considering that the United Nations, as the internationally recognized impartial institution, has a particularly important role to play, in establishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan,*
- 14. The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be independent and shall be vested in a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, and such other courts as may be established by the Interim Administration. The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United Nations, a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions” (United Nations 2001: 01).*

After the fall of the Taliban regime, the first presidential election was held in 2004 and Parliamentary and Provincial election was held in 2005 under the supervision of the NATO led ISAF. The Afghan Government and its security forces had lead the effort to ensure that the people of Afghanistan have a safe and secure election. Security for the elections was provided first and foremost by the Afghan National Security Forces, ISAF providing once more third line support. The Alliance had generated temporary additional troops to be deployed in time prior to the elections. The international coalition was shown at the Bonn Conference in November 2001 which led by the EU and through the ‘Bonn Agreement’ Afghanistan agreed to adapt a new constitutional framework. In that conference NATO and the EU member states were not only emphasized on fight against terrorism but also attempted to reform the Afghanistan political system with the new constitution (THEIR 2006: 566).

At the presidential election in 2009, there was a successful voter registration under the leadership of the Independent Election Commission (IEC). The IEC has registered almost 4.4 million new voters, in addition to the more than 12.5 million registered in 2004 and 2005. Security was provided principally by the ANP, with support from the ANA, while ISAF’s role was mainly logistical support. ISAF has supported the

ANSF throughout the election process. In the first presidential election, 75% of eligible voters were participated and 51% voted in the 2005 Parliamentary elections (NATO Public Diplomacy 2009: 22). After NATO led ISAF involvement in Afghanistan, some of the new political parties were emerged such as Republican Party of Afghanistan, National Congress Party of Afghanistan, Mutahed-e Milli, National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan and the National Front. During the first presidential election in 2004, an independent candidate called Hamid Karzai was won the election and became the first independent President of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime (Katzman 2006: 02). In this regard, the EU has a very significant role in promoting and strengthening the democratic government in Afghanistan. The Presidential and Provincial Council elections in 2009 were an important milestone of democratic progress, where both the NATO led ISAF and the EU have cooperated each other with their respective resource capability. The NATO led ISAF was basically emphasized on security sector and the EU was on the democratic norms and principles. In addition, the EC organized an Election Observation Mission of around 100 observers with General Phillippe Morillon as Chief Observer. The EU Observation Mission was the sole internationally recognized mission observing the election in August 2009. The EU has directly or indirectly supporting to the NATO led ISAF for its mission to establish democracy in Afghanistan, like the EU long term election observers for both the Parliamentary elections in 2005 and the Presidential elections in 2009 were in-country for several weeks before the election-day, reporting on a range of issues including access to media, voter registration, and equal treatment of candidates. In 2005, the European Commission of the EU committed EUR 4 million for running of the EU Election Observation Mission and EUR 8.5 million towards the cost of organizing elections, plus EUR 3 million for the institutional development of the Afghan Parliament. Free and fair elections are at the core of democratic rule, and the EU has helped plan, fund, and monitor elections in Afghanistan since 2005. The EU Election Observation Mission was also emphasized on the Expansion of political participation through a strengthened civil society, continuing improvement of the situation of women especially in public life, Strengthened role of the media and Enhancement of national unity and reconciliation. It also conducted a comprehensive assessment of the entire electoral process with reference to the international standards for democratic elections

during the presidential election in 2009, at the same time it also expressed its opinion on the importance of electoral process in several press for the development and stability of the Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the EU has consistently supported credible and transparent elections that express the will/interest of the people. The EU's European Commission contributed €35 million towards presidential election of 2009 and was the sole internationally recognized election observation mission. NATO's role in this context is to assist and build Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity as an essential element of good governance. ANSF and ISAF are working to provide the security necessary to allow for economic and social development to take root. Admiral Matthieu Borsboom, ISAF's deputy chief of staff for stability, visited the registration site at Aisha Durani in 1st December, 2009 and said that *"It's a good process because [it has been] invented by the Afghans; they decided on it and conduct [it] with Afghan people," he said. "It's a step by step process that has been made very clear for the people, and I think they are doing quite well. What I found very interesting is that the ladies would motivate other women to vote"* (International Security Assistant Force 2008: 01). The constitution of the Afghanistan was formally approved in January 2004 which consists of 162 Articles and officially signed by Hamid Karzai as the President of Afghanistan in 26th January 2004 and this development has further strengthen the democracy and its norms or principles through the written document (Katzman 2006: 01).

The socio-cultural activities are the most important influential factors in the political developmental activities in Afghanistan, and particularly 'Islam religion' is regarded as state religion of Afghanistan which also plays as the most important role in controlling women empowerment and their participation in the political system. Obeying Islam is more important than obeying roles and regulations of the constitution which causes behind the failure to bring gender equality and women's rights. In the various ways Islam religion makes obstacle towards promoting gender equality and women's rights in political activities like not allowing women for voting and contest in election, to enjoy the right, liberty and equality in political institutions etc. Even Afghanistan's commitment to international human rights treaties have been contravened with the

provisions and tenants of Islam particularly in the cases of gender equality before the law, under-age marriages, domestic violence and forced marriages etc. But, there are certain challenges towards the democracy and rule of law in Afghanistan which need to address. According to the report of Independent Election Commission (IEC), during the parliamentary elections of Afghanistan in 2010, around 5.6 million ballots were cast, out of which 23% were invalid. At the same time that election process was accompanied by extensive deception such as ballot-box stuffing, corrupt election officials, people forced to cast their votes at gunpoint and security forces complicit with corrupt candidates were raised and particularly Pashtun province in the southern region of Afghanistan (CANAS 2011:02). Although the EU has been contributed financial aid and sends election observation mission to Afghanistan to re-build and strengthen its democratic system, still problems like illegal opium production, corruption and lack of good governance and lack of security and stability in the different parts of the country etc are the existing challenges for the NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan.

Social and Educational field

Islam religion plays a very significant role in every aspects of life in Afghanistan. The socio-economic and educational systems determined through the norms and principles of Islam. The vast majority of Afghans are Muslims and they follow the Qu'ran as the holly book of Islam. The book declares that the God is dictated to the Prophet Mohammed and the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet). Islam religion has basically five tenets or principles such as *Reciting the Declaration of Faith, Praying five times per day (at dawn, midday, in the afternoon, at dusk, and at night), Giving alms (charitable donations) to the needy, Fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, Performing the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) if means and health permit (Background Brief 2007:10)*. All the people of Islam are believed in those five principles and it is regarded as the most important disciplines of life, even more than constitutional laws and regulations. In Afghan society men are responsible for the family's financial affairs as they work and provide all the necessary elements like food, clothes and other needs. Due to restrictions in Islam, women do not work outside the home and live in silence as they have no voice or choices. Afghan women are restricted by their cultural issues. The woman's duty is to stay home, cook,

clean the house, raise the children, weave and sew. They accept their lives and rarely question the restrictions placed on them. Reputation is also very important in the family, and women are the primary source of a family's reputation depends on her obeying and respecting the rules and regulations which have been established by the men in the family (Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center 2011: 02). In view of the multi-ethnic composition, cultural and linguistic policies were an important factors in the development of education as lack of economic stability considers the major drawback in education (Samady 2001: 09).

