EMPIRE, FAITH AND REASON: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **"Empire, Faith and Reason: A Study in the History of Ideas"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Resurgence of Religion in International Politics

The study began amidst the debate whether there is an actual resurgence of the religion question in international relations. The Islamic Revolution in Iran, the rainbow revolutions in Eastern Europe, the ethnicity based genocides in Africa had lingered the imagination of International Relations for long after the Second World Warbut identity based focus was still on the periphery(Bellin 2008). 9/11 had changed that in the imagination of the West drastically, and the reaction of the West in terms of the full-fledged invocation of the clash of civilisations dictum, sent the discipline of international relations in search of answers. However, the resurgence of religion phenomenon could still be explained in terms of the ghosts of the cold war haunting the west (Shah and Philpott 2012).

WhenUS President George Bush used the word "crusade" for the west's global war against terrorism however, it invoked the image of medieval religious wars of the Christian church against the increasing spread of the Islamic faith and kingdom – "a just war" – that was to be continued through history (Bush 2001). It was to be a war that derived its history from much before the cold war. It also soon made the word "terrorism" synonymous with "Islamic terrorism". This made theorizing of religion necessary, both to explain religious terrorism as also to counter and find solutions to religious terrorism. The causal derivatives for this resurgence came to be located in all kinds of explanations- Social Constructivists saw religion as embedded in societies- in culture and norms, and thus as a threat to other oppositional identities ascribed by the states. Realists saw religious resurgence as, just an ideology for waging "real" wars, the Liberals traced it to the philosophical loss of confidence in reason – emanating from the recognition that full exercise of reason in political institutions and public debates does not guarantee a

congruence on the issues of what constitutes a good communal life, Marxists saw it as the 'primitive accumulation of cultural capital' – a concept developed by Pierre Bourdieu to explain modes of domination, whereby certain groups in society "partially or totally monopolise society's symbolic resources" (Bourdieu 1994:181) including religion, extracting them from an individual embodied form which enables its use for action or even violence. Like always, as in theoretical discourses, there is a grain of truth in all of them, and all schools are still grappling to find a complete theory of explaining the causes, motivations and mapping the patterns of religious actors and processes in international politics (Casanova 1994)(Hehir 2012)(Cox et al. 2001) (Morawcsik 1997) (Philpott 2001) (Ruggie 1983).

Facts and events sincethen however, have brought the scepticismabout the resurgence question to naught. That religion and the uses or misuses of religious invocation has come to drive international politics is not a matter of debate anymore. The rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), the funding to and the spread of Wahabbism, the resultant refugee crisis and the rising of protectionist walls in Europe (especially in the UK with Brexit) and the proposals for heightened state surveillance in the United States on its citizen of colour, especially Muslims is a reality of International Politics. It seems that all the orthodox motivations of realpolitik in international relations including national interest, have now, to be viewed through the alleyways of religion. The resurgence of religion question however came to be delved into more deeply with time. This was also because the question came to be rearticulated in different ways with time- as to whether there was a disappearance of religion at all?;for there to be a resurgence of religion, there has to be a moment of disappearance too (Huntington 1993) (Hurd 2012) (Keohane 2002).

Empirical evidence came to the rescue to strengthen the argument. Away from the characterisation of the religion question as Islam vs. the West; scholarships uncovered the evidence on the rise in the number of religious civil wars in which states are not parties,

the increase in the number of governments with right wing agendas across the globe, the rise of religious and cultural discrimination and intolerance in hitherto pluralist societies, the phenomenon of new religions and the increased levels of self - identified religiosity amongst world populations(Nexon 1997) (Nexon 2012). These figures tell a story which is not ambiguous anymore. Scholars have also come to argue that looking at religion as the source only of division and strife is also empirically falsifiable in history, that religion can also be used for peace and reconstruction in post-conflict situations etc, but this school too does not deny that in the present global context the question of religious recognition motivates violence reminiscent of the bloodiest of medieval religious wars (Juergensmeyer 2008) (Snyder 2012) (Toft 2012) (Nexon 2009) (Hurd 2012).Toft's study is a test case in this context. Toft bases her analysis by gathering a huge range of data on religion across the globe. She establishes three premises empirically(Toft2012: 122-123):

a) There is an increase in the number of people who identify themselves as religious and are part of an active religious movement across the globe.

b) That there is an increase in the democratisation average of the countries, a total 2.3 on the scale of 0 to 6; where 0 stands for autocratic regimes and 6 for democratic.

c) That there is a decline in the legitimacy of secular ideologies. However she contests the common hypothesis that this decline is a post-cold war phenomenon and situates this development to the 1960s and 1970s.

After establishing these premises she gives an account of sub-state religious civil wars and divides them into civil wars with religion as peripheral and central issue respectively. Data reveals that since the 1940s, the wars that have had religion as a central issue of contention have increased from 19% to 45% in the 1990s. By the year 2000 majority of wars have been religious wars. The propensity of these wars has been noted to be highest in the Asia Pacific (56%) , followed by the Middle East (22%) & Africa (19%) and of the

religions, Islam has been a religion from at least one side in 82% of these wars. The other religions are Christianity at 52% where one or both parties are adherents, followed by 14% of Hindus. Toft also establishes that on the scale of war duration, war recurrence and non-combatant deaths, religious civil war score much higher than wars by other causes. The statistics are as follows:

Aspects	**Non Religious Wars**	**Religious Wars** **Rc (Religion as Central)** **Rp (Religion as Peripheral)**
Average War Duration	18 months	Rc 92 months Rp 120 months
War Recurrence rate	12%	26%
Non Combatant Deaths (average deaths per year)	14000	31000 (two times deadlier)

Source : (Toft 2012 : 124)

Another 2015 study done by German economists of over 800 elections claims that every economic recession in the past has been followed by the resurgence of parties riding on right wing agendas mostly on majoritarian religious identities (Funke 2015). The progressive trend of swing to the right wing governments in the Parliaments of 20 European countries was documented by a 2016 New York Times report(Aisch 2016). The trends have only been validated by Brexit and the election of the 45th US President

backed by the far right whowas outright in his attack on one particular religious identity during his election campaign and continues to be so.

Resurgence of Religion and International Relations (IR) Scholarship

There is, as a result, currently immense amount of scholarly reflection in IR on how to theorise the phenomenon of resurgence of religion. In political terms, it means finding answers to the crisis of secularism by revisiting the secularisation thesis itself.At present, the major contesting scholarship on religion in international politics can be divided into four theoretical approaches following Jack Snyder's framework (Snyder 2012). First, the scholars who use traditional paradigms of International Relations theories and how religion can affect or shape them. Secondly, those who use religion itself as a paradigm in international politics, independent of states. Thirdly, the relational-institutional approach which sees religion both as potentially integrative and exclusive to the traditional paradigms simultaneously; and finally those who see religion as an external causal variable interfering in the relations between traditional IR actors such as states, empires etc. The works of Daniel Philpott, Samuel Huntington, Daniel Nexon and Monica Duffy Toft are representative of each strand respectively. All these works have enriched our understanding of religious resurgence in international politics. Much however remains to be done especially in laying bare the genealogy of the secular in the International. For this, it is necessary to seek the origin of this discourse, understand the conditions that gave rise to it and how far its meaning has changed and evolved over time. Origin can be studied both as cause and as beginning.

The present work studies transition in empires (from empires of vassals and kingdoms to empires made up of colonies) as aresult of the emerging secular. It may thus qualify as an exercise in converse. It is an attempt to trace in political thought the marginalisation of religion through the category of two empires– one largely understood to be based on the legitimizing principle of faith and the other on the legitimizing principle of reason. It

undertakes this analysis to understand what historical moments in politics of political community makes the transformations in legitimizing ideas possible. It is thus an attempt in employing and learning from the history of two ever contesting and often collapsing ideas of faith and reason and how they shape and are in turn shaped by international politics. In other words from where and how does this struggle between faith and reason originate and what process does it undergo before it takes its present form in the "secular" state in which faith must recede in the public sphere and the reign of reason is used to negotiate relations within and between states?

Faith, Reason and Empire

It was in 1651 that Hobbes could proclaim the triumph of the sovereign state over religious kingdoms in the west in the following words:

> God made space to the great Leviathan (the Sovereign State) (Ludwig2006:12)

However this was preceded by a long and protracted process of wars between the church and the kings but also between ideas. Ideas that became instrumental in replacing the rule of the Holy Books by the principle of *Cuius regio, eius religio* (Whose Realm, His Religion). Apart from changing the character of the units (i.e. from kingdoms to sovereign states), the empire of God also simultaneously made space for the empire of the 'individual rational man' even though as a representative of God on earth.This however did not necessarily mean that Empires became inconceivable or an anathema in world politics. For political thought, this posed a challenge. It is therefore important to analyse how did political thinking of the age negotiate with this paradox that required them to argue for liberty of the states on one hand but also justify subjection of their colonies? Did the creation of the rational state and abolition of the religious empire really divorce faith from politics? It is this transition in the ideological underpinnings of empire, marked as the point of distinction between the medieval and modern period in political thought,

which this work envisages to inquire into closely. It asks the question of how the categories of faith and reason come into play in these two empires. In the process it revisits the ways in which these two empires have been understood as simple caricatures of faith and reason and how these uncritical simplifications have been used to draw meta-narratives in international politics, on what Taylor calls subtraction thesis[1]of secularism (Taylor2007). Empires, this work argues, are important sites from where the operating logics of theseprocesses can be criticised and understood.

Empire as a category in IR theory (International Relations) has not always occupied a significant place. Mainstream theories of IR do not characterise empire as a political unit in international politics, yet its character has always played a determining influence in deciding the very definitions and constitution of political units like kingdoms and eventually states. It is thus not surprising that most studies in intellectual history begin by trying to trace the fine lines– that only became clear over centuries – which distinguish these political units. Armitage for example begins his work on the ideological origins of the British Empire by citing Trusler's Dictionary of Synonyms.

> …the word, *empire*, conveys an idea ofa vast territory, composed ofvarious people; whereas that of *kingdom* implies, one morebounded; and intimates the unity ofthat nation, of which it is formed (Trusler quoted in Armitage 2000: 1).

Empires themselves have evolved over time and thus historicizing empires in terms of history of ideas which have formulated and legitimised them remains an important area of inquiry, which can give us answers about the present articulations of political categories formulated in history of empires. This can be done by studying empires not just as

[1]Charles Taylor offers an elaborate critique of secularity understood as absence of religion in modernity. These subtraction theses he argues are "stories of modernity in general, and secularity in particular, which explain them by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge. What emerges from this process—modernity or secularity—is to be understood in terms of underlying features of human nature which were there all along, but had been impeded by what is now set aside" (Taylor 2007:22).

'visions of global order' but also as vehicles of global politics and history (Bell 2012) (Barkawi 2010) (Bryan 2004).

The character of the transition which this study tries to capture is unique in both its history and nature. William Sewell (2005), while deciphering the logics of history and its relationship to the social systems, defines a problem with Wallerstien's study of the world capitalist system. He articulates it as a general choice that a researcher is bound to encounter while studying phenomenon, that are unique to history , as they have occurred only once in history. Thus, he argues that given that the world capitalist system has evolved only once in human history and there cannot be drawn any parallels temporally or spatially to draw a comparative study, the researcher may either describe or discover its laws. The present work might face the same problem as the transition from the Christian Roman Empire to the British Colonial Empire is in many ways singular. Whether and to what extent can they be seen as continuous is an important question, as is the inquiry into the question about the ways in which they are distinct. One of the most obvious discontinuities is the geographical discontinuity between the areas on which these empires yielded their influence. England was never central to the Holy Roman Empire, and we do not have any major scholarships in support of the Holy Roman Empire coming from England. Geographically the imperial ideology exerted its force from its east to the west; in other words the influence was unidirectional. This changed with the rise of Protestantism which became an important break in the largely though not completely coherent and continuous Catholic narrative. The questioning of Catholic faith on the basis of reason thus became one of the three bastions that drove the ideology of the British Empire that broke itself free from the seat of the Holy Roman Empire in Germany. The other two factors to which origins are attributed being trade and oceanic commerce.From the period of Charlemagne, however there are two overlapping transformations around England, one of that from a kingdom to a nation stateand second from being a part of the Holy Roman Empire to the centre of the British colonial Empire. What these two transformations had in common was the transition from Catholicism to

Protestantism in the background. It is important to point this because even in terms of political thinking related to the empire which this work envisages to trace, we see a shift inthe location of political thinkers that gain importance- from the Eastern to Western Europe. This is not to argue however, that the Holy Roman Empire was a predecessor to the British Colonial Empire though it was surely informed by it. The nation-states of Europe were formed out of the struggle between the authority of the church and the independent rulers. This narrative of opposition to a central church authority remained integral to the British Empire through the creation of the modern states. The study of political theory is largely understood as the theory of the *polis* or the state. However, the access to the theory of empire does demand revisiting the political theorists who were not situated in either the conquest or the finality of the nation-state when they were writing. They were thus writing more about principles and ideas around which to organise the *polis* than the nature or structure of the *polis* itself. Skinner articulates that the study of Christian political thought may be our only access to political theory, as also to the political theory of the empire of faith(Skinner 2009). Such an articulation rules out the possibility of studying other religious traditions and their determining role in the formation of empires, be it the Islamic Caliphates or the eastern expansion of Buddhism through the patronage of the kings. Christian political thought however remains important not only because it is our only way to a political theory of empire, but because it derives its path dependence from the fact that it informed the need and the birth of the modern nation state. These nation states were exported to the rest of the world through the colonial empires. It is in this sense that theChristian Roman Empire and its transition to the British colonial empire are both unique and important for the discipline of International Relations.

Rationale and Methodology of the Study

The work tries to trace a selective history of the two empires – the Holy Roman Empire and the British colonial empire through the constitutive role played by ideas and

investigates whether these ideas were anchored in faith or in reason. This implies covering a broad span of over 1500 years – from 313 CE- the year that Christianity is adopted as the official religion of the empire by Emperor Constantine and panegyrics have started to legitimise his empire,to about 1750 CE when the project of legitimizing the expansionist ambitions of the British Empireis sufficiently in place. Thus, more than a chronology of physical conquests, the work concentrates on the project of ideological conquests that the empire required, used and often unsuccessfully to legitimise its claims. In a broader sense, it looks at how these times made sense of the organisation of their political units, what were the major drivers in the process and what were the causal origins from which they drove their discursive logics.It is not to be understood that empire as a story of conquests and wars is absent from the narrative, it is however invoked only as far as required for the purpose of tracing history of ideas. Empires therefore form the important background in which ideas operate. They are used to describe the process that saw the changing relation between religion and monarchy as one of mutual benefit, dependence, co-operation and then conflict. This approach is in line with some of the recent works by International Relations scholars that focus on studying the development of international thought of empires (by) 'analysing how thinkers of previous generations conceived of the nature and significance of political boundaries, and the relations between discrete communities'(Bell 2007:1) but who have chosen the same region restricting their inquiry to the colonial period Britain and France (Bell 2007) (Pitts 2005) (Miller 1994) (Armitage 2000). This work stretches the inquiry back into history to derive an insight into the evolutionary history of the category of Empires.

The corpus of ideas is derived from a set of 21 texts spanning from 337CEto 1779CEin terms of their date of publication.The selected texts are a collection of works from different genres – panegyrics, theological tracts, legal codes, advice to princes, philosophical argumentations, letters and full-fledged theoretical expositions. The earlier texts are chosen to understand the theories that became the basis of the Holy Roman Empire. Eusebius Pamphilius' panegyric was part of his History of the Church and the

life of Constantine which remained an authoritative work of history for centuries after his death. Both Eusebius and Augustine were crucial to the scholastic learning until the Aristotelian revolution confronted the Platonism that the earlier Christian thinkers adopted. This confrontation is captured best in the post-Farabian[2] debates on interpretation of religious texts. The texts by Ibn Sina, Al- Ghazali, Ibn Rushd and Moses Maimonides are included to study the context and nuances of this debate.To understand the Holy Roman Empire apart from its theoretical groundings, legal documents and an advice to prince text are also made part of the selection. The legal documents comprise of a formal legal code issued by an emperor and a royal grant to the church. These texts are then followed by those that capture the reaction against the church and thereby root themselves in temporalism[3]. The texts in this section come from Thomas Aquinas, John of Paris, Marsilius of Padua, Ibn Khaldun and Dante. Protestantism and the development of the secular are studied through Martin Luther, followed by the development of the concept of liberty and its relation /reaction to religion. This is done through the works of Machiavelli, Bodin and Grotius. The final paradox between liberty and empire and its resolution through the category of reason which was exclusive of medieval enchantment but not exclusive of faith is studied through the works of Hobbes and Locke. This also includes the stricter scrutiny of reason in the thinking of David Hume.

The following is the list of the texts arranged in chronological order(all dates in CE):

1. Eusebius (337) *Oration in the Praise of Constantine*

2. St Augustine of Hippo (413-426), *De Civitate Dei*(The City of God)

3. *Justinian Code* (534)

[2] Debates after the period of the Islamic political philosopher Al Farabi (870-950/951 CE).
[3]A turn in Western political thinking that began to ascribe primacy to the Crown and the defence of its autonomus authority over political (temporal) matters. This was opposed to the earlier understanding where the Spiritual sphere was considered higher and the Church wielded authority indirectly on the Crown.

4. *Donation of Constantine* (750-800)

5. Constantine Porphyrogenitus (912-959), *De Administrando Imperio* On the Governance of Empire

6. Ibn Sina (1027), *Kitab-al- Shifa'* (The Physics of The Healing)

7. Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), *Tahfut Al-Falasifa* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers)

8. Ibn Rushd (1126- 98), *Tahfut Al- Tahfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)

9. Moses, Maimonides (1135-1138), *Moreh Nevukhim* (Guide to the Perplexed)

10. Aquinas, Thomas (1265- 1274), *Summa Theologica*

11. John of Paris (1302), *On Royal and Papal Power*

12. Marsilius of Padua (1324), *Defensor Pacis (*The Defender of Peace)

13. Ibn Khaldun (1337), *Muqadimmah*

14. Dante (1559), *Monarchy*

15. Luther, Martin (1523), *On Secular Authority*

16. Machiavelli (1532), *Il Principe (*The Prince)

17. Bodin, Jean (1576), *Les Six livres de la République* (The Six Books of the Commonwealth)

18. Hobbes (1651), *Leviathan*

19. Locke, John (1689), *Two Treatises on Government*

20.Grotius, Hugo (1755) *De Veritate Religionis Christianae*(The Truth of the Christian Religion)

21. Hume,David (1779) *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*

On the definitional front, the work uses the terms faith and reason as two oppositional categories not denying the fact they have not always been treated as exclusive of each other or even possible without each other in political thought of the period under consideration. Faith was considered as the only reasoned response to the challenges of the political world and reason could not be conceived as conflicting to religious faith. Especially the meaning of reason as an ability to inquire with a critical mind has evolved over time; and thus faith and reason cannot be defined as dichotomous for all periods of history. Nevertheless, the study of the transition under inquiry is from political allegiance based on faith to reason and thus they are used to define mutually exclusive ideas. Secondly, the category of empire and its relationship to political thought is an important area of inquiry. The term empire and not imperialism is used precisely to control the scope of the study by which it is meant, firstly that empire and imperialism may not always coexist. This study shall use the term empire to mean the area where the supremacy of the hegemon or central power is internalised deeply not only in economic, political and societal structures but also in terms of ideology (Negri and Hardt 2000). So the empires of faith, in this case, of Christian faith have a strong ideological allegiance which does not necessarily coincide with its military borders. On the other hand, imperialism has a strong spatial aspect which includes physical acquisition, be it in military or economic terms (Doyle 1986) (Patnaik 2010). Both imperialism and empire mostly coexist but the success of the empire depends upon how imperceptible and strong

the internalisation of the ideological basis of the empire is. Thirdly, the canons of history of ideas and intellectual history have been used without confusing the two with respect to their scope of inquiry or methodology but keeping in mind the similarity of the area of inquiry between the two.[4] Also, most work on ideas and their historical value in international political thought falls under the area of intellectual history and is of great value for undertaking the present study.

The definition and the scope of the research require studying these two empires through the prism of these ideas. The work does not make a case that either faith or reason were the primary drivers of empires they nevertheless are dominant motivations in theory and not insignificant in practice. For it cannot be denied that the British soldiers who crossed the oceans in the service of the empire believed that they were acting at the behest of an enlightened civilisation against the superstitious pagan uncivilised Indians; or that Ireland had to be within the British fold as it was part of the Protestant bloc in Europe. To the extent then, that these ideas were used to internalise the legitimacy of expansion and continuation of the empire the inquiry through the faith-reason lens holds a firm ground.

Review of Available Scholarship

The work studies the history of the two ideas – faith and reason – as the history of these two ideas were central to empires at two different points in time.The method of studying the history of ideas is in itself a branch of 'social philosophy and is considered as a paradoxical science that is concerned with history for concerns made possible by the present' (Oakeshott 1983:4). The debates over the possibility and desirability of objectivity in studying the history of ideas have been circular and continuous (Carr 1961).

[4]Peter Gordon defines Intellectual History as 'the study of intellectuals, ideas and intellectual patterns over time'. He goes on to differentiate history of ideas as histories weaved around one single idea, its development and transition over different times and in different contexts; whereas intellectual history treats ideas as historically conditioned and give contexts precedence over ideas.'(http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/pgordon-whatisintellhist.pdf)

From the Lovejoy thesis that propounded studying of evolution of unit ideas by breaking down discursive canons to Leo Strauss's attack on positivism and historicism; the present scholarship on history of ideas has come to terms with the impossibility of devising a universal method for all disciplines – a direct negation of the Lovejoy assumption of the impossibility of specilaised logics within disciplines (Lovejoy, 1983).Both Skinner but more explicitly Bevir (1999) have acknowledged the need of what can be called particularistic studies of disciplines by deciphering the logics that make sense only within discursive limits of a discipline. Though Skinner's speech act theory seems broadly applicable universally, it has essentially focussed on deriving internal logics and meanings specific to individual discourses (Skinner 1963). However, the contextualist school of thought has largely concentrated on the 'theory of state in its domestic or municipal capacities' (Armitage 2013) and the fact that this remains unproblematised in the study of international political thought, speaks volumes about the post-secularisation break and its internalisation in the discipline. This has led to the study of the works on Christian political thought, as applying to an empire with smaller dominions and princely states but not as a hierarchic interstate system.

With the secular turn in political thought, the division between religion and state develops and the two periods of history become two different disciplines– that of theology and political thought. Though this does not arrest the influence that religion has on political thinking or politics as a whole, the connection becomes less explicit. The rich and growing work on intellectual history in IR especially the inquiry into the international political thought of the Victorian Empire or the British Colonial Empire in Duncan Bell is an apt trigger of such a conversation (Bell 2008). Though international intellectual history is dominated by the doctrinal history of International Law, there have been interesting inquiries into the unseen sections of the works of modern political theorists and their potential to inform the intellectual history of International Politics (Armitage 2013).Methodologically, two works seem to be very appropriate starting points for this study. Firstly, Edward Keene's historical introduction to international political thought

and Adam Watson's history of the evolution of international political society. Keene's approach especially studies major ideas in terms of what they are, i.e. it does not organise them in schools of thought but studies ideas in their conceptual apparatus (Keene, 2005). Watson's approach to the study of the history of international societies in a way complements this conceptual approach by keeping events in history central to map the ideas they can be understood to generate (Watson 1992). Combining these two approaches in the areas of history and theory together for studying the transition from one system of thinking about international politics to other and aiding them by seeking the evolution of major ideas such as *Ius naturale*(natural law)and Ceaseropapism[5] would be a novel attempt at reading history. Understanding change thus requires us to understand how that change was brought about in the first place, what the latitude of agency in this process was and who the agents were, once we have understood as to why that particular change has come about. Such an account of history of the idea of sovereignty has been developed in Philpott who records three stages of evolution of the principle of sovereignty and identifies colonialism as an expansion of these principles to the colonies. In Philpott's analysis any new idea which questions the legitimacy of the existing order evolves and establishes itself through - firstly converting 'hearers', theses hearers then mobilise their own ranks around the idea, in the second stage these ranks protest, lobby and argue for a new order based on this idea; and finally the dissonance between the existing order and the opposition reaches a peak which leads to its disruption and the new idea becomes the legitimizing logic. In case of sovereignty, he identifies two periods and geographies where he traces this revolution. These are post Protestant Reformation Europe and the struggle for colonial independence.

> In early modern Europe, it was the Protestant Reformation that brought a century of war, culminating in the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), which in turn brought about a system of sovereign states. In the twentieth century, it was nationalism and

[5]Caesaropapismisapolitical system in which the head of the state is also the head of the church and the supreme judge in religious matters
(Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica URL: https://www.britannica.com/topic/caesaropapism).

> racial equality that brought the revolts, protests, and colonial wars that extended the system globally. For both revolutions, international agreement upon sovereign statehood was the terms on which a crisis of pluralism was settled (Philpott 2001:4).

The work also draws on the budding scholarship in the field of history and ideas in International Political Thought. The problems with respect to the political characterisation of medieval political thinking have been stated briefly in the previous section. Probably, that is also the reason why not much scholarly endeavour has been made to inquire into the influence of medieval political thinking on international political thought. The Palgrave Macmillan's series of 19 books on the history of international political thought does not undertake the study of works from any political thinker before Hobbes with the exception of Hugo Grotius. Interestingly though the series claims that its aim is to have covered the analysis of the evolution of particular ideas and concepts in the field [both classical (pre-1919) and modern (post-1919) thought].

However, the field of inquiry into the history of international political thought is a rather nascent one and thus the present scholarly analysis and conclusions cannot be understood as definite.Works that begin dating the history of international political thought have invariably focused on the ideational histories of colonial empires of Britain and France (Bell 2007) (Pitts 2005) (Miller 1994) (Armitage 2000). Stressing on the need of studying the long neglected discipline of international political thought, these works study the parallel development of theories based on reason such as liberalism, free trade, imperialism etc, and how these legitimised the expansion of colonial empires that led to a more arrogant global hierarchy than the previous one.

The available narratives of the history of Medieval Political Thought have been used extensively to aid where individual texts have been wanting,as an attempt to develop a coherent historical account.Otto Von Gierke's *Die Staats-und Korporationslehre des Alterthums und des Mittelalters und ihre Aufnahme in Deutschland* written in 1881

(Political Theories of the Middle Ages) is arguably the first in-depth attempt to analyse the political thought of the medieval period (Gierke 1900). He characterises the essence of this work aptly as a battle between the antiquity and the modern. Gierke's thematic analysis is matched in English by Carlyle's 6-volume study of the history of medieval political thought. Carlyle's work however is chronological and thus requires analysis on the reader's part. *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thoughtc.350 to c. 1450* in a way tries to balance both by dividing chronological developments in a thematic fashion and thus attempts a historical study of development of ideas (Burns 2008). Burns correctly points out the predicament that one faces while taking up the study of political thought of the medieval period– wherein a lot of political thinkers have been studied in their own right. However a thematic understanding of their whole period requires a lot more attention to the history of their period. This in turn, restricts the study of the text in relation with the historical period.

The other body of literature comprises of a collection of subject wise excerpts from the texts of political thinkers (Brown 2002) (O'Donovan 1999). Donovan's sourcebook divides texts into five periods according to the developments in Christian political thought. His division is instructive and important as he underlines a very important gap in the thematic histories and histories based on original texts. One important example can be the rise of the idea of the individual. Black (2008) in his thematic analysis makes a claim that the rise can be dated to around 1100 AD, influenced by the investiture controversy (Black 2008). On the other hand, in the world of political thinking, this period was still dominated by the integration of Aristotle and the individual surfaces only in the works of 13th century CE writers such as John of Paris and Dante. Thus, there clearly is a need for a more coherent conversation between these two approaches of studying history of ideas of this period which can be done only by contextualising the texts to the political worlds in which they were developing.Works on medieval political thought generally begin with long winding clarifications on how the study qualifies as a study of political thought thereby articulating the definitional challenge which is central to the study of medieval

political thought (Burns 2008) (Carlyle, 2008) (Ullmann 2004). Burns articulates the very character of medieval political thought as 'problematic' given that 'its very existence, as an identifiable entity or subject, may be questioned, and has been denied' (Burns 2008:1), what Ullman calls the problem of a universal bias in thinking or the "wholeness point of view" (Ullmann 2004).The first problem is a problem of definitional categories of politics. These are simply non-existent in the medieval era given that the very constitution of what we understand as political begins in the faith to reason transitionera. Though works have tried to articulate and with success, the institutional nature of the papacy and the theories of Ceaseropapism have also found acceptance (Ullman 2004), there still remains a tendency to characterise these as a study of Christian theology or as a discipline dominated by Christian theology. However, several historical inquiries into the Byzantine period literature also characterise the political thinking as one derived from the amalgam of Roman, Greek and Christian codes of thinking about politics. This is true especially in the sphere of politics where Roman law and Greek conceptions of collective and city life are dominant influences. Christian ideas of a parallel kingdom of God on earth wherein the King was the representative of God on earth were then adopted along with these two traditions in the Byzantine Empire (Nicol 2008). For example, Burns states that:

> the theory of dominium expounded by John of Paris at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries has a great deal to do with problems arising from changing economic conditions, but it is expounded deliberately in the context of an argument - a political argument, we may properly say - about royal and papal power (Burns 2008:3).

The problem thus rests equally in the articulation of political theories wrapped in theological rhetoric and the proclivity to refute the immense power of religion in controlling the ways of thinking about politics.The second problem is the problem of influences. The foundational Greek and Roman influences did exist but these were also accompanied by the other influences, which were coming from different geographical regions and were affected by the social character of those regions.The rise of Islam was

one of the most important influences on the trajectory that medieval western political thought took. It was simultaneously an ideational challenge and a methodological aid to the thinkers of the Roman west (Black 2008). The introduction of Aristotle and other Hellenic literature to the west happened in Arabic through the Muslim world which also encouraged a convulsive development in political thought. However, the biggest changes were brought about from within the Christian world as conversion through various missions brought together thinking from vast geographical areas with variant social groups. Nothing changed the politics of the Christian empires as the integration of the Vikings and the Germanic peoples who established a Carolingian monarchy within four centuries of their conversion (Markus 1997). This not only expanded the Carolingian empire in terms of its area, but it altered Christianity in practice, creating an exclusive melting pot for an exclusive Anglican Christianity which would then become not only central to the demands of complete independence from the papal authority but also the bedrock of the Anglican identity, from whichthe imperial project of English colonialism will set of. This alteration happened through the change that these trading and raiding communities brought in the material conditions in which Christianity came to be practised. The east-west schism and marginalisation of papacy in a societal structure that was to rest increasingly on the personal contracts of feudal allegiance based on economic considerations, brought out a phenomenal change in the conception of the empire and its legitimizing principle. The problem arose not from the vast expanse of the empire but the shifting centres of power that co-existed for a relatively long period of time. This gives rise to various internal conversations within the canon of medieval political thought without clear resolution of debates in theory; which invariably forces the researcher to turn to history for these answers. It is by situating this study in the overlapping corpus of these scholarships and with these caveats that this work seeks to understand the international.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

The work rests on a central hypothesis that, the transition from the system of religious empires to colonial empires in Europe was marked by a similar ontological shift in political theory from faith to reason. The logical corollary of this is the secondary hypothesis that the conflict for supremacy between the Crown and the Church was catalysed by the increasing scientific knowledge about the material world, which eventually undermined the authority of the Church, thereby altering the character of political control.

From these hypotheses, several important research questions are derived. These are as follows:

1. When do reason and faith come to be defined as mutually exclusive of each other? When does secular become the categorical imperative for reason in the modern sense?

2. To what extent does the East-West schism of 1054CEthat created the eastern and western Roman Empire affect the shift in political thought from faith to reason?

3. Under what historical context does the ontological transition from faith to reason happen in Western Political Thought? How does it affect the character of empires ruled by the West?

4. What role did the Reformation ideas, scientific discoveries and increasingknowledge about the material world that challenged the authority and teachings of the church play in shaping new political ideas?

5. How does the process of identification of reason as an individual sphere of thought from faith occur in late medieval political thought and how do matters of state come to find their location in the former mode of thinking?

6. What does the resurgence of old principles in this case faith or religion which governed the distribution of power in international politics in the past, and their influence across state boundaries imply for our understanding of the category of empire?

The narrative of this transformation is divided into five chapters. It begins by tracing the first big shift from the city states into the Macedonian empire in 359 BCE and uses this as a background to derive the context in which the Roman Empire which was its predecessor inherits the crisis post the Pax-Romana system. The flux created by the end of the principatial system leads to the polarisation in political thought from cynicism on one hand to the exploration of one centralising force on the other. Christianity with its powerful idea of one monotheistic God, fills the void; but the demands of the empire requires both an invention and evolution of the Christian Roman Empire. The first section of the second chapter describes this context both historically and in terms of the political thinking, and traces the twomajor challenges faced immediately by the empire post the adoption of Christianity. In Eusebius and Augustine, the challenge of defining the empire in Christian terms and defending the Christian adoption in the face of attacks on the empire are studied and the evolution of the theory of Christian Platonism drawing upon Latin Pagan, Greek and Christian sources is traced. Though the Church did a commendable job to disseminate these views into the populace of the empire, one of the biggest challenges it faced was the empire itself, which had integrated the Greco Roman principles into its institutions. The second part of the chapter lays down these challenges that surfaced in the form of heresies and concentrates mainly on the persistence of the Roman influence through the Donation of Constantine, a grant of lands to the Church which was later discovered to be forged and the Justinian Code which ensured that the Roman continuity in the sphere of law despite the Christianisation of the empire. These two parts reinforce each other in terms of the possibility to which faith and reason (in terms of secular requirements of the empire) had to co-exist and negotiate with each

other. The following chapter lays down the Aristotelian challenge to Christian Platonist philosophy, its origins in Islamic philosophy in the context of the politics of the Caliphates and the preceding dynasties. It traces this history of ideas in the background of the diminishing fortunes and strength of the Roman Empire beginning in the 7thc CE to the actual schism of the eastern and western empire in 1054 CE. This chapter marks an important turn in the transition narrative as it records the initial motivations and articulations for the separation of the spheres of influence of religion and government. Chapter 4 begins with the historical background of the political changes that the Roman Empire was going through when the Islamic world was refuting Platonism through a new method of inquiry. With the weakening of the Empire post 1054CEespecially in the East, the Church tried to overexert its own claims of power which lead to a reaction against papal authority. For thinkers encountering this paradox, the introduction of Aristotelian philosophy became an important source for arguing against the papacy. Aquinas, Dante, Marsilius of Padua directly and Ibn Khaldun indirectly contributed to the anti- papal tradition. Chapter 5 discusses the temporal- spiritual break and the ways in which both instigated and constricted the nature of budding national particularisms. It traces how these expansive national particularisms drew themselves on religious dissents such as Protestantism and gave rise to the ideologies of the new Empire. Chapter 6 develops on the paradox which arises from the religious- temporal break and argues that the exercise of resolving this paradox led to a partial translation of the religious in the temporal authority which has percolated into the theorisation of reason in modern western political thinking. This obfuscated “religious-temporal” understanding fashioned as universal and ahistorical reason; was then employed for imperial purposes. The works of Hobbes, Locke and Hume have been used to make such a case. The final chapter summarises the major conclusions of the study.

