


CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS IN PAKISTAN, 1973-2008

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
For award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2017




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
DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "**CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN PAKISTAN, 1973-2008**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any degree of this university or any other university.


SHRADDHA RISHI

CERTIFICATE

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


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Acknowledgements

It's been a long and memorable journey all these 7 years. I remember each of the phases of writing this thesis, sometimes running short of ideas; to getting extremely panicking to meet up deadlines for submission; to spend sleepless nights for editing and formatting; to avoid family and friends sometimes due to mountainous pressure to finish work. And today I feel empty as if all my emotions solidifying inside me for long has taken a sigh of relief, yet it fills my heart with contentment and pleasure as I can see my own work finishes, I can hold my creative piece of work finally in its complete form and shape.

However, my continuous efforts would not have seen its wonderful outcome today without the support, supervision, love, care, and the presence of those loved ones who not only helped me shaping my dream project but also supported me throughout with their unconditional love and care. Besides, there are memories of amazing people, places which I came across and have remarkable influence throughout this journey. The memories of days and weeks and months where I had spent sleepless nights and those moments where body and mind diverged from each other with series of unproductive tensions and nights. Although not everything can be recalled to be acknowledged at this moment, but some people and some places deserve the most attention.

I owe my successful completion of this Thesis, first to the most kind hearted soul and a great supervisor Prof. Savita Pande, who has always been there as a constant support and inspiration. With her

knowledge and wisdom she molded my thoughts and ideas and helped substantiate my thesis. When at times I was facing low tides of my life, her constant faith helped me sailing through adverse situation and retain strength again. She always inspired me to enjoy this solitary act of academic writing. Besides being a supervisor, she was an awesome individual with so much compassion and understanding for all her students, and I was blessed to shine under her light of guidance. Thank you Ma'am, for believing in me and for all your support and inspiration. This work would not have claim for its academic existence without you.

I am grateful to Mr. Syed ul Hasan Bokhari, Joint Secretary, Central Government of Pakistan who spared time from his hectic schedule to interact with me giving me in depth understanding of the practical aspects of the working of bureaucracy. I would also like to extend my special thanks to Prof. Moonis Ahmar, Prof. Ilhan Niaz, Professor Moonis Ahmar, Mr. Saeed Shafqat, Mr. Saeed Nawaz, Mr. Khadim Hussain Mirani and Mr. Imran Khan for their kind and generous support in shaping my knowledge on various issues of Pakistan's bureaucracy. I am thankful to all the staff of the library of Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis, Nehru Memorial Library, Teen Murti Bhavan and Sapru House Library for their logistic and library support. I will never forget the timeless support and facility that the central library of JNU provides me. I think the library has been the temple of my journey where I would come everyday to worship my work. JNU library and its staff are so friendly and supportive that students always felt it home. JNU library is my second home.

While extending my warm regard for the academic community, a part of me also knows that I owe a great deal of success for completion of this research to my family and loved ones, who stood by me in thick and thin times with their unflinching support, care, affection and love for me. I thank my entire family- my mother, my Brother Swapnil, Bhabhi Neha, my mother in law and father in law, Bade Bhaiyya, Sangeeta didi, Archana didi, Appu didi, Santosh Jijaji and Rakesh Jijaji for all your endless love, care and faith in me. I like to thank from the core of my heart to my adorable friend Archana for giving me so much love, care and timely help for structuring and formatting my research. There are some friends/some happy souls who always stay apart yet remain timeless and evergreen and make life beautiful and joyous just by their presence in life.

Last but not least, what could I say more for you Ajay, my husband- the lighthouse in my life. My words would never be enough to define you and your love and support for me. I just want to say that you are the reason for my consistency and success. Thank you for walking with me in this wonderful journey and tolerating my temperament and mood swings during the last phases of writing with your bright smile and compassion. I wouldn't be even writing this if it weren't for your help and support at the beginning of this process and your enduring friendship all this time. I have spent best of my memories with you and would like to spend more memories and get more of your smile and laughter and more of your intellectual exploration and adventure. Thank you Ajay.

Finally, I want to thank that one last person who is just there with all her unconditional love waiting for me to come home. You were my reason for my life, my dream—still is, and will always be: you are always with me 'Maa'.

Shraddha

India 2017

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMT	Army Monitoring Team
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan
DCO	District Coordination Officer
DMG	District Management Group
ED	Establishment Division
FAC	Food and Agricultural Commission
FPSC	Federal Public Service Commission
GAR	General Administrative Researve
ICPCR	International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights	
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICS	Indian Civil Service
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
LGP	Local Government Plan
LRP	Lateral Recruitment Programme
OSD	Officers on Special Duty
MQM	Mohazir Qaumi Movement
NCGR	National Commission for Government Reforms
NWFP	North-Western Frontier Province
PB	Placement Bureau
PLS	Profit and Loss Sharing
PML(N)	Pakistan Muslim Legue (Nawaz)
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPP	People's Party of Pakistan
PSP	Police Service of Pakistan

TAG	Tribal Areas Group
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The term “bureaucracy” was first used by Gaurney, Vincent de when he used the term “bureaumania” to criticize the government that existed in the first half century in France. The term was also used by Mill, J.S., Michels, Robert and Marx, Karl. Although, it has existed in various forms in earlier period in different countries of the world, the evolution of bureaucracy has been significant in some countries like China and India.

As a concept, bureaucracy was developed for the first time by a German sociologist Max Weber in early 1900s. He conceptualised the features of legal-rational bureaucracy and the features of the officials who form very important component of the bureaucracy. According to him a bureaucratic organization entails: (1) Division of labour (2) hierarchy of authority (3) formality or a formal rule (4) impersonality and; (5) career service. For Weber, bureaucracy has a positive meaning. He calls it an ideal type of organization. His concept of bureaucracy provided theoretical background for further studies.

It, generally, refers to the administration by officials or civil servants with their particular activities, hierarchical structure and regularised code of rules. It is a particular type of organisation where the officials work without any compassion or empathy. However, more often than not, it is taken as disrepute particularly due to its cumbersome and red tape functioning and insensitivity.

Although the structure of ancient bureaucracy evolved and grew in the countries like India and China, bureaucracy, as a concept has been studied through western countries perspective and it is much alien to non-western third world countries. The administrative structure adopted in third world countries was merely the continuation of that of their colonial powers. The need to have a bureaucratic

structure according to the indigenous needs of the society was not recognised in these countries. Thus the structure and the working of bureaucracy have been dysfunctional and unable to deliver the public goods and aspirations in developing countries.

In Pakistan, the British structure of bureaucracy was retained without bringing any substantial and organic changes. The evolution of civil service reforms in Pakistan has various dimensions: a part of them constitutes various committees and commissions, recommendations of which were partially implemented or remained unimplemented, the other part composed of the reports which were suppressed and barred to publish as their recommendations were against the ruling regime, the rest of them includes those attempts which were taken to manipulate the civil service in order to harness political benefits for the ruling government. The most important factor which worked behind the restructuring of bureaucracy in Pakistan was regime survival and political legitimacy. Although civil service of Pakistan remained the target of every ruling regime whether civilian or military, it was during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, that the civil service of Pakistan saw radical restructuring, called as 1973 reforms. The other drastic reforms were undertaken during the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf which was the part of his Local Government Plan 2000. The proposed study focuses on a comparative study of these two reform periods and to analyse the impact of these reforms on bureaucracy.

The political and economic situation after independence did not allow Pakistan to entirely restructure its civil service and the colonial administrative structure prevailed. Apart from that a group of fifty British ICS officers was recruited in order to fulfil staff shortage. Thus influence of colonial structure of bureaucracy was dominant on the civil service of Pakistan. The ICS which was regrouped and renamed as Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), was the core of the civil service

structure of Pakistan and total administrative power was centralised in the hands of these few officers. It was criticised for its elitist character and for the undue advantage which generalist services received by subordinating specialist and technical service. The CSP occupied such an important position within the structure that it was able to prevent all administrative reforms that threatened its special status. The 1973 reforms during Bhutto tried to address this problem to some extent. He made various structural changes in the civil service in order to correct the power imbalance within the bureaucracy of Pakistan. His lateral entry scheme was introduced to curb the influence of generalists over bureaucracy and to bring forward specialist in the administration. The pay scales were also reformed bringing more equity and reducing disparities. Although 1973 reforms brought substantial structural changes, the need of human resource management to bring organic changes did not receive much importance. On the other hand, most of his reforms were undone by General Zia Ul-Haq. In his period, the institutionalisation of militarisation of bureaucracy took place which harmed to the professional ethos of bureaucracy. The secular character of bureaucracy was degraded in his period and it was re-framed on ideological basis through measures like uniform civil code and enforced prayers breaks during office hours.

The military rule of General Musharraf is worth mentioning as far as civil service reforms are concerned. The Local Government Plan (LGP) during General Pervez Musharraf focused mainly on the local level of bureaucracy as its stated goal was to restructure the bureaucracy to decentralise the administrative authority. His LGP included following provisions:

- The district administration which was formerly headed by District Commissioner was now replaced by District Coordinator Officer (DCO).
- The role of district commissioner as district collector and district magistrate was reduced to the district coordinator.

- The DCO was made accountable to indirectly elected district *Nazim* instead of provincial bureaucracy to which he used to report till now.
- The judicial power of the DCO was given to district level judiciary and the revenue collection power to the district *Nazim*.
- Also the district level police officer who till now was accountable to the district Commissioner was now made accountable to the district elected *Nazim*.

The approach behind restructuring of bureaucracy during Musharraf seems to be merely piecemeal as it focused only at the district level without giving importance to the devolution of power from central to provincial level. The commonality between the civil service reforms during these two periods i.e. 1973-1979 and 1999-2008 was that the underlying objective stated in both regimes was to end the centralisation and devolve power to the local level. This was done through the provision of lateral entry scheme during Bhutto and through the indirectly elected *Nazim* during Pervez Musharraf. However the difference was that while Bhutto focused on the Central Superior Services in order to break the centralisation of power in the bureaucracy, the focus of LGP under Musharraf was the district level bureaucracy. Also as the military rule of Musharraf was different from the civilian rule of Bhutto, the civil service of Pakistan saw extensive militarisation during Musharraf's regime. The political intervention in civil service during Bhutto took place in the form of lateral recruitment, however during Musharraf it was the supervision of bureaucracy by Army Monitoring Teams which promoted militarisation of bureaucracy. It is a matter of research that to what extent these reforms attempts succeeded in achieving their stated objectives. The study attempts to understand the power imbalance between civilian and military bureaucracy on one hand and weak and underdeveloped political representative institutions on the other. It aims to find out whether the various structural changes in the civil service of Pakistan

were sufficient for its dynamic transformation and improvement in the administration. The research is focused to study these reforms in the light of importance of organic changes in bureaucracy as a complement of the structural changes.

Review of Literature

The concept of bureaucracy

There are mainly two perspectives prevalent among the scholars of bureaucracy: bureaucracy as a sign of inefficiency in an organisation and bureaucracy as a form of efficient organisation. There are basically three paradigms related to the concept of bureaucracy- the Marxist, the Weberian and the elitist theory of Mosca and Robert Michels. There is a broad range of literature available on the concept of Bureaucracy. However, it does not provide a consensus on the definition of bureaucracy.

Albrow, Martin in his book "*Bureaucracy*" has given a historical analysis of how the concept of bureaucracy developed. He also throws light on the current debates revolving around post Weberian critiques of bureaucracy. He has identified following seven concepts of bureaucracy: as a rational organisation, as organisational inefficiency, as rule by officials as public administration, as administration by officials, as the organisation and as modern society. According to Albrow, Max Weber's concept of bureaucracy serves as the pivot for past and present bureaucratic concepts. In short, Martin Albrow has presented a compiled study of all complex and contradictory concepts of bureaucracy, however it is more descriptive than analytical. He has also failed to recognise the important contribution by Karl Marx in the development of bureaucratic concept.

Nicos, Mouzelis P. in his book "*Organisation and Bureaucracy*" presents bureaucracy as an approach to organisation. While describing the theory of

bureaucracy he deals with two streams, namely classical writings and post Weberian writings. In the context of the former, he talks about Marx, Weber and Michels. According to him, classical view of bureaucracy had mainly historical and humanistic perspective and it dealt with power, alienation, and individual freedom that confronted with our organisational society. He criticises post Weberian writers for being myopic and ignoring the broader aspects of bureaucracy raised by classical writers. However Mouzelis has been less analytical in his description of a broad range of theories. He has also not integrated this broad range of theories in his analytical framework.

Post Weberian Critiques of Bureaucracy

Weberian model of bureaucracy has remained the subject of criticism among the post Weberian scholars. Merton, Robert K. was among the first sociologist to point out the other face of bureaucratic picture. In his book *“Bureaucratic Structure and Personality”*, he expressed the view that too much emphasis on precision, reliability and rules may be self-defeating. Graded career structure may encourage the bureaucrats to develop a group solidarity, which may oppose any structural changes and reforms in the bureaucracy.

Similar argument has been presented by Selznik, Philip in his article *“An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy”* He felt that the purpose or objectives of the organisation get defeated if the sub-units set up individual goals for themselves and function contrary to the goals of the broader organisational or administrative structure. Both Merton and Selznik criticise Weber for neglecting humane characteristics of bureaucracy as the interest, prejudices and fears of bureaucrats will influence their functioning as they are members of other self interest groups also.

Strauss, E. in his book *“The Ruling Servant”* has criticised Weberian bureaucracy for being ambiguous and incomplete as he says that “Max Weber’s rudimentary theory has exerted a strong influence on the American literature on the subject, and his terminology has, therefore, been accepted by a number of other writers, frequently with confusing results”. He says that Weber’s sketch of the nature of large scale administration and its methods, which he categorically describes as “bureaucratic”, is a compact and highly suggestive outline of the whole subject.

Weberian model of bureaucracy and developing countries

The Weberian model of bureaucracy does not explain the case of developing countries. After the World War II, the bureaucratic model has been closely examined from the point of view of the organisational needs of developing countries by various scholars. Bhattacharya, Mohit in his book *“Bureaucracy and Development Administration”* argues dysfunctionalities of bureaucracy. He has comprehensively presented the conceptual debates around developmental administration and bureaucracy on one hand and some practical issues on the other. Thus the behavioural and post-behavioural scholars have questioned the role of bureaucracy for not achieving the developmental goals. It has started a debate for the transformation of bureaucracy into developmental bureaucracy or developmental administration.

Friedman, Harry J. in his article *“Elements of Development Administration”* argues the need of development administration. For him colonialism and tradition- the two elements comprise the setting within which the development administration is needed. He admits that there is a need for development administration in Pakistan for the speedy transition from colonial period. However, the arguments of the writer are obsolete in the current context. Pakistan has traveled 60 years of its independence; the talk of the transition from colonial period will not help, given the various problems with which the bureaucracy of Pakistan is suffering.

Bureaucracy in Pakistan

As far as bureaucracy in Pakistan is concerned, one of its most dominant features is its *colonial inheritance*. The problem of this colonial feature has been argued by Haque, M. Shamsul in his article “*Incongruity between Bureaucracy and Society in Developing Nations: A Critique*”. According to him the over-developed bureaucratic apparatus inherited as a colonial legacy expanded through imitative post colonial reforms while political, economic and cultural realms remain largely undeveloped is the main cause of fissure between administration and society in developing countries. However, Haque has limited himself in merely criticising the foreign influence over the administrative structure of developing countries without giving any alternative to these newly independent nations.

Braibanti, Ralph has widely discussed the role of imperial influence on the bureaucracy of Pakistan in his book “*Research on the Bureaucracy in Pakistan*”. According to him the British legacy of bureaucracy in Pakistan was strengthened by the foreign influence in the form of British officers who were hired on contracts to deal with the shortage of staff in the country after independence. According to him even the administrative reforms were influenced by the British. The book of Braibanti is the most comprehensive study of civil service of Pakistan after independence, however it does not provide an up to dated information on the subject and current problems of Pakistan’s bureaucracy.

Islam, Nasir in his article “*Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform and Politics: Pakistan 1947-1987*” calls Pakistani state as “an administrative state” or “a bureaucratic polity” due to extra ordinary role played from the part of military and civilian bureaucrats. He has also asserted that the persistent colonial legacy, the fragmentation of political power, and the absence of effective political institutions have prevented the implementation of global administrative reforms in Pakistan. According to him after independence reforming the bureaucracy was left as an

unimportant issue in the face of major internal crisis. He counts it as a major factor in the failure of reform attempts.

Ziring, Lawrence in his article "*The Pakistan Bureaucracy: Two Views*" has referred to the period of 1951-1958 as the politics of crisis, instability, lack of consensus among politicians to produce constitution for the country, and a deteriorating law and order situation made it impossible for governments to give attention to fundamental administrative reforms. Ziring fails to denote that it was the political expediency in the initial period which left the law and order worsening and thus failing reforms of civil service.

Burki, Shahid Javed in his article "*Twenty Years of Civil Service of Pakistan: A Re-evaluation*" maintains that the initial leadership crisis left a power vacuum which was willingly filled by the bureaucracy-particularly the Civil Service of Pakistan. Thus post-colonial Pakistan developed into an administrative state where bureaucracy instead of being a class instrument became relatively autonomous. Burki's analysis of the dominance of civil service in the initial period is incomplete without bringing the role of military into the picture.

It is apparent that the initial period after independence has been given importance as a factor in the bureaucratic reforms. All the scholars have admitted that the initial period of crisis left the bureaucratic reforms as an unimportant issue; for other political crisis left a vacuum in the country which was filled willingly by over-arching presence of bureaucracy.

Structure of the bureaucracy in Pakistan

As far as *the structure of the bureaucracy in Pakistan* is concerned, Chaudhary, Muzaffer Ahmad in his article "*The Organisation and Composition of Central Civil Service in Pakistan*" finds that until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's bureaucratic

reforms, Pakistan's civil service was divided horizontally into three main categories: (a) generalist administrative services such as the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP); (b) functional services like audit and accounts, income tax, customs and central excise; and (c) the specialist services such as health, engineering, survey, etc. Vertically they were divided into four classes- Class I- appointed by the President; Class II- appointed by the secretary of the department, Class III- appointed by deputy secretary and, Class IV- appointed by still lower authority. The author defends the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy saying that "some kind of hierarchical organisation is unavoidable." He has effectively described the structure of bureaucracy, however, his criteria is rather descriptive and less analytical. He has omitted to notice the dominant position of CSP among the hierarchy of civil service.

Egger, Rowland A. in his article "*Ministerial and Departmental Organisation and Management in the Government of Pakistan*" has analysed the bureaucracy in Pakistan in terms of coordination, supervision and communication problems. He says that the administrative units under different ministries are a combination of various unrelated functions; he suggests for a complete reorganisation of central secretariat on functional basis. He does not believe in once for all restructuring but suggests for continuous study of administrative structure for achieving efficiency and economy. However, he refrains from bringing organic changes and to strengthen human resource management in order to succeed the structural reforms in the administration.

As far as pay structure of civil servants is concerned, Ashraf, Mohammad, member of National Reconstruction bureau has summed up the recommendations of Justice Munir Commission and A R Cornelius Commission in his article, "Pay Structure of Public Employees of Pakistan." He also gives the description of pay structure reform during 1973, 1976, 1981, 2002 and 2006. He finds the implementation of

Pay structure reform in 1973 as inefficient and inadequate mainly due problems maintenance of hierarchy and overlapping of scales. According to him, there have been wide disparities in the civil service which leads to the division of employees in haves and have-nots, the decrease of real value of the income is incompatible with the economic growth and inflation. However his description of pay reforms is very brief and while criticising the implementation, Asharaf does not come up with adequate alternatives for effective reforms in pay structure.

Bilqees, Faiz in his PIDE Working Paper “Civil Servants Salary Structure” discuss the civil service pay structure in a broad and comprehensive manner. He identifies various anomalies in the allowance structure and recommends for major overhaul of the existing structure of salaries and perks to make the public sector employment competitive and cost-effective. His recommendations for the pay reforms are less workable and exaggerating.

Previous reforms of civil service of Pakistan

There has been immense literature available on the civil service reforms in Pakistan. Braibanti, Ralph in his book, “*Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*” has presented a comprehensive description of bureaucratic reforms during the earlier period after independence. The depiction is very descriptive, duplicating and ambiguous. Also it is limited by updated information about the subject. Nasir Islam in his article “*Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform and Politics: Pakistan 1947-1987*” shows that bureaucracy has not been favourable to the recommendations, one of the main causes of failure of reforms. Eggers recommendations challenged the privileged position of the CSP; therefore it was suppressed by the administration. However he is less critical of the reforms committees headed by foreign officials which did not give sufficient attention to the indigenous needs of the country and forwarded merely the replication of western model of bureaucracy for Pakistan.

Gorvine, Albert in his article *“Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change”* asserts that both Egger and Gladieux did not give sufficient attention to the existing culture and institutions in making their recommendations. Shafqat, Saeed in his article, *“Pakistani Bureaucracy: Crisis of Government and Prospects of Reform”* finds that the basic democracies and Rural Development Programme enormously increased the power, privilege and prestige of CSP cadre officers, who served in these districts.

Kennedy’s article *“Prestige of Service and Bhutto’s Administrative Reforms in Pakistan”* revolves around 1973 reforms. He has presented an empirical study on the radical reforms conducted by Bhutto. He concludes that the CSP was a main target of administrative reforms of 1973, and all the cadres of bureaucracy in Pakistan has seen decline in 1984, it is more egalitarian than pre-reform period. However he has failed to notice that the prestige of CSP has shifted to the newly emerged DMG during Zia ul-Haq regime.

Jones, Garth N. in his article *“Pakistan: A Civil Service in an Obsolescing Imperial Tradition”* has examined the prestige of CSP in the wake of Zia Ul-Haq’s reversal of Bhutto’s reforms. He finds that Bhutto with his leftist leaning tried to change the administrative structure to serve his own political designs but his political acts proved futile and the upper strata of bureaucracy shifted from CSP to newly constructed District Management Group (DMG). He concludes that in many ways, the 1973 reforms represented only “a change in nomenclature.” However his explanation is not clear and coherent and sometimes the language becomes vague.

Khan, Muhammad Iqbal in his thesis, *“Administrative Reforms in Pakistan”* and in his paper *“Pakistan’s Initiatives for Administrative Reforms and the Impediments”* discuss various attempts for reforming the administrative system. For him the Constitution of 1973 was a new era of development in the field of civil service

reforms. However he is less critical in his description of administrative reforms and also does not identify the importance of Local Government Plan 2000 in the era of Musharraf for the civil service of Pakistan.

The nexus between civilian and military bureaucracy was strengthened and institutionalised during General Zia-ul-Haq regime. According to Wilder, Andrew while Zia-ul-Haq did reverse some of Bhutto's reforms, such as lateral entry of civilian bureaucrats, he offset this by increasing the lateral entry of military officers into civilian bureaucracy. Zia-ul-Haq also ensured that the civilian bureaucracy did not regain its preeminent position in policy making by deliberately failing to restore the powerful CSP cadre. The net effect was not to decrease the influence of politicians over the bureaucracy, but to increase the influence of the military.

A lot of concerns have been there among scholars and policy makers about the need to reform the bureaucracy in Pakistan. Shafqat, Saeed in his article "*Pakistani Bureaucracy: Crisis of Government and Prospects of Reform*" describes the importance of civil service reforms. Quoting Osborne and Bachler he says, there is a need to redesign the "DNA" of bureaucracy. He feels that the lack of collaboration between elected official and the civil servant was the main factor for the civil service reforms not succeeding. Similarly, Jones finds that "Most of the regimes have pursued purges and reforms as policy instruments to change the behaviour of civil servant and expand their own political control." These purges and reforms shook the confidence of the civil servants, led to politicisation and to a certain degree encouraged an environment where financial corruption and misuse of authority proportionally increased. However, the literature so far has not focused the need to engage the common people and to strengthen civil society as pre-condition to make administrative reforms more effective.

According to Cyan, Musharraf Rasool the author of the article "*Main Issues for Setting the Civil Service Reform Agenda*" the over-simplification of the complex nature of civil service reforms is the main factor behind their failure. According to him, a meaningful reform demands sector specific actions. He has stressed the need of local civil service reform built on the principle of decentralisation to sustain the results of bureaucratic reforms. However he has not discussed how previously, the strategy of decentralisation has been misused for political benefits by almost every ruler in the country. He has also not noticed that reforms ultimately should be in integration and while dealing at various levels also require better coordination among them in order to escape from repetition and to make them easier and effective.

Wilder, Andrew in his article, "*The Politics of Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan*" denotes that the power imbalance between the very strong bureaucratic institutions that Pakistan inherited from colonial India and the very weak representative and democratic institutions has been one of the greatest causes of political instability in Pakistan since its independence. Wilder has voiced the concerns of a common US citizen when he says that the US aid for development can be utilized best only in the wake of civil service reforms, however he has merely a one sided view on the administrative grievances and shunned from noticing various other problems of administration like militarisation, politicisation and inefficiency of the bureaucracy.

Although there has been vast literature on the civil service reforms in Pakistan, only a few has focused on the need of human resource development for the success of civil service restructuring and reforms. Like Khan, M I admits the importance of training in the efficiency of administration. Similarly, Cheema, Ali and Sayeed, Asad also accept that for the bureaucracy to be competent and pro-poor there is a need to develop a sense of accountability among the administrators.

Definition, Scope and Rationale of the Study

Carl J. Friederick defines bureaucracy as “a form of organization marked by hierarchy, specialization of roles and a high level of competence displayed by incumbents trained to feel these roles.”

In the words of Fritz Morstein Marks, “the type of organization called bureaucratic in this now widely used sense has several unmistakable characteristics. They include as principal factors hierarchy, jurisdiction, specialisation, professional training, fixed compensation and permanence.”

As a concept the term bureaucracy has been defined as an organisation having some certain features i.e. hierarchy of authority, specialisation of labour, fixed jurisdiction, professional training, impersonality and career service. For the purpose of this study civil service can be defined as a subset of the public service, a body of appointed officials which carry out the functions of government under the direction of political government. It is the core and permanent administrative arm of government. It is the agency of the government which takes public services to the common people at the lowest level.

An efficient civil service working for the welfare of people is the foundation of the government. In developing countries, the role of civil servants becomes more important in the face of instability of political system. Pakistan is often called “administrative state” or “bureaucratic polity” due to the important role of bureaucracy in the politics of the country. Being referred an important organ of the administrative machinery it is relevant to study its evolution, structure and role played in the administration of the country. It is also relevant to study the changes which have been brought during different regimes to improve the administration to make it dynamic and susceptible to the changing needs of the society. In Pakistan, civil service reforms have been the focus of every regime, however in the period of

Z. A. Bhutto and General Pervez Musharraf several radical changes were introduced in the structure of civil service. Present study aims to learn the civil service reforms in Pakistan comprehensively by comparing reforms during and between these two periods. Thus the scope of the study is limited from the period of Z. A. Bhutto (1973-1977) to the period of General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). The main objective behind comparing the two reforms is to understand the pros and cons of both the reforms and to sort out which steps can be useful in the context of present administrative scenario. The comparison has helped to understand the outcome of these reforms whether they succeeded in achieving the targets and if not what had been the factors which hampered the civil service reforms to succeed.

Objectives

1. Understand the structure of bureaucracy in Pakistan.
2. Comprehend the nature of civil service reforms in Pakistan while comparing those made during civilian and military regimes.

Research Questions

The present study examines the following questions:

- What are the salient features of bureaucracy and what are the current debates regarding the concept?
- What is the structure of bureaucracy in Pakistan? What is its role in policy making and administration of the country?
- What are the previous attempts that have been made for reforming bureaucracy? What are the steps undertaken during the civilian and military regimes.
- To compare the reforms attempts during these two regimes and to know how it has affected the civil service of Pakistan.

- What are the constraints in the way of reforming bureaucracy in Pakistan?

Hypotheses

- The civil service reforms in Pakistan are governed by the need of political legitimacy and regime survival than the necessity of administrative efficiency.
- The importance given to structural changes rather than organic changes is the main factor behind the failure of civil service reform in Pakistan.

Research Methods

The proposed work is based on analytical and empirical review of data collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources mainly comprise of the the interview and discussion undertaken through email. The study has followed deductive method. Various committees and commissions have been formed in Pakistan to recommend administrative reforms from time to time. There are also various studies, undertaken by World Bank, Asian Development Bank and International Crisis Group. Official literature available on the proposed study has also been analysed. Experts on Pakistan have also be interviewed on the subjects. All these sources have been studied and analysed in a scientific and empirical manner.

Sources of Data:

Primary Sources: Government reports of various committees and commissions, personal or phone interviews, letter or email.

Secondary Sources: Relevant and concerned books, articles in Journals, Reports of World Bank and other International Organisation, seminar papers, newspapers and magazines.

Chapters: The outlines of chapters are as follows:

- (1) ***Theoretical Background-*** This chapter deals with the conceptual background of bureaucracy, current debates and the structure of bureaucracy. It also deals with the structure, role and development of bureaucracy in third world countries. This chapter focuses on the structure and functioning of bureaucracy in Pakistan in the context of the need of civil service reforms. It also describes and analyses the attempts towards restructuring and reforming the civilian bureaucracy prior to 1973 in order to understand the background of civil service reforms in Pakistan.

- (2) ***Civil Service Reforms during Civilian regimes-*** While focusing on the civilian rule under Z A Bhutto (1973-77) and that of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto (1988-1999), this chapter mainly focuses on the attempts towards radically restructuring the civil service of Pakistan during Z A Bhutto and its impact on the civilian bureaucracy. It also studies the civil service of Pakistan during the decade of civilian rule under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. All this study has been driven by the objective to understand that how the civilian rule has affected the bureaucracy of Pakistan.

- (3) ***Civil Service Reform during Military Regimes-*** As the name suggests, this chapter deals with the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf. This chapter mainly aims to understand the impact of military regime on the civil service while studying the steps undertaken during these two military regimes. It largely focuses on Local Government Plan 2000 introduced by Pervez Musharraf, basically the provisions which were related to the restructuring of civilian bureaucracy.

(4) ***Comparison of Reform During Civilian Regimes and Military Regimes -***

After going through the civil service reforms during civilian and military, this chapter is devoted to analyse them while comparing the civilian and military regimes in terms of reforms in bureaucracy. While comparing the two, it analyses how the civilian and military regime has affected the bureaucracy of Pakistan.

(5) ***Conclusion-*** The last chapter is attempted to summarise the major findings towards administrative reforms in Pakistan. It also examines the previously formulated hypothesis that the theory of bureaucracy has confirmed or contradicted the structure and functioning of bureaucracy in Pakistan.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In today's world, the transformation of the state from a police state to a welfare one¹ has increased its activities manifold. This increased span of the state's role highlights the need for an efficient and well-oiled civil service. In a modern state, the civil service turns out to be an indispensable organisation of governance without which the state cannot imagine the performance of its duties towards its citizens (Shaw 1992: 387). It is not only a democratic form of government that finds the civil service organisation as an indispensable part of the political system but also it happens to be a lifeline of the administration even in most authoritarian regimes, ranging from the monarchical to the totalitarian. In every type of political system, the civil service exists in some form or the other and governs primarily because of its wide-reaching system of professionalised administration and the hierarchy of appointed officials, upon whom the society is thoroughly dependent (Dwivedi 1988: 1).

In a welfare state, the work and responsibilities of the organs of the government increase substantially in order to provide the benefits of social security components—health, education, employment, sanitation, etc.—to a number of people. In this state of affairs, being the main organ of the government, the role of the civil service in general and the administrative bureaucracy in particular increases manifold in terms of it being the engine of modernisation, inclusive growth and development. Being one of the core agencies of the government, the conventional wisdom and hierarchies of the bureaucracy need to be synergised as

¹ The concept of welfare state developed during the long struggle of socialist parties mainly western and Eastern Europe. The socialist parties opposed the concept of laissez faire state and demanded the Government a larger role to play in the health, education, infrastructure for the well being of the people. It was thought that these increased activities will help to decrease the inequalities, generated by capitalism. In a welfare state, the role of civil service not only enhanced but also demands transformation driven by development administration. It is more true about the developing countries.

per the changing demands of society. Moreover, the bureaucracy also has a crucial role to play in policy planning and formation of programmes. In the modern world, the responsibility of the bureaucracy in the modern world is growing as the achievement of a country's key development objectives depends upon the performance of a professional and accountable civil service (World Bank 1998: ii). It should therefore become more efficient and more responsive to the demands and opinion of the people as well as more reactive to the ideas of the elected policymakers (Raj 2014).

Today, when the world is faced with profound responsibilities to achieve targets under Sustainable Development Goals², to be implemented in the period of 2015 to 2030 (United Nations 2015), the civil service organisation cannot afford to remain confined in its conventional role of merely maintaining law and order. It needs to be efficient, effective, accountable, corruption-free and transparent for ensuring better public service delivery (Kardar 2014). The instruments for reforming the civil services have been in terms of data gathering and analysis, organisational restructuring, improving human resource management and training, enhancing pay and benefits while assuming sustainability under the overall fiscal constraints and strengthening measures for public participation, transparency and combating corruption (Rao 2013). The challenges in the way of reforming the civil service system have been many: political patronage, political will to reform, weak institutions, sustainability of reforms in terms of time and money and lack of coordination across different levels (UNU-Wider 2013).

² Sustainable Development Goals officially known as 'Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development' have been formulated by the United Nations. They have replaced the Millennium Development Goals, implemented during 2000-2015. It is a set of 17 aspirational global goals under 169 targets between them mainly focused upon poverty, education, sanitation, infrastructure, employment, institutions and energy.

Meaning and Definition of Civil Service

The civil service which is the subject of the present study is a subset of public service. It is a body of appointed officials which carries out the functions of government under the direction of the head of government (United Nations 2011: 5). To Herman Finer, civil service is a professional body of officials, permanent, paid and skilled (Finer 1950: 709). The phrase “civil service” was first used by British Administration in India and was popularised by Sir Charles Trevelyan a little more than a century ago, when the principle of open competitive examination was introduced in Great Britain in 1854; the term applied to officials serving the state in a professional capacity except for those in the military and judicial services (Imtiaz 2013: 10). It is the core and permanent administrative arm of the government and comprises permanent and pensionable officials working in the government ministries, departments and agencies. Public service³ also includes the military, police, teachers, health workers, local government workers and public enterprises. The civil service more specifically advises on and develops policy, implements government policies and programmes and manages the day-to-day activities (Government and Social Development Research Centre 2011: 1).

While the term ‘Public Service’ is rather of a recent origin and has limited application, its predecessor, civil service, has still the largest application and is well-understood. Civil service refers to purely non-technical services. The term was coined as an analogy and is contrasted with other bodies serving the state in a full-time capacity such as the military service, the judicial service and the police service. But while the military and police services are concerned with the

³ The civil service and the public service both are under the Government and the employees of both the services are known as servants. Despite this there is a subtle difference between the two. The civil servant is the part of administration and generally associated with the upper rung of the hierarchy. Since the main function of the civil servant is the execution of the policies and the programmes, they are generalist and can function in every area. In this sense, they are in contrast with their brethren of technical servants.

safeguarding of the country from external and internal dangers, the civil service is concerned only with the civil affairs of the state (Santosh 2006: 1). Hence the term ‘Civil Service’ has come to signify the non-combatant branches of the administrative service of the state. In almost all countries, the term civil service refers to purely a non-technical civil service. While providing the requirements of the civil service, E. N. Gladden says that its members shall be impartially selected, administratively competent, politically neutral and imbued with the spirit of service to the community (Gladden 1945: 26-27).

The term bureaucracy⁴ is defined by Merriam Webster dictionary as an organisation of non-elective government officials and an administrative policymaking group. It is a part of the government characterised by a specialisation of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and the hierarchy of authority (Merriam Webster Dictionary, Online). The terms bureaucracy and civil service have sometimes been used interchangeably (Bhattacharya 2003: 308)⁵. Even the term bureaucracy has been used in a sense to mean ‘just plain professional civil service’ (Avasthi and Maheshwari 2002: 293) or ‘higher civil service’ (Chowdhury 1990: 25). It is also used with pejorative connotations to refer to inefficiency, incompetence, red tape, or the government (Goodsell 1985: 62, Martin 1990: 199).⁶ In fact, the civil service system is a formal type of organisation having some certain features which entitle it to be referred to as a bureaucracy. Civil services are organised upon standard bureaucratic lines, in which a chain of command stretches

⁴ The term bureaucracy is formed with two words bureau and kratia. The French term bureau literally meant the baize used to cover the desk. The suffix kratia is a Greek work which means power or rule. Thus the literal meaning of the word bureaucracy meant rules of the officers.

⁵ Although the term civil service and bureaucracy have been used interchangeably, the bureaucracy generally denotes any organization consisted with the features of Weberian model of bureaucracy. While it is mainly associated with the Government Organisation, many private organizations also possess the same features for example corporations, political parties, churches, temples and trade unions. None of these consists features of pure bureaucracy (Martin, 1990: 199)

⁶ The phenomenon of negativity associated with the bureaucracy was stronger in the third world countries which talked about reforms in the colonial structure of civil service to get rid of the negative bureaucratic connotations i.e. corruption, complexity and inflexibility.

in a pyramidal fashion—from the lowest offices to the highest. This command implies a superior-subordinate relationship in which the offices are marked by fixed positions with well defined duties, specific powers and privileges, all objectively assessed. In this context if the bureaucracy is understood as a pyramidal or hierarchical system, then the civil services mean the staffing of this system (The New Encyclopedia Britannica 1974: 667).

E. N. Gladden while differentiating between the term “civil service” and “bureaucracy” says that the term civil service denotes the individual official being known as “servant”. Although basically his service is to the Crown (or the government in the modern times) whose servant he still is, the official is habitually conscious of his duty to serve the community, albeit through his master, the government, which is indeed the people’s instrument. In this way, the “Civil Service” differs fundamentally from “Bureaucracy”, which is “self seeking” and “self-controlled” or the instrument of a narrow oligarchy in a machine (Gladden 1945: 26).

Max Weber in his book *The Theory of Economic and Social Organisation*⁷ has characterised the bureaucratic organisation with the following features (Weber 1947: 330-39):

1. It is a continuous organisation of official functions, bound by rules.
2. This organisation has a specified sphere of competence which involves
 - (a) a sphere of obligations to perform functions which has been marked off as part of a division of labour;
 - (b) the provision of incumbent with the necessary authority to carry out these functions;

⁷ The book *The Theory of Economic and Social Organisation* is a translation of Max Weber’s work *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Economy and Society) written in German. The translation was done by Talcott Parsons in 1947.

- (c) the necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use subject to definite conditions.
3. The organisation of offices follows the principle hierarchy and each lower office is under the control and supervision of the higher one.
 4. The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or norms, so for a proper functioning of the office, specialised training is necessary.
 5. The members of the organisation should be clearly separated from the ownership.
 6. Administrative acts, decisions and rules are formulated and recorded in writing.

Weber goes on to describe the “purely bureaucratic organisation” from a “purely technical point” of view, which is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally, the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings (Garston 2012: 4).

For P. M. Jackson, “A bureaucracy is a particular form of organisation comprised of bureaus or agencies, such that the overall bureaucracy is a system of consciously coordinated activities which has been explicitly created to achieve specific ends” (Jackson 1982: 121).

According to Brian Martin, “Bureaucracy is a way of organising work in which people are treated as interchangeable and replaceable cogs to fill specialised roles. Two key features of bureaucracy are hierarchy and a specialised division of labour. Other characteristics of an 'ideal' bureaucracy are rules which describe the duties of members, a set of standard operating procedures, and impersonal relations between members. In a model bureaucracy, initiatives and policy directions come only from

the top echelons. Work in carrying out policies is done at the lower levels within the guidelines set from above” (Martin 1990: 199)

A Brief History

The Civil Service in its present structural form appears to be a modern phenomenon. Though its emergence is related to the beginning of the modern industrial society in Europe, it has existed in various societies as an institutionalised activity of administration since the earliest times. The evolution of the bureaucracy took place in those places where large groups of people existed in large areas, thus creating a need for an agency to deal with the day-to-day problems.

An immature form of organised administration can be seen as early as ancient Mesopotamia⁸ (Kamenka 1989: 15-22). There, industrial production was carried out by a grand organisation of the temple and king’s household. It used to collect taxes, maintain public buildings, organise labour, distribute materials and rations to the workers and other people and supervise the military organisation (Jha 2004: 15). Similarly, an elaborate and hierarchical administration organised around a temple economy was also found in the Sumerian civilisation (around 3000 BC). However, the true marks of bureaucracy were first seen in China. For Kamenka, no ancient society has seemed so thoroughly, so sophisticatedly and so successfully bureaucratised over millennia as the Chinese (Kamenka 1989: 22). It was believed that way back in 186 BC, in China, the public officers were recruited through

⁸ Mesopotamia civilisation was based on industry and trade which led to the state activities increased in manifolds. There was a system of an enlarged and complex bureaucracy. The system was highly centralised during the dynasty of King Nergal and Queen Ereshkigal (Rhea and Nejat, *Daily Life in Ancient Mesopotamia*, URL. https://books.google.co.in/books?id=lbmXsaTGNKUC&pg=PA145&lpg=PA145&dq=sign+of+early+bureaucracy+in+mesopotamia&source=bl&ots=dt6M9oFOpj&sig=HWPTKM9nhidZgX3zc0nuVC_HSdms&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjh886k_azPAhXFvI8KHVvFCPIQ6AEILzAE#v=onepage&q=sign%20of%20early%20bureaucracy%20in%20mesopotamia&f=false)

competitive examinations and that a bureaucratic system was in place (Anderson 1971: 919). The administration of China had many features of modern-day bureaucracy. In ancient China, the Han Dynasty established a complicated bureaucracy based on the teachings of Confucius, who emphasised the importance of rituals in family relationships and politics (Riegel 2012: 1) With each subsequent dynasty, the bureaucracy evolved. During the Song Dynasty, the bureaucracy became meritocratic. Following the reforms introduced by the Song Dynasty, competitive exams were held to determine who would hold which positions (Mcknight 1983: 1). China then had a highly organised civil service entrusted with the task of public works like the building of long canals as well as mighty tombs. The Great Wall of China seems to be a magnificent example of such a highly specialised network of administration. The concept of civil service, as well as a written examination for recruitment, was introduced by China to the enlightened Europe of seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries (Kamenka 1989: 24).

In India, way back in the fourth century BC, the existence of a highly centralised and bureaucratised Mauryan Empire consisted of many of the present-day administrative features. The *Arthashastra*, a treatise on statecraft and economics written by Kautilya, gives a detailed account of an elaborate system of taxation and administration (Kamenka 1989: 40). It talks about separate “superintendents” for various departments like agriculture, commerce, weights and measures, storehouse, infantry, chariots, slaughter-house, prostitutes, etc. It also talks about an array of officials dealing with public works like constructing dams, irrigation, canals, roads, wells and rest houses (Deva 1984: 813). From the Mauryan Dynasty, founded by the celebrated Chandragupta Maurya in 322 BC, to the rise of Mughal Empire under Akbar the Great, India experienced varied administrative patterns and practices that existed at different places and at different times. However, according to E. N. Gladden, a unitary form of administration could not emerge in India as it

frequently faced several calamities and kinds of oppression from time to time (Gladden 1972: 231-235).

The Mauryan Empire in ancient India developed a highly efficient and organised civil administrative system, the glimpses of which can be found in Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as well as in the Greek visitor Megasthenes's⁹ account (Mookerjee 1966: 1-10). At the central level, the king was assisted by a council of ministers or *mantriparishad*. Although the king had an absolute power to appoint these ministers, the *ministers were selected on the basis of four qualities: dharma* (morality and law), *artha* (finance and worldly affairs), *kama* (recreation and aesthetics) and courage (Imam and Dar 2014: 26). There were highly skilled superintendents or *adhyakshas* who looked after various aspects of civil administration. Kautilya in the second book of his *Arthasastra*, "Adhyakshaprachara", gives an account of the working of nearly 27 *adhyakhsas*. Some of the important ones were the *akshapataladhyaksha* or the accountant-general of currency and accounts, *sitadhyaksha* or the superintendent of the agriculture, the *akaradhyaksha* or the superintendent of mining and one who possessed a scientific knowledge of mines, metallurgy, gems and precious stones, *lavananyadhyaksha* or the salt superintendent, *navadhyaksha* or the Superintendent of Ports, the *panyadhyaksha* or the controller of commerce, the *sulkadhyaksa* or the collector of customs and tolls, the *suradhyaksha* or the superintendent of excise and the *pautavadhyaksha*, the superintendent of weights and measures (Farazmand 2009: 52-55).

At the local level, there were the municipal boards. Megasthenes has given the account of the administration of the city of Pataliputra which was administered by a

⁹ Megasthenes was a Greek ethnographer and explorer in Hellenistic period. He has thrown light on many aspects of Indian administration especially during Chandragupta Maurya through his work *Indica*.

Municipal Board of 30 members divided into six committees. Each of these committees had five members to manage the administration of the city. For revenue collection, there were two most important officers: *sannidhata* and *samaharta*. The *sannidhata* was responsible for the storage of the royal treasure and of the state income both in cash and kind and the *samaharta* was in charge of the collection of revenue from the various parts of the kingdom and looked after the income and expenditure by supervising the works of the *akshapataladhyaksha* (Dikshitar 1993: 154-168; Agnihotri 2005: 256-260). At the level of a city also, there was a city superintendent who was responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the city. He was assisted by two subordinate officials, the *gopa* and the *sthanika* (Pinto and Myall 2011: H-62).

While describing the city administration, Megasthenes outlines a more elaborate system. According to him, the officials were divided into six committees with matters relating to industrial arts, facilities to foreigners, the registration of births and deaths both by way of a census and for purposes of taxation, trade and commerce, public sale of manufactured articles and the collection of tax on the articles sold—this being one-tenth of the purchase price respectively (Pinto and Myall 2009: 59-61).

With the passage of time, the administration of India evolved into an administrative structure consisting of a variety of features which can be called as the synthesis of the indigenous and non-native features. During the Mughal Empire, the bureaucracy was a mix of the military and civil bureaucracy. The monarchical system revolved around the emperor and he was supreme in the administration. Apart from the emperor, the most important posts were that of the *wazir* and the *diwan* who were in charge of the military and revenue affairs respectively. Among other the chief departments, the most important were:

1. The Imperial Household Department under the *Khan-Saman* or High Steward.
2. The Military Pay and Accounts Department under the Imperial *Bakshi*.
3. The Canon Law, both Civil and Military, under the Chief *Qazi*.
4. Religious Endowments and Charity under the Chief *Sardar*.
5. Censorship of Public Morals under the *Mahtasib*.
6. The Justice Department under the *Qazi-ul-Quzat*.
7. The Artillery Department under the *Mir Atish* or *Darogha-i-Topkhana*.
8. Intelligence and Postal Department under the *Darogha-i-Dak Chauki* (Aggarwal 2015).

Although the structuring of the personnel system was taking place in an organised manner during the Mughal rule, it must be seen in the context of the monarchy which ruled at that time. The whole structure of the personnel system revolved around the *Mansabdari* system—a mix of administrative and military hierarchy. The emperor maintained a number of *mansabdars* to look after the administration and manage the prescribed number of troops which they had to provide at the time of emergency (Meredith and Garret 1995:165). Created mainly for military purposes, the military obligations were always incumbent on the *mansabdars* (Ray 1984: 208). As they were not paid in cash and made up their disbursements in the form of revenue collected from the *jagir* given to them, a civil administrative duty was essentially involved in the *mansabdari* system. The *mansabs* were not merit-based and it was the emperor who could confer, decrease, increase and resume the *mansabs* (Khosla 1991: 23). The *mansab* was the grant to every official, of the rights to enjoy a *jagir*. The term “*jagir*” meant revenue assignments (not the land

per se) for the services rendered (instead of a cash salary). The power to transfer the *jagir* as a measure to control the *mansabdars* was in the hands of the emperor himself. Also, these *mansabs* were not hereditary and when a *mansabdar* died, his entire personal property was taken over by the state and after deducting what he owed to the State, the balance would be returned to his heirs. There could be no hereditary claim over the *mansab*. Apart from the *mansab*, there was a category of nobles who received salaries in cash also. These nobles had to place their entire time and service at the disposal of the emperor (Arora and Goyal 2005: 24-27).

Although monarchical rulers deployed a vast system of civil administration, this system did not have the features of a modern Weberian model of bureaucracy. A similar system developed during the ancient period in Europe and the present modern bureaucracy has vital linkages with the past. But in spite of having potent historical linkages, the modern bureaucracy which emerged in modern Europe differed from the ancient one in more than one way especially it was affected by the features of dynasty and patronage (Sharma 2016: 17). The ancient bureaucracy, though highly elaborate, organised and efficient, depended heavily on the patrimonial ruler—the king. The ruler enjoyed paternalistic and traditional authority and there was no separation between the personal and official. The emergence of the modern nation state in Europe played a vital role in the development of the structure of modern bureaucracy¹⁰. The development of a money economy and the emergence of mass democracy prepared the ground for the rise and growth of bureaucratic administration (Naidu 2005: 82).

Till the sixteenth century, Europe consisted of several hundred independent political units and the king was also just one of the many royal leaders. But by the

¹⁰ Apart from industrial revolution and money economy, the war system has played an important role in the evolution of bureaucracy. Brian Martin in his book, *Uprooting War* has shown that although the war has been fought by the armies, on behalf of the states, bureaucracy is the key organizational building block of the state.

nineteenth century, it came to be consolidated into 20-odd states. Thus by that time, modern European nations emerged with a national administration, imbued with the spirit of nationalism (Gladden 1972: 85-110). Due to the industrial revolution in Europe, a number of new cities emerged and became centres of economic activities. The administration of these cities was a difficult task in comparison with the simplistic and self-dependent structure of the rural economy. Thus, with the emergence of a modern nation-state¹¹, also emerged the powerful hierarchical and centralised administrative institutions comprised of royal officials (Dev and Dev 1989: 163-75). These royal officials were appointed by the king and were loyal to him. Still, as there was no clear conception of the state or nation-state separate from the king's personality, these officials were the king's servants and not of the nation. It took another two to three centuries for a bureaucracy with modern characteristics to emerge in Europe (Halevy 2013: 116-121).