However, since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the women have been allowed to return back to work, the government no longer forces them to wear the burqa, and they have even been appointed to prominent positions in the government. Both the NATO and the EU have contributed their respective resource capabilities with mutual coordination and cooperation to the improvement and safeguard of human rights, women's rights, and gender equality in Afghanistan. When the EU take care of the policies and programmes for the socio-economic and educational empowerment of the women, the ISAF have provided its troops for giving security for the successful conducting of those empowerment programmes. For the women empowerment and protection of women right and liberties, a legal framework of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security is already existing, and in this regard both the NATO and the EU are strongly supported and asserted their concrete steps towards ending sexual violence in war, empowering women and highlighting their vital role in restoring stability.

Under authorization of the NATO led ISAF, PRTs have been engaged in school infrastructural development and playing a very significant role in the socio-educational sectors for women empowerment like Schools are being rebuilt with the mentoring or assistance of ISAF engineers, allowing children to resume their education in Afghanistan. 06 (six) million children were enrolled in primary schools in 2008 (of which 2 million were girls), up from only one million under the Taliban (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2010: 57). Its Schools' enrollment went from approximately 900,000 in 2000 to 6.7 million in 2009. For girls, the increase was even more dramatic: from only a few thousand to 2.7 million in 2011. Signs of progress are noticeable in other domains

including Afghan National Security Forces and Afghanistan parliamentarians. The EU has provided resources for building administrative infrastructures and reforms the political policies and programmes for giving representation to women in politics, for example providing 27% reservation to women in political system and till 2011 more than 28% of Afghan Parliamentarians are women (NATO 2012b :02). Another example is during the provincial and presidential elections of 2005 and 2009, women were getting more number of participation than Taliban regime to elect the democratic representatives. In this context, when the EU Election Observer Mission were taking care of the voter registration and ballot systems, reforming policy and programme during elections, the NATO led ISAF provided security to women voters and candidates.

At a conference in Brussels on 27th Jan, 2010, both NATO and the EU sides have addressed their policies and programmes to enhance cooperation with other international actors in dealing with the issue of standing together for women's rights. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Vice President of European Commission Margot Wallström have encouraged to women empowerment and said that *"We want to ensure that all EU and NATO-led operations comply with UN resolutions relating to women, peace and security, and that they are supported by appropriate education, training, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms"* (Pajhwok Report 2010: 02; European Union 2010:01). The EU is also bringing gender equality through its EUPOL which provides a helpline for Afghan policewomen as well as effectively making and distributing a textbook for the training, Human Rights, Gender and Child Rights with the support of National Police Academy in Afghanistan (Stockli 2014: 11). The EU Development aid is a significant tool for mainstreaming gender deliberations or to bring gender equality in Afghanistan. Different women-specific projects are supporting and funding by the EU which supports in providing legal aid and protection of women, empowering them through their participating in democratic election process and public affairs, building capacities of national and local institutions etc. The best example is the 'EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development' in 2010 which tried to reinforce the formation and implementation of the gender policy in Afghanistan, and the plan is basically emphasized on the gender mainstreaming, specific action and programme on women and addition of gender equality issues into policy (Stockli 2014: 07).


The EU also assisted to enhance the quality of the higher education and research institutions in Afghanistan, by developing links between European and Afghan institutions, providing scholarships and through language support. The EC has also funded to Afghanistan Women's Resource Centres (WRCs)¹³. The centres provide a comprehensive training programme aiming at empowering women and strengthening the civil society. Since education is one of the most important factors in the development of women, AWRC provides learning opportunities to young and old women by establishing learning centers that houses literacy classes, libraries, management/journalism institute and teacher training institutions.

The EU is also providing 'Erasmus Mundus Programme' to Afghanistan students for higher education. Its aim is to provide quality of higher education and encourage dialogue between people and cultures through mobility and academic cooperation (EACEA 2013: 01). On the other side under the authorization of the ISAF, PRTs are actively engaged themselves to visit, build and reconstruct Schools. The PRTs have interacted with children, teachers, village elders to enhance the quality of education and at the same time, if schools are becoming a target of violence then the ISAF have provided security with their military capabilities. The Dam Kalay School in Afghanistan was funded by the Kunar PRT at a cost of \$219,000. This school construction was begun in August 2009, with having 14 rooms and which accommodated 300 students. In Kunar province gradually the numbers of schools are increased to 50 as committed effort of the EU and PRTs which authorized through the ISAF in Afghanistan (USCC 2011: 01).

¹³ AWRC serves women and children in six provinces including Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman. AWRC strives to strengthen women so they can actively take part in decision-making processes that affects their lives and social standing. These learning centers also offer English language classes, management and other jobs skills to increase access to job opportunities. AWRC helps women to improve their economic and social well-being through vocational skills trainings, micro-finance loans, literacy classes, preventive health education, management capacity building programs, advocacy for equitable and sustainable national development. It also provides awareness raising about the role and contribution of Afghan women to society. To reach women in urban and rural communities, AWRC establishes community-based women's centers, a hallmark of AWRC's model. The centers facilitate opportunities for women to share experience and exchange ideas on various issues, including debates that promote solidarity among women.

