


‘STRIKE HARD CAMPAIGN’ IN XINJIANG, 1996-2014

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

For award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled '**Strike Hard Campaign**' in Xinjiang, 1996-2014 Submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of the Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of the University or any other university.

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Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
ETR	East Turkestan Republic
WUC	World Uyghur Congress
PRC	People's Republic of China
NPC	National People's Congress
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IMT	Islamic Movement of Turkistan
HT	Hizb-ut-Tahir
ETIM	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
USSR	Unions of Soviet Socialist Republics
ETLO	East Turkistan Liberation Organization
ETIC	Eastern Turkistan Information Center
XUAR	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
XPCC	Xinjiang Production Construction Corps
CECC	Congressional-Executive Commission on China
CSPU	Chinese Special Police Unit
UNDP	United Nation Developmental Programme
GWDP	Great Western Developmental Programme
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

PREFACE

‘Strike Hard Maximum Pressure Campaign’, a new form of Chinese military strategy to combat anti-Chinese violent activities, was initiated in 1983 in Xinjiang and Tibet, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), as it is officially known, is home to around ten million Uyghurs, a Turkic speaking and largely Muslim ethnic minority people, who have been demanding a separate homeland out of China. Xinjiang is geopolitically sensitive region bordered by Russia to the north, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the west, Tibet autonomous region to the south and Qinghai, Gansu and Mongolia to the East. Xinjiang is the largest province of China, occupying one sixth of country’s total territory. A sizeable Muslim population lives in almost all countries bordering the region, which is complex in nature for its geography, history, ethno-culture and religious diversity. What add to its importance are its abundant natural resources like oil, natural gas and minerals. Against this backdrop, this research work, which comprises seven chapters, including an introductory part and a conclusion, discusses the Chinese military strategy of Strike Hard against the Uyghurs, who have been demanding a separate homeland. The introductory chapter deals with the background of the problem in Xinjiang, where the Uyghur minority people have been demanding a separate homeland and how this demand turns into violent activities and chaos between Chinese government and Uyghur separatists. The second chapter describes the minority policies towards minority during the Marxist-Leninist period, particularly when Mao Tse Tung ruled over China. It discusses the preferential policies undertaken by the Chinese Central Government since 1949. This chapter focuses on the impact of minority policies in Xinjiang and try to find out how Chinese minority in Xinjiang has resulted in simmering discontent among the minorities, especially Uyghurs and how this discontent has been translated into ethnic disturbances. The third chapter analyses the Chinese government policies towards ethnic groups during post-Mao period that started after the death of Mao Tse Tung in 1976. Fourth chapter dilates upon China’s military strategy through Strike Hard Campaign to curb ethnic tension and violence in Xinjiang from 1996 to 2013. The repercussion of this campaign is being assessed in detail. Fifth chapter explores China’s military strategy to fend off separatism and terrorism in the country after 9/11 attacks in the USA and global repercussion about the overall scenario of Strike Hard campaign. The penultimate chapter narrates the Uyghur response to the Chinese military strategy in Xinjiang. It discusses the internationalization of the Uyghur cause by the Uyghur diaspora

through mobilization of the international community. It further discusses the international response to the human rights violation in Xinjiang. The concluding chapter rounds up with the major findings of the study.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Xinjiang is a home to around ten million Uyghurs, a Turkic speaking and largely Muslim ethnic minority region. Of the total population of twenty million that is native to, it comprises Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik and Han communities. It is a region which is a very attractive site for some of the country's most ambitious developmental projects. For centuries, it was a territory partly controlled by various Chinese kingdoms, although was autonomous in internal affairs. It became a part of China in the year 1949. In China, the majority of the people belonged from the Han population but besides this the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recognized fifty five other minority nationalities in various places in China, some of them also were running their own state to the bordering areas of China, like Mongols in Mongolia, Kazaks in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan. Out of these fifty five minority nationalities, ten minority nationalities were predominantly dominant in the countryside in China. The largest group among them is Hui, who came from Persia and Central Asia in between the 7th to 14th century. The second largest group is Turks, who are living in China's North western frontier. This Turkic Muslims are sub-divided into Uyghur, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Baon and Tatar.

Locating Xinjiang

Xinjiang, which was previously known as *Xiyuor Qurighar* (western region), is a geopolitically sensitive region bordered by Russia to the north, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the west and the Tibetan autonomous region to the south and Qinghai, Gansu and Mongolia to the East. Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is the largest province of China (occupies one sixth of China's territory) with Uyghur Muslims as the majority. A sizeable Muslim population in almost all neighboring countries (except Mongolia) bordering this region makes its situation complex in terms of its geography, history, ethnic culture and religious diversity.

For its geo-strategic location, Xinjiang is one of the most important areas for Chinese government. It is said that Xinjiang is the 'Gate Way of Central Asia'. Ethnic disturbances and the demand of separate homeland have posed a threat to China and it is necessarily a security

threat. China is a victim state of separatism, extremism and terrorism as the government claims. This study concerns the Chinese government's claim as well as the minority activities regarding these contexts. The present study also deals with the controversy of how Chinese government adopted minority development programmes, the nature of these policies which adversely affect Xinjiang's minorities. In this context, K. Warikoo discusses history and causes of the ethnic disturbances in Xinjiang. He deliberates upon the dissolution of Unions of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the formation of Central Asian States, how the Muslims of Xinjiang (Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz etc) awoke for their Islamic identity and socio- economic and political positions. He also highlights China's intimidating condition for this religious and ethnic resurgences in Central Asia as well as in its own territory and preferential treatments as to what has been taken for the minorities especially who are living in Xinjiang and Tibet. The Chinese concern about Islamic Fundamentalism, cross-border drugs and arms smuggling, human trafficking, its territorial integrity and sovereign identity became the important factors to bring some reform in Chinese minority policy from the latter half of 1990s (Warikoo K. 1995-1996:30-40).

Abundant Natural Resources and Geo-Strategic Importance

The region has abundant natural resources like oil, natural gas and minerals making Xinjiang important for China's growth trajectory. Uyghur's complaint is that their homeland is being used by Hans who exploit their culture and subvert their social values. Despite this the CCP claims that it has brought overall development to this vast and landlocked region which is bordering Central Asia. Xinjiang's landscape is composed of five major components, including the three large mountains of Altay, Tianshan, and Kunlun and the two great basins of Junggar and Tarim. It is said to be a place of "treasure on every mountain, oil in every basin". The three large mountains are all mountains of treasures and abundant in gold, jewels and precious metals. The Altay Mountain in the north means "the place producing gold". As a saying goes, there are seventy-two ditches in Altay Mountain and each ditch has gold and jewels. The Altun Mountain in the south is also named after gold. Since there is a large gold deposit and no inhabitants, illegal mining is frequently reported around these parts.

The two basins are really treasure bowls and abundant in oil, natural gas, sylvite, mirabilite, vermiculite and bentonite, which are of high economic value and a large amount of wealth given by the nature. Over millions of years, the geological movements of mountains and basins have produced many large minerals in mountains and deposited large quantities of precious mineral reserves. With gold mountains and treasure basins Xinjiang's mining prospect is universally considered cheerful. Xinjiang's other mineral resources include petroleum, natural gas, coal, gold, copper, nickel, lead, zinc, asbestos, salts, bentonite, limestone and vermiculite etc. There are oil, natural gas, coal and mineral salts in large basins like Tarim, Junggar and Turpan, and gold, iron, nonferrous metals, rare metals, and non-metallic mines in mountains like Altay, Tianshan, Kunlun and Altun (Chengli 2008:1-3).

Xinjiang is also important for China's energy needs, because it is the source of 13 per cent of its crude oil production and 29 per cent of its natural gas output. Oil and natural gas production accounted for nearly 30 per cent of the economic output of Xinjiang in 2009, a vast area ringed by high mountains and deserts that has seen increased migration from China's majority ethnic group, the Han, since the 1950s as part of Beijing's push to solidify control of the region. But despite the region's vast mineral wealth, sufficient food resources and cotton farms, Xinjiang's development is lagging behind the rest of China, and much of its wealth has flowed disproportionately to the Han.

In late 1990s, China launched some ambitious policies to open Xinjiang to the rest of the world, as well as to raise living standards of the local people, through expanding its border trades and investing massively in infrastructural development and declared the zone as special economic zone. Five basic strategies are very significant for this massive investment to the minority areas like Xinjiang. Among them the first strategy has to do with the location of the minority areas mostly in China's frontier areas. This is why some ethnic groups are arbitrarily divided. So it was always a threat that foreign powers may use their own minority nationalities to convince China's ethnic minorities to destabilize China's internal sovereignty. The second strategy was the potential of less populated minority areas to absorb migrants from overcrowded areas within the country. The third strategy has to do with the rich natural resources of minority areas and its geopolitical importance for China's growing economic development. The fourth strategy showcased the historical evidence of ethnic conflict between Han and non-Hans, which is an embarrassment for People's Republic of China's (PRC) internal and external strategies as

well. The fifth or last strategy was China's more recent focus on tourism, which was noticed in Deng Xiaoping era by opening the minority areas to the outside world, as well as to attract various ambitious projects to boost up the economic development of that minority area. Though minorities have occupied around 9 per cent of the PRC's total population, the problem of the ethnic minorities has assumed an important role in China's policy making (Dreyer 2008).

The Chinese government with the assistance of the World Bank and international petroleum companies has invested billions of dollars to explore hydrocarbon resources in the Tarim Basin, which is expected to become the center of China's developing petroleum industry. Construction has already begun on transportation infrastructure and supporting oil refineries.¹ In between 1991 to 1994 the infrastructure investment increased from 7.3 billion Yuan to 16.5 billion Yuan and the state's GDP rose from 7.5 billion Yuan to 15.5 billion Yuan (Becquelin 2000:67).

Xinjiang through the Ages

From historical point of view, XUAR had always been geo-strategically important for both the inside and outside world. Xinjiang was controlled by nomadic people Xiongnu before the beginning of the Han dynasty. In the Han era, it established the protectorate of the western region to oversee the west. In the fourth century AD, Jin dynasty ruled this region. Then the Tang rulers came and continued their dynasty till eighth century. During this period the An Shui rebellion took place and Tibet took control over this region. At this same time, Uyghur Khaganate captured the northern part of Xinjiang. Kara Khanid kings ruled the region during mid-ninth century onwards. In the 11th century AD, Xinjiang was controlled by Yuan dynasty. After that the region was fractured and was ruled by different Persianized Mongols. During the early 17th century, this region came under the Dzungars Empire and was ruled by them from 17th century to the mid-18th century.

After a long struggle with Zhungars Empire, the Qing dynasty gained control over Xinjiang. It was China's last dynasty who ruled from 1644 to 1912. Through the Xinhai revolution, China's last imperial dynasty was overthrown and the Republic of China came into existence. It sustained until 1949. In this period, Xinjiang underwent different changes for its

¹ (<http://sedac.ciesin.org>).

divergent politics. During this time, Russia tried to wrest the area from fragmented rebel factions with assistance from Jin Shuren (governor of Xinjiang). The Kumul rebellion was one of the most important rebellions of this time period. In 1933, East Turkestan Republic (ETR) was declared by Uyghurs and other Turkic groups, but it was vanquished by National Revolutionary Army in 1934 at the battle of Kashgar. In 1937, with help of Russia, Sheng Shicai took control over Xinjiang and continued ruling it till 1943. From 1944 to 1949, there was a short lived Soviet backed Turkic People's Republic known as second East Turkestan Republic. This came to an end after the PRC's incorporated Xinjiang in the year 1949. In this regard, Debata (Debata 2007) traces the ethnic diversity in the western province of China and how it played its role with respect to religion, nation and state and nationalism. He also deals with Xinjiang history, politics, China's policies for national minorities, CCP policies in Xinjiang from 1949 onwards and its effect on this region. To deal with the Chinese Strike Hard Campaign in Xinjiang, this study has documented the time period from 1996 to 2014. This study has tried to focus on CCP's formulation of policies for ethnic minority's areas, the reaction of minorities regarding the implication of these policies and state responses during these various time periods. In an interview with a renowned Chinese sociologist Ma Rong, it came to notice that most of the Chinese scholars never considered China to be a once colonized state like India. Ma argued that for Chinese academicians the country was always independent of colonial rule. In the aftermath of the Japanese invasion the civil war had taken place in China and the KMT was defeated by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 and rebuilt the Chinese nation. For them, it is like a newly formed structure of an old nation² (Rong, Ma. 2017, personal interview).

Uyghur-Han Relations and Discontent among Uyghurs

The Han population is in the majority regarding the total population of the country. Most of the minority populous areas, Han population is greater than ethnic minorities except in Xinjiang, Tibet and some other places. So to build a strong relationship between Han and minority nationalities regarding cultural and economic bondage and to safeguard its national integrity countrywide, China adopted the path of regional autonomy. Since 1998, China established five autonomous region, thirty autonomous prefectures and one hundred twenty autonomous counties or banners. Among the 55 ethnic minorities, 44 ethnic minorities have their

² Rong, Ma. 2017, personal interview, Peking University, Beijing, 24 February.

own regions. Han population has increased drastically from 6.7 per cent (2, 20,000) in 1949 to 40 per cent (8.4 million) in 2008. According to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), the Chinese government "provides incentives for migration to the region to anywhere else in China, in the name of recruiting talent and promoting stability". The CCP says its policies in Xinjiang are designed to promote economic development, not demographic change. But as Han migrants poured into Xinjiang, many Uyghurs came to resent that the strain they faced are limited and resources like land and water were being captured by Hans. In 2006, Human Rights in China said population growth in Xinjiang transformed the local environment leading to "reduce human access to clean water and fertile soil for drinking, irrigation and agriculture." More recently, the region has been upset by government plans to raze the oldest part of the ancient Uyghur city of Kashgar and resettle the residents to the newly developed constructed area. Uyghurs believe it to be another attempt to destroy their culture to make areas free for the Han, but the government argues the changes are needed to protect against earthquakes.

The identity of these minority nationalities are far older than the concept of ethnic identity recognized by CCP since 1949. In 1979 the Chinese government officially recognized 56 different ethnic groups, including the majority Han. These groups are categorized according to the Stalinist model for defining minority nationalities, a combination of shared history, language, economic life, common territory and culture. China officially recognized its nationalities who are also categorized according to their place in Marx's five modes of production - primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist with the last being considered the most advanced form of production. The Han are ranked higher on this scale than any of the other minority groups what promotes the idea that the non-Han minorities are less developed or less advanced or more backward than the Han (Rebecca Clothey 2005:389-409). This was one of the prominent reasons that from the beginning of the foundation of the PRC most of the Muslim minorities began to see themselves different culturally and religiously from the majority of the population. Not only that, most of these Muslim minorities were socially and economically less prosperous than the Han. These inequalities carried out tensions among some minorities to protect their religious and cultural beliefs. The Tibetan struggle, the Uyghur issues in Xinjiang are the well-known conflicts that originated mainly from disparities between the Han and other minorities. Chinese assimilationist Approach towards some minority areas was another cause of ethnic minority conflict inside China (Gunaratna, Acharya, Pengxin 2010:28).

While a number of Chinese diplomats and academicians believe that ethnic tension is fanned by economic disparity, some other experts say the wage gap between the Hans and Uyghurs because of discriminatory hiring practices was the real reason. The USA based CECC reported in 2006 that the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) reserved approximately 800 seats among the 840 seats for job for civil servants for Han. This policy changed in 2011 and in the XPCC various positions were reserved for minorities. But both the government and private sectors adopted discriminatory hiring practices against the minorities in Xinjiang and also ignored their religious rights such as observing Ramadan and allowing Muslim men to keep beards and women to wear veils etc.

According to Bequelin, "...Uyghurs were also upset by what they consider Chinese attempts to refashion their cultural and religious identity...". In an interview to the Washington Post, Rebiyah Kadeer, the leader of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) based in Germany, condemned China for its "fierce repression of religious expression" and its intolerance for any expression of discontent towards minorities in Xinjiang." Beijing officials responded against these accusations by saying that they respect China's minorities' culture and their ethnic rights and doing work to improve the quality of life of Uyghurs in Xinjiang by raising economic investment to modernize the public health infrastructure and educational level of qualification in Xinjiang.

Han and also Hui dominance of the market economy and the comparative disadvantages of the ethnic minorities in skills, education, and language ability, ethnic minority populations are unable to benefit equally from the booming market economy. Therefore, marginalization can intensify the divisions between local ethnic populations and the new Han migrants. These types of problems are inevitable in a free market economy; thus, policy adjustment by the government is crucial. The government should utilize its regulatory and administrative resources to better manage the employment situation. It can use a reward policy to encourage business people to increase ethnic employment and can continue to use the traditional preferential policy to create more jobs for the local populations in the public sector. The difficulty for government is that its intervention and regulatory power is constrained because of market mechanisms and private ownership domination in investment and business projects: many jobs demand certain skills and education levels, and many Han employers prefer hiring people with whom they find it easier to communicate.

Income disparity and poverty in ethnic minority areas are important preconditions if we want to understand the employment situation as a result of marketization. Employment concentration reflects social disparity among different ethnic groups. Xinjiang's employment statistics show that in the formal employment categories, according to the statistics on job structures for different ethnic groups in the 1990s, Han Chinese have been concentrated in state-owned enterprises at 31.2 per cent, technology jobs at 12.4 per cent, government officials at 4.5 per cent, the service sector at 4.9 per cent, and at 38.1 per cent in the agricultural sector. They are particularly overrepresented in two major economic sectors: the oil industry and XPCC, which together had Han Chinese as over 95 per cent of their labor force. The Hui are represented reasonably well in public service at 5.3 per cent, business at 4.5 per cent, and enterprises at 15.1 per cent. Uyghurs held 17 per cent of government jobs, and Mongols and other ethnic minorities were fairly well represented in public economic sectors. Uyghurs hold about 30 per cent of professional jobs, but they are also concentrated more in agricultural sectors at 61 per cent (Yuchao Zhu and dong Yan Blachford 114-133).

Uyghurs and Tibetans, because of their disadvantaged economic and social positions, have been marginalized during marketization. Under the old centrally planned economy, the Chinese state could still stop this damage to ethnic minorities through redistributive and preferential policies that tended to support and subsidize vulnerable groups. However, a free market economic structure and its associated results such as privatization, decentralization, and deregulation reduce the state's micro-management capacity. This seems consistent with the underlying discourse of a market economy. Second, it is ironic that in these two regions the state's macro-management capacity usually remains strong compared with other regions. But central and regional governments always set national security and political stability as the top priorities in dealing with Tibet and Xinjiang. So, from this perspective even economic growth and poverty reduction can be seen only as instrumental to maintaining stability and curbing separatist demands. The real goal of regional and local development, therefore, is secondary. Also, within the structured state bureaucracy and between central and regional governments, competing sectional and regional interests can determine governance priorities, which may not fully reflect the local populations' concerns.

5 July 2009 Ethnic Riots in Urumqi

On 5 July 2009, ethnic tensions between the Han and Uyghur communities were exposed to the international community after severe riots had taken place between the two groups in Urumqi the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The riots were reportedly sparked by a Uyghur protest over the ethnically motivated killing of two Uyghur workers in the southern province of Guangdong. According to a Chinese media report, 197 people were killed, more than 1,600 were injured, and 718 people were detained. According to the BBC news approximately twenty-five people were sentenced to death in 2010 over organized killings in the riot. Xinhua news agency said the riots were masterminded by Kadeer. In May 2012, about 200 ethnic Uyghur from around the world gathered in Japan for a five-day meeting to make their case for independence. The meeting was harshly condemned by China and created diplomatic tensions with Japan. (Bhattacharji, 2012) This resulted in further gap between the two major communities in Xinjiang. This uprising put Beijing's trust of the Han elite in Xinjiang to the most demanding test. The provincial government immediately tightened the security control of the cities. Mosques were ordered shut and armed police personnel surrounded Uyghur neighborhoods. The severity of this heightened social control and paranoia is evident as information was officially restricted. The authorities limited, often deprived an entire province's Internet access for ten months followed by a suspension of International long distance calls. The 2009 riots were the ghastliest of ethnic conflicts in the country since the 1989 Tiananmen clashes. Political control and administrative structure became stricter after the large-scale 2009 riots; security forces were further tightened. Stronger efforts were made to limit contact with Uyghur immigrants and Islamists from abroad. Xinjiang was placed under the tightest of security measures since the Mao era, with maximized street patrols and aggressive policing against all kinds of suspicious activities. The tensions between Uyghurs and Han Chinese reached an all-time high. Political unrest broke out again in 2011 and 2012. Uyghurs continued to feel underrepresented at the highest echelons of administration. The continued influx of Han Chinese migrants made it easy for local administrations to justify their bias towards Han Chinese. Uyghurs resented the recruitment system as it was predominantly benefiting Han Chinese.

Separatism by Uyghurs

Since the last eight decades, Xinjiang region has been in news because the Uyghurs demand a separate East Turkestan Republic out of China. In the past, the East Turkestan Republic was established in Xinjiang twice, in 1930s and 1940s. Since the incorporation of Xinjiang as a province of PRC in 1949, the Uyghurs have been continuing their demands for a separate state, mostly through revolts in 1950s till 1980s, and resorting to violent separatist and terrorist activities in recent times. The Baren uprising on 5th April 1990 marked the beginning of violent separatism in Xinjiang. From 1990 to 2001, Uyghur separatist and terrorist forces indulged in some 200 terrorist small, medium and large scale strikes in Xinjiang. In the last five years or so on, Xinjiang has become a focal point of violent separatist and terrorist activities.

9/11 attack on America was a turning point to fight against terrorism and religious extremism in Central Asia also. The emergence of Afghanistan as an epicenter of international terrorism, challenges facing by Russia from Chechen extremists for the demand of separate Chechen Islamic Republic and Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan increased China's uneasiness about Uyghur restlessness in Xinjiang. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) ignored the constitutional system of Central Asia and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The quest for energy security in Central Asia, the disagreement of IMU and HT with the constitutional system in Central Asian States including China was another side of the coin which were some strong variants to decide China's Central Asian Policy during 1990s onwards. Basically after the dissolution of Soviet Russia, China's Central Asian and Russian Policy acquired a new dimension regarding the economic cooperation and cultural exchanges between these countries. In a broader sense in recent years China's interests in Central Asia is based on stability in this region and must ensure its energy security, strengthening the economic cooperation through revival of the Silk Route and strong geo-political cooperation between states to combat and dissolve "the three evil forces" separatism, extremism and terrorism from the entire bordered region. This also included government's resolution on border disputes with Central Asian States, reduction of military forces from border regions through promoting military trust and friendship cooperation with neighboring Central Asian Countries including the newly formed Russia.

In 2007, a raid in Xinjiang was one example, where Chinese policemen suspected an East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) training camp. The security personnel killed eighteen terror suspects and captured seventeen. On 4th August 2008, Kashgar attack was a symbolic one, where a group of police officers were attacked by two men. On 9th July 2009, an ethnic riot in Urumqi claimed 197 lives and injured more than 1,700 people. In July 2011, there were two terrorist attacks within a short span of two weeks. The first happened on 18th July, where a group of people attacked a police station and killed four policemen. During a rescue operation fourteen attackers were also killed. Another one broke out in Kashgar on 30th July, where fourteen civilians were victimized. In July 2012, six men tried to hijack a Chinese aero plane when it left the Xinjiang city of Hotan. Chinese government's claim is they are Uyghur separatists. On 23rd April 2013, Kashgar witnessed the year's first violent attack, where 15 Chinese cops and community officials were killed. Further on 26th June 2013, 24 people were killed in Turpan. To combat these violent activities, Chinese Central Government called for a more stringent campaign against those who indulged in anti- Chinese activities, and Strike Hard Maximum Pressure Campaign is one such measure to stave off any challenge by the separatists or terrorists.

This prompted China to rebuild its relationship with neighbouring countries and thus Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) became the main medium. Through SCO, China has been able to raise the issue of separatism, religious extremism and terrorism as three evil threats to the region's peace and stability. Under the growing partnership between SCO members People Liberation Army (PLA) what also got promoted was the "Peace Mission" along with the SCO members against the common threats of separatism, extremism and terrorism, as well as, to improve the stability and economic development of Central Asian region. A huge financial investment has been taken place to develop roads, railways linkages, industrial buildings and oil-gas pipe line on the basis of various MoU signed between these states. "...To ensure its internal and external security China also focused on its future prospect in Central Asian region and did a large amount of investment for making these newly developed states in this region..." (Dwivedi 2006). According to some Chinese academicians China's counter terrorism policies nowadays is quiet successful for maintenance of peace and balance in this region. The 14th SCO Prime Ministers' meetings in December 2015 announced plans to tackle regional challenges including economic down-turn and terrorism. The discussion about trade, investment, financing,

transportation, cultural cooperation along with the anti-terrorism cooperation got major priorities in this diplomatic event (Xiaokun 2015:9).

Soviet Disintegration and Emergence of Central Asian Republics (CARs)

The disintegration of the Soviet Union over the course of 1990 to 1991 and the growing ethnic and religious revival that was strengthened in Central Asia had significant consequences for China's north western provinces, especially in Xinjiang. Significantly Sino-Soviet relation had an important impact in this context of Chinese policy to Xinjiang during 1949 to 1991. One of the primary external threats to Xinjiang was the Soviet Union. But 1990's Baren uprising and the movements within the territories of Soviet Union changed the nature and scope of external threat for China. Revival of radical Islam in this region was one of the significant parameters in this context.

The removal of Soviet power in this region and emergence of five Central Asian States brought an opportunity to maintain and strengthen the Chinese state control over this region. To conduct of its relations with the various Central Asian States exhibited China's preeminent concern with the stability and development of Xinjiang because the volatile situation in Xinjiang is a very important deterrent for China's Central Asian policy. The Uyghurs living in borders states, have a strong feeling for Uyghurs who are struggling for greater autonomy and independence of East Turkestan (Xinjiang) since 1949, when the area was incorporated within China. The victory of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in 1992, the Tajik Civil War and the emergence of various religious extremist groups like IMU, IMT, HT posed major challenges for China's internal security and stability. To neutralize the minority issues especially the Uyghur issue Beijing took initiative to form the SCO. The internal parallel approach was reinforced its integrationist techniques over this region through strengthening its foreign policy with five Central Asian State including Russia. US interest over this region was also the CCP's internal as well as external security concern since mid-1990 onwards (Clarke, 2011). In Central Asia Kyrgyzstan is one of China's smallest neighbors, both economically and geographically, but these two states nowadays see great value in spurring the growth of their relationship. The Chinese border with Kyrgyzstan may be only 533 miles long, but it's one of China's gateways to Central Asia and a node on the amorphous but undeniable belt where Beijing is working on from China to Europe.

The growing conflict in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan's Fergana valley increased China's concern to maintain Central Asian relationship which is very significant to balance China's internal stability in Xinjiang. After recognizing the importance of economic majors as one of the key factor of Xinjiang stability and stability in its bordering area China started to strengthen its economic ties with Central Asia, which got more importance to the decades of 2000 onwards. In 1991 CCP delegation to visit Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kirghizstan promoted China's state agreement with Central Asian Republics. Rail and flights link had been developed. In 1992, nine cooperation agreements were signed between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang. Joint ventures for consumer good agreements were signed between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and China. In the same year Xinjiang established economic and trade ties with more than fifty countries. Though it was notable, Xinjiang and Central Asia both were under-developed. It helped the CCP to construct economic ties with Central Asian States through Xinjiang (Harris 1993: 111-129).

The collapse of Soviet Union brought a dramatic impact upon China's Xinjiang and Central Asian policies. China's increasing economic ties with Central Asia provided a significant economic and social security to Xinjiang, but, the ethnic and religious resurgence emerging in Central Asia similarly developed in Xinjiang. The limited economy cultural and political reforms were the main cause of developing the ethnic nationalism in Xinjiang though the government's view was that external influences are also responsible for volatile situation. The government assumption was that if the economic growth and standard of living increase, the separatist tendencies among the minority would be disappear. The multilateral economic and security dialogues and agreements were signed on 26th April, 1996 in the first making of SCO in Shanghai, to find solutions for ongoing regional stability. In a press conference it was informed by the government of China that the fourteenth SCO prime ministers meeting which will be held in Zheng Zhou, capital of Henan province, on December 14th and 15th will focused on urgent task in regional development to face the challenges including growing pressure on the economy and rising terrorism risks (Xiaokun 2015:4).

In 2015, China and Kyrgyzstan have jointly focused to work together to combat terrorism from the previous experiences of complex and severe security situation in this region. In a joint statement these two nations have given their consent to work together against the three evil forces separatism, extremism and terrorism including control the ETIM activities in this region.

These two nations also agreed to integrate their national developmental strategies with each other. Both side approachable foreign policy has increased China's investment into Kyrgyz economy, technology and infrastructural development along with advanced production capacity and the railway linkages between China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Xiaokun 2015:3) According to Goldstein (Goldstein 2001: 325-329), the development of China's post 1991 strategy was based on distinctive combination of military, political and economic policies to ensure its national security from external as well as internal threat. In this respect (Xiang 2004:3) says that Beijing is not seeking a place in the sun rather than a protected place in the shade.

China's Hard-line Stand against anti-Chinese Forces in Xinjiang

In 1983, a political perception of decline of social order in China occasioned the launch of first phase of 'Strike Hard Campaign' as a massive anti-crime campaign that lasted for three years till 1986. On 28th April 1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched the second phase of 'Strike Hard Maximum Pressure Campaign', a hard line approach against the separatists, splittists and terrorists active in this important region of north-west borderland. The period from 1990 to 1995 witnessed several violent attacks against Hans and Chinese interests in Xinjiang. Chinese authorities not only put down these separatist attacks, but also brought this stern measure, 'Strike Hard Campaign', to launch crackdown against those who were indulged in anti-Chinese violent activities. Three main characteristics of this campaign were (a) forceful crackdown (b) the severest of Capital Punishment and (c) the Swiftest of execution. According to Chinese government, though this campaign focused on crimes such as drug smugglings, theft and murder at the initial stage, the scope of the campaign was later expanded to curb anti-Chinese forces that included separatists and terrorist cadres. In the latter half of 1996, all the top notch provincial leaders in Xinjiang, including Abulohat Abduruxit, the then Chairman of the Xinjiang regional government and Wang Lequan, the General Secretary of CCP branch in Xinjiang and senior military and police officer decided to extend the period and scope of the Strike Hard Campaign. After the 9/11 attacks in USA, China was one of the first states to support the US War on Terror in Afghanistan and legitimized 'Strike Hard Campaign' as a potential bulwark against separatist and terrorist forces in the country.

In 2001, the third phase of Strike Hard Campaign began exactly on the pattern of the first phase, beginning with a national conference on the state of public order convened in Beijing. A

group of experts and politicians participating at this conference took stock the crime situation in the country, especially in Xinjiang, and informed the government, local party committees and public about the existence of unacceptability high crime rate. They emphasized that even though the criminal justice agencies had made significant breakthroughs in tackling criminal activities, the result were not satisfactory. They suggested four strategies as follows: Firstly, a systematic campaign to curb criminal activities and to effect a stable social order within two years by 2003; secondly, announcing the intended targets of the campaign and referring these as enemies of the masses and saboteurs of socialist modernization; thirdly, mass mobilization against the anti-Chinese forces; and fourthly, encouraging all the agencies of criminal justice to coordinate, and cooperation among police, prosecutors and courts in a multi-agency approach to campaigning. Besides, they suggested joint public arrest and public sentencing rally. The public sentencing rally is a degradation ceremony in which the judgment and sentence of a convicted criminal already determined in court, is announced in a public forum, in a venue such as market place, stadium, and community hall, at the site of the crime or the criminal's work place. As part of the act of degradation, criminals are forced to bow their heads and sometimes wear placards around their necks and tied to their backs, which detail their name, the nature of the offence and the sentence given. After the senior judge or court president declares the sentence, the convicted criminals are placed in court vehicles and are led either to their deaths at the local execution grounds or to prison. However, this campaign has not been able to totally wipe out the anti-Chinese forces of extremism and terrorism. In the last couple of years, the Xinjiang region has witnessed violent separatist and terrorist activities, the recent being the attack in Turpan in June 2013. Further, this campaign has been dubbed by western countries as a mechanism to persecute the minority people like Uyghurs. And the human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have criticized this campaign as a Chinese tool to browbeat the minority people (1999).

For its geo-strategic location, Xinjiang is one of the most important areas for Chinese government. It is called that Xinjiang is the 'Gate Way of Central Asia'. Ethnic disturbances and the demand of separate homeland have posed a threat to China and it is necessarily a security threat. China is a victim state of separatism, extremism and terrorism as the government claims. This study concerns about the Chinese government's claim as well as the minority activities regarding these contexts. Present study also deals that how Chinese government adopted

minority development programmes, the nature of these policies and its impact on minorities as well as on Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Mainly this study will vividly describe the Chinese military and police strategy in the context of Strike Hard Campaign and the linkage between minority policies, demand of separate homeland, ethnic violence and terrorist activities in Xinjiang. The nature of Strike Hard campaign and the repercussion of this campaign would be assessed. It would be tried to examine critically the Strike Hard Campaign as well as the history and future of Chinese state policy and minority policies on Xinjiang. The objectives of this research work are: a) to analyze the causes of ethnic disturbances in Xinjiang and its consequences; b) to evaluate China's policies towards Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang; c) to critically examine the Strike Hard Campaign in Xinjiang; d) to discuss Uyghur responses regarding Strike Hard; and e) to evaluate International reaction on overall scenario.

This research work makes attempt to answer the following research questions: i) Why Xinjiang is important for China? ii) What are the key factors for ethnic disturbances in Xinjiang? iii) What is the Chinese policy towards minority's vis-à-vis Uyghurs in Xinjiang? iv) What are the main aims and objectives of 'Strike Hard Campaign' as part of its military strategy in Xinjiang? v) How has China used the 'Strike Hard Campaign' before and after 2001 and what has been impact on the Uyghurs? vi) What is Uyghur response to 'Strike Hard Campaign'? and vii) How has international community reacted to the Chinese 'Strike Hard' strategy? In addition, this research work revolves around two main arguments, which will either be proved or disproved: a) China's implementation of the 'Strike Hard Campaign' in Xinjiang is a fall out of the failure of policy of assimilation of minorities in China; and b) transformation of the 'Strike Hard Campaign' is a result of the hardening of Uyghur resistance. This study has applied both historical and analytical methods to analyze the root cause of the disturbances in Xinjiang. The study has used inductive and deductive method wherever applicable. Entire data and information have been collected from various secondary (journals, newspapers, articles, books, websites etc.) and primary (White Papers, Information Office of the State Council Report, decrees, fieldtrip interviews and other Chinese and Uyghur source materials) sources.

Review of the Literature

From 2001 onwards, China's "Strike Hard Campaign" took a strategic change but nature wise how it was before and after 2001, how China used it in time to time, what was its impact on

Chinese security in north-western China, all these issues came into light in various studies. The review of Literature focuses on three themes such as (a) Xinjiang problem; (b) Chinese Minority Policies and (c) 'Strike Hard Campaign' in Xinjiang.