Chapter 2

Christian Platonism and Persistence of Roman Influence in the Christian Empire

I. Theoretical Narrative of a New Empire

The Roman Empire inherited by Emperor Constantine who adopted Christianity as the official religion of the Empire was preceded by a fifty year period of 'political convulsions from 235- 285 CE. This was a trying period for the Roman Empire as the empire had to counter external invasions, economic decline and cultural disunity' (Odhal 2004:17) during this time. This was also the Roman Empire's last period of "crisis" under the exclusive patronage of its pagan Gods. Constantine's adoption of Christianity did not obliterate the influence of the pagan faith at once but it transformed the principle of monotheism from a cult practice by a handful of underground followers of Christ to the status of a religion acknowledged and protected by the Emperor himself. This is where the generation of Christianity and its most powerful principle of monotheism started to take root as syncretism appeared to offer a better alternative to the Empire in crisis. This so called "crisis" was also in fact a break from the 200 year period of Pax Romana which stood on the strong principatial system where all the nobility came from the homogenous Flavian[6] stock and were understood to be as more imbibed in the Roman principles of polity (Burns: 2008). The empire that Constantine inherited traced back its history to Ancient Greece. Back in 359 BCE, the city state system of the Greek states was discontinued by the rise to power of one of the cities of Macedon under Philip II, whose son and successor went on to build a huge Macedonian Empire in the later period. The Macedonian empire built on the likes of the Egyptian and Syrian empires put an end to the system of independent *polis* but it also succeeded in defeating the age-old rival of the city states – the Persian Empire. The Macedonian empire under Alexander which stretched till Asia became the first world empire. In Aristotle's famous letter to

[6] A Roman dynasty that ruled the Empire from 69 to 96 AD.

Alexander who sought advice from Aristotle and the other Greek philosophers titled 'On Universe' we have important tracts on building a world empire (Rowe 2005). Following is an excerpt from one such letter where Aristotle emphasises on accommodation to the ways of living and warns against centralisation of power in an imperial centre.

> ..It is no use putting to death the men you have conquered; for their land will, by the laws of nature, breed another generation which will be similar. The character of these men is determined by the nature of the air of their country and the waters they habitually drink. The best course for you is to accept them as they are, and to seek to accommodate them to your concepts by winning them over through kindness (Manzalaoui 1974:195).

However,the early Roman Empire found its expansion in Europe in the era of Julius Augustus Caesar, around 100 BCE. It was Augustus who suspended the Consulship and concentrated all the power in his own hand after suspending the first triumvirate which consisted of himself, Crassus and Pompey who provided Augustus with money and army legions respectively. Caesar managed to get rid of the other two but was in turn stabbed and killed by the members of the senate. Plutarch relates the predicament of Brutus when he was plotting to kill Caesar with the others and how the political thinking of the time determined how he chose his accomplices. He tells us that Brutus first examined the views of the Epicureans and the Stoics at the court in a contorted way. The Epicurean Statillius argued that it was inappropriate for a wise man to take up risks for the benefit of other people and the Stoic Favonius argued that a law flouting monarchy was always better than a civil war. Brutus thus, did not take them up as co-conspirators. Nevertheless, it shows that Greek political philosophy was represented in the senate of the Romans affecting the character of the empire (Rowe 2005) (Wickham2009).

The 200 year period of the principatial system of emperorship referred to above is also known as the Pax Romana as the emperors from Augustus through the Antonines succeeded each other in a peaceful manner, "The Roman Empire had reached the apex of its political power, military sway, economic prosperity, and cultural achievements"

(Odhal 2004 :14) in this period. At the root of this success was a well-defined system of social and political stratification. The roman citizenry was divided into two classes– the Patricians and the Plebians. The Patrician class was the propertied class and the Plebians were the common people. However, as the Roman Empire sought expansion, it had to fall back on more army legions. Also the concentration of power in the hands of the emperor required him to get all the possible military power possible. Now, the commanders of the legions required some land in promise of their service. As the army expanded, the need for new lands increased, which could only be acquired by military conquest. This gave rise to a new class – a horse riding and prosperous military class known as the Equestrians. The old Patrician class which gave the empire almost all of its republican nobility and bureaucrats, declined. The increasing size of the empire and the increasing problem of succession created the period of great crisis for the Roman Empire from 235-285 CE. The massive external invasions saw the rise of the soldier emperors from the region of Illyria. It was to this period and lineage that Constantine's parents belonged. Under the more aggressive and organised attacks of the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire's economic and cultural decline began. The cults of the old Gods seemed to be helpless at the eve of the big crisis and their appeal amongst the people started to decline. The mysticism of Neoplatonism also strengthened in this time when the people as a whole were looking for some alternative that would give them hope.

> Plotinus, a Neoplatonic philosopher who lectured in Rome at the court of Emperor Gallienus, taught that through physical abnegation, intellectual exercise, and psychic meditation; a person could turn within his soul and obtain mystical union and perfect peace with the One, the first principle and spiritual deity who existed beyond space and time but from whom all creation had been generated. (Odhal 2004:22)

As crisis made political thinkers reflect on the internal problems of the empire, the emphasis shifted from the polity to the wellbeing and potential of the individual. This period also saw the advocacy of religious syncretism as the empire required more than ever before an idea that would unify the populace. This search for ultimate restorer of

order in times of chaos led different schools of thought to fairly one conclusion- "The *One* of the Neoplatonists, the *Logos* or divine Reason of the Stoics, *Jupiter* of the Olympians, *Mithras* of the mystery cults, or *Sol* the generic Sun god." This need for a personal God ended in a monotheistic religion taking place of the olderpolytheistic Gods eventually with the advent of Christianity (Odhal 2004).

The motivations behind the adoption of Christianity by Constantine is still a matter of debate within the historical circles; what is certain however is that it did not change radically the belief system of the pagan population of his empire. If anything, this only marked the long struggle and change that Christianityitself had to undergo as a result of this adoption of a mendicant religion by the royalty. The polity however underwent a change, the principles that it adhered to changed and most importantly, the ideas from which the authority gained its legitimacy changed (Burns 2008) (Rowe 2005).

The present chapter analyses and discusses two texts that were written in very early periods of Christianisation of the Roman Empire. This period was a period of expansion of Christianity as a religion within the empire. Map 1 shows the spread of Christianity between the period of 325-600 CE. The chapter tries to situate these texts in the larger theoretical milieu of the time and then tries to map the delineation that germinates into the full-fledged ideology of the Christian Roman Empire. These two texts are *Oration in the Praise of Constantine* which is a panegyric written in 337CEby Eusebius of Caesarea and *The City of God* written by Saint Augustine from 413-426 CE.

Map 1: Spread of Christianity 325 CE-600 CE

Source: Atlas of Ancient Rome (Wikimedia Commons)

URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Roman_Republic_Empire_map.gif

Sources of Christian Political Thought

The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought sees this distinction between political system and political thought as manifesting in two very different trajectories, i.e. though the adoption of a monotheistic religion of Christianity by the Roman Emperor Constantine is seen as a momentous political change, the political thought that develops alongside takes a course of change through conservative, cautious and modified routes. This is primarily because ideas grow and get entrenched at glacial speed and are rarely eroded. They are rather building blocks for new ideas even when they are integrated or when rejected; thereby making the project of political thought one that grows and exists by rule of conservation.

The influence of Greek political thought on the political thought of the time was enormous to the extent that it gave the very language and truth system for arguing anything political. Though Plato and Aristotle did not surface directly, the later Hellenistic thinking and schools of thought such as Cynicism, Epicureanism and Stoicism had a direct intervention in the political thinking of the time. Augustine's two most important influences M.Terentius Varro's *de Philosophia* and Cicero's *de Re Publica,* comefrom the works of Latin Pagan and Stoic rhetoric which, belong to the same corpus. Developments in the thought of Plato, the school that has come to be called Neoplatonist (though they identified themselves Platonists) also had a determining role. Though the work of Aristotle wasn't available to the Roman world till the Islamic contact, there is now a range of scholarship on looking at Aristotle too, as a Platonist and thus categorizing him as a Neoplatonist (Gerson 2005). This work will take up this debate at a later stage in Chapter 3, however it is important to keep in mind that even established and determined corpus of thought are being opened for re-interpretation with fresh perspectives than the one determined by the chronology in which they were "received" by those who mainstreamed knowledge and how these accidents of history determine the way we approach our theory. For now thus, it would suffice to say that the influence of

theoretical Aristotle cannot be completely refuted in the early Christian political thought through the medium of Platonists. Another important influence was that of Christ's life and thought and the scriptures related to the religion. The main themes of these works were Apocalypticism[7], Gnosticism[8] and later the Apologetic literature[9] (Brent 2009). Though the last was mainly due to the political context of persecution and rising heretical challenges and thus would be dealt with in the next section. The political thought of these earlier times is embedded deeply into what we now have as the separate disciplines of philosophy and natural sciences. Though the direct references to natural sciences and derivation of political principles from them had remarkably reduced in the Hellenistic period as compared to the political thought of the times of the city-states i.e. in Pythagoras, Plato or Aristotle; their refined and condensed versions are inherited by all later schools of thought. Philosophy however – moral, ethical and theological –is inseparable from the political imagination of the times. This condition is explained succinctly by Wilson in his authoritative work on the whole corpus of Western political thought,

> Historically the main difference between philosophy and political philosophy has been a matter of specialization rather than one of method or temper (Wilson 1960).

[7] Apocalyptic eschatological (end-time) views and movements focus on cryptic revelations about a sudden, dramatic, and cataclysmic intervention of God in history; the judgment of all men; the salvation of the faithful elect; and the eventual rule of the elect with God in a renewed heaven and earth. Arising in Zoroastrianism, apocalypticism was developed more fully in Judaic, Christian, and Islāmic eschatological speculation and movements (Encyclopaedia Britannica URL:https://www.britannica.com/topic/apocalypticism).

[8] Gnosticism is a special class or race of humans that is descended from the transcendent realm , destined to achieve salvation and to return to its spiritual origins. Salvation is understood as a revelation that reawakens knowledge (gnosis) of the race's divine identity; in contrast, the traditional Christian emphasis is on redemption through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ (Encyclopaedia Britannicahttps://www.britannica.com/topic/gnosticism).

[9]Early literature written in a systematic argument form, in defence of the Christian faith. Apologists is the name given to the Christian writers who (c. 120–220 CE) first undertook the task of making a reasoned defence and recommendation of their faith to outsiders (Oxford Dictionary of Christian Reference 3rd ed.URL: http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780192802903.001.0001/acref-9780192802903-e-391).

It is with this understanding that one approaches these texts to identify the conceptualisations of political structures and their imagination through this thought. This essentially requires one to often be selective in reading and interpretation and thus always also maintaining a distance from falling into what Skinner calls the mythology of doctrines. In his seminal work on approaching the meaning and understanding in the history of ideas, Skinner raises caution for the historians of ideas dealing with classical texts. Skinner discusses two particular fallacies that one is bound to be trapped in and calls them mythologies. These are the *mythology of doctrine* and the *mythology of coherence*. The historians of ideas may be said to have fallen into the first fallacy if s/he tries to approach the text from preconceived expectations due to paradigmatic academic training and find in the text what one is looking for, even though that may not be the original intent of the author. The second fallacy is the fallacy of coherence, where the reader brings on an artificial coherence to the text; which in fact may be a method of cognitive coherence one has employed to make sense of the text. In reading these classical texts, this work is highly liable to fall into the first fallacy i.e. the mythology of doctrines. While trying to understand the ideas of empire in these texts it is highly possible that stray and incidental remarks made by an author on a theme (here empire) be picked up to develop a doctrine of empire by the author.

> For if there must be at least some family resemblance connecting all the instances of a given activity, which we need first of all to apprehend in order to recognise the activity itself, it becomes impossible for any observer to consider any such activity, or any instance of it, without having some preconceptions about what he expects to find. (Skinner 1969:6)

Secondly, the meaning and understanding of the term empire itself has changed over time and so have the nature, motivations and methods of imperialist ambitions and resultant acquisitions. It is thus unfair to bring upon one's anachronistic expectations while studying empires across periods separated by centuries and measuring their advocates by one yardstick. Skinner uses Lovejoy to illustrate this argument on how approaching texts with some ideal type through which the reader has imbibed her/his own

knowledge discourse may produce two types of historical absurdities (Skinner 1969:10). It firstly defeats the purpose of studying history and history gets contaminated by the present understanding or dominant understanding of the concept or theme in question. The writer's treatment thus,is continuously understood through the available ideal type. Secondly, it projects a semantic debate (on the meaning of terms over time) as an empirical one, demanding if the particular idea really originated at some particular time in history.

Skinner's critics thus, question the whole project of the history of ideas on the basis of the methodology he forwards, which according to them would make the selective reading of history – to understand some key ideas – through a text impossible (Parekh and Berki 1973). Informing oneself with these debates, the work not just situates the author and the text in its intellectual and historical context as advocated by Skinner but also tries to maintain a critical distance from the project with which the text is being approached.

a.Greek Political Thought

The era of large scale organization that began with the rise of the Macedonian kingdom threw up a challenge on the 'later Hellenistic and Roman thought to discover the meaning of the political dimension of existence in an age of empire' (Wilson 1960). The shift from *polis* to *megapolis* was an overwhelming development for those accustomed to the "municipal" city-state, the concerns of the political thoughtof Plato and Aristotle. The great number and heterogeneity of citizens, the new forms of political organization for imperial resistance in the form of regional leagues (e.g. The Achean League) and the shift from isopolitic to *sympolitic*[10] models made politics more abstract and distant (Rowe : 2005). The emphasis on and retreat to the individual was the first response of political thought of this time- the first reaction from which the work begins its story of

[10]A shift from a model of homogenous political unit internally ruled by similar laws to a *sympolitic* model where a city belongs in a larger federation of states.

numerous transformations in ideas. This found articulation in various schools of thought that held sway in the period in which select authors were writing. Diogenes, the most famous cynic whose free spirit was envied by the likes of King Alexander represents the first trend in the scepticism and retort that the shift towards empires generated. The expansion of the *polis* and its distant nature also found an expression of the cynic conceptions of the citizen being homeless in the "civilised" city. Clearly, the contradictions that the heterogeneity of population under a singular rule produced were immense. The cynics thus developed the contrast between law *"ius"* and natural order *"cosmos"* and placed the cosmos as universal and higher. The radical and 'infamous' association of Cynics with their prescriptions for free and public sexual activity and rejection of social mores comes from this fetishism for the natural order. The most important idea that is attributed to the cynic thought of this time however, is their imagination of a potential kinship with mankind at large, which the huge imperial scale with immense population could have triggered. The idea that later came to be called cosmopolitanism remains crucial and central to the justifications that empires sought for their expansion. However, some interpretations also see this conception of 'cosmic community' as a result of disenchantment with political institutions of the time (Burns: 2008). Both interpretations however see this as a cause of the transformation in the political system. The retreat from the city to the individual in political thought became further condensed in the thought of the Epicureans and Stoics. Whereas Epicureanism advocated complete retreat from political participation, Stoics saw it as an utter necessity. Though two opposite extremes of each other, they both moved philosophy from its natural place and pushed political philosophy into an area of Quietism[11] (Rowe 2005). In their defence, it can be argued that this was a result of the sudden reduction in platforms for political participation in the empire. Epicureanism a school of thought founded after the name of Epicurus, whose two books named *On Modes of Life* are articulate condemnation of political participation and cynicism. Epicurean thought identifies two

[11]Quietism is an approach in philosophy that sees philosophy as broadly therapeutic and remedial.

motivations for a political life. These are seeking security from other men and gaining confidence. Through these two motives are variables they generate the first account of the genesis of law. This identifies threat to security as the binding factor of a political community; as the threat obscures, the solidarity or common interest wanes and stability is lost. The project of the intelligentsia thus should be to evaluate the values that the community identifies as advantageous. Epicureanism also established an intimate relationship between law and justice. Central to this relationship is the agreement which Epicureanism argues is the contract between wise and rational beings which requires 'mutual acceptance and observance'. However, the conception of justice in Epicureanism is not the independent ideal of Plato which is an imperative in itself; they argue that men seek justice because justice is advantageous to them. Injustice is not bad in itself; it is just not beneficial. The threat of punishment and disobedience reduces the confidence in the contract and this is bad for men in the long run. Wise men should thus, retreat from the political limelight and be in the company of friends to reach a state of maximum security. Friendship however, should not be a utilitarian goal. Interests of security can thus be achieved by being non-utilitarian in this one sphere.

One school that had a very important influence on Augustine especially was that of Stoicism and it was his disquiet and struggle with Stoicism that helped him develop his own conceptions about the nature of the divine and the polity.The Stoics were monists who rejected outright the matter-spirit duality and all the hierarchy it generated. The early Stoics were in that sense the first humanists, in the sense that they advocated participation in politics for humanism and included the concepts of friendship and concord into their theory. Zeno of Citium's Republic is an important document of this early strand of stoicism.

It is the later Hellenistic Stoicism though that becomes important to the enquiry. This later period is marked by a shift in themes, rejection of Platonic idealistic conceptions and its emphasis on the material life as opposed to Zeno's cosmic city; and is a symptom of

the changed political circumstances. Cicero, the second great influence on Augustine belongs to later Stoic tradition. Cicero finds no contradiction in man wanting to take up duties of the state on the one hand, and having a wife and children in accordance with nature, on the other. Resultantly, even philosophy did not mean mere thinking with leisure and arguing within one's intellectual circle but philosophy as a profession meant going out as professional teachers and sophists and reaching out to all (Gerson : 2005). This was a starkly realistic view, more in line with Epicureanism without its escapism and a firm denial of abstract philosophy.

The Stoics begin from the premise that humans possess what they call *Oikeiosis i.e.* 'a natural disposition to identify with others and their interests. (This disposition) is considered as the origin of justice' (Rowe 2005: 449).This conclusion is drawn by observing altruism in nature which in turn leads them to conclude that men are motivated not just by their self-interest but also by their desire to be identified as part of a group- i.e. to belong to some identity. This altruistic behaviour is interrupted due to corruption of human nature by social environment.

As we move closer to the period under study in this thesis, the Stoics become more determinate and started arguing against private possession of property, natural sociability and the common interest of the preservation of human association. However, later Stoics qualify this by making exception through these very tools whereby the justice of human association requires to concede to laws whereby forceful conquest, covenant, lottery, etc. can mean legitimate means of owning public property. This anomaly again rises from the methodological fallacy whereby human laws are not considered different from natural laws and as the natural world is ruled by the rule of the might, there is for the Stoics no contradiction in the same being the case for humans. The human world is thus the reflection of the non-human (animalistic) world.

The cosmic city of Zeno is taken up by Plutarch to draw its parallel with the empire of the great king Alexander as a world state, the 'one with a political system in which the unity of all mankind finds expression, all cultural differences are obliterated across a large territorial expanse. Chysippus[12] however, reads the old Stoic differently, and reads a non-spatial community of all good and wise men across the geographic and imperial expanse to constitute a universal community. Both these readings of the *Republic of Citium of Zeno* by Plutarch and Chysippus are of extreme importance, as we shall note shortly that the Plutarch version of the Republic in terms of a worldly territorial empire with a homogenous culture is adopted by the Romans. Whereas, the Christians that follow the Romans, use the Chysippian version which is replicated in works of Augustine where the earthly city is not some empire or the church but the invisible and unidentifiable community of the good.

b. Neoplatonism

The most important development of the time however is the new way of reading and interpreting the ideas of Plato also termed now as Neo-Platonism. Neo-Platonism was the Platonism of its own time. This is indubitably the most influential school of thought as the Christian theorists especially Augustine imports several conceptions of his political ideas directly from Platonism. Whether the adoption of Neo-Platonism by Augustine was a conscious deliberate choice on his part or whether the dominance of Neo-Platonism at the time compelled him inadvertently to articulate himself in the Neo-Platonist language, is in itself an important question, discussed later in the chapter. The main principles of Neoplatonism however can be summed up. Neoplatonist school of thought holds that the universe is a systemic unity and is thus governed by universal laws. This conception is derived from the pre-Socratic lines of thought.The world as a unity governed by real and intelligible inter-related laws though a significant claim had existed in Greek

[12]Chysippius was an eminent Stoic philosopher born in 279 BCE and expanded the work of Zeno of Citium.

philosophical thought since the 6th c. BCE. The Neoplatonist thought congruently held that the doctrines of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics were relatable and in essence one and the same. They further explained this systematic unity as a hierarchy in which the system ascends from the simple to the complex and from the sensible (that which can be sensed by human organs) to the intelligible. This however, is not to be understood as evolutionary in the temporal sense; this system is generated in the sphere of the ontological and the conceptual. The universe can thus be understood by applying one simple principle of conceptual reduction. In parallel to this, divine too is an irreducible explanatory category as is the intelligible – irreducible and exclusive from the physical. This view of ontology and theology being unified inseparables has later been integrated into Christian political thought.

Neoplatonism also integrated an Aristotelian idea about the movement of each body towards its higher form. All humans are thus supposed to be aspiring to become like God– the highest in the hierarchy. It is the position in this hierarchy they argued that determines the moral and aesthetic evaluation of a person or body (Gerson 2005) (Burns 2008). Interestingly, Neoplatonists applied these principles even in the modes of cognition and method. To explain this in a simpler form one can consider an example. If a,b and c are the three objects in the explanatory hierarchy of Plato, where a > b > c in the Platonic hierarchy and ea, eb and ec are their respective epistemies, then ea > eb > ec. Plotinus (205 CE -270 CE), one of the most important of the Neoplatonists gave the conception of the dark/evil not being an entity or thing in itself and just the absence of light/good thereby becoming the reason for Augustine's conversion from Manichaeism[13] to Christianity, centuries later.

[13]Manichaeism is the doctrine that the world is not governed by one perfect Being, but by a balance of the forces of good and evil. The doctrine elevates the devil, as the personification of evil, into a position of power comparable to that of God (The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 3rd ed).

c. Christian Themes

Finally, Christianity itself provides a corpus of themes from which these writers derive the constitutive logics and legitimacy for their ideas, although the Christian thought itself underwent a drastic change from what its major claims and beliefs were at its inception. The first and second centuries after the birth of Christ saw two consecutive Jewish revolts against the Romans; this led to an image of Christianity as a rebel political sect. The Jewish 'Zealots' who wanted to oust the Romans out of their holy land of Judea in favour of a theocracy and a Davidic kingdom comprised a huge number of the early members of the Jesus Movement (Rowe 2005).Of the political attitudes that can be deemed as scriptural, Apocalypticism seems to be the strongest. That the world would end and all humans will be judged according to the life they have lived was in direct opposition to the Roman ideology and authority. This dethroning of the Roman authority not just by challenging its power but also its continuance is understood to have sent a sense of a revolt to the authorities. This was one of the prime reasons that the Roman Emperors used, to justify Christian persecution. The fact that for a long time after the death of Christ the believers took no interest in writing down any history can be seen as a measure of what effect the apocalyptic faith had on the thinking. The Christians believed that the world was about to end and thus obedience to political authority of the Romans was the least important subject to delve upon. Rather salvation and religious observance were of more importance. Another extremely important theme in early Christianity was what has come to be known as Gnosticism. Gnosticism is the belief in a non-materialistic and transcendent life beyond the petty concerns of the material world and preaches life across the material and temporal world. The political manifestation of this belief was very strong and finds its source in the words believed to have been Christ's own: "it is as difficult for a rich man to pass through the gate of heaven as it is for a camel to pass through an eye of a needle.[14]" This also implied love and equality for the dispossessed and even a higher place for them in the hierarchy of the Christian cosmic order. Scholars see this as a strong

[14]Matthew 19:24

sense of a demand for social justice in the Jesus Movement and see him as a "Jewish wisdom teacher who attacked social stratification on religious basis" (Gerson: 2005).However, as times passed and the apocalypse did not seem to be on the horizon, the political attacks on Christians and the confrontation of the new faith with Paganism led to persecutions of the Christians. After being a persecuted faith for over 237 years (from 64CEwhen Nero blamed the Great Fire on Christians to 301 CE when Armenia acknowledged and accepted Christianity in 301 CE), Christianity finally gained the favour of the powerful and those in authority. This gave birth to the need of constructing or attuning the Christian cosmic order to the political and social structure of the empire. It was a challenging task for an order which had the unimportance of the material world as the principle of its foundation. The calibration of the Christian faith to the needs of the Empire was achieved by the reordering of the faith itself. This was similar to the reordering that the pagan cosmic order had to go through in the era of Middle Platonism, also discussed as Neoplatonism and popular Stoicism. This provides an important insight into how doctrines of faith which are largely understood as affecting political orders and motivations of the rulers and the ruled are also tailored by the requirements of political order. This calibration is not always slow adaptation or effect of existing in the imperial fold for a long time; but a conscious and deliberate chiselling of the original doctrine and addition of new tools to interpret the old doctrine or teaching. The stream of Christian political thought that emanated through such transitionhas been called the Apologetics. The Apologetic Christian thought had to take a sharp conservative turn due to its newfound favour with the authorities. It is this strand of thought and the way it affected and got affected by the course of the Roman Empire, which is the main subject of the chapter. With this background, the study ventures into the development in Christian political thought and the ideas that it produced, through a reading of select texts, that shaped the way politics of empire came to be conceptualised for many centuries that followed.

Development of Christian Platonism

The text *Oration in the Praise of Constantine* written by Eusebius of Caesarea in 337CEis a panegyric written at the end of the thirty years of rule of Emperor Constantine. The work was written as an accompaniment to the *Ecclesiastical History of the Church* and was an uncontested authority on empire and the period of Constantine until the discovery of the writings of Zosmius by the German humanist, Johann Lowenklau during the renaissance period. The work of Eusebius is classified in the apologetic canon of Christian works. Eusebius was writing in the period when the horrors of the persecution age were still fresh. The persecution of Christians under Nero and then Diocletian had made it very difficult for the Church to sustain itself. A huge population of Christians was made to give up their religion and made to perform pagan rites to prove their adherence to the old Gods during the times of Diocletian. When the state turned in the favour of Christianity and the persecutions came to an end, it was seen as the result of Christ's favour on his believers, but it was also at least from the Christian perspective, a new way of how the empire was being imagined. On the other hand, Augustine is writing almost a century later. In the year 378CE, on the ninth day of August for the first time in the history of the Roman Empire, the "barbarians" were convinced that they could cross into the great city of Rome. In the battle, the forces under Alaric had slaughtered a 40,000 strong Roman force and in 410CE, they destroyed the city of Rome. Though the material plunder was not very devastating, the psychological impact of this act was immense. It meant that the ever-glorious Golden city of Rome was not safe from its enemies any more. It exposed the weakness of the Roman Empire at a time when the enemy had already entered the gates. This encouraged others too, as in 430 CE the Vandals entered with 80,000 of their troops and laid a siege to the city of Augustine-Hippo. This reversal in the fate of the empire though neither accidental nor sudden was nevertheless jolting. The welcome given to the new faith of Christianity by Emperor Constantine was understood to have brought upon this wrath of the old Gods on the Roman Empire. It is in response to this attack on Christianity that Augustine wrote *De Civitate Dei* or the *City of*

God. The present section tries to read the evolution of the early Christian Roman Empire through a reading of Eusebius and Augustine. It asks whether the increased realism about state affairs in Augustine can be attributed to the fact that he is not writing on a clean slate as Eusebius but also by the fact that the arguments given by the Christian thinkers such as Eusebius crediting Christianity for the successes of the empire, and in the same measure ascertaining the blame of earlier upheavals to pagan Gods now stood reversed. Were the favours given to the faithful of Christ over? More importantly, how was the reversal of the empire to be made sense of? This was an urgent question for Augustine to answer but he could not do it without keeping Eusebius or other Christian apologists and their narrative of the empire in mind. However, this entire exercise gives the reader an important insight into the way the empire was evolving and how its thinkers were negotiating with different motivations,ranging from defending the primacy and proximity that church had to the ruler whiletrying to understand the relation between Christianity and the successes or fall of empire.

The chapter tries to discuss the motivations of the texts and evaluates them in the light of the history to understand the empire and the legitimizing discourse which was built around it. It does so, by discussing firstly,the nature of the empire that can be derived from the text, secondly its treatment of the issues of expansion and the role of proselytizing in the expansion of empire. This remains a very important theme even as we discuss the religious motivations and aid of Christian missionaries in the expansion of the British Empire in the later part of the work. Protestantism provided a potent unifying factor in the consolidation of colonial units such as Scotland and Ireland within Europe but once the expansion reached outside the continent, there was a lot of modification made to the earlier rhetorical protestant expansionism. Thislater had to give way to the more nuanced Protestantism which could be imparted. Such conflicts lie at the heart of all empires. For the Christian Roman Empire, this conflict primarily was the conflict of the necessity of war for the religion that originated from Christ, who gave his life for the sins of others. This conflict reaches its apogee in Martin Luther where he is redefining the role

of the individual and the political community vis-à-vis the religion of Christ. This will be discussed in the latter part of the section. Also, it discusses the theoretical edifice these political thinkers built against polyarchy.A unified empire with a centralised power also required uniformity of law. In the legal sphere the Romans had made advances and these legal traditions were developed and retained in the Empire even after Christianity became the official religion. The second section discusses this persistence of Roman influence and also looks at the way the Church negotiated its own power by the use of Roman legal apparatus to issue papal bulls etc.

a. Themes of Political Thought in the Early Empire

Eusebiusbegins his account in favour of the establishment of the two capitals at Constantinople and Rome post Diocletian reforms of 285CE,which according to him facilitated the efficient administration of the empire. This system of a large empire with two capitals, he argues, brought in a condition of relative peace. He however, qualifies his assertion by a peculiar definition of peace, as replacement of pagan places of worship by the Churches and ecclesiastical offices. A situation,whose probability of being peaceful seems very thin. The authenticity of Eusebius's account of the events is broadly a matter of doubt amongst historians, as even after Constantine's conversion, Constantine did not sever his relations to the pagan beliefs or religious institutions. Also there is no historical proof that non-Christians were given either a discriminatory or different treatment let alone persecution in the empire. Historians however agree that the vision of the empire that Eusebius was trying to push finally sustained itself. Before discussing this vision however it is important to understand the nature of the empire that existed.

Constantine converted to Christianity in 330 CE, the centuries old Roman Empire had very much existed even before this point in history. The uniformity in architecture in the cities, the vassal kingdoms as far as the near east since the times of Pompey (63-64 BCE) or Hadrian's wall across the northern expanse of England and the uniformity of taxes in

the provinces point to the development of a centrally controlled empire. However, what becomes important after 330CEwas the integration and the centrality that the "remote" eastern provinces acquired; being the land where Christ once lived (Hamarneh 2011: 1060). This shift to the east led to the actual integration of the eastern population in the Roman way of life as well as the internalisation of the rooted eastern practices into the Roman Empire and Christianity itself.

> Each separate portion of the Roman dominion became blended with the rest; the Eastern nations united with those of the West, and the whole body of the Roman empire was graced as it were by its head in the person of a single and supreme ruler, whose sole authority pervaded the whole…..Thus, as he was the first to proclaim to all the sole sovereignty of God, so he himself, as sole sovereign of the Roman world, extended his authority over the whole human race. (Eusebius 337:790)

Thus after 330 CE, the Roman Empire was still the empire consisting of heterogeneous peoples and regions but one with an official universality (though Christianity still had a long way to become the official religion of the state and longer still was the way to its monopolisation of the religious space), which itself was a product of the living heterogeneity of the times. This was a conscious process as Eusebius tells us that Constantine showered "numerous favours on the heathen peoples and the other nations of his empire"(Eusebius 337: 763). This is an important statement as it shows that the recognition to the other nationalities (as Eusebius uses the word Nation- *natio*in Latin which literally means 'by birth') within the empire was granted at the highest court. It also throws light on the way in which this was achieved, for Eusebius tells us that the best from the tribes and "other" peoples adjoining the empire who came to the court to extend vassalage were integrated as officers with the empire. This initiated not only diversity in military and administration but it also set rolling the process of integration of various traditions into the imperial civilisation.

As a critique against him, it is often argued that most of Eusebius's motivations were to record the history of the reign, to justify the rule and to legitimise the rule of the sons of Constantine thereby creating grounds for smooth succession (the mention of succession does not occur in the earlier orations written at the completion of 10 and 20 years of his rule), and most importantly to underline the centrality of the Christian religion to the empire. Definitely this was a huge task for Eusebius given that the document was written only 7 years after Constantine adopted Christianity. Howsoever true that may be, the fact that Eusebius throughout the text emphasises on integration and assimilation especially of the East does point out to this being an important strategy of the empire post Diocletian reforms.

> So that the inhabitants of our [Eastern] regions, who had heard of the privileges experienced in the opposite portion of the empire, and had blessed the fortunate recipients of them, and longed for the enjoyment of a similar lot for themselves, now with one consent proclaimed their own happiness, when they saw themselves ...in possession of all these blessings; and confessed that the appearance of such a monarch to the human race was indeed a marvelous event, and such as the world's history had never yet recorded diplomacy. Their aspect truculent and terrible, their bodily stature prodigious: some of a red complexion, others white as snow, others again of an intermediate colour(Eusebius 337: 848).

The most important historical proof that can be advanced for this apart from the diplomatic documents which are not always reliable- as one can never be sure of the *telos* of the writer- is the history of the empire itself. The persistence of the united eastern empire up until the very difficult Muslim acquisition of Constantinople and the whole *integrationism*present in the Byzantine Orthodox Christianity till today is a testimony to this. The Western empire on the other hand, was more divided on the lines of nationalities (though ascribed much later) and thus it negotiated differently with Christianity – giving rise to numerous church orders all often supporting conflicting claims of various rulers. This document thus was written in turbulent times at the cusp between Pagan and Christian Rome and must have been a subject of contention.

One of the best sources through which this contention can be studied is Augustine. Writing at period much later than Eusebius, the continuities and distinctions are both informing and enlightening. Even in the 5th century CE Augustine was grappling with the definition of the political unit which was bred by the pagan and Christian religions. Other continuities are the paradox at the heart of the very idea of Christian empire and thus the invocation of the dual spheres of authority and legitimacy. On the definitional question, Augustine asks us to refute the earlier definitions of the "people" to be understood here as a political unit and gives us a new definition which is,

> A people is a multitude of reasonable creatures conjoined in a general communication of those things it respects, and then to discern the state of the people, you must first consider what those things are(Augustine 413-426: 241).

He ishowever, simultaneously also faced with the paradox of imperial expansion and Christian piety. The predicament for Augustine then,was whether he could legitimise any principle or virtue to which people ascribe themselves worthy of instituting a commonwealth? He simply could not declare all political empires that came before his own as not constituting the people. Augustine thus qualifies his definition by the demand to *discern* the honourable things for human associations. He argues that any group of people who have agreed to or can associate with a common virtue are fit to be called a polity. The empires before Christianity thus are empires by definition. This however is not true by qualification as the empires constituted by higher virtues are true empires whereas those based on lower virtues as their constituting principles are by that very measure low and thus liable to perish. Examples of Rome, Greeks, Athenians and Babylonians whose history he relates in brief is a testament of this truth for Augustine. The initial virtue which bound the people together in these commonwealths argues Augustine, was found wanting as it gave way to the wreckage of its collective will in bloody wars, sedition, confederacies and civil strife. This problem he argues is inimical in the earthly empires as long as they are not conjoined by the empire of god – the empire of the other world. There are two interesting developments which can be used to germinate

the seeds that Augustine is planting here for his theory of the empire. First, is the question of what is this virtue– the true Augustinian justice which has been absent in all of the earthly empires including the Christian Roman Empire?

> For in the "City of the wicked," where God does not govern and men obey, sacrificing unto him alone, and consequently where the soul does not rule the body, nor reason the passions, there is generally found wanting the virtue of true justice(Augustine 413-426: 241).

The obedience of humans in a city where God does not govern is compared to a body which is not ruled by its soul. The empire of God is thus inseparable from the empire of earth,but the existence of the empire on earth is not impossible in the absence of the people adhering to the rule of the heavenly city. What is at stake here is that empires will retain their "failings" just like humans will be imperfect but polities like humans are purposive and can reach their end of the divine *telos* – replication of the earthly city in case of empires and living by Christian principles in case of human individuals. The Christian moral order is thus expanded on the empire but it also explains its failings and the need to strive for being like God – the ideal.

Augustine has been attributed the title of a nascent political realist, as this argument is seen as his acceptance of the tendency in human nature to acquire power. However, such a reading assumes the cause only by studying the effect. That is, the context in which Augustinewas writingis used to define the motivations and resultantly, anachronistic domain assumptions are labelled on him. Augustine also spends considerable time on telling us about the Christian ruler and what it means to be ruled not by God but someone in the image of God.

