

Role of Indian Diaspora as a Heritage Resource in Indo-Tanzanian Relations: 1965-2012

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

for award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2017



Date: 21/July/2017

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**Role of Indian Diaspora as a Heritage Resource in Indo-Tanzanian Relations, 1965-2012**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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Acknowledgement

This is a great opportunity to extend my sincere thanks and gratitude to all who have contributed in my arduous endeavour, and made possible to reach at this feet of my academic career. Firstly, I would like to extend my whole hearted gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Ajay Dubey for his invaluable guidance and suggestions, not only in completion of this thesis but also the overall development of my academic performance. Secondly, I would like to pay my grateful gratitude to Prof. S.N Malakar and Dr. J.M Moosa for their invaluable suggestions in my academic pursued.

I would also like to thank Mr. Dinesh Vaishnav, Executive Secretary of Tanzania Asian Development Association (TADA) for arranging my stay and meetings with resource persons in Tanzania during my field trip. I would also like to thank JNU administration for providing me the necessary funding for my fieldtrip.

My family remained the constant source of motivation throughout my life which cannot be discernable. First and foremost thanks to my Ma and Papa, who has always given me support and encouragement. My loving sister and brother, without their care and moral support at every stage of the work, it would not have been possible for me to sustain myself and complete this work.

Last but not the least; I am thankful to my senior Neha Sinha, friends Judith, Priyadarshika, Debjani, Chandani and Ankur for having given their time and advice all through my interactions and helped me ease out tensions and stay calm and focused.

Thanks to all of you for being there for me. Thanks a lot.

Lastly it would be my sole responsibility to accept any omissions and errors committed in this thesis.

Ruchi Verma

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
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Map 1:



Indian Diaspora

(Source: Google Images (2011), URL: <http://blog.y-axis.com/?p=3432>)

Map 2:



Migration pattern of Indian diaspora to East Africa

(Source: https://www.uni-due.de/SVE/VARS_Indian_Diaspora.htm)

Abbreviations

AFRICA	Action for Resisting, Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid
ANC	African National Congress
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASSOCHAM	Associated Chambers of Commerce of India
AU	African Union
BHEL	Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
BJP	Bhartiya Janta Party
BOAD	West African Development Bank
CHEMEXCIL	Basic Chemicals, Cosmetics & Dyes Export Promotion Council
CII	Confederation of Indian Industry
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CTI	Confederation of Tanzanian Industries
DIPP	Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion
DTAA	Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
EABC	East African Business Council
EAC	East African Custom
EAINC	East African Indian National Congress
ECGC	Economic Credit and Guarantee Co-operation
ECOWAS	Economic Communities of West African States
EdCIL	Educational Consultants India Limited
EPC	Export Promotion Council
EPZ	Export Processing Zone

EU	European Union
FERA	Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GAIL	Gas Authority of India Limited
GAPCo	Gulf African Petroleum Corporation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOPIO	Global Organization of People of Indian Origin
IAFS	India Africa Forum Summit
ICCR	Indian Council for Cultural Relations
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFM	Institute of Financial Management
IIFT	Indian Institute of Foreign Trade
IIMM	Indian Institute of Material Management
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Indian National Congress
ITCoEICT	India-Tanzania Centre for Excellence in Information and Communication Technology
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme
LIC	Life Insurance Corporation
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MOIA	Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NCTI	National Centre for Trade Information

NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NIC	National Insurance Corporation
NM-AIST	Nelson Mandela African Institute of Science and Technology
NMDC	National Mineral Development Corporation
NRI	Non – Resident Indian
NSIC	National Small Industries Corporation Limited
NSSF	National Social Security Fund
NTC	National Transitional Council
ONGC	Oil and Natural Gas Commission
OVL	ONGC Videsh Ltd.
PBD	Pravasi Bhartiya Divas
PHARMEXCIL	Pharmaceuticals Export Promotion Council
PIO	People of Indian Origin
PMC	Project Management Consultant
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
SACU	Southern African Custom Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SIDO	Small Industry Development Organisation
SWAPO	South West African People’s Organisation
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TCIL	Telecommunications Consultants India Limited
TIC	Tanzania Investment Centre
TPDC	Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation

TRA	Tanzanian Revenue Authority
TRL	Tanzanian Railways Limited
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UTP	United Tanganyika Party
WTO	World Trade Organization

Preface

The beginning of twenty first century and the revolution in information and communication technology have eliminated the geographical distances. Now the process of global economic, social and cultural integration has received a stimulus from the presence of transnational communities. In such circumstances study of the Diaspora has gained momentum. Major countries of the world have recognized their Diaspora, and they are maintaining close relationship with them. Today Indian Diaspora is playing a very significant role in international affairs due to its presence in large numbers in almost all parts of the World. Though, it is within the last decade, that the Indian government has shown significant interest in the Diaspora and established a number of Diaspora policies.

This study will look into India and Tanzania relations. This study will particularly focus on Indian Diaspora in Tanzania and thus, taking Indian Diaspora into account as a heritage resource will try to look into India-Tanzania relations. In Tanzania, Indians mostly Gujarati traders arrived in the 19th century. Most of them were Muslims and the rest were Hindus. Majority of the free migrants in East Africa are from Gujarat and Sind. Indian merchants began to acquire increasingly important roles in the commercial and financial life. Apart from their near monopoly of the wholesale and distributive trade, some of the leading Indian traders provided the main banking and financial services available in Zanzibar. They were involved in the trade of ivory, spices, goat skin, dried fish and agricultural cargo. After the First World War Tanganyika, the German East African colony came under the control of the British. Indians have also actively participated in freedom struggle in Tanzania. Several Indian associations came up to extend the helping hand in the freedom struggle of Tanzania. Thus, taking into account contribution of Indian Diaspora in social, economical, and political field, Indian Diaspora would be looked as a heritage resource and thus their role as a heritage resource in enhancing the relationship between India and Tanzania will be discussed.

This study will look into what are the challenges and opportunities in utilizing Diaspora as a heritage resource. This study will also explore what crisis does Indian Diaspora faced after independence in Tanzania and what was their reaction towards the crisis situation will also be looked into. What were the changes followed after post cold war globalization in the attitude of both India and Tanzania government towards Indian Diaspora will also be discussed. To analyse Indian diaspora as a heritage resource, analysis of the India's response towards the crisis faced by Indian Diaspora during that time is also of prime importance. Indian policy towards Indian Diaspora has been varied, from the colonial times through the period of independence to the present day. Policies adopted by the Indian gave them little recognition except the advice that they should strive hard to be the best citizens of the country of their adoption. What were the changes followed after post cold war globalization in the attitude of both governments towards Indian Diaspora will also be discussed.

Chapter I

Introduction: Background and Conceptual Framework

With the beginning of 21st century the process of global economic, social and cultural integration has received a stimulus from the presence of transnational communities. In such circumstances the study of Diaspora has gained momentum. Diaspora is a diversified group in terms of their language, identity, status, socio-economic political role, level of integration and assimilation. Diaspora inherits and preserves culture, traditions which form an invaluable link between the two countries. The actors of Diaspora are either looked at with suspicion or with awe. Diasporas have been posited as challenging traditional state institutions of citizenship and loyalty, and as an important feature of the relationship between domestic and international politics.

Indian Diaspora is playing a very significant role in international affairs due to its presence in large numbers in almost all parts of the World. Africa is the host of more than two million people belonging to Indian Diaspora. And it is an undeniable fact that a new dimension to India-Africa relations was added when a large number of Indians went to, and settled in Africa. But as a heritage resource Indian Diaspora contribution to the African society had not got much attention thus, this work will try to look into that gap. In international relations how diaspora aspire to link with the country of origin work in the same way as heritage. Traditionally, money, remittances, lands etc were predominantly given importance while looking into the bilateral relations. But now, social capital considered as an important part of production and relation. Diaspora works in bilateral relations as a catalyst and resource. This work will particularly focus on Indian Diaspora in Tanzania and thus, taking Indian Diaspora into account as a heritage resource will try to look into their impact in India-Tanzania relations.

1.1 Conceptualising Diaspora

The word 'Diaspora' derives from the Greek word dia (through or over) and sperio (dispersal or to sow). Diaspora literally means "scattering" or "dispersion". In the case of Indian Diaspora, India is that common ancestral homeland from which people left for various reasons, voluntarily or involuntarily, to various parts of the world. Diaspora was formed due to this kind of migration (Lal 2007: 14-18).

The term 'Diaspora', according to V.S Sheth, denotes, "scattering of people with a common origin, background and beliefs" (Sheth 2003: 105). With the enhanced interdependence between states, transnational relationship and contacts have become significant. According to the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, "Diaspora is a Greek term for a nation or a part of the nation separated from its own state or territory and dispersed among other nation but preserving its national culture (*The Encyclopaedia of Social Science* 1935: 126)".

The term, "Diaspora" is generally used to refer to those Jewish people who reside outside the Palestine. The connections that diaspora maintains are symbolic. For the scholars, the term 'Diaspora' combines various categories such as immigrants, guest workers, ethnic and racial minorities, refugees, expatriates and travellers. Diaspora may be created as a community, as a result of voluntary or forced migration, mass exile and by the emigration of economically depressed groups to other countries. Recent changes in the world political and economic order have caused large scale movements of people in almost every region. Given the relationship between diasporic community and the motherland there exists a possibility of their return from the country of their adoption. Thus, diaspora had originated from migration.

It is also quite clear that diaspora are ethnic minority groups residing in host countries but maintaining strong emotional, sentimental and material links with their respective countries of origin (Sheffer 1986: 3). The concept has now been generalized to refer to any population which has migrated from its country of origin and settled in a foreign land. They selectively incorporate and synthesizes themselves with the root of their origin and senses of their past.

The assessment of the diaspora thus, goes beyond the historical and cultural ties and extends itself to the wider economic role. In a globalising world, migration is a significant force of historical change, when a diasporic community assimilates, acculturates into its host society and tends to lose its affinity and linkages with its land of origin (Gupta 2003: 2). Thus, the role of diaspora is important in formation of ethnic identity, shaping ethnic relations and the reconstruction of societies. They provide a broad way for understanding the dynamics of culture. By this way, it is gaining competence in the contemporary history.

Robin Cohen in his book, 'Global Diasporas: An Introduction' recognises the difficulty in coming to terms with 'Diaspora' and as such it introduces conceptual categories to display the variety of meanings which the word invokes (Cohen 1997). The author sees a common element in all forms of diaspora. These are people who live outside their 'natal territories' (or imagined Natal) and recognizes that their traditional homelands are reflected deeply in the languages they speak, religion they adopt and the culture they produce. Beginning with the Jewish experience as the original diaspora, it is argued that while it is important to take this into consideration, it is also to go beyond it.

As such diaspora is broken down into various forms: labour diasporas, imperial diasporas, trade diasporas, homeland diasporas, and cultural diasporas (Gupta 2003: 3). Each of these categories under line a particular groups of people. And these categories are not at all exclusive and one diaspora group can fall into different categories at any given moment. For example, in the case of Indians, they are seen as the indentured labour in the colonial system, thus a part of labour diasporas.

The issue of inclusion in or exclusion from the diaspora is even more complex from a historical point of view. Historical sources are mostly related to particular geographical areas; in general, they are more focused on the local migrants' issues than their social or cultural ties to their homelands, therefore, making it extremely difficult to deduce the social, economic, or cultural relations with the homeland. In short, the question here is why and when do South Asian migrants overseas consider themselves as part of a 'South Asian diaspora' and what do they gain from it in economic, sociological, or cultural terms?

The concept of diaspora has been related to a growing field of meanings, including processes of transnationalism, de-territorialisation, and cultural hybridity. These meanings are opposed to more 'rooted forms' of identifications such as 'regions' and 'nations'. This implies a growing interest in the discourse of 'rootedness', changing identities and the relation between the local and the global. There are some of the factors that define the groups in diaspora, including the dispersal to two or more locations; collective mythology of one's homeland; and alienation from the host nation, among others (Cohen: 2007). This question obviously could only be answered by making a comparison between different ethnic diasporas. One of the outcomes was that it might be fruitful not to compare these diasporas based on their ethnic origin but based on the causes of migration such as being victimised (Jews, slaves) or looking for employment (indentured labour and the migration of semiskilled workers)(Cohen: 2007).

1.1.1 Definition of Diaspora

If we focus on the most generally accepted definitions of the term diaspora, we can define four broad periods: antiquity, a time during which it had different meanings; the Middle Ages to the Renaissance; the beginning of the 19th century to the 1970s; and the 1980s to the present (Helly:2006).

During the antiquity (800-600 BC), the term was used to describe the Greek colonization of Asia Minor and the Mediterranean; it referred to trade expansion and had a positive connotation. Later, it was used by Jewish scholars during the third century BC in a Greek translation of Bible, and had a negative connotation: it referred to the Jewish experience of displacement to Babylon after the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple (596 BC) (Cohen: 1997). Hence the terms diaspora and Babylon came to mean being cut-off from one's roots and being forced to live in a foreign place. Diaspora conveyed the notion of loss, of suffering, and of exile from a place of origin, as well as the idea of religious punishment of the Jews.

This meaning changed with time as Jews started settling outside Palestine and Diaspora now meant the gathering of all Jews by the will of God. Yet again it came to be associated with exile from a historical and cultural centre, after the Roman

destruction of the Second Temple in CE 70. Thus, the meaning of Diaspora again started to signify exile, suffering and displacement.

Another issue which is of significance here is the issue of allegiance of the diasporas. The diaspora was alleged of having allegiance to their own community and not to the nation in which they had settled. The ideology of national and cultural homogenization in the 19th century gave a negative shade to the term diaspora. The term contradicted the precepts of national and state ideologies, since 'nation' meant superimposition of ethnic group, a territory and a political system. It also meant that there is no loyalty towards any extra-national community, group or institution. The expression 'internal enemy' used to designate Diasporas, minorities or political opponents, was adopted in France in the 19th century (Helly: 2006).

The definition of diaspora as a culturally specific population that places little value on the borders of empires, states, nations and majority cultures and religions was hardly questioned until the 1960s. Until this time, the term implied a clear distinction between diaspora and the migratory shift generated by industrial and capitalist development. Robert Fossaaert has referred to diaspora as a chain of colonies without a homeland. He distinguishes diasporas born of enclaves of foreign merchants located at the crossroads of commercial routes from diasporas born of European and Asian industrial reserves created by capitalism, which prompted migration to the Americas (Helly: 2006).

Starting from the 1970s and 80s, the term diaspora came to mean a population living outside its homeland (Tololyan: 1996). According to this view, minorities of immigrant ancestry who develop strong ties with their country of origin make up modern-day diasporas. The acceptance of this meaning was popularised during the 1980s through the journal *Diaspora*. Many different studies document the existence of transnational immigrant networks and transnational identities. Scholars like Arjun Appadurai have talked about trans nation, of a displaced nation, of deterritorialization and of multiple identities (Appadurai: 1991).

During the 1980s the meaning of diaspora changed from its negative connotation to a positive connotation. Earlier it was being used to designate all forms of migratory movement of different communities such as Jewish, Turkish, Japanese and Polish.

According to Wang Gungwu, “the current resurfacing of the idea of diaspora reminds us how shallow the roots of nationalism are in comparison with the long history of diasporas; but this does not mean that all emigrants are diasporic” (Gungwu: 1997). A number of emigrants and their descendants evolve in a space where national borders seem to have lost their meaning. Instead, they create ties with two societies or with transnational community.

Hence, there are different interpretations of the term diaspora by various scholars. To develop an understanding of diaspora different definitions have been examined in this study. William Safran proposes five characteristics: dispersion from a homeland to various regions; collective memory of homeland; ties maintained with the country of origin and a will to return; responsibility for its reproduction; and uneasy relations with the society of residence. On the other hand, from the definition in which diaspora and ties with a homeland are assimilated Gabriel Sheffer retains three characteristics: the claim to an ethnic identity; strong ties to a transnational community; and contact with the centre of origin (Sheffer: 2003). This new image of the diaspora thus, emphasizes the ties linking local communities originating from a dispersed population rather than underlining exile from a homeland and links with a country of origin.

1.1.2 Concept of ‘New Diaspora’

The Indian overseas community includes the foreign citizens of Indian origin who are called People of Indian Ocean (PIO) and Indian passport holders based in foreign countries known as Non-Resident Indians (NRI). This community comprises of various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, which reflect the cultural and regional diversity of India. Migration phases are varied in terms of historical circumstance, causes and consequences, and Indians emigrated in different migration surges and occupational capacities.

During ancient times, they went as merchants and explorers. Though, in the last three decades of the 20th century, the character of Indian migration increasingly changed in form, and a ‘New Diaspora’ began to emerge. Spurred particularly by more flexible United States policies for highly skilled migrants, Indian migration was increasingly dominated by the professionals - academics, scientists, engineers, doctors and

managers, many of whom showed considerable entrepreneurial flair. The United States was the prime destination for those who become Non Resident Indians (NRI's), but this new wave also moved into Britain and the dominions. Many of these professionals have shown considerable entrepreneurial flair, establishing themselves as the major players in global 'big businesses'.

The 20th century also saw the return of a demand for contract labour in the oil rich states of the Gulf and in the economies of the Southeast and East Asia. Such labour became important to India because of the substantial remittances made by the workers. These new contingents of labourers suffered many of the oppressive conditions of their 19th century indentured forebears; but, unlike them, they were generally not allowed to settle in their host societies. Over the years, the Indian diaspora grew in their host countries, gained in importance and emerged as valuable assets for their new home and host countries.

1.1.3 Diaspora as Active Non-State Actors

1.1.3.1 In International relations

Indian diaspora has been looked as a potential driver for bilateral partnership between host-land and motherland. The High Level Committee on Indian diaspora (2001) makes a very generous comment about retention of cultural identity among Indian diaspora worldwide. Committee notices that 'members of Diasporic community are deeply conscious of their rich cultural heritage. Deep commitment to their cultural identity has manifested itself in many ways and in every component of the Indian diaspora. There is probably no other diaspora in the world, which has such an extraordinary diversity. It is as diverse as the ethnic linguistic and religious groups in India itself'.

The original member of the diaspora, therefore, carried with them the rich traditions of harmonizing different customs, practices, values and beliefs.' But, despite of such diversity they have feeling of being originally hailing from India. They could be source of inspiration for many countries that how people of diverse cultural and ethnic background could live together and bring peace and prosperity to land of their

destiny. On the other hand India can use this as an opportunity to deeper partnership on the footprint of goodwill creating by her Diaspora in these countries.

It is well established fact that in international relations, role of non-state actors has increased many folds in the era of privatization, liberalization and globalization. Diasporic communities are one of the important non-state actors in international relations. International migration has shown tremendous increase in last few decades and therefore, their role in political, economic, cultural and other aspects of international relations is growing. On the other hand, Africa has also gain importance in international relations due to huge natural resources and numeric strength in United Nations and other International Organizations. “India has historic relations with African countries and currently engaged in deepening partnership on the footprint of that relationship. Recently concluded India-Africa Forum summit was a step towards this. With around 3 million strong Diaspora, India has natural advantage in Africa. They are vital force to promote partnership. This is high time for India to utilize all of its resources state level as well as ‘non-state actor’ to curtail such propaganda and further enhance India-Africa partnership. According to Garab, however, discussing diaspora engagement can therefore be analytically challenging:

“First of all, the word diaspora is applied to different migrant populations each having its unique features in regards to home country, migration patterns and historical experiences. Second, the definitions may give the appearance that diasporas are dispersed populations with common views and shared experiences. Yet today’s diasporas are not homogenous groups, despite sharing a common country of birth or origin members can differ significantly in regards to their interests, ideas, values and attitudes. There is therefore a need to understand the different interests, aspirations, institutions and objectives of diaspora communities. Moreover the political opportunity structures in the country of origin as well as in the country of residence provide both constraints and opportunities and shape what diasporas can and cannot do.” (Utouh & Mutalwema, 2005:74)

1.1.3.2 In Development area

Diasporas have emerged as one of the agents of development in today's world. India's experience with the IT industry can be cited as one of the best instances of Diaspora-induced development. The Indian Diaspora has shared a symbiotic relationship with the Indian IT industry, where both have reinforced each other's quantitative and qualitative growth over the decades. On the one hand, the Indian Diaspora brought a multi-layered gain to the IT industry in terms of enhanced skills; capital formation (human, social and financial); inward remittances; foreign direct investment flows; creation of networks/markets and a boost for India's image. On the other hand, the Indian IT industry created a strong incentive for the mobility of highly skilled professionals and provided the Diaspora with the much needed opportunity to engage with their motherland.

Indian diaspora can provide up-to-date information about local rules and regulations, foreign government and business procedures etc. In addition, they can also use their own contacts and networking to help open the door for new products, services and exports from India. Some members of the Indian diaspora are amongst the top consultants of business strategy in the same countries. They help in facilitating access to the decision making levels and top management. They also give useful guidance to trade and investment initiative. In turn they also help in facilitating trade for their host country also.

The emergence of overseas Indians as a diasporic network coincided with the advent of globalisation. This network manifested itself in a diasporic web of a professionally advanced and economically affluent community originating from what was then a basically underdeveloped country. They were well received by the indigenous communities in countries where they chose to settle down; they also grew comparatively faster and prospered more than other communities.

India has been witnessing an upward trend in remittances from abroad since the 1970s. The proportion of remittances to the gross national product has grown from a negligible 0.14 percent in 1970 to 5 percent in the recent years (World Bank :2011) These figures are based on estimates of the flow of remittances through formal channels of transfer only. The high volume of remittances has helped in increasing

foreign exchange reserves of India. The remittances are sources of additional savings, investments and capital formation. As termed by Kathleen Newland (2004):

“Remittances are not the only instrument of Diaspora contribution. They can be a major source of Direct Foreign Investment (FDI), market development (outsourcing), technology transfer, philanthropy, tourism, political contributions and more tangible flows of knowledge, new attitudes and cultural influence.”

At the international level also, there is a trend now for social remittances connoting Diaspora contributions in wider fields of health, education, environment energy, municipal management, traffic management, etc. Indian Diaspora also emphasize the need for “diasporic transition to a Cultural force and “establishing Indian Heritage in Global Space” (Sushma Verma and Radhika Seshan, 2003).

Remittances include different kinds of monies that flow from migrants to their families. These include regular amounts of money that are important for the family budget; money sent for investment like the purchase of land or the building of a house; money for community development like the building of a mosque; repayment of family debt; and gift money for family celebrations. Remittances are unlike market flows if money for they are not sensitive to interest rate movements and are relatively stable.

At the micro level, remittances give a country a large stable flow of money and contribute to foreign exchange balances and the gross domestic product. At the individual level, remittances reduce the poverty of families and improve their standard of living, together with their status in their community. Remittances remain the second-largest financial flow to developing countries after foreign direct investment; more than double the size of net official finance. The stability of remittance flows gives developing countries the ability to borrow against them, though this aspect of remittances was earlier questioned (Nayyar, D.:1994). Dunn (2004), notes that remittances contribution is greater than the combined money given by international foundations, non-government organisations and corporate philanthropy.

The macro economic impact of remittances has led to a re-evaluation of the contribution of non-resident populations, who are now valued for their economic contribution. The most evident signs of this change in perception are the institution of fairs and meetings and in India, the establishment of Non-Resident Indian ministry and NRI cities, and the introduction of limited dual citizenship. The multiplier effect of remittance spending is also felt in the local region. Kuptsch and Martin observe that each US\$ 1 in remittance spending can generate US\$ 2 to US\$ 3 in local economic activity especially if remittances are spent on locally produced goods (Kuptsch,C & P. Martin: 2004).

Studies of remittances at the local community level agree that remittances are important to the migrants and to the communities they leave behind. It was seen that migrants retain strong feelings of obligation and loyalty to their kinsfolk back home. Hence migrants typically remit a substantial proportion of their earnings during their initial period of overseas residence, which are usually deployed in such a way as to improve the living standards, as well as the social standing, of their family back home. The typical initial investment is the construction of a new, prestigious family residence. This is followed by investment in additional agricultural land and machinery, providing a substantial dowry for their unmarried sisters and sponsoring public rituals and shrines. In the short term, these remittance inflows can have a far-reaching impact on the character and structure of the local economy. This is particularly true when ‘chain migration results in a significant proportion of the local population in a specific area moving overseas (Ballard, R.:2003).

Where there has been concentration on remittances, the main attention is paid on the money flowing from the diaspora to the country of origin. This created the impression that the Indian diaspora largely focused inwards on itself and were consumed by its own efforts, resulting in its more rapid advancement. Native and other communities felt that the Indian diaspora had exclusivist tendencies and was not adequately focused on the local society and host country leading to the allegation that it was self-centred and only interested in its own betterment. This gave credence to the argument that Indian settlers have benefitted a great deal in their new home, but did not contribute much to it. Therefore, there was no need for host governments to gear national policies to their advancement. However, studies show that Indian

overseas communities contributed significantly to their host societies and countries by contributing economically through trade, businesses etc. in the GDP of their host country.

1.1.3.3 In Domestic and Homeland Politics

What needs to be emphasized here is that there is no symmetry in the way homeland societies and host societies, on the one hand, and their governments, on the other, treat their Diasporas. The Irish, Greek and Israeli societies, for example, frowned on those numbers who voluntarily migrated to the more economically developed, richer and freer host countries and have not returned. The primary reasons for this negative attitude were patriotic and nationalistic. These societies were mainly concerned about 'brain drain', the loss of human capital, and the consequent weakening of national morale, honour and cohesion. However, recently, there has been a decline in patriotic and nationalistic feelings in most countries, the social pressures intended to discourage emigration have diminished. Probably the most striking example of such changes attitudes in the case of Israel, where emigrants are no longer regarded as 'deserters' who betray the nation and country (Yaar, E.: 1998).

Societies in less developed countries encourage such emigration. Moreover, poverty in homelands tends to promote chain migration. In turn, that pattern influences the nature of the diasporic entities that such migrants establish, and they tend to be more cohesive and supportive. The Christian Palestinians, Ghanan, Filipino, Moroccan and Mexican societies provide good examples of that patters. Migrant families, friends and other relevant social groups remaining behind in the homeland expect that their migrants will maintain ongoing contacts with them. Moreover, migrant families also expect that as soon as their kinfolk reach a host country and find work there, they will transfer money back home. Indeed the remittances from Indian Diaspora are huge now.

During the later stages in the development of diaspora- homeland relationships, families and other social groups remaining back in the homelands tend to become more concerned about the personal fate of their relatives abroad, particularly those who never intended to assimilate into their host societies and who always maintained close contacts with their homelands. At a later stage, homeland societies lose some

interest in those who integrate or assimilate into host societies and do not maintain contact with their kin in the homeland. This, for example, has been the case with the changing societal attitudes toward Israeli migrants who have decided to settle permanently in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Britain and Germany (Sheffer, Gabriel: 2003).

Homeland government's attitude toward their diasporas are quite a different matter. Generally, those political actors prefer that their emigrants retain their original citizenship and accept only temporary status in the host countries. They hope that retention of homeland citizenship will allow them to have some control over emigrants. Usually that is indeed the pattern of development. The principle reason is that during the initial stage of diaspora emergence, the difficult conditions that migrants encounter in most host countries force them to depend on their homelands for substantial amounts of political and support, especially support from their homeland governments. Some homeland governments reveal an attitude of cynicism in dealing with their diasporas. The history of Israeli's relations with Israeli emigrants and the Romanian and Turkish government's relationships with their migrants in Europe well illustrate that pattern.

A second factor contributing to homeland government's caution is that even in cases in which it is clear that members of diasporas are reasonably loyal to their homelands, there is self-doubt about the ability to closely control the diasporas activities. Furthermore, homeland governments are apprehensive about the possibility of being asked to help emerging diasporas in times of distress. For example the Nehruvian policy towards the Indian Diaspora was always crystal clear, it was a policy of disassociation. He said that the Indians in Africa are as important to him as any other African. He always emphasized that no special consideration can be given to these Indians.

Despite this the home governments cannot totally ignore their emerging diasporas nor their established diasporas. Hence, it is rare to detect total apathy in those relationships. Although the relationships may fluctuate, in the final analysis most governments continue to hope that in the long run they may benefit from those relationships. Rather than ignoring or alienating emerging diasporas, they usually try

to cooperate with the more important diaspora associations and their leaders, hoping for at least a reasonable degree of interaction with their diaspora. An example of the case where the home government cannot totally ignore their diaspora can be seen during Indian expulsion of Uganda ordered by Idi Amin when India had to plead Britain to provide asylum to all of the Indians. Idi Amin, the President of Uganda on 4th August, 1972 ordered the expulsion of his country's Indian and Pakistani minority, giving those 90 days to leave Uganda. Amin said that he had had a dream in which God told him to order the expulsion. The ethnic cleansing of Indians in Uganda was conducted in an Indophobic climate in which Ugandan government claimed that the Indians were hoarding wealth and goods to the detriment of indigenous Africans.

In the process of integration with the host countries the Diaspora are faced with a number of problems like economic hardships, denial of equal political rights, social segregation and loyalty towards their homeland. Economic hardships of diaspora come out of the stringent measures taken by the host governments in terms of land ownership, business and employment. In some cases it is so severe that they are forced to leave their adopted country. To give an example, the Burmese Indians held affluent economic status in Burma until the Burmese Government nationalised their lands and businesses in 1950s. Similarly, Jomo Kenyatta was in favour of continuity and gradual Africanisation of the government. In Kenya where the People of Indian Origin control the business, the then PM Jomo Kenyatta ordered that the business licenses would be given only to Africans of African descent not to Africans of Indian origin (which most of the Indians in Kenya were). There was a lot of political uproar in India and Kenya regarding this decision. In Zambia too Kenneth Kaunda reacted against the Indians who were in control of the economy of Zambia.

In case of Indian Diaspora, one can see various examples where the Diaspora is integrated with the local society in terms of social practices, like they would mix and mingle with each other in social functions, they would give and be employed in each other businesses but even after all the social integration they would maintain their own Indian identity as they wouldn't ever intermarry with the locals. There are also countries where the Indian Diaspora is seen as totally segregated from the local population and the relationship between the Indian Diaspora and the local

community is not good. Thus, we can see that the Indian Diaspora is also integrated in different nature with each other in different countries.

1.2 Defining Indian Diaspora

Migration of Asians, Africans and Europeans were central to the fashioning the world of the 19th and 20th century. The rise of the immigrant communities in various parts of the world is a distinctive feature of the modern age. The Asians have been the most notable immigrant community. Among the Asians, the Indians are the prominent group involved in migration. Indians have left India in search of economic prosperity. The story of Indian emigration begins from time immemorial. When we look at the demographic map of the world today, there is hardly any country where there are no Indians.

The overseas Indian community is spread across every major region in the world, particularly in the West, Middle East, Africa, West Indies, South and South East Asia, Australia and Oceania. It should be emphasized, however, that the emigration of Indians has a much longer history than what the reference point of colonialism seems to suggest.

It is well known that Indian saints and monks undertook long journey to spread knowledge, peace and love. Apart from Monks and Bhikshus India's mercantile connections led to East Africa belonged mainly to the small trading communities. Similarly, Indian traders went to Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Indonesia and settled there (Dubey and Tyagi 2011: 130).

There are three major patterns of overseas Indian emigration on the basis of which Indian Communities in the former colonial societies were formed. These were: (i) Indentured labour¹ emigration (the West Indies, South Africa, Fiji and Mauritius),

¹ *Indenture* was a contract by which the emigrant was bound to work for a given employer for a three to five year term, performing the task assigned to him for a specified wage. At the end of the contract, the worker was free to re-indenture or to work elsewhere in the colony. After ten years, he was entitled to a subsidized return passage. In India the system was also known as the *girmitiya* and the labourers as *girmitiyas*. *Girmitiyas* means those who went on an agreement (that is, indenture), the word 'agreement' being rendered as *gimit* in Indian popular speech (Jain 2003: 10-12)

(ii) Kangani/maistry labour ²emigration (Burma, Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka) (Jain 2003: 10-12), and (iii) “free” or “passage”³ emigration or emigration of trading castes and classes (African countries South of the Sahara and North Africa) (Jain 1990: 5). However, in the last three decades of the 20th century, the character of Indian migration increasingly changed and a ‘New Diaspora’ began to emerge. Indian migration was increasingly dominated by professionals-academics, scientists, engineers, doctors and managers and many entrepreneurs.

The most crucial phase of Indian migration started in the colonial era. The industrial revolution in Europe, brought revolution in transportation and communication as well and this facilitated the large scale emigration of Indians in far off lands. European mercantile class grew new area for raw materials and new markets were discovered in Asia, Africa and Latin America. By nineteenth century, slavery was abolished. This created an enormous demand for a cheap and regulated labour force. This made India a reservoir of cheap, docile and dependable labour, especially to work on the plantations abroad.

However, a new and significant phase of emigration began after India became independent in 1947. The large scale and steady emigration of doctors, engineers, scientists and teachers to the industrially advanced countries of the West is essentially a post-independence phenomenon, and particularly so of the 1960’s and 1970’s, known as ‘brain drain’. (Dubey and Tyagi 2011: 130-131)

Since in the 1970’s, the economic boom combined with acute labour shortages has created a huge and continuing demand for short term immigrant labour in the countries of the Gulf and West Asia and North Africa. Estimated at more than 3

² The *Kangani* system of recruitment was used to supply South Indian labour to Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and the *Maistry* system to Burma. The word Kangani is the anglicized form of the Tamil word Kankani, meaning overseer and foreman. Under this system, a kangani (himself an Indian immigrant) used to recruit the coolies in India, paying them in advance for expenses.

The Maistry system was more or less similar to the Kangani system except that the former was characterized by a gradation of middlemen-employers (the labour contractor, the head maistry, the charge maistry, the gang maistry) and innumerable illegal deductions. In contradiction to indentured labourers, coolies under these systems were legally free. There was no contract and no fixed price of service. The Kangani system began early, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and continued until its final abolition in 1938. The Maistry system began some time in the third quarter of the nineteenth century (Jain 2003: 10-12)

³ The nomenclature ‘free’ and ‘passage’ emigration is derived from the fact that the emigrants paid their own passage and were free in all respects (Jain 1990: 5).

million, with more than half from Kerala, 70 percent of Indian population in the region consists of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, 20 -30 percent consists of Indian professionals and white collar workers (doctors, engineers, architects, chartered accountant and bankers) and a small fraction is composed of domestic help. Remittances to India from the Gulf, long recognised as a significant contribution to India's balance of payments, are mostly made by Indian workers in the first category (Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, Executive Summary 2001: xiii).

The Indian Diaspora is a representation of India: its people, regions, values and diverse and appealing range of cultures. Through the movement of people and ideas, Indian influence was important throughout Asia and Europe before the 19th century. However, it was in the 19th and 20th centuries that large scale migration from India across the world took place. It is from this migration that the Diaspora was formed and it is crucial, therefore, to understand the circumstances in India that led to this major movement of Indian people who created the communities which comprise the Diaspora.

The people who migrate and settle carry with them 'cultural artefacts'- ideas and values in terms of religion, artistic endeavour, social norms, political thought, ethical suppositions and organisational attitudes from the country in which they have been born and raised, in this case India. Understanding how Indian diasporic communities work, their nature and organisational form, requires a sense of the India from which people came and the 'socio-cultural baggage' that they brought with them to their new homes (Gupta 2003: 7).

1.2.1 Indian Diaspora Globally

The Indian diaspora is now the second largest diaspora in the world, after the Chinese diaspora. Indians/ People of Indian Origin (PIO)/ Non-resident Indians (NRI) are found across the world, which are estimated at over 25 million.

Since 2003, the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Non-resident India Day) sponsored by Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), is being celebrated on 9th of January each year in India, to 'mark the contribution of Overseas Indian community in the

development of India'. The arrival of Mahatma Gandhi in India from South Africa is commemorated, during a three-day convention, a forum for issues concerning the Indian Diaspora is held and the annual Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards are given away. As of January 2006, The Indian government has introduced the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme to allow a limited form of dual citizenship to Indians, NRIs and PIOs for the first time since independence in 1947. The PIO Card scheme is expected to be phased out in coming years in favour of OCI.

In Mauritius the overseas Indians are estimated at 68.60 percent, in Guyana at 42.35 percent, in Fiji at 36.13 percent, Trinidad and Tobago at 41 percent, Suriname 26.5 percent, United Arab Emirates 22.17 percent, Reunion has 32.78 percent and Nepal 600000 overseas Indians form a substantial proportion of the country's population as per May 2012 data. They also have a large presence in Qatar at 26.73 percent, Bahrain at 26.45 percent, Oman at 25.2 percent, Kuwait at 20.5 percent, Sri Lanka at 7.67 percent, Singapore at 13 percent and Myanmar has 3 million Indians (MOIA: 2012).

The PIO from South Asia living outside of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh altogether, with the majority in Africa, Caribbean and Oceania are currently approximately 20,000,000. Although there are regional variations in their adaptations, in many ways they show a common Indian identity. They might want that their children prosper in their adopted countries, but at the same time they may prefer them to adopt Indian family values, marry other Indians and share their common Indian culture. In other words many South Asians living overseas tend to reproduce their Indian culture, language, values and religion as much as possible (Oonk, G: 2004: 7-23) Moreover, many South Asian migrants are currently trying to reconnect with their homeland, either through modern mass media, the internet or through personal visits and these re-connections are often seen as romantic rendezvous with the historical past and their 'original roots' (Sheffer, Gabriel: 2003).

The literature on Indian diaspora represents the reproduction of culture in an often-hostile environment and the relations to the homeland are key features of the diaspora concept (Cohen, R: 1997). However, the research also shows that there are quite a few overseas Indians who are not interested in reconnecting with the

homeland. They felt that the Indian Government was excluding them from their historical roots, as in the case of many Muslim Indians after Partition and Indian Africans after their expulsion from Uganda by Idi Amin. In the case of 'twice migrants' like the Hindustanis in the Netherlands, we find that they may identify with both India and Suriname. Moreover, it has been shown that in cases where Indians do reconnect with their ancestral villages, the relationship with family members has grown ambivalent and is sometimes experienced with noticeable discomfort. In other words, re-connection with one's homeland is not self-evident. It happens or it doesn't. Though some of these findings are not new, they do shed some fresh light on the diaspora concept as a whole.