The evolution of bureaucracy in France can be divided into three phases: before 1630s, 1630s to 1789 and after 1789. In France, the development of a powerful and centralised organisation of the bureaucracy was mainly driven by the need of an effective collection of taxes. This gave way to the appointment of a large number of administrators. Before the seventeenth century, the bureaucracy was not all that effective and there was merely the temporary appointment of administrators only for specific purposes. In fact, they were not administrators in a true sense but limited to being inspectors of the activities of the local independent officers. It was only in the 1630s that the role of French bureaucrats known as 'provincial intendants' underwent a transformation from being inspector reformers to administrators (Krygier 1979: 4).

¹¹ The state is a geographical and political entity while the nation is a cultural and ethnic one, the term nation-state implies that both can coincide and conjoin. Although, the factors associated with the emergence of modern nation state has been disputed but it is said that the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 is one of the major incident which contributed greatly to stabilize the borders of European states and led to the rise of modern state systems.

There was a constant vying between the intendants on the one hand and the independent officers, local notables and local traditions on the other. Again, the intendants were not the only agents who had the privilege of writing to the government. Reports and correspondence were welcomed from any notable, engineer, technician, ambassador and the like—whoever was in a position to provide useful information (Gladden 1972: 154). Moreover, the intendants themselves were not always easy to control. In the years before the French Revolution, the Central Directorate of Intendants became far less effective. There was a great deal of confusion and turning over among certain officials (Franklin 1965: 35-36). The French Revolution in 1789 changed this situation dramatically. It was only after the French Revolution that a clear disengagement of the state from the king occurred (Barker 1945: 22-47).

Another example of a magnificent development of bureaucracy was its development in Prussia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During this period, Prussia had the fortune to be ruled by four kings, of whom three had an administrative genius of the highest order: the great elector Frederick William of Brandenburg (1640-88), Frederick William I (1713-40) and Frederick the Great (1740-86). All together, their reign lasted for about 110 years (Finer 1950: 727). The rise and subsequent evolution of the Prussian bureaucratic structure started in 1722 when Frederick William I introduced a centralised supervisory body called the General Directory and Provincial Domain Boards, as a result of which local associations, estates, municipal corporations and provincial courts were subordinated to a central direction (Rosenberg 1960: 68).

It was under Frederick II that Prussia became a major European power and the outlook, role and organisation of its administrators changed remarkably. The bureaucrats started functioning on an enormously increased scale. A large-scale

institution of specialised training and regularised recruitment of the civil servants started, a merit system was instituted for all posts, a degree in Cameralistics was required for higher posts followed by a period of practical training and a further oral and written examination. Thus, though there was no civil service in the modern sense by this time, the bureaucratic elite of Prussia came to represent an important step in this direction (Gladden 1972: 163).

An important innovation in this period was the mode of organisation of the administrative structures. The eighteenth-century Prussian monarchy had a ‘collegial’ organisation (Halevy 2013: 103).¹² The college or boards were organised on a territorial rather than a functional basis. Under Frederick II, new specialist function-based ministries were established which surrounded the collegial bodies and made them almost impotent. A gradual ‘disengagement’ of public officialdom from the king or dynasty occurred. As a result the bureaucracy “...derived great advantage from the impersonal basis of its strength, from its huge size as an organisation, from its permanence, functional indispensability and monopoly of expert knowledge, from its self-consciousnessas a power elite....” (Rosenberg 1960: 68).

The ever-increasing power of the bureaucracy resulted in the drafting of “The Prussian General Legal Code of 1794” under which the bureaucracy was granted a legal status and was recognised as a privileged corporation subject to its own jurisdiction, distinct in title and rank, and exempt from many of the ordinary civil obligations (Gillis 1971: 22). It subjected the monarch to binding rules in matters of personal administration, curbed his power and placed him under the law and generally ‘depersonalised’ the government (Gillis 1971: 22-24).

¹² The colleges in Prussia comprised of a body or community of persons having certain rights and privileges. All affairs were discussed collectively and all members were responsible for the actions of the majority.

The analysis of both the French and the Prussian models has in a way helped to discover the common denominator of bureaucratisation. In other words, “the earlier involvement of public employment with family prerogative and the identification of office with property have been superseded in the course of long and diverse developments, by the emergence of the nation state in which public officials administer a service rendering organization for the protection of rights and the enforcement of duties of a national citizenry” (Barker 1945: 6).

Again, with the emergence of a dynamic concept of a responsible state, especially following John Locke’s interpretation of state as a ‘trust’ for the people¹³, the quality of administration became a matter of public concern, and the purposes which the officials served became public purpose (Laslet 1988: 112-117). Now, the institutions of the state began to be assessed in terms of the success in achieving public goals, rather than simply in terms of genealogical or divine claims. This criterion of assessment placed demands on and turned the attention to their executing machinery i.e. the bureaucracy for achieving these goals (Krieger 1975: 52). The mechanistic view that prevailed during the eighteenth century led the administrators to be viewed as functionaries. More and more attention was given to the administrative part of the political system; on how the administration could be reformed to become more efficient and competent in functioning. As Bosher writes, “whereas the posts of officials during the ancient regime had been called offices or places, they now began to be called functions and the officials themselves were for the first time described as functionaries”. This utilitarian vocabulary was used to

¹³ John Locke has given the concept of state as a trust in his social contract theory in the book *Two Treatises of Civil Government*. Locke advocated a limited sovereign state and for him the Government is a trust and political community is an organisation of equals. The Government has the responsibility to protect the right of property, liberty and security and if the Government is unable to do so; the citizens have right to overthrow the Government.

describe the organisations with quasi-mechanical virtues...the idea of function became a principle of the quasi-mechanical organisation (Bosher 1970: 296).

Perhaps it was those mechanical analogies which led to the birth of a rational-legal approach to the bureaucratic structure; legal because legislation was treated as one of the most important means of implementing the administrative reforms and rational, because of the concern to establish streamlined, simplified, harmonious administrative structures in which all parts fitted and worked smoothly. Within these broader functional concerns, specific suggestions and practical measures like the rules specifying a department's function, payment by salary, use of records, inspection and reporting were almost universally recommended. These schemes and proposals contained a great deal which anticipated Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy: The Concept

The use of the term "bureaucracy" is traced to Vincent de Gaurney (1712-1759), a French civil servant and physiocrat. In 1745, he used the term "bureaumania" to criticise the government that existed in France and was ailing with red-tapism, formalism, hierarchicalism and laziness (Raadschelders 2015: 316). Before Weber developed the theory of bureaucracy in the 1920s, the concept had been given by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx.

The Hegelian Concept

Hegel in his concept of the idealist state gave the theory of bureaucracy. However, he did not propound a well-structured concept of bureaucracy; for some, it is as broad as that of Weber (Shaw 1992: 382). Like Marx, Hegel's main concern was not bureaucracy as such, but he developed it in the larger interest in examining the nature of the state. The state, for Hegel, is the last development in a series of rational social orders; the other two being the family and the civil society. Once the

state is produced, it is supposed to provide the grounds where the unconscious and particularly oriented activities become gradually self-conscious and public-spirited (Gaubá 2010: 265). For Hegel, the prince, the bureaucrats and the deputies of the estates are political actors par excellence. In his *Philosophy of Right* (1921), he raised the concept of bureaucracy to abstract heights—a transcending entity, a mind above individual minds. He defined it as a “state formalism” of civil society, and the state power as a corporation (McLellen 1971: 68).

The Marxist View

We do not find an elaborative discussion on bureaucracy in the writings of Karl Marx. In fact, he could not attempt a very systematic analysis of the state itself due to his preoccupation with political economy. However, his first lengthy piece of writing after his doctoral dissertation, namely “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” (1843) is in a large part concerned with the state. In this work, we find some very brief comments on bureaucracy. Marx studied bureaucracy in the context of the capitalist state and its administrative apparatus. He deduced the notion of bureaucracy from the relationship that existed between the power-holding institutions, primarily the state and the social groups subordinated to it. The significance of Marx’s analysis of bureaucracy lies in his insistence that bureaucratic structures do not automatically reflect the prevailing social power relations but pervert and disfigure them. Bureaucracy is thus the image of a prevailing social power, distorted by its claim of universality (Thakur 1992: 32).

The Weberian Model of Bureaucracy

It goes to the credit of Max Weber, a German historian and sociologist, to give a theory of bureaucracy. It is his theory of bureaucracy which set the foundations for

many subsequent works on the subject¹⁴. Max Weber was the first one to talk about bureaucracy as a big improvement over the administration. He provided a profound account of the nature of bureaucracy and the forms of bureaucratic organisation and thinking. He described bureaucracy as one of the most rational and efficient means to organise authority (Guy 2000: 41). Weber presented his ideas on bureaucracy within the broader formulations of power, authority and legitimacy. It is important to point out that he differentiated between power and authority on the basis of legitimacy (Gangadhar 2004: 413). According to him, if the individuals on whom the power (influence even against their will) is exercised deem it as proper or appropriate, it becomes legitimate and takes the form of authority. While talking of his authority systems, Weber, on the basis of its claim to legitimacy, classified authority as (Schultz, 2004: 458):

1. Traditional Authority
2. Charismatic Authority
3. Legal-Rational Authority

Under the traditional authority, the basis of the acceptance and legitimacy of authority is the sacredness of the rulers and his orders. Under this system, personal contacts, loyalties, kinship, etc., influence the structure and decisions of the administration. Under the charismatic authority, 'charisma' or 'the supernatural qualities' of the ruler are the basis of acceptance of the authority (Slattery 2003: 32). Charisma is a God-gifted virtue where a leader himself knows what to do. A charismatic leader contrasts with the traditional leadership of a king or the modern rational leadership of an administrative or elected leader (Tullock 2005: 138-39).

Under the legal-rational system, the acceptance of authority is sought on the basis

¹⁴ On the foundational work of Weberian model of modern bureaucracy, many critiques have been subsequently grown mainly by Ludwig Von Mises, Robert K. Merton and Michel Crozier.

of rules, which are framed in an impersonal, impartial and rational manner. It is to be noted that Weber never defined bureaucracy; rather, he outlined the essential features of an 'ideal type' bureaucratic organisation based on the legal-rational system. His ideal type bureaucracy consists of structural and behavioural features such as rationality, division of work and specialisation, hierarchical authority system, merit-based recruitment and promotion, distinction between the position and its incumbent, between public and private, emphasis on written documents, office procedures, rule-orientation, formalism, etc.

A systematic division of labour and specialisation of tasks is one of the fundamental features of bureaucracy. To achieve it, a precise and detailed definition of duties and responsibilities of each position of office is drawn out. It constitutes 'a specific sphere of competence' which involves a sphere of obligations to perform functions; the provision of the incumbent with the necessary authority to carry out these functions and the necessary means of compulsion, clearly defined, with the use being subject to definite conditions. A unit of exercising authority which is organised in this way will be called an 'administrative organ' (Weber 1964: 334).

The hierarchical system of the organisation is another basic feature of bureaucracy. According to Weber, bureaucracy is organised according to rational principles and is characterised by a rational and impersonal regulation of the inferior-superior relationship. In the traditional (feudal/patrimonial) types of administration, the inferior-superior relationship is personal and the legitimisation of authority is based on a belief in the sacredness of tradition (Bondless 2015: 1). On the other hand, the legitimacy of bureaucratic authority lies in the belief of the correctness of the process by which the administrative rules were enacted. The loyalty of the people in the bureaucrats is based on the superior position of the post and in the impersonal order. The offices are ranked in a hierarchical order in this organisation

and the officials are set for a career within this hierarchical order of the public service. The personnel are recruited on the basis of the merit of the candidates, or according to specialised qualifications and not on the basis of such particularistic considerations as family positions or political loyalties (Mouzelis 1975: 38-43).

Weber emphasised the appointment by a superior authority and considered it as an essential feature of bureaucracy. In contrast to elected officials, an appointed official, from a technical point of view, functions in a more exact manner because his selection and promotion in his career depend purely upon his functional capabilities and qualities (Dolan and Rosenbloom 2003: 10). A bureaucrat gets his salary based on status rather than productivity or performance, but usually promotions within the bureaucracy are based upon seniority as well as achievement. Also, there is a clear-cut separation between the 'public' and 'private' spheres of a bureaucrat. In his official job, a spirit of impersonality without any hatred or passion—and hence without affection or enthusiasm—dominates (Weber 1964: 340). Weber said that the more it is dehumanised, the more the bureaucracy's specific nature perfectly develops, that is, "the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from officials' business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue" (Weber et al. 1970: 216). To Weber, the bureaucracy is a particular type of administrative structure developed in association with the rational legal mode of authority. In his view, it is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings (Weber and Slattery 2003: 32). To him, it is an administration based on discipline, which is "nothing but the consistently rationalised, methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order" (Antonio 1979: 895-912). According to Weber, only traditional and rational-legal authority relations are sufficiently stable to provide the basis for the formation of permanent administrative structures. Thus,

the bureaucracy is a type of administrative organisation with the above-mentioned characteristics which once established will continue because it is the most efficient, most rational form of organisation for exercising legitimate authority in a modern society.

Causes for the Emergence of Bureaucratic Organisation

Weber gave many causes for the emergence of an organisation based upon legal and rational principles, three of which, however, need special attention:

(i) *The creation of a money economy:*

The emergence of money economy was a major factor in the development of a rational form of administration. Weber states that while capitalism and bureaucracy have arisen from many different historical sources, they are today interdependent; capitalism is the most rational economic basis for bureaucratic domination, since it supplies the necessary monetary resources for the payment of officials. Thus, the bureaucracy presupposes a monetary economy for its continued existence (Cohen 1991: 92). Bureaucracies based on compensation of kind had existed, for instance, in Egypt, Rome and China. But a payment in kind could not ensure dependable revenues for the bureaucrats. Hence, the practice was to reward them by grants of land or the collection of tax revenues from given territories. This led to the disintegration of bureaucracies into feudal or semi-feudal domains. A money economy, on the other hand, permitted a payment of secure, regular salaries, which in turn created dependable organisations.

(ii) *The emergence of a capitalist economy:*

The system of free enterprise, the essence of capitalism, fostered bureaucracy. It created those needs which only a bureaucratic

organisation could satisfy. The growth of capitalism required and even encouraged a strong and orderly government based on a bureaucratic organisation in its own interests. Not only governments but also capitalist enterprises themselves began to follow the bureaucratic principles of organisation because of the requirements of rationality and calculability—the prime feature of capitalism.

(iii) The more encompassing trend towards rationalism in the Western societies:

This trend found an expression in a general ‘disenchantment’ or demystification of the world, in a more effective adaptation of means to ends and a more systematic organisation of reality. For Weber, the Protestant ethic was the basic of the spirit of capitalism which called for the rational investment of time and effort so as to maximise profit and achievements. The general trend towards rationalism was also evident in the development of modern science with its combination of rational theory, mathematical calculations and systematic empirical observations. Protestantism, capitalism, science and bureaucracy were thus all part of one cluster of development—the process of rationalisation (Merton 1952: 60-68).

Weber formulated his ideal type concept of bureaucracy having in mind mainly the administrative apparatus of the modern Western state. Being primarily concerned with explaining the features of Western civilisation, he wanted to examine the process that made the state apparatus of western European societies approach closely his ideal type of bureaucracy. He observed that the power position of bureaucracy could vary from case to case, but its permanence and technical indispensability in the modern societies was beyond doubt. Revolutions of all type in the modern societies could change radically the power positions of various

groups, but even they could never abolish it. Whatever the political regime and whatever the socio-political changes in the modern society, according to Weber, bureaucracy was there to stay (Sharan 1989: 23) Not only would the state bureaucracy not wither away, but the bureaucratic form of organisation would spread and become dominant in all spheres of life.

On this account, Weber did not agree with the Marxist notion of the eventual disappearance of bureaucracy. He criticised the Marxist theory of socialism, contending that the socialisation of the means of production would merely subject the economic life to the bureaucratic management of the state. The state would in this way become totalitarian as Weber felt that this socialism would lead to not an egalitarian society but to further serfdom. For him, “the dictatorship of the official and not that of the worker is on the march” (Weber et al. 1970: 335).

Similarly, Weber rejected the prediction of some others that the spreading and technical indispensability of bureaucracy in a modern society would make the bureaucrat’s political dominance inevitable. In his view, the bureaucracy’s indispensability does not automatically imply political dominance; its impersonality makes it a tool that can serve many masters. The masters, being at the top of the bureaucratic organisations, are necessarily not purely bureaucratic (Weber 1964: 33)

A Critical Appraisal of the Weberian Model of Bureaucracy

As a matter of fact, Weber himself was aware that an ideal bureaucratic functioning is a difficult proposition—a mere abstraction (Srivastava 1992: 16). Weber’s model of bureaucracy has met with a lot of criticism at the hands of behavioural scholars¹⁵

¹⁵ Behaviouralism, an approach in Political Science which emerged in 1950s, is a sharp departure from the previous Political Science. It asserts that in place of the study of organisation and units,

like Robert Merton, Michael Crozier, Robert Michels, Monroe Berger, Alfred Diamant, Ferrel Heady and Robert Presthus. These behavioural writers have the common tendency to concentrate upon that behaviour which is “dysfunctional” or “pathological”. This refers to the tendencies of the bureaucracies to develop those behaviour patterns which, although linked to the rational base of bureaucratic organisation and related structural devices, inhibit the attainment of the legitimate objectives of bureaucracy (Heady 1959: 517).

The most generalised argument against such structures was developed by Robert Merton, who argued that there is a tendency for “the rules to become more important than the ends they were designed to serve, resulting in goal displacement and loss of organisational effectiveness” (Merton 1952: 361-371). Merton was among the first sociologists to emphasise systematically the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy i.e. red-tapism and inefficiency. According to him, the preponderance of rational rules and procedures brings about lack of flexibility. Procedural rules become ends in themselves, instead of simply being means leading to a “goal displacement”. Merton first identified this problem and applied this term to organisational preoccupation with its rules and regulations, to the point that the managers keep the organisation from meeting its goals. He said that in this system, “adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself; there occurs familiar process of “displacement of goals” whereby “an instrumental value becomes a terminal value” (Merton 1952: 365).

Another point of criticism which emerges from Merton’ discussion is that while bureaucracy emphasises a rational and secondary relationship between functionaries and beneficiaries , the beneficiaries who are to be served by the bureaucracy want to establish a primary group relationship with the bureaucrats so

the political behaviour of the actor should be the subject of political study. It advocated for the adoption of the tools which are acceptable in modern empirical sciences. It means that behaviouralism claims it can explain political behaviour in an unbiased, neutral point of view.

that they can get things done. Hence, there appears to be an incompatibility between the structural demands and their execution by the primary group. Yet another shortcoming of the bureaucratic system is that very often it is difficult to pin down the responsibility of an individual. And the irony of it is that the bureaucracy can turn down any programme of reform when it does not want to accept it by refusing to act immediately. It tries to serve its own interests, and for this a general slackness in the system becomes a part of its functioning (Merton 1959: 321-332).

Lipset contends that bureaucrats have their own vested interests in the existing legal order and therefore are resistant to change. This is where bureaucracy is attacked as an impediment both to democracy, and more particularly, to change (Merton 1959: 321-332).

In addition to these criticisms of bureaucratic functioning, the Weberian model has been questioned for being a theory per se (Udy 1959: 415-418). Hall observes that it is presented as a finished tool, whereas it is a set of hypotheses to be verified by empirical findings (Hall 1963: 32-40). These attributes need to be first established before being accepted as a universal model. It has also been felt that it overstates the positive functions of bureaucracy such as efficiency, rationality, etc., but misses out on the 'dis-functions' like red-tapism, trained incapacity, procedural delays, occupation, etc. (Merton 1952: 50-54).

Similarly Damle criticises Weber for not foreseeing the possibility of the political and administrative authority being coalesced into one (Dube 1979: 11-15). He also criticises him for not visualising the bureaucrats as being called upon to perform the task of providing leadership for social transformation. He observes that it would not be desirable to have a technocratic rule in a democracy, particularly when modernisation and social change are the goals. A democratic process requires that

people should be involved in the new changes in all walks of life. As such, apart from the fact that the bureaucrats have to supply the relevant services and facilities for the production of goods and commodities, they also have to educate the people with a view to changing their mental attitudes. It is absolutely necessary in a democracy that a bureaucrat plays a role wider than that of a mere technocrat. It is because of this that the formalistic model of bureaucracy would not be enough and that informal groupings will have to be reckoned with by the bureaucrats in their day-to-day working (Damle 1979: 17-20).

La Palombara¹⁶ points out that as an instrument of economic change, the structural model is not fit for developing countries. While giving the example of India, he adds that “in a place like India, public administrators steeped in the tradition of the Indian Civil Service may be less useful as development entrepreneurs than those who are not so rigidly tied to the motions of bureaucratic status, hierarchy and impartiality” (La Palombara 1963: 12). Philip Selznick points out the organisational paradox in the structure of bureaucracy. The goals, responsibilities and powers need to be delegated to sub-systems by the central system in order to accomplish the task but in due course these sub units or sub-systems develop an informal system and set up their own goals which may be in conflict with the real purpose of the organisation (Selznick 1943: 47-54). According to him, this informal structure serves a triple function: (a) it serves to control the behaviour of the members of the worker group (b) it also affects the conditions of its existence being

¹⁶ The book of La Palombara *An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development* has been prominent in developing debates around the role of bureaucratic organisations in the contemporary world. What is the role of the public bureaucracy in social, economic, and political development? Driven by the questions such as what are the alternatives of development for newly emerging nation-states? How does a bureaucracy satisfy or inhibit the requisites of democratic development?, twelve outstanding scholars—Joseph LaPalombara, Fritz Morstein Marx, S. N. Eisenstadt, Fred W. Riggs, Bert F. Hoselitz, Joseph J. Spengler, Merle Fainsod, Carl Beck, J. Donald Kingsley, John T. Dorsey, Ralph Braibanti, and Walter B. Sharp approached these questions both by historical analysis (in the U.S. and in a score of countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa), and by empirical field research (in such varied places as Nigeria, Pakistan, and Viet Nam).

the member of a large organisation (c) it also acts to develop an expression of informal and personal relationships which a formal organisation does not provide. This informal structure exists in every organisation and in every organisation, the goals of the organisation are modified (abandoned, deflected or elaborated) as per the needs of this informal structure. It further leads to a bifurcation of interests as well as a conflict between the central system and sub-units.

The problem of developing an informal structure has also been identified by Peter Blau¹⁷—“this informal structure is a more cohesive and cooperative group”. He criticises the bureaucracy for being ritualistic. The people in an organisation or bureaucracy are not only linked with each other through official channels and links but also share their life situation, happiness, sorrows, dreams, and aspirations as the office constitutes a mini-world for them (Blau 1956: 43). The existence of an informal structure can work both ways for the bureaucratic organisation. It can increase the efficiency of the organisation as unnecessary official hurdles are surpassed by the informal links, but at the same time, this informal structure can be detrimental to the organisation if it starts functioning with cross-purposes and sets up its own goals and objectives (Jacobs 1969: 414).

Gouldner has pointed out the structural contradictions of the ideal typical model. According to him, certain characteristics enumerated by Weber are mutually inconsistent. There is an in-built contradiction between the authority of the ‘experts’ and the authority of a ‘hierarchy’ based on discipline. One comes from superior knowledge and another from the office held. Professionals may have more technical knowledge than hierarchical super-ordinates. It is very easily possible that

¹⁷ Peter Blau, an American sociologist, wrote his Ph.D. thesis with Robert Merton on dynamics of bureaucracy. He was one of the first sociologists to imply empirical method and use high level statistics to establish a social theory. His main works on bureaucracy include *Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (1955) and *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (1956). Blau’s work mainly centred on the interplay between formal structure, informal practices and bureaucratic pressures and how these affect organisational change.

people who have an expertise, who know how to do things, would find themselves stifled by unnecessarily submitting themselves to the dictates of the rules and procedures slammed upon them by their superiors (Gouldner 1954: 16-29). He also made a point that though the structure of the Weberian bureaucracy is based on the rationality of the civil servants and Weber seems to have assumed that the cultural setting of a specific bureaucracy would be neutral, but since that culture is not neutral and prefers the agreed-upon rules rather than imposed ones, these two cannot be fused together without blurring the dynamics of a bureaucratic organisation (Gouldner 1954: 20).

Finally, looking at the Weberian structural model of the ideal-type bureaucracy, one is forced to infer that the structure depends a lot on the socio-cultural context in which it operates, the people and the officials who man the structure and the circumstances in which they operate (Haque 1997: 432-462). If the structure is universal and secular but has to operate in a society where people are governed by primordial identities, it would fail to serve the purpose and remain largely ineffective despite being efficient. This appears true particularly in the context of developing countries, many of which have stable bureaucracies and an unstable political regime. The result is that the bureaucracy, manned by the modernising elites of these societies, provides stability and continuity to an otherwise unstable system of government. In these societies, the bureaucracy already has a firm and strong position than the other structures of politics which are struggling to establish themselves. While the political leadership, party organisation, electoral system and elected legislature, all are in a state of flux, the bureaucracy continues to provide a permanent leadership in the administration. This leads, in many of the newly independent countries, towards a bureaucratic rule, often with the backing of the army—its natural ally. In this way, the natural growth of emerging political institutions is hindered as the bureaucracy harbours its traditional hatred towards democratic principles. The bureaucracy consolidates its already firm position in the

background of the frequently emerged internal and external threats which a newly formed state faces in the initial years and leads the way to authoritarian rule, thereby further impeding its political growth (Jha 2004: 51).

This point becomes more relevant in the Third World¹⁸ context. An organisational rationality to determine administrative action tends to freeze the administrative autonomy. In uncertain and rapidly changing conditions, results and achieving objectives are more important than adhering to rules. Rules must be deemed as resources, to be weighed from the point of view of their adequacy for specific tasks. Societal expectations of programmes and results should be the main driving force of a government organisation and not the rules, norms and procedures. Also, in the context of the Third World developing countries, the structural characteristic of “formalistic impersonality” is not suitable as the need to fulfil developmental programmes is more urgent. What is required here is not impersonality but rather identifying with the purpose, goals and the people for whom these development programmes have been designed. One needs to be socially sensitive to the cause of the poor, marginalised and downtrodden sections of society. Also, a little bit of personal touch in the delivery of the services would be more desirable.

There is a need to adopt a behavioural outlook in terms of bureaucratic behaviour, according to the changing context of the cultural environment of the developing countries. The people in these developing countries are still being guided by primordial loyalties and a particularistic identity. It does not mean that the bureaucracy should discard its universalistic norms and procedures to accomplish the task, for that would undermine the very ethos of bureaucracy. But it can definitely adopt a more humanist posture and shed off its mechanistic

¹⁸ The term Third World is associated with the cold war where First World referred to the block of capitalist states, Second World to that of the communist states and the third world countries were non-aligned and neither associated to capitalism nor communism.

dispositions in order to establish a positive atmosphere with the people whom it is meant to serve.

The Civil Service of Pakistan: Initial Years

Pakistan, after getting independence in 1947, faced several internal and external problems and one of them was the organisation of its administrative system. At the time of partition, Pakistan had a few choices regarding the organisation of its administration: first, either follow the same administrative structure developed by the British rule bringing some or more changes according to its own political system and second, to begin with a thoroughly new administrative structure, developed in accordance with the needs of the indigenous society. Pakistan, faced with political instability, economic insecurity and various internal and external threats, was not in a position to start with a totally new administrative structure and it chose to follow the former choice. Thus, the administrative structure of Pakistan was carved out of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) of the British Raj¹⁹. This inheritance of the British administrative structure emerged as the most significant factor in influencing the further development of the civil service system of Pakistan. It has been stated as one of its most important features, upon which many of the other characteristics of Pakistan's bureaucracy depend.

Pakistan, after independence, was faced with several problems regarding administration; one of them was the acute shortage of experienced staff, especially

¹⁹ However some authors are of the view that the civil service system of Pakistan and in other South Asian countries evolved even before the British Rule (Niaz 2016:1, Imam and Dar 2013). According to Ilhan Niaz, the British did not establish the bureaucratic structure from the scratch, rather they modernized the existing system over a long period of time. Even the structure of civil service of Britain was also modernized on the lines of the then Indian traditions (Niaz, Ilhan (2016), Professor in the Department of History, Quaid-E-Azam University, In response to the questionnaire on Gmail (Annexure E).

at the higher level of the civil service. This problem was largely due to the fact that the Muslim representation in the British Indian administration was meagre²⁰ and the higher civil service in undivided India was predominantly British and Hindu. During the first quarter of 1947, the ICS and IPS had the strength of 1157 officers, of which 101 or 9% were Muslims (Braibanti 1966: 245-247). A disproportionate representation of the Muslims in the administration was further confirmed by the fact that “in the entire interim Government of India on the eve of Partition there was not one Muslim officer of the rank of secretary. There were only four officers of the rank of Joint Secretary” (Sayeed 1958: 137).

Further, at the time of independence, an Indian or British officer serving in the ICS was permitted to choose whether to serve in India or in Pakistan. Of the 101 Muslim ICS-IPS officers, 95 opted for service in Pakistan; the others remained in India or got retired. The net result was that the total strength of ICS-IPS officers in Pakistan at the time of partition was 157. But the figure 157 had a limited significance for only 136 of these were available for service in Pakistan. Nearly half of these were British officers, most of whom decided to stay in Pakistan after its independence. Moreover, most of the officers were short of experience in service. Thus, fewer than 20 officers in service during the first two years had more than 15 years of experience. Half of the officers had less than a decade in service. The position was reversed in some of the lower grades and there was a surplus of employees in the railways and post and telegraph departments (Chaudhury 1963: 73).

In this way, after partition, most of the higher posts in Pakistan remained vacant or

²⁰ The main reason behind the meagre representation of Muslims in British Civil and other services was their socio-economic backwardness due to which they were largely unable to compete. The orthodox attitude, contempt towards western education and lack of socio-religious reforms among the Muslims were also the factors behind their lesser representation. It has been the subject of various scholars to study for example Bipan Chandra, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sir Sayyad Ahmad Khan.

were filled by inexperienced personnel. In spite of the lesser number of staff in the upper ladder of bureaucracy, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), earlier the ICS, exerted a great influence on Pakistan's administration. The unstable situation after independence and various political and economic problems on the one hand as well as the weak democratic structure on the other provided a wide scope for the bureaucracy to play in. The partition resulted in a mass migration and bloodshed which weighed heavily on the newborn state. It has been estimated that 65,00,000 Muslim refugees came to Pakistan and 55,00,000 Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan²¹. About 5,00,000 Muslims lost their lives or were abducted (Symonds 1950: 84). In this exchange of persons, Pakistan obtained a surplus of cultivators and artisans but lost most of its merchants, clerks, accountants and professors (Goodnow 1964: 26).

The CSP was the lineal descendent of the ICS and its characteristics were largely influenced by this colonial legacy. The colonial legacy influenced the civil service system in two ways. Firstly, the shortage of experienced staff led the state to incorporate the British officers into the system. These British ICS officers who chose not to leave the country played "an important role" in determining the form of the bureaucratic system. The presence of British influence is reflected by the fact that some fifty per cent British officers remained in Pakistan's Civil Service and formed about 28 per cent of the higher bureaucracy. From 1951 to 1960, a British officer headed the Civil Service Academy in Lahore; thus, a large number of new recruits were infused with the British tradition during their one-year training. Four out of eight civil service reform efforts were headed by British officials during 1952-1958 (Braibanti 1966: 246). There had been considerable foreign inputs in the

²¹ The mass migration in both side of borders presented vast challenges for the political establishment and administration of both the countries. Various aspects of life, full of challenges during migration has been depicted in the literary and artistic works like Khushvant Singh's Train to Pakistan, Toba Tek Singh by Saadat Hasan Manto, Subah-e-Azadi by Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Jhootha Sach by Yashpal, Tamas by Bhishm Sahni. There are various movies on partition like Earth, Garm Hava, Tamas, Gadar, Lahore and many more.

form of reports and advice supplied by the many advisers who assisted in establishing the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, the National Institute of Public Administration, the Rural Academies and sundry academic programmes.

As time passed, the direct British influence began to decline; however, it was replaced by that of the US²². Since 1953, advisory services began to be provided by the Ford Foundation. Later, a financial and administrative aid was also provided by the United States Agency for International Development. Three institutes of Public Administration were established with the help of the United States, two of them under the auspices of the Ford Foundation. In 1961, a rather enlarged network of training institutions was started under the operation and advice of the University of Southern California. In 1959, the Ford Foundation aided the establishment of the Administrative Staff College and two academies of Rural Development (Braibanti 1966: 264-292). Garth N. Jones while observing the influence of both Great Britain and the US over Pakistan's bureaucracy says, "Pakistan inherited a civil service with a long and illustrious history, a product of two great imperial civilisations. The civil service is a cultural artefact which is now caught in a transitional time" (Jones 1997: 346).

Secondly, the following of colonial customs and traditions helped to keep intact and further strengthen the British values in the administrative apparatus. The nationals in the civil service system tried their best to duplicate the British elitist practices. Albert Gorvine while quoting Tarzie Vittachi says that the "Brown *Sahibs*" had been substituted for white ones (Gorvine 1966: 187). A similar

²² United States was one of the first states to establish relations with Pakistan. Pakistan was a part of South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), formed against USSR. Pakistan also played an important role in Ping Pong diplomacy and inviting Nixon to China (1974). The close relations between the US and Pakistan has however not been welcomed and it has been the cause of unrest among a large population of Pakistan.

expression has been given by Ralph Braibanti when he says, “Structurally, the existing system is not unlike that in effect before independence” (Braibanti 1966: 242). The higher levels of the Indian civil service which became the CSP in Pakistan were an important source for infusing the elitist colonial values in the civil service system. The earlier ICS cadre of the British Civil Service system in pre-independent India was highly exclusive, generalist and classical. The examination system designed for entry into the ICS permitted only those people with a superior education. As a result, it led to an exclusive and elitist type of civil service. The elite character of the ICS was reinforced by relatively high salaries, secure tenures and a wide range of discretionary powers. The inherent elitist characteristics of the ICS were retained in the form of CSP. It proved far away from the aspirations of the society and was the main source of diffusing British values in Pakistan’s bureaucratic system.

The elitist character of the civil service²³ was protected by continuing the colonial training and in-service practices. The CSP probationers were required to be proficient in horse riding, were given membership in the exclusive Lahore Gymkhana Club and attended mess nights where a formal attire was required, and often, where important officials and guests were invited (Jones 1997: 346-347). A large number of CSP officers, educated in England, trained abroad and with their knowledge of English, felt a superiority complex. The colonial character of the CSP led to the centralisation of bureaucracy in Pakistan and tended to separate it from the larger part of the society. The centralisation of power in the hands of the CSP proved to be detrimental to the development of the democratic institutions of Pakistan. The members of the CSP, who used to serve both the central and

²³ The British structure of the bureaucracy consisted of all the main features of Weberian Model of bureaucracy like formalization of rules and goals of the organisation, merit based recruitment, hierarchical system etc. This model has influenced the post independence bureaucratic structure of all the South Asian countries. The elitism among the civil servants has been the prominent point of criticism, however the elitism has diminished over the years (Jamil et.al, 2013: 18)

provincial governments, occupied by far the bulk of the most important and key positions in the central and provincial secretariats. Sixty per cent of the post of under-secretaries and two-thirds of the post of deputy-secretaries were reserved for the CSP officers at the centre. The CSP was the *corps d'elite* within the civil service, like the administrative class in Britain (Chaudhury 1962: 262). The CSP became the pivotal service around which the entire administrative edifice, central and provincial, was organised. As Shahid Javed Burki has put it, “Even though the CSP constitutes only 0.07% of the country’s total bureaucratic population, it is not all that surprising that they have been the subject of academic attention over such a long period” (Burki 1969: 239-254).

In a rapidly changing environment characterised by one political revolution (October 1958) and two economic revolutions (1963-65 and 1967-68), the CSP not only displayed a remarkable ability to survive but grew enormously in both power and prestige (Chaudhury 1962: 239).

The centralisation of power in the hands of CSP was the main concern of reformers. The committees and commissions which were formed to address the inefficiency of the administration in the period under study attacked the monopolistic position which the CSP enjoyed and recommended for the decentralisation of power and uniformity in the organisation. Out of three separate studies undertaken during 1948-58—the Pakistan Pay and Service Commission 1948, the Rowland Egger Committee 1953 and the Gladieux Committee 1955—the latter two recommended the reforming and reorganisation of the administrative system in order to bring in more equity and uniformity. However, due to “the tremendous and influence of the CSP” in the political system, these recommendations could not be immediately accepted and implemented. In fact, the Egger Report was not even made available for general circulation for more than five years (Sayeed 1967: 155-156).

While it is true that the bureaucracy and especially the CSP inherited the elitism of its predecessor, the ICS, and continued to play its predominant role in the political system of the country, there was another factor which was equally responsible for the situation and that was the power imbalance between the political institutions and the bureaucracy. On the one hand, this power imbalance was furthered by the monopolistic position of the CSP tilting the balance on the side of the bureaucracy. On the other, it hindered the spontaneous growth of the democratic institutions. The political instability and the weak political structure of Pakistan left the vacuum to be filled in by the well-established bureaucracy.

The poor representation of the various and diverse segments of the society was another characteristic of the bureaucracy in this period. This exclusiveness was both in regional terms as well as with regard to social levels. During the earlier decade after independence, the province of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), in particular, had been very poorly represented in the services. According to Muzaffar Ahmed Chaudhuri, more than 93% officers in superior services belonged to West Pakistan. The uneven representation of the provinces has continued even after Bangladesh was separated; the representation from Sind, the former NWFP and Baluchistan is negligible, and the CSP has been mainly dominated by the Punjabis (Chaudhury 1963: 77-78). This poor representation continued even after the splitting of the country and more recently, A Perception Survey conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics shows that during the period 2000-2006, a majority of candidates appearing in the civil service were from the Punjab province²⁴ (Khan and Din 2008: 3).

²⁴ The Perception Survey conducted by the PIDE compiled the view of civil servants about the various aspects of bureaucracy like their views on recruitment, training, performance evaluation, job satisfaction, and relationship with the private sector. It found that the civil service which generally supposed to be very prestigious among the masses has been losing its charm and thus

Another feature which Pakistan's civil service inherited from the British administrative system is the preference given to generalists. The ICS officers in the British Administration were expected to be generalists on a diversity of subjects including law, history, politics, economics, local languages and ethnography. Following this tradition, Pakistan's civil service has been dominated by the generalists subordinating the technical services. This aspect of the bureaucracy was criticised by Rowland Egger and Bernard Gladieux, who were among the first of American public administration experts to survey the state of administration in Pakistan. This power monopoly by the generalists was targeted in Bhutto's 1973 reforms by introducing the provision of lateral entry; the influence of generalists, however, could not be removed completely.

The Classification of Pakistan's Civil Service

The classification of the civil service in post-independence Pakistan can be divided in two parts: (1) Classification in the pre-reform period (1947-1973) and (2) Classification after Bhutto's reforms (1973 onwards).

Before the 1973 civil service reforms, Pakistan's bureaucracy was divided both horizontally and vertically. The services were classified vertically according to the type of work and under this concept there were three main categories:

- (a) a generalist-administrative service, such as the civil service of Pakistan;

- (b) functional services like audit and accounts, income tax, customs and central excise;

unable to attract the best potential candidates for the examination. The same finding has also been supported by Khan and Din (Khan and Din, 2008: 779) and Imam and Dar (Imam and Dar, 2013: 198)

(c) the specialist services such as health, engineering, survey etc.

The horizontal classification of services was based on the degree of the importance of work and the nature and scale of the responsibilities involved. The services were vertically divided into four classes: Class I, Class II, Class III and Class IV. The members of Class I and Class II officers were gazetted officers and, in practice, were invested with higher powers and responsibilities with regard to management. The Class III civil servants carried on routine work under the control and supervision of the Classes I and II officers. The Class IV employees carried on manual work and petty jobs. By far, the bulk of employees belonged to Classes III and IV (Chaudhury 1962: 255-256).

According to the 1962 Constitution, all the civil servants working under the Central Government were to be appointed by the President; in reality, all appointments were not made by him (Chaudhury 1969: 61). The members of Class I offices received appointments from the Establishment Division under the signature of the President. The Class II officers were appointed by the secretary of a department or by some other specified higher authority. The Class III officers were appointed by a deputy secretary or an equivalent officer and sometimes by even a lower authority. The Class IV civil servants received appointment by still a lower authority. No civil servants, according to the Constitution, could be dismissed, or removed from service, or reduced in rank, by an authority, subordinate to that by which he/she is appointed.²⁵

This structure of the civil service remained intact till 1973 when sweeping changes in the structure of bureaucracy were initiated by Bhutto government. Bhutto introduced a new classification system; the twelve All- Pakistan and the Central

²⁵ Article 181 (1), *The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, [Online: Web], Accessed 26th of June, 2011, URL. <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/>

Superior Services were disbanded. Horizontally, the central public services were classified into seventeen occupation groups along functional lines. The positions reserved for the CSP cadre (generalist/policy/administration) were placed in three different occupational groups. The field administration posts were classified into the new District Management Group (DMG). The policy positions in the Central Secretariat were allocated to the Secretariat Group. The lower level positions in the secretariat were grouped into an Official Management Group. A new Tribal Areas Group (TAG) was created to administer to the federally controlled tribal territories. Three different accounts services were merged together into an Accounts Group. A new Occupational Group of Planners and Economists was created, grouping largely the positions in the Planning Commission and some other ministries (Akhtar 2003: 150-167). The antiquated and confused system of some 600 pay scales was abolished and it was replaced with a Unified National Pay Scale consisting of 23 grades. The post-reform structure of the civil service is displayed in Table 1 (Annexure A) (a detailed analysis of the bureaucratic structure will be dealt with in the next chapter).

Civil Service Reform in Pakistan: A Concern for Various Committees and Commissions

A brief description of the various important attempts made on the part of government has been given below as well as summarised in Table 3. This description below is based on the studies of Nasir Islam, Ralph Braibanti, Mohammad Iqbal Khan and the report of the National Commission for Governmental Reforms (Islam 1989; Khan 2005; Braibanti 1966; NCGR 2008).

Victor Turner Report:

The first attempt towards reforming the bureaucracy was a reorganisation committee headed by Sir Victor Turner, the then Finance Secretary. It was formed just six days after independence on August 21, 1947, and submitted its report after two weeks. Its purpose was to advise on the staff strength for the seven ministries and the cabinet secretaries of the newly created central government. The Turner Report has the distinction of being the first administrative survey in the history of Pakistan (Braibanti 1966: 216).

Justice Munir Commission:

The second committee was the Pakistan Pay Commission headed by Chief Justice Mohammad Munir, with Muzaffar Hussain, CSP, Abdul Matin Chaudhury and M. A. Mozaffar, AAS, as members. Its report was published in 1949 and 1950. Its findings received a wide criticism within the bureaucracy by its comment that the government service does not necessarily require the best talent. The commission recommended the scaling down of the salaries of the senior bureaucracy. The recommendations of the commission were implemented by the government despite a great deal of criticism within the bureaucracy (Islam 1989: 273-274).

Jeffries Committee:

In 1952, K. S. Jeffries, an official of the UK Treasury, was requested by the Government of Pakistan to prepare a report on the Development of Organisation and Methods work in the administration (Khan 2005: 108). This report is significant because it marks the beginning of the Organisation & Methods work in Pakistan.

Rowland Egger Commission:

In 1953, the Ford Foundation sponsored a study by Rowland Egger. He prepared a 134-page report titled “The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan” often called as the Egger Report. Nasir Islam has called it as being probably one of the most important documents in the history of administrative reforms in Pakistan (Islam 1989: 274). Egger made a strong criticism at Pakistan’s secretariat system which separated policymaking from policy implementation. He also criticised the dominance of generalists’ in whose hands the decision-making power rested. Numerous communications related to the final approval of higher policy matters were handled by generalists with no background, experience, or competence in the technical areas.

Rowland suggested that the highest post in the secretariat be opened to the men from technical service cadres: engineering, agriculture, medicine. He found the recruitment standards outdated and the selection system self-perpetuating. He recommended the unification of the entire group of employees into the Civil Service of Pakistan with internal groupings for administrative purposes, for e.g., Administration, Foreign Service, Accounts, etc. He also suggested standardised pay scales based on a comprehensive job analysis.

Report of Pakistan Government for National Development:

In 1955, Bernard Gladieux, from the US, was engaged by Pakistan’s government as a consultant on Public Administration. It was the second major report by a foreign consultant, written for the Planning Commission. Gladieux was mainly assigned to undertake the study of the organisation of Pakistan’s government with particular reference to the provinces. It was written under the title, “Report of Pakistan Government for National Development”. Gladieux was even more critical of the superiority of the generalists over the specialists. He criticised both the organisational and personnel system. He found the secretariat administration “precedent-bound and dependent on clerical employees” (Islam 1989: 274).

Regarding the personnel system, he criticised it for being self-perpetuating and relying excessively on academic standards. He recommended a drastic decentralisation. He said that the technical and professional civil servants also possessed administrative skills and should be encouraged to hold higher positions.

Administrative Reorganisation Committee:

The Administrative Reorganisation Committee was perhaps the most important administrative reform effort undertaken by a martial law regime. This committee consisted of career civil servants and was chaired by G. Ahmad, a member of the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP). The Report of the Ahmad Committee was probably the first major reform document not to be classified and suppressed. It was mainly deputed by the Government to make suggestions about the organisational structure, functions and procedures of the ministries, departments and subordinate offices of the government. Ahmad submitted two reports to the Government, first in 1956 and the second in 1962. Its major recommendations were to introduce the Section Officer's Scheme to improve the secretariat; create an economic pool for recruitment to the senior positions in the economically oriented ministries; give financial powers to the ministries, abolishing the multiple approval procedures and modify the responsibilities of the Foreign Service Officers (Islam 1989: 275). These recommendations were successfully implemented. Gorvine and Braibanti both consider this report as the most significant reform effort in Pakistan's history. For Braibanti, it is the most comprehensive administrative reform effort and the first to be undertaken under the aegis of martial law (Braibanti 1966: 223)

Reorganisation of Public Administration Committee:

This was a Standing Reorganisation Committee, appointed in 1962, under the chairmanship of Muhammad Shoaib, the then Finance Minister. Its main task was

the revival of the functional and structural reorganisation of public administration at the federal level in the light of the 1962 Constitution (Khan 2005: 92). It was made responsible for the follow-up and oversight of the implementation process.

Pay and Service Commission:

It was appointed by the Ministry of Finance under the chairmanship of A. R. Cornelius, the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in 1959. The terms of reference of the second (Cornelius) Pay and Service Commission were considerably broader than those of the earlier 1948 (Munir) Pay Commission (Braibanti 1966: 223). This report was classified and released later in 1969. The Commission proposed a thorough overhaul of the bureaucratic system inherited from the British (Kennedy 1987: 55). It recommended the unification of the disparate services into a seven-tiered structure (Gorvine 1965: 329). It suggested replacing the CSP with a Pakistan Administrative Service which would also include the technical services. Thus, the Cornelius Committee sought to end the elite character of the CSP and improve the status and mobility of the specialists in a significant manner (Islam 1989: 275). The provision of the inclusion of specialists in CSP in a significant manner sought to encourage a more participatory role of the civil society in the CSP. Thus, the inclination of the report was to democratise the institution of the CSP.

Hardin Report on Agricultural Administration:

This report was submitted to the Food and Agricultural Commission (FAC) by Charles M. Hardin, a World Bank consultant to Food and Agricultural Commission. Like the Gladieux Report, the Hardin Report was never published as a separate document; rather, it was incorporated in the FAC's Report as Chapters VI and VII. It provided several suggestions to improve the government machinery

in order to increase the agricultural production. According to Ralph Braibanti, these chapters are the best analysis of the secretariat and local administration in print, largely because they deal with the traditional bureaucratic system and rural development administration in a coordinated way (Braibanti 1966: 224).

The above-mentioned description of the various governmental reform commissions and committees shows that there have been rich sources of various plans and proposals to improve the civil administration in Pakistan.²⁶ They have identified the major structural weaknesses in Pakistan's civil service structure, which are: regional disparity in the selection of civil servants, the dominance of generalists in civil service and a politically motivated civil service which is devoid of the socio-economic needs of the society.

The characteristics of Pakistan's civil service, as discussed above, underline a dire need of reforms in Pakistan's administration. As most of the features were related to the British inheritance of civil service and particularly the CSP, there has existed a wide space to take the administration away from the colonial inheritance and adapt it to the indigenous needs of the society. The departure of the British from the subcontinent created the need to shift the state from a conventional administration based on law and order to the development administration based on the welfare of the citizens. The independence raised the expectations and hopes of the people for a better standard of living. The various experts, as have been shown above, of the Pakistani state, saw the civil service reforms as one of the answers to all these problems. Pakistan, since its inception, has a rich history of various committees and commissions which produced several invaluable suggestions to bring efficiency to Pakistan's administration. But on the other hand, the ruling regime in Pakistan remained interested only in the civil service manipulations driven by political interests, rather than reforming those services.

²⁶ A list of various steps which were undertaken to reform the civil service has been given in Annexure A.