Secondly, philosophically what is the genealogy of this principle of true justice? It is here that Augustine seems to be striking at the heart of the paradox question– the realisation of the true principle of justice is impossible in earthly empire and thus wars– which are the

expression of that folly in the principle, must be accepted as reality. Thus wars are not only inevitable but also instruments through which earthly city can move towards the correction of its course. Of the second question it must be emphasised here that both Eusebius and Augustine rely heavily on the concept of logos – the Greek for reason– which is the principle on which they build their theory of empire– Christian Platonism. If the Greek logos are an idea from whose etymology the true principle of justice is deriving itself then, why are the Greeks subjected to the same scorn as the unreflective Romans or Babylonians in both these thinkers? Clearly, it is the distance that this *logos* will travel from the Greeks and the way it gets its Christians appendages, which will create a new definition of reason as the word of God. This remains one of the most crucial threads in terms of the history of the idea of reason and its integration into the realm of faith throughout the study. From the Christian fathers' treatment of the Greek logos which was at the heart of the very constitution of the political life, to the Christian word of the God, its severe contestation and defence in the Muslim scholars, its bifurcation in the late medieval era and its final polarisation in the Protestant era and the resultant bifurcated reason subtracted from religion – the trajectory of this development and its relation to its corresponding political units, in our case the empire remains central to the narrative of this work.

b. War, Empire and Christianity

Let us now turn to discuss the question of the paradox which lies at the heart of the Christian Roman Empire, which has been referred to earlier in detail. The letter by Aristotle to his disciple, Alexander of Macedonia has been quoted in an excerpt above. The letter has a philosophical but pragmatic undertone advocating integration of the people whom one is conquering as the only means to retain long term loyalty. In the preceding paragraph, it has been discussed that both the accounts by Eusebius and to some extent Augustine accept this as a principle which was integral to the nature of the Christian Roman Empire. However, Augustine by comparison is less idealistic and much

less in awe of this integrationist model. At the heart of the failure of adherence to this model is the question of war – and for the Christians the questions of just war. Eusebius argues at length about how the emperor Constantine won loyalty by other means than "unnecessary" wars. Honouring the leaders of contending groups by granting them important offices, at times even military units assimilated into the imperial army was one way of reducing wars, their casualties and their infusion into the inner territories of the empire. This can be understood as an efficient strategy of pushing wars to its furthest boundaries by an empire which befriended its invaders. These potential invaders in turn fought the empire's wars. For Eusebius tells us,

> ...Blemmyan tribes, of the Indians, and the Ethiopians,that widely-divided race, remotest of mankind ...These presents he separately received and carefully laid aside, acknowledging them in so munificent a manner as at once to enrich those who bore them. He also honored the noblest among them with Roman offices of dignity; so that many of them thenceforward preferred to continue their residence among us, and felt no desire to revisit their native land (Eusebius 337: 848).

He also cites the letter that Constantine wrote to one of the most bitter and long standing enemies of the empire – the Persians. An excerpt from the letter which was worded in very strong tone making an argument against war, but also at the same time invoking the position of the Christian Roman Empire as repository of stabilizing hegemon giving the region a "well-grounded hope of security". Here security can be understood to mean absence of war. It also at the same time critiques tyranny and thus accepts if necessary, the condition of war to free those under such a yoke of tyranny. It reads as follows:

> I have aroused each nation of the world in succession to a well-grounded hope of security; so that those which, groaning in servitude to the most cruel tyrants and yielding to the pressure of their daily sufferings, had well-nigh been utterly destroyed, have been restored through my agency to a far happier state(Eusebius 337: 849).

Though the exact date of this letter is unknown, historians largely believe that this was before the last Persian war that Constantine had to fight before his death. In Eusebius however, this conflict though ever present is not dealt with frontally. Augustine starts his work on a very different plane. He starts by discussingRome's invasion by the Visigoths and the Sack of Rome that followed.

He uses this as a launch pad to attack the imperial image that Rome had of itself. The Romans had for long kept the philosophers at bay as they were primarily a military state and the patriotic ideology derived itself from military ardour and martyrdom for the fatherland. Even the Stoics had faced antipathy in the Roman authorities initially, when they came to Rome around the 2nd c BCE. But then they adopted the stoic cosmopolitan image as a justification of Roman imperialism where Rome worked for the welfare of those it dominated – as an all-embracing empire of various races ruled by universal Roman law, sung in the ballads of the great poet Virgil as the '*imperium sine fine'*- an empire without end. This self-image was a very tightly woven one into the Roman political culture (Jones: 1948). Augustine's *City of God* was thus a counter -history which meant to demystify this illusion of the Roman Empire. The Roman city for Augustine is based on sin and is thus devoid of any justice. The real justice lies in the platonic ideal world, substituted by Augustine in the City of God. It is at this point that Augustine starts making his conservative concessions to the earthly state whereby an earthly state can deliver justice under the supervision of God– the idea that later came to be used as one advocating the supremacy of the church over the Emperor. The possibility of a just rule exists only in the 'rule of a Christian prince who acknowledges himself to hold power at the Church's pleasure' (Dyson 2006). The powerful on the Earth i.e. the rulers should be obeyed by the Christians because they rule due to the will of the Gods. Unless the ruler does not conflate the authority of the Supreme God, civil disobedience is not justified.

Augustine devotes a chapter to this predicament of war and peace in the earthly Empire which he argues is “condemned to perpetual pain” just as sinful as the human (material) body. This acceptance of the imperfection of humans and thus by extension of all that is constituted by humans is at the heart of the argument, which Augustine builds towards the resolution of the paradox of the empire legitimised by Christianity.

> …because it is not a good that acquits the possessors of all troubles, therefore this city is divided in itself into wars, altercations, and appetites of bloody and deadly victories. For any part of it that wars against another, desires to be the world's conqueror, whereas indeed it is vice's slave. And if it conquer, it extols itself and so becomes its own destruction : but if we consider the condition of worldly affairs, and grieve at man's openness to adversity, rather than delight in the events of prosperity, thus is the victory deadly : for it cannot keep asovereignty for ever where it got a victory for once(Augustine 413-426 :56).

He goes on to accept the paradox within human nature to desire both the earthly and the heavenly kingdom and resolves it by attributing a lasting character to the latter.

> ..It desires an earthly peace, for very low ambitions, and seeks it by war, where if it subdue all resistance, it attains peace: which notwithstanding the other side, that fought so unfortunately for the same reasons, lack. This peace they seek by laborious war, and obtain (they think) by a glorious victory…Doubtless those are good, and God's good gifts. But if the things appertaining to that celestial and supernal city where the victory shall be everlasting, be neglected for those goods, and those goods desired as the only goods, or loved as if they were better than the other, misery must needs follow and increase that which is inherent before (Augustine 413-426 : 57).

In the matter of War, Augustine is often read as a reluctant realist despite being a church father, who had read Christian scriptures and was well versed with the principle of piety central to Christ’s teachings. As a bishop of a city that had faced a siege at the hands of the Visigoths, he had to characterise war as a remedial and disciplinary force.

> …but the great western Babylon endeavours to communicate her language to all the lands she has subdued, to procure a fuller society, and a greater abundance of interpreters on both sides. It is true, but how many lives has this cost! and suppose that done, the worst is not past: for although she never wanted stranger nations against whom to lead her forces, yet this large extension of her empire procured greater wars than those, named civil and confederate wars, and these were they that troubled the souls of mankind both in their heat, with desire to see them extinct, and in their pacification, with fear to see them renewed. …Yea but a wise man, say they, will wage none but just war (Augustine 413-426: 221)

The Christian roots of just war theories however can be traced farther back than Augustine's time. The 314CECouncil of Arles under the emperor Constantine had given Christians the grant to fight in defence of the empire. Dyson reminds us that Christian thinkers before Augustine had established war to be a consequence and an occasion of sin. This again highlights the paradox that war was also a means of limiting or controlling the damage (Dyson 2005). Augustine observes the same conservatism when it comes to the institutions of slavery and private property which he argues are not in keeping with the natural law, but advocates respect of the status quo as it is the intentions and not social standing that matter in the community of the good- the city of God – the final empire.

c. Difficult Abnegation of Polyarchy: Christian Political Thought and the Centralisation of Power

Finally, the theoretical apparatus that is cultivated by the theorists of the Christian Roman Empire uses both the Greek and Christian traditions to create a dominant discourse of the political which abnegates polyarchy. This principle is one of the most internalised principles of western political thought and the Christian thinkers' imagination of One ruler on earth as complementing the One God in the heaven is at its heart. However, in the period in which Eusebius was writing, this was neither common place nor uncontested. Eusebius lays special emphasis on the role played by Constantine as a unifier of the Roman Empire. It must be noted that there is no outright objection in

sharing powers but there is equal insistence on retaining the undivided imperial command. This if challenged, justifies war. The Christian thinkers used the Greek logos which meant reason – the capacity to deliberate and used it to be understood as the word of God– deliberating human action under the central command of God's own life replicated by the ruler in the earthly sphere. This unifying of reason which was inseparable from faith and in fact possible only in the realm of faith was an important postulate of what became the Christian Platonist advocacy of empires. Eusebius seamlessly conjoins the two with his eloquent prose:

> Thus, being the perfect Offspring of a perfect Father, and the common Preserver of all things, he diffuses himself with living power throughout creation, and pours from his own fullness abundant supplies of reason, wisdom, light, and every other blessing, not only on objects nearest to himself, but on those most remote, whether in earth, or sea, or any other sphere of being (Eusebius 337: 934).

This appears continuously in Eusebius who ironically uses the logics of Philonism, Neo-Platonism and Neo-Pythagoranism to argue for the empire based on the Christian faith.

> Then, finally, at the time of the origin of the Roman Empire, there appeared again to all men and nations throughout the world, who had been, as it were, previously assisted, and were now fitted to receive the knowledge of the Father, that same teacher of virtue, the minister of the Father in all good things, the divine and heavenly Word of God, in a human body not at all differing in substance from our own. He did and suffered the things which had been prophesied. For it had been foretold that one who was at the same time man and God should come and dwell in the world, should perform wonderful works, and should show himself a teacher to all nations of the piety of the Father (Eusebius 337: 92).

And again,

> And surely monarchy far transcends every other constitution and form of government: for that democratic equality of power, which is its opposite, may rather be described as anarchy and disorder. Hence there is one God, and not two, or three, or more: for to assert a plurality of gods is plainly to deny the being of God at all. There is one Sovereign; and his Word and royal Law is one: a Law not expressed in syllables and words, not written or engraved on tablets, and therefore

> subject to the ravages of time; but the living and self-subsisting Word, who himself is God, and who administers his Father's kingdom on behalf of all who are after him and subject to his power (Eusebius 337: 941).

However, as the church stabilised and prospered, the debates about the purity and principles of true faith also began to develop. This led to various controversies and heresies from within the Christian church. The most prominent and probably immensely popular and damaging in its time was Arianism. Arianism questioned and sought clarification between the relationships between the Holy Trinity. It argued that if Christ is made like humans then, he is lesser than God in his existence. In other words, it argued that Christ is the form of existence of what is in fact God or 'the Essence'. This led to a huge controversy and divided Christian population and the Church. The intricacies of the Christian faith and the alleged heresies is however not a matter of discussion here, thus it shall suffice to say that the controversy was resolved after several ecclesiastical councils under the emperor's authority by inventing the principle of substantiation.

The church required the intervention as well as the authority of the state on its own side in order to silence the heretics which had a huge potential to cause schism in the Christian community. The conservatism of the Christian thought was thus at once coming to define itself as that which reinterpreted the earlier themes in Christianity, in order to comply itself with the needs of the empire and conversely also including the image and importance of the earthly empire within the Christian imagination. These themes were totally alien to the original teachings of Christ or the earlier scriptural interpretations.

Eusebius of Caesarea is also credited with the Christianisation of the theory of kingship with the help of the Platonic philosophy (Rowe: 2005). He was influenced by Philonism, a school of thought that was influenced by Judaism and Platonism. The integration of religion and political philosophy thus was not novel to the times of Eusebius. The idea of empire is axial in the *Oration* by Eusebius. He keeps the idea of God's divinity at the centre and uses the idea of the empire in a dual manner– firstly, to characterise the idea of

the heavenly empire under God and secondly, as the earthly empire under Emperor Constantine. Further, this duality is developed and theorised to its fullest in Augustine's *City of God*. Though Eusebius's conception is that the latter is the sub-kingdom or rather a reflection of the former, both empires have also been treated simultaneously. The concern here shall largely be confined to the earthly empire, i.e. the Roman Empire under Constantine and its ideational and historical confluence. Augustine on the other hand,can be considered to be the first political thinker to engage with and alter the meaning of the prevalent political thinking of his time. Dyson attributes the emergence of the 'high' medieval theory of papal monarchy to the contribution of Augustinian ideas (Dyson 2005).*The City of God* begins with the Sack of Rome and the attacks against Christianity in its wake. Augustine's political thought is largely influenced by his theological concerns. A short prologue of his theological canvas on whose basis his political principles hold is thus required.

Augustine uses history of Rome to draw arguments against these attacks and to, in turn, attack the Roman pagan Gods, who according to him, represent a decadent moral order of worship and had thus, led to the crisis in the Roman society. Augustine denies that Rome ever had a glorious past at all and thus declines the slightest chance for remorse. He in fact attributes that the reduced scale of slaughter and reasons of Visigoths not attacking the Christian places of worship to the grace of the Christian God. However, Augustine does not discussanywhere that the religion of the Visigoths themselves is that of Arinaism – a sect within Christianity. He then goes on to propound his alternative Christian order of the two cities- the earthly city and the city of God. The members of the two cities exist simultaneously whereby the good and the righteous and the corrupt and immoral both exist in the world. The idea of justice in Augustine is not only delayed and final but also quite complicated whereby all pains and crises have different effects on the members of the two cities. However the Christian eschatology allows room for compassion for all and thus the possibility of redemption is never denied. Augustine thus goes at length to describe the higher nature of the city of God, which is governed by a

natural higher law which requires Christians not to abide by any earthly rules of kingdoms like fighting for the state, etc. This idea of the heavenly city of righteous Christians has often been interpreted to mean the church, however Augustine's conception of the city of God is not a community of Christian believers but those who will be judged only by theGod on the day of the judgement. Though this part of Augustine's arguments makes him seem very close to the apocalyptic and other early Christian themes, there is also a strong sense of revisionism in his work. Augustine was functioning in a highly politically charged atmosphere often hostile to the Christians. As stated earlier, the era of persecutions had still not been forgotten. After Constantine, his successor went back to making Paganism the official religion which had a very strong following in the large section of the population. Even during the era of Constantine, Christianity had to adapt to the ambiguity that Constantine had given to the religion in order to balance his positioning vis-a-vis the believers of the two faiths. Constantine himself believed and worshipped the Sol– the sun God as the supreme God – though a Christian monotheistic idea but still rooted in Pagan beliefs. Also, the Arian controversy[15] and the role played by the emperor in the council of Nicea in 325CEhad established the importance of the backing of state power to maintain the religious order from falling apart. Though faint demands for ecclesiastical autonomy were present, the overall political situation required the Christians not to take positions antagonistic to the empire. It is in this context that Augustine by using the categories of faith and reason forwards his vision of an empire of God for which the grounds are prepared by the empire on earth (Dyson 2005). Dyson argues that the theoretical interest of the Christian church in the questions of polity was a result of their attraction to the conception of an unwritten natural law available to human reason. Since the time of St. Paul, evangelists had to be well versed in branches of philosophy in order to communicate about their belief to the

[15] In Christian theology, the main heresy denying the divinity of Christ, originating with the Alexandrian priest Arius (c. 250 CE–c. 336 CE). Arianism maintained that the son of God was created by the Father and was therefore neither coeternal nor consubstantial with the Father. It retained a foothold among Germanic peoples until the conversion of the Franks to Catholicism (496 CE) (The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable)

gentiles. The Christians interpreted the law of nature in contemporary political philosophy to the law of God. Fig 1.1 denotes the confluences of concepts in Christianity with Neoplatonism and Stoicism. Augustine is attributed with a further modification to this interpretation. He modified the classical law of nature doctrine in the light of the pessimistic view of human nature in Christianity. This new Christian view of human nature was then used to explain its implications for social and political life and relationships. Augustine also used Neoplatonism and Stoicism to confirm biblical truths based on several basic principles.



Fig 1.1: Concepts in Christianity, Neoplatonism and Stoicism

Augustine characterises human will as defective from the biblical fall, and accounts the problem of evil to the absence of Gods that sets in since the fall. The driving force of

Augustine's history is thus the free will given to humans, misused by Adam and Eve. He argues that both reason and faith are important but when they conflate it is faith that must be given an upper hand. These doctrines come up in the context of a challenge to Augustine's ideas from Pelagianism – a school of thought led by Pelagius which denied that the original sin had the capacity to taint reason and the capacity of humans to will and choose the right from wrong forever (Rowe 2005). Pelagius made an appeal to the reason of the Christian evangelists arguing that the wrong act of parents does not make the children and progeny amenable to repeat the offence. Augustine retorted by saying that the reasoned enquiry by Pelagius can only elaborate the problem and to that extent it is important but it does not reveal the problem and thus cannot resolve it.

It is on this foundation that Augustine further modifies the logos as understood by Eusebius. Reason as deliberation remains important for collective life but impossible without the mediation of God. Faith is thus the only medium through which Augustinian reason can be accessed. It is this reason that can define the "justness" of Empire's expansionist wars, when they are done with defending the faith of those who understand its meaninglessness. This Christian Platonism then becomes the dominant theory that dictated the narrative of this new empire– the principle through which acts of empires can be judged and can be measured against. These principles were also used to resolve the central paradox of wars in a Christian empire and the resultant contestations that flew from this central paradox, such as punishments for crimes in the empire, treatment to the prisoners of war, etc.

In the following chapters, the further development of this paradox and its relationship to this legitimizing principle of deliberative logos– enmeshed in the discourses of faith and reason will be traced. Until it reaches a point of radical break, where it is separated in theory but retains its recalcitrance in the political expressions of the second political unit of our scrutiny – the British colonial empire.

II. The Persistence of the Roman in the Christian Empire

Augustus, Diocletian and Constantine, all three were considered the greatest emperors of the Christian Roman Empire. This despite the fact that the Christian narrative which had beyond doubt established itself as the dominant discourse in the empire discounted all emperors that came before Constantine as persecutors. Nevertheless, the period from 337 CE, i.e. the death of Constantine to the 410CEVisigoth attack on Rome is characterised as the period of monumental change in establishing the basic principles of Christian narrative. This was also possible despite and arguably also because of the reign of the emperor Julian from 360-363CE.Julian is also called 'Julian the Apostate' because though he was born a Christian, he tried to re-establish the lost Roman culture including the cults of the pagan Gods. Julian though an excellent military commander and one of the very few Roman emperors trained in philosophy in Athens and exhibiting qualities of a philosopher, faced vehement opposition from the church and even his own supporters in the senatorial elite. The death of Julian in 363CEmarked the end of any attempt to roll back the Christian influence in public and political life of the empire as also the end of any attempt to bring back civic polytheism. This received an imperial seal in 393CEwhen Theodosius proclaimed Christianity as the sole official religion of the empire with only the limited exception of Judaism. This by no means meant either that all subjects of the empire were adherents of Christianity. The main dissenters were the country folk who either assimilated the old Roman traditions with the new religion or just went on practicing their old religion; the members of the upper Senate and the aristocratic elites who considered themselves the inheritors of the antiquarian empire and lastly the philosophers who also called themselves Platonists. The last section discussed in brief the grappling of the problem of Arianism philosophically in Augustine. Arianism was declared a heresy by the Nicene Creed[16] at its very first council in the year 325 CE. Yet again in the 381 CECouncil of Constantinople in which the Nicene Creed was amended

[16] The Nicene Creed is a "profession of faith" – a symbol used in Christian liturgy adopted at the First Council of Nicaea in 325 AD. It was later revised at the First Council of Constantinople in 381 AD.

to resolve the debates over the holy trinity and declared that the Father, the Son and The Holy Spirit (added in 381 CE) were made of the same substance and were thus co-equals. What this in turn meant was, that given the Son was born in the human form his substance could be shared in material form through transubstantiation(transfer of substance) through sharing of wine and bread by humans- thereby emphasizing on the Baptist tradition. Arianism however still remained central to the empire. Not only this, but two other heresies of Donatism and Manicheanism also come to haunt the empire. The reasons why heresies which are primarily questions of theology or at best philosophy become a question of importance for the empire are related to the successful geo-political expansion of the empire. This is also complemented by the question of the decline of the empire. The section has a twin objective; firstly to grasp the contentions to Christianisation of polity as opposed to the contentions to Christianity. This involves the arduous task of deciphering what exactly was the claim of Christianisation on the empire. However, the first section gives a detailed account of the Christian political ideal and thus this section will argue in light of that background. This section delves on the contentions that came both from within and without to challenge the mainstream homogenous conceptualisation of this "Christianisation." Secondly, it tries to extract the persistence of the Roman influence, again not to be understood as pagan religious influence exclusively, which expresses itself in highly assimilated forms at times.

The last section has related how Christianisation of the empire or the process of making Christian religion compatible to the requirements of the imperial ambitions and necessities was attempted. This was by no means a seamless process and was met with challenges from both external and internal sources. The external source chiefly was the obvious tying up of the Christian God to the military successes and failures of the empire. This was inescapable for Christianity, as the emperor who adopted the Christian religion and saved it from persecution had done so claiming that Christ guided him in an important war. This challenge was tackled by the theory of duality in empires and the necessity of wars in the differentially capable earthly empires which needed perfection

often through the instrument of war. But there were several other challenges that questioned the very philosophical and theological basis of Christianity. Before discussing these contentions which were denounced as heresies and remained a problemfor almost all the emperors since Constantine during the period of religion dominating the matters of empire, it is important to discuss why they are relevant at all for the empire? The question is related to the expansion and retention of the empire.

The Expanding Empire and the Problem of the Heresies

By the late 4th century and in the early 5th century, the expanding empire came to include many new lands and people. These expansions included the "barbaric tribes" from Germany who were mostly converted by the Arians. Some newly acquired territories were heavily under the influence of Donatism and Manicheanism which held sway in North Africa and Palestine. Moreover, these debates were not constricted to only those who wrote onphilosophy or theology. These debates between various sects of Christianity meant separation of the church orders, which in turn meant separation of authority. Not being able to command authority over the divided Christian population of the Donatist, Manichean and Arian orders, changed the dynamics of the power wielded by church over the empire. After the death of Theodosius in 395 CE,the eastern and western empire had undergone an irreversible process of separation. This was seen as a loss of the great Roman Empire- unified under the great emperors from Augustus to Constantine. This takes us to the second part of the persistence of the memory and legacy of the massive Roman Empire unified by similar law and decree. They are both interconnected and informed by the same problem of trying to address the crisis of the empire.

At least two of the heresies Arianism and Manichaeism are informed by Plato in some way. These can thus be discussed together. Arius who was a priest from the region of Alexandria, was a follower of Plato's teachings. He thus held in the Platonist ideal of the absolute. Plato in his theory of forms argued that absolute truths-in our case God-must be

like pure forms unknowable; known or accessible only by their impure expressions in the material. This attributed a lesser value to the material aspect of reality including the human realm. Human realm thus, came to be considered not evil, but far from perfection. This was deeply problematic for the Church which argued that Christ was God himself, embodied in human form. This questioned everything from transubstantiation[17] to the idea of the holy trinity[18]. It also questioned the authority of the church priests to administer ceremonies by which people could share the same substance as God. Arianism also raised the question for the church: if Christ was the son of God, why God should not be considered as a priori to Christ? In other words, God must have been present even before Christ. Manicheanism which was not directly related to Plato nevertheless argued for a duality of material and spiritual and unlike Arianism, it associated all that is material to evil and all that is abnegating the physical as good. It was not difficult to find support for this principle in Christian scriptures. The original sin basically had emanated from this. This was a big problem considering the fact that Christianity was the religion of the empire, which meant supporting material conquests and the opulent grants and offices. Therefore, all that Manicheanists argued was incontravention to Christianity. It is interesting that Augustine employees Platonism to counter Manicheanism.

Finally Donatism, the third heresy under discussion asked more questions of practical nature. Donatism dealt with the question of "traditors". Under the persecutionist regimes, from 260CEtill 324 CE (with a roughly 40 year period of peaceful coexistence in the period of Gallienus (260 CE-284 CE), especially that of Diocletian beginning 303 CE, a

[17] Transubstantiation is the process of changing of the elements of the bread and wine, when they are consecrated in the Eucharist, into the body and blood of Christ (a doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church). Transubstantiation was the focus of a great controversy during the Reformation, because most other groups of Christians do not maintain this doctrine. They usually hold that the body and blood of Jesus are only symbolically present in the bread and wine or that the bread and wine are the body and blood of Jesus and bread and wine at the same time (The American Heritage New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition).

[18] The great debate on the Holy Trinity refers to the contention in Christianity on whether the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are made of the one substance and are thus equal are not. This was considered important to establish the nature of the relationship of humans to the divine and whether the divine could be accessed by the human flesh in which the Son (Christ) existed.

lot of Christians had knuckled under pressure and given up their Christian scriptures and thus faith. Some had gone back to the pagan worship to please authorities and escape persecution. Donatists argued that these priests were traitors to the true Christian tradition; thus the word traditors. The problem however did not end here. If these traditors retook their parishes and churches and presided over the important life ceremonies of baptism and insubstantiation, etc. it basically meant that people were living with illegitimate sacraments. That there was no connection between them and theGod as the intermediary was a fraud, to use a strong word.The Donatists held a great influence in North Africa and the rise of these questions led to scepticism amongst people about their priests and the bishops who anointed them. This raised questions like whether the ceremonies of Baptism and marriages performed by such traditor priests were legitimate or not.Donatism spread widely, especially in the North African region.

Persistence of Greco- Roman Political Theories

Apart from these there was also a set of legalistic and institutional apparatus which continued in the post-Christian Roman Empire. These influences can be summarised by dividing the Greco-Roman traditional theories into the theories of kingship, theories of constitutional empires, and the theories of juridical tradition. The appeal of these theories can be attributed to the political context of the post-Theodosius era[19] when the reduced size and influence of the Empire becomes a cause of political and theological deliberation.

a. Kingship Theories

Thefollowing period saw the rise of strong autocratic kings on the model of the Persian and Egyptian kingdoms. The form of rule throughout Europe was almost uniform in

[19]Theodosius was the Emperor of the Roman Empire from 347- 395 CE. He is also known as the Emperor who made Christianity the Roman religion. Politically, taking stern action against the heretics and closing down places of pagan worship, Theodosius ended up placing his own power under that of the Church.

terms of the type of polity, i.e. of kingships and this more or less continued till the Middle Ages in varying forms and under varying names. The kingship theories argued that the democratic system needs laws because they did not have a rational king to take charge of the people and lead them with a flexible rational law which he could interpret with his own reason. It was probably through such subversion of law as that applied by dry irrationalism and thus the king being awarded the status above the law, that we have a place for religion opening up to enter the "rational discourse" as it is determined by the king. The important example of the literature that supports these claims is a letter 'To Philocrates' written by Aristeas which brings in God's sanction as an important element in ruling and is considered as an important contribution of Jewish Hellenistic Greco-Roman political theory (Wickham 2009) (Burns 2008).This is seen as a marked low in consideration of regard for human reason as 'compensatory legislative basis for kingship'. In this respect the kingship theories and the later constitutional theories that followed were a break from the earlier Macedonian theories which laid emphasis on the intervention of the king who was himself a philosopher. These theories however tied all power of the king to the divine sanction.

b.Constitutional Theories

The Achaean League which was a confederation of Greek city states that organised to resist the Macedonian upsurge was confronted with an important question: what made it possible for a small city like Rome to conquer a vast area of the inhabited world known to them in what seemed like a miniscule period of 53 years? Polybius, a 2nd century Achaean statesman came up with a theory to explain the emergence of the powers like Carthage and Rome in the West. He found the story of Rome's success in its constitution. He begins on a Platonic plane by arguing that good governance requires that those governed assent to being ruled. Then he classifies the constitutions into three types as those legitimating the rule of one, a few and the many. He then goes on to identify what he called the motives of change that lead to a generic decline of constitutions. He

identifies six types of constitutions and gives a cyclical theory of their birth, generation and decay. These six types are Monarchy which comes into being when a people herd under the leadership of the most powerful within them to gain security against the other groups. He furthers this psychological account of why polities are formed by arguing that when the people realise that it is only reasonable that the stronger and wiser rule them, they submit willingly to the authority of the king, and thereby the second type of the state or *polis* is constituted which he calls the Kingship. He sees a development of a utilitarian ethic of 'enlightened self interest' that holds the syncretism between the ruler and the ruled alive. However, when the kings become indulgent and hereditary rule is established, all insecurity and incentives on the part of the ruled is removed. It is no more binding for the king to rule with reason to continue ruling, which leads to the next system of Tyranny. Tyranny when made unbearable turns into Aristocracy, Aristocracy into Oligarchy and Oligarchy into mob-rule or Democracy. Polybius does not spend a lot of time discussing the last three systems (Rowe: 2005).His basic thesis however is, that the Roman constitution, like the Spartan, is the best and enduring because it is a mixed constitution. The three parts of its polity that is, the Monarchic (represented by the consuls), Aristocratic(represented by the Senate) and the Democratic (represented by the people who elect them indirectly and can recall them), function in a system of checks and balances against each other. The monarchs in the form of consuls lead the army, but the aristocracy in the form of senate generates the funds for the army and in turn gets the right to reappoint the consuls. However, whomever the aristocrats may choose to be consuls the people that is "the *demos*" have the right to annul or ratify the treaties made by the consuls.

Though this was not exactly how the Roman kingdom functioned, in terms of a theoretical explanation Polybius' theory made a strong argument for the time.

c. Jurists

Jurists developed as a class in around 3rd c CE from the priest class which had a sophisticated knowledge of jurisprudence. However, the seeds of classical law can be said to have sown as far back as in the tribal laws of the small city states of the 5th c CE The concept of *ius gentium* i.e. the laws of all civilised people, existed but there was no concept of the law of nations. The three greatest jurists of the period were found in Papinian, Paul and Ulpian who served in the imperial office of Severus. The works of these jurists led to the development of various schools of legal interpretation. By the 1st c the two jurist schools of Proculians and Sabinians had developed. The former laid emphasis on the strict interpretation of the textual law, whereas the latter relied on practice, interpretation and authority (Burns 2008). The importance of the jurists and their scholarship declined by the 4th and 5th centuriesCE, this period did not see any significant development on the works done by the jurists before until the 6th centuryCEsaw the codification of law in the form of the two bodies of law in the Barbarian codes which was the collection of the rules made by Gothic and Burgandian kings for their Roman subjects and the Corpus Iuris or the Justinian Code which codified all the available legal material from the ancient world and revisited it.

The reign of Justinian (527- 565CE), an emperor who longed for the old glory of the empire and re-conquered most of the territory that once comprised the Great Roman empire will be studied in the light of these influences. Two primary sources those of the Justinian Code and the Donation of Constantine will be used to study the persistence of the Roman influence.

Emperor Justinian and the Roman Legal Code

In Justinian, we witness both the apogee and the crisis of the empire. Justinian's ambition to bring back the long lost glory of the empire,dotted his reign with a series of military expeditions. Justinian re-conquered all the major areas of the divided western empire. He defeated three major groups of peoples whom the Romans termed barbaric invaders – as these groups pillaged Rome and other cities and looted the regions of the empires across the empire's boundaries regularly. These were, the most notorious-the Vandals who held sway in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and modern Libya; the Ostrogoths who held Italy and the Visigoths who held Spain. These were the empire's wars of conquests– they were expensive to fight, increased the burden of taxation on the rich and did not bring much bounty to the empire. On the other side there were wars of defence – these were the wars with the Persians – these were fought mainly to keep Persian aggression in check. In 531CE, the Eastern Empire had signed a 'perpetual peace' with the Persian Empire. This was instrumental in achieving the peace to acquire power in the west. However, the empire exhausted economically and militarily by the western acquisition, was attacked by the Persians after the nine years of peace. Justinian had a grandiose conception of the Empire. And he was willing to tax his subjects heavily and to endanger the security of the eastern frontier in order to expand his territory and his prestige(Freedman 2011).

The capital fell to the Persians and the siege of the capital was followed by a disastrous plague. In retrospect, the policy of defensive wars of one border and offensive ones on another proved detrimental. Most historical attempts on Justinian's reign summarise this verdict. Some accounts also go further to inform us of an important revolt that had a religious underpinning called as the Nika revolt or the Monophysite controversy. The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines monophysitism as 'a Christological position that asserted unity in the person of Jesus Christ and held that there was only one, divine nature rather than two natures, divine and human despite the fact that he appeared on earth in

theform of a human body. This position was upheld in 451CEat the Council of Chalcedon. The controversy seems to have affected the population of the empire deeply as primary sources on Justinian's life such as the *Secret History of Procopius* tell us. Not just the people but Justinian and Theodora, his wife and partner, ruling the empire were also divided on the issue. Justinian tried to impose his own unilateral decrees on the church but this yielded no influence on the increasing divide amongst the supporters of these two factions. Even the circus teams– the highest form of athletic, literary and cultural exhibition of excellence in the empire – were represented by the monophosyites and anti-monophysites (known as the Blues and the Greens). The conflict broke into the Nika revolt which led to a civil rebellion and the burning of much part of the city of Rome. The scale of the devastation and discontent was such that the emperor at one point seriously considered fleeing the capital. This is the story of the rise and fall of Justinian's empire, but the narrative raises several important questions for the empire. Firstly, how didthe empire sustain despite such internal divisions in terms of the senate itself opposing high taxation and the deep divisions on religious basis which expressed themselves in terms of civil wars? What was the unifying mechanism if any? Secondly, how didthe empire that faced such devastation towards the end of Justinian's era, persist itself continuously in the east till the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453CE. It is here that we come to the second part of the chapter which is the persistence of the roman influence in the empire. A very important part was played by the uniformity of the administrative apparatus, law administering bodies, complex laws on private property, contracts of business, civil and criminal law and the structures of bureaucracy outlived the emperors and at times even the new found religions. One such drive for uniformity and centralisation of power which proved to be a very important instrument of uniformity was the Justinian Code. The Justinian code which was a compilation of various responses, i.e. precedents of law and the *novella* or new laws persists even today in the European law tradition.

It was immediately after his accession to the throne that emperor Justinian gave his commands for the codification of the Roman law. The codification which began in 528CEwas finished a year after in 529CEwhen it was enacted as a *Novus Codex Justinianus.* Historians attribute such immediacy to the need to replace the old *Codex Theodosianus* of 438CEwhich was replete with contradictions and thus a thorough revision of rules was required. In 530 CE, he commanded a second law commission under the leadership of jurist Tribonian to collect the works of all earlier jurists. Justinian then issued the compilation of *Institutiones* as a legal handbook for students. The Digest was presented to the king as a fifty-book document in 533CE, the same year as the *Institutiones* was completed. The second edition of this whole corpus was issued by the Emperor in the year 534CEin the name of *Codex Justinianus* or*Justinian Code*.The *Justinian Code* isthus, itself a huge document and despite its continuing influence – or what is termed as the document that has the single-most living influence on European law, the debates on the versions of the document and its editing still continue to contribute fresh scholarship. For example the *Digest* itself, the largest constituting part of the *Codex* is divided into two addendums. Addendum A introduces the titles or *Coda* whereas Addemdum B actually is a list of all the *Codas* under which is the Mass or the Content of the Text. However, different editors of the *Digest* give different co- relations with the Addemdums whereby it has been arguably concluded that a considerable amount of the fifty books of the *Digest* is missing (Honore 2010). This has led to the questioning of the old readings of the document and the contestations between the old and new readings. It is however concluded that the immense codification of the law was made possible by the division of the 17 Commissions into three teams – under the heads of Sabinian, Edictal and Papinian texts (Honore 2010).