The South Asian migrants and their ancestors migrated from the subcontinent as part of various migration patterns. In general, four patterns have been identified in the currents of South Asian migration. Each of these currents has had its own specific background, characteristics and conditions. Some of which caused variations in the way migrants reproduced 'Indian culture' abroad and/or how they were received by the host societies. Moreover, these patterns differ in terms of age, numbers and the historical context in which they emerge. In some areas like East Africa, South Asian communities have lived for six or more generations, while in other areas, like the Gulf States they are recent arrivals. In most areas they comprise of small minorities, although in Mauritius and Fiji they are politically and economically dominant.

India is diverse and so are all the Indian migrants. These migrant Indian identities are presented as the mirror of India itself. It is acknowledged that Indian migrants abroad tend to reproduce their own religions, family patterns, and cultures as much as possible. At the same time however, they adjust to local circumstances. Caste and language issues also have to be negotiated in new environments. This is not a natural process but one in which great efforts need to be made - sometimes in an effort to maintain one's own culture, but also with regard to the host society. In other words, these migrants differ in their cultural and religious backgrounds, in the causes and durations of their migrations and the extent to which they adapt to local societies (Oonk, G: 2007).

Bringing these various migration patterns together under the unifying label of 'Indian Diaspora' is no easy task. The patterns vary regarding the causes and consequences of migration, the numbers of migrants, the periods of migration, the numbers of returnees, the manner in which they were received by their host countries, whether or not circular migration was transformed into permanent settlement and family reunion and the questions of whether locally there was an emerging 2nd, 3rd and higher generations of 'Indian migrants' as opposed to intermarriages and cultural alliances with the local communities (Nayar, K.E: 2004). Furthermore, there is a wide variety of religious, regional and ethnic background of the migrants. They are labelled 'Hindus', which of course entails a variety of castes, sub-castes and 'jatis'. There is a great variety of sects and beliefs among the South Asian Muslims (Sunnis, Ismailis) as well and the other religious ethnic groups such as the Sikhs, Jains, Goans among others. Moreover, there is also a broad variety of regional and language backgrounds: such as the Gujaratis (Hindus and Muslims) from northwestern India, Telugu migrants from the South, Bhojpuri-speaking people from the North-east and central India and so on.

There are two problems concerning Indian diaspora which has been discussed by Gijsbert Oonk in *Global Indian Diasporas*. "One is the prefix 'Indian' and the other is the term 'diaspora'. The implication of being 'Indian' means that there is a single India with its people, who are somehow united under one flag. This is far from obvious. India has been described as a 'nation and its fragments' or an 'invented nation' (Chatterjee, Partha: 1993)". This literature implies that the unity of India is a construction or, at best, referred to as 'unity in variety'. This is even more the case for South Asians abroad, who have to experience various processes of integration and assimilation in very different host countries.

Moreover, the Indians settled outside India do not identify with India as a nation but with the 'homeland', that is, the specific region, where the migrants or their descendents come from. They would often call themselves Bengalis, Gujaratis, Telugus or to their specific sub-castes, such as Patels, Lohanas and kutchis. In as much as they have created a 'myth' about their 'homeland', it appears that region and locality are much more important in structuring the migrants' identities than 'religion' or 'nationality'. "Claude Markovits rightly asserts that migrants from

Gujarat, whether they were Hindus, Muslims or Jains, had more in common with each other in their experience of migration than Gujarati Hindus had with Bhojपुरi Hindus, or Gujarati Muslims with Bhojपुरi Muslims” (Markovits, C.: 2000).

However, this is not the case for many South Asian migrants in the Caribbean, or the ‘twice migrants’ living in the UK and the Netherlands. They are descendents of Indian indentured labourers who migrated from India to the Caribbean and from there to the UK or the Netherlands. Most of today’s descendents of these migrants are barely aware of their regions of origin, be it Bengal, Bihar or Uttar Pradesh. However, they continue to maintain a vague notion of India (Oonk: 2007). Meanwhile, South Asians in the Caribbean, UK, East Africa and elsewhere are often referred to as ‘Indians’, while the region from which they come does not play a role. This suggests that the prefix ‘Indian’ has a local meaning, but not so much in terms of ‘self-identification’, but more as a label used by natives in the host nations. Many non-Indians, do not see India as fragmented, and the geographical masses of the sub-continent somehow presupposes a cultural unity (Oonk,G: 2007).

The idea of South Asian subcontinent ‘unity’ has been brought about in a vast number of literature on Indian diaspora, which emphasizes how and to what extent ‘Indian’ culture was reproduced in the various host countries. Furthermore, the often ambivalent relation of migrants abroad to their homeland is highlighted. In this literature the word ‘Indian’ is often substituted for ‘South Asian’ to refer in particular to the pre-independence migrants whose origin lie in contemporary Pakistan or Bangladesh. Despite this, the Indian government has recently made a strong effort to ‘reconnect’ to its ‘Indian diaspora’ migrants. Here, the word ‘Indian’ is again clearly intended to unify the migrants whose origins lie within current borders of the Republic of India. This means that the prefix ‘Indian’ has been defined though not without problems by the Indian State.

Another problem that has been highlighted is the term ‘diaspora’. Despite the growing acceptance of the word as representing migrant groups beside those of the Jewish diaspora, social scientists continue to disagree on two basic questions regarding diaspora studies. One is: What is a diaspora? And the second is Who is a diaspora? In other words do all international migrant groups belong to a diaspora?

Moreover, should we consider a diaspora as a static and unchanging phenomenon, or is it constantly changing? Most importantly, what do we gain by using the diaspora concept? Moreover, from an academic point of view can we expect any new insights or is it just another buzzword? Obviously, the popularity of the term itself is related to the increasing relevance of representations of 'identity' and 'culture' in international politics (Butler, Kim D.: 2001). The diaspora debate over the past decade has experienced two extreme positions: One being that the term and concept refers to the specific migration of Jews, which occurred under very unique historical circumstances; while the other is that of a more universal application to all cases of migration and settlement beyond the borders of native nation-states, irrespective of the migration circumstances.

A diaspora refers to a particular kind of migration. Most scientists agree that at least a few of the following characteristics are crucial to describe a diaspora. According to Clifford (1994) some of these characteristics are: (1) Dispersal from an original homeland to two or more countries. The causes for the dispersal may vary from traumatic experiences, as was the case with the Jews, or the African slaves, to the search for work, or the pursuit of a trade or other ambitions. (2) There must be a collective - often idealised - memory/myth of the homeland. In some cases, there is a commitment creating and/or maintaining this homeland, as is the case with some Sikhs and their efforts to create an independent Khalistan, or the Jews and their relation to Israel.(3) A myth of returning to one's homeland (be it now or in the future, temporary or permanent). This myth is grounded in a strong ethnic consciousness of migrants abroad, which may have prevented them from assimilating in the local society. (4) There is a sense of empathy and solidarity with similar groups elsewhere in the world and/or with events and groups in the homeland. Since, diaspora is a contemporary term used to describe practically any population considered 'deterritorialised' or 'transnational', whose cultural origins are said to have arisen in a nation other than the one in which they currently reside, and whose social, economic, and political networks cross nation-state borders and, indeed, span the entire globe. According to Vertovec, for instance, intellectuals and activists from within these populations increasingly use this term, emphasising that

the ‘Diasporic language’ appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, minority discourse (Clifford, James: 1994).

It was in the period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s that the term ‘diaspora’ became fashionable. Its connotations were no longer monopolised by the Jewish diaspora. The question was raised whether other groups of migrants could be labeled as a diaspora. Politicians and representatives of overseas communities started using the term ‘diaspora’. Africans, Armenians, and indeed Indians and Chinese migrants began to refer to themselves as being part of a ‘diaspora’. Moreover, the academic field began wondering how the word ‘diaspora’ could be useful in understanding migration, migrants, and the relation between the motherland and the host societies.

As the diaspora concept has matured, alternative definitions, different approaches, and new suggestions for more research are emerging. Steven Vertovec (2000) proposes three meanings of Diaspora: as a *social form*; as a *type of consciousness*, and as a *mode of cultural production*. The diaspora as a ‘*social form*’ refers to the process of becoming scattered. It draws on the Jewish model, and it looks at how social ties were cemented, at the process of maintaining a collective identity, at the institutionalising networks, and at the social and economic strategies as a transnational group. In addition, it focuses on their political orientations, their inability - or unwillingness – to be accepted by the ‘host society’. Especially now, where communication and transportation are relatively easy and inexpensive the diaspora as a social form may be characterised as a ‘triangular relationship’ between (a) the ‘globally’ dispersed, yet strongly transnational organised group (b) the territorial states where groups reside, and (c) the Indian State or imagined homeland.

The diaspora as a *type of consciousness* emphasises the variety of experiences, a state of mind, and a sense of identity. This is described as *dual or paradoxical nature*. This nature has various connotations. First, it refers to the experience of discrimination and exclusion, and at the same time, the positive identification with the highly praised historical heritage of the Indian civilisation. Second, the awareness of multi-locality, the notion of belonging ‘here and there’ as well as sharing the same ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ thus, making the bridge between the local and

the global. Third, double consciousness creates a 'triple consciousness', that is, the awareness of the double consciousness and being able to use it instrumentally. In addition to the identification with the host society, and the homeland, there is the identification with the locality, especially in the discourse of multiculturalism. Indians in Southall, London include the awareness of being 'Southallian', emphasising their multi-racial character, within the discourse of the multi-cultural character of their local environment.

The diaspora as a *mode of cultural production* emphasises the currents of cultural objects, images, and meanings back and forth, and the way these transcend and change according to the wishes of the customers and artists. It refers to the production and reproduction of transnational social and cultural phenomena. Here, the position of youth in diaspora is highlighted. They are socialised in cross-currents of different cultural fields and form an interesting market for 'diasporic cultural goods'. Moreover, they are the ones who receive and transform these new ideas and developments. Furthermore, it is clear that modern media are used to reformulate and translate the cultural traditions of the Indian diaspora. The popularity of episodes from the Ramayana and the Mahabharata among the migrants has led to new ideas regarding 'Indian' culture'. The Indian diaspora has also found its way into the virtual existence of the Internet, with its numerous discussion lists, 'find one another through school pictures sites' and transnational marriage agents.

1.2.2 Indian Presence in Africa

Indian emigration has been taking place for centuries but never before in history has India witnessed such massive movements of people to other parts of the world as in the 19th and 20th centuries. Probably due to the fact that in India crossing the seas was prohibited by the sacred Hindu scriptures. First major emigration took place during the colonial rule in India; and after that flow of immigration has been coming one after another.

There were four broad patterns of overseas migration in terms of history and political economy. Emigration that began in the 1830's to the British, French and Dutch Colonies; Free emigration to the developing countries as a trader, artisan and professional; emigration of Indians to West Asia in the late 1970's and early 1980's

and emigration of software engineers and other professionals since mid nineteenth eighties to developed countries. Indian migration to African countries is seen primarily in the second and third pattern of migration.

1.2.2.1 First pattern of Emigration

First pattern of emigration begun, during the second half of the eighteenth century, some Indians emigrated to Philippines, USA and Indonesia to work as agricultural labourers. It was the European imperialist expansion during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which created condition for emigration in large number. New plantations, industrial and commercial ventures in European colonies created the need for large supplies of labour.

With the abolition of slavery in the British, French and Dutch colonies respectively in 1834, 1846 and 1873, there was a severe shortage of labourers working in sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, rice and rubber plantations in the colonies. India and China became the obvious alternative sources of labour. These countries also provided the entrepreneurs who settled in different colonies.

Thus, by and large, there were two streams of Indian emigrants to the colonies: unskilled labourers and small scale entrepreneurs. In countries where the two types of immigrants or their descendants co-exist, the distinction between them is a marked feature of intra group relations in the Indian community.

1.2.2.2 Second pattern of Emigration

Indian labour emigration under the indenture system first started in 1834 to Mauritius, Uganda and Nigeria. Later the labours emigrated to Guiana (1838), New Zealand (1840), Hongkong (1841), Trinidad and Tobago (1845), Malaya (1845), Martinique and Guadeloupe (1854). Grenada, St. Lucia & St. Vincent (1856), Natal (1860), St. Kitts (1861), Japan & Surinam (1872), Jamaica (1873), Fiji (1879), Burma (1885), Canada (1904) and Thailand (1910) under the indenture system some 1.5 million persons migrated (Gupta 2003: 5).

On their arrival in the colony the immigrants were assigned to the plantations to which they were bound for 5 or more years, where they lived in isolated and

insulated life. When their indentures were completed some immigrants stayed on the plantation, while other moved out into the rural communities. They combined subsistence family with wage labour. However most of these migrants and their descendents did not return home though the indentured system of labour was discontinued in 1917.

Emigration to Srilanka, Burma, and Malaya presents a marked contrast to migration to the West Indies. All the emigrants to Sri Lanka and Malaya were from the south and head man known as “Kangani” recruited the migrants. The Indians worked on the tea, coffee, and rubber plantation. During the period 1852 and 1937 some 1.5 million Indian went to Ceylon, 2 million to Malaya, and 2.2 million to Burma. After 1920 the Kangani emigration gradually gave way to individual on unrecruited, free migration due to fall in demand for Indian labours.

Emigration to East Africa, Natal, Mauritius, Burma, Malaya, Fiji during the late 19th and first half of 20th century presents a second pattern: the free emigration of traders, skilled artisan, workers, petty contractors, clerks, professionals and entrepreneurs. Though initially indentured labours from India were brought to Africa to build the Mombasa railway, most of the present Indian population in Uganda and Tanzania arrived after the railway stimulated opportunities for trade and industries.

1.2.2.3 Third Pattern of Emigration

The third wave on emigration of the Indian to the West African country is basically oriented to labour and servicing occupation on a contract basis. There were only 14 thousand Indians in the Gulf in 1948, and 40 thousand in 2001. Following the oil boom of the mid 1970's the Middle East has witnessed a massive induction of the South Asian workers. Here the need for the skilled south Asian worker during 1960s and early 1970s has eclipsed by the requirement for the skilled labour since 1980s. There are more than 2 million Indians in west Asia. The year 1973 experienced the beginning of the rapidly increasing demand for expatriate labours in oil exporting countries of the Gulf and North Africa such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Libya.

1.2.2.4 Fourth Pattern of Emigration

The fourth pattern of emigration is to the developed countries like Britain, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The first trickle of Indians to Britain occurred during the period of British Raj. However, the major influx of Indians took place only after India's independence in 1947. The number of Indians in U.K. in 1987 was 12,60,000. There was also migration to England and Netherland of people of India origin from Africa and Caribbean.

In contrast to the ex-indentured population, Indian migrants in the industrially developed country have been able to maintain extensive ties with India because of their comparative affluence. Marriage arrangement, kinship networks, property and religious affiliation keep many migrants well limited to their place of origin, since the large numbers of Indians are still first generation migrants. Another factor, which has enabled overseas Indians in Britain to maintain ties with the home land is the follow of their remittances and investments.

Those who migrated during this phase hailed from urban middle class families and were well educated and professionally trained. They form the new Diaspora and maintain close ties with the places of the origin. This migration is also called "migration of talent" or "brain drain."

Migration of software engineers to the Western countries, USA in particular, which occurred in a significant way during the last decades of the 20th century, forms the fourth wave of Indian emigration. They are considered to be the cream of India, trained in her premier educational institutional, such as IITs, IIMs and other universities.

India's relations with its Diaspora evolved haphazardly over time. In the 19th century, there was little public comment about the migration of its people to distant parts of the Globe beyond the occasional complaint about abuses in the system of recruitment. In the early years of the 20th century, Mahatma Gandhi's struggle for racial equality in South Africa bore fruit in the form of scathing enquiries, which led to the abolition of indenture system. In the inter-war period, India sought to use its influence with London to secure better political rights for 'Indian Overseas'.

This active engagement and concern turned into passive interest after independence in 1947 as India got embroiled in regional conflicts and as it championed the cause of non-alignment. Overseas Indians were explicitly urged to identify themselves with the interests and aspirations of the countries of their residence. This pragmatic and sensible advice, self-evident and perhaps even self-serving, acknowledged the growing cultural and political distance between India and its Diaspora.

The period of disengagement, lasting from the 1950's to the late 1980's or the early 1990's coincided with two significant developments of great relevance to India's relationship with the Diaspora. One was the phenomenal growth in the population of the Diaspora in western countries and its position in strategic sectors of the economy and public life: information technology, business, finance, the professions and academia, and in the upper reaches of national and international politics.

The mid-20th century saw the beginning of a change in the pattern of Indian migration. For the first time, people moved not to the colonial periphery but to the metropolitan centres at the heart of the empire - commonwealth. Initially, this movement was to the UK, particularly to urban centres in England. The Migrants came - some from India itself, some from colonial diasporic communities- to take advantage of labouring or service opportunities in Britain's post war economy.

Reaching a peak in the early to mid - 1960's, the first movements were directed to Britain because Asian and (African) immigration into the white settler dominions- Australia, Canada, and New Zealand - was heavily restricted at that time. By the mid - 1960's, restrictions were loosened and migration to the Dominions picked up, in part to ease the plight of Indians settled in East African colonies which had become independent and began to limit the position of Indian settlers.

1.2.3 Indian Diaspora in Tanzania

Tanzania, officially United Republic of Tanzania, is the country that was formed by the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. The name Tanzania derived from the first syllable of the name of the two states, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, united to form the country.

Indians mostly Gujarati traders arrived in Tanzania in the 19th century. The Sultan of Zanzibar entered into a treaty with Britain in 1839 which guaranteed the British subjects to stay and trade within the sultan's dominion. In Zanzibar, a British consulate was established. Due to these developments, the number of Indian traders in Zanzibar steadily grew from 2,500 in 1870 to 6,000 in the early 1900's. Majority of the free migrants in East Africa are from Gujarat and Sind. Gujarati and Kutchi are the predominant Indian Languages spoken in East Africa (Kadekar 2012: 47).

In 1890, East Africa was partitioned among the European powers. Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890. And when Germany was defeated in the world war I, Tanganyika too become a British Protectorate. In the nineteenth century, Indian merchants began to acquire increasingly important roles in the commercial and financial life of the sultanate. Apart from their near monopoly of the wholesale and distributive trade, some of the leading Indian traders provided the main banking and financial services available in Zanzibar (Oonk 2007: 255).

They were involved in the trade of ivory, spices, goat skin, dried fish and agricultural cargo. According to Sir Bartle Frere, who visited Zanzibar in 1873, "the preponderating influence of the Indian traders along some 6,000 miles of sea coast in Africa and its islands, and nearly the same extent in Asia, the Indian trader is, if not the monopolist, the most influential, permanent, and all-pervading element of the commercial community" (Jain 1993: 132). The number of Indians also rose steadily from an estimated 1,200 in 1844 to about 6,000 in 1960. In Zanzibar, there lived the 'Chotara' or a half caste breed between the Indians and the Swahili. After the First World War Tanganyika, the German East African colony came under the control of the British. Large number of Indians in Tanzania grew in 1921 and rose to 40,500 in 1939. By the end of the European colonial era in 1961, the population of PIOs in Tanganyika was 92,000 and 22,000 in Zanzibar (Kadekar 2012: 48).

Indians have a long history in Tanzania starting with the arrival of traders. Indian Diaspora has contributed in political, social and economic sphere of Tanzania. Indians have also contributed immensely in the freedom struggle of Tanzania. In fact, they fought together with the native people against the colonial rule. To contribute in the freedom struggle of Tanzania Tanganyikan Indians established

several associations like the Asian Association, Mombassa Indian Association, East African Indian National Congress, Kikuyu Central Association for joint action against the colonial powers.

In 1909, the committee of Indians was also formed in Zanzibar. In 1964, after independence Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to form Tanzania. The party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) came into power. The leader and president till 1988 was Julius Nyerere. Tanzania had one of the first one party States in Africa. Though for some time the relations become terse between Indian diaspora and Tanzanians due to Ujamization but situation became amiable after 1990's. Since then, Indian Diaspora in Tanzania has been actively participating in the political process of the country.

They have been able to occupy important political offices. Sophia Mustafa got elected thrice in the parliament of Tanzania. Abdul Karim Karimjee served as deputy speaker and Amir Jamal as Minister for Communications, Power and Works. Dr. Krishna Member of Parliament, Mr. Bajaj and Al- Noor Kassum also played important role in the politics of Tanzania (Rajan, 2005). If we compare political participation or role of Indian Diaspora in three countries of East Africa, Tanzania is the country where Indian Diaspora has been more vocal in the political space and could secure place in different governments and political parties. Many Indians for example Mrs. Zakia Meghji as a finance minister of Tanzania, has done remarkable contribution in the economic development and investment promotion in the country. Economic prosperity and political success of Indian Diaspora in Tanzania is an asset for India and it could be a tool to promote healthy partnership between two countries at bilateral as well as multilateral level.

1.3 Conceptualising Diaspora as a heritage resource

1.3.1 Concept of heritage resource

Heritage can be defined as a full range of inherited traditions, monuments, objects, and culture. Most important, it is the range of contemporary activities, meanings, and behaviors that we draw from them. Heritage includes, but is much more than preserving, excavating, displaying, or restoring a collection of old things. It is both tangible and intangible, in the sense that ideas and memories of songs, recipes,

language, dances, and many other elements of oneself and how one can identify themselves-as important as historical buildings and archaeological sites.

Heritage is a contemporary activity with far-reaching effects. It can be an element of far-sighted urban and regional planning. It can be the platform for political recognition, a medium for intercultural dialogue, a means of ethical reflection, and the potential basis for local economic development. It is simultaneously local and particular, global and shared. Heritage is an essential part of the present we live in- and of the future we will build.

Even within a single society, pasts, heritages and identities should be considered as plurals. Not only do heritages have many uses but they also have multiple producers. These may be public or private sector, official or non-official and insider or outsider, each stakeholder having varied and multiple objectives in the creation and management of heritage (Ashworth and Graham, 2005). In addition, societies, notably in Western countries, are experiencing greater socio-spatial segregation as they become more culturally diverse (and more self-consciously so), a fragmentation which raises issues as to how this heterogeneity should be reflected in heritage selection, interpretation and management. As Littler and Naidoo (2004) argue, “the definition of heritage has ‘morphed’ over time. In this present context, we adopt a constructionist perspective which regards the concept as referring to the ways in which very selective past material artifacts, natural landscapes, mythologies, memories and traditions become cultural, political and economic resources for the present”.

This idea of present-centeredness is a recurrent theme in the recent literature on heritage. “For Lowenthal (1998, xv), ‘in domesticating the past we enlist [heritage] for present causes ... [it] clarifies pasts so as to infuse them with present purposes’, one result being that, ‘heritage vice becomes inseparable from heritage virtue while under the aegis of national patrimony looms a multinational enterprise’ (Lowenthal, 1998, 5). This present-centred perspective is reiterated by Peckham (2003), argues that heritage is often used as a form of collective memory, a social construct shaped by the political, economic and social concerns of the present”. Thus, the study of heritage does not involve a direct engagement with the study of the past. “Instead,

the contents, interpretations and representations of the heritage resource are selected according to the demands of the present and, in turn, imparted to an imagined future (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007)". It follows, therefore, that heritage is less about tangible material artefacts or other intangible forms of the past than about the meanings placed upon them and the representations which are created from them (Graham, Ashworth and Tunbridge, 2000; Graham, 2002; Smith, 2004).

Consequently, it is now largely agreed that most heritage has little intrinsic worth. Rather, values are placed upon artefacts or activities by people who, when they view heritage, do so through a whole series of lenses, the most obvious of which are: nationality; religion; ethnicity; class; wealth; gender; personal history; and that strange lens known as 'insiderness'. The validity of a particular lens may also be situationally determined rather than a constant while the interpretations will vary depending on the situation of the observer in time and space. Thus, it is meaning that gives value, either cultural or financial, to heritage and explains why certain artefacts, traditions and memories have been selected from the near infinity of the past (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007). The key word here is 'selected', in that, a focused definition of heritage has to avoid the commonsense way in which the term is often employed to refer to the totality of the inheritance of the past.

Thus, not all the past is heritage nor is it all culture. Meanings are marked out by identity, and are produced and exchanged through social interaction in a variety of media; they are also created through consumption. These meanings further regulate and organize our conduct and practices by helping determine rules, norms and conventions: 'It is us-in society, within human culture-who makes things mean, who signify. Meanings, consequently, will always change, from one culture or period to another'. (Hall, 1997: 61)

To complicate matters further, any detailed investigation of a particular heritage item or site will soon reveal a vast array of actors and stakeholders. While the view of heritage in any given society will inevitably reflect that of the dominant political, social, religious or ethnic groups, in what Smith (2006) refers to as the 'authorized heritage discourse', the sheer number of actual and potential participants and stakeholders in transnational societies means that there is no simple binary

relationship of insider/outsider, colonizer/colonized, or even hegemonic/resistant. In sum, therefore, heritages are present-centred and are created, shaped and managed by, and in response to, the demands of the present. As such, they are open to constant revision and change and are also both sources and results of social conflict.

The quite unavoidable implication of heritage in the contestation of societies invokes the condition of disparity which refers to the discordance or lack of agreement and consistency to the meaning of heritage (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996). For two main sets of reasons, this appears to be intrinsic to the very nature of heritage and should not be regarded as an unforeseen or unfortunate by-product.

First, dissonance is implicit in the market segmentation attending heritage when viewed as an economic commodity – essentially comprising tangible and intangible, often place-centred, products, which are multi-sold and multi-interpreted by tourist and ‘domestic’ consumers alike. That landscapes of tourism consumption are simultaneously other people’s sacred places is one of the principal causes of heritage contestation on a global scale, because the processes of sacralization and sacralizing also involve the exercise of profane forces (Kong, 2001). Secondly, as Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996) argue, dissonance arises because of the zero-sum characteristics of heritages, all of which belong to someone and logically, therefore, not to someone else. The creation of any heritage actively or potentially disinherits or excludes those who do not subscribe to, or are embraced within, the terms of meaning attending that heritage. While much of this disinheritance may seem to be, or actually is, relatively trivial, the processes of exclusion and forgetting involved in disinheritance may have profoundly important effects.

Despite the growth since the 1960s of many manifestations of individual heritage such as genealogy (fostered, not least, by popular television programmes), Lowenthal (1998) “claims that heritage has moved from the private to the public realm and that, more and more, it denotes that which we hold jointly. He observes, too, the legacy of ‘oppression’ in validating present identity, and the national being replaced or supplemented by the local and ethnic. Heritage conflict has thus become a global issue because it is so deeply implicated in the processes of social inclusion and exclusion that define societies characterized by ever more complex forms of

cultural diversity. While its origins can be linked to the nineteenth-century rise of ethno-nationalism and Romantic notions of attachment to place, heritage can also function as a form of resistance to such hegemonic discourses and a marker of plurality in multicultural and plural societies” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007).

The content of heritage is commonly seen as embracing both material or tangible - natural landscapes and the settlements, buildings, monuments and the like of the built environment - and the intangible. The latter term is defined in the criteria set out in the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) criteria for World Heritage Sites as the ‘expressions, knowledge and skills that communities recognize as part of their cultural heritage’, a ‘living cultural heritage’ expressed in a number of ways including oral traditions and social practice (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007).

Intangible heritage, itself a contested concept, is ‘interactive, dynamic and cohesive’ and ‘transmitted from generation to generation’ to provide ‘people with a sense of identity and continuity’. “Logan points, for example, to the Ancient Quarter of the Vietnamese capital, Hanoi, where the key elements are pagodas, temples and communal buildings that have a symbolic worth linked to the intangible heritage of myths and legends, rather than a ‘value based on the authenticity of their physical fabric’(Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007)”. Intangible heritage is no less powerful than material forms as Marschall (2006) establishes in her reading of the Hector Pieterse Memorial in Soweto, South Africa, where simple signifiers have the power to evoke similar emotional responses across time, space and cultures (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007).

Protecting intangible heritage is particularly difficult, especially given that it is impossible to ‘own’ people in the way that we can own, buy and sell, destroy, rebuild or preserve the tangible heritage of places and artifacts, and also because the veneer of self-consciousness, inevitably part of heritage designation, can destroy the meaning of the intangible.

While the debate on tangible and intangible heritage, particularly as expressed through international conventions, is important because of the implications of inclusivity and the recognition of the importance of the non-material world in representation and identity, it can nevertheless be argued that if the core content of heritage is defined by meaning, then it is probably something of a false distinction. No heritage value is completely tangible; even the ‘tangible can only be interpreted through the intangible’. Material heritage sites may comprise no more than empty shells of dubious authenticity but derive their importance from the ideas and values that are projected on or through them (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007).

Intangible heritage, therefore, can be made less ‘virtual’ by its transformation into or interconnection with some form of material heritage. In turn, there is a wide and growing interest in the intangible interpretations that can be attached to sites which embody ideas of values, moralities and resistances. The crucial questions are thus arguably less about tangibility or intangibility but with the identities and motives of those projecting or commissioning meanings through heritage which, after all, is meaning whatever will be its form (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007). Consciously, therefore, the practices and markers of heritage are presented in a form that encapsulates heritage in its totality while deliberately shunned an attempt to introduce and sustain a contestable distinction between the tangible and intangible realms.

1.3.2 Considering Diaspora as a heritage resource

Diasporas are nodes of cultural exchange, bringing into contact different systems of values, beliefs and social organization. Throughout history and present, diaspora have provided important contribution to economic, politics and culture both for their home countries and for societies of residence. Departing from earlier modes of emigration as a terminal loss to the homeland, “homeland” nation states increasingly come to utilize their diasporas as potential motors of development. The significance of diaspora within their host societies has also been confirmed by the wide range of studies.

Diaspora clearly can be seen as a resource on collective and on institutional levels, often even as an avant- grade for economic development and cultural transformation. The strategic use of networks, institutions and support systems provided by well-established diaspora structures can enable and enhance successful agency even for individual actions also.

However, still in the majority of ethnographic case studies, issues of resources and success are conspicuously absent, while diaspora relations to their “host” countries are described mainly in terms of unequal power and exclusion (Clifford:1994). This rather limited view seems to be grounded in a generalized understanding of prototypical diaspora as “victims” minorities, which in many cases echoes the identity politics of influential diaspora elites. But diaspora vary in their historical experiences as much as in their community structures, and can be very differently embedded within the overall system of their societies of residence. To make matter even more complex these variations can also appear in communities of the same origin during different phases of their history.

As according to Safran⁴ (1991, 2004), diaspora takes part in threefold system of references: local communities are embedded within the local, regional and national institutions of their residential societies and each one is positioned in world-wide network of other communities of the same origin. In addition, diaspora communities keep ongoing relations to the country of origin ranging from symbolic references and ritual remembrance to active practices of trans-nationalism. Hence, internal cohesion and mutual trust fortified by a normative system of close co-operation among co-ethnics is only one aspect of successful agency in diaspora.

The potentials of diaspora as a resource are closely related not only to internal cohesion within communities, but also to overarching ties relating them to the outside world. However, the potential of diaspora as resource is expected to vary with the strength of ethnic solidarity and trust but at the same time also with the degree of openness of their norms regarding inter-cultural interactions.

⁴ William Safran also emphasises that ‘Diaspora consciousness is a particular kind of awareness said to be generated among contemporary transnational communities’

1.3.3 Indian Diaspora as heritage resource

Diaspora plays certain very important role. Firstly, by creating work opportunities for co-ethnics and by linking ethnic networks to formal economic institutions, they can contribute significantly to socio-economic integration and social cohesion of migrant communities. And secondly, they are also an important asset in a highly contested market. They can provide even small-scale entrepreneurs with capital, labour, customers and business connections, enabling wider radius of activities though these intense social networks and ethnic institutions as one of the reasons for success of diaspora. However, the significance of networks is not limited to ethnic cohesiveness alone. Diasporas are interlinked by various layers of relationships.

Indian diaspora have contributed positively to every stratum of African economy, polity and society. They participated in national movement and made significant contribution in the national building process. They have played a key role in industrialization process of these countries. In Tanzania, many of the largest sisal and other plantations are owned by Indians. It is in fact difficult to think of any significant sector in the East African economies where Indian capital, entrepreneurial ability, and skills have not made an appreciable contribution. The most important thing to notice is that though they constitute a very small population their contribution to the land of their new destiny is enormous. Hard work, skills and passion have made them successful in entrepreneurship, services and other activities and they are sharing their economic prosperity with the needy people of the society by various philanthropic activities apart from generating significant revenues to the state.

1.4 Research Approach

1.4.1 Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

Etymologically, the term ‘Diaspora’ is derived from the Greek word *diasperien*. *Dia* means “across” and *-sperien* “to sow or scatter seeds” and originally referred to the dispersal and settlement of Jews outside of Palestine following the Babylonian exile. However, in the later phase of 20th century a broader perspective of Diaspora emerged and now it is not confined merely to the Jews migration. Now, the term is used for migration of any particular community to the other place. Encyclopedia of

Diasporas gives a very broad and liberal definition of Diaspora, a people dispersed by whatever cause to more than one location. The people dispersed to different lands may harbour thoughts of return, may not fully assimilate to their host countries, and may maintain relationship with other communities in the Diaspora.

The Diaspora debate over the past decade has experienced two extreme positions—one being that the term and concept refers to the specific migration of Jews, which occurred under any unique historical circumstances; while the other is that of a more universal application to all cases of migration and settlement beyond the borders of native nation-states, irrespective of the migration circumstances. However, growing acceptance of the ‘Diaspora concept’ with its universal application is related to the increasing relevance of representations of ‘identity’ and ‘culture’ in international politics.

As is evident in the relationships between the Indians and Africans, the broad line separating co-operation from ‘collaboration’ is usually indistinct. Collaboration without the direct admission of one of the parties usually can be discovered only by inference. In fact it was even stated that Indians just wanted to be on the winning side. They have always been middlemen, and they helped the British make all their money. They are middlemen economically, but cowards politically. Some confirmed anti-colonialists will nowadays accuse the entire Indian community of collaboration by maintaining that any co-operation, no matter how well intentioned, with the colonial rulers was in effect collaboration. One must either be a rebel or a collaborator there is no in-between. On this view all Indians who remained in East Africa, not only those who engaged in business and politics, but all who lived within the protection of European law, were collaborators to the detriment of the far more numerous Africans.

But this interpretation unfortunately precludes the study of the overall Indian relationship with Africans. When seen in its entirety, the Indians presence in East Africa was beneficial to African interests during the very period. And even though they have been exploited in the name of Africanization they have contributed not only politically but economically and socially as well, and their contribution cannot be neglected. Indians in each territory did wholeheartedly support the African

nationalists, a fact though not recognized strongly enough. The scope of the study thus, would be to look into what are the challenges and opportunities in utilizing Diaspora as a heritage resource.

1.4.2 Review of the Literature

Review of literature is thematic under four broad themes: (i) Theoretical perspectives on Indian Diaspora as a heritage resource in bilateral relations, (ii) Indian Diaspora and Indo-Tanzanian relations pre globalization period (iii) Change in policy adopted by India and Tanzania on Diaspora issues during post-cold war globalization (iv) Role of Indian Diaspora in India- Tanzania relations.

Theoretical perspectives on Indian Diaspora as a heritage resource in bilateral relations

Indian Diaspora today constitutes an important and in some respects unique force in world culture. The origins of the modern Indian Diaspora lie mainly in the subjugation of India and its incorporation into the colonial empire. In the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, the Indians (mainly Gujaratis, along with some Punjabis) immigrated on their own as ‘passage’ or free immigrants, largely before and after the Second World War. Indian emigration to Africa, as to other countries, was a response to the job opportunities resulting from the colonisation and the ‘opening up’ of Africa by the British and other European powers (Jain, 1982). Opportunities then existed in areas such as trade and commerce. Ever since, Indians had been engaging and monopolising these vocations until the emergence of the competing native African bourgeoisie in the early sixties.

Indian Diaspora is increasingly recognized as a resource in international relations, for economic collaborations and development in the larger sense in the country of origin. In this regard, the role of remittances, Diaspora investment and charity, as well as Diasporas as elements of cultural policies strengthening the soft power of their country of origin are recognized by a large number of countries over the world (Dubey, 2008). Thus, in the last decade, the area of Diaspora policies and attempts by governments to strengthen the relationship with their Diasporas has gained much momentum.

The Diaspora as a mode of cultural production emphasises the currents of cultural objects, images, and meanings back and forth, and the way these transcend and change according to the wishes of the customers and artists. It refers to the production and reproduction of transnational social and cultural phenomena. The position of youth in Diaspora is thus, very important. They are the ones who receive and transform new ideas and developments. The Diaspora as a type of consciousness emphasises the variety of experiences, a state of mind, and a sense of identity. This is described as dual or paradoxical nature. This nature has various connotations. First, it refers to the experience of discrimination and exclusion, and at the same time, the positive identification with the highly praised historical heritage of the Indian civilisation. Second, the awareness of multi-locality, the notion of belonging 'here and there' as well as sharing the same 'roots' and 'routes'(Vertovec, 1991). The awareness of the ability to make a connection helps in making the bridge between the local and the global.

Indian diaspora have made numerous contributions to the East African society and state. In past they introduced the monetary economy, built railway line, played significant role in nation building process and participated in national movement (Ghai & Ghai (1965), Nanjira (1976), Oonk (2007)). However, after independence their contribution has been neglected in case of East Africa and conflict arises. The main causes for the conflict were the economic gap between the Africans and the non-Africans and social impediments between them.

However, Nanjira also pointed out the fact that causes for conflict also includes: the adherence by the racial minorities to their own racial, linguistic, and religious differentiations; the failure by the East-African states to create an identification of political and national divisions; the resentment of, or the tendency by the East African majority to resent, the presence of the racial minorities; and the feeling of the African majority that it possesses a national characteristic in which the minority groups do not, and perhaps cannot share (Nanjira,1976). Thus, their contribution has not been much emphasised. They participated in national movement and made significant contribution in the national building process.