XUAR on the north-western part of China borders Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Three of these bordering countries –Russia, India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. Inside China, it borders two sensitive autonomous regions- Tibet and Inner Mongolia, which are in the same mould as Xinjiang to carve out their own separate home lands out of China. Xinjiang has been witnessing separatist activities since the independence of China in 1949. In this context, Calabrese (1999) made a good attempt to analyze the geographical location and geostrategic importance of China's far west province Xinjiang from imperial history to till today. Narrating the geo-economic importance of Xinjiang, Gosset (2006) stressed that Xinjiang provides a corridor to Central Asian region through the fabled silk route to and is the gate way to trade China and post-Soviet Central Asia. Gladney (1996) showed the background of Xinjiang problems, why the minorities and Muslims of Xinjiang started the demand of separate state out of China. Citing marginalization of this area and its people by the Chinese authorities as one of the important factor of Xinjiang conundrum, he attributed Xinjiang's history, culture, religion, ethnic diversity and some external forces as the other remaining factors.

To Mackerras (2001), disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, self-determination demand by Uyghurs, liberalization and globalization of outside world as the other contributing factors of the present situation in Xinjiang. Fuller and Starr (2001) added that the problem of separatism, extremism and terrorism in Xinjiang have been aggravating the situation in this restive province. Further they term Uyghurs feeling about Chinese minority policy in Xinjiang very important in this context. To them, Uyghurs feel alienated in their own land and believe that the benefits of so called Chinese development in Xinjiang do not fulfil Uyghur's need, but mainly go to Han. An edited volume by Starr (2004) talked about the geo-political, cultural and linguistic aspects of separatism and the ethnic tension in Xinjiang, besides finding out the connection between Islamic fundamentalism and the demand of autonomy and separatism in Xinjiang. Davis (2008) stresses that ethnic separatism and religious rhetoric are the causes of Uyghur Muslim violence in Xinjiang. Warikoo (1995-96) discusses history and causes of the ethnic disturbances in Xinjiang. He tries to find out, how the Muslim of Xinjiang (Uyghurs,

Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs etc.) awoke for their Islamic identity and socio- economic and political positions after dissolution of USSR and the formation of Central Asian States. He narrates the Chinese concern about Islamic Fundamentalism, Cross-border drugs, arms that have further added fuel to the already fired situation in Xinjiang. Clarke (2007) discusses how identity of the ethnic minorities especially the Uyghurs, has been an important factor of the Xinjiang problem. Clarke further (2011) highlights the Chinese perception about Xinjiang as an important strategic and economic asset, and the Chinese will power to frustrate any attempt by the three evil forces (separatism, extremism and terrorism) to create any untoward situation in this volatile region. Debata (2007) describes the situation in Xinjiang as highly sensitive, and keeping in view the present state of affairs there, this may assume dangerous proportion in future. He touches upon some important factors, such as history of Xinjiang, ethno-cultural issues, Chinese policies towards minorities etc., have affected the situation in this region. Further, the disintegration of USSR and the creation of five Central Asian States, Debata argues, brought about significant development in Xinjiang.

In the second theme, discussion on pre-1949 situation in Xinjiang has been elucidated. In the pre-1949 period, Uyghurs were able to establish a separate East Turkestan Republic in Xinjiang first in 1930s with the help of Kazakhs and other minority people and also in 1940s with the help of Soviets. In the post-1949 period, the Uyghurs continued to demand a separate republic for themselves. This prompted the Chinese Central Government to devise a calculated minority policy towards Uyghurs of Xinjiang. Some White Papers published by the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China are important in this regard. One White Paper (September 1999) clearly spelt out the Chinese policy towards minority nationalities. The summary of the White Paper is: (a) China is a united multi-ethnic state, (b) It adheres to equality and unity among people, (c) It has concern for the regional autonomy given to the ethnic minorities, (d) It intends to promote the common development of all ethnic groups and (e) Preservation and development of the culture of ethnic minorities is one of its main goals. Another White Paper (2003) discusses history and development of Xinjiang in border details. Further, the White Paper (2005) talks about regional autonomy for the ethnic minorities in China. The latest White Paper (2012) claims that the educational system has properly developed and coordinated in ethnic minorities areas, especially in Xinjiang. Traditional culture of the minorities is being protected and different policies and programme have been initiated by the

Chinese leadership. It has highlighted a more liberal child birth policy for ethnic minorities. It shows more liberal policies and programmes of government to protect the religious beliefs of the minority nationality as well as increase the participation of minorities in CCP's various political affairs in Xinjiang. It appreciates the great efforts and contribution of the Chinese leadership for the modernization of Xinjiang. An article in Chinese official mouthpiece *Beijing Review* (2000) points out how China uses and taps the rich resources in Xinjiang for its all-round development. It not only appreciates Chinese state policies for industrialization process in Xinjiang, but also the support and care for ecological conservation, environmental protection. A report by the Xinhua (2007) highlighted Chinese efforts in rebuilding and restructuring ethnic minority areas on the line of the developed regions in China. The Five Years Plans emphasizes improvement of public infrastructure, ecological environment, poverty level and the standard of living of the minorities. It also assures that there will be no discrimination on the basis of any ground and the state will protect the lawful right and interests of ethnic minority groups and will develop the relationship among all people. Rongxia (2000) narrates the present state of development in Xinjiang under the ambit of Western Development Programme. Rong and Shi (2001) highlighted on Chinese educational equality in the context of Chinese economic, political and social reform in 21st century. According to them, education, which has become an important tool to promote economic and social development, has a positive effect on gender equality, ethnicity and economic development of minorities and overall development of society.

However, the Uyghurs living in Xinjiang or abroad have a very different view. According to Uyghurs, the Han Chinese has created a difficult situation for the local people in Xinjiang, who have been living there as an alienated and marginalized lot. Even the Uyghur diaspora abroad subscribes to this view. A Uyghur Conference Declaration (2010), demand that Uyghur grievances be addressed in accordance with Chinese Minorities Policies. It calls upon the Chinese authorities for proper implementation of Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of 1984 to manage the internal affairs of the minority areas by the minorities. Criticizing China's religious policy in Xinjiang, Radio Free Asia (2013) dubbed CCP's implementation of registers of religious believers in north western region of Xinjiang as weird.

Many western scholars do criticize the Chinese policy in Xinjiang. Dillon (2009) dilates upon the Chinese experiences with Cultural Revolution, reform and opening policies of Deng Xiaoping, the brutal suppression of democracy movement in Beijing, the large scale migration of

men, women to the cities to search work, land ownership, the one child policy, ethnic and cultural disturbances between Hans and minority groups. David (2008) depicts Chinese policy in Xinjiang as anti-minority, which has resulted in simmering discontent among minorities. Wei (2005) highlighted CCP's preferential policies such as reducing agricultural tax, compulsory education for low income earner's children, priorities for health related issues were some good measures with the objective of creating a harmonious society, where the rule of law is maintained, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality as well as social stability are being realized.

However, Wei (1993) criticizes the policy being very unpopular. According to Wei, the economically disparity between Eastern and Western China has been one of the major reasons for China's ethnic disturbances in western part, especially Xinjiang. Becquelin (2000) makes a critical analysis of the Chinese policy in Xinjiang. To him, Chinese Government Policies have been to ensure stability and territorial assimilation in Xinjiang. To link Xinjiang with rest of China, Becquelin argues, military and paramilitary strategy and systematic Han immigration have been the mainstay of CCP's policy. Sing (2012) has given a different perspective. Sing has highlighted Chinese government's conception that symmetric economic development is an instrument to deal with the problem in Xinjiang. Not only in past it failed to implement the minority policies what generated in 1980s, but also it failed to decrease the asymmetry of economic development between Uyghurs and Hans. Employment generation and socio-cultural autonomy for this section was misdirected by CCP's planning at policy level.

Clarke (2003) gives another angle to China's minority policies in Xinjiang. According to him, Chinese policy in Xinjiang has been linked with China's foreign relations with Central Asian States. CCP's policy over Xinjiang and its integration process to assimilate the ethnic minorities into China's political and economic milieu, Chinese leadership prepared strategies such as (1) cooperation with ethnic elites to reform the political, economic and cultural order; (2) The Great Leap Forward policy to accelerate fusion of Xinjiang's ethnic minorities with the Han and decrease Soviet influence in this region; (3) After the Cultural Revolution in 1978, CCP adopted some liberal policies regarding religious and cultural traditions of minorities, but it increased internal well as external threat for Beijing. Millward (2009) describes the Chinese minority policy in Xinjiang meticulously. He narrates how Chinese government has been accelerating the long delayed development in Xinjiang and how it has been changing the

demography and cultural flavour of Xinjiang. Besides, China has played its card to block the US influence in Central Asian region. It has also been able to prevent any attempt of anti-Chinese activities by Uyghur, besides asserting its role in domestic and international politics.

In the last theme, ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ is shown as part of Chinese military strategy in Xinjiang, which has been on boil since 1949. According to Godwin (1996) need of China’s military Strategy in mid 1980s was to form a more modern flexible and trained military force which would always ready to defend the possibly unexpected local war and border conflicts. Swift and effective application of military forces for a demanding situation became the benchmark of this strategy, he adds. ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ became an important part of this strategy in 1983 when the chorus of Uyghur separatism was very much louder. According to Chien-peng (2000) Chinese leadership modified its strategy to combat anti-Chinese forces. Millward (2004) gives a detailed report of violent separatist activities in Xinjiang. According to him, between 1957 and 1981, there were nineteen revolts and 194 cases of separatist activities in Xinjiang, which forced the Chinese authorities to be more stringent towards Uyghurs. Paul (1998) talks about the Chinese concern about growing Muslim religious nationalism in Xinjiang, which prompted Beijing to launch the ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ for a period of three years, from 1983 to 1986. Throughout 1990s, the situation in Xinjiang was grim following numerous attacks in this restive region. Even on the funeral day of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, there were multiple blasts in Xinjiang leading to loss of several innocent lives. This period marked the beginning of the second phase of the Strike Hard Campaign, in a much bigger and harsher way. Jeffrey (2008) argues how violent activities in Xinjiang in 1990s prompted Chinese authorities to enforce ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ for the second time in the region.

The 9/11 attacks in USA and the subsequent Global War on Terror provide the Chinese an opportunity to legitimize this military campaign. China was one of the first countries to support the USA in its war against terror. Bachman (2000) argues about Chinese action in Xinjiang against separatist and splitists movement after 9/11 terrorist attack. Dillon (2001) examines China’s strategy after 9/11 to get support from USA as well as from outside world in the favour of Strike Hard in Xinjiang. He talks about re-launching of Strike Hard in 2001 under the cover of “War against Terror” after forceful crackdown in 1996. Fan and Binghui (2003) highlights Sino- US cooperation against terrorist forces, which became good for Chinese security policy and its implication as well as domestic and international security of China. China was able

to garner USA support to launch Strike Hard Campaign through a new way against separatism, terrorism and extremism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as well as its border areas. Trevaskes (2003) gives detailed account of the three phases of 'Strike Hard Campaign'. According to him, like the situation in late 1980s, in which crime rates increased after the end of the campaign in 1986, same happened after the campaign in 2001. In 2003, short-term declines in crime rates have quickly been replaced by dramatic rises in violent criminal activities. This is because, he argues, this campaign is not a long-term answer to Uyghur violence in Xinjiang. Lafraniere (2011) tries to compare the nature of Strike Hard Campaign since the mid-1990s to the recent years, besides raising the question about human rights violation throughout this campaign in Xinjiang. Becquelin (2004) outlines the Chinese government strategy to gain wider international support for its 'Strike Hard Maximum Pressure Campaign'. He gives detailed reports issued by the Chinese Central Government to take stringent measures in Xinjiang on one hand, to enlist Uyghur organizations in the global terror list on the other. He further argues that the Chinese leadership not only mobilized the leadership in Central Asian Countries, where a sizable number of Uyghurs live, but also, created a security mechanism, the SCO, with four of the Central Asian Countries (excluding Turkmenistan) and Russia and its members. And since its inception, the SCO has showcased the Chinese view on the evil forces of separatism, extremism and terrorism, he adds. On a critical note, Human Rights Watch (2005) critically examines about China's internal ethnic violence in Xinjiang and the Chinese strategy to stop this violence. This report examined the nature of the Strike Hard Campaign and how China used this campaign time to time during the period of 1990 to 2002. According this report, Strike Hard Campaign used in Xinjiang to enforce the Uyghur community to keep their loyalty to Chinese Communist Party.

After China became a republic in 1949, there were a number of challenges, both domestic and external, before the new government under Mao Tse Tung. He realized the gravity of the situation in this new republic being aggravated by external forces such as USA and Russia and deeply thought that if internal issues were in order, it would be difficult for outside forces to put China into trouble. To keep the house in order, Mao and his team understood the importance of ethnic minority groups, who, they thought, could be persuaded by outside forces to take up cudgels against China. So, in order to keep the ethnic minority groups in good humour as well as to keep his promises made to national minorities during famous Long March, Mao devised well

thought-out policies towards the ethnic minorities, which is discussed in the forthcoming chapters.

Chapter 2

Chinese Strategy towards Xinjiang under Mao Tse Tung (1949-1976)

Most of the minority areas that came under the Chinese territory were through military conquest. So it is in the mind of the CCP leadership that the government has to win the hearts and minds of the minorities. The CCP started to train the small groups of different minorities for the purposes of national integration. The objective behind it was to understand the customs of different minority groups which the CCP tried to achieve through a cadre building procedure. This way the CCP focused on building the party's image with the minorities promoting the process of integrationist approach towards minority areas.

Xinjiang was ruled by three forces - the Soviet-backed Eastern Turkestan Republic in the north-west, the Guomindang in the south and Kazakh groups in the mountains before CCP's 1949 victory on political and administrative control over this region. In 1949, without any resistance from the USSR, the PLA invaded and overthrew these regimes. Xinjiang remained under military rule until late 1950, and then changed from previous state or condition to the standard civilian administrative system. From late 1954, the Xinjiang Military Region was put under direct control of the Central Military Commission in Beijing. Both military and civilian administrations were initially dominated by Han Chinese military stagers, though both non-Party Han Chinese and local ethnic minorities, particularly Uyghurs were recruited into the local administration. Ethnic minorities became increasingly common in leadership positions at the provincial and local levels, but the Han Chinese continued to hold controlling positions in every administrative branch mainly the higher position at every level.

After coming to power in 1949 CCP announced that all nationalities are equal in the eyes of the constitution as they were also allowed to get some autonomy for practicing their own religion, customs and languages. They were also allowed to promote themselves to different government position in CCP. But it was very clear from the beginning of the rule of CCP that these minorities must be the part of CCP and should be loyal to the Chinese constitution. This integrationist approach of CCP and economic disparities generated local nationalism among the minorities like Uyghur in Xinjiang (Mackerras 2011:228). In 1949, the CCP adopted these minority policies which were based on the Stalinist theory of national minorities as they started a campaign to identify and recognize the fifty six minorities in 1950. Many parameters adopted

from the minority policy of Soviet Union and number of Soviet experts helped and assisted the research and the formulation of China's minority's policies. Different autonomous regions were established with Xinjiang being one of them. According to some Chinese diplomats and academicians the Soviet model of minority policy was one of the significant reasons of creating the minority conflicts in China. The policy of national identity has promoted a sense of difference between minority and majority. This following process of nation building sometimes entails ethnic or separatist clashes in different corners of China, mainly in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia since to its rebuilding to till now (Rong, Ma. 2017, personal interview and Zhang Jiadong 2017 personal interview).

Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities

During the 1940s, the People's Republic was founded under the revolutionary conditions of new democracy. Mao vehemently condemned the mistreatment of China's minority populace as "chauvinism." Nevertheless Mao had made it perfectly clear that the CCP would lead the minority nationalities as they pursued their respective political ambitions. This was in fact the strategy adopted by the CCP in Inner Mongolia during the 1940s, which was the first such action on the part of the CCP. In 1945, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movements Association endorsed Mao's project of new democracy and proceeded to target landlords, rich peasants, and Nationalist reactionaries in Inner Mongolia as a first step towards land reform and class struggle. To the Party's misfortune however the wanton destruction of livestock and Lama Buddhist temples and the denigration of the Mongol language and culture produced charges of "extreme leftist mistakes" against the CCP leadership of the revolution in Inner Mongolia. But the region was finally integrated into the new system that the CCP had envisioned (Bulag 2002: 108-31; Hao, 1994; Liu, 2006: 252-55, 270-80). The ultimate success of CCP policy in Inner Mongolia gave the party confidence as it planned the revolutionary transformation of Tibet, Xinjiang, and other minority areas.

The Chinese Communists and Mao thoroughly rejected the Soviet definition of federalism for minorities (1935) and slowly over a 10-year time period the concept of regional autonomy was developed. The switch to regional autonomy was legitimized in 1949 Common Programme and also later in the 1954 Draft Constitution. The term "regional autonomy" came to be defined as: "An area where a certain minority people have formed themselves into compact

communities shall be constituted as a national autonomous district along with the right of electing local government and the power of issuing ordinances and regulations not contrary to the provincial constitution (John N. Hawkins, Feb., 1978:149).”

The gradual turn to socialism in the minority nationality dominated autonomous provinces encountered resistance mainly in Tibet and Xinjiang. As Mao noted in 1957 that socialist transformations and democratic reforms were carried out in most places except Tibet, where the time and conditions were far from satisfactory (Mao, 1957, 1971: 460). Like Liu Shaoqi, Mao too had expressed his anxiousness over relations between the Han majority and the minority nationalities in his 1956 speech "On the Ten Major Relationships." He preached respect towards the minority nationalities and professed equal treatment for all. This was in part however a diplomatic and pragmatic admission as the Han nationality was the largest in number (about 94 per cent), but it occupied a rather small part of the territory of China. The much smaller total population of minority nationalities (6 per cent) occupied up to 60per cent of the Chinese territory and most importantly this territory held many natural resources that were crucial to the development of Chinese socialism (Mao, [1956] 1977: 295). It was, therefore, imperative that the Han majority had to have good relations with the minority nationalities.

Regional autonomy for the ethnic minorities is an important part of China’s political system which was adopted by 1950s to manage the internal affairs of their own region under the leadership of the state. Autonomous regions were established where the people of ethnic minorities lived as individual communities in that area or two or more than two communities live in concentrated communities in different areas of the country. Mainly these autonomous areas are divided by autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties.

Inner Magnolia’s autonomous region was the first provincial autonomous region founded in 1947 under the leadership of CCP. In 1952 the Programme for the Implementation of Ethnic Regional Autonomy was issued by PRC and the autonomous regions were established subsequently. These are Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regions (1955), Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region (1958), Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (1958) and the Tibet Autonomous Region (1965). The goal of the practice of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities had to ensure that the Chinese national interests as well as the minorities’ fundamental interests were maintained. To satisfy the desire of all ethnic minorities regarding equal footing and

politically equal rights, China chose this path. This was because China did not want to face the struggle against imperialism, feudalism and the domestic ethnic conflicts which it had experienced since 1840 onwards. So to ensure integrity inside the country and through ethnic group's practice of autonomy, China wanted to promote development and progress in minority regions for its national construction. Though some minority areas like Tibet and Xinjiang were not happy with the degree of autonomy in this region and soon the demand of more autonomy was transformed to the demand of separate home land in Tibet and Xinjiang subsequently. Here Mao's plan for new democracy did not materialize: the inclusion of all Chinese people under CCP leadership did not produce a unified and classless society, and did not transform a Han-dominant nation into a truly multinational country in preparation for the erosion of the state. Instead social struggle persisted in part because of enduring contradictions among the people, and in part because multinational relations within China had been over determined by imperialism. The political conflicts that rose from cultural and economic differences persisted and so violent confrontations, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang, continue to undermine relations between CCP leadership and minority nationalities (Gladney 1990; Dreyer, 2000; Howlang 2011).

China published a White Paper on "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China" in February 2005. The Paper begins by asserting that throughout the history of China, all ethnic groups "rose in united resistance" against the invaders. As a result, the White Paper explains that all ethnic groups have "come to enjoy freedom, equality, development and progress." In Section Two, the White Paper briefly outlines the formation and structure of regional autonomous regions. According to it, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy formed the legal basis for establishing autonomous areas. They provided the structure of an area's autonomous government depending on the minority group's size, with the largest groups formed into autonomous regions and smaller communities structured as autonomous prefectures or autonomous counties. Very small ethnic groups that live in compact communities who were not large enough to form into any of the above governmental entities can form "ethnic townships." Also in Section two, the White Paper explains that though officials from the highest levels of state and local governments conferring with the ethnic group's representatives in establishing autonomous regions, it is the National People's Congress who decides whether to approve the formation of an autonomous

region or not. To gain approval all of the affairs must be “in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law.” In Section three, the White Paper explains the structure of the government within each autonomous region. First, ethnic minorities are allowed to “vote and stand for election. Each autonomous region’s head is a member of the ethnic minority group, and each region’s congress must include ethnic minorities among those participating as “chairmen or vice-chairmen”. Ethnic minorities also elect deputies to the National People’s Congress. The White Paper does not specify what role these deputies play in the National People’s Congresses, but asserts that representatives from the various ethnic minority autonomous regions outnumber those from other regions (Corey Bosely 2007: 291-319).

The practice of regional autonomy was, however, a remarkable decision for CCP after the foundation of PRC. To fulfill the national interest as well as to satisfy the fundamental interests of the ethnic minorities, CCP included this approach into its political agenda. Unification of the minority area’s local government under the leadership of Central government and the integration of regional factors with national political system were two basic factors regarding the adaptation of regional autonomy policy in Western region of China. In 1952, the minority program was issued for implementation and in 1954 the Constitution adopted this policy. China claimed that the ethnic languages were never even recognized by the state before the foundation of PRC (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2000). In the first half of 1950 after adopting the constitution, China included some preferential policies for ethnic minorities, by which the minorities will enjoy the right to equality regarding their culture, language, religious beliefs and customs while mainland China and will be benefitted by mutual aid from central government to boost up their regional and cultural livelihood. To align the ethnic groups with mainstream Chinese society, CCP emphasized on maintenance of equality among the ethnic groups as well as prohibition against discrimination and oppression of any ethnic group.

The CCP after coming to power started making efforts towards political and national integration and tried to instill the sense of national identity into all ethnic minority groups inside its claimed territory. The establishment of the PRC in 1949 saw the need to build a country that was militarily secure and economically self-sufficient; possible sources of friction were to be avoided through political integration and allowance of cultural distinctiveness. The overarching principle was thus "unity in diversity" which means all must share the unity of the motherland as

the Chinese. It was emphasized that all minorities have equal rights in self-administration and economic and cultural affairs. In concrete terms these were manifested in such policies as regional autonomy and the right of each group to develop and use its own language, which were institutionalized first in the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1949 elaborated in the subsequent constitution and codified in the legal system. To carry out these policies, 1950-51 was a period of social mobilization, during which the PRC tried to inculcate a spirit of patriotism among the minorities to project an image of the older brothers (the natives of mainland China) who were helping their younger brothers (mainly the ethnic minorities to the frontier China) in developing their own languages, literature and folk art. This led to large collections of folk tales and folk plays to be used in propaganda against the Nationalist regime and in spreading the Communist ideology among minority people. Activists were sent into minority areas to give mass meetings. Replete with theatre performances and film shows, these meetings tried to show the oppression that minorities supposedly faced in the previous decades and centuries while carving a way out to save their ethnic identity under the rule of the CCP. They were also used to find out the tensions within the community and those who were conservative and backward did not willing associate with the Chinese identity.

Anthropologist Fei Xiaotong had helped in the classification and organization of minority groups as part of the Central Delegation. As a result of this mobilization, more than one hundred groups were found. Since such diversity was politically unfeasible, the concept of "autonomous area" was refined in 1952. It was decided that an area inhabited by one minority would be an autonomous Zhou or prefecture; when there was a second minority within this area, they would form an autonomous Xien or county. Areas with two or more relatively strong minorities live in an area it would become the autonomous region. By 1952, land reform in China proper was completed, but minority areas were advised to conduct their own land reform, but the concept did exclude the local minority leadership. Regarding minority rights (Mullin and Wangyal 1983:12) argue that nearly all important posts in the Communist Party committees in autonomous regions have been occupied by Hans. Even in cases where the principal post is occupied by a minority representative, the deputy is invariably a Han who holds real power, particularly the PLA which plays an important role in sensitive areas like Tibet and Xinjiang, dominated by Han senior officers. In general, then the system of national regional autonomy was tightly integrated with the state hierarchy dominated by Han. In cultural policies CCP included

(1) preservation of the native language and its use in official business and legal procedures of that minority region though the language of a minority region was often not the only language in that area; (2) minority languages were to be studied and dictionaries would be made for Han cadres; old scripts were modernized with pin-yin; (3) minorities had the freedom to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs; (4) minorities had the right to participate in any organization and occupation; (5) minorities had the right to express their concern to the court if they feel any discrimination, oppression or insult; (6) they were bound to be legal to get active help from central government to upgrade production, health and education to the minority areas. Communications and transport infrastructure were greatly improved. In the area of health, more clinics and hospitals were opened; numerous indigenous medical and para-medical workers were trained by Han professionals and had been sent to minority areas. Statistics show impressive improvement has taken place in health provision and minority education. New textbooks were written in minority languages, and both Han and the native languages were used as a medium of teaching the minorities. However, most education above primary level was still overpowered by Hans and the majority of literature was written in Han.

Mao government's policy towards ethnic minorities were basically three fold: a) policies during the first half a dozen years, from 1949 to 1956, during which the government had a relatively pro-minority stance; b) policies during the decade long Great Leap Forward (1958-66) that started in the year 1958; and c) policies during the Cultural Revolution that continued for a decade from 1966 to 1976, till Mao's death.

Hundred Flowers Movement and the Minorities

The beginning of Hundred Flowers Movement, launched by Mao, allowed more freedom of expression to criticize the party's politics. After getting the opportunity, many minority communities along with the Uyghur in Xinjiang expressed their dissatisfaction because of Han Chauvinism in autonomous government, and demanded greater autonomy. Some of them demanded total exclusion of Han population from minority region or demanded for separate homeland from mainland China. To get control over this situation, CCP launched a severe crackdown and many non-Han officials were removed from their offices. This event showed the ideological and political dominations of CCP over Uyghur people in Xinjiang.

Soviet sympathy for the local people of this region and border disputes made Xinjiang as a sensitive zone for CCP in the early decades of its rule in China. The formulation of hard core control policies of PRC over Western provinces brought an enormous impact on the economy and the way of politics by non-Han cadres which continued during Great Leap Forward period too. This period of mobilisation stood on two pillars - one based on the modernization and industrialization like the western development model and the other represented the diversified traditional culture of different ethnic groups. The concept of common kitchen and individual's income according to his ability generated an anti-governmental feeling among the minority people in various places in the country. The time and process of cooking for each family was considered as a waste of time. Housewives freed themselves from kitchen to provide education to their children. In this way some direct attacks on nuclear families raised certain problem during Great Leap Forward Period. (Dreyer 2016)

The beginning of Hundred Flowers Movement and its transformation into an anti- rightist movement was born out of a general discontent with CCP's adopted Soviet Stalinist model for XUAR and other minority areas. In 1956, the Hundred Flowers School of thought faced enormous criticism in late 1950s. Voices emerged from different sections of the society against CCP's non-cooperative, fallacious work culture. Some ethnic minority groups found themselves being victimized by the Chinese state and started to demand an independent state from China. The most prominently held scholarly view in this respect is that the hundred flower movement proved the disadvantages of mass collectivization of agriculture, handicrafts, private commerce and industries. The movement gave voice to the discontent shaping China's socialist nature simultaneously generating a sense of anger against the central government in the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. (Millward and Tursun 2004: 92-93)

Great Leap Forward (1958-1966)

The Great Leap forward period was the extension of Hundred Flowers movement, when modernization and industrialization became unrealistically fast. Exploitation of economic and social policies caused an economic and humanitarian crisis inside the country. With the progress of China's socialist construction, the gap between the Han Chinese and the national minorities was apparently widening rather than becoming narrow. Finally a basic readjustment to the CCP's national minority policy had been required to save the image of China's great family of

nationalities what was advancing on the socialist road. But the implications of this policy's readjustment were far beyond the immediate need to develop the national minorities. As late as the end of 1961 a vice-chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission said that national differences constitute contradictions, whereas by 1963 it was being conveyed that there are no contradictions between identities of nationalities but only between classes. Before 1956 the national minorities enjoyed a high degree of freedom but after that during the years of collectivization and Great Leap Forward (1956-1960) they were treated like second-class citizens. So it is said that the perspective of the policy from 1949 to 1956 CCP's approach was all unity and no struggle whereas the 1956 to 1961 period can be considered all struggle and no unity especially in Xinjiang and Tibet.

There had been enthusiastic reports in the Chinese Press about the collectivization movement in agriculture and animal husbandry among the forty million people of the national minorities in China. But it now appears that the socialist revolution has not developed successfully in these non-Han frontier regions. Because of that Premier Chou En-lai in his report to the National People's Congress in December 1964 said, that to gain complete liberation, the people of all minority nationalities in China must support Cultural Revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party. They must conduct and accomplish not only the democratic revolution, but also carry forward the socialist revolution. Chou also quoted Chairman Mao in this regard that the national minority problem was really a class problem; henceforth he asserted, class struggle would be the main theme of the CCP's national minority policy (George Moseley 1965:15-27).

Some scholars argue that the religious reform movement mainly against the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang differentiated CCP's anti-Islamic propaganda during this time frame. Increasing Islamic fundamentalism compelled CCP to implement some harsh policies to accomplish its integrationist and socialist goals in minority areas. Most of the Islamic religious organizations and Islamic publications were stopped. To bring uniformity inside the country CCP promoted Chinese Mandarin language in government educational system and the languages of minorities were side lined. During this time, Xinjiang experienced a tremendous economic and food grains scarcity. A large number of emigrations had taken place from Xinjiang to Soviet Central Asia due to the panic of CCP's anti-religious stance. This mass emigration transformed a

Yining city and Tachene County into battlegrounds when Chinese government tried to prevent the Uyghur people from crossing the borderland.

The voice emerged regarding the success and failure of communism and income transformed from ability to needs according to each individual. The period of 1959 to 1961 was the period of the great famine when Chinese society faced shortage of food, clothes, fuel etc. The huge production target, compulsion to use common communes and illogical policy formulation produced the famine in Xinjiang and other parts of China. The failure of Great Leap Forward period caused a transfer of power from Mao to Liu Shaoqi as the chairman of CCP. At the same time the Wuhan resolution declared to keep away the individual from blind faith. Attacks on daily life were reduced and people enjoyed their basic civil rights like the right to eight hour sleep, right to private plots or wealth etc. The period of 1962 to 1966 was the period of reintroduction of socialist orthodoxies to correct the unhealthy capitalist tendencies among the different social groups. In August 1966, Red Guards were formed by the revolutionary purity of five working classes to demolish old ideas, culture, habits and customs called the 'Four Olds'. (Peking Review 1966:17) It was at the beginning of Cultural Revolution which extended from 1966 to 1976 and a major change was observed in minority policies through radical assimilationist approach towards minority areas in the first half of Cultural Revolution. But the failure of this approach brought some flexibility in CCP's policies towards minorities in 1970s. Minorities were promoted to practice their own culture, languages and customs but the compulsory Friday work, common kitchen and so many others of CCP's forcible policies upon the minorities dissatisfied the people of ethnic minority areas like Hunan, Xinjiang during this time period.

The Great Leap Forward Campaign brought harsher policies as the government thought to re-establish its control to the minority areas. In August 1957, at a Nationalities Work Conference in Tsingtao, Premier Chou En-Lai had quoted local nationalism as the main stumbling block to implement the Party's policies. Minorities were attacked for their backwardness, their customs, superstitions and religion and particularly more stress was given regarding the Muslim nationality and Tibetans. As a consequence, in 1958 the Central Theatrical Institute (Peking) opened a special five-year course for thirty acting students from Xinjiang, mostly of Uyghur and Kazakh nationalities. The government thought that through this extensive training programme it would be able to transform the minorities into socialist nationalist. These

students learned to perform in both Uyghur and mandarin Chinese. In the course of their study, however, they also lived and worked in the countryside, studied Mao's works, and toured various part of the country to learn about socialist construction during this campaign. Similarly, the Performing Department of the Shanghai Theatrical Institute undertook the training of Tibetan drama students in a course lasting two years and four months, involving acting, singing, dancing, make-up, plus theories of drama, literature and art (Walter J. Meserve and Ruth I. Meserve, 1979:109-112). Uyghur playwrights were also active, primarily because Saifudin Azizi, as Chairman of the XUAR from October 1955 to September 1968, put pressure for literary and artistic involvement. Generally, minority writers were less interested in writing according to communist command as the Chinese desired. Most plays were written only at the urging of local Party officials. Broadening China's influence over the minorities was the main objective in the CCP's curriculum during this period.

While carrying out these policies, CCP's migration policy to or from the minority region was questioned. The forced migration or *Xia Fang* of several million Hans to the frontier minority areas generated conflicts between the natives and the newcomers and transformed to a competition between local nationalism vs. Han chauvinism. Unfortunately in 1958, the CCP shifted policies denouncing local nationalism as a greater evil than Han chauvinism to the minority areas. Secondly, it saw the end of a partial or total impunity of minority areas from some of CCP's significant policies to increase the sense of national unity and patriotism to the ethnic minorities like in August 1958, when the policy of establishing rural communes as part of agricultural reorganization to the minority areas. Thirdly, there was an increase in heavy usage of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the official documents to indicate a Chinese hegemonic superiority over minorities. Wang Feng, then a Deputy Director of United Front Work Department and a Vice Chairman of the State Commission on Nationalities Affairs kept his view that Hans were more developed than minorities in all fields that shows the government's dual approach to the minorities regarding its written documents and practice in nature. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the spirit of the 1949 Common Program was covered by ultra-left policies to destroy the Four Olds and local authorities destroyed places of worship including temples, churches and mosques (Siu-Mi Tam and David Y.H. Wu, 1988:78-95).

During this period, the consideration for minorities' special characteristics and special privileges in minority policies were attacked. The radical site of CCP's leadership called for the

abolition of all privileges for minority nationalities and treating them as equal of Hans. A constitution was drafted at the end of 1970 that confirmed the existence of autonomous areas by noting their inalienability, but reduced their rights. Changes also had been seen in policies concerning cultural rights. Although the same draft granted the right to use native languages but there was no encouragement of doing so in practicing. Methods were also developed to teach minorities to read works of Mao and similar other works in Chinese to inculcate Chinese nationalist sentiments in them instead of translating the texts into minority languages as was promised in CCP's pre-Cultural Revolution propaganda. The preservation and reformation of minority customs was also overlooked though in the 1959 the constitution did not ignore this matter. In the 1975 constitution only the freedom of using minority languages was stated, while the provision for the freedom of development of these languages stipulated in the 1954 constitution was dismissed.