Table no 05.7: Contributions to the GPE Fund by donors (%)

S.N	DONORS TO GPE	% OF FUNDS	NATO Member	EU Member
1	Australia	9.03	NO	NO
2	Belgium	1.71	YES	YES
3	Canada	3.2	YES	NO
4	Denmark	7.62	YES	YES
5	European Union	4.71	XXX	XXX
6	Finland	0.14	NO	YES
7	France	2.52	YES	YES
8	Germany	1.37	YES	YES
9	Ireland	1.83	YES	YES
10	Italy	1.00	YES	YES
11	Japan	0.53	NO	NO
12	Luxembourg	0.18	YES	YES
13	Netherlands	16.60	YES	YES
14	Norway	7.96	YES	NO
16	Romania	0.02	YES	YES
17	Russia	0.39	NO	NO
18	Spain	9.90	YES	YES
19	Sweden	7.04	YES	YES
20	Switzerland	0.86	NO	YES
21	U.K	21.92	YES	YES
22	U.S	2.15	YES	NO



Sources: GPE (2011), DONORS, URL: <http://www.globalpartnership.org/donors>

This chart is showing the data of above table no 05.07. The NATO Virtual Silk Highway (SILK) project provides Internet access via satellite to the academic communities of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Since 2006, it has been also operational at the Kabul University and has expanded to the provinces. Through SILK, NATO Public Diplomacy Division's Science for Peace and Security (SPS) programme is assisting the Afghan authorities in developing their educational system. In 2008, the SPS programme connected to the Kabul University and the Ministry of Higher Education to a campus network and set-up a video teleconferencing facility. Work is in progress to provide Internet access through the Virtual Silk Highway to other higher education institutions in Kabul, including the National Military Academy, and the Media and Information Center. In March 2008, the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) was tasked to conduct a feasibility study on the potential provision of Internet connectivity for

universities outside of Kabul. The Afghan Ministry of Higher Education has identified 6 universities such as Heart University; Jawzjan University in Sheberghan; Kandahar University, Sheikh Zaid University in Khost Province, Balkh University in Mazar-e-Sharif; and Nangarhar University in Jalalabad are the first beneficiaries of that facility.

Conclusion

The NATO-EU cooperation has been achieved in staff to staff contacts, institution to institution in both sides from formal and informal point of view. But, the NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan is in question of success and failure?, and also it's a question of credibility of respective military and civilian power. Due to lack of political experts and civil servants, Afghanistan's political and administrations are very weak and for that reason NATO and the EU have been trying to enhance the effective political and administrative servants with proper trainings. The PRTs have actively engaged in establishing rule of law, political and administrative institutions, conducting elections and improving political participations. The EU supports in reform of public administration and civil services. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, both NATO and the EU have been reformed the political system with their respective resource capabilities like in promotion or establishing democratic government in Afghanistan EU had tried to reform political institutions, rule of laws with its political experts and financial assistances. During election of 2005 and 2009, the EU have send its election observers and political experts to successfully conduct elections in the democratic ways and NATO led ISAF have provided security in different electorate places in Afghanistan.

Both the organization have very limited emphasis on the long term projects for the structural change and job creation than short term cash for work programmes. One of the alternative livelihood programme like the Helmand Food Zone Programme, it was introduced in 2008 designed to assist farmers in switching from growing poppy to legal crops, has introduced a more comprehensive strategy than ever and received support from different ministries of Afghanistan. In this programme Afghan Farmers were received diverse agricultural inputs including seeds, wheat and fertilisers with targeting opium eradication campaign and executed also. This program was only carried out mainly in the

central part of Helmand as considered one of the more secure parts of the province. Although both the member states and non-member states of NATO and EU are individually donated in Afghanistan for humanitarian aid, still in most of the part of Afghanistan people do not getting minimum requirements or facilities such as food security, drinking water, medical care, shelter, hygiene promotion, sanitation and livelihood supports.

In socio-educational sectors also Islam religion plays a great significant role where people of Afghanistan blindly obey and respect to the religious principles than rules and regulations of NATO led ISAF and the EU. In this context, both the organizations don't have specific formal agreements to rebuild socio-educational sectors and only following to the Berlin plus agreements. Through their respective resource capability both have been trying in their won level best. Terrorist groups like Taliban and Al-Qada have manipulated to different religious leaders in different ways against the state and government, and also empowering them with providing necessary resources to carry-out their religious activities, and almost all the activities in the state. In Afghanistan peace operation, there is lack of regular dialogues between NATO and the EU, which may conduct or ensure consultation, cooperation and transparency in particular by holding formal meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO, and ministerial meetings as well as meetings between the NATO and EU Military Committees at the request of either organization on the basis of specific agendas on Afghanistan. Thus, the NATO Secretary General should have a seat at the meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is the lynchpin of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Likewise, the EU's High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU, should be invited to NAC meetings on a permanent basis. The International Community, including NATO, is helping the Afghan Government enhance security, improve governance and step up reconstruction and development. Still, Afghanistan's economic and political administrations are not well-functioning and not self-sustained. To end the production of narcotic drugs and to bring a well sustainable economic systems are difficult for the EU which will take long time, and if the EU will not able to do then it also lose its political and economic credibility in the

world affairs. The NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan has revealed serious gaps between political rhetoric and actual commitment. Member countries of both the organization have not always matched political commitments with necessary resources. Although NATO Allies unanimously agreed on a greater role for the Alliance, the allocation of troops and equipment dragged considerably. Lack of consensus on how best to adapt funding for joint operation is also limited NATO's effectiveness in Afghanistan.

The US has determined to stay for long period in Afghanistan with the support of other member states of NATO and the EU as planned for a long-term presence with their forces. But, some member states of both the organizations are more or less contemplating. Due to unfair distribution of the military and financial burden country like Canada has asserted its view over the future fair distribution of military and financial burden in Afghanistan peace building operation. And if the member states of both NATO and the EU will withdraw their troops without success in Afghanistan then, probably it will not considers as a breakdown of the ISAF mission but, capability or credibility of both the organizations would be seriously undermined. The UN's given authorization to the NATO to led ISAF and its seeking/taken cooperation from the EU in Afghanistan which regarded as one of the very illogical/controversial issues. If, the UN continues to allow this type of operation to NATO and the EU in future then there may emerge conflicts among the international organizations. After some years other regional organizations such as South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Shanghais Cooperation Organization (SCO), African Union (AU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Association of South East-Asian Nation (ASEAN) will come forward to make their own separate or independent military capabilities and then after they may desire to carry out various peace keeping and crisis management operations.

CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION

Both NATO and the EU were originated after the World War II. Both are two different regional organizations. NATO is a military organization with having the strong military capability, and the EU is a political and economic organization with having civilian resource capability. In the Cold War period, NATO had solely emphasized on a deterrent role against the Soviet Union and its allies, and the EU had emphasized on economic integration in the Western Europe. In this period, both the organizations have given importance on their respective role and functions without significant interaction between each other. However, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, NATO was expected to lose its relevance in the post-Cold War period. During this period, due to the growing numbers of crisis-management and peace-keeping operations and global challenges in the larger world, the UN has been unable to provide necessary resources which influence it to seek cooperation from other regional organizations for the burden sharing and maintain international peace and security. This reason has propelled the UN to authorize to NATO and the EU for peace keeping operation in the world. After the 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S, the UN made International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) at Bonn conference in 2001 to conduct peace operation in Afghanistan. However, due to lack of military capability, the UN authorized NATO to led ISAF in 2003. However, Afghanistan peace operation needs both the military and civilian resource capabilities. As a military organization, NATO has military resource capability, and has not enough civilian resource capability. Moreover, in this time NATO realized to take cooperation from the EU as a political and economic organization it can contribute better civilian resources in this operation. In 2003, through the Berlin Plus agreement both the NATO and the EU have developed formal agreement and through which they have enhanced their cooperation and partnership in the field of peace-keeping operations and global challenges. This chapter provides the major findings of the previous chapters and highlights answers of the research questions and testing hypotheses. It further throws light on learning lessons of both the organizations in Afghanistan.