But it should be stressed that India's Diaspora are inevitably a minority in the country of settlement. Both the Indian state and the Diaspora from India's majority community must realise, that the claims of protection of communities of Indian origin in their countries of settlement are weakened if minorities in the countries of origin are not protected. One cannot claim protection in one context while seemingly violating it in another context (Kapur, 2003).

Indian Diaspora and Indo-Tanzanian relations pre globalization period

Gijsbert Oonk (2013) emphasised that South Asians rather had the need to establish political organisations in order to redress their issues like getting licenses, protection of their properties etc. When Tanzania got independence in 1961, the future of Indians or rather South Asians was at stake. Almost one third of the South Asians took up local citizenship thinking of the perspective that it would grant them same rights and duties as any other citizen of the new nation states. During that time taking up Indian citizenship was not an option, as from India they were encouraged to settle permanently in their host country.

Though, after independence Tanzanian government started taking control of the principal economic sectors. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 legitimised the nationalisation of the main economic institutions. Most of the legislation affected adversely the South Asian and especially the Indian community (Oonk, 2013). Though, Tanzanian had not adopted the Ugandan harsh approach, yet political and economic insecurities in Tanzania also caused massive emigration.

Infact, in case of India both domestic and international changes have altered the priority and agenda of India's policy towards the PIO's in Africa. During the colonial rule in Africa India advised the PIO's to join black Africans in the freedom struggle and to become one of them without seeking special privileges or status for themselves (Dubey, 2010).

By the second half of 1960s, there was increasing realization that Indians in Africa, whatever passport they might hold, should not be regarded as falling outside India's Africa policy. This also suited Indian move of economic policy in Africa and other developing countries as Indian settlers in East Africa had the required capital as well

as the will to promote Indian economic initiatives in African countries. India's policy towards its Diaspora thus can be said that shown a considerable change after 1960's (Dubey, 2000).

Change in policy adopted by Indo-Tanzania on Diaspora issues during post cold war globalization

Globalisation has reduced the territorial rigidity and cross-country linkages for a better economic gain and better life. Thus, in this present era of globalization, there is no place for the old political and economic behaviour, it has become relevant to build bilateral and multilateral relations among countries. Though globalization has several definitions assigned to it but here in this study globalization which arises after cold war has been taken into account.

Globalization has had two major implications for India's relationship with the Indian Diaspora. Firstly, globalization has resulted in an assault on the cultural identity of the Indian Diaspora, as of other sections of the society in the country of their residence. This has engendered a strong urge among the Diaspora, to go back to its cultural roots as a defence mechanism. Secondly, in spite of the existence and intensification of restrictions on migration, globalization has led to an increase in migration globally (Sassen, 1998).

For India, PIOs were an equally relevant overseas segment to rope them in India's new drive for globalisation. When Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) came into power, in contrast to Nehru's policy of active dissociation of PIOs from Indian foreign policy objectives, BJP stood for active and overt association of PIOs for foreign policy objectives of India (Dubey, 2000). It issued PIO card which provide a very substantial advantage to PIOs compared to other foreign nationals (Dubey, 2010).

In 2004, Government of India constituted a separate Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs which is totally dedicated to the dealing of issues of Indian Diaspora. The Indian Government cannot overlook combined economic might of PIO and NRI who are and could be, of value to Indian economic development. Far reaching changes have been suggested by the High level Committee appointed by the government of India to look into how to effectively leverage the Indian Diaspora consisting of both PIO and NRI for the economic development (Sheth, 2005).

As far as Tanzania is concerned, the socialist Tanzania switched over to capitalism during the economically difficult years of the early 1980's. The government headed by the Ali Hassan Mwinyi implemented the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations which included large scale farming, denationalization of coffee and sisal estates, and loosening of the Building Acquisition Act of 1971. These measures have helped in improving the conditions of Indians (Oonk, 2007).

Role of Indian Diaspora in India- Tanzania relations

In the present era of globalization, India has to adopt different approaches and make use of the entrenched Indian Diaspora for strengthening relationship with different countries. It has to develop linkages and establish institutional connections with the Indian Diaspora (Dubey, 2010). Indian Diaspora in African countries are economically well off and culturally keen to retain identity. Some of leading journalist, prominent academician and lawyers, who shape public opinion in these countries, belong to Indian communities. Therefore, Indian Diaspora could play marginal, if not substantial role in the promotion of bilateral partnership between motherland and host-land (Gupta, 2012).

Indian government had started economic initiatives at bilateral level to bring Indian settlers in Tanzania within the policy framework of India. It proposed to establish Africa-India Development Corporation with PIO and Indian capital, its aim was to seek integration of the Indian community in the economic life of Africa, thus fortifying the foundation of a multiracial society (Dubey, 2010).

The 1980s and early 1990s saw considerable improvements in race relations between Africans and Indians in East Africa. Public debate shifted from Africanisation in the colonial period to socialism (independent Tanzania) and to the 'indigenisation of South Asians' in the 1980s and 1990s. An important reason for this shift was the declining economic situation in Tanzania, which made it necessary to re-establish the economic and social roles of Asians in East Africa (Dubey, 2010).

Tanzania-India bilateral relations have always been close, characterised by active bilateral cooperation and a strong mutual understanding, further bolstered by Tanzania hosting a sizeable Indian Diaspora and high levels of bilateral trade

(MOIA, 2010). But how far these bilateral trade are successful and what role did Indian Diaspora played in boosting these trade and relations between India and Tanzania has not been discussed widely thus it has to be looked into. Tanzania is the country where Indian Diaspora has been more vocal in the political space. Prosperity and political success of Indian Diaspora in Tanzania is an asset for India and it could be a tool to promote healthy partnership between two countries at bilateral as well as multilateral level (Gupta, 2012).

Indian Diaspora is the microcosm of Indian diversity. Indian Diaspora around the world seems to sense a feeling of oneness and feel a part of greater Indian society. Common point which puts Indian Diaspora in a single category is their advancement in the economic field (Nanjira, 1976, Mehta, 2001). Therefore, PIO as Diaspora has strength of being prosperous, professionally and intellectually advance and sharing common identity and attachment to the country of origin.

So, it can be said that as a social and cultural capital Indian Diaspora can be of very much importance and can be utilized as a heritage resource in enhancing relationship between India and East Africa and particularly in Tanzania. Very few literatures have seen Indian Diaspora in this aspect. Thus, this gap would be looked into in this study.

1.4.3 Research Questions

- How strong is Indian Diaspora as a heritage resource in Tanzania?
- Is Indian diasporic resource in Tanzania a latent or active resource for bilateral relations?
- What were the policies, programmes and initiatives of India and Tanzania for using Indian Diaspora as a resource?
- What role did Indian Diaspora played as a heritage resource in Indo-Tanzanian relations?

1.4.4 Hypotheses

- Indian Diaspora in Tanzania were the latent resource and catalyst but no policies were made by government of both sides to utilize them till advent of post cold war globalization.
- Quantum change in interaction between India and Tanzania happened during post cold war globalization since both accessed Indian Diaspora as a resource to promote bilateral relations.
- The new Diaspora policy of India enable Indian Diaspora in Tanzania to play a significant economic and political role in Tanzania but so far it has not played such significant role in promoting Indo-Tanzanian relations.
- Indian Diaspora after post cold war globalization has emerged itself as a heritage resource in Tanzania.

1.4.5 Research Methodology

In this study theoretical and descriptive framework has been used. Since the study of topic was exploratory as well as analytical in nature an extensive field survey has also been carried out to elaborate the study. In the field study, along with people of Indian origin, several professors and resource persons from Tanzania has been met and interviewed.

Both primary as well as secondary sources have been used in order to substantiate the hypothesis. Primary sources mostly involved the documents related to the Government ministries, organisations, as well as official documentation of conferences, committees, conclave etc. The primary sources data mainly collected from the documents of Tanzanian government, from Official Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, High Level Committee reports and documentation such as summits, protocols and treaties. Archival sources for authentic narratives have also been sought as evidence for the study. Secondary sources of data have been drawn from books, articles, research journals and newspapers. Working papers of various universities and research work related to the

topic are also to be used. In addition internet sites have also been used for enhancing the scope of study by deriving relevant information.

1.4.6 Chapterisation

To attempt a thorough study of the matter, this thesis has been divided into four chapters followed by a conclusion. In this first chapter the concept of Diaspora in general and Indian Diaspora in Africa in particular has been discussed. Indian presence in Africa is discussed. How they migrated over there? Pattern of their migration has been discussed in detail. Concept of heritage resource has been discussed along with discussing Indian Diaspora as a heritage resource

Second chapter deals with the Indian Diaspora in East Africa. In this chapter answers to some of the questions has been tried to look at like Why Asians in general and Indians in particular were the target over there? Why in the process of Africanization they were particularly targeted? Secondly this crisis has also been tried to look from the Diaspora perspective. In this chapter Indian diaspora in Tanzania particularly has been discussed. Comparison of Indian-Tanzanians with Indian diaspora in other East African states and comparative advantage of Indian diaspora as a heritage resource in Tanzania has been discussed.

Third chapter dealt with Indo Tanzanian relations under globalisation taking heritage as an important factor. In this chapter Indian Tanzania relations had been discussed broadly under socio, economic and political headings. How diaspora as a heritage factor is an important determinant, along with its limitations, in Indo-Tanzanian relations has been discussed. How they are contributing and encouraging these countries bilateral relations has been looked upon.

Fourth chapter, dealt with the opportunities and challenges in utilization of Indian Diaspora as a heritage resource in Indo-Tanzanian relations. In this chapter challenges and opportunities in utilizing the Indian Diaspora as a heritage resource has been discussed. The changes in policies from the both side of government, and how they facilitated Indian diaspora as a heritage factor is also explored.

The conclusion, which forms the last part of thesis or the fifth chapter, dealt with the concluding remarks or findings of this research. The concluding inferences have drawn insights from the discussions of different chapter to make concluding remarks rather than making qualitative judgement or value preference of my own. However it is desirable to suggest readers to go through the chapters to make a sense of the findings of this research rather than confining to the concluding remarks. The findings of the research have been discussed in different chapters of this thesis.

Chapter II

Indian Diaspora in Tanzania: comparative advantage as a heritage resource in East African context

2.1 Indian Diaspora in East Africa

Indians in East Africa share a history in which cultural encounters, alliances and clashes became the backbone of Indian-African relations. Indians traded along the East African Coast long before the arrival of the Europeans. Nevertheless, their numbers and socio-economic importance grew steadily with the establishment of the European colonies in East Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Oonk, 2007:254). In spite of an increase in numbers following the advent of colonialism, they remained a small community, never accounting for more than 2 per cent of the total population. However, they played a significant role in the economic and political history of East Africa.

2.1.1 Historical back ground

The first written evidence of the presence of Indian traders in East Africa was provided by *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, authored by a Greek pilot in the first century AD. Kilwa, Malindi and Mogadishu were sizeable trading posts around that time. The other dominant trading community included Arabs who developed Mogadishu and Mombasa as great trading centres. Indian traders, manufacturers and clove cultivators were concentrated in Zanzibar. They were both Hindu (mainly Vaishyas) and Muslims (Ismailis and Bohras). The Venetian traveller Marco Polo (1254-1324 AD) has a word of praise for the Gujarati and Saurashtrian merchants on

Africa's east coast whom he considers as the best and most honourable that can be found in the world.

Vasco de Gama touched East Africa on his historic voyage to India. He reached Malindi in 1497 AD and found Indian merchants in Mozambique, Kilwa and Mombasa. He hired a Gujarati mariner named Kanji to take him to the shore of India (Desai, 1993). The Indian traders had also settled in Aden and the Persian Gulf (Tinker, 1977).

In 1832, the Arab ruler Seyyid Said shifted his capital from Oman to Zanzibar. Many Indian traders in Oman followed him to Zanzibar. The Sultan entered into a treaty with Britain in 1839 which guaranteed the British subjects to stay and trade within the Sultan's dominion. A British consulate was established in Zanzibar, due to these developments, the number of Indian traders in Zanzibar steadily grew from 2,500 in 1870 to 6,000 in the early 1900s (Oonk, 2006: 254). Most of them were Muslims and the rest were Hindus (mainly Lohans, Shahs and Patels). Majority of the free migrants in East Africa are from the areas of Gujarat and Sind in India. Gujarati and Kutchi are the predominant Indian language spoken in East Africa.

In 1873, Sir Bartle Frere, who investigated East Africa's slave trade, wrote admiringly of Indians in Zanzibar:

Arriving at his future scene of business with little beyond the credentials of his fellow caste men, after perhaps a brief apprenticeship in some older firms he the Indian trader starts a shop of his own with goods advanced on credit by some large house, and after a few years, when he has made a little money, generally returned home to marry, to make fresh business connections, and then comes back to Africa to repeat, on a large scale (Oonk, 2007:255).

Ivory was the major trade of Indians in East Africa- it was first sent to Bombay, partly for re-export to China and the West. Many Indian merchants were also involved in the trade of spices, goat skin, dried fish and other agricultural cargo. A number of established Indians were involved in the financing the East African slave trade. Some also traded slaves directly although on the small scale, partly due to

British pressure to abolish the trade. On the other hand, there were Indians such as Tharia Topan, who was knighted by the British in 1890 for services rendered in suppressing the slave trade (Oonk, 2007:255)

2.1.1.1 Migration patterns

The largest number of Indians in East Africa, particularly those who were free migrants, came from Northwest India, primarily Gujarat, Kutch and Sind and to a lesser extent, Maharashtra, whereas Punjab supplied nearly all of the indentured labourers who worked on the Uganda railway. The year 1890 marked the end of the Arab ascendancy in East Africa and the region was partitioned among European powers. By then, over 6000 Indians lived in Zanzibar and along the East African coast. Between 1890 and 1914, this relatively small number was augmented by almost 38,000 indentured labourers who worked on the construction of Uganda railways. After the end of their contracts also many have decided to stay in East Africa and joined different professions in railways or opened small shops and came to be known as *Duka wallas* or petty traders.

The next wave of migration was linked to the growth of British colonial power in East Africa. After World War I, in addition to Kenya and Uganda, the British secured control of the former German East African colony, Tanganyika. A growing number of Indians found jobs in the civil services. By now, the Indians settled over there made Africa their home. Between two world Wars, the total number of Indians in East Africa doubled from approximately 55,000 in 1921 up to 105,000 in 1939 (Oonk, 2007: 256).

The largest increase in the Indian Population in East Africa occurred after World War II. In 1969, around 300,000 Indians lived in East Africa. Approximately half of this growth can be attributed to economic expansion in the East African region, particularly in Kenya. However, unlike the preceding periods, the other half of the growth in population can be attributed to natural increase. Although the number of migrants arriving in East Africa continued to increase every year, the percentage of migrants as a proportion of Indian residents gradually diminished which can be clearly understood from this table:

Table 1: Number of Indians in East Africa

Year	Kenya	Uganda	Tanzania
1921	25,253	5200	10,209+13,722 in Zanzibar
1931	43,623	14,150	25,144+15,247 in Zanzibar
1939	46,897	17,300	25,000+15,500 in Zanzibar
1962	175,000	77,500	92,000+20,000 in Zanzibar
1969	140,000	75,000	85,000
1972	105,000	1000	52,000
1984	50,000	1000	30,000
1995/2000	100,000	12,000	90,000

Source: Oonk (2006), “East Africa”, in Brij V Lal (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Indian Diaspora*¹.

2.1.1.2 Experience during colonial period

During the colonial period Indian migration took place to the British colonies as a way of indentured labour for plantations, or building of railways. The forced migration of the People of Indian Origin under colonial rule was part of the British policy to take Indian labour all over the world to replace Black slaves after their emancipation with cheap and reliable labour. Indians were also later recruited to run the railways after they were built. Thus, various parts of Africa have played host to Indians since pre colonial times. Indians, in fact have a history of migration that dates back to thousand of years initially as traders and later as sojourners. In Africa

¹ Notes: Figures for 1969, 1972 and 1984 are estimates. Figures for 1995/2000 are based on the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora. Their numbers for Tanzania and Kenya are highly overestimated. A more realistic estimate would be 45,000 and 70,000 respectively.

reference to Indians goes back to the first century AD, when they arrived mostly as traders rather than migrants or permanent settlers.

An aggregation of indentured Indians in any given area created the economic base for a certain amount of free immigration. Attracted by the commercial potentialities inherent in the needs of their fellow countrymen, Indians of the business classes followed indentured immigration. And given any encouragement by circumstances or policy, these businessmen quickly expanded their operations to non-Indians in the territories in which they settled. In South Africa, for example, traders who came at first to trade with fellow Indians quickly extended out into the African trade and, to a much lesser degree, into the European trade as well (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 26-27).

The colonial administration in India came under heavy pressure in early 20th to open up restrictions on Indian immigrant as job opportunities for employment in Ugandan railway or as petty traders, that is, as 'Duka Wallas' were available to those who wanted to take risk to go to Africa. It seemed to the British that if trade was to be developed, it was necessary to give every facility and possible encouragements to traders and settlers irrespective of the colour, who wish to come into front on their own accord.

The only policy that the government followed was to export sufficient low paid work force to run the plantations. The British encouraged the indenture labour to settle down in their island colonies following the ban on indenture system to serve essentially the interest of British Plantations rather than the thoroughly exploited labour.

Through this British benefitted as the number of Indian community increased in Anglophone Africa, and that is why the German proposal to have free import of Indians was turned down by the British authorities. There were nearly 3,110 Indians in Uganda, 10,000 in Zanzibar and nearly 15,000 in Kenya by 1914. The French also found Indians useful for agricultural purposes and they purchased Indian labour from the ports under her control in 1800. Encouraged by Mauritian success story, 5,000 Indians were brought to Natal in 1860 as indentured labour and by 1900 their number increased to 15,000 in Natal (Gupta, 2003:3).

The Indian immigration to Africa in 19th and 20th centuries grew in phases. The increased employment and business opportunities due to the opening of Ugandan railway attracted the Indians settled on the port of Mombasa and Zanzar to go hinterland. In 1896, only 1,449 Indians left Indian shores as free migrants to East Africa on completion of Ugandan railways. As stories of African riches began to spread, nearly 12,212 Indians left for East Africa in 1906-1908.

Table 2: Indentured Indian immigrants by colony in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and Indian population by county, 1980

Colony	Period	Indian Immigrants	Indian Population (Est.) 1980
Mauritius	1834-1912	453,063	623,000
Natal (South Africa)	1860-1911	152,184	750,000
Reunion	1829-1924	118,100	125,000
East Africa (Kenya/Uganda)	1895-1901	39,771	79,000/430*
Seychelles	1899-1916	6,319	NA

* These figures are much lower than those prior to the expulsions of 1972. In 1970, the Indian population of Kenya was 1,82,000 while that of Uganda was 76,000.

Source: Clarke, Colin, Ceri Peach and Steven Vertovec (eds.) 1990. *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The British could not ignore the economic strength of the Indians and as per 1921 census, Indians constituted the second largest racial group after Africans in Kenya. From 1913 to 1948, Indian population in Uganda increased from merely 3,651 to 35,215 as many were born there. Increasing numerical and economic strength of the Indians could not be ignored by the colonial power and when representative institutions were established in East Africa, the Indians were given a representation.

2.1.2 Crisis faced by the Indian Diaspora in East Africa

Indian Diaspora are spread in various parts of the East African countries. They had gone into different capacities as indentured labourers, workers, artisans and some early ones as slaves. Indian Diaspora faced discriminatory practices during colonial period in Africa. They thus, fought together with the native people against such practices and equally participated in national movement with the hope that once independence will be achieved their grievances will be shuttled. But, consequences of post-independence period indicate that Indians have become more hated than the Europeans.

From the very early days of Independence, the issue of citizenship of Indians in East Africa has remained very vital. It has even lead to a misunderstanding between Indians and native people. Their loyalty to their country of adoption was also questioned. In order to clarify what exactly happened, it is necessary to discuss the issue in some detail. According to the British Government's decision, after the end of 1948 Indians were either British subjects or British protected persons. The British subjects were Asians born on British territory. Those Asians were called British Protected Persons.

On the eve of Independence, Indian settlers were asked to opt any one citizenship, among these three- Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania citizenship, British citizenship and Indian Citizenship. Majority of Indians applied for British citizenship, and few of them applied for the citizenship of respective East African countries. But, those Indians who applied for the citizenship of their country of residence faced a deep silence of the government over their applications for citizenship. At the same time the government gave the impression that the Indians were unwilling to accept their citizenship. Instead of looking at the root cause of such mindset and trying to sort out grievances of Indians, African leaders utilized this opportunity to spread racial hatred.

Soon after independence, government of these countries starts the policies that were favourable to native businessman but anti - Indians. Indians faced a series of official and unofficial discriminatory policies in the 1960s-70s, commonly called

Africanisation of the Economy. Government of East African states started restricting immigrants as well as non-citizens access to trade and work permits.

When it realized that there were enough Indians with East African citizenship to lower down the African aspirations, the government switched to policy of *Africanisation* - which meant the cancellation or non-renewal of trading licenses to non - blacks, whatever their nationality was. Affirmative action in favour of the indigenous was apparent in every aspect of socio - economic life: in trade, the award of contracts, appointments to government jobs, and many other spheres.

Indians have to face the discrimination in all parts of East Africa. In 1967, the Government of Kenya started the Kenyanisation of its economy, when all non-citizens, largely Indians were asked to take work and residence permit. It allowed them to trade only in restricted areas and specified items. Though, it was a purely internal policy measure of the Kenyan government. Indian advised them to surrender British passport and get local move but not many responded to it, for to accept the advice to mix with Africans seemed to imply that Indians should give their daughters in marriage to local Africans. The PIO were not ready to do that.

Situation was most vulnerable in Uganda during the period of Idi Amin. Indians since soon become the economic elite of their country of adaptation. In fact they were controlling almost the whole economy of the respective country. The economic achievement of Indians in Uganda made the indigenous jealous of them. A type of distrust emerged in the society about the Indians whom indigenous saw as exploiter of the economy.

The words of Idi Amin are enough to expose the distrust:

“Marketing of cash crops such as coffee and cotton was carried out entirely by Asians. The Asians had monopoly of the processing and marketing of these crops, although they never went down to dig and did not know the problems of the farmer’s crops with the least investment. When the Asians dominated the buying processing and marketing of farmer’s crops, they limited the opportunity of Ugandans to acquire knowledge and experience in

the field. The foreign language they used and the family investment in the business made it impossible for the African farmers to know the profit margin and price” (Syed 1996: 47)

Dictator Idi Amin’s announcement to expel Asians, he wanted to see all Asians be out of Uganda within three months. He was of the opinion that Asians in Uganda are sabotaging the economy, encouraging corruption and therefore there is no room for them in Uganda. Amin described the expulsion of the PIO as part of the war of liberation.

Idi Amin’s statement –

“We are determined to make the ordinary Ugandan master of his own destiny, and above all to see that he enjoys the wealth of his country. Our deliberate policy is to transfer the economic control of Uganda into the hands of Ugandans, for the first time in our country's history” (Jorgensen 1981: 288)

According to Ugandan census report of 1969, there had been 74,308 Asians in Uganda of which 25,657 regarded themselves as Ugandan citizen but by the end of 1972 there were only few hundred PIO’s left in whole Uganda. PIO’s were not only forced to leave behind their country but also harshly victimised. Keeping aside all the conventions of respecting for Human rights and personal dignity of a human being, the departing PIO’s were beaten up, the females raped, and property including personal possessions and ornaments were forcibly taken from them by the country’s military and police officers.

Idi Amin, in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, assured the world body that the Asians being expelled would be allowed to take their possessions and there would be no mistreatment of those leaving. In reality, expelled persons were allowed to take out of the country no more than \$131. A pecuniary limitation of \$ 131 was placed on personal possessions and they were not allowed to take that also. Many of them were made to leave behind valuable items like

jewellery, cameras, etc. (Jorgensen 1981: 288). In the end, even those possessions which they were allowed to take out were not allowed and left there. Thus, Diaspora had suffered a lot during that time but Indian government policy was still that of non - interference.

2.1.2.1 Why Asians in general and Indians in particular were the target?

The period December 1971 - November 1972 has been discussed in detail in order to highlight the issues, policy changes. Amin's speeches and statements do provide some insight into the expulsion of Indians from Uganda. The concept of visibility is important in understanding the Indian expulsions. Through this visibility in the Ugandan setting one can look into the reason which made Indians the targets of criticism and ultimately expulsion, which includes basically historical forces, the way of life and behaviour of the Indians, mixture of physiognomy and the attitude of African towards them.

Indians had come to the end of the road in Uganda, partly, because of historical developments which placed them in the role of middle-men in the professions, bureaucracy, and commercial sector in Uganda. Colonial policy had been deliberate in bringing this about, for Indians were denied a role as land owners and were concentrated in the lower echelons of administration and commerce. Thus, they were often labelled agents of colonialism in Uganda.

This description ought to be placed in proper perspective, for Indians had little choice with respect to the role they would play in the development of Uganda; Indians were denied any real political power to alter the tone and direction of colonial policy and, as a minority, Indians could either emigrate, accept the role they had been channelled into, or protest their position. The fact remains that they were never powerful enough to alter policy decisions made by the Government.

Historically, Indians were a transplanted, immigrant community which differed physically from the indigenous black population. Indeed, the Indian community was seen as a different community. If a Northern Ugandan came to Kampala and engaged in any occupation, even that of a trader, he would have confronted little difficulty

merging with the local Ugandans. But for the Indian, no matter where he might be in Uganda, such assimilation was impossible; it was prevented by his very appearance.

The greatest goodwill and effort in the world could not have rendered a brown brush mark invisible on a black canvas. The historical separation of races did not help matters. Anything it reinforced was an insular attitude and behaviour which found Indians preoccupied with ameliorating the effects of discrimination against them in many aspects of their lives. Institutionalized separation of the races also fed the fire of misunderstanding between the races in Uganda.

On the socio - economic scale, Indians were the middle men and while there were many poor Indians in Uganda, as a group they were patently better off than the indigenous African. This also helped shape their attitudes and behaviour as a community apart from and superior to that of black Ugandans. But of course Indian attitudes and behaviour – however much shaped by historical circumstance within Uganda - were also shaped by Indian tradition. Elements of this tradition often militated against close contact with black Ugandans. It was not unusual to find that Indians possessed attitudes of superiority and negative pictures of the ability and efficiency of Africans.

No doubt one could find instances of African inefficiency and lack of ability - especially (as far as the Indian was concerned), in the business world - but stereotyped thinking on the part of Indians with respect to Africans was fairly general. Many Indians prided themselves the inheritors of an ancient civilization and looked upon the African as a person who had a long way to go before attaining the heights of the Indian civilization.

These attitudes were certainly not well received by the African, and resentment at this sort of stereotyped thinking was understandable. But such thinking was not confined to the Indian. Many white expatriates in independent Uganda could be accused of the same kind of prejudice. And of course the African was not immune from stereotyped thinking either. As Mazrui has argued, Indophobia is not something invented by Amin.

Indophobia is defined as,

“a tendency to react negatively towards people of Indian extraction. Cultural Indophobia is a reaction against aspects of Indian culture and normative habits; economic Indophobia in East Africa has been a resentment of Indians as a successful economic group” (Patel 1972: 19).

The Indian was frequently looked upon as merely a trader, without much attention to the occupational diversification which characterized each succeeding generation. The typical Indian dukawalla engaged in bargaining while selling his goods and this fed the impression that the typical Indian was a cheater. There was no recognition of the fact that the duka is not the only businessman to bargain and that only the styles of bar-gaining differ according to the nature of the business. Still, one could not blame the African buyer if he went away feeling cheated because the article he had just bought from one Indian duka could be had more cheaply from another. In the trading pattern which had developed in East Africa and which constituted the bazaar economy, fixed prices were a rarity.

Another image which worked to the disadvantage of Indians was that of the typical duka being involved in a family business. Here again it was not often understood that the Indian - like any other Ugandan - could hardly be expected to forsake the welfare of his family for others. The desire to promote the advancement of family members is not confined to Indians, nor is it necessarily to be viewed as wrong in principle.

Stereotyped thinking on the part of Africans often saw the Indian as unwilling to fraternize with the African, smug and self-sufficient in his society, and conservative to the core. No doubt there was some truth in such characterizations, but often a finer appreciation of the realities of Indian life was absent. Indian society in Uganda was often ridden with its own internal cleavages and members of this society were not, in practice, self-sufficient.

The fact that most Indians, when given the opportunity to do so, had not opted for Ugandan citizenship contributed to the negative perceptions held by Africans. As far as citizenship was concerned, most Indians:

“who adopted British citizenship did so purely and simply as an exercise in the economic lottery. They had no special feelings for Britain, and the great majority of them had never been to Britain and did not even intend to go there. The calculation was in terms of acquiring the British economic umbrella to ensure them economic security within East Africa while they themselves continued to live there. The Asians had carried the entrepreneurial culture to its logical extreme - citizenship itself became an exercise in cost - benefit analysis, a theorem in profit and loss” (Patel 1972: 20)

The citizenship issue supplied a legitimate excuse for government in Uganda to economically de-Indianise the country. After all, it is the duty of every government to protect its own citizens first and give them priority over non - citizens.

Because of its domestic positioning, lack of networking and absence of a strong global organisation, the Indian Diaspora has failed to mobilise its resources and strength when it faced crisis as in Uganda. The second reason for its feeble impact in international area is the weak position of the origin country. India, though big in population, economically and militarily it is not so strong and therefore it can neither help effectively nor do PIO look towards it for vital support during crisis.

2.1.2.2 Crisis through Diaspora lens

East Africa provides an interesting case for considering the many complications that comes to the foreground when we consider matters through a Diaspora studies lens. Indians were first brought to East Africa as indentured labour from about the 1890s. The indentured labour policy was itself designed as a response to the abolition of slavery in the 1840s to take account of the needs of plantation owners who now felt their plantations were sure to collapse due to the loss of slave labour.

When the policy was extended to East Africa it was mainly to provide non - African labour for building the East African railway line that the British administration wished to develop. One feature of these Indians in East Africa was that most of them were skilled labour, being mainly technicians, blacksmiths, woodworkers, etc. They were specifically targeted for their skills. After the termination of the indentured

labour policy in the 1920s some of them decided to remain in the region. Being mostly male, they were encouraged to marry and bring their wives over from India.

By the 1960s, and after the independence of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, the Indians had not only become a central part of the civil service administration but also considered themselves African. An effect of this was that by the 1960s the myth of return, long taken as a defining feature of Diaspora, had been progressively abandoned by the East African Indians. Having come from largely rural areas in India they were also now heavily urbanized and used to negotiating with urban institutions.

The policy of Africanisation that was instituted in East Africa following Independence was to trigger a new process of diasporisation for these Indians. Africanisation meant a form of affirmative action to rectify racial anomalies within the government sector that had been prevalent during the rule of the British administration. But the effects of the policy proved to be deleterious for the Indian community. They were forced to take early retirement or in several cases were relieved from their jobs. And in Uganda, Idi Amin was to trigger a mass migration of South Indians from Uganda and from the rest of the region.

The Africanisation of the civil service in East Africa and the violent policies of Idi Amin generated the process of twice migrant phenomenon. For many of these Indians now had to migrate again, moving to the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. Because of their highly urbanized and technocratic and administrative skills, these migrants were very different from Indians who had originally migrated to the Western countries directly from India itself. In the UK it did not take long for the East African Indians to enter into the higher levels of the civil service and businesses; most of them bought their own homes shortly after arrival in the UK, again distinguishing them sharply from direct migrants from India.

What was most important is that because of the gradual process of shedding the myth of return (since they had no inclination to go back to India and could not return to East Africa) they consolidated their families firmly within the new societies in the West, they had settled into. Furthermore, unlike migrants coming directly from India, the East African Indians were often able to move with an entire three -

generation set of a family with them to their new homes, thus allowing them to rapidly replicate the community networks in their new locations that had been firmly evolved within their East African societies in 1890s.

What we see then is that there are prolific intersections between African Studies and Diaspora Studies. There are certain questions that this brief account of the East African Indian Diaspora brings to the foreground. The first is how much they allow us to see the complexity in the Diaspora phenomenon. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the East African Indians could be described as a labour Diaspora, and thus similar to the Indians who found themselves in Guyana and other places. But by the 1930s and 40s and after two generations of settlement they had become a vibrant trade and administrative Diaspora.

The concept of trade Diaspora also allow to bring into view the long trading relations that Gujarati Indians had with the East African coast from at least the 14th century onwards. However, following the process of Africanisation and Idi Amin's brutal policies, the East African Indians were very much a victim Diaspora, thus comparable to the Jewish, Armenian, and African American traditions. Thus, by the 1970s the East African Indians represented a telescoped form of the various phases diasporisation. In their particular case the early migrants were male and had a strong focus on the homeland of India. The next phase was that of family re-unification from the 1920s and 30s, and the third was the consolidation of community ties within the new location.

In a way by the time the East African Indians became re-diasporised from the 1970s they had reached the tail end of the multi-phased diasporisation process. Thus when they migrated they had a more secure consciousness of their identity and social networks and were able to reproduce these relatively rapidly within their new Western locations.

2.1.3 Present condition of the Indian Diaspora in East Africa

After the expulsion, most of the Indians migrated to Britain, Canada, India, Pakistan and the USA. Only 1,000 remained behind in Uganda. Amin was ousted in 1979. Uganda and her East African neighbours, Kenya and Tanzania, experienced in the

late 1970s and the early 1980s declining economic situation contributed by the decline in agricultural production, fall in the production of export crops, increase in oil prices and severe deficits in the national balance of payments. They accepted the rehabilitation plans the IMF and the World Bank, which included liberalization of markets, establishments of a multi-party democracy and rehabilitation of the Asians (Lal, Brij V, 2007: 259).

Yoweri Museveni became the president of Uganda in 1986 and ended the civil war and encouraged the Asians to return and invest in Uganda. The government returned over 5,000 properties and businesses of Asians earlier confiscated. The Ugandan Asians say that more than 50 per cent of confiscated properties of the Asians are yet to be returned by the government (Lal, Brij V, 2007: 259). In 1991, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni invited the Asians to return and invest in Uganda.

A new era of social, political and economic changes followed the inauguration of Ali Hassan Mwinyi as the nation's president in 1985. Economic policies moved from emphasizing small-scale communal production in agriculture to the support of large-scale farms. Former coffee and sisal estates were denationalized and the Building Acquisition Act of 1971 was loosened. While these efforts improved the lot of many Indians, they continued to suffer formal discrimination from the state, which until the 1990's, did not allow citizens of South Asians background into the ranks of the civil service. Informal discrimination against South Asians also continues in daily life.

Obviously, very few Indians returned to Uganda. Of the 12,800 claimants registered with the foreign office, only 900 properties have been reclaimed. The Ugandan experience left behind a deep scar among the Asians of the region. The Asians are afraid that the Ugandan story could at any time produce a sequel elsewhere. In 2000, Uganda had 23,300 PIO's constituting 0.03 percent of the country's population.

The dilemma that Asians in East Africa find themselves in currently is that they have neither the political nor the institutional capacity to counter anti-Asian sentiments. In spite of their generous contributions to building hospitals and schools, and the provision of social services, their role has been underplayed because of the lack of Asian representation in the media and politics.

In addition, there is a clear need for Asians to articulate a new industry for themselves in East Africa. Two options exist: the old option, favoured by many South Asian traders and businessmen, emphasizes the need to maintain a low profile through ‘silent diplomacy’, i.e. by not participating in the public debate, living a sober life and not showing their wealth; and the second option, favoured by many middle-class professionals, writers and artists is the celebration of an ‘African Asian’ identity in which they emphasise their loyalty to their home, Africa. This option was highlighted during the popular Asian heritage exhibition in Nairobi. Reflecting the changing times, the exhibition sought to challenge stereotypes about the Asian community while acknowledging that the community is as much a part of modern Africa as any other group.

However, Ugandan crisis made India realized that the leadership and political system of African states vary considerably from country to country and Indian support to Afro-Asian solidarity had to be qualified by longer national interests. These expulsions brought home another point to India. Despite Indians consistent support to African decolonization and Afro-Asian solidarity none of the African countries howsoever friendly to India and opposed to Idi Amin’s action, offered to accommodate expelled Indians even in smaller number as a gesture to sympathise with Indians.

The 1980s and early 1990s saw considerable improvements in race relations between Africans and Indians in East Africa. Public debate shifted from Africanisation in the colonial period to socialism (independent Tanzania) and capitalism (independent Kenya and Uganda), and to the ‘indigenisation of South Asians’ in the 1980s and 1990s. An important reason for this shift was the declining economic situation in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, which made it necessary to re-establish the economic and social roles of Asians in East Africa.

The most profound example of these changes in East Africa was the rehabilitation of the Ugandan Asians. When President Yoweri Museveni gained powers in 1986 in Uganda, he ended years of civil war and promoted Uganda as a secular state. During the same period, public debate in Tanzania saw a shift in rhetoric. In the economically difficult years of the early 1980s, Tanzanian Asians were seen as

smugglers, quick money-makers and ‘evil barons’, but following the implementation of the IMF programme, they were seen as the ‘saviours’ of the economy.

2.2 Backdrop of Tanzania

Tanzania, officially United Republic of Tanzania, is the country that was formed by the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. It is located in the East Africa bordered by Kenya and Uganda to the North; Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, and Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to the South. The name Tanzania derived from the first syllable of the name of the two states, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, united to form the country.

2.2.1 Indian Diaspora in Tanzania

There are evidences of permanent settlements of Indian traders along the coast of East Africa. The other dominant trading community included Arabs who developed Mogadishu and Mombasa as great trading centers. Indian traders, manufacturers and clove cultivators were concentrated in Zanzibar. They were both Hindu (mainly Vaishyas) and Muslims (Ismailis and Bohras). In the nineteenth century, Indian merchants began to acquire increasingly important roles in the commercial and financial life of the sultanate. Apart from their near monopoly of the wholesale and distributive trade, some of the leading Indian traders provided the main banking and financial services available in Zanzibar.