With respect to cultural policies initial 'gradual united frontier' strategy tolerated Islamic religious and cultural practices in this region. Mass primary schooling was introduced, but not yet compulsory until 1958 because very few minority parents used to send their children to schools at all levels. But most of them preferred the regional languages as the primary mode of instruction in those schools where they sent their children. In the mid-1950s, cultural and educational policies began to follow an assimilationist approach more aggressively as Uyghur and Kazakh scripts were changed by the new Latin-based Chinese phoneticization system. At least two to three hours a day of Chinese language teaching and instruction to all schools was compulsory. After a period of moderation, however in the early 1960s, the Cultural Revolution emphasized on class struggle to remove the traditional culture. Religious places, mosques were widely shut down, ethnic dresses were prohibited and traditional government holidays were cancelled (Shale Horowitz & Peng Yu 2014:461-642). Actually after coming into power in both Xinjiang and Tibet, Mao wanted to quickly establish Chinese state sovereignty and administration. This occurred first in Xinjiang and Tibet who were allowed to maintain an autonomous Lamaist administration under CCP rule until before the rebellion in 1959, after that it came into line with Xinjiang. In 1950s, recruitment of local ethnic administrative cadres, Han immigration, land reform and economic development projects, secular and communist-oriented schooling got the priority in Xinjiang and Tibet respectively. In both regions, a more aggressive assimilationist approach to the agricultural policy was evident in the mid-1950s. Rebellion in

Tibet in the year 1959 brought policies more closely into the line with those in Xinjiang. Agricultural collectivization and cultural repression consolidated in both regions during the Cultural Revolution (Shale Horowitz & Peng Yu 2014:463-64).

Impact of Cultural Revolution on Ethnic Minorities

In Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), minority groups were a popular target in Xinjiang. The proportion of Han had risen by 5.5 per cent in 1949 and to 40per cent till 1980. This migration created tension among the ethnic population. Research on China's population profile shows that in 1950's Xinjiang's population was dominated by the Uyghur and there were 75 per cent Uyghur, 10 per cent Kazak, 5 per cent Han and 10 per cent other minorities. Except Han, most of the ethnic groups in China are followers of Islam. Some authors argue that this ethno-nationalism converted into Islamic fundamentalism and created tension in China and it was to reduce this China adopted this migration policy of Han towards the Western province of Xinjiang in 1960s which became another important reason to conduct the ethnic conflicts in this region during this time frame. Most of the administrative, professional and technical posts were assigned by Han Chinese. XPCC was also managed by Hans. The Uyghur were taught Chinese language forcibly. One school of thought believes that the Chinese government wanted to show that it is an integration process which will familiarise the non-Hans with the Hans and will create a homely atmosphere to the way of infrastructural development in this area. Not only had that, on the behalf of secularization of Islam, CCP started to close the mosques. Supervision and dismissal of clerics, restrictive policies for the registration of religious organizations and ban on Uyghur social organizations soon followed. The Gang of Four was the prominent figure during the Cultural Revolution period that effectively controlled the power organs of CCP.

Though the minority issue was moderate in early 1950s, but, during the Cultural Revolution period the minority situations was in turmoil. Muslim minorities especially the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Tibetans in Tibet were repressed from their cultural and religious freedom. Various traditional and precious works, pagodas and mosques were destroyed by the red guards during this period. This repressive attitude of CCP created the tension between Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and Chinese government. The Cultural Revolution introduced relatively moderate and strategic CCP's policies for Muslim minorities to maintain the stability of this region, where Uyghurs were concentrated. Han emigration policy raised the socio-

economic disparities during and from 1966 to 1976, which generated a sense of marginalization among the Muslim minorities. This sense fuelled up the minorities against the CCP's policy in this region. (Gunaratna, Acharya and Pengxin 2010: 38-39).

The most chaotic situation took place during the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to 1976. This time CCP's minority policies focused on immediate and total assimilation, which generated political strife between the government and the Uyghur. Because of its extremist left policies religion, language and cultural traditions were suppressed and it was a humiliation of Uyghur customs and Islamic traditions of the Uyghur in Xinjiang. But according to CCP's declaration, the Soviet provocation was an important factor in provoking Uyghur people against the Chinese government. The assimilationist agenda of CCP's leadership brought an opposite reaction among Uyghur Muslims. Because of it, the clashes continued even after the end of Cultural Revolution. Islam was used as a fundamentalist element to protect the rights and independence of Uyghur along with other Muslim minorities in this region. From the last half of 1950s to middle of 1970s the harsh treatment doled out to the Muslim minorities deteriorated the relation between CCP and Muslim minorities particularly with the Uyghur in Xinjiang. In the Cultural Revolution era, cultural policies attacked traditional culture as traditional and religious education was rejected. Use of the Arabic script was restored by replacing the Mao era's Latin script. Mosque attendance restarted on a large scale. In schools, traditional cultural studies also resumed. Compulsory education was extended from primary school to middle school for nine years, although in practice Uyghur secondary school enrollment remained extremely low. Beginning in primary school, full-time Mandarin instruction was an option alongside local languages and some Mandarin instruction remained compulsory in all cases. Like in colleges Mandarin teaching was mandatory (Shale Horowitz & Peng Yu 2014:466).

During a field visit to China in February 2017, a Chinese scholar Ma Rong told this research that during the time of Cultural Revolution Mao's CCP policies created a very confusing situation for the majorities as well as the minorities living in Xinjiang. A large number of complaints can be found from majorities and minorities both against the CCP's preferential policies that had been adopted in minority areas especially in Tibet and Xinjiang during this time frame. The local people were confused regarding their practice of religion, customs and cultural traditions and had a strong feeling of dissatisfaction against CCP's policy formulation and its implementation in those regions. He also argued that enforcing and practicing these policies also

generated a two tier class structure in the nation building process in China, i.e. the upper level and the lower level as fifty six minority nationalities came to the local level with the exception of Han. This generated separatist sentiments in some minority regions in China like in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia (Ma Rong, 2017, personal interview). Shale Horowitz and Peng Yu argue that the less important point is that geographically speaking that the Chinese state cannot easily control the high Tibetan plateau without control over Xinjiang, whereas the reverse is not the case. Xinjiang is open to approach from the east much more easily than is Tibet. Xinjiang was considerably more valuable to Mao than Tibet, both in order to secure China's territorial integrity on its long and vulnerable northern periphery and to protect Mao's own position in CCP (Shale Horowitz and Peng Yu 2014).

According to Michael E Clarke, there were two phases of Chinese policy in relation to the internal administration of Xinjiang and PRC's foreign relations during 1949 to 1976 which reflected on the entrenched goal of integration. During 1949 to 1955, CCP's goal was to unite minority nationalities into one system and establishing communism throughout country including Xinjiang. Simultaneously, China was also cautious about its foreign policy and balanced its relationship with Russia to maintain the disputed border conflict in Western China. In a 1954 address to the First National People's Congress, Liu Shaoqi argued that, on the one hand, imperialists and enemies of the people plotted to thwart the unification of the motherland; they sought to enslave the minority nationalities and divide them from their Han brothers. An implicit target of Liu's remarks was the Dalai Lama, who was supposedly supported by a coalition that advocated his theocratic and so-called feudal rule. In the face of such opposition, Liu encouraged the minority nationalities to remain vigilant and to strengthen their ties to the motherland. But on the other hand, because the minority nationalities suffered from "economic and cultural backward ness," Liu contended they were unable to progress without the help of their Han brothers. Thus, the state had a duty to send Han cadres to work in the minority areas, where they would serve and assist the minority nationalities to consolidate their internal unity and political maturity, until the time when they could assume leadership in the area From 1956 to 1976 during latter half of Mao period, China stressed on social, political and economic integration towards its minority regions. Different policies were implemented to assimilate the ethnic nationalities with Han Chinese which was a strategy of regional orientation of minority areas with mainland China in Deng's reform era (Douglas Howland 2011:170-201).

After creation of the People's Republic of China, the major challenge before Mao and his team was nation building in a country where a substantial number of minorities live in. There was a need of specific policy towards national minorities and Mao did that. In order to upkeep his promises made to ethnic minority groups during the civil war with Guomindang that some amount of autonomy would be provided to the ethnic minorities, Mao offered pro-minority policies in the first few years of his rule. Many factors, both internal and external, were responsible for change in CCP's policies towards ethnic minorities in the later years, especially during Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. The radical policies during these periods brought dissent and discontent among national minorities. This was ironically felt by the next set of leadership that begun with Deng Xiaoping, who could be able to imagine the challenges to economic development under the liberalization process launched in the late 1970s without taking minorities into confidence. The next chapter delves into the nuances of Chinese policies during the reformist period.

Chapter 3

Chinese Minority Policies in post-Mao Reformist Period

After the upheavals and catastrophes of the Mao era, the main objective of CCP under Deng Xiaoping objective was the combined the goal of restoring political stability with the positive goal of economic development. In pursuit of economic development, communist and Maoist policy's orthodoxies had been relaxed and more market-oriented policies were promoted which produced growth. This is mostly explicitly indicated by a Chinese scholar Ma Rong who quoted Deng's famous saying that it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches the mice. (Rong, Ma. 2017, personal interview), In post-Mao era under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Cultural Revolution came to an end and CCP adopted some flexibility and brought liberalization in terms of state approach to the region. Deng reformist period not only tried to develop the socio-economic system all over China, but also gave the importance to the minorities.

The non-assimilationist minority policies were pressed to restore through the Nationalities Affairs Commission. Chinese Islamic Association was re-established. Minority people were brought into the political process though without much power. Mongolian leader Ulanhu who was the highest ranking non-Han in CCP called for real autonomy in Non-Han areas. Basically this was Zhou Enlai's thought against Han-Chauvinism and local nationalism which was echoed by other leaders also in the reformist period. The CCP leadership was also criticized because of dominance of Han cadres in Xinjiang. In 1982, the state constitution revived the financial right of the local government in minority areas and utilization of resources and development by the local government was restored which had been dropped during the Cultural Revolution era. Reopening of Mosques, loosening restriction on religious activities and publications, these were the strategy of Chinese government by which it tried to promote Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities to keep them religiously active instead of being politically conscious. In 1982 CCP's policy towards religion started to maintain the flexibility in minority regions like in Xinjiang and Tibet where religion was a basic element for social life. Xiaoping himself was keenly interested to restore and strengthen the local autonomy by increasing participation of non-Han people. To ensure it in May 1984 a law was passed by CCP where

minority nationality got the right of local self-rule. Capacity building programmes in the non-Hans started through systematic training and employment of minority people. Minority languages got priority in local areas administration. On the other hand to assimilate non-Han people with Chinese culture, CCP focused on some key factors like development of a common geographical characteristic within nationalities promoting a common economic system and form a common culture.

Reformist and Preferential Policies

The policy of tolerance, which started at the last phase of Cultural Revolution, extended in post-Mao era, when CCP adopted some flexibility and brought liberalization in terms of state approach to the region. This policy of reformist period was pursued by Hu Yaobang under the direction of Deng Xiaoping in late 1970s and continued till late 1980s. The differences which had taken place during the Mao period between Hans and non-Hans were concealed by equalizing the living standard of both these groups, though it was expected that the differences between language, dress, culture and custom could not be concealed for very long. To reduce the tension between Han and non-Hans, minorities were allowed various degree of freedom regarding their child birth policy, higher education, share their religious expression and thought, Madrasa education etc (Dreyer 2008:291)

In 1980s, in Xinjiang political movement was started by the Muslim students who sought for civil and political rights. There were several factions of this movement. One faction believed in the humane ideals of democracy, freedom and equality of minority nationalities but for other radical factions it was for the liberation of East Turkestan. There was a demand of regional autonomy also. In 1982, the constitution of the People's Republic of China adopted some provisions for minority nationalism and declared that all nationalities are equal. Discrimination would be prohibited. In case of language, religion, economy and cultural development, the Constitutional rights of all minority nationals would be reserved and protected. Constitutional rights also gave them the power to self-govern over the autonomous regions with financial administrative duties. Language of the local level area was granted for official works. But in terms of the investment of capital and the economic growth rate, the disparities between the Han and non-Han dominated areas increased. The class differences started to increase day by day. Many policies like replacement of subsidies by loans proved disadvantageous for minorities

because of their lack of awareness and of information regarding the government's policies. Subsequently the western region became the suppliers of raw materials to increase the production and development of eastern coast region. The purchasing costs of those products were comparatively high in minority areas. These increasing disparities between Han and non-Han were a very prominent cause of unrest in minority areas during this time frame. To deal with these problems, CCP stopped the enforcement on agricultural production and state subsidies were increased. Minorities in borderland areas were encouraged to develop trade with neighboring countries. Foreign investments to the minority areas were welcomed. The objective was not only economy but, the government's perception was that a co-religionist approach towards neighboring countries will increase the foreign investment to the minority areas.

As per constitutional amendment in the year 1982, the minorities of Xinjiang got opportunities to decide their educational system, more flexibility in child birth rate policy, greater representation in public offices, worshipping and practicing their religion, customs etc. Since mid-1980s, the minorities enjoyed the real benefits of this constitutional amendment. But the "Open Door Policy" woke the fundamentalist sentiments inside some minorities in the borderland areas. It also increased illegal border trade to concretize fundamentalism against the CCP's rule on minority areas. The disintegration of Soviet Union added another feather of Islamic fundamentalism to PRC's border areas with this region. The internationalization of minority issues by different groups compelled the central government to take some hard measures along with its economic development to solve the minority problems. To get the situation under control CCP started a sharp crackdown of all anti-governmental demonstration and activities which were taking places in parts of the country. The world saw China's first Strike Hard Anti-Crime Campaign being used as a tool to repress the demands of greater autonomy or separatism in minority areas at the first half of 1980s.

Xiaoping's reformist policy brought opportunities to the Muslim minorities to focus on their tradition and culture. A considerable increase in literacy and frequent contacts with the outside world made the people in this area conscious of their rights and identity. In the meantime, the period from 1980 to 1990 was the turning point of Xinjiang's contemporary history. The Tiananmen Square protest (1989) and the disintegration of Soviet Union insisted the demand for separate state to North-Western China which was seen as a threat for China's integrity and political stability. Different clashes ensued for greater autonomy. The most violent

riot occurred in April 1990 at Baren in Kashgar. CCP also launched the ‘Strike Hard (Yanda)’ campaign to deal with Uyghur separatists. This campaign which showed China’s hard line approach against the fundamentalism of minorities. The main three characteristics of this campaign were forceful crackdown, severest of punishment and the swiftest of execution.

The 1984 Chinese Constitution gave the right to publish books, papers, articles as well as translate writings of the minorities. It recommended protecting the scenic spot, historical sites and culture of the minorities. During 1980’s the idea of autonomy had merged with the economic reform, though ultimate control was in the hands of Han nationalities. The non-Han cultural expression was strategically increased to some extent. From the macroeconomic point of view per capita production and income were increased during this period. It also helped to come out from crisis like production of agrarian society, oil production and labour supply from west to east. There was an enlarged ethnic difference in occupational attainment in Xinjiang between 1982 and 1990, which is related to a widened educational gap between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities during this period. These patterns reflect mainly the employment patterns in the state sector given its predominant position in the economy in Xinjiang at that time. Secondly, discrimination has become a major determinant of ethnic inequality in Xinjiang. It is noted that when a state firm downsized its workforce, managers first chose to sack minority workers. Educated ethnic youths were unable to obtain good jobs because of Han discrimination against minority nationalities in Xinjiang. It is reported that ethnic minorities in Xinjiang had “complained that the government has forsaken the preferential policy for national minorities. Moreover, thousands of minority youth, newly graduated from colleges and universities, are without jobs. By comparison, Han graduates from local or inland universities can easily land a job in the government”. Amnesty International similarly stated that many Uyghurs complain that racial abuse and discrimination against ethnic minorities is common, and that they have no equal opportunity in education, health care and employment. In industry, the vast majority of workers employed in the new oil fields and other enterprises in the north, which are key to the region’s development are Han Chinese. In the south, according to some sources, many enterprises which have been privatized have come under Chinese management and increasingly hired Han Chinese workers instead of Uyghurs (Gardner Bovingdon 2002:45; Joanne Smith 2002:157; Herbert Yee, 2003:449).

By all means, the Chinese leadership hoped to raise the technical and cultural standard of minorities through its language policy. But more than thirty of the minorities still did not have their written languages. The right to conduct legal proceedings through minority languages became very difficult to carry out. To improve the economy, organization of production in minority localities, factories, schools and hospitals of minority regions affiliated with Beijing and Shanghai like developed cities to help them to build the parallel set up units and to assist them to operate those facilities on their own. Much effort was put to the improvement of the infrastructure to connect the minority areas with mainland China through railroads, airline services, telegraph and postal systems. It also facilitated physical and economic interchange between minority and Han areas. Magazines, films and newspapers were distributed nationwide. The Chinese Communist government also emphasized broadcasting in minority languages. The 30-minute programme was broadcasted four times a day by the 29 local radio stations of the Central People's Broadcasting Station (CPBS), not only that it included national and local news, as well as educational, propaganda and cultured contents. The objective of media policy was to encourage a uniform, common culture and thus to create a sense of patriotism among the minorities and keep them loyal to the CCP and the State. Under the birth control policy, for instance, a couple of minorities were allowed to have two (sometimes more) children such as Uyghur in Xinjiang.

Concerning religious freedom, Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution hypothesized that no state or public organization nor any individual may compel citizens to believe or not to believe in any religion; nor may they discriminate any citizen who believe in, or do not believe in any religion. In practice, mosques, temples and churches had gradually been re-opened in different parts of the country since 1976 onwards. Yet state control was still evident in the religious life of the people (Siu-Mi Tam and David Y.H. Wu 1988:78-95). Thousands of Mosques which were destroyed during Mao's era were rebuilt or got government funds for renovation. Muslims in Xinjiang got opportunities to decide their educational system, permission to have more children, greater representation in public offices, worshipping and practicing their religion etc. Xiaoping reformist policy brought opportunities to the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang to focus on their tradition and culture. Reintroducing it through the Arabic script and languages, the Chinese government allowed the Muslim Uyghur's to publish their writings in their own written languages, as well as using the local languages in radio and television broad-casting. Revival of

autonomy and socioeconomic development brought far better condition among the minorities. High level visits in minority areas outlined the governmental policies to increase the number of minorities in various administrations and professions. Tax relief and special protection care fund were sanctioned during this period.

Deng's signature objectives of political stability and market-oriented economic development were evident to revive the local culture and religious institutions. Local language and culture were also restored in public education. Infrastructure development continued because of market-oriented economic growth became the main priority. Deng responded with renewed repression including closer oversight of local ethnic cadres, education and religious institutions and a renewed ideological emphasis on pan-ethnic Chinese cultural identity and China's territorial integrity. Deng's policies in Xinjiang and Tibet reflected his larger policy orientation regarding China proper. Similarly, Deng's paramount power position gave him a greater ability to test large risky changes to status-quo policies. Even the pattern of popular disharmony and state reactions were similar to China proper and to the minority regions regarding this minority issue. Deng's reforms in China proper commanded to the Tiananmen Square protest and inspired mass demonstrations across China's major cities. So scholars argue till today that Deng's strategy of crackdown and turn to the patriotic education indicated that he was determined to maintain the CCP's ruling position throughout the country and to bolster the state's legality by depending on Chinese nationalism rather than the thrust to promote the communist ideology. The priority shifted to market-based economic development in this region. Han immigration slowed and balance was maintained. Market reforms were introduced and international trade with the western border-states resumed. CCP was understood to attract the foreign countries in the border trade infrastructural projects remained large and vital for economic development though relaxed household registration (*Hukou*) rules attracted a large Han migrant-worker population during this time.

Through the preferential policies CCP adopted a strategy to develop the Eastern Coast first and then the development of the western region. Introducing the law of regional autonomy, the government showed that the minorities are not neglected and they can improve their economies to attract foreign investment. State also agreed to give financial, material and technical assistance to improve their economy and culture. The Open Door policy promoted contacts between Muslim in Xinjiang and the Islamic world. The pilgrims were allowed to visit

Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and other Muslim states in Central Asia. Foreign funds started to come from different Islamic countries including Arab countries to develop the Islamic religious thought and culture. Through the opening of border cities cultural and religious communication increased and it also increased the investment of the foreign companies in tourism as well as increasing the pan-Turkic and Islamic fundamentalist sentiments in Uyghur in Xinjiang. The riots in Tibet in 1987 and the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989 showed the anger of common men and the minority discontent towards Beijing's ruling class inside China. The demand of greater autonomy and voice of separatism also rose against the Chinese rule in many minority areas, which were seen as a threat for China's integrity and political stability. The most violent riots took place in April 1990 at Baren in Kashgar. The widening inequality between Han and Uyghur people in terms of socioeconomic development was one of the main causes behind this uprising. The Uyghur's demand was this that the migration of Han people has limited the scope of employment and the scope of educational and cultural rights in XUAR.

While summing up reformist policies under Deng Xiaoping and predecessors, one American scholar, Gardner Bovingdon found large ethnic differences in occupational attainment in Xinjiang between 1982 and 1990, which was related to a widened educational gap between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities during this period and it was reflected mainly to the employment patterns in the private and state sector in Xinjiang's economy at that time. Secondly, discrimination became a major determinant of ethnic inequality in Xinjiang. It is noted that when a state firmly downsizes its workforce, managers first choose to sack minority workers. Educated ethnic youths were unable to obtain good jobs because of Han discrimination against minority nationalities in Xinjiang. Ethnic minorities in Xinjiang continued to lodge their complaints that the government has forsaken the preferential policy for national minorities. Moreover, thousands of minority youth, newly graduated from colleges and universities were without jobs. By comparison, Han graduates from local or inland universities were capable to easily find a job in the government and private sector. In this respect Amnesty International highlights that many Uyghur complain that racial abuse and discrimination against ethnic minorities is common in China and there had been no equal opportunities in education, health care and employment in this region. In industrial recruitment the vast majority of workers employed in the new oil fields and other enterprises in the north were mainly the Han Chinese and this was recognized as the key factor of eastern development of China proper. According to some sources, in the South

many enterprises which had been privatized came under Chinese management who increasingly hired Han Chinese workers instead of Uyghurs during this time (Gardner Bovington 2002:45; Joanne Smith 2002:157; Herbert Yee, 2003:449).

It was also claimed that Han always gets more priority rather than Uyghur. This partiality generated a sense of injustice, as well as anti-Hans and anti-government feelings among this minority. The Open Door policy at reformist periods and the disintegration of Soviet Union were other co-factors to insist the demand for a separate homeland in China's North Western Xinjiang. This time the extreme economic and political backwardness of the minorities, coupled with the historical antagonism between the Chinese and the minorities has a tendency to generate pan-Hanism, which is manifested in the impatience of the Chinese with the habits and ways of life of the minorities and which seeks to mold their lives according to the Chinese pattern, on the one hand and local nationalism which seems to sense danger in every reform suggested by the Chinese irrespective of its soundness, on the other. In so far as the Chinese are in a comparatively advantageous position culturally, politically, materially, and numerically, the Communist leaders have characterized pan-Hanism as the chief factor impeding the implementation of a healthy nationalities policy. The development of the minority areas has a special significance for China because a success in this field would revolutionize the social and economic life, not only of the minorities, but also of the whole of China. It may hold the key to the future of China in so far as the only way of reducing the pressure of population growth in certain parts of China which is growing more acute, may lie in opening out the vast expanses of the under-populated minority areas, which are rich in mineral and forest resources and hold great potentialities for development. The Government has sought to encourage large-scale Chinese resettlement in minority areas, but it is opposed not only by the patent unwillingness of the Chinese to move out of a familiar environment to face an uncertain future, but also by the unconcealed distrust of Chinese intentions, sometimes amounting to active hostility, of the minorities, who cherish bitter memories of past Chinese oppression (Subhash Chandra Sarker 1959:408-416).

Baren Incident of 1990

1989-91 was a remarkable time in China. The Tiananmen Square protest in 1989 and the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 were turning points to reshape CCP's minority policies

during this decade. Increasing Sino-US tension was another highlight of this same time. These following events provided a fresh momentum to the demand of a separate homeland in Xinjiang also. The strategic importance of Xinjiang as well as changed geo-political situation in Central Asia produced a fear of domestic and international threat to Chinese integrity and political stability. But the most important highlight of this period was the Baren incident in Xinjiang in April 1990, when a group of Uyghurs led by Abdimit gave a call for jihad against the infidel Chinese. According to (Michael Dillon 2009) in 1990, the Baren uprising was a planned and organized operation by Islamic Party of East Turkestan and it politicized Islam regarding the independence of Xinjiang. The incident was held at Baren in Akto County of the Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture near Kashgar. The tension was started when a group of Uyghus and Kyrgyz people after attending the regular prayer at a Mosque started demonstration against the CCP's policies towards minorities and the removal of Chinese from Xinjiang and to form an independent East Turkestan State. They also called for a *jihad* against the CCP's provincial and central unit.

The ban on the construction of a privately sponsored mosque near Kashgar was the main reason behind this uprising which was channelized and politicized into a violent uprising (Debata 2007). The agitators took control over the government buildings and started slogans to vacate the towns to government officials, mainly the Han. The two negotiators, who came to inspect the situation, were killed. One of them was Deputy Political Instructor of Akto County Border Defense Regiment and head Xu Xinjiang. Then the heavy exchange of gun fire started between the protectors and PLA troops. According to Chinese records 200 armed men engaged in this gun war (Millward 2004). The counter-attack by 1000 PLA troops cracked down the insurgents including the commander of the rebellion Zahideen Yusuf. It spread to other cities like Khotan, Kashgar, Aksu, Urumqi and some other places. Though, the Baren uprising was suppressed, the conflict became more prominent in mid-90s onwards. The government's attempt to shut-down and prevent the construction of mosques and Islamic schools during this period increased the ethnic minority conflicts and demand of separatism in this region. The CCP reported that they had captured some documents written in Uyghus language during the Baren incident which prove the existence of separatist attitudes and approaches mobilized by Islamic Party of East Turkestan behind this ethnic conflict. During this period several incidents took place in Urumqi, Kashgar, Yining, Khotan and other places also.

The Baren incident was followed many more attacks by Uyghurs against Chinese. In February 1992, bus bomb explosions killed and injured some people in Urumqi. In June, 1993 a bomb explosion in Urumqi Company killed two people and injured six in Kashgar. Another explosion took place at Seman hotel in Kashgar at the same year. Department stores, markets, hotels, cultural activity centers became the target places of the separatists. In 1995 a Khotan demonstration by Muslim crowds was another significant event because Chinese authority arrested some imams for Koranic teaching from Baytulla mosque. Authority's fear was that imams are penetrating with an anti-nationalist approach to the Muslim minorities. As a result, the 7th July demonstration converted into a violation between CCP and ethnic Uyghur. To trap the demonstrators, Chinese authority called a large number of police force and forcibly it was stopped. In 1996, several bombings in Kucha, uprisings and protests in Kashgar, Aksu and other places took place frequently. The Uyghur leaders were assassinated.

Keeping in view the above-mentioned events, CCP started to adopt some harsh policies like "Strike hard" to deal with this domestic ethnic conflict in this region. Xinjiang's abysmal conditions propagated CCP to formulate economic policies for massive investment in this region since 1980s onwards. Despite this the dissatisfaction and the demand of separate state during this time enhanced CCP's control over Xinjiang. On the other hand, it increased development programmes and efforts to get rid of ethno-nationalist separatism. CCP thought that a strong economic development and an improved standard of living can promote the relation between the non-Hans and the Chinese communist party. Per Capita GDP was increased 43 times since 2001 which was 166 Yuan in 1952. In 1990 the Northern Xinjiang and in 1999 Kashgar and western Tarim Basin linked with national rail network. By the help of World Bank loans, road connectivity was also improved. "One white, one black" strategy referring to cotton and oil were the main pillars of Xinjiang's economy from Deng's period and Xinjiang achieved the fame of single largest cotton producer during this time.

During this, the decade old housing was replaced by a new Housing system. New apartments were built, old style bazaar was replaced by malls and shopping centers, public sectors were commercialized and privatized. There is a debate that Great Western Development Programme was used as a tool to promote Han migration in Xinjiang and the motto was of stabilizing the internal security and Chinese sovereignty over this region. CCP's 1990s policies also allowed the minorities of Xinjiang especially Uyghur to travel outside the Chinese nation.

The newly formed Central Asian countries relation with China started through Uyghur trade and this relation brought an opportunity to politicize them through direct communication with Central Asian Muslim world and increased their political and economic contacts. China also established its diplomatic relations with Middle East and Central Asia. Because China suspected that the oil suppliers may be encouraging and responsible for the ethnic unrest.

Policies in the First Decade of post-Cold War (1991-2000)

The development of eastern coast attracted the foreign funds rather than the western region. The opening up of west for foreign investment was a strategy of CCP to increase job opportunities and infrastructural and educational development among the minorities. The changes in earlier policies for favoring the coastal region, transformed into favoring the minority areas especially in China's minority dominated frontier regions. The objective was slow-down the growth to decrease the economic disparities between the Han and the non-Han regions. In an official report of State Ethnic Affairs Commission it says that in 1994 a large investment had taken place by the CCP and World Bank, which helped to promote a healthy livelihood in minority areas. The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report of 1997 praised China's poverty reduction programs. But it criticized the very common and serious problems in minority areas like the lack of sanitation and drinking water, poor health and educational infrastructure. The report insisted CCP to introduce some special program in minority areas, especially Xinjiang and other autonomous regions to boost-up the human development parameters. The promotion of Great Western Development Program (GWDP) was a part of these special policies that were executed in 2000 to reduce the inequality between Western and Eastern coast. But the revival of Islam in Central Asia gradually became a problematic element in Muslim dominated minority areas in China. Religion started to play a strong role in transforming the demand of greater autonomy to the demand of separatism among the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Baren uprising and Ghulja incident in February 1997 were the symbols of rising religious fundamentalism and ethnic demand of separatism in this region. The series of disturbances in Xinjiang throughout 1990s became a threat to social stability and integrity of the nation. For wiping out these disturbances, China used Strike Hard as a strategic tool during this period. On 28 April, 1996, the former Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched this campaign to focus on crimes such as drug smugglings, theft and murder but it was linked with Tibet and Xinjiang to the anti-split's struggle.

Wiping out crime from Chinese society was the main objective of Strike Hard. Xinjiang and Tibet were used as applying tools for this campaign. To curb this increasing violence on 28 April 1996, the former Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched this campaign. According to Chinese government, though this campaign focuses on crimes such as drug smugglings, theft and murder it was linked with Tibet and Xinjiang to the anti-split's struggle. The government's claim was that the constitution gave the freedom of all nationalities to practice their own language and culture it is impossible to translate a generalized conception through minority languages which was the demand of some minority areas like Tibet and Xinjiang. In this context, a large number of academicians also think that the translation of overall Chinese history and contemporary issues into any minority language is very difficult because there is no such type of scope or space into minority languages and education. So it is necessary for minority cadres to have a good command in Chinese mandarin. In 1996, CCP declared that every religion has the right of practice its own culture under the cover of socialism. It also declared that the education, family planning etc. will not come under the religious system. To get control over minority areas CCP started to increase cooperation with Border States of Central Asian Countries including Russia and the formation of SCO was one of the major steps in 1996 to develop the mutual understanding between the member states against any type of separatism and religious extremism.

CCP tried to show to the outside world that Xinjiang has victimized from separatists activities, religious extremism and terrorism which jeopardize China's National Security and territorial integrity. In the latter half of 1996, all the top-notch provincial leaders in Xinjiang, including Abulahat Abduruxit, then the chairman of the Xinjiang Autonomous Regional Government and Wang Lequan, the CCP general secretary in Xinjiang and senior military and police officers decided to extend the period and scope of the Strike Hard Campaign. *Xinjiang Ribao* published an article "The End is nowhere in sight Xinjiang's Strike Hard Campaign", which gave hints that to restore peace, order, stability and sovereignty over Xinjiang, CCP can go to any extent for adopting hard policies in any minority areas inside it's claimed territory.

In addition, CCP followed a policy of suppression against the demand of ethnic minorities in different areas of China, expressed China's religious stand in 1990s and onwards. From early 1990 after the reformist period, the CCP leadership agreed that religious fundamentalists are being used as a tool to spread anti-governmental and separatist activities in

minority areas like Xinjiang, Tibet and some other area of China. During this period, in one side CCP started to increase the recruitment of minority carders in administration and tried to achieve economic prosperity of this region. It also started to invest in various developmental projects. In other side, it ordered the local authorities to take firm action against the demand of ethnic separatism and conflicts. Though the development of ethnic minority areas got the priority during Deng's era, but, the Seventh Five Year plan (1986 to 1990) divided the country in three economic zones Eastern, Western and Central zones. A bulk of investments had occurred rather than the other two areas. It was the CCP's claim that the strategy was to develop the Eastern coast first and then the western region. This formulated policy opened an even wider gap between the Han and minority areas within few years. After recognizing this policy as an additional factor of Uyghur conflict in Xinjiang, CCP reversed the economic policy towards minority areas in Ninth Five Year plan (1996 to 2000) though this shift was not very clear in practice (Palmer 2011:222).

In 2001, the National Autonomy Law for Minority Areas was revised by CCP to bring the control over minority regions, which were far from development in terms of financial capital, making of policy and infrastructural development rather than the eastern regions of China. It is also argued that through the promotion of development in minority areas, especially in the west, CCP increased its interference for its own interest rather than to fulfill the local requirements. On the other hand the risk of more autonomy will stimulate more demand among minorities, this fear compelled CCP to continue such type of harsh policies like Strike Hard to the ethnic disturbances areas. After the incident of 9/11, Strike Hard followed the path of US 'War and Terror' strategy against religious extremism, separatism and terrorism. Chinese government also claimed that China is a victim state of international terrorism. In a declaration it stated that from 1990 to 2001, China was victimized by East Turkestan terrorist forces over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang. In Xinjiang whoever was fighting for the independent state, the government considered them as part of international Islamic terror. Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister declared at UN on November, 2001, that the terrorist groups of East Turkestan are trained, equipped and funded by international terrorist organizations and 2001 onwards this campaign was mounted in China's northwestern province Xinjiang. Western media and scholars argue that thousands of arrests, human right violation and improper death penalties were held in this time period on the name of possible terrorist activities and attacks. They also argue that to

get China recognized globally as a victim of domestic terrorism, Xinjiang was used as an ace of spades to enforce ‘Strike Hard Maximum Pressure Campaign’ and to determine China’s sovereignty and control over this region.