Though the relationship between the law and the empire is not a subject of this work, the interference of power and state ideology (Harries 2013), in this case the Christian ideology does find its expression in the text of the *Codex*. The mention of the great classical jurist Gaius as Gaius Noster (Our Noster) in the *Justinian Code* is an example of

this expression (Kelly: 1979). This seems odd not because the contribution of Gaius was in anyway lesser as the father of the Historical school of lawbut because of eclipsing other important contributions, for example, Ulpian who contributes to almost 40 per cent of the text of the *Digest* is not attributed with a "noster". This is because of the Christian objection to his "listing of constitutions hostile to Christianity as a guide to provincial governors." (Honore 2010:3). The *Code* however is detailed and applied uniformly throughout the empire. The precedents recorded give an insight in the way the rules for holding property and inheriting it and other civil procedure had an accumulative bearing of the Roman influence. In this, the persistence and influence of Roman law seems more organically ingrained in the empire than one hegemonic conception of Christianity. It can be an interesting inquiry to see how Christianity reformed the strongly Roman characteristic of the imperial law. Though one instance of it has been stated above, the case of the *Donation of Constantine* –a document forged by the church can be an apt case in studying the Christian negotiation with Roman law

Donation- Christian Negotiation with Roman law

Towards the end of the eight century around 756 CE, a document called the *Donation of Constantine* was forged in Rome, which was supposed to be a grant that conferred the lands in Judea, Greece, Asia, Thrace, Africa, Italy and other various islands upon Saint Peter and Saint Paul to be regulated by Pope Sylvester (314- 335CE) and his successors from thereon. The story then prevalent regarding the document was that Constantine went back to persecuting Christians and was afflicted with leprosy. This was one of the many dominant myths about Constantine's encounter with the power of Christianity that led him to adopt Christianity as the state religion. According to this myth the pagan priests arranged for Constantine a bath in the blood of the infants as a cure, but he declined. He then had a dream in which two men offered him relief from his destitute state. He could not understand the meaning of the dream. It was then that Sylvester, who had sought refuge with the king due to persecution orders in his name, interpreted the dream and

explained the two luminaries in his dream to be Peter and Paul. Then Sylvester asked the king to fast and baptized him and then the king (obviously) was healed. It was then that the King declared Christianity as the official religion of his realm.Granting the city of Rome and other western provinces to the Pope as stated in the *Donation*, he moved his own seat of power to the Byzantium (Levine 1973). The story and the document were later on refuted as proven to be false due to the historical inconsistencies in the narrative (when compared with that of Eusebius's) and language by Reginald Pocock but more definitively by Lorenzo Valla, an Italian priest in the1440s. Both Reginald Pocock and Lorenzo Valla look at three kinds of fallacies in the *Donation* to establish it a forgery – these are scriptural, historical and philological. The scriptural fallacies were regarding the method in ways in which script was written. Pocock argued that some of the Latin script used in the document could not have been used in the 4th century CE. Similarly, in terms of historical fallacy he recovered a tract written by Pope Pius II in 1443 CE in which the Pope attributed the grant of some of the land under discussion in the Donation as presented by Charlemagne (800-814 CE). It is interesting to note that the major philological discrepancy that Valla discovered was, with respect to the definition of the category of empire (Zinkeisen: 1894).The following excerpt gives a sense of the grandeur and power of the empire invoked in the document. It also simultaneously collapses and separates the church and the throne thereby leaving a larger scope of interpretation of power being scaled on the side of the church.

> And, to the extent of our earthly imperial power, we decree that his holy Roman church shall be honoured with veneration; and that, more than our empire and earthly throne, the most sacred seat of St. Peter shall be gloriously exalted; we giving to it the imperial power, and dignity of glory, and vigour and honour. And we ordain and decree that he shall have the supremacy as well over the four chief seats Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople and Jerusalem, as also over all the churches of God in the whole world. (*Donation of Constantine* 756: 142)

The overall impact of what this does among other contestations of authority between the church and the emperor however reaches it crescendo in the 14th century.The *Donation* is an important vestige for understanding the relationship between the church and the throne and the ensuing power struggle within them; but at the time when the *Donation* was written, this struggle was in its nascent stage. However, the document gives an important insight into the traditions of papal bulls[20] and the power and jurisdiction it held on the regions of the empire and beyond. It must however be noted that the implementation of the bulls beyond the empire was largely dependent on the enforcement mechanisms overt and covert possessed by the empire. It is also important to note that the characteristic of these papal bulls which increased exponentially in number, and their claim to power in the empire paralleled with the older Roman codes. These were simpler, did not draw themselves on precedents in law and charted authority only from the seals of the Saints and the Pope. The legal forms of claims to jurisdiction were thus changing but even in their opposition, were defined by the Roman parallels in law. Besides, the history of the empire itself contradicted the *Donation* which portrayed Constantine as wanting to shift the empire to the east. Constantine's own program of a tripartite empire did not fall in line with this assertion. Another important problem with the empire defined in *Donation* was that it could not explain the acts of the church itself. Emperor Phocas's permission had to be sought by Pope Boniface IV for conversion of a pantheon to the Church after the 250 years of the *Donation* which raised important questions about the date of *Donation* but also about the empire and its conception which was imbibed by the church and its fathers throughout the empire.

It is thus important to understand that the Christian projection of the empire and its role within it started to be questioned and torn by the 13th century and this was a major issue of public contention and unrest throughout the empire but more importantly from within the church. This was a major challenge to the empire with a Christian Platonist theory and the persistent and uniform Roman law. Map 2 shows the expanse of the Roman

[20]A public decree, edict or charter issued by the Pope.

Empire where uniform Roman law was applicable.This challenge has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The next chapter discusses the other contentions that arise due to the Christian Platonist worldview and the method from which it derives its truth claims.

Map 2: Holy Roman Empire 1000 CE

Source: Campo Juan Eduardo (1950)

Chapter 3

Logos and Aristotelian Reason: Challenging the Christian Theory of Empire

This chapter discusses the link period of the beginnings of transition in the method of inquiry into the theory of empire. The argument of the chapter rests on the hypothesis that it is this debate on the method of inquiry that brought the conflicting relationship between reason and faith to the centre of scholarly exercise thereby drastically altering the imagination of political units – the empires. The issue of method is of singular importance because it is the through the tools of Aristotelian logic honed at the hands of the Islamic scholars, that critical analysis of the religious scripture and authority are introduced to the West. The primary texts to be discussed in this chapter have similar intellectual context but come from different geographical locations. However, as Oliver Leaman in his answer to the particularistic reading of Maimonides Moses- which argues that his text is a prescription written for the Jewish people by a Jew- defends the philosophy of its content, form and universal scope in the following words:

> (T)he fact that the author is Jewish is as relevant or irrelevant as the fact that the author of *Summa Theologica* is Catholic, or that the author of *Incoherence of the Incoherence* is Muslim and its audience is Muslim. We have to take into account the cultural context in which all of these works have been produced, but this should not lead us to regard them as anything else but serious philosophy (Leaman 1990).

This chapter studies this transition through six very crucial texts in the medieval history of political philosophy. To avoid the sudden shift of geography and because of its own importance in terms of its revolutionary (for the period) treatment of the subject of empire, the chapter includes the *De Administrado Imperio* ('On the Governance of the Empire') - a key to understand the administration of the Roman Empire or whatever of it was left by around 912CE; written by the king Constantine Porphyrogenitus for his son and successor. It then makes a necessary theoretical detour and proceeds to the centre of the brewing debate on the method of finding out the truth where Aristotle and the original

theorisations in support or antithetical to him were produced in the Arabia. This is an enormously exciting period of scholarship for political philosophers to delve in. However, three important texts have been selected which are by no means exhaustive but representative of the main threads of the debate. These are *The Physics of the Healing*by Ibn Sina, *The Incoherence of Philosophers* by Al Ghazali and the *Incoherence of Incoherence* by Ibn Rushd. The other two works –Maimonides Moses's the *Guide for the Perplexed* and Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* are similar to each other in thesubject matter of their concern and its treatment. These authors were arguing for a language and method of philosophical reason and trying to situate the expanse of theology the only accepted and unchallengeable knowledge of their time. These works set the tone of the juggernaut of ideas which were then launched to challenge the claim of religion in the matters of empire.

On the Imperial Foreign Policy

From the time of the adoption of Christianity as an official religion of the Roman Empire till the time of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, approximately hundred years after which the great schism of 1054CEtook place, wherein the Patriarch of the Eastern Roman empire and Pope of the Western Roman empire excommunicated each other, numerous developments had taken place in the empire. Though since Augustine had given his theory of the City of God, the role and conception of Christianity had changed; it still remained important if not central (Burns 2008). An attempt to trace this change has been made in the previoustwo chapters. By the seventh century, Constantinople had been besieged twice by the Sassanids (Browning 2012). Besides, the borders of the Roman Empire had generally become more porous and perilous and weak than ever. Thus though in theory the empire remained holy, blessed and guarded; the more pressing concerns of statecraft had occupied the minds of the leaders. Moreover, the tension between the Church and the Crown kept augmenting, whereby each, rather than complementing each other, tried to carve their own spheres of supremacy (Ando 2000). The text *On the*

Governance of the Empire is thus a journal of the internal history, politics and the organization of the empire.

Dwindling Empire, Challenges of Statecraft and De-centring of Christianity

The treatise written by Constantine Porphyrogenitus is not a theoretical work but a journal of foreign policy. The internalisation of the notion that all power to the king is derived from the power of the Christian religion remains a constant theme in the text.This makes it difficult to treat it exclusively as a book on statecraft. It cannot be denied however, that Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus wrote a document - a foreign policy journal, one may call it;between 948- 952 CE for the next emperor and his son Romanus. This work was a combination of two earlier works *On the Governance of the State* and *The Various Nations*; however the intention of its compilation is in itself an important area of inquiry. The life of Constantine VII growing up as a mere mark of royal blood devoid of even a sight of real power in a crumbling empire is itself telling of the need that a king of an empire in internal and external crisis feels necessary to address. Constantine VII was the only surviving son of the emperor Leo VI who ruled from 866 to 912 CE. He was under the protection of the members of the royal family and his father in law, the General Romanos Lecapenus for a long time. In 920 CE, he was dethroned by the same Romanos Lecapenus and got a real taste of power only in 945 CE because of the change in the equations of power. In 944, General Romanos Lecapenus was dethroned by his two sons (Constantine VII's brothers-in- law). Constantine's wife then helped him to remove her two brothers and co- emperors from position of power, thereby leaving Constantine VII as the sole emperor in 945 CE. This writing began only two years after his coming to power and thus it is a documentation of the concerns and the strategy of the empire.The work itself is arranged into 53 chapters though not written chronologically in that order. Editors classify chapters 14 to 42 to have been written earliest while chapters 23, 25, 48, 52, 53 are notices written at different points of time. The emperor was handling three major questions through this work. Firstly, the neighbouring nations and their positioning

in terms of their capability to hurt or help the empire. Secondly, different origins of other nation states and their people and the inferior nature of both when compared to Rome. Finally, the history of Rome's inter-state relations. Constantine's immediate concerns are the three kingdoms on its border – the Pechnegs, the Rus' or the Russians and the Turks. The Pechnegs especially take much of his attention - a warring tribe which is dreaded by all the major kingdoms and are a crucial element in maintaining peace at the border. The Pechnegs werethe ones with whom Constantine advises maintaining peace as the best policy and a necessary requirement. Russians, he argued, are enemies and can be kept at bay by keeping the Pechnegs, the only people who can facilitate the entry of any other force into Rome, in good humour. Romans too needed the Pechnegs to both trade or fight the Russians. The Pechnegs thus were a countervailing force between the two. Constantine was an ardent advocate of diplomacy – a trend which is very different from the Roman empire of early Christianity. The Christianity appears in this work but is neither a constant axial theme nor an organizing logic as in the works of Eusebius or Augustine respectively. It is more of a symbol of historical superiority *'Kamelaukia'*- as Constantine calls it, is a divine process whereby clothes were believed to be sent by God through an angel to the emperor (Constantine Porphyrogenitus 912-959). He mentions this process without much divine fanfare to mention that these purple vestments may never be traded for peace even with the Pechnegs. Thus the symbolic monopoly on the recognition from the Church was non- negotiable, even if it came at a cost of a full-fledged war. This should not be understood however, as the factor of religion becoming irrelevant. One example of this is that alliance in marriage with the unbaptized or the infidels was considered a policy of doom for the empire.

The text also discusses the Muslims but the discussion on the Muslims is based on the history of Muslims from St. Theophanes. The account is thus biased and at several points factually incorrect. Historically, when the Roman Empire close to its decline was busy trying to think its best strategy in statecraft, the Islamic Empire was growing around the idea it had discovered - "There is but one God, and Muhammad is his Prophet". The idea

of this new religion had taken hold over new and even Christian lands. Islam was both similar and different to the other Abrahamic faiths. One significant divergence was that the prophet Muhammad himself was also a warrior and later a king. The religion was thus a political religion from its inception. Black terms this a unique combination of faith and force (Black 2001). This might lead one to ask whether the lack of re-imagination of the idea of the Christian empire especially in the east or the new realities of the *realpolitik* was responsible for the decline of the eastern Roman Empire. Whereas the western empire, though not untouched had the advantage of being distant from the encroaching influence and conquest of Islam. This however is a matter of raising inquiry over a historical counterfactual, and not a subject of the current discussion. The following passage will give a brief history of the political context in which the selected works were produced.

The Rise of Islam and the Evolution of Early Islamic Political Thought

In the year 622 CE, the Prophet had taken his flight to Medina and this was the beginning of the Islamic calendar. By 632CEwhen Muhammad died and the recitation of the Quran was complete, the foundations of what was to become the empire of the idea of Islam were strongly laid. Around 656 CE, divisions started to appear and the first *fitna* was fought. Though after the death of Muhammad, Abu Bakr was chosen as the Imam in 632CEby the tribe of Prophet Muhammad – the Quraysh, followed by Umar in 634CE; problems arose when the third Imam Uthman was assassinated. The opponents of Uthman held that Ali, the son-in- law and one of the first children to be converted to Islam by the Prophet himself should be the Imam while the opposing camp did not accept this. Thus in 656CEa battle was fought near Basra in which Ali won, however in the next battle fought in 657CEcalled as the battle of Siffin the governor of Syria managed to obtain a truce between the warring parties. Though some of Ali's supporters accepted this truce, the majority chose another Imam and came to call themselves the anti-truce *Kharijis.* Eventually, the Kharijis assassinated Ali and recognised the Syrian governor

Mu'awiya as their Imam, thereby establishing the Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyad Caliphate lasted from 661CEto about 744CE, when after the third civil war the Abbasids came to power as a response against the corruption of Islamic justice under the regime (Black 2001) (Burns 2008).Map 3 shows the Islamic Expansion from the year 622 CE to 750 CE.

Map 3: Islamic Expansion 622- 750 CE

Source:worldreligions.psu.edu

URL:https://archive.is/www.worldreligions.psu.edu

Most authors discussed in this chapter fall under the period of the rise and fall of the Abbasids,and henceunder a period of tremendous transformation. This by no measure means that they operated under a homogenous set of polity. By the end of the 10th century CE, there were three separate and consolidated powers in the Islamic world; these were the Gazanavids in the east who were traditional Sunnis, the Buyids in the centre and the Fatimids in the west who were Imami Shia and Ismaili Shia respectively. All these developments were intertwined with various interpretations, schools of thought and theology which led to different sects and powers within Islam (Browning 2012)(Erwin 1962) (Bennison 2009). These will be discussed in detail in the next section on the theoretical background. As stated earlier, though the impact of Abrahamic monotheism and platonic legacies on the three religious traditions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam was immense, the outcome and impact was different in every respect. Islam especially shows a great divergence in its overall conceptions of Platonism and in turn had a great impact on the European awakening of the 1050 CE. The message of Muhammad was a 'decisive break' in the imagination about politics and society as in him we have a religious message which is also explicitly political (Black 2001). The concept of Umma can be read as a call for a political community. Islamic politics thus had the present discipline of sociology as its organizing principle. The Islamic nation at its very constitution was self-transcending with the power being transferred from empire to the Prophet and then on to the religious community based on the Sharia. Though parallels can be seen between the religious community and the Church, the Islamic conception was from its very inception more tilted to the higher power of the religious authority and was definitive in its obedience to the Sharia. In this sense power was at the centre of Islamic religious imagination unlike ethnic law and universal brotherhood which were the telos in the practice of Judaism and Christianity respectively. Thus, the political theory that emerged from this had strong elements of the Arab Bedouin culture and the Imami patrimonial monarchy (Browning 2012). Unity of people devoid of any geographical bond was a social norm. Tracing genealogy of such thinking was a part of historical and sociological episteme. Thus, even in works of scholars of the 12th and 13th century what

we find first is the detailed layout of the family tree of each scholar and its root into history. In the Islamic families of Africa and Arabia, children as a part of their religious chores are made to learn by heart, the names of their ancestors to inculcate this connection with the umma and one's place in it. This is accompanied only by the learning of the Quran by heart. This importance of clan and tribe led to the formation of a strong and closely bound political community which averted segmentation of the society. Another important political translation of this, was that all authority, spiritual as well as personal was derived from personal merit and not bestowed by any authority as in Christianity. The Islamic polity was thus, like the religion very personal and this explains the expansion of the empire at an exponential rate. By the year 720-770CE, the *Hadiths* which are reports on the Quran were completed. These reports furthered the republican nature of the Islamic political conception: that it was God who alone was and could be the King. This was very different from God being a father to the King; or the King having the divine right to rule, as in the Christian tradition, where the church and the king had to strike agreements to share the spheres of power. In Islamic political theory there was only one supreme authority- and politics and religion were inseparable in the Umma- the people. There is no denying however, that once the Caliphate was established, the theory of the Islamic empire too had to respond to the concerns of divisive opinions and their understanding of the challenges faced by the Islamic empire. Under the Ummayad Caliphate itself the challenge of Ali to Uthman and the events thereafter had led to the creation of four divisions. These groups were:

- The Kharijis: These consisted of those members amongst the supporters of Ali who were against the truce obtained by the governor of Syria in the battle of Siffin. They also later assassinated Ali for his compromise with his rival Muwayiah after the battle of Siffin and joined the Governor.

- The Kharijites: These can be qualified as extremists who were not ready to tolerate those who had supported Ali. This to them was pure sin to be awarded

with exclusion from the community. They had similar views regarding the non-Muslims and thus were ardent supporters of religious wars.

- The Murji'a: Also termed as the postponers, argued that sinners too were Muslims and thus they should not be excluded or discriminated against.

- The Mutazila: The Mutazilites who have had an important influence on Islamic political philosophy were termed as neutrals or those who withdrew themselves from the conflict about the Caliphate. It is thus natural that many of the philosophers fall under this category. Founded by Wasil Bin 'Ata' in the 8th century CE, the movement was united in the conviction that it was necessary to give a rationally coherent account of Islamic beliefs. They held an atomistic view of nature, believed in the unity of God and asserted the existence of free will in nature (Browning 2012) (Burns 2008).

As we move towards the era of the rise of the Abbasids, we see a clear conflict that arose due to the confluence of Arabia with that of Persia. The Arabs whose political system can be termed as Islamic Neo-tribalism relied largely on the Arab *fiqh* or the religious jurisprudence. The Persian or Iranian patrimonial bureaucracy laid emphasis on '*adab*' or the high political culture of the Persian courts. The literature that came out directly from this tradition was called '*nasihat al-muluk*' or the 'advice to kings' literature (Bennison 2009) (Black 2001).

In the year 685CE, Abd-al Malik postulated a theory of kingship which portrayed the king as the shepherd. In this phase, the continuous threats of civil war were temptations enough for the polity to turn towards absolutism. The Ummayads thus began to express a monarchical view of the Imamate. This also led to the change in the approach towards jurisprudence. The ruler could as a matter of practice contribute to the *Shari'a*. This was

met with opposition, even though the opposition was kept out of the court circles and the king came to take over the *Shari'a*.

The Umayyad had initially made their kinship with the prophet as their qualification of the rightful claim to the title of kingship. This state of affairs was met with protests and thus by 744 CE, the grounds for the rise of the Abbasids became clear. The Kharijites had rebelled in north western Africa and Iraq, the Zaydis were ready to take the south of the Caspian and Lebanon whereas the proto-Sunnis had kept aside as quietists (Black 2011:349). The third*fitna*(civil war) of 744 between various claimants of the Caliphate gave the Abbasids a decisive victory, which was termed as a victory against the corruption of Islamic justice under the Umayyad. With this began the importation of the centralised monarchical system of Iran. It must be noted that parallel development of imperial monarchy under the emperor Charlemagne and the Ottovians was underway in Europe. Scholars see these two developments as connected to each other or one as a response to the other. It is argued that though based on the same principle of middle-eastern monarchical monotheism; these political developments in Europe were a defensive strategy against the threat of Muslim invasions.

The political thought which developed in the period of the post-Umayyad dynasty can itself be divided into five periods (Browning 2012).

- The first period comprising from 750 CE to 1055CEsaw the emergence of the literature from the administrative class called the *kuttab*, the legal scholars called the *ulama* or the *fuqaha*, the theologians called the *mutakallimun*, and finally the *falasifa* or the circle of philosophers. The period's scholarship has two interesting influences of the Pahlavi or Iranian court culture on one side and the Greek-Byzantine influence on the other. The scholars like Harun-Al Rashid and Ma' periods when what can be termed the actual Islamic philosophy developed.

- The second period can be demarcated from 1055 CE to 1258CEwhich was a period of upheaval amongst the Sunni Turkic nomads. The Turkic sultans of the Seljuk dynasty attacked Iran; however there was not much of cultural imposition in the period.

- The third period from 1258 CE-1500CEmarks the demise of the Abbasids and rise of various dynasties in the East. The Ilkhamids or Timurids rose to power in Iraq and Iran, the Khanate of the Golden Horn took over Subera, Caucasus, Urab and the ancient Roman frontier of the Danube river, and thirdly the rise of the Delhi Sultanate in the Indian subcontinent. In the West too, Egypt and Syria were taken by the Mamluk Turks and the Circassians.

- The fourth period beginning CE to 1800CEsaw the rise of three major empires that of the Ottoman empire - a Sunni Caliphate comprising the regions of Constantinople, Syria and Egypt; the Safavid Empire which was an Imami Shia monarchy that ruled over Iran and the Mughal Empire which took its Persian speaking culture to rule the Indian subcontinent.

- From 1800CEonwards the demise of all the above three empires had set in. However, by this time the five principles of observance were outlined. These were *Shahada* or the profession of faith, *Salat* or the practice of praying in the direction of Kaabbah five times a day, *Sawm* or the month long fast of Ramadan, *Zakat* or donating a percentage of one's income to the poor and needy, and finally the pilgrimage of *Hajj*. By these five principles the declining Islamic empire tried to keep its subjects part of the umma - observant of the religion in the empire. It must be noted that these principles emerge at a much later period in the Islamic scheme of necessary set of observances.

The Beginnings of the Separation of Religion and Politics in Islamic Political Thought

The Iranian influence led to the early separation of political and religious spheres in the Abbasid Empire. Thus religion became the foundation of kinship and kinship became the foundation ofKingship or political authority. Some important scholars who were instrumental in this formative theorisation were:

Ibn Muqaffa who translated the Persian political texts into Arabic, is classified as a skeptic and is credited with an important work called *Risala – fi'l – Sahaba* in which he raised several important questions over the need for political theory. The major question that he tried to inquire into is as to why should people obey a ruler and in what ways should the ruled support him? He pointed out two erroneous views of Caliphate authority: that all men are equal and do not need a leader and that one should obey leaders unconditionally. He argues that the sensible view lies between the two positions. A leader should be obeyed on the condition that he acts in accordance with law. He also postulated that army should consist only of moderate Muslims, however lasting power cannot be based on arbitrary power. He equated stability with rule based on religion and saw religion as the factor which establishes equality between the ruler and the ruled. On the powers of the political leader with respect to *Shari'a*, he argued that the leader must have the power to impose legal penalties.However, in the case of pronouncement of judgements, his jurisdiction should be limited only to those subjects which are not clearly specified in the Quran. He also assigned the task of systemizing the whole framework of the Holy law into an authoritative codification which should be the exclusive sphere of the authority of the leader. One important point was the acknowledgement of *Ra'y* or personal opinion or judgement in evaluation of a law and assigning it to a particular situation. This opens a window for the scope of applying reason to interpret the *Shari'a*. However this right to reason operates only for the leader who must rule by striking a fine balance between reason and religion.

Abu Yusuf was another important scholar who served as the *qadial qudat* or the Chief Religious Judge which was a position first occupied by the legendary Yakub Abu Yusuf. Yakub Abu Yusufwrote the Book of Taxes (*Kitab al-Kharaj*) which dealt in detail with leniency in taxation, relation between *Shari'a* and the Ruler, and the accountability of the Caliph towards God. The works also has references to political economy especially to government relations, free market and regulation of prices.

By the year 809CE, Al Rashid had died and the fourth civil war brought Caliph Al-Mamun of the Abbasid dynasty to power. He laid great emphasis on the support of the people and chalked out a cultural policy for the regime. In terms of juridical scholarship, he favoured those who were opposed to literal mindedness. However, he also accumulated theologians, Hellenistic philosophy and the Shias. He subscribed to the Shi'te view of the Imamate and gave patronage to the House of Wisdom which spearheaded the translation revolution in Islamic philosophy[21]. Though it is rather wrong to call it just a translation movement as the Arabic translations were not mere translations but commentaries and thus invaluable works of scholarship in their own right. The Caliph had acquired great support of the Sunni religious groups. The period of Al-Ma'mun developed and nurtured the development of rational argument in religious discourse. However, the Mutazilites who were at the time presenting a reasoned argument for the state as opposed to the deputyship model of the Shias (where the outgoing deputy appoints the one who will take over from him and this appointed deputy then wields the power) were out of the favour of the court. The Mutazilites held that the reason for leadership was human contentious nature. It is due to contention between individuals and groups that an agency in the form of a leader was required above them to deliver on justice. They stretched this same idea and expanded it to justify universal sovereignty in

[21]The translation movement was part of the activities of the *Bayt al- Hikma* literally, the House of Wisdom established by the Caliph Harun al- Rashid (763/766 CE- 809 CE). The House of Wisdom was a centre of intellectual activity and attracted many scholars of religion and science, mathematicians, poets and translators. It housed a big library which served as a translation institute where numerous scribes worked day in and day out. Texts from several languages including Farsi, Syriac, Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, Farsi, Aramaic, and Devnagari were translated in this period into Arabic and passed on to other regions.

the Shi'ite thought on utilitarian grounds, thereby minimizing conflict and maximizing governance.

Al-Jahizwas an important Mutazilite thinker of the time who supported Al-Mamun and his claim to Abbasid deputyship. He was the first scholar to establish the elite (the ruling) -mass (the ruled) distinction (al-khassa wa' l 'amma) which became an integral principle of Islamic statecraft as developed by the Mughals in India into Diwan-e-khaas and Diwan-e- aam. His ideas about religion as social control can be found in the writers like Al Jahiz and Ibn Sina in the later period. Though elitist in his approach, Al-Jahiz was also concerned about constitutional issues and was in favour of revolution against tyrants.

However in the period of the Caliph Al-Mu'tawakkil that is around 847CE, the decline of the Abbasids had set in (Bennison 2009). By this period, the people of the book, that is the literalists had completely taken over the Mutazilites; and the Neo Platonism and Neo-Aristotleanism was also at its lowest (Erwin 1962). By 861CE, the Turkish slave soldiers had carried out assassination of the Caliph and with this began the era of the rise of the Shi'te Buyids. After this, the Abbasid Sunni Caliphate was reduced to a mere symbol and the Silver Age of the Sunnis came to an end. This development was similar to the disintegration of the Carolingian empire with small provinces gradually declaring their independence from the Caliphate (Black 2001).

However the Sunna[22] tradition in Islam produced impressive scholarship even after political decline set in. Amongst the most important names figure, Al Shafi'iwho synthesised the literalist school of Medina with the rationalist Iraqi school of Abu Hanifa. He reduced the four roots of jurisprudence that of the Quran, the Reports, Consensus or *ijma* and Analogy or *qiyas* to only the Quran and the Reports. He also laid principles for accepting the authenticity of divine revelation wherein he argued that the revelation in

[22]The traditional portion of Muslim law based on Muhammad's words or acts, accepted (together with the Koran) as authoritative by Muslims and followed particularly by Sunni Muslims.(Oxford English Dictionary)

discussion must be traceable to the Prophet himself and this should be done only through authenticated transmitters. Texts whose content was under contradiction were settled by inquiring into the context of their speech, time and writing. In terms of the use of reason to interpret the sacred texts, he prescribed a limit on its application. However, for the purpose of interpretation in the light of *maslaha* i.e. welfare use of analogy could be made according to the Hanafi School. Al Shafi is grouped amongst the Hadith collectors or the makers of the Reports which were considered authoritative texts in the religion. The Hadiths went on to the extent of arguing that the Quran was an uncreated text (not created by any agency/ creator) and given that only God can be eternal, Quran is eternal. This view also had popular support in the times of Al-Rashid and Al-Mamun. By the year 1024 CE, the Caliph had declared the questioning of the eternal nature of the Quran as a heresy (Erwin 1962). The Mutazilites or the authors of the *kalam* were the only theological exponents of Quranic discourse. These however were relegated to the periphery of the thinking of the times. By the 10th and 11th century CE, Al Shafi's literalism had become the dominant thinking amongst the Ulamas and the Jurisprudence and thus state practice was carried out in accordance with these principles. Black sees this control of knowledge as a major factor that helped the ascendency of the class of Ulamas. He locates the reason of their eminence in Islamic social and political life to this earliest accumulation and hegemony over knowledge.

> It is they who, once the imperial aspirations of deputyship had died away, held and still hold, the house of Islam together. They are the authorities, others, sultans or presidents, merely hold power. (Black 2001: 36).

In the more conservative Imama or the Shi'ite tradition which developed in the 10th and 11th century, these Imams became central. The Shias wanted the recognition of the true leader, whereas the Zayids were insistent that only armed insurrection can lead to the emergence of a new leader. After the death of the 7th Imam Jafar al Sidiq in 765 CE , the issue of succession led to a split between the Ismailis and the Imamis. The Ismailis or Seveners held that Ismail, the son of Jafar was the true Imam. Whereas given that Ismail

died before the death of his father Jafar and thus they declared Ismail's son Mohommad Ibn Ismail as the true heir.

The Imamis or twelvers were the group that followed the 12th Imam Muhd-al-Mahdi. The imam went under permanent hiding after 941CE. The Imamis forwarded a rationalist theory of the Imamate and located the need for political authority in the imperfection of human nature. Associated with the Baghdad school, the correction of this imperfection they argued was the *raison d'etre* of the state. In other words until the scholars did not find the causes of the imperfections of human nature the imperfections of the state could not be addressed. The *hadiths* produced during the disappearance of the Imam, however give some scope to reason. The Imam was given a status like that of God and thus was above election. It is through the Imam that God governs the kingdom on earth. In the 'period of disappearance' or occultation called *gaybah*[23] in Arabic however, the believers could compromise with unjust rulers and co-operate as a measure of caution.

These later got appropriated into various traditions. The **Fatimids** (can be classified as Ismaili Shia), for instance had declared the rule of Ubaydallah al Mahadi by 909CEas the era of the return to the Golden Age of Islam referring to the period of Prophet Muhammad. They conquered the areas of Sicily, North Africa, Egypt, Palestine, parts of Syria, Mecca and Medina under the Ismaili movement. Most Ismailis in Iraq and Arabia had declined to accept this claim of the Fatimids. However, under the Fatimids, Egypt became the seat of power to world rule. This was however, different in the sense of being a progressive emergence in the cosmic history. It laid down that the Imam was actually the cause of the world and was an epistemological medium between God and Man. The

[23]Refers to the hidden state of the twelfth Shii imam. Shiis believe that during the Lesser Occultation, the imam continued to communicate with the community through four successive appointed agents, the last of whom died in 944. During the Greater Occultation, which continues to the present, there is no special agent, although Shii jurists are recognised as his agents and the only legitimate interpreters of shariah. (Oxford Dictionary of Islamic Studies)

need for knowledge as a basic necessity fulfilled by the medium of the Imam remains a recurring theme in these times.

It was a period of constant violence and battle between the Shia and the Sunni regimes and the New Teaching movement of the Nizaris emerged from this very conflict.*Itjihad*is an important principle of this teaching which emphasises on reasoning independently. This principle was developed as opposed to *taqlid* which means imitation.

On the one hand, the Saljuks were on a military campaign to eliminate the Ismaili Shias; parallel to this, the pro-Fatimid Ismaili leader Hasan-i- Sabban launched a campaign to institute the reign of the Imam by assassinating the Salijuk vizier Nizam-ul-Mulk (Browning 2012). When the Imam Caliph Mutansir died, the Sabbah backed Nizar and thereby declared him as lieutenant to Imam. This new and "purified" version of the Ismaili political religious programme emerged in the midst of bloodshed and killings and left the Nizaris with only a few strongholds around the Alamut in the Rubdar region of present day Iran. The Nizaris held that Prophecy and Imamate are necessary because humans cannot live without co-operation and coercive governance. Secondly, they held that religion and not reason was the correct episteme to discover the true Imam. They were extremists in their belief in revelationism, argued that revelation can't be questioned and held up the inerrancy of scripture (Black 2001).

Though by the end of the 10th century CE, the division into three distinctive Islamic kingdoms with their claim to world power was complete; one can hardly argue that a rigid distinction can be attributed in terms of political thinking or for our purposes more distinctively, in the episteme of political thought. The two Shi'ite kingdoms in which the Imami Shi'a Buyids were in power occupied the centre and the Ismaili Shi'a Fatimids who held power in the west did not adhere to political theory in stark opposition to the Sunni Gaznavids in the east. Neither were the territorial or demographic boundaries that strict.

The major Sunni and Shia kingdoms have been represented in the table below. The rise of the slave dynasty is an important development of the period which gradually led to the increasing reliance of the ruler on tribal armies and slave soldiers. However, more loyal slave soldiers rather than the tribes which asserted their share in power by right, gained access to power in the long term. The phenomenon however, made the ruler independent and also dissociated him from the majority of the masses, the tribal social network and the religious body of the state – the ulama. This separation of the state and society in the Islamic world gave the process of its state formation a very different character from that of the state in Europe as there were layers of authority and obedience within the society which made the state authority more distant and relatively alien. However, the patrimonial system of inheritance followed in Islamic dynastic families that divided the property or kingdom equally among all the sons diminished the stability of the Empire in the long run.

Shia Dynasty	Region		Sunni Dynasty	Region
Buyids	Western Iran ,Iraq		Samanids	Eastern Iran
Fatimids	Egypt		Ghaznavids	Afghanistan, North western India
Hamdanids	Syria, Cappadocia		Qarakhanids	Central Asia
Qarmati	North Eastern Arabia		Ummayds	Al- Andalus (modern day Spain)

Fig 3.1 The Shia and Sunni Kingdoms at the end of TenthCentury

The Islamic state had its ideology of the state as central to its power promotion and retention strategy. *Dawla*, which was supposed to be 'an inexplicable outcome of cosmic forces' was consequential in bringing about a dynasty or a ruler to power. Later Islamic scholars pointed this out as a reason for decline and thus tried to emphasise on the importance of dynastic history and its importance in the stability of the empire. Ibn Khaldun can be cited as an example here. It was as a resolution to this problem – the problem of the absence of social cohesion or solidarity that the later distinction between *dawla* and *din* – i.e. separation of the spheres of the state and religion was either evolved

or borrowed by the Islamic scholars. Black draws a parallel between the evolution of this principle in the Islamic world and Latin Christendom (Black 2001). Another important and less controversial adoption was made by Ibn Qutaiba while studying the role and integration of status groups. He derived the idea of social stratification of society where hierarchy was ascribed in terms of status of the social groups from India and applied it to the Iranian concept of 'Circle of Power'- a theory in which man was characterised as a subject and purpose of government. It was natural for men, in this scheme, to accumulate property and the only way to produce property was through cultivation. Cultivation in a just way however could only take place when there was justice and good government. The figure 3.2 below shows a diagrammatic representation of the theory of Circle of power. It was through the amalgamation of these two theories that Ibn Qutaiba forwarded his theory of Islamic status groups.