The Indian merchants in this way were a critical juncture between urban and rural markets, serving their host societies by providing investment capital to facilitate agricultural production even when local people could not afford initial investment in seeds for planting or other necessary materials. In addition to their role as rural credit agents, the Indians commonly purchased the remainder of the harvest for cash and arranged for its sale in urban markets. In this capacity, the Indians served their host by extending a monetised economy into the countryside, facilitating the collection of taxes in cash. They also serve them by importing necessary goods, purchasing local products and arranging for their export, and supplying a considerable tax income for the treasury. The combination of these factors at least partly explains the motivation

of Muslim administrators to protect the Indian merchants and ensure that they could conduct their business in a safe, predictable and reasonably agreeable social climate.

2.2.1.1 Historical Background

In 1832, the Arab ruler Seyyid Said shifted his capital from Oman to Zanzibar. Many Indian traders in Oman followed him to Zanzibar. The Sultan entered into a treaty with Britain in 1839 which guaranteed the British subjects to stay and trade within the Sultan's dominion. A British consulate was established in Zanzibar, due to these developments, the number of Indian traders in Zanzibar steadily grew from 2,500 in 1870 to 6,000 in the early 1900s. Most of them were Muslims and the rest were Hindus (mainly Lohans, Shahs and Patels).

Majority of the free migrants in East Africa are from the areas of Gujarat and Sind in India. Gujarati and Kutchi are the predominant Indian language spoken in East Africa. In 1890, East Africa was partitioned among the European powers. Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890. When Germany was defeated in the World War I, Tanganyika too became a British protectorate. Indian merchants began to acquire increasingly important roles in the commercial and financial life of the Tanzania. Apart from their near monopoly of the wholesale and distributive trade, some of the leading Indian traders provided the main banking and financial services available in Zanzibar. They were involved in the trade of ivory, spices, goat skin, dried fish and agricultural cargo (Oonk, 2007:255).

According to Sir Bartle Frere, who visited Zanzibar in 1873,

“the preponderating influence of the Indian trader along some 6,000 miles of sea coast in Africa and its islands, and nearly the same extent in Asia, the Indian trader is, if not the monopolist, the most influential, permanent, and all pervading element of the commercial community” (Jain, 1993).

The number of Indians also rose steadily from an estimated 1,200 in 1844 to about 6,000 in 1960. After the First World War Tanganyika, the German East African colony came under the control of the British. Large number of Indians in Tanzania

grew in 1921 and to 40,500 in 1939. By the end of the European colonial era in 1961, the population of PIOs in Tanganyika was 92,000 and 22,000 in Zanzibar.

Sir John Kirk reported that the estimated capital invested in Zanzibar Island in 1873 was not less than 1.6 million pounds. The number of Indians also rose steadily from an estimated 1,200 in 1844 to about 6,000 in 1960. In Zanzibar, there lived “the ‘Chotara’ or a half-caste breed between the Indian and the Swahili”. Extensive South Asian penetration of the East African interior occurred in the immediate aftermath of the European colonial partition, at the very end of the nineteenth century. There were rarely sufficient densities of either Arabs or Asians in inland East African townships before the First World War (Twaddle, 1990: 153).

After the First World War Tanganyika, the German East African colony came under the control of the British. Large numbers of Indians joined the civil service. The number of Indians in Tanzania grew from 23,981 in 1921 (10,209 in Tanganyika and 13,772 in Zanzibar) to 40,500 in 1939 (25,000 in Tanganyika and 15,500 in Zanzibar) (Gregory, 1993). A large number of Hindus migrated from India mainly from Gujarat and Punjab. They outnumbered Muslim South Asians. By the end of the European colonial era in 1961, the population of PIOs in Tanganyika was 92,000 and 22,000 in Zanzibar (Gregory, 1963). Hindus accounted for around 70 percent of all East African Asians (Ramchandani: 1967).

2.2.1.2 Political involvement of Indians

The first sign of Indians entering the politics in Zanzibar came in 1909, when the Committee of Indians was formed in Zanzibar which was later renamed the Indian National Association. In 1914, the East African Indian National Congress (EAINC) was established which tried to unite all the Indians in East Africa. Over a period of time, the organization got divided over political issues. In the 1950s, the EAINC was renamed the Kenyan Indian Congress and Tanganyikan Indians established the Asian Association. These political associations fought discrimination. In 1926, the legislative council was established in Tanganyika. It had 13 official and 10 non-official seats. The Asians had only three non-official seats and the Africans had none. Higher posts in the civil service were not given to the Asians. Still Indians’ status was much better than that of Africans (Oonk, 2007: 256).

In Tanganyika, it was the local framework of racial categories and related policies of segregation in quarters and schools which served as the main impetus for a feeling of Indian unity, while also strengthening communal ties. Religion, caste, political attitudes, gender, and class informed relations between the different Indians were responsible for divergent relations with the state. Economically, class divisions became more pronounced. State policies encouraging African agricultural cooperatives made it increasingly difficult for Indian traders and shopkeepers to buy crops. Many small Indian crafts like shoe-making, tin-smithing and tailoring “simply collapsed under pressure of mass- produced imports” (Stichproben 2013: 16). On the other hand, Indians who had managed to diversify their economic activities or collect rents in the towns were able to accumulate substantial physical and financial capital. This group supported British colonialism.

Conflicts between the different religious communities led to stiffer sectarianism. The Ismailia Council petitioned the British government to censor Hindu-owned newspapers in which supposedly ridiculing articles about their leader, the Aga Khan, had been published (Brennan 2011: 54). Communal violence was expressed also more openly in stone-throwing during parades in honour of Gandhi or the Aga Khan. Developments within the communities and their relation to the state were influenced by transnational connections. For instance, the Aga Khan instructed the Ismaili Khojas in Tanganyika in 1952 to follow a policy of Westernisation (Stichproben 2013: 17).

In the government-owned newspaper *Mambo Leo* (Current Affairs), Indians and specifically their economic strategies were keenly debated among editors and readers who sent in their letters. Already in the first issue from 1923, the author of an article entitled “The Africa of Tomorrow” (*Afrika ya kesho*), giving himself the name “Native of the country” (*Mwenyeji wa nchi*), describes Indians as those who control the trade and make profits – which they are going to take with them when returning to India, leaving “us” Africans and “our stupidity” behind (Stichproben 2013: 17). Indians, as strangers (*wageni*) are contrasted with Africans, who fail to conduct business in a successful way. The articles in *Mambo Leo* mark the early stage of a relation between “Africans” and “Indians” as constructed groups in which Indians

serve as the constitutive “Other” for African nationalists. As James Brennan (2012: 2) stated:

For most Africans in colonial and early postcolonial Dar es Salaam, that ‘Other’ was neither the town’s European community, which figured so prominently in Africa’s settler colonies, nor its similarly small Arab population, which figured so prominently in neighbouring Zanzibar. Rather, it was the town’s Indian community, who outnumbered Europeans and Arabs combined by nearly four to one, and who constituted roughly one quarter of colonial Dar es Salaam’s population.

“Racial” consciousness was stimulated not only through economic circuits (African producers – Indian traders and shop-owners – African consumers) and the zoning of residential areas, but also through wartime policies of rationing during World War II. The state allocated and distributed resources and ration according to (its knowledge of) community needs. Here, taxonomies based on “racial” criteria were used to the greatest disadvantage of African consumers. African resentment against Indians grew. Unlike Europeans, they were visible profiteers in the racialised rationing schemes of the state and they also dominated the visible channels of the black market. The figure of Indians not “belonging” to East Africa became more popular during British colonialism as the counter-image to those who belonged to the territory (Stichproben 2013:18).

Experiences during the years of World War II shaped the opinions and strategies of nationalist leaders. Especially in the tense situation of Dar es Salaam, popular African politics made wide use of racial categories (Brennan 2012: 16-17). Together with Arabs, Asians were increasingly identified by African intellectuals as Tanganyika’s “chief malefactors” and obstacles to African self-improvement in the 1940s and 1950s (Brennan 2006: 392, 404). British efforts to establish political “multiracialism” with equal numbers of representatives for Asians and Europeans as for Africans generated a heightened awareness of “racial” identities and fears of a persistent Asian-European minority rule (Stichproben 2013:18). “Racial” polemics necessarily also hit those Indian nationalists who “attempted to guide African post war politics toward a generic critique of European unaccountability” (Brennan 2012: 158).

Contributions like these were marginalised or forgotten in the decades that followed. Ideas brought forward in Indian newspapers in 1940s, for instance concerning the derogatory nature of the English term “native” which should be exchanged against “African,” significantly shaped the intellectual framework of African nationalism (Brennan 2011: 53). The generic anti-colonialist stance of some Indian papers was appropriated, as were more universal concepts of “civilization” and majority rule. The African nationalist newspapers which emerged in the 1950s (Mwafrika, Sauti ya TANU, Zuhra) were supported by Indian capital (Stichproben 2013:18-19). While most Indians, being mainly concerned with business, distanced themselves from or even ridiculed the struggle for the control of the state, a number of “radical” Indians whole-heartedly supported African nationalism.

The Tanganyika Asian Association, established in 1950, tried not only to reconcile Indians and Pakistanis, but also identified with Tanganyika and African nationalism. Its leaders frequently met with Julius Nyerere and other TANU representatives. After the new “multi-racial” constitution of 1955 was introduced, in which Europeans, Asians and Africans were allotted one third each of the Legislative Council’s seats, TANU also sponsored Asian candidates and thus win the elections of 1958/59 with an overwhelming success. Yet, all of these interconnections were seldom, if ever, acknowledged (Stichproben 2013:19).

In the African Association, the most important nationalist organisation which became the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954, so-called machotara or “half-castes” (most of whom were born to African mothers but had an Indian or Arab father) were barred from membership. Only by 1955 were they allowed to join – on the condition that they legally classified themselves as natives. Julius Nyerere later remembered that this partial decision resulted from the lobbying of African women, “who said that after all they were their children” (Nyerere cited in Brennan 2012: 151). The party was opened for persons of all origins shortly after Independence. Approximately half of the members of the dissolving Asian Association registered with TANU (Brennan 2006: 420; Brennan 2012: 148-155).

Despite of these differences, Indians have actively participated in freedom struggle in Tanzania. In 1909, the committee of Indians was formed in Zanzibar. It was later renamed the Indian National Association. In 1914, the East African Indian National Congress (EAINC) was established which tried to unite the all the Indians in East Africa. These political associations fought discrimination. In 1926, the legislative council was established in Tanganyika. It had 13 official and 10 non-official seats. The Asians had only three non official seats and the Africans had none.

Over a period of time, the organization got divided over political issues. In the 1950's, Indians began to divide amongst themselves over the issue of African nationalism (Gregory: 1981: 264). Tanganyikan Indians established the Asian Association (Oonk: 2007: 260). Among the Hindus, the Patels, were generally the closest to the Europeans. With a tradition of high government service in Gujarat, they occupied a large number of the clerical posts in East Africa. Among the Muslims, the Ahmadiya sect was definitely the most supportive of the British connection. As Punjabi Muslims separate from both Sunnis and Shias, the Ahmadiyas observed a decree from their founder that every member must render perfect obedience to the Government. In 1942 when apprised of this, the Tanganyika Government considered asking an Ahmadiya leader to give speeches urging support of the war effort. The political leaders of the Muslim community tended to associate closely with the Government, and certain of their actions, in Kenya at least, can be interpreted as collaboration. Early in the twenties as Hindus surpassed the Muslims in size of population and began to dominate Indian political organization.

Due to differences in attitude and aims of leaders, new Organizations designed to replace the older Indian Association, which had more overtly political emphasis. Among the twenty founders were K. L. Jhaveri, Habib Jamal, A. A. Adamjee, M. N. Rattansey, J. K. Chande, and D. K. Patel, on the whole younger men representative of nearly all segments of the Asian community in Tanganyika. Central to their aims were a common roll and a universal adult franchise (Gregory, 1981: 264). By then Africans, Asians, and Europeans all were in the Legislative Council, but all were still nominated, and there was no all-embracing African political organization. In 1951 when a United Nations mission visited Tanganyika, the Asian Association presented

a very forward petition requesting a common roll, universal adult franchise, and independence within twenty years.

Subsequently the Asian Association's leaders began to meet frequently with Africans, including Julius Nyerere, to consider formation of an African organization. They helped to institute Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954 and afterwards to further its progress. Indeed, some of the initial TANU meetings were held in Jhaveri's home. Two Asian brothers, Surendra and Randhir Thaker, also devoted their printing works to issuing the TANU weekly *Mwafrika* and in 1959 established their own newspaper *Ngurumo* (Thunder) as a voice for African independence. In promoting African interests, these Asian leaders provoked opposition not only from the Government, but also from many others in their own community (Gregory, 1981: 262-264). When they began to support TANU in their newspaper, Government often sent police and CID to their office.

In 1956, anticipating the critical general election of September 1958, Twining, the then Governor of Tanganyika, took the lead in initiating the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) with a platform of multi-racialism, a communal roll, and parity of representation in opposition to TANU's common franchise and 'one man one vote'. Although Asians were not permitted to join TANU, the party endorsed ten Asian candidates, some of whom faced African opponents. To the gratification of the Asian Association, TANU won by an overwhelming margin, and all three candidates put forward by the Association- Rattansey, Jhevari, and Amir Jamal-were elected. The 1958 election saw the end not only of the UTP, but also of earlier Asian factionalism. The disaffected Asians now tended to rejoin the Association and lend enthusiastic support to TANU (Gregory, 1981:266).

After the win in the election Julius Nyerere pays tribute to the role of Indian community in freedom struggle and the election. He quotes the words written in the report of the Royal Commission on East Africa:

“The remarkable tenacity and courage of the Indian trader has been mainly responsible for stimulating the wants of the indigenous people even in the remotest areas, by opening to them a shop window on the modern world and for collecting for sale elsewhere whatever small

surpluses are available for disposal. The royal commission in that passage paid tribute to the trading activities of the Indian community, but we would like to add to that tribute the professional, managerial and artisan sections of the community which have contributed equally to the steady development of the territory. In the public life the Indian community has never been lacking in civic minded men, prepared to give up their time to sit in legislative Council and on local government councils and on the numerous boards, committees and other such bodies which do so much work for the people of this territory and are such a feature of the democratic type of government which we are trying to develop here”(J.K Nyerere, 1974: 6).

But his words proved to be of having no effect as the rewards to those who had faithfully supported TANU, however, were minimal.

2.2.1.3 Condition of Indian diaspora post independence

The postcolonial state under the leadership of Julius Nyerere quickly abandoned colonial categories of race and gradually employed a new political terminology of Ujamaa (familyhood) and African Socialism (Brennan 2006: 395). In the interplay with popular discourses, Ujamaa rhetorics also had consequences for the Indian population. Although Indians were not targeted as a specific group of malefactors in official communications, the actualisation of the categories in popular and also some few state-sponsored discourses definitely pointed to a unidimensional image of Asians as exploiters.

All nationalists agreed that “membership in the new nation depended on the commitment of each citizen to combat exploitation and the enemies who thrive on it” (Brennan 2006: 391). To achieve true independence required to break free from all kinds of exploitation, and a true member of the Tanzanian nation-state could only be the individual who was committed to fight exploitation. In this wider debate of citizenship and development, Indians figured-meanwhile almost a tradition-as scapegoats.

The Swahili word for exploitation, “unyonyaji”, carries a strong metaphorical content which was widely shared in East Africa. It literally means “sucking”, and was portrayed in cartoons with images of Indians, Europeans, Arabs and malevolent Africans sucking blood and other fluids from Africans (Brennan 2006: 392-393). Two terms also used by Nyerere (in a general sense) were “parasites” (wanyonyaji) and “ticks” (makupe). “Parasites” and “ticks” were common metaphors in the 1960s and 1970s for people whose behaviour purportedly made national development impossible. Rhetorical de-humanisations as these are a characteristic element of both racism against “foreign groups” and the degradation of other, “inner” groups (Brennan 2006: 393). The ideology of Ujamaa was presented as the “medicine” (dawa) against the exploitation, a term reverberating with the popular language of healing and discourses of witchcraft (Brennan 2006: 399). It would thus be insufficient to read the state’s language only as contained in speeches and documents, for it was interconnected with popular discourses. In debates of good citizenship, Indians were displayed as the non-citizens and exploiters par excellence (Brennan 2006: 413). Africans expected and demanded more from Asians than from Europeans, whether in intermarriage or in the participation in nation-building activities (Stichproben 2013:21).

In 1962, shortly after independence, Julius Nyerere proclaimed that there was “[n]o room for land parasites” (cited in Brennan 2006: 394). All lands were effectively nationalised, which disproportionately affected Indians. The same is true of banks, industries and services which were turned into state property following the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The status as a middleman minority was henceforth gone, or at least considerably weakened. Many Indians, especially those without a Tanzanian citizenship, were forced to give up their posts in schools and civil service due to a programme of Africanisation. The “racial” distinction between Tanganyikan citizens of African and Asian origin was only upheld until 1964. Nyerere, despite facing hostility from fellow party members and the army, argued that “we cannot allow the growth of a first and second class citizenship. Both as a matter of principle and as a matter of common sense, discrimination against certain Tanganyikan citizens on grounds of origin must go” (Stichproben 2013:22).

In their position as traders, Indians were affected adversely through the state's monopolisation of foreign trade and the government-sponsored establishment of agricultural cooperatives. Dual citizenship was not allowed, meaning that Indians are not automatically qualified for Tanganyikan citizenship at independence, had to choose. Almost all of those who opted for Tanganyika were granted Tanganyikan nationality, but certain TANU members continually demanded that it be denied to them. Rewards for those Indians who had supported African nationalism were minimal. Nyerere's first cabinet was made up of seven Africans, four Europeans and just one Asian. Still, Indians remained politically active in the TANU so that in 1968, 10% of all TANU cell-leaders in Dar es Salaam were Asians, but very few occupied higher positions than cell-leader. Voigt- Graf (1998: 96) argues in this relation that Indian support of Nyerere's policies was probably less grounded in a hailing of socialist economic principles but more in a support of his principle of non-discrimination. Maltreatment of Indians in Uganda and Kenya as well as anti-Indian remarks from other TANU members contributed to their persistent involvement in politics to actively prevent similar events in Tanzania.

In Zanzibar, President Abeid Karume held convictions pretty much opposite to Nyerere's principle of non-discrimination. The revolution in 1964 had been openly anti-Arab, with thousands of Arabs being killed. There had been almost no casualties among Indians, but many shops had been looted. Most Indians fled to the mainland in the aftermath of the revolution and in the following years. In 1970, Karume demanded that all Indians without Tanzanian citizenship be expelled within one year.

In 1961, some 112,000 Indians had lived in Tanzania (including then still colonial Zanzibar) (Stichproben 2013: 22-23). By 1980, not even 60,000 remained. Emigration intensified in the years following independence. A case-in-point was the Building Acquisition Act passed in 1971. Following popular pressure, the government nationalised all buildings worth over 100,000 Tanzanian Shillings which were not entirely occupied by the owner in April 1971. The lists of the affected buildings, which were published in the newspapers the following day, named almost exclusively buildings owned by Indians. In front of a political parade-cum-celebratory march made up of several thousand Africans, Nyerere proclaimed that the goal of the Building Acquisition Act was "to prevent the

emergence of a class of people who live and thrive by exploiting others” (Brennan 2012: 4). The socialist terminology also evoked, as shown above, racist stereotypes of Indians. Nyerere admitted in 1997 that he saw himself forced to nationalise buildings and businesses lest racial conflicts would arise (Brennan 2012: 199). Asian themselves also perceived the State’s policies through a “racial lens” and felt severely discriminated, “which in turn enhanced the segregation and ethnic consciousness” (Stichproben 2013: 23). However, the conditions improved after globalization. Tanzanian Asians were seen as smugglers, quick money-makers and ‘evil barons’, but following the implementation of the IMF programme, they were seen as the ‘saviours’ of the economy.

2.3 Comparison of Indian-Tanzanians with Indian diaspora in other East African states

During the colonial period both the Africans and colonial officials regarded the Indians in East Africa as a single group. The Indians themselves often acted as a united force despite their communal differences. From the early 1900s, they established numerous political organizations in order to speak with one voice. Though they have to face the biasness, except Kenya, in other areas they gained success. In 1934, the government of Zanzibar introduced legislation to protect the interests of Arab clove traders and planters. Indians in Zanzibar, protested strongly against the measures, and won their rights.

The independence of the East African states in the early 1960s raised question about the nature of the Indian settlements. Were Indians to be seen as settled ‘Asian Africans’ or were they temporary migrants. By the late 1960s, the East African economy declined and the uncertainties and consequences, following the independence of the East African states were to have an adverse impact on the Indian community. The push towards rapid Africanisation resulted in the adoption of various discriminatory schemes in East African countries. Most terrible situation was in the Uganda; Dictator Idi Amin accused Asians of the ‘economic sabotage’ of the country. Despite the fact that neither Kenya nor Tanzania followed the Uganda pattern, insecurities in these countries also caused massive migration.

From the late 1960's, the future of Asians in East Africa became uncertain. They knew that they would have to leave one day, and yet held on to the hope that this would not be the case. Their most pressing concern, and therefore the most important subject of their conversations, was how much time they had and what stage they had reached in securing a British visa or a local work permit. Following the nationalisation projects across the regions, they did their best to secure economic and social capital. Information on who was reliable in the immigration office, the export department or the foreign exchange section became increasingly valuable. However, not all Indians had the means or the right network to access these channels of information.

Indians were the middle men on socio-economic scale, and while there were many poor Indians in East Africa, as a group they were patently better off than the indigenous African. This also helped shape their attitudes and behaviour as a community apart from and superior to that of black Africans. But of course Indian attitudes and behaviour – however much shaped by historical circumstance within Africa - were also shaped by Indian tradition. Elements of this tradition often militated against close contact with black Africans. It was not unusual to find that Indians possessed attitudes of superiority and negative pictures of the ability and efficiency of Africans. No doubt one could find instances of African inefficiency and lack of ability - especially (as far as the Indian was concerned), in the business world - but stereotyped thinking on the part of Indians with respect to Africans was fairly general. Many Indians prided themselves the inheritors of an ancient civilization and looked upon the African as a person who had a long way to go before attaining the heights of the Indian civilization.

Africans hence did not taken this attitude of Indians well, and resentment at this sort of stereotyped thinking was understandable. But such thinking was not confined to the Indian. Many white expatriates in independent Uganda could be accused of the same kind of prejudice. And of course the African was not immune from stereotyped thinking either. After the expulsion, most of the Ugandan South Asians migrated to Britain, Canada, India, Pakistan and the United States of America. Amin was ousted in 1979.

Uganda and her East African neighbours, Kenya and Tanzania, experienced in the late 1970s and the early 1980s declining economic situation contributed by the decline in agricultural production, fall in the production of export crops, increase in oil prices and severe deficits in the national balance of payments. They accepted the rehabilitation plans the IMF and the World Bank, which included liberalization of markets, establishments of a multi-party democracy and rehabilitation of the Asians (Lal, 2007:259).

The most profound example of these changes in East Africa was the rehabilitation of the Ugandan Asians. Yoweri Museveni became the president of Uganda in 1986 and ended the civil war and encouraged the Asians to return and invest in Uganda. The government returned over 5,000 properties and businesses of Asians earlier confiscated. The Ugandan Asians say that more than 50 per cent of confiscated properties of the Asians are yet to be returned by the government (Lal, 2007:259-260). In 1991, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni invited the Asians to return and invest in Uganda.

During the same period, public debate in Tanzania saw a shift in rhetoric. A new era of social, political and economic changes followed the inauguration of Ali Hassan Mwinyi as the Tanzanian president in 1985. Economic policies moved from emphasizing small-scale communal production in agriculture to the support of large-scale farms. Former coffee and sisal estates were denationalized and the Building Acquisition Act of 1971 was loosened. While these efforts improved the lot of many Indians, they continued to suffer formal discrimination from the state, which until the 1990's, did not allow citizens of South Asians background into the ranks of the civil service. Though if we compare condition of Tanzanian Indians with the Indians in other east African countries for example Uganda, they have suffered but less.

2.3.1 Comparative advantage of Indian diaspora as a heritage resource in Tanzania

The 1980s and early 1990s saw considerable improvements in race relations between Africans and Indians in East Africa. Public debate shifted from Africanization in the colonial period to socialism (independent Tanzania) and capitalism (independent Kenya and Uganda), and to the 'indigenisation of South Asians' in the 1980s and

1990s. An important reason for this shift was the declining economic situation in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, which made it necessary to re-establish the economic and social roles of Asians in East Africa.

In the economically difficult years of the early 1980s, Tanzanian Asians were seen as smugglers, quick money-makers and ‘evil barons’, but following the implementation of the IMF programme, they were seen as the ‘saviours’ of the economy. Indian diaspora relationship with India and Tanzania was seen as social capital for Tanzania. Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together. This is especially challenging because social capital is comprised of concepts such as “trust”, “community” and “networks” which are difficult to quantify. The challenge is increased when one considers that the quest is to measure not just the quantity but also the quality of social capital on a variety of scales.

Most Indians today belong to the third or fourth generation living in Tanzania, are Tanzanian citizens and have a feeling of “home” towards Tanzania and the respective town. Some Indians, as so-called “twice- migrants”, remember both India and Zanzibar as a former place of home. Identification with the Tanzanian nation and a feeling of belonging are contrasted in a persisting aloofness of a majority of Indians towards the African population in social life as well as vivid memories of state- sanctioned repression in the past (Stichproben 2013:24)

2.3.2 Importance of Indian diaspora as a heritage resource in Tanzania

Today there are over 25 million Indian diaspora, reflecting the full multiplicity and variety of the rich social, ethnic, religious and cultural tapestry of the land of its origin. According to High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, In Tanzania there is

85000 PIO's and 5000 NRI's. This consists around 0.28% of the total population of the country (Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, 2001)².

Economic prosperity and political success of Indian Diaspora in Tanzania is an asset for India as well as for Tanzania and it could be a tool to promote healthy partnership between two countries at bilateral as well as multilateral level. Economically Indian Diaspora is relatively better off in every country included in this category than their African counterparts. Early immigrants, sometime referred as 'old Diaspora' is predominantly engaged in trade and businesses while new immigrants those referred as 'new Diaspora' are primarily professionals like doctors, engineers, lawyers etc. As many of them are first generation immigrants they have their families and close relatives in India and send remittances to back home. They have been mixed attitudes towards them in the host-land.

Sometimes they have been looked as 'looters' and 'cheaters' by host society. On the other hand, they have also been looked as a potential driver for bilateral partnership between host-land and motherland. The High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora (2001) makes a very generous comment about retention of cultural identity among Indian Diaspora worldwide. Committee notices that 'members of Diasporic community are deeply conscious of their rich cultural heritage. Deep commitment to their cultural identity has manifested itself in many ways and in every component of the Indian Diaspora'.

It is well established fact that in international relations, role of non-state actors has increased many folds in the era of privatization, liberalization and globalization. Diasporic communities are one of the important non-state actors in international relations. International migration has shown tremendous increase in last few decades and therefore, their role in political, economic, cultural and other aspects of international relations is growing.

Unlike, neighbouring countries Kenya and Uganda Indian Diaspora in Tanzania has been actively participating in the political process of the country. They have been able to occupy important political offices. Sophia Mustafa got elected thrice in the

² However, revised estimates of Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, shows sharp decline in the Disporic population and currently their strength is confined to only 54700 (MOIA, 2010).

parliament of Tanzania. Abdul Karim Karimjee served as deputy speaker and Amir Jamal as Minister for Communications, Power and Works. Dr. Krishna Member of Parliament, Mr. Bajaj and Al- Noor Kassum also played important role in the politics of Tanzania. Mr. Ashok Shah describes that if we compare political participation or role of Indian Diaspora in three countries of East Africa, Tanzania is the country where Indian Diaspora has been more vocal in the political space and could secure place in different governments and political parties. He emphasizes on role of Mrs. Zakia Meghji as a finance minister of Tanzania. She has done remarkable contribution in the economic development and investment promotion in the country.

There is probably no other Diaspora in the world, which has such an extraordinary diversity like Indian diaspora. It is as diverse as the ethnic linguistic and religious groups in India itself. The original member of the Diaspora, therefore, carried with them the rich traditions of harmonizing different customs, practices, values and beliefs.’ This is very much true in case of these countries of Africa as well. Though, they are very few in numbers, they have built temple, mosque, *gurdwara*, social halls etc. wherever they are. They have organized themselves as per their region of origin in India as well as their mother tongues. But, despite of such diversity they have feeling of being originally hailing from India.

Indian diaspora could be source of inspiration for many African countries that how people of diverse cultural and ethnic background could live together and bring peace and prosperity to land of their destiny. On the other hand India can use this as an opportunity to deeper partnership on the footprint of goodwill creating by her Diaspora in Tanzania. The Indian Diaspora in Tanzania can be considered as a great strategic asset for India. Their strength lies in their rising prosperity, their business and technical skills, their industry and enterprise, their willingness to collaborate with India, thus despite of their small numerical number their role as a heritage resource cannot be denied.

Chapter III

Indo-Tanzanian Relations under globalisation: The heritage factor

3.1 India- Tanzania broader relations

Tanzania and India have traditionally enjoyed close, friendly and cooperative relations. From the 1960s to the 1980s the political relationship was driven largely by shared ideological commitments to anti-colonialism, anti-racism, socialism in various forms as well as genuine desire for South-South Cooperation. In recent years Indo-Tanzanian ties have evolved into a modern and pragmatic relationship with greater and diversified economic engagement. The High Commission of India in Dar es Salaam was set up on November 19, 1961 and the Consulate General of India in Zanzibar was set up on October 23, 1974.

3.1.1 Political Relations

The two countries enjoyed a tradition of high level exchanges between India and Tanzania. In the post-Nyerere period, a series of high level visits have been exchanged¹. Shri APJ Abdul Kalam, visit in 2004 as a President, Shri Manmohan Singh visit as a Prime Minister of India in 2011 are to name a few. From Tanzania Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete the then President came in April 2008 to co-chair the India-Africa Forum Summit (MEA report 2014). Along with this there were several ministerial level visits from both sides.

¹ See the appendix Table 3, 4, and 5 for more details.

3.1.2 Economic Relations

India and Tanzania have a vibrant business and commercial relationship driven by the presence of large community of Tanzanians of Indian origin. India is a leading trading partner of Tanzania's as well as an important source of essential machinery and pharmaceutical products. Many of the top business establishments of Tanzania are owned by members of the Indian origin.

Government of India extended a Line of Credit of US\$ 40 million for financing Tanzanian agriculture sector. The LOC was signed on 5 June 2009. The Tanzanian Prime Minister, Mr. Mizengo Pinda received the first consignment of 288 Escort tractors on 07th October 2010 which arrived in Tanzania, of the total of 1860 tractors, since received. Tractors and agricultural equipment's have since been supplied in full to Tanzania. The second Line of Credit of US\$ 36.56 million for supply of Ashok Leyland trucks to the Government of Tanzania was approved and the Agreement was signed on 28th March, 2011 on the sidelines of the 7th CII Exim Bank Conclave on India Africa Project Partnership in New Delhi from 27-29 March, 2011(MEA report 2014). Till date, a total of 382 vehicles have arrived in four consignments and the rest is likely to arrival at Dar-es-Salaam shortly.

Another Line of Credit of US\$ 178.125 million to Tanzania was announced in 2011 for development of water supply projects in Dares- Salaam and coastal regions. The LoC Agreement was signed on October 2, 2012 at Dar-es-Salaam. The process for selection of Project Management Consultant is underway (MEA report 2014). A grant of US\$ 10 million for projects in social and educational sectors, projects for which is to be identified by the Tanzanian side to Tanzania was also announced.

Vocational Training Centre and a grant of US\$ 100,000/- for Zanzibar for purchase of laboratory equipment for schools to Tanzania was also announced from 2011. The equipment was handed over to the Zanzibar Minister of Education and Vocational Training on May 30, 2012. Some other LOCs for projects identified by the Tanzanian Government are under consideration by the Indian side.

Tanzania is one of the largest beneficiaries of the ITEC/SCAAP programme. The two countries signed in 1966 an Agreement on Friendship and Technical, Economic and Scientific Cooperation, within the framework of which ITEC cooperation has been extended to Tanzania since 1972 (MEA report 2014). Starting with 24 trainees annually, the number has gradually increased to 200 in 2011, and the total number of trainees till date has exceeded 1400. 320 slots have been sanctioned for the year 2012-13.

Tanzania is a major beneficiary of Indian scholarships and other educational assistance, including self-financing seats in India's institutes of higher learning. Almost all official agencies in Tanzania have Indian trained alumni. 26 scholarships have been offered in 2012 by ICCR under the Commonwealth Scholarship/Fellowship Plan and General Cultural Scholarship Scheme (MEA report 2014). About five thousand Tanzanian students are estimated to be in India on a self-financed basis.

Cooperation in the education sector constituted an important aspect of bilateral relations. It emanates from Tanzania's request. On the Indian side, EdCIL coordinated the cooperation. A Delegation from EdCIL visited Tanzania from 7-17 April, 2010. Three lecturers from India are working in two private universities (Zanzibar University and College of Education) in Zanzibar

Tanzania's most important hydrocarbon discovery- natural gas reserves at Songo Songo Island located at a distance of 25 km from the east coast was made by ONGC in 1974. In 1997 ONGC Videsh Limited was requested by TPDC for assistance (OVL provided the consultancy service free of charge). In 2004 Larsen & Toubro Ltd. constructed a gas processing plant at Songo Songo, a 25 km marine pipeline and a 220 km land pipeline (MEA report 2014). The Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Limited, Ranchi carried out detailed pre-feasibility and feasibility studies in respect of Mchuchuma-Katewaka coal reserves in the mid-1990s.

The only Indian company currently active in mineral sector in Tanzania is the National Mineral Development Corporation [NMDC]; it had carried out gold exploration in the region south of Lake Victoria in north-west Tanzania during the period 2000 to 2003 and successfully delineated promising targets in Siga Hill area [Kahama dist] and Bulyang'

Ombe area [Nzega dist]. NMDC is scaling up its gold mining activity in Tanzania in 2012. Some Indian companies have expressed interest in power generation [using natural gas], sugar and cement plants and infrastructure projects in electricity transmission, water supply, etc. A Nagpur based company, Kamal Steels, operates a small scale steel plant in Dar-es-Salaam and a second larger plant is to come up at an SEZ, which is also promoted by the same group (MEA report 2014). Some Indian companies have also shown interest in the real estate / housing sector and in the hospitality industry. GAIL has shown interest in purchase and marketing LNG as and when available. Bank of Baroda commenced operations in 2004 in Dar es Salaam with a second branch opened in Arusha. Bank of India commenced operations in June 2008 with a second branch opened in September, 2012 (MEA report 2014). Tata International Limited has large presence, particularly in the automobile [trucks] and chemical sectors.

Some insurance companies with Indian connections including the Tanzindia consortium operate in Tanzania. Reliance Industries Ltd has acquired a majority stake and management control of Gulf Africa Petroleum Corporation, headquartered in Mauritius and having a significant presence in east Africa in the downstream petroleum sector. The first ever private Export Processing Zone owned by an Indian Company – Kamal Group of Industries, set up in Tanzania which was designed to accommodate 80 industrial units spread over 300 acres, was inaugurated by President Kikwete on 25th July, 2010. Bharti Airtel acquired Zain Telecom in Tanzania as part of its 16 countries buy from Zain Africa. Zain Telecom was re-branded as Airtel on 22nd November 2010 which was presided over by President Jakaya Kikwete. Airtel is estimated to have invested US\$ 150 million and is focussing on competitive pricing as well as penetration into rural areas. Escorts [tractors], Ashok Leyland [trucks], Bajaj [scooters] and TVS [scooters] also have a visible presence in Tanzania (MEA report 2014).

In September 2002, India gifted two raw cashew nut processing plants in Tanzania. India gifted 5,000 tons each of wheat and rice to Tanzania in May 2004 when it faced food scarcity arising from drought conditions [aid promised in April 2003, arrived in May 2004]. Small Industry Development Organisation of Tanzania was established by National Small Industries Corporation Ltd of India in November 2007.

Two Indian funded projects were set up : A Centre of Excellence in ICT by C-DAC; and the Pan African e-Network Project by TCIL. The Centre is named “*India-Tanzania Centre for Excellence in Information and Communication Technology*” [ITCoEICT]. The ITCoEICT was set up at Dar-es-Salaam Institute of Technology with one Param High Speed Super Computer and 10 remote regional centers. The Pan African e-Network Project entails both Tele-education Centre in the University of Dar-es-Salaam and Telemedicine Centre in the Ocean Road Cancer Institute and a VVIP hotline and audio visual conferencing facility set up in State House under this project (MEA report 2014). An IT Centre at the Nelson Mandela African Institute of Science & Technology is to be set up with Government of India assistance for which feasibility study has been done.

A Bangalore-based Vigyan Educational Foundation set up in Dar es Salaam in 1996, an International Medical and Technological University, the first private university in Tanzania. A proposal for setting up of super speciality hospital in Tanzanian is being actively pursued between Apollo Hospitals, India and National Social Security Fund of Tanzania. Seventeen Indian professors joined the University of Dodoma during the period March to June, 2011. The Government of India has agreed to set up of an ICT Resource Centre at the Nelson Mandela African Institute of Science & Technology at a cost of US\$ 1.3 million (MEA report 2014).

MOU on Economic Cooperation between India and East African countries was also signed. An EAC delegation led by Hon. John Arap Koech, Chairperson of the EAC Council of Ministers and Minister for East African Community of the Republic of Kenya paid a six day official visit to India from 19 to 24 February 2007 (MEA report 2014). A joint communiqué was signed on 22 February 2007 which spelt out a programme of India-EAC cooperation in various sectors.