Chinese Policies in the post-9/11 Period

In December 2001, the Politburo and State Council jointly convened a National Religious Work Meeting during which, Jiang made a remarkable new formulation of the issue. For the first time he acknowledged that religion could act as a stabilizing force in society and, as such, could be mobilized as a positive force for national development. “Stability” had long been a keyword in Jiang’s political strategy. This was usually in the context of limiting moves towards more representative government and freedom of expression. Now, however, the keyword was to be applied in a completely different and potentially more positive context. Although the policy of religious freedom remained fundamental for the Party, Jiang established a new orientation towards religion by defining it as having three important characteristics. First, he argued, religion has to be thought of as a phenomenon that will survive for a long time. Secondly, religions may have considerable influence on national development and social stability. And finally, he reiterated that religion is always a factor in international politics (Beatrice Leung 2005:894-910).

The 11 September 2001 catastrophe in New York gave China completely new insights into the dangers of religious forces in society where these are driven to desperate straits and extremism. After Jiang, Hu Jintao became the most powerful man in China, who continued Jiang’s policies. In particular the regulation programme was completed in a way that more-or-less consolidated the rules and regulations of the last ten years. China also expanded its security cooperation and exported military hardware and purchased oil from Persian Gulf countries. In 2001, after the 11th September terrorist attack, China supported War on Terror strategy of USA. It was a strategy to control the unrest of XUAR and to get back international support to suppress the demand of autonomy by Muslim Uyghur in this region. In a research it was showed that the Reformist period onwards China stressed on three different types of pattern to keep balance between its domestic as well as international politics in the context of Xinjiang and its minority policies. These are ethnicization, integration and trans-nationalization (Gladney 2004).

While the state decreased military deployment along the border, it heavily increased the strength of security forces to deal with surging Uyghur nationalist unrest—particularly the small-

scale violence and larger-scale rioting, which had begun under Deng in the early 1990s. In 1996, the state launched the “Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure” policy against Uyghur nationalism. China used the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to forestall external assistance to Uyghur separatism. Rising Uyghur nationalism and unrest and state repression resulted in greater tension and loss of trust on both sides of the ethnic divide. Rapid economic growth was driven both by private business and, largely via the XPCC, heightened state-led development. Fast-growing private business and the border trade were heavily Han Chinese-run.

Economic development is another area at which to look in comparing ethnic group experiences. China has experienced tremendous economic growth over the past 25 years and has reduced the number of people living in poverty. However, the rural poor have not experienced growth equal to urban areas. The Communist Party recognizes this and has now made it a priority to invest in rural areas. China has also implemented programs specifically targeted at certain ethnic minority regions. For example, in Xinjiang, home of the Uyghurs, China has implemented the Great Western Development Programme. The Plan’s official, stated goal is to “alleviate poverty and bridge the growing gap of economic disparity between the eastern and western regions” by increasing wealth. Two important transportation infrastructure projects – the Taklamakan Highway connecting the northern and southern parts of Xinjiang; and a rail route between Korla and Kashgar were completed in 1995 and 1999, respectively. Economic zones were set up to attract foreign direct investment. Beijing also enforced policies to encourage cross-border trade with Central Asian countries. To finance these projects, Beijing’s investment for infrastructure in Xinjiang increased from 7.3 billion Yuan in 1991 to 16.5 billion yuan in 1994 (Becquelin, 2000). The actual goal is much more complex. First, China wants to increase wealth and modernize Xinjiang in order to assimilate the Uyghur population into the Han majority. But that is not all. Xinjiang has some of China’s largest natural resource deposits, such as oil and natural gas. This gives China a strong incentive to diminish dissent in the region. To exploit the natural gas reserves, China is building a pipeline to transport gas from Xinjiang to the Eastern Coast. Despite the investments in natural resource extraction, the Uyghurs see only the drawbacks and none of the benefits. For example, China spent forty billion dollars constructing an oil pipeline, but none the money went into Uyghur hands. Similarly, Uyghurs in the industry, including those with a university education, since Han entrepreneurs, foreign businessmen, and workers from the east come in to fill the positions. In addition to economic loss, China has

instituted policies such as the “Strike Hard” campaign, which was intended to quell crime, protest, and separatist activities. As already discussed, China mostly targets Islam and its practitioners in their effort to maintain control of Xinjiang.

Despite the coercive and co-opting policies taken by Beijing, the undercurrent of an anti-China sentiment prevailed in the Uyghur community in the late 1990s and beyond. In 1997, for example, Uyghur students in a secular region of Xinjiang started a campaign to discourage alcohol consumption, but the government, believing fundamentalist Islam to be the cause, forcibly stopped the movement. China fears are not without basis in fact, as separatists, aiming for an independent nation, caused riots and bombings throughout the 1990’s. However, the government’s response, the “Strike Hard” anti-crime campaign, only inflamed the separatist movement. A series of bus bombings conducted in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, in 1997 (Stan Hok-Wui Wong, and Hiroki Takeuchi 2010:97-125). In addition to a crackdown on dissident intellectuals, tighter controls were placed on Uyghur education and culture. Following the “Strike Hard” campaign, the CCP issued directives to investigate and organize schools so as to prevent teachers from instilling separatist and religious ideas. In 2002, the government declared that all classes, except Uyghur literature, would be taught in Chinese. New directives also sought to control foreign cultural and education exchange programs. Many Uyghur students were not allowed to study abroad. Education on Xinjiang history was limited to the official account. Religious and education personnel were sent to teach “patriotic reeducation.” New regulations also sought to limit the influence of mosques in propagating Islam such as prohibiting use of loudspeakers for *namaz*, ban on prayer before 9 am etc.

In both Xinjiang and Tibet, Jiang maintained Deng’s emphasis on political stability and economic development. In response to the unrest that had begun in the late Deng period, Jiang presided over an intensified security presence, more rigorous oversight and policing of dissident or suspect minority elites, and a shift of emphasis from minority to Chinese identity in culture and education. All of this continued and intensified changes begun under Deng. Also like Deng, Jiang continued to push economic development—both through state-led infrastructure projects and market based activity. This development was the assimilationist carrot meant to attract minorities into the mainstream of Chinese life and culture. In both regions, Han immigration—both state-directed and market-driven—was significant. The continuation of Deng’s objectives and post-unrest policy approach is consistent with Jiang’s similar preferences and China’s

relative power advantage. Of course, the bargaining framework does not predict Jiang's policies exactly—it only predicts broadly similar policies. Thus, Jiang's intensified police and cultural repression is not exactly predicted by the ongoing upsurge in ethnic unrest. He might have continued with Deng's more ad hoc form of repression, or even tried to reduce tensions by relaxing repression. Both of these policies would have remained consistent with the broader stability-and-development goals. A stronger championing of China's territorial integrity and the broader, pan-ethnic Chinese national identity, and therefore a tougher line toward weak but rebellious minorities, makes sense politically (Shale Horowitz & Peng Yu 2014:467-470).

In the post-9/11 period, Xinjiang has become a focal point of ethnic tension. Ethnic minority conflicts usually develop from the threat of majority group and this distrust among the minority, in turn feeds the policy and practices of government in minority areas. The increasing number of ethnic violence in 1990s showed the Uyghur's support towards the movement inside and outside the China. An official document issued by CCP in 2002, banned the ETIM and charged to this group to launch Jihad in Xinjiang. It was claimed by CCP that, in-between 1999 to 2001, a bulk amount of money was funded by al-Qaeda and Taliban to increase the Islamic fundamentalism in this region. The recruited militants who were organizing crime and terrorism in this region took training in Afghanistan and after coming back they are involving themselves with terrorist and violent activities in Xinjiang. It was also reported ETIM has some close relations with a number of Jihadists based in Pakistan, as well as being engaged in involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, robbery, kidnapping and other forms of organized crime. According to Chinese official report ETIM is responsible for conducting a series of terrorist attacks and the cause of deaths of so many lives to carry out terrorist attacks in Xinjiang and many other places inside and outside in China. Though in 2000 Hasan Mahsum changed the name of the group, but, this group was black listed as ETIM in Chinese official document in 2002 after the 9/11 attack on America (Gunaratna, Acharya, Pengxin 2010:61-63.).

In 2007, Chinese policemen suspected East Turkestan Islamic Movement training camp and eighteen terrorists were killed and seventeen captured. In 2008 Chinese forces destroyed another ETIM camp in Xinjiang. Police also seized a number of weapons which were collected to conduct attacks during the 2008 Beijing Olympic. In March, 2008, Chinese policeman arrested two suspected ETIM members from Lan Zhou Airport, who confessed the plan of hijacking the

plane during the police interrogation. In July, 2008, Shanghai police cracked a terrorist cell which was plotting and attack on Shanghai stadium during the Olympic Games. To combat the terrorist activity during the Olympic game, CCP tightened the security measures throughout the country. On 4 August 2008, a group of police officers were attacked by two men in Kashgar. In April 2009, Kashgar local court gave the death penalties to them. According to the government report a series of explosions took place in markets, hotels and government buildings during this time. On 10 August 2008, during a cross fire with the Chinese police force 10 suspected terrorist were killed and two were arrested. The violence occurred just two days after the opening ceremony Beijing Olympic. On 12 August 2008, three security personnel were killed in Yamanya near Kashgar. In 2008, the increasing number of violence prompted an increase in counterterrorism raids by CCP. It also announced rewards for public for getting information relating to serious crime in different sensitive places like Xinjiang and Tibet. In between January to August 2008, Xinjiang police arrested eighteen ETIM members who were involved in terrorist activities in and outside China.

East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) was black listed by China's Ministry of Public Security in 2002. The main objective of ETLO was to achieve independence of Xinjiang (especially East Turkestan) to establish an Islamic state. The members of this group call themselves as freedom fighters to resist China's suppression on Uyghur people in Xinjiang. ETLO is also involved in various type of violent crime in West and Central Asian region including China. They also killed a Chinese diplomat to Kyrgyzstan. In 2003 Chinese police raided a camp and destroyed it, which was organized by ETLO in Hebei province. Though the group claimed, it does not have any problem with Chinese common people but the brutality of Chinese government in east Turkestan is the main cause of violation between government and separatist minority groups. In July 2009 Urumqi riots took 197 lives and more than 1700 people were injured. In this same year in September, Xinjiang experienced a period of unrest. Chinese government found World Uyghur Congress (WUC) as an illegal organization which was responsible for those unrests. In the same year the Easter Turkestan Information Center (ETIC) was identified as an Eastern Turkestan terrorist group by CCP. China's claim was that this terrorist group was involved in developing network for conducting terrorist activities to propagate separatism inside China especially Xinjiang. Though the claim of this group was, their objective is to provide current information and knowledge of cultural civilization of Eastern

Turkestan to the natives and the next generation people in Xinjiang (Gunaratna, Acharya, Pengxin 2010:87-88).

In June 2010, Ministry of Public Security Affairs Launched a seven month Strike Hard Campaign to severely crack down every type of serious violent crime. 2010 Strike hard Campaign was the main cause of violent crimes in 2009 in China, especially conducted by different fundamentalist groups (People's Republic of China, Ministry of Public Security 2010). In 2011, two incidents which were called terrorist attacks according Chinese government had happened within a short span of two weeks in the month of July. The first happened on the 18th, where a group of people attacked a police station and killed four policemen. During a rescue operation fourteen attackers were also killed. Another one broke out in Kashgar on 30th July, where fourteen civilians were victimized. To suppress these tensions, Chinese Central Government tightened its noose in the region and called for a more stringent campaign for two months against those who were involved in anti-Chinese activities. A series of important anti-terrorism laws were passed by National People's Congress Standing Committee on December 2015. The government made it clear that the priority is to strengthen the high profile anti-terrorism law rather than compromise with human rights violations and all. It also paid attention to preserving the minority's culture, customs and education to those areas. At a press conference, Li Shouwei, an official spokesperson of National People's Congress (NPC) said that discrimination would not be entertained by areas, ethnicity or religion to fight against terrorism (Yin 2015:1).

After the incident of 9/11, Chinese authorities followed the path of U.S 'War and Terror' strategy against religious extremism, separatism and terrorism. It used Strike Hard for cracking down any dissidence or separatism attempts in Xinjiang and other minority regions which were affected by these "three evils". Chinese government's claim was from 1990 to 2001, China was victimized by East Turkestan terrorist forces over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang and government considered them as part of International Islamic Terror. Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister declared at UN on November, 2001, that the terrorist groups of East Turkestan are trained, equipped and funded by international terrorist organizations and it has mounted in China's North- Western province Xinjiang. Some Uyghur organizations argue that to get world recognition that China is a victim of domestic terrorism; Xinjiang was used as a playing card to

enforce Strike Hard like ‘stick’ policy. Some human right observers and scholarly arguments denote that the Chinese operation and Han emigration was the main cause of Uyghur resentment in Xinjiang during 1990s. Along with this main factor the disintegration of Soviet Union and the rise of ethnic-nationalism in the era of globalization were another two dominant co-factors which affected CCP’s rule and sovereignty over Xinjiang. CCP’s claim was, illegal religious activity and Islamic fundamentalisms are main factors to generate this volatile situation (Mackerras 2006:244).

Hu Jintao’s Policies towards Xinjiang

A sizeable representation of ethnic minorities employed in the public sector is largely due to the government’s policy of preference in employment since the 1950s. Layne and Liang’s 2008 study states that the Han have come to occupy 71 per cent of the well-paying jobs such as managerial and administrative white collar posts whereas 57 per cent of professional jobs. But Uyghurs still constitute of only 17 per cent of government officials in all. The new jobs created in both formal and informal economic and job sectors migrant workers mainly Han Chinese from other provinces, have taken over most of the employment opportunities. To counter this, the Xinjiang government with cooperation from other provinces have tried creating jobs for Uyghur and Muslim populace either in Xinjiang or in other parts of the country. For instance, officials have signed agreements with coastal area industries to send Xinjiang ethnic minority workers to work in the coasts. Gradually, the government began to realize the downside of economic expansion on employment which increased preexisting inequalities. However any market expansion is generally followed by deregulation and decentralization. In the process of marketization, the state’s regulatory and distributive role is assuaged alongside dispatching employment subsidies to the local populace. Previously the government was able to use its power of creating to assign more jobs to ethnic minority groups to improve their employment situation. But under a market economy the government has less and less resources and strength to do what it used to in market sectors. Even among college graduates in Xinjiang according to the 2005 data, ethnic minority graduates only had about an employment rate of only 50 per cent after graduation. The grim employment situation for Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities (except for Hui) has come to have important roles contributing to a decline of ethnic relations in Xinjiang.

Migration and development policies of economic development continued to be the highest priority with large infrastructure and energy projects devised in safeguarding China's energy security. After 2009 the state introduced a series of completely new policies to boost economic growth in Xinjiang. The influx of Han Chinese, especially laborers, remained significant, though the ethnic balance remained somewhat similar. The members of the Han Chinese community were earning thrice more than those in the Uyghur-dominated southern provinces. For cultural policies after the 2009 riots, Hu emphasized economic progress in his political speeches. But this did not reflect the intensity of state control pertaining to education and culture. The multilingual education system continued to be revised to increase Chinese literacy. Those schools that functioned previously as ethnic schools in some areas were merged with Chinese schools.

China's minority policy strengthens its assimilationist approach towards minority areas 2000 onward. After 9/11 attack on America, the implementation of repressive policies were increased. To ensure public security, joint defense teams were organized in various areas, but the violent incidents continued albeit in a smaller scale in some minority regions. In 2001 the revision of the national autonomy law provided more governmental support to the minority regions to develop its infrastructure and finance. The 11th Five Year Plan (2006-10) issued by China government stressed upon much progress of minority nationalities in public infrastructure, ecological environment and standard of living. But questions continued to be raised about the implication or practicing of these policies. In 2007, there had been little change to the policies in autonomous areas. The CCP decided that, any regulation of autonomous region will be implemented after its approval from National People's Congress (NPC) standing committee. In this way the interference of Central government was increased in decision making of autonomous regions from mid-2000 onwards (Dreyer 2008:297-299).

In April 2010, ten months after the Urumqi riots, the Central Government announced that Wang Lequan was to be replaced by Zhang Chunxian, a relatively moderate figure who was previously Party Secretary of the Hunan Province. A new series of development programs in Xinjiang in hopes of using economic benefits to reduce ethnic conflicts was also introduced by the central government. However the overwhelming problem is that the developmental programs results in a widening of the economic gap between groups engaging in different economic productions. Uyghurs were not engaged in the industries that benefit from these government

sponsored developmental programs. Additionally the costs of industrial reforms were too high for them. At the same time economic opportunities accompanied by the GWDP was disproportionate with the Han Chinese all over China and not just in Xinjiang, but also those from other far-off regions who were attracted by the prospect of development programs to emigrate in increasing numbers in Xinjiang. As a result the developmental programs actually increased Uyghur disenchantment with the system that was prevalent while reinforcing their feelings of being victimized by Han Chinese colonialism. A survey research (Yee 2003) found that nearly 40 per cent of the Uyghur feel that the betterment in their living standard had been 'slower' than that of the Han Chinese while only 15 per cent answer 'faster.' This suggests that ethnic groups would not be able to choose to rebel when they can easily adapt to the technological requirement for the dominant mode of production. If adaptation is vaguely described as opportunities for education, then Uyghurs will stand a good chance of switching to the more advanced mode of production. The Chinese authorities have implemented various modules of affirmative action to help Uyghur students attend college since the 1980s. For example, Uyghur students can enter college with a much lower score on entrance examinations than Han students. However, in reality adaptation involves more complicated socio-economic processes at play. In fact many Uyghur students complain that they cannot find jobs after graduation not because they are not qualified as far as skill is concerned but because employers have racial biases in favour of Han students. Fuller and Lipman (2004) found that Han employers tend to have a belief that the Uyghur lack work ethic and drive. The situation would be worse for Muslims, who are discouraged from engaging in religious practices in the work places in many ways (Finley 2007). Despite the Urumqi riots, only a handful Uyghurs were engaged in anti-Chinese protests and secessionism. Yet it is also true that a considerable number of Uyghur share the view that the Han Chinese have 'colonized' their homeland. In Xinjiang, many Uyghur earn their livelihood through non industrial means like farming while most Han Chinese work in urban areas and many are employed by enterprises owned and funded by the state. Although the Uyghur are 90 per cent of the population in the rural southern Xinjiang, they represent only 12per cent of the population in Urumqi (Stan Hok-Wui Wong, Hiroki Takeuchi 2010:97-125).

Hu Jintao continued to gather support from the Deng and Jiang-era objectives of political stability and economic empowerment whereas the ethnic policies had remained strongly assimilationist, following Jiang's lead. Political and cultural repression remained firm. Attempts

to co-opt minorities into the management hit a stumbling block as Han Chinese cadres were brought in to intensify political reliability. Han Chinese immigration continued at the grassroots levels. In Tibet it continued to shift the demographic balance. The emphasis put on Chinese language in schools continued and intensified. The factors are roughly the same as they were for the Jiang period. Preferences and relative power predict continued pursuit of the goals developed by Deng. Jiang's hardened assimilationist policies and its continuity is also explained by a concomitant continual of the decentralization of power. More so than Jiang, Hu was confronted with rivals at the top (including a powerful group of leaders who were Jiang's allies), a more independent PLA and stronger nationalist Han Chinese public opinion. Under these circumstances, responding to minority unrest with more assimilationist policies would be the safest path to take politically. This is also in tandem with continuing aligning of cross-regional policies. More rapid Han Chinese immigration into Tibet continued under Hu Jintao, destroying the last remnants of Tibet's traditionally more tolerant policy regime. The protracted differences between Xinjiang and Tibet—as far as objective factors were concerned such as strategic importance, geography and size of the Han Chinese population, and in terms of political factors such as cohesion and preferences of ethnic minority leaders continue to fade away or become less relevant.

Xi Jinping's Approach towards Minorities in Xinjiang

Under the rule of Xi Jinping, the theoretical factors predict little deviation from the precedents set under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The broader priorities for Xi's China remain largely unmoved and his power to exercise strategic discretion is unlikely to deviate from that of Jiang's or Hu's. One evident sign is the soaring profile of Chinese nationalism both in public psyche and in foreign policy sectors like the island disputes in the East and South China Seas. Under such circumstances peaceful and united movement in the direction of passive coexistence with the Tibetan and Uyghur minorities seem highly unlikely. During his visit to Xinjiang in April 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping focused on the stability and peace in Xinjiang to create the atmosphere of developmental work in this region. He also gave importance to the objective of Xinjiang's Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) which was established in 1954. It has transformed a vast west land into a green oasis as well as maintaining the security of this region. Xi also encouraged the members of this crop to increase its efforts to promote China's integrationist approach to the countries' North Western border areas, which are

mainly dominated by Muslim minorities. The government's claim is that this integrationist approach will help establish a model of advanced productivity and prosperous culture in this region. To find out the causes of terrorism, the central government also recognized three factors: poverty, inequality, and unemployment. These three factors are the main causes of spreading religious fundamentalism among the minorities and promoting terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism in Xinjiang Uyghur's autonomous region. He also emphasized that development would be the key issue in the CCP's policy towards Xinjiang and to ensure livelihood and stability among the different ethnic groups, employment would be generated for this region. Xi's visit also emphasized the gas and mineral wealth in Xinjiang's geo-strategic importance to China. Industrialization of agriculture, promotion of local industries, ensuring employment opportunities to local people were the main focused areas during Xi's Presidential visit, which shows China's recent attitude towards the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.

During his visit to Kashgar, Xi Jinping also stressed on the Strike Hard Campaign, to make it efficient against the terror cells he was informed about by the local police to him, that it has massed so many a number of terrorist cells in 2014. The 2014 Chinese Presidential visit kept the CCP's concern on religious affairs in Xinjiang also. According to the Xinjiang Islamic Association, Xi's visit to a mosque in Urumqi and his meeting with the religious leaders on different issues expressed the government's understanding about the importance of religion in Xinjiang. In a speech delivered by the Dean of Xinjiang Islamic Institute, Abudulrekep Tumniyaz informed about some initiatives like sanction from the government fund to expand his institution. The objective of Xinjiang Islamic Institute is to provide training to one thousand students in an academic year, who will serve as Imams to represent the next generation Uyghur. He also suggested increasing such type of program for Imams for updating their knowledge to satisfy the people's curiosity and question about Islam. Xi also gave the government's viewpoint regarding religious publications, which contained the message of religious tolerance encouraging acts of kindness. The government's belief is that the religious leaders will keep the local people away from religious extremism. The government report said that the integration of counter terrorism in people's daily life would be the priority nowadays for the region's long term success; the focus was also on the irreplaceable link of this region with the proposed Silk Route Economic Belt (Cuigia 2014).

After Xi's visit to Xinjiang, in a statement in 2015, the newly elected chairman of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region Shohrat Zakir said that ethnic unity is the key to promote the region success and to bring out this unity, the Chinese government will speed up the process of building a mixed community. It was also said that the Han Chinese would encourage promoting their business skills in this region, but indirectly it shows the government's support for promoting Han emigration policy to strengthen and pursue its integrationist approach towards Xinjiang since 1949 from the country's reformation to till now. Not only that, CCP is also planning to mix students from different ethnic groups in primary and high schools by introducing the concept of merged school to promote ethnic harmony and educational reformation in this decade. The chairman also highlighted the government view on partiality and discrimination that no discrimination would be tolerated on the matter of ethnic identity and every citizens has to obey and function under the law while all its affairs will be handled in accordance with the law and Chinese Constitution. He also added that to achieve the region's developmental goals new policies will be drafted for promoting economy and eliminating religious extremism and combating terrorism (Jia 2015)

Impact of China's Minority Policies in Xinjiang

The reformist policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping after correcting the unpopular policies of Mao era not only beneficial from the economic point of view, but also was politically correct as it dealt with ethnic minority issues (Gladney and Starr, 2004). At this time state not only maintained flexibility to recognize the various demands like, right to speech, right to language, and right to religious belief of the ethnic minorities, but indirectly insisted on advancing the status of separatist demand by attracting huge investment here for trade and development. However, it was not sufficient to pacify anger of the minorities. Gradually increasing economic disparities and dissatisfaction among ethnic minorities transformed to a violent movement such as the one in 1990 in the town of Baren being followed by many more in the coming decades. Increasing conflict in this decade compelled CCP to adopt some harsh policies to suppress the voice of minority nationalities and 'Strike Hard' fitted into their bill. It is also said that it worsened the human rights conditions in Xinjiang from mid-1990s onwards. The new decade started with a wide spread violation between ethnic minorities and the Xinjiang's regional government. For instance when the government's motive is not one of sincerely promoting a harmonious and equitable relationship, but rather assimilation in the long run through

sinicization and industrialization, then the perception of the minority policy by the minorities themselves become an important factor in determining the success of the policy (Siu-Mi Tam and David Y.H. Wu 1988:89).

The Standing Committee of CCP Politburo in March 1996 took some major steps against these underground pan Islamic religious affairs and warned the minority people to be cautious about their religious beliefs and practices. Emergence of Pan-Turkic and Islamic political parties and organizations in neighbouring Uzbekistan, Turkestan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the penetration and infiltration of religious extremism were emergent threat to the region. To combat the effect of raising Islamic fundamentalist ethnic nationalism from Central Asian Republics to Xinjiang, CCP took some hard line approaches in its ethnic minority policy to this border-land area. The announcement of the “Strike-Hard” campaign in 1996 played a major role regarding this adaptation of hardline approaches to control the ethnic disturbances in minority areas. Basically “Strike-Hard” was an anticrime, anti-separatist tool which was a political premium of CCP’s approach to deal with the separatism and anti-nationalist activities in the latter half of 1990s. The establishment and role of SCO was very significant actor in this respect. A large number of economic and security treaty with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkestan and Uzbekistan was signed to balance the social stability and to reduce the tension of external threats from Central-Asian Republics into its domestic matter like China’s claim its sovereignty over Xinjiang.

With the formation of SCO not only China influenced its role in Central Asia, it also influenced and control the diplomatic interest of United State upon Central Asia and increased the cooperation between China and Russia. In April, 1996’s meeting removed the border disputes between these countries. In 1998 meeting in Almaty declared the joint struggle will be conducted by these group of countries against ethnic separatism, religious extremism, international terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking and other cross-border illegal activities. China’s diplomatic initiatives compelled the Central Asian States as well as Russia, Pakistan and other countries to keep them silent regarding China’s internal minority issues and strike hard like hard approaches was responsible for human rights violation. In case of Muslim world China also maintained warm relations with Arab countries. In 1990s, China and Turkey agreed to strengthen their defense relation, though China raised its voice regarding the use of foreign soil by Uyghur separatists but China praised Turkish government for their non-interference approach regarding

China's internal affairs and human rights issue. China also developed its economic ties with Turkey. Time to time high official visits between these countries brought a healthy diplomatic and bilateral relation to 1990s onwards. China also increased its diplomatic relation with Iran through nuclear cooperation in 1992. Diplomatically, Chinese authority controlled Iran's interest on mineral rich Central Asian region and to Xinjiang during this period. China-Pakistan relationship also took a favourable turn to build up a healthy relation between these two countries, when Pakistan criticized India's interference in China's domestic affairs for providing political asylum to the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama (Debata 2007). In recent years China-India diplomatic relation has become more peaceful and stable, but China-Pakistan relation has taken a remarkable transformation in South-East Asian politics and now a days these two countries have good ethos to each other. Opening of Karakoram pass in 1986 increased the economic and diplomatic relationship between China and Pakistan. This highway was closed when China strongly opposed Pakistani activities to encourage the separatist movement in Xinjiang. To satisfy the Chinese authorities in late 1990s, Pakistan took some major steps against Uyghur to use Pakistani soil for their training and started to combat the separatist activities in the border land areas. China's Afghanistan polity got another clarity after the 9/11 attack on USA and when USA. Started its military action against the Taliban ruled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Then China used its strategy through combined military exercised with USA force to combat separatist and terrorist activities in this region. China's demand was, there have Taliban connection with religious extremism and terrorism inside the Chinese soil Xinjiang. The Western Development programme and its announcement was another major step, taken by China in 1999. On one hand to deal with ethnic separatism by severest repression and on the other to recognize the poverty and underdevelopment are the root causes of the region's social problem, China took this stick and carrot strategy to develop this region. Not only Xinjiang but Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Tibet were also included under this policy. Through this policy China started transfer of resources from East to West and reinsured Han settlement in the minority region. Actually China's internal security dilemma compelled it to initiate developmental strategy in Western Region. Though Chinese argument is China followed its developmental path from East to West. But in the context of ethnic minority region such as Xinjiang, the security dilemma was focused to the relationship between security and identity (Clarke 2007). And to keep balance between these two actors Western Developmental

Programme played a very significant role to ensure CCP's sovereignty over this region. Basically there was a clear interrelationship between China's hard and soft policies during 1990s onwards (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004).

There was no major outbreak of violence at the first half of 2000, but, a small number of incidents had taken place during this period. 2002 bomb explosion in Qinghai, a large number of Tibetan student demonstration against the CCP government in the same year, 2004 riot in Guangzhou, on 4 August 2008, Kashgar attack and some other attacks during Beijing Olympic in 2008, 2009 ethnic riots in Xinjiang's capital Urumqi expressed the anger of common masses against the CCP's preferential policies over this decade. Interestingly, since the ethnic clash in 2009 the Xinjiang government, with special funding support from the central government, has deliberately created many public sector jobs in order to strengthen and maintain social stability. New positions will particularly accommodate ethnic minorities. That is clearly an indication of the state's macro-management efforts in this regard, which, if properly utilized, could still balance some of the negative impact of the market economy on ethnic minorities. In fact, Xiaowei Zang's (2010) study of Han-Uyghur variation in employment in Urumqi highlights the following important information: while in the private sector economy the ethnic variation obviously favors the Han, within the state sector the situation is different. For example, in state firms ethnic differentiation regarding job attainment does not favor ethnic minorities such as Uyghur workers, mainly due to the market economy. This situation reflects the fact that the state's affirmative action policy continues to benefit local ethnic minorities in certain parts of the state sector economy (Xiaowei Zang 2010:728; Yuchao Zhu and dong Yan Blachford714-133).

In March 2014, knife attack in Kunming, Yunan province and May 2014 bomb attack in Urumqi were some examples of violent attacks against the Chinese. CCP's consideration was the technological improvement in minority areas has become the main channel for spreading religious fundamentalism through cyber-crime. The government declared that any individual or group, who will try to advocate violence, or will try for separation of minority areas from CCP, will identify at terrorist group by China and other international partners who supported U. S's War and Terror strategy. Recently a security report said that, since on 31st March, 2014 Xinjiang police have detained more than two hundred thirty suspects who involved promoting terrorism and separatism through cyber-crime (Liqiang and Yan 2014:4).

Although most Uyghur in Xinjiang maintain strong Uyghur national identities, not every social group subscribes to the separatist ideologies of the late eighties and nineties. The elderly generation of Uyghur grew up during the chaotic, unstable years of the Warlord Period. Most are grateful for recent improvements in standards of living and do not want to ‘rock the boat’. Middle-aged Uyghur suffered persecution during the Cultural Revolution and fear a return of Maoist ideology. Furthermore, they have homes and families to protect. The younger generation, however, has grown up amidst the relative freedom of post-1980 conciliatory minority policy. It has known the 1989 pro-democracy movement in China, the collapse of Eastern Europe and the USSR, the subsequent formation of the CIS, and the burgeoning of Islamic fundamentalist movements world-wide. These significant events have provided inspiration for a Uyghur youth that is ever more militant in its aspirations to independence. Unlike their elders, they have both less to fear and less to lose (Rebecca Clothey 2005:389-409).

The isolation of minorities is also thought to be a result of their cultural and, in particular, religious tradition which, it is argued discourages their engagement in education and reinforces their insularity. Minority communities invest considerable amounts of money and time into religion whilst school-aged children are sent to religious institutions. At a more fundamental level, religion is seen as encouraging believers to obey and preserve tradition, leading them to resist other cultures or cultural innovations. The implication is that the lack of intelligence caused by physical and cultural environments is significantly responsible for poor minority school performance (Lin Yi 2007:937). Among a wide range of factors responsible for poor minority performances, many academics highlight backwardness in the thinking modes of minority people as the fundamental element that is responsible for their poor educational achievement and persistent poverty. Lack of enthusiasm and motivation for education lie at the centre of these modes of thinking. Inadequate evaluation of education is believed to be embedded in minorities' isolated physical and cultural environments, which are causatively intertwined. Commentators have said that ethnic minorities usually live in isolated (nomadic or agricultural) areas and thus are unfamiliar with modernization, in which education plays an important role. Others suggest that minorities' disengagement from education or ineffective academic outcomes are largely a result of their lack of access to education, or of the irrelevance of education to their local socioeconomic situation or cultural values. For these academics, the national curriculum has an immediate effect on the failure because of lack of responsiveness to

locality and ethnicity in minority areas, in two basic ways. First, it is not designed to accord with the present physical or socioeconomic conditions of minority areas, and therefore confidence in school education among minority communities has significantly declined. Secondly, the curriculum is not relevant to the historical socio economic patterns of minorities. This is why commentators criticize the limited textbooks dealing with ethnic minorities as merely providing skin-deep knowledge about MCs, and tending to confuse students by inappropriately presenting information. The conclusion drawn by academics is that minorities are reluctant or even resistant to engage in education. Therefore, whilst a number of mainstream academics acknowledge that the physical or socioeconomic situation and the school curriculum all need to be changed, essentially it is minorities' backward modes of thinking that are seen as being in urgent need of transformation (Lin Yi 2007:938).

With more than 60 years' development since the CCP came to power in 1949, minority education has been to a large extent systematized, with various levels as well as forms of schooling for ethnic minority people. In the Party-state's attempt to realize its goals for minority education, special policies are at the center of the official agenda. The issues these policies are concerned with include, among others, bilingual education and college entrance examinations. As an important means of promoting bilingual education, an increasing number of schools of ethnic minorities and those of ethnic Han Chinese have been merged to become minority-Han merger schools (Min-Han Hexiao) in XUAR, which has featured new developments for minority education in the region. The principles of the development of the merger school are detailed in 'The Decision of XUAR Party Committee and Government on Vigorously Promoting Bilingual Education' issued in 2004. It prompts minority-concentrated regions to establish merger schools.

In April 2010, about ten months after the 2009 Xinjiang riots, the central government introduced a new series of development programs in Xinjiang in hopes of using economic benefits to reduce ethnic conflicts. However, as we have argued in this article, the overarching problem is that developmental programs widen the economic gap between groups engaging in different economic productions. Uyghur are not engaged in the industries that benefit from the developmental programs, and the costs of industrial transformation are too high for them. At the same time, economic opportunities accompanied by the GWDS disproportionately go to the Han Chinese— not only the Han Chinese in Xinjiang, but also those from other provinces who have been attracted by the development programs to settle in ever-increasing numbers in Xinjiang.

Thus, the developmental programs actually increase Uyghur' dissatisfaction with the current system, and reinforce their resentment as victims of the Han Chinese colonialism. In survey research, (Yee 2003) finds that nearly 40per cent of the Uyghur feel that the improvement in their living standard has been 'slower' than that of the Han Chinese while only 15per cent answer 'faster (Stan Hok-Wui Wong, Hiroki Takeuchi 2010:97-125).