Several committees and commissions, constituted from time to time, have recommended suggestions for reforming Pakistan's civil service. The main recommendations include the reports of the Rowland Egger Commission, the Report of Pakistan Government for National Development, and the Report of Pay and Service Commission. The main orientation of these reports was to address the dominance of generalists in Pakistan's civil service and a drastic decentralisation of power. As already mentioned, Rowland suggested that the higher posts in the secretariat be opened to officials from the technical service cadres. He found the recruitment standards outdated and the selection system self-perpetuating. Bernard Gladieux recommended drastic decentralisation. He said that the technical and professional civil servants also possessed administrative skills and should be encouraged to hold higher positions to check the centralisation of power in the hands of the generalists. Following the same line of recommendations, the reports of the Pay and Service Commission suggested the inclusion of technical services and technical personnel in the Pakistan Administrative Service.

CHAPTER 3: CIVIL SERVICE REFORM DURING **CIVILIAN REGIMES**

Civilians are referred to as being all those persons who do not belong to the military and under a civilian rule,²⁷ no member of the military can hold public office (Tischler 2013: 501). The origin of the term civilian can be traced to a French word “*civilian*” that meant “of the civil law”. It was used to denote the people who would not participate in a combat role. Where the term ‘civilian rule’ is concerned, it basically refers to a democratically elected government. It is a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and is exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation, usually involving free elections held periodically (Merriam Webster). It is a political system where an implicit bargain takes place among the representatives (Powell 2013: 207). The democratically elected civilian government derives its legitimacy by aligning itself to the rule of law and it is dependent on the claim that it is doing what its citizens want to do.

In 2004, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution wherein seven elements of a democratic government were identified (UN website un.org):

- Separation and balance of power
- Independence of the judiciary
- A pluralistic system of political parties and organisations

²⁷ While a military rule is nothing short of dictatorship, a civilian rule ensures that the military is answerable and accountable to the civilian government—a government chosen by the people. The nature of the military organisation is authoritarian and undemocratic, where one has to follow orders without raising a question, so it is very natural that the military rule turn into authoritarian rule. It has not only been in Pakistan but in other countries also like Myanmar and Thailand.

- Respect for the rule of law
- Accountability and transparency
- Free, independent and pluralistic media
- Respect for human and political rights; e.g., freedoms of association and expression; the right to vote and to stand in elections

*Separation and balance of power*²⁸ is essential for the protection against the tyranny of any one organ of the government i.e. the legislature, executive or judiciary. The essence of democracy is that political power should not be concentrated in any one branch, but should be distributed such that each branch can independently carry out its own respective function (Feiner and Feiner 2009: 400). The separation of power rests on two main principles. First, the competencies of the three branches of governmental power must be clearly delimited and defined. Second, all branches of government are bound by the rule of law functions (Meyer 2009: 8). Separation of power safeguards liberty by ensuring that all government power does not fall into the hands of single person or group of people (Janda et al. 2007: 69).

The separation of powers also involves the principle of *checks and balances* among the three organs of the political system. It forces the various organs of the government to work together and protects the people from worrying about the government abusing its power (McCormick 2007: 49). The system of checks and balances specifically works among all the three organs but it particularly means the *independence of judiciary*. The relationship between the legislature and the

²⁸ The concept of separation of powers has always been pondered over by scholars. Aristotle first talked about a 'mixed government or 'hybrid government'. The French philosopher Montesquieu, for the first time, developed this concept in a very systematic manner. In his book *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), Montesquieu described the separation of political power among the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. Montesquieu's approach was to present and defend a form of government which was not excessively centralised in the hands of a single monarch or similar ruler.

executive is very complex and forms the basis of two forms of government: the presidential and parliamentary (Capriola 2008: 1). From the perspective of an international consensus on the essential elements of democracy, the key issue is not the type of political system or government regime; both presidential and parliamentary systems are equally acceptable. Rather, the salient issue is that the elected legislators must have sufficient powers and competencies to exercise their functions, whose existence must not be merely customary (Meyer 2009: 8).

The other essential component of democracy is the *political party system*. By competing in elections and mobilising citizens behind particular visions of society as well as through their performance in the legislature, the political parties offer citizens meaningful choices in governance, avenues for political participation and opportunities to shape their country's future (National Democratic Institute 2015: 1). In order to maintain the people's faith in political parties, there is a need that these parties must be capable of responding to the needs of the society; otherwise, public confidence in the political parties is compromised and the entire democratic process suffers (Hofmeister 2011: 62). In all sustainable democracies, the party system must be deeply and durably entrenched in the fabric of society.

In a democratic system, the role of political parties is critical in forming the public opinion. They, in their effort to come closer to the people, organise public rallies, meetings, press conferences on important issues and provide the common people with an opportunity to analyse the pros and cons of various important issues (Goel 2015: 1). The political parties in more than one way unite, simplify and stabilise the political process of the country. The destabilising forces of localism, of sections, interests and geographical situations, are tackled by the political parties by making them part of their party ideology, thus pacifying the disintegrating forces and inducing cohesion (National Democratic Institute of International Affairs 2015: 1).

*The rule of law*²⁹ is one of the basic features which differentiates the civilian government from the military government which is the rule under martial law. As an inherent element of democracy, the rule of law therefore indicates that the will of the majority has clear and certain limits, not only in the form of universal human rights, but also in relation to the constitutional framework of a state (Meyer 2009: 12). It is also essential to preserve the rights of the minorities in a democracy, otherwise it becomes the tyranny of the majority. It is viewed as a credible limitation on arbitrariness and thus provides safeguards to the minorities (Morlino and Palombella 2010: 40).

Transparency and accountability are some other features which differentiate the civilian government from the military government. Openness and transparency are the key ingredients for building accountability and trust, which are necessary for the functioning of democracy (Gurria 2015: 1). These attributes are ensured by separation and division of power among the various institutions, freedom of speech, periodic elections, independent and autonomous institutions and right to information (Meyer 2009: 13-14). While transparency refers to the ability of the people to “see” what the government does, as opposed to the government acting in secret behind closed doors, accountability is the ability of the citizen to reward or punish its public officials for their performance. They both are closely and intimately interrelated. Unless sufficient transparency is present in a political system, full and accurate accountability cannot take place (Centre for Civic Education 2007: 106). Praise and blame cannot be meted out to the officeholders in a fair and rational way unless accurate and timely information regarding their actions and policies is available and known to the public.

²⁹ The rule of law is one of the basic principles of democracy. It safeguards the people from the arbitrary actions of those in power. It is a principle that not only the people but also the institutions are under law, a law that is fairly enforced and applied.

In a democracy, the *media* is called as the fourth pillar of democracy after the executive, legislature and judiciary (Kumar 2011: 1). It is a fundamental human right as accepted in Article 19³⁰ of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (un.org). Checking the concentration of power is one of the goals of democracy and free media is one of the means in this direction as it ensures that all organs are being closely watched and the conduct of the affairs of the government is to a large degree transparent (Centre for Civic Education 2007: 116). A free media plays an essential role in guaranteeing the freedom of expression and the freedom of information, both of which are necessary in facilitating the effective participation of the citizens in the democratic processes (Meyer 2009: 14). At the social level, a free press builds the basis of political debate and civil participation and at an individual level, it promotes intellectual emancipation and human welfare (Udlap, 2015: 1). The free media helps the citizen to be connected with the government and to ensure that the elected representatives do not deviate from the promises made during the election campaign. Thus, it helps to strengthen democratic values in society.

Civil and political rights are the essence of democracy as has been recognised by the United Nations International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (un.org). The link between democracy and human rights is interdependent, intricate, mutually supportive and symbiotic (Tommasoli 2013: 7). A functional democracy which accommodates diversity, promotes equality and protects individual freedom is increasingly becoming the best bet against the concentration of power in the hands of a few and the abuse of human rights. In turn, for the greatest protection of the civil and political rights it is necessary that the government should be grounded in the rule of law. In the United Kingdom, the Bill of Rights, 1688 and the Claim of Right of 1689, in France, the claim of the Right to

³⁰ Article 19 of the UNHRC says, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

Liberty, Equality and Fraternity as well as in the United States of America, the inclusion of the Bill of Rights by the first constitutional amendment shows the importance of civil and political rights in the democratic system (Klug et al. 2003: 37-39). The civilian rule is the rule of the majority and the protection of civil and political rights ensures that the rights of the minority will not be curbed. The rule of law guarantees that the majority will not abuse or use its power to violate the basic and inalienable rights of the minority (Democracy Web 2015: 1). The freedom of speech, assembly and to form organisations facilitates the scope to criticise the existing government and enables the people to participate in policymaking. The participation in policymaking by the people is the fundamental meaning of democracy (Cohen 1971: 4).

The Nature of the Civilian Regime in Pakistan

Before going into the details of the civil service reforms in Pakistan, it is essential to have an insight into the nature of the civilian regimes³¹ in Pakistan. It is necessary to understand if the civilian regime in Pakistan could fulfil the above-described preconditions which are the basis of democracy. It will be helpful to identify the impact of the civil service reforms upon the political system of Pakistan. The civilian regimes in Pakistan, elected by the people in the democratic setup established by the Constitution, has not been strong and the course of democracy has been obliterated under the impact of the frequent imposition of martial law, deviation from secularism and affiliation to Islamism as well as the violation of civil and political rights.

³¹ The democratic rule in Pakistan has been afflicted by military coups which have taken place from time to time. In the course of 70 years, the civilian regimes were restricted during 1972-79 (the regime of Z. A. Bhutto), 1988-90 (Benazir Bhutto), 1990-1993 (Nawaz Sharif), 1993-96 (Benazir Bhutto), 1997-99 (Nawaz Sharif), 2008-13 (Yousaf Raza Gillani) and 2013-present (Nawaz Sharif).

Any civilian government, elected on the basis of a free and fair election, will lack substance if this electoral process is not coupled with the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and the civil and political rights and freedoms of the people. The state must practise the principle of equal citizenship irrespective of religion, caste, ethnicity and regional background. The state must also ensure the equality of opportunity to all for the advancement in social, economic and political domains and guarantee the security of life and property of its citizens (Rizvi 2015: 1).

To understand the nature of the civilian regimes in Pakistan, their attributes and characteristics can be categorised into two parts: political institutions and political democratic values. In Pakistan, the democratic political institutions as established from time to time under the different constitutions were not provided with a sufficient time and scope to develop and take root. Their spontaneous development was hampered by the frequent imposition of military rule. It can be substantiated by the fact that it was only after 66 years of independence that in Pakistan, a civilian government could complete its term and lead to another civilian government (Nasir 2015: 1). Similarly, due to many problems like corruption, nepotism, authoritarianism and feudalism, democratic values have not been able to flourish in the society and be ultimately reflected in the polity. Due to all these reasons, there is no surprise that in the Democracy Index 2015,³² Pakistan is ranked 108 among 167 countries under the category of “hybrid regime”³³ with a score of just 4.64.

³² The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit that measures the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 165 are UN member states. The index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories measuring pluralism, civil liberties and political culture. In addition to a numeric score and ranking, the index categorises the countries as being one of four regime types: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes.

³³ As per the Democracy Index, hybrid regimes are nations where consequential irregularities exist in the elections, regularly preventing them from being fair and free. These nations commonly have governments which apply pressure on the political opponents, a non-independent judiciary, widespread corruption, harassment and pressure being placed on the media, an anaemic rule of

Political Institutions

Pakistan is an Islamic and Federal Parliamentary Republic (Article 1(1)–6(3), the Constitution of Pakistan). The institutional setup of Pakistan, as established by the Constitution, has been marred by a time-to-time military intervention. This military intervention has led to various problems regarding the democratic institutions and they can be described as follows:

Power Imbalance

The institutions in the democratic setup have their own functions and mandate which should be done by them and any encroachment upon their jurisdiction will lead to structural dysfunctionality as Almond and Powell has called it (Almond and Powell 1966: 44). In Pakistan, there has existed an institutional imbalance which it inherited from the British rule. It means that the bureaucracy, military and intelligence services were more organised and powerful than the political and democratic institutions (Askari 2014: 7). Pakistan had to build and strengthen the democratic institutions patiently and gradually. But the encroachment of military has reinforced the power imbalance among the various institutions of Pakistan's political system. Pakistan has had a long record of Army involvement in politics and according to Shuja Nawaz, the author of *Crossed Swords*, the Pakistani history is one of conflict between an underdeveloped political system and a well-organised army that grows in numbers and political strength; "Whenever there is a breakdown in...stability, as has happened frequently in Pakistan, the military translates its potential into the will to dominate ..." (Nawaz 2008: xxvii).

The power imbalance among the institutions leads to the centralisation of power (Atlee and Atlee 2014: 1). The sharing of political power is necessary to check any

law and more pronounced faults than flawed democracies in the realms of an underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics and issues in the functioning of governance.

centralisation of political power in the hands of any one institution or person (Gupta 2007: 2-10). There is a need for a full political discourse and debate in an environment of liberty and freedom of speech, free from any manipulation. In Pakistan, this sharing of political power could not take place as the free and independent process of political discourse was obstructed by an intervention of the intelligence agencies (Kamran 2014: 128). The active political role of the intelligence agencies has restrained the autonomous and spontaneous development of the civilian institutions and processes. During the military rules of General Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, the intelligence agencies were used to divide and fragment the political forces. The war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan (1980-1989) and the linkages between the Pakistani intelligence agencies and their US counterparts in the context of the Afghan war helped to put more material resources at the disposal of Pakistan's intelligence agencies (Askari 2014: 7). The interference of these intelligence agencies in the national and provincial elections has raised doubts over the genuineness of the political process as well as in the widening of the scope of these agencies.

The Decay of Parliamentary Democracy

With repeated efforts by the military to intervene in the government process either directly or indirectly, the parliamentary system of government has suffered a lot. The military has at least thrice (by General Ayub Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf) tried to reorient the parliamentary form of government towards some sort of semi-presidential form of government³⁴ (Iqbal 2012: 1). This

³⁴The semi-presidential system provides a middle ground between a purely parliamentary and a purely presidential form of government. It is a form of government in which a directly elected president shares the executive power with a prime minister and a government appointed by and serving with the continuing confidence of a democratically elected legislature (Stacy and Chaudhury, "Semi-Presidential Government in the Post-Authoritarian Context", [Online: Web], Accessed 12/10/2015, URL: <http://constitutionaltransitions.org/publications/semi-presidential-government-in-the-post-authoritarian-context/>)

has not only weakened the Parliament but also the post of the Prime Minister who is supposed to be the chief of the government in this system. This trend could be witnessed just after independence when the viceregal supervisory authority, the Governor-General, dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1954 when it tried to usurp his powers (Akhtar 2014: 2).

There are some certain provisions in every parliamentary democracy to deal with the concentration of powers in any one institution and for this there some institutional checks and balances as given in the constitution. However, sufficient care must be taken in minimising the scope of discretion and thus the misuse of power by any one institution. In Pakistan's Constitution, this type of power was inserted by the Eighth Amendment in the form of Article 58-2(b) by the Majlis-e-Shura³⁵ in the absence of an elected parliament. As per the provision of Article 58-2(b), "*the President shall dissolve the National Assembly if a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and an appeal to electorate is necessary*"³⁶. Apparently, this amendment provided a large scope for discretion by the President.

In fact, in the absence of safeguards like the compulsory judicial review of the decision or the responsibility on the President to prove the constitutional malfunctioning of the Parliament, the emergency provisions of Article 58-2(b) became handy for the President to seize political power (Akhtar 2008: 4). This article was first used by General Zia-ul-Haq to dismiss the civilian government of the Centre under the Prime Ministership of Muhammad Khan Junejo as well as those in the provinces (Malik 2008: 1). Similarly, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan

³⁵ Pakistan's parliament is officially called as the Majlis-e-Shura. It is a federal and supreme legislative body.

³⁶ The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, [Online: Web], Accessed 23rd of June 2015, URL: http://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf

used this Article to dismiss the government of Benazir Bhutto in 1990 and Nawaz Sharif in 1993, while President Farooq Leghari dismissed Benazir Bhutto's government in 1996 (Iqbal 2012: 1). All the governments were dismissed on corruption charges, which could not be proved against any of them in a court of law despite spending billions of rupees of the taxpayers (Malik 2008: 1). In 1993, although the Nawaz Sharif government was reinstated as per the instructions of the Supreme Court, in other cases the judiciary has been too weak to protect the legitimacy of the elected government.

Consequently, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were passed, repealing the Eighth Amendment and gave the elected government a legal immunity from being dismissed. However, the situation got reversed again by the 17th Amendment. It was passed by the Musharraf government and it weakened severely the civilian institutions of Pakistan (Sharif 2002). It downgraded the institution of the parliament as subservient to the President (Rizvan et al. 2014: 150). The parliamentary spirit seemed to have been restored with the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment as it has paved the way for a democratic rule in the future and blocks all the ways which were used in the past to derail the democratic system (Hussain 2012: 82).

Guided Democracy

The manipulation of democracy has been presented under various nomenclatures like "basic democracy"³⁷ by General Ayub Khan and "true democracy"³⁸ by

³⁷ Having a disbelief in the sufficiency of a sophisticated parliamentary democracy, Ayub introduced a new system in the name of 'Basic Democracy'. He promised that this system will bring democracy to the doorstep of the people through their direct participation. It was a four-tier hierarchical system: the Union Council, the Tehsil Council, the District Council and the Division Council. The system had many flaws and could not take root in Pakistan and was disbanded in 1969.

³⁸ General Musharraf claimed to bring true democracy in place of a "sham democracy" which he claimed was existent in Pakistan at that time. He abrogated the Constitution in 1999 and said that it will help the 'true democracy' to flourish in Pakistan.

General Pervez Musharraf (Vorys 2015: 230). These terms were used to garb the military dictatorship and present the military rule as a civilian rule (Siddiqui 2002: 1). The argument given was that the country and Pakistani society are not ready for a full and complete freedom and democracy has to evolve through checks on it by the President (Akhtar 2008: 9). The scope of an autonomous political action by the civilian leaders depends upon their ability to maintain a cordial interaction with the top military commanders (Askari 2014: 5). The Army holds the upper hand on political matters, even during the periods of the civilian government (Akhtar 2008: 10). The October 1999 dismissal of the Nawaz Sharif government is a case in point. Acutely aware of Pakistan's precarious economic situation, Sharif was keen to divert the country's limited economic resources from defence to development. By entering into a substantive dialogue with New Delhi, he had also hoped to ease the bilateral relations and sideline the military internally. The PML-N under Nawaz Sharif having a majority in the Parliament, also repealed Article 58(2)B, eliminating the President's power to dismiss the elected governments. Not unsurprisingly, the Army sabotaged his peace overtures to India by sending troops into Kargil. Wary of the Army's discontent, Sharif made a futile attempt to remove General Musharraf when the former was on a trip to Sri Lanka. The Army then seized power, dismissed the Prime Minister and suspended the Parliament and the Constitution (Shah 2014: 7).

The Judiciary as an Institution

The autonomy and independence of the judiciary make it the most important pillar of democracy. Unfortunately, the judiciary in Pakistan has not been able to perform its assigned duty of being the harbinger of equality and truth (Jha 2009: 62); neither has it been able to protect the Constitution of Pakistan. For long, judiciary in Pakistan was seen as playing a pliant role to the military dictatorship (Jetly 2012: 1), leading to this harsh observation from one commentator, "In short, Pakistan's supreme court has followed the path of least resistance and least fidelity to

constitutional principles.....the courts have been the military's handmaiden in extra-constitutional assaults on the democratic order" (Kausar 2012: 30).

Attempting to explain its failure to protect the Constitution through "the doctrine of necessity",³⁹ the judiciary has relied on the dubious argument that the Army's intervention could be justified because of the pressing needs of political stability (ICG 2008: 8). However, it is also true that the judiciary by itself cannot be the saviour of democracy until and unless the other political institutions are also strong. Under the "doctrine of necessity", the Supreme Court validated General Muhammad Ayub Khan's 1958 declaration of martial law, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's 1977 coup and General Pervez Musharraf's 1999 coup (ICG 2008: 8). The costs of repeated judicial ratifications of the extraconstitutional actions have been borne by the constitutional fabric and by the courts' legitimacy (ICG 2004: 7).

In Pakistan, judges from the subordinate courts are eligible to be appointed on the ex-cadre posts in the bureaucracy (ICG 2004: 3). This is a clear violation of the principle of separation of powers which is in fact the bedrock of democracy. This provides a scope that the judges at the subordinate positions could give a verdict in the favour of the executive so that they can be appointed on lucrative posts. It hurts the principle of natural justice which demands that the jury should not be biased in any case. Apart from that, the existence of a series of courts outside the hierarchical structure of the main judiciary is also responsible for the weakening of the judiciary in Pakistan, for example the *Shariat Court* which was established by General Zia-ul-Haq with the jurisdiction to review the laws for their repugnancy with the Islamic injunctions (Khan 2002: 640). This is against the principle of secularism on

³⁹ The "doctrine of necessity" has been very controversial in Pakistan. It was discovered by Justice Mohammad Munir in 1958. It is the basis on which extralegal actions by state actors, which are designed to restore order, are found to be constitutional. The maxim on which the doctrine is based originated in the writings of the medieval jurist Henry de Bracton, and similar justifications for this kind of extralegal action have been advanced by more recent legal authorities, including William Blackstone.

which democracy is based. Similarly, there have been established the military courts to try the cases of terrorism outside the mainstream criminal justice system which is a clear encroachment of the military into the arena of the judiciary. It is contradictory from the perspectives of human rights and other aspects of democracy (Goethals 2015: 3). The judiciary has also failed to invalidate the discriminatory religious legislation which has undermined the rule of law, encouraged vigilantism and emboldened the religious extremists (Bouvier and Casadia 2009: 38).

Under the military rule, the judiciary placed its personal survival over the rule of law and was unable to protect the Constitution from sweeping changes by the military (Ghous and Anjum 2014: 2). The judiciary also failed to identify the threat to the rule of law from the Eighth Amendment⁴⁰ introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq and the Seventeenth Amendment⁴¹ by General Pervez Musharraf. The task of protecting the Constitution was put on hold when the judiciary was forced to take an oath to his Provisional Constitutional Order, 1999, superseding the oath it had sworn at the induction of the 1973 Constitution (Bouvier and Casadia 2009: 12). The judges who denied doing so were removed and thus the judiciary was purged from the anti-military elements. The reconstituted court now consisted of only those judges who were ready to accept the military's instruction (Gazdar 2009: 10).

The new phase of judicial activism post-2005, which has been referred to as the judicialisation of politics in Pakistan under the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

⁴⁰ The Eighth Amendment allowed the President to unilaterally dissolve the National Assembly and the elected governments. The Majlis-e-Shura amended the Constitution of Pakistan in 1985 and the law stayed on until its repeal in 1997.

⁴¹ The Seventeenth Amendment was passed in December 2003, after over a year of political wrangling between the supporters and opponents of President Pervez Musharraf. Many of these changes dealt with the office of the President and the reversal of the effects of the Thirteenth Amendment. Also, the Legal Framework Order of President Musharraf was largely incorporated into the Constitution.

of Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, has led to a confrontation between the executive and the judiciary (Waseem 2012: 19). This cannot be called as a healthy tradition for the consolidation of democracy in Pakistan.

Political Parties

Political parties are an essential part of democracy. In Pakistan, there is a multiparty system which is led mainly by two opposing parties: the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (Akhtar 2011; 9). The internal democracy of a political party which is essential to build the democracy in any country is very weak in Pakistan (Hussain 2014: 1).

There are many parameters to judge the existence of internal democracy in any political party like regular and competitive party elections, the effectiveness of intraparty structures such as the Central Executive Committee,⁴² the number of party officials elected vs those who were nominated, the role of the local party leaders in selecting the party candidates for legislatures, the regular meetings of the parliamentary parties, the tradition of annual general meetings or conventions, the discouragement of a dynastic leadership, a regular change in party leadership, a broad funding base and credible party accounts, the tolerance of dissent within the party, a democratic decision-making process, an active participation of women, youth and minorities in the party affairs and a current and comprehensive party website. On most of the parameters, Pakistan's political parties have a dismal show (PILDAT 2014: 72). The parties are also affected by the periodic restrictions on political activities under the military rule, infrequent elections, a weak organisational structure and poor discipline among the members, the absence of

⁴² The Central Executive Committee of a political party is an apex governing body with executive powers. The character of this committee shows whether the functioning of the party is democratic or authoritarian. The method of selection of its members, decision-making procedures and transformation of membership shows the democratic character of the CEC which is very necessary to promote the democratic values in a country.

attractive socio-economic programmes and a paucity of financial resources. The prevalent factionalism based on personality, region and ideology in the political parties of Pakistan has adversely affected the growth of this most essential institution of the democratic system (Askari 2014: 8).

The Militarisation of Institutions

The roots of democracy in Pakistan have not been able to flourish because the Army having once tasted power, has never really let go. Periods of military rule have dented Pakistan's democracy three times in the history of just 66 years (Iqbal 2015: 1). Pakistan's military has always been engaged in a power struggle with the civilian leadership (MacKenzie 2014: 3). It has spread out in the government and semi-government institutions and pursues wide-ranging commercial and business activities, especially in the fields of industry, transport, healthcare, education and real estate development (Askari 2014: 5).

The accommodation of military elites in the civilian political system has eroded the democratic institutions in more than one way. This military government is not based on the people's participation, transparency and accountability, which are supposed to be the essentials of democracy, but has led to the centralisation of political power in the hands of military-headed institution i.e. the President and thus undermined the parliamentary system of government.

The militarisation of the political system has reached such an extent in Pakistan that no institution has been left untouched, whether it is the political parties, the legislature, parliament or other civilian institutions (Human Rights Watch 2002: 247). The military rulers, in order to gain legitimacy in a civilian system, replicated the civilian processes particularly in 1985-89 and 2003-2008. For example, General Pervez Musharraf held elections by forming his own political party called PMN (Q) and used the intelligence agencies for political purposes (Askari 2014: 5).

Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, has an influence over the civilian institutions⁴³ which also hampers the growth of democratic institutions in Pakistan. There is the tendency of growing power and involvement of the ISI and the military intelligence in the domestic political and civil issues (Chengappa 2012: 1). The ISI, a highly effective counter-intelligence entity, has often been called as a 'rogue agency' or a 'state within a state' (Wilkinson 2008: 1). Sumit Ganguly has highlighted the challenge of controlling this hydra-headed monster and making it answerable to the civilian institutions:

“Can the ISI ever be reined in? There is no clear cut answer to this question. However, for the foreseeable future it would be naive and indeed risky for any civilian leader to drastically curb its powers or try to render it accountable by a public diktat....Any civilian regime hoping to make the organization more accountable will first to think about the best to limit the privileges of the Pakistan army. Until they can devise some institutional means to make the army more accountable to civilian authority, any attempts to control the activities of the ISI will not only be futile but dangerous.”

The question before us is that whether the establishment of political institutions as per the Western model of democracy is possible in Pakistan? The answer seems to be 'no', as these institutions like the legislature, executive, political parties, media and even the judiciary today are not able to function as per the mandates assigned to them by the Constitution. This has eroded the general public belief in the political system to such an extent that the civilian government in Pakistan is supposed to be very weak and unable to take independent decisions by itself without the backing of military. Even some of the critics have called the civilian government as a mask and that it is the military and the ISI which call the shots from behind (Chengappa 2014: 1, Rabbani 2012: 5). The degree of the weakening of democratic institutions in Pakistan can be anticipated from the fact that today the

⁴³ Reasserting a civilian control over the intelligence agencies is a primary challenge in most countries. In Pakistan, the ISI is accused of as being the main arm of the military. The growing influence of the ISI over civilian institutions has been highlighted by many scholars such as Shuja Nawaz, Pervez Hoodbhoy and others, as well as the International Crisis Group reports.

civilian government is supposed to be unable to deal with any serious crisis which Pakistan faces, both internally and externally.

Political and Democratic Values

Building democratic values⁴⁴ in a society is not an easy task and it requires patience, time and most importantly, a consensus among the powerful groups and elites in a society on the desirability of the rule of law and governance through the consent of people (Shafqat 1998: 283). The natural process development of democratic values in Pakistan has been obstructed due to the inefficiency of the political leadership, the frequent imposition of martial law and the consequent disruption of the consensus-building process among the different political stakeholders, the rise of militancy and Islamic terrorism and prevalent feudal values. Due to these obstructions, the spontaneous development of institutions as well as the values of a democratic political system could not take place in Pakistan.

One of the main reasons for the lack of development of the democratic values has been the inefficiency of political leadership. In a democracy, the role of political parties is very important for political socialisation. The methods adopted by them in harmonising the diverse interests of the society, like organising rallies, debates and discourses through non-violent means, lead to the development of democratic values. In Pakistan, the political parties have failed to create a pro-democracy environment and most importantly, to develop a policy framework in which conflict may be resolved through negotiation by making bargains and by building consensus (Salim 2005: 1)). The political leaders while struggling for democracy, show an enthusiasm for democracy but upon assuming power, show authoritarian attitudes rather than democratic ones, flout the rule of law and defy the tolerance of

⁴⁴ Of the two pillars of democracy, the democratic structure and democratic values, the latter is one of the more important features of democracy. The democratic values of liberty, equality and justice were evolved during the Renaissance and Reformation movements in Europe and were further consolidated during the American Revolution (1776) and the French Revolution (1789).

the political opposition (Shafqat 1998: 284). The indulgence of politicians in acts of corruption has also contributed to a public disenchantment of both politics and the political process (Haqqani 2006: 219). It is not a surprise then that the military dictators have been presented as the saviours of democracy in Pakistan.

The feudal values and system⁴⁵ that prevails in Pakistan is also responsible for the erosion of democratic values in society. Feudalism is so strong that in Pakistan, it is said that it is a case of elite re-adjustment and there has never been the case where the voter decides everything (Rasool 2014: 1). It has tremendous influence in the corridors of power. In the initial days of the Muslim League's formation, much of its leadership—especially from the areas which later became part of Pakistan—was composed of wealthy and powerful landlords and feudal and tribal leaders. Their interest lay in maintaining the status quo; they never had any particular affinity for democratic values (Rasheed 2015: 1). After independence also, the feudal class not only still continues to exist but has gained in strength and influence in the Pakistani politics. Many of those who occupy the prominent positions in political parties, both ruling and opposition alike, belong to this class and their interests lie in the perpetuation of the present feudalistic system. They hurt the democratic process because there is no space for the common people to take part in politics and in the elections or to challenge them (Ali 2014: 1).

Pakistan's elite are the master manipulators of the government mechanisms. It does not matter for them who is in power; the Army, political parties, judiciary and bureaucracy—all important institutions are under their control (Jha 2009: 89). Under democratic rule, they form political parties, participate in elections and become part of the ruling classes. In case of a military government, they have

⁴⁵ Pakistan inherited not only the colonial structure of the bureaucracy but also the feudal system. The concentration of resources in terms of the ownership of land leads to inequality and constrains the fair functioning of democracy. The problem of feudalism and feudal values and how it has affected the district-level bureaucracy has been particularly highlighted by A. Imam in her book, *Public Administration and Democracy in Pakistan*.

supported every coup in order to preserve and protect their privileges and properties (Ali 2014: 1).

The institutional setup for democracy has to be strengthened with the incorporation of democratic values in the socio-political life. Pakistan, a declared Islamic republic,⁴⁶ has deviated from secular values which are necessary to protect the interests of the religious minorities of the country—for example, the President of Pakistan according to its constitutional provisions must be a Muslim (Article 41(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan). The legacy of General Zia-ul-Haq has manipulated the civilian law of the country as per the Sharia law (ICG 2005: 3-4). The adherence of the state to Islamic tenets coupled with the state's policy of tolerance or certain level of protectionism to various non-state actors for various purposes has led to the spread of Islamic terrorism in Pakistan. The steady growth of Islamic extremism has further hurt the right to dissent. The opposite opinion is intimidated with violence, imposition of blasphemy, etc. The murder of Salman Taseer, a supporter of the abolition of the blasphemy law (Hoodbhoy 2012) as well as the brutal murder of the investigative reporter Saleem Shahzad (Walsh 2011: 1) are symbols of the decaying democratic values in Pakistan.

The need for developing a consensus has not been recognised in the democratic polity of Pakistan. In a democratic system, both political debate and discourse matter a lot and are part of an essential process to reach the level of a consensus (Weinberger 2012: 218). But in Pakistan, the tradition of political intolerance has frittered away whatever consensus had been reached on some of the issues; it has been done either by the fragmentation tactics adopted by the military rulers or due

⁴⁶ Pakistan was declared as an Islamic Republic by the promulgation of the first Constitution in 1956; Islam was declared as the official religion. It was against the vision of Qaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as has been reflected in many of his speeches including the one on August 11, 1947; "In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims—Hindus, Christians, and Parsis — but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan."

to the own weaknesses of the political parties. It is in the environment of debate and discourse that the rule of law, respect for procedures, fair play and justice, equality before law—irrespective of caste, creed, religion or status— thrive. These are the principles on which democracies are built. Widespread corruption and self-interested politicians have also ruined any chance of an effective governance, while the bureaucrats, police and other public servants have failed to deliver the badly needed public services (MacKenzie 2014: 3).

Under the concerned period of the thesis, i.e. 1973-2008, the term of the civilian regimes can be classified into two broad periods: (1) the civilian regime under the Prime Ministership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1973-79) and (2) the civilian regimes during 1989 to 1999. The “civilian regime”—a democratically elected government—is considered better for the welfare of the people and is more conducive to reform the administrative machinery in order to bring changes according to the changing societal needs (Ghinder 2009: 11-13). The timely elections of political representatives ensure that the political system will be responsive to the needs of the changing society and consequently, changes in the structure can be introduced. As people’s rights and civil liberties are recognised in a democracy, it is supposed that civilian and political rights are ensured better in a democracy than an authoritarian regime (Warren 2015: 6). Again, the elements of bureaucratic organisation, i.e. impartiality, professionalism and independence from political interference, can better be ensured in a democratic setup (Ensch 2015: 1). In this context, it is interesting to explore the civilian regimes in Pakistan and to look into the steps that have been taken for bringing changes in the civil service machinery.

The Civilian Regime and Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan

Of the two periods, the first period under Z. A. Bhutto was more important in terms of structural reforms in the civil service system of Pakistan as for the first time after

independence, thorough changes in the structure of the civil service were brought about by Bhutto (Chaudry 2015: 1). However, the second period is also no less important. Although, no structural changes were brought to the civil service, the fragility of the democratic government certainly affected the overall efficiency of the administrative machinery (Hippler 2012: 1).

Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto (hereafter Bhutto) came to power in 1971 (Rizvi 2015: 6). His government was the first elected civilian government in the history of Pakistan (Khan 2005: 67). Therefore, the first priority was to restructure Pakistan's political, economic and social institutions to reassert the supremacy of the civilian government (Panhwar 2008: 3-4). His main concern was to have a political and legal system which might suit his own style of working. For the first, he prepared a legal and constitutional base for his thorough reforms in the form of the 1973 Constitution (Jaffrelot 2004: 76).⁴⁷ In this way, he secured a legal system which prepared the background for changing the other institutions. The most prominent changes he brought were related to Pakistan's civil service, judiciary system and military bureaucracy (Siddiqui 2012: 33).

The revolutionary changes which were brought to the civil service machinery were more important as they changed radically, the core character of Pakistan's bureaucracy (Siddiqui 2012: 33). These reforms were introduced at the recommendation of a committee under the chairmanship of Khurshid Hasan Meer, the then Minister of the Establishment Division (Maheshwari 2002: 26). Formed in April 1972, the committee was required to chalk out an action programme of administrative reforms, keeping in sight the current requirements (Khan 2005: 92). Apart from Khursheed Hasan Meer, the other members of the committee were Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (Minister of Political Affairs), Faizullah Kundi (Chairman,

⁴⁷The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, was the third Constitution with the first and the second being in 1958 and 1962, respectively. It was drafted by the 12th Parliament under the Prime Ministership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The main purpose was to establish a parliamentary democracy and to replace the Legal Framework Order, 1970.

Federal Public Service Commission) and Waqar Ahmad (Establishment Secretary) (Syed 1992: 136).

Bhutto's main purpose behind bringing the administrative reforms was to discontinue the colonial legacy of bureaucracy—an organisation which should have been with the disappearance of the foreign rule (Maheshwari 2002: 26). One of the main features of this colonial legacy was that it centralised power in the hands of a small group of civil servants, i.e. the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the direct descendant of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) (Khan, 2015: 1). For devising a strategy to break the monopoly of the CSP, Bhutto carefully chose those persons who were having a personal grudge against it. Although the committee was chaired by Meer, the real spadework was done by the then Establishment secretary, Waqar Ahmad, who harboured a personal grudge against the ICS/CSP as he had failed to qualify for the ICS in the 1930s and thus been appointed to the Indian Audit and Accounts Services (Chaudry 2011: 110). The committee also received considerable help from Hassan Habib (then Principal, Pakistan Administrative Staff College), who had been opposed to the CSP for many years. The committee also appeared to have been influenced by the reasoning of Justice A. R. Cornelius, a former Chief Justice of Pakistan and the most senior member of the CSP, who was also a vigorous critic of its role and ethos (Syed 1992: 137). The committee considered the following as the major issues regarding Pakistan's administration (Islam 1989: 276):

- Unification of the service structure
- Eradication of corruption
- Reorganisation of recruitment agencies
- The secretariat and departmental organisation
- The field administration

Although the committee did not make any detailed recommendation on items 2, 4 and 5, it made major recommendations regarding item 3. It recommended

combining the Federal Public Service Commission and the Establishment Division into a Central Management Agency responsible for the personnel function. It also recommended for the unification of the service structure. Another significant but controversial recommendation was to institute a two-way traffic of personnel between the public and private sectors to permit the government to recruit talented people from the banking, trade and industry sectors for senior-level positions in the government (Government of Pakistan 1981: 276).

The timing of the committee was fateful. Pakistan, at that time, was experiencing unprecedented floods.⁴⁸ This natural calamity exposed the inadequacy of the bureaucracy in terms of the tasks entrusted to it and poignantly underlined the necessity of reforms in the public administration of the country (Maheshwari 2002: 27). Apart from the immediate situation in the form of floods, various other reasons also formed the background of a public resentment against the then civil administration in the country, wherein, three main factors were more prominent and led to the 1973 reforms:

- Student disturbances of 1968-69
- Dismemberment of the country
- The rise of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to power (Shafqat 1999: 1005-1006).

⁴⁸ The catastrophic floods of 1973 were one of the major floods ever recorded in the history of Pakistan. They affected a large area of the country, thus highlighting the fact that the flood forecasting arrangements in the country were still inadequate and did not meet its requirements. These floods, thus, paved the way for full-fledged activities for the further strengthening of the flood forecasting system (Economic Impact of Flood in Pakistan, [Online: Web], Accessed 12 July 2015, URL: <http://floodvictims-pakistan.blogspot.in/2010/10/economic-impact-of-flood-in-pakistan.html>).

The anti-Ayub movement during 1968-69 was very significant. In this movement, the resentment against the structure of the administration of the country figured prominently (Eisenberg 2013: 1). People from all walks of life, including those in the government services, condemned the administrative structure on several grounds and the bureaucracy was seen as a relic of the colonial past consisting of a ruler-and-ruled relationship between the administration and the people, and consequently unsuited to the needs and aspirations of a free and sovereign people (Kennedy 1987: 77). At the same time, the report of the Cornelius Committee also argued for bringing a vital improvement in the administrative system as well as for strengthening the democracy (Haque 1970: 145-149). During this protest, people from the civilian bureaucracy also joined the demonstrations aimed at the elite structure of bureaucracy, demanding a radical restructuring of the system for bringing equality into the administration (Paracha 2014: 1). Most of the demands from the civilian bureaucracy were for uniformity in the bureaucracy and for ending the monopoly of the CSP in filling the higher ranks of, for e.g., postal employees, Telegraph Engineers Association as well as the Custom and Excise Service, which all demanded an enhancement of their own cadres. Similarly, the Central Superior Services Association, which was saving those representing the CSP and the PFS, called for a radical restructuring of the service structure of Pakistan in its petition (Kennedy 1987: 76). Thus, the 1968-69 protests⁴⁹ were by the public against the bureaucracy as a whole and for its being an inefficient institution, by the professionals and specialists against the generalists and by the lower-cadre officers against the elite CSP for an enhancement of their status. As per the response to the demands to reform the public administration, in 1969, General Yahya Khan appointed the Services Reorganisation Committee (Sabharwal and

⁴⁹ The author Lal Khan in his book *Pakistan's Other Story: The Revolution of 1968-69*, has analysed various factors which led to one of the largest mass movements in the history of Pakistan. According to him, the overwhelming influence of security concerns over economic policies, the impact of similar global movements, brutal and repressive dictatorships, a widening disparity between the rich and the poor and the alienation of smaller provinces were some of the factors which led to this mass mobilisation.

Berman 2013: 463). Thus, the framework for civil service reform started in 1969 itself. Gen. Yahya also passed a regulation under which 303 Class I officers were removed (Akhtar 2003: 252).

The Indo-Pak war which led to the dismemberment of the country, also undermined the position of the bureaucracy (Kennedy 1987: 78). The bureaucracy in general and the CSP in particular were held responsible for the dismemberment of the country, and thus, the prestige and power of the CSP was challenged (Shafqat 1999: 1000). Also, the creation of Bangladesh presented the need for a reorganisation of the bureaucracy because many officers opted for Bangladeshi citizenship. It left the most immediate consequence on the administrative system of Pakistan as 39 per cent of the total officials opted for service in Bangladesh (Kennedy 1987: 78-80). Each cadre underwent a severe curtailment. The PFS was the least affected but still lost 23 per cent of its officers. Pakistan's Postal Service, the worst affected, lost 48 per cent of its cadre strength (Kennedy 1987: 80). The CSP lost a significant portion of its strength in the federal government. In the aftermath of the war, 89 CSP officers holding posts at the policymaking level (deputy secretary and above) opted for Bangladesh. Among them, 28 had held posts at the level of joint secretary and above. On the other hand, other Class I services—though they may have lost proportionally more than the CSP officers—lost for the most part, the officers who were serving out their careers in the provincial government and thus as a consequence did not lose the same degree of relative control over the affairs of the federal government (Akhtar 2003: 254). To put it simply, the Bengali CSP officers before the formation of Bangladesh had held more influential posts than the Bengali non-CSP officers. Therefore, when they opted for Bangladesh, the CSP lost relatively more influence when compared to the other cadres. The 1971 war most adversely affected the public image of the bureaucracy and the previous government was blamed as being inefficient and incompetent (Sadaat 2013: 1).

The electoral victory of the PPP in West Pakistan and the kind of attack on bureaucracy that Bhutto and his party started during the anti-Ayub movement, emerged as important contributory factors for the administrative reforms (Eisenberg 2013: 1). Prime Minister Bhutto's motive was to establish political supremacy over the senior bureaucracy⁵⁰ and to break the power monopoly of the CSP. Bhutto, as the leader of the PPP, had directly experienced the heavy hand of the bureaucracy when it was curbing the basic political freedoms of the people (Burki 1980: 100). After getting hold of political power, he was determined to challenge the dominant position of the CSP.

Acting on the recommendation of the Meer Committee, the Bhutto government announced the following measures for the administrative reforms on August 20, 1973 (Maheshwari 2002: 27):

- All service cadres including those of the CSP were abolished and replaced by occupational groups.
- The long-standing practice of reservation of certain posts in the Central Secretariat for the members of elite cadres was discontinued.
- A unified pay scale system of thirty-three grades was introduced which replaced the numerous pay scales numbering more than 600.
- A programme of joint pre-service training was established.
- A system of lateral recruitment at all levels of the federal bureaucracy was introduced to bring the technocrats or technical specialists from different professions into the civil service.
- A horizontal movement from one occupational group to another was now made possible.

⁵⁰ The power imbalance among the various institutions has been one of the concerns of the political analysts. It has been highlighted by Shuja Nawaz in *Crossed Swords* that in Pakistan, the security conditions after the creation of the country led to the dominance of the military and the civilian bureaucracy and that the democratic institutions were not allowed to flourish.

- All federal government employees, regardless of their method and source of recruitment, were to be governed by the Civil Servants Act 1973.

Removal of Constitutional Guarantees

Bhutto also prepared a legal ground for his structural reforms. In the 1973 Constitution, the constitutional security⁵¹ provided to the civil servants since 1935 was removed (Wilder 2010: 23). The provision of constitutional security gave an exceptional sense of security to the civil servants, when combined with the system of reservations of posts for one part of the bureaucracy—the CSP; they together created what Bhutto called ‘the Brahmins’ of the administrative structure (Ziring 1974: 1088). It was first introduced in the Government of India Act, 1935, due to the experience of the rule of dyarchy in 1919. It was limited to the services under the Crown only. After independence, this constitutional safeguard of the services was retained and extended to all services. According to the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, the following constitutional protections had been extended to the civil servants in Pakistan (Khan 2005: 108):

- Any person serving in the affairs of the federation appointed by the Secretary of State for India or the Secretary of State-in-Council, would not be dismissed by any authority subordinate to the Governor-General.
- Any such person serving in the affairs of a province would not be dismissed from the service by any authority subordinate to the Governor of a Province.
- Any civil servant, not falling in the above categories, would not be dismissed from service by any authority subordinate to the one by which he was appointed.

⁵¹ In the extension of the “doctrine of pleasure” where the British civil servants remain in office at the pleasure of the Crown, in Pakistan’s Constitution, they do so at the pleasure of the President. However, in order to inculcate a sense of security and fair play, the tenure of the civil servants is protected by the Constitution and they can be removed only through due procedure.

- Any civil servant as aforesaid would not be dismissed or reduced in rank until he was given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. However, this protection was not extended to the persons dismissed or reduced in rank on the grounds of conduct, leading to their conviction on a criminal charge.

Now, the provisions related to the terms and conditions of the services were to be governed by an ordinary law, The Civil Servants Act, 1973 (Sabharwal and Berman 2013: 460). This Act consisted of the legal provisions for the appointment of persons in the service of Pakistan and for the terms and conditions of their services (Imtiaz 2013: 13). Although, it provided a greater flexibility in the appointment, assignment and dismissal of civil servants (LaPorte 1986: 257), this Act was not an exhaustive legislation. Being an ordinary law, it could be amended by an ordinary procedure which was easier than the process of constitutional amendment. Besides, the removal of the constitutional guarantee also enabled the government to remove the civil servants easily. Bhutto himself dismissed 2,000 civil servants in 1972 and some more in 1976 (Bahadur 1998: 22).

The constitutional protection to the civil servants provided them with the right to appeal to a high court under the writ petition, but the Constitution of 1973 stated that no court would have the jurisdiction over service matters; instead, service tribunals would handle the grievances, but would be available only after the internal remedies were exhausted, including redress through one's superiors in the service, and the officers could go to a tribunal only after three months had passed after the submission of grievances (Civil Service Tribunal Act 1973, Ministry of Law and Governance Pakistan).⁵² Moreover, these tribunals were staffed by bureaucrats, who were generally retired persons, and not professional judges. The

⁵² The Civil Service Tribunal Act was promulgated on September 26, 1973. It provided for the establishment of the Service Tribunals to exercise an exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the matters relating to the terms and conditions of the civil servants and for any other matter connected therewith.

administrative tribunals were no match for the system of the writs. The change considerably weakened the independence and professionalism of the civil service; without any constitutional or legal protection, independent action became unlikely (Root 1997: 8).

Changes in the Structure vis-à-vis the CSP

Bhutto's civil service reforms were mainly targeted against the CSP (Jaffrelot 2004: 76). Having served in the Ayub government (1958-66), Bhutto was aware of the power and organisational capacity of the bureaucracy and was determined to reduce its power. He found the CSP to be arrogant and anti-people, and in his public meetings Bhutto and his party stalwarts termed them as "*Naukershahi*", "*Brahmins*" and "*Bara Sahibs*" (Noman 1988: 61). The reasons for the anti-bureaucracy attitude of Bhutto have been explained by Shahid Javed Burki (Burki 1980: 101):

First, Bhutto had a personal conflict with a number of civil servants;

Second, limiting the power of the bureaucracy was crucial for the freedom of the government to work;

Third, there were ideological differences between the senior bureaucrats and the influential leftists in the Bhutto government.

The CSP which had its origin in the British Indian Civil Service, was the pivotal service around which the entire administrative edifice, central and provincial, was organised. It had been an elite service which had earlier resisted all those civil service reforms which threatened its prerogative position (Farazmand 2002: 79). Having tremendous influence and power, it was able to prevent the publication of two reports (Egger and Gladieux) which were adverse in their comments on its role and efficiency (Sayeed 1967: 155-56). Till the 1973 reforms were introduced, the CSP controlled its own recruitment, training and indoctrination, disciplinary

procedures, performance ratings, promotions and transfers and administrative investigations (Goodnow 1964: 230-31). The classical generalist tradition, the elite position of the CSP in the public service hierarchy, the special privileges and promotion facilities and the secretariat structures all remained intact till the end of the Yahya regime (Islam 1990: 73). As Burki has put it, “Even though the CSP constitute only 0.07% of the country’s total bureaucratic population, it is not all that surprising that they have been the subject of academic attention over such a long period” (Burki 1969: 239-254). The fundamental structure of the CSP was laid down in the resolutions adopted and rules made by the central government. The members of the CSP, who used to serve both the central and provincial governments, occupied by far the bulk of the most important and key positions in the central and provincial secretariats (Chaudhury 1962: 262). The reservation of posts for the members of the CSP was so unequal, authoritarian and unscientific that all the major reform bodies called for its replacement by a system which would be just, democratic and egalitarian (Khan 1980: 122).