Agreement has been made on the establishment of Joint Business Council between FICCI & ASSOCHAM and Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture. MoU between Indian Institute of Foreign Trade and the Institute of Financial Management, Dar-es-Salaam was signed in December 2000, offering a two-year MBA

[International Business] and one-and-a-half year Executive Masters in International Business at Dar-es-Salaam. MOU between Indian Institute of Materials Managements and National Board of Materials Management of Tanzania was signed in May 2006 for institutional cooperation (MEA report 2014). MoU between the Government of the State of Gujarat and the Tanzania Investment Centre was signed in Dar-es-Salaam on July 19, 2012.

3.1.2.1 Bilateral Trade

Tanzania’s Major imports from India include mineral fuels, oils, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles [including auto parts], electrical machinery/ equipment, yarn, apparel & clothing, articles of iron & steel, plastic products including synthetic polymers, inorganic/organic/agro-chemicals, rubber items including tyres, cotton fabrics, etc. Major exports to India include cashew nuts, pulses, ores and metal scrap, gemstones, cloves & other spices, tanning/dyeing, coloring materials, non-ferrous metals, essential oil and cosmetic preparators, leather etc.

India and Tanzania have a vibrant business and commercial relationship. India is a leading trading and investment partner of Tanzania's as well as an important source of petroleum products, essential machinery and pharmaceutical products. Many of the top business establishments of Tanzania are owned by persons of Indian origin.

Table 6: India-Tanzania Trade [in million US dollars] Year

Year	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009
India’s exports	2467.14	2308.71	880.63	1564.95	895.01	772.87
Tanzania’s exports	1293	752.17	480.10	207.99	226.19	187.58
Total	3760.14	3060.88	1360.73	1772.94	1121.2	960.45

[Source: MEA Report June 2015]

According to Department of Commerce data, total bilateral trade with Tanzania was US\$3573.63 million during 2014-15, of which exports to Tanzania constituted US\$2484.60 million and imports from Tanzania was US\$1089.03 million. Significantly, Tanzanian exports to India which were stagnating at around \$187 million annually in 2009 have jumped to over \$ 1293 million in 2014 according to TRA data (MEA report 2014).

India's economic engagement with Tanzania has also increased with a cumulative investment of US\$ 2000.04 million [1990-2014] which is supporting employment of over 54,176 persons in 426 projects, as per Tanzanian official sources. India is at third position after the UK and China. Additionally, Indian firms have invested over \$ 497 million in EPZs across the country, taking the total investments to about \$2497 million. Tanzanian investments in India are a little over US\$ 1 million as per DIPP.

However, recently a Tanzanian company claims to have invested US\$200 million in pulses processing plants set up in Gujarat and Kolkata. Major Indian companies and brands operating in Tanzania include Bank of Baroda, Bank of India, Tata International Limited, National Mineral Development Corporation Limited, insurance companies (LIC, NIC, United India, etc), Reliance Industries Ltd, Kamal Group of Industries, Bharti Airtel, Tata [trucks, buses and SUVs], Escorts [tractors], Ashok Leyland [trucks and other vehicles], Eicher [buses and trucks], Bajaj [three wheelers], TVS [three wheelers], Kirloskar engines and Godrej safes. About 42% of medicines and pharma products imported by Tanzania are sourced from India (MEA report 2014). All major Indian pharma companies have their distributors and representatives here.

Tanzania is one of the largest beneficiaries of training slots allocated under ITEC programmes, and also avails of a number of such training slots offered under IAFS. The two countries signed in 1966 an Agreement on Friendship and Technical, Economic and Scientific Cooperation, within the framework of which ITEC cooperation has been extended to Tanzania since 1972. Starting with 24 trainees annually, it has gradually increased to 330 slots. Tanzania is a major beneficiary of Indian scholarships and other

educational assistance, including self-financing students in India’s institutes of higher learning. 24 scholarships have been offered by ICCR under the Commonwealth Scholarship/Fellowship Plan and General Cultural Scholarship Scheme. About 2000 Tanzanian students are estimated to be in India, the majority on self-financing basis.

During the State Visit of the President of Tanzania, a Loan agreement between Exim Bank and Tanzania on LoC for US\$ 268.35 million for extension of Lake Victoria pipeline project to Tabora, Igunga and Nzega was signed. An IT Resource Centre at Arusha, an NSIC project for establishing Incubation Centres at SIDO, and a Vocational Training Centre (VTC) at Zanzibar are being funded under Government of India grants. A LoC of US\$ 178.125 million for development of water supply projects in Dar-es-Salaam and coastal Chalinze region is currently under implementation. Another LoC of US\$ 36.56 million for supply of Ashok Leyland trucks and other vehicles to the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF) was completed. In June 2009 LoC of US\$ 40 million for supply of tractors and agricultural equipment was completed. Two Indian funded IT/Communication projects have been established: A Centre of Excellence in ICT by C-DAC; and the Pan African e-Network Project by TCIL (MEA report 2014).

3.1.2.1(a) Important Bilateral Treaties and Agreements

Given below in the tabulated form the important bilateral treaties and agreements signed between India and Tanzania:

Table 7: Important bilateral treaties and agreements signed between India and Tanzania:

PTA/FTA	signed the Letter of Intent in June 2008
MoU on Preliminary Joint Venture Agreement between the Boards of Trustees of the National Social Security Fund, Tanzania and the Ministry of Health and social Welfare Tanzania and M/s. Apollo	Was signed during the visit of Prime Minister to Tanzania from 26-28 May, 2011.

Hospitals Enterprises Limited India	
Agreement on Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion [DTAA] [Earlier DTAA was signed don September 5, 1979]	Was signed during the visit of Prime Minister to Tanzania from 26-28 May, 2011.
Joint Action Plan between National Small Industries Corporation Ltd [NSIC] and Small Industries Development Organisation [SIDO]	Was signed during the visit of Prime Minister to Tanzania from 26-28 May, 2011.

[Source: MEA Report, June 2015] (refer to the appendix Table no.8 for rest of the table*)

A Line of Credit worth US\$ 178.125 million for water supply augmentation projects in Dar-es-Salaam City and Chalinze region was finalized in October 2012. Government of Tanzania has reiterated its request for a second LoC for purchase of tractors and farm equipment after the successful import of over 1800 tractors and related farm equipment under an earlier LoC of US\$ 40 million. By the second quarter, all the tractors had been sold or leased out. Under a LoC for US\$ 36.56 million for the supply of Ashok Leyland trucks and other vehicles to the Tanzanian defence forces, over 85% supplies had been completed. A formal handing over ceremony, at which Minister for Defence and National Service participated, was held in Dar-es-Salaam. An exchange of MoUs for the Indian assistance in setting up an IT Resource Centre at the Nelson Mandela-African Institute of Science and Technology at Arusha took place (MEA report 2014). Officials from the Gas Authority of India (GAIL) visited Dares- Salaam twice during the year to discuss with the Tanzanian Petroleum Development Corporation, the GAIL's interest in business opportunities in all segments of the gas industry in Tanzania.

A large delegation from Tanzania, comprising of all the Members of the Standing Committee of Parliament on Energy and senior officials of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals and TPDC visited India in on a study visit, particularly to look at India's management of its energy assets including natural gas. A delegation led by the Minister of Steel also visited Tanzania. A Letter of Intent on areas of cooperation was signed during the visit. Minister of State for External Affairs visited Dar-es-Salaam and held talks on issues of mutual bilateral, regional and international interests with the Tanzanian President and the Foreign Minister (MEA report 2014). She co-chaired the 8th meeting of the India-Tanzania Joint Commission. Minister of State for Commerce and Industry visited Dar-es-Salaam. She held talks with the Tanzanian Minister of Trade and Industry and participated at the inauguration of 'The India Show' organized by CII. She also co-chaired the 3rd meeting of the Joint Trade Committee. An 18-member delegation from the National Defence College visited Tanzania in May 2013 and interacted with senior officers and Ministers from the Tanzanian Defence Forces, Ministry of Defence and National Service, the Tanzanian National Defence College, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation (MEA report 2014).

The Zanzibar Minister for Labour, Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives visited India on 2013 on a study visit, during which he held meetings with the Minister of Labour and Empowerment in India. He also visited the Barefoot College, Tilonia which has trained some village women from Zanzibar to install and maintain solar power systems and has proposed to set up a training institute in Tanzania for this purpose.

'*INS Jamuna*', a hydrographic ship of the Indian Navy visited Tanzania in December 2013 and completed detailed hydro graphic survey of Dar-es- Salaam port and nearby coastal waters. President of Zanzibar, Mr. Ali Mohamed Shein, accompanied by a delegation comprising of senior ministers visited India at the invitation of the Vice President of India.

A delegation from CHEMEXCIL visited Dar-es-Salaam for B-to-B meetings in order to consolidate and increase bilateral trade in this field. A 25-member delegation of the Indian pharmaceutical industry comprising of medium and small scale businesses

organized by PHARMEXCIL visited Tanzania. A team of MEA and the National Skills Development Corporation visited Zanzibar and Dar-es-Salaam to carry out feasibility study on the proposed Vocational Training Centre to be established in Zanzibar with Indian assistance (MEA Report 2013-2014).

India's relations with Tanzania continue to be warm and friendly. Minister for Trade and Industry Dr Abdulla Kigoda led the Tanzanian delegation to the 'India Economic Forum' held at New Delhi. Total bilateral trade during 2013 has crossed the US\$ 3 billion mark as per Tanzanian official figures with Indian exports to Tanzania at US\$ 2.3 billion, and imports from Tanzania to India at US\$ 700 million. The main items of export from India were petroleum products, pharmaceuticals, iron and steel, electrical apparatus, motor vehicles etc. The main items of import from Tanzania to India in this period were gold, cashew nuts, pulses, timber, and precious stones.

3.1.2.1(b) Prospects of Emerging Economic Cooperation

In the present era of globalization, both India and Tanzania has to adopt different approaches and make use of the entrenched Indian Diaspora for strengthening relationship with each other. It has to develop linkages and establish institutional connections with the Indian Diaspora (Dubey, 2010). Indian Diaspora in African countries are economically well off and culturally keen to retain identity. Some of leading journalist, prominent academicians and lawyers, who shape public opinion in these countries, belong to Indian communities. The 1980s and early 1990s saw considerable improvements in race relations between Africans and Indians in East Africa. Public debate shifted from Africanization in the colonial period to socialism (independent Tanzania) and to the 'indigenisation of South Asians' in the 1980s and 1990s. An important reason for this shift was the declining economic situation in Tanzania, which made it necessary to re-establish the economic and social roles of Asians in East Africa (Dubey, 2010).

Indian government had started economic initiatives at bilateral level to bring Indian settlers in Tanzania within the policy framework of India. It proposed to establish Africa-India Development Corporation with PIO and Indian capital, its aim was to seek integration of the Indian community in the economic life of Africa, thus fortifying the foundation of a multiracial society (Dubey, 2010).

Tanzania-India bilateral relations have always been close, characterised by active bilateral cooperation and a strong mutual understanding, further bolstered by Tanzania hosting a sizeable Indian Diaspora and high levels of bilateral trade (MOIA, 2010). Therefore, Indian Diaspora could play marginal, if not substantial role in the promotion of bilateral partnership between motherland and host-land (Gupta, 2012).

3.1.3 Cultural Relations

The trade relations in turn led to cultural interactions. The close cultural contact between India and Tanzania is evident from the fact that Kiswahili, the official language of Tanzania has a considerable mix of Indian words. In turn Indian government is also making elaborate efforts to maintain these close cultural ties.

An Indian Cultural Centre (ICC), sponsored by Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), was set up in December 2010. Currently the ICC offers Yoga classes and tabla and other musical instruments training by India-based teachers. Hindi classes on gratis basis are conducted by a local volunteer. The ICC has been increasing local content in its programmes and partnership with local artists, cultural entities and publishing fraternity to enhance the cultural dialogue between India and Tanzania.

Among the major programmes held at/by the ICC in last two years were performances by ICCR-sponsored Lavani group, Hindi Divas celebrations, performances by ICCR sponsored Goan cultural group, an evening with Anup Jalota, performances by Kuchipudi group led by Ms. Prateeksha Kashi, fusion music band led by Murad Ali Khan, Vani Madhav, an Odissi exponent, concerts by Vidya Shah, performances by a Delhi-based contemporary Indian dance company which was sponsored by CII, and a Kathak dance troupe. A painting exhibition on Kalpana – Masterpieces of Figurative

Contemporary Indian Paintings was held at the National Museum in Dar es Salaam. A showcase on western India (Gujarat, Goa, Maharashtra and Rajasthan) was also held at the Indian Cultural Centre.

Several programmes with local content, including Indo-African fusion music in cooperation with the Department of Arts and Music of Dar es Salaam University, rangoli exhibition, photographic exhibitions, fashion show, Hindi comedy show, mono-artist from India performing a skit on Swami Vivekananda, exhibition of paintings and sculptures of local artistes, film screenings, public receptions for iconic Indian celebrities, including Grandmaster Vishwanathan Anand, etc, have been held at the Centre. During this period, Ms. Vani Madhav, an Odissi dance exponent, held performances at Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. 'Soul Samvad', a musical band held a performance in Dar es Salaam. Shri Shekhar Sen, a renowned monologue artiste performed a musical skit on Swami Vivekanand at the Indian Cultural Centre in August, to commemorate Hindi Divas (MEA Report 2014-2015).

There are about twenty active Indian/Asian community groups in Tanzania, most of them Dar es Salaam based. These groups regularly organize Indian cultural and social events mostly with local participation and occasionally by sponsoring performing artistes from India. Sports exchanges between India and Tanzania are rare, even in the field of cricket, which has some enthusiasts especially among the local Indian/Asian community.

3.2 Diaspora as heritage and an important determinant in Indo-Tanzanian relations

Indian Diaspora is known to be deeply conscious of their rich cultural heritage. They have carried the rich traditions of harmonizing different customs, practices, values and beliefs along with them. It is important to understand how Diaspora can maintain their cultural identity without losing their roots in different places and cultures. The culture of the place where they are living and the culture of their motherland are different. Usually the Diaspora with the same cultural identity share their culture, history and ancestry. Indian festivals are celebrating across the world and these festivals are creating more

and more interest for their motherland. The local Indian communities are playing an important role in making those festivals a success in their host country. Culture is a channel to bring Indian Diaspora together. Culture acts as a parameter of Identity of Indian Diaspora. Thus, Diaspora provides a platform to connect India with the place where they are residing. Secondly, they bridge the connection to share cultural aspects with India.

India has recognized the importance of overseas communities and has successfully leveraged it for its own soft power diplomacy and economic development. It also looked upon Diaspora as an important factor in India's foreign policy and bilateral relations with the countries where they were present in significant numbers. Due to the proactive policy of engagement pursued by the NDA government there was an increased awareness about the diaspora among the Indian people. Indian media and the civil society started paying for greater attention to overseas Indian communities (Sharma, 2009:174).

Both India and Tanzania has to adopt different approaches and make use of the entrenched Indian Diaspora for strengthening relationship with each other. It has to develop linkages and establish institutional connections with the Indian Diaspora (Dubey, 2010). Tanzania is the country where Indian Diaspora has been more vocal in the political space. Prosperity and political success of Indian Diaspora in Tanzania is an asset for India and it could be a tool to promote healthy partnership between two countries at bilateral as well as multilateral level (Gupta, 2012).

3.2.1 Diaspora role in bilateral relations in Indo-Tanzanian context

Throughout history and present, diaspora have provided important contribution to economic, politics and culture both for their home countries and for societies of residence. Departing from earlier modes of emigration as a terminal loss to the homeland, "homeland" nation states increasingly come to utilize their diaspora as potential motors of development. The significance of diaspora within their host societies has also been confirmed by the wide range of studies. Thus, diaspora clearly can be seen as a resource on collective and on institutional levels, often even as an avant- grade for

economic development or cultural transformation.

Globalization had two major implications for India's relationship with the Indian diaspora. Firstly, globalization has resulted in an assault on the cultural identity of the Indian diaspora, as of other sections of the society in the country of their residence. This has engendered a strong urge among the diaspora, to go back to its cultural roots as a defense mechanism. Indian policy makers should, therefore, be able to devise means and create institutions to meet this cultural urge of the Indian diaspora. Secondly, in spite of the existence and intensification of restrictions on migration, globalization has led to an increase in migration globally. This has taken place mostly in a clandestine manner, driven by market forces and this has comprised of a particular class of migrants, mainly women and low skilled workers (Sassen, 1998).

India now regards several sections of the PIOs as an asset while the PIOs look upon India as a source of cultural and intellectual inspiration and also as a land of economic and other opportunities. The annual celebration of the Pravasi Bhartiya Divas, the establishment of a separate Ministry of the Central Government of Overseas Indians, headed by a Cabinet minister, the grant of Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) card to eligible PIOs and NRIs, the establishment of a Facilitation Centre with the support of the government, to liaise with the diaspora in matters related to investment, and the promise of setting up a world class university for the NRIs children whom their parents would like to leave behind for education in the Indian cultural environment- are some of the measures reflecting the change that has taken place in the attitude of the mother country towards the Indian diaspora.

There has also been commensurate progress in strengthening Indian Missions abroad in order to be able to more effectively cope with the problems of the local diaspora and provide them assistance when in distress and in formulating norms and rules to control certain undesirable types of labour migration and to provide assistance to the vulnerable sections.

In turn, Tanzania also opened a diaspora division in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010. They considered their diaspora as an asset both within the country and outside the country. Thus, they considered Indian diaspora as a heritage resource and as an important tool in bolstering Indo-Tanzanian relations.

3.2.2 Cultural aspect

The groups of migrants in any country are called ‘minority’, ‘cultural minority’ ‘ethnic minority’ and are considered as a part of ‘Pluralism’, ‘Cultural- pluralism’, and ‘Multi-culturalism’. When a group is socially marginal in comparison to the majority host culture it is called a ‘minority’ group. The term cultural or ethnic minority is considered synonymous. The term ethnic has been placed as a prefix before the name of the community, such as, ethnic Indians, ethnic Turks and so on.

The notion of a multi-cultural society is derived from the concept of ‘Pluralism’. During the colonial times, in the colonies, the concept of Pluralism was developed. It implied a colonial inherently unstable society, where the dominant society (alien) minority exercises control over the indigenous majority. J. S. Furnivall, a Dutch administrator analyzed the societies in the Dutch East Indies (at present known as Indonesia) ‘a plural society exists when a country under colonial rule shows the following broad cultural, economic and political characteristics; a) Culturally, it comprises groups which are institutionally disparate and do not share the same basic values and way of life; b) Economically, these separate social entities have interaction mainly in the market place, in buying-and -selling types of relationship; c) Politically, these disparate but economically interacting segments are held together by a super-ordinate authority-that is, the colonial rulers’ (Furnivall, 1948).

In other words, in the plural society, a poly-ethnic society is integrated with various ethnic groups in the market place under the control and domination of an administrative authority but allowed to observe the cultural diversity. There are also the contact zones where interdependence creates contacts and vice versa. The contact centers are the meeting places, which could be in market, trade centers, plantation estates, towns, play grounds, religious places, police bureaus and taxation departments of the government.

In cultural- pluralism there is a common feeling that all ethnic groups belong to the same country. The democratic political parties after the election decide which ethnic group or groups can create the government and become the governing authority. Cultural-pluralism is the principle of many democratic countries, such as, the European countries, India, South Africa, those in Europe and so on. The notions of Pluralism, Cultural- Pluralism and Multi-Culturalism are based on the concept of culture and interactional network between the members of an ethnic group.

The important aspect is the concept of culture and interrelationship between its members of the ethnic group. One needs to recognize some of the reasons why social, political and economic relations between dominant and subordinate ethno-cultural groups within the plural societies almost inevitably involve competition and outright conflict. According to 'rational choice theory' group members exchange goods and services, seeking their own advantage (Banton, 1983) but remain integrated with the host society and simultaneously maintain their own ethnic identity. In anthropological and sociological literature ethnic identities are termed as 'core values' and 'expectations'. Using the situational approach an ethnic group defines its minimum and maximum boundary and the limits of its 'social structure' in terms of 'we' versus 'they' (others) and forms a polarity. Since ethnicity is not limited to the borders of a country, another can easily be affiliated to similar groups in other countries. This develops feelings of togetherness, expressing 'Indianness' (as is the case of Indians), which is shared by all Indian communities and which helps to form an Indian Diaspora that has transnational affinities.

Culture thus, in terms of their heritage becomes an unforgettable historical fact which is shared in memory though interaction with other members of the community. It becomes a source of their action, voices, selection of material, behavior, self-perception and world view. Culture is used to confirm, reinforce, maintain, change or deny a particular arrangement of states, power and identity.

3.2.2.1 Community feeling

The Indian diaspora micro-cultures encompass a set of practices, norms, and representations that are a direct product of the society of origin, and have been kept and reproduced for close to a century. This is the case particularly in language, type of food, etiquette, body aesthetics, family organisations, education system and norms, religious beliefs etc. although some of these cultural ingredients are undoubtedly unique to every religious or regional community, many are shared by the entire diaspora.

Indian of diverse origin remains united by adhering to the same big and ancient civilisations whose major components are obvious. Language, etiquette and social customs, way of dressing, rituals, and largely they have a common conviction that largely transcends religious belonging. Given that they have the same difficulties due to the fact that they are immigrants and that they have to defend the same rights, the representatives of diaspora have a feeling that they have a lot in common. The sense of identity that unifies them is based on how they are looked upon by the others.

The relentless of Indian communities in their desire to keep their original cultural matrix alive and unaltered- by way of massive translocation outside their borders- reveals a paradox that goes contrary to the thinking of proponents of vernacular authenticity. Kept apart from the British during the colonial period, the Asians of Tanzania, on their side, did not spare their efforts to avoid cohabitation with Africans, opting for intra-communality sociability, imposing endogamy rules. Existing cultural differences between Indians and Africans have always been given as an explanation to these tendencies.

3.2.2.1 (a) Religion

Religion serves as a major symbolic resource in building community around gurdwaras, temples and mosques. In Tanzania there are several temples and mosques for various congregations of immigrant Indian minorities. Some of them are majestic while some are more modest. Cast in stone and deeply rooted in the soil, the Indian diaspora religious presence is as affirmed as it is displayed in a traditional nature. It symbolizes

the visible and lasting nature of Indian presence in the region. Hindu temples served not only as places of worship, but as meeting sites where peoples of Indian origin could be assembled and discussed.

Relations between Hindus and Muslims have for many decades been characterised by many clashes. However, collective relations between Hindus and Muslims of Indian origin in the diaspora are characterized by friendliness, mutual respect and assistance. A good number of representatives of the Hindu and Muslims diaspora are present in Tanzania. A common social and geographical origin and the existence of a common cultural and linguistic heritage is also a major factor that unifies Indian diaspora of all different kinds of religious affiliations.

3.2.2.2 (b) Marriage

Rapid growth of education, modernization and urbanization has made remarkable effect on Indian marriage system. Inter caste and Inter-religious marriages are not taboo today. It is highly impossible to argue that our traditional marriage system has clearly vanished in educated and modernized urban people. Till today migrated people wants to have marriage relationship with their motherland. There are good number of websites which are playing effective role in this way and social networking sites are also in the cutting edge in this initiative. These websites act as intermediate to get the suitable life partner according to bride and groom wishes. These websites provide information regarding bride/groom age, education qualification, occupation, religion, caste and sub-caste, mother tongue, color, height, native place, contact details and also photograph. Internet facilitates to build marriage connection with Indian Diaspora. Finding right bride or groom has become much easier than earlier days with the help of internet. Online communities are contributing to bring Indian Diaspora together. In fact, in Tanzania still the Gujarati people come to India (mostly to Gujarat) and marry the Gujarati girl of their community.

3.2.2.3 (c) Language

All Indian diaspora are multilingual. All speak the language of their region of origin (Gujarati, Punjabi, Urdu etc.). This is the language used within the family and for intra community communication. Through various means (television, community organisations etc), the learning of Hindi is widespread and enables the immigrants to maintain cultural contact with their motherland. With the exception of recent immigrants, the Indians in Tanzania are also fluent in Swahili, the language of communication in Tanzania used in everyday interactions with Africans, especially in professional settings. In smaller towns, Indians occasionally speak an African vernacular language. Though, now, the language of inter-community communication is English. Moreover, its use currently tends to go beyond communication between various vernacular groups. Used as elsewhere as the language of social development, English is becoming the internal communication language among the communities as well as within the number of families that have embraced modernity, especially the youth, notably among those who often travel abroad. But still the use of vernacular languages predominantly Gujarati as prominent means of communication among Indian diasporic community can be seen at home in Tanzania.

3.2.2.4 (d) Dietary Practices and dress habits

The attachment of people of Indian origin to their dietary practices captures the attention of all observers. The cuisine is not connected to any community in particular, but has emerged from regional traditions. Despite the many decades that have gone by since the first days of the emigration, there is not a single Indian in Africa who can accept to compromise the absolute rule of never departing from the dietary prescriptions. The great complexity in the recipes, the length of preparation and the wide range of dishes at every meal, as well as the preparation of ordinary meals demand from women a lot of domestic works. For several years, now, it has become imperative almost everywhere to hire cooks of African origin at home. In the eyes of Africans this is considered an important innovation that is indicative of decisive symbolic progress among the representatives of the diaspora.

The retention of dress styles and body aesthetics is another characteristic of Indian community culture. Both inside and outside the house, women mostly wear saris or tunic (kamiz) and trousers (pajama) with a dupatta (similar colour veil). Men generally dress western away from home. Though, it is rare for men and women to permanently adopt western attire, those who do it retain, in any case, their traditional clothing for community and religious events.

3.2.3 Aspirations to link with the home country

The trip to the Indian Subcontinent is a major goal for all families. Even though, the links with their ‘mother’ country have been cut for a long time; every Indian dream of visiting the place of his ancestor at least once in his life time. In line with keeping caste endogamy, another reason for travelling to India is the search for suitable spouses, especially women. Several Indian organisations, during several occasions, invite artists, intellectuals or religious personalities from India. The considerable affluence that goes with these events bears witness to the passion with which diverse cultural aspects of the former homeland are welcomed in Africa. These “masala cultures”- a term used as a parody to designate the local diaspora sub cultures in all countries where there are Indian immigrants- are maintained through such renewed exchanges. Though they have aspirations to link with the home country, but they are also loyal to their country of adoption. They are heavily engaged in the philanthropic activities.

3.2.4 India’s attitude and policies

Indian policy towards the Indian diaspora has continued to evolve since colonial times, through the cold war period, to the present day. Both domestic and international changes have altered the priority and agenda of India’s policy towards PIOs. Overseas Indians were explicitly urged to identify themselves with the interests and aspirations of the countries of their residence. This pragmatic and sensible advice, self-evident and perhaps even self-serving, acknowledged the growing cultural and political distance between India and its Diaspora. The period of disengagement, lasting from the 1950’s to the late 1980’s or the early 1990’s coincided with two significant developments of great

relevance to India's relationship with the Diaspora. One was the phenomenal growth in the population of the Diaspora in western countries and its position in strategic sectors of the economy and public life: information technology, business, finance, the professions and academia, and in the upper reaches of national and international politics.

3.2.4.1 Pre independence period

India's relations with its Diaspora evolved haphazardly over time. In the 19th century, there was little public comment about the migration of its people to distant parts of the Globe beyond the occasional complaint about abuses in the system of recruitment.

The British colonial rulers invented an ingenious method of recruiting much needed plantation labour, popularly known as indenture system, following the Abolition of Slavery in 1833 and the emancipation of African slaves. The unscrupulous ways of labour recruitment - by fraud and by force - and the treatment meted to them, both during the long journey and in plantations is best described as a system of slavery in disguise.

Despite the voices raised by the freedom fighters in India against the indenture system, the practice was unabated for nearly a century from 1834 till 1920. In fact, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the most critical among the members of Imperial Legislative Assembly, stated that the 'worst feature' of indenture system was that the plantation labour was placed under a special law, never explain to them before they left the country. This law was in a language, which they do not understand and which imposes on them a criminal liability for the most trivial breaches of the contracts, in place of the civil liberty, which usually attaches to such breaches (Bhat, 2003:16).

Thus, they are liable under this law to imprisonment with hard labour, which may extend to two and in some cases to three months, not only for fraud, not only for deception, but for negligence, for carelessness and- will the Council believe it? - foe even an impertinent word or gestures to the manager or his overseers. Poor and helpless left the shores of India in thousands, undertaking long journeys with uncertainty and hope to be the victims of such horrendous system of labour under the British planters.

The worst sufferers of this treacherous system were the migrants from the Bhojpuri region.

Though the colonial government enacted a few legislative directives for the protection and well-being of the indenture labour in plantation barracks, they were only violated than followed. The colonial Government of India had persuaded the Secretary of state for colonies to appoint a few Commissions of Inquiry in order to seek justice against discrimination and exploitation of Indian labour but the reports of various commissions hardly mitigated their plight.

The congress party of India has set up an overseas department in 1929 and a contract was established with the local Congress organizations in East and South Africa. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru took over foreign relations when an interim nationalist government was formed on 2nd September 1946. He took the issue of discrimination against Indians in South Africa to the United Nations.

Nehru represented the left wing of the congress. He differed with the conservative wing whose demand was confined only to the improvement of the lot of overseas India. Nehru believed in cooperation between Indians and Africans, but until late 1940s, his sympathy and worry were also confined only to the Indians in South Africa. This contrasted with his general policy of Indian support to the combined struggle of Indian settlers and Africans in which the African cause was deemed to be paramount.

When Nehru was appointed the secretary of All India Congress Committee (AICC) in 1927, an organisation of Indian National Congress (INC), he prepared a paper, "A foreign Policy of India" for the AICC. In this paper, for the first time, he categorically outlined the policy of the INC regarding Indian settlers in other colonial countries. The role India wanted them to play in their country of adoption and the kind of support they could expect from India (Dubey, 2000:72).

Nehru suggested at one place: "An Indian who goes to the other countries must co-operate with people of that country and win for himself a position by friendship and service. The Indians should co-operate with Africans and help them, as far as possible and not claim a special position for themselves" (Dubey, 2000:73).

In the early years of the 20th century, Mahatma Gandhi's struggle for racial equality in South Africa bore fruit in the form of scathing enquiries, which led to the abolition of indenture system. In the inter-war period, India sought to use its influence with London to secure better political rights for Indian Overseas.

However, the Indian government under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru took care not to align itself exclusively with Indian's cause. In fact, Nehru has given a speech in 1957, which shows the attitude of government towards the Indian Diaspora. Indians abroad always should give primary considerations to the interests of the people of those countries; they should never allow themselves to be placed in a position of exploiting the people of those countries. In fact, he said that *"If you cannot be, and if you are not, friendly to the people of that country, comeback to India and do not spoil the fair name of India"* (Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 1976:618).

The Indian Government was faced with the problem of building bridges of friendship with the African nationalist leadership, which was fighting for independence from the colonial rule. Indians in Africa were, therefore, advised to identify themselves with the country of their residence and work in harmony with majority African population to win independence for African territories.

From the very early days of Independence, the issue of citizenship of Indians in East Africa has remained very vital. It has even lead to a misunderstanding between Indians and native people. Their loyalty to their country of adoption was also questioned. In order to clarify what exactly happened, it is necessary to discuss the issue in some detail. According to the British Government's decision, after the end of 1948 Indians were either British subjects or British protected persons. The British subjects were Asians born on British territory. Those Asians were called British Protected Persons.

Indian willingness to accept the African's right to self-government- even in the face of marked doubt concerning his capacity for it- was helped along by the tendency to equate Indian and African nationalism and thus to identify emotionally with the African cause. But the pro-nationalist stand of the Indian Government lent certain plausibility to the

ubiquitous rumours of direct financial support to the African cause circulating within the European community.

Political action of the kind open to Africans spelled great danger to the Indians who were in a seriously exposed position, given real trouble. Disliked by both Europeans and Africans, they stood as an easy target for random aggression. Organized withdrawal of economic cooperation is an obvious first step to dissatisfy masses without other weapons. Thus when the African National Congress wished to impress its existence upon the Europeans, it did so by a boycott of retail shops in 1956. Both Europeans and Indians were affected. But since the African trade was mainly in Indians hands, it was the Indians who were especially hurt.

A measure of the boycott's effectiveness is the fact that it was still a major reference point for discussion. A boycott, however, is not an overt violence. This first appeared later, at the time of the emergency of 1959, in the form of a spate of arson incidents, nearly all of which involved Indian shops. Indians in isolated areas in particular were helplessly exposed to whatever violence might have been generated through political excitement. Police might not be immediately available; and even if there were police in the area, in most instances they would have hesitated to intervene in an attack upon Indians for fear of provoking a larger reaction than they could control (Lal, 2007:330-331).

At a less dramatic but much better documented level, thousands of Indian civil servants in East Africa either have been deprived of their jobs through africanisation or live in daily dread that they will lose them. The Kenya government has continually and publicly demanded a greater African share in commerce and that it has on more than one occasion broadly hinted that political power will be used if necessary to get that share-presumably at Indian expense.

While thus economically harassed, the East African Indians loyalty has been continually brought into question. The charges are typically vague but terribly inclusive: Indians fail to "identify" themselves socially and culturally with the African people. Political

disloyalty is inferred in short from the social aloofness so characteristics of Indians in their relations to others.

In turning to a discussion of the politics of Indo-African relations, one overriding fact needs to be made unambiguously clear lest there be misunderstanding. Indians fears in East Africa are appropriately labelled anxieties: they are forebodings of what might happen rather than what has happened.

As a general factor underlying everything else and cross-cutting the entire region, there is the question of the stability of these infant states, so recently born that they have not yet had an opportunity to prove that they can stand, let alone walk. Indians constantly fear that even favourable circumstances may not long remain as they are.

More concretely, Indians know that the potentialities for trouble which they fear but have not yet experienced have been manifested often enough elsewhere to confirm that they are not illusory. Outside of Africa, Indian experience in East Africa was most troublesome. Both the people and their situation are quite similar; and in the processes of decolonization and Africanisation, East Africa has been just a step ahead of these areas. This reason therefore, remain in their minds as a barometer of what they too might have expected.

The push towards rapid Africanisation resulted in the adoption of various discriminatory schemes in the East African countries. On the eve of Independence, Indian settlers were asked to opt any one citizenship, among these three- Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania citizenship, British citizenship and Indian Citizenship. Majority of Indians applied for British citizenship, and few of them applied for the citizenship of respective East African countries. But, those Indians who applied for the citizenship of their country of residence faced a deep silence of the government over their applications for citizenship. At the same time the government gave the impression that the Indians were unwilling to accept their citizenship. Instead of looking at the root cause of such mindset and trying to sort out grievances of Indians, African leaders utilized this opportunity to spread racial hatred.

Indians faced a series of official and unofficial discriminatory policies in the 1960s-70s, these policies commonly called Africanisation of the Economy. Government of East African states started restricting immigrants as well as non-citizens access to trade and work permits. When it realized that there were enough Indians with East African citizenship to lower down the African aspirations, the government switched to policy of *Africanisation* - which meant the cancellation or non-renewal of trading licenses to non - blacks, whatever their nationality was. Affirmative action in favour of the indigenous was apparent in every aspect of socio - economic life: in trade, the award of contracts, appointments to government jobs, and many other spheres.

Wedged in between the ruling whites and the numerous indigenous blacks, the emerging socio-political and economic situation of the Indians was a delicate one in the various countries of East Africa to which they had migrated. Accordingly, Indian political leaders consistently followed the policy of advising them to integrate themselves in their newly adopted homelands, so as to be accepted completely by the native population. For his part, Jawaharlal Nehru never tired of advising them to become nationals of their countries of permanent domicile and to make common cause with the indigenous. In the event, this had resulted in their adopting British citizenship throughout the three countries of East Africa during the colonial period, even though they had continued to retain their Indian lifestyle and did not mix freely with the African Blacks. It had equally meant their respective countries of residences when each of them attained independence.

The evolution of Indian policy in the late 1940s and 1950s led to a sense of disappointment among Indians overseas, especially in countries where they faced harsh condition, even evacuation. Following decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, as the newly independent dominions of Africa actively pursued the policy of Africanisation, conditions become rather unfavourable for Indian communities, sometimes forcing them to emigrate.

Till late 1950s, Indians of East Africa were considered as hurdles in consolidating Indo-African relations. 'But after India China war of 1962 when Indian isolation was exposed in Africa, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in her capacity as the official delegate toured African countries in 1964. She continued to emphasise that Indians settled in Africa must

identify themselves completely with the African people and make their fullest contribution to the societies in which they lived. However, as seen by her tour programme in Africa, besides her official engagements, she made it a point not to miss Indian settlers, leaders and members of the community though in certain small location their number did not exceed even fifty. She also called Indian settlers as “Ambassadors of India” in Africa. It shows a subtle departure from Nehru policy, as Indian settlers became now a useful instrument for generating goodwill for India. Their position as ambassador of India implied that they were no longer excluded from policy considerations of India.

By second half of 1960s there was increasing realisation that Indians in Africa, whatever passport they may hold, should not be put outside India’s Africa policy. This also suited Indian move of economic diplomacy in Africa and other developing countries as Indian settlers in East Africa had requisite capital and also a will to share it with Indian economic initiatives in African countries.

3.2.4.2 During Globalization period

The Indian Government’s interaction with the diaspora is in line with global trends. The global view of migrants has been changing in recent years, with migrants no longer perceived as economic refugees. Today, Indians overseas, particularly in developed countries, are seen as a potential resource for the country due to their success and achievement in the countries of their adoption. With 25 million PIOs, India is no longer restricted to the subcontinent. They may be just over 2% of India’s population, but their estimated collective resources are substantial. The diaspora has gained in importance over the years, and the more prosperous overseas communities have acquired substantial political influence in their adopted countries and have emerged as useful assets for their home countries.

Though the Indian government, till the appointment of the high level committee, has never made any formal attempt to engage the Indian Diaspora, the Diaspora, both pre-independence and post-independence, have nurtured emotional links with their homeland through culture. Visiting cultural troupes, Indian music and above all the

Hindi films have culturally nourished their heart and soul. The Indian Diaspora for their adaptable nature and their significant role played in the host country has made them a force to reckon with for both the host country and the country of origin. Whether they were indentured workers, free passengers, semi-skilled, skilled workers or business community, almost all of them have done quite well economically and professionally. Second and third generation members of the Indian Diaspora hold prominent positions in economic, political and other spheres.