NATO and EU: Development in the Cold War Era

During the Cold War, NATO focused solely on its deterrence role against the Soviet Union and its allies for the protection of Western Europe. The NATO member states such as the U.S, Canada and some Western European countries were feared on a massive Soviet military buildup and the ideological challenge of communism which considered as the main reason for its maintaining deterrent role against the Soviet Union. The EU has evolved through the process of integration in several stages and forms. In 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed by Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, West Germany and the Netherlands. In March 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) to establish a common market, defined as the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital to approximate national economic policies and to develop common policies, most specifically in agriculture. Again European atomic energy community 'Euratom' was also set up in 1957 by the second treaty of Rome to promote collaboration on the development of nuclear energy for peaceful economic purposes. In 1967, all the three institutions such as EEC, ECSC and EURATOM were merged to form a single set of institutions and in 1968 through the ratification of the Merger Treaty, it became known as the European Community (EC) (Meher 2016a: 02). From the structural point of view, the NATO has not changed much more in the Cold War period like the EU. NATO's structural evolution basically took place in the post-Cold War era where as the EU's structural evolution was seen in the different stages of successes like the formation of the ECSC in 1952, again after its success, the European countries were created the Euratom and EEC in 1957. After formation of those institutions then jointly all those three institutions came into a single set of an institution called the European Community (EC) in 1967 (Meher 2016a: 02).

In this period, there was stern division of functions and roles between NATO and the ESCS and its other institutional heirs. The NATO's purpose was to provide collective defense for the U.S, Canada and its European allies to counter-balance the probable threats from the Soviet Union. The U.S possession of atomic bombs and aircraft with the capability to deliver them was the real deterrent to a Soviet attack at the time. The U.S

needed military installations in Western Europe to operate those aircraft and the Western European countries interested to providing them. The European states could pin down the reluctant United States in defense of the Western Europe through NATO. There was not much of formal interaction between the two organizations. Whatever the EEC/EC/EU did in the realm of low politics moved to the rhythm of NATO's tune and any European overtures aimed at revising NATO's mandate were in the end downplayed by the spectrum of the Soviet Union's military muscle. Absenteeism from high politics gave the Western Europeans, through their regional organization, a free ride to economic development, social welfare and the feeling of moral superiority that resulted from their lack of direct involvement in power driven geopolitical games (Galbreath and Gebhard 2010: 100).

NATO and the EU: post-Cold War Era

After end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded its role of collective defence to collective security through adapting new tasks such as peace keeping and crisis-management operations, fight against global challenges (Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Narcotic Drugs and Piracy problems etc) in the changed international scenario. In the Cold War period, NATO did not emphasize all these issues and only concentrated on a deterrent role against the Soviet Union and its allies. On the other hand, the EU Member States determined to strengthen their ties and negotiated a new Treaty called Maastricht Treaty at the Maastricht in December 1991. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992, gave the process of formal title of the European Union (EU) which entered into force in November 1993' (Meher 2016a: 03). There was a major shift from purely economic purpose organization to gradually acquiring a role in both economic and political integration of the countries in Europe (Peterson and Usherwood 2007: 14; Pinder and Usherwood 2007: 04). Managed inter-dependence model is best suitable to explore the changes in the organization of the European countries. There was no institutional coordination between both NATO and the EU during the Cold War time, but in the post-Cold War era both the organizations have expanded their role and functions to other areas. Emerging global challenges made NATO more conscious for seeking cooperation from other international organizations like the UN and the EU. This realization made NATO to increase its interactions with other international organizations and especially with the EU. While the

NATO-EU relationship has greatly improved over the years, further development of the relationship towards a more effective partnership continues to be slow and uneven. Progress has been achieved in staff-to-staff contacts between NATO's International Staff and the EU Council. Ad-hoc co-ordination of efforts on the ground can by no means be a supplement for a necessary, and indeed long overdue, institutional co-operation between NATO and the EU. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been steadily moving in a direction consistent with the purposes of an Alliance of collective security. At the Summit Meeting in London in July 1990, in the most far-reaching Declaration issued since NATO was founded, the Heads of State and Government announced major steps to transform the Alliance in a manner commensurate with the new security environment and to bring an end to the confrontation between the East and the West. They extended offers to the governments of the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO and to work towards a new relationship based on cooperation (NATO 1990: 01). After the Rome Declaration and London summit of NATO in 1991, NATO sought the support of the EC because during that time EC was a single political and economic organization which holds strong civilian resource capability in Europe. Therefore, mainly due to the lack of civilian resource capabilities, NATO was keen on cooperation with EC to carry out its new roles and functions effectively. The NATO's growing partnership with the EC/EU had been seen since the Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) was the first crisis response operation of NATO in 1992, where it launched its first air support mission and bombing several Serb targets at the request of UN commanders and also initiated its air campaign and deployed forces to implement the military aspects of the 'Dayton Peace Agreement' which was replaced a year later by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). In the year 1999, NATO launched military operations in Kosovo and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was launched in March 1999, to stop hostility and to demilitarize the Kosovo liberation army; to support the international humanitarian effort, and coordinate and support the international civil presence. In the case of Macedonia, NATO launched its operation to disarm the ethnic Albanian groups and destroy the weapons collected from them. On 27 August 2001, NLA fighters began handing over the weapons to the NATO-led Task Force in FYROM. In the past peace keeping and crisis management operations

of the NATO and the EU in Kosovo, both the organizations have shared the common objective to support and assist the Kosovo authorities in developing a stable, peaceful and multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. On 17 March 2003, due to lack of civilian resource capability, NATO transferred this operation to the EU as the EU wanted to share the burden of NATO by managing the crisis in FYROM. It was the first time that NATO transferred the operation to the EU and worked together on the ground. Like in FYROM case, in June 2004, due to lack of civilian resource capability of NATO and under the Berlin Plus agreements NATO decided to end its Stabilization Force (SFOR) in BiH and transfer this operation to EU for security burden sharing.