The making of religious leaders is a major project of government for the stability of this region. According to head of the Xinjiang Islamic Institute and the deputy director of Xinjiang Islamic Association Adudulrekep Tumniaz, that the training of religious leaders is an important cause to curb the religious extremism, which is responsible for growing number of terrorist attacks in China. Lack of knowledge regarding Quran was unable to do the right explanation of Islam by the Imams. It is the main cause to inject violent thought among minority people through misinterpreting the doctrines of Islam by the extremist. Most of the Mosques in China situated in Xinjiang. The number is more than twenty four thousand. And around twenty eight thousand religious leaders are serving these Mosques, but, fifty per cent of them have only a primary school education. It shows a genuine cause of misinterpreting the Muslim doctrine. As a result government funded the Xinjiang Islamic Institute is serving as an educational institute to provide education to the Imams about the religious doctrine. In 2014, the institute has invested three hundred million Yuan for expansion of this government project and to train the religious leaders in the right direction across this region. Because CCP understood that in Xinjiang, improving peoples livelihood means improving their religious life. Several training classes already have been taking place to the various prefectures of this region. In the same year early March Shanshan county in eastern Turpan Prefectures, had run fourteen such type of training programmes for one hundred trainees in each session. In this respect the type of training would be decided by the trainer according to the thought of local people regarding religion. The government also started door to door visit accompanied by religious personnel for explaining Quran and to remove confusion among the minorities regarding its guideline.

Against this theoretical background, the Chinese proceeded over time to expand on the notion of regional autonomy and to develop differential approaches to the specific problems of the many ethnic and linguistic minorities within and on China's borders. In one sense regional autonomy meant that, while selected minority areas would enjoy autonomy with respect to local conditions and needs (including education, culture, and language), they would remain an

indivisible political and economic portion of China, combining to form a multinational unitary state. More specifically, it meant that four different types of regional autonomy evolved. Areas were designated autonomous regions if they were inhabited by one minority group exclusively, one dominant minority group but with other smaller groups as well, two or more minority groups of equal size, and, finally, primarily Han Chinese but containing significant numbers of minorities. Regions which fall into any of these categories have been granted some degree of regional autonomy, but limited to such areas as those mentioned above (education, culture, language) rather than to political or economic independence. It is with respect to these latter considerations (political and economic independence) that China's minorities and the Han majority has exhibited the most tension (John N. Hawkins 1978:150).

While China has some policies to benefit ethnic minorities, those policies are actually designed to assimilate ethnic minorities into the Han majority and eliminate their ethnicity. Therefore, China's preferential policies are, actually, harmful policies from the point of view of ethnic minority groups who want to retain their traditional heritages and not assimilate into the Hans majority. In fact, most ethnic minorities are proud of their culture and are hostile to the Han because they resent Han domination and do not want to assimilate. The sometimes violent resistance shows that China's policy of assimilation has been somewhat self-defeating. Nonetheless, with the promise of modernization and economic development, many Uyghur, for example, are willing to submit to Chinese rule and assimilation. Chinese policy results in quite a paradox: China claims to have preferential policies and a system of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, but if the ultimate plan, assimilation, succeeds, no ethnic minorities will exist to benefit. In other words, if ethnic minorities assimilate, any benefits they gain from their status will disappear. Further, if the ethnic minorities do not assimilate by their own volition, their ethnic minority regions may cease to be minority regions since China is moving so many Han into those regions. Once Hans become the numerical majority, those regions will no longer be ethnic minorities regions and the government will have no reason to confer special status upon them (Douglas Howland 2011: 313-318). International relations theorists and security experts optimistically report that the PRC's position on sovereignty is "easing"—becoming more flexible— particularly where economic matters are concerned. But on issues of territorial jurisdiction, such as Tibet and Xinjiang, nothing has changed in the past 60 years; China continues to claim territories lost to imperialism in the nineteenth century and on these historical

grounds demands that its fellows in the international community acknowledge China's longstanding territorial sovereignty over these region (Carlson 2005) what basically undermines the objectives of Chinese minority policy (Douglas Howland 2011:192).

In comparison to the minority policies of the Mao era, the reformist policies undertaken by Deng Xiaoping and his predecessors were better, but could not live up to the expectation, hopes and aspirations of national minorities, especially Uyghurs. If watched closely, it could be found that during the first decade or so of reformist policy (1976-1990), a lot of benefits were offered to the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. However, it did not stop them to continue their demands for a separate homeland that to through armed rebellions or violent separatism. It is perhaps the failure of the Chinese Central government or the inspiration the ambitious Uyghur cadres got from outside sources to take up cudgels against the Chinese state. Hence, the period from 1990 to 1997 saw a series of bloodiest attacks in Xinjiang. Even on the funeral day of Deng Xiaoping, there were serial blasts in Urumqi. Amidst this sorry state of affairs, it was but natural for the Chinese Central government to change their pro-minority stance and bring about a more stringent option to deal with rebel Uyghur cadres. And thus reappeared the Strike Hard Maximum Pressure campaign, an out and out military crackdown against all anti-Chinese forces, including the Uyghurs. The forthcoming chapter dilates upon this military means adopted by the Chinese forces to deal with those forces who were indulged in separatism, religious extremism and terrorism.

Chapter 4

Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure Campaign (1996-2001)

At the latter half of reformist period, CCP adopted some hard policies, which continued to 1990s onwards. The government claim was, from 1990 to 2001, instead of the government's relaxation towards

China launched Strike-Hard a domestic campaign in 1983 to wipe out crime from Chinese society. Strike-Hard campaign took a different shape regarding its implementation of the use against specified crime by the target but in case of Tibet and Xinjiang it was used against the demand of greater autonomy or separatist movement which China called "splittist activities". In March, 1996, National People's Congress further adopted this law under the rule of Jiang Zemin's government. The demand for a separate homeland or organizing events to save the religious identity, the occasional conflicting events conducted by Uyghur as resistance had a historical, political and social linkages with China's North Western province Xinjiang. The ideological basis of this conflict that transformed to the nature of terrorism as per the Chinese claimed had taken place after the disintegration of Soviet Union in the beginning of 90s. Before 1949, with the support of foreign forces, the majority of Uyghur constructed the East Turkestan Republic in 1933 and 1944 subsequently over the ideological based on pan Turkism and pan Islamism in this region which in a sense was revived at the latter half of Deng's Reformist Period and continued throughout 90s. Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang knew that China requires the support of all the minorities, including the Hui Muslims and the Uyghur in order for the country to progress economically. In October 1979, the Nationalities Commission of the NPC which was abolished during the Cultural Revolution was re-established (Clarke 2007: 43). It was part of the CCP's initial effort to bring about reconciliation between the government and the ethnic minorities after the Cultural Revolution. The CCP was aware of the economic potentials of Xinjiang especially its vast natural resources. Therefore, it required the support and cooperation of the Uyghur. Therefore it was characterized by relative tolerance towards the religious practices and customs of Muslim minorities and encouraged institutionalized Islamic studies and culture through construction of mosques and madrasas and also funded for these constructions. It also formed the Chinese Islamic Association which was a regional body of CCP to uplift the minority's culture, education and control the religious-political stability inside Xinjiang like

ethnically conflicted autonomous region. Some Uyghur organizations considered that the economic development in Xinjiang must be accompanied by political reforms. But the party refused to accept political reforms what fueled the Uyghur in Xinjiang.

The United states-led war in the Middle East was another main cause of religious extremism in Xinjiang-Central Asian region. U.S double standard strategy undoubtedly generated various kinds of terrorist groups in Central Asia from-which separatist from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region received ideological indoctrination of religious extremism and military training for the demand of separate Islamic religious states.

The Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure Campaign initiated by the Chinese Central government has been a major policy framework to deal with this restive situation in the northwestern region of China, which is strategically located with minority dominated and economically backward despite having rich natural and mineral resources. After the great disaster of Cultural Revolution, Chinese authority started development policies and programmes in Xinjiang. Mainly to spread the integrationist approach into the ethnic minorities, CCP adopted mostly soft approach during Deng's reformist period. It was characterized by relative tolerance towards the religious practices and customs of Muslim minorities and encouragement of institutionalized Islamic studies and culture through construction of mosques and madrasas. During this time, CCP also provided fund for these constructions. Those were controlled by Chinese Islamic Association, a regional body of CCP, to uplift the minority's culture, education and to bring political stability inside Xinjiang.

When state came to realize Islam as a threat for the regional integrity in China especially in Xinjiang, then it started campaign against the Muslim literature, construction of mosques, reeducation and reform of Muslim cadres etc. Simultaneously Strike-Hard was re-introduced such kind of hard policy and used as a control machinery for controlling the political and social stability in Xinjiang and Tibet and it brought a deep impact on minority people in these regions. Some factors insisted CCP to launch Strike-Hard in 1996. The Baren uprising in April 1990 followed a series of violent separatist attacks on Chinese interests in Xinjiang and other parts of China and prompted the Chinese authority to begin this campaign. China's liberal policies for economic reforms for ethnic minorities also allowed religious and cultural freedom within 1980s. In this respect the economic development of Xinjiang benefited the Han migrants more

compared to the Uyghur. The non-Hans, especially the Uyghur were mere labourers, whereas, the Han Chinese dominated the managerial positions according to the economic strata. It is noteworthy to mention that the economic reforms contributed to the rapid urbanization in China in reformist period, but unemployment among workers increased and their frustrations were not given proper attention when the authorities denouncing their protests as part of an effort to undermine the government. The desire for a better future inspired the students and ordinary citizens in Beijing to take to the streets on 22nd April 1989 demanding for democratization and fulfillment of the rights enshrined in China's Constitution 1982. During the same period, approximately 3,000 Uyghur students from the University of Xinjiang and the Urumqi Institute of Quranic Studies demonstrated in front of the Xinjiang CCP headquarters to protest the publication of Sexual Customs, which allegedly contained insults and blasphemy against Islamic teachings (Gladney, 2004: 231).

Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989 happened when the economic development and reforms were reshaping China. The students were seeking for political reforms. Similarly, some Uyghur groups considered that the economic development in Xinjiang must be accompanied by political reforms. But the CCP hardened its stance of refusing to accept political reforms. With the economic reforms the government also supported the Han migration policy. It also contributed to the increase of unemployment among the Uyghur. In addition, they also feared their religious and cultural identity would be eroded due to the influx of Hans into Xinjiang. But their demands did not receive the attention of the government. Both cases of Tiananmen Square demonstrations and Xinjiang clearly demonstrated that the government is suppressing the voices of the people instead of fulfilling their aspirations. The failure of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 had deep impact on the Uyghur groups seeking greater freedom and political reforms in Xinjiang. They viewed the government as incapable of listening to the grievances of the people and intolerant to any political reforms. Unfortunately, the death toll as a result of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations also convinced some Uyghur groups that the so called peaceful demonstrations would not provide the intended results; instead they were convinced that the only way to bring about change was through violence. Therefore, since the 1990s the outbreak of political violence had been serious that the province could be considered to be in a constant state of emergency (Roy Anthony Rogers 2014:413-43).

China's "Open Door" policy added another feather to develop relation of ethnic minorities with Pakistan, Turkey, Central Asia and other neighboring Muslim countries. The contact with outside world as well as Han immigration in this region mobilized the Muslim minorities against CCP's rule in this region. At the same time disintegration of Soviet Russia and emergence of Central Asian Republics created a new encouragement among the minorities in Xinjiang to raise their voice for separate homeland. So, Chinese concern over growing ethnic nationalism reinforced to take some hard-line approaches like Strike-Hard in XUAR. The disintegration of Soviet Union and emergence of five Central Asian States in 1991 was an important factor to shape and operational China's Central Asian Policies because Uyghur of Xinjiang had many similarities with their ethnic cousins in Central Asia and Central Asian history, culture, language, religion etc. Not only that the revival of Islam in Central Asia led to growth of radical Islam and it had a considerable impact over China's territorial security and sovereignty. From mid-90s to 2001 five major conflicts created an annoying situation for China's domestic and international politics. The followings are: Afghan conflict and the rise of Taliban during 1996 to 2001, civil war in Tajikistan, volatile situation in Fergana Valley, Indo-Pak conflict in 1999 and 9/11 terrorist attacks on USA (Debata 2007:148-164).

The Islamic separatist and terrorist threats insisted China to launched Strike Hard like hard policy. The government policies which curtailed Islamic practices and opportunities, insisted anti-Han and anti-governmental sentiment in this region. In 1990, the Baren uprising was one of the major incident and showed the social and political frustration among the minorities for CCP. The Baren affair also created China's fear over Islam as a security threat. Another prominent religious violence in 1995 took place in Khotan. A large demonstration was conducted by Uyghur against the arrest of an Imam by police. A massive revolt took more than one hundred lives and so many were injured. The Chinese government identified, the dissatisfaction on policies is not only the main cause of religious and ethnic violence in Xinjiang, but, the opening of Xinjiang border and increasing exposure of the ethnic minorities to neighboring countries promoted the Uyghur nationalism to create a separate homeland from China, or an Independent Eastern Turkestan state. In 2000 various reports highlighted that Uyghur are fighting with the Talibanto establish a Taliban regime in Afghanistan, as well as, they are being actively recruited by the IMU. Such reports have been further acknowledged by

the Pentagon after 9/11 terrorist attack on America (Ahmed Rashid and Susan V. Lawrence: 2000).

Through the establishment of the Shanghai-Five, and after entered the Uzbekistan in through SCO China managed to focus on the perceived threat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the related Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) insurgency and economic problems and other regional crisis during this time. The establishment of the SCO, in this way became a land mark for making counter terrorism strategy and a healthy cooperation between China, Russia and the newly developed Central Asian States.

Strike Hard Campaign in 1990s

Strike Hard as a hard policy was first formulated and launched by China in 1983 as a domestic campaign to wipe out criminal activities from Chinese society. But it took different shapes and changed its nature with time and situation. But in case of Xinjiang and Tibet it was used against the demand of greater autonomy or separatist movement or to combat “splittist activities”. After the Baren incident in 1990, Xinjiang police started a large scale campaign to demolish the extremist and separatist ideas carried out by some Islamic fundamentalist groups, who were responsible to spread Islamic fundamentalism in this region. In March 1996, National People’s Congress adopted this law with more stringent measures. Severe and speedy punishments were two basic objectives of this campaign. The legislation also allowed the provincial High Court to approve death sentences or lifetime imprisonment passed by lower courts. Although it was a successful campaign according to Chinese authorities, but, China was criticized for the violation of human rights especially in Xinjiang and Tibet for this campaign. The aftermath of Baren incident, CCP started to strengthen its control over Xinjiang and the organizational body in grass root level was criticized. Receiving foreign funds and donations for Islamic schools, foreign preachers mainly from Central Asian region were force-fully close-down. The Xinjiang regional government designed new laws to restrict religious activity. This regulations were sub divided into regulation for religious personnel and regulation for religious activity. Without governmental approval or government license, religious leaders were prohibited for practicing any Mosque and Quranic school. In 1993, in a conference between senior official and party leaders, it was decided that the number of armed police will be increased in Xinjiang. The Han emigration policy was also promoted to get control over the region. To

slow down the crime rate in April 1996 the Strike Hard was directed to demolish the unofficial political organizations and their activities which were involved to spread separatist ideas and thought among the common masses. XPCC was also assigned to maintain Xinjiang's stability and integrity. A document was also published which outlined the guidance for publishing Islamic books, article, audio visual broad-casting at the same time. The publications related with Islam was compulsory to get governmental approval before publication and XPCC was used as a most reliable governmental force during the first half of 90s and before the initiation of Strike Hard to get CCP's long standing diplomatic control over this region. The rights of media had been cut-down, only those, who showed their liability towards Chinese government got the permission to broadcast government initiatives and success among the public masses. These agencies was also bounded to criticize the anti-governmental extremist ideas which was spreading by some extremist groups in and outside China at this time. Subsequently CCP issued a statement for party carders that if anybody has been found associated with any anti-governmental activities like helping to spread the idea of separatism and religious extremism would be punish strictly under the guideline of the constitution . The centre also criticized that CCP's local bodies are not performing well to control the illegal religious forces at grass root level who are injecting the separatist and anti-governmental feelings among the local citizens.

Since over three decades to till now China's Strike Hard campaign stands on three pillars, professionalism, and rule of law and independent administration of justice (Trevaskes 2001). This anti-crime campaign came to the forefront as a tool of China's anti-crime weapon since last three decades when CCP promoted the process of liberalization in 1980s. The Yanda (Strike Hard) first conducted for three years from 1983 to 1986 in Tibet and executed an estimated around ten thousand criminals, who were involved in anti-governmental activities (Tanner 2000: 93).

Increasing ethnic conflicts and then the Chechen struggle created a fear in CCP's central body that a massive demonstration can be taken place for the fever of a separate home land in Xinjiang. So a massive crackdown was directed on April 1996. Approximately one thousand three hundred people were arrested and so many organization were destroyed and a large scale of arms-ammunition, drugs and money were seized. It was quiet clear from Chinese side that CCP's attempts for recruiting ethnic minority members to the different levels in this administration,

created the thought of separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. A number of attacks on police and other government bodies had increased. From April to June around four thousand students were arrested and a large number of troops were deployed to find out the sympathizers, who supported the separatist activity in Xinjiang. The XPCC was used in roads and railways and every sensitive region to monitor the situation. A large number of arrests had been taken place in Aksu, Urumqi, Turpar, Ghulzaand other region of the country. School and colleges were identified as potential hot bed for spreading the idea of religious fundamentalism. The unlawful religious activities were banned, but, it was pointed out the Muslim had freedom to follow their rituals under the guidance of the constitution of the People's Republic of China. But the reactionary books and publications, scripts etc were seized. In this way CCP's 1983s law got a new dimension and amended by NPC in 1996 and 1997 subsequently.

In July 1996 the senior military officers and CCP's leaders decided in a meeting to extend the period and scope of Strike Hard Campaign to sweep up the separatist element from Xinjiang. The growing trends of serious crime became slow down and public order in most of the regions was restored. Though CCP extracted many weak links inside this criminal law and it was ones against revised in January 1997. The patriotic Re-education campaign was also launched by CCP along-with the Strike Hard. This Re-education campaign was the authority's tool for controlling the religion dominated minority area. The CCP's view over religion was a political problem, which harvested the seeds of religious fundamentalism. From the latter half of 1996, CCP decided to focus more on the role of religion. It increased its monitoring to content of scriptural teaching, the venue of religious programs, ethnic customs and habits and so on and sabotage fifteen violence crime in Aksu, Kashgar and Urumqi from April to May in 1996. With these two campaigns China started to strengthen all levels of government and legal control to any type of ethnic and religious affairs. Minority institutions mainly the mosques and madrassas came under strong surveillance. PLA and XPCC were strengthened to promote and deal with Han immigration and separatist activities subsequently. Some scholars argue that Strike Hard Campaign was as a major instrument to promote and accelerate the developmental policies as well as to recentralize the decision of CCP's integrationist approach towards its frontier minority regions. It also helped to promote Han immigration and to explore and exploitation of mineral resources from West to East to strengthen the China's political and economic hubs and cultural ties between Han and non-Hans (Dillon 2009).

But the tightening atmosphere of the region induced Ghulja incident on 5th February 1997. The Muslim minority people came to the street against the arrest of hundred Muslim Uyghur, in which thirty had been executed. It was also claimed by Uyghur organization that the Chinese are trying to destroy the Uyghur culture. They also attacked Han residence and government officials and approximately ten Hans were killed and hundred people including the officials were injured. The local Han residence started to flee from their locality. Though the government claim was four to five people had been killed and five hundred were arrested. But some Uyghur reports highlighted that, on 5th February Uyghur public demonstration was organized for the demand of the reliefs of a large number of Uyghur people, who had been arrested by the police during strike hard. Over three hundred minorities were dead and armed police brutally suppressed this conflict. These reports also claimed and that the Chinese troops used heavy guns to the protesters both from the air and ground. The whole city was surrounded by the army and a large number of troops moved to the rioting areas. According to the memorandum of understanding with Central Asian States, then the Chinese president Jiang Zemin informed his Kazakh counter-part Nursultan Nazarbayev regarding the large scale troop's movement to the border city Yining, which is only seventy kilometers from Kazakh border. Solders were ordered to kill anyone who will disobey the rule. A major number armoured vehicle started to patrolling twenty four hour inside the city. The central government imposed "three-no policy", were no one was allowed to question that what is happening or happened in Yining, nor anybody allowed to tell the actual story to outsider. Not only that the local people were not allowed to visit their relatives whose family members got imprisonment for Yining massacre. On 8th February a combined arm forces investigated against a group of separatist, who were hiding at Yuqiweng County. A heavily opened fire had been taken place between the police and the separatists. In the same year on 25th February, the last official mourning day of Deng Xiaoping, the bus bomb explosion killed seven people and over seventy were injured. Simultaneously the Uyghur nationalist and Islamic groups declared in a press conference in Moscow, that terror campaign is the only way to create an Islamic state in this region and the United Revolutionary National Front took the responsibility of that bus bombing in Urumqi. Large areas of Urumqi were sealed by armed police forces and a number of soldiers were deployed in every bus stop (Dillon 2004:99).

In the same time CCP used XPCC to launch a confidential campaign to transform the population into CCP's informants. This policy also included attractive rewards for every informant. CCP claimed that this policy was popular among the local people to shut down the terror attacks and to promote the sense of the regional development. A high alert was declared after the Ghulja incident. Xinjiang and Tibet were placed in number one and Beijing was placed in number two regarding the possible attack by foreign hostile forces. Despite taking the preventive measures to the public transport system and spreading highly alert to the bus and taxi drivers by the CCP administration, the bus bombing attacks were continued by the separatist and hostile forces.

In February 1997, three bus bombs were detonated in Urumqi, planned to coincide with the last day of official mourning for Deng Xiaoping's death, and causing large numbers of anti-riot police and armed soldiers to be deployed on the streets. A spokesman for Uyghur nationalists calling himself Sagari Tarim publicly affirmed that some of those bus-bombings supported the creation of an Islamic state in Xinjiang were turning to anti-Chinese terror. He said that, in the current situation, this was the only way for Uyghur to oppose the Han police and military. In March of the same year, Uyghur nationalists took their cause to Beijing for the first time, where a time bomb exploded on Xidan Street. A Uyghur dissident group in Turkey subsequently claimed that the attack had been perpetrated by exiled Uyghur separatists who came into the region from Kazakhstan (Joanne Smith 2002:197).

The then, Xinjiang regional chairman blamed that the hostile foreign forces are trying to take advantage of splitting China, as like what happened with Soviet Union. Through promoting the state border trade with Central Asian Countries, CCP also wanted to stress regarding its control over Xinjiang and ensured that, Xinjiang is secure enough to continue the cross border trade with the neighbouring states. Fifty to sixty thousands of PLA armed forces were send to support the local military in Xinjiang. The Chinese authorities showed it's serious concern about the linkages between separatists in Xinjiang and the Islamic organizations, mainly the Taliban in Afghanistan, though it was rejected by Taliban side.

The increasing anxiety of the Chinese authorities concerning the step-up in Uyghur violence has been reflected in their political decisions as well as in CCP discourse in the nineties. In 1997, Xinjiang became the first region in the country to computerized information about its

population with personal details and photographs of each individual. It would now be even harder for Uyghur separatists to slip through the net. The second half of the nineties has heralded the return of Maoist rhetoric in the government's fight against extremism. From May 1997 onwards, attempts to play down or simply hide incidents of unrest were accompanied by a grim development in anti-separatist tactics. In a further echo of the Cultural Revolution, 'rectification work teams' were now sent to Xinjiang's villages to 'carry out propaganda face to face with the masses'. Maoist rhetoric became still more extreme as Amudun Niyaz, Chairman of the Regional People's Congress Standing Committee, said of the summer assassinations of two Uyghur cadres by Uyghur separatists: 'We must differentiate fragrant flowers from poisonous weeds and eradicate poisonous weeds to enable fragrant flowers to bloom more brilliantly. Criticism and denunciation meetings were held throughout the townships of Ili prefecture, and literary and art teams were dispatched to stage 'educational performances' concerning the February riots, religions, and the law (Joanne Smith 2002:201).

Soon after the Yining incident the fast group of thirty people received their sentences for their connection with this conflict. Among these thirty, three had been given death sentences and rest-of got seven to eighteen years imprisonment at the end of April, only three months later of this rebellion in the same year. The government television broad-casting reported that the objective of this renewed hard measure campaign is to wipe-out the separatist and religious extremist ideas from this region. It was also a governmental indication that hard measures would be taken by swift judgment through the principle of Strike Hard policy.

CCP also tried to understand that the discourse of this ethnic conflicts and how it functions to create a division and volatile situation inside a country. Not only that, the authorities also tried to convince the local people to stay their own country who wanted to flee to others. It also paid attention on education and discipline and duties of cadres because of their lack of knowledge in education especially in the regional level. To promote inter-ethnic harmony, Religious Affair Committee of Chinese Communist Party formed a high profile forum and included the religious leaders of different ethnic minority groups to carry out the picture of CCP among the minorities and has to develop confidence to each-other. Basically United Front Affair Department under this forum, was responsible to integrate the non-party members, mainly the ethnic and religious leaders with CCP's administrative and political structure. Through a major propaganda CCP started educational campaign and targeted the party members and religious

believers mainly the minority leaders from Xinjiang and Tibet. The CCP administration also acknowledged to take measures to build-up a trust among the local people that the government war is based against the ethnic fundamentalists, separatists and the religious extremists, but not against the minority culture or customs or common masses of Xinjiang and other minority areas in the countryside. Accordingly CCP basically its a people's war against the ethnic terrors. CCP also demarcated a line between the orthodox underground religious institutions and the government approved Islamic institutions. The message was clear that CCP was trying to accommodate Islam with other religions under the umbrella of a socialist country and conveyed the instruction to the common masses to follow the Islamic rule and customs under the guidance of government approved Islamic Associations.

The suppression of Yining and Ghulja protest in 1997 and the launch of hard measures like Strike Hard undergrounded the separatist and terrorist activities to the coming years. Despite of some small scale disturbances, there were no large scale conflicts between the minority Uyghur and CCP since 1998 onwards. According to the Voice of Eastern Turkestan, is a Kazakh based Uyghur newspaper, published in Russia on 29th August, 1997, reported about several incidents and then the present scenario of Uyghurstan. In the same year 10th August in Aksu four Chinese Court officials were killed by some Uyghur separatists. On 17th August, the Chinese authority was able to arrest Ibrahim Ismail, who had been accused for 1997 Ghulja incident and prepared a group of extremists to conduct guerilla war against the Chinese forces. Three days later after this incident two Chinese officials were killed by Uyghur guerrillas. On 23rd August a blast was taken place on the railway track between Korla and Kashgar. According to another report published on October 1997, the same newspaper claimed that over five hundred Uyghur have been executed and over sixty two thousand Uyghur patriots were exiled to remote areas in the same year. In the same month Hong Kong press reported regarding the riots in Tuksun, Shawan, Shanshan, Kutubi and other areas in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. In a meeting to address the People's Liberation Army in November 1997, the Xinjiang communist party secretary Wang Lequan expressed his concern regarding the long and arduous struggle of PLA and CCP against the extremist and terrorist forces to this border land area. In December at the same year, the Ministry of Public Security and the Bureau of religious affairs of the State council jointly issued a circular and warned the government officials for possible fundamentalist terror attacks during the period of Christmas and the Spring Festival.

In January 1998, to get the confirmation of their loyalty towards CCP, government started to meet the religious leaders and practitioners. Basically after one year of Yining-Ghulja, massacre Chinese government wanted to reconfirm the commitment of religious leaders to the Chinese constitution and CCP's rule in Xinjiang. The XPCC was ordered to keep them ready for any emergency during this period. In the same year the first day of Id festival, three Chinese informers were killed by the Uyghur extremist at Kargali. A number of arrests were made by armed forces for this incident. After this incident, Tomur Dawamat the Vice Chairman of National People's Congress, visited various police units in Urumqi and gave the moral support to the police officers and cadres, who were working hard to maintain the stability and CCP's sovereignty over this region. He also added that the police forces need more public support to keep the areas stable. On 5th February CCP send more than eighteen thousand security guards to the villages and towns throughout the region. Through organizing various meetings, CCP tried to convince the party members and cadres about the importance of national integrity and declared the joint struggle against separatism and religious extremism. Special fund was allocated to increase the number of police stations and the development of military equipment. According to Voice of Eastern Turkestan, the repression by CCP over Minorities was continued in 1998 also. It also highlighted that the Chinese police force conducted a search-campaign to every house hold in Aksu and destroyed many Uyghur materials including books and literatures. Another similar campaign took place in Khotan, where police seized a large quantity of explosive with arms and ammunition. The religious rights of minorities in Xinjiang were also curtailed. The Mosque were informed to organizing the Morning Prayer not before than 9 o'clock in the morning and the prayer will be organized inside the Mosque only. No loud speakers and slogan were allowed outside the Mosque. During the Muslim celebration in April, a high armed police forces were deployed to Urumqi, Yining, Aksu, Kashi, Khotan and other sensitive areas across the region. A number of religious publications were destroyed to the name of illegal fundamentalist religious publications which came under the party's national policies and state sovereignty was highly criticized by Uyghur authors for this circumstance. In a statement the Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Regional Government Abdukadir Nasirdin blamed the separatist and conveyed the message to the local people that a normal religious activity in daily life is necessary to bring stability and development of this region and people must support and protect the legal activities and should oppose the separatist activities conducted by some insurrectionists.

In May, 1998, People's Armed Police (PAP) conducted a month long special training programme in Urumqi to how to handle and control the emergency attack or situation. The training provided practical as well as theoretical knowledge to the police forces to take the situation under control.

In July 1998, the Presidential Visit in Xinjiang showed the government concern over the separatist movement and the development of this region. CCP also tried to convince the public the most negative aspects of separatism and terrorism and how it affects the growth of social and economic development in an area through the exhibition organized by the prefectural government of Hotan. Such type of attempt had been done to attract and raise the concern of the local people against the separatist forces across the region. But in 10th August a series of violence had been taken place in Pishan, Kargilik and Kashgar. In Pishan an arms factory was attacked. At the same day attacked on a police station in Kargilik and Kashgar killed eight police personnel. In August in an interview to the Xinjiang Daily, the director of Public Security Bureau in Yining, Wang Mingshan, said that with the support of local people, the police force of Yining have able to successfully crack down the terror and violence in this region and to secure the social security thirty three additional police station have been established in this region. The Ministry of Public Security decided to honor those personnel from police and related department or organization who performed well to the battle against the extremists and fundamentalists across this region. In this way CCP was continued its methodology to boost-up the arm forces against the well-known 'three evils' extremism, separatism and terrorism.

In 1999, the conflict between the Chinese police forces and separatist were continued. But the detail did not reported clearly because it is said China developed a state controlled political and administrative system rather than promoting an open society, so such type of report which criticized the government policy or programmes were rarely got the permission for reporting or broad-casting. The report of any conflict had been rarely published or broad-casting during this time. According to a Uyghur source, in this year China gave death sixty one death-penalty who were arrested for anti-governmental activities. On 7th January, 1999 a hundred days Strike Hard was launched because of to secure the social order during the spring festival and the Muslim festival of Id-ul-fitr. The mutual surveillance and collective responsibility had been promoted by CCP among the minority localities in town and villages. The government attitude towards religion was, there should not be any interference from any religious body to

government's administrative and religious affairs as describe in Chinese Constitution and religion is completely a different and societal phenomenon than government machinery and judicial tools. This way CCP showed its dominations over Islamic law. In March 1999, to intensify the Strike Hard campaign, CCP leadership started to meet the special team who worked to the town and villages in Southern Xinjiang. Mass educational program was started to counter the separatist and Islamic propaganda. In August 1999 the Lanzhou military base was attack by some separatist. In a gun-battle both groups lost their twelve personnel. These continuous insurgences, did Strike-Hard more prominent in nationwide and major crack-down took placed in Xinjiang and other volatile minority regions. Thousands of people were arrested against the charges of intending to split sovereignty of the nation, conducting fundamental religious activities and counter revolutionary activities especially in Xinjiang. This repression gave the birth of underground fires and resentment among the Jihadis.

In 1999 December, police discovered such underground training camp in Zepu County. On 25th February, 2000, the police arrested seven terrorist from Shache County and discovered an underground tunnel and ceased anti-tank grenades, twenty two electric detonators, eighteen explosive devices etc. In august 2001, another underground tunnel was discovered by police at Uzun Township in Kuqa County and ceased sixty one explosive devices and various kind of military equipment. Government started to publish various reports against these separatists and terrorist forces and to make a confidence building among the common masses towards CCP. In order to protect the life of common people, the government declared that any harsh measure which had been taken by Chinese forces did not targeted any ethnic group rather than terrorist or anti-nationalist in order to protect the common interest of different minority groups and religion. In a special issue the information office of the state council declared that, the ethnic group of Xinjiang had very glories tradition to save the national unity and religion and it is not a problem to the way of national integrity. The whole hearted support of the common masses helped the arm-forces to slow-down the illegal activities in Xinjiang. In this report it was also claimed that after the 9/11 attack on USA changed the world view about extremism, separatism and terrorism. And the world wide joint hands against terrorism compelled the ETIM to go to underground for a time being. As a result the people of Xinjiang were living a stable life. CCP also showed its pretension to the question raised by some human rights Watch Dogs and denied everything. It was also assured from government's side that the people of different ethnic groups respect each

other and co-exist with peace and harmony to pursue the developmental achievement of this region. Though there are still the activities of ETIM inside and outside the bordering areas in Xinjiang, but, it is impossible for them to exploit the local people fundamentally. Despite the all efforts of local separatism motivated by some international cofactors, still Xinjiang is enjoying the economic, political and social development because of the participation and support of its local people to the government machineries to carry out the state policies toward its goal for enjoying equal political, economic and cultural rights under the guidance of the constitution of China (East Turkistan Terrorist Forces cannot get away with Impunity 2002:17-23).

To secure its hard-line approach it has already discussed before that why and how China developed the relation with Central Asian States. It also interested about the energy and hydrocarbon resources of this region. The changing political scenario of 1990s also stressed upon the relation on trade, border and regional security between Central Asia, Russia and China. The formation of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 1996 and in 1998 meeting in Almaty declared the joint struggle of SCO against ethnic separatism, religious extremism, international terrorism, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking to secure the regional security. These two major steps concretized Chinese hard line approach in Xinjiang. To deal with this severest repression Chinese government also recognized the poverty and underdevelopment were the root cause of this social problem which showed China's soft-line initiatives like the Western Development Programme to make it hard line approach uncontroversial.