Fig 3.2 The Iranian Theory of Circle of Power

This was the historical and theoretical background in which a new approach called *falsafa* or philosophy began to take roots around the late 9th early 10th century CE. This new approach to thinking about political life and religion was parallel to the translation movement i.e. the time around which the works of Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle had been translated. This new philosophy was a confluence of these Greco Roman ideas with those of Judaeo-Islamic ones.

Aristotle and Islamic Political Thought

This Neoplatonism characterised as Aristotleanism in Islam brought about a revolutionary change in Islamic thinking and had long term effects on all of philosophy and political thinking in the West. Al Farabi and Ibn Sina were amongst the first philosophers to pose *falsafa* as an alternative articulation of Islamic postulates. Opposed to them were scholars who held the sanctity of the scripture- the word as it is. This war of logic vs. language performed itself at two levels; firstly, within Islam and the second- within the Christian world and Islam. It is the first war within Islamic scholars that we shall be dealing with when we look at the particular works of the scholars. As regards the second war, it is in context of the alleged uncritical reception of the translated texts of Aristotle and Plato. However, recent works on Islamic scholars have pointed out to the original readings of these two Greek scholars by Islamic scholars as a development of new philosophy in itself. There is also no denying the fact that the Christian world's criticism of the works of Plato and Aristotle came largely from the requirements of the Church's world view which it required its adherents to follow; most important of which was the rejection of both pure idealism and causal analysis of religion. The Islamic scholars integrated both these principles and questioned revelation, eventually affecting the Christian thinking radically.

Ibn Sina or Avicenna, is an author of the Islamic *falsafa*tradition whohad an emerging canon of Islamic philosophy behind him. It will thus be appropriate to situate him first in

the intellectual milieu in which he was writing. By the late ninth-early tenth century CE, the encyclopaedic work of surveying all branches of knowledge was complete. Al-Farabi, the tallest philosopher of the age was a very strong influence on the Avicennian scholarship. Al Farabi's summary of Plato's laws was the foundational text for studying philosophy in Ibn Sina's era. Most of his major works were written after joining the Hamadanid Imami court. He wrote his major works on politics between the years 945-950CE. Works like *The Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Best State*, *The Governance of the State and Aphorisms of the Statesman*can be attributed to this period. However, it was Al Farabi's epistemology that had the most impact on the centuries of scholarship to come. He was one of the first scholars in the Islamic world who tried to establish a relationship between philosophy and revelation. Till that point Philosophy or analysing the natural or metaphysical world was enmeshed in religion. This relationship had been internalised to the point of undifferentiating till the secularisation of political theory began in the late 17th century. It cannot be underlined enough that it is this convincing challenge to the primacy of logos in the history of ideas that plays a crucial role in destabilizing the Church's claim to temporal power. This important but less noticed development that occurred in parallel, in the realm of ideas, was adopted by almost all thinkers who then made a case for temporalism. This temporalism though did not abolish the legitimacy of an empire as a political unit but it severely challenged the conception of a church or a religion being the basis of this legitimacy to the empire. Al Farabi underlined that this relationship is fundamental to political knowledge and enterprise of government (Al Farabi 10th c). The early Islamic scholars adapted Neo-Platonism to the use of their own project of interpreting the message of Muhammad in the language of philosophy. The Islamic scholars had turned the wheel of philosophical history backwards since they too like the Greeks, especially Plato; believed that knowledge and thus intelligence was the highest human attainment and thus in the hierarchy between religion and intelligence or faith and reason; faith ranked lower in the order. This was moving backwards from the Christian system which had given a higher place to faith over reason as we have seen continuously in the authors

dealt with in the previous chapters (Black 2001: 60). The problem becomes acute precisely because the Christian thinkers used Plato's Logos (reason) to argue for the primacy of scripture (word) and thus of faith. This also led to the rise of the school of sceptic scholarship in this era, representative of which Abu Bakr[24] raised a question on whether faith and revelation serves any purpose at all.

The scholars of this period can be broadly divided into the Jurists, the Rationalists and the Sceptics. Al Farabi who was a rationalist made a distinction between religion and revelation. He ascribed the role of active intelligence in revelation as well, thereby portraying Prophet Muhammad himself as a philosopher. This demystification of the genesis of the Quran attracted strong criticism from both the Literalists and the Sceptics. The criticism from the Sceptics can be understood by observing the two trends of Aristotelian philosophy that were used in the period. The first, practical philosophy was a teleological philosophy – where the end for which one was philosophising – find God/ for human good etc. was pre-defined. The Rationalists followed this method from Aristotelian thought which laid down the teleology based reasoning where the purpose of scholarly practice was pre- determined or fixed. For e.g. the search of truth etc. However, the Sceptics were advocates of the speculative episteme of philosophy whereby no assumption was held before embarking on any philosophical enquiry. Rationalists contested the social relevance of a sceptic philosophy that had no purpose. It must be stated here, however that this notion of socially answerable nature of philosophy did not come from a moral perspective in the rationalists (what is good or bad philosophy). In fact, they held that a good ruler is one who can strike a balance between the elite philosophy and mass religion i.e. the determined end was political and not epistemic. This mixture of Shi'ite philosophy and Plato would change the course of political theory in the days to come through the works of Ibn Sina.

[24] Abu Bakr Al-Razi (854 CE– 925 CE) was a vehement critic of unreasoned and unreflective acceptance of religion and wrote several diatribes against religions and Islam in particular. Some of his works include "The Prophet's Fraudulent Tricks," "The Stratagems of Those Who Claim to Be Prophets" and "On the Refutation of Revealed Religions".

a. Ibn Sina's Tasdiq and the Anti- Scriptural Tradition

Born in Bukhara in 980 CE,Ibn Sina known to the west as Avicenna; took birth in the house of an Ismiali sympathizer but himself went on to being a Sunni. A man of the state as well as a philosopher, he was a child prodigy and had mastered most of the disciplines of the available education of the day by his teenage. He later on went to the court of the Samanids as a political advisor. As stated earlier, Al Farabi had cast a great influence on Ibn Sina. Apart from him, the philosophy of the Brethren also had an impact on him.

TheHealing and *the Book of Governance* both show influence of these two sources. Ibn Sina's theory of the state points to his rationalist positioning quite strongly as he argues that human life is by its very constitution socially complementary and thus the transactions between subjects of law and law giver is a must to maintain order. Some scholars of Islamic philosophy also trace roots of Durkheim's theory of social function of religion to Ibn Sina. Cautioning oneself of committing anachronism that Skinner warns of – one can segregate his postulates of the relationship between being a good lawgiver and a religious leader; the advocating of simplifying the revelation in order to make it socially accessible and useful; and his categorisation of religious observance, civil law and religious law as corresponding to rituals, God and after life (Avicenna 1027). He adhered to the Sunni way of succession through consensus and evolved an Islamic-Platonic content of legislation, whereby he argues for a flexible legal system in which the government acts as a facilitator for redistribution of resources and regulates commerce. It was this new epistemological context in which the later Ulamas came to be written by the philosophers. The evolution of the concept of the guardian welfare state (to translate it incompletely into English language) with complementary juridical responsibility towards the *demos* is an original contribution of the Islamic political scholarship. We would later question if this thinking crystallised into generation of concepts like the social contract in

Hobbes. It must be kept in mind that the time in which Ibn Sina was writing was a period of political factionalism in the midst of strong religious belief, where individual and her place with respect to the government's power were non-existent concepts.

The influence of the Greek platonic ideas dominated the Shia Ismaili philosophy into which Ibn Sina was born. For Ibn Sina himself the problem that he was addressing was one of unique doctrines called "*the Doctrine of Giver of Unique Forms".*Ibn Sina in dealing with the question of what gives birth to forms or essences in the Platonic sense relegates physical agents as mere tools of rearrangement of matter. As an example, he states that his parents are mere physical agents that lead to a rearrangement of matter which is Ibn Sina, but the essence or form of things and beings comes from the immaterial. This immaterial metaphysical agency is one which can design unique forms. This had beyond doubt a contextual embeddedness to it. The Arabic philosophical tradition or *falasifa* explained in detail above was a direct heir to Neo-Platonic Aristotleanism. Whereas the indigenous influences of *kalam*, Persian renaissance and development in mathematics were more local and thus had an immediate appeal and acceptance. Ibn Sina had learnt key concepts in Aristotle through Greek logic. These included the concepts of genus, difference, species, property, accidents etc. These texts especially *Isagoge* and *Categories* are credited with having given direction to his ontology, whereas *The Prior Analytics* and *The Posterior Analytics* influenced his methodological understanding, especially in terms of deriving and using methods of deduction and demonstration. The academic environment in which Ibn Sina grew gave him two criteria to evolve an understanding of the world. These were:

a) Knowing the causal explanation of a given phenomenon and,
b) Knowing that the explanation is a necessary one and not an accidental one (Avicenna 1027).

These were based on the four causes identified by Aristotle himself as – the **material cause** or something that has a potential to become a certain natural kind, the **formal cause** or the form by which something becomes the actual thing, the **efficient cause** or the cause (agent) that explains the transition from the material to the formal cause and the **final cause** which is the end or purpose that explains the intention of the efficient cause. Ibn Sina explains this in his Physics (Avicenna 1027 Chapter 2, Discussion 9). Ibn Sina in a way rejected this to evolve his criteria of impossible, contingent and necessary essence.

In the very first discussion, Ibn Sina makes an important point about the method of philosophy- going beyond the Aristotelian method of empirical inquiry.

- Ibn Sina insists that the correct method is not just empirical inquiry but the study of the hidden ramification – to study the un-obvious truths.
- That whatever the truth itself reveals of its form, giving evidence against the one who disagrees by means of what the truth shows and hold back to itself.
- Though his book exhibits truths that have been accumulated over a period of time by a corpus of scholars, it is not an exercise in interpretation or criticism.

Ibn Sina is thus trying to explain the method- the episteme to know the science of natural things through the study of its first principles. The whole enterprise of Ibn Sina's epistemological endeavour rests on three basic principles and assumption of their functionality which are discussed below (Avicenna 1027: 63).

1. **Substance dualism:** That human body and human intellect are the dual forms of substances that can be called human. The human intellect however is an immaterial substance.

2. **Estimative faculty**: Estimative faculty or *wahm* is a faculty present in all humans which is also a cognitive faculty; it is a strong force and must be given a priority over instinct.

3. **Theory of causation**: Ibn Sina holds the theory of causation as the explanatory principle to trace and establish the necessity of the Necessary Existent. In other words he holds on to the principle that if there is causation, there has to be a cause. In the case of our world then in which causation can be observed, causation must hold. If the world then, is the produce of infinite causes regressing these causes must point us to the primary cause; what he calls the necessary cause and thus a necessary existent must hold true. The world therefore cannot be created out of nothing, and thus exists in eternity. This explanation made it difficult to argue that God made the world, as He must have then used the necessary existent, which means He just uses them to cause the world. It also makes it difficult to argue that God was the necessary existent as it amounts to arguing that God is not someone who is above or separate from his creation.

Another branch of study in which Ibn Sina was initiated was that of Physics. He had read and digested texts like Aristotle's *Physics, De Caelo, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology and De Anima* to gather the concepts like sublunar realm, inanimate things, animate things and parva naturalia.

The third important branch of knowledge was that of Metaphysics. The major corpus for this syllabus was derived from Plotinus and Proclus. Arsitotle's *Metaphysics* also was an important text. This influence can be seen in his use of important Neo-Platonism conceptions like that of the One and the concept of emanation.

Ibn Sina's time had two schools of kalam which commanded respect and obedience from the scholars as well as the masses. These were the Mutazilites or those who rejected the literal reading of the Quran and the Asharites or literalists who held every word in Quran as final and infallible. Al Ghazali who later wrote against Ibn Sina was a literalist. However, Ghazali rejected them as a child showing a great tendency for an independent thinking. In him we see numerous ideas many of which scholars argue are deliberate attempts to depart himself from other authors of his time (Benison 2013).

Though the Samanids were strong when Ibn Sina was a child, as he grew up there was a power transition with the power shifting from the Samanids to the Buyids. The Buyids had occupied most of Baghdad, Iraq, Iran, and Fars as the Abbasid Caliphate became largely confined to being a symbolic power. The period of the Buyids was one of prosperity for the spread and growth of philosophy. The assimilation of the Greek philosophy into the Islamic philosophy was at its peak after the 9th and 10th century CE translations of all the major Greek books. Other major influences were the ideas he derived from his study of the kalam (Erwin 1962). His dialectical doctrinal theology was derived from these kalams, though these were also in a way a response to the initial assimilation of Greek ideas and methods of argument based on reason. His discussion on the debates on divine assets and attributes is most interesting. The example of his floating man work experiment[25] to prove the independent existence of the human ability to consciously think and know itself laid down a strong instrument for the authority of reason over more abstract intuition or faith. He thus gave a logical proof that intelligence has an existence independent of physical attributes. This was used by him to counter the necessary cause argument laid down by the Greeks and eminent Islamic philosophers like Al-Farabi and those from the Brethren of Purity. Ibn Sina argued that the necessary cause

[25] In this thought experiment, Ibn Sina asks the reader to imagine herself as floating in a vacuum, in a state of complete sensory deprivation. Then he asks whether one could experience the sense of being, or one's existence. Ibn Sina argues that the experimenter must. He then uses this-the experience of one's being in the absence of one's senses to establish that the experience of one's own being is integral or innate. Human self- awareness he argues is the primary cognition.

argument rested on a logic which when reversed made God's existence contingent on the existence of its creation. Thus, it makes every act of God necessary for him to exist. His experiment however conceptually proved the conscious existence of the divine intellect as independent of its attributes. This debate often characterised as – "nothing can come from nothing" as we shall further see, takes a centre stage on the contentious philosophical dais of the medieval Islamic period (Adamson 2013).

However, the scholars on Ibn Sina argue that his purpose behind the thought experiment was more than bending the necessary cause argument. Amira Benison for example holds that it is the epistemology rather than ontology that he is more concerned with (Benison 2013).

b. Epistemological Questions in Ibn Sina

Ibn Sina's epistemology can be seen as one more concerned with modalities of necessity and modalities of contingency. He can be seen as evolving his epistemology in the background of the conflict of 'the ultimate principle of reality' that is present in Aristotle. What Al Farabi and Ibn Sina have in common is the *conception of a pure being*(necessary existent)vs. *the preoccupation with proving the existence of God* as central to it. Al Farabi deploys necessary existence as one that is itself the reason of one's own existence. This hypothesis was severely criticised and refuted by his critics. For Ibn Sina however, the world doesn't have to exist; that is, it is not an absurd thought but has a causal relationship to God. He characterises three kinds of essences:

- Impossible essence – like squares and circles which cannot exist in their perfect forms (This idea developed in Plato that all natural things even seemingly perfect geometrical shapes like a square or a circle are imperfect replications or forms of their pure idea /essence).

- Contingent essence – these are essences that do not need to exist and thus philosophically can be termed as non-existent (for there is no way to prove the existence of a thing, for whose existence no reason exists). He argues that if everything is contingent as later argued by philosophers, then there has to be no cause, thus there has to be no prime cause, and thus no God (Avicenna 1027).
- Necessary Essence –it has to exist because there cannot come something out of nothing. Thus to avoid the chain of infinite regress of causes, the necessary essence is required. This necessary essence is the ultimate cause or God (Bizri 2001).

Ibn Sina's Metaphysics does a better job at refuting the criticisms of his infinite regress. He himself discusses some of the problems that might arise from the argument. He argues that there cannot be an infinite regress of contingent causes because that would mean committing a fallacy of composition in the relationship of the three essences. These arguments however could not rescue Ibn Sina from being characterised as a determinist who tried to make all of creation a necessary automatic and mechanised process. This shall be dealt with in detail in the next section on Al-Ghazali.

In Ibn Sina, we see a shift from the earlier practitioners of *falsafa*,in that for him logic becomes a tool of scientific discovery and not a framework to be overwhelmed with. This tool has a performative function in that it helps the philosopher to generate reasoned connections between objects or principles. This was a radical shift in terms of methodology used in the *falasifa* tradition as it established a close connection between logic and science and thereby logic and truth, making a whole lot of literalists uncomfortable. It would thus not be wrong to say that his ontology too was driven by this methodological concern, thereby making the ontology also- ***modal*** - where everything – the lowliest to the highest or divine is a necessary or possible existence, thereby leaving nothing contingent, abstract or vague. This was the beginning of the revolution of

materialism in methodology of science (McGinnis 2010).Every aspect of Ibn Sina's scholarship is thus defined by his meta-theory of logic. Another defining logic of the Ibn Sina's scheme is that of his definition of scientific knowledge or *ilm*. *Ilm* is comprised of *tasawwun* or conceptualisation of a term, premise, inference or syllogism; and secondly *tasdiq* – or verification of the conceptualisation. These concepts opened up the religious texts to critical inquiry by the philosophers. It also meant a challenge to the authority of the Ulama who was hitherto the uncontested authority on interpretation of texts. Resultantly, this was faced by a virulent critic by the defenders of the scriptural tradition. One such important critic was Al Ghazali but Ibn Sina too had gathered followers. The following section deals with the debate between Al Ghazali and Ibn Rushd as representative of the Revelation vs. Rationalism debate.

Al Ghazali vs Ibn Rushd: The Revelation vs. Rationalism Debate

Al Ghazali was a prolific scholar of the literalist school and wrote over a series of 200 books on various subjects. His academic project can be seen as a crusade against the *falsafa* tradition not to invert their claims to scholarship per se but to their projection of philosophical knowledge as something that is subversive to religion (Winter 2008). He argued that disciplines of inquiry, logic, and maths are not mutually exclusive to the teachings of religion. In his defence of some of the postulates of Greek philosophy, he argued that Islam too like the Greeks believed that the world is eternal. In the text that is under discussion *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, he delves into the relationship between revelation and reason. He enquires into the authority of reason to conflict the word of the scripture and finally reached a conclusion that the clash is a mere creation that emanates not from reason but unreason of the philosophers. What must be underlined here itself is that Al Ghazali too, is not arguing against reason, but claiming reason to be on his side of the argument. The philosophers of the *falsafa* tradition including Ibn Sina argued that God was creator of only the perfect forms. This lineage from Plato believed

that the Creator had no knowledge of the particulars in the created world. Al Ghazali sought to falsify this using the *kalam* in the Islamic tradition.

In his first proof he argues against the philosophical claim that temporal can proceed from eternal i.e. the abstract (ideal) has primacy to the material (temporal).

> For, if we suppose the Eternal without, for example, the world proceeding from Him, then it would not have proceeded because existence would not have had that which gives [it] preponderance; rather, the world's existence would have been a pure possibility. If thereafter it were to come into existence, then a giver of preponderance either would have come into existence anew or would not have come into existence anew. If no giver of preponderance had come into existence anew, the world would have then remained in a state of pure possibility as it had been before. If [on the other hand] a giver of preponderance did come into existence anew, then [the question arises]: "Who originated this giver of preponderance and why did it originate now and not earlier?" The question regarding the giver of preponderance persists (Al-Ghazali 1058-1111:13).

To this,Ibn Rushd (Averroes), an Aristotelian philosopher responds:

> The Philosophers say: It is impossible that the temporal should proceed from the absolutely Eternal. For it is clear if we assume the external existing without, for instance, the world proceeding from Him, then , at a certain moment, the world beginning to proceed from Him- that it did not proceed before, because there was no determining principle for its existence was pure possibility. When the world begins in time, a new determinant either does or does not arise, the same question can be asked about this new determinant, why it determines now, and not before, and either we shall have an infinite regress or we shall arrive at a principle determining eternally.
>
> I say: this argument is in the highest degree dialectical and does not reach the pitch of demonstrative proof. For its premises are common notions, and common notions approach the equivocal, whereas demonstrative premises are concerned with things proper to the same genus (Averroes 1126- 98:34).

A follower of the Hanbal tradition, Al Ghazali identifies stumbles in Ibn Sina's philosophy and tried to present an alternative. His work welcomes logic and does not refute Ibn Sina's work for being systemically incoherent. He however identifies three fatal heretical fallacies in the works of philosophers like Ibn Sina (Al-Ghazali 1058-1111) (Leibniz 1686).

1. That the Universe is eternal, i.e. it has always existed and shall continue to exist. In other words, Ibn Sina denies the process of creation and thus the existence of a creator.

2. The principle that God has no knowledge of the particulars but is only the creator of the whole, perfect forms. Thus God's divinity is not omnipresent.

3. That the body's journey ends after one's death and the only thing that lives on is the soul. There is no resurrection of the body.

It is through these conflicts which had their genesis in the conflict over method that the debate on political philosophy in Islamic political thought progressed. The philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wanted to strike a balance and held that revelation could sustain the rationalist approach. This increasing amalgamation of philosophy and theology took a bent in the favour of philosophy as his age progressed. He rewrote many versions of his own work. However unlike Ibn Sina, he was completely devoted to Aristotle, this was the Aristotle of the Islamic east which saw him through a metaphysical Neo-Platonism. Whereas Ibn Sina tried to reconcile different versions of Aristotle, Ibn Rushd sought to concentrate only on the original Aristotle. His work shows a strong rationalist bent and he held that only true empirical observation can help one to see the truth. He held that philosophy and theology are not exclusive but only methods of catering to different minds – philosophy which can be appreciated by only a few and theology which is for more emotional, sublime lower minds. He thus did not see them as completely separate. This was a stark contrast to the view of earlier philosophers who saw philosophy and

theology as mutually exclusive or worse as opposed to each other. Al Ghazali in fact held that philosophy was a road to atheism. Ibn Rushd on the other hand did not see things as concrete homogenous whole and held that not all rationalists can be necessarily atheists. He was an active judge but also wrote medical and legal documents, he was what can be calledin today's terms -a public intellectual (Averroes 1126- 98).

Writing in the times when the tension between philosophy and literalism was at its peak, the atmosphere of intolerance of difference though always present in Islam had taken a strong character in the times of Ibn Rushd. The Iberian Peninsula in which Ibn Rushd was living was the most turbulent area in that period. Born in 1126CEin the family of an important Jurist of the region, he was brought up in an environment of political importance. His education began in religion like most people in Cordoba, however soon his interest in Greek knowledge took over him and he eventually went on to become one of the greatest influence on the Latin Christian scholars. His upbringing had aptly trained him in the art of political manoeuvring – a lifesaving art in the turbulent and intolerant political times.

One of the episodes of his life when he was introduced to the new Amir by the philosopher and courtier, Ibn Tufail is interesting in this context. When on their first meet, the Caliph questioned him on the most burning philosophical question of the day as to whether the heavens were created or eternal, Ibn Rushd scared to be frank about his radical views kept silent. Later on, when he realised that the Amir was a liberal, he went on to impress him, so much so that he was immediately appointed the chief judge of Cordoba and an advisor to the Caliph. However, when the next Caliph came to power 10 years later, Ibn Rushd was termed a heretic.

Ibn Rushd authored several translations on Arsitotle with his own *taqsirs* or commentaries. This was how Aristotle was read in the through Ibn Rushd in the western world. The *taqsirs* are themselves considered as works of original philosophy of Rushd.

Aristotle was introduced to Aquinas only through Ibn Rushd. Also the Jewish world read Aristotle through him. The Jews wrote commentaries on the commentaries of Ibn Rushd. It is thus no surprise that Rushd's most works are available in Latin and Hebrew. Ibn Rushd was an ardent supporter of the movement of Almahadism. This movement was critical of all literalism and argued that God did not have human attributes. They held that it was naïve to believe for humans that their mirror conception of God was even close to truth. God was a far removed and higher idea to be reified by human conceptions. Though the view held by Ibn Rushd was relatively milder in that he thought that if the common mass could access the divinity of a higher being, it was harmless as long as God was understood to be a mere symbol for the ideal of divinity.Given that the text under consideration – *The Incoherence of Incoherence* was written over 15 years after Al Ghazali's death i.e. in 1126 CE; one cannot see it merely as a polemic against Ghazali but a serious philosophical and intellectual exercise. He rather rescued philosophy from the fierce attacks of the religionists and spearheaded the revival of the works of the Baghdad school. When he died in 1198CE, the people of Arabia were dealing with the philosophical exegesis of Ibn Sina. Rushd himself however was dismissive of Ibn Sina and judged him against Aristotle. The critique that Rushd forwards of Avicenna however is also interestingly a critique of Ibn Sina's method. Rushd is dismissive of his methods of proof. He is particularly critical of his way of evolving the proof of God which Rushd argues is not a credible and robust defence in the long way. He rather holds the Aristotelian method of using the first law of motion to prove the existence of God. Given that God is a subject matter of metaphysics, his existence can't be convincingly proved by metaphysics itself (Averroes 1126- 98). This throwback to classical approach was in a way receding to the old Persian days – methods which in Rushd's view were already convincingly refuted. Due to Rushd's approach of universalising philosophical methods, he was more popular in both the east and the west of Arabia. The excitement with which he was received, read and argued about in the 12th and 13th centuries CE in the Latin Christendom is unparalleled when compared to any other scholar of the time. Averroes the name given to him by the western world, was also more popular because he dealt with

the concerns of philosophy both practical and theoretical directly. He thus, dealt with topics like – What is the legal status of philosophy in Islam? Is Philosophy antithetical to Islam? By coming up with these treatises, he confronted the view held by the Islamic Jurists that any exercise not commanded by the Quran is heretical.

Ibn Rushd argued that revelation is purposive of the method that one should adopt for verification of truth – this method is that of arriving at the best possible understanding or demonstrative logic through the intellect. Given that such a method is best explained and devised in Aristotle, it is one's duty to know and study Aristotle. His method is thus, the exact inverse of the method adopted by Ibn Sina. He provides not a philosophical defence of philosophy but a Quranic defence of it. He thus speaks to the jurists in their own language. Also while considering objections to philosophy, he counters them not with philosophical truths but dialectic arguments or what can be termed as rhetoric. He thus converses with them in their own language. Philosophy, he thus argues is not a command with universal execution, rather revelation in the form of Quran. It is a universal injunction of philosophical truths which can be easily grasped through the rhetoric and persuasive method of powerful symbolisms adopted in the Quran. He can thus easily emphasise on the obligatory character of philosophy. Philosophy is essential because it is the best method to interpret the Quran, and it is the best method because it gives us the method of demonstrative logic.

Ibn Rushd thus argues that if everything in the Quran is true and if demonstrative logic is true then it is only implicit logically that the two truths cannot contradict each other. Only untruth contradicts truth. Demonstration of logic thus is a check on interpretation. He thus refutes Al Ghazali for committing a basic but fatal methodological fallacy of using dialectical works to answer questions that can be answered only through demonstration (Averroes 1126- 98). This tradition of ideas caught on in the continent like wild fire in the very lifetime of these philosophers.

Maimonides: Against the Rigidity of Scriptures

Maimonide**s** Moses also called Rambam – a contemporary of Ibn Rushd and was born in 1138CEwas instrumental in fusing philosophy with Jewish religion. He too, like Ibn Rushd was born in a family of lawyers in Cordoba. His father was an authoritative legal scholar. This trained Moses into the use and analysis of language. His argument against the rigidity of scriptural references is not an attack on scriptures but on the narrow interpretation of those scriptures. He urges upon the philosophers and religious authorities to approach scriptures with a more open and reasoned mind:

> The theory that imagination was an essential element in prophecy is supported by the fact that figurative speech predominates in the prophetical writings, which abound in figures, hyperbolical expressions and allegories. The symbolical acts which are described in connexion with the visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel from Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah's walking about naked and barefoot (Isa. xx. a), Jacob's wrestling with the angel (Gen. xxxii. 17 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam's ass (Num. xxii.28), had no positive reality. The prophets, employing an elliptical style, frequently omitted to state that a certain event related by them was part of a vision or a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech events are described in the Bible as coming directly from God, although they simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of nature, and as such depend on the will of God. Such passages cannot be misunderstood when it is borne in mind that every event and every natural phenomenon can for its origin be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the prophets employ such phrases as the following "And I will command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it" (Isa. v. 6); "I have also called my mighty men" (ibid. xi. 3) (Maimonides 1135-1138: 68).

Maimonides used similar arguments to refute the theory of apocalypticism- the end of the worldwhich sent a big blow to the whole redemptive purpose of the Church which was the bedrock of its authority.

> The theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the belief that the Universe will at a future time be destroyed ; the Bible distinctly teaches the creation, but not the destruction of the world except in passages which are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On the contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it is clearly stated "He established them forever." (Maimonides 1135-1138: 59).

For if the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the universe was to be accepted the way the Islamic scholars had done by refuting the first cause argument, then the empire of the earth or the temporal empire was as eternal and permanent and therefore as prime as the spiritual or Augustinian city of God. Despite his non-confrontational style of writing, this invited a lot of scorn from the church and other religious authorities. When the environment became inhospitable to his philosophy he moved on to Morocco where many Jews resided. Al Mahads who had a very strict view of Islam had invaded Al-Andalus where Cordoba was, when he was a child but created welcoming environment only for Islamic philosophers. The Al-Mahads also had control in Morocco from where they went on to establish their rule in Jerusalem and then Cairo. Moses wrote many commentaries. He argued that Jewish law was not exclusively based on the Bible. He wrote a simpler version of *Misveh Torah*[26] for everyone. This book which he called the second law, he argued is sufficient for all common Jews. He was a proponent of the integration of philosophy and religion. He argued that the highest goal of philosophy was intellectual edification. He saw no contradiction between Jewish law and Aristotle's philosophical inquiry.

His whole life was a mission to prove his commitment to the unity of philosophy and religion even though he held that the scope of philosophy was rather lean when compared to the scope of religion. Like Aristotle, he came from the ontological slate that it is matter that underlines all form and thus in the *Guide,* which is his famous appeal for a rational appeal for Judaism, he takes up the task of dispelling specific perplexities for the students

[26] The Hebrew Bible which is a collection of 620 commandments.

of philosophy. God he argues has no body but is transcendent, simple and perfect. Given that the language available to us is insufficient when talking about God, we cannot completely understand him. Though he wasn't a follower of Islamic speculative philosophy, in this respect he agreed with the Al- Mahads and the Mutazilites. In fact, he held Islam in disdain but agreed on the conception of one absolute God without a corporeal body to be understood by all. However it is not difficult to find several contradictions within this text of Moses. There are several contradictions like concealed negations and symbolic allegories in the text (Maimonides 1135-1138: 176).

It will be useful to mention here that contradictory interpretations of the *Guide* also abound, a phenomenon ever present in the history of ideas canon. Donald McCallum has done an extensive study on the ways in which the interpretations of Moses's *Guide* itself makes up for a canon in philosophical literature (Callum 2007). Marvin Fox, for example classifies the interpretations of the *Guide* into naturalistic and harmonistic interpretations. He classifies Leo Staruss, Shlomo Pines and Lawrence Berman into the naturalistic canon whereas Julius Guttman, H.A.Wolfson and Arthur Hyman as harmonistic interpretations. Naturalistic interpretations are identified as those which have used the esoteric (intended for or likely to be understood by only a small number of people with specilaised knowledge or interest) aspect of the *Guide*. This esoteric aspect then has been contrasted in these interpretations with the exoteric one dealing with everyday consciousness and goes on to highlight the political implications between the two. Harmonistic interpretations are those which focus on metaphysical and epistemological issues in the *Guide*. Marvin Fox then, uses these two types of interpretations to lay the foundation of the third interpretative approach to studying the *Guide*. In this connection, it is important here to lay down the political implications of the *Guide* as laid down by Leo Strauss. He argues that the very intention in masking the esoteric teachings of the *Guide* is to avoid attracting the attention of the orthodox forces; as also to not expose the masses to such views. Strauss thus backs this elitist intention in Moses by identifying three literary devices in the Guide – these are choice of words, deliberate contradictions and the

scattering of the chapter headings throughout the book. However, Strauss's critics have argued that Strauss only makes a claim that there is a hidden secret teaching in the *Guide* but does not go on to reveal what it is. Oliver Leaman in criticizing Strauss argues that *Guide* is an entirely philosophical text in its content and its form. He is also critical of those who try to limit the scope of the text to that being one for a Jewish audience by a Jewish author. In that way Leaman argues, one can also characterise Aquinas as a Christian author writing for a Catholic audience and Ibn Rushd as a Muslim scholar whose work was specifically written for Muslim audience. He thus recognises the magnitude of the scope of the subject that Moses was trying to address. Reading a primary text which has been contested in terms of its meanings and motivations by eminent scholars can be intimidating and at times confusing, however what is more important for this chapter is that the method and intention with which this text was written. As Fox summarises, the basis of the uniqueness of *Guide* as a text is that 'it explicitly deals with the apparent conflict between religion and philosophy'(Callum 2007 : 23). This conflict is central to the work as it navigates the movement of the Christian Roman Empire towards its disintegration. This disintegration however is not generated as a critique of the empire model of polity but of faith that subtracts reason (let's call it the reverse subtraction thesis[27]) as the legitimizing principle of this rule.

Aquinas and the Aristotelian Scrutiny of Christian Political Thought

The conflict however is not more apparent than any of the thinkers as it is in Thomas Aquinas.Born in 1224/1225 CE, in Roccasecca near Naples, Thomas Aquinas had earned a Masters in theology at the University of Paris at the age of 34; and became a Professor at the age of 44. At the university he was at the centre of the brewing and now more

[27] The term subtraction thesis has gained immense currency in the current studies on religious resurgence and its explanation after it was coined by sociologist Charles Taylor in his seminal work "The Secular Age". Taylor uses the term subtraction thesis to describe the understanding of secular as negation of religion from politics and public life. It can be argued that the thinkers discussed in this chapter were precisely arguing the reverse i.e. the prevalent definition of faith as a negation of reason.

explicit conflict between the Faculty of Arts or the Secular Philosophers and the Theologians. On the one hand, the period marked a formal institutionalisation of knowledge in the proliferation of universities throughout the western world. The syllabus of the universities was largely conventional and the conception of the "inner word" was central to what defined and constituted knowledge. The space was gradually made for debate and growth. The sophisticated hermeneutics (*lectio*) and the *disputatio* or disputations comprised the modes of learning in these early universities (Stump 1993). This is reproduced in his long thesis *The Summa Theologica* in which he lays down a set of questions / propositions, lists down objections to these questions and then gives his own analysis. The tract is thus a disputation (from *disputatio* which means argument in Latin) in a text. This also follows from the fact that Aquinas held that there were two fold modes of truth in Christianity – some that surpass the ability of human reason to prove them and others which can be reached by natural reason, let's call them discoverable and non- discoverable truths. Thus theological science proceeds from articles of faith, which are revealed to human beings in the Bible. However, resolving theological questions through the power of an authority to him meant no contribution to creation of knowledge but it did not mean that temporal authority had no role to play. In other words, the heavenly and the earthly could simply not function independent of each other.

> It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith…To this he replies:The symbol (already in operation) was drawn up by a general council. Now such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol. (Aquinas 1224/1225:23-24)

This is a very radical position to take, but it is not falling out of line with the scholarship of the time and therefore is simply unavoidable.This philosophical revolution of the 13th century CE is a compelling intellectual context of this time. This was the period when the

Arabic translations and commentaries on Aristotle arrived in the Western world. Aristotle's philosophy faced a strong resistance from the theologians and the Church because of its inversion of the hierarchy of higher ideal forms and matter in Plato. Aristoteleanism was resisted in all major centres of Christian learning which were spread throughout the empire by this period. Map 4 shows the distribution of Arabic and Christian centres of scholarship in Medieval Europe 1100- 1300 CE. It also shows universities which largely focussed on Christian theology but became centres of questioning it and adoption of Arsitotleanism (with the dates of their foundation).