From the past experiences in peace keeping and crisis management operations, both NATO and the EU have realized the need of formal institutional cooperation, and developed the institutional coordination like PSC of EU and NAC of NATO, Berlin plus agreement of 2003, the EU cell at SHAPE (EUCS) and NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) at the EU military staff, Deputy Supreme Commander of Europe (DSACEUR) and EU-NATO Capability Group etc. All these formal institutional relations have a significant impact over the NATO-EU partnership and play an effective role in carrying out peace operation in Afghanistan.

NATO's Mandate and Resource Capabilities in Afghanistan

In military role, NATO provides security to the EU officials and PRTs officials during their civilian re-construction activities through its military and police forces and providing military and police training to ANA and ANP. In civilian role, NATO-led ISAF and its PRTs have conducted different civilian activities such as counter narcotic operation and economic reconstruction, political reforms and socio-educational developments, etc. In both military and civilian role, NATO needs both the military and civilian resources capabilities. However, due to lack of civilian resource capabilities to re-build socio-economic-political and educational system, the help of civilian resources capabilities from the EU was necessary and without its cooperation NATO-led ISAF could not able to carry out its operation in Afghanistan. The NATO-led ISAF's resource capability in its Afghanistan peace building operation, not only depended on its member

states but also depended non-member states and also from the EU, the UN and the World Bank (WB) for financial burden sharing. In the context of financial burden sharing, more than 50 percent humanitarian donors and financial resources are coming from the outside of the NATO member states and other international partners like the EU, the UN and the WB. Not only in humanitarian donation but also in the military costs are also assisted by the non-member states like Australia and India. Chapter four has addressed that non-member states of NATO like Australia, India and others have contributed a significant amount in relations to the military and civilian expenditure. It implies NATO's dependent on non-member states and other international organizations. Although NATO has the capability for military resources, still it does not have enough civilian capability for ISAF's peace building operation in Afghanistan.

NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan

Initially, the UN mended ISAF was created at the Bonn conference in 2001 to operate in Afghanistan and to help the newly formed Afghan Government in re-building socio-economic-political and military systems. However, due to lack of military resources of UN, it authorized NATO to lead the ISAF in 2003. After getting authorization from the UN in 2003, the NATO-led ISAF pursued its operation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is NATO's first 'out of area' operation beyond Europe. This peace operation is a multi-faceted task which needs all the economic, political and military tools or resources. As a military organization, NATO could lead the ISAF but for rebuilding the socio-economic and political system, it needs civilian resources. However, NATO does not have enough civilian resources for this operation and for this reason it seeks cooperation from other international organizations in 2003. On the one hand, NATO's having a tremendous financial burden in the civilian reconstruction effort, and on the other hand the EU as an only single political and economic organization of Europe, show its interest to assist NATO in civilian reconstruction activities in Afghanistan (Lindley-French 2007: 116). The NATO-EU formal partnership was already finalized on 11 March 2003 through 'Berlin Plus Agreement'. Through this agreement both NATO and the EU have had coordinated and cooperated in different operations like Macedonia and Kosovo etc, and in Afghanistan also they followed different measures to rebuild Afghanistan with their respective military and civilian capabilities. In Afghanistan the EU has had committed to

provide civilian resources for reconstruction of the political and economic systems of Afghanistan and the NATO-led ISAF provided security for the EU's tasks in civilian sectors.

In Afghanistan, both NATO and the EU have been engaged in different areas of operations such as partnership in Economic Reconstruction Tasks, Alternative Livelihoods, Political and Administrative Reforms, Police Training, Humanitarian Assistance, Democracy Promotion, Social and Educational field, etc. Above all, in all these fields both the organizations have cooperated and coordinated with their respective resource capabilities and enable the Afghanistan government to re-build its social, economic, political and security systems. In many sectors, progress have been achieved as both the organizations have provided police training through their respective initiative like EUPOL of the EU, German police forces, NATO police forces (NTM-A) . If we see the data of 2011, then the EUPOL mission has provided training to over 1,000 policemen in criminal investigation techniques, 675 police trainers, and over 300 inspectors in Afghanistan. The NATO and the US have provided the police training to the Afghanistan police forces in six-week NTM-A training course basis which covered the use of weapons and counter interagency operation. Both the organizations have engaged in counter narcotic drugs operations in Afghanistan, when the EU have provided agricultural and infrastructural facilities and alternative livelihood programmes at that time the NATO-led ISAF have provided security for the successful implementation of them. The ECHO has provided € 493 million of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan in between 2001 to 2011, and during the presidential election in 2004 and 2009, the EU has provided its civilian resources like financial aid (for example European Commission of the EU has provided EUR 4 Million for conducting of the EU Election Observation Mission) election observation team, rule of law and policy sector reforms, voter registration etc and at the same time, the NATO-led ISAF has provided security to all the EU official for successfully conducting election. It means, during the election time the NATO-led ISAF was basically emphasized on security sector and the EU was on the democratic norms and principles. In the context of women empowerment, the EU tried to reforms the policies and programmes for women and the ISAF have provided its troops to give security for the successful conducting of those empowerment policies and programmes

and one of the best example is more than 28% of Afghan Parliamentarians are women. The NATO-led ISAF has its own PRTs which have been engaged in school infrastructural development and for that Schools' enrollment went from "approximately 09 lakh in 2000 to 6.7 million in 2009. Through SILK/SPS programmes of NATO, it has been assisting the Afghan authorities in developing their educational system. In different sectors of engagements, both the organizations have cooperated and coordinated each other to reconstruct the socio-economic-political and educational systems of Afghanistan.

The NATO-EU security partnership in Afghanistan is currently experiencing serious difficulties to meet the essential core tasks of the new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, also recognized the need to adapt the institutional structures of the Alliance, and as such called for "an ambitious and coherent package of reform measures". Those measures include a review of the NATO Command structure and reform of NATO's agencies, and headquarters, in addition to the Secretary General's current initiatives to streamline for existing civilian and military structures within NATO and to improve the management of resources (NATO 2010b). At the same time in the Declaration on Alliance Security, "NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the EU's efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges" (NATO 2009d: 01). Nevertheless, the old debate remains a source of tension: some believe that the fully independent EU capabilities are desirable and necessary, allowing the EU to undertake missions that NATO does not choose to pursue, and others worry that a robust ESDP could mean duplication and transatlantic divergence at the expense of NATO and U.S. leadership of the Alliance (Archick and Gallis 2005: 05).