The Western Development programme and its announcement was another major step, taken by China in 1999 to reintroduce it's kind of soft and developmental policy after reformist period. CCP thought that it would be beneficial to decrease the idea of separatism among the underprivileged section of minority people. Through this programme Chinese government also acknowledged the less develop and under develop west, where enormous disparities had has in income and in standard of living in comparison to Eastern part of China. In one hand to deal with ethnic separatism by severest repression and in the other to recognize the poverty and underdevelopment are the root causes of the region's social problem, again China took it's stick and carrot strategy after reformist period to develop and stable this region mainly economically. Not only Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Tibet were also included under this policy. It was also argued that through this policy China started transfer of resources from East to West and reinsured Han settlement to the minority region. Actually China's internal security

dilemma compelled it to initiate developmental strategy in Western Region. Though Chinese argument was, China followed its developmental strategy from East to West. But in the context of ethnic minority region such as Xinjiang, the security dilemma was focused to the relationship between security and identity and the developmental factor used as an insisting tool to take initiative from both side (Clarke 2007). And to keep balance between these two actors Western Developmental Programme played a very significant role to ensure CCP's sovereignty over this region. Basically there was a clear interrelationship between China's hard and soft policies during 1990s onwards (Rudelson and Jankowiak: 2004). Though it was also highlighted through various studies that the Western development programs actually excluded the non-Han people including the Uyghur in Xinjiang and it was a very strong reason to continue the ethno-religious conflict in Xinjiang throughout 90s.

Instead of the reintroducing CCP's hard and soft policies as well, accordingly to a government report, released by the Information Office of the State Council on 21 January 2002, gave the estimation over 200 militant attacks from 1990 to 2001 and claimed that East Turkestan forces planned and organized these violent attacks against Chinese interest with the financial and material support by al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (Clarke 2010).

The 9/11 episode also had a significant impact on geopolitical situation of Xinjiang. China was among few countries which supported USA war on terror strategy to Afghanistan. In 2000, Russian sources claimed about Uyghur training in Afghanistan under the guidance of Taliban. China wanted to take the advantage of that situation for getting world wide support against the Uyghur separatist. Just before the 9/11 incident, on 4th April, 2001, China launched the Strike Hard Campaign. President Jiang Zemin, officially named the campaign Strike Hard and Rectification Drive. Government reported that 1983, 1996, and 2001 Strike Hard were used to reduce criminal activities inside the country. In a report in People's Daily published on 4th June, 2000, highlighted that the beginning of 2000 has increased the gang-crime rate inside China. So 2001 witnessed a record number of executions and arrests between in April to July. The scale of repression was very difficult to assess during this time. Even till that time there were published various reports about the demolition of unregistered Mosques and illegal Islamic institutions in the countryside. In addition with this military and political repression, Chinese communist party promoted a major economic developmental program in 1999, called *Xibu da*

Kaifa or the Western Development Programme and it continued during the decade of 2000. The main aim was defusing the economic, social and political differences between the Uyghur and the immigrated Hans what has discussed above.

On February 2001, the law of regional autonomy was amended to improve the opportunities of minorities in various government positions. Earlier version of this law emphasized on the cadre building procedure in various levels. Though there were preferential policies of minorities in earlier decades, but, recruitment of minorities in different government position was a new initiative to project CCP's consciousness regarding empowerment of ethnic minorities. Simultaneously 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on America had a considerable effect to improve China-USA relationship. The Chinese support to the US War and Terror brought China and USA to a discussion table together. The far long China's demand, that China it-self is a victim of Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang was firstly acknowledged by the USA ambassador in China. The USA government reported that the United State forces had captured some Uyghur people during the USA strike against Taliban and al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. In August 2002 USA blacklisted ETIM as a terrorist organization. It was a very significant victory for China and helped to use this declaration as a safe-guard against them in international arena who criticized China's Strike Hard and minority policy in Xinjiang. Beijing wanted to take advantages from this new bilateral relation to clean its territory from anti-governmental movement (Gladney 2004).

Instead of its minority policy to Xinjiang, the region was hit by two hundred militant attacks and one hundred sixty-two deaths including attack on police station, assassinated judges, demolished communication and electric power infrastructure, bombings in buses, movie theaters, markets, hotels and trains, even tried to attack on Chinese base camp. Though the scope of the attackers was limited in scope, but, the growing scale of attacks evoke the CCP for strong response (Rudelson and Jankowiak, (2004:316).

After the great disaster of Cultural Revolution, Chinese authority started to promote development policies and programmes in Xinjiang and other minority autonomous regions. Mainly to spread the integrationist approach into the ethnic minorities, CCP adopted mostly soft approach during Deng's reformist period. Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang knew that China requires the support of all the minorities, including the Hui Muslims and the Uyghur in order for

the country to progress economically. In October 1979, the Nationalities Commission of the NPC which was abolished during the Cultural Revolution was re-established (Clarke, 2007: 43). It was part of the CCP's initial effort to bring about reconciliation between the government and the ethnic minorities after the Cultural Revolution. The CCP was aware of the economic potentials of Xinjiang especially its vast natural resources. Therefore, it required the support and cooperation of the Uyghur. Therefore, it was characterized by relative tolerance towards the religious practices and customs of Muslim minorities and encouraged institutionalized Islamic studies and culture through construction of mosques and madrasas and also funded for these constructions. It also formed the Chinese Islamic Association which was a regional body of CCP to uplift the minority's culture, education and control the religious-political stability inside Xinjiang like ethnically conflicted autonomous region. Some Uyghur organizations considered that the economic development in Xinjiang must be accompanied by political reforms. But the party refused to accept political reforms.

Instead of the political reforms at the latter half of reformist period CCP adopted some hard policies to re-assure its sovereignty to some minority areas like Xinjiang, which continued 1990s onwards when the Chinese state realized that religion especially Islam is a threat for the regional integrity in China's Xinjiang. China launched Strike-Hard a domestic campaign in 1983 to wipe out crime from Chinese society. Strike-Hard campaign took different shape regarding its implementation to the particular used against specified crime by the target but in case of Tibet and Xinjiang it was used against the demand of greater autonomy or separatist movement which China called "splittist activities". In March, 1996, National People's Congress further adopted this law under the rule of Jiang Zemin's government. Then it started campaign against Muslim literature, construction of mosque, re-education and reformation of Muslim cadres and their religious training etc. Simultaneously Strike-Hard was a kind of hard policy and was used as controlling machinery for controlling the political and social stability in Xinjiang and Tibet and it brought a deep impact on minority people in these regions. Its main objective was to use as a driving force to concretize the sovereignty of the member states against any type of separatist and terrorist activities inside and outside their territory.

According to Davis (Davis 2008:10) China's Strike-Hard strategy was a close relationship between agriculture policies, minority policies and Han immigration in Xinjiang. Though he argued that the Chinese Strike-Hard policy should not be discriminated against non-

violent Uyghur and that government aid should be allotted through adaptation of soft policy regarding their rights should promote the economic development, otherwise it will fuel the ethnic unrest in Xinjiang. In this respect another study highlighted that Beijing needs to recognize its policies towards minorities which were the root cause of Uyghur resentment rather than stamp out the problem through force and repression which can provide more fuel to separatist feeling (Clarke, 2007: 43). The rising political instability before and after launching Strike-Hard raised questions regarding China's Minority Policies in the context of Xinjiang and Tibet. Not only that the Western Development Programme that China adopted to address the underdeveloped minority regions also promoted the CCP's long-lived Han immigration strategy and the Han domination in the minority regions. According to (Clarke 2008: 339) though the Great Western Development Strategy had to address the needs of ethnic minorities but Han played the leading role in this modernization process. On the other hand, the state's ongoing concern to manage and control the Uyghur identity increased the disparity among Uyghur and Han people. Uyghurs also learned through the media that certain organizations in co-religionist countries support their political cause. For example, on 26 March 1996, the 4th Turkic States and Communities, Friendship, Brotherhood, and Co-operation Council in Ankara issued a communiqué recommending the speedy activation of a Turkic states' human rights committee to inform the world of the mass murder of Turks in eastern Turkestan. Similarly, an Iranian newspaper published a long article in 1997 that condemned the execution of Muslims in Xinjiang and noted that the crisis in Xinjiang is the outcome of that government's policies towards its minorities in this region. Thus, overt support from Islamic countries outside the region further encouraged the separatist activities in Xinjiang. So, it can be said that China's Strike-Hard like hard policy had a key link between the geographic template of Xinjiang and Chinese Policies towards its minorities especially in Xinjiang and the CCP's integrationist approach towards this region.

The Chinese government used the Strike Hard Campaign as a Chinese military strategy to curb separatist and terrorist activities in the volatile region of Xinjiang. Though in the beginning of Strike Hard, it was used against crime and threats by the police but from 2001 onwards it took a strategic change and was used to deal with increasing separatism, extremism and terrorism mainly in the disputed border land areas. Throughout this controversial campaign the picture came to be visible regarding how the international community and China's domestic minority communities came together on this question of whether China is victimizing the minorities or

China itself is a victim from some of its minority issues. This is also said that Strike Hard Campaign was used throughout China to keep the population under control. The launching of Strike Hard Campaign and its objective was mainly to dominate the demand of autonomy or separate homeland and ethnic tensions which was started from Tibet and simultaneously spread in Xinjiang also.

This chapter tries to find out the impact of China's adopted policies for minorities and the link between these policies and ethnic disturbances in Xinjiang. Mainly this study has vividly described the Chinese military and police strategy in the context of Strike Hard Campaign and the links between ethnic disturbances, minority policies and adaptation of Strike Hard in Xinjiang. The nature of Strike Hard campaign and the repercussion of this campaign have also been assessed. It has tried to examine critically the Strike Hard Campaign as well as the history and future of Chinese state policy and minority policies in Xinjiang.

Criticism of Strike Hard Campaign

Another scholarly argument is that Strike-Hard did not able to prevent further ethnic separatist protests and clashes during coming years. A raid on the Guma district ammunition depot and attack on Kargilik police station in 1998 were the evidence of continued regular clashes by well-armed committed Muslim minorities, despite the government's forceful crack-down to those regions. According to government report released by the Information office of the State Council on 21 January, 2002, that there were over 200 militant activities between 1990s to 2001 and East Turkestan forces was one of the master mind for these planned and organized violence with the financial and material support by al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and China itself a victim state by three evils extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Though, the internal causes of ethnic minority's opposition was got different dimension to the outside world though various academic studies. It can also be argued that economic disparities between Han and non-Han and continued state control over religious expression and customs compelled the Muslim Uyghur in to go to an arms struggle against the Chinese authority (Clarke 2010).

China's Strike Hard campaign came to under the critique and observation of human rights watch dogs. Amnesty International raised serious concerns on the nature and legislation of Strike Hard and its impact on the general human beings and the violation of basic rights of the

people in Xinjiang. It is observed those human rights groups are concerned that this new campaign will enlarge the scope of death penalty and suppress freedom of expression of the ethnic minorities. The question arose to the international community that whether China is victimizing the Muslim minority in Xinjiang or it itself is victim by Uyghur separatist activities (Davis 2008). In the meantime to defend its domestic strategy and ensure its internal and border security China became very active to get the support from its Central Asian neighbours and SCO was formed as a regional security body composed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and Beijing's supreme position had been able to keep silence to the member states of this regional body regarding the Uyghur's demand and China's stick measures to suppress their demand (Becquelin 2004).

It is critically acceptable that the 11 September 2001 attack on New York and Washington dramatically changed on the scope and implication of "Strike-Hard" campaign in Muslim minority's areas. It gave opportunity to the strong Chinese demand of terrorism on its own soil and started to label those as terrorist who were fighting for the demand of greater autonomy and separate state in Xinjiang. China hoped the fight against East Turkestan forces will become a part of international effort against terrorism. But at first China's attempt wasn't deemed acceptable by the western block and the Bush administration thought that it is a strategy of Chinese authority to oppress the demands of minorities. But the increasing economic ties compelled USA to allow China's interest for joint struggle against religious extremism, separatism and terrorism within and outside its frontier. Even on August, 2002 the East Turkestan Islamic Movement was added into USA list of terrorist group. It was a big achievement for China to strengthen its Strike-Hard like hard policies in Xinjiang. Beijing wanted to take advantages from this new bilateral relation to clean its territory from anti-governmental movement (Gladney 2004).

Strike Hard Campaign and Human Right Issues

China's Strike Hard campaign came under the observation of human rights watch dogs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International. Both these agencies raised serious concerns on the nature of legislation and its impact upon the general human beings and the rights of the people of Xinjiang. Human rights groups were concerned that this new campaign will enlarge the scope of death penalty and suppress the freedom of expression and other rights of the ethnic

minorities. The question also raise in academics to that whether China is victimizing the Muslim minority in Xinjiang or it, itself is victim state by Uyghur separatists (Davis 2008).

Various studies show that the Strike Hard Campaign has been manifested as act of suppression of religious and individual rights in Xinjiang. The period also witnessed a gradual removal of Uyghur minority incumbents from higher posts of local governance structures by Han migrants, which was one of the major reasons for the ongoing discontent in this whole decade. More stringent measures were introduced to eradicate ‘illegal’ mosques and religious schools as well as to combat religious practices among party members (Waite: 2006). The repercussions of economic policies followed by the Chinese state, hitherto, also became evident in the lopsided development of the region. While the northern region flourished economically, the southern Tarim Basin remained overwhelmingly rural. It demarcated CCP’s favourable policy towards the Han dominated northern part of Xinjiang. So, Xinjiang had become the hotbed for ethnic minority protests in contemporary China. The crackdown by the state intensified during this period and a large number of cases were registered against the Uyghur and subsequently executed though the organs of state security decided that political crimes were not to be reported or published in public. The Strike Hard Campaign fomented more distrust between the locals and the state and consequently came to be abhorred by the indigenous minorities. Somehow for the inefficacy of these repressive measures Chinese authorities adopted some new methods like developing certain regions as Special Economic Zones and ascertaining special privileges to the residents of those regions regarding employment schemes and education. This way China uses its hard as well as soft policies to achieve integrationist approach to Xinjiang (Davis 2008).

Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports on the situation in Xinjiang have estimated that thousands of Uyghurs were arrested or detained under the new amendments between 2001 and 2005, corroborating claims made by Uyghur diaspora also. In 2006, the Chinese authorities had arrested 18, 227 people in Xinjiang for endangering national security (South China Morning Post 2006). Further, according to a list compiled by the China Rights Forum, from 25 September 2001 to March 2003, thirty-six Uyghurs were arrested and charged for illegal religious activities, political offenses, teaching the Koran, possession of wrong books, organizing and leading terrorist organizations etc. Among them seven were sentenced to death, four were sentenced to 10 to 20 years imprisonment and nine were sentenced to 1 to 10 years

imprisonment (Becquelin 2004:39-46). Human Rights Watch in its report narrated the renewed repression of overt religious observance through taking such measures like increasing control over the registration and operation of religious organizations, tightening control over religious publications and imposition of heavier sanctions and penalties for violating rules and regulations. Indeed, it was clear that the CCP's view over religious observance in Xinjiang was a threat for national security.

In the meantime to defend its domestic strategy and ensure its internal and border security China became very active to get the support from its Central Asian neighbours and Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formed as a regional security body composed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and Beijing's supreme position had been able to keep silence to the member states of this regional body regarding the Uyghur's demand and China's stick measures to suppress their demand (Becqilin 2004). Its main objective was to use as a driving force to concretize the sovereignty of the member states against any type of separatist and terrorist activities inside and outside their territory. With the formation of SCO not only China influenced its role in Central Asia, it also influenced and control the diplomatic interest of United State upon Central Asia and increased the cooperation between China and Russia. In April, 1996's meeting removed the border disputes between these countries. In 1998 meeting in Almaty declared the joint struggle will be conducted by these group of countries against ethnic separatism, religious extremism, international terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking and other cross-border illegal activities. China's diplomatic initiatives compelled the Central Asian States as well as Russia, Pakistan and other countries to keep them silent regarding China's internal minority issues and strike hard like hard approaches was responsible for human rights violation. In case of Muslim world China also maintained warm relations with Arab countries. In 1990s, China and Turkey agreed to strengthen their defense relation, though China raised its voice regarding the use of foreign soil by Uyghur separatists but China praised Turkish government for their non-interference approach regarding China's internal affairs and human rights issue. China also developed its economic ties with Turkey. Time to time high official visits between these countries brought a healthy diplomatic and bilateral relation to 1990s onwards. China also increased its diplomatic relation with Iran through nuclear cooperation in 1992. Diplomatically, Chinese authority controlled Iran's interest on mineral rich Central Asian region and to Xinjiang during this period. Before Hu, President Jiang Zemin in December 2001 stated

that China will never allow the use of religion to oppose Chinese Constitution and the CCP's guideline about its socialist system (Clarke 2010).

China-Pakistan relationship also took a favourable turn to defend China's position on Uyghur issue. When Pakistan criticized India's interference in China's domestic affairs for providing political asylum to the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama, then a healthy relation build up subsequently between these countries (Debata 2007). In recent years China-Pakistan relation has taken a remarkable transformation in South-East Asian politics and now a days these two countries have good ethos to each other. Opening of Karakoram pass in 1986 increased the economic and diplomatic relationship between China and Pakistan. This highway was also closed when China strongly opposed Pakistani activities to encourage the separatist movement in Xinjiang. To satisfy the Chinese authorities in late 1990s, Pakistan took some major steps against Uyghur to use Pakistani soil for their training and started to combat the separatist activities in the border land areas.

In this way though China faced some serious questions regarding its violation of human rights into Uyghur issue but it was also able to defend its governmental position to the international stage and did not agreed with any negotiation. According to Davis (Davis 2008:10) China's Strike-Hard strategy was a close relationship between agriculture policies, minority policies and Han immigration in Xinjiang. Though he argued Chinese Strike-Hard policy should not be discriminated against non-violent Uyghur and the separatists and the government aid should allotted through adaptation of soft policy regarding their rights should promote the economic development, otherwise it will be fueled and increased further ethnic unrest in Xinjiang

A Critical Appraisal

The strengthening of the separatist struggle in the last 20 years has attributed by the Uyghur against CCP's minority policy under the rule of Wang Lequan, then the CCP's Party Head and the Chairman of Xinjiang, made a high-handed posture on assertion on ethnic identities as well as his over emphasis on the anti-separatism issue. While the Chinese authorities blame the foreign hand or the terrorist proliferation from other regions for the upsurge for such type of conflicts generated during this decade, but it was acceptable a large number of academicians and experts that most of the retaliations were driven by religious and cultural

repression rather than an Islamic threat. The local police was also a target of Uyghur attacks which implies a deliberate attempt by the locals to target government apparatus to show their anger. Also, the attack on the police station might be an indicative of the blatant resort of the locals in attacking vital government installations to express their displeasure against the government. The Uyghurs believe that the incidents in Kashgar and Hotan to be more dangerous since they were random and unpreventable. Those events led to the resumption of strike hard campaign by the Chinese authorities.

An interesting fact to note here is that the Uyghur demand for a new state argued under the banner of 'East Turkestan' is highly debatable even among the Uyghurs (People's Daily 2011). The main contention is that "East Turkestan" signified a Turkish association, while the Muslims in Xinjiang have historically called it the 'Land of the Uyghurs' and do not want the name to be thrust upon them by the Turks. The establishment in 1991 of the six independent Muslim republics the Uyghur, the Tatars, and the Salars became the only Central Asian Muslims in Xinjiang without an independent country named after their ethnic group. The vision of the adjacent CIS republics has since greatly encouraged Uyghur national identity and the Uyghur independence movement, and has contributed to the coining in 1995 of a new name for the prospective independent state: 'Uyghuristan'.²⁸ The Chinese authorities have similarly identified the collapse of communism around the world as a major source of inspiration for separatists in Xinjiang (Joanne Smith 2002:202).

Meanwhile, the Uyghur also object to the term 'Xinjiang' or 'new frontiers' as it means acceptance of the Chinese government's absolute sovereignty over this region. Because the Chinese state continued its strategy to assimilate Xinjiang into the national mainstream. The intensity of the revival has not drastically altered in comparison to the previous decades; rather it is the increasing media attention to the Xinjiang issue that has brought these violent episodes under the scanner of international groups. It can be said that the local Uyghur population who was adversely affected from China's Minority Policy was rarely taken into consideration by the state in previous decades. Further, the Xinjiang problem was becoming more and more problematic for the lack of proper governance to restore the overall minority's economic and social status in Xinjiang. There was a cause and effect relationship which can be observed through various incidents which have already discussed above. So in a brief it can be said that

first, limited economic opportunities and confiscation of large chunks of land had led to simmering discontent among the Uyghur. The influx of Han migrants had led to siphoning of job opportunities from the indigenous minority groups, particularly from Uyghur in Xinjiang to the name of alleviation of poverty and expanding the economic base in minority areas. In this respect some several studies highlighted that Beijing needs to recognize the loop-holes of the policies of minorities which were the root cause to accuse Uyghur resentment rather than stamp out the problem through force and repression which can provide more fuel to separatist feeling (Chung 2002:12). The rising political instability before and after launching Strike-Hard raised question regarding China's Minority Policies in the context of Xinjiang and Tibet. Not only that the Western Development Programme what China adopted to address the underdeveloped minority regions also promoted the CCP's long-lived Han immigration strategy and the Han domination to the minority regions. According to Clarke (Clarke 2008:339) though Great Western Development Strategy had to address for ethnic minorities but Han played the leading role of this modernization process. On the other hand states ongoing concern to manage and control over Uyghur identity increased the disparity among Uyghur and Han people. Uyghur also learned through the media that certain organizations in co-religionist countries support their political cause. For example, on 26 March 1996, the 4th Turkic States and Communities, Friendship, Brotherhood, and Co-operation Council in Ankara issued a communiqué recommending the speedy activation of a Turkic states' human rights committee to inform the world of the mass murder of Turks in eastern Turkestan. Similarly, an Iranian newspaper published a long article in 1997 that condemned the execution of Muslims in Xinjiang and noted that the crisis in Xinjiang is the outcome of that government's policies towards its minorities in this region. Thus, overt support from Islamic countries outside the region further encouraged the separatist activities in Xinjiang. Second, the lack of effective forums within Xinjiang had led to the appropriation of the separatist movement by organizations based on abroad and promoted the thought of opposition and violence among the minorities instead of dialogue. Third, Chinese attempts to link Uyghur Separatism to international Jihadist groups also need to be dealt with carefully. They also failed in making a distinction between the adherence of religious practices by a particular group and its propensity to seek a larger goal of alignment. Thus while, the Uyghur have been fighting for religious accommodation, they have not unnecessarily voiced a willingness to join the pan-Islamic movement against China. In this respect a study shows that both the strengthening of the

Uyghur national identity and the emergence of separatist ideologies in Xinjiang were the product of the aforementioned internal and external factors. Yet although most urban Uyghurs presently maintain strong Uyghur national identities, not everybody subscribes to separatist views that have emerged during the late eighties and early nineties. Since the introduction in 1980 of new conciliatory policies emphasizing the need to respect minority nationality customs and guaranteeing freedom of religious belief. The sudden relaxation of minority policy after so many years of suppression seemed to create an initial atmosphere of euphoria that encouraged Uyghur almost instantly to begin campaigning for greater autonomy. Following the opening of Xinjiang's borders in the mid-eighties, news from the outside world has flooded into the region via domestic and international media and Uyghur have been increasingly exposed to knowledge of world events (Joanne Smith 2002:207-208).

Another reality was of the differing circumstances of urban and rural Uyghur. Firstly, rural Uyghur experienced a substantial improvement in living standards since the advent of the Open Door policy and the new freedom to till private plots. Rudelson (1997: 68) found in 1989/90 that peasants in Turpan were relatively pleased by the religious, economic, and cultural changes introduced by the government. Similarly, many peasants in Aqsu in 1996 expressed satisfaction with post-1980 economic policies, and indicated that life had been better since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, the popular Islamic culture has developed in a moderate and liberal fashion when compared to Islamic practices in other parts of the world. Contrary to general perceptions, the Uyghur religious leaders have offered a voice of moderation in the Xinjiang province. The Uyghur middle class is composed mainly of professional people who have secular disposition, adhering to their religious learning in their private space and not as a part of political propaganda. The linking of the separatist groups to international jihad or terrorism not only helps China to escape accountability regarding human rights in international forums, but also helped to manage its domestic politics and retaining administrative legitimacy. On the contrary Uyghur nationalism poses a thumping challenge to the Chinese Central government and the surge in Han nationalism was overpowering the domestic issues. Thus, by focusing on the separatist and terrorist dimension rather than the issues at the core of dissent in its minority regions, China tries to hold its political fabric together. Fourth, a mobster mentality pervaded by an extreme sense of fear and humiliation is palpable amongst those Uyghurs who participated in gory incidents previously had been organized against the CCP and Han Chinese.

While 1990s incidents have had covered by regional and the international media in a limitation but the international community continued their observation to watch the whole episodes and started to give its opinion and critiques during and after this decade. Though 9/11 incident brought a dramatic change in International Politics and the Uyghur issue. Various countries including USA, the Central Asian States and Arab World started to change their belief that minority groups in Xinjiang has been involved with various separatist and terrorist attacks in and outside China. The governments of these countries continue to publicly reassure China that they will not support separatism in Xinjiang. As a mark of their commitment to this promise, the Qazaqstan government returned four Uyghur mallas and their children to China in 1998 after they allegedly fled religious suppression in Qaqar (Joanne Smith 2002:195-224).

The lack of media transparency in reporting and providing details hinders an objective analysis of the turn of those events took placed throughout the overlong decades. No foreign journalists were allowed to engage to investigate the ground realities and audacious attempts made by certain organizations like the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch called for retributive action by Beijing. Another aspect of the separatist struggle which required further probing is the inability of the government to distinguish between “mass incidents” which occur all over the Chinese territory and those of separatist in nature. Another opinion is, under the mask of Strike Hard across the country Chinese authority generally tried to root out the extremist and separatist ideas which had been breed in minority areas like Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. The classification of violent incidents were more or less arbitrary, some being designated as separatist incidents, some as terrorist incidents while others as mass incidents. Arbitrary detention which was often a corollary to these incidents and whereby the Uyghur or other minority citizens were subjected to torture leads to further disenchantment with the Chinese government. A major player which had received even less attention in the overall analysis of separatist discourse is the police. As the prime operator of the state policies in the field, the police force somehow represented and fuelled the feeling of separatism in Xinjiang and the significant gap became transparent regarding China’s minority policy in practice. Most often any violent incident was sparked by police heavy-handedness leading to rioting and shouting of anti-Chinese and Islamic slogans and student marches. The police forces were responsible for sensibly dispersing the mob in the immediate aftermath of any incident, but since most of the police cadres were constituted by Han officials; they harbour no sympathy with the Uyghur

citizens. They also closely observed the fissures and fault lines within the Uyghur communities and were able to gather information from local people who did not associated with their fellow Uyghur. Thus, a closer analysis of Chinese security force and their pattern of operation revealed the vested interests of the mid-rung strata in preserving a disturbed polity, possibly even to the surprise of the Chinese authorities in Beijing (China Daily 2011). The conventional dictum of the Chinese state that the three evils of ‘separatism, terrorism and extremism’ have rendered the polity of Xinjiang weak and unmanageable and also need to be revised in terms of demarcating what these three idioms (extremism, separatism and terrorism) stand for and how they are differentiated from one another. Since 2001 onwards Chinese government took a fortunate step to identify and analysis of the root cause of these three evils.

In the final analysis, the separatist discourse is over-valued both domestically and internationally in and outside China for above signified reasons. From an internal security threat China responded to even a minor interruption from its ethnic minorities and at the same time tried to exploit it for maximizing its gain to the international level. Any objection from the international community drew an unsolicited response from the Chinese authorities who believe that any nation state have been experienced volatile domestic situation as similar as China’s Xinjiang, they will obviously response and will react similarly like China and Strike Hard strategy was used as a tool to defend China’s sovereignty in those decades since 1990s onwards.

It is also interesting to note that the Uyghur community in Xinjiang basically was divided into three different groups. The first group consisted of the mainstream Uyghur, who may despise the Chinese policies but want to live peacefully. They had no intention to destabilize the security of the province. The second group was made up of pro-Chinese Uyghur, who were either member of the CCP or government officials. They received preferential benefits from the state due to their support towards the government. The third group consists of the Uyghur who were against the Chinese administration and willing to adopt violent approach in order to achieve their political aims. Thus far the Chinese government focused its attention on either empowering Uyghur who were members of the CCP (second group) or pursuing harsh policies on the extremists (third group). Instead of China needed to re-focus its attention on the mainstream Uyghur community before they isolate themselves and turn towards extremism (Roy Anthony Rogers 2014:427).

So it can be said, this should not however transpire as a valid excuse, for any nation state operating under the constraints of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural polity needs to accommodate the wishes and demands of its minority population and should address the core issues which thwart the progress to a sustainable development of a society. Similarly, the international community should not target Chinese endeavour to protect and restore unity and territorial integrity of its own nation. Though it can't be overlooked that China's Strike-Hard like hard policy had a key link between the geographic template of Xinjiang and Chinese Policies towards it's minorities especially in Xinjiang and CCP's integrationist approach towards this region.

Chapter 5

Strike Hard Campaign after 9/11

The revival of Uyghur nationalism alarmed Beijing. The Chinese authorities devised new approaches to deal with the Uyghur issue. On the one hand, it escalated its assaults against separatist movements. Beijing appointed Wang Lequan as Provincial Party Secretary. Wang has been nicknamed ‘stability secretary’, thanks to his unreserved use of repressive power in the name of maintaining Xinjiang’s stability. During his tenure, he launched a series of ‘Strike Hard’ campaigns against ‘East Turkestan terrorists’ and ‘illegal religious activities’ (Becquelin, 2000). Despite the coercive and co-opting policies taken by Beijing, the undercurrent of an anti-PRC sentiment prevailed in the Uyghur community in the late 1990s and beyond. A series of bus bombings occurred in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, in 1997 (Stan Hok-Wui Wong and Hiroki Takeuchi 2010:110-111).

Through various observations it can be seen that the Chinese authority never banned the practice of religion and custom among the minorities entirely even in Uyghur, with the exception during the time of Cultural Revolution. On the contrary people were free to practice their religious-customs under the guide lines of the constitution. After the disintegration of Soviet Union, the North Western borderland of China regained its lost geo strategic glory falling under the influence of some religious and radical groups based in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. This was one of the main causes of the rise of unrest in Xinjiang during the after-math of 1980s and then again 1990s onwards. PRC took many steps to curb the demand of separatism and extremist activities across the region. As people in the neighbouring countries use Islam as religious and political tool, so it can be a threat to China’s sovereignty to Xinjiang, became a very serious concern among the higher authorities of CCP. So in Xinjiang where people were marginalized by the CCP’s rule for economic, social and migration policies, CCP started to address the socio-economic grievances of Uyghur by opening and promoting more chances for the minorities in the socio-economic policies of the government.

In the case of Xinjiang, a scholarly argument is that CCP failed to distinguish between separatist terrorism and socio-economic popular grievances. As a result, Beijing’s economic assistance policy didn’t work properly to maintain political and social stability in Xinjiang. In 2001, February, the law on regional autonomy was amended to improve recruitment

opportunities in the various machineries of the government. The earlier law on regional autonomy only promoted training of the cadres of various levels and provided them preferential treatment to boost up and increase various kinds of construction to the autonomous regions but in 2001 the new policies increased the opportunity of government positions among the minorities. Though the new policies did not bring a considerable change in the socio-economic status of minorities, the sense of self-empowerment became strong among the minorities especially the sense of separatism among Uyghur in Xinjiang 2000 onwards.

The Strike Hard campaign of 2001 began with a national conference for the state of public order convened in Beijing. Key personnel from the three arms of criminal justice attended this conference and informed the experts and politicians that China's crime rate had grown exponentially and that the "Strike Hard and Rectification" campaign should be launched to turn the situation around. At the conference, it was emphasized that although the criminal justice agencies had made various breakthroughs for reducing crime in previous days but the results were not satisfactory. A new campaign was needed to ward off criminals and to restore a stable social order in 2001. Political and legal agencies throughout the country were urged to mobilize the masses against all kinds of criminals, so that criminals can be scattered for cover like rats on the street. Severe but swift punishment was the main objective into this campaign.

Criminal justice agencies were not only encouraged to practice close cooperation and mutual coordination to this initiative but also to devise their own strike hard strategies. Most of the strike hard initiatives had been devised to suit the provincial level and deployed mainly to the local municipal or county level. It generally incorporated the ethos of flexibility. Strike Hard Campaign comprised inter and intra-agency mutual coordination of activities for severely and swiftly punishing the criminal groups who were responsible for creating particular problems in local areas. As a part of the cooperative multi-agency approach to this campaigning a series of public sentencing rallies were organized nationwide, in which criminals were arranged in batches to be publicly humiliated before large audiences. During the campaign, which was launched on 4th April 2001 and lasted up to 2003, government took harsh actions against more than 3,000 criminals nation-wide (Smith 2001).

The then president Jiang Zemin also emphasized to make a law enforcement body to make sure the social situation and security in China. In the beginning of 2000 the official

corruptions were increased including gang crimes, violent explosions, robbery, kidnapping and life-threatening. Xiao Yang, the president of Supreme People's Court in Beijing made a bold announcement on 3rd May 2001 that the officials will be will be received the severe punishment according to the laws, if they have been got for any involvement with any gang crimes, he also emphasized to strengthen the mission of courts for fair judgment against the economic crimes committed by companies, institutions and organizations what were the basic cause to harm the economic order across the nation mainly to the minority regions. A record number of executions had been taken place to intensify the Strike Hard campaign. Within July 2001, two thousand nine hundred sixty death sentences were carried out and one thousand seven hundred executions were conformed. According to some legal experts and some organization working on the protection of human rights raised questions over the violation of international law of human rights related with these executions given by CCP. It was also claimed that the pressure was putted upon the police and the judicial system to achieve quick results through quick judicial procedure what mainly violated the norms of any severe execution. A serious doubt was also generated regarding the partiality among lawyers and police personnel to this campaign during that time.

In 2001 Strike Hard campaign launched under the banner of 'Patriotic Re-education Campaign' was first launched in 1996. It became a channel through which again it was implemented in 2001 against the all expression of political dissent. The main objective of Patriotic Re-education Campaign was to achieve political indoctrination to the religious institutions mainly located in minority areas. The economic development was also acknowledged. Stability and development got the main priority in CCP's policies towards minority areas. The propaganda made by the then president Jiang and then Hu was based on the acceleration of economic growth and development, transfer of ethnic Chinese migrants, strengthening the absolute control over religious activities, institutions and publications and curbing the splitties and separatist forces in and outside China, mainly to the China's frontier bordering area Xinjiang and Tibet.

The 11th September attack in New York and Washington brought an opportunity to the Chinese state to support the United States led war against terrorism and helped China to keep its demand that China itself is a victim state of separatism, religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Before that, China faced the attack of America and other western countries for its harsh measures like Strike Hard and the human right violation because of its hard taking measures to the

minority areas. China's strategy after 9/11 changed the attitude of USA and valued China's support for its war against terrorism. In this respect China's Afghanistan policy helped China to get especially Western support in this regard.