Map 4:Religion and Scholarship in Medieval Europe 1100- 1300 CE.

Source: Campo Juan Eduardo (1950)

Aristotle had placed the agency of inner principles within the nature of matter itself. This was unacceptable to the provincial synod in the University of Paris which declined to teach Aristotle in the University of Paris from 1210CE. It was only in 1255CEthat the university started courses on Aristotle. Aquinas's preoccupation with Aristotle emanates from this very concern– the challenge that Aristotle's principles meant for Christian thought. Aquinas's works were influenced by several ideas which he identifies as essential insights from Aristotle, Plato and Boethius. His work was unique as he brought these traditions together. From Aristotle, he adopted the conception of sense experience being the basis of human knowledge as opposed to innate ideas. He thus argued that human intellect has a natural light and attaining certain knowledge does not require divine illumination. This was later developed into a principle that is central to political theory of a citizen with a free will, with access to knowledge without any mediation from the divine or institutionally religious force. The category of this political subject with a free will is very important to the claims that will be made by new political formations such as city-states that will come to challenge the empire in the next centuries. This is discussed in Article 9 of the text in the discussion on the meritorious value of believing without assent or questioning.

> Objection 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known [*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion.
>
> Therefore belief is not meritorious.
>
> *I answer that,* …our actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divinetruth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious (Aquinas 1224/1225:24:33).

That the path to reach intellectual cognition is through the steps of sensory cognition, followed by abstraction and not vice versa. Aquinas understood the fundamental principle of organization through the Neoplatonic scheme of *exitus* (Creation itself) and *reditus* (ordering of Creation). This meant that he gave credence to the notion of participation in Plato based on the third man argument of Parmenides – whereby for anything to exist, its independent being is necessary. So in the Aquinasian frame if all things and qualities exist, they are to that extent similar and thus are characterised by the same form. But this did not resolve the problem that their independent existence would entail infinite regress to the ultimate participant. Aquinas used Boethius to resolve this problem.

> The intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will (Aquinas 1265- 1274: 1567 : 25).

As has been sufficiently stated, the chapter is a very important part of the story of faith and reason as methods of building the explanations of the worlds – political/ social and metaphysical. It is also important because it is the moment of the beginning the biological mitosis if one may call it of the two separate spheres of reason and faith – which were till now – mixed, ambiguous and thus one. In terms of the political situation, the old Roman Empire was being replaced by the new empire that operated on the lines of the principles of Islamic political thought. However, as the tracing of the history of the development of ideas is concerned we do not see a sudden shift in terms of ideas or values of the polity. It can be argued convincingly that the organizing principle changes from being a God to the umma, however the political history of the Islamic Empire, the influence of the Persian history and the persistence of the bureaucratic culture register the presence of realism of Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the practices of the Islamic Empires. This gave a unique socio-political character to what became an empire. This argument of a polity to be one

constituted of a similar people remains an appealing one and a matter of contention even today. That this becomes an important factor when we talk about the return of the empire cannot be emphasised enough. This is another reason why the discussion on method though seemingly a digression from the topic of empire is nevertheless important to the subject under discussion.

The emphasis on method is crucial because it is through method that reason comes to derive the supremacy that it does in philosophy and later thinking about truth in other spheres of knowledge. This laying down of certain truth criteria for all accessible through the faculty of reason which is universal and impersonal was a revolutionary turn in the way knowledge was accessed. This change in the epistemic outlook revolutionised everything from the subjects of knowledge and inquiry to the very ontology of being. This automatically changed the way political power derived its legitimacy.

As the monopoly of theology and scripture on truth came under challenge their claim to political power also weakened and so did the reliance of the rulers on faith to back their power claims. However, this transformation occurred at a glacial pace. The transformation that we see from Ibn Sina, the reaction in Ghazali and later the fortification in favour of the method of logic and argumentation with rationality or reason as its truth test; are all significant in that they use the same Aristotelian standard of logical consistency and truth criteria. The issue of conflict is thus not whether the human reason has the capacity to know the truth but whether whatever capacity it has should precede the dictates of scripture. The answer comes out to be overwhelmingly, if not definitively the precedence of the appeal of reason over scriptural faith. The conquest of reason thus makes its way through the conquest of Aristotelian method.

The next chapter traces the absorption of the Aristotelian method of political thinking into the West and its effect as well as use in thinking about the Empire in decline. It looks at how the political thought takes a sharp turn against the papacy and the struggle between

the secular and spiritual authority that leads to the schism and later on disintegration of the Christian Roman Empire.

Chapter 4

Division of the Post-Justinian Empire and the Anti-Papal Reaction

The condition of most of 5th to 9thcentury CEEurope was that of a culturally rural area with less commerce, militarised with decentralised authority in the hands of the small class of clergy. There are very few to no written records surviving of this period. The period is characterised by no religious heresies or major invasions either.

East- West Schism and the Post Roman World

The post-seventh century period is also termed by scholars as the post Roman world, marking the beginning of the early middle ages, marked by the rise of Islam and the consequent radical changes especially in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and eventually North Africa – changing geography, culture and political orientation. After the death of Justinian; in what can be argued to be a reaction to imperial overreach- which becomes a continuous economic, resource and cultural problem throughout history – Justinian formed his expanded empire and merely a few years after his death it started to fall apart (Ullmann 2004). The conquest of Italy, an expedition that cost the empire a great effort, resources and bounty,and took almost 20 years to conquer was finally acquired by the Austrogoths. North Africa was occupied by Vandals and the Lombards came to occupy most of the peninsula (Ando 2000). This was a period of radical crisis for the empire with foreign occupation accompanied by the shrinking of the borders of the empire. The period post the settlement of the Iconoclasm controversy[28] i.e. from 843-1011CEwas a

[28]The Catholic Encyclopaedia defines Iconoclasm as a heresy in the 8th and 9th century which concerned itself mainly with the Eastern Church. It concerned mainly with the issue of veneration of images. The spectacular rise of Islam was attributed to their strict abomination of pictures, idols or any kind of

period of splendour for the Byzantine Empire until the rise of the next enemy the Slavic Turks in the region. This was to be followed by the period of ultimate crisis for the Byzantine Empire. The empire post this period comprises of Haldon, Anatolia and small parts of Italy. Even the Balkans was with the Slavs. In the year 1071 CE, the Turks achieved their victory casting a final blow to the Byzantine Empire in the year 1453CE.

As discussed in detail in chapter 3 the major political problem of the era was that of imperial over reach (Burns 2008). The emperor Justinian during the whole of his reign remained focused on re-conquest of western provinces from barbarians. He strategically dealt with one enemy at a time. On the one hand was Persia, whom he pacified with a treaty and on the other hand took over the west in peace. Though Justinian considered the peace in the west a settled matter and also profited from it; in retrospect lack of attention to Persia proved to be a fatal mistake. The aggression from the Persians was complemented by the plague of 541-42CE. The empire was ravaged by this black death and this morbid period was followed in turn by the death of the king Justinian himself in the year 568CE. Right after his death, the Lomabard invasion of Italy started. The Lombards – which was a pseudo ethnic name given to the people who invaded the Balkans were led primarily by the Avars who had slave Slav armies. Anthropologically, the Avars were of Turkic origin whereas the slavs were Indo-Europeans. The origins of this arrangement are not yet clear to historians. This group though acquired almost all of the Balkans including present day Greece, Bosnia, Croatia, and Herzegovina. After the killing of the emperor, his general Phocas became ruler. He was however overthrown in 610CEby the conglomerate of the Persians and the Barbarians. This alliance laid a two sided siege of his territory in the year 626CE. The Persians entered from the Asiatic Turkey, the strait of Bosphorous, while the rest entered from land. The taking over of the city of Constantinople however, was an uphill task and a strong resistance was exhibited.

representation. Though several traditions within and outside the Catholic Church (such as the Paulicans) had raised concern over the representation of God as idols, pictures or even the cross as being idolatry.

The resilience of the city was internally attributed to its divine and semi-divine icons. It was largely believed that the grace of the Gods of its citizens saved the city from falling to the attackers. However, in reality it was the strategic position of the empire which made it extremely difficult to take it by force. In 1205 CE, the western crusaders (venetians and franks) entered the city of Constantinople and deposed Justinian II. The king was mutilated by taking away his nose and after his return was eventually killed (Black 2001) (Browning 2012).Meanwhile the Slavs were increasingly settling in Greece and the Balkans. This was followed by the entry of the Bulgars under the rule of the Slavic Turkic khanate who came to occupy the territory. The Bulgarians who eventually inter married the Slavs hated to be called as Turkic predecessors. The Bulgar and Slav populationseventually turned to orthodox faith.

So far the Holy Roman empire had tried to survive by employing a range of strategies not all of them were prudent or successful. Of these, one was to move the capital out of Constantinople. Ironically it was Emperor Constance II who in 661 CEmoved his capital to Syracuse thereby also facilitating the guarding of Italy and North Africa easier. Constance II however was murdered shortly after in 668CE. This led to the shifting of the capital back to Constantinople. This was followed by the sweeping conquest of North Africa by the Arabs leaving only Anatolia and Balkans to the Holy RomanEmpire.Since the Diocletian Reforms of 3rd to 4th century CE the borders of the empire had changed a lot. Losing out on Egypt and Syria meant that the empire could no more acquire taxes from these regions. The practice of deporting the whole population with their livelihood and means of subsistence displaced was not only brutal but economically imprudent and militarily fatal. The most important problem was that of paying the army which was impossible with the low revenue generated by the empire. The Egyptian and Syrian lands could help maintain local armies who were then paid in grains or leather which was no more sustainable. This led to the formation of the Theme System where the peasants were to be recruited as soldiers when their service was required by the empire. By the year 1000CE, the whole system of imperial security rested on these themes which were

agglomerations of military provinces and generated their revenue internally. Also the invention of the Greek fire which meant throwing burning projectiles at enemy's ships gave the empire and edge over the Caliphate onslaught in naval battles around 674 CE. By the year 717CE, the empire recovered slowly and gradually from the heresy of Iconoclasm and the resultant convulsion. By the year 843 CE, the empire could be said to have had a rebirth with a viable military so much so that by the year 1000 the empire had expanded its territory by almost a one- third; now to include Armenia, Syria , Antioch, modern Greece and Italy. The period also saw the restoration of education and learning. By the year 1019CE; the Empire had also defeated the Bulgars, the Abbasids and entered as far as Lebanon (Black 2001) (Browning 2012). However the recalcitrant religious controversies continued to trouble the empire. One of the most important of these religious controversies was one that gained ground in about the 7th century which was regarding the nature of Christ; i.e. whether Christ had one or two natures (A J Carlyle 2008). If Christ had two natures i.e. of God and that of the son of God (man), then what was the relationship between the two?, which one was primary?; were some of the questions which were hotly discussed and debated amongst the ecumenicists. Politically this was the period when the Monophosite territories were taken by Islam. Emperor promoted a response which was a rather diplomatic one. The royal position stated that though Christ may be said to have two natures still he exhibits mono-energism (one energy) and mono-thelitism (one will). The papacy however was adamant on upholding two natures-one person theory. This controversy strained a huge amount of energy of the empire. This was followed in the 8th and 9th century prohibition on worshipping icons. Worshipping icons was characteristic of the Christian faith in the eastern part of the empire. The icons were portable, non-narrative and consisted of a single depiction i.e. there was no depiction of events- i.e. there was no story behind these symbols that were worshipped. The Iconoclasts saw this as idolatry. The success of Islam and Judaism, the two contemporary competing religions patrolled the border of image worship very seriously. Many scholars see Iconoclasm as a response to the crisis imposed by Islam. However there is also a line of argument which argues that the heresies were ethno-

nationalist revolts against the imperial control. The case of North Africa which was divided by Donatist controversy is a well-researched case in point (Brown 1961). However, the Donatist schism happened very early on in the 4th century CE on a technical point on the treatment of those who gave in during the Diocletian persecution. This rift had a long term effect and resulted not only in the permanent division of the church but also eradicated Christianity from some parts of North Africa. Other important cases are Monophysite nationalism in Armenia and Egypt (Llewellyn 1916). Whether the Iconoclast controversy can be compared to these heresies without factoring in the weakening of the empire vis-à-vis the other rising powers in the region is an important question. However what can't be denied is that like the other heresies demanded the direct intervention of the emperor in the religion. In the west however, the secular rulerswere not very strong and had no control over the doctrine of the church but only the wealth. It is thus no surprise that the western tradition separated the Church. In the east we find the patriarch, sitting right next to the emperor and both operating in collaboration. However in the west the emperor is also the pope (Burns 2008). But if we look at the question theoretically, what we see is the failure of the empire. The rational compromise is only verbal and no party accepted it. Iconoclasm thus was an inherently imperial demand. It was successful for a period where matters of theology were not just political trade-offs. By the end of the 10th century CE, the religious orthodoxy was politically centralised in the empire, popes were replaced by the confederation and vernaculars replaced Latin. The priests in the Eastern Church could marry, grow beards, the church in the West however allowed no statues or images and evolved a very different style of worship. The 1054 schism between eastern and western churches becomes an important point especially in terms of the shift in geography and the site from where ideology of empire now came to be generated. Both the Byzantine Church which controlled the east and the Western Roman Church in the west consolidated their own beliefs about the permissible and non- permissible in Christianity, often offering polarizing narratives. The rise of Islam also structured a lot of debates and responses in political theory as well as practice. The Crusades changed the way the Christians

themselves saw their religion and the increasing conflict between the Pope and the Crown gave rise to the conflict that gave modern political theory its constitutive principle-the secular state (Prodi 1987).

The Contest Between Papal Monarchy and Secular Authority

The schism and the strength gained by smaller kings were increasing markers of the weakening of the empire. However, the church still remained one overarching factor yielding influence through papal bulls and documents like *Donation of Constantine*, etc. The thinkers of the time thus faced a new but at the same time particular paradox of claims of papal monarchy vs. the philosophical voice standing by the secular temporal emperor. Be it Barbossa excommunicating the Pope in Germany, conflict between Philip of France and the Pope, the Islamic liturgy and ulema diatribe against philosophy; Henry the VIII in England centralising power into his own hands or the Italian city states emerging as important and powerful actors. The move towards autonomy of political units from the church was largely uniform. It is at this point important to inquire into why and how is it that we have the spiritual – church and the temporal – monarch co-relation strengthening in this period. The scholarship available on the period before this mitosis occurs provides interesting hypothesis on the role of the church in the providing the formative structure of the modern nation-state. Prodi (1976) evaluates this view,

> that the medieval papacy opened the road to the modern state by leading the way to the modern concept of state and sovereignty and towards a concentration of power and bureaucracy is a view that needs refinement and qualification (Prodi 1976: 2).

However, he finds more credence in the works of E W Bockenforde and Otto Brunner who do not deny the role played by the papacy in bringing about the unification of the polity and the religious sphere bya thorough institutionalisation of religion through a regime of church rules administered by parishes but also look at the internal conflicts that the Church of Rome comes to face when a class of priests close to monarchies wasformed

(Prodi 1976: 6).Thus, both the Anglican and Lutheran traditions use this very fusion of the *spiritualia* and *temporalia* and dissect its value to attack the political role of the Church.

From the perspective of history of ideas, it is important to note that this development was also accompanied by the institutionalisation of knowledge and its propagation i.e. in the period which saw the establishment of Universities in Europe, the tradition of questioning was given a formal structure. The earliest universities were very much an instrument of instilling, discussing and containing debates and discussions of the ecclesiastical nature. Though termed as Dark period in the history of Europe, this period not only saw a great awakening in science and philosophical method in the Islamic world, which occurred in parallel to the decentralisation of power in Europe with smaller kingdoms and the feudal system evolving making this a quieter period without much infighting and wars and the development of agriculture wherein for the first time in the history of non-Islamic or non-Latin Europe, the life expectancy of the population increased from 28 to 30 years of age. Modern historians see this as a great advance and thus find the term Dark ages problematic. The immense strides in theoretical developments in the Islamic corpus have been discussed in detail in the last chapter. In the non-Latin west, we see the Roman tradition of ruler ship emerging with three major centres of power in Germany (the seat of the neither Holy, nor Roman nor Empire – Holy Roman Empire); the English Carolingian Empire and the third model of Northern Italian city states.

Tracing its root to the 12th century renaissance which brought in the translations of Aristotle and other Greeks back to Europe, we have a turning point in the history of Europe in the 13th century whereby the idea of the state as political and ‘of the material world’ takes a deep root in our understanding – an understanding that has remained un-flinched though not uncontested till today. This was fostered by the development of a mix of three kinds of systems – Theocratic, Feudal and Hierocratic. The theocratic part though far from vanished, now finally had to struggle for its place in the power sharing with the

crown. This period saw a new world in which the emerging territorial states made Universalist claims of empire anachronistic. The main preoccupation of the age remains the relationship between the church and the crown i.e. the papacy and the secular rulers. During 1152-1190 CE, we have the beginning of this conflict between the emperor Frederick Barbossa who occupied the restored the seat of the Holy Roman Emperor in the west of the 5th century, and Pope Alexander III. Frederick was trying to implement the Corpus Iuris Civilis as the Roman Emperorship. He wanted to revive the ancient conception of Holy Roman Emperor as the emperor of the whole world. This led him to articulate that the papacy had no claim or business with the secular sphere of authority and thus could not interfere or challenge its authority. We see a conflict on very similar lines in the Carolingian empire though at a later date where Henry the VIII went into conflict with the church at Rome on the issue of his remarriage, something the Church was against. Similarly by the 12thcentury CE,we have the commune states or city states system emerging in Northern Italy against the claims of Frederick Barbossa. This gave church enough ground to play sides and bargain for its powers but what came out undisputed was the primacy and independence of the political sphere over the religious/ spiritual. The period also saw the sharpening of the struggle for church reform and this inevitably led to sharpening of the conflict between spiritual and temporal powers. The period in general saw a greater emphasis on hierarchal models whereby the hierarchy of ruler at the top, followed by military, followed by the church and the peasants. A new class of merchants and artisans also emerged.

Another important feature of the period was also the crusades. Though the movement to recapture Christian territories from the Muslims had started to take roots by the beginning of the 8th century under the name *Reconquestia*, it was in the year 1906, after the 1095 Council of Piacenza, where military aid was requested by the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos from Pope Urban II, which the first crusade began. This period is thus generally considered not very consequential in terms of political theory though in terms of political events it had consequential results. However we see a fortification of the idea

of sovereign communities or the civitates ruled by the civil law or *ius civile*. The works of Cicero and Seneca played an important role in bringing forth these ideas. Cicero's definition of the people or what he termed the populous had the notion of community and its internal association central to it. He argued that man's possession of reason and speech leads naturally to a kind of association and community; and it is the association based on consent to law and agreement as to the advantages of such an association exists that can be called a people. The idea was reinforced by the translations of Aristotle which were made available to the west in the 13thcentury CE. Aristotelian conception of the idea of the naturalness of the *polis* replaced the Augustinian Christian notion of the state of innocence without civil law of any social agreement as the only natural state.

These parallels which were drawn between ancient philosophy and the Christian Doctrine led to a new churning in political thinking and practice. The two swords theory[29] was an example of this very parallelism. Thus began the contest of the political particularism vs. the religious universalism. Gradually, this dualism became one of the major axioms of medieval politics, where the two great authorities both supreme and autonomous began their contest for power. This debate on dualism took place in three major areas – on papal position, the position of the Holy Roman Empire, and the position of the national kings or the attitudes of the medieval Christian kingship. By the 13th century, this boiled down into a simmering warfare between the two jurisdictions of the church and the crown. The writ of prohibition the instrument through which the crown commanded the frontier however deserves a brief mention. "Under the writ all the proceedings of the ecclesiastical court were stayed until the crown decided as where the jurisdiction lay" (Ando 2000: 395). The rest of the story is about the Church's rebuttal and how the whole

[29]Though originally propounded to mean that two separate swords wielded power in the two separate spheres of the political and the spiritual, the theory was largely misinterpreted or re-interpreted to one's convenience by both sides. The church especially interpreted it as the unity of powers founded on the supremacy of the spiritual.

debate turned into one between divine will *vs*. the common good of the people represented in the crown.

In what follows, the story will be traced through four primary sources of this period. Firstly, the tract *De potestate regia et papali* (*On Royal and Papal Power*) written by Johannes Quidrot also known as Jean de Paris (John of Paris). John of Paris was a teacher at the University of Paris. He was himself a French Dominican who was taught by Thomas Aquinas himself. Other texts are Marsiluis of Padua's *The Defender of Peace*- the author who spearheaded secular humanism in Italy, *Muqadimmah* by Ibn Khaldun who conceptualised solidarity in the polity which had its location outside the religious – an important alternative imagination at the time when the church was at the helm of laying down principles of organizing politics on the basis of scripture and lastly, a chiselled attack by Dante on the claim of the church on temporal authority in the text titled, *On Monarchy*.

It is important to underline here that all these authors are arguing not for a subtractionist sphere of secular in the political but against the reverse subtractionist model of authority devoid of political that was being propagated in the papal monarchies. In other words, the church was usurping the spheres of both spiritual and the temporal whereas the secular thinkers were arguing for the separation of the two spheres and relegating the authority of the church to the spiritual. Why and how is it that these thinkers were simultaneously arguing for such a retreat in the claims of the church and how does this inform our inquiry regarding the Christian Roman empire and its aftermathare the two questions that the next section tries to analyse.

John of Paris: The Critique of Papal Claim on Temporal Authority

On the work of John of Paris, the influence of Aquinas is evident and at times so dominant that most commentators and translators do not consider it a very original work.

The work *On Royal and Papal Power* is an account from the French side of the struggle for power between King Philp IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII. The problem began in 1296CEwhen Pope Boniface VIII demanded that all secular rulers must seek his permission before taxing the clergy in their respective states. Several Papal bulls along with the earlier discussed *Donation of Constantine* were used by the papacy to make its claims on authority over monarchical decisions in temporal matters. This was unacceptable to Philip IV of France. The text was written in context of this conflict for authority between the papacy and the monarchy. There are about three authoritative translations available of this work; the most authoritative probably is the one by J.A.Watt.

In many ways, John's work is the best one to begin this section, not just because he writes at the beginning of the period under discussion but his approach to the problem also justifies the underlying hypothesis, that the methods adopted by thinkers are affected if not determined by the context in which they are writing. Writing from within the papal tradition, John's work is a re-evaluation of existing relationship between the papacy and the monarchy. Though he goes further than the dominant papal position on supremacy, he uses the papal method of argumentation in the text. The whole text can be separated into two main parts. The first one is the proposition where he laid down his own position and the second part is where he answers the probable questions that may be posed to his proposition. What is characteristic of this method is that this was a part of the scholastic method in medieval universities and in its basic form also called scholastic disputation. As scholastic disputation however was principally a lecture– a form that developed from the experiment in teaching methods at Paris. The University teaching technique evolved from the ordinary lecture to a method of instruction divided into a lecture (lectio) and a disputation (disputatio). Another method was to separate a lecture into a text and a commentary. That John's published manuscript is in the first form, directs one to hypothesise that the work was a lecture he delivered at the university of Paris, as publication in those days can be understood 'as a process whereby scribes at the university bookstore made master copies of teachers' lectures' (Grant Edward 1996: 41).

The translations however retain the structure as a book's manuscript – the text is divided into 25 chapters, the last one consisting of the replies to probable questions. This however does not take away from the fact that his contribution is crucial in terms of both his method the impact that it generated on the politics of his time. Watt attributes to him the first systematic demonstration of the divine, natural and ecclesiastical law being the corpus from which national kingdoms draw their political practices and traditions (Watt 1971).

Whether John intended it or not, the book demolished the papal claim and rendered all claims of the pope in temporal affairs indefensible. The text makes extensive use of both scriptures and tradition. The work firstly explores the spiritual idea of the church – whereby he invokes Aquinas, Augustine and their reference to the inherent separation of the church and the state as stated by Christ himself (John of Paris 1302 b: 77, 224). John argued that Christ made it explicit enough that his kingdom was not of this (temporal) world and even if he wielded any power on the temporal world he did not pass it on to his disciples or apostles after him. Thus though the Pope can claim the authority over divine sphere, his claims on the temporal are void whether or not Christ's own claims over temporal existed. Further, the spiritual idea of the church he argued, is not the priest but the commune i.e., it is the people collectively that constitute the church and thus all property under the Priest is actually the property of the church and is thus common property. This made any attempts of appropriation or use of the church's property by an individual of the priestly class a violation of the church. But he was equally explicit on the opposition to empires as political units and is thus crucial in resolving an important conflict that one faced while encountering the available scholarship on the relationship between the universal claims of*Respublica Christiana* in both the temporal and spiritual spheres, the reaction against it and the resultant rise of the nation states as political units. According to him,

> ... because one man alone cannot rule the world in temporal affairs as can one alone in spiritual affairs. Spiritual power can easily extend its sanction to everyone, near and far, since it is verbal. Secular power, however, cannot so easily extend its sword very far, since it is wielded by hand. It is far easier to extend verbal than physical authority (John of Paris 1302 b: 85).

Secondly, he used the Aristotelian idea of natural state and this was important from two perspectives. One, that the translation movement from the Arab world affected not only the secular philosophers but was studied and adopted with enthusiasm by the church scholars. The context in which John was writing this text approximately in 1302CEwas not far from the period when reading Aristotle was banned especially in the University of Paris. The University of Paris had not only the greatest theological school of the Latin Middle Ages but it was also home to the largest of the Arts Faculty. The potential challenge to the church doctrine by the works of Aristotle was sensed early on by the church fathers. This in 1210CEled to the decree of the provincial synod of Sens which made the reading of the books of Aristotle on natural philosophy and all commentaries thereon in public or secret punishable by penalty of excommunication. This ban on the books of Aristotle in the University of Paris was not lifted until 1255CE. Writing within the 50 year period of the lifting of the ban, it is undisputable that John of Paris read the Aristotelian literature in his formative years in defiance of the papal decrees. As stated above the possibility cannot be completely factored out that the work was a lecture and thus one can also postulate that he taught Aristotle's teachings to his class. Since this is a work in the history of ideas, this context makes the reading of John's work all the more intriguing especially when one can identify the gap between the way it is articulated and the intent of the articulation as the context directs.

The work definitely is a 'contribution to the medieval church state-theory' (Tantall 1974). The work also however is very specific in that it can be easily argued to be an anti-papal theory prevalent in France. As John makes it amply clear in the very first chapter that it is for the kings who are outside the Holy Roman Empire that the *Donation of Constantine* cannot hold. These empires including France therefore were outside the weight of the

papal tradition. John argues after Aquinas that both kings and priests are integral to human life. Both however are very different by their nature. The divine empire can be a world empire because its teachings and subjects are universal. No specificity can qualify as diversity for divine instruction, and thus for divine rule. Moreover its power is its word – the only thing it wants to spread is the message of the God which does not require it to hold territory, take care of temporalities or specificities as the secular empires have to. Thus, there can be different monarchies – the church does not require one holy empire.

Though John concedes that papacy by the reason of what it covers as a universal sphere is superior, both kingship and priesthood derive their power from one origin i.e. God. Thus, he argued that one cannot say that the king is subordinate to the priest (John of Paris 1302 b: 55). He also argued that though a pope can depose a king, it is not improbable that a pope too can be deposed under several circumstances. The text thus is a logical re-assessment of the relationship between the papacy and the monarchy in a period which Colin Morris calls the century of papal-monarchy paradox (Morris 1989). The text is thus representative of what a major section of Parisian intelligentsia held as an opinion not in favour of the monarchical autonomy but more as a reasoned redrawing of the sphere of authority for religion. The secular sphere was thus for the first time being created in negation of the religious which it was argued was at the same time universal, over-arching yet limited in the functions it could/ was ought to deliver. The paradox ripens in the hand of our next author under discussion, also termed as the first secularist, the Marsilius of Padua.

Marsilius: Theorizing of Secular as Negation of the Religious

Written in 1324 CE, the works also shifts us geographically to a very important region in medieval Europe i.e. to Italy. The record of Marsilius' early life is not very coherent. Born into a prominent family with a history of serving in the civic administration of the city of Padua in the north of Italy, Marsilius did not choose the legal family profession;

he rather chose to study medicine. Another available record of his early life is that of his friendship with the poet and historian Albertino Mussato. Credited with spearheading the humanist movement[30] in Italy through his play Ecrinis, the association with Mussato is likely to have shaped Marsilius' attitude towards the more secular ideas such as humanism. Marsilius is known to have attended several meetings with this group of like-minded humanists who had their own take on the signorial monarchies in Padua, and created a strong base of humanism in the state. In the text under consideration however there is an immense effect of the Greek sciences, especially Aristotle's Politics which is referred to as the authority with rapt frequency throughout the work. The political context of the age posed two questions to Marsilius. Firstly on the question of why was the question of the relationship between church and crown important to him? It is important to state here that the first concrete record of Marsilius thought, is found in the year 1313CEwhen he is selected to become the rector at the University of Paris from amongst the Faculty of Arts. From his appointment as from other records, it is amply clear that he enjoyed church's patronage and favour in the early days of his career. Like Mussato Marsilius too shifted to politics in the later days of his career. The work in discussion was central to this shift from academia to statesmanship. The treatise was written in context of the conflict between Ludwig of Bavaria and Pope John XXII. Ludwig of Bavaria was the elect of the Holy Roman Emperor but the papacy was not very happy with his policies in Italy. This was seen by the papacy as a challenge to its authority. Pope John supported the claim of Frederick of Austria. This support was not, as stated earlier, a result of personal liking for Frederick but due to impending struggle between the Guelps (papal party) and the Ghibelline (imperial party). The Guelps argued against the support to the king,

[30] Originating in the 13th century, Renaissance Humanist Movement dominated Europe as an intellectual movement that used classical texts to alter thinking in medieval Europe. "It took human nature in all of its various manifestations and achievements as its subject, stressed the unity and compatibility of the truth found in all philosophical and theological schools and systems (syncretism), emphasised the dignity of man, placed the medieval ideal of a life of penance as the highest and noblest form of human activity, looking to the struggle of creation and the attempt to exert mastery over nature and looked forward to a rebirth of a lost human spirit and wisdom." (Britannica .com)

especially in the financial sphere to the Franciscans[31] whereas the Ghibelline protested the extreme claims of the pope's authority over the empire. The *Defensor Pacis* was a doctrinal defence of the position of the Ghibelline. Another defence which was written for the emperor was the one written by the William of Ockham who was himself a Franciscan friar. The conflict was important because the authority in question was not authority in the spheres of abstract influence, rules or movable property, the conflict was a conflict of territorial sovereignty. The conflict boiled over when Louis sent a standing army into Italy – a gesture which the pope saw as an infringement of his territorial sovereignty. The army was sent by Ludwig to defend the city state of Milan against the Kingdom of Naples. Naples and France were allies of the pope and with their support the pope declared that the Ludwig had no right to the imperial throne despite the fact that he had defeated Frederick of Austria. Ludwig in turn bolstered his activities in what pope claimed as his own area of influence and sovereignty.

Marsilius left France for Bavaria and wrote his treatise as a double demonstration, whereby he used the arguments of reason and arguments of authority to prove that the authority of Ludwig was supreme in the conflict between the emperor and the papacy. This treatise was immediately declared as a heresy. Within four years of the writing of the *Defensor Pacis,* Ludwig entered Rome and crowned himself the emperor. In less than three months, Pope John XXII was deposed by an imperial decree. Marsilius's support for the empire was as grounded in philosophy as it was in the political context. The very title of the work to which he dedicates an entire chapter in the third discourse exhibits the obsession of Marsilius with the maintenance of peace. In his analysis of the travails of the Roman Empire he identifies civil strife as a major cause of discord.

[31]Franciscans who were an order formed on the teachings of St. Francis of Assisi, adhered to a different view of poverty and the relationship of the church to the poor. They were more strict with the rituals and practiced austerity and fasting etc. as compared to the mainstream Roman Catholic church factions. They grew too importance in the 14th century forming almost a sect for themselves. Pope XXII condemned them through a papal bull.

> … (civil strife) under which the Roman empire has laboured for a long time and labours still. This cause is highly contagious, and equally liable to spread to all other civil orders (Marsilius 1324: 69).

It is from this discord that he derived his justification of empires ruled by hereditary monarchs. This obsession with and primacy to peace and order and the need to address civic strife reigns high up to the time of Hobbes. Though the reasons for the need of civic order are political, its justification and preconditions are philosophical and even scriptural. The first precondition out of disorder is the need of single political unit that derived its primacy from the philosophical value of the numeral one – depicting the entirety of the universe and the being of all pluralities therein.

> …with Mainz and the other communities, are one realm or empire in number; but only because each of them is ordered by its will towards a supreme principate which is one in number. In the same sort of way the world is said to be one in number and not several worlds. All beings are said to be one world not because of some numerically unique form that inheres formally in the universe of beings, but because of the numerical unity of the first being, since every being naturally inclines towards and depends upon the first being…. So too the men of one city or province are said to be one city or realm, because their will is for one single principate (Marsilius 1324: 121)…because the principate of a monarch who succeeds on the basis of heredity is more similar to the governance or principate of the entire universe, since in the universe it is always one alone who exists unchangeably, as in Metaphysics XII, last chapter: 'One prince, therefore, because beings do not wish to be badly arranged. (Marsilius1324: 103)

Second precondition was that the church should not try to usurp the temporal sphere of power and this was supported by quoting scriptures:

> … it is certainly a cause for wonder why any bishop or priest, whoever he may be, should assume to himself an authority greater or other than Christ or his apostles wanted to have in this world. For they, in the form of servants, were judged by the princes of this world. But the priests their successors not only refuse to be subject to princes, against the example and command of Christ and the apostles; they even say that they are superior in coercive jurisdiction to the highest powers and princes, when in fact Christ said..(quotes) Matthew (Marsilius 1324: 227).

Growing up in the first of the city states which threw away a tyrant rule for a system of internal self-government in the region had an impending influence on Marsilus. As also the frustration of the city states with the rival claims of the papacy and the empire convinced Marsilus of a need to resolve the contesting claims over authority. Marsilius also grew in a very interesting intellectual milieu and the last chapter of this work is very important in this context. Being a student and later a scholar in medicine the influence of Arabic translations of Aristotle were all the more influential for Marsilius. A work written in this period titled *Concillator Differentium* made an attempt to reconcile the philosophical and scientific principles from the perspective of medical science. The author of this work was contemporary of Padua named Pierro d' Abaro. Thus the Arsitotelean method and worldview and state as a natural state had an impact on Marsilius. This was also a period that saw a shift from the branches of theology to that of sciences in universities across Europe especially the University of Paris at which Marsilius spent most of his academic life. Another important influence on Marsilius was Averros or Ibn Rushd. Some scholars on political thought of medieval Europe classify the scholars writing in this light as Latin- Averroism. There is also a contestation on whether the *Defensor Pacis* is a work of political Averroism as it used a method of argumentation decried as a heresy by Islamic religious authorities known as the theory of Double truth. Ibn Rushd argued that there are two types of truth – the truth of revelation and the truth of philosophy. These truths are truths, independent of each other. As stated earlier Marsilius in Dictio I and Dictio II used two types of argumentation – one based on reason and the other based on authority parallel to Ibn Rushd's theory. Though the method shall be analysed later for its Averroesique influence, it shall suffice here to state that the term Averroism had its genesis in a specific intellectual debate – that of the unity of the intellect. It might thus be committing an intellectual fallacy to argue otherwise and use it as a category of historical analysis. As Annabel Brett states in her opposition to the use of the term for *Defensor Pacis* in the introduction to her translation of Marsilius,

> Double truth' is a very crude way of characterising the intellectual stance of these philosophers, who did not in fact posit that there were two completely distinct truths, but that there were two different cognitive procedures. The possible dissonance between the results of these different procedures was undoubtedly a disturbing and challenging eventuality within a Christian philosophical horizon, but it did not necessarily imply that the ultimate unity of truth was irremediably fractured. (Brett quoted in Marsilius 1324 : XV)

The section above has given a detailed description of the conflict between pope Boniface VIII and the French king Philip IV. This conflict and the debate around it had captured the imagination of political thinking of the time. The secular and the theological had for the first time appeared as crystallised opposition to each other. John of Paris's treatise and the treatment of the poverty controversy – austerity in imitation of Christ as opposed to the opulence of the church became the central again in the Franciscan case. The influence of John's work can also be seen on this Paduan political theorist who like John used scriptures and philosophy who pointed out the papal-monarchy paradox that was generating the civil discord in their times. The papacy was arguing for universality of its rule in both temporal and spiritual, thereby leaving the monarchs to embattle them by arguments of particularity – for their own kingdom – a kind of thesis developed by some historians to point out how the church played important role in generation of states by being opposed to them. These thinkers however were pointing out the paradox that this was liable to generate that of – if one was to concede universality in the sphere of the temporal and grant it only to the spiritual – it was tantamount not only to philosophical imperfection, scriptural fallacy but also amounted to placing spiritual sphere as higher to the temporal and thus granting it supremacy over the temporal. Both the subtractionist definitions of our secular today and the re-emergence of the empires of nation states can possibly be scrutinised through the arguments which these thinkers were trying to navigate through. Political history however, shows that the immediate concerns got the better of the philosophical attempts that these theorists were trying to make. The discord between the church and the crown became more acute with the Lutheran reform thereby

the immediate realpolitik concerns becamemore important. This immediacy will be more pregnant in the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes who were writing in more turbulent times than these thinkers.