Burki has identified three reasons for the dominance of the CSP in the civil service structure of Pakistan:

First, the CSP was one of the heirs of the famous Indian Civil Service (ICS) created by the British and considered to be the “steel frame” of the British administration in India.⁵³ These centralised bureaucratic institutions were created by the British government during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Imtiaz 2013: 10). In the latter period, though gradually, representative institutions were introduced, their role was restricted to serve as mere advisory bodies rather than

⁵³ Although there is a wide agreement among scholars about the inheritance of the colonial structure of bureaucracy, according to Ilhan Niaz, South Asia has had an ancient tradition of bureaucracy and service nobility. The British did not introduce bureaucratic structures into South Asia; rather, they modernised the existing structures over a long period of time. It is to be noticed, however, that although there had been a system of administration in ancient and medieval India, the British bureaucratic structure was the only one having Weberian features like merit-based recruitment, hierarchical structure, paperwork and a system of promotion and pension (Niaz Ilhan (2016), Professor, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Email to the Author, September 8, 2016)

policymaking bodies (Wilder 2010: 20). Thus, although Pakistan inherited the civil service system of its colonial predecessors, the democratic culture of the civil service systems where the civil servants consider themselves as public servants rather than masters, was yet to be built (Sabharwal and Berman 2013: 465).

Second, of the two successor services, the Indian Administrative Service and the Civil Service of Pakistan, only the latter continued to work as a real elite group; the former surrendered a substantial part of the power it had inherited to its new political bosses.

Third, in a rapidly changing environment characterised by one political revolution (October 1958) and two economic revolutions (1963-65 and 1967-68), the CSP not only displayed a remarkable ability to survive but also grew enormously in both power and prestige (Baloch 2003: 236). As a result, the structure of the bureaucracy in the pre-reform period was criticised as it was highly centralised and also for the undue importance which the CSP received (Shafqat 1999: 995-1017).

Since independence, various studies undertaken on civil service reforms recommended bringing decentralisation and equality into the structure of bureaucracy. Out of the three separate studies undertaken during 1948-58—the Pakistan Pay and Service Commission 1948, the Rowland Egger Committee 1953 and the Gladieux Committee 1955—the latter two recommended the reform and reorganisation of the administrative system in order to bring about more equity and uniformity. Apparently, they attacked the monopolistic position which the CSP enjoyed during this period. However, due to “the tremendous power and influence of the CSP” in the political system, these recommendations could not be immediately accepted and implemented. In fact, for more than five years, the Egger Report was not made available for general circulation (Sayeed 1967: 155-156). It is true that the bureaucracy and especially the CSP inherited the elitism of its predecessor, the ICS, and continued to play its predominant role in the political

system of the country, but the other factor which was equally responsible for the situation was the power imbalance between the political institutions and the bureaucracy (Islam 2013: 1). The political instability and the weak political structure of Pakistan left the vacuum to be filled by the well-established bureaucracy. The appearance of Bhutto with a huge public mandate, provided the best opportunity to correct this power imbalance vis-à-vis the bureaucracy (Sadaat 2013: 1).

The structure inherited from the colonial administration was based on rank classification. It consisted of four horizontal categories with little mobility between them. They were called as Class I, II, III and IV (Maheshwari 2002: 26). Class I was vertically organised into twelve cadres, known as the Central Superior Services (Chew 1992: 29). It also contained hundreds of individual positions. Two of these services—The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and the Police Service of Pakistan—were called the All Pakistan Services (Vorys 2015: 113). The members of these services could be posted to senior positions at all levels of the government.

Other superior services were unfunctional⁵⁴ cadres like the Foreign Service, the Audit and Accounts Service, the Taxation Service, and the Information Service (Jones 1997: 21). This structure led to a strong cadre system and the generalist cadre, i. e. the CSP, received much criticism due to its elitist character. The elitist character was achieved via a very rigorous examination, by keeping the cadre strength limited and reserving for the CSP a large number of senior positions in the secretariat and field administration. The CSP could move freely between the provinces and the central government and the state enterprises. This meant a quick promotion. Higher pay scales and the prerequisites attached to senior positions also conferred a special status on the CSP (Ahmed 1974: 278).

⁵⁴ There are ten unfunctional services in Pakistan: Foreign Service, the Audit and Accounts Service, The Taxation Service, and the Information Service, Military Accounts Service etc. These require specialisation of the cadres and thus having a large scope of lateral recruitment.

The 1973 reforms worked as a double-edged sword for the CSP cadre system. On the one hand, the CSP cadre was bifurcated into a District Management Group (DMG) and a Tribal Areas Group (TAG), while on the other, some groups were created by merging similar services, like the Accounts Group which consisted of the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Services, Military Accounts Services and Railways Account Services (Cheema and Syed 2006: 14). In the same way, the Secretariat Group was created whose membership was open to all officials from the federal services after they attained a level of seniority (ICG 2010: 11). The Accounts Groups officers were now able to be counted at par with the newly constituted cadres like the DMG, TAG, etc., which had not possible in terms of the CSP vis-à-vis the Pakistan Accounts and Audit Services. Some other services experienced only a change in nomenclature like the Information Services was changed to the Information Group and Foreign Services to the Foreign Affairs Group, etc. (Annexure B). Moreover, the name ‘Occupational Group’ was given to notify more professionalism in the civil service system.

The All Pakistan services which had earlier comprised only the CSP and PSP cadres, now comprised the DMG, TAG, the Police Group and a newly formed Secretariat Group (Jaffrelot 2004: 76). The All Pakistan Services were renamed as the All-Pakistan Unified Group while other federal services, previously known as the Central Services, were designated as the Federal Unified Group (ICG 2010: 5). Prior to the 1973 reforms, the selection, appointment and training of the CSP cadre used to be held separately from the Central Superior Services which included the occupational groups such as Audit and Accounts, Income Tax, etc. Under the 1973 reforms, both the CSP and CSS were combined and were jointly called as the CSS for the purposes of examination, selection and common training (Imam and Dar 2013: 55). For this, a new Academy of Service Training was established and the earlier CSP Academy was closed down.

The Lateral Recruitment Programme

One of the unique features of the 1973 reforms was the “Lateral Recruitment Programme” (hereafter LRP) or the “*Chor Darwaja*”, as a commentator put it (Khan 2015: 1). There has been a debate of generalists vs specialists since independence (La Porte 1981: 583) and the LRP was introduced as an instrument to break the monopoly of the generalists in the administration of Pakistan. In Pakistan’s bureaucracy, the dominance of the CSP, i.e. the generalists, over decision-making had led to the centralisation of power in this group of bureaucracy (ICG 2010: 13). Bhutto, who was determined to reduce the influence of the CSP over decision making, placed specialists to counter-balance the dominant position of the CSP (Khan 2005: 172). The CSP effectively refused to include members from the other services within its cadre and tried to maintain and strengthen its exclusive and elitist character (Khan 1980: 123).

Bhutto’s main idea behind recommending the entry of professionals like doctors and engineers in the bureaucracy was that their field experience could be an asset for policymaking and coordinating functions. It would provide the breadth of vision and an understanding of the environment in which the policies are formulated and eventually implemented. The monopolisation of senior positions by the generalists was restricting the professionals’ chances of moving up to the policymaking jobs. Here, the problem was not only of efficiency but also of equity. It was demoralising the specialists and affecting their motivation (Islam 1989: 280).

The LRP proved to be unique in the sense that although it was introduced to reduce the dominance of generalists in Pakistan’s bureaucracy, the hidden motive behind it—as its implementation proved later—was to open positions in the government for the supporters of the politicians in power (Khan 2015: 1; Nawaz 2016: 1).⁵⁵ The

⁵⁵ Nawaz, Saeed (2016), Governance and Public Policy Analyst, University of Punjab, during informal discussion on LinkedIn. According to him, as there was a mismatch between the stated

lateral entry system was not new for the bureaucracy of Pakistan and had been followed earlier in the form of the General Administrative Reserve (GAR). Under GAR, nearly 100 officers had been inducted during the years 1948-1952 (Kennedy 1987: 129). But unlike the LRP, the recruitment under GAR was temporary and never institutionalised. The well-meaning objective behind the LRP of inducting technocrats was blemished by its implementation procedure. The civil servants, through the LRP, were simply nominated by the politicians, which left the bureaucracy politicised (Imam and Dar 2013: 55). The major lacunae in the selection procedure were:

Firstly, the responsibility to recruit lateral entrants was not given to any independent authority like the Federal Public Service Commission which was the statutory authority to conduct the examination for the recruitment of the civil servants; instead, it was given to the Establishment Division Ministry under the government (Sohail 1990: 62). It led to the President controlling the appointments, dismissals, retirements, recruitments, promotions and grievances and thereby an increase in the scope of misuse of discretion in authority (Roots 1997: 475).

Secondly, there was no standard and rigorous criterion and a transparent process like that for their brethren (Root 1997: 8). For posts at the Additional Secretary level in the Central Secretariat, applicants were screened by the Cabinet Secretary and a Special Selection Board (ICG 2010: 6). The latter body was composed of several cabinet ministers and was responsible directly to the Prime Minister (Khan 2015:1). The examination for the posts of Joint Secretary and Deputy Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat was conducted by the Establishment Division. The successful candidates needed training according to their jobs before being assigned to their new posts; they were required to undertake a course of study at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College which conducted six 'Foreign Officer Training

and implied objectives, therefore, instead of correcting the balance, the system introduced further distortions because of the fact that the party loyalists were being inducted.

Courses' and three 'Special DS/JS Short Courses', during the years 1974-77 (Kennedy 1987: 131).

Although the LRP system was introduced to shatter the traditional cadre system of the bureaucracy, it was only half-successful in its objective. Most CSP officers continued to wield wide-ranging powers at the most sensitive spots across the length and breadth of the state administration (Jalal 1995: 82). The nationalisation programme by Bhutto under which some 30 private sector companies were nationalised, helped to increase the authority of the bureaucracy (ICG 2010: 12). The civil servants were also the beneficiaries of Bhutto's policies of nationalisation, land reforms and labour programmes (Jalal 1995: 82).

The implementation of the LRP showed that out of all 514 lateral entrants between 1973 and 1975, 90% were already government officers—among them, 61.4% were from the bureaucracy, 16.3% from the Army and 12.4% from the education sector (Waseem 1994: 305). Ziring and La Porte have called these officers as political administrators who were recruited for the posts vacated by the members of the higher bureaucracy (Ziring and La Porte 1974: 108). According to Kennedy, the programme combined characteristics of lateral recruitment (entry from outside the civilian bureaucracy), vertical movement (promotion within the established bureaucratic cadres and sub-cadres) and horizontal movement (the transfer of officers from one occupational cadre or sub-cadre to another, i.e. to the APUG or the FAG) (Kennedy 1987: 136). The most interesting example of the faults of this policy was the Secretariat Group which consisted of officers who were at the top of the merit list of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) Examination, i.e. the CSP, those who were at the bottom, i.e. Section Officers and the lateral entrants who were selected on contentious grounds (Chaudry 2011: 114).

The LRP helped to establish and further stabilise the system of granting political appointments to the bureaucrats. Although the system was discontinued after the

end of the Bhutto regime, the practice refused to end and survived in the form of the Placement Bureau and others. It was one of the worst examples of political intervention through which incompetent cronies were selected by the Government (Khan 2016: 1).⁵⁶ This system proved to be a backdoor and shortcut entry to the superior services for the influential people (Bokhari 2016:1).⁵⁷ Moreover, the concept of horizontal movement was, in fact, conceptually flawed and grossly misused (Root 2006: 164). Under this provision, an officer who found limited chances for promotion in his parental cadre could move to the Secretariat Group. Thus, this provision of horizontal movement was helpful to the civil servants for hopping from one group to another to further their career prospects. Giving an example, Aminullah Chaudry says (Chaudry 2011: 114):

“A certain income tax officer, finding his chances of promotion rather bleak, first moved to the Intelligence Bureau, got a local promotion, and on this basis transferred to the secretariat group at a level higher than his compatriots, then was allocated to Punjab where he became a secretary and finally scaled the rarefield heights of a federal secretary in the Nawaz Sharif administration. All this while his counterparts in the parent cadre barely made it to regional commissioners of income tax.”

Although if used judiciously, the LRP could have proven to be a good vehicle to promote the movement of personnel between the government and the business sector or other professions, the system was misused and used for distributing political patronage and conversely, to punish political opponents (Weiner and Banuazizi 1994: 165; Subramaniam 1990: 86). As the lateral inductees were not

⁵⁶ Khan, Imran, Assistant Superintendent of Police (UT) at National Police Academy Islamabad, during informal discussion on LinkedIn (Attached in Annexure E).

⁵⁷ Bokhari, Syed, Joint Secretary at Ministry of Finance, during informal discussion on email (Attached in Annexure E).

brought in on the basis of their presumed skills but on the basis of political loyalty regardless of skill, they were also “generalists” (Niaz 2016: 1).⁵⁸

There were also allegations against the LRP that it was leading to the selection of unsuitable and incompetent candidates for the civil service (Root 1997: 475). The system also failed because there was only a loose correlation, albeit some slippage, between the entrant’s old job background and the new job. For example, an officer, eventually assigned to the post of Joint Secretary, Religious Affairs Division, was a mathematician by profession and now had to demonstrate his expertise in religion (Kennedy 1987: 137-39). There was also a lack of suitable posts for the candidates selected laterally. As there was no previous exercise for making the LRP to get a favourable opinion among the bureaucrats, the prevalent view among the bureaucrats about these lateral recruits was not favourable. They alleged that those lateral recruits were blocking their promotion opportunities; they did not have the requisite competency and were being recruited because of their political connections and aimed to spy on the civil service (Kennedy 1987: 141). It resulted in a chaos and demoralisation of the service (Root 1997: 475). The analysts criticised the LRP, saying that it had deviated from its concept of ‘lateral entry’ as most of the beneficiaries were those civil servants whom the regime was supposed to be giving a much-needed dressing-down (Jalal 1995: 82). This system did not continue and was discarded after the end of the Bhutto regime. Due to this reason also, Pakistan’s civil service failed to reap its benefits (Bokhari 2016: 1).⁵⁹ According to Muneer Ahmad, a serious gap exists between the promotion prospects of the specialists and the generalists, due to a non-availability of senior positions

⁵⁸ Niaz Ilhan, Professor in the Department of History, Quaid-e-Azam University, in response to the questionnaire on email (Annexure E). According to him, the power of the civil servants had increased greatly because of the ill-planned nationalisation of the economy and as their pay and service conditions deteriorated, it led to the decline of professionalism and the rise of corruption.

⁵⁹ Bokhari, Syed, Joint Secretary at Ministry of Finance, during informal discussion on email (Attached in Annexure E).

for the specialists in the higher grades. The LRP which was envisaged to bring generalists as well as specialists at par was not be able to retain its goal and the non-availability of posts was also one of the reasons for it (Muneer 1964: 24).

Changes in the Pay Structure

The modification in the classification of posts was followed by changes in the pay structure. As the 1973 reforms were being implemented, the archaic and chaotic system of some 600 pay scales was abolished and replaced with a Unified National Pay Scale consisting of 23 grades. The pay scales were again revised upwards in 1977 (Kennedy 1981: 92-97). Each grade carried a scale of pay and allowances, etc. Grade I was the lowest grade applicable to the posts of peon, messenger, etc. and Grade 23 was the highest post at the level of the Secretary General (there were only 2-3 posts in this grade, which were abolished). The usual head of the ministry i.e. the secretary was in Grade 22, the additional secretary was in Grade 21, the joint secretary in Grade 20, the deputy secretary in Grade 19, etc. These grades were applicable to all the employees and professional or technical posts which had been integrated into this unified system (Baloch 2003: 270) (See Appendix 1).

Role of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC)

Another important feature of the implementation of the 1973 reforms was the dilution of the role of the FPSC. In fact, this was one of the objectives of the reforms of 1973, which is not to say that any of the committees making recommendations had, in fact, wanted a strengthening of the FPSC (Chaudry 2011: 118). It was palpably easier in the context of Pakistan's administrative system to control the policies of an orthodox administrative institution with no independent constituency, such as the Establishment Division, than to contend with the long-established tradition of independence from political influence as enjoyed by the Public Service Commission (Baloch 2003: 256).

Impact of the 1973 Reforms

Questions appear as to what extent, did the steps taken by the Bhutto regime affect the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan and also whether these reforms affected the administrative system positively or negatively, whether the objective underlined in these reforms was achieved, whether the reorganisation and restructuring of the civil service could create a unifying effect and whether opening the civil service system to the technical officers was able to improve the system's efficiency?

It cannot be denied that the prestige, professionalism and independence of the bureaucratic system was reduced to some extent by Bhutto's policies and in the way they were implemented (Root 1997: 474-75). The Civil Service Commission (established in 1978) chaired by Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq found that the morale in the civil service was low and it thereby recommended an increased civil service tenure as well as modifications in the present group categorisation (La Porte 1986: 260). Similarly, Kennedy found that the 1973 reforms affected the prestige and status of the CSP negatively, and it never succeeded in getting it back. For some scholars, the power of the CSP now shifted to the DMG, with the CSP dominating the senior policy positions (Shafqat 1999: 102; Alam 2015: 7).

The lateral entry scheme, which was introduced to reduce the influence of the generalists by giving the specialised services more importance in the civil service system, received maximum criticism. It had sought to widen the base of recruitment and to make the bureaucracy more egalitarian. The scheme was very good on paper and underlined the problems of the civil service system. But the way it was implemented proved to be counter-productive and did more harm than benefitting the system (Ahmar 2016: 1).⁶⁰ It became the prey of political opportunism and expediency (Burki 1974: 113). Since there was a lack of transparency in the

⁶⁰ Ahmar, Moonis (2016), Professor in Department of International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Karachi Islamabad?, in response to the questionnaire on email.

selection procedure of the lateral recruits, it served as an instrument to benefit the political loyalists and to punish the opponents. It led to the politicisation of the civil service and it is conceded that the lateral recruitment and horizontal movement facilitated a control by Bhutto's political party (Root 1997: 475). Bhutto now had a free and legal hand to pick and choose whomever he wanted to man the key government positions (Khan 2015: 1). These reforms coupled with thousands of dismissals of civil servants by the Prime Minister, radically changed the composition of the services and provided for an increased opportunity to control the government operations (La Porte 1986: 259). The LRP contributed to the politicisation of the bureaucracy (Wilke 2001: 24). The system which was supposed to serve the citizens, was serving the interests of the politicians. In this way, it led to the bureaucracy functioning dysfunctionally.

The 1973 reforms also failed to break the monopolisation of power in the hands of the CSP and to achieve equality in real terms. Although, it helped to facilitate integration among 12 federal services as well as ensure the equality of pay scales among all the groups and services, it did not provide a clear vision and framework for equal opportunities and prospects of promotions for all groups. The system of Unified Grading Structure masked great chaos, wastefulness and complexity (Niaz 2010: 114). The inspiration of the system came from the United States with its eighteen grades and Lord Fulten's Committee in Britain which had also recommended a similar system. The British tried the system at few levels but soon abandoned it and reverted to the earlier system. In the United States also, such a job-oriented system has no concept of promotion, seniority or transfers with some civil servants getting stuck, while others do manage to jump around (Zaidi 1985: 114). It provided the scope for a manipulation of the system, by choosing certain officials to be promoted by the government as a reward for loyalty.

The lateral recruitment system left deep implications for the civil service as well as the political system of Pakistan. Although, there had been attempts from the

military government to recruit military officials laterally into the bureaucracy, it was during Bhutto's time that this practice was institutionalised. Due to the inherent benefits of the government controlling the recruitments, appointments, dismissals, retirements, promotions and grievances, this practice could never be reverted in the political history of Pakistan (Kennedy 1987: 1300). Each new government welcomes the opportunity to intervene in the appointments, transfers and postings in order to exercise patronage and build long-term alliances with the bureaucrats (Root 1997: 475). Over time, this system has thus become embedded in the wider political structure, compromising the independence, neutrality and competency of the bureaucracy (Kardar 2002: 456).

Bhutto's authoritarian and arbitrary style of working also contributed to the formulation of the required policy and its flawed implementation. It also degraded the democratic values in the civilian government. Bhutto was determined to eliminate his rivals right at the beginning of his tenure. He eliminated all those centres of power that could have competed with or obstructed his policies or position. He began his tenure by sacking over 1,300 officers under the martial law regulation with the intent of acquiring complete and absolute control over the bureaucracy and thus giving a message, loud and clear, to every civil servant: support the PPP or go home (Chaudry 2011: 111). This was a one-shot mass dismissal; punitive measures were applied non-uniformly without establishing the institutional norms or standards of surveillance (Root 1997: 175). Burki has provided an account of the authoritarian style of Bhutto and according to him, Bhutto's personal background contributed a lot to his arbitrary style of working (Burki 1980: 83-91).

Bhutto's government, undoubtedly, was responsible for restructuring the civil bureaucracy which had remained unreformed since independence. Bhutto showed his determination to demolish the colonial legacy linked with bureaucracy. But in fact, he was more worried about his legitimacy and survival in a country which was

awaiting its leader to deliver. Though, the crisis of legitimacy was not so stark this time, it did exist. The government had been handed over to him in circumstances, which were, to say the least, unusual. Within days his political opponents began alleging that he had been responsible for the country's dismemberment. His legitimacy could be helped by a cleansing operation (Syed 1992: 139). Also, Bhutto's regime was the first civilian regime in the country, so the expectations were high. He had to show the spirit of the revolutionary changes in the system.

Due to some historical reasons, the military and bureaucracy in Pakistan were much more developed than the political institutions. Given the deteriorating and unstable internal political situation, the political institutions were not allowed to flourish further and the political instability provided the opportunity for the civil service to take control of the state. On the face of it, the bureaucracy in Pakistan tended to overshadow each and every branch of the government and decision-making institutions. Although, Bhutto seemed to recognise the power imbalance in the political system of Pakistan where the civilian and military bureaucracies were more powerful than the political institutions, he failed to take measures to strengthen the latter; moreover, his autocratic style of working did undermine them. By the mid-1970s, his autocratic tendencies had seriously started interfering with his ability to govern. The nature of the 1973 reforms has been correctly analysed by Aminullah Chaudry: "To imagine that Bhutto was motivated by a genuine desire to put in place an efficient, well oiled, apolitical bureaucratic machine would be naïve. He was a politician and his purpose in making revolutionary changes in the bureaucratic structure was purely political, nothing less and nothing more" (Chaudry 2011: 111).

Even today, the structure of the civil services in the eyes of the critics, is colonial and the transformations merely cosmetic (Khan 2016: 1; Shafqat 2016: 2; Nawaz

2016: 3).^{61, 62, 63} In their perception, the civil service system of today is afflicted with arrogance, corruption, lack of accountability, inefficiency and politicisation (Kardar 2014: 1; Siddiqui 2010: 1; Siddiqui 2006: 1).

The Second Period of Democracy (1988-99)

The second period of democracy consisted of the regime under Benazir Bhutto and two regimes under Nawaz Sharif. This period was marked with lack of stability where no intent was shown to restore the autonomy and secularism of bureaucracy damaged during the preceding rule of General Zia-ul-Haq. This brief interval of civilian rule under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif fell short of addressing this power imbalance, which got further widened with the weakening of the political institutions. They failed to bring any expected and needed reforms in the civil services but deepened the politicisation. This period is known for the political expediency and arbitrariness in dealing with the civil servants. The political misuse of civil bureaucracy appeared in both an ad-hoc manner like the promotion of political loyalists well as in the more institutional way such as Benazir Bhutto's Placement Bureau (1989). The removal of officers arbitrarily from the posts, rendering them Officers on Special Duty for long periods, took place frequently under both the PPP as well as the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) governments (Hussain and Hussain 1993: 85). Such arbitrary actions generated a lot of

⁶¹ Khan, Imran, Assistant Superintendent of Police (UT) at National Police Academy Islamabad, during informal discussion on LinkedIn (Attached in Annexure E).

⁶² Shafqat, Saeed (2016), Director, Centre for Public Policy, in response to the questionnaire on email. According to him, the increasing politicisation, loyalty over neutrality and dispassionate and merit-driven postings have become the norm rather than an exception.

⁶³ Nawaz, Saeed (2016), Governance and Public Policy Analyst, University of Punjab, during an informal discussion on LinkedIn. According to him, the reforms introduced by the various rulers never intended to disband the colonial structure; rather, they compromised the independence and neutrality of the bureaucracy, leading to its politicisation. No effort has been made to affect its reorientation towards being a public service and it continues to be loyal to the ruling elite.

resentment and increased the reluctance of the officials to take decisions at their own respective levels.

Benazir came to power on a very weak political mandate. She got only 93 of the 205 seats in the National Assembly, which was far from enough to form a majority, but the government could be formed with the support of small parties like the MQM (Mohajir Quami Movement/Refugee National Front) and independent members. She was criticised for being autocratic during her first term. Unable to transcend her father's political legacy, she dismissed competent public servants who had earlier been in disagreement with her father. She was criticised for nepotism when she set up the controversial Placement Bureau, which made political appointments to the civil bureaucracy, not on the basis of ability but on personal loyalty to the Bhutto family, particularly during their time of trial in the Zia years.

There was a tendency in the PPP government to treat the civil servants as an undifferentiated mass of adversaries who must be constantly watched for any mischief they might be getting up to and swiftly brought to heel if caught (Akhund 2000: 75). The Benazir government undermined the service system at the core through practising discretionary appointments, promotions and removals of officers. For this, two prominent tactics were applied. The first was the tactic of the Officers on Special Duty (OSD)—a designation denoting the absence of a regular posting for an indefinite period (Kukreja 2003: 232). It was used as 'a broad, often senseless removal of officers from their positions and placing them for long period as OSD' (Hussain and Hussain 1993: 85). The PPP saw the civil servants as people who had worked against it during the Zia years and so, they needed to be punished. Macho new ministers, lacking governmental experience and self-confidence but eager to assert their new-found authority, shunted secretaries and other officials from one post to another (Akhund 2007: 76). The other tactic was an attempt to

bypass the established procedure of selecting public officials through the Public Service Commission and to open an employment exchange in the PM's own office. Through this expedient, Benazir unabashedly appointed her party workers at various positions and posted them at all levels of the federal and provincial bureaucracies (Kukreja 2003: 232).

Although this Placement Bureau was wound up in the second half of 1989, the damage had been done since the Bureau's arbitrary actions generated a lot of resentment within the bureaucracy. Even the lateral entry scheme of Z. A. Bhutto's government had an institutional character, unlike the Placement Bureau (Hussain and Hussain 1993: 85). In this way, administrative efficiency was put on hold, and became a tool for furthering political patronage and nepotism in order to attain political legitimacy and regime survival.

Again, the charges of corruption against the PPP government under Benazir also harmed administrative efficiency. It led to the fall of the government in 1990 and later in 1996. All government policy decisions and contract negotiations—particularly those directly related with privatisation affairs—became suspect, reducing the government's ability to perform developmental functions (Shah 2007: 168).

The Nawaz Sharif government was particularly notorious for its propensity to 'rule by verbal order' and for following a monarchical style of governance (Maleeha 1994: 243-44). During the second Nawaz Sharif Government, 1997-1999, a Commission on Administrative Restructuring was established in 1997. It reviewed the size of the government and following its recommendations, a large number of employees were laid off. The report was finalised in September 1998. It covered the following five core areas, which according to the World Bank, required comprehensive reforms (Mahmood 2007: 135):

- Personnel and Wage Bill Management

- Improving Performance and Accountability
- Downsizing and obtaining new skills
- Devolution of power
- Compensation reforms

At the recommendation of the Commission, five technical committees were set up—one for each of the identified core areas and which were to examine the World Bank recommendations in detail and suggest various reforms keeping in view the social, economic and political conditions in Pakistan.

Thus, the concepts of bureaucratic neutrality and professionalism were diminished to their lowest extent during the civilian rule in the decade of 1988-1999. Ad-hoc provisions like the Placement Bureau damaged the efficiency and credibility of the bureaucracy (Ahmar 2016: 1).⁶⁴ During this period, the bureaucracy was used by the government to further its political interests and to ensure its political legitimacy and survival. The state failed in its most basic task of providing the security of life and property to its citizens.

The administrative decline has left the citizens without that order, security and justice which they had previously been used to. At the institutional level as well, the system has become unresponsive to public needs, and therefore, dysfunctional (Lodhi 1994: 18). The prolonged politicisation of the bureaucracy has severely affected the efficiency of the administration (Khan, 2016: 1).⁶⁵ In this system of political patronage, the honest and competent officers were regularly shuffled to unimportant posts while the plain and corrupt were routinely rewarded with those

⁶⁴ Ahmar, Moonis (2016), Professor in Department of International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, in response to the questionnaire on email.

⁶⁵ Khan, Imran, Assistant Superintendent of Police (UT) at National Police Academy Islamabad, during an informal discussion on LinkedIn (Annexure E).

important assignments where they could be of use to the ruler (Niaz 2010: 122). These corrupt and plain officials further may not have had the capability of doing their assigned work which hampered the efficiency of the government. Moreover, the capable officials without getting any rewards for their good work were instead demoralised by the promotion of their inefficient co-officers, and there was no encouragement to work efficiently and honestly. This has led to an institutional disorder which demands urgent attention in order to be corrected.

CHAPTER 4: CIVIL SERVICE REFORM DURING MILITARY REGIMES

Under the concerned period of the thesis i.e. 1973-2008, Pakistan encountered two military regimes: first under General Zia-ul-Haq from 1977-1989 and the other one from 1999-2008 under Pervez Musharraf. After attaining power, both military rulers were faced with the challenge of providing legitimacy to the rule of military even after gaining normalcy. The first of the two selected the goal of establishing a puritan Islamic state⁶⁶ to colour its non-representative military rule while the other tried to ensure political legitimacy by setting up ‘genuine democracy’ in place of a ‘sham democracy’.⁶⁷ Both the military regimes targeted the civilian bureaucracy as part of their larger policy to gain political legitimacy in contrast to the previous military ruler i.e. Gen. Ayub Khan, who used to see the bureaucracy as its equal partner. Unlike Ayub, those two successors refused to make their civilian counterparts as equal power-sharers; rather, their political interests were best suited by subordinating them.

However, the similarity between the two ends here. Although the bureaucracy was targeted by both the regimes, the way the bureaucratic structure was affected by their policies was largely different. Zia-ul-Haq’s policies mainly affected the bureaucracy ideologically, which till now was supposed to be most secular structure following the legacy of the British colonial regime. This ideological connotation given to the bureaucratic structure was a part of a larger agenda where Zia wanted to modify every state institution according to the Islamic traditions and laws. On the other hand, during Musharraf’s regime, the civilian bureaucracy was

⁶⁶ An Islamic state is a type of government primarily based on the application of the sharia law for the dispensation of justice and the maintenance of law and order.

⁶⁷ General Musharraf claimed to bring “true democracy” in place of “sham democracy”, which he claimed to be existing in Pakistan at that time. He abrogated the Constitution in 1999 and said that it would help “true democracy” to flourish in Pakistan.

thoroughly restructured in order to make it subservient to the military rule. The main target of his restructuring was the civil service at the local level, which was done in order to make the central government have a better grip of the local-level government. Another major factor which had a detrimental effect on the neutrality of the civilian bureaucracy was the provision of Army Monitoring Teams⁶⁸ which proved to be the final blow to the integrity and ethos of the civil service.

The Military Regime under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1989)

General Zia-ul-Haq came into power at a time when the country was facing various problems on both internal as well as external fronts. After the end of the term of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, elections were held for the next parliament. In the background of various problems like sectarianism, unemployment, droughts, economic crisis, etc., the public became disenchanted with the Bhutto regime. The country, therefore, at that time was being guided by the anti-incumbency factor. In the first half of 1977, the elections for the new government formation were alleged to be rigged. It led to a political crisis. The opposition parties tried to ride the bandwagon of this anti-incumbency factor. The nine primary opposition parties formed an anti-Bhutto front in the name of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)⁶⁹ and started massive campaign against Z. A. Bhutto. There was a lot of violence, social unrest and political conflict in the country—a situation that the transitional

⁶⁸ The introduction of the Army Monitoring Teams was a temporary measure, but aggravated the situation from bad to worse. It led to a trust deficit between the government and the bureaucracy. The AMT proved to be counter-productive and was accused for misusing power and thus ultimately discontinued (Bokhari, (2016), e-mail to the author, 13/09/2016).

⁶⁹ The PNA was a coalition of nine different political parties that encompassed a broad political spectrum from the political Left to the ultra-Right wing. The constitutive parties included: the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam (JUI), the Muslim League (PML), the Jamaat-e Islami (JI), the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan (JUP), the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the Pakistan Tehrik-e Istaqlal (PTI), the Khaaksaar Tehrik and the finally Sardar Qayyum Khan's Muslim Conference. (Suhail, Adeem (2010), "Pakistan National Alliance of 1977", Thesis, University of Texas, [Online: Web], Accessed 24th December 2015, URL. <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3621/SUHAIL-THESIS.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

civilian regime was unable to control. The Pakistan Army, in this critical situation, saw an opportunity to take over political power on the midnight of July 3-4, 1977. Zia-ul-Haq, the then Chief of Army Staff, assumed power through a coup d'état, codenamed Operation Fair Play (Hyman et al. 1989: 25). He conveyed the image of a political novice and reluctant ruler; however, in reality, he very carefully and cautiously consolidated political power (Shafiqat 1997: 189). As per the stated goal of the newly formed military government, the military intervention was to be a brief, corrective but necessary operation. Zia's initially stated concern was merely the "restoration of democracy" (Jabeen, 1987: 70). He promised to hold elections within 90 days. Throughout the period of Bhutto's trial, Zia maintained the pretence that he was ultimately going to permit the elections to take place, as this was necessary to keep the support of the political parties grouped under the PNA umbrella (Ali 1983: 136).

Zia-ul-Haq presented himself to be concerned about the restoration of democracy to save the country from civilian unrest which was taking place since the end of Bhutto's regime but turned back from his plan to hold the elections, particularly after the release of Bhutto from police custody and his wide popular support. Power intoxicated Zia and led to a desire within him of not leaving it. A close examination of his policies suggests that he undertook a very vigorous and systematic plan to remain in power (Askari 2000: 169). First, he declared himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CLMA)⁷⁰ only for 90 days, within which period the elections were to be held (, 2003: 1). The initial calculation by Zia gave him the signal that due to the anti-incumbency factor and public disenchantment the PPP would not be able to come to power, therefore in a way he was not concerned with not holding

⁷⁰ The office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator was a senior government authoritative post created in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia that gave considerable executive authority and powers to the holder of the post to enforce the martial law in the country in an event to ensure the continuity of government. This office has been used mostly by military officers staging a coup d'état. On some occasions, the office has been under a civilian head of state.

the elections. But his wrong strategy to put Bhutto in police custody seemed to go against him and it generated sympathy among the public, which resulted in a wide popular support for Bhutto when he came out of the police custody.

Zia, who came to power as the Chief Martial Law Administrator just to prevent bloodshed and facilitate the elections as an impartial referee (Hyman et al. 1989: 35), now abandoned the idea of holding elections in the name of restoring political accountability. He not only cancelled the elections by a decree on March 1, 1978, but progressively suppressed all political activity.⁷¹ Initially, he did not ban the political parties but later they were also banned and the elections for local bodies were held in September 1979 on a non-party basis, a system that Zia continued in the 1985 national and provincial elections. To manipulate political activity, he introduced several amendments in the election rules. The major electoral changes included (i) introduction of a separate electorate for Muslims and non-Muslims; (ii) a declaration of intent to introduce proportional representation and (iii) an amendment in the Political Parties Act, 1962, which called for (a) registration of the political parties with the Election Commission as a precondition for participation in the elections (b) submission of party accounts annually to the Election Commission for scrutiny (c) publication of a formal manifesto (d) annual election of the party office-bearers and (e) the submission of a list of office-bearers and ordinary members to the Election Commission. A failure to fulfil these conditions resulted in the refusal of registration by the Election Commission, which meant that the party could not take part in the elections (Askari 2000: 169).

On the one hand, Zia-ul-Haq campaigned for the non-holding of elections at the national level under the garb of various excuses like improving public

⁷¹ Zia suppressed the PPP by keeping at times Bhutto's widow, Nusrat, and his daughter, Benazir, under house arrest or jailed. Members of some of the PNA parties, including the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Pakistan Muslim League, joined Zia's cabinet as he tried to give a civilian cast to his government. But, the suppression of the PPP continued.

accountability, dealing with the Afghan crisis or ensuring political stability, while on the other, the military government used Islamisation as an instrument to gain the legitimacy for continuing with the Martial Law. Later, this strategy of Islamisation led to a referendum where the people were asked to answer only one question—whether they supported his Islamisation agenda or not. Thus, his rule as a military dictator revolved around his strategy of Islamisation which affected every sphere of the political, social and economic life of Pakistan. The Zia regime became progressively more autocratic and eventually directionless—there was improvement in the lot of the common man but the undemocratic fiat and restricted personal freedoms and judicially awarded punishments fractured the democratic momentum gained during the short regime of Z.A. Bhutto (Cloughley 2008: 31). All this could not leave the civilian bureaucracy unaffected and it harmed the civil service in various ways i.e. by the erosion of secular values, the lack of public accountability and the degradation of work ethics and integrity. In order to understand the impact of the Zia regime on the bureaucracy, it is first required to discuss the core legitimacy agenda of Zia-ul-Haq i.e. the Islamisation of the political system as a whole.

Islamisation: An Instrument of Legitimacy

The main motive of remaining in power was stated by Zia as the establishment of a puritan Islamic state. He was often called as a ‘mullah in uniform’ (Datta and Sharma 2002: 171). Zia used the Islamisation of polity, economy and society as a tool for legitimacy. In Pakistan, it did not seem to be unusual as Islam had been earlier used to justify the creation of Pakistan as a state. In Pakistan, time and again, it has been used not only to provide legitimacy to the state of Pakistan but even more importantly, to the regime which would come to power (Ayub 1979: 537). Zia claimed that he was remaining in power not because he was covetous but because he was Islamising the country (Bajpayee 1990: 45). He claimed:

“I must say that the spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement was commendable. It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. This is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country.”⁷²

As has been said before, the process of Islamisation affected every field of Pakistan’s polity, economy, society, administration and law. The steps undertaken by him, thus, can be divided into these areas:

The Islamisation of Law

The first step towards Islamisation was through the Martial Law Order No. 5 which introduced the Islamic punishment of amputation of the right hand from the wrist for theft, robbery and decoity. The Islamic elements in Pakistan also supported the military regime hoping that with the restructuring of the polity on the Islamic lines, a built-in bias in the political system would enable them to dominate the state institutions and processes that they were not expected to achieve under the existing political and electoral arrangements (Rizvi 2000: 170).

The Constitution was amended to set up a *Shariat* bench in each of the four provincial High Courts and an Appellate Bench in the Supreme Court in early 1979. One year later, a Federal *Shariyat* Court replaced the *Shariyat* Bench. During the next five years, the functioning of these benches was regulated through the issuing of Presidential Orders. Also, a new Chapter 3A was incorporated into the Constitution providing these *Shariyat* courts with constitutional safeguards. The

⁷² Speech related to “Trial and Execution of Bhutto”, [Online: Web], Accessed 24/12/2015, URL. <https://archive.org/stream/TrialAndExecutionOfZulfikarAliBhutto/TheTrialAndExecutionOfBhutto.djvu.txt>

FSC was however debarred from questioning the Constitution, the Muslim Personal Laws and fiscal matters, including taxation, banking and insurance.⁷³

One of the most infamous instruments of Islamisation was the “*Hudood Ordinances*” which were mainly passed to Islamise the corpus of the Pakistani criminal law. These *Hudood Ordinances* comprised four ordinances denoting four laws (i) The Offence of *Zina* Ordinance (ii) The Offence of *Qazif* Ordinance (iii) the Offences against Property Ordinance and (iv) the Prohibition Order. They provided corporal punishment for five *Hadd* crimes.⁷⁴ These punishments included the amputation of limbs; death by stoning and flogging—the most severe of these *hadd* punishments, namely death by stoning, never took place. These punishments were seen both inside and outside Pakistan as signs of a return to an earlier age in which barbarity was perhaps more common (Muneer 1981: 81). When these ordinances were reviewed by the FSC, they found them inconsistent with the principles of Islam. The most controversial of them was the *Zina* ordinance which prior to amendment in 2006, made any sexual intercourse outside a valid marriage a criminal offence. If the guilty party was married at the time of offence or had been married previously, the punishment was death by stoning—as long as four male, adult, Muslim witnesses of the highest moral standing had witnessed the illicit ingress. In other cases *Zina* was punishable by lashes, imprisonment, or both. This *Zina* ordinance was reviewed on the basis of Islam by the FSC in 1981. In its

⁷³ The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Articles 203B and 203C, [Online: Web], Accessed 24/12/2015, URL. <https://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/article-203b-definitions/>

⁷⁴ *Hadd* meaning limit or prohibition, is a punishment fixed in the *Quran* and Hadith for crimes considered to be against the rights of God. The six crimes for which punishments are fixed are theft (amputation of the hand), illicit sexual relations (death by stoning or one hundred lashes), making unproven accusations of illicit sex (eighty lashes), drinking intoxicants (eighty lashes), apostasy (death or banishment), and highway robbery (death). Strict requirements for evidence (including eyewitnesses) have severely limited the application of such penalties (Oxford Islamic Studies Online, [Online: Web], Accessed 23 July, 2014, URL. <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e757>

verdict, the FSC ruled 4: 1 that death by stoning was against the principles of Islam and that hundred lashes were the correct punishment for the offence of adultery (Khan 2001: 41). Zia managed to get the decision overturned after replacing the judges of the FSC with more complaint ones. In 1982, the newly constituted FSC overruled its own ruling, finding punishment by stoning to death according to the principles of Islam (Lau 2010: 383). Similarly, in October 1984, a new Law of Evidence (*Qanoon-i-Shahadat*) was introduced according to which the testimony of one man was considered equal to that of two women (Jaffrelot 2004: 81). The Laws of *Qisas* and *Diyat* was another one that discriminated against women. It divided murders into four categories: *qatal-i-amad* (premeditated murder), *qatal-i-shibha* (suspected premeditated murder), *qatal-i-khata* (accidental murder) and *qatal-bi-sabab* (consequential murder). The most important point of the ordinance was the following:

- (i) In case of a *qatal-i-amad*, the evidence of women was not entertained at all. For the proof of *qatal-i-amad*, at least two pious Muslim adult male witnesses were required.
- (ii) If the victim was a female, her *diyat* shall be one-half of that of a man (Mehdi 1994: 151-52).

This was resented by the women in Pakistan. They argued that both sexes enjoy an equal status in Islam and this distinction in the rate of *diyat* discriminated against women. In the case of rape, under *hudood*, there should be four pious male witnesses to testify the commission of rape. It is well-nigh impossible to procure witnesses of a rape committed in privacy. As a result, the victims of rape were often accused of wrongful accusation and punished either for adultery or for false allegations (Datta 2002: 172). There were many horror stories of women who were raped and got pregnant, but when they accused the men of rape, were themselves convicted for adultery and sent to jail as they had failed to provide proof (Mohiuddin 2007: 191).

The Zia regime is known for its stringent application of the Blasphemy Law. While there were only 14 cases reported prior to 1986, these went up to 1,300 from 1986 to 2014.⁷⁵ In 1984, the *Qadiani* ordinance was issued which included two new clauses (298B and C) into the Pakistan Penal Code.⁷⁶ It denied the status of Ahmadis and made it possible to punish them for continuing to practice as Muslims (Khan 2012: 107). Pakistan's Supreme Court upheld the law in 1993 (Shafqat 1998: 221).

The Islamisation of Polity

The need of religio-political legitimacy led Zia-ul-Haq to Islamise the political institutions as he did in the field of law and judiciary (Shah 2012: 1). He reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) in order to give a more comprehensive role to religious leaders and to prepare the outline of an Islamic theocratic state (Mohiuddin, 2007: 190). The council represented conservative and orthodox Islamic priests and scholars and its scope was widened while it was directly linked to the office of the President. It was tasked to advise the government on the Islamisation of polity including the review of existing laws with the objective of bringing these into conformity with the Quran and the Sunna (Malik 1996: 33-54).⁷⁷

All the political institutions felt the impact of theocratisation of the polity by the military regime. Obligatory prayer breaks during the working hours were introduced in the government offices and the non-governmental sector was

⁷⁵ Blasphemy Law, *Dawn*, August 18, 2013, [Online: Web], Accessed 23rd of June 2015, URL. <http://www.dawn.com/news/750512/timeline-accused-under-the-blasphemy-law>

⁷⁶ Pakistan Penal Code, [Online: Web], Accessed 24th December 2015, URL. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be8e8.html>

⁷⁷ *Sunna* is an Arabic word. It is the traditional portion of Muslim law based on Prophet Muhammad's words or acts, accepted (together with the Quran) as being authoritative by the Muslims and followed particularly by the Sunni Muslims.

encouraged to do the same (Rizvi 2000: 172). This produced a new office culture where a special break for prayer during the office hours was allowed and continues to be a norm. It was instructed that on Fridays during prayer hours, shops must be closed and that the call for prayer be announced on the radio and television (Shafqat 1997: 199).

The Islamisation of Economy

During Zia, the Islamisation of the economy and the banking system was undertaken and it was said that it would ensure the equitable and fair distribution of wealth, thereby establishing the foundations of the society on a firm and equal footing. Zia started the *zakat*⁷⁸ and *ushr* as well as an interest-free banking system, described as the Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) system, which became some of the most controversial and substantive measures (Jabeen 1987: 80). Under this new system, the *riba* or interest was abolished from all financial transactions. A storm of controversy surrounded the PLS, particularly in the business community of Pakistan, as the sharing of profit and loss would induce no competition in the economy and there would not be any incentive for investment of the money in the economy (Evans 1986: 1). Moreover, the wealthy entrepreneurs and business class found their position and wealth in jeopardy and, thus, started settling and moving their assets outside the country.

On the recommendation of Islamic scholars, Zia introduced the *zakat* and *ushr* Ordinances, promulgated in 1980. The *zakat*, levied at an annual 2.5% on the savings (wealth), was to help the needy, which is one of the five pillars of Islam. The *ushr* levied at 5% on the agricultural produce, was to be paid in cash by the landowner or the leaseholder and its proceeds would go to the *zakat* committees to

⁷⁸ *Zakat* is one of the underlying principles of Islam which has been given considerable importance in the Quran and the *Sunnah*. Under this system, financial assistance is provided for subsistence, rehabilitation, health, education, *Deeni Madaris* (Religious schools) and social welfare.

help the needy. It replaced the former land tax (revenue) levied by the provincial government (Mohiuddin 2007: 110).

The *zakat*, by then had been a religious obligation and was performed privately by individuals; with this law or ordinance, the duty for the imposition and collection of *zakat* was assumed by the government (Zahid 2012: 15). As a result, the declaration invited criticism and controversies from different sections of the society, which manifested the loopholes in the process. The first reaction to the ordinance came from the Shias who wanted deal with the issues related to *zakat*, marriages and divorce (especially temporary marriage), inheritance and wills and the imposition of *Hadd* punishments differently according to the principles and requirements of their own sect; they vehemently rejected the state's role in the collection of *the zakat*. The measures adopted by the Zia regime led to the alienation of the Shia community on one hand and the rise of sectarian organisations on the other. The major organisations included the Deobandi-oriented Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI), Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith from the Sunni sect and the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafriya (TNFJ) from the side of the Shia community (Waseem and Mufti 2009: 30).

The Shias started protests and demonstrations against the government demanding exemption from the payment of *zakat*, which culminated in bloodshed and violence. An important Shia cleric, Mufti Jaafar Husain (1916-1983), argued that if Pakistan was to have Islamic law, the Shias should be allowed to follow their own jurisprudence known as the *Jaafariya fiqh* after the sixth Shia Imam, Jafar al-Sadiq (Ahmar 2008: 6). As a result, Zia reluctantly gave in and signed an agreement with the Shia leadership, exempting the Shias from the mandatory annual deduction of *zakat* from their bank accounts through amendments in the Ordinance of 1980 (Abbas 2013: 1). But in spite of this concession, the Shias were required to file sworn affidavits to affirm their faith, thus making the sectarian divide distinctive (ICG 2005: 12). On the other hand, the Sunnis could not tolerate such a hospitable

treatment of the Shias by Zia and, therefore, as a reaction to this move, started anti-Shia and anti-government demonstrations demanding a complete implementation of the Hanafi law in Pakistan, as according to their understanding, the majority of the people in Pakistan were followers of this particular school of thought. Consequently, such moves on the part of the government laid the groundwork or foundations for a sectarian divide and disharmony between the Shia and Sunni sects, thus worsening the law and order situation (Shah 2012: 322). The divide was not only between the Shias and Sunnis but various among the various versions of Sunni Islam as well—especially the Wahabbis, Deobandis and Barelvis, as they all wanted the state to enforce their own version of Islam (Chandran 2003: 2). It was thus made clear that developing consensus over a single interpretation of the *Sharia* as well as the Quran and Sunnah was impossible in Pakistani society.

The Islamisation of Society

Zia-ul-Haq strengthened his grip over the society through his Islamisation agenda. The establishment of *madaris* flourished during his regime. In 1979, the Federal Cabinet passed the National Education Policy that banned the establishment of new English-language schools, which were replaced by the *madaris* and *maktabs* at the primary level. Moreover, the existing English-language schools had to change their medium of instruction to Urdu (Chengappa 2004: 15). The state patronised the *madaris* as Zia needed young people to fight the US's proxy war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The establishment of the *madaris* became a cradle for fundamentalist elements and sectarian conflicts that affected the internal security and stability of the country (Shah 2012: 314).