China declared that, it is victimized by three main sources of terrorism from its own territory and these are Tibetan, Taiwan, and Uyghur separatism and extremism. The willingness of various countries to co-operate with each other increased the power of the government of a group of countries against the non-state actors such religious extremism and terrorism. CCP also understood that economic development can be the useful tool to decrease separatist and terrorist ideas and feeling. But the concept of development did not fulfill the gap between urban and rural areas and increased the polarization between these different social groups. Ethnic and cultural conflict between the immigrated Han and local Uyghur in Xinjiang was one of the significant example for increasing the above mentioned gap and polarization during 1990s onwards and it strengthen the Uyghur's demand of separatism and made it somehow reasonable from historically and contemporarily. Basically this feeling of separatism was confined in the county, towns and villages in the Han dominated Garrison cities like Kashgar, Yining, Ghulja. The growing politicized role of Islam and the increasing social gap mainly captured the poor section of the society in the countryside subsequently. So through promoting the economy policies and to decrease the social disorder, China developed its para-military and police control to ensure its political sovereignty over Xinjiang. Since 1949 through the building of Garrison towns in Xinjiang, PRC continued its domination to this region and the subsequent economic development through reformist period onwards raised the live standard and social strata of hundreds of millions of minorities in comparison with the newly develop Central Asian States. But, from the traditional concepts of identity of customs and religion became a major issue among the Uyghur in Xinjiang at the first half of 1990s and continued in 2001 onwards.

The changing geo-political scenario of central and East Asia and the emerging political Islam as a powerful threat to Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan and Afghanistan became one of the most significant concern for China's sovereignty to Xinjiang in 90s. Not only this regional powers failed to save the common interest of local people, it also failed to combat the emerging political fundamentalism as a powerful threat into this region at the first half of 90s, but, in 1996 a joint meeting between the foreign ministers of China, Russia, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in Shanghai named Shanghai Five formulated policies focused on the border security dispute

among these five nation and the common threat of insurgence of Islamic forces and weapons smuggling in this region. In 2001 after the joining of Uzbekistan the group was renamed (SCO) Shanghai Cooperation organization and started to work more vibrantly to combat any fundamentalist or separatist activities in and outside the member-states.

The 9/11 incidence brought a considerable change on the political situation of Central Asia. At first the bush administration admitted that they have captured some people belong from Western China, mainly the Uyghur's during it's Strike Hard against the al-Qaeda and Taliban network in Afghanistan. In November, 2001, the Chinese foreign minister declared from the U.N. (United Nation) that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement were trained equipped and financed by international terrorist organization and responsible for more than 200 terrorist attacks to this region. But in 2002, January, in an interview to Radio Free Asia, the ETIM leader Hasan Mahsun stated, that the main objective of ETIM is the liberation of Xinjiang from Chinese domination, but, he ignore the ETIM link with al-Qaeda. In August 2002 the USA government blacklisted East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization. The Chinese government warmly agreed with this decision and took some measure steps to formulate Anti-terrorist mechanism. The integration of Xinjiang to main land China was a long and continued struggle of CCP since 1949. So China supported the American war and terror strategy and it helped China to deploy and restructured its repressive force to demolish the idea of separatism and established a politico-economy and legal framework to secure China's internal security and sovereignty to the minority region and the western border land Xinjiang as well. During the first half of 2000 to achieve China's goal to its north western border lands, China took three measure steps as followed firstly in it's criminal law and deployed a large number of military to prevent the separatism, terrorism and criminal activities across the country, especially to Xinjiang and Tibet. Secondly, it increased its cooperation and border security and counter terrorism strategy through the regional forum of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and concretize it's diplomatic relationship with the Central Asian neighbours and Arab Worlds. Thirdly, it gave its full support to U.S War on Terror strategy to the aftermath of 9/11. To different world forum China started to project, since 1990 it was suffering from East Turkestan Islamic forces for a series of violent incidence to the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region and was responsible for explosions, assassinations, arsons and assaults to other neighboring countries. This terrorist threats seriously

jeopardizing the lives and property of the people and in this region and disestablished the social stability of the region.

According to some scholars China's strategy towards Xinjiang had been framed by the goal of overall integration. It not only consolidated China's territorial control and sovereignty over Xinjiang, but also absorbed the region culturally, economically and politically through the encouragement of Han immigration and to settle them to the various non-Han ethnic minority region for making of the unitary, multi-ethnic socialist state of PRC. In 2000 more than sixty two billion Yuan had been invested by PRC to develop the infrastructure of Xinjiang. More than forty billion Yuan was increased compare to the investment during 1990s. In tenth five year plan (2001 to 2005) the state declared to invest four hundred twenty five billion Yuan under this five year plan with focus on local water conservation, transportation, energy and teli- communication. The beginning of Western Development Program in this decade increased the competition between many provinces and organizations to enter Xinjiang because of it's attractive opening-up polices and mineral rich hydro-carbon resources. In a statement to Beijing Review, then the chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Abulait Abudurexit said that though Xinjiang by no means a violence stricken region, despite of this fact the region is enjoying its best period of social stability and high economic growth (Zi 2002:24-25).

Though the Chinese authority amended the regional autonomy law and increased various programmes and policies to promote the ethnic minority people in its tenth five year plan (2001 to 2005), but, it also increased its monitoring and management on religious institutions and customs in this period. The Muslim preachers and students who were involved with illegal religious centers or illegal religious activities had been arrested, the imams were compelled to take political education under the massive banner of patriotic re-education campaign. Religious worship, education and instruction had been restricted before eighteen years of age. Though article 37 of the National Regional Autonomy law guarantees the use of ethnic minority languages in education, but the use of Uyghur language in education had been limited and approval of censorship was increased regarding Uyghur political and cultural literatures. Chinese mandarin was compulsory in high school education and classes were ethnically mixed to promote the unifying approach of the state. In this regard government view was, there had been limited scope in ethnic minority languages to express the today's consequences in a proper way,

and it had also a limitation to the way of higher education and standard profession. So it was required to use the Chinese language as a medium to achieve the overall developmental goal of the region.

In 2001 onwards Xinjiang experienced a higher degree of central government control which reflected to the role of Han dominated XPCC. Basically XPCC resettled the Han immigrants as a tool of unification and integration when Western Developmental Programme started. It is said that since 2000, the GWDP used as a safe-guard to defend China's harsh policies like Strike Hard to dominate Uyghur's opposition in Xinjiang. In this time CCP's crackdown focused over the rectification of religious venues and the arrest of the religious activists who preaching "a Holy War" across the region, mainly in Hetian, Kashgar, Aksu, Ili, and other places in Xinjiang. In this respect the authorities closed sixty-four illegal teaching venues, seized a large number of illegal publications and reactionary tapes and videotapes. In April 2001, China's Minister of Public Security announced to carry out a two-year Strike Hard campaign with aimed at eliminating separatism and illegal religious activities from this region. In response with an increasing crime and corruption over the past 30 years since 1980s, the Chinese government periodically instituted this nation-wide crackdowns and rectification campaign against crime to the name of "Strike Hard" anticrime and rectification campaigns. The "2010 Strike Hard campaign" was the fourth round of nationwide "Strike Hard" campaigns in this context.

Though the post-September 11 anti-crime campaigns in China has severely curtailed the crime-rate, but the local accounts tell of an even more tense and repressive climate. As the Chinese government embarked on an effort to convince international observers about the legitimacy of its crackdown on Xinjiang's Uyghur. Then the local media apparently stopped carrying periodic reports over the results of this campaign, which often had featured information such as number of people arrested and convicted, names of such individuals, and details of their sentences. A report on January 1, 2002 provided a rare insight into the extent of the post-September 11 crackdown, indicating that security forces had arrested 166 violent terrorists and other criminals in a campaign from September 20 to November 30 in 2001. In 2002 and 2003, the authorities continued to wage a 'Strike Hard Campaign' against the purported three evil forces—separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism. Official media reported in January 2004 that, during the past twelve months, CCP suppressed a number of terrorist and separatist

activities in this region and arrested a large number of criminals from different parts of China.³ In September 2004, Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan disclosed that in the first eight months of the year, Chinese authorities had prosecuted twenty-two cases of groups and individuals for alleged separatist and terrorist activities. He said that courts in Xinjiang had passed fifty sentences, including an unspecified number of death sentences. During this campaign, police usually took tough measures against crimes and judicial authorities hand down swifter and harsher penalties. As a result, some Chinese scholars and lawyers expressed their concerns that efforts to meet the law enforcement targets under this campaign led to wrongful convictions and abused the criminal procedure. They also criticized previous ‘Strike Hard strategy and it’s severity and speed which led to criminal procedure violation (Oriental Outlook, July 2010) In an interview to Radio Free Asia in the same year on July 3, Heilongjiang-based lawyer Wei Liangyue described the shortcomings of the strike hard policies. According to him the most fundamental law of a country is it’s Constitution; the Constitution also clearly stipulates that the People's Republic of China implements the rule of law and establishes a socialist country ruled by law. However, this type of ‘Strike Hard’ campaign often occurs outside of rule of law and legal provision.

In 2001, December, the standing committee of ninth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China adopted a number of major amendments in the criminal law to protect the states security and people’s lives and property, simultaneously to punish the crime of terrorism to maintain social and public order. Though it was argued that within the criminal law there was no consistent definition of terrorism and the widened scope of action by law. On 29th December, 2001 Various Articles were amended on 29th December, 2001, under the criminal law of PRC, these were as follows: (a) article 114 described the persons who are responsible for arson, explosion, spreading of poisons or radioactive elements or such like of other things will be sentenced for three to ten years of imprisonment;(b) article 115 described the person who are responsible for serious injury or death of people or the cause of heavy losses of privet and public property, will be sentenced not less than ten years or life term; (c) article 120 described that persons who are responsible to form and lead any terrorist organization will get the life time

³ <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/9.htm>

imprisonment or not less than the ten years of jail term and who are partially with these organization will be sentenced at least for three years and who provide fund this organizations will be sentenced for life term or not less than five years; (d) article 125 highlighted persons who are responsible for illegal manufactures for trading or to store poisonous and radioactive substances which threat to the public security will be sentenced from five years to fix term according to the constitution; (e)Article 127 revised the life time imprisonment or not less than ten years jail term or sentenced to death to those who are responsible for theft arms, ammunitions or explosives from any state organs; (f) article 191 highlighted drug related crimes which had been punishable for at least five years to life time; (g) article 291 defined the nature of disturbances created by any individual or groups to disturb the social order by gathering in any public places without any state permission or block traffic or any agent of the states would be punishable for five year to life term imprisonment. These amendments also increased the scope and use of death plenty in China (Clarke, 2010:15-16).

In December 2003 the deputy director of the counter terrorism bureau and the ministry of public security, Zhao Yongchen in an interview stated that as a member of United Nations Security Council it is a responsibility of Chinese government to fulfill the anti-terrorist commitment according to the United Nations passed resolution. To show the firm determination of the government against terrorism, the ministry also made the list in public which identified four Eastern Turkestan terrorist organization and eleven alleged member organizations were responsible to spread the anti-nationalist approach to this region. He also added that these organizations were also involved as information providers to the outside enemies and planned and organized crimes and terrorist attacks inside and outside China. In this time various publications of these organizations defined their propaganda towards the demand of more autonomy or a separate state ethnically and religiously would be dominated by Uyghur Muslims. These propagandas also targeted the Han community members, government institutions and Chinese arms forces and made them target for organizing their violence or terrorist attacks. Computerized information system was used as another important tool to spread the feeling of separatism and terrorism among the young generation of Uyghur during this time. So to identify this terrorist organizations the criteria was used by the CCP were as follows: (a) the organizations which have their headquarters either outside or inside Chinese territory and who engaged in terrorist activities and causing harm to people's lives and property; social stability

and states security; (b) Currently or previously involved to plan, instigate, conduct or execute terrorist activities; (c) financing and supporting terrorist activities; (d) capacity building bases like organizing, recruiting and training terrorist and terrorism and (e) collaboration with terrorist organizations by receiving finance or training from those organizations.

As on human right issues raised by some international forums against the CCP, the deputy director revealed that Chinese government followed the UN mechanism to identify and to take counter terrorist measures to the fight against terrorism. To combat terrorism with the cooperation of foreign government on anti-terrorism method, he declared that China wants cooperation from other countries within the UN framework and desire to use the SCO as a bridge between regional and international actors to combat terrorism and to take various developmental and anti-crime methods to maintain the social stability and sovereignty of each country within this framework. After the 9/11 attack the Chinese government signed different agreement with different international forum to protect the natural and human resources from the three evils extremism, separatism and terrorism. In a question on human right violation of Uyghur by CCP, Zhao defined why no terrorist organizations can be a part of any nationality or nation, because it violets the rights of the people to those regions and the crackdown of these violent activities effectively protect the public life and public interest and maintain the social stability and development to make a socialist society under the banner of CCP. It means China's concern only upon the most serious offenders to protect the rights and interest of common people including the Uyghur in Xinjiang. He also stated the ETIM and ETLO jointly engaged in a series of terrorist activities to destabilize the state's security in China and other neighboring countries. So severe crackdown of these organizations is necessary to maintain the regional and states security and to promote the smooth development for a modern socialist society (Li 2003).

In late March, 2007, the Chinese government issued the eleven five year plan (2006 to 2010) for ethnic minority affairs. In this plan CCP focused more on public infrastructure, balancing the ecological environment, improving the poverty level and standers of livings. In an interview the vice minister of the state Ethnic Affairs Commission Dondrub Wangben stated that the aim of that five years plan was to provide equal bases public services to all by solving the problems and difficulties of ethnic minorities and their autonomous regions (Jianhua 2007:20). In the same year in June, the CCP circulated an order to the local authorities to promote strict restriction on international travel for minorities, especially restriction imposed upon the Uyghur

Hazz pilgrimages and the organizer of these tours. To get official approval for these events one must go through a number of criteria and had to bound for submitting proof of no previous link with any fundamentalist groups or anti-Chinese activities. Patriotic reeducation Campaign for the religious personnel used to brought CCP's control over religion and CCP's guideline to for practicing it. As like as 1990s, in 2007 also observed the restriction was imposed on the age bar of eighteen years, before it, at the previous half of this decade nobody was allowed to provide religious worship, education or instruction to the common masses. In the beginning of 2000, the Chinese authority claimed that that tactics of the independence of Xinjiang changed its way of strategy to attack China and it is applying its ideological ground instead of the frequent violent attacks. For examples CCP took four cases as proofs of spreading the separatist or terrorist ideas. In 1999 the Rebiya Kadeer incident was the first one, where she sentenced for eight year imprisonment for providing secret information of the government to outside the country. After her releasing she moved to the US. The Uyghur poet Tursunjan Emet was the second one where he recited a poem in 2002 at the Xinjiang people's hall in the capital of Urumqi which beard the anti-governmental feeling and the ideas of ethnic separatism. In 2004, the Uyghur author Nurmuhemmet Yasin case was the third one where he published a short story in the Kashgar literature journal named Blue Pigeon what expressed a story of a pigeon. The summary was after completing its journey when it came back to it's own home it saw some other colourful Pigeon captured its home. The Blue Pigeon commit a suicide rather than come under their control, which was like an allegorical attack on Chinese government policies on Minorities especially in Xinjiang since last few decades. He got ten years jail sentenced for generating the separatist and terrorist feeling and among the common people in this region. Such type of events also increased CCP's vigilance over the news media, literature and Arts performance, illegally printing reactionary books and periodicals leaflets letters and posters, audio-video recording, radio and television broadcasting and using internet to spread the anti-governmental feelings. The fourth case was taken place in 2006, when the Uzbek government arrested the Uyghur political activist and a Canadian citizen Huseyin Celil and handed over him to the Chinese government. He had been found in guilty for spreading separatist activities and ideas in Xinjiang and got life time imprisonment. According to government's claim Celil actively participated to the East Turkestan Liberation Organization and funded this terrorist group, which come under the article 120 of the criminal law for actively participating in a terrorist organization or providing fund to any terrorist

organization, amended after 9/11 amendments in the Chinese constitution. These above all incidences also promoted China's increasing security and counter terrorism cooperation among the SCO's countries and with neighboring Central Asian states, as well as successfully portrayed CCP's approach to Xinjiang in post 9/11 onwards (Clarke 2010:14-17).

But it was argued in various publications during that period that the rapid police interrogations and hasty judgment by the court were also blamed for its wide spread torture and unjust punishments to the innocent people. Many people were given harsher punishment than they deserve according to the law of the Chinese constitution. In October 2006 the policy of 'balancing severe punishment with leniency' was first recognized by the CCP that only strike hard related harsh policy can't be the spirit to build a harmonious society, which is based on equity and justice. The Chinese authorities then brought an ambitious reforms to address the structural problems which were affecting the Chinese judiciary since the last two decades from the starting of time of Strike Hard campaign. The changes observed to the court adjudication, the system people's assessors and the judicial review. The China's Supreme People's Court took back the power from the lower level court to review and ratify all death plenty were given by the lower courts. The judiciary system also improved the educational level and the quality of understanding among the judges to give their judicial opinion (Zhang, 2007).

During this time period the government's attention refocused on the CCP's traditional fear that religion and ethnic minorities are being use by the hostile outside forces to destabilize the Chinese society. So party directed its political control over the religious believers, through the local officials. Since 2000, China's autonomous regions had experienced increased economic output and improved transportation and communications across the region, but, the developmental policy and financial resources were under the control of central government. It is critically approved by a large number of academicians that the developmental and financial control over the autonomous regions mainly in XUAR weakened the economic autonomy of Minorities and disproportionality favoured the Han Chinese in this border land since last few decades, though the minority education got the priority for increasing investment by the central government, but, the literacy rate and educational qualification was far below than the Han Chinese as like in CCP's rule to the previous decades. Government promotion of Han immigration to minority the minority areas and more concern over the immigrated Han rather than the local community increased the tension in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia regions to

the coming years. In 2005 onwards government also took step to curve the growing activism of different civil society organizations and also increased its control over civil society and autonomous social organizations. The formation of independent worker unions were prohibited and state run-union was promoted by CCP. Government's belief was these organizations played an important role to promote the social and economic problems in Chinese society, mainly in minority dominated economically and socially deprived regions to fulfill their anti-social interest. So instead of supporting these organizations, government forcefully and legally restricted their registration and sponsorship procedures to undermine their ability to provide any financial or other assistance to any separatist organization. Though the Chinese government promoted the 'carrot and stick policy' to take the political control and to bring social stability, but, it is argued that these hard measures under the cover of soft measures has been faced various difficulties to control corruption, local abuses and social unrest which can be hurdle to achieve the goal of maintaining a stable internal environment as a foundation to continue the China's development plans to the far north western border lands Xinjiang. Since 2006, the Chinese government started to encourage the private companies to hire the Uyghur workers from Xinjiang and recruit them to the factories to eastern and southern region of China. According to the authority, this opportunity provided the teaching and technical skill to the Uyghur workers, which would be helpful to develop the western part of the country as well. Some Uyghur groups recognized a deep political agenda of CCP behind the transfer of Uyghur workers to the other region of the country from their native home land. In the case of Uyghur workers the ethnic and cultural differences increased the isolation of Uyghur from Han. In 2008 though there were no such type of Uyghur separatist or political violence in Xinjiang and across the country, except some incidences and government measures at the time of Beijing Olympic regarding Uyghur community and Buddhist Tibetans as security threats for the game, but in 2009, on 26th June Shaoguan incident and 5th to 7th July the Urumqi riots conformed the unfolded background of Uyghur separatism against the Chinese state sovereignty in Xinjiang which refueled since 1990s onwards.

Under the banner of increasing employment opportunity for minorities a large number of Uyghur workers were transferred to the Shaoguan city in Guangdong province in the month of May. In this place the Han and the Uyghur's both were living together at the different sections of a dormitory. Actually whatever happened on 26th June, it was quite unclear to till now. But from Xinhua report published on 29th June reported that two Han women workers were raped by Six

Uyghurs on 26th June at the Xuri toy factory in Shaoguan. According to another story reported by Xinjiang Regional Government, a female Han worker lost her way and entered into Uyghur men's dormitory and raped. After this incident the ethnic friction was taken place on the same day. This confused fight which was supposed to base on a false report converted soon to an ethnic conflict and two Uyghur workers were killed and more than one hundred eighteen people were injured. After this conflict the particular Han workers who was supposed to responsible to spread this news according to some Uyghur reports were arrested along with several hundred workers. Several images and videos of this incidences were circulated through the internet as a claim of Uyghur casualties by some Uyghur organizations. Though China's claim was Kurban Khayun, a resident of Kucha and a member of World Uyghur Congress, an umbrella organization of Uyghur groups, headed by Rebiya Kadeer, was responsible to circulate these false images through internet. Some sources claimed that the number of death was more than thirty including few Hans. This violence reaffirmed the economic and social disparities between the Hans and Uyghur since last three decades (Millward 2009:349-351).

On 26 June, Shaoguan incidence inspired the Uyghur domestically and internationally to take their position against the Chinese authorities and kept their demand for proper investigation of this incidence and raised question against China's labour transfer policy from far north-western minority areas to across the country. Though the Guangdong party secretary Wang Yang stated that rethinking was needed regarding China's ethnic policy, but the CCP was remained silence regarding this issue. In early July the Uyghur planned to do a march with the common people to Urumqi People's Square for the demand of thorough investigation of the Shaoguan. The news of this demonstration were also spread over internet, cellphones and through other media in and outside China. According to government statement many Uyghur from other parts of the region came to participate in this demonstration during those days.

On 5th July, people from different areas of Xinjiang began to gather to the Nanmen area of Urumqi. A large number of people, according to some media reports estimated over ten thousand, were participated in this march. When the march moved with shouting slogans against the Chinese government and demanded to the authorities to answer their question regarding the Shaoguan incidence then security forces moved and started to beat the local mob harshly. According to some reports gun fire was also took placed over this demonstration. The news of

this repressed demonstration transformed to an ethnic violence soon. Various roads were blocked and questions were asked to the passers-by regarding their ethnicity. Mainly the Han people were beaten and their shops vehicles were destroyed and burned. Though it was criticized that the reports of international media were taken to mainly the Han residential areas which was relatively well documented about the damage of Han properties rather than Uyghur. When on 7th July some reporters reached to the Han areas to get the media coverage, they faced a demonstration by some Uyghur women who were demanding to release their family members who were swiftly arrested without any concrete evidence after the 5th July riots. At the same day some international media highlighted that some gangs of Han who were well armed started to attack to the Uyghur and destroyed various Uyghurs shops and stalls in Shanxi Hang area for taking revenge. Uyghur too took up clubs to defend themselves. Soon a curfew was launched to protect the social stability.

But the partiality was seen to the appearance of CCP by some Uyghur's claim or vice versa. Aftermath of this rioting the main part of the city mainly the Han populated areas were covered by the Chinese press. Government figures highlighted that one hundred ninety seven people were passed-away and over one thousand seven hundred were injured during this conflict and various shops and vehicles were destroyed. Chinese media and state council demanded that Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress were the main responsible actors to plan and organized this riots. It was also claimed that there has been association between the WUC and al-Qaeda. But it can't be argued that the clashes between demonstrators and armed police was the main cause of a peaceful demonstration to convert into an ethnic violence. Though it is noticeable that Shaoguan Xury toy factory incident was the main reason behind the 5th July Uyghur's demonstration against the Chinese authority at Urumqi in Xinjiang. The widespread Uyghur belief's was the Uyghur death toll from the Shaoguan and Urumqi attack, were more than the official media record.

The riots that broke out in July of 2009 put Beijing's trust of the Han elite in Xinjiang to the most severe test. The first riot broke out on 5 July and more than a thousand Uyghurs were reportedly involved. They specifically attacked the Han Chinese on the street, leaving 197 killed and 800 others injured. Two days later, some Han Chinese took to the street to launch retaliation attack on Uyghurs, although they were soon dispersed by the police. The provincial government immediately tightened security control of the cities. Mosques were ordered to be closed down

and armed police surrounded Uyghur neighborhoods. The severity of the heightened social control can be gleaned from the official restrictions on information. The authorities cut off the entire province's Internet access for ten months. International long distance calls were also suspended. The 2009 riots were the deadliest ethnic conflict since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident (Stan Hok-Wui Wong, Hiroki Takeuchi 2010:112).

In September 2009, another set of Han demonstrations continued spreading a sense that the government did not responded robustly to the riots flamed by the Uyghur and was too soft regarding Uyghur. They also demanded for the resignation of the first party secretary of XUAR Wang Lequan, who as a party secretary of this region had been characterized for his unforgiving hardline approaches to the Uyghur issue of separatism and it was said that the Uyghur inside and outside Xinjiang at the previous days were more concern to achieve their full-fledged cultural autonomy rather than achieving an independent Uyghur state. Then the Uyghur concern was focused to the use of their mother tongue in education, increasing Han immigration as a main factor to decrease the employment opportunity for Uyghur, the increasing cultural assimilation of Hans in Uyghur society and the labour transfer policy of Chinese authorities from Xinjiang to the other parts of the country. While China's constitution and various government White Papers on ethnic minorities and religion contained grantee of religious freedom but according to some Uyghur sources it was strictly controlled. Genuine freedom of custom and religion what are the right of individuals to freely practice their religious traditions and customs, were conspicuously absent from Uyghur in Xinjiang at those days (Millward, 2009:354-357).

In 2009 incidences encourage the CCP to revision its anti-extremism and separatism procedure along with increasing the force deployment and coordination between different unites to reestablish the social stability. This revision focused on social and institutional reforms along with educating the local authorities to deal with the local common problems. In November 2009 an official outlet of CCP highlighted China's core interest cover China's sovereignty over Xinjiang and Tibet. The principal instrument to protect this core interest was to maintain stability by a combination of traditional hard policy of using force and non-traditional socio-economic policies as a development para-meter. The 2008 Tibet incidence and 2009 Xinjiang's demonstrations highlighted into the reform measures of CCP in 2010 to use forces without permission in its regional law of autonomy, when the situation will be getting out of hand from

local authority. The regulation constituted a detailed guidelines from the center level to the local, provincial and regional levels and instructed them how to maintain stability during an armed uprising. Intelligence agency were reshaped to ensure cooperation from neighboring states and to address the internal and external problems of insurgencies. Enhanced economic investment to the economically deprived areas directed incentive plans to the favor of the ethnic minorities in CCP's labour transfer policy after 2009's riot. Building of Mosques and temples, establishment of schools to promote minority languages and education also got the priorities at the same time, but strict controlled was imposed according to the CCP's criteria.

After that China's 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) addressed the problem of social inequality at all levels of the government. Previously the socio-economic development was seen as source of inequality and increasing unemployment rates among non-Han minority people. The average living standard was below then the national levels. Government belief was, inefficiency of communications between government and the ethnic minorities had discouraged the dialogs and produce a feeling of anger or displeasure among the minorities, especially in Tibetans and Uyghurs against the government, as well as CCP also addressed the importance of national security and the requirement of using hard policies as a tool to dominate and manage anti-nationalist protests. Armed uprisings and terrorism like explosions, hijacking or attacking upon any government places got more priorities on the basis of national security define by CCP's political guideline. In 2011 CCP hosted a joint anti-terrorist exercise under the flag of SCO in the Tianshan Mountains, which was a safe haven for Uyghur insurgents according to the Chinese intelligence agency. In 2013 China's Snow Leopard Commandoes took part in a joint exercise with Russia in Beijing. This exercise created opportunities for China to give and take supports in its operations to the event of any troublesome unrest in an outside the country. These joint exercises increased the scope to China's Strike Hard like hard policies to keep and balance the any turbulent situation under controlled that had a limited scope in previous decades due to limited trusts among the neighboring countries (Odgaard and Nielsen 2014:543-544).

It seems that China has adopted the "carrot and stick" approach in maintaining stability which has had tremendous impact on the sociopolitical conditions in Xinjiang. The CCP adopted the "carrot" approach by granting some freedom to the Uyghur such as the right to worship and use their language as well as some preferential policies like employment in government

departments. The “stick” or coercive approach was used when the CCP was confronted by the separatist groups demanding independence. China is even willing to take a hard-line approach in order to defend its national unity and security. It has also intended to send a message to the international community that it will never give up its sovereignty over any of its provinces, including Xinjiang. Scholars such as Justin Rudelson and Doak Barnett have also argued that if the Chinese economy continues to develop in Xinjiang and it manages to improve the living standards of the Uyghurs, it is possible to overcome the problem of separatism (Rudelson, 1992; Barnett, 1993: 97). This paper agrees with Rudelson and Barnett; on another hand, it emphasizes that China should also adhere to the provisions regarding the rights of the ethnic minorities in its own constitution (Roy Anthony Rogers 2014:427-429).

Chapter 6

Responses of Uyghur and other International Actors

Uyghur discourse in China's Minority Policy:

Although, the Uyghur question in China dates back to hundreds of years, one of the critical turning points of this issue took place after the establishment of the East Turkestan Republics in the 1930s and 40s. These republics later were taken over by China with the invasion of PLA in 1949. Founded under the name of XUAR, the new regime assured the cultural, social and political rights of Uyghur and other minorities living in the area through various constitutional provisions and adopting and introducing the Chinese Minority Policy. However, the totalitarian system subsequently established by the communist state in Mao's regime and suppressed the entire Chinese nation and its minority regions. Mao's policy for homogenization had a great impact on Muslim Uyghur and their cultural, and social differences were perceived as counter-revolutionary threats from both side. With the introduction of Deng's Reformist Policy temporary relief came with granted the basic freedoms of the people of this region into early 1980s. These new freedoms were enacted as a result of major policy changes toward minority regions by the central authority. In fact as a result of changing policies in China as a whole, after the death of Mao, the XUAR region and its people took advantage of this limited liberalization policies in those days (kilic bugra kanat, 2016:191-192).

Things in China changed dramatically with the event of Tiananmen Square, the end of the Cold War and the corresponding wave of independence of the Central Asian Republics. Together with the event of Tiananmen Square and shattering with the Eastern block created a climate of insecurity and paranoia among the policymakers in Beijing. In the last years of the 1980s, under pressure from rising public unrest, the Beijing government's approach to every hint of dissent as a potential destabilizer and threat to the survival of the CCP regime especially in Xinjiang. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese administration adopted a series of strict measures against political demands and protests of Uyghurs in XUAR. The Strike Hard Campaigns were frequently applied and had had a serious negative impact on interethnic relations in XUAR and on the relationship of CCP and ethnic Uyghur. A new category was added to this repressive campaign, designating crimes of separatism and religious extremism.

The concept and scope of separatism and illegal religious activities were excessively broad in scope to the vision of CCP at that same period. In the late 1990s, at the time of Jiang Zemin the economic developments of China and rapid rise of the Chinese economy added a new dimension to the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang. The ethnic minorities especially felt relative social and economic deprivation to a greater degree than before. Various studies also demonstrated that Uyghurs in Xinjiang became the most disadvantaged group in comparison to local Hans and those who had migrated to the region in those recent years with the encouragement and sponsorship from the government. Many scholars argue that at that time the Chinese government's economic policies merely focused on natural resource extraction and the immigrated Han Chinese were the main beneficiaries (kilic bugra kanat, 2016:196-197).

In this context another argument shows Mao was bent on creating his own synthesis of Chinese and socialist cultures. His attitude toward the cultures and traditions of minority peoples was no more tolerant and far more distant, and these were expected to conform themselves to Mao's new Chinese socialist synthesis. Mao's internal and foreign policies showed that he was willing to accept very high costs to achieve these goals. During the Great Leap Forward and later in the Cultural Revolution he was willing to impose considerable suffering on the Han Chinese population to keep his hold on power secure. To summarize, Mao's leadership represented a sharp shift to the direction of more extreme national-communist preferences, as well as more strongly power-seeking preferences; (Shale Horowitz & Peng Yu 2014) which was the breed of Strike Hard like harsh campaign to the coming periods.

The scope of the Strike Hard campaigns was gradually broadened to contain all kind of nonconformist voices in XUAR. This zero tolerance policy against the XUAR and the resulting state of constant unrest brought the region to the attention of the CCP and subsequently generated increasing attention from the international community. In a contrary during this period policies implemented by China in this region negatively affected the country's international image by the constant securitization, increasing use of security measures and disproportionate use of force against demonstrations generated an unfavorable image of China around the world. In a critique it was stated that China is a country that was so willing to use its soft power, cultural influence and public diplomacy in order to gain super power recognition, status and international prestige, the Uyghur question became a significant pothole for China's path to reach it's goals. In order to prevent this, Chinese foreign policy makers and public diplomacy officials launched

information campaigns to change the discourse of the Uyghur question into the international sphere (kilic bugra kanat 2016:197-198).

China's Foreign Policy and relation with Uyghur:

Although China sought to keep the Uyghur question as a domestic matter and opposed any form of involvement or interference from outside forces but the influences of the outside forces gradually began to notice in China's foreign policy. Somehow the failure of the government to handle any issue and the use of force and emergency measures was blamed to the existence of active outside forces to support and pursue the separatist movements in this region. However, with the proof of absence of a direct link, it was hard for the Chinese government to put the blame on a specific state or country. Still, an ambiguous external forces discourse was constantly utilized by the CCP and the Uyghur question influenced the foreign policy of the PRC. In these years, neither Turkey nor the Central Asian Republics had a foreign policy agenda regarding the situation of Uyghur, however interestingly it was China that brought these issues to the agenda of its diplomatic meetings with these countries.

The CCP has reached out separately to the USA, Russia, and other neighboring states to secure its domestic security through intelligence sharing and military exchanges. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), originally referred to as the Shanghai Five, was a primary example of China's solicitation of international security assistance. Essentially, the SCO serves as a safety net for both China and the Central Asian states, promoting partnership on economic, political, cultural exchange and security initiatives, and most importantly reducing the possibility of escape terrorist to the neighboring safe haven countries. Basically CCP followed its century old tradition for resolving its domestic matters in a private way without any foreign meddling. C

In 2009 Ghulja event highlighted the Uyghur problem for the world attention as a human rights issue. Mass detentions, rapidly spreading torture and frequent executions in the region became increasingly visible to the international community. The incidents and its aftermath also led to an exodus of refugees from Xinjiang. In Ghulja province, young Uyghur activists who joined the protests first migrated into neighboring countries, then into Turkey and eventually Europe. There they revitalized the existing Uyghur organizations and increased the power and influence of the Uyghur diaspora. The Chinese administration considered both the movement of Uyghurs, who escaped to different countries at the end of the 1990s, and the broader cultural

awakening of Uyghurs living in the Central Asian Republics as serious threats to its security and reputation to the international arena. The PRC sought to promote relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the face of increasing numbers of Uyghur organizations and movements in these countries. It was hoped that stronger economic relations will increase the leverage of the Chinese government into the domestic affairs of these countries and thus hinder the activities of Uyghur separatists and potential cross-border movements. The Chinese government also increased border controls, signed border agreements with Central Asian Republics, and worked to protect border security in order to achieve its propaganda regarding Xinjiang. China demanded that Central Asian Republics should limit the activities of their Uyghur population and should maintain the economic and bilateral relations with Beijing through supporting China's stand regarding Uyghur issues. Trade relations and foreign aid to the same countries became linked to their positions on the Uyghur issue. In addition, China took another step to bring the Uyghur problem as a key element of threat against regional security and territorial integrity by trying to project its strike hard policies to the Central Asian Republics and other Arab and Western countries. Perhaps the most critical of such attempts was the formation of the Shanghai Five, the backbone of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and its efforts to weep out the three 'evil forces' (separatism, extremism and terrorism) from this region (Kilic Bugra Kanat 2016:198-200).