The Case for Secular Monarchy in Dante

A prelude of this can be clearly seen however in Dante's *Monarchy*. Dante encountering the more immediate concerns of his times launched a stronger case for an empire which is universal and temporal as opposed to the church which for him must be universal but spiritual. Dante's Monarchy is a treatise on temporal monarchy or what can be termed as empire is thus of direct consequence to the project at hand. He defined temporal monarchy as that which men call 'empire'. It is, he stated –'a single sovereign authority set over all others in time, that is to say over all authorities which operate in those things which are measured by time' (Dante 1559:4) He furthered a dual qualification for his definition of the empire:

> The definition has two key elements: temporal monarchy is one and indivisible *[unicus];* and it is set over all other forms of temporal (i.e. secular) authority *[superomnes (sc. principatus) in tempore]*, secular authority being distinguished from spiritual authority precisely by its relationship to 'things measured by time' as distinct from the eternal things of the spirit which are outside time. Cf. (Corinthians) m, x. 10; 'empire is a jurisdiction which embraces within its scope every other temporal jurisdiction'(Dante 1559 :4).

The treatise engaged itself with three points of inquiry – whether temporal monarchy was necessary for the world? Whether the Romans took over the monarchy of the world rightfully and whether the emperor's authority is derived from God? Dante employed the Aristotelian method to answers these questions.He started by stating that every truth must be deduced from the Aristotlean first principle[32] and thus he tried to investigate as to what the first principle of monarchy is. He then divided things into those that can be changed

[32] Aristotlean first principle is a basic irreducible foundational assumption or proposition that cannot be deduced from any other proposition.

by human action and those that can't be changed by human action. Natural sciences, maths, divinity are abstracts that he argued can't be changed by human action. We can theorise them, understand them, use them and apply them in our daily lives but we through our actions cannot interfere or change the principles of their working. On the other hand, we have social life or political life where theory is for the sake of action. In the sphere of politics, for Dante, action was predicated upon a final objective/ purpose. Having established this, he then went on to ask as to what is the purpose of human society.According to Dante, nothing is produced in vain, all humans have a particular activity and this activity when collective is specific only to humanity. This collective activity according to him was directed to fulfil collective potential as a creature that apprehends by means of potential intellect.

Here as in Marsilius, we see the idea of cumulative knowledge – that knowledge is a collective enterprise and so is human potential. For Dante, the fulfilment of human potential requires 'a vast number of individual people in the human race, through whom the whole of this potentiality can be actualised (Dante 1559:7). Potentiality existing separately from actualisation is impossible, the fatality of events in nature also apply to social. i.e. if a potentiality of something to happen exists it will happen in nature.

Dante established the necessity of temporal monarchy by two kinds of argumentation. Firstly, he referred to Aristotle stating that if a number of things are ordered to an end, then one of them must guide and thus we require a ruler. Secondly, he used inductive reason whereby he argued that a leader is required to lead as parts make a whole. Therefore having a ruler for the world is an imitation of the divine scheme where one God rules. So if the ideal state of mankind is the resemblance of God and if God is one then unity of mankind i.e. an empire is the only ideal political state.

> …mankind is in its ideal state when it is guided by a single ruler (as by a single source of motion) and in accordance with a single law (as by a single movement) in its own causes of movement and in its movements. Hence it is clear that monarchy

> (or that undivided own rule which is called 'empire') is necessary to the well-being world (Dante 1559:14).

Thus, we see Dante making a strong case for a unitary empire of all mankind.It is important to note here that the very understanding of human generation in Dante is derived from Aristotelianphysics. He used the concept of *Primum Moble* or the single source of motion which according to him rocks all of existence and the sphere of heavens. The ideal state of for mankind is to follow in steps with this prime motion. The plurality of rules thus is against the principle of divine nature. He usedthe Roman poet Virgil to argue that there should be one single ruler – the unmoved mover like Saturn and thus it becomes necessary to concentrate power in one ruler to lead. The ideal human state of the state of freedom thus can only be realised when we have a temporal monarchy according to Dante. The other forms of government such as democracy, oligarchy, tyranny for him were perverted forms of government. Dante also forwarded a diatribe against kings who were trying to usurp the right of the emperor by disobeying or challenging what he arguedwas divine providence. He argued of himself as being a convert of reason which helped him see that the delegation of universal rule to the emperor and the church in the *temporalia* and *spiritualia*, respectively as the only truth and divine will.

> …when I penetrated with my mind's eye to the heart of the matter and understood through unmistakable signs that this was the work of divine providence, my amazement faded and a kind of scornful derision took its place, on seeing how the nations raged against the supremacy of the Roman people…..the Roman empire, is founded on right will not only disperse the fog of ignorance from the eyes of kings and princes who usurp control of public affairs for themselves, falsely believing the Roman people to have done the same thing, but it will make all men understand that they are free of the yoke of usurpers of this kind (Dante 1559 : 32, 33).

The appeal to divine providence in the service for arguing the case of temporal monarchs was thus pervasive. There were however important differences in terms of the degree to which scriptures were invoked and interpreted. In Dante we also find the formative articulations of reason as a position- a standpoint so to speak which the thinker uses as a position of privilege to the extent that it allows her to look at things from a "neutral, removed, all pervasive, and thus a superior ; perspective than a "internal, invested, subjective and participatory" approach of faith. Dante then goes on to tell us that reasoned outlook will 'disperse the fog of ignorance' – for all kings who are challenging the empire. It is as if through this position of reasoning they will all reach this certain truth about the supremacy of the Roman Empire independently. The power attributed to reason through this quality of extracting individuals to a common position from where truth becomes visible and certainty is possible – even on matters of imperial supremacy is an important instrument against the authority of faith. This instrument is then sharpened and its use reaches in apogee in the enlightenment thinkers- where using similar analogies we see thinkers arguing that reason casts a "new light" over the earlier darkness / innocence. It is a progression from the unknowing to the knowing- a journey that vests agency and power to the common human endeavour. This articulation is rephrased and repeated over and over till it becomes commonsense and faith or subjective experience becomes unfit for scholarly enterprise. Faith at best becomes something individuals do for themselves. The early origins of the relegation of faith to the private sphere can be traced here. Though Dante here is appealing only to the kings and not the populace to invite themselves on this excursion of reasoned inquiry to revisit the divine plan outside the schema sketched by the Church. Interestingly, such daring articulations were being propounded as well laid out theories by Dante's contemporaries. The next section discusses one such scholar Ibn Kahldun who imagined social solidarity or association as the basis of politics in the era of religious empires.

Khaldun and the Non- Religious Imagination of Political Organization

A 14th century scholar and statesman Ibn Khaldun forwarded a daring theory of relegating both *spiritualia* and *temporalia* to the utilitarian need of human societies – a principle he termed as *assabiyah*. A contribution largely unassimilated in the later political thinkers of the west, it was later on recovered for the important insights with which it elucidated for the discipline of sociology and political science. His work is often termed as the first systematic and scientific attempt to write history (Fromherz: 2010) (Rosen: 2005). Scholars have attributed foundations of various later theories to him like Ahmed who finds the reflection of Durkhiem's concept of "mechanical" and "organic" solidarity, Marx's stages of human history (to provide the dynamics for the dialectics of conflict between groups), Max Weber's typology of leadership, Vilfredo Pareto's circulation of elites; and Ernest Gellner's pendulum swing theory of Islam, oscillating from an urban, formal literal tradition to a rural, informal and mystical one" (Ahmed 2002:101). Black on the other hand avoids any anachronistic fallacies and characterises Khaldun as a Neo-Aristotelian thereby placing him within the academic discourse of his own period. He also gives him credit for adding his original thought to Neo- Aristotelianism for developing a cosmology that has a dynamic conception unlike the modern epistemologies which have a static conception of human nature. In Khaldun therefore, the self or the subject of investigation differ drastically and so does the ontology of this self (Black 2001). This is reflected in an important theory of Assabiyah which has been recognised as one of his most original and important contribution and has been applied extensively to assess the political upheavals in Muslim societies. This application has also led to development of competing definitions of the term assabiyah. "According to the Arab-English Lexicon, the term 'Asabiyyah emerged from the word "ta'asub" which literally means "bounding the turban round one's own head". In another prominent source –a saying from the Prophet Muhammad"(it means) you helping your own people in an unjust cause" (as quoted in Halim & et.al 2012:2). In the academic paradigm Franz Rosenthal who did a commanding translation of the huge volumes of the Muqaddimah –

the work in which Khaldun lays down his philosophy of human history *assabiyah* has been translated as 'group feeling' or 'social bond of solidarity'. It is this meaning from Rosenthal that this work takes from Khaldun for further analysis. From the lens of *assabiyah*, Kahldun forwarded a theory of empire as an empire of continuation. He used the metaphor of layers for dynasty but empire is collated with the human need to live in a social order and is thus a continuum. He says,

> confirmation of our theory is the fact that we find that (later)dynasties are unable to tear down and destroy many great architectural monuments, even though destruction is much easier than construction, because destruction is return to the origin, which is non-existence, while construction is the opposite of that (Khaldun 1337: 438).

This also means that the variables that build and sustain empire may be many but social solidarity and the principles on which these are built will always gain prominence in the Khaldunian scheme of things. This implied that the variables in the conflict such as *spiritualia*vs *temporalia* could be displaced by the manifestations of the social which was formed more by history – shared and overlapping than anything else. He thus also emphasised on the importance of shared knowledge and how that sustained empires and was consequential in their fortunes.

> Among the Persians, the intellectual sciences played a large and important role, since the Persian dynasties were powerful and ruled without interruption. The intellectual sciences are said to have come to the Greeks from the Persians, (at the time) when Alexander killed Darius and gained control of the Achaemenid empire. At that time, he appropriated the books and sciences of the Persians (Khaldun 1337: 628).

Khaldun thus expanded both the meaning and the scope of the term empire and tied it to history in a way that no other thinker of his time did. This helped him derive a more realistic assessment of the problems of his own time and location rather than being caught

in, what for him would have been superficial paradoxes that the Christian church and kings were fighting about. His anthropological enquiry of history gives a very different account of how empires were understood in parallel in the same span of time. According to him,

> …the sciences came to belong to sedentary culture, and the Arabs were not familiar with them or with their cultivation. Now, the (only) sedentary people at that time were non-Arabs and, what amounts to the same thing, the clients and sedentary people who followed the non-Arabs at that time in all matters of sedentary culture, including the crafts and professions. They were most versed in those things, because sedentary culture had been firmly rooted among them from the time of the Persian Empire (Khaldun 1337: 736).

Khaldun's theory of social solidarity established the absolute necessity of the social life for human survival. He then traced the evolution of human societies from simple bonds of social life to those of imperial (state) sovereignty. What however is peculiar about his analysis is that though the loci of his social solidarity shifts from blood relation to kinship and then from kinship to knowledge of kinship. This ideal of social solidarity as a variable remains strongly functional even when a sovereign state is established and continues to interact with the state and shapes it (Khaldun 1337) (Lacoste: 1984). The other important feature of the success of the sovereign state being its ability to retain the historical memory of social solidarity what will from here on be called social memory. Khaldun went on to say that social solidarity within the populations which are not necessarily homogenous states (though it would be hard for him to imagine state-societies with as diverse populations as exist in the present) can also support state sovereignty by the bond of historical memory of association with the territory. The variable of restraint and security is extremely central to the Khaldunian theory of social solidarity. It is not only a causal variable for why state sovereignty comes about in the first place but then it also evolves into a relational one, i.e. state solidarity strengthens security of a territorial state in physical terms, whereas a state that is endangered by reduced levels of social solidarity undergoes increase in militarisation (Issawi:1950).

This is symptomatic of why we have an international system which is simultaneously being challenged by alternative conceptions of world order and undergoing increasing militarisation. At the level of the state, we see the failure of the liberal social contract as the fallacy of the universal category which requires constitution by particular units.These units or subjects functioning in a power quagmire do not let go their identity and embedded interests. Such behaviour attracts counter social solidarities. This leads to the split in the nation and the state, where the state expropriated by dominant identity fashions itself in its own reflection to an extent that the project and promises of the social memory that led to that solidarity constituting the state is the first place collapses. The basic point of departure thus, is the conception of the self than the liberal conception which becomes redundant once the state is institutionalised in a social hierarchy. Khaldun thus resolved the papal-monarchy paradox though not directly addressing it by arguing for a very different motivation of political organization and the way it worked.

Gathering the threads from the analysis of these authors from the 13th and 14th century CE, the motivations for raising and dissecting the subject of the spheres of authority of the church and crown are evident. The carving of *spiritualia* and *temporalia* as distinct arose from the encroachment of the church on the temporal but also because of the princes'growing assertion on the empire. This led to a convulsion that led to several combinations of distribution of powers within these two spheres – the most dominant of which was the nation state which fused or assimilated the *temporalia* and the *spiritualia* in the new states. Prodi observes the religious and cultural integration of the subjects of these two spheres in the following lines,

> ….not only from a jurisdictional point of view but more particularly in the religious and cultural integration of their subjects as a governing principle, until the affirmation of the cuius regios euis religio rule in the whole of Europe, Catholic and reformed, at the end of the wars of religion (Prodi 1987: 6).

Such an analysis claims that the church laid the foundation of this modern nation state and the disintegration of *Respublica Christiana* was also the disintegration of the universal appeal of a legitimizing empire. It thereby initiated secularisation and also led to nationalisation and emergence of the nation state.(Map 5 shows the rise of Nation States in Europe in the 16th century).It however does not explain the simultaneous rise of new empires in Europe by states who came out of the *Respublica Christiana* decrying the church's universalism two centuries later.

The period nevertheless witnessed two very important but related phenomena interacting with each other. One is the crystallisation of the antagonism between the church and the monarchs. This makes the question of the realms and nature of acceptable authority an immediate question for the political thinkers of the time. Secondly, as the scales tip in the favour of the monarchical power and the legitimacy of its authority, we see that the corpus from which truth claims and methods are both derived also become increasingly non-religious. Though the idea of the supreme creator still remained embedded in the background, the development of double truths[33], which in the modern language of social science can be called truths of science and the impending problems of philosophy present themselves in their nascent forms. The Aristotelian method becomes the tool for the secularists. This we see starkly in Marsilius and Dante but it is in the Islamic philosophy that the more calibrated analysis of the questions that the polity faces comes to be articulated. The period thus makes the stage for the arrival of the secular sphere in politics – but the one that remains semi-porous, contested but still a valiant category in politics till date.

[33] "Double-truth theory, in philosophy, the view that religion and philosophy, as separate sources of knowledge, might arrive at contradictory truths without detriment to either—a position attributed to Averroës" (Encyclopedia Britannica).

Map 5: Rise of European Nation States 16th Century

Source: Campo Juan Eduardo (1950)

Chapter 5

Protestantism, Liberty and Empire

> On the one side, the contribution of Luther and the early Protestant Reformers was to depoliticize religion; on the other, that of Machiavelli and the Italian humanists worked to de-theologize politics. Both sides served the cause of national particularism (Wolin 2004:128).

As the quote from Wolin above states, the works of Luther and Machiavelli did affect to a considerable degree both, the way the role of religion in politics was imagined and the prevailing dependence of politics for its sources of authority on religion. These two related but bifurcated trajectories of mixed sphere of politico-religious authority did lead to the consolidation in new variables such as national particularism as a legitimizing principle of politics. However, this consolidation of national particularism needs further qualification. Firstly, because neither national particularism as a principle nor those actors who argued for it were free of the dominant imagination of religion and politics as a collapsed sphere of authority. Such a conception was in contravention to the Christian worldview – even the Protestant view and thus posed an intricate challenge to the political thinking of the time. Secondly, from the very inception, national particularism seemed a difficult idea to be absorbed, probably due to the immediacy of the Roman Empire's past which kept imperial ambitions largely unchallenged till the 16th century. However, a religion-politics break was an important break which the new colonial empires had a difficult time negotiating with.

Though it is not incorrect to state that this is a period where we have the rise of the national particularism and this idea affects the world of political thought arguably more than any other idea in political thought, it needs to be qualified with the simultaneous reality of expansive national particularisms drawing themselves on religious dissents such

as Protestantism. The chapter discusses the first theories post this temporal-spiritual break using the prism of empire through Luther's *On Secular Authority,* written for the German nobility in 1523CEfrom a small shire calledWittenberg; Machiavelli's *Prince* written in an entirely different political context of Florentine republic under the Medici family in 1531CE , Jean Bodin's *Six Books on Commonwealth* written in context of the wars on Religion in 1576CEand finally Grotius and the increasing importance of trade for empires and the religious tolerance it necessitated, through his 1627CEtext *The Truth of The Christian Religion.*

The centrality of the works discussed in the chapter derives itself from the fact that as the legitimizing principle of authority changes its realm from the religious to the secular (monarchical/ republican) sphere, the principles of organizing imperial authority too, change (Skinner 1978 a). The process of shift from holy empires to colonial empires is largely understood by the adjoining separation of church and state. But the empires of states challenge precisely this. Though the Catholic church receded; the English state that later expanded to the British empire and the Anglican church had a close relation – though now the direction of authority stands reversed – it is the king who was the head of the church. The four authors and the texts that we are looking at here, beyond doubt derive their rationale from this particular historical juncture in which religious authority was facing increasing challenge from the crown. The translation of this into the method of political thought and its epistemological sources; took another century to make itself visible and thus will be discussed in the next chapter, but the texts discussed in this chapter are a reaction to the authors' contemporary political problems. This is also one reason why these authors separated in geography and time need to be read together. It is interesting to see how all four of them stemmed in their peculiar politico-religious location argue for fortification of political power outside the sphere of religion; but they do not argue against empires as political units. It is all the more interesting how this is strategically used with qualifications by the apologists of the empire. Though, this may seem immanent to the present day political theorist, but it was not so, for the period under

discussion. It was perfectly natural and acceptable that the religious supremacy may spread over all aspects of human life. One major challenge to this was present in Christ's own dictum in refuting his claim to the earthly kingdom; however when the predicted day of judgement did not seem to be arriving soon, the church fathers took it upon themselves to build the city of God, in God's own image on earth. Augustine saw it in the body of the believers and Aquinas saw it in natural law. Luther however had the project of challenging this overlap itself. Luther's primary project was never to embolden the claims of the temporal authority but to establish the sanctity of the religious by tying it to the divine sphere – concerned with the Augustinian City of God.

Protestantism and the Roots of National Particularism

The puzzle that arose in the last chapter was how from decrying the church and embracing national particularism, the nation states went on to establish their own empires? Both Luther and Machiavelli are very important thinkers to understand this. In the initial readings they might seem to be ambiguous at best for it is difficult to place them down to advocacy of one or other political form but what these thinkers actually do, or are used to do –especially Luther, is that they transform the anti-papal authority movement into a new reified religious identity– a faith which is more amenable to reason than its predecessor. It does away with the backlog of classical Christianity and frees itself of its "unreason". This makes Protestantism'stransition into the Enlightenment easier. What this new religion also does is that it superimposes itself on some national identities. In the case of Britain, it became synonymous with Englishness and was used by the Stuarts[34] to weave a seamless narrative of Anglo-Scottish Union. The new national particularism that arises as a reaction to papacy was not strictly anti-religious. Scholars of intellectual history of empires thus do not hesitate to call Protestantism as the 'ideological taproot of British Imperialism' (Drayton 2006) or the sole thread joining the

[34] House of Stuart, also spelled Stewart, or Steuart, royal house of Scotland from 1371 and of England from 1603. The Stuarts joined Scotland and England into dynastic unions first and then formally into a commonwealth by the Acts of Union 1707(Encyclopaedia Britannica).

three mutually constitutive processes' of consolidating English national consciousness, religious unification of Stuart monarchies or the Anglo-Scottish Union, and the English nationhood that included Ireland to facilitate the process from 'state formation to empire building' (Armitage 2013). Protestantism became both a symbol of opposition to the authority of Roman Catholicism as well as unifier of the three civilised peoples of Britain, Scotland and Ireland. The narrative had to be adduced with new justifications and qualifiers with time as the empire was extended to the Americas and subsequently to India, but the origins of the British imperial project were rooted strongly in Protestantism more than any other ideology.

The political context in which Martin Luther was operating was the fodder for this development. The changing equations of power post 1453CEand Luther's 95 theses nailed the fate of the Catholic Holy Roman Empire. Since the 15th century the situation of the Holy Roman Empire in Germany was one of decay. Germany was surrounded by the Teutonic order, an order that originated in 12th century Levant and moved to Europe after the Christian defeat by the Muslim forces in West Asia. The order eventually conquered Courland, Livonia and Estonia and established an independent kingdom which owed allegiance to the king of Poland. The ties of the order with the German emperor complicated the relationship as the Eastern Empire viewed the Teutonic invasion as backed by the imperial seat of the Roman West. This was accompanied by the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453CE. Though the actual power of the empirewas in decline for some time, the actual physical fall of the seat of power of the eastern Christian Empire changed the equations of power and the possible imaginations of configuring power. The Turks had entered and captured the area of the lower Danube, i.e. Hungary and large parts of Mediterranean and North Africa. The situation of increasing national fervour in Europe was a resultant reaction; especially the autonomy proclaimed by England, France and Spain. Internally this meant less control from the weakened Roman Empire and more power to the king (Erasmus-Luther 2002).

At this point one must step back to evaluate the primacy of realpolitik in this transition. Realists would argue that it was primarily the fall of Constantinople and thus the relative autonomy from the Church that made possible or even relevant the importance that the questions raised by Luther gained. Ideas thus became secondary. They became justifications for power transitionsor at best catalysts for these transitions. Though the aim of this study is not to establish the primacy of the realpolitik or ideas, it must be stated that the Lutheran ideas though they might not have created a viable environment for nationalisms in the first place, did contribute to the weeding phase where the excesses of the religious were checked (Hendrix 2008) (Brady 2008) (Lehmann 2008). Luther not only questioned unengaged submission to the authority of the clergy but even to the princes.

> God Almighty has driven our princes mad: they really think they can command their subjects whatever they like and do with them as they please. And their subjects are just as deluded, and believe (wrongly) that they must obey them in all things (Luther 1523: 2).

The latter is of immense importance, as Luther does not decry the empire but the princes who later on became the fulcrum of nationalism for their superficial allegiance to the empire on one hand and the actual movement for autonomy underneath. This is the crucial critique which is also in a way the resolution of the problem of how Luther is used to serve the cause of both national particularism and that of empire. The Holy Roman Empire could not do it, because Luther's primary critic was that of the Clergy and then later of the princes. The princes used the former to mobilise their population under the flag of Protestantism – something which the Holy Roman Empire could not control; being a primary target of Luther's critic. Thus, it was the fusion of the papal authority and the temporal power in the Holy Roman Empire that made Luther's critic so lethal to its sustenance. Luther nevertheless also wrote a reprimand to the people blindly obeying the Princes, as if to repeat the original blind obedience to the agency of the clergy, as quoted

above. This lesser acknowledged facet of his work is found in his work, *On Secular Authority*.

History too supports this line of analysis. For in the year 1500CE, when Kaiser Maximilian began the Imperial Reformsby constituting a State Council made of 20 imperial politicians, these were seen as efforts to arrest the decline of the empire. By 1521CE, the Emperor was vested with the right to impose edicts. The princes however continued to pose a challenge to the authority of the empire as the emperor required the princes in order to implement the verdicts he cast as edicts (Luther 1483-1546). For example, the Edict of Worms which disbanded Luther from the empire could not be implemented unless all the princes consented. This conflict helped create a space for the ideas of Reformation to sustain and spread (Lehmann 2008). Luther takes up the issue of edicts as a marker of the disobedience, which the empire had been slighting in the process of its own struggle for supremacy over the Church. For Luther the corruption of the church and that of the empire were a parallel development. He thus remarked,

> They write and issue edicts, [pretending that these] are the Emperor's commands, and that they [themselves] are merely acting as the Emperor's obedient Christian princes, as if they meant it seriously and as if people were incapable of seeing through that sort of subterfuge. If the Emperor were to take away one of their castles or towns, or to command something else that did not seem right to them, we would soon see them finding reasons why they were entitled to resist and disobey him. But as long as it is a question of harassing the poor man and subjecting God's will to their own arbitrary whims, it must be called ‘obedience to the Emperor's commands’ (Luther 1523:3).

Written in Wittenberg in 1523 CE, this small piece was originally addressed to the Duke of Saxony. The piece is written in Luther’s typical ferocious style attacking the Christian princes, Sophists, the academics and those who called themselves Christian only in name. The pamphlet is titled *On Secular Authority: How Far Should it be Obeyed? How Far Does the Obedience Owed to it Extend?* Clearly, at a time when Luther saw a situation of moral crisis in the Church, he was also concerned about its reflection in the world

outside. He dealt with the question of the relation that Christians should have to temporal or secular authority. He did not deny that Christians must obey the rule of the law but he did not argue for it as for the same reasons as do the Sophists. The Sophists advocated that bishops could take up the sword and thus attribute the secular authority to themselves and thereby gave the same primacy to the temporal and spiritual sphere. For the Sophists, Obedience to the latter thus implied obedience to the former.

For Luther the question is twofold – firstly, do Christians need to obey any other authority but God? Secondly, as Christ himself forsake both this world and violence i.e. the sword, do rulers who rule in the name of the faith have a right to do so? In other words, is it un-Christian to have an empire that needed to be defended with a sword? It is clear that these must be very pertinent and disturbing questions for the time especially for a reformist like Luther who advocated staunchly going back to the word of God and finding one's own salvation without any mediation (Luther 1483-1546). He thus lashed out at the Sophists and the academics who prescribed merely a nominal value to the word of God when it came to these matters. The Sophists in their bid to facilitate the princes' access to the sword called the commands of God with respect to violence as mere counsels. This to Luther meant under valuing the importance of what God said and interpreting Him to one's own convenience. Secondly, Luther also criticises the Christian princes whose obedience to the Holy Roman Emperor was only in name. These princes he said ruled and punished in the name of the authority derived from the emperor but in all respects had no real obligation to the emperor and thus to the faith when they rule.

Luther established that the relation between the secular sword and Christians is a very social one. It is because the Christians had to live alongside the non-Christian – who in his opinion was imperfect and needed to be tamed by the secular sword –that the Christian must obey the secular sword.

> …And for the rest God has established another government, outside the Christian estate and the kingdom of God, and has cast them into subjection to the Sword. So that, however much they would like to do evil, they are unable to act in accordance with their inclinations, or, if they do, they cannot do so without fear, or enjoy peace and good fortune (Luther 1523: 6).

It is thus for the benefit of the others that Christians should obey the temporal authorities, who need Christians to set example for others of living an ideal social life. Thus in Luther's scheme, the empire was not outside of the Christian ideal and may be even necessary for it. Both Protestantism and the favouring of empire – as a singular rule was used by the British empire, firstly to inscribe a common identity upon the people of England, Scotland and Ireland and secondly to expand the dominion of a singular rule in a Protestant state-empire. But as the empire expanded further through trade, new challenges were thrown in. Especially, in the Indian colonies where a vast majority of people did not resemble the British in any respect, least of all in religion. This required new justifications as adages to the imperial ideology. This interaction in the colonies of both the Americas and India also led to religious tensions between the British and their colonial subjects.More importantly the colonists themselves went to wars with religion as a central issue of contention. Expansion through trade required religious toleration.

Grotius and the Liberal Inquiry of Christianity

This period thus can also be seen as the origin of the liberal doctrines of institutionalisation. It will thus be appropriate to read this through the work of Hugo Grotius who instituted the laws of the seas– on which stands the edifice of much of contemporary international law – including that of international trade till date. A prodigy of sorts, this scholar from Holland came from a well to do family. He received a nourishing education and was very early on identified and selected for service by the Dutch statesman Oldenbarenevelt. It was he who took Grotius to the court of Henry IV-

the meeting that went on to become a legend where impressed by the knowledge of this young Dutchman, called him "the miracle of Holland". This boy would later go on to acquire the title of "the father of International Law".

Grotius has become immortalised in the world of international politics for his work *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (*On the Law of War and Peace)* a treatise he wrote in 1625CEconsidered as the text that laid the foundations of contemporary International law. He is also given the credit for having first systematically theorised natural law and tied them to the concept of rights. His work inspired the social contract theorists and later libertarians. Having said that, the present section will study not *De Jure* but another text called *The Truth of the Christian Religion.* Unlike *De Jure* this is a lesser-known text, however *De Jure* gained prominence long after Grotius passed away. During his lifetime, the book that gained much attention of the scholarly and the general public alike was *The Truth of the Christian Religion.* Thusmuch of the influence that Grotius maintained apart from his practical legal work in which he advised on high profile legal conflicts between nations was anoutcome of this work. The book also written in the classical six books format just like *De Jure* was so famous that it had to be reprinted several times on demand. Choosing this book, as stated, does not bereft one from the method of Grotius's classical writing. He maintains a similar style in *De Jure* with both texts having a very strong Aristotelian influence. This is another reason for choosing the book. In addition, and most important reason for choosing this text is its subject and the profound impact that it had on all of Grotius's scholarship and personal life. It deals not only with the concern as shared with Bodin of a more moderate and universal religion for the period torn by wars of religion, but also with the subject of the political unit (Brady 2008 b). It is interesting that unlike in Bodin and Grotius' *De Jure*, in this text empires find a place. Even though this work has also been read as a work of a Christian apologist, the present analysis will deal primarily with how faith shaped the political imagination in Grotius and how he defended it as a reasonable and rational co-relation.

Hugo Grotius, who was the first to codify these laws, too was battling the challenges that this transition from a catholic empire to a Protestant state empire entailed. The expansion on the seas and across it required a relative quiet at home. An empire of trade especially, required religious tolerance and the use of one's own religion to further the imperial goals required molding one's faith or at least revisiting it to make it compatible with the new political goals. He understands empires as a proof of the superiority of the Christian religion but also at the same time as a vehicle to take this truth to other parts. In Section XII of his six books on the "Truth of Christian Religion" he states,

> The preservation of commonwealths hath been acknowledged, both by philosophers and historians, to be no mean argument for the Divine Providence over human affairs. First, in general; because wherever good order in government and obedience hath been once admitted, it has been always retained; and in particular, certain forms of government have continued for many ages; as that of kings among the Assyrians, Egyptians, and Franks; and that of aristocracy among the Venetians. Now, though human wisdom may go a good way towards this, yet, if it be duly considered what a multitude of wicked men there are, how many external evils, how liable things are in their own nature to change; we can hardly imagine any government should subsist so long without the peculiar care of the Deity (Grotius 1583-1645: 39).

Born in 1583CEin the Delft region of Holland, Grotiuswas born in a family of political influence. His father was the chief magistrate of the town of Delft and was also the curator of the University of Leiden. Grotius took his education at the same university and had the honour of being selected for the same at the age of 11. This prepared him enough to accompany the Dutch statesman Oldenbarenevelt on a diplomatic mission to the French king, the story of which has been narrated above. By the age of 16 Grotius had published his first book titled*Martiani Minei Felicis Capellæ Carthaginiensis viri proconsularis Satyricon, in quo De nuptiis Philologiæ & Mercurij libri duo, & De septem artibus liberalibus libri singulares. Omnes, & emendati, & Notis, siue Februis Hug. Grotii illustrate*(O'Donovan1999). It was at 16, that he became an advocate to The

Hague. In the years to come, he got his first chance to work first hand on issues concerning the problems of international justice as the increasing trade across the seas also led to increasing conflict of interest and interpretations of existing laws within the merchants (Grotius 2005).

He advised the royalty and merchant companies and also assisted statesmen. His talents earned him the position of the Attorney General of Holland, a position for which he was chosen over other more experienced candidates. His next big appointment was as a Pensionary of Rotterdam at the age of 30. It was in this very decade that big political power and religious controversies caught up with Grotius. In a case of sea dispute between the English and the Dutch over a Dutch ship faring into the English waters, despite having won the legal argument Grotius had to concede the ship and its goods to the English as they were a bigger power. This brought him face to face with the challenge of laying down international laws in a world where strong and weak states existed beside and relative to each other. On the religious front, like in most of post-Lutheran Europe dispute on theological matters had broken out in Holland. The specific spat that occurred in this period was between Orthodox Calvinists and the reformist Arminists who challenged the belief that every soul was to be granted salvation irrespective of their conduct in earthly life. They argued that salvation irrespective of good conduct would make the concept of free will irrelevant. This divided the moderate or tolerant also termed as Remonstrants and those who aligned with the Calvinist establishment which included Prince Maurice, Grotius' benefactor, called the Contra-Remonstarnts. Grotius sided with the Remonstrants,which made his situation all the more complicated with the appointment of Vorstius who was a reformist theologian in the position of the Chair of Theology at Leiden. The matter became a big controversy not only because Vorstius was chosen to replace an orthodox theologian but also because his teachings were seen to be too liberal, to be termed as "beyond Arminism" and thus heretic or irreligious. Vorstius' appointment was backed by Oldenbarnvelt with whom Grotius closely worked, and he also continued to defend his actions in office. The controversy boiled over beyond

borders when King James I of England pointed out that Vorstius was not only backed by the Remonstrant leaders in Holland but also that he was preaching heresy (Knud 1985) (Edwards 1970). This led to his books being burnt across English Universities including Oxford, Cambridge and the University of London. It was at this point that Grotius making an appeal for reason wrote a pamphlet titled *Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae Pietas* inwhich he defended academic freedom and argued that academic appointments should not be tampered with on the will of religious or political authorities. The pamphlet had such a vitiating counter response that Grotius had to go to jail in 1618CEand spent the rest of his life defending his defence of Arminism. Grotius also authored an edict titled *Decretum pro pace ecclesiarum* in 1614CE, when Holland declared its policy of religious toleration. The Edict proclaimed what may be the most important contribution articulated by Grotius that any authority whose primary concern is ought to be maintaining civil order should not concern itself with the particulars of its subjects' personal beliefs and theological doctrines. Grotius was by no means a non-believer, but he was beyond doubt one of those who wanted to see religion with an open mind. It is ironic that this same man has also beencharacterised as an apologist of Christian faith and empires based on faith– a criticism not completely untrue. What is interesting to note is that it goes unnoticed that studying the classic *De Jure* removed from this context as is often done in international politics today can provide no insight into the text and its constitutive or formative motivations.