Zia preached a kind of 'theodemocracy'⁷⁹ by the dissemination of Islam through the setting up of schools, teaching and preaching, publications, rendering social

⁷⁹ 'Theodemocracy' is a [theocratic political system](#) that includes elements of [democracy](#). It was theorised by [Joseph Smith](#), founder of the [Latter Day Saint movement](#), in the context of the United

service and by creating Islamic student organisations (Nayyar 2003: 100). The educational curriculum was revised to inculcate Islamic ideology as well as the regime's perspective and many educational institutions for imparting the education of Islamic law and *Sharia* were established under the state patronage. Additionally, the introduction of the *Majlis-i-Shura*, the banning of political parties, the setting up of the Council of Islamic Ideology and the nexus of military and religious class for the attainment of common goals characterised the Islamisation of politics and state institutions. A *Sharia* Law Faculty was established at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, in 1979 and merged the following year into the International Islamic University, with financial help from the Saudi government. The university, called a "modern madrasa", comprised different institutes which offered training and courses for various institutions of Pakistan like the judiciary and the education sector, in order to adapt them according to the *Sharia* law (ICG 2003: 24). In 1984, the *Nizam-e-Salat* campaign was launched.⁸⁰ Under this campaign, 1,00,000 Prayer Wardens were appointed in the rural and urban areas. The task of these state functionaries was to monitor the religious activities of individuals and to seek their compliance in the religious activities (Dass 2006 :218).

The Islamisation process by the military government created a fatal and lasting effect on both the polity and the society. It encouraged the religious and fundamentalist groups which till then had never gained such a strong position in the political system of Pakistan, as during the Zia regime. However, at the level of

States's constitution. According to Smith, theodemocracy was meant to be a fusion of the traditional republican democratic rights under the United States Constitution with those of theocratic principles.

⁸⁰ The *Nizam-e-Salat* campaign was one of the most important tools of the state to acquire control over the private lives of the members of the public. Recently also, the Pakistan Government under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to implement the *Nizam-e-Salat* system (*The Nation*, March 4, 2015, [Online: Web], Accessed 13 October 2016, URL. <http://nation.com.pk/national/04-Mar-2015/government-to-implement-nizam-e-salat-system-in-islamabad>

society, Zia was unable to form an ideological unity among the people. There were numerous religious and sectarian groups that emerged during his regime.

Changes in Bureaucracy during Zia Regime

There were various changes in the civil service structure which Zia-ul-Haq introduced. One of his first tasks was to appoint a Civil Service Reform Commission under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq to examine the efficacy of Bhutto's reforms (Baxter 1991: 91). The Commission's recommendations sought a profound departure from the 1973 reforms of civil services (Kennedy 1987: 101). Although the report of the Commission was never made public, some of the information was derived from interviews of the members of the Commission. According to the available information, the major recommendations of the Anwar-ul-Haq commission can be described as follows:

- At the federal level, the report made a case for restoring the constitutional guarantees for the higher cadres.
- It recommended for the emasculation of the lateral entry programme of Bhutto. Instead, it urged the creation of several technical branches in order to accommodate the engineers, agriculturalists, scientists and statisticians.
- It was also in favour of revitalising training in order to upgrade the structure of the civil service and recommended the creation of numerous new in-service training facilities.
- It also recommended the establishment of a National Administrative Reserve (which paralleled the functions of the defunct CSP).
- It recommended the respecting of merit for recruitments and empowering the public service commission for ensuring the recruitments on merit.
- It also recommended fixing of tenures of the chairman and members of the federal and provincial public service commissions.
- The important contribution of the report was that it expanded the reform domain to the provincial and local governments. For the provinces, it was

recommended to merge the Tribal Administration Group (TAG) with the DMG and the share of PCS officers was to be fixed at 40 per cent in the merged section, which would provide adequate promotion opportunities to them (however, no consensus could be evolved on the question of nomenclature for the merged TAG and DMG).

- The report was very emphatic in changing the nomenclature of section officer to under-secretary, suggesting the years of service and promotion to the next grade and streamlining the flow of postings from field to the Secretariat and vice versa.
- A lesser noticed but important contribution of the report was that it gave salience to gender issues at a time when the military regime was the least receptive towards this. The Report recommended the correction of the male-female imbalance by catering to women's training needs, providing them with female trainers and including females in the selection process as well, making part-time jobs available to them and allowing the transfer of spouses in cases of their transfer (Kennedy 1987: 101; Shafqat 2013: 1).

Zia-ul-Haq was very cautious in accepting the recommendations of the Commission and accepted only those which provided a political advantage to him.⁸¹ Although, the civil service reforms introduced by Bhutto were good in spirit but the way they were implemented, created resentment in the bureaucracy as well as in the public. The target of the 1973 reforms was to subordinate the bureaucracy to the political regime and break the monopoly of power centralised into the hands of a smaller group of the CSP. Now after the departure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, this higher echelon of bureaucracy was desperate to get its lost status again. On the

⁸¹ The Government of Zia-ul-Haq like other military and civilian governments, was categorical in using the Civil Service Reform Commission to further its own interest and legitimacy agenda. It has been one of the most prominent reasons for the fact that whatever reforms have been introduced, have been piecemeal and incomplete and at times, even counter-productive. (Bokhari (2016), e-mail to the author, 31 August, 2016, attached in Annexure E).

other hand, the lateral entry scheme also created dissatisfaction among the bureaucrats as well as the public, as this scheme was misused to incorporate favourable persons in the administration. Thus, by the time of 1978, the environment was mainly favourable for rolling back the 1973 reforms. The changes brought by General Zia-ul-Haq in the bureaucracy can be summarised as follows:

- Following the recommendations of the Justice Anwar-ul-Haq commission, Zia-ul-Haq abolished the lateral recruitment system.
- He also merged the Tribal Area Group (TAG) with the District Management Group (DMG).
- The direct recruitment to the Official Management Group (OMG) was halted.
- He also started the direct recruitment of military personnel into the bureaucracy. While initially only retired military officers were re-employed on a contract basis, in 1980, he decreed that 10 per cent of the vacancies in the federal bureaucracy would be reserved for retired or released military officers. These officers would not be selected by the FPSC but by a High Powered Selection Committee headed by Zia himself (ICG 2010: 6).
- He reframed the secular bureaucracy ideologically through measures such as a uniform dress code and enforced prayer breaks during office hours. There was a minimal emphasis on professional work ethics as long as officials were deemed as “good” Muslims (Shafqat and Wahla 2010: 5).
- He also established the institution of *Wafaqi Muhtasib*⁸² in order to “diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice done to a person through mal-administration”.⁸³

⁸² The *Wafaqi Muhtasib* is an ombudsman in Pakistan who is an official, usually appointed by the government or by the parliament but with a significant degree of independence, who is charged with representing the interests of the public by investigating and addressing complaints of maladministration or violation of rights. In Pakistan, the institution of *Wafaqi Muhtasib* has been constituted under Article 270A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.

⁸³ The institution of the *Wafaqi Muhtasib* was established by the President’s Order No. 1 of 1983; the establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order 1983, was promulgated

In fact, at least as important as what Zia's policies have done, are what Zia's policies did not do. Firstly, the Zia government never seriously considered the re-encadrement of the CSP. Secondly, Zia did not re-establish the use of service designations nor did he sanction the reintroduction of the service associations. Thirdly, the Zia government consistently rejected recommendations to expand the number of occupational groups in order to include the technical cadres (Kennedy 1987: 102).

The Militarisation of the Bureaucracy or the Civilianisation of the Military

Zia's regime was unique in terms of the deep militarisation of the civil service.⁸⁴ The militarisation of bureaucracy that was being followed during the earlier regimes on ad-hoc basis was properly institutionalised during his rule. Initially, his attempts to recruit military personnel into the administration were restricted by Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti, who was the Establishment Minister then. According to Lt. Gen. Chishti:

“As Minister in charge of the Establishment Division I received a letter from Gen. Zia the CMLA (Chief Martial Law Administrator), ordering me to induct about twenty retired and serving officers of the Armed Forces to the Civil Services. I was upset on the receipt of the letter because it was entirely against decided policy.....Mr. Bhutto was blamed for destroying the institution of civil service of Pakistan, as it was said, by recruiting his own party men into the civil service and now

in 1983. [Online: Web], Accessed 28th of November, 2013, URL. <http://asianombudsman.com/ORC/factsheets/WafaqiMohtsibFactsheet.pdf>

⁸⁴ The militarisation of the civil service is one of the foremost concerns of the civil servants. Imran Khan, Assistant Superintendent of Police (UT) at the National Police Academy, Islamabad, during an informal discussion on LinkedIn (Attached in Annexure E) expressed that Pakistan's military, being oversized, has lobbied to induct mere 12th Pass officers into the prestigious civil service of Pakistan. The only reason is the welfare of the Army officers and it is no good for the civil service. These officers though very well trained in warfare, are completely useless for the civil service, having had no proper education and training. They are a cause of constant tension within the service and are complete misfits in the hierarchy.

Gen. Zia was going to do it. If the PPP was Mr. Bhutto's party, then the Armed Forces were Gen. Zia's party" (Chishti 1996: 202).

After Chishti's exit, Zia found a more accommodative and obedient Establishment Minister in the form of Ijlal Haider Zaidi (CSP1954) who was given the task of institutionalising the induction of army officers into the civil administration (Chaudry 2011: 152). At the approval of that policy, an office memorandum was issued in which it was stated that the "question of institutionalizing the induction and re-employment of officers of armed forces of Pakistan in civil posts has been under consideration for some time past" (Government of Pakistan 1980: 1). According to the instructions, it was specified that under normal circumstances, the officers of the Armed Forces with up to eight years of commissioned service would be inducted into grade 17 to the extent of 10 per cent of the annual direct recruitment vacancies. Majors were included in grade 18 and in exceptional cases, lieutenant colonels and above could also be employed (Kennedy 1991: 94). The Public Service Commission was eliminated from the proceedings and the recruitment was entrusted to a high-powered selection board called the Defence Services Officer Selection Board (DSOSB) headed by the Defence Secretary (Chaudry 2011: 1).

Unlike Gen Ayub Khan who relied heavily on his steel frame of senior civil servants and did not involve the army much in the day-to-day administration of the governmental decision-making process, Zia relied on a small number of powerful army officers and involved the army significantly in the administration of the country (Mohiuddin 2007: 187). His programme of lateral recruitment of the military in the civil service was his own version of Bhutto's Lateral Recruitment Programme. For this, he created a Review Board within the Establishment Division in 1978 in order to investigate the cases of individual lateral recruits. The Review Board found many cases of irregularities of appointment. Among such irregularities were the selection of candidates who had failed the written

examination; those who had bypassed the scrutiny of the Special Selection Board (set up to interview the prospective recruits); those who had been promoted to the posts without the requisite qualification of experience and education; those who had been or were active members of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and those whom the Federal Security Force (FSF) deemed to be “anti-Pakistan” (Kennedy 1991: 92).

Thus, the recruitment of a military officer in the civilian bureaucracy during Zia-ul-Haq’s regime created a very detrimental effect on the structure and functioning of bureaucracy. Through his scheme more and more numbers of the retired and serving military officials were inducted into the civilian bureaucracy on an annual basis. His programme integrated the military officials more closely with the civilian bureaucracy than their counterparts under the previous military recruitment programmes (Kennedy 1991: 92). Such appointments generally take away the merit and seniority-based hire and promotions, distort performance incentives for the career bureaucracy, undermine the organisational morale by “subjecting civil servants to the ridiculously irrelevant military notions of order and discipline” and placing those trained for military purposes into civilian contexts for which they do not have the appropriate skills (Shah 2008: 61). Often military recruits were assigned to the much coveted administrative postings; their induction also often blocked or retarded the promotional prospects of their civilian counterparts. The cost to morale was, therefore, correspondingly high (Kennedy 1991: 92). It affected the efficiency of the administration adversely as the military personnel were trained to work in emergency situations which was very different from the case of the civil servant who was supposed to maintain law and order in peaceful situations. Thus, mingling the military officers who are “managers of violence” (Huntington 1957: 11)⁸⁵ into the civilian administration has created

⁸⁵ Samuel Huntington in his book, *The Soldier and the State*, has specifically used the term, “managers of violence” for military officers, mainly to distinguish the military bureaucracy from

dysfunctionalism in the political system of Pakistan. Unlike the withdrawal of the Lateral Recruitment Programme, the induction of military officers created resentment and opposition from the part of the civil service of Pakistan (Khan 2016: 3).

The Second Military Regime under General Musharraf

After a brief interval of democracy, in 1999, the then civilian government under Nawaz Sharif was overthrown and the military took over in Pakistan, under General Pervez Musharraf. In a more “corporate style” and unlike his predecessors, Musharraf declared himself as the “Chief Executive” of the country. The military government immediately declared its “seven point” agenda which included the following (Maluka 2004: 55-56): (i) rebuilding national confidence and morale (ii) strengthening the federation while removing inter-provincial disharmony (iii) reviving and restoring the investors’ confidence (iv) ensuring law and order and dispensing speedy justice (v) depoliticising the state institutions (vi) devolving power to the grass-root level (vii) ensuring swift and across-the-board accountability. The agenda of high rhetorical goals by a military government was the first step of an exercise towards distracting the attention of the people from the autocratic rule of a military government at the centre and providing a democratic colour to it in order to appease both the domestic and foreign critics.

Consequently, on November 18, 1999, the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) was established under retired Lt. Gen. S. Tanvir H. Naqvi with an aim of “restructuring” a system of governance (Mezzerra 2010: 8). The formation of the NRB would be remembered as the most controversial and self-serving decision as

the civilian bureaucracy as well as other associations. According to him, “a military specialist is an officer who is peculiarly expert at directing the application of violence under certain prescribed conditions”.

it was formed by a military government which did not have any mandate to introduce novel innovations for demolishing the old political and administrative structure of the country (Maluka 2004: 94). The NRB released a Local Government Proposed Plan (LGPP) with the title “Devolution of Power and Responsibility: Establishing the Foundations of Genuine Democracy” within less than six months, in May 2000. It was prepared with the technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). On the basis of its drafting the Local Government Ordinance for Sind/Balochistan/North-West Frontier/Punjab (LGO-SBNP), it was promulgated by four provincial governments in August 2001. This LGO-SBNP was further placed in the Sixth Schedule with the passing of the Legal Framework Order which was termed as the 17th Constitutional Amendment Act. It meant that the LGP could not be amended without the consent of the President.⁸⁶ Apparently, the military government under Musharraf was adopting a top-down approach for decentralisation where a plan, prepared at the central level without any consultation of the provinces, was imposed arbitrarily and no autonomy was given to either the provinces or the local bodies.

The government presented various reasons by for launching the Local Government Plan (LGP) as it was needed to convince the people about the ostensible good intentions of the military government. These reasons summarised under three main groupings, however, did not follow during the implementation. The first reason was stated to replace the century-old British bureaucratic system with the new system of administrative decentralisation. Secondly, it was to evolve a system which would allow the people at the grass-root level to resolve their immediate problems and by bringing in political decentralisation, devolve the powers from the central and the provincial levels to the local levels through the elected representatives in order to

⁸⁶ Under Article 268(2) of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, the laws specified in the Sixth Schedule may not be altered, repealed or amended without the previous sanction of the President. Constitution of Pakistan [Online: Web], URL. <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/schedules/schedule6.html>

improve the delivery of social services. Thirdly, it was to actively involve a broad section of the people to create new political forces from a middle class and lower middle class background who in the long run could replace the domination of the traditional political families (Robotka 2011: 1). This three-pronged strategy of the LGP was based on five fundamentals: the devolution of political power, the decentralisation of administrative authority, the deconcentration of management functions, the diffusion of power-authority nexus and the distribution of resources to the district level (Figure 1).

Salient Features of the Local Government Plan 2000⁸⁷


In accordance with the plan, a new government setup was established at the local level, introducing a model described as 5Ds (Figure 1). With the launching of the Local Government Plan, the long-established district administrative system was replaced by three countrywide levels of government i.e. district (District Councils headed by a District *Nazim*), tehsils (taluka in Sind and town in the city districts, headed by a Tehsil *Nazim*) and union councils (headed by a Union *Nazim*). The administration of the whole district was placed under the indirectly elected District *Nazims*. The main features of the LGP 2000 were:

- According to the LGP, a three-tier government was established at the local level, including the District, Tehsil, and Union levels—each comprising its *Nazim* [mayor] and *Naib Nazims* [deputy mayors]. The life of these councils was to be three years.

- The lowest level of the government was the union council, covering a population of about 25,000 people. It is the one and only level where all the elections were direct. Each union council was composed of 21 directly

⁸⁷ This plan was officially called the Local Government Plan; however, it got popular as the Devolution Plan 2000.

Figure 1:5D of Local Government System



Source: National Reconstruction Bureau (2001), Local Government Plan 2000 [Online: Web]
 Accessed on 17th March 2011 URL. http://www.nrb.gov.pk/local_government.htm

elected members. The *Nazim* and *Naib Nazim* were to be elected on a joint ticket. The remaining 19 seats were to be composed of 12 seats for Muslims—4 of which were reserved for women—six seats for peasants and workers—two of which reserved for women—and one seat for the minority communities. The abovementioned two tiers of the government were the

Tehsil Municipal Council (TMC) or the Town Municipal Administration (in the city districts) and the District Council (DC), all having the same structure (Government of Pakistan 2001: 47-49).

- The Union Council (UC) worked as an electoral college for the DC and TMC along with the District *Nazim* and *Naib Nazim* and Tehsil *Nazim* and *Naib Nazim* at large. The elected union councillors were not permitted to contest the elections of the *Nazim* and *Naib Nazim* of any tehsil or district. The TMC and DC were headed by the Tehsil *Nazim* and the District *Nazim* respectively. The union *Nazims* and *Naib Nazims* of the union council became automatically the members of the TMC and DC (the Union *Nazim* in the DC and *Naib Nazims* in the TMC) and they constituted a two-third membership of these councils. The remaining one-third members of the district and tehsil councils and the head of these councils were elected indirectly by the directly elected union council members. One-third seats of the total were reserved for women, peasant and workers. The structure of political decentralisation is shown in Figure 2 (Government of Pakistan 2001: 41-43).

- The most radical reforms regarding the bureaucracy at the local level were determined to change the centuries-old bureaucratic system. There were mainly two major changes brought in the name of administrative decentralisation: (a) abolition of the post of the District Commissioner (DC) and its replacement by a District Coordinating Officer (DCO) and (b) the accountability changes whereby the provincial bureaucracy at the local level was made accountable to the elected heads of the district. The District Collector prior to the devolution was accountable to the non-elected provincial secretariat; the LGP now made the DCO accountable to the elected heads of the District and Tehsil governments (Husnain 2008: 5).

- Although it is interesting enough to note that the authority of the *Nazim* over the DCO and Executive District Officers (EDO) was restricted in matters of transfers and promotions, which continued to remain under the purview of the provincial secretariat, this accountability change remained “circumscribed in both a de jure and a de facto sense”.

- Several responsibilities were trimmed under ten departments and were transferred from the province to the district level, i.e. agriculture, community development education, finance and planning, health, information and technology, law, literacy, revenue, works and services (NRB 2001).

- Pakistan as a fiscally centralised country, did not give sufficient financial protection to the local governments.⁸⁸ While the plan did not clearly define the exact modalities of fiscal decentralisation, it envisaged the formation of a Provincial Finance Commission at the provincial level to decide the distribution of revenues; thus financially, the local units were made excessively reliant on the provincial, and ultimately, the federal funds. In addition, they were allowed to levy local taxes/fees from a specified list of local taxes/fees. According to the LGP, the local governments were not allowed to incur any debt to finance their expenditures. The provinces still had substantial control over the budget preparation process of the district governments.

⁸⁸ Ilhan Niaz, Professor in the Department of History, Quaid-E-Azam University, in response to the questionnaire on Gmail (Annexure E) has expressed this fact categorically that the local governments under the LG plan of Musharraf were centrally financed and therefore a lack of financial autonomy was one of the major factors acting as a barrier in the process of actual decentralisation.

- To involve people more actively in the community development, grass-root organisations like the Village Councils and Citizen Community Boards were introduced. The scheme also proposed to provide for monitoring the functioning of the government and the delivery of services by the citizens and their representatives at all levels (SBNP Ordinance (2001): 49-50).

- One significant change which was brought through the LGP was the reservation of one-third of seats for the women and other marginalised groups like peasants, workers, etc. (SBNP Ordinance (2001): 56, 93, 97).

- The plan also expanded the adult franchise by reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 (Paracha, 2003: 18-19).

- In order to resolve the disputes and check the malfunctioning of the government, an institution of the *Zila Mohtasib* (District Ombudsman) was introduced which was empowered to investigate any reported maladministration by any local government official, including the elected members of the local councils and the public servants (SBNP Ordinance 2001: 121-123). It had the same powers as are invested in a civil court. Apart from that, the LGP also provisioned for a *Zila Mushavirat* (District Consultation) Committee to resolve the intra-district disputes (SBNP Ordinance 2001: 90) and the *Musalihat Anjumans* (Conciliation Committees) to facilitate and mediate any dispute, thus informally working as an alternative dispute mechanism (SBNP Ordinance 2001: 90).

The Implementation of the Local Government Plan

Being a contradiction in itself, the devolution of power plan under Musharraf had everything in itself, but not the devolution of power.⁸⁹ The military government was more interested in political manipulation rather than political devolution (ICG 2010: 13). It is contradictory due to the reason that administrative decentralisation is literally impossible in a country having an undemocratic and unrepresentative government at the centre because such a government would not risk the loss of control over the peripheral units, i.e. a loss of power. The strategy of implementation of the plan, having the ostensible aim of strengthening democracy and empowering the people to bring about an empowerment of democracy was driven by the political considerations in order to gain regime legitimacy.

The main aspects of the implementation of Local Government Plan can be described as follows:

The Approach of Decentralisation: Top-Down vs Bottom-Up

There was a desperate need for the devolution and decentralisation of authority, the decision-making power and resources to the local level in Pakistan (Niaz 2016: 1).⁹⁰ With the expansion of political participation, democratisation and electoral contestation, the demands for devolution of authority increased. There were basically two approaches regarding decentralisation: the top-down approach and

⁸⁹ Prof. Niaz, in response to the questionnaire on Gmail (Annexure E), expressed that the Musharraf regime's LG plan was not intended to devolve power, as its own documents clearly establish that the plan was to use the scheme in order to sideline the provincial administration and the civil service and thus establish the Army's direct control over the local politics; since the LGs were centrally financed and *a federal ministry of local government* and the district *Nazims* were indirectly elected and beholden to the military for their election, there was no question of an actual transfer of power to the grass-root level administration.

⁹⁰ This aspect of lack of devolution of power has been categorically highlighted by Syed Anwar-ul-Hasan Bokhari, Joint Secretary at Ministry of Finance, during an informal discussion on Gmail (Annexure E), where he says that the devolution of power to the local level government was not accompanied by the devolution from the provinces to the local bodies.

the bottom-up approach. But, a comprehensive process for decentralisation would be firstly to enhance the powers of the provinces and then to increase the power and authority at the district level. The other process may be firstly to empower the local institutions at the village and district levels and then at the provincial level (Boadway 2004: 11). Musharraf's Local Government Plan however followed a "missing chain of top-down approach". The provinces were missed in this missing chain of top-down approach. Notably, they were supposed to be in better position than the centre to deal with the affairs of district level. The LGP failed to recognise the forceful need to devolve power from the federal level to the provincial level. The LGP reduced the power and functions of the provinces by reducing their role from policy formulation and implementation and transferred ten departments from the provinces to the districts, i.e. agriculture, community development education, finance and planning, health, information and technology, law, literacy, revenue, works and service; they did not receive any further authority and power from the central level as is supposed in any decentralisation plan (Mahmood 2001: 19). Thus, while it seemed "a top down approach", the spirit of decentralisation was hurt by refusal of the centre to devolve powers and authority to the provincial level. Also, as a part of the colonial legacy, the centralisation of power at the hands of the top-level bureaucrats did not allow them to devolve power at the local level (Khan 2016: 1).⁹¹ The centre's strong and direct grip over the local level was against the spirit of decentralisation and nothing could be expected like the empowerment of the local institutions through this contradictory plan.

⁹¹ Imran Khan, Assistant Superintendent of Police (UT) at the National Police Academy Islamabad, during informal discussion on LinkedIn (Annexure E) expressed that the 'babus' are deadly opposed to a local government; they consider it as their opponent, rather than a modern democratic institution. These babus, being at the top, continuously create confusion and mix up things in order to weaken the local government system so that as their hegemony over the government affairs continues.

Political Contest at Local Level

The electoral competition at the local level was distorted by banning the political parties at local level. It gave room for the emergence of the military-supported groups. In other words, the vacuum created by banning the political parties to contest in the local-level elections had been easily filled by the military -supported groups in the name of a non-political contest. In fact, it was a deliberate effort to give an upper hand to the military in local governance. Thus, the local governments could hardly be called as the true representatives of the people. Although on the one hand, it talked about the strengthening of democratic institutions, the right of contesting the elections on a party basis was taken away. This was not a unique exercise under the Musharraf regime. Previously, Ayub Khan had removed over 6,000 politicians from office when he imposed the martial law in 1958 and brought about the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order. His idea of “Basic Democracy” could not work further as the controlling authority remained in the hands of the bureaucracy, which had the power to put an end to the proceedings and suspend the resolutions passed by the local bodies.

Thus, the bureaucracy enjoyed the ability to overrule any power that the local bodies had (Mezzerra 2010: 2). Similarly, General Zia-ul-Haq, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, revived the local government system by promulgating the Local Government Ordinances. He saw the fragmented and divided local government as the surest way to decrease the influence of the politicians at the provincial or national level. Twenty years later, the same strategy was applied by General Musharraf when the centralisation of power involved a selective disqualification of the political party representatives and at times, outright bans on all or certain political parties (Cheema 2003: 402). Veena Kukreja has called it as a gimmick to institutionalise the martial rule. According to her, “building a democratic society at the grassroots level without the involvement of political parties is not possible. That would further depoliticize the people and strengthen the

influence of biradaris and tribes and promote the already entrenched feudal, economic and social mafias in society (Kukreja 2003: 279).

Further, the district *Nazim* and *Naib Nazims* were indirectly elected and it has been alleged that opting for the indirect polls was a calculated move to prevent the political parties from sweeping the district Nazim polls (ICG 2010: 11). The non-party based elections also tended to encourage the politics of patronage based on tribal, ethnic and sectarian divisions. In fact, the plan was implemented in haste without creating enough awareness among the citizens; it is revealed from the fact that the plan was prepared within less than six months.⁹²

The Militarisation of Space created by a Non-Political Contest

The central government's control over the local elections bypassing the provinces also defied the spirit of decentralisation. Since the local government is a provincial responsibility under the 1973 Constitution, the provincial authority traditionally conducts the local bodies' elections. However, the Local Government Election Order 2000 bypassed the provinces from holding the elections, which now came under federal control. The accountability campaign through the National Accountability Bureau was launched to disqualify the politicians selectively and a pro-military party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), was created to bring together the political leaders from the other political parties. Since the elections at the local level were held on a non-party basis, most of the councillors had no political background and lacked the skill and experience and a knowledge of the new scheme. Further, the elections were rigged and the local power brokers were provided with financial resources and informal support by the local military

⁹² Zahid Hasnain et al. have given a detailed study of the PFC awards comprising a separate study of each province. They have shown that the legislatively mandated transfers of the Provincial Consolidated Fund to the local governments amounted to less than 25%. They also show that the provincially controlled programmes still accounted for 30% to 60% of the local governments' development expenditure.

officials (Mezzerra 2010: 2).⁹³ In fact, the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and the Military Intelligence (MI) have become notoriously effective in engineering the rigging of various elections, according to the preferences of each military dictator. These tactics were seen at their “best” in the elections of 2002, where General Musharraf used all means to achieve the desired results (Hasnat 2011: 52). Later, Musharraf, ironically, said, “I also admitted that some excesses had indeed taken place without my knowledge or consent” (Musharraf 2006: 168). All these factors reveal that the local councils were short of being representative in nature; rather, they can be called as units to serve the political interests of the military government.

All these political and electoral distortions by the military government later resulted in a tension between the provincial/federal representatives and the local councillors. These local councillors tended to be seen as “a competing tier of patronage” (Wilder, 1999: 412) by the political leaders in the provinces and therefore no efforts were made by them to empower the local government system. In fact, there was no idea of ownership about these local government systems in the provinces and it created open conflicts between the two tiers, especially in Sind and the former NWFP.⁹⁴ This ideal was further strengthened by the question of continuity and the concern of the political future of these local units.

⁹³ The International Crisis Group Report No. 77 titled “Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?” after an extensive field study and interviews has revealed that in the indirect elections, direct and indirect rigging, influence of the military, disqualifications of the candidates with party affiliations and the policy of coercion and cooption were used to ensure the victory of the pro-military district *Nazims*.

⁹⁴ In the former NWFP for instance, all the 24 *Nazims*, most of whom belonged to the centrist parties, resigned in protest at the right-wing provincial government’s excessive interference in the local government affairs and the federal government had to intervene to resolve the issue. (Mezzera et al. (2010: 28)).

Integration of the 3fs of Functions, Functionary and Finance among the Three Tiers

The LGP scheme lacked the insight to provide measures for integration and coordination among the provincial/federal elected representatives and the local level councillors. As the LGP was imposed without any consent of the provinces, it did not enjoy the support of the provincial governments. The smooth functioning at the local level was constrained due to a lesser coordination between the DCO and the *Nazim* mainly due to the lack of clarity in the responsibilities and functions which were assigned to them and also due to the absence of hierarchical linkages between the various levels of the local government (Jamal et.al. 2008: 16). While the DCO was made accountable to the indirectly elected district *Nazims* in order to make the bureaucracy subordinate to the representative institutions, the new procedure resulted in the duplication in the chain of command as the DCO now had to report both to the *Nazim* on the one hand and the provincial departments on the other. Although the district police officer was made responsible to the indirectly elected District *Nazim*, thereby removing the control of the DCO, the lack of coordination between the district police officer and the District *Nazim* resulted in an unaccountable police department. Further, under the new structure, many laws and statutes were left un-conferred which created a power vacuum and hampered the smooth functioning of the government.

Integration of Functions at the Local Level

Further, no efforts were made from the part of government to integrate the functioning of the local level of government. Although the three levels were quite integrated, an ambiguity remained in the demarcation of roles among the three tiers i.e. union, tehsil and district. It created tensions among them over questions like the distribution of funds and approval of projects. Moreover, the LGP did not establish an effective check and balance system at the local level, which often resulted in the lack of accountability of the District *Nazim* towards the District Council. While the

District *Nazim* was supposed to be accountable and responsible to the District Council for the functions headed by the *Naib Nazim*, the District Council was virtually unable to have any control on the District *Nazim*, mainly because the balance of power tilted in favour of the latter. Although the District *Nazim* and *Naib Nazim* were provisioned to be elected on a joint ticket, a link was conceived between the District *Nazim* on the one hand and District Council headed by a *Naib Nazim* on other; the latter could not have any control over the District *Nazim* mainly due to a gross imbalance of power between these two offices. It also resulted in some districts in an antagonistic relationship between the two. In such cases, the *Nazim*, as the executive head of the district, often ran the government arbitrarily without consulting the Council (ICG 2010: 16).

The district administration which was formerly headed by the District Commissioner was now replaced by the District Coordinator Officer (DCO). This was done in order to reduce the influence of the bureaucracy over the district administration. However, it is interesting to note that the hold of the Provincial Secretariat over the district bureaucracy resulted in a considerable administrative authority over the district bureaucrats. Although the districts were provided with their own institutional systems, the staff at the local level still consisted of the federal and provincial-cadre civil servants. It is also consolidated from the fact that the local governments had had little de facto control over the appointment, transfer, and firing of authorities of the local government.⁹⁵ The need of a proper training and capacity-building programme in order to prepare the elected and bureaucratic officials for the new environment was not identified. Neither the need of creating a separate District Civil Service was given any importance. The

⁹⁵ According to an ICG interview, the district *Nazims* who were not pro-military or not favourable to the central government, had no control in the transfer of the district officials. Nafisa Shah, the *Nazim* of Khairpur district, complained that the district officials were transferred without her knowledge because she had refused to attend Musharraf's referendum rally (ICG interview, Khairpur, June 2003, as cited in International Crisis Group (2010: 13)).

inadequate quality and quantity of training available for the influx of the new staff and elected members across the three tiers of local government was one of the serious daunting challenges faced during the LGP's implementation (Mezzerra 2010: iv).

As part of the administrative devolution, some of the most important functions of the provinces like health, education and infrastructure were transferred to the local governments. The local governments, however, were not provided with a full autonomy regarding these services and the provinces remained primarily responsible for the policymaking. Further, no delineation was made regarding the role and responsibilities of the local governments and the provinces, which created a great deal of ambiguity, overlapping and conflicting service functions (Peterson 2002: 2). For example, the Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASA) of the large cities were devolved to the TMA under the LGP, but remained administratively under the control of the provincial governments, with their own budgets for the district governments or the TMA.

Financial Protection to the Local Units

For making the much-trumpeted-about political and administration decentralisation, the local governments were not provided enough financial protection to carry out the massive functions assigned to them. It was an exercise in shifting the crucial responsibilities, without providing the resources which could be considered as fully adequate for the tasks (Manning 2003: 2). The development funds which were announced for the respective members involved no role of the district governments. The district governments continued to have limited revenue collection mandates. The provinces still had substantial control over the budget preparation process of the district governments. An ambiguity of rules and procedures also affected the financial relations between the provinces and the districts as in many cases, the duplication of tax authority created much uncertainty

and resentment like an overlapping base of the property tax which complicated the tax structure and created an undue harassment of the taxpayers (Paracha Year: 35). Also, the revenue-raising authorities of the local governments were impeded by the strings attached. Thus, their autonomy for bringing in innovations into their revenue-raising and resource allocation formula was severely hurt (Taj 2010: 32). It is also notable that the lowest two tiers of the local government were left with more inadequate funds that were seldom sufficient for any substantial development project. Further, these already meagre funds were preferred for spending in quick impact projects like sanitation and sewerage rather than long-term investments in health and education—a consideration mainly driven by vote-bank politics. Hasnain maintains that the provincially allocable amount was transferred to the local government broadly under two separate block grants—one for recurrent expenditures, which constituted approximately 88% of the allocable amount, and the remainder for development expenditure. Furthermore, a significant proportion of district expenditures were “establishment charges” including the salaries of the administrative personnel who were appointed by the provinces. Manning has expressed grief over the lack of financial autonomy at the local level, saying, “the huge gap between salary and non-salary budgets was discouraging. The districts could not create or reduce posts or adjust their salary structure and therefore, a large fraction of the district budget is fixed” (Manning 2003: 60-65).

Women Empowerment

There were many provisions in the LGP with good intentions which were included to satisfy the conditions of the donor agencies. However, these provisions proved to be cosmetic in the lack of proper implementation of these provisions. It is applicable to the issues of women reservation, expansion of voter franchise and creation of the Citizen Community Boards or CCBs. According to the LGP, women were provided 33% of seats in the local bodies; due to many factors, this provision was unable to empower women thoroughly. The true intent of the policymakers

was expressed from the fact that they did not provide any reservations for the posts of the District *Nazim* and *Naib Nazim*, and reservation was limited to the councillor level only. Also, in the absence of gender equality at the societal level, women reservation could not do anything for women empowerment. Paracha reports that the women felt uncomfortable in participating in meetings and many of them faced ridicule from their male colleagues. Their work was made more difficult as the access to the bureaucratic authorities was gender-differentiated. The women were particularly disadvantaged even before they could become effective in their work, as they had to overcome the mundane problems of obtaining office space and separate toilets (Paracha, 2003: 35). Further, the representation of women was affected by the traditional structure of Pakistan's patriarchal society where the women who came out to contest the election were actually the daughters, wives, daughters-in-law and sisters of the traditional political leaders; thus, the representation of women at the local level was devoid of participation from the diverse segments of the society (Maluka 2004: 93). Various issues like training of women councillors were not given importance, which also hampered their working in the administration. Further, the federal government's true intent in reference to women empowerment is reflected in the fact that in spite of the opposition of the women legislators, the *sharia* law having many anti-women provisions was passed under the pressure of the Islamic parties whose support was essential for the military government to remain in power.

With the view to involve community participation at the local level, the provision of the CCB and Village and Neighbourhood Councils was introduced; in most areas, they existed merely on paper. Since the CCBs were authorised to be given only 80% funding for any project, the remaining 20% they had to mobilise on their own. It was impossible to expect 20% funds voluntarily from the communities who were hardly able to earn their living. Eventually, the community participation and grass-root level involvement of the citizens remained elusive (Taj 2010: 35). Latif

maintains that the CCBs had difficulties in getting their projects started, mainly because they did not have the capacity to submit the technical proposals and cost estimates. The government lacked the staff to process the proposals and applications. The *Nazims'* control on the CCBs' funds and projects also undermined the ability and progress of the CCBs (Latif 2006: 6-7). On the contrary, the functioning of the CCBs was dominated by the influential business community and political patrons. Further, many NGOs got registered as CCBs in order to get extra funding from the local government. Fraudulent registration was also reported to be undermining the functioning of the CCBs.

At the local level, the role of the district administration needed to be redirected from that of a patron to being an equal partner (Shafqat 1999: 1014). There was an overlap of functions of the local councillors and the district administrator. This was one of the major reasons for which the devolution of powers could not succeed.⁹⁶ The Local Government Plan failed to define properly the functions of the District *Nazim* and the District Coordinator Officer. Traditionally, the District Administrator (DA), having both advisory and paternal powers, managed the functions of recruitment, development funding/projects and collection of the district/tehsil taxes. With the elections of local councils at the district/tehsil level, the councillors demanded a greater share and control of these functions. Since the elected officials were not empowered enough to undertake the responsibility of those functions which were traditionally conducted by the DA or the DMG, it created a conflict of interest between the DA and the local councillors. With the implementation of the devolution plan, although the magisterial and legal powers of the DMG were transferred to the district and session judges along with the police oversight powers to the District *Nazim*, there were left many loopholes which

⁹⁶ The need of streamlining and clear-cut division of powers was not recognised under the LGP, as the plan lacked coherent strategy and careful planning before executing it. It resulted into repetition of functions in some cases while non-disposal of functions in other cases resulting into wastage of resources.

created a power vacuum. This power vacuum was supposedly to be filled by the district officer or the DCO (Mezzera 2010: 16).

The devolution or the decentralisation of power and the efficiency of the civil service are symbiotic of each other. There is a very important need to make efforts in the direction of strengthening the democratic institutions in Pakistan. The devolution of power is one of them. It will not only strengthen the roots of democracy in Pakistan but also bring democratisation of the civilian bureaucracy. This dual process can succeed only by bringing institutional as well as attitudinal changes in the civil service. The colonial *mai-bap* (subject and the ruler relationship) attitude of a civil servant is the main hurdle in the way to build and strengthen the democratic institutions at local level. An efficient and accountable administration at the local level demands that the relationship between the civil servant and elected political official should be based on trust, confidence and credibility. Both the political leadership and the bureaucracy need to develop a transparent and effective partnership for promoting the public interest and ensuring a humane governance (Shafqat 1999: 1016). Civil service reforms therefore tend to centre on enhancing democracy and accountability and thus have a strong political component. Responsive and transparent bureaucratic mechanisms call for an increased citizen participation (United Nations 2011: 4).

The Musharraf period was known for its attempt towards bringing radical changes in the bureaucracy of Pakistan. It was only after the civil service reforms of 1973 under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that such sweeping changes took place. Although every government in Pakistan is known for manipulating the civil service in order to gain legitimacy and prolong its rule, the Musharraf regime was distinct in the sense that while other governments tended to bring the bureaucracy as a partner in power, Musharraf tried to subordinate and sideline the bureaucracy and at the same time created a parallel line of a “localized patronage structure to produce

collaborative politicians” (Cheema 2003: 407), who acted as a conduit between the local level constituencies and the non-representative centre. During his tenure, there were mainly five steps undertaken which were related to the civil service of Pakistan:

- The restructuring of the bureaucracy under the Local Government Plan (LGP).
- The formation of a National Commission for Government Reform (NCGR).
- The formation of Army Monitoring Teams for supervising the bureaucracy.
- The formation of a reform-related body—the Civil Service Reform Unit (CSRU).
- The formation of a Cabinet Committee on Civil Service Reforms under the Ministry of Finance.

The Devolution of Power Plan and Civil Service Reforms

The civil service was the main focus of attention under the “Local Government Plan” of the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB). The task of reforming the public services was given to one of the think tanks under the NRB known as the Civil Service Think Tank (CSTT) (NRB 2001: 6). The aim of the CSTT was stated as reconstructing the existing structures and systems of public services so as to ensure an efficient, fair and transparent functioning of the government at the local, provincial and federal levels, with a view to providing a sustained good governance and for promoting national cohesion.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Government of Pakistan, *Agenda for Civil Service Reform*, Ministry of Defence, [Online: Web], Accessed 5th of April, 2011, URL: http://202.83.164.27/wps/portal/Mod/ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os_hQN68AZ3dnIwN312BTAYNTE1MvR0tXgwBLI_2CbEdFAFNHPjc!/WCM_GLOBAL_CO NTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/DefDivCL/division/policies/civil+service+reform

The objectives of changing the system of governance were stated as follows:⁹⁸

- The restructuring of the bureaucratic setup and decentralisation of the administrative authority to the district level and below.
- To reorient the administrative system for allowing public participation in decision-making.
- To rationalise the administrative structures for improving efficiency.
- To introduce performance incentive systems in order to reward the efficient officials.

The administrative changes which were brought under the devolution of power plan were related mainly to the bureaucracy at the district level. As it was the Local Government Plan, it had nothing to do with the administrative structure at the federal level. Although the NRB established the Higher Government Restructuring Committee in 2001 for suggesting a devolution of powers from the federal to the provincial level, no concrete steps were taken in order to implement the recommendations (Cheema 2003: 425). Meanwhile, the NRB which was given the task to draw a plan for the devolution of power was of the view that it is the supremacy of the district-level bureaucracy which was one of the major constraints in the way of efficient administration.

This was reflected in the NRB document:

“the Civil Service is effectively controlled by the DMG. The group has close relations with international donors...Other groups in the public administration chafe under the control of one group and would welcome a democratization of civil service structure as a basic element of civil service reform. The end of domination of bureaucracy by one group is a necessary pre-condition for the attainment of administrative power by the army and the creation of conditions for national reconstruction” (NRB, 2004: 7).

⁹⁸National Reconstruction Bureau (2001), *Local Government Plan 2000* [Online: Web] Accessed on 17th March 2011 URL. http://www.nrb.gov.pk/local_government.htm

Restructuring of District Level Bureaucracy

The supremacy of bureaucracy was seen as a sign of British colonialism and in order to abolish it, a new structure was installed at the district level placing the District *Nazim* at the top. The posts of the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner who traditionally controlled the executive, judicial and revenue functions in a district were removed and a new system was put in place with the DCO as the bureaucratic head in the district. The role of the District Commissioner as the district collector and district magistrate was reduced that of the district coordinator and he/she was made accountable to the district-elected *Nazim* instead of the provincial bureaucracy to which he/she used to report until then. The judiciary power of the DC was given to the district-level judiciary and the revenue collection power to the district *Nazim*. Also, the district level police officer who till then was accountable to the District Commissioner was now made accountable to the District *Nazim* (Government of Pakistan 2001: 16-22).

Merging of the Rural and Urban Areas

The administration of the rural and urban areas was merged and the ostensible aim behind it was to mitigate the rural-urban divide.

The Devolution of Subjects from the Provinces to Districts


As a part of the devolution, some line departments were devolved from the provincial level to the district level.⁹⁹ Apart from that, three new departments were created—namely law, literacy and information and technology. Each district

⁹⁹ The functions which were devolved from provinces to districts were agriculture, community development education, finance and planning, health, information and technology, law, literacy, revenue, works and services.

⁹⁹ In Pakistan, the officers belonging to technical and professional categories, e.g., specialized positions in Ministries of Education, Science and Technology, Food and Agriculture, and subordinate offices are not en-cadred and excluded from training.

department was placed under an Executive District Officer (EDO), assisted by a Deputy District Officer (DDO) at the sub-district level. There was a tehsil/town municipal officer at the tehsil. The new structure of the bureaucracy can be explained through Figure 2.

Figure 2: the Administrative Structure at the District Level



Source: Adapted from the National Reconstruction Bureau (2001), *Local Government Plan 2000* [Online: Web] Accessed on 17th March 2011 URL. http://www.nrb.gov.pk/local_government/figure_2.gif?NOCACHE=1 (Government of Pakistan 2000: 1).

The radical changes brought at the district level bureaucracy under the Local Government Plan show that in theory, the entire exercise was conducted in order to subordinate the bureaucracy to an elected person. Although it seemed to be a positive effort to strengthen the elected representative vis-à-vis a bureaucrat—the priorities and choices for developmental projects could be then determined by the representatives of the communities—the implementation of the LGP took place with extreme political control and interference by the centre.

It was claimed that the changes will make the administration more efficient and productive as the Plan claimed to abolish the centralisation of bureaucracy which had been described by the NRB as the main cause of the bureaucratic inefficiency. In reality, the whole exercise was an effort to cloak the centralised control over the local administration being exercised through the new institution of the District *Nazim*. As this new institution was made the main tool in the hand of the military to extend its centralised control, it was essential to lower the grade of the district head of the bureaucracy (DC) in order to raise the stature of the District *Nazim*. Thus, the whole exercise remained cosmetic and could not bring any path-breaking change into the civil service. The district governments were likely to face many constraints under Musharraf's LGP. Although certain functions were devolved to the district and lower level of government in the name of the devolution of power, the districts been imposed by each province, in some cases the local governments were given were not provided with enough autonomy (fiscal and political) to bring about desirable changes as per their own needs. The recruitment of officials at the district level was still controlled by the provincial government and influenced by the federal government (Cyan 2004: 21). Although the prohibition on recruitments had the authority to hire the administrative staff and officials only on a contract basis. This practice however did not do much favour to the local government, given the fact that it was limited to merely some grades and some departments; especially,

the districts were not given any authority for the recruitment, transfer or promotion of the higher levels of officials (Cyan 2004: 24-25).

The Ambiguity of the Rules and Procedures

There erupted a lot of difficulty in identifying the locus of responsibility for action, due to a lack of clarity. This ambiguity ultimately led to the breakdown of law and order (Government of Pakistan 2011: 1). The absence of no clear rules or policy support created confusion and complexities, further making the administration complicated rather than smooth. For example, the local government did not enjoy the status of an employer in spite of going for recruitment on a contract basis in some cases. The legal definition of an employer was not certain and neither was the status of the government. It constrained the employees to contest legally in the court if any injustice was poured upon them. The absence of clear rules and policies also created the problem of dual accountability, for example, although the district level officials including the DCO were made accountable to the elected District *Nazim*, their loyalty to the district level was not paramount as the recruitment and transfer powers existed at the provincial level of the government. Cyan and others have expressed the possibility of politically motivated transfers caused by that dual accountability in these words, “the threat of an unpleasant transfer or the promise of an attractive one can pressure the senior staff member to arrange the transfer of a junior employee” (Cyan 2004: 27).

The Disadvantages of Hasty Implementation

Moreover, the lack of much preparation before putting an unfamiliar and untested system also hampered the smooth functioning of the new administrative system which had been put in place (ICG 2010: 13). Although the District *Nazim* was provided with the new responsibilities, in spite of knowing the fact that the democratic functioning was weak at the local level, no efforts were made on the part of government to strengthen the community participation and to strengthen the

hands of democracy at the local level. The result was obvious that on the one hand the provinces were reluctant to devolve their powers to the districts and on the other hand, it created a vacuum at the level of the local administration as the elected *Nazim* was not able to bear the new responsibilities. It also led to the further concentration of power in the hands of DCO who took an advantage of the ambiguity of the rules and procedures. In an interview conducted by the International Crisis Group, it is shown that in spite of the reduction in the judicial and revenue collection power of the DCO, he/she still enjoyed wider administrative and financial powers than the former DC (ICG 2010: 15). The linkages among the district, tehsil and union level governments were weak, resulting in a lack of coordination among them; also, a horizontal integration was absent which led to a poor coordination between the various line departments at the district, tehsil and union levels (Taj 2010: 16). There were no efforts made on the part of government to integrate the administrative reforms at the local level to that of the federal and provincial levels.

The Financing and Allocation of Functionaries at the Local Level

Although some line departments were devolved from the provincial level to the district level and some new departments were created, the provincial governments retained substantial control over the district government regarding policymaking on the devolved subjects. However, the government employed a one-size-fits-all approach of the LGP as all the districts initially were assigned all the departments to be established, irrespective of the need (Manning 2003: 33). It created serious irregularities in the allocation of functionaries and finance. Moreover, it led to some redundancies with the provision of staff and budgets for each of departments in each district. For example, urban Karachi was assigned the agriculture department (along with other departments) whereas the *Nazims* of the predominantly rural districts complained that they had to budget for an IT department, despite a limited utilisation of IT. Similarly, the literacy department was assigned to all districts,

with almost the same number of staff, although city districts and small rural districts had less demand for this service (Manning 2003: 33). These were mainly the pains of providing less discretion and thus the local governments were left with little scope of innovation according to the needs of the local communities. Although much later this anomaly was tried to be removed and the provinces were given the right to modify their respective organisations and thus provide for a more efficient allocation of resources, the problem was not fully addressed in all the provinces except Baluchistan and the former NWFP. It was mainly because the districts were still not supposed to be eligible to manage according to their own needs.