After Indian independence, they also went as contract skilled worker and as professionals such as doctors, engineers and businessmen. By the end of the 19th Century, the number of emigrants who left India was nearly 1.6 million. While the emigrants of the colonial period have lost touch with most relatives back home, the professionals who migrated in the later period have kept touch with their family. At present the Indian Diaspora is emerging as an international force sharing a common identity and attachment with their country of origin.

There are some successful aspects of the Indian diaspora policy are: (i) its initiative to spread the message that India has changed its diaspora policy, (ii) its North American and European focus on NRI, both to link the diaspora and to get them to lobby for Indian causes, and (iii) to sensitise state governments to engage their diaspora. But there are certain areas where Indian diaspora policy needs to look into.

There is a need to rope in the MEA in effective and substantial ways in India's Diaspora policy. Diaspora policy needs to chart its roadmap by understanding the operation of other different diaspora and their interactions with the mother country, both in the recent past and in the contemporary phase. And along with this diaspora has a strong civil society interface. When the potential, practice will to interact at civil society level exists, the diaspora policy should provide them such interaction (Dubey, 2008: 16-17). State governments should also have interaction with NRIs in terms of inviting investment or reinforcing cultural links, and so on. What they should refrain from is commenting on any action or non-actions of foreign governments when the interests of their compatriots are perceived to be affected (Desai, 2008: 21).

This relationship has been shaped by the fundamental changes that took place in both India and Africa. On the one hand was India's rise as an economic power, its vibrant democracy, its integration into the world economy; on the other hand was a democratizing Africa, its rapid economic growth rates and its continental integration. Their ability to help one another is far greater today than it was in the past. There is a desire to work on their complementarities and build a partnership based on equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit. The focus has now shifted to economic emancipation and collective dreams of sustainable development, and interaction is now moving beyond government to governmental exchange to embrace the people at large.

The move is towards intensifying collaboration on bilateral, continental and global issues. Africa is co-operating with India at a continental, regional and bilateral level. The partnership at various levels is aimed at strengthening south-south co-operation, as there is a desire by both Africa and India to see each other prosper and gain a just place on the global stage. At the pan-African level India stepped up its relations with the African Union (AU), which was formalized by the IAFS in April 2008, and its Delhi Declaration (India-Africa Forum Summit, 2008). The Indian Government argued that this Delhi Declaration and the IAFS was a defining moment in the India-Africa relationship' (Mukherjee, 2008).

India views the AU as embodying the spirit of resurgent Africa and has been fully supportive of its programmes and objectives. India is now not just an observer, but a 'dialogue partner' with the AU. Given India's current relations with the AU, there are enormous possibilities for further co-operation, both economic and political, in the context of a multi-polar and globalized world. The 'democracy deficit' the UN is clear to both India and Africa. Both India and Africa feel that they deserve permanent representation on the UN Security Council, and would support each other. Both sides have been broadly working together for UN reform and are now ready to strive to make the UN more representative and democratic. They also stand together on other critical issues, such as multilateral trade negotiations, reforms of international financial institutions, climate change and the fight against terrorism.

At the regional level India is engaged in constructing relations of partnership with regional organizations. India made good progress in developing co-operation with regional organizations within Africa like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and is expecting to make similar progress with others. India has lines of credit available with the east African development Bank, the Preferred Trade Area/Agreement (PTA) bank for the COMESA region, the West African Development Bank and, most recently, a line of credit of US \$250m to the ECOWAS Development Bank in West Africa, to help finance sub-regional projects. At the bilateral level, India is intensifying collaboration with African countries in sectors like agriculture, food and energy security, trade and technology.

Both regions understand the strategic importance of the other. India assumes immense significance for Africa's developmental goals in terms of trade, investment, entrepreneurial skills, military powers, and educational and research training. Meanwhile, Africa's potential in terms of energy resources, minerals, raw materials and geostrategic location has strategic value for India. Such an understanding has led to emerging areas of co-operation, which include the economic field, energy sector, human resources development and capacity building, security and maritime co-operation.

India and the African countries are devising new parameters for an enhanced and enlarged relationship appropriate to their new role in a changing world. This new dimension in the India-Africa relationship has been a response to the challenge of globalization, and what have emerged are immense opportunities for mutually beneficial co-operation.

The introduction of multilateralism into India-African relations through a multi-tiered co-operative partnership framework has brought transparency in decision making and reflects India's respect for its African partners. Out of the substantial funds committed for capacity building in Africa at the 2008 IAFS, one- half will be channeled through AU-led decisions and a similar amount is committed to the bilateral and regional tiers.

The action through the AU was concretized through the announcement of a Joint Action Plan in March 2010, in which India shared the decision making on the allocation of resources, the creation of training programmes and the establishment of 19 institutions in Africa with the AU Commission and member states. This is an important feature of India's new model of engagement with Africa.

India-African relations over the years have witnessed various changes, moving from a period of high political, emotional and moral solidarity, to a more material, concrete and developmental approach. Indo-African diplomatic relations by the mid-1960s had reached very low ebb. Indian policy was unrealistic in perceiving both the role Africa was going to play due to its numerical strength and sense of solidarity, and the importance and priority that Africans attached to issues like decolonization and racial equality, though India provided increasing support to African liberation movements both for decolonization and an end to racism.

During the early period, India's support was not strong in material terms. Although during the 1970s and 1980s material assistance was added to Indian diplomatic efforts, they remained meager due to India's own limitation for giving more in those terms. However, diplomatic alertness and initiative were so vigorously pursued that they bridged the gap of material assistance and projected India as a champion and uncompromising fighter against colonialism and racism. However, although Indian diplomacy did succeed in filling the gaps in Indian desires and its effective role in African liberation struggles, how far did it actually succeed in providing coherence to India's economic relations within the emerging south-south concept?

India has added an economic dimension to its diplomacy and policy toward Africa by the mid-1960s. Selective and aggressive initiatives for friendship through economic diplomacy did help India, and through its ITEC and other programmes, India started to counter the growing Chinese economic diplomacy in the Third World, a competition that has re-emerged in recent years in Africa. Under the umbrella of the NAM, this economic focus became the main policy driver for India, and other diplomatic endeavours became supportive and adjunct to it in Africa. However, the economic

relations that emerged in the context of Indian initiatives in the umbrella of south-south links were not very equitable, at least in trade. Indo-African growing trends in economic areas demand that in the light of India's past experiences, India should be sensitive to African concerns and expectations.

The current interactions call for partnership and south-south solidarity, and focus on economic empowerment and sustainable development in Africa. They show signs of both expanding and deepening, but if the growing trends under the Indian private sector in Indo-African economic relations do not distinguish themselves qualitatively from north-south relations, then it will create problems for Indian moves in Africa. The economic relations of India with Africa under globalization are gainful for India, but they have to be qualitatively different from north-south relations as far as African perceptions are concerned.

3.3 Limitations of heritage resource

Historically, Indians were a transplanted, immigrant community which differed physically from the indigenous black population. Indeed, the Indian community was seen as a different community. For example: if a Northern Ugandan came to Kampala and engaged in any occupation, even that of a trader, he would have confronted little difficulty merging with the local Ugandans. But for the Indian, no matter where he might be in Uganda, such assimilation was impossible; it was prevented by his very appearance.

The historical separation of races did not help matters. The greatest goodwill and effort in the world could not have rendered a brown brush mark invisible on a black canvas. Anything it reinforced was an insular attitude and behaviour which found Indians preoccupied with ameliorating the effects of discrimination against them in many aspects of their lives. Institutionalized separation of the races also fed the fire of misunderstanding between the races.

On the socio - economic scale, Indians were the middle men, and while there were many poor Indians, as a group they were patently better off than the indigenous African. This also helped shape their attitudes and behaviour as a community apart from and superior to that of black Africans. But of course Indian attitudes and behaviour – however much shaped by historical circumstance - were also shaped by Indian tradition. Elements of this tradition often militated against close contact with black Africans. It was not unusual to find that Indians possessed attitudes of superiority and negative pictures of the ability and efficiency of Africans.

No doubt one could find instances of African inefficiency and lack of ability - especially (as far as the Indian was concerned), in the business world - but stereotyped thinking on the part of Indians with respect to Africans was fairly general. Many Indians prided themselves as the inheritors of an ancient civilization and looked upon the African as a person who had a long way to go before attaining the heights of the Indian civilization.

3.3.1 Maintaining community self-segregation

Social and urban segregation that currently characterizes the relationship between Tanzanian Indians and Africans is the product of old socioeconomic asymmetries of power as well as of as more recent history of political ostracization, economic witch-hunts and strategies of exclusion. Kept apart from the British during the colonial period, the Asians of East Africa, did not spare their efforts to avoid cohabitation with Africans, opting for intra community sociability, imposing endogamy rules and carefully avoiding certain residential areas.

From an Indian African point of view, the centripetal and protectionist decision taken by all societies could be justified by several reasons: in the eyes of those concerned, it was a way of maintaining cultural identity; 2) it brought social security protection to every community- as a minority- that the state proved incapable of providing; 3) it would facilitate future community commitment to collective development without harming all citizens. Governed by the customs that give preference to intra-community contacts, the social life of families of Indian origin is organized in accordance with a closed mentality that leaves little room for Africans. Beyond the intercommunity rivalries, a common

social and geographical origin and the existence of a common and linguistic heritage is also a major factor that unifies Indian Africans of all different kinds of affiliations. And also the fact that they are immigrants and that they have to defend their rights, the representatives of diaspora have a feeling that have a lot in common but little to share with Africans.

3.3.2 Poor social integration

In contrast to the strong integration of Indians in key sectors of national economy, poor relations between them and the Africans is the result of the social gap between the two groups and the segregation policy maintained by the Indian communities. Endogamy represents the culmination or conclusion of a group centred sociability that is almost inevitable and not very keen to expansion. It is also in line with the internal constraints of the Asian society.

Though these limitations are there but still it cannot overshadow the fact that Indian diaspora plays an integral role in the development, polity and economy of Tanzania. Though there is residential segregation but there is no polarisation. Minorities tend to live together in solidarity in any community, thus, Indian diaspora is no exception. In the case of Tanzania several multicultural societies are co-existing in a very amiable nature.

3.4 Assessment of Heritage as a catalyst between Indo-Tanzanian relations

Diaspora as a heritage is an important factor in India's foreign policy and an asset for its diplomacy. The presence of Indian communities is an important factor in bilateral relations with the countries of their settlement. Diaspora is also playing a significant role in strengthening political relations. They can facilitate access to the highest level of decision makers. They are also facilitating the visits of high level dignitaries in India. They are also the main catalyst in development. They proved to be an asset in areas like international trade, investments, education and culture (Sharma, 2008:1-3). The soft power diplomacy has emerged as an important instrument of foreign policy. Joseph Nye who coined the term has defined 'soft power as the ability to get what you want through

attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced (Nye, 2004:16-20).

The term has acquired great acceptance after the last gulf war where the world had witnessed the limitation of the military power of the world's sole super power. Most of the nation states are paying great attention to the use of their soft power. The overseas communities of diaspora have emerged as one of the most important tools of the soft power diplomacy. The process of globalization and economic liberalization has given a great impetus to this phenomenon (Sharma, 2009:171).

The migrants in the colonial time who have long settled down in their countries of residence and who have maintained a continuous a continuous cultural link with the mother country, seem to have been ignored in this policy. This negligence cannot be justified, because Indian has a moral obligation to satisfy the yearnings of this section of the diaspora to intensify and maintain cultural links with the mother country. It should also not be forgotten that though this diaspora may not be able to transfer riches to the mother country, they have the potentiality to make an important contribution by enhancing India's prestige and position in the comity of nation and by garnering support for legitimate causes and positions on issues of importance to India. Secondly, in spite of the significant contribution now being made, particularly through remittances, by the Indian diaspora to India's development, the full potential of the diaspora in this regard remains to be tapped. The mere enhancement in the flow of remittances is not enough. A lot depends upon where the remittances go, i.e. how they are invested.

India's diaspora policy needs to treat its Indian diaspora as a 'strategic' resource. It needs to have policies and instruments for engaging its diaspora globally, which give it global visibility and goodwill. An assessment of India's diaspora policy would show that it has acquired greater momentum and magnitude, but it is still both lopsided and short-sighted.

According to Niranjana Desai, this was the basic loophole in the Indian diaspora policy, as they made the economic consideration the main factor of the diaspora policy. Barely one per cent of the Indian diaspora is rich enough to invest in India, and surely this can not be the prime focus of government's interaction with the diaspora (Desai, 2008: 20). The captive Indian diaspora in west Asia and the opportunities for Indian workers in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries gets only cosmetic policy support.

The real issues facing these sectors and the opportunities in the regions are not being addressed either by engaging these countries or by policy support. Some of the India diaspora is in non-Anglophone regions like the francophone and Lusophone areas. There is no policy designed and extended to those whose identity and culture has been eroded substantially under the assimilative policies of France. There is a strong urge in these communities to restore their identity and link with India. In countries like Malawi, where indentured Indians went, even today are stateless and need and support from India.

Indian policy needs to design a strategy and set of initiatives to broaden its focus and include the PIOs who form the bulk of its diaspora. In this context, Indian can learn from the experiences of other countries with a large diaspora. In other words, a comparative understanding of the diaspora as a player in international relations and as a resource for home and host countries will provide a better insight into a new diaspora policy for India. Diaspora can also contribute in institution building (Desai, 2008: 22). Another area where they can contribute immensely is the partnership between major NRI organizations and Indian diplomatic missions and other organizations to project India better abroad.

The question arises as to whether India's growing strategic significance in the world politics can be utilized to the benefit of the Indian diaspora. Major powers like the United States, U.K. etc., are able to rush to the rescue of their diaspora in distress or help them otherwise, by virtue of their superior strength. Indian has still a long way to go in building its economic and military strength, before it acquires such a strategic leverage.

However, the strategic space India has been able to gain recently has put it in a better position to come to the assistance of its diaspora than was the case only a few years ago. The real difference that can be discerned in the following: India is no longer following a 'hands off' policy vis-a vis the interest of the Indian diaspora; India is in a position to send signals, at least to some countries, that they will have to pay a price-sometimes a heavy one-if they wantonly ignore India's concern about its diaspora; and there are more instances than before, of India being able to send signals that it is concerned about its diaspora in a difficult situation, and that it has the will to take all possible diplomatic and other measures to alleviate their condition (Dubey, 2008: 81).

India's policy towards the diaspora still leaves much to be desired and suffers from the absence of a long term vision and strategy. One of the deficiencies recently pointed out by a section of the NRIs is that this policy suffers from a bias towards the more recently and prosperous among the Indian diaspora, particularly those NRIs who have migrated during the last two decades.

National boundaries had been turning porous under globalization. The movement of people and resources is becoming easy politically and technologically. Cultural and civilisational identities are emerging as a strong networking force. Instead of solely focusing on dollar-rich diaspora in North America, a wider focus on Indian diaspora globally will give India strategic assets and opportunities to play a global role in times to come (Dubey, 2008:15).

The governments need to determine its priorities based on a realistic understanding of the diaspora and fashion different strategies for different segments of the diaspora. And the governments should also have to strengthen its regulatory and policing methods. The government, while implementing its diaspora policy should focus on initiating programmes that caters for the interests and requirements of the diaspora. It is the culture, religion and language that draw overseas Indians to their Indian heritage. Thus, primary aim of diaspora policy should be to keep alive the ties with India and build a mutually beneficial relationship. All those of Indian descent should feel welcome in

India and experience the warmth of their ties with the ancestral land (Singh, 2008:27-28).

Chapter IV

Opportunities and challenges in utilisation of Indian diaspora as a heritage resource in Indo-Tanzanian relations

4.1 Opportunity through modes of participation

Several factors explain India and Tanzania's recent interest in strengthening transnational linkages with its diaspora. First, the government's early investments in state-funded higher education are translating into a greater share of both countries graduates emigrating to take high-paid jobs across the world. To make up for this shortfall, the government is recognizing that it must reach out to its large and potentially circular diaspora by encouraging its members to move back or send money through remittances or investments.

Second, tapping the potential of diaspora has been facilitated by the recent liberalization and globalization of the economy, which have reduced the institutional barriers and negative stigma earlier attached to partnering with those living outside the country. Finally, India's and Tanzania's recent rise in economic and geo-political terms has provided emigrants with the dignity that many crave, as their income and skill have proved insufficient in ensuring their full assimilation into their host countries.

4.1.1 In Home Country

4.1.1.1 Social and economic participation

Prior to the mid-1980s, the Indian diaspora's relations with the home-land were weak. Under British rule, Indians abroad were seen as a labour pool designed to

benefit mainly the British Empire. In 1947, the newly independent Indian government pushed the diaspora away by using the state's physical boundaries to define the nebulous limits of national identity.

Since the mid-1980s, the Indian government and the diaspora have altered their stance toward one another. In the United States, for example, there has been an expansion in the number of organizations that Indian immigrants have launched to foster linkages with their country of origin. Concurrently, the Indian government has initiated new policies and institutions to strengthen its bonds with the diaspora. In the mid-1980s, it created new bank accounts that allowed non-resident Indians (NRIs) to invest in their home country. In 1999, it launched two new visa status cards for Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCI), which facilitated emigrants' ability to travel in and out of India, invest in property, and hold rupee bank accounts.

In 2000, the Indian government commissioned a high-profile committee to write a report on the diaspora. Based on that report, in January 2003 the government inaugurated its first annual conference of overseas Indians, known as Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) or Overseas Indian Day. The conference date, 9 January, commemorated the day that Mahatma Gandhi returned from South Africa to launch the independence movement. The PBD conference facilitates net-working opportunities between emigrants, the Indian government, and Indian organizations; commemorates emigrants who have contributed to the country's development; and communicates new diaspora policies, such as the recent bill that will enable overseas Indians to vote in their country of origin.

Development is defined broadly to include policies and practices that aim to improve well-being in the socioeconomic and political realms. Surveys have shown that nearly 95 percent of overseas Indians send money to their families or close friends to support education, health, or other personal concerns in the homeland. For years, India has been the largest recipient of remittances, estimated at \$54 billion per year today (World Bank 2009). Nearly 30 percent of these remittances come from the Middle East (where most Indians are blue-collar workers), and 40 percent come from

North America (where the majority are professionals and technicians) (Reserve Bank of India 2010).

Indian diaspora donors are quick to give to natural disaster relief (Gujarat earthquake, tsunami in Tamil Nadu, floods in Punjab), but sustained development efforts are often underfunded. Many groups focus on children, which are considered an attractive area of philanthropy for Indian expatriates. By far the most popular cause for Indians is education in India. They see education as the path out of poverty for India's masses and as a politically noncontroversial subject. The focus on education has not only inspired many transnational development organizations, but has also forced several organizations that address broad-based development to rebrand themselves as "education-oriented."

Many transnational organizations tap diaspora wealth to raise funds for existing organizations in India. The Indian government has supported these efforts by offering incentives for professors and graduate students to teach in India. Creating "world-class universities" has now become a central component of India's economic growth strategy. Professional associations (including physicians, entrepreneurs, and hoteliers) are increasingly trying to form partnerships with institutions to transfer knowledge from the host country to their home country. Government has tried to facilitate such business partnerships by supporting software technology parks and research and development centers (Saxenian: 2005).

Religious organizations routinely raise funds for religious bodies (ashrams, gurus, or dioceses) or movements in India. Religious groups have been able to bypass suspicions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and access diaspora's wealth in the form of donations.

Many development organizations began simply to raise money from expatriates to support a parent organization in India. In most cases, the organization is well-known in India and enjoys substantial capacity. However, Indian NGOs have had to seek alternative funding sources as multilateral and bilateral aid to India has declined. The growing mass of "high net worth" Indians thus have become an important source of alternative funding for Indian NGOs. The diaspora is used for its money, but it does not exert much influence over the direction of development back home.

In addition to raising funds for a particular organization, Indian transnational organizations are increasingly raising funds to support direct development projects. Some religious organizations, especially among Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs, have participated in development philanthropy and education in India for decades. Leaders of these religions all spoke of how charity is an important and often articulated part of their practice. In the United States, Indian mosques, churches, and gurudwaras (Sikh places of worship) provide a physical channel through which members can share information about community needs and collect contributions.

Secular organizations have also been created to foster development in India. Unlike organizations that raise funds for a parent group in India, these exert more power over their Indian partners. While surveys of philanthropy in India have shown that traditional forms of individual giving to family members, religious institutions, or beggars is extremely high, institutionalized forms of giving are low.

Underlying these ideals is a strong distrust of government and a privileging of private charity. A number of Indian NGOs are currently working with government officials to decrease the bureaucratic hurdles involved in international philanthropy and to improve the tax incentive to give from abroad.

4.1.1.2 Political participation

In addition to raising funds for organizations back home and for economic development projects, Indian diaspora organizations also transfer ideas and practices to support political movements in India. Some religious organizations, for example, advocate secularism and religious equality-principles that are considered foundational to India's constitution but are viewed (especially by members of minority religious groups) as under threat today.

Others use their own status to directly lobby the Ministers of government of India. Still others support movements to protect members of religious minorities in India. Muslim organizations also advocate secularism in India, but they do so by raising awareness of the effects of poverty on Muslims. Since the 1980s, Indian ethnic and identity organizations have increasingly engaged in bridging functions to support the Indian government's efforts to expand the country's international influence. They do

this by offering to “spread Indian culture.” In addition to fostering social and cultural links, identity organizations strengthen India’s international influence by shaping its foreign policy agreements.

4.1.2 In Host country

4.1.2.1 In Political sphere

The Indian diaspora has emerged into a heterogeneous community with a multiplicity of national, regional, linguistic, religious and occupational and class backgrounds. This community has established a distinct cultural presence in the African context as evidenced through its heritage language preservation, its religious preservation efforts, its promotion of performing arts, its cultural associations, its food and cuisine and its political institutions.

Indian diaspora have occupied important political offices in Tanzania. Sophia Mustafa got elected thrice in the parliament of Tanzania. Abdul Karim Karimjee served as deputy speaker and Amir Jamal as Minister for Communications, Power and Works. Dr. Krishna Member of Parliament, Mr. Bajaj and Al- Noor Kassum also played important role in the politics of Tanzania. Mr. Ashok Shah describes that if we compare political participation or role of Indian Diaspora in three countries of East Africa, Tanzania is the country where Indian Diaspora has been more vocal in the political space and could secure place in different governments and political parties.

4.1.2.2 In socio-economic sphere

Large number of Indians are taking active part in voluntary welfare organisations and has been contributing to the projects of national importance such as literacy campaigns, self-help schemes, and raising funds for scholarships. Hospitals, clubs, and community centers are bringing down barriers erected against one race or the other.

The shift from socialist Tanzania to capitalism during the economically difficult years of the early 1980’s has shown the improvement in the relations between Indians and Tanzanians. The government headed by the Ali Hassan Mwinyi

implemented the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations which included large scale farming, denationalization of coffee and sisal estates, and loosening of the Building Acquisition Act of 1971. These measures have helped in improving the conditions of Indians (Oonk, G: 2007). There are currently over 90,000 people of Indian origin in Tanzania and they control a sizeable portion of Tanzanian economy now.

4.1.3 Indian diaspora role in bilateral relations

Diaspora are an important factor in both countries foreign policy and an assets for its diplomacy. The presence of Indian communities is an important factor in bilateral relations with the countries of their settlement. Diaspora is also playing a significant role in strengthening political relations. They can facilitate access to the highest level of decision makers. They are also facilitating the visits of high level dignitaries in India. They are also the main catalyst in development. They proved to be an asset in areas like international trade, investments, education and culture (Sharma, 2008: 1-3). India now regards several sections of the PIO's as an asset while the PIO's look upon Indian as a source of cultural and intellectual inspiration and also as a land of economic and other opportunities.

One of the important ways in which the new relationship between India and the Indian diaspora has recently been reflected is the dramatic increase in the volume of remittances by the Indian diaspora to India and a significant shift in the provenance and composition of these remittances. The Indian diaspora has acquired a higher stature and respect in their countries of residence because of the higher status acquired by the mother country in the committee of nations by virtue of the dynamism displayed by its economy and the remarkable achievements recorded by it in frontier areas of technology. On the other hand, the mother country has also been basking under the glory of the pioneering role of NRIs in the expansion and sophistication of the IT industry in advanced countries, and notable contributions in other areas of advanced technologies in these countries.

The soft power diplomacy has emerged as an important instrument of foreign policy. Joseph Nye who coined the term has defined 'soft power as the ability to get what

you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced (Nye, 2004:16-20). The term has acquired great acceptance after the last gulf war where the world had witnessed the limitation of the military power of the world's sole super power.

Most of the nation states are paying great attention to the use of their soft power. The overseas communities of diaspora have emerged as one of the most important tools of the soft power diplomacy. The process of globalization and economic liberalization has given a great impetus to this phenomenon (Sharma, 2009:171).

India has also recognized the importance of overseas communities and has successfully leveraged it for its own soft power diplomacy and economic development. It also looked upon Diaspora as an important factor in India's foreign policy and bilateral relations with the countries where they were present in significant numbers. Due to the proactive policy of engagement there was an increased awareness about the diaspora among the Indian people. Indian media and the civil society started paying for greater attention to overseas Indian communities (Sharma, 2009:174).

Indians overseas, particularly in developed countries, are seen as a potential resource for the country due to their success and achievement in the countries of their adoption. With 25 million POIs, India is no longer restricted to the subcontinent. They may be just over 2% of India's population, but their estimated collective resources are substantial. The diaspora has gained in importance over the years, and the more prosperous overseas communities have acquired substantial political influence in their adopted countries and have emerged as useful assets for their home countries.

4.2 Evolution of Diaspora policy of India and Tanzania

4.2.1 Diaspora policy of India

Indian policy towards the Indian diaspora has continued to evolve since colonial times, through the cold war period, to the present day. Both domestic and international changes have altered the priority and agenda of India's policy towards PIOs. The major concern of India during the colonial rule was to see to it that the colonial government gave equal privileges to the PIO compared to European settlers. It advised the PIO to join the other countries native people in the freedom struggle and to become one of them without seeking special privileges or status for themselves.

The British could not ignore the economic strength of the Indians and as per 1921 census, Indians constituted the second largest racial group after Africans in Kenya. From 1913 to 1948, Indian population in Uganda increased from merely 3,651 to 35,215 as many were born there. Increasing numerical and economic strength of the Indians could not be ignored by the colonial power and when representative institutions were established in East Africa, the Indians were given a representation.

These earlier colonial experiences show that the development of a highly hierarchical society, often described as an 'upside down pyramid': at the top was a very small European Elite, below them were the Indian migrants; and at the bottom were the majority of Africans. Indians and Europeans remained the predominant economic force in spite of the fact that European accounted for only about 1 per cent of the total population, while Indians accounted for only 2 percent (Lal, 2007:258).

Wedge in between the ruling whites and the numerous indigenous blacks, the emerging socio-political and economic situation of the Indians was a delicate one in the various countries of East Africa to which they had migrated. Accordingly, Indian political leaders consistently followed the policy of advising them to integrate themselves in their newly adopted homelands, so as to be accepted completely by the native population. For his part, Jawaharlal Nehru never tired of advising them to become nationals of their countries of permanent domicile and to make common cause with the indigenous. In the event, this had resulted in their adopting British

citizenship throughout the three countries of East Africa during the colonial period, even though they had continued to retain their Indian lifestyle and did not mix freely with the African Blacks. It had equally meant their respective countries of residences when each of them attained independence.

Political action of this kind spelled great danger to the Indians who were in a seriously exposed position. Disliked by both Europeans and Africans, they stood as an easy target for random aggression. Organized withdrawal of economic cooperation is an obvious first step to dissatisfied masses without other weapons. Thus, when the African National Congress wished to impress its existence upon the Europeans, it did so by a boycott of retail shops in 1956. Both Europeans and Indians were affected. But since the African trade was mainly in Indians hands, it was the Indians who were especially hurt.

A measure of the boycott's effectiveness is the fact that it was still a major reference point for discussion. A boycott, however, is not an overt violence. This first appeared at the time of the emergency of 1959, in the form of a spate of arson incidents, nearly all of which involved Indian shops. Indians in isolated areas in particular, were helplessly exposed to whatever violence might have been generated through political excitement. Police might not be immediately available; and even if there were police in the area, in most instances they would have hesitated to intervene in an attack upon Indians for fear of provoking a larger reaction than they could control (Lal, 2007:330-331).

But lately the push towards rapid Africanisation resulted in the adoption of various discriminatory schemes in the East African countries. On the eve of Independence, Indian settlers were asked to opt any one citizenship, among these three- Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania citizenship, British citizenship and Indian Citizenship. Majority of Indians applied for British citizenship, and few of them applied for the citizenship of respective East African countries. But, those Indians who applied for the citizenship of their country of residence faced a deep silence of the government over their applications for citizenship. At the same time the government gave the impression that the Indians were unwilling to accept their citizenship. Instead of

looking at the root cause of such mindset and trying to sort out grievances of Indians, African leaders utilized this opportunity to spread racial hatred.

At a less dramatic but much better documented level, thousands of Indian civil servants in East Africa either have been deprived of their jobs through africanisation or live in daily dread that they will lose them. The Kenya government has continually and publicly demanded a greater African share in commerce and that it has on more than one occasion broadly hinted that political power will be used if necessary to get that share- presumably at Indian expense.

While thus economically harassed, the East African Indians loyalty has been continually brought into question. The charges are typically vague but terribly inclusive: Indians fail to “identify” themselves socially and culturally with the African people. Political disloyalty is inferred in short from the social aloofness so characteristic of Indians in their relations to others.

In turning to a discussion of the politics of Indo-African relations, one overriding fact needs to be made unambiguously clear lest there be misunderstanding. Indians fears in East Africa are appropriately labelled anxieties: they are forebodings of what might happen rather than what has happened.

However, more concretely, Indians know that the potentialities for trouble which they fear but have not yet experienced have been manifested often enough elsewhere to confirm that they are not illusory. Outside of Africa, Indian experience in East Africa was most troublesome. Both the people and their situation are quite similar; and in the processes of decolonization and Africanisation, East Africa has been just a step ahead of these areas.

Soon after independence, government of these countries starts the policies that were favourable to native businessman but anti - Indians. Indians faced a series of official and unofficial discriminatory policies in the 1960s-70s, these policies commonly called Africanisation of the Economy. Government of East African states started restricting immigrants as well as non-citizens access to trade and work permits. When it realized that there were enough Indians with East African citizenship to lower down the African aspirations, the government switched to policy of

Africanisation - which meant the cancellation or non-renewal of trading licenses to non - blacks, whatever their nationality was. Affirmative action in favour of the indigenous was apparent in every aspect of socio - economic life: in trade, the award of contracts, appointments to government jobs, and many other spheres.

After Indian independence, they also went as contract skilled worker and as professionals such as doctors, engineers and businessmen. By the end of the 19th Century, the number of emigrants who left India was nearly 1.6 million. While the emigrants of the colonial period have lost touch with most relatives back home, the professionals who migrated in the later period have kept touch with their family. At present the Indian Diaspora is emerging as an international force sharing a common identity and attachment with their country of origin.

Post-colonial India's Diaspora policy believed that it is in the best interest of overseas Indians to integrate into their host countries. Secondly, the goal of national self-sufficiency led Indian policy makers towards the framework of a closed economy, which did not value links with Indian mercantile communities overseas.

The policy that the Indian diaspora should focus itself on the countries where they had settled and to which it should be loyal started to change in the latter half of the 1960's, especially after Indian isolation following the Indo-Chinese war of 1962. Early hopes of a more intensive Indo-African partnership went into a low ebb in the 1960s. Indian policy was unrealistic, overestimating the role Africa was going to play due to its numerical strength and underestimating the importance and priority that Africans attached to issues like decolonization and racial equality. India failed to realize that such issues like decolonization and racial equality. India failed to realize that such issues like peaceful co-existence, highly relevant and important though they were for India, had to be integrated with African impatience for decolonization.

In support for African decolonization, India was branded as having a softer attitude towards colonial powers. Indian insistence on non-violent struggles against colonialism, its advocacy of 'peaceful co-existence' and moderate stand on issues like the Mau Mau rebellion, the Algerian war of independence and the Congolese civil war, did not appeal to Africans¹(Kimche, 1973:246). On the other hand, the Chinese militancy and advocacy for armed struggle did appeal to African. Furthermore,

India's Anglo-centric view resulted in no time limit being fixed for colonial withdrawalⁱⁱ(Jansen, 1966:299), and the gulf caused between Indian settlers and Africans by colonialist propaganda that India was attempting to end white domination to replace it with Indians, brought differences out into the open. During the Indo-Chinese War of 1962 India was isolated; very few African countries supported India and many adopted an openly unhelpful attitude. The Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (1964) exposed Indian isolation, with Africa taking the dominant control of the NAMⁱⁱⁱ(Breacher, 1968:226).

The result of the was that by the mid-1960s India's advantages as a beacon of decolonization in Africa, as one of the founders of the NAM and a leader of Afro-Asian resurgence, had been let down during the Indo-Chinese War by those very peoples whose demands it had championed. The situation for India became more alarming when it observed that African countries belonging to and professing the aims of non-aligned groups were ready to accept Chinese claims and versions of events.

The issue of India's policy towards Indian settlers in Africa was another factor that did not augur well with African leaders. India had taken the exclusive issue of the discrimination of Indian settlers in South Africa to the UN. Blacks, who suffered worse discrimination in South Africa, were initially not included in the Indian resolution moved in the UN under Article 10 of the UN Charter. This caused great misgiving among Africans. Admittedly, Nehru had made it clear that 'in many parts of Africa-East, West, South-there are considerable number of Indians, mostly business people. Our definite instructions to them and to our agent in Africa are that they must always put the interest of indigenous population first. We want to have no vested interests at the expense of population of those countries' (Chhabra, 1986:15). However, in the aftermath of the Chinese attack of 1962 he talked of the 'dual loyalty' of Indian settlers in Africa. They were supposed to stand up beside India when India was in crisis (Gupta, 1975:130). During the 1964 Africa Safari, Mrs. Indira Gandhi also called these overseas Indian settlers 'Ambassadors of India'.

By the end of the 1960s India had a tough politico-diplomatic task to overcome the growing isolation in Africa. It was time for India to reconsider its relations with Africa. Its policy-makers in New Delhi adopted a less ambitious national policy, focusing instead on building their country's defence sector and securing its immediate neighbourhood.

In the aftermath of the Chinese attack in 1962, India stopped treating African countries as a bloc and became more selective in its friendship. It started integrating the priorities of African countries and was able to convince African countries, to a certain extent, of the importance and countries of this own stand and views on different issues. International situations and India's achievements at home played an important role in India's move to befriend African countries. India won the 1971 war with Pakistan, thereby liberating Bangladesh. The Sino-Soviet conflict and the Cold War enabled India to sign the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. Indian diplomacy scored points by obtaining the support of one superpower against the other without being an ally of either.

The success of India's 'Green Revolution' and achievement of self-sufficiency in food grains production demonstrated Indian economic and managerial capability. India's explosion of its nuclear device in 1974 restored its military confidence and raised its status as a military power. The launching of the Aryabhata rocket launcher in 1975 again placed India among the leading scientific and technological countries of the world. With newly acquired self-confidence, Indian policy became more proactive towards the African countries. For India it was the planned, systematic and persistent attempt of its policy pursuits that took the problems in its stride and exploited the favourable circumstances that came its way. India again became a power to which Africa turned for help and assistance, and as a model for development.

Under these changed domestic and international circumstances, Indo- African relations showed noticeable changes compared with the earlier period. The most important change was in the field of India's economic diplomacy towards the African states. The ever-growing industry and need to keep its balance of trade kept Indian economic diplomacy at the forefront of its foreign policy. Therefore,

economic diplomacy, a secondary objective to the political imperatives of the 1960s, became the primary objective by the 1970s.

The previous policy to make friends in Africa and to gain their diplomatic support on various issues shifted to the creation and cultivation of gainful economic links. This was in tandem with the increasing realization among developing countries of the need for economic co-operation under a south-south umbrella. India utilized its diplomatic strength in international forums like the UN, NAM and 'Group of 77', to develop south-south co-operation. Both the African states and India underlined the need for economic co-operation among themselves. It was at the Lusaka Summit (1970) that the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, articulated and gave the call for south-south co-operation. She pledged Indian technology and human resources for this. Politically, by the early 1970s most of the African colonies had become independent except Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. For the newly independent countries, the priority was to consolidate their freedom by accelerating economic development.

On the issue of the struggle for liberation, India worked closely with the African countries in their fight against apartheid in South Africa and Namibia. India accorded diplomatic status to the African National Congress (ANC) in 1967 and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1985. Apart from diplomatic support, it added material assistance, but the material assistance remained meager due to India's own limitation on giving more in those terms. However, the diplomatic initiatives were so vigorously pursued by India that they bridged the gap of less material assistance and projected India as a champion and uncompromising fighter colonialism and racism. India also made contributions to the UN Fund for Namibia, UN Institute for Namibia, and Un Educational and Training Programme for South Africa. At the Harare NAM Summit in 1986 the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was chiefly responsible for the establishment of the Action for Resisting invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid (AFRICA) fund. The purpose of the AFRICA fund was to enable the NAM to help all the victims of apartheid in South Africa, Namibia and in the frontline states. According to one estimate, India provided Rs36m. by 1977-78, while India's initial contribution to the AFRICA fund

was Rs500m, which included private and individual contributions of Rs25m (MEA, 1973:161-162).

Though, in 1970s, on the issue of the Indian diaspora, Indira Gandhi advanced a policy of engagement which was resented by Africans. When Kenya and Uganda initiated the Africanisation process, the Indian Government's sympathy and concern for people of Indian origin was resented (Dubey, 1997:51-55). India's intervention at that time was perceived as interference in internal affairs. This had policy implications. There was a realization of the fact that Africa did not reciprocate India's support for the African liberation movements by giving fair treatment to the people of Indian origin. India had to revert to the policy of disengagement with the PIOs.