Aftermath of September 11

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US, China intensified its crackdown in Xinjiang. The Chinese government claimed that the security and stability of Xinjiang had been threatened by separatists and religious extremists. Ironically, prior to the attacks of September 11, China had never admitted that Xinjiang was facing some international and domestic terror problems, yet openly called for international support to their struggle against domestic terrorism. It is undeniable that the cross-border trade between China and the Central Asian republics contributed to the economic development of the province since 1990s, but it also brought the Uyghur into closer contacts with the Muslim societies in Central Asia. Beside closer contacts with the Muslims in Central Asia, the cross-border links with Pakistan extend its cultural and religious influence in Xinjiang. According to Sean Roberts, "the most significant Pakistani influence on Xinjiang was the education of Xinjiang's mullahs and imams in Pakistani madrasahs (Roberts, 2004: 226-227). These led to the revival of Islam and the Uyghur identity in 90s and continued 2001 onwards. However, some scholars argue that these factors alone were

not sufficient to inspire the resurgence of Uyghur nationalism. The main motivating factor was the mass migration of Hans into the province and reluctance of the government to listen the frustration of the people. The Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 became an impetus for the Uyghur to continue their struggle (Roy Anthony Rogers 2014:425).

Although the perception of external threat fully existed into CCP's security structure, the elements of internal threat were pushed to the forefront in order to maintain people's allegiance to the State. In those years, the State targeted minorities mainly Uyghur separatists in particular to link with the policy of 'three evil' powers. The Chinese administration adopted a new strategy based on the premise that any kind of disruption in XUAR is a threat to the government and therefore requires a public reaction that enhances the legitimacy of the State (kilic bugra kanat, (2016:198-202).

The turning point regarding the Uyghur Question in China was the September 11, 2001 attacks on USA and international atmosphere that emerged just the aftermath of the event. Before the attack, the party leaders of CCP asserted the enduring stability and security of Xinjiang. However, on the heels of the attacks, the Chinese government announced its support for the USA-led global fight against terrorism, claiming that China had long been victim, itself, to terrorist activities. The USA administration, in return, labeled the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, as a terrorist organization was responsible to organize and spreading terror attacks in the Central Asian region and that enabled China to take some measure steps to oversee those organizations spreading the ideological and religious beliefs against the CCP's guideline.

Through the PRC's new campaign, the Uyghur community began to experience a more securitized dimension of the policies of otherization that had been implemented in 1990s. At those days, according to Chinese claim Uyghur were not only considered as others, but were also increasingly associated with different forms of terrorist and criminal activity against the government of PRC. Although the Chinese government preferred to use the label Eastern Turkestani terrorist forces instead of the ethnic name Uyghur, it was common knowledge that the primary targets of these propaganda materials were the Uyghur Muslims from XUAR. In the meantime, the Chinese administration expedited harsh military and security measures under the name of the "War on Terror" in 2000 onwards in XUAR. During this period, any form of Uyghur political activity and dissent was criminalized within the context of the war on terror.

This evolution of anti-Uyghur discourse resulted in dramatic domestic repercussions. The state-sponsored wave of nationalism and anti-Uyghur sentiments launched after the Cold War, combined with the Islamophobic atmosphere following 9/11, resulted in the intense isolation of Uyghur community from CCP's ideological framework. In this challenging period, Uyghur experienced intense crackdowns and discrimination and humiliation such as hotels refused to allow Uyghur customers to book rooms during the Beijing Olympic Games. On the eve of the Olympic Games, the PRC accused some Uyghur including those who were living in Western countries and planning acts of terrorism to target the Beijing Olympics.

Another very significant impact of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent global war on terror was the implementation of increasing restrictions and limitations on the freedom of religion. In past that helped China to take some attempts to associate Uyghur dissent with the country's global war on terror strategy. Religion had long been considered by the government as a potential barrier between the Han Chinese and Uyghur and a significant impediment to the assimilation of Uyghurs in Chinese mainland. In the early 1990s, religious restrictions were imposed in Xinjiang, but it took a more serious turn with the declaration of the 2005 Religious Affair Committee's Regulations, which significantly affected the religious lives of the Uyghur people in this region. Religious restriction was not the only outcome of the China's participation in the global war on terror, but, the implementation of this anti-terror campaign with the adoption of some social and economic policies further deteriorated the relation between the Uyghur and CCP. An acceptable critique in this context is that the Chinese government did not take necessary steps to eradicate the inequality among the Uyghur that escalated in the 1990s.

Aftermath of 9/11: Repercussion of Uyghur and CCP to Each-other

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, China's Afghanistan polity offered to assist and cooperate with the USA force for preventing, identifying, and eliminating terrorist organizations. In return China demanded for USA assistance and acknowledgement that the ETLO is an international terrorist organization. However, critics remarked that China's domestic counter-terrorism campaign served as a guise and showed CCP's intolerance towards political dissent, religious practices, and separatist activities by ethnic minorities. China and the USA started to work together with a series of dialogues that promoted collaboration and helped to take a joint initiative to combat domestic and international terrorism. China also started to demand to the

USA and to the United Nations to designate and fully recognize ETLO and ETIM as terrorist organizations. In other words, the impetus behind many terrorists are till to date that the USA and other Western powers directly served their role to threat the foundations of Islam and therefore these countries, their people, and their ideology must be eliminated. If China follows it's own traditional way as a threat to treat with the minority regions then it would be responsible to generate the sense of separatism and anti-nationalism among Uyghur in general.

Tension in Xinjiang transformed into a dispute not between Uyghurs and the PRC, but between Uyghurs and the Han Chinese. Among those days who were arrested, sentenced to prison, or executed, a great majority of them were Uyghurs. These incidents created serious questions about China's approach to the minority problem in Xinjiang. For the PRC, the Uyghur issue had taken a turn toward further securitization. The Ghulja incident in 1997, the Urumqi events in 2009, and the resulting crackdowns by security forces led to an exodus of Uyghurs from XUAR mainly the young Uyghurs looked for ways to flee the region. In their quest to leave China, the fleeing populations were often victimized by human traffickers. Others who remained in XUAR found themselves embedded in a cycle of mounting violence and human rights violations.

Since mid-1990s, the perception of the region shifted with China's increasing trade volumes, improving relations with Central Asian countries and Pakistan, and the increasing demand for oil production. The XUAR region subsequently began to be considered as a possible bridge between China and Central Asia and a critical geopolitical power center for the government, into CCP's operational approach to this region. It has been examined through various publications that at the end of the Cold War, China's policy towards Central Asia was greatly shaped by its policies in Xinjiang. CCP also tried to export the nature and principles of strike hard campaigns to the other side of the border in order to secure the control of this region against the above mentioned "three evil forces" into the previous chapters.

However, in the 1990s, this region was also started to be considered as a possible asset instead of a burden or risk for developing China's economic relations with Central Asia. Introducing of Western Developmental Project in 1999, was another significant step of CCP to increase Xinjiang's economic appeal for outside investments and increased the economic cooperation with Central Asian Republics. It has been proved through various studies that

Central Asia provided not only a significant market for the Chinese goods and products, but it was also a great source of energy that the booming Chinese economy urgently required since that period. Simultaneously in 2000 onwards Xinjiang became more critical because of the 9/11 incident in addition with of it's booming economy, own energy resources and the increasing bilateral or multilateral relations with Central Asian region.

In 2000s, in a pervasive and uniform way CCP reinforced its commitment to sustain the equality and unity of ethnic groups, but, on the other hand, ignored the fact that Xinjiang is a region mainly characterized by the duality of both Hans and Uyghurs. There are two or three separate names also exists this area; Xinjiang for Hans or main land China and in some local Uyghurs also, East Turkestan for most of the Uyghur intellectuals and diasporas working in abroad and Uyghurstan mainly demanded by some local Uyghur organizations. Most importantly, there are two versions of the region's history was existing from the very beginning of CCP's rule in Xinjiang. According to official Chinese records, Xinjiang had been an inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese state since the first half of the Han dynasty (approximately 101 BC) and Hans were thus one of the earliest inhabitants into this region. Meanwhile, most Uyghur intellectuals disagree with this argument and try to highlight that their kin was the first ascendance in today's Xinjiang from centuries ago and is the rightful native inhabitants (Elena Caprioni 2011:268).

Beyond the official rhetoric, in the last two decades media and scholars of contemporary China have proposed various explanations to define the state of ethnic relations. According to a large number of Chinese scholars Han-Uyghur ethnic relation was basically peaceful and sometimes the lack of integration solely generated by the Uyghurs due to their year longs resistance against CCP's rules and policies in Xinjiang. Alternatively, local Uyghur-run websites blamed the failure of the Chinese government to implement ethnic solidarity and genuine autonomy which had been blocked and their webmasters were sentenced for endangering state security, after the 2009 riots. Meanwhile, outside the PRC, many scholars and media agree that the principal source of instability in Xinjiang is the problematic Chinese regional autonomy system and the nature of it's preferential minority policies from the very beginning to till now. Similarly, Uyghur diaspora argue that the Communist victory in 1949 created a purposeful break between Hans and Uyghurs relationship. The created disharmony and distrust between them was

the result of present volatile existing situation in Xinjiang's politics and to the respect of region's social order (Elena Caprioni 2011:269).

After the launch of the shehuizhuyi hexie shehui (harmonious socialist society) on October 1, 2006, the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC proclaimed that the CCP's leadership motivates each ethnic group to collaborate with the others in order to build a comfortable life and a beautiful home characterized by equality, unity, mutual assistance and harmony. In particular, Urumqi was officially described as a place where different peoples "live harmoniously, build villages, and develop rich and fascinating cultures. However, behind this idyllic picture, one should keep another important issues in mind that all the elements or social groups of the society (majority and minority groups) had ready to cooperate for the pursuit of a harmonious society? (Elena Caprioni 2011:275-276).

In the years following 9/11 through launching a more aggressive anti-terror campaign, the PRC attempted to resolve the Uyghur problem with its own methods. The international community criticized terror reports released by the Chinese administration for discrepancies and the arbitrary use of the term terrorism or terrorist activities mainly organized by the Uyghur as a concept. The reports were questioned particularly by the human rights groups of Western countries. Despite their unintended consequences, China continued to adopt its anti-terrorism campaign and effectively ignored the presence of a multitude of problems that fueled the 2009 uprisings in this region. At the same time the administration widely circulated its propaganda materials that encouraged fighting against terrorism throughout China. State television and radio stations broadcasted documentaries among the common masses to identify the East Turkestan Terrorist Forces and their anti-nationalist activities by made films and documentaries based on the struggle of Chinese security forces against those terrorist or separatist groups in this region. During this period, any form of Uyghur political activity and dissent was criminalized within the context of the war on terror (kilic bugra kanat, 2016:203-204).

The fate of Uyghur economist, Professor Tohti in Beijing, who was very well integrated with the Chinese society, was a warning for all intellectuals who might otherwise made positive contributions to the separatism issue in XUAR in recent years. The detention of Ilham Tohti, his indictment on charges of separatism and cooperation with terrorist organizations and his sentence of life imprisonment for his published article can be argued that the existing problems in XUAR

in the decade of 2000 what seriously damaged the relations between Uyghur intellectuals and Chinese government. Considering the difficulty of dialogue with Uyghurs in the region and their lack of political representation, some Uyghur organizations became active in abroad like WUC and human rights organizations can be the key actors for interfering to overcome the crisis and boost-up confidence between the Uyghur people and the CCP and served as a pro-Uyghur sentiment from the beginning of the dialogues to address Uyghur demands. In this respect a study examined that Uyghurs had lack of efficient or popular leaders who can unite the Uyghurs across the region throughout it's history. At present, mainly there are two types of figurehead available among Uyghur émigrés. The first is the armed resistance leader based in Kazakhstan, who periodically slips into Xinjiang to incite rebellion and encourage Uyghurs to take up arms in a guerrilla war against Han troops (for example, Abdulghappar Shahiyari). The second is the dissident intellectual, who actively do their campaigns for the Xinjiang independence movement from outside the region (for example, Erkin Alptekin, son of the late Uyghur nationalist Yusuf Isa Alptekin). Another well-known popular business figure and politician Rebiya Kadeer might be identified in this regard. To date, no one figure has managed to gain the unanimous support and recognition of the Uyghur population in the way that certain novelists and singer-songwriters had during these days. There is a popular saying among young Tibetans regarding Uyghur is that: they have the leader, but they had the lack of people. On the other side the Uyghurs had the people, but, yet they had lack the leader. Many intellectuals thus rest their hopes for the more effective mobilization of ethno-political ideologies to the young Uyghur generation (Joanne Smith, 2002:195-224).

However, after 7/5, PSB officials concluded that the individuals involved in the Olympics bombing scheme were affiliated with the ETIM, with a majority of its followers residing in Xinjiang, China. There was a heavy presence of Chinese Special Police Units (CSPU), a paramilitary law enforcement branch of the PSB, stationed in Xinjiang, China. According to a high-ranking SPU official, Muslim Uyghurs united against the Han Chinese on 7/5 and beat, murdered, and robbed more than 190 innocent passersby and the majority of which were Han Chinese. CCP stated that the attack was premeditated, purposeful, and politically motivated. In the eyes of the Communist Party, Xinjiang separatism and ethnic tensions were considered national security threats that undermined and threatening to the existence of Chinese sovereignty over Xinjiang.

A number of recommendations has to be given to the CCP in this regard to reduce and balance the ethnic situation in Xinjiang in this time. These recommendations quoted the requirement of reducing the strategy of migration of Hans to Xinjiang. In this respect, it has been highlighted that until the educational levels of this province is improved and the Uyghurs are able to compete with the Hans, it is difficult for Uyghurs to keep their patience regarding the increasing of the Hans in Xinjiang. The policy of mass migration of the Hans already has exacerbated the situation rather than alleviating the tensions between the CCP and the Uyghurs. Hence, it should be reviewed. The Chinese government should discourage the middle-class and educated Uyghurs from leaving Xinjiang to move into Central China. One of the strategies, has to offer them more incentives and better positions. It is noteworthy to mention that the Chinese government's attempt to suppress Islam by confining it to tight state control also produced negative impacts on Xinjiang. It can be critically accepted that suppressing Islam or any traditional religion or custom can alienate any ethnic minorities and the Uyghurs were not the exceptional. So CCP's harsh policies can drive further underground religious expression and can encourage the growth of more radicalized and oppositional forms of religious identity. If this trend continues, it may result in more and more Uyghur youths to be radicalized and the number of moderate Uyghurs will be declined. In fact, the Uyghurs should not be deprived of their rights to retain their Islamic identities such as women wearing their headscarf or men keeping beard. This can be encouraged the greater participation of the Uyghurs rather than isolate them. 2009 riot in Urumqi clearly confirmed the argument that the political violence which occurred in Xinjiang since the 1990s onwards, were due to internal factors which encompassed economic deprivation, failure of the government to hold dialogue with the common people and its unwillingness for political reforms (Roy Anthony Rogers 2014:425-426).

One of the most significant outcomes of the post 9/11 atmosphere in China in regards to the Uyghur question was that the securitization of the Uyghur question and the criminalization of Uyghur dissent in the country started to be accepted by some segments of Chinese society. The constant propaganda of the Chinese state and state-controlled media generated a significant fear factor which spread to different segments of the society. This policy led to the marginalization of the Uyghur communities and further alienation of Uyghurs from the State. More dangerously, this combination of fear and marginalization also paved the way for ethnic tension between the minority Uyghur and majority Han Chinese populations. Another very significant impact of the

9/11 attacks and subsequent global war on terror was the implementation of increasing restrictions and limitations for the freedom of religion. In the early 1990s, religious restrictions were imposed in the region, but it took a more serious turn with the 2005 Religious Affair Regulations, which significantly affected the religious lives of the Uyghur people. In a report on the repression of Uyghur religious freedom, the Uyghur Human Rights Project argued that the regulation have had the effect of criminalizing peaceful religious practices among Uyghurs on par with illicit and violent activity. Chinese local and central authorities implemented policies that subsequently narrowed the definition of lawful activity, as a result many Uyghurs found that even traditional religious customs were restricted by the government more and more in 2001 onwards what made things worse for the Uyghurs and compelled them to do the strict interpretation of CCP's regulations in XUAR (kilic bugra kanat, 2016:205).

It was also noticeable into some critique that despite the brutality of the 2009 riots, it is important to note that only an insignificant few numbers were engaged in the previous movements of anti-PRC political violence which can't be acceptable as a serious threat for any country's sovereignty and integrity. Most Uyghurs accepted the rule of the PRC. Yet it is also true that many Uyghurs share the view that the Han Chinese colonized their homeland (Finley 2007). In Xinjiang, many Uyghurs are non-industrialized farmers while most Han Chinese started to work in urban areas and many were employed by state-owned enterprises. While the Uyghurs were 90per cent of the population in the rural southern Xinjiang, they represented only 12per cent of the population in Urumqi (Stan Hok-Wui Wong, Hiroki Takeuchi 2010:112).

In a contrary another view highlighted the dramatic economic development experienced by Xinjiang between 1980s to till 2000s led to drastic changes into the social structure of the Uyghurs. In the early 1950s, over 95 per cent of Xinjiang's population was illiterate, but by 1990, illiteracy was reduced to 12.75 per cent. In 1949, Xinjiang had had only one institution of higher learning with an enrolment of only 379 students, but by 1991, the province had 21 institutions of higher learning. Similarly, in 1949, Xinjiang had 363 industrial and mining enterprises but by 1990, Xinjiang's total industrial output value rose by 142.73 per cent (Beijing Review 1994). Urumqi was transformed from an oasis town to a bustling commercial and tourist center. CCP had been very careful about the socioeconomic conditions in order to promote a positive image and to attract foreign investment into the province. As a result, the CCP published several white papers such as White Paper on the situation in Xinjiang and White Paper on the

history and development of Xinjiang (2003) to portray a positive impression and to respond to the international criticism on the human rights conditions in Xinjiang (Roy Anthony Rogers 2014:416-417). Other than that, there were developments in the areas of transportations, telecommunications and postal services which contributed to the improvement of contacts among the minorities in Xinjiang.

In my field trip during two interviews with Professor Zhang and Prof Ma, they stated that Communist regime impartially rampaged both ethnic minority group's and the Han majority group's human rights during the time of Chinese Cultural Revolution. However, after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Government denounced the abuses of the past and announced reforms including a more liberal human rights policy, but, it is also important to note that the Chinese government continuously published reports that emphasized their progress on human rights and criticized the negative reports that were politically motivated by the enemies. These reports also emphasized that many non-governmental sources often report only the most horrific and sensational cases which describe an incomplete and misleading picture of reality to the world (Ma Rong, 2017 personal interview and Zhang Jiadong).

To examine and portrait of four generations of Uyghurs since 1949 onwards various studies had able to highlight that not surprisingly many older Uyghurs had no desire to return to the chaos and instability of that time and consider the present political, social, and economic climate that much improved in comparison with the past. In 1995-1996, ethno-political ideologies were rarely to be found on the lips of members of the older generation. Similarly, a man in his seventies from Urumqi summed up the viewpoint of his generation thus young generation can't the ability ability to look ahead only see what is in front of them at the contemporary times.

In this same context many Uyghurs aged between thirty and fifty showed signs of psychological confusion when they had been caught between loyalty to the Uyghur ethnic group and adherence to the Chinese Communist Party line. Uyghurs in their thirties, forties, and fifties had become anxious to protect their families and had no desire to return to the atmosphere of ethnic and religious persecution that characterized the Cultural Revolution. But the young generation, conversely grown up in an age of relative ethnic and religious tolerance.

During the early 1990s, changes began to take place and ethnic minorities were no longer taught solely in their native languages instead of, they began to be taught additionally in

Putonghua. Gradually, a new bilingual mode of instruction took shape. Minority students were taught in both Putonghua and their mother tongues (Zuliyati Simayi 2014: 148-149). The two separate systems defined on the basis of ethnic identity of minority versus Han that created a bifurcated education system.

A recent study in 2010 highlighted a transformation among present Uyghur generation what came to the forefront through the study of Chen Yangbin, where he highlighted that one Uyghur female student in Shanghai and her Uyghur boyfriend told him that they do not trust Uyghur society rather than believing an American or a Han, possibly this is due to the influence of CCP's general views on Uyghurs (Chen Yangbin 2014:207).

However, Uyghurs lack a figurehead capable of uniting Uyghurs across the region, and have lacked such a leader throughout history. At present, there are two types of figurehead available among Uyghur émigrés. The first is the armed resistance leader based in Qazaqstan, who periodically slips into Xinjiang to incite rebellion and encourage Uyghurs to take up arms in a guerrilla war against Han troops (for example, Abdulghappar Shahiyari). The second is the dissident intellectual, who actively campaigns for the Xinjiang independence movement from outside the region (for example, Erkin Alptekin, son of the late Uyghur nationalist Yusuf Isa Alptekin). To date, no one figure has managed to gain the unanimous support and recognition of the Uyghur population in the way that certain novelists and singer-songwriters have. There is lately a popular saying among young Tibetans which goes: 'We have the leader, but we lack the people. The Uyghurs have the people, and yet they lack the leader. Many intellectuals thus rest their hopes for the more effective mobilization of ethno-political ideologies on the young generation (Joanne Smith, 2000:207-08, 217-18). In fact, if P.R.C. policies succeed, ethnic minorities will eventually disappear as they are assimilated into the Han majority.

Uyghurs and Tibetans, because of their disadvantaged economic and social positions, are more likely to be marginalized during marketization. Under the old centrally planned economy, the Chinese state could still remedy this damage to ethnic minorities through redistributive and preferential policies that tended to support and subsidize vulnerable groups. However, a free market economic structure and its associated results such as privatization, decentralization, and deregulation reduce the state's micro-management capacity. This seems consistent with the underlying discourse of a market economy. Second, it is ironic that in these two regions the state's macro-management capacity usually remains strong compared with other regions. But

central and regional governments always set national security and political stability as the top priorities in dealing with Tibet and Xinjiang. So, from this perspective even economic growth and poverty reduction can be seen only as instrumental to maintaining stability and curbing separatist demands. The real goal of regional and local development, therefore, is secondary. Also, within the structured state bureaucracy and between central and regional governments, competing sectional and regional interests can determine governance priorities, which may not fully reflected into the local populations' concerns (Yuchao Zhu and dong Yan 732-733).

China has perpetually read the issue from the perspectives of territorial integrity and national security. Relying on police measures rather than paying attention to the community's social and economic demands, launching propaganda campaigns for the indivisible unity of the country rather than addressing identity issues and identifying the Uyghur problem with fundamentalism and terrorism rather than as an issue in regards to the religious freedom have.

The increasing pressures led to the social explosions, underground networking and acts of violence pointed that the taboo about XUAR in the Chinese security structure and iron-fist approach of the local bureaucracy prevented China from shifting its paradigm and addressing the problem in a more civil and solution-oriented manner. The Chinese state must implement specific policies in dealing with distinctive ethnic minority regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet. More precisely, the government needs to remedy social exclusion problems by implementing more specifically targeted redistributive policies and intervening more actively to the management of marketization through locally oriented employment policies in minority area especially in Xinjiang. Only by doing this can officials support and empower local populations and can promote sustainable development in China's periphery. The key factor is realizing that the overall impact of market-oriented economic expansion that is largely unfavorable to ethnic minorities facing the daunting challenge of bettering their social and economic conditions while striving to maintain their autonomy and identity.

For a Chinese state seeking a complete remedy for ethnic problems through economic growth both market-driven integration and forced assimilation can be futile. Ethnic diversity will not disappear, and ethnic relations will become even more complex and interdependent under the current conditions of economic and social change. If not dealt with appropriately, increasing social exclusion will continue to occur in China's periphery, especially in Xinjiang and other

conflicted minority's areas. This would be truly detrimental to China's goal of building a harmonious society and ensuring sustainable development in its periphery.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

Going through the foregoing chapters it appears that the failure of the Chinese Central government to address the grievances of the Uyghurs about widespread violation of their socio-economic and cultural rights has been the major source of ethnic tensions in the Xinjiang region. This rising ethnic tensions are also attributed to the Chinese minority policy, which during Mao Tse Tung's rule did not gel with the ambitions and aspirations of the minorities, especially Uyghurs. The young communist cadres targeted minorities in the western part of the country during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Not only the transfer of Han people to the region, but also deprivation of the basic freedoms of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang became the cause of anger. This became even worse during the period of 1956 to 1967, when minorities lost all freedoms including cultural and religious freedoms. Uyghurs were the most vocal amongst the minorities who took up cudgels against the minority policy of the Central government.

After China became a republic in 1949, there were a number of challenges, both domestic and external, before the new government under Mao Tse Tung. The major challenge before Mao and his team was nation building in a country where a substantial number of minorities live in. There was a need of specific policy towards national minorities and Mao did that. He realized the gravity of the situation in this new republic being aggravated by external forces such as USA and Russia and deeply thought that if internal issues were in order, it would be difficult for outside forces to put China into trouble. To keep the house in order, Mao and his team understood the importance of ethnic minority groups, who, they thought, could be persuaded by outside forces to take up cudgels against China. So, in order to keep the ethnic minority groups in good humour as well as to keep his promises made to national minorities during famous Long March, Mao devised well thought-out policies towards the ethnic minorities. Mao offered pro-minority policies in the first few years of his rule. Many factors, both internal and external, were responsible for change in CCP's policies towards ethnic minorities in the later years, especially during Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. The radical policies during these periods brought dissent and discontent among national minorities. This was ironically felt by the next set of leadership that begun with Deng Xiaoping, who could be able to imagine the challenges to economic development under the liberalization process launched in the late 1970s without taking

minorities into confidence. After 1949, tensions with political, religious and ethnic overtones appeared. The ethnic minority nationalities orchestrated protest against Chinese efforts to consolidate their rule in Xinjiang and the policy of Han immigration. Between 1957 and 1981, there were nineteen revolts and 194 cases of separatist activities in Xinjiang. And the post-Cold War period witnessed many violent incidents in the region taking different hue and colour from time to time.

After the great disaster of Cultural Revolution, Chinese authority started development policies and programmes in Xinjiang. In order to spread the integrationist approach into the ethnic minorities, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted mostly soft approach during reformist period, which started under the able leadership of Deng Xiaoping and a host of others like Hu Yaobang, Jiang Zemin and Hu Zintao. It was characterized by relative tolerance towards the religious practices, and customs and traditions of Muslim minorities and encouragement of institutionalized Islamic studies and culture through construction of mosques and madrasas. These constructions were controlled by the Chinese Islamic Association, a regional body of CCP, to uplift the minority's culture, education and bring political stability inside Xinjiang. But at the latter half of reformist period CCP adopted some hard policies, those were continued in 1990s onwards. When state came to realize Islam as a threat for the regional integrity in China especially in Xinjiang, then it started campaign against the Muslim literature, construction of mosques, reeducation and reform of Muslim cadres. January 1990 marked off the closing down of all Quranic schools, exclusively attended by Uyghur and Kazakh students by the Chinese government in Xinjiang cities. Strike Hard campaign was such a hard policy that has had a significant impact on minorities in Xinjiang. While conducting field trip to China, this researcher has found that Communist regime of China had violated human rights of both ethnic minority groups and the Han during the time of Chinese Cultural Revolution. However, after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Government denounced the abuses of the past and announced reforms including a more liberal human rights policy, but, it is also important to note that the Chinese government continuously published reports that emphasized their progress on human rights and criticized the negative reports that were politically motivated by the enemies. These reports also emphasized that many non-governmental sources often report only the most horrific and sensational cases which describe an incomplete and misleading picture of reality to the world.

In comparison to the minority policies of the Mao era, the reformist policies undertaken by Deng Xiaoping and his predecessors were better, but could not live up to the expectation, hopes and aspirations of national minorities, especially Uyghurs. If watched closely, it could be found that during the first decade or so of reformist policy (1976-1990), a lot of benefits were offered to the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. However, it did not stop them to continue their demands for a separate homeland that to through armed rebellions or violent separatism. It is perhaps the failure of the Chinese Central government or the inspiration the ambitious Uyghur cadres got from outside sources to take up cudgels against the Chinese state. Hence, the period from 1990 to 1997 saw a series of bloodiest attacks in Xinjiang. Even on the funeral day of Deng Xiaoping, there were serial blasts in Urumqi. Amidst this sorry state of affairs, it was but natural for the Chinese Central government to change their pro-minority stance and bring about a more stringent option to deal with rebel Uyghur cadres. And thus reappeared the Strike Hard Maximum Pressure campaign, an out and out military crackdown against all anti-Chinese forces, including the Uyghurs.

China launched Strike Hard as a domestic campaign to wipe out criminal activities from Chinese society. Strike Hard campaign took different shapes in different times. But in case of Xinjiang it was used against the demand of greater autonomy or separatist movement which China called “splittist activities”. At the latter half of reformist period CCP adopted some more hard policies that continued in 1990s onwards. In fact, some important factors insisted CCP to re-launch its Strike-Hard campaign in 1996. This included the barren uprising in April 1990 that followed a series of violent separatist attacks on Chinese interests in Xinjiang as well as in other parts of China and prompted the Chinese authority to begin this campaign. Therefore, in March 1996, National People’s Congress adopted this law with more stringent measures. Severe and speedy punishments constituted the two basic objectives of this campaign. The legislation also allowed the provincial High Court to approve death sentences or lifetime imprisonment. Although it was a successful campaign according to Chinese authorities, China was criticized for the violation of human rights especially in Xinjiang and Tibet. It seems that China has adopted the “carrot and stick” approach in maintaining stability which has had tremendous impact on the socio-political conditions in Xinjiang. The CCP adopted the “carrot” approach by granting some freedom to the Uyghur such as the right to worship and use their language as well as some preferential policies like employment in government departments. The “stick” or coercive

approach was used when the CCP was confronted by the separatist groups demanding an independent state out of China. China is even willing to take a hard-line approach in order to defend its national unity and security. It has also intended to send a message to the international community that it will never give up its sovereignty over any of its provinces, including Xinjiang.

During the period of this study, i.e., 1996 to 2001, it has been found that there was a difference of state perception regarding the internal threat as well as external between the first half of reformist period and its later half onwards. CCP suspected external support is provoking ethnic separatism in Xinjiang. Although there was limited evidence regarding this matter, a number of external incidents in Russia, Afghanistan and Central Asia reinforced the state fear and Strike-Hard was considered to be a forceful tool to win the fear of Chinese authority. It was also related with economic development strategies and immigration of Hans in Xinjiang. Strike-Hard was used to limit influence of Islam on ethnic minorities especially for Uyghur's in Xinjiang.

In the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks, China was perhaps one of the first countries that supported wholeheartedly the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan by the USA and her allies. In this process, China accelerated its Strike Hard campaign with special force in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In the past few years before 2001, violence in Xinjiang, particularly terrorist violence, has reached unprecedented levels. Xinjiang's separatist attacks have become increasingly sophisticated and increasingly tied to Islam. China's Strike Hard campaign is certainly not the only factor contributing to the uptick in Uyghur radicalism and the development of a robust terrorist movement in Xinjiang, but its central role in that metamorphosis, particularly by means of its crackdown on Uyghur religious freedom, is difficult to deny. Instead of quelling Xinjiang's separatists, China's Strike Hard campaign unwittingly seems to have fertilized a cohesive separatist movement-a movement that is increasingly embracing violence and terrorist activity, as witnessed in the lead-up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing and many other attacks later on.

However, China's Strike Hard campaign came under the observation of International human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch Dog. In addition, Amnesty International raised serious concerns over the nature of legislation and its impact on the general

human beings and their rights, particularly of the people of Xinjiang. Human rights groups were concerned that this new campaign would enlarge the scope of death penalty and suppress freedom of expression of the ethnic minorities and started publishing material on the poor treatment of ethnic minorities by the Chinese authorities. The question rose to the international community that whether China is victimizing the Muslim minority in Xinjiang or Beijing itself is a victim of Uyghur separatist activities.

In the meantime, China had become very active to get the support of Central Asian countries and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was used in this respect. SCO is a regional security body composed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and under pressure from Beijing, these countries effectively silenced regarding the Uyghur's demand and supported China's hard policies to suppress their demand. What China also did was that in order to restructure Xinjiang, the central authority brought different developmental projects in Xinjiang but it was alleged that this process increased segregation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

Furthermore, September 9/11, 2001 attack on New York and Washington dramatically changed on the scope and implication of "Strike-Hard" campaign in Muslim minority's areas. Among the first few, China supported U.S. strategy of "War against Terror" in Afghanistan. These once again broadened the opportunity to reinforce China's Strike-Hard campaign in Xinjiang. It gave opportunity to strong Chinese demand of terrorism on its own soil and started to label those as terrorists who were fighting for the demand of greater autonomy as well as separate state in Xinjiang. On August 2002, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement was added into U.S. list of terrorist group. It was a big achievement for China to strengthen its Strike Hard campaign in Xinjiang. Beijing wanted to take advantages from this new bilateral relation to clean its territory from anti-governmental movements.

For any nation state operating under the constraints of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural polity needs to accommodate the wishes and demands of its minority population and should address the core issues, which thwart the progress to a sustainable development of a society. Similarly, the international community should not target Chinese endeavour to protect and restore unity and territorial integrity of its own nation. Though it cannot be overlooked that China's Strike-Hard like hard policy had a key link between the geographic template of Xinjiang

and Chinese policies towards its minorities especially in Xinjiang and CCP's integrationist approach towards this region. Further, for a state like China seeking a complete remedy for ethnic problems through economic growth both market-driven integration and forced assimilation can be futile. Ethnic diversity will not disappear, and ethnic relations will become even more complex and interdependent under the current conditions of economic and social change. If not dealt with appropriately, increasing social exclusion will continue to occur in China's periphery, especially in Xinjiang and other conflicted minority's areas. This would be truly detrimental to China's goal of building a harmonious society and ensuring sustainable development in its periphery. Thus it can be concluded that separatist movement in China do not have sufficient strength as well as external support to put pressure on Chinese government for separate homeland and China has given appreciable efforts at the domestic as well as international level to check extremism, separatism and terrorism. This argument, thus, symbolizes the success of domestic military strategy like Strike-Hard. On its part China tolerates no international interference to its internal affairs in Xinjiang.

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