Attitudinal Change

Although various positive changes were made under the LGP, the tool of implementation remained the same—the bureaucracy remained unaccustomed to change.¹⁰⁰ Thus, there was no effort that was made to bring about an attitudinal change into the behaviour of the civil service members. Particularly at the initial stage (December, 1999 to January 2001), the civil service was found resisting the idea of devolution as has been stated by Baela Raza Jamil, “the bureaucrats, who had the most to lose in terms of status and authority, led the resistance; since the bureaucrats had to lead the pre-devolution transition process, they themselves became the primary blockers of the idea” (Jamil 2002: 16). There was a lack of insight for the human resource development in the LGP. The administrative changes under the LGP did not emphasise the need for capacity-building programmes to smooth the process under the new structure of the administration. A formal system of in-service and recruitment-level training was not sufficient for the

¹⁰⁰ Mr Imran Khan, (op.cit.) during an informal discussion on LinkedIn (Annexure E) expressed that one of the major factors behind the failure of LG Plan was that it was implemented by the same bureaucracy which is unaccustomed to change and does not want to lose power.

administrators for working in the new environment (Government of Pakistan 2006: 9).

The need for creating a distinct District Service was not identified. The Article 240 of the Constitution of Pakistan stipulates that there would be All Pakistan, Federal and Provincial Services—the Constitution does not mention a District Service.¹⁰¹ There was a need for creating a separate District Service provided with a constitutional protection. The district-elected government needed to be given the authority to appoint the officials of the District Service having enough discretion to make a policy in this regard so that they could select the official staff according to the local needs.

Although it may seem good in theory that the administrative officer has been made accountable to the representative head of the people, in reality, this ostensible good effort was undermined by the fact that the representative head at the district level according to the LGP did not represent the local people in a true sense mainly due to two reasons: firstly, these elected officials were indirectly elected and secondly, because of a military government at the centre and its direct control over the local government, the politically favourable people were placed as the district *Nazims*. Shafqat Munir has called electoral tactics as a “big power game” where the traditional establishment backed the power elites at the local level through the excessive use of money and power tactics (Munir 2001: 1). Thus Cheema and others have doubted the loosening of the bureaucratic control in effect when they say, “it is unclear that the de jure shift in emphasis towards elected representatives vis-à-vis the bureaucracy has been matched by their substantive de facto empowerment” (Cheema, 2003: 415). In most of the cases, the LGP resulted in a nexus of a corrupt DCO and an equally corrupt District

¹⁰¹ Article 240, The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, [Online: Web], Accessed 26th of June, 2011, URL. <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/>

Nazim on the one hand and the transfer and postings of civil servants, mainly driven by political interest to extend the reach of military regime to the local level on the other (ICG 2010: 1).

A Restored Military Control over the Local Government and the Suppression of the Principle of Separation of Power

Under the military rule of Musharraf, the militarisation of the civil services crossed every limit of intensity and reduced the credibility and efficiency of the bureaucracy (Ahmar 2016: 1; Shafqat 2016: 1). Previously, whenever the civil service was misused for political benefits, it was kept at par with the ruling regime. However, during the military rule of Musharraf, the situation grew worse when the bureaucracy was made subordinate to the military government and the Army was authorised for its monitoring. Meanwhile, the system of a proper check and balance among the institutions at the local level was ineffective due to which various conflicts erupted.

Further, the military government introduced a novel system of Army Monitoring Teams¹⁰² on November 15, 1999, to draw the performance and evaluation reports of the civil officers and their working. The rationale for the induction of the army monitors was stated to be for the improvement of the efficiency of the civil officers (Maluka 2004: 64). The monitors were required to receive inputs from the field and pass it on to their top military brass for policy formulation. These AMT were divided into divisional level structures and then further divided into district level structures. These were manned entirely by the military officers who reported to their own senior military command. Thus, there were nine corps commanders to

¹⁰² The system of Army Monitoring Teams was against the democratic principles. Mr Khan (op.cit.) during an informal discussion on LinkedIn (Annexure E), expressed that the Army as an institution doesn't have any expertise to oversee the civil matters and that the "army officers' only quality is being good at bullying and cursing".

oversee the governance machinery (Mahmood 2001: 21). Notwithstanding this ostensible purpose, in practice the role of the AMTs was widened to serve the interest of the military regime so much so that no departmental civilian posting or transfer could be made without any prior clearance from the military officers. The AMT served to provide the basis for a major overhaul of the civil servants according to the political needs of the military government. On the basis of the AMT reports, thousands of officials were removed from office or forced to take premature retirement through the promulgation of two ordinances—Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000 and the Civil Servants (Amendment) Ordinance 2000 (Maluka 2004: 65). Later, these AMTs were empowered to initiate and conduct fact-finding inquiries against the civil bureaucrats—a serious blow to the independent functioning of the civil bureaucracy (Datta 2003: 108). An attempt was even made to empower these teams to evaluate the performance of the bureaucrats which would form an input for writing their annual confidential reports.

Some Other Civil Institutional Arrangements

There were some other institutional arrangements that were made to bring about a reform in the civil services during the period of Gen. Musharraf. A Cabinet Committee on Civil Service Reforms was formed, chaired by the Minister of Finance. The other members were the Chairman of National Reconstruction Bureau; the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission; the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister; the Establishment Secretary; the Secretary of Finance and the Chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) (Bokhari 2011: 1). A supervisory unit called the Civil Service Reform Unit (CSRU) was established as a sub-component of the establishment division to facilitate the implementation of the reform agenda and to fulfil the need of the capacity-building programmes (Government of Pakistan 2000: 13). The establishment of this unit was one part of the Public Sector Capacity Building Project assisted by the International

Development Association (IDA) (Bokhari 2011: 1). The CSRU was to serve as secretariat to the Cabinet Committee on Civil Service Reforms in order to oversee the government's comprehensive civil service reform programme. Its task was mainly to provide technical recommendations in order to support the civil service reform by outsourcing technical studies and organising seminars/workshops of provincial and national level stakeholders to develop a consensus on the Civil Service Reform Agenda, i.e. restructuring, compensation, professional development and associated recruitment and promotion reforms. The CSRU was also made responsible to monitor the implementation of the agreed-upon reforms (Government of Pakistan 2002: 13). The government also amended the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance to institutionalise a merit-based, transparent recruitment for the civil service (United Nations 2004: 11). While there has been some improvement as a result of the reforms, Pakistan's civil service still requires a systemic renewal and many structural changes.

A Civil Service Think Tank (CSTT) was constituted under the NRB that was provided with the aim to reconstruct the existing structures and systems of public services so as to ensure an efficient, fair and transparent functioning of the governments at the local, provincial and federal levels, with a view to providing sustained good governance and for promoting national cohesion (NRB 2001: 1).

The National Commission for Government Reforms

A National Commission for Government Reforms was set up in 2006 (Springborg 2009: 196). It was the only good attempt regarding the civil service reform made during the Musharraf regime. The commission was headed by Dr Ishrat Hussain, a retired civil servant and former State Bank Governor. It produced its report after two years of consultations with provincial and district governments, serving and retired civil servants and civil society members (ICG 2010: 10). It was for the first time in the history of Pakistan that a body was set up to undertake a comprehensive

study extending to all the three tiers of the Government in an integrated manner. The NCGR was distinct from its previous such attempts as it was the latest attempt to know the problems which the Government of Pakistan was facing in the formulation and implementation of policies. The NCGR was also important because it conducted a critical analysis of the various reforms which it had undertaken so far. The Commission consisted of six independent members and three ex-officio members drawn from the different provinces (NCGR 2006: 3). There was also a High Powered Steering Committee (HPSC) co-chaired by the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Pakistan and consisting of four provincial Chief Ministers. This was responsible for approving the recommendations of the NCGR and for monitoring their implementation (Hussain 2006: 14).

According to the NCGR, the steps undertaken so far at reform had been piecemeal, partial or ad hoc. Every government in Pakistan, whether military or civilian, was interested merely in manipulating the various institutions in the name of administrative reforms, thus leaving the situation worse than before. According to NCGR, the governmental reforms have to be comprehensive, concurrent and coordinated, covering the following dimensions (Hussain 2006: 6):

- a. Federal, provincial and local governments
- b. Organisation of the three tiers of government and horizontal relationships within and across these tiers
- c. The internal structure of each ministry and department and the hierarchical relationships governing the structure, composition, delegation of powers and HR policies in respect of the Secretariat and the executive agencies.
- d. The size of the cadre and composition of the civil services at all levels of the government and the evolution of the future civil service structure and policies pertaining to human resource deployment at the three tiers of government.

- e. The business processes including the rules of business, financial, administrative and establishment rules and regulations and the flow of work.
- f. The replacement of manual processes by automation, thus ensuring a greater transparency.

According to the NCGR, there were a number of factors which had contributed to the gradual deterioration of the capacity of the civil service—the most identified ones were the absence of a long-term human resource development and management policy, the risk-averse attitude of the civil servants, the pressures and compulsions from the political leadership pushing the ambitious civil servants into taking partisan positions favouring the ruling party, the training being limited to only the en-cadred group of civil servants leaving aside the ex-cadred group,¹⁰³ a highly centralised system of decision-making and lack of delegation of powers, a rapid turnover and transfers of civil servants at the behest of the politicians in power, a reliance on the antiquated and outdated rules, procedures and regulations and an absence of an internal accountability for results and outcomes which took away the incentives for improving performance (NCGR 2008: 51).

The recommendations given by the NCGR were to be carried out by following two objectives (NCGR 2008: 54):

- Improving the capacity of the civil servants in order to become more responsive in delivering the basic public services to the common citizens in an efficient, effective and equitable manner.
- Attracting, retaining, motivating and developing high-quality civil servants, in order to improve the functioning of all the three tiers of the government.

¹⁰³ In Pakistan, the officers belonging to the technical and professional categories, for e.g., specialised positions in the Ministries of Education, Science and Technology, Food and Agriculture, and subordinate offices are not en-cadred and excluded from training.

It is to be noted that the NCGR was not in favour of conducting radical changes in the structure of civil service and other governmental institutions, as has been expressed in the following statement of Ishrat Hussain:¹⁰⁴

“I am quite sure that except for some anarchists most Pakistanis will not wish that we should implement any radical reforms that will lead to a chaos and instability in the country. Such an action will once again put us back on the path of retrogression and regress. The more sensible option is to review and fix the administrative structure at the Federal, Provincial and Local governments, revise and update the processes, rules and delegation of powers and responsibilities to the different tiers of the government, automate and make transparent the way in which a common citizen can obtain the various services from the Government departments, re-organize the civil services so that we have motivated, competent and responsive public servants” (Hussain, 2011: 1)

The major recommendations given by the NCGR can be summarised as follows (Government of Pakistan 2008: 1):

- The Commission mainly focused on reducing the size of the bureaucracy on the one hand and using optimally the existing workforce by making various changes, on the other. According to it, the civil service should be reorganised in order to meet the varying demands of the governments at all levels. It also suggested removing the concept of a superior civil service and the uniform treatment and training of all cadres, i.e. ex-cadres and en-cadres. The NCGR recommended that the civil service of Pakistan should be restructured having four types of civil service:

¹⁰⁴ Dr Ishrat Hussain, currently Public Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington D.C., has been actively engaged in the research to transform the civil service structure of Pakistan. According to him, the overall governance structure is important because it is through this structure that the economic policies are intermediated and translated into the economic and social benefits for a vast majority of the population. This can be compared to a water system whereby the water is gushing out of the tap but if the pipe through which it is being conveyed is corroded, leaking or clogged, then those expecting water at the other end of the pipe would either only get a trickle or a water of unhygienic quality that is not usable for drinking, cooking, bathing and other uses of human consumption (Hussain (2011), [Online: Web], Accessed 21 June 2015, URL. ishrathussain.iba.edu.pk/.../New/Civil_Service_Reform_Jul18_2011.docx).

- All-Pakistan** (i) National Executive Service (NES)
(ii) Pakistan Administrative Service (Formerly DMG)
(iii) Police Service of Pakistan (PSP)
- Federal** (i) Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS)
(ii) Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service (PAAS)
(iii) Pakistan Taxation Service with two cadres for Customs
and Inland Revenue (PTS)
- Provincial** (i) Provincial Management Service (PMS)
(ii) Provincial Executive Service (PES)
(iii) Provincial Technical and Professional Service (PTS)
(iv) Provincial Judicial Service (PJS)
- District** District Service

- Under this system of the new structure, all cadres and occupational groups will have a uniform nomenclature i.e. service. The NCGR recommended the creation of a new National Executive Service (NES), along with the Provincial Executive Service (PES) comprising Grades 20-22. It will be open to all existing officers serving the Government and also professionals from outside; they will be drawn through a competitive process. The NES will be divided into three specialised cadres: Economic Management, Social Sector Management and General Management. The need for a separate NES was identified recognising that the future knowledge-based economy can be effectively managed by the individual who possesses a mixture of substantive knowledge and skills, combined with leadership skills (NCGR 2008: 62-69).

- The NCGR also gives a separate system for subordinate service in grades 1-16. It recommends that all posts in Grades 1-16 at the District, Tehsil/Town and Union Council level be classified into two categories (NCGR, 2008: 73).
- All common services staff who can be rotated from one office to another such as messengers, drivers, clerks, assistants, superintendents, serving at the district, town/tehsil, union administration levels, should be grouped together to form the General Cadre. The inter-changeability of the staff, who will mainly be generalists, will be the main criterion for induction into this grouping.
- All technical staff which belongs to specific departments will either be grouped into separate cadres, if there is a justification to do so, or remain in ex-cadre or non-cadre posts in their respective departments, with their promotion prospects at par with the cadre employees. The NCGR was of the view that the separation of the generalist and common services and rotational positions from specific technical positions¹⁰⁵ will bring about a great deal of clarity and transparency (NCGR 2008: 73).

d. The NCGR strongly recommended for the decentralisation and devolution of various powers from the centre to the provinces and from the provinces to the

¹⁰⁵ In order to modernise the civil service system, the balancing of a mixed system of generalist as well as specialist services has been recognised by various experts in Pakistan (Bokhari (2016), e-mail to the author, 31 August). During an e-mail conversation, Prof. Niaz expressed that on the one hand, at the field level, the primacy of the generalist collector/magistrate/commissioner/or district coordination officer, continues to be necessary in order keep a check on the local bureaucracies and provide a semblance of control over the disbursement of the central and provincial funds and implementation of the national or regional policies; on the other hand, Pakistan does need specialised central superior services for managing education, health, public works, agricultural development and livestock, science and technology, communications, forests, environment, etc. (Niaz (2016), e-mail to the author, 08 September).

districts. On the other hand, the NCGR recommended the strengthening of the district administration by two means: first, the creation of a District Service under the control and management of the District Government, putting all employees in Grades 1-16 in the devolved departments of the districts and also improving the span of control and accountability for the results. Secondly, the transfer of functions from the federal to the provincial governments as well as the introduction of a regional quota at the federal level, reserving the highest policymaking positions for the qualified and competent provincial civil servants.

- e. The NCGR was of the view that for the benefit of the citizens, the interface between the public and the civil servants should be improved. According to it, “the civil service of Pakistan is comprised of low grade officials lacking neutrality, integrity and right attitude, who often lack the skills to address the concerns of the citizens” (NCGR 2008: 6). The NCGR proposed to adopt a holistic approach for human resource management to turn the civil servants into competent, motivated, well-trained problem-solving individuals. It emphasised the adoption of a transparent and accountable merit-based approach that rewarded performers and penalised the recalcitrant ones through a “Transparent Promotion Policy” with a clearly defined role for the Selection Board and Departmental Promotion Committees (NCGR, 2008: 60). The NCGR recommended the seizure of promotions on the basis of seniority and said that the promotions should be based on the performance and efficiency of an official. It also proposed the transformation of the Establishment Division into a modern agency for the management and development of the human resources in the Federal Government. It thus hoped to bring the much-needed “cultural change” to the organisation and to ensure that the mechanisms were put in place in order to address under-performance (NCGR 2008: 6).

f. To make the administration efficient and quickly accessible, the NCGR proposed to exploit the potential offered by the e-Government quickly and advantageously (NCGR 2008: 20). The introduction of e-governance¹⁰⁶ would ensure that there is a move away from paper-based working towards a more efficient, productive and cost-effective approach. This would also imply that all government rules, regulations, circulars, instructions and manuals are readily accessible through web in the public domain and so are the latest editions of the documents. This will not only curtail the discretionary and arbitrary powers of the lower functionaries but also encourage openness, transparency, lesser opportunities for corruption and accountability by the public.

The Impact of the Devolution Plan on the Civil Service

After a decade of military rule in Pakistan along with the strategy of the Local Government Plan to extend control over the local government, we are faced with the question as to how it affected the bureaucracy apart from questioning that whether the stated objectives were met or not. In the words of Sania Nishtar, the president of an NGO think tank Heartfile, “the Local Government System which was meant to be departure from the post-colonial style of administration was not able to deliver on its premise” (Nishtar 2010: 1). According to an ICG report, “the devolution plan of Musharraf resulted in corrupt bureaucrats joining hands with equally corrupt and unaccountable local officials” (ICG 2010: 1).

¹⁰⁶ E-governance is one of the efficient tools for enhancing transparency, efficiency, faster delivery of services and reducing corruption. There are various programmes being run by the Government of Pakistan under the electronic delivery of services, for example, the delivery of services to citizens through the internet, a management information system, the skill development of government functionaries and network infrastructure. Yet, there is still more to be done in order to increase the people’s trust in the government and to make the government accountable (Kabani (2005), [Online: Web], Accessed 12 October 2015, URL. <http://www.slideshare.net/kabani/managing-e-governance-in-pakistan>)

In Pakistan, the civil service has been exploited by every government through institutional manipulation in the guise of reform. It has deeply damaged the integrity, neutrality and professionalism of the civil servants (ICG 2010: 1). The military rule under Musharraf was no different from the previous rules in this respect and the bureaucracy was much politicised and militarised through the institutional mechanisms of the LGP. The monitoring of the bureaucracy by the Army Monitoring Teams seriously injured the integrity and neutrality of the bureaucracy. Before the impact of Musharraf's rule over the civil service is analysed, it is necessary to bring forth some critical flaws in the whole programme initiated by the military government:

- Although the LGP's stated objective was to devolve administrative power and thus end the colonial legacy, the true intent of the military government was in doubt as the devolution of power meant the devolution of certain functions from the provincial level to the district level and also, the devolution of power from the centre to the provinces was not given any priority by the government (Ali 2003: 399).¹⁰⁷
- The whole mechanism of the LGP was contradictory in itself as the decentralisation and democratisation of the civil service was taking place, while having an undemocratic and military government at the centre. Moreover, the commission which was given the task to draw a plan for the devolution was headed by a military officer.

¹⁰⁷ The National Reconstruction Bureau established the Higher Government Restructuring Committee in 2001 to suggest a devolution of powers from the Federal to the Provincial level. However, no steps were taken as far as the implementation is concerned (Cheema et al. (2003): 425).

- One of the critical flaws of the military government can be revealed from the fact that on one hand the military government brought the plan of devolution of power in order to introduce decentralisation; on the other, the bureaucracy was put under the supervision of the Army by bringing in the mechanism of the Army Monitoring Teams which created fear, affected performances negatively and made people callous (Bokhari 2016: 1). It was for the first time in the history of Pakistan that the bureaucracy was subordinated to the military; thus, Musharraf was one step ahead from his predecessors who had merely militarised the bureaucracy in order to sustain their grip on the political power.
- Although in the name of strengthening democracy at the local level, the bureaucratic head of the district, the DCO, was made subordinate and accountable to the District *Nazim*; as mentioned before, these district *Nazims* were indirectly elected and through many manipulations favourable people were placed at this post. Later, these district *Nazims* became the tool of the military government at the centre to strengthen the grip of power at the local government rather than strengthening the democracy per se.

All these flaws reveal that reforming the bureaucracy was not the true intent of the government; rather it was to extend its power under the guise of reform. This left a further manipulation of the bureaucracy in order to gain legitimacy rather than reforming it. The military rule of Musharraf left the civil service more *politicised* and *militarised*. The way the Local Government Plan was drawn and implemented left many loopholes as have been discussed earlier in this chapter. The political intervention in the civil service gravely undermined the professionalism and capacity of the civil service. The politically oriented transfers and promotions of

the civil servants contributed to their *dysfunction*,¹⁰⁸ with the promotions being increasingly dependent upon the officers' proximity to those in power rather than their own skill and performance. According to the ICG, it weakened the constitutionally guaranteed protection of employment that previously shielded the bureaucracy against political interference (ICG 2010: 5). It gradually undermined the importance of merit and performance of a civil servant and institutionalised the ethical, procedural and financial malpractices (Nishtar 2010). In this environment, a civil servant got more incentive for being loyal to his superior rather than being responsive to the citizens' need, thus leaving the bureaucracy completely dysfunctional.

As frequent political interference weakened the constitutional protection of the civil services, it distracted and prevented the young, honest and enthusiastic people from joining the civil service; the participation of candidates in the Civil Service Examination reduced from 4,669 in 2001 to 4,125 in 2006 (Khan and Din 2008: 3). At the end of the Musharraf regime, the students were less interested in joining the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). A perception survey conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics shows that the students not interested in the CSP gave the following reasons for that choice: the recruitment system is not fair; there is political influence over the civil service; there is a less competitive salary package; there is limited vision and creativity and a limited freedom of action and initiation. For most of the students, a lack of fairness in recruitment and the political influence over the civil service are the major causes for their not joining

¹⁰⁸ Dysfunctionalism in the political system is an institutional disorder where an institution fails to perform a function which it is assigned to do by the law and the constitution. The concept of dysfunctionalism was given by Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell while dealing with the approach of structural-functionalism to study the political institutions. There are three general types of dysfunction in public administration: (1) doing the wrong thing wrong (2) doing the wrong thing right (3) doing the right thing wrong.

the civil service (Khan and Din 2008: 15-16). It shows that people now have less faith in the bureaucratic machinery. The pattern of passing the examination signifies a lack of interest among the brighter students.¹⁰⁹ The corruption in the civil service has grown during the previous years. In the Corruption Perception Index, Pakistan gaining 2.3 points, was ranked as the 34th most corrupt country in 2010.¹¹⁰ The intensity of corruption in Pakistan can be realised from the fact that 65 per cent civil servants need a bribe to be offered to get things done in an official department. 93 per cent of the people think that the performance of the civil servants has deteriorated over the years (Haque 2007: 17). All these facts reveal that the efficiency of the civil service has been seriously eroded. There should be no surprise that despite the various attempts at reforming the civil service, the common perception seems to be that the system essentially remains similar to the one inherited from the colonial past (Haque 2006: 1199).

¹⁰⁹ The percentage of applicants passing the written examination has declined sharply in the recent years—from about 21 per cent in 2001 to only about 7 per cent in 2006. (Khan and Din 2008: 4).

¹¹⁰ Corruption Perception Index (2010), [Online: Web], Accessed 23rd of June, 2011, URL. www.transparency.org

CHAPTER 5: COMPARISON OF REFORM DURING CIVILIAN REGIMES AND MILITARY REGIMES

The civil service has always been one of the favourite areas for the rulers of Pakistan whenever the question of reforms has appeared before it. However, behind bringing changes in the structure of bureaucracy, the will of acquiring legitimacy¹¹¹ seems to be more forceful rather than reform. In Pakistan where the foundations of democracy are yet to take root, the worrying question of legitimacy has haunted an elected and democratic government as well as a non-representative and non-elected military government in the same way. Thus, every attempt towards restructuring the civil service must be seen in this context, be it the 1973 reforms of Z. A. Bhutto, the Islamisation of the civil service by General Zia-ul-Haq or the devolution of power plan by General Pervez Musharraf. Both types of regimes have targeted the structure of bureaucratic organisation and they also brought changes in the process of appointment of civil servants. Though, these changes appeared to be in the positive direction of reforming the civilian bureaucracy, the actual implementation proved to be the opposite in the course of time. The changes in the structure affected the autonomy and efficiency of the civil service organisation. The intrusion of the military and political elements through changes in the appointment process reduced the secular and professional character of the civil service.

The Changes in the Civilian Bureaucracy in the Civilian and the Military Regimes: A Comparative Analysis

Similarities: Although the reforms as well as the changes introduced by the civilian and military regimes in Pakistan differ in their character, many similarities among them can be found as most of them were driven by the need for legitimacy

¹¹¹ The problem of "legitimacy" is one of the central problems of authoritarian regimes. It is concerned with the first and foremost right to govern. Legitimacy is the recognition of the right to govern. In this regard, it tries to offer a solution to a fundamental political problem which consists in justifying simultaneously, political power and obedience (Coicaud 1997: 6).

and regime survival. The similarities among them range from the camouflage of democracy and decentralisation, the targeting of structure overlooking the need for organisational reforms, a justification by committees and commissions, an implementation in a crisis-driven background situation, the lateral recruitment used as strategy and lastly, the dilution of the role of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) by establishing a similar parallel institution for recruitment. These similarities can be explained under the following headings:

Reforms in the Name of Democracy and Decentralisation

In the present world, “democracy” is the “providential fact” and every type of regime whether authoritative, totalitarian or liberal in some way or the other, pretends to be democratic (Nelson, 2016: 298). Alexis De Tocqueville concludes that “to attempt to check democracy will be to resist the will of God” (Tocqueville 1945: 7). Every ruler in Pakistan seemed very much concerned to consolidate the hands of democracy, bringing decentralisation and shattering the colonial legacy.¹¹² The first elected government of Z. A. Bhutto was very much enthusiastic for removing the colonial structure of bureaucracy, the *mai-bap* attitude of the civil service and the centralisation of power in the hands of a closed group of the Civil Service of Pakistan (Maheshwari 2002: 26). Not only the civil service, but the legal and constitutional framework also brought changes to the military and judiciary (Panhwar 2008: 3-4). Similarly, Musharraf also talked of bringing “genuine democracy” in place of “sham democracy”. However, the replaced structure in order to bring democracy and decentralisation was designed so as to suit the own

¹¹² There is a general consensus on the argument of the colonial legacy of the structure of the bureaucracy in the South Asian countries including Pakistan (Sabharval and Berman 2016; Islam 1989; Rizvan 2014). However, some authors like Ilhan Niaz and Anjum Imam disagree. According to Niaz, South Asia has had an ancient tradition of bureaucracy and service nobility. The British did not introduce bureaucratic structures into South Asia; rather, they modernised the existing structures over a long period of time. It is to be noticed, however, that although there had been a system of administration in ancient and medieval India, the British bureaucratic structure was the only one having Weberian features like merit-based recruitment, hierarchical structure, paper work and system of promotion and pension (Niaz (2016), E-mail to the author, September 8).

style of the established government, whether military or civilian. For example, the constitutional base of 1973 was brought forth to reassert the civilian supremacy over the military. The members in the Civil Service Reform Commission under the chairmanship of K.H. Meer were carefully chosen by Z. A. Bhutto (Chaudry 2011: 110) in order to chalk out a favourable plan to dismantle the monopoly of power of this successor of the ICS. These members were those who had had a personal grudge against the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) (Syed 1992: 137).

The authoritarian nature of the Zia regime did not prevent it from initially declaring the goal to be merely the “restoration of democracy” (Jabeen 1987: 70). His “brief, corrective and necessary” military intervention proved to be almost decade-long and the democratic elections that were promised to be held within 90 days were never held (Ali 1983: 136). Under the garb of the restoration of democracy to save the country from civilian unrest, there was a vigorous and systematic plan to remain in power (Askari 2000: 169). Strategically, Zia masterminded Bhutto’s judicial murder and executed it with military precision; thus, preparing a new ground for holding elections (Zahid 2011: 10). Bhutto, his cabinet colleagues and the leading opposition leaders were arrested and kept in protective custody (Mclynn 2016: 69). There were many amendments in the election rules which ultimately led to a distortion of the elections and a weakening of the democratic values. For example, the separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims and a system of proportional representation were alleged to be for the purpose of dispersing the political representatives. The initial concern for a restoration of democracy faded away, as Zia gradually left the idea of holding elections and tried to delay them as long as possible by making several excuses, for example the Afghan crisis. A system was put in place by the Zia government to hold elections at the local level in September 1979. Though the local-level elections were held on non-party basis, a large number of people with affiliation to the political parties got elected in their individual capacity. This perturbed the military government which decided to

postpone the general elections saying that that time was not suitable to hold the elections and thus, additional restrictions were put in place on the political parties (PILDAT 2013: 16). The people were asked to be more concerned for public welfare and general good rather than for holding elections. Not only that, but Zia also projected an ‘Islamic system of democracy’ as the highest priority; at other times, he emphasised that the elections could not be held without ensuring positive results—an indirect way of suggesting that no elections could be held unless they were sure of the success of the political group supported by the military (Rizvi 2000: 169). As the elections were put on hold, the military government now used Islamisation as an instrument to gain the legitimacy for continuing with the Martial Law. Later, this strategy of Islamisation led to a referendum where the people were asked to answer only one question regarding whether they supported the Islamisation agenda or not. The wording of the referendum’s proposition made it difficult for the voters to oppose Zia without giving the appearance of voting against Islam. This was reinforced by the fact that the “Yes” column was printed in green and the “No” in white (Talbot 1998: 260-61).¹¹³

The military government of General Pervez Musharraf, having a non-representative base, also presented the cause of changing the structure of the civilian bureaucracy as bringing genuine democracy at the grass-root level. After overthrowing the civilian government, he declared himself as the Chief Executive of the country (Ali 2012: 171). Apart from the non-representative base, the focus of devolution being the local level administration while overlooking the second tier of provinces, was itself against the spirit of democracy and decentralisation. The aim of transferring

¹¹³ A referendum on the Islamisation policy of President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq was held in Pakistan on December 19, 1984. The voters were asked whether they supported Zia-ul-Haq's proposals for amending several laws in accordance with the Quran and the Sunnah; whether they wanted this process to continue and whether they supported the Islamic ideology of Pakistan. The referendum also served as a way of extending Zia-ul-Haq's presidential term by five years. The official results declared it as being approved by 98.5% of the voters, with a turnout of 62.2%. Independent observers, however, questioned whether the voter participation had even reached 30%.

the administrative and financial powers to the local governments in order to establish the foundations of a genuine local democracy was alleged to be a strategy of creating a pliant political elite that could help create a base for the military's power in the local politics and displace its traditional civilian adversaries (ICG 2010: i).

The selective implementation of the Local Government Plan (LGP) also put a question mark over the genuineness of the decentralisation programme of the Musharraf regime. It is to be noted that the LGP was not implemented in the cantonment areas in the cities and districts. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was also kept out of the plan (Taj 2010: 27). Evidently, in those places which were important for the military government, the colonial system of bureaucratic control was to be maintained (Niaz 2010: 130). The contradictory character of the decentralisation plan was also evident from the fact that the local institutions under the LGP were not provided with constitutional guarantees as the 17th Constitutional Amendment offered only a six-year protection to the local government system (Cheema et al. 2003: 398). Thus, Local Government Plan (LGP) 2000 had to die its natural death as soon as Musharraf departed in 2008.

The financially starved district units of Musharraf's devolution plan could not fill themselves with the spirit of democracy. Pakistan being already a fiscally centralised country, did not give sufficient financial protection to the local governments. On the one hand, the devolution plan did not clearly define the exact modalities of fiscal decentralisation; on the other, it envisaged the formation of a Provincial Finance Commission at the provincial level to decide the distribution of revenues. Thus, financially the local units were made excessively reliant on provincial and, ultimately, federal funds (Niaz 2016: 3). In addition, they were allowed to levy local taxes/fees from a specified list of local taxes/fees. According to the LGP, the local governments were not allowed to incur any debt to finance

their expenditures. The substantial control of the provincial government over the district units in case of the budget preparation process of the district governments also hindered the evolution of the democratic institutions in Pakistan at the local level.¹¹⁴

Structure was the target of both

Changing the structure of the civilian bureaucracy was one of the most important instruments used by the two kinds of governments in the concerned period, in the quest for reforming the bureaucracy. These structural changes were driven by the concern of doing away the legacy of the colonial structure. Z. A. Bhutto and General Pervez Musharraf both talked about dismantling the colonial structure of bureaucracy (Maheshwari 2002: 26). The centralised system of bureaucracy was supposed to be one the features of the inherited British bureaucratic model and every ruler envisioned to do away with the centralised system in order to decentralise the power within the bureaucracy. Bhutto tried to break the monopoly of power in the hands of CSP—what Bhutto called as constituting “the Brahmins of administrative structure”—through various ways, for example the constitutional guarantees given to the civil servants under the 1973 Constitution were taken away; the service cadres including the CSP were abolished and replaced by occupational groups; the long-standing practice of reservation of certain posts in the Central Secretariat for the members of elite cadres was discontinued and a unified pay scale system of thirty-three grades was introduced which replaced the numerous pay scales of more than 600 (Ziring 1974: 1088; Jaffrelot 2004: 76; Maheshwari 2002: 27). Bhutto introduced a programme of joint pre-service training in order to reduce the privileged position enjoyed by the CSP (Ali 2002: 80). The system of lateral recruitment at all levels of the federal bureaucracy as well as the horizontal

¹¹⁴ Ilhan Niaz, Professor in the Department of History, Quaid-E-Azam University, in response to the questionnaire on Gmail (Annexure E) has expressed this fact categorically that the local government under the LG plan of Musharraf was centrally financed and therefore a lack of financial autonomy was one of the major factors acting as a barrier in its actual decentralisation.

movement from one occupational group to another was also brought about with the purpose of reducing the predominated position of the CSP (Khan 2015: 1; Nawaz 2016: 2).

In contrast to Z. A. Bhutto, Musharraf's regime targeted the restructuring of the administration at the local level (Maluka 2004: 55-56). Under the new 5D¹¹⁵ model, established at the local level, the long-established district administrative system was replaced by the three countrywide levels of government i.e. district (District Councils headed by district *Nazims*), tehsils (taluka in Sind and town in city districts, headed by tehsil *Nazims*) and union councils (headed by union *Nazims*) (Government of Pakistan, 2001: 4). The restructuring of the administrative system at the local level also changed the accountability pattern of the bureaucracy. Till then, the district collector had been accountable to the Secretariat at the provincial level but with the enactment of the LGP the new bureaucratic head of the district was made accountable to the indirectly elected District *Nazim* (Husnain 2008: 5). Although it is interesting enough to note that the authority of the *Nazim* over the DCO and the Executive District Officers (EDOs) was restricted in matters of transfers and promotions, which continued to remain under the purview of the provincial secretariat, this accountability change remained "circumscribed in both a de jure and a de facto sense" (Ali 2003: 399). Ostensibly, this was said to be strengthening democracy at the local level and as dismantling the centralised bureaucracy (Jamil 2016: 1).

The changes in the structure of the grievance redressal mechanism were also seen during the Musharraf regime. An institution of the *Zila Mohtasib* (District

¹¹⁵ The Local Government Plan was called as 5D as it was concerned with Decentralisation of administrative authority, Distribution of resources to district level, Deconcentration of management functions, Devolution of political power and Diffusion of power-authority nexus.

Ombudsman)¹¹⁶ was introduced in order to resolve disputes and check the malfunctioning of the government. The *Zila Mohtasib* was empowered to investigate any reported maladministration by any local government official, including the elected members of the local councils and the public servants (SBNP Ordinance 2001: 121-123). It had the same powers as are invested in a civil court. Apart from that, the LGP also provisioned for a *Zila Mushavirat* (District Consultation) Committee for resolving the intra-district disputes (SBNP Ordinance 2001: 90) and *Musalihat Anjumans*¹¹⁷ (Conciliation Committees) to facilitate and mediate any dispute, thus informally working as an alternative dispute mechanism (SBNP Ordinance 2001: 90).

Apart from the regimes of Z. A. Bhutto and General Musharraf, the restructuring of the civil service remained, although implicitly, the chief instrument of the civil service reforms. Abolishing the lateral recruitment system of Bhutto, merging of the Tribal Area Group with the District Management Group, ending the direct recruitment in the Occupational Management Group, enabling the direct recruitment of military officers in the bureaucracy up to 10% through the High Power Selection Committee, creating an ideological orientation of the civilian bureaucracy through several measures like prayer breaks during office hours and

¹¹⁶ The institution of the *Zila Mohtasib* is the establishment of an ombudsman at the district level. Before this, the *Wafaqi Mohtasib* had been formed at the provincial level. The need for establishing an ombudsman has been widely recognised at the global level in order to ensure accountability and to prevent corruption. The inspiration for establishing a *Mohtasib* in Pakistan was mainly drawn from the Islamic traditions and institutions set up by the (Khalifa Rashiduddin? Please check Shradha) Khulafa-Rashideen?? such as the Department of *Nazarul mazalim* (Review of Wrongs) (Bokhari (2012), [Online: Web], Accessed 23rd of June 2015, URL. http://www.policy.hu/bokhari/ombud_pak.htm).

¹¹⁷ The Local Government Ordinance (LGO) of 2001 created a new system of local government in Pakistan. Among other institutions, it created an Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism at the level of the Union Council (UC), the lowest level of the local government. This ADR is called the *Musalihat Anjuman* (MA) and is a formal mechanism that uses informal procedures for resolving disputes. There was one more project named Gender Justice through the *Musalihat Anjuman* Project which is a joint effort between the UNDP and Government of Pakistan for promoting a non-formal community based alternate dispute resolution (ADR) process, as provided for in the Local Government Ordinance 2001.

the imposition of a dress code and introduction of the institution of *Wafaqi Mohtasib*, were some of the measures that were taken by Zia which impacted the structure of the civilian bureaucracy (ICG 2010: 6; Shafqat and Wahla 2010: 5). The unstable regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during 1988-1999 could not leave a direct impact upon the structure of the bureaucracy; the ethical values of bureaucracy like integrity, accountability and work ethics were however deeply impacted by the political expediency and arbitrariness of the politicians (Kardar 2014: 1; Siddiqui 2010: 1; Siddiqui 2006: 1).

The Background Situation

A critical background situation either in the form of internal law and order problems or problems at the external front has always remained in Pakistan and it was used in some way or the other, as a justification for tinkering with the structure of the bureaucracy. Z.A. Bhutto faced many such crises that were existing and emerged either before or during his tenure. They can be pointed out in the following points:

- Firstly, Bhutto found the flood situation which the country was facing at the time of his coming to power as an immediate cause of overhauling the administrative structure of the country (Maheshwari 2002: 27).
- Secondly, during the student protest in 1968-69, the overhauling of the administrative system was demanded not only from the public but from the inner circles of the bureaucracy itself (Eisenberg 2013: 1; Kennedy 1987: 77). The people from the civilian bureaucracy also joined the demonstration against the elite structure of the bureaucracy, demanding a radical restructuring of the system for bringing equality into the administration (Paracha 2014: 1). The internal turmoil affected the Class I Officers Service Association as well as the Central Superior Services Association. The petition signed by the Central Superior Services Organisation highlighted

the need for restructuring the bureaucracy with regard to the centralisation of power in the hands of the CSP.

- Thirdly, the 1968-69 protests also revealed the inefficiencies of the institution of bureaucracy. The professionals and specialists demonstrated against the generalists and the lower cadre officers against the elite CSP for an enhancement of their status.
- Fourthly, the onset of the Indo-Pak conflict in 1971 which led to the dismemberment of the country and undermined the position of the bureaucracy, compelled Z.A. Bhutto to purge the administration in some way or the other (Kennedy 1987: 78). The bureaucracy in general and the CSP in particular were held responsible for the dismemberment of the country, thus challenging the prestige and power of the CSP.
- Fifthly, the formation of Bangladesh also presented the need to reorganise the bureaucracy because many officers opted for Bangladeshi citizenship. It had the most immediate impact upon the administrative system of Pakistan as 39 per cent of the total administrative service members opted for service in Bangladesh (Kennedy 1987: 78-80). Each cadre underwent severe curtailment. The CSP lost the most significant portion of its strength in the federal government. The Bengali CSP officers, before the formation of Bangladesh, had held more influential posts than the Bengali non-CSP officers. Therefore, when the Bengali officers opted for Bangladesh, the CSP lost relatively more influence than the other cadres. The electoral victory of the PPP in West Pakistan and the kind of attack on bureaucracy that Bhutto and his party started during the anti-Ayub movement, emerged as an important contributory factor also.

Driven by the accumulated impact of all these situations, Prime Minister Bhutto's main motive was to establish a political supremacy over the senior bureaucracy and to break the power monopoly of the CSP. Bhutto, as leader of the PPP, had directly

experienced the heavy hand of the bureaucracy in curbing the basic political freedoms of the people (Burki 1980: 100). After getting hold of political power, Bhutto was determined to challenge the dominant position of the CSP.

The instability of the coalition-based civilian regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif proved to be a primary factor for justifying their political expediency and arbitrariness in dealing with the matters of the bureaucracy. The deep politicisation of the bureaucracy through measures like ad-hoc promotions and transfers, officers posted on special duty and the dilution of the role of the FPSC through the newly constituted Placement Bureau were there in the background of the instability of the civilian regime where stability was being given the highest priority, neglecting all other issues.

In Pakistan, the existence of the military regimes has largely depended upon the crisis situation in the background and that crisis situation has provided them with the justification for bringing in new reforms, for example in the form of strengthening democracy and decentralising power in the administrative structures. As far as the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq is concerned, there were many crises that Pakistan faced during the period 1977-88, for example the Afghan war and the resentment in the bureaucracy against the steps taken by Z. A. Bhutto. Islamic fundamentalism spread in the country in the background of the Soviet-Afghan war¹¹⁸ and Zia's Islamisation policy led to the Islamisation of all aspects of public life be it judiciary, law, society or bureaucracy. A wide antipathy in the civil service and public against the steps taken by the Bhutto regime ripened and this

¹¹⁸ The war in Afghanistan began on April 27, 1978, when the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took power in a military coup, known as the Saur Revolution. The Soviet war in Afghanistan began in December 1979 to replace the then communist government. Afghanistan's resistance forces, known as the mujahideen, fought against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Some factions received support by the United States, with the Pakistani ISI serving as the US middleman, and Saudi Arabia. The former Soviet Union had to withdraw its troops in February 1989. The Soviet-backed Afghan communist government survived for three more years until the fall of Kabul in 1992.

provided a perfect background situation for the roadmap towards a further manipulation of the civil service. The target of the 1973 reforms was to subordinate the bureaucracy to the political regime and break the monopoly of power centralised in the hands of a smaller group of CSP (Maheshwari, 2002: 26, Abbasi and Mussarrat, 2015: 898). Thus after the departure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, this higher echelon of bureaucracy was desperate to get its lost status again. On the other hand, the lateral entry scheme also created dissatisfaction among the bureaucrats as well as in the public as this scheme was misused to incorporate favourable persons into the administration (Khan, 2015: 1; Nawaz¹¹⁹, 2016: 1).. Thus, by 1978, the environment was mainly favourable for rolling back the 1973 reforms. During the military regime of Pervez Musharraf, there were many such factors in the background which helped him to justify the launch of his Local Government Plan, for example the political instability, widespread corruption and rising inflation, which were some of the reasons due to which the people found some relief in a government in military uniform (Dawwod, 2014: 284).

The Formation of Committees and Commissions

A notable pattern can be seen in every regime whether civilian or military, regarding the steps taken for bringing changes in the civilian bureaucracy—every government constituted a committee or commission for examining the current system and recommending to further reform it. Z.A. Bhutto formed a committee under the chairmanship of Justice Khursheed Hasan Meer. General Zia-ul-Haq constituted the Justice Anwar-ul-Haq Commission. Similarly, during the second Nawaz Sharif Government 1997-1999, a Commission on Administrative Restructuring was established in 1997. The LGP 2000 was also based on the recommendations of the National Reconstruction Bureau formed under the

¹¹⁹ Nawaz, Saeed (2016), Governance and Public Policy Analyst, University of Punjab, during informal discussion on LinkedIn. According to him, as there was a mismatch between the stated and implied objectives of the initiative so instead of correcting the balance the system introduced further distortions because of party loyalists inducted.

Musharraf regime. During this time, a National Commission on Governmental Reforms was also constituted to suggest measures for improving the administrative system. It can also be noted that not every recommendation suggested by these commissions and committees was implemented and a selective approach was followed in the implementation of these recommendations.

It has also been alleged that the chairman and members were chosen very carefully in order to receive favourable recommendations. The members in most of the cases were political appointees and the need of selecting experts as members was not recognised. These committees and commissions also were not given sufficient functional and financial autonomy and they seemed to be working as a department of the government. For example, Meer was a minister in charge of the Establishment Division. Further, his chairmanship was purely nominal. As Bhutto's main concern was to dismantle the power monopoly enjoyed by the CSP, he chose those persons as members who had a personal grudge against the CSP. The Establishment Secretary Waqar Ahmad who was a member of the Justice Meer Committee harboured a personal grudge against the ICS/CSP as he had failed to qualify for the ICS in the 1930s and thus had been appointed to the Indian Audit and Accounts Services (Chaudry 2011: 110). The Committee also received considerable help from Hassan Habib (then Principal, Pakistan Administrative Staff College), who had opposed the monopoly of power in the hands of the CSP for many years. The Committee was also appearing to have been influenced by the reasoning of Justice A. R. Cornelius, a former Chief Justice of Pakistan and the most senior member of the CSP, but a vigorous critic of its role and ethos nevertheless (Syed 1992: 137). Two major recommendations of the Committee were about the unification of the service structure by a combination of the Federal Public Service Commission and the Establishment Division and about a two-way traffic of personnel between the public and private sector to permit the government to recruit the talented people from banking, trade and industry sectors for a senior

level position in government (Government of Pakistan 1981: 276). The implementation of these recommendations was perfectly suited to the political interests of the Bhutto government. The selective implementation of the Lateral Entry Scheme was used to induct favourable officials into the civil service.

The roadmap for the changes brought by General Zia-ul-Haq was drawn on the basis of a Civil Service Reform Commission under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq. This Commission was constituted to examine the efficacy of Bhutto's reforms (Baxter 1991: 91). The Commission's recommendations sought a profound departure from the 1973 reforms of the civil services (Kennedy 1987: 101). The report of the Commission was never made public, and the non-availability of the report provided an ample scope to the Zia government to pick and choose only those recommendations which suited his political and military interests. For example, the much criticised LRP of Bhutto was discontinued but a new provision of the lateral entry of military officers into the civilian bureaucracy was brought forth. The induction of military officers did more harm to the civilian bureaucracy than the LRP of Z. A. Bhutto. The insistence of the Justice Anwar-ul-Haq Commission of creating several technical branches to accommodate engineers, agriculturalists, scientists and statisticians was not paid attention. Similarly, the need for revitalising training for upgrading the structure of the civil service was one of the most important recommendations of the Haq Commission; it would modernise the structure of the bureaucracy according to the need of the hour. But as it was less important to the military government at the centre, it was also left untouched. For preserving the autonomy and independence of the civil service, the Commission made several important recommendations. It called for respecting merit in recruitment and empowering the public service commissions for ensuring recruitment on merit. It also recommended fixing the tenures of the chairman and members of the federal and provincial public service commissions. But this suggestion also the military government of General Zia ul Haq did not find useful

and hence it was left untouched. The military regime was also less receptive to the need for identifying gender issues and for bringing gender equality¹²⁰ into the civilian administration. The Report recommended the correction of the male-female imbalance by catering to the women's training needs (Kennedy 1987: 101; Shafqat 2013: 1)

During the second Nawaz Sharif Government 1997-1999, a commission on Administrative Restructuring was established in 1997. The mandate of the Commission was to review the size of the government, personnel and wage bill management, improving the performance and accountability, downsizing and obtaining new skills, devolution of power and compensation reform (Mahmood 2007: 135). At the recommendation of the Commission, five technical committees were set up, one for each of the identified core area, which were to examine the World Bank recommendations in detail and to suggest various reforms keeping in view the social, economic and political conditions in Pakistan.

During the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf, the National Reconstruction Bureau was set up under retired Lt. Gen. S. Tanvir H. Naqvi (Mezzerra 2010: 8). One of the stated objectives of the NRB was the restructuring of the bureaucratic setup and decentralisation of the administrative authority to the district level and below and a reorientation of the administrative system for allowing public participation in decision-making; however, the implementation of the Plan failed to bring about the desired changes to the civil service system. The formation of the NRB proved to be the most controversial and self-serving decision as it was formed

¹²⁰ The importance of gender mainstreaming in Pakistan has been highlighted in various reports and studies from time to time. As far as the constitutional and legal provisions are concerned, there has been 10% seat reservation for women candidates in the civil services. However, the feasibility of quota as a catalyst has been questioned particularly in the background of poor human development indicators like literacy, health and socio-economic conditions in a report by the UNDP. United Nations Development Plan (2007), [Online: Web], Accessed 8th of November, 2016, URL. https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/rai/outreach/undp_report.pdf

by a military government which did not have any mandate to introduce novel innovations to demolish the old political and administrative structure of the country (Maluka 2004: 94). The NRB released a Local Government Proposed Plan (LGPP) with the title “Devolution of Power and Responsibility: Establishing the Foundations of Genuine Democracy” within less than six months in May 2000. It was prepared with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). On the basis of its drafting, the Local Government Ordinance for Sind/Balochistan/North-West Frontier/Punjab (LGO-SBNP) was promulgated by four provincial governments in August 2001. This LGO-SBNP was further placed in the Sixth Schedule with the passing of the Legal Framework Order which was termed as the 17th Constitutional Amendment Act. It meant that the LGO could not be amended without the consent of the President.¹²¹ Apparently, the military government under Musharraf was adopting a top-down approach for decentralisation where a plan, prepared at the centre level without any consultation from the provinces, was imposed arbitrarily and no autonomy was given to either the provinces or the local bodies. Apart from the LGO, a National Commission for Government Reforms was formed during the Musharraf regime. In spite of underlining various valuable suggestions, the NCGR remained unimplemented.¹²²

The Use of Lateral Recruitment as an Instrument

The lateral entry into the civil service system has been one of the most important instruments which have manipulated the bureaucratic structure and left a lasting

¹²¹ Under Article 268 (2) of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, the laws specified in the Sixth Schedule may not be altered, repealed or amended without the previous sanction of the President. Constitution of Pakistan [Online: Web], URL. <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/schedules/schedule6.html>

¹²² There was one more Committee that was formed during the regime of General Musharraf i.e. the Cabinet Committee for Civil Service Reforms. It had a limited scope and its major mandate was to examine the recommendations given by another committee formed under the chairmanship of Mr Shaukat Aziz. The Committee submitted its report in 2000-01 (Bokhari (2011), Joint Secretary at Ministry of Finance, e-mail to the author, 31 June).

impact upon the administration. Although the induction of specialists like engineers, doctors, and experts from various fields helps to bring efficiency into the administrative system, without a proper roadmap and regulation of the procedure, the system becomes a tool in the hands of the political machinery. In Pakistan, the Lateral Entry Scheme has been used as a tool by both the civilian and military government to induct favourable persons into the system. Thus, its misuse by the civilian and military government has led to the politicisation and militarisation of the bureaucracy. The K. H. Meer committee which recommended the bureaucratic reforms of 1973, highlighted the need for balancing the generalists with the induction of specialists. The Meer Committee, however, was not the first to address the dominance of generalists in the bureaucracy; there has been a debate regarding generalists vs. specialists since independence. In Pakistan, the dominance of the CSP, i.e. the generalists over decision-making, had led to a centralisation of power in this group of bureaucracy. The LRP was launched with one of the goals being the breaking of this power monopoly. But, the implementation of the LRP failed to achieve its desired objective as its implementation proved later that the hidden motive behind it was to open positions in the government to the supporters of the politicians in power (Burki 1980: 102). The failure of the LRP was inscribed in the plan itself as there were many lacunae in its framework. The most dangerous lacuna was that the authority for recruitment was given to the Establishment Division Ministry under the government, in spite of the prescribed statutory authority of the FPSC. Further, in the absence of any standard and rigorous criteria and a transparent process, much scope was left for manipulation. These loopholes were certainly to be misused in order to serve political purposes.