In short, while Indian foreign policy during much of the Cold War did not have significant direct impact on unfolding developments in Africa, its political commitment to the NAM and its emphasis on south-south co-operation led to increased Indian exports to Africa. The balance of trade, which was in favour of Africa, shifted in favour of India until petroleum imports from Africa increased. This was resented by African countries as a new pecking order rather than south-south co-operation. However, consistent diplomatic support for African nationalist movements left India well positioned to take up its engagements across the continent and forge new ties, as it has done in recent years under globalization. However, subsequent governments until the late 1990s continued this policy. Further, India's hesitation in welcoming the expelled Indians back into its fold, in turn made the PIOs realize the limits of Indian policy towards them and the fact that they were left to their own fates in their adopted countries.

Though the PIO's are prosperous and confident of their identity, they suffer from their status of being minority. The prosperous minority faces subtle or obvious hostility of lesser developed majority community. This problem is compounded when the affluent minority also happens to be an immigrant community and not successfully integrated with the indigenous groups. If such minority is not networked strongly, as Indian Diaspora is not, its global strength does not help it domestically.

Besides the above weakness, the Indian Diaspora suffers from two additional factors; first they are not mobilised Diaspora as compared to Chinese and Jewish, because of its domestic positioning, lack of networking and absence of a strong global organization, the Indian Diaspora has failed to mobilize its resources and strength when it faced crisis as in Uganda. The second reason for its feeble impact in international area is the weak position of the origin country. India, though big in population, economically and militarily it is not so strong and therefore it can't either help effectively nor do PIO look towards it for vital support during crisis (Dubey, 2003: vii-viii). And all these weaknesses link back to the past. In the Colonial period Indians were taken as labourers to Africa and they were not allowed to intermingle with the local people. This resulted in alienation of them. And in their mother country also they were not getting the desired treatment which resulted in dilemic position of the Diaspora.

Before independence the Indian concern about the treatment of Indian settlers abroad was with the intention of making British rulers of our country responsible for the welfare of overseas Indians and to secure for them fair treatment and justice in relation to White settlers. The assumption that such responsibility continued was occasionally expressed in parliament and press. Immediately after India's independence, the Government of India was not in a position to secure full justice to Indian settlers in Africa. But by the second half of 1960s there was increasing realisation that Indians in Africa, whatever passport they may hold, should not be put outside India's Africa policy. This also suited Indian move of economic diplomacy in Africa and other developing countries as Indian settlers in East Africa had requisite capital and also a will to share it with Indian economic initiatives in African countries.

4.2.1.1 Changes in Diaspora policy

The period of disengagement, lasting from the 1950's to the late 1980's or the early 1990's coincided with two significant developments of great relevance to India's relationship with the Diaspora. One was the phenomenal growth in the population of the Diaspora in western countries and its position in strategic sectors of the economy

and public life: information technology, business, finance, the professions and academia, and in the upper reaches of national and international politics.

In the post - Cold War era, with the end of apartheid, one of the major rationales of solidarity no longer exists. The shared ideologies of NAM and anti-colonialism no longer remained the rallying points of interaction between India and Africa. The relationship was being shaped by the fundamental changes that took place in both India and Africa. On the one hand was India's rise as an economic power, its vibrant democracy, its integration into the world economy; on the other hand was a democratizing Africa, its rapid economic growth rates and its continental integration. Their ability to help one another is far greater today than it was in the past. There is a desire to work on their complementarities and build a partnership based on equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit. The focus has now shifted to economic emancipation and collective dreams of sustainable development, and interaction is now moving beyond government to governmental exchange to embrace the people at large.

The move is towards intensifying collaboration on bilateral, continental and global issues. Africa is co-operating with India at a continental, regional and bilateral level. The partnership at various levels is aimed at strengthening south –south co-operation, as there is a desire by both Africa and India to see each other prosper and gain a just place on the global stage. At the pan-African level India stepped up its relations with the African Union (AU), which was formalized by the IAFS in April 2008, and its Delhi Declaration (India-Africa Forum Summit, 2008). The Indian Government argued that this Delhi Declaration and the IAFS was a defining moment in the India-Africa relationship' (Mukherjee, 2008). India views the AU as embodying the spirit of resurgent Africa and has been fully supportive of its programmes and objectives. India is now not just an observer, but a 'dialogue partner' with the AU.

Given India's current relations with the AU, there are enormous possibilities for further co-operation, both economic and political, in the context of a multi-polar and globalized world. The 'democracy deficit' the UN is clear to both India and Africa. Both India and Africa feel that they deserve permanent representation on the UN

Security Council, and would support each other. Both sides have been broadly working together for UN reform and are now ready to strive to make the UN more representative and democratic. They also stand together on other critical issues, such as multilateral trade negotiations, reforms of international financial institutions, climate change and the fight against terrorism.

Both regions understand the strategic importance of the other. India assumes immense significance for Africa's developmental goals in terms of trade, investment, entrepreneurial skills, military powers, and educational and research training. Meanwhile, Africa's potential in terms of energy resources, minerals, raw materials and geostrategic location has strategic value for India. Such an understanding has led to emerging areas of co-operation, which include the economic field, energy sector, human resources development and capacity building, security and maritime co-operation.

India and the African countries are devising new parameters for an enhanced and enlarged relationship appropriate to their new role in a changing world. This new dimension in the India-Africa relationship has been a response to the challenge of globalization, and what have emerged is immense opportunities for mutually beneficial co-operation.

The introduction of multilateralism into India-African relations through a multi-tiered co-operative partnership framework has brought transparency in decision making and reflects India's respect for its African partners. Out of the substantial funds committed for capacity building in Africa at the 2008 IAFS, one-half will be channeled through AU-led decisions and a similar amount is committed to the bilateral and regional tiers. The action through the AU was concretized through the announcement of a Joint Action Plan in March 2010, in which India shared the decision making on the allocation of resources, the creation of training programmes and the establishment of 19 institutions in Africa with the AU Commission and member states. This is an important feature of India's new model of engagement with Africa.

India-African relations over the years have witnessed various changes, moving from a period of high political, emotional and moral solidarity, to a more material, concrete and developmental approach. Indo-African diplomatic relations by the mid-1960s had reached a very low ebb. Indian policy was unrealistic in perceiving both the role Africa was going to play due to its numerical strength and sense of solidarity, and the importance and priority that Africans attached to issues like decolonization and racial equality, though India provided increasing support to African liberation movements both for decolonization and an end to racism.

During the early period, India's support was not strong in material terms. Although during the 1970s and 1980s material assistance was added to Indian diplomatic efforts, they remained meager due to India's own limitation for giving more in those terms. However, diplomatic alertness and initiative were so vigorously pursued that they bridged the gap of material assistance and projected India as a champion and uncompromising fighter against colonialism and racism. However, although Indian diplomacy did succeed in filling the gaps in Indian desires and its effective role in African liberation struggles, how far did it actually succeed in providing coherence to India's economic relations within the emerging south-south concept?

India has added an economic dimension to its diplomacy and policy toward Africa by the mid-1960s. Selective and aggressive initiatives for friendship through economic diplomacy did help India, and through its ITEC and other programmes, India started to counter the growing Chinese economic diplomacy in the Third World, a competition that has re-emerged in recent years in Africa. Under the umbrella of the NAM, this economic focus became the main policy driver for India, and other diplomatic endeavours became supportive and adjunct to it in Africa. However, the economic relations that emerged in the context of Indian initiatives in the umbrella of south-south links were not very equitable, at least in trade. Indo-African growing trends in economic areas demand that in the light of India's past experiences, India should be sensitive to African concerns and expectations.

The current interactions call for partnership and south-south solidarity, and focus on economic empowerment and sustainable development in Africa. They show signs of both expanding and deepening, but if the growing trends under the Indian private

sector in Indo-African economic relations do not distinguish themselves qualitatively from north-south relations, then it will create problems for Indian moves in Africa. The economic relations of India with Africa under globalization are gainful for India, but they have to be qualitatively different from north-south relations as for as African perceptions are concerned.

The Indian Government's interaction with the diaspora is in line with global trends. The global view of migrants has been changing in recent years, with migrants no longer perceived as economic refugees. Today, Indians overseas, particularly in developed countries, are seen as a potential resource for the country due to their success and achievement in the countries of their adoption. They may be just over 2% of India's population, but their estimated collective resources are substantial. The diaspora has gained in importance over the years, and the more prosperous overseas communities have acquired substantial political influence in their adopted countries and have emerged as useful assets for their home countries.

Thus, it can be said that in the present era of globalization, old political and economic behaviour has become irrelevant to build bilateral and multilateral relations among countries. India has to adopt different approaches and make use of the entrenched Indian Diaspora for strengthening relationship with different countries. It has to develop linkages and establish institutional connections with the Indian Diaspora. Tanzanian Indians with the help of their entrepreneurial skills and capital can play a direct and an intermediary role in promoting India's relations with Tanzania.

4.2.1.2 Factors responsible for these changes

The Indian leadership in the post-independence period undertook anti - imperial, anti - colonial, anti - racial discourse in international forum to help African people overcome these evils, supported national independence and liberation movements and advocated non-violent approach for Africa to gain independence. African leadership in post-independence period looked to Indian leaders and their foreign policy model to stand up to the global challenges of the 1960s.

India attempt to construct framework of friendly relation with African nationalist leadership was not successful due to several reasons. The vested colonial interests portrayed the Indians in colonies as opposing African interests, and thereby sought to create misunderstanding between Africans and Indians. The equivocal stand of Indian government on the use of violence by African leaders for achieving independence and insistence on inviolability of nation states structure did not help in endearing Indian image in African eyes. The depth of African support to India was revealed at the time of 1962 Chinese crisis (Sheth 2005: 31).

The value of Indian population was revealed to the Indian government in the post 1962 period. New Delhi revised its diplomacy towards African states in the wake of Chinese debacle. The Indian government began to call Indian immigrants in Africa as ‘Ambassadors of India’, allowed Indian teachers and managerial skills to take assignments in Africa and encouraged Indian industries to invest in Africa independently or through joint ventures with Indians.

A community in order to call itself a Diaspora must have aspirations to live with the mother country and possess network to protect its interests and also interact with the mother country. The mother country’s capacity to intervene in crisis situation on behalf of Diaspora and the position it enjoys in the international relations are also crucial for Diaspora to become effective. In the contemporary international relations, Diaspora was recognized as an international force (Sheth 2005: 31).

This is primarily because scientific and technological advancement has deduced the distance and cost, has broken the communication barrier and the ensuing race for globalization has created an environment to look beyond rigid national boundaries for economic and other developmental aspirations of the people. Making use of global networking, interactions and the use of complimentarily at global level, the Indians immigrants spread over hundred countries all over the Globe, have been successful in establishing Global Organization of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO) towards the turn of the twentieth century (Sheth 2005: 31-32).

The Indian government has encouraged the setting up of such kind of organisations and networking of PIO with mother country. The primary reason for giving this new emphasis to PIO is the need to promote Indian trade and commerce with all countries

of the world, especially with Africa which has been traditional trade partner for Indian trading and commercial communities.

Over last one decade Indian economy has become increasingly self-confident with the expanding for ex reasons, exports and decreasing inflation. The economic strength of PIO is complimented by the Indians who have migrated to United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Persian Gulf, Africa and the other Western Countries for higher education and settled there during post war period.

The Indian Government cannot overlook combined economic might of PIO and NRI who are and could be, of value to Indian economic development. Far reaching changes have been suggested by the High level Committee appointed by the government of India to look into how to effectively leverage the Indian Diaspora consisting of both PIO and NRI for the economic development of the Indian several countries such as China, Lebanon, Israel have been effectively harassing economic support for their diasporic communities for several decades. The Indian settler communities have risen in literary and digital world from humble position of job seekers and migrant low maid workers to one which commands respect and economic wealth (Sheth 2005: 33).

Perhaps no other country in the world is characterized with such diversity in its population as India, in terms of culture, including languages, regions, religions and other forms of social stratification. Emigration from India too has been widely varied in terms of their historical context, causes and consequences of migration from India as much the social characteristics, such as level of education, caste and class, place of origin and religious and linguistics affiliation of these emigrants. Hence, no uniform policy towards such diverse Diaspora communities is feasible. Indian Diaspora is highly differentiated especially in the case of the old and the new emigrants. It is necessary to address both the groups whenever any policy is formulated.

A growing and rising India needs to engage its diaspora for its global positioning, with Vasant Moharir's sense at the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas-Europe of, 'the role of India Diaspora in accelerating India's transition as a Global Power' (Mohahir, 2009). India's diaspora policy needs to treat its Indian diaspora as a 'strategic' resource. It

needs to have policies and instruments for engaging its diaspora globally, which give it global visibility and goodwill. An assessment of India's diaspora policy would show that it has acquired greater momentum and magnitude, but it is still both lopsided and short-sighted. The narrow focus on the dollar-rich diaspora in North America is not broad enough. A global focus on the Indian diaspora will give India strategic assets and opportunities to play a global role in times to come. According to Niranjana Desai, this was the basic loophole in the Indian diaspora policy, as they made the economic consideration the main factor of the diaspora policy. Barely one per cent of the Indian diaspora is rich enough to invest in India, and surely this cannot be the prime focus of government's interaction with the diaspora (Desai, 2008: 20).

During late 1950s, Indians of East Africa were considered as hurdles in consolidating Indo-African relations. 'But after India China war of 1962 when Indian isolation was exposed in Africa, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in her capacity as the official delegate toured African countries in 1964. She continued to emphasise that Indians settled in Africa must identify themselves completely with the African people and make their fullest contribution to the societies in which they lived. However, as seen by her tour programme in Africa, besides her official engagements, she made it a point not to miss Indian settlers, leaders and members of the community though in certain small locations their number did not exceed even fifty. She also called Indian settlers as "Ambassadors of India" in Africa. It shows a subtle departure from Nehru policy, as Indian settlers became now a useful instrument for generating goodwill for India. Their position as ambassador of India implied that they were no longer excluded from policy considerations of India. These shifts became more noticeable in many areas when Mrs. Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India.

Indian policy needs to design a strategy and set of initiatives to broaden its focus and include the PIOs who form the bulk of its diaspora. In this context, India can learn from the experiences of other countries with a large diaspora. In other words, a comparative understanding of the diaspora as a player in international relations and as a resource for home and host countries will provide a better insight into a new diaspora policy for India. Diaspora can also contribute in institution building (Desai, 2008: 22). Another area where they can contribute immensely is the partnership

between major NRI organizations and Indian diplomatic missions and other organizations to project India better abroad.

The Indian diaspora policy has acquired higher momentum and magnitude but it is both lop-sided and short-sighted. National boundaries had been turning porous under globalization. The movement of people and resources is becoming easy politically and technologically. Cultural and civilisational identities are emerging as a strong networking force. Instead of solely focusing on dollar-rich diaspora in North America, a wider focus on Indian diaspora globally will give India strategic assets and opportunities to play a global role (Dubey, 2008:15).

Though, India's policy towards the diaspora still leaves much to be desired and suffers from the absence of a long term vision and strategy. One of the deficiencies recently pointed out by a section of the NRIs is that this policy suffers from a bias towards the more recently and prosperous among the Indian diaspora, particularly those NRIs who have migrated during the last two decades.

4.2.1.3 Effects of these changes

The Indian Diaspora is now the second largest Diaspora in the world. The Indian diaspora has acquired a higher stature and respect in their countries of residence because of the higher status acquired by the mother country by virtue of the dynamism displayed by its economy and the remarkable achievements recorded by it in frontier areas of technology. On the other hand, the mother country has also been basking under the glory of the pioneering role of NRIs in the expansion and sophistication of the IT industry in advanced countries, and notable contributions in other areas of advanced technologies in these countries. One of the important ways in which the new relationship between India and the Indian diaspora has recently been reflected is the dramatic increase in the volume of remittances by the Indian diaspora to India and a significant shift in the provenance and composition of these remittances.

Diaspora as a heritage resource is an important factor in India's foreign policy and an asset for its diplomacy. The presence of Indian communities is an important factor in bilateral relations with the countries of their settlement. Diaspora is also playing a

significant role in strengthening political relations. They can facilitate access to the highest level of decision makers. They are also facilitating the visits of high level dignitaries in India. They are also the main catalyst in development. They proved to be an asset in areas like international trade, investments, education and culture (Sharma, 2008:1-3). The soft power diplomacy has emerged as an important instrument of foreign policy. Most of the nation states are paying great attention to the use of their soft power. The overseas communities of diasporas have emerged as one of the most important tools of the soft power diplomacy. The process of globalization and economic liberalization has given a great impetus to this phenomenon (Sharma, 2009:171).

India now regards several sections of the NRIs as an asset while the NRIs look upon Indian as a source of cultural and intellectual inspiration and also as a land of economic and other opportunities. The annual celebration of the Pravasi Bhartiya Divas, the establishment of a separate Ministry of the Central Government of Overseas Indians, headed by a Cabinet minister, the grant of Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) card to eligible NRIs, the establishment of a Facilitation Centre with the support of the government, to liaise with the diaspora in matters related to investment, and the promise of setting up a world class university for the NRIs children whom their parents would like to leave behind for education in the Indian cultural environment- are some of the measures reflecting the change that has taken place in the attitude of the mother country towards the Indian diaspora. There has also been commensurate progress in strengthening Indian Missions abroad in order to be able to more effectively cope with the problems of the local diaspora and provide them assistance when in distress and in formulating norms and rules to control certain undesirable types of labour migration and to provide assistance to the vulnerable sections, like deserted wives, children smuggled out in immoral traffic etc.

India has also recognized the importance of overseas communities and has successfully leveraged it for its own soft power diplomacy and economic development. It also looked upon Diaspora as an important factor in India's foreign policy and bilateral relations with the countries where they were present in significant numbers. Thanks to the proactive policy of engagement pursued by the

NDA government there was an increased awareness about the diaspora among the Indian people. Indian media and the civil society started paying for greater attention to overseas Indian communities (Sharma, 2009:174).

The BJP in its vision document also devoted a specific paragraph strengthening India's links with the Indian diaspora. The BJP believes that the growing achievements of the vast Indian diaspora are a matter of pride and a source of strength for India. Similarly, India's growing strength and its rising global stature are also a matter of pride and a source of strength for the Indian diaspora. Together we constitute the great Indian family. We are proud of the NDA Government's unprecedented efforts to broaden and deepen the emotional, social and economic links of NRIs and PIOs with their cultural motherland. These links will have to be comprehensively strengthened in the years to come (BJP vision document, 2004).

Globalization had two major implications for India's relationship with the Indian diaspora. Firstly, globalization has resulted in an assault on the cultural identity of the Indian diaspora, as of other sections of the society in the country of their residence. This has engendered a strong urge among the diaspora, to go back to its cultural roots as a defence mechanism. Indian policy makers should, therefore, be able to devise means and create institutions to meet this cultural urge of the Indian diaspora. Secondly, in spite of the existence and intensification of restrictions on migration, globalization has led to an increase in migration globally. This has taken place mostly in a clandestine manner, driven by market forces and this has comprised of a particular class of migrants, mainly women and low skilled workers (Sassen, 1998). The position of such newly arrived migrants has become highly vulnerable.

In this context, a major objective of India's policy should be to negotiate new regimes and bring about changes in the existing regimes for liberalizing movement of labour across borders and for bringing about improvements in the conditions of migrant workers. Going by the trend of the negotiations on services within the framework of the Doha Round of Trade Negotiations, this is going to be a difficult task. Prospects for liberalization of services under Mode-IV i.e. Movement of labour for seeking employment abroad, do not appear to be bright. Therefore, time may

very soon come when developing countries like India may have to make, as they have done with the issue of agricultural subsidies, progress in this sector, a litmus test for the success of the entire Doha Round. But in that event, these countries should be prepared to accept larger scale movement of labour to their territories from other developing countries, particularly from neighboring least developed countries.

Though there are some successful aspects of the Indian diaspora policy are: (i) its initiative to spread the message that India has changed its diaspora policy, (ii) its North American and European focus on NRI, both to link the diaspora and to get them to lobby for Indian causes, and (iii) to sensitise state governments to engage their diaspora. But there are certain areas where Indian diaspora policy needs to look into. There is a need to rope in the MEA in effective and substantial ways in India's Diaspora policy. Diaspora policy needs to chart its roadmap by understanding the operation of other different diaspora and their interactions with the mother country, both in the recent past and in the contemporary phase. And along with this diaspora has a strong civil society interface. When the potential, practice will to interact at civil society level exists, the diaspora policy should provide them such interaction (Dubey, 2008: 16-17). State governments should also have interaction with NRIs in terms of inviting investment or reinforcing cultural links, and so on. What they should refrain from is commenting on any action or non actions of foreign governments when the interests of their compatriots are perceived to be affected (Desai, 2008: 21).

The governments need to determine its priorities based on a realistic understanding of the diaspora and fashion different strategies for different segments of the diaspora. And the governments should also have to strengthen its regulatory and policing methods. The government, while implementing its diaspora policy should focus on initiating programmes that caters for the interests and requirements of the diaspora. It is the culture, religion and language that draw overseas Indians to their Indian heritage. Thus, primary aim of diaspora policy should be to keep alive the ties with India and build a mutually beneficial relationship. All those of Indian descent should feel welcome in India and experience the warmth of their ties with the ancestral land (Singh, 2008:27-28).

The question arises as to whether India's growing strategic significance in the world politics can be utilized to the benefit of the Indian diaspora. Major powers like the United States, U.K. etc., are able to rush to the rescue of their diaspora in distress or help them otherwise, by virtue of their superior strength. India has still a long way to go in building its economic and military strength, before it acquires such a strategic leverage. However, the strategic space India has been able to gain recently has put it in a better position to come to the assistance of its diaspora than was the case only a few years ago. The real difference that can be discerned in the following: India is no longer following a 'hands off' policy vis-a vis the interest of the Indian diaspora; India is in a position to send signals, at least to some countries, that they will have to pay a price-sometimes a heavy one-if they wantonly ignore India's concern about its diaspora; and there are more instances than before, of India being able to send signals that it is concerned about its diaspora in a difficult situation, and that it has the will to take all possible diplomatic and other measures to alleviate their condition (Dubey, 2008: 81).

4.2.2 Tanzania's own diaspora policy

Over the past ten years there has been a significant change in African governments' perception of their diaspora. In the previous three decades, home countries did not recognise the need to pursue and promote the dynamic of diaspora and development. This is no longer the case. Now, diaspora are increasingly seen as positive actors: the diaspora can and does serve as an important 'bridge' to access knowledge, expertise, resources and markets for the development of the country of origin (Utouh & Mutalemwa, 2015:78).

Indeed, countries that have successfully engaged their diaspora pursue a "roadmap" strategy which include (Utouh & Mutalemwa, 2015:78-79) identifying goals, mapping diaspora geography and skills, creating a relationship of trust between diasporas and governments of both origin and destination countries and, ultimately, mobilising the diaspora to contribute to sustainable development and also the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals. The strategy also devotes attention to strengthening the capacity of both government institutions and diaspora communities to work with each other and with other stakeholders (Utouh &

Mutalemwa, 2015: 79). With a view to nurturing and ensuring a sustainable diaspora role, most African countries are now adopting policies and measures to attract much more active and comprehensive involvement of the diaspora in national development.

4.2.2.1 Tanzanian assessment of diaspora as an asset

The current situation of Tanzania is contrary to the cherished dreams and expectations of people at independence and during the first phase government. Having abandoned their determination to empower Tanzanians economically in the 1980s - and acquiesced to external pressure to adopt western capitalism which is alien to our cultural-economic set-up, the drive towards economic empowerment of the people seems to have been stalled. Today, many indigenous Tanzanians are being economically disenfranchised with many of them being forced to sell land and their assets to foreign and local investors. The number of indigenous Tanzanians who are having access to the economy is relatively small. Those who are having access to the economy are the privileged few. Self-employed Tanzanian professionals and individuals who want to establish their own businesses are facing difficulty conditions and many of them are forced to abandon their initiatives. Consequently, the rate of unemployment and poverty is increasing rapidly.

Tanzania government thus, decided to create favourable conditions for the Diaspora, including policies which would enable them to contribute to the development of the country. Diaspora can be the key partners for development by harnessing the power of their private remittances which have the potential to contribute to job creation and entrepreneurship. For example, Migrants remitted 404 billion USD to the developing world, three times the amount of money given in Official Development Aid (ODA).

A substantial number of the Tanzanian diaspora live in the East Africa Community (EA) and other neighboring countries. Other leading countries hosting Tanzanian Diaspora include; the UK, USA, Canada, Scandinavian countries, South Africa, Oman, Australia and China, to mention a few. The estimated 3 million Tanzanian migrants living abroad remitted a modest 75 million dollars in 2013. In comparison,

the Kenyan Diaspora remitted 1.4 billion dollars, while Ugandans living abroad accounted for approximately one billion dollars in remittances in the same year.

The major challenge in this task is that despite the high levels of mobility in Tanzania, there is not enough data to determine the nature and developmental impact of migration in Tanzania. Therefore in order to develop effective migration policies and ensure their coherence with other policy areas, policymakers need a comprehensive and reliable knowledge base. It is assumed that a large number of Tanzanians are living abroad but there is little knowledge on the composition of the diaspora, including their profiles, skills, and numbers.

4.2.2.2 Tanzanian policy for its diaspora outside and diaspora within

The lack of a well-formulated and applicable diaspora policy is a barrier to diaspora engagement. A policy framework is essential to link national development needs with diaspora resources and to guide respective activities more systematically. A clear national policy that is developed and widely communicated, will serve as basis for implementing a government's diaspora-related activities. All relevant stakeholders including diaspora communities, local institutions concerned, international development partners, and government policy makers are to be involved when drafting a national diaspora policy (Utouh & Mutalemwa, 2015:78).

While many governments in Sub-Saharan Africa acknowledge the importance of diaspora engagement in development, many still lack the capacity to design effective policies and implement them on a meaningful scale. This explains the gap between schemes that look good on paper and truly effective policies and programmes that actually make a difference.

Tanzanian diaspora in 2006 has been estimated at around 200,000 people or around 0.5 per cent of the entire population -with the largest population in Uganda, UK, Canada, United States of America, Australia, Rwanda, Germany and the Netherlands (World Bank, 2006). In 2010, the number rose to 320,000 Tanzanians living outside the country and the top destinations countries are Kenya, Uganda, the UK, Canada, Mozambique, Malawi, United States of America, Burundi, Rwanda and Australia (World Bank, 2010).

The lack of a Tanzanian diaspora policy was a barrier to engagement. A clear and widely communicated policy would engage the diaspora comprehensively, and serve to focus the Tanzanian government's diaspora-related activities.

Thus, due to the Government of Tanzania's high regards for its diaspora, a specialised Diaspora Engagement and Opportunity Department was set up in 2010 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development (MFAIC) and a diaspora coordinator has been appointed to coordinate diaspora affairs.

The establishment of a diaspora office in a government that is mandated to serve the diaspora could be indicative of a government's commitment to engage its national abroad in its development plans and processes and attests to improved relations between home governments and their nationals abroad.

Keeping all this in mind a new division been created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tanzania known as 'Diaspora Engagement and Opportunities Division' in 2010. Its main aim is to create conducive environment to engage the Tanzania Diaspora to effectively contribute to political, socio-economic and cultural development of the country.

The functions which are attributed to this division are:

1. To coordinate the development, implementation and review of Diaspora focused policies and legislation and ensure the incorporation in national development frameworks;
2. To sensitize and promote the understanding of the role of the Diaspora in the development of the country;
3. To develop and maintain a database for the Diaspora;
4. To provide technical advice to Diaspora participation in relevant sector in the country;
5. To coordinate and sensitise the participation of MDAs and Non-State Actors in activities relating to the Diaspora;

6. To facilitate and advise the Diaspora to access investment opportunities in the country;
7. To coordinate with other entities initiatives geared towards the promotion and protection of the welfare of the Diaspora; and
8. To coordinate labour arrangements and agreements with other countries with a view to promote and secure decent international employment for qualified Tanzanian candidates (MFA of Tanzania: 2011).

This Division will be led by a Director and will comprise of two Sections as follows:-

1. Mobilization, Protection and Data Management Section

This Section will perform the following activities:-

Coordinate with other entities initiatives geared towards the promotion and protection of the welfare of the Diaspora;

Establish, update and maintain a Diaspora database;

Coordinate labour arrangements and agreements with other countries to protect Tanzanians employed abroad;

Provide guidance and sensitisation to the Diaspora on existing skill gaps in Tanzania and match with available skills in the Diaspora;

Link and facilitate the Diaspora returning to Tanzania to secure employment in various sectors;

Facilitate promotion of public awareness and foster public understanding of the Diaspora, its potential and needs;

and Initiate and coordinate preparation of cabinet and policy papers for the review of legislations and policies.

2. Diaspora Investment and International Employment Section

This Section will perform the following activities:-

Liaise with investment authorities to identify existing investment opportunities in the country;

Identify and advise the Government on necessary measures for the creation of conducive environment for the Diaspora to effectively participate in the economic, social and cultural affairs of the country;

Facilitate and advice Diaspora interested to return to Tanzania on access to investment opportunities in various sectors;

Seek information on international vacancies, identify potential candidates, advice and facilitate Tanzanians both in Tanzania and those in Diaspora to secure decent international employments;

Coordinate and manage campaign for Tanzania candidates vying for International posts;

Gather and avail information on dynamics and trends of the international labour markets;

Analyse and advise on the existing regulations governing candidatures for international employments; and Advice the government on employment policies,

Acts and regulations changes to encourage public servants to secure international employment (MFA, Government of Tanzania: 2011).

It is crucial for a government to “know its diaspora”. A “know its diaspora” exercise involves serious data collection (e.g. a migrant/diaspora census), mapping the diaspora, skills and experience inventories, and extensive listening exercises to understand what the diaspora has to offer, what it is willing to offer and what it expects from the government in turn. It is therefore crucial to acknowledge the diversity of diaspora agendas, interests and strategies. Through the establishment of a continuous dialogue with diaspora, government policies can reconcile or at least understand differing and often diverging views. Successful government interventions are the result of years of continuous, open engagement. In short, the diaspora require

timely and accurate information on which to base decisions as to where and how to allocate their resources as regards development initiatives in countries of origin (Utouh & Mutalemwa, 2015:81).

4.2.2.3 Tanzanian initiatives on diaspora outside as well as within

Tanzanian Diasporas are an important section of the Tanzanian society that has a historical role to play in the transformation of the country. As class that has a privileged position to dialogue with both the government and investors and donors one the one hand, and with the people on the other hand they provide the insight that is needed for policies that facilitate economic enfranchisement of Tanzanians.

The long-term success require local and regional approaches to build the economy from within, and a public policy platform that focuses on economic and social empowerment of the people through the provision of equal and gender sensitive opportunities. The success for rural and deprived urban areas in the national and global market place demands a new paradigm for building the economy. Therefore the focus should be on fostering local entrepreneurship - especially among the youth and women groups and those in emerging and potential small and medium enterprises in rural and urban areas. There should be strong collaboration across all sectors so that there is effective leveraging of scarce resources, targeted investment, and practical policies that “make sense” in diverse urban and rural areas. The adage is that healthy and vital rural and urban economies are essential to the overall vitality and competitiveness of the economy.

Economic empowerment of the people is an important condition for the present and future of this country. Experience of lack of serious efforts to empower the people in other countries have resulted into deep resentment among the people since it is only the few who have benefited at the expense of the majority. The consequence of such a situation is increased criminal activities and deep poverty.

The political will of the Government of Tanzania to engage its diaspora in the national development process is highly commendable. There is room for improvement, however, as even countries such as India, Mexico, China and Rwanda considered leaders in tapping and channeling the financial, technical, and intellectual

resources of their diaspora communities for capacity development, continually fine-tune related policies and strategies. Diaspora contributions are related to institutional frameworks, socio-economic settings, political environments as well as issues of privileges/ rights, perceptions, images, trust and social identification, in both the home and host country. Thus, if, Tanzanian Diasporas will be given prominent recognition and role in designing and running development and investments projects it will help in empowering the nation.

Thus, through the overall discussion it can be inferred that both India and Tanzania considers their diaspora as a heritage resource and trying to establish connection with them. Since, Tanzanian government held their diaspora in high esteem, for them the diaspora residing in their country are also very important. Thus, they are formulating policies considering diaspora as a heritage resource both inside and outside the boundaries of their country.

4.3 Challenges

A diaspora refers to a particular kind of migration. Most social scientists agree that at least a few of the following characteristics are crucial to describe a diaspora. Firstly, dispersal from an original homeland to other countries. The causes for the dispersal may vary from traumatic experiences, as was the case with the Jews, or the African slaves, to the search for work, or the pursuit of a trade or other ambitions. Secondly, there must be a collective - often idealised - memory/myth of the homeland. Thirdly, a myth of returning to one's homeland (be it now or in the future, temporary or permanent). This myth is grounded in a strong ethnic consciousness of migrants abroad, which may have prevented them from assimilating in the local society. And lastly, here is a sense of empathy and solidarity with similar groups elsewhere in the world and/or with events and groups in the homeland.

Diaspora, then, is a contemporary term used to describe practically any population considered 'deterritorialised' or 'transnational', whose cultural origins are said to have arisen in a nation other than the one in which they currently reside, and whose social, economic, and political networks cross nation-state borders and, indeed, span the entire globe. According to Vertovec, for instance, intellectuals and activists from within these populations increasingly use this term, emphasising that the 'Diasporic

language' appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, minority discourse (Clifford, 1994: 311).

Cohen's argument (1997:26) that a diaspora can emerge from a growing sense of group ethnic consciousness in different countries- a consciousness that is sustained by, amongst other things, a sense of distinctiveness, common history and the belief in a common fate. For scholars like Vertovec (2000), Parekh (1993), religion provide that commonality, however for other scholars, caste provides a marker of identity. But perhaps the core feature that defines the Indian diaspora is its collective imagining of India- of emotions, links, traditions, feelings and attachments that together continue to nourish a psychological appeal among successive generations of emigrants for the 'mother country'. But as argued by Gurharpal Singh (2003:4), there is no underlying 'myth of return' to the 'homeland'. Quite the opposite, in fact the idea of a return to India is for many overseas Indians, especially those who were trapped in the plantation economies, a haunting fear that frequently conjures up the bitter experience of emigration. The diasporic sensibility in settlement societies approves civilizations. This is a facet of the heuristic relativization that should be considered.

But despite of the limitations identified, if all these taken factors taken together, it provides sufficient parameters for recognizing overseas communities of Indian origin as a diaspora. What possibly distinguishes the Indian diaspora from its counterparts is its extreme heterogeneity, diversity and in some cases, a persistent localism-a plurality (Gurharpal Singh, 2003:4-5).

4.3.1 Issue of Identity

There are two problems concerning Indian diaspora, one is the prefix 'Indian' and the other is the term 'diaspora'. The implication of being 'Indian' means that there is a single India with its people, who are somehow united under one flag. This is far from obvious. India has been described as a 'nation and its fragments' or an 'invented nation' (Chatterjee, 1993). This literature implies that the unity of India is a construction or, at best, referred to as 'unity in variety'.

Moreover, the Indians settled outside India do not identify with India as a nation but with the 'homeland', that is, the specific region, where the migrants or their descendents come from. They would often call themselves Bengalis, Gujaratis, Telugus or to their specific sub-castes, such as Patels, Lohanas and kutchis. In as much as they have created a 'myth' about their 'homeland', it appears that region and locality are much more important in structuring the migrants' identities than 'religion' or 'nationality'. Claude Markovits (2000) rightly asserts that migrants from Gujarat, whether they were Hindus, Muslims or Jains, had more in common with each other in their experience of migration than Gujarati Hindus had with Bhojpuri Hindus, or Gujarati Muslims with Bhojpuri Muslims.

This suggests that the prefix 'Indian' has a local meaning, but not so much in terms of 'self-identification', but more as a label used by natives in the host nations. Many non-Indians, do not see India as fragmented, and the geographical masses of the sub-continent somehow presupposes a cultural unity (Oonk, 2007).

The issue of inclusion in or exclusion from the diaspora is even more complex from a historical point of view. Historical sources are mostly related to particular geographical areas, In general, they are more focused on the local migrants' issues and then their social or cultural ties to their homelands, therefore making it extremely difficult to deduce the social, economic, or cultural relations with the homeland. In short, the question here is why and when do South Asian migrants overseas consider themselves as part of a 'South Asian diaspora' and what do they gain from it in economic, sociological, or cultural terms?

Another issue which is of significance here is the issue of allegiance of the diaspora. The diaspora was alleged of having allegiance to their own community and not to the nation in which they had settled. The ideology of national and cultural homogenization in the 19th century gave a negative shade to the term diaspora. The term contradicted the precepts of national and state ideologies, since 'nation' meant superimposition of ethnic group, a territory and a political system. It also meant that there is no loyalty towards any extra-national community, group or institution. The expression 'internal enemy' used to designate Diasporas, minorities or political opponents, was adopted in France in the 19th century.

East Africa provides an interesting case for considering the many complications that comes to the foreground when we consider matters through a Diaspora studies lens. South Indians, mainly from India, were first brought to East Africa as indentured labour from about the 1890s. The indentured labour policy was itself designed as a response to the abolition of slavery in the 1840s to take account of the needs of plantation owners who now felt their plantations were sure to collapse due to the loss of slave labour.

When the policy was extended to East Africa it was mainly to provide non - African labour for building the East African railway line that the British administration wished to develop. One feature of these Indians in East Africa was that most of them were skilled labour, being mainly technicians, blacksmiths, woodworkers, etc. They were specifically targeted for their skills. After the termination of the indentured labour policy in the 1920s some of them decided to remain in the region. Being mostly male, they were encouraged to marry and bring their wives over from India.

By the 1960s, and after the independence of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, the Indians had not only become a central part of the civil service administration but also considered themselves African. An effect of this was that by the 1960s the myth of return, long taken as a defining feature of Diaspora, had been progressively abandoned by the East African Indians. Having come from largely rural areas in India they were also now heavily urbanized and used to negotiating with urban institutions.