In the context of counter-narcotic drugs operation, it is difficult to eradicate of poppy crops in Afghanistan until there are no comprehensive alternative livelihood schemes. Although NATO has involved since 2003 in Afghanistan, still now it has not brought stability in the local level capacity building due to lack of civilian resources. From the above discussion with reference to table no 04:7, it is clear that more than 50 percent humanitarian donors and financial resources are coming from the outside of the

NATO member states and other international partners like the EU, the UN and WB. Not only the humanitarian donation but also the military costs are also assisted by the non-member states like Australia. It means NATO led ISAF is depending on the other non-member states and international organizations. The NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan and the question of success and failure of both the organization is still pending, as their credibility of respective military and civilian capabilities are in question mark on Afghanistan operation. Still Afghanistan's economic and political administrations are not well-functioning and not self-sustained. At the same time although, to end the production of narcotic drugs and to bring a well sustainable economic systems are difficult for the EU which will take long time. Nevertheless if the EU will not able to do then it also lose its political and economic credibility in the world affairs.

Decision making problems is another most important challenge for the NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan. Their cooperation in civilian matters in Afghanistan confronted with number of challenges, for example Germany says that police as a civilian law and order force whereas U.S regarded that it could play counter insurgency role. Training efforts of Afghan police under German and American leadership are not only partially overlapped but also contradict one another on account of their different approaches to policing. Lack of consensus on how best to adapt funding for joint operation also limits the NATO's effectiveness in Afghanistan. NATO has to improve its efficiency, particularly how it shares resources and how it finance joint operations. NATO must urgently review the issue of common funding for operations. Due to that reasons and views among the NATO-EU member states, participation and decision making problems have been arising. Issues of Atlantic's view (which is advocated by NATO) and Europeanist view (proposed by the West-Europe especially France and Germany) are the emerging obstacles towards NATO's out of area operation and its long term cooperation with the EU and other international organizations. France, Belgium, Britain and Luxembourg are the important exponent of Europeanist view; they are objected to the presence of US in any form in Europe. But according to Atlantic's view US presence is necessary in Europe and opposed to the Europeanist view (Schake 2001: 31).

Afghan government opposed to the death of innocent civilian people through the ISAF operation in different provinces of Afghanistan. Death of the innocent afghan civilian by the US/NATO strikes are also the most important challenge and in this context, it is important to mention that according to the 'Global Research' around 2,2562,949 civilian were killed by the U.S and NATO led ISAF in 2001. According to the UN report up to 11,864 civilians were killed in Afghanistan from 2007 to the end of 2011 (Chesser 2012: 03). At the Munich Security Conference, he has criticized the PRTs as "parallel structures" utilizing development funds which should rather be channeled through the Afghan government. In addition to this it also argued that there are Afghan institutions already deemed capable of delivering services and spend donors fund to sustain socio-economic development in the country. For example the Minister for rural development and rehabilitation, through the National Solidarity Programme, has been able to channel funds to agricultural development plans in 25 provinces since 2008 (ISAF 2011: 01; Marrone 2011: 26).

Although initially the President Karzai of Afghanistan was agreed and welcomed to the NATO-EU involvement and cooperation in re-building Afghanistan's economic, political and military system with the cooperation of the UN, now he is against of NATO-EU engagement in Afghanistan and wants to take responsibility by its own civilian and military capability. At the Munich Security Conference, he has criticized the PRTs as "parallel structures" utilizing development funds which should rather be channeled through the Afghan government. And argued that there are Afghan institutions already deemed capable of delivering services and spend donors fund to sustain socio-economic development in the country. For example the Minister for rural development and rehabilitation, through the National Solidarity Programme, has been able to channel funds to agricultural development plans in 25 provinces since 2008 (ISAF 2011: 01; Marrone 2011: 26). However, the Afghan Government as a whole still lacks the technical capacities, and particularly the human resources, to adequately provide basic services such as health, education, and drinking water. In 2010 only one third of the state budget was spent, while the remaining funds were not spent because of the state's inability to plan and implement its investments. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the

Alliance announced that it was entering a new phase in the ISAF mission. NATO has progressively transferred the responsibility for maintaining security in the country to the Afghans. The aim is to complete the process of transition by the end of 2014. Transition will be 'conditions based, not calendar driven and not equal to the withdrawal of ISAF troops'. Not surprisingly, the Alliance has been keen to stress that 'transition does not mean exit'. Instead, 'it means moving into a supporting role'. To emphasize this point, the Alliance also concluded a long-term partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014. Over the last few years, public support for the ISAF mission in the majority of NATO member states has plummeted, specifically in relation to the continuation of a combat role (CHAPPELL 2011: 02). With this in mind, the announcement undoubtedly marks the beginning of the end of NATO's combat role in Afghanistan.

Another problem is lack of formal agreements between NATO and the EU on Afghanistan in taking care of practical measures such as NATO soldiers and the EU police operating, sharing civilian resource burden between both the organization and sharing information and security guarantees in Afghanistan. Therefore, in spite of the additional positive tendency on both sides in Brussels, the partnership between both the organizations is not as effective as it could be. Therefore, the EU and NATO lack consultations on security challenges on all levels to achieve a maximum of policy coordination in different fields of operations. Formal institutional linkages between both the organizations is necessary as well as member states of both the organizations have to show maximum flexibility to allow for the realization of successful partnership. In the peace operation in Afghanistan, there is not enough regular dialogues between NATO and the EU, which may conduct or ensure consultation, cooperation and transparency, particularly by holding formal meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO, and ministerial meetings as well as meetings between the NATO and the EU Military Committees at the request of either organization on the basis of specific agendas on Afghanistan. Thus, the NATO Secretary General should have a seat at the meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is the lynchpin of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Likewise, the EU's High

Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU, should be invited to NAC meetings on a permanent basis.

Another challenge is burden sharing among the member states and between both the organizations in Afghanistan. Although NATO Allies unanimously agreed on a greater role for the Alliance, the allocation of troops and equipment dragged considerably. These shortcomings still continue today. Lack of consensus on how best to adapt funding for joint operation, also limits the NATO's effectiveness in Afghanistan. NATO has to improve its efficiency, particularly how it shares resources and how it finances joint operations. NATO must urgently review the issue of common funding for operations. NATO's funding arrangements no longer make sense in an era in which NATO has more than 49,000 troops deployed on three continents. It is not only inefficient and unfair; it is a disincentive for nations to participate in the NRF and other on-call forces. If the Allies do not address this issue, it will negatively affect NATO 'out-of-area' operations in the future, thus undermining one of the key strategic purposes of the Alliance. Therefore, NATO needs to enhance common funding of operations, but this should be carefully balanced between nationally-funded items and those funded commonly by the Alliance. Contributions to common budgets must be seen as part of the overall burden-sharing assessment. The Afghanistan Study Group argued, "Burden sharing among NATO allies is critical to the mission in terms of both available resources and public perceptions an increasingly unilateral mission will be politically vulnerable in Afghanistan, the U.S and NATO. After the withdrawal of the ISAF/US coalition forces from Afghanistan, there may be endanger to the peace and stability of the south and central Asia. Till now, the Afghanistan government doesn't have enough capability to fight against Taliban. Afghanistan government doesn't have effective military and air forces (including logistical support like arms and weapons) to carry out combat operations against the Taliban. After the withdrawal of US/ISAF forces in 2014, if again Taliban re-emerges then spill over into neighboring countries like India and Pakistan, and may create proxy war between countries and regional instability would be emerged. NATO and US were expected to completely withdraw their troops in the end of 2014, but in the Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan in Sep 2014, NATO, US and other member states of NATO have changed their previous declaration which made in June