After Bhutto, the Lateral Entry Programme remained in place in different forms. Zia was the first to institutionalise the induction of military officers into the civilian bureaucracy. Before Zia, only the retired military officers had been re-employed on a contract basis. He disbanded the LRP of the Bhutto regime, and formally

established the system of recruiting officials from the military on 10 per cent of vacancies in the federal bureaucracy through a decree. Although some experts have expressed that there is no harm in inducting military officials into the bureaucracy (Nawaz 2016: 2), the conditions of fair and transparent recruitment were violated under the Zia regime also (like that of Z. A. Bhutto) as these officers were not be selected by the FPSC but by a High-Powered Selection Committee headed by Zia himself (ICG 2010: 6).

Benazir Bhutto's Placement Bureau was yet another instrument for lateral induction into the civil service. The removal of officers arbitrarily from their posts, rendering them as Officers on Special Duty for long periods, took place frequently under both the PPP as well as the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) governments (Hussain and Hussain 1993: 85).

The lateral entry of military officers continued during the rule of General Pervez Musharraf. During his rule, the military officials were appointed to key civilian posts including the chairmanship of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), which is responsible for the recruitment of civil servants at the federal level.

The misuse of the Lateral Recruitment Plan resulted in the selection of unsuitable and incompetent candidates in the civil service which reduced the efficiency of the organisation to a great extent. It led to the use of bureaucracy for political purposes as it served as a mechanism to distribute patronage to those personally loyal to the then government, whether civilian or military. The selection of loyalists as civil servants was made possible through an opaque and patronage-based system (under the government itself) of lateral recruits.¹²³ During Z. A. Bhutto's rule, no

¹²³ The Lateral Recruitment System was very much criticised inside and outside the bureaucracy. It became an instrument to induct incompetent cronies at the cost of meritorious and deserving candidates. Imran Khan in an interview has categorically expressed his experience that he has

comprehensive procedure was placed for the induction of the lateral entrants; it resulted in a selection of unsuitable candidates. It has been observed that there has been very little support among the civil servants for lateral recruits, and the need to generate a sense of confidence into the system was not identified which further became a cause for the failure of the system.

Contrary to the institutional character of the lateral entry scheme of Z. A. Bhutto, Benazir followed the tactic of Placement Bureau (PB) formed through the executive order (Hussain and Hussain 1993: 85). The PB along with the discretionary appointment, promotion and removal of officers undermined the civil service system to a large extent. The designation of Officers on Special Duty (OSD) was used as “a broad, often senseless removal of officers from their positions and placing them for long period on service” (Hussain and Hussain 1993: 85). The Benazir government even appointed party workers and posted them at levels of federal and provincial bureaucracies by diluting the role of the Public Service Commission, by passing its role to the Placement Bureau. The PB’s arbitrary actions generated a lot of resentment within the bureaucracy. (Kukreja 2003: 232)

During Musharraf’s rule, the military officials, some serving but mostly retired, were appointed as heads of a large number of civilian organisations, many of which required technical expertise such as the Chief Executive of the Alternative Energy Development Board, the Chairman of the Pakistan Steel Mill and the Chairman of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (ICG 2010: 10).¹²⁴ In this way, the administrative efficiency was put on hold, serving political patronage and nepotism, in order to attain political legitimacy and regime survival. The system

personally seen the PPP loyalists being at crucial positions; their only credentials were that they were political workers (Khan (2016), e-mail to the author, September 24).

¹²⁴ A list has been given in Annexure B of some top military officers working in various government departments during the Musharraf period.

which was supposed to serve the citizen, now was serving the interests of the politicians. In this way, it led to dysfunctionality within the bureaucracy.

The Role of the Federal Public Service Commission

Under both the civilian and military regimes, various steps undertaken from the part of the governments have constantly decreased the autonomous role of the Federal Public Service Commission. Be it the regime of the civilians or the military, there has been a tendency in Pakistan of keeping a control over recruitment, particularly in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, and it has resulted in a dilution of similar duties performed by the constitutional body of the FPSC. During the Z. A. Bhutto regime, it was the Establishment Division Ministry; during Zia's it was the Review Board and during Benazir Bhutto's, it was the Placement Bureau that kept a complete control over the recruitment of the civil servants. Under the other regimes, the control over the recruitment was indirect and impacted upon by the arbitrary promotions and transfers.

During the Musharraf regime, the system of Army Monitoring Teams (AMTs)¹²⁵ had the intent of having a complete control over the district level civil service and it affected the autonomous role of the FPSC very much. It completely defied the FPSC and left the professional civil service merely an instrument in the hands of military government to further its political interests. The purpose of these AMTs was to draw the performance and evaluation reports of the civil officers and their working. The rationale for the induction of the army monitors was stated as being the improvement of the efficiency of the civil officers (Maluka 2004: 64). The monitors were required to receive inputs from the field and pass it on to their top military brass for policy formulation. These teams were manned entirely by the

¹²⁵ The provision of the Army Monitoring Teams was an external accountability mechanism which mostly created fear, effected performance negatively and made people callous (Bokhari (2016), , e-mail to the author, 31 August).

military officers who reported to their own senior military command. Thus, there were nine corps commanders to oversee the governance machinery (Mahmood 2001: 21). Notwithstanding this ostensible purpose, in practice the role of the AMT was widened to serve the interest of the military regime so much so that no departmental civilian posting or transfer could be made without a prior clearance from the military officers. The AMT served to provide the basis for a major overhaul of civil servants according to the political needs of the military government. It can be revealed from the fact that on the basis of an AMT's report, thousands of officials could be removed from the office or forced to take premature as cited earlier in Chapter 3. Later, these AMTs were empowered to initiate and conduct fact-finding inquiries against the civil bureaucrats—a serious blow to the working of the independent functioning of the civil bureaucracy (Datta 2003: 108). An attempt was even made to empower these teams to evaluate the performance of bureaucrats for forming an input for writing their annual confidential reports.

Though having various similarities, there are *some differences* in the civil service reforms which can be observed during two types of the regimes. Different steps taken by different regimes left different impacts upon the bureaucracy. These impacts differed in nature, intensity as well as longevity.

The Longevity of the Impacts

The 1973 reforms left a far-reaching impact upon the structure of the bureaucracy rather than those of any other regime. Other regimes also deeply impacted the civil service but the bureaucratic structure had the tendency to regain the same structure. Although the steps taken by Z. A. Bhutto were reversed by the subsequent military regime (particularly the lateral entry system), various other features targeting the change in structure could not be reversed. The overhauling effect of the 1973 reforms was stronger than any other reforms that were attempted. The reason of the lasting impact of the 1973 reforms on the bureaucracy was that this framework of

reform was attached to the constitutional background. Also, unlike his military counterparts, Bhutto was having a democratic mandate to change the civil service system as per the needs of the contemporary society. He prepared a legal background for his structural reforms. The provisions related to the terms and conditions of the services were to be governed by an ordinary law—the Civil Servants Act, 1973.¹²⁶ This Act consisted of legal provisions for the appointment of persons in the service of Pakistan and for the terms and conditions of their services. It provided a greater flexibility in the appointment, assignment and dismissal of the civil servants (LaPorte 1986: 257). The provision of constitutional security had worked as a shield for the civil servants, protecting them from political misuse; the doing away of this provision left an ample scope for the political misuse, for example, the Civil Servants Act provided that while the servants would ordinarily retire at the age of 58, a “competent” authority, meaning the appointing authority, could retire them—without any explanation or reason—at any time after they complete their 25 years of service and become eligible for retirement benefits. Through a notification dated October 20, 1973, the President of Pakistan designated the Prime Minister as the appointing and competent authority in relation to all posts in Grades 16 to 23. The Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules of 1973 allowed penalties of compulsory retirement, removal and dismissal from service for incompetence, corruption or reputation for corruption, subversion or association with persons engaged in subversion and disclosure of official secrets to unauthorised persons. The accused would have the opportunity to respond to the charges, but could be denied the same in the interest of national security. A notification dated November 7, 1973, named the Prime Minister as the competent

¹²⁶ The Civil Servants Act 1973 which stripped the civil servants of the constitutional guarantees to the service was very much criticised for worsening the morale of the bureaucracy. The constitutional safeguards are important for inculcating a sense of security and fair play so that a civil servant may work and function efficiently. The above act being an ordinary law could be amended with a simple procedure, thus leaving the bureaucrats on the whims and fancies of the political executive. The impact of this is evident from the rampant politicisation of the bureaucracy at the hands of arbitrariness of the politicians (Niaz (2016), Professor, E-mail to the Author, September 8).

authority for deciding such cases involving Grades 17 to 23. Thus, now the civil servants were left on the whims and fancies of the rulers.

Compared to the 1973 reforms, the steps taken by the military government under Zia and the civilian government during 1988-99 were not supposed to have a lasting impact. Similarly, the LGP of Pervez Musharraf was not given constitutional protection and therefore it was disbanded just after his departure. Although, there has been the tendency of reversing the steps taken by the previous ruler especially when there is a change in the nature of the government, i.e. from military to civilian and from civilian to military, the impact could not be omitted completely and it left some indelible effect even after the end of every regime.

The Target of the Structure

There was one more difference regarding the targeting of the hierarchy of the bureaucracy. Some targeted the upper echelon while others had the target of the district level administration. Bhutto's civil service reforms were mainly targeted against the Civil Service of Pakistan i.e. the higher echelon of bureaucracy. There was a centralisation of power in this group which can be reflected from the fact that the members of the CSP, who used to serve both the central and provincial governments, occupied by far the bulk of the most important and key positions in the central and provincial secretariats. Sixty per cent of the post of under-secretaries and two thirds of the post of deputy-secretaries were reserved for the CSP officers at the centre. The CSP was the *corps d'elite* within the civil service, like the administrative class in Britain (Chaudhury 1962: 262). The reform of 1973 had impacted deeply this monopoly of power by the CSP and after the 1973 reform the CSP was unable to get the same privileged position in the hierarchy. The reforms introduced by Zia, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif largely impacted the whole structure but Musharraf's devolution plan was focused largely on the district level bureaucracy. However, other provisions like the induction of military officers

and Army Monitoring Teams impacted other parts of the bureaucratic structure also.

Democratic vs. an Undemocratic Regime

The basic difference between the two types of regime is the nature of the government itself. Although changes in the civil service has been used as a tool by both types of government, the mandate of the civilian institutions was the characteristic of the democratic government and the non-representative military governments of General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf did not have the right and authority to bring changes to the civil service system. Thus, the claim of bringing genuine democracy in place of a sham democracy by the Musharraf government was a contradictory claim in itself. It should also be noted that although the representative government of Z. A. Bhutto and those of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were having the mandate of restructuring the civil service system, the implementation of these restructuring steps proved that there was a misuse of their mandate. The LRP system of Z. A. Bhutto as well as the Placement Bureau of Benazir Bhutto were apparently attempts to appoint the politically favourable persons in the civil service system. The piecemeal approach by these democratic governments failed to bring any systematic change in the civil service of Pakistan; rather it led to a more politicised bureaucracy. Thus, the civilian regimes merely left the bureaucracy as the servants of political masters rather than the servants of the people.

On the other hand, the military government was not representative of the people and thus any changes brought from the part of the military were unjust in themselves. The military governments' chief concern was mainly to gain legitimacy for their government. They were to provide excuses as a justification to be in power; thus, we found the Zia government with the aim of establishing an Islamic system of administration and the Musharraf government with the claim of establishing a genuine democracy in place of a sham democracy. With these kinds

of justifications they got the opportunity to change the structure of the administration as per their requirements. In order to weaken the control of the civilian officers over the bureaucracy, they inducted retired and serving military officers on various civilian posts. It helped to strengthen the grip of the military over the civilian bureaucracy. Not only a direct recruitment of military officers but a direct control of the military over the civilian officers was managed through different measures. The whole of the LGP of Musharraf was an attempt in this direction where the district level bureaucracy was weakened and a directly controlled institution of the District *Nazim* was created.¹²⁷ The Army Monitoring Teams of the Musharraf's regime was also an attempt to establish a direct control of the military over the civilian administration.

Thus, since the democratic and military governments were different in nature, the intensity of harm to the neutrality, professionalism and efficiency of the bureaucracy was different in both types of regimes. However, the bureaucracy in both types of regimes was subordinated to their political masters rather than the citizens.

The Impact of Reforms on the Civil Service under the Civil and Military Regimes

Although various steps were undertaken by the civilian and military rulers in the direction of reforming the bureaucracy, the misuse of these steps in the course of time left the civil service more *politicised* and *militarised*. The political

¹²⁷ The Local Government System which was introduced by General Musharraf to devolve the administrative, financial and political powers of the provincial governments to the district governments without any devolution of powers from the federation to the provinces, was devoid of any political ownership and the provincial governments started to reclaim their powers even during the incumbency of General Musharraf and completely rolled back the system after his departure from Presidency (Nawaz, Saeed (2016), Governance and Public Policy Analyst, University of Punjab, Email to the Author, September 12, 2016.

intervention in the civil service gravely undermined the professionalism and capacity of the civil service. The politically oriented transfer and promotions of the civil servants contributed to their *dysfunction*, with the promotions being increasingly dependent on the officers' proximity to those in power rather than their skill and performance. According to the ICG, it weakened the constitutionally guaranteed protection of employment that had previously shielded the bureaucracy against political interference (ICG 2010: 5). It gradually undermined the importance of merit and performance of a civil servant and institutionalised the ethical, procedural and financial malpractices (Nishtar 2010). In this environment, a civil servant got more incentive for being loyal to his/her superior rather than being responsive to the citizens' need, leaving the bureaucracy completely dysfunctional. The impact of the civil service reforms under the civilian and military regimes can be analysed under the following headings:

Islamisation, Militarisation and Politicisation

The attempts undertaken in the last four decades have left the civil service of Pakistan today as much more politicised, militarised and Islamised. The removal of constitutional guarantees and the LRP system of Z. A. Bhutto proved to be detrimental to the professional organisation of the bureaucracy. The LRP was significant in shattering the traditional cadre system of the bureaucracy. The cadre system was mainly based on the similarity of the services, while officers were now selected through the LRP, contributed to break this similarity. The selection of specialist officers in the specific cadre blotted the consolidation of the civil servants.

During Zia's regime, both militarisation and Islamisation of the civil service deepened. The main motive of remaining in power was stated by Zia as the establishment of a puritan Islamic state. He was often called as a 'mullah in uniform' (Datta and Sharma 2002: 171). Zia used the Islamisation of the polity, economy and society as a tool for legitimacy. His policies mainly affected the

bureaucracy ideologically which till then was supposed to be most secular structure, following the legacy of British colonial regime. This ideological connotation given to the bureaucratic structure was a part of a larger agenda where Zia wanted to modify every state institution according to the Islamic traditions and laws. On the other hand, during Musharraf's regime, the civilian bureaucracy was thoroughly restructured in order to make it subservient to the military rule.

The programme of LRP of Z. A. Bhutto was converted in order to recruit military officers into the civilian bureaucracy. Through the instrument of a Review Board, many incompetent candidates who had failed to pass the written examination certain in their loyalty to the military regime, were inducted.

Thus, the recruitment of military officers in the civilian bureaucracy during Zia-ul-Haq's regime created a very detrimental effect upon the structure and functioning of the bureaucracy. Through his scheme, more and more numbers of retired and serving military officials were inducted into the civilian bureaucracy and on an annual basis. His programme integrated the military officials more closely with the civilian bureaucracy than his counterparts under the previous military recruitment programme (Kennedy 1991: 95). Such appointments took away the merit and seniority-based hire and promotions, distorted performance incentives for career bureaucracy, undermined organisational morale by "subjecting civil servants to the ridiculously irrelevant military notions of order and discipline" and placed those trained for military purposes into civilian contexts for which they did not have the appropriate skills (Shah 2008: 61). Often, military recruits were assigned to the much coveted administrative postings; their induction also often blocked or retarded the promotional prospects of their civilian counterparts. The cost to the morale was correspondingly high (Kennedy 1991: 96). It affected the efficiency of the administration adversely as the military personnel are trained to work in an emergency situation which is very different from a civil servant who is supposed to maintain law and order in a peaceful situation. Thus, mingling the military officers

who are “managers of violence” with the civilian administration created a dysfunctionality in the political system of Pakistan (Huntington 1957: 11)¹²⁸. Unlike the withdrawal of the Lateral Recruitment Programme, the induction of the military officers created resentment and opposition on part of the civil service of Pakistan.

The Benazir and Nawaz governments undermined the service system at the core through discretionary appointments, promotions and the removal of officers. Benazir Bhutto was criticised for nepotism when she set up the controversial Placement Bureau, which made political appointments to the civil bureaucracy, not on the basis of ability but on personal loyalty to the Bhutto family—particularly during their time of trial in the Zia years. There was a tendency in the PPP government to treat the civil servants as an undifferentiated mass of adversaries who must be constantly watched for any mischief they might be getting up to and swiftly brought to heel if caught (Akhund 2000: 75). The Nawaz Sharif government was particularly notorious for its propensity to ‘rule by verbal order’ and a monarchical style of governance (Maleeha 1994: 243-44). All this added to the politicisation of the bureaucracy which now remained oriented towards its political masters, deviating from the original role of protecting the citizens’ interests.

The Bureaucracy vis-à-vis the Government

Until 1973, the bureaucracy had been seen as an equal partner of the government, but the post-1973 governments refused to make their civilian counterparts as equal power-sharers—rather, their political interests were best suited by subordinating it. It cannot be denied that the prestige of the authoritative bureaucratic system was reduced to some extent by Z. A. Bhutto’s policies. The Civil Service Commission chaired by Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq (established in 1978) had found that the

¹²⁸ According to Huntington, “a military specialist is an officer who is peculiarly expert at directing the application of violence under certain prescribed conditions”.

morale in the civil service was low and it recommended an increased civil service tenure as well as modifications in the present group categorisation (LaPorte 1986: 260). Similarly, Kennedy found that the 1973 reforms affected the prestige and status of the CSP negatively and it never succeeded in getting that status back. For some scholars, the power of the CSP now shifted to its analogous DMG. However, it could not regain the same supremacy that the CSP had enjoyed during the Ayub era (Shafqat 1999: 1007; Islam 1990: 75).

Under the military rule of Musharraf, the militarisation of the civil services crossed every limit of intensity. Previously, whenever the civil service was misused for political benefits, it had been kept at par with the ruling regime; however, during the military rule of Musharraf, the situation grew worse when the bureaucracy was made subordinate to the military government and the Army was authorised for its monitoring. Meanwhile the system of proper checks and balances among the institutions at the local level was ineffective due to which various conflicts erupted. Further, the military government introduced a novel system of AMTs to draw performance and evaluation reports of the civil officers and their working which completely placed the bureaucracy under the subordination of the military.

The Decentralisation of Power and Equality in the Bureaucracy

Since independence, various studies undertaken on the civil service reforms, recommended a bringing out of decentralisation and equality in the structure of the bureaucracy. Out of three separate studies undertaken during 1948-58—the Pakistan Pay and Service Commission 1948, the Rowland Egger Committee 1953 and the Gladieux Committee 1955—the latter two recommended the reforming and reorganisation of the administrative system in order to bring about more equity and uniformity. Apparently, they attacked the monopolistic position which the CSP was enjoying during this period. However, due to “the tremendous influence of the CSP” on the political system, these recommendations could not be immediately

accepted and implemented. In fact, the Egger Report was not made available for general circulation for more than five years (Sayeed 1967: 155-156).

For the first time, Z. A. Bhutto attempted to break this centralisation of power in the civil service by disbanding the CSP. The 1973 reforms however failed to achieve equality in real terms. Although, they helped to facilitate integration among the 12 federal services as well as ensuring an equality of pay scales among all the groups and services, they did not provide a clear vision and framework for equal opportunity and prospect of promotions for all groups. The system of the Unified Grading Structure masked great chaos, wastefulness and complexity (Niaz 2010: 114). The inspiration of the system came from the United States with its eighteen grades and the Lord Fulton Committee¹²⁹ in Britain which also recommended a similar system. The British tried the system at few levels but soon abandoned it and reverted to the earlier system. In United States also, such a job-oriented system has no concept of promotion, seniority or transfers with some civil servants getting struck while others managed to jump around (Zaidi 1985: 114).

The devolution and decentralisation of power cannot be expected from a military government, the tendency of which is always to centralise power in its hands. However, in Pakistan the civilian government also failed to bring about any power decentralisation. Bhutto's authoritarian and arbitrary manner defied the noble intentions of the 1973 reforms. Bhutto's personal background and earlier experience explain his style of working. Having experienced the heavy hand of the bureaucracy during his earlier days in the Ayub Khan government, Bhutto was determined to eliminate his rivals at the beginning of his tenure. He eliminated all

¹²⁹ The Fulton Committee was formed by the British Government in 1965 under the chairmanship of Lord Fulton. The committee submitted its report in 1968. It highlighted that the civil service of the day was fundamentally the product of the nineteenth-century philosophy produced by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report, whereas the tasks the civil service now faced were those of the twentieth century. Thus the committee underlined the need for modernising the civil service system of the UK.

the centres of power that could have competed with or obstructed his policies or position. He began his tenure with sacking over 1,300 officers under the martial law regulation with the intent of acquiring a complete and absolute control over the bureaucracy giving a message, loud and clear, to every civil servant: ‘support the PPP or go home’ (Chaudry 2011: 111). Consequently, he first eliminated any potential rivals in the military. Second, he brought the major industrialists ‘to heel’. His third target was the civil bureaucracy, especially the members of the CSP, who had frustrated him during his tenure in Ayub’s cabinet (LaPorte 1986: 257). Burki has analysed the factors which had contributed to Bhutto’s preference for an authoritarian political system. According to him, these factors were—first, he came from a backward part of the province of Sind which did not possess the groups that had softened the relationship between the landlords and the cultivators like in Punjab; the second was his desire to disassociate himself from the stereotypical image of a Sindhi, cultivated by the British for whom the Sindhis were less attractive than the Baloch, the Pashtuns and the Punjabis; the third factor was his desire to overcome the stigma associated with being the son of Shahnawaz Bhutto by a wife of low social origin; fourth, although he was educated in two of the great liberal universities¹³⁰ of the West, he remained a representative of a social class that was authoritarian in its outlook. All these factors helped shaped Bhutto’s political attitude which explain his autocratic style of rule (Burki 1980: 83-91).

Being a contradiction in itself, the devolution of power plan under Musharraf had everything in itself but not the devolution of power. The military government was more interested in political manipulation rather than political devolution (ICG 2010: 13). It was contradictory due to the reason that administrative decentralisation is literally impossible in a country having an undemocratic and unrepresentative government at the centre, because such a government would not risk the loss of control over the peripheral units which implies a loss of power. The

¹³⁰ Bhutto had studied at the Berkeley and Oxford universities (Mohiuddin (2006: 275)).

strategy of implementation of the plan, having the ostensible aim of strengthening democracy and empowering the people to bring about an empowerment of the democracy was driven by political considerations to gain regime legitimacy.

Musharraf's Local Government Plan followed a "missing chain of top-down approach". The provinces were there to be missed in this missing chain of the top-down approach. Notably, they were supposed to be in better position than the centre to deal with the affairs of the district level. The LGP failed to recognise the forceful need to devolve power from the federal level to the provincial level. The LGP reduced the power and functions of the provinces by reducing their role of policy formulation and implementation and transferred ten departments from the provinces to the district level, i.e. agriculture, community development education, finance and planning, health, information and technology, law, literacy, revenue, works and services; the provinces did not further receive any authority and power from the central level as can be supposed in any decentralisation plan (Mahmood 2001: 19). Thus, while it seemed like "a top-down approach", the spirit of decentralisation was hurt by the refusal of the centre to devolve power and authority to the provincial level (Abbasi and Mussarrat, 2015: 899). The centre's strong and direct grip over the local level was against the spirit of decentralisation and nothing could be expected like the empowerment of the local institutions through this contradictory plan.

Although trumpeting about political and administration decentralisation, the local governments were not provided with enough financial protection¹³¹ to carry out the massive functions assigned to them. It was an exercise in shifting crucial responsibilities, without providing fully adequate resources for the tasks (Manning 2003: 2). The development funds which were announced for the respective

¹³¹ Prof. Niaz, in response to the questionnaire on Gmail (Annexure E), has expressed this fact categorically that the local governments under the LG plan of Musharraf were centrally financed and therefore a lack of financial autonomy was one of the major factors acting as a barrier to actual decentralisation.

members involved no role of the district governments. The district governments continued to have limited revenue collection mandates. The provinces still had substantial control over the budget preparation process of the district government. The ambiguity of rules and procedures also affected the financial relations between the provinces and the districts as in many cases, the duplication of the tax authority created much uncertainty and resentment like an overlapping base of the property tax which complicated the tax structure and created an undue harassment of the taxpayers (Paracha, 2003: 35). Also, the revenue-raising authorities of the local governments were impeded by the strings attached. Thus, their autonomy was severely hurt in bringing in innovations into their revenue-raising and resource allocation formula (Taj 2010: 32). It is also notable that the lowest two tiers of the local government were left with inadequate funds that were seldom sufficient for any substantial development project; further, these already meagre funds were preferred to be spent in quick-impact projects like sanitation and sewerage rather than a long-term investment in health and education, mainly driven by the vote banks politics. Hasnain maintains that the provincial allocable amount was transferred to the local government broadly under two separate block grants—one for recurrent expenditures, which constituted approximately 88% of the allocable amount, and the remainder for the development expenditure (Husnain, 2008: 14). Furthermore, a significant proportion of the district expenditures were the “establishment charges”, which included the salaries of the administrative personnel appointed by the provinces. Manning has expressed grief over the lack of financial autonomy at the local level, saying, “the huge gap between salary and non-salary budgets was discouraging. The districts could not create or reduce posts or adjust their salary structure and therefore, a large fraction of the district budget is fixed” (Manning 2003: 60-65).

The devolution or the decentralisation of power and the efficiency of the civil service are symbiotic. There is a very important need to make efforts in the direction of strengthening the democratic institutions of Pakistan. The devolution of

power is one of them. It will not only strengthen the roots of democracy in Pakistan but also bring about a democratisation of the civilian bureaucracy. This dual process can succeed only by bringing institutional as well as attitudinal changes to the civil service. The colonial *mai-bap* (subject and ruler relationship) attitude of a civil servant is the main hurdle in the way to building and strengthening the democratic institutions at a local level. An efficient and accountable administration at the local level demands that the relationship between the civil servant and the elected political official should be based on trust, confidence and credibility. Both the political leadership and bureaucracy need to develop a transparent and effective partnership for promoting the public interest and ensuring a humane governance (Shafqat 1999: 1016). The civil service reforms therefore tend to centre on enhancing democracy and accountability and thus have a strong political component. The responsive and transparent bureaucratic mechanisms call for an increased citizen participation (United Nations 2011: 17).

The Musharraf period will be known for bringing about radical changes in the bureaucracy of Pakistan. It was only after the civil service reforms of 1973 under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that such sweeping reforms took place. Although every government in Pakistan is known for manipulating the civil service for gaining legitimacy and prolonging its rule, the Musharraf regime was distinct in the sense that while other governments tended to bring bureaucracy as a partner in power, Musharraf tried to subordinate and sideline the bureaucracy and at the same time created a parallel line of a “localized patronage structure to produce collaborative politicians” (Cheema 2003: 407) who acted as a conduit between the local-level constituencies and the non-representative centre.

The Separation of Powers and a System of Checks and Balances among the Institutions

Due to some historical reasons, the military and bureaucracy in Pakistan were much more developed than the political institutions. Given the deteriorating and unstable

internal political situation, the political institutions were not further allowed to flourish and the political instability provided the opportunity for the civil service to take control of the state. On the face of it, the bureaucracy in Pakistan tended to overshadow each and every branch of the government and the decision-making institutions. Although, Bhutto seemed to recognise the power imbalance in the political system of Pakistan where the civilian and military bureaucracies were more powerful than the political institutions, he failed to take measures to strengthen the political institutions; moreover, his autocratic style of working did indeed undermine them. His autocratic tendencies started seriously interfering with his ability to govern by the mid-1970s. He acted more like an autocratic Sindhi landlord than a democratically elected public servant, getting the reputation of “an elected dictator” (Mohiuddin 2006: 184). The nature of the 1973 reform has been correctly analysed by Aminullah Chaudry; he says that “to imagine that Bhutto was motivated by a genuine desire to put in place an efficient, well oiled, apolitical bureaucratic machine would be naïve. He was a politician and his purpose in making revolutionary changes in the bureaucratic structure were purely political, nothing less and nothing more” (Chaudry 2011: 111).

The electoral competition at the local level was distorted by banning political parties at the local level. It gave room for the emergence of the military-supported groups. In other words, the vacuum created by banning the political parties to contest in the local level elections was easily filled by the military-supported groups in the name of a non-political contest. In fact, it was a deliberate effort to give an upper hand to the military in local governance. Thus, the local governments could hardly be called as the true representatives of the people. Although at the one hand, the strengthening of the democratic institutions was talked about, the right of contesting the elections on a party basis was grabbed. However, this was not a unique exercise by the Musharraf regime.

General Zia-ul-Haq had revived the local government system by promulgating the Local Government Ordinances. He saw a fragmented and divided local government as the surest way to decrease the influence of the politicians at the provincial or national levels. Twenty years later, the same strategy was applied by General Musharraf when the centralisation of power involved a selective disqualification of the political parties' representatives and at times, outright bans on all or certain political parties (Cheema 2003: 402). As according to Veena Kukreja, "building a democratic society at the grassroots level without the involvement of political parties is not possible. That would further depoliticize the people and strengthen the influence of biradaris and tribes and promote the already entrenched feudal, economic and social mafias in society" (Kukreja 2003: 279).

The LGP scheme lacked the insight to provide the measures for integration and coordination among the provincial/federal elected representatives and the local-level councillors. As the LGP was imposed without any consent of the provinces, it did not enjoy the support of the provincial government. The smooth functioning at the local level was constrained due to a lesser coordination between the DCO and the *Nazim* mainly due to lack of clarity in the responsibilities and functions which were assigned to them and also due to the absence of the hierarchical linkages between the various levels of the local government (Jamal et.al. 2008: 16). While the DCO was made accountable to the indirectly elected district *Nazims* in order to make the bureaucracy subordinate to the representative institutions, the new procedure resulted in the duplication in the chain of command as the DCO now had to report both to the *Nazim* on the one hand and the provincial departments on the other (Paracha, 2003: 28) . Although, the district police official was made responsible to the indirectly elected District *Nazim*, thus removing the control of the DCO, the lack of coordination between the district police officer and District

Nazim resulted in an unaccountable police department¹³². Further, under the new structure, many laws and statutes were left un-conferred which created a power vacuum and hampered the smooth functioning of the government.

The radical changes brought at the district level bureaucracy under the Local Government Plan show that in theory, the entire exercise was conducted in order to subordinate the bureaucracy to an elected person. Although it seemed like a positive effort to strengthen the elected representatives vis-à-vis the bureaucrats and thus the priorities and choices for developmental projects being determined by the representatives of the communities, however the implementation of the LGP took place with extreme political control and interference by the centre as well as the provinces, as has been described in the previous chapter. It was claimed that the above-mentioned changes would make the administration more efficient and productive as the plan claimed to abolish the centralisation of bureaucracy which had been described by the NRB as the main cause of the bureaucratic inefficiency.¹³³ In reality, the whole exercise was an effort to cloak the centralised control over the local administration through the new institution of the District *Nazim*. As this new institution was made the main tool in the hand of the military to extend its centralised control, it was essential to lower the grade of the district head of bureaucracy (DC) in order to raise the stature of the District *Nazim*. Thus, the whole exercise remained cosmetic and could not bring any path-breaking change to the civil service. The district governments faced many constraints under Musharraf's local government plan. Although certain functions were devolved to the district and lower level of government in the name of the devolution of power, the districts were not provided with enough autonomy (fiscal and political) to

¹³² Imam and Dar (2014: 99-144) has shown by presenting quantitative data how crime and law and order problems have increased in Pakistan with the tinkering of functions of district level bureaucracy which somehow validates that scrapping the police oversight powers of DCO has been detrimental for the internal security of the country.

¹³³ Government of Pakistan, Local Government Plan 2000, Ministry of Education, [Online: Web], Accessed 26th of March, 2011, URL. <http://www.moe.gov.pk/Local%20Government.pdf>, p.1.

bring about the desirable changes as per their own needs. The recruitment of officials at the district level was still controlled by the provincial government and influenced by the federal government (Cyan 2004: 21). Although a prohibition on recruitment was imposed by each province, in some cases the local governments were given the authority to hire the administrative staff and officials only on a contract basis. This practice, however, did not do much favour to the local government, given the fact that it was limited to merely some grades and some departments; especially, the districts were not given any authority to make recruitments, transfers or promotions of the higher level officials (Cyan 2004: 24-25).

The absence of clear rules or policy support created confusion and complexities, further making the administration complicated rather than smooth. For example, the local government did not enjoy the status of an employer in spite of practising recruitment on a contract basis in some cases. The legal definition of an employer was not certain, neither was the status of the government. It constrained the employees to contest legally in court, if any injustice was poured upon them. The absence of clear rules and policies also created the problem of dual accountability, for example, although the district level officials including the DCO were made accountable to the elected District *Nazim*, their loyalty to the district level was not paramount as the recruitment and transfer powers were vested at the provincial level of the government. Cyan and others have expressed the possibility of political motivated transfers being caused by the dual accountability in these words, “the threat of an unpleasant transfer or the promise of an attractive one can pressure the senior staff member to arrange the transfer of a junior employee (Cyan 2004: 27).

Although it may seem good in theory that the administrative officer was made accountable to the representative head of the people, in reality, this ostensible

good effort was undermined by the fact that the representative head at the district level according to the LGP did not represent the local people in a true sense mainly due to two reasons—firstly, these elected officials were indirectly elected and secondly, having a military government at the centre and its direct control over the local government, the politically favourable people were put in the post of the District *Nazim*. Shafqat Munir has called these electoral tactics as a “big power game” where the traditional establishment backed the power elites at a local level through the excessive use of money and power tactics (Munir 2001: 1). Thus Cheema and others have doubted the loosening of the bureaucratic control in effect when they say, “it is unclear that the de jure shift in emphasis towards elected representatives vis-à-vis the bureaucracy has been matched by their substantive de facto empowerment” (Cheema 2003: 415). In most of the cases, the LGP resulted in a nexus of the corrupt DCO and the equally corrupt District *Nazim* on the one hand and the transfer and postings of civil servants mainly driven by political interest on the other in order to extend the reach of the military regime to the local level (ICG 2010: 1).

The brief interval of civilian rule under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif fell short of addressing this power imbalance, which further widened with the weakening of the political institutions. These regimes failed to bring about any expected and needed reforms in the civil services, but instead deepened politicisation. This period is known for the political expediency and arbitrariness in dealing with the civil servants. The political misuse of civil bureaucracy appeared in both an ad-hoc manner like the promotion of political loyalists well as in more institutional way such as the Placement Bureau (1989). The removal of officers arbitrarily from their posts, rendering them Officers on Special Duty for long periods, took place frequently under both the PPP as well as the PML government (Hussain and Hussain 1993: 85). Such arbitrary actions generated a lot of resentment and increased the reluctance of the officials to take decisions at their own level.

Structural vs. Organic Reforms

Although various positive changes were made under the LGP, the tool of implementation remained the same: in a bureaucracy unaccustomed to change, there was no effort made in order to bring an attitudinal change in the behaviour of the civil servants. During the Musharraf regime, the civil service was the most resisting to the idea of devolution as has been stated by Baela Raza Jamil: “the bureaucrats, who had the most to lose in terms of status and authority, led the resistance; since the bureaucrats had to lead the pre-devolution transition process, they themselves became the primary blockers of the idea” (Jamil 2002: 16). There was a lack of insight regarding human resource development for the various reform attempts. The administrative changes under the LGP did not emphasise the need for capacity-building programmes to smooth the process under the new structure of administration. A formal system of in-service and recruitment level training was not sufficient for the administrators to work in the new environment.¹³⁴

The need for creating a distinct District Service was not identified by any of the regimes. Article 240 of the Constitution of Pakistan stipulates that there would be All-Pakistan, Federal and Provincial Services; the Constitution does not mention a District Service.¹³⁵ There was a need for creating a separate District Service provided with a constitutional protection; the district-elected government should have been given the authority to appoint the officials of the District Service having enough discretion to make policies in this regard so that they could select the official staff according to the local needs.

¹³⁴ Government of Pakistan (2006), “Agenda for Civil Service Reform”, Policy Paper, [Online: Web], Accessed 17th of October, 2010, URL. http://202.83.164.27/wps/portal/Mod/ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os_hQN68AZ3dnIwN312BTAYNTE1MvR0tXgwBLI_2CbEdFAFNHPjcl/WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/DefDivCL/division/policies/civil+service+reform p.9

¹³⁵ Article 240. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, [Online: Web], Accessed 26th of June, 2011, URL. <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/>

Lack of Fiscal Decentralisation

Fiscal decentralisation is one of the necessary components of decentralisation of powers which brings about direct benefits like enhanced efficiency of public goods provision, quality of government through democratic accountability and economic growth (Mustafa, 2011: 2). In Pakistan, the central government have control over 90% of the total revenues (Mezzera, 2010: 16). These revenues are transferred to the provincial government on the recommendation of National Finance Commission Awards¹³⁶. The LGP was deprived of the discretionary powers to raise funds at local level and majority of their funds were to come from the transfer from provincial government. Although the local units were given powers to levy taxes to generate a portion of the funds, the mechanism was not clearly defined due to which provincial government implemented it at their own discretion. It created disparity in the funds availability across various local units (Mezzera, 2010: 16). There was the provision of formula based horizontal allocation of financial resources to the local units¹³⁷ and discretionary vertical allocation from the provinces to the local units. At one hand the formula for horizontal allocation was not clearly established and it resulted into the differences in terms of availability of funds across various local units for example in Sind, NWFP and Balochistan (Keefer et.al., 2003: 12). On the other hand the vertical distribution of funds, since it was to be decided by the provinces, led to the full control of provincial governments over local units.

Further, provincial governments retained substantial control over the district government regarding policymaking on these devolved subjects (Manning 2003: 33). It created serious irregularities in the allocation of functionaries and finance (Mezzera, 2010: 26). Moreover, it led to some redundancies with the providing of

¹³⁶ National Financial Commission of Pakistan is formed under the Article 160 of Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and it recommends for distribution of financial resources between central and provincial government on annual basis (Mustafa, 2011: 3)

¹³⁷ The horizontal allocation of funds was to be made on the recommendation of Provincial

staff and budgets for each of departments in each district. These were mainly the pains of providing less discretion, and thus the local governments were left with a little scope of innovation according to the needs of the local communities. Although much later this anomaly was tried to be removed and the provinces were given the right to modify their respective organisations and thus provide for a more efficient allocation of resources, the problem was not fully addressed in all provinces, except Baluchistan and the former NWFP. It was mainly because the districts were still not supposed to be eligible to manage according to their own needs.

Transparency and Accountability

The lack of transparency in the administrative affairs led to an opaque government which further deepened the lack of accountability among the bureaucrats. All this resulted in a rampant corruption in the civil service which has grown during the previous years. The efficiency of the civil service has been seriously eroded. There should be no surprise that despite various attempts at reforming the civil services, the common perception seems to be that the system essentially remains similar to that inherited from the colonial past (Haque 2006: 1199).

The comparative study of various attempts undertaken during the civilian regimes and the military regimes shows that all the reforms seemed to be driven by the same intent of gaining political legitimacy and regime survival, rather than bringing an improvement into the administration. It also shows that the instruments and manner of bringing changes have also been largely the same, whether it were the changes in structure, system of lateral entry or the constitution of any commission or committee. However, there have been some differences also, for example under the civilian regimes, the use of bureaucracy for political purposes left the bureaucracy much politicised. On the other hand, under the military regimes, the induction of the retired and serving military officers into the administration led to

the politicisation of the bureaucracy. General Zia-ul-Haq's regime was different in that through his Islamisation drive, he tried to give an ideological cover to the secular bureaucracy. Thus, the civil service of Pakistan, apart from the other characteristics, can fairly be described as being deeply politicised, militarised and Islamised. Thus, the original purpose of the civil service of serving the citizens without being affected by the interests and ideology of the ruling regime has been lost somewhere.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

An efficient civil service, working for the welfare of the people is the foundation of the government. Civil service, on one hand, plays an important role in the formation of policies and on the other it is also responsible for the implementation of those policies and programmes. It is best suited to bring good governance at the doorstep of the people to enhance their socio-economic development. Being referred as the permanent organ of the government, civil service is the most important part of government machinery having the ethos of political neutrality and meritocracy needed to serve under an elected government of any political party. It is the agency of the government which takes the public services to the common people at the lowest level. As an important part of the government, it is necessary to ensure the smooth and perfect function of civil service.

With the change of time, everything has to alter in order to keep pace with the changing environment; it is true for civil service too. Civil service reform is a process which is needed in a country in order to transform the administration according to the changing needs of the society. Given the tendency of bureaucracy to accumulate power and centralisation of the organisation, it is often suggested that in order to improve the efficiency of the civil service and public service as a whole, there is a vital need to devolve and decentralise the government functions substantially. Devolution of government functions being a part of the whole strategy of decentralisation, further requires human resource management and capacity building of administrative institutions in order to prepare the civil service to work under the new environment of decentralization. There is also a need to bring attitudinal changes and technical upgrading at the lower level so that the devolved machinery can work smoothly. Thus civil service reform forms an important part of the process of decentralisation and devolution of power.

Civil service reform is as complicated as important. It requires a sustained commitment from political parties and government as the civil service reform cannot be implemented at one go. There may be many ways to address the inefficiency of the civil service in order to improve its capacity and boost its morale and it depends on the nature of the existent political government in the state as well as indigenous situation and requirements of the society. Every reform package has its particular shades and focus and resultant winners and losers; moreover reforms are conceived in a particular context addressing a particular problem which may not be effective as the environment changes (Bokhari, 2011). No reform can fully resolve the all inclusive problem of good governance but strategic reforms in right direction can dramatically improve government's ability to do what must be done (Ketti, 1996: 6).

Civil service reforms in Pakistan have been related to mainly the manipulation and changes in the civil service systems in order to gain political legitimacy and regime survival. The first hypothesis of the present study is that the civil service reforms in Pakistan are governed by the need of political legitimacy and regime survival than the necessity of administrative efficiency. The overall analysis of the history of civil service reforms shows that in most of the cases, the reform strategy was used to cover up the unrepresentative political regime on one hand and to gain political legitimacy on the other. Civil service reforms in Pakistan have been a piecemeal, discontinued and non-substantial effort and thus unable to bring required changes in the structure and functioning of bureaucracy. In reality there have been no substantial reforms in Pakistan which could address the inefficiency of bureaucracy, but only the misuse and manipulation of the civil service in the name of reform leaving bureaucracy much militarized and politicized.

Bureaucracy has been misused and manipulated by the government through different measures; the most popular among them has been to remove the officials

in the name of corruption charges and ill-performance. The bureaucrats are forced to take pre-mature retirement and leave the office in order to appoint the favourable officials in the office. This was done during Yahya Khan who suspended 303 senior civil servants on charges of corruption, misconduct or abuse of authority and tried them before specially constituted military tribunals. Again during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 1300 civil servants were dismissed on the grounds of corruption and incompetence. During Musharraf, the National Accountability Bureau was formed under a serving lieutenant general mainly to root out political opponents and prosecute anti-government officials. It was against the principles of separation of power that executive was performing the judiciary function, thus creating a parallel judicial system in the country. Further the civil service reform in Pakistan during Musharraf regime was also insufficient centred at the district level only; the need of reform at provincial as well as federal level was not identified.

The other tactics which have been used is the formation of committees and commission in order to address the illness of administration. Some 30 commissions have been constituted since independence to reform the civil service but very few recommendations have been accepted or implemented (ICG, 2010: 1). Some of them deserves admire to give valuable suggestions in order to address the problem of dysfunction of the bureaucracy e.g. Justice Rowland Egger Committee, Meer Committee and National Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR). The formation of commissions and committees has proved to be merely a cover to unrepresentative regime without bringing their recommendation into implementation. Furthermore, whatever the recommendations accepted were those which suited to the political interest of the government in power. Most recent among them is the National Commission for Governmental Reform constituted during General Pervez Musharraf. No important recommendation has been implemented or considered for implementation as for now (Bokhari, 2011: 4). In order to find out the recommendations suitable to the present political government,

the NCGR has been kept under the chairmanship of Chaudhury Abdul Ghafoor, a Pakistan Peoples' Party Parliamentarian mainly to revisit the recommendation and produce a new report (ICG, 2010: 10). *One of the hypotheses of the present study that the civil service reforms on Pakistan are governed by the need of political legitimacy and regime survival than the necessity of administrative efficiency is thus proved.*

The subordination of bureaucracy to the military has degraded the moral obligation and autonomy of civil service to a great extent. The misuse of bureaucracy at the hands of military regime was mainly to ensure power legitimacy and regime survival, however in this practice; the bureaucracy was dealt at par with military. During Musharraf regime this practice saw a sudden flipside as the bureaucracy was sidelined in the whole exercise of power legitimacy. Musharraf saw it more useful to create a new class of proxy politicians (District Nazim) in order to extend military control at the local level. The bureaucracy was subordinated to the military on one hand (through the provision of Army Monitoring Teams) and made accountable to the proxy political institution of District Nazim on the other. The provision of Army Monitoring Teams did an unprecedented harm to the professionalism and moral obligation of bureaucracy. It was unfortunate as it led to the situation aggravating bad to worse as never in the history of Pakistan the civil service was subjected to the junior military officers. In addition, during Musharraf regime military officials were appointed to key civilian posts including the chairmanship of Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), which is responsible for recruitment of civil servants at federal level. Military officials, some serving but mostly retired, were appointed heads of a large number of civilian organizations, many of which required technical expertise, such as the chief executive of the Alternative Energy Development Board; chairman of Pakistan Steel Mill; and the chairman of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (ICG, 2010: 10). Thus the overall supervision of bureaucracy by the Army Monitoring Teams (AMTs) was

the most important factor which had an adverse impact on administrative decentralisation in Pakistan. As a result of it, Pakistan's Civil service today is very much militarized and politicized and reduced to an inefficient and incompetent civil service structure.

One of the important findings which became clear during the research is that it is the power imbalance between the political institutions on one hand and civil service and military on the other which is the major cause of failure of the civil service reform. Due to historic reasons, Pakistan inherited a weak political structure with fragile democratic tradition which was not deep seated in Pakistan's society. It was mainly due to historic reasons as during the colonial rule; a powerful and centralized steel frame of bureaucracy was introduced with the purpose of maintaining law and order, largely at the expense of democratic institutions. After getting independence, Pakistan needed a bureaucratic structure that best suited the necessities and expectations of indigenous society, though it had continued with the old British pattern of bureaucracy. British bureaucratic model proved highly insufficient as the purpose of British bureaucratic model was only to maintain law and order. Even subsequently, in the name of reforms bureaucracy is made to become merely a tool to manipulate and change the existing ruling system to gain political benefits for particulars and parties. Thus the bureaucracy is used as an instrument in subsequent bureaucratic reforms in Pakistan. Moreover, in the name of bring out reforms in civil service subsequent civil service reforms made Pakistan's civil service structure as highly centralized and relatively organised as compared to the political representative institutions.

At the initial period of independence, political institutions were not allowed to flourish, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan along with Governor General Mohd. Ali Jinnah relied heavily on the bureaucracy and the civil servants effectively controlled the entire administration in the provinces. The absence of political

stability provided the civil service an opportunity to consolidate its position, and it eventually ran the country in the absence of united government turning it into a “Bureaucratic Polity”. While informally taking part in the politics of Pakistan, bureaucracy was made a willing junior partner of military government during the Ayub Khan’s rule and a pattern of interdependence between bureaucracy and military emerged. He launched the Basic Democracy system which was nothing more than a power legitimacy exercise to create a new political class in place of political parties. He brought the “Elective Bodies Disqualification Order” to remove 6000 politicians from the office. During his regime, the controlling authority remained in the hands of bureaucracy, which had the power to put an end to proceedings and suspend resolutions passed by local bodies. Thus the bureaucracy enjoyed the capability to overrule any power that the local bodies had.