The policy of Africanisation that was instituted in East Africa following Independence was to trigger a new process of diasporisation for these Indians. Africanisation meant a form of affirmative action to rectify racial anomalies within the government sector that had been prevalent during the rule of the British administration. But the effects of the policy proved to be deleterious for the Indian community. They were forced to take early retirement or in several cases were relieved from their jobs. And in Uganda, Idi Amin was to trigger a mass migration of South Indians from Uganda and from the rest of the region.

The Africanisation of the civil service in East Africa and the violent policies of Idi Amin generated the process of twice migrant phenomenon. For many of these

Indians now had to migrate again, moving to the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. Because of their highly urbanized and technocratic and administrative skills, these migrants were very different from Indians who had originally migrated to the Western countries directly from India itself. In the UK it did not take long for the East African Indians to enter into the higher levels of the civil service and businesses; most of them bought their own homes shortly after arrival in the UK, again distinguishing them sharply from direct migrants from India.

What was most important is that because of the gradual process of shedding the myth of return (since they had no inclination to go back to India and could not return to East Africa) they consolidated their families firmly within the new societies in the West, they had settled into. Furthermore, unlike migrants coming directly from India, the East African Indians were often able to move with an entire three - generation set of a family with them to their new homes, thus allowing them to rapidly replicate the community networks in their new locations that had been firmly evolved within their East African societies in 1890s.

What we see then is that there are prolific intersections between African Studies and Diaspora Studies. There are certain questions that this brief account of the East African Indian Diaspora brings to the foreground. The first is how much they allow us to see the complexity in the Diaspora phenomenon. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the East African Indians could be described as a labour Diaspora, and thus similar to the Indians who found themselves in Guyana and other places. But by the 1930s and 40s and after two generations of settlement they had become a vibrant trade and administrative Diaspora.

The concept of trade Diaspora also allow to bring into view the long trading relations that Gujarati Indians had with the East African coast from at least the 14th century onwards. However, following the process of Africanisation and Idi Amin's brutal policies, the East African Indians were very much a victim Diaspora, thus comparable to the Jewish, Armenian, and African American traditions we noted earlier. Thus, by the 1970s the East African Indians represented a telescoped form of the various phases diasporisation. In their particular case the early migrants were male and had a strong focus on the homeland of India. The next phase was that of

family re-unification from the 1920s and 30s, and the third was the consolidation of community ties within the new location.

In a way by the time the East African Indians became re-diasporised from the 1970s they had reached the tail end of the multi-phased diasporisation process. Thus when they migrated they had a more secure consciousness of their identity and social networks and were able to reproduce these relatively rapidly within their new Western locations.

In the process of integration with the host countries also the Indian Diaspora are faced with a number of problems like economic hardships, denial of equal political rights, social segregation and loyalty towards their homeland. Economic hardships of diaspora come out of the stringent measures taken by the host governments in terms of land ownership, business and employment. In some cases it is so severe that they are forced to leave their adopted country.

Indian Diaspora integrated in different nature in different countries. They would mix and mingle with each other in social functions, they would give and be employed in each other's businesses but even after all the social integration they would maintain their own Indian identity as they wouldn't ever intermarry with the locals. There are also countries where the Indian Diaspora is seen as totally segregated from the local population and the relationship between the Indian Diaspora and the local community is not good.

In Tanzania, Indians participated in the freedom struggle as well as in the post-independence initiatives of Nyerere government. They voluntarily became part of nationalisation. But, after the racial discourse which started after Ujamaization, there was a natural fear. Due to Idi Amin exodus also, no African country was ready to host them. Diversification of citizenship experienced in Uganda, is not reflecting their tendency to run away from Tanzania. Though due to all this they wanted to have a base elsewhere but they didn't run away. In fact now, Indians are active politically and they are also prime factor in booming economy and GDP of Tanzania. Thus, their culture, arrival, suffering is all part of their heritage. Political economy connect is there between Indo-Tanzanian and Africans. They stay between each other. They are Tanzanian in all sense. In fact if we compare the situation among the

other East African countries, for example in Kenya, where the residential segregation is very prominently evident, we can see that the Indians are almost integrated in the Tanzanian society though polarised.

4.3.1.1 Prevalent stereotypes

Social and urban segregation that currently characterizes the relationship between Tanzanian Indians and Africans is the product of old socioeconomic asymmetries of power as well as of a more recent history of political ostracization, economic witch-hunts and strategies of exclusion. Drawing upon sharp binary social representations, segregation contributes to the endless reproduction of identity categories. For many Africans, wealth and miserliness go hand in hand among Indians. The preconceived idea that all Indians are rich, through their trading activities, remains resilient despite a multifaceted reality consisting not merely of wealthy traders, but also of teachers and civil servants of modest means, shopkeepers who cannot make ends meet at the end of the month, and humble artisans. It is obvious that the influence of Indian immigrants on urban economy is still strong today. In spite of the recent and spectacular growth of small and medium African businesses in Dar-es-salaam, the majority of businessmen are people of Indian Origin. Most businesses employ African staff as waiters, cooks, tailors, vendors or guards. In residential apartments, domestic workers are also African. All of them complain about low wages, usually insufficient for a living. In comparison to African bosses, bosses of Indian origin are said to pay their employees badly.

Prevalent stereotypes about Africans among many Tanzanian Indians are exact opposite of those used by Africans to describe Indians. According to Indians, prevalence of poverty among Africans is due to latter's laziness, for this reason, they would not deserve sympathy (Fouere, 2015). Africans would be able to work adequately only if they are urged to do so, reprimanded or even insulted. Africans are frequently described as thieves, either by nature or by necessity, in addition to being lazy and profiteers. As a result, African staff members rarely have access to the cash desk in shops and restaurants.

These mutually stereotyped of behaviours at work led to the adoption of similarly stereotyped behaviours as well as produce a tacit ethnic hierarchy. Africans accused that such a hierarchy exists in the minds of Tanzanian Indians. Indians would not take public transport to avoid mixing with Africans. Swahili being considered an inferior language, Indians would not make much effort to speak it just to highlight that they are different, even superior.

However, Indians deny the existence of such an ethnic hierarchy, but also refute the condescending and contemptuous behaviours attributed to them. The comments they make to their staff would be those of any employer reprimanding an employee for misconduct or incompetence. Rather, philanthropic activities in which many personalities of the Indian community are engaged would bear witness to their compassion for the poor African people and their involvement in the country's development. The opening of the Indian private schools and hospitals to the general public, without racial or community discrimination, are some example in regard to this.

4.3.2 Community and Residential segregation

In contrast to the strong integration of Indians in key sectors of national economy, poor relations between them and the Africans is the result of the social gap between the two groups and the segregation policy maintained by the communities of Asian origin. Residential segregation is the most visible way which people of Indian origin has used in East Africa to stay apart. Residential segregation is very evident in the case of Kenya. This segregation is also visible in Tanzania and it concerns all statutory and religious sub groups. Largely confined in the Dar es Salaam, Indians share the same territory divided into several communal perimeters which, for some of them, have collective and enclosed housing provides with common services. In such protected areas rarely visited by Africans- apart from domestic workers- Indians live and mix among themselves and visit one another like citizens of a miniature country of their own.

Residential segregation has not been significantly reduced since independence due to the fact that there has been an increasing separation of work places and residential areas. Increasing urban insecurity is one of the major factors contributing to this

phenomenon: in the first place, urban insecurity leads to the concentration of commercial activities in more secure areas; this intensifies or doubles up other forms of classical social segregation that exist almost everywhere.

Their sense of unity is again increased by the fact that since they have been the diaspora, all Asian communities are considered by Africans as belonging to one socio-cultural entity. In the eyes of the Africans, who are generally poorly informed about the complex differences that distinguish numerous communal sub groups, the social class of East African Asians can only be defended by a strong coalition that is efficient and receives many resources that go beyond ascribed factors. The sense of identity that unifies them is based on how they are looked upon by others.

Though from diaspora point of view, the centripetal and protectionist decision taken by all societies could be justified by several reasons: it was a way of maintaining cultural identity, it bought social security protection to every community-as a minority- that the state proved incapable of providing, it would facilitate future community commitment to collective development without harming others.

4.3.3 Attitude of Homeland and Host country government

Homeland government attitude toward their diaspora are quite a different matter. Generally, those political actors prefer that their emigrants retain their original citizenship and accept only temporary status in the host countries. They hope that retention of homeland citizenship will allow them to have some control over emigrants. Usually that is indeed the pattern of development. The principle reason is that during the initial stage of diaspora emergence, the difficult conditions that migrants encounter in most host countries force them to depend on their homelands for substantial amounts of political and support, especially support from their homeland governments. Some homeland governments reveal an attitude of cynicism in dealing with their diaspora. The history of Israeli's relations with Israeli emigrants and the Romanian and Turkish government's relationships with their migrants in Europe well illustrate that pattern.

A second factor contributing to homeland government's caution is that even in cases in which it is clear that members of diaspora are reasonably loyal to their homelands, there is self-doubt about the ability to closely control the diaspora activities. Furthermore, homeland governments are apprehensive about the possibility of being asked to help emerging diaspora in times of distress. For example the Nehruvian policy towards the Indian Diaspora was always crystal clear, it was a policy of disassociation. He said that the Indians in Africa are as important to him as any other African. He always emphasized that no special consideration can be given to these Indians.

Despite this the home governments cannot totally ignore their emerging diaspora nor their established diaspora. Hence, it is rare to detect total apathy in those relationships. Although the relationships may fluctuate, in the final analysis most governments continue to hope that in the long run they may benefit from those relationships. Rather than ignoring or alienating emerging diaspora, they usually try to cooperate with the more important diaspora associations and their leaders, hoping for at least a reasonable degree of interaction with their diaspora. An example of the case where the home government cannot totally ignore their diaspora can be seen during Indian expulsion of Uganda ordered by Idi Amin when India had to plead Britain to provide asylum to all of the Indians.

However, India's policy towards the diaspora still leaves much to be desired and suffers from the absence of a long term vision and strategy. One of the deficiencies recently pointed out by a section of the NRIs is that this policy suffers from a bias towards the more recently and prosperous among the Indian diaspora, particularly those NRIs who have migrated during the last two decades. The migrants in the colonial time who have long settled down in their countries of residence and who have maintained a continuous a continuous cultural link with the mother country, seem to have been ignored in this policy.

This negligence cannot be justified, because Indian has a moral obligation to satisfy the yearnings of this section of the diaspora to intensify and maintain cultural links with the mother country. It should also not be forgotten that though this diaspora may not be able to transfer riches to the mother country, they have the potentiality to

make an important contribution by enhancing India's prestige and position in the comity of nation and by garnering support for legitimate causes and positions on issues of importance to India. Secondly, in spite of the significant contribution now being made, particularly through remittances, by the Indian diaspora to India's development, the full potential of the diaspora in this regard remains to be tapped. The mere enhancement in the flow of remittances is not enough. A lot depends upon where the remittances go, i.e. how they are invested.

Indian policy needs to design a strategy and set of initiatives to broaden its focus and include the PIOs who form the bulk of its diaspora. There is no policy designed and extended to those whose identity and culture has been eroded substantially under the assimilative policies. There is a strong urge in these communities to restore their identity and link with India. In this context, Indian can learn from the experiences of other countries with a large diaspora. In other words, a comparative understanding of the diaspora as a player in international relations and as a resource for home and host countries will provide a better insight into a new diaspora policy for India (Dubey, 2008: 22).

A growing and rising India and Tanzania, thus needs to engage Indian diaspora for a dynamic relationship. Both India's and Tanzania's diaspora policy needs to treat its diaspora as a 'strategic' resource. It needs to have policies and instruments for engaging its diaspora globally, which give it global visibility and goodwill. Diaspora can also contribute in institution building. Another area where they can contribute immensely is the partnership between major NRI organizations and diplomatic missions and other organizations to project their respective host and home countries better abroad.

ⁱTanzania's foreign minister, Oscar Kambona, said in the early 1960s that he and others thought that India's leadership of Asia's was decadent and that China was an emergent force. Quoted in D.Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign policy of the third world*, Jerusalem:Israel University Press, 1973, p. 246.

ⁱⁱDuring the Belgrade NAM summit India did not want to fix any date for ending colonialism in Africa because it felt it would be unrealistic, while Sukarno wanted it to be two years, Nkrumah insisted on 31 december 1962, and Mali wanted it to be 'immediate'. Later India suggested it to be

‘speedy’ and improved this to ‘immediate’, which was finally accepted. See G.Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment*, London: Faber, 1966, p.299.

ⁱⁱⁱKrishna Menon said, ‘we became camp followers there[...]our personality did not make any impact on the conference or on the Delegates’. See M. Breacher, *India and World Politics-Krishna Menon views of the World*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 226.

Chapter V

Conclusion

Heritage is both tangible and intangible, in the sense that ideas and memories-of songs, recipes, language, dances, and many other elements of who we are and how we identify ourselves. Heritage can be shown as objects, artifacts, sites, practices, means of remembrance, practices, means through which people of particular place are attached to ancestors, attributes, history, and a homeland. The practice of heritage creates natives. Heritage always requires reclamation. Heritage can be taken as a form of cultural production in the present that has recourse to the past.

Heritage, be it in the form of an object, monument, inherited skill or symbolic representation, must be considered as an identity marker and distinguishing feature of a social group. It provides a historical path and permanent pattern in a perpetually changing world. The effect of globalisation on cultural heritage, especially in the context of diaspora, cannot be overstated.

Culture in terms of their heritage becomes an unforgettable historical fact which is shared in memory through interaction with other members of the community. It becomes a source of their action, voices, selection of material, behaviour, self-perception and world view. Culture is used to confirm, reinforce, maintain, change or deny a particular arrangement of states, power and identity. Culture includes both material culture such as sites, buildings, landscapes, monuments, and objects, as well as non-material culture such as language, arts and handicrafts, music, dance and poetry. Non-material cultural heritage is a key characteristic of many regional and cultural groups and is passed from one generation to another (Sahoo & Sangha, 2010:82).

In the diaspora, Indians have retained many aspects of their cultural heritage including folk art, literature, and dance forms. However, in recent time as a result of globalisation many of these traditions are either changing form or becoming extinct. The preservation of their cultural heritage in the diaspora is a clear means for Indians to take pride in their identity in an often harsh and marginalising new environment. As Nostra has rightly pointed out:

“Globalisation, be it economic or cultural, means change - change at a pace that can be disruptive politically, economically, socially, psychologically. Adaptive reuse of the heritage resources can provide a touchstone, a sense of stability, and a sense of continuity for people and societies that help counteract the disruption which economic globalisation can exacerbate. Heritage conservation has been portrayed as the alternative to economic development, either we have historic preservation, or we have economic growth” (Sahoo & Sangha, 2010:82)

Although emigration has been taking place for centuries, never before in history has India witnessed such massive movements of its people to other parts of the globe as in the nineteenth and early twentieth century's. Recent population estimates suggest that the Indian diaspora has crossed well over the 25 million mark, dispersed around the globe in more than 102 countries, numbering more than half a million and now located in more than 11 countries. Out of 25 million people comprising the Indian Diaspora, about 3 million are located in Africa. Although they are mainly concentrated in the Eastern coast of the African continent and the Indian Ocean countries, they are present in Central, Western, and Northern Africa as well.

Thus, the question of diasporic identity has become an important issue today in the global context. Immigrants often face the problem of identity at the initial stage of their settlement in the host society because of their minority status. Martin Baumann (2001: 59) provides instances of how the members of the host society; generally, perceive Hindus and their religious practices as alien. He points out that Europeans treat Hindus and their religious practices as “alien, foreign, exotic, being only a tolerated, but not really [an] accepted part of European culture” (Sahoo, 2010:89). However, the immigrants, through their religious and cultural symbols, negotiate this

identity in the course of time. Therefore, there is a need to create awareness of what these cultural heritages are. Perhaps no other country in the world is characterised by such diversity in its population as India in terms of culture, and this diversity includes language, regional, religious and other forms of social stratification.

Identity can be defined under two headings: identity relating to a group, and identity relating to an individual. The former clearly emphasizes the objective attributes and behaviour by which a human is recognized as an individual within a collective context; whereas, the latter emphasizes how one sees the world from a particular position and relative to what aspects or how one experiences self-hood (Sahoo, 2006:89). Though these two types of identity are distinct, it might be claimed that an individual develops a sense of identity through social practices and that social practices are tied to the fact of identity.

Diasporic Indians have been able to construct their identities since their physical displacement from the homeland. They share among themselves and with the next generations not only the history of their dispersion, but also the history of the people in general, including myths, legends, and traditions that constitute an integral part of their contemporary identity (Sahoo, 2006:89). Among the several criteria's through which Indians fortified their identity in the host societies, important are language, religion, dress, food, cuisine, cinema, and so on.

Language forms an important aspect in the formation of ethnic identity in the diaspora. The maintenance of language in the diaspora is now an important issue among most of the diasporic groups, as it not only provides a forum to bind the community together, but also attaches them to their homeland and thereby their culture, tradition, and value system. Diasporic Indians in this sense have retained much of their language through publishing newspapers, journals, novels, literacy anthologies, and stage plays in their regional vernaculars.

The identity of Indians in the diaspora is also reflected in the cultural traditions of India. One such form of cultural tradition is the "Indian classical dance." Major Indian dance forms such as Kuchupudi, Odissi, Bharatnatyam, and Kathak are successfully transplanted in the Indian diasporas and are well maintained by renowned performers. The classical dance forms are so popular now that, besides

dancers of Indian origin, non-Indians are also attracted to the form and many have also become famous in this field.

Religion is another identity marker that helps Indians to preserve their individual self-awareness and group cohesion (Rayaprol 1997:16). The reconstruction of religion in a diasporic context occurs in two ways. First, religion attaches itself to culture, and second, it becomes identified with ethnicity. Thus, under global conditions religion may manifest both as a cultural particularism identified with particular ethnic groups and as a global universal, forming the locus of a set of beliefs and practices (Sahoo 2010:90). According to Williams (1998), immigrants are more religious when they enter into a new land than they were previously because religion outside the home territory provides important identity markers that help to perpetuate and preserve individual self-awareness and cohesion in the group. Religion, apart from its spiritual dimensions, acts as a major force in binding immigrants together and at the same time sacralizes one's self-identity.

Like all ethnic groups, Indians in the diaspora define themselves partly by their cuisine. They remain emotionally attached to the Indian food, clothes, and music. As Lessinger (1995:32) points out, such things provide "a powerful reminder of 'home' and become even more intensely important to immigrants as the visible signs of ethnic identity." Further they continue to connect with the homeland through the construction of Indian restaurants, spice shops, movie stores, and other such initiatives in the urban areas wherever the Indian density is high. Today, for example, one can easily locate an Indian restaurant in any cosmopolitan city of the world. Indian cinema is another cultural premise that shapes and reflects the Indian identity in the diaspora. Bollywood films are widely circulated in the Indian diaspora and thus have gained popularity. Similarly, films made by NRIs in Hollywood such as *Monsoon Wedding*, depict the story of the Indians in the diaspora.

Diasporas have emerged as powerful entities since they are recognized as 'soft power' in the realm of foreign policy strategy and also as an agent or catalyst of economic development of countries of origin beside their active role in the host countries. For instance, in the economic sphere, the Chinese Diaspora has been seen as a propelling force for its emergence as an economic super power. In the political

sphere, the Jewish Diaspora has a strong grip over the US and European Union in terms of shaping their strategic relationship with Israel. Hence, Diasporas being transnational communities have become important non-state actors as well as deciding factors in international political and economic relations.

The city of Dar es Salaam where people of Indian origin have a strong demographic, social and economic weight which provide it a suitable points to observe intercommunity relations and explore the way identity categories have been constructed and entrenched overtime, thus making Dar es Salaam an important demography for analysis in this thesis.

Fouere (2015) argued that, “identity formation is the result of processes that can only be understood through a historicized and politicized approach to society” in “contrary to culturalist interpretations according to which the impossible integration of Asian immigrants is the result of insurmountable and inherent cultural differences”. She further argued, that the “links between the African and Asian worlds are still fragile and unstable today as a result of elite manipulation of politicized identities in the current context of economic liberalization”. Fouere argument is supported by Adam (2015), who emphasized that relations between Africans and Asians are hierarchical and limited. Living in a diaspora brings one into an identity conflict because identity discourses are still understood in terms of loyalty to ‘nations’ and ‘nation-states’.

However, their views can be criticized on the basis that they preserve their culture as heritage. Indians maintain their identity that’s true whether it is in the East Africa, South Africa, or in Western countries. Globally Indians are staying as one group, whether it’s in the developing societies or in developed nations. But they did not maintain their identity for favour. The transnational character of these collective identities should not be conceived as detrimental to their integration, on the contrary it should be considered as an asset through which African states involved in the globalization process can benefit from.

Due to globalization and liberalization of global economic system coupled with the rapid advancement of transport and communication technologies that have reduced time and space that have in turn intensified their socio-economic, political and cultural ties very stronger with their origin countries. Hence, not only have Diasporas attained due importance at the international level, but also in the domestic political and economic affairs of home countries than ever before. Eventually, they have emerged as an 'inevitable link' between their home and host lands along with major political and economic implications for both sides.

Indian Diaspora, though during both pre-independence and post-independence, have nurtured emotional links with their homeland through culture. The Indian Diaspora for their adaptable nature and their significant role played in the host country has made them a force to reckon with for both the host country and the country of origin. Whether they were indentured workers, free passengers, semi-skilled, skilled workers or business community, almost all of them have done quite well economically and professionally. Second and third generation members of the Indian Diaspora hold prominent positions in economic, political and other spheres.

Though, India's re-engagement with the Diaspora really took off only after 1991, when the Indian economy faced an unprecedented crisis arising from the bankruptcy of its foreign exchange reserves. And it was realized that if intended to develop economically and remain competitive in a swiftly globalizing world, it had to aggressively pull in foreign direct investments and readily allow for the infusion of new technologies. It was in this context of larger policy shifts that India re-engaged with its Diaspora in the 1990's. Within the last decade, the Indian government has shown significant interest in the Diaspora and established a number of Diaspora policies.

India's increasing interest in its Diaspora has three major factors. First, India once had a closed economy that did not encourage foreign contributions, businesses, or investment. When the government liberalized the economy in 1991, Indian Diaspora became more useful as agents of trade, investment, and technology (Naujoks 2009). Second, Indian foreign policy began to recognize the value of the Diaspora in industrialized countries, especially the United States, for public diplomacy. And

third, only from the mid-1990s, ethnic Indians started surfacing as high-level executives of multinational corporations. The general success of the community and the community's positive influence on the overall idea of Indian qualities led successive Indian governments to take a more proactive approach (Naujoks 2009).

On the side of PIO also things changed which enabled them to look towards India from different footing. By mid 1990s, except in South Africa, the PIO got long enough time to prove their loyalty to the country of their adoption. They emerged from isolation at home and emerged as a confident identity group. It also emerged as one the most prosperous and organised ethnic groups in their countries. By 1990s they could see no contradiction, after proving their loyalty to their countries, between their citizenship and getting a favourable commercial deal from their countries of origin. After all, it is not peculiar to Indian Diaspora. Many countries have successfully used the presence of different Diasporic community to mobilise economic and diplomatic support for the country. In fact, by 1990s diasporas - Black, Jewish, European, Chinese or Indian is not centrifugal sectarian force which need to be continued or crushed, rather, it has emerged as a secular, acceptable identity force at international level.

The concept of culture as a baggage of cultural heritage is used to unite the community. Once the community is united, it is extended to the dimension of inter-diaspora relations. The problems arise when youth born and brought up within other surroundings cannot imagine India. On the basis of oral traditions, observation of festivals and rituals and cultural forms the parents of the first generation tell the second and third generations that they are Indians. India and the Indian community become an imagination to them. They become confused and cannot place their identity. Their cultural heritage as told by parents remains imaginative. The reality is the place where they are born and has African friends. They do know through the media that like China, India is rising economically. They are also given extra information about India through internet, cyber technology and media. Their own respective country government also have an interest in developing business relations with India. The imagined Indian Diaspora and India have thus become a living reality.

In order to contribute to the Tanzania and India, the role of the Indian Diaspora can be very important in shaping the future policy. There can be two ways to facilitate this process. Firstly, the Indian Mission of the Government of India should have regular meetings not only with the businessmen but also with countrywide associations. It should include both PIOs and NRIs. In meetings priority areas can be discussed and areas of potential economic and cultural engagement can be identified. There are people who would like to do business with India and they can be selected. There should be extensive bilateral treaties and exchange of experts between India and the African countries. The second alternative would be that like, China, India should send delegations of experts regularly to their host country. On many issues there can be face to face dialogues in meetings with the Indian diaspora youth. The young generation has to be given more opportunity. They are leaders of future African politics. This would give new ideas for new projects. India should focus on the younger generation. One initiative would be to increase scholarships. When the youth stay in India and learn various professions, automatically, they will develop an emotional attachment to India. It would help them to feel “Indian” and develop a sense of belonging to India.

Diaspora contributions are related to institutional frameworks, socio-economic settings, political environments as well as issues of privileges/ rights, perceptions, images, trust and social identification, in both the home and host country. The political will of the Government of Tanzania to engage its diaspora in the national development process is highly commendable. There is room for improvement, however, as even countries such as India, Mexico, China and Rwanda considered leaders in tapping and channeling the financial, technical, and intellectual resources of their diaspora communities for capacity development, continually fine-tune related policies and strategies. Since, Tanzanian government held their diaspora in high esteem, for them the diaspora residing in their country are also very important. Thus, they are formulating policies considering diaspora as a heritage resource both inside and outside the boundaries of their country.

However, some experts¹ argue that the relevance of the Diaspora in defining India's ties with Africa will be very limited in the future. According to Carmody (2011), East African countries, where the Indian Diaspora is concentrated, are in the process of being eclipsed in India's strategy of engagement with the continent in favour of West and Central African oil producers. He goes on to say that even in East African countries such as Kenya, Indian engagement is largely private-sector driven and market seeking. Carmody's view may be criticised for two reasons. Firstly, East Africa continues to retain its importance in India's engagement with Africa despite India's growing economic footprint in West and Central Africa. Prime Minister Modi's high profile visit to Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa in July 2016 underlines the importance of East and South Africa in India's relations with Africa. Moreover, engagement with the Diaspora was a critical aspect of the Prime Minister's visit to East and South Africa (Chakrabarty 2016:277-278). Secondly, Carmody's underlying argument is that India's sole interest in Africa is limited to oil extraction which, again, can be contested.

In Alex Vines words, 'Indians investing in Africa are not associating themselves with Indian Africans so much. Indian businesses are not necessarily looking for partners of Asian descent on the continent. They are just looking for good business partners' (Chakrabarty, 2016:278). While it is true that Indian companies, particularly big companies, are looking for good business partners and not partners of Indian descent, there is little reason to completely eliminate the role of Diaspora.

But despite of the limitations identified there is no denying of the fact regarding the role of Indian diaspora as a heritage resource. Diaspora as heritage is getting reclaimed proactively, both in India and Tanzania and for strengthening their relations because of the changing policy now. Earlier "India connect" was weak because of Indian policy of disassociation; which changes to association since 1990's thus, catering into stronger connections. Now both India and Tanzania

¹ Carmody, Padraig (2011), 'India and the 'Asian drivers' in Africa', in Mawdsley and McCann (eds.), *India in Africa*, Pambazuka Press

² Alex Vine cited in Jacobs, Sherelle, (2012), *India-Africa Trade: A Unique Relationship*, Global: The International Briefing, Accessed on 5 April 2017, [http:// URL: www.globalbriefing.org/2012/10/india-africa-trade-a-unique-relationship..](http://www.globalbriefing.org/2012/10/india-africa-trade-a-unique-relationship..)

considers their diaspora as a heritage resource and trying to establish connection with them.

Dubey (2016) asserts that the Indian Diaspora will act as an ‘important resource and facilitator’ in furthering India’s ties with African countries. According to him, the Indian Diaspora is an important consideration for both India and Africa. They should not to be seen as the forgotten children of India but as an objective lobby which wishes to see the prosperity of India and of Tanzania.

Diasporas are political and cultural bridges between two countries. They are ‘cultural ambassadors’ of their homeland in their host country and of their host country in their homeland thus, helps in creating goodwill for their host country in their home country and vice versa.

They are successful businessmen in Tanzania and hold considerable share of Tanzanian economy. Their familiarity with Indian cultural, trade and commercial practices give them a certain edge in doing business with India. They also help in enhancing two way dialogues, promoting tourism, educational cooperation, and creating joint economic ventures. Tanzania views Indian diaspora in an increasingly positive context for mutual empowerment of both countries. The visit by the Tanzanian President to India in 2015, he reaffirms and emphasized on harnessing the diaspora potential in for enhanced India Tanzania relations.

Indian diaspora has actively participated in the freedom struggle of Tanzania. Presently also they are represented well in the Tanzanian political system. They are proportionately represented in the teaching, medical and legal professions as well as in governmental services and thus, helping in the betterment of their host country. Since, Indian diaspora contributed significantly in political and economical development of Tanzania, it helps India and Tanzania to proactively approach each other. Indian diaspora long term presence in Tanzania helps to facilitate bilateral relations between India and Tanzania.

Thus, in the conclusion it can be said that the Indian Diaspora in Tanzania is emerging as an international force; sharing a common identity and attachment with India as well as aiding in socio-economic and political development of Tanzania therefore, creating goodwill as a heritage resource in bilateral relations between India and Tanzania.

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APPENDICES

TABLE 3:

Indian High Level visits to Tanzania

Shri I.K. Gujral, Prime Minister of India	18-19 September, 1997
Shri APJ Abdul Kalam, Hon'ble President	11-13 September 2004
Shri Yashwant Sinha, Hon'ble Minister of External Affairs	25-28 April, 2003
Shri Anand Sharma, Hon'ble Minister of State for External Affairs	27-30 August 2008
Smt. Meira Kumar, Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, accompanied by 54 member strong delegation	28 September to 6 October, 2009
Shri Vayalar Ravi, Hon'ble Minister for Overseas Indian Affairs	29-31 January 2010
Shri Manmohan Singh, Hon'ble Prime Minister of India	26-28 May, 2011
Shri Vilasrao Deshmukh, Hon'ble Minister of Science & Technology and Earth Sciences	7-10 December, 2011.

Source: MEA Report 2014

TABLE 4:**Visits from Tanzania:-**

President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete as the then Minister for Foreign Affairs	May 2001 for the Joint Commission meeting
President Benjamin William Mkapa	15-21 December 2002
Mr. Amani Abeid Karume, President of Zanzibar	7-12 March 2004
Ms. Asha Rose Mgiro, Foreign Minister	7-12 March 2004
Muhammed Seef Khatib, Minister for Information and Culture	Satyagraha conference in January 2007
Mr. Basil Mramba, Minister	Joint Trade Committee Meeting in May 2007
Dr Ali Mohamed Shein, Vice President accompanied by the Minister for Health Minister for Industry Trade and Marketing, MOS in the President's office and Deputy Foreign Minister	18-24 March 2008
President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	April 2008 to co-chair the India-Africa Forum Summit

Source: MEA Report 2014

TABLE 5:**Ministerial Level visits to India in 2012**

Mr. Charles Muhangwa Kitwanga, Hon'ble Deputy Minister of Communication Science & Technology accompanied by Mr. Hassan Mahmoud Mshinda, DG, Tanzania Commission for S&T	Visited India to attend the India-Africa S&T Ministerial Conference in New Delhi from 1-2 March, 2012. Mr. Aloysius Saul Salim Chebet, Principal Education Officer, EAC Secretariat, also attended the event.
Mr. Mustafa H. Mkulo, Hon'ble Minister for Finance, accompanied by Dr. Servacius B. Likwelile, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Visited India to attend the 8th CII Exim Bank Conclave held in New Delhi on 18-20 March, 2012.	Visited India to attend the 8th CII Exim Bank Conclave held in New Delhi on 18-20 March, 2012.
Dr. Hussein Ali Mwinyi, Hon'ble Minister of Defence and National Service accompanied by Lt. Col. Amri Seif Majid	Visited India to attend the International Defence Exhibition on Land and Naval Systems –Def Expo in New Delhi from March 29 to April 01, 2012.
Ms. Anne Makinda, Speaker, National Assembly	Visited India to attend the 7th Meeting of Women Speakers of Parliament held on October 3-4, 2012 at New Delhi.
Dr. Terezya Huvisa, Minister of State [Environment], Vice-President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania	Visited India to attend the 11th Conference of Parties [COP-11] to the Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD] and the 6 th Meeting of Parties [MoP-6] to the Cartagena Protocol at Hyderabad from October 17-19, 2012.
Dr. Abdallah Omari Kigoda [MP], Minister of Industry & Trade	Visited India to attend the IOR-ARC Ministerial Meeting in Gurgaon from October 29, 2012 to November 2, 2012.

Source: MEA Report 2014

Table 8 (contd.) : Important bilateral treaties and agreements signed between India and Tanzania:	
Agreement on Friendship and Technical, Economic and Scientific Cooperation	28 January 1966
Trade Agreements – 12 December, 1972	[14 January 2000]: Pursuant to the agreement a Joint Trade Committee was established.
MoU on Technical Cooperation in the field of Posts and Telecommunications	Signed on December 12, 1996.
Agreement on the establishment of Joint Business Council	Was signed on June 25, 1997.
MoU for Co-operation in the field of Agriculture and Allied Sectors	signed on 16th December, 2002 during the visit of President Benjamin William Mkapa to India
Agreement in the field of Health & Medicine	signed on 16th December, 2002 during the visit of President Benjamin William Mkapa to India
MoU on Exchange Programme on Cooperation in the field of Education	signed on 27th April, 2003
MoU on Defence Cooperation signed	on 1st October 2003 in New Delhi
Agreement on Waiving Tanzania's Outstanding Loans	was signed during the visit of President Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam to Tanzania from 11-14 September, 2004.
Agreement on Cooperation in Information Technology and Services	was signed during the visit of President Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam to Tanzania from 11-14 September, 2004.

Source: MEA Report 2015

TABLE 9:

Trade figures between India and Tanzania are given below:

TRADE WITH TANZANIA								
India's export [in million US dollars]								
Year	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005
	880.63	1564.95	895.01	772.87	859.73	512.40	237.02	191.21
India's import [in million US dollars]								
Year	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005
	480.10	207.99	226.19	187.58	171.82	78.65	56.56	64.18
TOTAL	1360.73	1772.94	1121.2	960.45	1031.55	591.05	293.58	255.39

[Source : Tanzania Revenue Authority]

As per latest statistics for the year 2012, the bilateral trade stood at US\$ 1360.73 Million Which is less in comparison to 2011 statistics i.e 1772.94 but which is still higher than the all previous years which shows the vertical growing graph in the bilateral trade.

TABLE 10:

Principal Destinations of India's Technical Cooperation Programme

The principal beneficiaries of India's Technical Cooperation Programmes in the Financial Year 2014-15 were as under (figures pertain to Budget Estimates 2014-15):

S. No.	Technical Cooperation Budget	(In Rupees crore)	% of India's Total Aid & Loan Budget
1	Bhutan	3065.99	48.91%
2	Bangladesh	350.00	5.58%
3	Afghanistan	676.00	10.78%
4	Sri Lanka	500.00	7.98%
5	Nepal	450.00	7.18%
6	Myanmar	330.00	5.26%
7	African Countries	350.00	5.58%
8	Eurasian Countries	40.00	0.64%
9	Maldives	25.00	0.40%
10	Latin American Countries	30.00	0.48%
11	Mongolia	2.50	0.04%
12	Others	449.32	7.17%
	TOTAL	6268.81	100.00%

TABLE 11: The Indian Diaspora in countries of Africa

No.	Country	Population	PIOs	NRIs	Stateless	% of Population
1	Algeria	30,200,000	5	40	Nil	Insignificant
2	Angola	12,000,000	45	250	Nil	Insignificant
3	Benin	4,590,000	450	Nil	Nil	Insignificant
4	Botswana	1,500,000	3,000	6,000	Nil	0.66
5	Cameroon	15,863,000	250	Nil	Nil	Insignificant
6	Cape Verde	437,500	4	Nil	Nil	Insignificant
7	Chad	7,068,300	125	Nil	Nil	Insignificant
8	Côte d'Ivoire	16,000,000	30	270	Nil	Insignificant
9	Djibouti	460,000	280	Nil	Nil	Insignificant
10	Eritrea	3,317,611	30	1,723	Nil	Insignificant
11	Ethiopia	63,500,000	34	700	Nil	Insignificant
12	Gambia	1,200,000	135	Nil	Nil	Insignificant
13	Ghana	19,400,000	2,000	1,800	Nil	Insignificant
14	G' Bissau	1,315,822	25	Nil	Nil	Insignificant
15	Kenya	28,600,000	85,000	15,000	2,500	0.36
16	Madagascar	14,800,000	25,000	3,000	1,000	Insignificant
17	Mali	10,109,000	20	Nil	Nil	Insignificant
18	Mauritius	1,186,000	704,640	11,116	Nil	60.35
19	Mozambique	16,500,000	20,000	870	Nil	0.13
20	Namibia	1,700,000	32	78	Nil	Insignificant
21	Nigeria	125,000,000	8,000	17,000	Nil	Insignificant
22	Réunion	709,468	220,000	55	Nil	31.00
23	Senegal	9,000,000	13	8	Nil	Insignificant
24	Seychelles	81,000	2,000	3,000	Nil	6.10
25	Sudan	29,000,000	300	1,200	Nil	Insignificant

26 Tanzania	32,000,000	85,000	5,000	Nil	0.28
27 Tunisia	9,200,000	Nil	70	Nil	Insignificant
28 Uganda	21,500,000	7,000	5,000	Nil	Insignificant

Source: Report of High Level Committee on the Indian diaspora (2001) .The figures reproduced in this table are based mainly on inputs that the Committee had received from Indian Missions and Posts abroad.