2011. NATO member states have decided and adapted three strategies such as Short term strategy is based on- NATO led ISAF is ready to continue to train, advise and assist the ANSF after 2014; Medium term strategy is based on NATO's contribution to the financial sustainment of the ANSF; long term strategy is based on NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership.

Difficulty in providing training to ANP is also another challenge for both the organizations. The member states of the EU have had difficulty during providing police training to ANP because at a time, extensive numbers of European police officers were also serving in Kosovo and Bosnia. As lack of the EU agreement with NATO on sharing confidential information has to some extent, limited for EUPOL which was also its challenge in situational awareness and operations. The impact over the security experts on security sector reforms and emerged a question of whether the European "community policing" model would be successful or not in Afghanistan. Another challenge in the police training in Afghanistan is that- when the NATO led coalition police training was fundamentally strengthening the police as a counter-insurgency force, which was also put it by the US forces for fire against the insurgents as an alternative of training recruits to defend the inhabitants and maintain the rule of law in Afghanistan. In this mission, NATO and the US's six-week NTM-A training course covered the use of weapons. On the other hand, the EUPOL aimed to form a police force with the traditional policing role over the longer term (House of Lords and European Union Committee 2011: 23). It means during the police training to the ANP among the NATO, the EU and the U.S, to some extent they vary from each other in terms of method, process, numbers and speed. The lack of literacy in the afghan police is a fundamental problem hindering its development as literacy is regarded as a prime requirement for civilian policing in order to take down evidence, keep proper records, read a map or a number plate or the serial number of a gun. If we see the police illiteracy rate then around 70% police forces are illiterate which regarded as the major obstacle in establishing security and stability in Afghanistan. If we see the literacy rate of 2009, then around only 14% of ANA/ANP recruits were literate. Mandatory literacy courses have been established for recruits since 2010, but resolving this problem requires time and in the meantime, the ANA's quality suffers. Therefore, it is

also necessary for the US, NATO and the EU to invest their resources in the field of literacy rate of ANP for old and new recruitment which may enable them for better policing (House of Lords and European Union Committee 2011: 17).

Answers of Research Questions

The second chapter entitled “*NATO and EU as International Organizations*” has answered that how unique are NATO and the EU as international organizations and also addressed on what conditions, NATO has changed its role and functions in the post-Cold War period. Both NATO and the EC/EU have originated after the end of the World War II with the different structures and purposes where NATO maintained it as collective defence organization and the EC maintained itself as a political and economic organization. The EU structure was totally based on civilian form and NATO consisted on military form. The NATO’s structural evolution was basically took place in the post-Cold War era where as EU’s structural evolution was seen in the different stages of successes. In the Cold War period, NATO concentrated on deterrence role against the Soviet Union and its allies, and EU emphasized on economic integration. In the post-Cold War period, Due to Growing numbers of peace keeping and crisis management operation and global challenges, UN had not been able to handle all of them throughout the world due to lack of enough military power. On the other side, NATO had strong military capabilities that could do that. And for those global challenges NATO needed civilian power as the EU could provide that as a strong economic and political organization.

In the third chapter entitled “*NATO’s Growing Cooperation with the EU*” has proved that in the different field of operations both the organizations have cooperated each other and also answered to the question like how did the NATO’s past experiences in the crisis response impact over its response to Afghanistan crisis. After the end of the Cold War, NATO has been involved in the different peace keeping and crisis management operations, within its territorial boundary of the member states or beyond its territory of member states. But, due to lack of civilian resource capability, NATO developed its relations with EU who holds civilian resource capability. Partnership has been seen in various crisis management and peace keeping operations which have been witnessed in Kosovo (1999), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993), Macedonia (2003), Darfur (2003) and

Afghanistan(2003 to Present). Both NATO and the EU have developed institutional coordination, like between PSC of EU and NAC of NATO, Berlin plus agreement of 2003, establishment of EU cell at SHAPE (EUCS) and NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) at EU military staff, Deputy Supreme Commander of Europe (DSACEUR) and EU-NATO Capability Group. Cooperation and coordination between both the organizations have had appeared in the various crisis-management and peace-keeping operations which have been witnessed in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Darfur and Afghanistan. Both the organizations have followed the ‘Berlin Plus Agreement’ of 2003, and cooperated and coordinated each other with their respective resource capabilities. In all these peace-keeping and crisis-management operations, both the organizations have cooperated in formal as well as in informal ways. Both the organizations have developed the institutional linkages such as the European Union Cell at Supreme Headquarters of NATO (SHAPE) and NATO Permanent Liaison Team (NPLT) at the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), Under the Berlin-Plus framework, both EUCS and NPLT have provided support to Deputy Supreme Commander Europe (DSACEUR) of NATO, for full transparency between NATO and the EU in the missions at Macedonia in 2003 and Bosnia since 2004, creation of the EU-NATO Capability Group in 2003, holding meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO, and ministerial meetings as well as meetings between NATO and the EU Military Committees. In the chapter four entitled “*NATO’s Aim and Resource Capabilities in Afghanistan*” showed that NATO does not have sufficient civilian resource capability as a military organization to carry out the civilian tasks in Afghanistan as the reasons behind the NATO’s seeking cooperation from the EU in Afghanistan. And the chapter five entitled “*NATO-EU Partnership in Afghanistan in Civilian Sector*” has highlighted on the ways in which both the NATO and EU have cooperated and complemented each other, and also examined on the different challenges encountered in the NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan and also threw light on what lessons could be learnt from the NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan.