During the study it also became clear that the misuse of bureaucracy for political benefits has degraded the morale and competence of the civil service. It has led to the politicization of bureaucracy which contributed to its dysfunction. The civil servants are pushed by political compulsions and they prefer to take the side of their political masters rather than taking neutral stance. In Pakistan, every regime change has been accompanied by broad transfers and postings of officials at the policy making levels in the secretariats as well as at the operational level in the districts. For instance, the constitutional protection of employment given to the civil servants was removed through 1973 constitution. The withdrawal of constitutional protection which shielded the bureaucracy from political interference did a serious blow to the professionalism of bureaucracy (ICG, 2008: 4). Bhutto’s measures, though increased the authority of political representatives to some extent, reduced greatly the performance of the civil service.

During Bhutto the lateral entry scheme was another instrument of the politicization of bureaucracy. Although it was ostensibly added that lateral entry of the official

would reduce the influence of generalists over the bureaucracy however, it was misused first during Bhutto for the recruitment of officials on political grounds than merit, then during General Zia-ul-Haq who inducted military officials into the civil service, thus intensifying the militarization of bureaucracy. The ad hoc practice of militarization of bureaucracy was institutionalized during Zia-ul-Haq. The measure of reserving 10 per cent recruitment of BPS-17 and 18 and the recruitment of 10 per cent senior level vacancies on contract basis deeply militarized the bureaucracy and seriously undermined its professionalism.

It is unfortunate that even after six decades of independence, the legacy of colonial bureaucracy system is continuing, having all the features intact like secretariat system, the policy administration dichotomy, the generalist bias, the district administration and the land revenue system. The 1973 reforms mainly brought to dismantle colonial structure could not sustain due to default in the implementation. The weak structure of democracy also contributed to the failure of these reforms to take root. The devolution plan of Pervez Musharraf was told to break bureaucratic superiority at the district level; however at the end of the day it proved to be one more power legitimacy exercise. It is reflected from the fact that the LGP was provided with merely a six-year constitutional guarantee. Further, there was a lack of political commitment towards administrative reform as the District heads of bureaucracy was weakened by subordinating him to the District Nazim; however the District Nazim was not made strong enough to deal with administrative issues. There were left many loopholes in the administrative rules and procedures leaving the District Nazim in a dilemma. Thus the vacuum which was created through the bureaucratic weakening at the district level was further filled by the District Coordinating Officer (DCO). Moreover the militarization of bureaucracy touched new heights in Musharraf's period which is set to change the historical power balance. The bureaucracy which was supposed to be more organized and developed

than political institution, the intrusion of military in the bureaucracy has weakened it to a large extent leaving the Army as the only dominant institution in the country.

There was a vital need to strengthen the hands of democracy in Pakistan to address the various problems which Pakistan is facing today. It will also help to bring organic reforms and attitudinal change in order to conform the bureaucratic system as per the indigenous needs of the society. In Pakistan it is only the growth of political institutions which can solve the structural and functional problem of civil service in the country and correct the power imbalance in the country. In this regard the need is to increase local level participation at each stage of governance. As the NCGR has acknowledged it in these words, “The major difficulty in the post independence period in Pakistan lay in the inability to replace the colonial practice of empowering the privileged class of executive/ bureaucratic system, by a new democratic system of governance at local levels.” Until or unless the power imbalance in the country is not corrected the civil service reform will remain ineffective. Z. A. Bhutto tried to correct this power imbalance by weakening the CSP For this he removed the constitutional guarantees given to the civil service since colonial time, introduced Lateral Entry Scheme and vertical and horizontal movement of civil servants in the organisation. Bhutto’s strategy to weaken the bureaucracy in order to correct the power imbalance could not succeed. Correcting the power imbalance must essentially be a two way process to succeed. Due to historic reasons democratic values have been fragile and strengthening the democratic structure as well as deepening the democratic values is very essential for any exercise to correct the power imbalance to succeed. However this need was not recognised by the rulers of Pakistan (Saadat, 2013: 1). During Musharraf period, although the strengthening of democracy at local level was talked in Local Government Plan (LGP), the local level units were proved to be merely the toothless tiger in the absence of financial resources. The end of the bureaucratic dominance at the district level also remained an unfinished goal as the LGP could

not ensure sufficient measures to do this. And lack of clarity of rules and procedures provide the opportunity to District Coordination Officer to fill the power vacuum.

In fact, every ruler in Pakistan who tended to bring reforms in the civil service has tried to make it subservient to it rather than evolving a strong and autonomous one. Either it was civilian regime of Bhutto or the military rule of Ayub, Zia or Musharraf, the effort to make bureaucracy a serving institution to the ruling regime has destroyed the principle of accountability to the people. As a result of it subsequently Pakistan's bureaucracy became self-seeking by nature and now it sees more incentives in serving the ruler rather than strengthening the management of bureaucracy and being responsive to the needs of the people. Pakistan's civil service today is deeply militarized, politicized and centralized which has shattered the concept the neutral and competent civil service.

The main hindrances to bring out reforms in Pakistan's civil service are its militarisation and politicisation by successive governments. There is a need of comprehensive and broader civil service reform along with decentralisation of power and functions at the local level which is critical for the success of civil service reform. On the face of prevailing hindrances in the form of militarisation and politicisation of bureaucracy in this study some of the tools of NCGR report are identified which may be instrumental to establish an efficient bureaucracy in Pakistan. According to the National Commission for Government Reforms the attitudinal changes through human resource management should be emphasized which include complete workforce analysis, training needs, induction, and promotion and remuneration strategies. Other recommendations which National Commission for Government Reforms finds important in the current scenario are as follows:

- (i) The need for greater efficiency and affordability through right-sizing of the large number of government employees in the relatively unproductive subordinate services (NCGR, 2006: 30).
- (ii) There should be an open, transparent, merit-based recruitment to all levels and grades of civil services, with regional representation as laid down in the constitution (NCGR, 2006: 54). It is essential in order to remove the influence of politicians, bureaucrats as well as that of military officials. Patronage based system which is prevalent in Pakistan hurt the efficiency of civil service it has deadly affected the whole civil service structure as it fails to attract the bright and motivated students in service.
- (iii) The need to promote equality of opportunities and career advancement within the civil service systems rather than the tradition of giving preferential treatment in terms of training, positions and promotions to certain elite cadres e.g. the Civil Service of Pakistan until 1973, followed by the District management group (NCGR, 2006: 54).
- (iv) The need to clarifying relationships and responsibilities of civil servants at federal, provincial and district levels. The LGP devolved considerable authority from provincial to district governments, and at the district level from civil servants to elected *Nazims*. The tensions which were generated by the devolution and transfer of authority creating law and order problems in some of the districts demand clarification of the rules and procedures. The LGP also generated considerable confusion about the responsibilities and reporting relationships for civil servants operating at the district level (NCGR, 2006: 105).

(v) To bring these changes would require a major cultural and attitudinal change from both politicians and the civil servants, rather than any change in the rules of business. The NCGR finds that the proposed Institute for the legislators and the management courses organized by the National School of Public Policy (NSPP), National Defence University (NDU), the Provincial Management Academies can play a pivotal role in bringing about these cultural and attitudinal changes (NCGR, 2006: 343).

The Bureaucracy of Pakistan today is very much centralised and inequality persists in the hierarchy. The power is centralised today in the hands of upper section of the hierarchy and very less opportunities are available to the majority of officers who are currently outside the occupational groups and service cadres in matters of recruitment, training, career progression and promotion on the basis of performance and achievements and does away with entitlements and reservations. There is a clear need to ensure that generalists and specialists are brought together under the highest policy making position matrix.

In order to further penetration of decentralisation there is a need to create District Management Service (DMS) which should be totally controlled and managed by the district government. In order to provide complete autonomy to the DMS the transfer of funds, functions and functionaries should be equally ensured. There is also a need to bring equality in policy making also and for this the regional civil service quota should be introduced.

There is a need to strengthen internal and external accountability mechanism to address widespread corruption within the bureaucracy (Government of Pakistan, 2008: 276). For this enhanced interface between public and the civil service would be crucial. At present the local level officers are not trained properly, they are incompetent, corrupt and biased. The ethical values of neutrality, honesty, integrity,

professionalism, transparency, accountability, leadership etc. has been decayed. To make local level administration accountable the change in the pattern of pre-service and in-service training has to be strengthened in order to inculcate ethical values among the bureaucrats.

The other hypothesis of the present study is that *the importance given to structural changes rather than organic changes is the main factor behind the failure of civil service reform in Pakistan*. In Pakistan, the focus of civil service reforms has been on the structural changes by different governments. The steps taken towards reforms were also implemented by the same civil service machinery which is engrossed with the colonial mindset of superiority. Thus in order to ensure the effective implementation of these reforms, the human resource management has to be emphasised. The prevalence of nepotism and political intervention in the recruitment process has to be stopped. The merit based system of recruitment will help to develop profession, competent and motivated bureaucracy.

The need for reforming the training as well as examination system has been well identified by various experts. The major areas for reforms identified are restructuring of occupational groups, personnel system, recruitment and training system, promotion policies and political interference, discipline, pay and service conditions (Bokhari, 2016: 9, Niaz, 2016: 2, Mirani, 2016: 2). Improving efficiency, eradication of corruption and nepotism, better performance particularly in revenue collection and in the mode of governance are also identified as major areas to bring reform into (Ahmar, 2016: 1). Despite the identification of the scope of reforms the major problem in Pakistan has been that there has not been any major reform effort in the Pakistan's civil service systems rather the system has been tinkered with, from here and there, not with the idea to reform rather to further deform the already fractured and deformed system (Bokhari, 2016: 10). It is to be

noted that unless an independent and merit based civil service is not in place, Pakistan institutions would continue to suffer. The political interferences where political convenience has been put in place higher than political neutrality and probity has deeply affected the efficiency of civil service and the independence of bureaucracy has been seriously compromised (Khan, 2016: 2). Thus, there is a need to make sure that civil servants remain public servants rather than becoming the servants of the political class. The attitude of the civil servants must be considerate to deal with the problems faced by the people at the grass root level (Ahmar, 2016: 1). For this there is a need of increased efficiency, integrity and professional approach to be promoted among the civil servants. There is a demand of taking some important innovative steps to increase professionalism, efficiency and integrity among the civil servants. These steps have been summarized by Saeed Nawaz a follows:

- The joint system of competitive examination for all civil services should be abolished and should be replaced with the introduction of service specific exams;
- There is a need of permanent allocations for officers of all Pakistan unified services and groups in the provincial services;
- There is a need of appointment against various assignments with tangible monitor-able targets (KPIs);
- The selection of officers for senior assignments should be free from arbitrary decisions of political class and it should be done through selection committees of senior bureaucrats;

- In order to increase the security of service and tenure, the civil servants should be provided protection against whimsical premature transfers. Further, there should be no premature transfers except on account of misconduct or failure to realize the targets;
- To deal with the requirements of the specialist services in the context of generalist-specialist dichotomy, there should be long-term placement of the generalist officers in the specific sectors at junior and mid-career levels;
- The efficiency of services demands recognition and incentives. For this there should be the introduction of fast track promotions for high achievers in all services (Nawaz, 2016: 3)

It is to be highlighted that in order to make the reforms effective and sustainable, there is a need of constant parallel political reforms to carry on. No reform of bureaucracy is in fact possible without political reforms and thus de-politicization is a major challenge (Shafqat, 2016: 3). For this there is a need of re-defining politician bureaucrat relationship, ensuring selection on merit, posting tenure; improving delivery of services, improving skills; integrating technology; and most importantly inducing the notion and value of public service and public welfare (Shafqat, 2016: 3).

One of the major reasons for the failure of civil service reforms has been that the need for bringing organic reforms along with structural reforms was not identified. There is a need of structural and organic reforms to go hand in hand to bring effective change in the civil service systems. The behavioural and attitudinal change is key to any reform effort (Shafqat, 2016: 3). The attitudinal barrier towards the reforms is one of the most important hindrances in the way of

implementation of the reforms. The problem is that there is dominance of the Pakistan administrative service (PAS) group which call the shot at all place. Mostly the secretaries, head of organization and policy makers come from this group and they are deadly opposed to any reform and want to continue the status-quo in order to ensure their grip over the state institutions. They are opposed to Local government, police reforms and all other initiatives which could lead to a step forward for the bureaucracy (Khan, 2016: 2).

There is a need for reorientation of bureaucracy to depoliticise it and to increase professionalism and efficiency. The reforms have been implemented with the top down approach which with the attitudinal barrier could not succeed. Thus we need to apply bottom up approach in South Asia and particularly in Pakistan as highlighted by Saeed Shafqat. As per this bottom up approach, we must pay attention to improving the skills, conduct, behaviour and capacity of First Respondents, who are the real face of the state and ordinary citizens have to interact with them on daily basis-the Revenue Official in the locality/district (Patwari), the Police Station Officer (SHO), who manages the law and order, crime etc, the lower judiciary (district and session courts) that dispenses justice (Shafqat, 2016: 2).

The top-down approach has been related to the Weberian model of bureaucratic structure which emphasises on centralised decision making and where the information as well as authority flows from top to the bottom. This type of structure works well in stable and peaceful environment, the dynamic and unstable societies like in Pakistan demand organic structure of the civil service which should be quickly able to adapt itself as per the demands of the environment. The bottom up approach ensures the quick dissemination of the information and thus enables the structure to quickly adapt to the changing demands of the society and politics. The

organic changes in the bureaucracy rely on informal networks among the staff as well as recruitment and training system.

In Pakistan, the uniformity in the training and recruitment system has been unable to identify the specific needs of a particular service. The examination system is archaic and has not been revised from years (Khan, 2016: 3). Similarly, there is a considerable room for improvement and radical change in the nature, orientation, duration and skills mix of trainings at all levels (Shafqat, 2016: 3). Training is one of the important means to adapt the administrative structure of a particular country to the needs of the indigenous society. The training and attitudinal reforms will also help in the effective implementation of the reform agenda by overcoming the internal barrier among the bureaucrats. In Pakistan, the need to infuse the spirit of public service among the bureaucrats was not identified and the elitism of the bureaucracy inherited by the British Rule is continued even today. Thus, the hypothesis that *the importance given to structural changes rather than organic changes is the main factor behind the failure of civil service reform in Pakistan, is proved.*

ANNEXTURES

Annexure A: List of Commission/Committees for Administrative Reforms in Pakistan

Chairman/Author	Title of Report	Date Reported
Sir Victor Turner	Administrative Reorganisation	1947
M. Munir/Chief Justice	Pay and Service Commission	1949
S. Ghulam Bhik Nairang	Report of the House Committee	1951
K.S. Jeffries		1952
Rowland Egger US/AID Expert	The Improve of Public Administration in Pakistan	1953
T.B. Creagh-Coen	Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee	1953
Bernard L. Gladieux, Ford Foundation	Reorganisation of Pakistan Government for Development	1955
Akhtar Hussain	Report of the Provincial Administrative Commission	1960
N. A. Faruqi	Report of the Provincial Re-Organisation Committee-West Pakistan	1961
G. Ahmad, Police Service of Pakistan	Administrative Reorganisation of Pakistan	1961
M. Shoaib, Finance Minister	Reorganisation of Public Administration	1962
A.R. Cornelius, Chief Justice	Pay and Service Commission	1962
Fazl-e-Akbar, Chief Justice	Regional Administrative Organisation	1969
D. K. Power	Report of the Working Group on the Re-organisation of the Service Structure	1969

Source: National Commission for Governmental Reforms Report¹³⁸

¹³⁸ Government of Pakistan (2008), *National Commission for Governmental Reforms* Prime Minister's Secretariat, Islamabad [Online: Web], Accessed February 16, 2011, URL. www.csru.gov.pk/Forms/Final_Report.pdf

Annexure B

Pre-1973 Service Cadres and Analogous Occupational Groups

Former Service Cadre	New Occupational Group
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) Provincial Service of Pakistan (PCS) Secretariat Group (SG)	District Management Group (DMG) Tribal Areas Group (TAG)
Police Service of Pakistan (PSP)	Police Group
Foreign Service of Pakistan (PFS)	Foreign Affairs Group
Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service (PAAS) Pakistan Military Accounts Service (PMAS)	Accounts Group
Pakistan Taxation Service (PTS)	Federal Revenues Group (Direct Taxes)
Pakistan Customs and Excise Service (PLES)	Federal Revenues Group (Indirect Taxes)
Trade Service of Pakistan	Commerce Group
Information Service of Pakistan	Information Group
Pakistan Postal Service	Postal Group
Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service	Cantonment Management Group
Central Secretariat Service	Office Management Group
Pakistan Railway Service	Railway Group
	Economists and Planners Group

Source: Islam, Nasir (1990), "Pakistan" in V. Subramaniam (ed.) *Public Administration in Third World*, Greenwood Press, p. 84.

Annexure C

List of some top military officers, working in various government department during Musharraf's rule¹³⁹:

Lieutenant Generals

Name	Serving/Retired	Department
Tauqir Zia	Corps Commander, Mangla	Chairman: Pakistan Cricket Board
Azia Ahmad	Corps Commander, Lahore	President: Hockey Federation
Zulfikar Ali Khan	–	Chairman: Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)
Khalid Maqbool		National Accountability Bureau
Najam Khan	Surgeon General Pakistan Army	Senior Member: Pakistan Medical and Dental Council
Moinuddin Haider	Retired	Federal Interior Minister
Muhammad Safdar	Retired	Governor: Punjab

¹³⁹ Source: The Friday Times, March 9-15, 2001 as quoted in S.K.Datta (2003), "The Internal Dynamics of Pakistan", in K.K. Nayyar, Pakistan at the Crossroads, New Delhi: Rupa Publications, p.145-147

Iftikhar Hussain Shah	Retired	Governor NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
Javed Ashraf Qazi	Retired	Chairman: Pakistan Evacuee Property Trust
Nasim Rana	Retired	Secretary: Defense
Arshad Hussain	Retired	Member: Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC)
Sohrab Khan	Retired	Secretary: Defense Production
Tanveer Hussain Naqvi	Retired	Chairman: National Reconstruction Bureau
Asad Durrani	Retired	Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Mohammad Akram	Retired	Vice Chancellor, University of Engineering and Technology
Arshad Mahmood	Retired	Chancellor, Punjab University
Mumtaj Gul	Retired	Chairman: (FPSC)
Muhammad Tariq	Retired	Punjab: Minister for Housing, Communication and Works
Syed Shujaat Hussain	Retired	Head of national University of Science and Technology, Rawalpindi

Major Generals

Safaraz Iqbal	_	Deputy Chairman: WAPDA
Mohsin Wahidi	Retired	Director: Pakistan National Shipping Corporation
Hamid Hussain Butt	Retired	General Manager: Railways
Mohammad Husain	Retired	Chairman: MFCLC
Agha Masood	Retired	Chairman: Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC)
Abdul Jabbar Bhatti	-	Deputy Chief of Staff in Secreariat
Viqarul Haq Khan Khalid	Retired	Chairman: National Highway Authority

Sahid Siddique Timizi	-	National Accountability Bureau's Chief in Punjab
Nazakat	-	NAB Chief in Balochistan
Zahid Ahsan	-	Chief: National Database and Registration Authority
Ehsan Ahmad	Retired	Sind: Health Minister
Zafar Abbas	-	Head of Anti Narcotics Force
Muhammad Imtiyaz Ali	Retired	Vice President: Pakistan Olympic Association
Farukh Javed	-	Deputy DG Development, Civil Aviation Authority
Khurshid Alam	-	Managing Director: Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation
Karamat Ahmad	-	Head: National Institute of Health
Khalid Bashir	-	Member: Pakistan Technical Telecommunication Authority

Brigadiers

Nayyar Afzaal	-	Director Administration, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA)
Tariq Arshad	-	Chief Executive: Lahore Electric Supply Corporation
Syed Ahahid Mukhtar Shah	-	Managing Director Karachi Electric Supply Corporation
Mussarratullah Khan	-	Secretary: Pakistan Hockey Federation
Tauqeer Qamar	-	Inspector General Prisons, Punjab
Yasoob Ali Dogar	Retired	Administrator: Metropolitan Corporation of Lahore
Ejaz Ahmad Shah	-	Home Secretary, Punjab
Muhammad Nisar	Retired	Manager: Pakistan Cricket Team
Akhtar Zameen	Retired	Director General: Sind Environment Protection Agency

Javed Iqbal	-	Head: Army Monitoring Team for Irrigation and Education Department, Punjab
Zahid	-	Head of AMT for the Cooperative and Excise Departments
Tahir Malik	-	Head of the Railway AMT
Usman Saeed	-	Head of Punjab Monitoring Secretariat
Firzauk Ataullah	-	Head of AMT for Taxes
Tariq Mahmood	-	Director: Quaid-i-Azam International Airport, Karachi
Shafaat Nabi Khan Sherwani	-	Director: Legal Services, Civil Aviation Authority
Saeed Akhtar	Retired	Chief Executive: Multan's Nishtar Hospital
Tauseefuzzaman Khan	-	Director Lahore Airport Terminal Project
Haider Abbas	-	Head of AMT for Karachi Building Control Authority
Zaheer Qadri	Retired	Director General: Karachi Development Authority
Behram Khan	-	Managing Director Karachi Water and Sewerage Board
Asif Ghazali	-	In Charge: Barge Baghi-i-Quaid-Azam Project
Mushtaq Ali Khan	Retired	Managing Director: Private Power and Infrastructure Board
Mian Khali Habib	Retired	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Abdul Haye	Retired	Director General: Frequency Allocation Board
Mohammad Anwar	Retired	Director General: Afghan Trade Development Cell
Mohammad Sarfraz	Retired	Managing Director: Baitul Maal
Colonel Azhar Mehamood	-	NAB's Presiding Officer in Faisalabad
Colonel Ghazanfar Abbas	Retired	Director of Coordination at the University of the Punjab

Colonel Asif Jamal	-	Director General: Multan Development Authority
Colonel Zafar	Retired	Chief Engineer: Metropolitan Corporation of Lahore
Colonel Mudassar Asghar	Retired	General Manager: Sport, PIA
Colonel Mohammad Afzai Khan	-	Chairman: Pakistan Steel Mills
Lt. Col Zaheerul Hassan	Retired	Senior Superintendent Traffic Police, Lahore
Major Iqbal Ahmad Raja	Retired	Commissioner: Faisalabad Division
Major Zia-ul-Haq	Retired	Commissioner Rawalpindi Division
Air Marshal Shfiq Mir	Retired	Chairman: National Animal Disease Diagnostic Epidemiological Centre
Air Marshal Aliuddin	Retired	Director General Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
Air Vice Marshal Zulfikar Shah		Deputy Director General of Operations, CAA
Air Commodore Jamal Hussain	Retired	Director Commercial CAA
Vice Admiral Khalid Mir	Retired	Chairman: Karachi Port Trust
Vice Admiral Ubaidullah	Retired	Chairman: Pakistan National Shipping Corporation
Vice Admiral Shamoon Ala Khan	Retired	Ambassador to Ukraine
Rear Admiral Khalid Mir	-	Chairman: Karachi Port Trust
Commodore Syed Tayyab Naqvi	-	Chairman, Fisherman's Cooperative Housing Society, Karachi

Annexure D

Questionnaire on Civil Service Reform in Pakistan

- 1- According to you, is there any scope for reform in Pakistan's bureaucracy, what are the main areas where reforms can be introduced?
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- 2- What are your views about the debate of generalist-specialist in Pakistan's bureaucracy? Do you think that there is a need of inducting specialists in various areas to deal with the changing demands in the administration?
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- 3- Do you think that the lateral entry system introduced during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto was helpful in correcting the balance between generalists and specialists in Pakistan's bureaucracy?
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- 4- Do you think that adhoc provisions like Placement Bureau by Benazir Bhutto and Army Monitoring Teams by Musharraf have done more harm than good of Pakistan's bureaucracy?
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- 5- To what extent, the Local Government Plan during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf succeeded in devolving powers to the district level?
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- 6- Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have been focused mainly on bringing changes in the structure of the bureaucracy and various organic changes like reforms in the training system and examination system were either ignored or given less importance?
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- 7- Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have succeeded to discontinue the colonial structure of Pakistan's bureaucracy and make it suitable as per the requirements of the indigenous political system?
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8- Do you think that reforms in Pakistan has been governed by the need of gaining political legitimacy by civilian and military rulers rather than the intent to reform the bureaucratic system?

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9- Any other view or valuable suggestion regarding civil service reforms in Pakistan:-

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ANNEXURE E: RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Professor Ilhan Niaz

Department of History

Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad

September 8, 2016

1- According to you, is there any scope for reform in Pakistan's bureaucracy, what are the main areas where reforms can be introduced?

The bureaucracy is deeply politicized in Pakistan. The efficiency of civil services has been compromised by political consideration in posting and transfers. Also, the bureaucracy in Pakistan is characterized by generic in nature i.e. one man fit all kind of approach. A person having no experience at all is selected to become the top management of an organization or ministry. The Pakistan administrative service (PAS) is a group which call the shot at all place. Mostly the secretaries, head of organization and policy makers come from this group and they are deadly opposed to any reform and want to continue the status-quo in order to ensure their grip over the state institutions. They are opposed to Local government, Police reforms and all other initiatives which could lead to a step forward for the bureaucracy.

2- What are your views about the debate of generalist-specialist in Pakistan's bureaucracy? Do you think that there is a need of inducting specialists in various areas to deal with the changing demands in the administration?

Yes, how can we expect a PAS officer whose qualification is BA English, to be the top boss of an specialist organization like Federal Board of Revenue, the top agency dealing with matter as complex as tax collection.

3- *Do you think that the lateral entry system introduced during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto was helpful in correcting the balance between generalists and specialists in Pakistan's bureaucracy?*

This is one of the worst examples of political intervention. Incompetent cronies are selected by politicians to join civil service, at the cost of merit and deserving individuals. I have personally seen Pakistan People Party loyalists (selected during 1990s) being at crucial position and their only credentials is being political worker. They even don't know how to write. The lateral entry as I have heard has been very damaging to the service.

4- *Do you think that adhoc provisions like Placement Bureau by Benazir Bhutto and Army Monitoring Teams by Musharraf have done more harm than good of Pakistan's bureaucracy?*

These have been only cosmetic measures. Army officers don't have any expertise to oversee civil matters and their only quality being good at bullying and cursing. Benazir has dented the very root of civil service with political appointment and this practices is continuing in Sind Province even today where her party is in power and government jobs are openly sold for a price.

5- *What are your views about the increasing militarization of Pakistan's bureaucracy which has intensified in one military regime after another?*

This is very unfortunate and most disturbing for all the civil servant of Pakistan who join the service based on their abilities and hard work. Pakistan Military, being oversized has lobbied to induct mere 12th Pass officers into the prestigious civil service of Pakistan. The only reason is welfare of Army officers and nothing good for civil service. These officers though may be very well trained in warfare are completely useless for the civil service having no proper education and training. They are a cause of constant tension within the service and are completely misfit in the hierarchy. It is strange that if these officers are bright why Army is losing their

services despite spending millions on their training, and if these are good for nothing, then what sin the Civil Service has committed to get these officers.

6- To what extent, the Local Government Plan during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf succeeded in devolving powers to the district level?

The local government was good initiative but it was primarily used for the purpose of helping prolong the dictator rule by getting an indirect support of people. Also, the colonial legacy of ICS, PAS (IAS in India) Baboos are deadly opposed to local government as they consider it as their opponent rather than a modern democratic institution. They baboos being at top, continuously create confusions and mix up thing in order to weaken the Local Government system so as they hegemony over affairs continues.

7- Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have been focused mainly on bringing changes in the structure of the bureaucracy and various organic changes like reforms in the training system and examination system were either ignored or given less importance?

The examination system is archaic and need to be revised thoroughly. We simply cannot continue with an exam which is there in exact shape for the last hundred or more years.

8- Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have succeeded to discontinue the colonial structure of Pakistan's bureaucracy and make it suitable as per the requirements of the indigenous political system?

No

9- Do you think that reforms in Pakistan has been governed by the need of gaining political legitimacy by civilian and military rulers rather than the intent to reform the bureaucratic system?

Yes

10- Any other view or valuable suggestion regarding civil service reforms in Pakistan:-

Unless an independent and merit based civil service is not in place, Pakistan institutions would continue to suffer.

Imran Khan

Assistant Superintendent of Police,
National Police Academy, Islamabad

September 24, 2016

1- According to you, is there any scope for reform in Pakistan's bureaucracy, what are the main areas where reforms can be introduced?

The bureaucracy is deeply politicized in Pakistan. The efficiency of civil services has been compromised by political consideration in posting and transfers. Also, the bureaucracy in Pakistan is characterized by generic in nature i.e. one man fit all kind of approach. A person having no experience at all is selected to become the top management of an organization or ministry. The Pakistan administrative service (PAS) is a group which call the shot at all place. Mostly the secretaries, head of organization and policy makers come from this group and they are deadly opposed to any reform and want to continue the status-quo in order to ensure their grip over the state institutions. They are opposed to Local government, Police reforms and all other initiatives which could lead to a step forward for the bureaucracy.

2- What are your views about the debate of generalist-specialist in Pakistan's bureaucracy? Do you think that there is a need of inducting specialists in various areas to deal with the changing demands in the administration?

Yes, how can we expect a PAS officer whose qualification is BA English, to be the top boss of an specialist organization like Federal Board of Revenue, the top agency dealing with matter as complex as tax collection.

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This is one of the worst example of political intervention. Incompetent cronies are selected by politicians to join civil service, at the cost of merit and deserving individuals. I have personally seen Pakistan People Party loyalists (selected during 1990s) being at crucial position and their only credentials is being political worker. They even don't know how to write. The lateral entry as I have heard has been very damaging to the service.

4- Do you think that adhoc provisions like Placement Bureau by Benazir Bhutto and Army Monitoring Teams by Musharraf have done more harm than good of Pakistan's bureaucracy?

These have been only cosmetic measures. Army officers don't have any expertise to oversee civil matters and their only quality being good at bullying and cursing. Benazir has dented the very root of civil service with political appointment and this practices is continuing in Sind Province even today where her party is in power and government jobs are openly sold for a price.

5- What are your views about the increasing militarization of Pakistan's bureaucracy which has intensified in one military regime after another?

This is very unfortunate and most disturbing for all the civil servant of Pakistan who join the service based on their abilities and hard work. Pakistan Military, being oversized has lobbied to induct mere 12th Pass officers into the prestigious civil service of Pakistan. The only reason is welfare of Army officers and nothing good for civil service. These officers though may be very well trained in warfare are completely useless for the civil service having no proper education and training. They are a cause of constant tension within the service and are completely misfit in the hierarchy. It is strange that if these officers are bright why Army is losing their services despite spending millions on their training, and if these are good for nothing, then what sin the Civil Service has committed to get these officers.

6- *To what extent, the Local Government Plan during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf succeeded in devolving powers to the district level?*

The local government was good initiative but it was primarily used for the purpose of helping prolong the dictator rule by getting an indirect support of people. Also, the colonial legacy of ICS, PAS (IAS in India) Baboos are deadly opposed to local government as they consider it as their opponent rather than a modern democratic institution. They baboos being at top, continuously create confusions and mix up thing in order to weaken the Local Government system so as they hegemony over affairs continues.

7- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have been focused mainly on bringing changes in the structure of the bureaucracy and various organic changes like reforms in the training system and examination system were either ignored or given less importance?*

The examination system is archaic and need to be revised thoroughly. We simply cannot continue with an exam which is there in exact shape for the last hundred or more years.

8- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have succeeded to discontinue the colonial structure of Pakistan's bureaucracy and make it suitable as per the requirements of the indigenous political system?*

No

9- *Do you think that reforms in Pakistan has been governed by the need of gaining political legitimacy by civilian and military rulers rather than the intent to reform the bureaucratic system?*

Yes

10- *Any other view or valuable suggestion regarding civil service reforms in Pakistan:-*

Unless an independent and merit based civil service is not in place, Pakistan institutions would continue to suffer.

Khadim Hussain Mirani

Deputy Accountant General at Accountant General, Sind

1. *According to you, is there any scope for reform in Pakistan's bureaucracy, what are the main areas where reforms can be introduced?*

There is definitely a need for reforms in the civil services of Pakistan. The main areas include recruitment, training career building, promotion policies and political interferences.

- 2- *What are your views about the debate of generalist-specialist in Pakistan's bureaucracy? Do you think that there is a need of inducting specialists in various areas to deal with the changing demands in the administration?*

Yes, I think there is need to have specialists with changing demands.

- 3- *Do you think that the lateral entry system introduced during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto was helpful in correcting the balance between generalists and specialists in Pakistan's bureaucracy?*

No it has failed to strike balance because generalists have pre-dominately controlled the decision making as a result all efforts went in vain which were meant for balancing.

- 4- *Do you think that adhoc provisions like Placement Bureau by Benazir Bhutto and Army Monitoring Teams by Musharraf have done more harm than good of Pakistan's bureaucracy?*

Yes, they have done more harms, specifically Musharraf's teams aggravated condition

- 5- *To what extent, the Local Government Plan during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf succeeded in devolving powers to the district level?*

It has been great experience as far as far as municipal services were concerned specially for big cities like Karachi.

- 6- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have been focused mainly on bringing changes in the structure of the bureaucracy and various organic changes like reforms in the training system and examination system were either ignored or given less importance?*

Agreed, reforms mainly focused on re-structuring rather than bringing required reforms in training and other required things.

- 7- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have succeeded to discontinue the colonial structure of Pakistan's bureaucracy and make it suitable as per the requirements of the indigenous political system?*

To some extent it has ended colonial structure.

- 8- *Do you think that reforms in Pakistan has been governed by the need of gaining political legitimacy by civilian and military rulers rather than the intent to reform the bureaucratic system?*

Agreed, just to legitimize power

- 9- *Any other view or valuable suggestion regarding civil service reforms in Pakistan:-*

No as such

Moonis Ahmar

Meritorius Professor, Department of International Relations,
University of Karachi, Karachi

1- According to you, is there any scope for reform in Pakistan's bureaucracy, what are the main areas where reforms can be introduced?

A. Reforming the bureaucracy of Pakistan has always been on the agenda of many governments. Several commissions to reform the civil services of Pakistan were constituted and their reports were submitted but the implementation remained. Last major civil service reforms were made during the regime of Z. A. Bhutto. The major areas of reform are: efficiency, eradication of corruption and nepotism, better performance particularly in revenue collection and in the mode of governance.

2- What are your views about the debate of generalist-specialist in Pakistan's bureaucracy? Do you think that there is a need of inducting specialists in various areas to deal with the changing demands in the administration?

A. Professionals with integrity can be op-opted in the bureaucracy.

3- Do you think that the lateral entry system introduced during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto was helpful in correcting the balance between generalists and specialists in Pakistan's bureaucracy?

A. No, it was counter productive because those inducted through that scheme were mostly political appointees.

4- Do you think that adhoc provisions like Placement Bureau by Benazir Bhutto and Army Monitoring Teams by Musharraf have done more harm than good of Pakistan's bureaucracy?

A. Such measures caused damage to the efficiency and credibility of bureaucracy.

5- *What are your views about the increasing militarization of Pakistan's bureaucracy which has intensified in one military regime after another?*

A. Such steps caused lethal damage as civil servants lost their confidence on reward and punishment as back door appointments were made by the military regimes.

6- *To what extent, the Local Government Plan during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf succeeded in devolving powers to the district level?*

A. To some extent but issues of development remained to a large extent.

7- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have been focused mainly on bringing changes in the structure of the bureaucracy and various organic changes like reforms in the training system and examination system were either ignored or given less importance?*

A. This is true to a large extent.

8- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have succeeded to discontinue the colonial structure of Pakistan's bureaucracy and make it suitable as per the requirements of the indigenous political system?*

A. Yes. But, the training given to civil servants at the entry level to a large extent disregarded the need to deal with local issues in a professional manner.

9- *Do you think that reforms in Pakistan has been governed by the need of gaining political legitimacy by civilian and military rulers rather than the intent to reform the bureaucratic system?*

A. True to a large extent.

10- *Any other view or valuable suggestion regarding civil service reforms in Pakistan:-*

A. To make sure that civil servants are public servants and their attitude must be considerate to deal with the problems faced by people at the grassroots' level. Furthermore, efficiency, integrity and professional approach needs to be promoted among the civil servants.

Saeed Nawaz

Governance and Public Policy Analyst,

University of Punjab

1- According to you, is there any scope for reform in Pakistan's bureaucracy, what are the main areas where reforms can be introduced?

Yes, there is ample scope for introduction of reforms in Pakistan's bureaucracy. Main areas for reforms may include the following:

- Abolition of joint system of competitive examination and introduction of service specific exams;
- Permanent provincial allocations for officers of all Pakistan unified services and groups;
- Appointment against various assignments with tangible monitorable targets (KPIs);
- Selection of officers for senior assignments through selection committees of senior bureaucrats;
- Security of service and tenure with protection against whimsical premature transfers;
- Long-term placement of the generalist officers in the specific sectors at junior and mid-career levels;
- No premature transfers except on account of misconduct or failure to realize the targets;
- Introduction of fast track promotions for high achievers in all services; and
- Implementation of Constitutional provisions concerning induction of civil servants in the superior judiciary.

2- What are your views about the debate of generalist-specialist in Pakistan's bureaucracy? Do you think that there is a need of inducting specialists in various areas to deal with the changing demands in the administration?

Only a few specialists assigned to head their relevant departments managed to justify their appointment. The oft cited reason for their failure is said to be their tunnel vision. Conversely, they alleged that generalists never let them work independently and hence ensured their failure. I am not aware of any conclusive evidence to support either of the two reasons. I am of the view that the top assignments necessitating coordination and convening are best managed by the generalists or specialists having extensive generalist exposure to field and staff assignments. Specialists in the dynamic current environments are ideally suited to facilitate decision making in junior, mid-career and the senior positions under the supervision of a generalist on the analogy of corporate sector worldwide where CEOs are invariably generalists.

- 3- *Do you think that the lateral entry system introduced during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto was helpful in correcting the balance between generalists and specialists in Pakistan's bureaucracy?*

Since there was a mismatch between the stated and implied objectives of the initiative so instead of correcting the balance the system introduced further distortions because of party loyalists inducted.

- 4- *Do you think that adhoc provisions like Placement Bureau by Benazir Bhutto and Army Monitoring Teams by Musharraf have done more harm than good of Pakistan's bureaucracy?*

Placement Bureau was a repetition of the lateral entry system introduced by Z.A. Bhutto and Army Monitoring Teams were fielded by the Musharraf Regime to institutionalize the role of military as Coordinators and Conveners in stead of ACs, DCs and Commissioners but it was abandoned because of troops' mobilization along the eastern borders.

- 5- *What are your views about the increasing militarization of Pakistan's bureaucracy which has intensified in one military regime after another?*

In case of military intervention militarization of society, politics and bureaucracy are inevitable but induction of military officers at the entry level through the Federal Public Service Commission is not a serious concern or maybe I myself being an inductee from the armed forces do not consider it a serious issue.

6- *To what extent, the Local Government Plan during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf succeeded in devolving powers to the district level?*

Local Government System introduced by General Musharraf devolved administrative, financial and political powers of the provincial governments to the district governments without any devolution of powers from the federation to the provinces. So, the system was devoid of any political ownership and the provincial governments started to reclaim their powers even during the incumbency of General Musharraf and completely rolled it back after his departure from Presidency.

7- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have been focused mainly on bringing changes in the structure of the bureaucracy and various organic changes like reforms in the training system and examination system were either ignored or given less importance?*

Yes, I generally tend to agree to this proposition. Except for the Civil Service Reforms of 1973 and Devolution of Powers Plan 2001 all other reform efforts were cosmetic in nature. The reforms of 1973 realized the objective of demolishing the primacy of Civil Service of Pakistan and take away the constitutional protection available to the civil servants. Services specific exams and training were done away with and replaced with a joint competitive examination and common training. Devolution of Powers Plan 2001 weakened the grip of District Management Group, abolished the offices of ACs, DCs and Commissioners. It placed all the services except Police under the control of the elected heads of the districts. Training and examinations were not attended to and Army Monitoring Teams were

tasked to fill the void created by the abolition of the office of District Magistrate.

8- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have succeeded to discontinue the colonial structure of Pakistan's bureaucracy and make it suitable as per the requirements of the indigenous political system?*

The reforms introduced by various rulers compromised the independence and neutrality of the bureaucracy leading to its politicization. No effort has been made to effect its reorientation to public service and it continues to be loyal to the ruling elites.

9- *Do you think that reforms in Pakistan has been governed by the need of gaining political legitimacy by civilian and military rulers rather than the intent to reform the bureaucratic system?*

I am not sure if any of the reforms imparted legitimacy to the rulers of the time but most of the reforms were agenda driven and considered the bureaucracy as a rival.

10- *Any other view or valuable suggestion regarding civil service reforms in Pakistan:-*

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Saeed Shafqat

Director, Centre for Public Policy, Lahore

1- According to you, is there any scope for reform in Pakistan's bureaucracy, what are the main areas where reforms can be introduced?

Higher Civil Service of Pakistan (known as Central Superior Services) have gone through several reform commissions, since 1947, over 30 reports and since 1972 at least 10 reports), however, little has been done to implement recommendations of these reports. In my view, no reform of bureaucracy is possible without political reform and that means de-politicization is a major challenge. Re-defining politician bureaucrat relationship, ensuring selection on merit, posting tenure; improving delivery of services, improving skills; integrating technology; and most importantly inducing the notion and value of public service and public welfare. That demands behavioral and attitudinal change, so structural and behavioral change key to any reform effort.

2- What are your views about the debate of generalist-specialist in Pakistan's bureaucracy? Do you think that there is a need of inducting specialists in various areas to deal with the changing demands in the administration?

I remain inclined towards retaining the Generalist pattern but emphasize that current global and local forces demand at places Generalist Specialist, that is in Finance, Economic Planning, Security, Social policies.....cadre of officers, who have acquired professional skills(Masters/PhD) and also have practical experience, such a critical mass of Generalist Specialists must head the federal and provincial ministries and departments.

3- Do you think that the lateral entry system introduced during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto was helpful in correcting the balance between generalists and specialists in Pakistan's bureaucracy?

In principle Lateral Entry is a good idea for infusing professionals/private sector experts in the government but politicization leads to misuse and hence it is discredited and same happened under Bhutto era and subsequently.

- 4- *Do you think that adhoc provisions like Placement Bureau by Benazir Bhutto and Army Monitoring Teams by Musharraf have done more harm than good of Pakistan's bureaucracy?*

Terribly bad ideas and practices and the country had pay price in the form of lack of confidence in public sector.

- 5- *What are your views about the increasing militarization of Pakistan's bureaucracy which has intensified in one military regime after another?*

No, militarization of bureaucracy but the principle of lateral inductions into civil service was introduced under colonial raj it was continued and expanded as a result of lateral entry and quota of 10 % officers in three services District Management Group, Police and Foreign Service was institutionalized under Zia and continues even today.

- 6- *To what extent, the Local Government Plan during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf succeeded in devolving powers to the district level?*

Considerable, remained experimental and suffered because of lack of ownership at the provincial level (see my two articles on the subject).

- 7- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have been focused mainly on bringing changes in the structure of the bureaucracy and various organic changes like reforms in the training system and examination system were either ignored or given less importance?*

Training continues to be mandatory at various levels in the higher bureaucracy but I believe there is considerable room for improvement and radical change in the nature, orientation, duration and skills mix of trainings at levels. This has not received the kind of attention that it deserves from the politicians/ political parties and even bureaucrats. As no one wants to get of the comfort zone and perpetuation of colonial mode of administration and management with minimal reform continues to persist.

8- *Do you think that the reforms introduced by various rulers have succeeded to discontinue the colonial structure of Pakistan's bureaucracy and make it suitable as per the requirements of the indigenous political system?*

Not really, politicization, loyalty over neutrality and dispassionate and merit driven postings have become the norm rather than exception.

9- *Do you think that reforms in Pakistan has been governed by the need of gaining political legitimacy by civilian and military rulers rather than the intent to reform the bureaucratic system?*

Its a loaded question but yes, both civilian and military regimes in the name of reform have ventured to establish super-ordinate subordinate relationship with the bureaucracy.

10- *Any other view or valuable suggestion regarding civil service reforms in Pakistan:-*

In South Asia and particularly Pakistan we need to adopt a bottom's up approach and must pay attention to improving the skills, conduct ,behavior

and capacity of First Respondents, who are the real face of the state and ordinary citizens have to interact with them on daily basis-the Revenue Official in the locality/district(Patwari), the Police Station Officer(SHO), who manages the law and order, crime etc, the lower judiciary(district and session courts) that dispenses justice, to name a few health, education, tax inspector and list can continue.

Annexure F

Various Steps Introduced to Reform Civil Service of Pakistan^{140*}

Phase 1: 1948-1971

1. Introduction of Section Officers Schemes in the Secretariat
2. Delegation of administrative powers to the Attached Departments (Ads) and the Secretariat entrusted with policy making and control
3. Delegation of financial powers to the Ads and Divisions and appointment of Financial Advisers in each Ministry
4. Creation of Economic pool for Economic Ministries
5. Re-organization of Planning Machinery
6. Creation of Public Corporations such as PIDC and Development Authorities such as WAPDA to undertake industrialization and other development assignments.
7. Introduction of Local Government System – Basic Democracies

¹⁴⁰ Source: National Commission for Government Reforms: Government of Pakistan (2008), *National Commission for Governmental Reforms* Prime Minister's Secretariat, Islamabad [Online: Web], Accessed February 16, 2011, URL. www.ncgr.gov.pk, pp.34-36

8. Governor's conferences, National Economic Council, National Finance Commission, Election Commission and Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions
9. Creation of In-service training institutions for public servants Civil Service Academy, Administrative Staff College, National Institute of Public Administration and Pakistan Academy for Rural Development.

Phase II: 1973-2001

1. Constitutional guarantee on the security of service removed.
2. Unification of all the services structure i.e. Non gazetted, class-II, class-I and superior services and abolition of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP).
3. The former Central Superior Services(CSS) were divided in functional groups such as All Pakistan Unified Group, Federal Unified Groups Provincial Unified Groups (later changed into Services, Cadres and Occupational Groups).
4. Merging of all services into a single unified grading structure and all civil servants categorized into 22 grades under the National Pay Scale (later Basic Pay Scale).
5. Horizontal movements allowed from one cadre to another and the scope of out-of-turn promotions introduced.

6. Lateral entry system through which individuals from the private sector could be inducted at higher grades into the Government.
7. The Federal and Provincial Secretaries and Additional Secretaries could be retired from the service without assigning any reason.
8. Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973 provided summary procedure of action against Government servants.
9. A common Training Institution was established for the entry level officers of all the functional groups.
10. The powers of Public Service Commissions were limited to that of the examinations and testing.
11. Commercial banks, insurance companies, manufacturing enterprises, educational institutions were nationalized and the appointments of the Chief Executives and the Boards were made by the Government.

Since 2001

1. A three-tier local government structure consisting of District, Tehsil/ Town and Union Council was established in all the four Provinces.
2. Head of District Government will be an elected District Nazim, Head of Tehsil/ Town Government will be an elected Tehsil Nazim and Head of Union Council will be an elected UC Nazim.

3. The Division level and Sub-Divisional level of administration were abolished.
4. The offices of Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner were abolished.
5. 12 departments of the Provincial Government were devolved to the District Governments with administrative and financial powers.
6. Each department will be headed by an Executive District Officer who will be under the direct control of the District Nazim with a District Coordination Officer (DCO) acting as the Coordinator for all departments.
7. A new Police Order replacing the Police Act. 1891 was enacted to lay the basis for a new administrative structure for the Police. The District Police Officers (DPO) will be responsible to District Nazim for law and order and not to DCO.
8. Executive magisterial powers were transferred to the Judicial Officers.
9. Provincial Finance Commissions were constituted for allocation of financial resources from provinces to districts.

Annexure G

Basic Pay Scales of Pay Under the Civil Servants Act, 1973

GRADES	PAY SCALES	POSTS
BPS 1	600-13-860	Peon, Messenger, Gardener, Watchman etc
BPS 2	625-16-945	Record Sorter
BPS 3	650-19-1030	Dispatch Rider/Duplicating Machine Operator
BPS 4	675-22-1115	Staff Car Driver
BPS 5	700-25-1200	Lower Division Clerk
BPS 6	725-28-1285	Sanitary Inspector
BPS 7	750-31-1370	Upper Division Clerk
BPS 8	790-34-1470	Typist
BPS 9	830-38-1590	Lady Health Visitor/Library Assistant
BPS 10	870-42-1710	Key Punch Verifying Operator/ Machine Operator
BPS 11	910-46-1830	Assistants
BPS 12	970-52-1830	Stenotypes
BPS 13	1035-58-2195	Assistant-in-charge
BPS 14	1100-64-2380	Naib-Tehsildar, District Accountants etc.
BPS 15	1165-71-2585	Stenographer
BPS 16	1350-105-2925	Superintendent, Private Secretary, to Secretaries
BPS 17	2065-155-3925	Section Officer/ Research Officer/Security Officer
BPS 18	2710-195-4660	Assistant Secretary/ Assistant Financial Advisor
BPS 19	4130-205-5770	Deputy Secretary/ Deputy Financial Advisor
BPS 20	4900-235-6780	Joint Secretary
BPS 21	5800-235-8400	Additional Secretary
BPS 22	5800-235-8400	Secretary
BPS 23		Secretary General

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