Hypotheses

The study has two hypotheses such as ‘*The lack of civilian resources to carry out reconstruction activities in Afghanistan influenced NATO to enter into partnership with*

EU and *NATO's operation in Afghanistan with EU partnership aims at proving its relevance in the changed international context*'. The first hypothesis has dealt in the fourth chapter titled *'NATO's mandate and resource capabilities in Afghanistan'*. This chapter has addressed that-NATO's engagement in Afghanistan typifies NATO's expanded role and functions and the lack of its civilian resources to carryout civilian developmental activities in Afghanistan has made it imperative to seek partnership with the EU. NATO has taken over the task of providing stability to the war torn state of Afghanistan as well as carrying out the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In the civilian role of the NATO led ISAF, different tasks are involved such as Provincial Reconstruction, Counter-narcotic operation and Police Training etc. The chapter five has examined that due to the lack of civilian resources of the NATO, it seeks cooperation of the EU as economic and political organization. And due to expanding role and functions of the NATO and as well as of the EU, both the organizations have strengthened their relevance in the changed international context.

The second hypothesis has substantiated in the fifth chapter entitled *'a study of partnership between NATO and EU in Afghanistan in civilian sector'*. This chapter has examined on how NATO could show its relevance in the changed situation and how it could carry out its expanded task with the EU in civilian sector in Afghanistan. In different field of operations such as Economic Reconstruction Tasks, Counter Narcotic Operation, Alternative Livelihoods, Humanitarian and Development aid, Democracy and Rule of law, Police Trainings, and Socio-Educational Development, all these sectors have achieved a certain level of cooperation and coordination. Although, there are certain challenges in achieving developmental activities in civilian sectors, still achievements in this regard have been strengthening the relevance of both NATO and the EU in the post-Cold War era. Peace operation in Afghanistan is not only emerged as out of area operation but also it reflected the expanding role and functions of NATO and the EU and also proved that both the organizations have played an important role in peace building operation in the contemporary period.

Lessons Learnt from Partnership:

The NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan is regarded as an 'out of area' operation, and for that reason, some of the member states of NATO and the EU such as France, Britain and Belgium are against of NATO's operation in Afghanistan and reluctant to provide financial resources. Some of the states like US and Canada are asserting that both the organizations can operate in out of area to maintain peace and stability in crisis response regions. Due to 'out of area' operation, some of the NATO-EU member states are also reluctant to provide their military forces and in Afghanistan, most of the member states are not contributing their military troops and certain few members have contributed only. Although NATO forces have made significant progress in the past some years, the mission is at risk because of the reluctancy to provide adequate economic and military resources. Currently 21 (twenty one) member states are common member states in the EU also, it effects deeply on mutual partnership between both the organizations. Therefore, here lesson is that before engaging in any operation both the organizations should come through proper process in their respective decision making process by which member states would be agreed to provide their civilian or military resources as necessary for successful operation.

Without cooperation of the EU, the NATO led ISAF couldn't rebuild economic, political and military systems. But, for how long the EU will provide its resources as certain member countries like France and Britain are against of that. Both the organizations have no any particular agreement on their partnership especially on Afghanistan issue. Due to lack of formal agreement on Afghanistan issue, the cooperation and partnership between both the organizations are not being fruitful. Therefore, the point is that in future to make specific formal agreement between both the organization on joint operation through which achievements and developments will come in very effective way. Burden sharing is the major problem in this operation as most of the NATO member states have small numbers of military troops and budgets, only a handful of NATO nations like France, US, Germany, Britain, Turkey, and Poland have the capacity to field significant numbers of troops. In this regards, there should be a proper burden sharing

mechanism or process through which no member could feel more burden to participate or operate in this type of crisis response region.

Success or failure of operations often depends on the sufficient allocation of resources. At the same time, in the Afghanistan operation, not only NATO and the EU member states have contributed their civilian resources but also non-member states of NATO and the EU such as India and Australia, and also other international organizations like the World Bank, the UN have contributed much more than the small member states of both the organizations. Coalition efforts towards civilian reconstruction such as the PRTs can only provide short-term effects while civilian instruments need to be employed to tackle structural long-term threats to stability in Afghanistan. Economic resources are required for developmental programmes and projects, providing alternative earning sources instead of production of narcotic drugs, building infrastructures, roads and also providing all the necessary developmental activities. And also without economic resources, the ISAF operation is not possible. Therefore, NATO's growing cooperation is not enough in Afghanistan; NATO should develop its relations with other non-member states and international organizations. If the member states of both NATO and the EU will withdraw their troops without success in Afghanistan then, probably it will not consider as a breakdown of the NATO led ISAF mission but its credibility of both the organizations would be seriously undermined, as well as the NATO-EU trustworthiness in out of area operations will be in question mark. Therefore, both NATO and the EU have learnt the lesson that they should extend their partnership to the other non-member states and other international organizations.

Concluding remarks

This operation is not the NATO's operation but the NATO led ISAF's peace operation as NATO got authorization from UNSC in 2003 to led ISAF. Both NATO and the EU are the regional organizations and limited to their geographical boundaries to operate. Afghanistan is existing in the Asian continent and it is neither coming under the purview of neither NATO nor the EU. So, this is an 'out of area' operation for both the organizations and it should not operate. Maintaining international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the UN, neither of NATO nor the EU. In the Afghanistan

episode, the UN should not authorize NATO to lead the ISAF in Afghanistan as NATO made for collective defence purpose of its member states only. Therefore, if the UN doesn't hold sufficient military capability, then it should reform its military structures to carry out larger number of peace keeping operations in the world. Authorizing regional organizations to operate in 'out of area' is unjustifiable. Therefore, the UN should have an effective monitoring mechanism for any peace operation at any part in the world in future, and without reforms to its military structures, if it further authorizes to any regional organizations in future then, it may create conflicts among its member states and other international organizations.

The NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan is not effectively working. There is no any particular formal agreement on Afghanistan issue between both the organizations. In this operation, there is no specific annual meeting between them on particularly Afghanistan issue to address their partnership. In Kosovo operation, there was a specific agreement between both the organizations on joint operation. But in Afghanistan, without formal agreement, partnership is going on and what they are only following is the 'Berlin Plus Agreement'. So, it needs formal agreements and annual meetings particularly on Afghanistan issue and through which an effective monitoring mechanism will emerge to enhance and strengthen this partnership effectively. And for all these reasons, some of NATO and the EU member states are reluctant to participate and contribute their military or civilian resources as both the organizations have been operated in beyond their geographical boundaries. Another most important issue is the U.S supremacy in the operation because most of NATO and the EU member states don't want U.S presence or influence at any form in the EU's activities. At the same time, the U.S has contributed much more civilian and military resources than any members of NATO and the EU in Afghanistan. For all these reasons, the NATO-EU partnership in Afghanistan is not effectively working to rebuild socio-economic-educational and political systems. Therefore, both the organizations should develop a joint effective monitoring mechanism in this operation.

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