It is with this analysis that the text *The Truth of the Christian Religion* has been included in this study. The following section will try to understand the themes of faith, reason – (not to be understood as absence of religion) and empires in this Grotian text.As the religious controversy deepened, Olderverbaldt fell out of Maurice's favour. This landed Grotius in prison from where he escaped hiding in a chest of books to France in 1621CE. It was in France that he translated his work *Bewijs van den waren Godsdienst* written in prison in verse form to prose and it was published in Latin in 1627CEas *De veritate religionis Christianae*.As stated earlier, the text is divided into six books. Grotius begins

by explaining the occasion of writing the text in which he says the text 'gives him the liberty denied to his body…( )..and that truth can be defended by nothing but truth and such that the mind is fully satisfied with'. However in the next few lines, he also states that he writes it primarily for the sea faring men of Holland who have a lot of time on hand while sailing, and that he writes in verse for their easy reading for it is through them that the Christian religion can further itself. The text then goes on to give a systematic account of why and how Christianity is a true religion. It is a historical, textual and comparative account of religions (Husik 1925) (Herring 2004) (Cutler 1991).

Grotius begins by explaining the idea of God, in which he sticks largely to the Christian conception of one supreme lord. However what he tries to do in the first book is important in that he tries to prove why this conception of God, alongwith the miracles and idea of life after death associated by it is not 'repugnant to reason'. This points to the fact that the word of the God in itself is not enough and that faith must be scrutinised by human reason. As Grotius stated, 'one cannot convince others of what you are yourself not convinced' (Grotius 2004). In book II, he presented and evaluated the historical proof of Jesus and instances related to his life and this is what he meant by the truth of Christian religion – that it is not based on mythical stories but historical facts. He was not claiming a universal truth for Christianity (Herring 2004). The work then scrutinises the Christian scriptures and the last three books are dedicated to evaluate the pagan, Judaic and Mohammadean faiths (Ziskind 1973) (Rabkin 1997).

An important question to ask is how this relates to what Grotius theorised about empires, political units and the theory of the relationship between them. In Book III, he dedicated an entire section to the subject of empires. The preservation of commonwealth he argued depends on not just the acquisition but on retaining the good government. Grotius adheres to the theory that the empires which sustain themselves do so because of divine providence and thus they are good (Ziskind 1973). If we see his ideas of universal rights in this context he can be argued to be giving a theory of expansion. However if one looks

at the second part of the book wherein he gives a historical –comparative account of other religions pointing out that other faiths and religions have successfully prospered chronologically and temporally; Grotius can also be read as a liberal as done in the liberal readings of Isaiah Berlin and others. As such, it is improper to judge a thinker on how his ideas were put to use. This however need not qualify as an anomaly because empires require both religious toleration and religious sanction derived by control over religious authority.

The sustenance of the empire posed another crucial challenge to the British empire especially at home as the idea of national particularism was centered on Englishness and the liberty of the English whose only expansion was imagined be to the religiously protestant sect to form a political dominion of their own.

Machiavellian Grandezza at the Service of the Empire

The expansion to other lands exhibited as a problem of justifying and sustaining the power extended beyond dominions – it was here that Machiavelli was brought to the rescue of British imperialism. The navigation of empire through the category of liberty in Machiavelli thus done through the use of his insistence on the concept of Grandezza or the importance of greatness in imagining and more importantly sustaining a political dominion. Machiavelli wasn't however, by any means the only thinker who informed the corpus which was employed by the British to reinvent and understand their own imperial expansion. Machiavelli nevertheless, demanded a special place in the intellectual history of political thought not only because he brings in the importance of the present histories of polity into theorizing politics but also because he sets in motion an important tradition of distinguishing theory from rhetoric. This was a result not only of the political context in which he operated but also his own personal experiences in the political world of Rennaissance Florence to which he was subjected. He is not considered strictly as a theorist by many a scholarship but as someone who advised on statecraft, yet it was this

very political historian (Vatter 2013) who brought both a humanistic and democratizing turn in how the political was imagined and for whom. It is interesting that at this turn, the thinkers that come to shape politics make themselves stand apart from the strictly academic corpus who were in the universities with their knowledge of the classics. For both Luther and Machiavelli, the subject of their writing was unconventional. Especially though the literature for *Prince* was an established form, the end – retaining power for the sake of retaining it, for political stability in the human world and not for reasons of the divine; and the guidance for the same was not furthered in such anexplicit fashion before. Machiavelli's humble background and personal ambition in a republican system ruled by the noble and rich families was a lesson in the conflict between theory and reality. The earliest influence was his father and lawyer who called himself a "humanist" who had to struggle to afford for young Niccolo an education in liberal arts. Practising law or teaching at the university required money and influence but a whole lot of humanists who would otherwise have ended as bookkeepers got a chance to enter the chancery of the republican governments. Torn between the strong influence of philological humanism from the classic sources which advocated a strong defence of the values of the republic and freedom etched in the political memory of the Florentines and the usurpation and concentration of power in the hands of one particular family – the Medicis; Machiavelli as an astute member of the chancery could still foresee that the bigger threats to these values came from the church and not the aristocrats. He thus attacked the intellectual obstinacy of the church more than the political ambitions of the monarch. The former, he argued were more programmatically against the values of freedom and republic , the latter only needed training, manoeuvring and thus help from the likes of Machiavelli (Luchesse 2105:16). His work thus became an instruction in how to make sense of politics through political history to achieve a combination of the now proverbial *virtu* with the equally proverbial *fortuna*. Machiavelli goes beyond Luther, in that he apart from stating outright that the church needs to be out of the business of the prince, strongly advocates the use of religion as defined by the prince to consolidate power. In a section where he discusses a scenario where a prince is likely to find a new successor in the

Church who is not friendly to him, Machiavelli states hypothetically stating what Alexander would do,

> He thought he might secure himself against this in four modes: first, to eliminate the bloodlines of all those lords he had despoiled, so as to take that opportunity away from the pope; second, to win over to himself all the gentlemen in Rome, as was said, so as to be able to hold the pope in check with them; third, to make the College of Cardinals as much as he could; fourth, to acquire so much empire before the pope died that he could resist a first attack on his own. (Machiavelli 1532: 31).

In another warning against allowing the Pope to acquire power in temporal affairs, he states

> …in recent times as soon as Italy began to repel the empire, and the pope gained much reputation in temporal affairs, Italy divided into many states" (Machiavelli 1532: 52).

Moreover, Machiavelli argues statecraft is the only way and religion is only one of the many tools which the prince must employ at the service of his imperial ambition. For Machiavelli conquest is important but a conquest whose legitimacy has been established is all the more important; and in this religion is a tool which the prince must employ. Thus, the difference between the empire (by which Machiavelli means a territory held by conquest or sheer power) and grandezza or glory (an imperium which rules with the legitimacy and allegiance of its subjects and kingdoms) is the key to true and lasting imperial power.

Machiavelli thus includes stability, order and legitimacy to the integrals of his empire 'because the prince cannot acquire glory for himself without bringing order to his principality, (thus) using religion for himself is using it to answer human necessities generally (Mansfield: 21). In his own words,

> ..a disorder should never be allowed to continue so as to avoid a war, because that is not to avoid it but to defer it to your disadvantage (Machiavelli 1532: 15).

It is thus no coincidence that he spends considerable time in discussing how the failure of rulers to achieve this, has led to a fall of numerous empires in the past. The British resolution of the paradox of liberty and empire found much of its resolution in Machiavelli. An empire which commanded legitimacy did not overrule liberty of its subjects. This line of justifications was prevalent in the American colonial discourse (Armitage 2000) whereas the use of religion at the service of the empire had been integral to the ideology of the British empire in India (Metcalf 1997).

> Yet one cannot call it virtue to kill one's citizens, betray one's friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to acquire empire, but not glory (Machiavelli1532:35).

David Armitage in his work on the ideological origins of the British Empire conclusively traces the immense influence of Machiavelli thinking about Empires on important thinkers, politicians and statesman of the British Empire. Most prominent amongst these are the British Libertarian John Lilburn, the Republican thinker and author of the *Commonwealth of Oceana* and the poet and civil servant of the British Commonwealth John Milton. The defenders of the Commonwealth found an important resource in Maciavelli according to Armitage (Armitage 2000: 133- 138). It will be useful to now draw the sources from which Machiavelli evolves his own thought.

Machiavelli grew up in Florence which was at that time the hub of commercial and banking activities. With the values of freedom and republic overriding in the public conscience, the power always rested with the few noble families– strongest amongst them the Medicis. However the city could maintain the values of freedom and republicanism, thanks to a tradition of humanists, thinkers, artists, philosophers performing as public intellectuals and conversing with both the history and the present of the Florentines in

public places. It was one such encounter with Savanarola [35]that had a profound influence on Machiavelli – which will be discussed in the next section.

Machiavelli could not only notice this farce but was also the first one to very courageously point it out. He could also see that though the city could bolster its ego by fashioning itself as one enshrined in great values – it could not escape the fact that it was politically very weak;a fact that it could not fundamentally alter given its own resources (Skinner 1981). What was a bigger concern for Machiavelli was that the powers of the time could not or rather chose not to articulate the problem stepped in the political geography of their region. The seat of the Catholic Church at Rome played the role of a puppeteer with the help of the "real powers" in the region to continuously make and unmake the powers in the so called independent city states of Italy. Hopelessly divided, these states rather than uniting against the big powers like Spain, France, England, Germany and the Saracens invited them to make life difficult for their small Italian neighbours. This made Italy the theatre for the power play of these big powers –where they played their moves on the chessboard of the Italian landscape.

It was thus inevitable that the French finally took the city of Florence without any resistance when it invaded Italy. Machiavelli was 25 at that time and what bothered him more was that prince Medici was actually facilitating the vassalage of the city of Florence to the French.

Machiavelli read early on a combination of Classical and Scholastic philosophy. It was his father who made sure the young Niccolo had access to the Greek and Roman history as well as the Scholastics. Machiavelli was influenced by the works of Titus Livy, Cicero, Polybius and Aristotle; as well as Aquinas. He was also educated in Italian literature in the tradition of Dante and Boccaccio. However it is in his radical use (Luchesse 2015) of

[35] (1452-1498) Italian Christian preacher, reformer, and martyr, renowned for his clash with tyrannical rulers and a corrupt clergy. After the overthrow of the Medici in 1494, Savonarola was the sole leader of Florence, setting up a democratic republic (Encyclopaedia Britannica).

the classics that the strength of Machiavelli lies. The importance of history not as a dead gone past but something that keeps reproducing exhibiting and performing itself in the present is a characteristic of his works (Skinner 1981).

Yet there is also an analysis of the psyche of the ruler– of the affective requirements of the ruler, the passions that should guide them, the human experience of ruling and being ruled. This could have largely been influenced by another important figure in Machiavelli's life – Girolamo Savonarola. Almost all works on Machiavelli have done an extensive analysis of the influence of this Dominican friar who preached publicly in Florence in defence of the most deprived classes of the society. In the context of the degradation of opulence of the church, the teachings of austere life by fierce friars like Luther or Savanarola had a great appeal. However, Machiavelli was not as impressed by the Platonic philosopher king. The preference of Thomist primacy to princely government or the church as a republican order in Savanarola's sermons was ripe with its obvious and debilitating limitations to Machiavelli, despite its influence (Skinner 1978 a). He rather took the important lessons of the importance of religion in politics, its effect and capacity to capture the imagination of people but also the limitations of religious power without the presence of a counter-power to fight it. It was briefly this intellectual and political context in which Machiavelli took up the second chancery of the regime. Though he was banished for being perceived as a republican and wrote most of his work under his punishment of house arrest, we can safely believe that he had the time to reflect on his influences while writing.

Dubbed by the Jesuits as having being written in Devil's own hands,*The Prince* has received much criticism for being an advocacy of cruelty and unabated ambition. Althusser notes that the entry on Machiavellinism in the *Encyclopedie* states that *The Prince* has acted unprecedented attention because it 'teaches rulers to trample on religion, the rules of justice, the sanctity of treatises and everything sacred' (Althusser 1999:106).

Machiavelli's position on religion thus is not Lutherian reformist or Gramscian utopian, but analytical in that he identifies the role of religion as impeding the political to take over. In that he is closer to Gramsci, because he realises the profane nature of the accepted virtues of the world. This section will limit itself to pointing out *The Prince* firstly, in the light of its take of religion – articulating it, not as an ideological superstructure internalised by public but as a political actor intervening in the national unity of Italy. Secondly, it will look at the imagination of political units in Machiavelli's book. It is not of small consequence that the elimination of religion from politics and the nation as a political unit opposed to empire is conceptualised in the same breath in *The Prince*. Placing himself in the small city-state of Florence, he imagines a national unification of Italians against the neighbouring empires. There are more direct references available in the *Discourses*.[36]It must be emphasised that Machiavelli asks the Prince to liberate Florence from the "barbarian" yoke (Machiavelli 1532: 105). He is thus clearly advocating a new way of doing politics of de-religionising it and therefore humanizing it,where politics is, the terrain of humans not of God.The call for the national unity of the Italian city states despite and because his own avowed dedication to the republican values articulating them from the point of view of the political subject is a very important and often neglected theme from Machiavelli. Unifying republican city states to counter both empires and the church which was an impediment – both materially and ideologically – but primarily materially, seen from an international relations perspective is an opportunity for, not only tracing the birth of or transition in political units; but also third party responses to the theory of church vs. state as the only actors in the power struggle in the period. This Machaivellian moment in the Prince is crucial not only because it

[36]*The Prince* and the *Discourses* - for example, in Book I, Chapter 12 of the *Discourses*, in connection with condemnation of the Roman Catholic Church's politics:
'[T]he church has kept and still keeps this land divided, and truly, *no land is ever united or happy unless it comes completely under the obedience of a single republic or a single prince*, as has occurred in France and Spain. The reason why Italy is not in that same condition and why it ... does not have either a single republic or a single prince to govern it lies solely with the church, because although the church has its place of residence in Italy and has held temporal power there, it has not been so powerful nor has it possessed enough skill to be able to occupy the remaining parts of Italy and make itself ruler of this country'(Machiavelli qouted in Althusser 1999:53).

questions faith but also because it teaches the prince to use it, not only because it employs reason but also humanises it – in its limits and capacities and thirdly it gives us a picture of how authority was negotiated with secular empires vis-a-vis the religious Empire.

Bodin: The Commonwealth above the Church and the Crown

Another important work that needs to be read in the context of the empire is Bodin's *Six Books on the Commonwealth*. Bodin's imagination of what constitutes a commonwealth though read primarily as the manifesto for the state was instrumental for the British Empire in the later period when the plank of Protestantism begins to seem insufficient to hold the empire together internally. Externally, Britain was still competing in the shadows of the historic memory of the religious wars and the intervention of other imperial powers through religion is not scant. The problem of institutional weakness that ensued from this, plagued the empire and required a way of not only an ideological unifier of empire but a parallel instrument of centralizing that power. The theorisation of the concept of 'politiques' in Bodin provided both, a framework of a strong centre and the imagination of an expanded commonwealth,which was at the helm of religious authority.

> …. Theparty of the politiques, whose distinction it was, in an age of rising fanaticism, to hold that the state is primarily concerned with the maintenance of order and not with the establishment of true religion. The party therefore stood for the absolute authority of the monarchy to determine the measures necessary to that end, and its unqualified right to demand obedience, as against the doctrine of the right of resistance in the name of religion…..Civil war inspired..(in him) a horror of rebellion and the anarchy that comes in its train, and convinced him that the politiques were right, and that the only remedy was the recognition of the absolute authority of the state 'to which, after immortal God, we owe all things (Bodin 1576: 7-8).

Bodin however was writing in context of the French situation. Marred by the religious wars, France had collapsed into a state of complete anarchy in this period. Jean Bodin

was born in a wealthy family, son of a master tailor and received a very good education from early on. A self-proclaimed devout Christian himself, Bodin questioned the authority of the *Corpus Juris*– a text studied under chapter three of this work. Clearly both the nature of politics and religion had changed considerably since then. The challenge to the Christian Empire under the church became grave so did the challenge to the Catholic Church and the faith it preached. Protestantism was spreading and the two rival camps having born from the same womb were fighting out political wars in Europe. This is a period of utter chaos and it is in this context is the ground for germination of Bodin's theory of sovereignty – an absolute authority in the hands of the sovereign – who makes religion less important in politics not by abolishing it but by controlling it to an extent that the ruler comes to define it. This is aptly brought out in the first chapter of his Book IV in which Bodin discussed the rise and fall of commonwealths.

> If the constitution of the sovereign body remains unaltered, change in laws, customs, religion, or even change of situation, is not properly a change in the commonwealth, but merely alteration in an already existing one. On the other hand the form of the government of a commonwealth may change while the laws and customs remain what they were, except as they affect the exercise of sovereign power. This happened when Florence was converted from a popular state into a monarchy (Bodin 1576: 145).

The forces of feudalism, revived under declining royal authority, and those of religious animosity, stimulated by the Reformation, reduced France to anarchy. Imminent or actual civil war was for four decades the prevailing condition (Tackett 2006), (Dunning 1896:83). It is thus important to study the political context of this situation in detail to be able to use this work to understand its adaption by the imperialists. The French Wars of Religion of the sixteenth century even until the 1997 publication of David Potter's *French Wars of Religion: Selected Documents* remained under-translated as a primary document. Though debates abound, historians largely agree that this was a war between the aristocratic families of France backed by foreign powers. The 1563 Massacare of Vassy and the 1598 Edict of Nantes are agreed upon as the beginning and end point of

these wars respectively (Tackett 2006). Though the entire episode is a complex story of diplomatic, strategic and religious warfare, it will suffice to state major part of the story here.

Since the 1530s, under the influence of John Calvin, several people from France came under the influence of Protestantism. Three decades later that is at the cusp of the religious war, the Protestants derisively called the Huguenots, constituted one-eighth of the French population. The French crown had been lenient and recognised the right of these people to practice their faith.However, these groups were seen as an increasing threat by the religious majority. The Church too, interfering from the outside on the part of the Catholics played a role. This led to a situation of division in command (Brown and Tackett 2006). This could have arguably been the formative situation that inspired the need for Bodin's theory of absolute sovereignty.

The French wars of religion are a perfect example of how the period saw the overlapped use of religion and politics by each other; but it is also a lesson in how obstinately religious affiliationswere embedded and turned the course of political histories. The fact that Henry IV could not capture Paris in the year 1590 as it was so resolutely Catholic to allow a Protestant king to take over is an example. The king thus had to not only convert himself over to Protestantism but also attack Spain which was supporting the Protestant League to create unrest in France. It was then argued that no other nation can be allowed to attack France in the name of religion, but it was also done to prove that the conversion of Henry wasn't a mere act of appeasement or strategy to capture power.

Another important development that this led to which must be pointed out here is that the layered overlaps within religion and politics were resolved in the political itself, i.e. the state took primacy over religion not to win but to stop the war and infighting. It can thus be argued that the reasoned calculation for the acquisition of power here triumphed over the Protestant faith. Attorney at the Paris Parliament at the time when the religious wars

broke out, Bodin himself had to prove his allegiance to the Catholic faith. He was also imprisoned during the Third War of Religion in the year 1568- 1570. Just like Henry IV switched his religious allegiance; Bodin too, switched his political allegiance from Prince Francois to Henry IV when it became amply clear that Francois' was the losing side. This can be seen as an expression of the confusion that the times exerted on people, rulers and thinkers whose allegiance to their faith and politics were for the first time beginning to become mutually exclusive.

> It is they who have founded all the great empires which have flourished in arms and in laws. God has so distributed His favours that great strength and great cunning are never allied either in men or in beasts, for there is nothing more cruel than injustice armed with force. People of the middle regions have more physical energy but less cunning thansoutherners, and more intelligence but less strength than northerners. They are better fitted to command, and to govern commonwealths, and they are more just in their conduct (Bodin 1756: 186).

The Six Books on Commonwealth which has been defined by *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* as "the sum total of the legal and political philosophy of the French Renaissance" was written in this context (Turchetti 2010). In many ways however this definition does not capture the real meaning or the intention with which the book was written. Both Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Bodin's *Commonwealth* were new in contrary terms. Machiavelli in the method of writing the text– he did not try to lay out judicious argument in a classical sense-did not give a definitional terrain to limit the reader in and had a lucid straight forward way of writing. Bodin's work on the other hand shows the influence of his conservative academic training, which even when he was talking about the novel subject matter does not inhibit him from designing the contents of his work based on Aristotle's *Politics*. He first lays down all his operative definitions – an influence of both his classical and legal training, then like an astute academic, gives the evidence on the basis of which he was going to forward his argument and follows it up with his analysis. Unlike Machiavelli, he is like a Roman poet sticking to his heroic meter singing his inquires not in the praise of the medieval favourites –the church and the

crown but the new protagonist – the State. It must be underlined here that, the commonwealth that Bodin talks about is conceptualised as something that has existed and will exist despite the church and the crown. It can thus arguably be called the very first theorisation of the political organization of the state in the modern sense of the term. Bodin's own criticism of Machiavelli about the limited nature of his sources and thus the limited scope of his argument derives itself from here (Bodin 1576).

The subject matter of the *Commonwealth* is new not just because it is about the state and not about the conflict of authority between the church and the crown, but because it for the first time, distinguishes the state not only from the church but also from the crown. Its genius lies in the fact that it extrapolates the location of authority and sovereignty from the agents of the state and makes it actor-independent. It abstracts the concept of the state and thus makes itself into a universal argument. It frees the location by articulating the state as a commonwealth– thereby shifting agency to the common– the*demos* and then it calls for the accumulation of sovereignty in the commonwealth. This analysis of the state as an organism in its own right where authority– ideational or material plays out but waxes and wanes was revolutionary for its time.

This as the times in which he lived, without doubt required negotiation with Bodin's own conceptions of faith. *Heptaplomeres* his last work written in form of a dialogue between adherents of people of different faiths; also gives an insight into Bodin's own religious views, his defence of a personal religion and the need for a common agreement as regards religion for the possibility of a peaceful and effective public life. Finally, the concept of Sovereignty though derived from the necessity of peace and a centre of command for the French kingdom, was influenced by the politiques movement of which he was a part (Bodin 1576). The politiques insisted on the concentration of power in the hands of the ruler after God but theorizing it was a challenge Bodin faced. His study of the Roman law had exposed him to such a conception of power, but he wanted to de-contextualise and

thus delimit both the nature and thus the concept of such unlimited power in order to construct a 'universal science of politics'.

As stated earlier, this chapter breaks the earlier pattern of setting a whole transformation in one historical context. Though sketching historical meta-narratives is almost always possible, the four authors discussed here are responding to very specific challenges in their respective epochs, not in terms of circumstances but also in terms of what they can perceive of as an imminent strategy to the philosophical problems of their age. In this vein, it must also be mentioned that Luther and Machiavelli suggest for the idea of Empire which was very different from what Bodin and Grotius imply.

Before discussing the differences, it will be helpful to highlight the common patterns. Firstly, all these authors observed the violability of the institutions they were operating in. It is important because they did not have the benefit of hindsight as we did. Luther could not have been sure that the hold of the Christian church over the moral capacity of people was to decline; Machiavelli could not have imagined a world with sovereign republics based on the Italian city states model, Bodin for sure had no idea that he was laying down the theory of the modern state nor did Grotius realised that his arguments were de-centring the debate from religion to reason as the legitimizing principle in deciding over matters of public life. For all of them, their questions were at one level of those of the philosophy of their self.

This applies in varying degrees to the authors discussed in the chapter but most of all to Luther. Luther's discontent with himself convinced him that what he was being told to do by the church was in no way taking him to God. Thus making himself the measure of deciding what it is to be spiritual, he opened up a host of questions for the Church and then the political state at the time – the empire.

The Lutheran revolution led to important developments and the struggle between the Protestants and the Catholics turned into a struggle between the Church and the Lutheran Princes and also the Church and the Empire. It is important to bring in here, the tendency in mainstream IR thinking about viewing the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as a radical break when suddenly earlier empires based on religions make space for the secular European States systems (Schmidt 2011). The study of political thought is a devastating rebuttal of this generalisation. Though it is true that Westphalia was a culmination of a number of treaties that ended the Thirty Years' War of Religion in Europe; it needs to be underlined that nor was Westphalia the first treaty to contest the authority of the Church neither was it the first treaty in which the Holy Roman Emperor was one of the signatories recognising the sovereignty of other political units. Both the Treaty of Nuremberg of 1532[37] and the treaty of Augsburg of 1555[38] had de-recognised Church as the only arbiter and authority over religion. One reason of such a misunderstanding could be the fact, that the Peace of Westphalia was the only treaty which was openly condemned by the Catholic Church. Pope Innocent X wrote a condemnation titled *Zelo Domus Dei* in which he criticised the Peace on 'account of its formal recognition of Protestantism' in the Empire and on a 'clause stipulating its own validity despite objections from the Church' (Croxton 1999). However, this was not because the Peace of Westphalia was a radical break but the reason can be attributed largely to the weakening of both the Empire and along with it the weakening of the patronage and protection to the Catholic Church. This was the period when both the Pope and the Emperor were facing a decline in their power. Croxton in his tracing of the Intellectual history of sovereignty states:

[37] The peace of Nuremberg was a protracted ceasefire between Holy Roman Emperor and the Schmalkaldic League (which was a defensive alliance of the Lutheran Princes). It finally granted religious freedom to Protestants. The Roman Catholic Church as a result no more remained the only authority or arbiter of Christian Religion. However, this was hardly a challenge as the history of Christianity has always been dotted by numerous contestations in the form of heresies and various monastic orders.

[38] The Peace of Augsburg was a settlement between Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor (the predecessor of Ferdinand I) and the Schmalkaldic League that accepted the co- existence of Lutheranism and Catholicism in Germany.

> If Westphalia did mark the end of papal authority in the Empire, it was the last in a series of retreats during the previous three hundred years in which popes had been forced to yield authority to kings. Innocent X's predecessor, Urban VIII, one of die organisers of the congress of Westphalia, recognised the limits to his authority and did not try to act as arbitrator; instead, 'in order to spare the sensitivity of the warring powers and not to endanger the peace process, [he] fearfully avoided any appearance of influencing the parties.' (Dickman 1959: 82)

This process accelerated and evolved into a more political self from a philosophical self as we move away from Luther towards Grotius. The individual self and their relation, the possibility of direct communion was a revolutionary idea and extrapolation of this into the individual political citizen who signs an accord each with each, became and remains the dominant basis of thinking politics. To this extent those who cite the Christian influence on western political thinking are not incorrect, however that does not deny them the credit for trying to rationalise the influence of religion, questioning and limiting it, at times discarding it. There is beyond doubt no clear cut distinction between the two unless we reach Hume but these are thinkers of what we may call at the cusp of medieval and modern political thought.

This is also one reason why these authors do not put forward abstract theories but record their discontent to the very real problems that they see around themselves. Their problems to this extent were very real. The cyst in ideas is not independent of the non-viability of the overlap of religious and political – especially after the Reformation. In this context, national particularism as a parallel phenomenon or as a phenomenon complementary to questioning of one universal religious institution dictating the matters of faith and salvation is interesting. For both Machiavelli and Bodin it is the city state, the commonwealth– the nation and not the empire that is the site of liberty. From this position to the defence of the next colonial empire there is another causal interlinking variable. The growth of science that helped demystify the beliefs and power of the Christian church and made it possible to challenge its authority; expanded the geographical horizons for colonizing new peoples and lands through trade. The

arguments for this expansion came from no holy book, but from what was termed as reason and science. The rise of the merchant class and the prosperity that it brought to the coloniser countries also played a key role in the way the context for later writers was shaped. However, the themes of both the individual as the basic unit of politics, its extrapolation to the human body and thus society– an aggregation of these bodies and that of conflation of Christian and European exceptionalism join these authors across centuries. From Luther to Bodin these themes remain an accepted and internalised as normalcy. Even Grotius who does a comparison of religions finds no problem with this. In Luther, it gets manifested in stating that it is for the non-Christian that the Christiansmust participate in the state and obey secular authority. Independent of non-Christians however, Christians do not need to obey secular authority. In Locke, this translates into the right to cultivation as right to property in colonies and auniversal (read European)reason as the sole path to civilisation. This is not to suggest either that these ideas don't move backward and forward across centuries or that these authors themselves claim religious neutrality. What must be underlined is the fact that they radicalise the notion of faith and its relation to the political life. The next chapter discusses this process in detail.



Map 6: European Colonial Holdings 1700 CE

Source: Campo Juan Eduardo (1950)

Chapter 6

The Empire of Paradox

Both historians and International Relations scholars dealing with the intellectual history of British Empire have highlighted the paradox that the imperialists faced, as they advocated liberty at home and executed colonial enslavement abroad. This has been done largely through the study of letters exchanged or diaries written by travel writers and curators of the likes of Samuel Purchas and the Hakyult brothers, not only by IR scholars such as Armitage but even by historians like Canny. The chapter tries to capture another paradox which not only posited itself to the empire but got internalised in western political thinking. This paradox which generated from the fission of the religious and temporal led to a partial translation of the religious in the temporal authority – simultaneously obfuscating and strengthening the religious logic – Christian logic to be more accurate – in the modern political theory. This obfuscated "religio-temporal" understanding was then fashioned as universal and ahistorical reason especially when it was required to be employed for imperial purposes. This was achieved by ascribing to political theories readily available justifications from natural sciences – a process that will be studied here through the work of Hobbes. This is followed by the superimposition of Protestantism on the category of civilisation in Locke and its employment for the imperial expansion. Finally, Hume's attempt at scrutinizing the underlying assumptions of such an exercise through which this new legitimizing principle of reason – at once both oppositional but superior to,and derivative of; the earlier legitimizing principle of religion – will be discussed in this chapter. This by no means is a sudden development nor is it specific to the authors chosen. However these authors can be safely said to be representative of these developments. As the discourse shifted from empires to sovereign states, the role of the Church as an actor reduced though it did not vanish and new actors gradually came to take its place. Several theorists of empire have rightly argued that it is wrong to see the medieval period as primarily the conflict between the Pope and the

Crown. They alsoemphasised on the changes in the conceptions of society that occurred when religion loses its authority. This change will be captured in the section on Hobbes,

So, if the Christian empire though politically loose survived for so long, it is according to some scholars because there was a sense of being part of one Christian society (Brown and Tackett 2006). This nuanced separation between government and legitimate rule is missing when we study political ideas. As a result, from Machiavelli onwards,the study of political thought undergoes a radical break from the medieval explanations of legitimate authority. In these medieval explanations, as the Reformation breaks this religious coherence (which again is an ideal type) we have the empire unable to sustain itself as a society and thus we have the rise of commonwealths. These explanations argue on the one hand that this change was final and irreversible and determined the fate of political units and their unidirectionality from empires to nation states. Such an approach forces one to either see colonial empires as a separate political category from religious empires altogether or to not characterise them as a novel political unit altogether. This is not only in contravention to historical evidence, but introduces an unnecessary break in the political thinking that has progressed not due to a process of elimination but also retention and assimilation of old ideas by transforming them. One interesting way to see this transition is offered by Halden, who sees it by creating three ideal types for these three stages. He identifies the Christian Republic (the Holy Roman Empire), European States System and the Colonial System which led to the present International order as the three stages in the evolution of organizing political units. He then attributes three ideal types to describe the nature of each of these systems of political organization. These are universal embedding, particular atomistic and universal atomistic for each of the three stages respectively. However, he does not see them as strictly linear processes temporally, but geographically as well; as he holds that all three ideal types can be studied from Europe (Halden 2012). The model developedbelow can help one to capture both the disjuncture and the continuity in these political units.



(Halden 2012)

Having stated that, in the last chapter the four authors we dealt with were each dealing with and conceptualizing a different political organization of power while theorizing. Though none of them fall outside of the first two ideal types given by Halden, they are symbolic of the turbulence that the transition from the *Respublica Christiana* to a states system in Europe entailed. It was Christian Kingdoms for Luther, the republican city states ruled by aristocrats in Machiavelli, the aspiring commonwealth of France in Bodin and the International society in Grotius. Yet they were dealing with similar theme – that of religion, the necessity of its reasoned reflection in politics, of the need of reimagining the primacy of religion in thinking about politics and replacing it with, though primordial but human intervention of reason. In the present chapter this process is further refined, in that the authors revisit their categories of viewing politics and the process by which

'reason' as a category gains its oppositional meaning vis-à-vis religion is scrutinised. Also these authors lay primary foundations for the theorisation and rationale of the third ideal type of international political organization i.e. the Universal but atomistic empires beginning from the colonial empires of the new European states.

History of Ideas – Two Long Views

This approach of accessing the history of ideas can be understood when we look at the two already available dominant long-views of studying the history of ideas and try to asses them. The first and more dominant view is to understand ideas in terms of the period in which they occur – whereby we have the division of ancient, medieval and modern ideas in political thought. This view discussed above sees the thinking of Machiavelli as a radical break from the thinking that was prevalent in medieval times. This way of analysing ideas, though a very neat way of thinking about the evolution of ideas, does injustice to both the contradictions and continuities that have existed and persisted in the canon of history of ideas throughout time. The second way of studying history of ideas over time and categorising them is to look at whether they use naturalist or anti-naturalist explanations as the basis of their theory. This appears to be a better prism to employ to study the evolution of ideas in order to understand the empire paradox. This model questions the nature of explanations employed rather than conclusions achieved by theoreticians to classify them. Thus, theories which have natural variables such as human nature as their preoccupation may be called naturalists, whereas those who preoccupy themselves with transcendental or non-observable variables such as divine providence or Plato's forms may be called anti-naturalists. This distinction gives an important observable lens for understanding the theorists at the cusp period between the medieval and modern, apart from the fact that they help us to see the preoccupation with meta-narratives in the later modern political thinking. Thus, rather that treating the enlightenment as a reified distinction what we have in this period are thinkers who use naturalist variables but employ them with anti-naturalist preoccupation – or more

accurately theological preoccupation of not disturbing the timelessness of universal laws and thereby not disturbing the omnipotence of the divine. Ian Shapiro discusses this as a problem which preoccupied Locke for a very long time and that he found its resolution in protecting the omnipotence of God, even if that meant a lack of coherence in his naturalist explanations (Shapiro 2003). The chapter places Hobbes, Locke and Hume in their historical and intellectual context to examine their respective resolution of this paradox.

In his reply to an interview on the life and philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, to a question on what is a *Leviathan*, Quentin Skinner a historian of ideas and scholar on Hobbes answered, "Leviathan is the State and Hobbes gave us the theory of the State" (Pike 2009) . Hobbes may arguably be the political philosopher on whose political philosophy most extensive work has been done. Though his theory of state is not of much relevance for this work, it is particularly for his method – his reliance on science and physics and its extrapolation in the science of politics; and the replacing of virtue in the political thought based on faith to liberty, that Hobbes has been chosen for this study.

Legitimisation of Empire in the Hobbesian Theory of the State

The universal jurisdiction of the Catholic Church had finally begun to crumble by Hobbes' time. The Reformation had spread from central to Western Europe like a wild fire. The kings saw this as an opportune moment to capture their autonomy and everywhere there were wars between Catholic rulers and Protestant princes. The Treaty of Augsburg signed in 1555 was meant to resolve this conflict. The principle of *cuius regio, eius religio (Whose land His Religion)* which mandated that the religion of the ruler which would determine the religion of its population was upheld in this treaty. The subjects who were of another faith were to be allowed to migrate in a peaceful manner. However, this is not how it worked out especially in England where a different Church – the church of England (Anglican Church) had been established much before. This had

already landed the English monarch in conflict with the Church and the Catholics in England. Moreover, the 1534 Act of Supremacy passed under Henry III which declared the supremacy of the monarch over the Anglican Church made matters worse. The Stuarts' attempt to restore Catholicism and the Parliament divided between the Presbyterian idea of establishment of a national church and the Independents and Puritans who wanted to democratise the Parliament in terms of more freedom to religious congregation both added to the turbulence and the civil war ensued.In 1648, the Royalists lost the civil war to Cromwell, an Independent. This was upturned when the Anglicans were restored in 1660 and James II came to the throne with a promise of vengeance to convert everyone to Catholicism. The Tories and the Whigs united, deposed him in 1668, but the mayhem continued for some time. It was in this political context that Thomas Hobbes born in 1588 in Westport (present day Wiltshire) grew up. The information on his childhood is scant but we know that his father was a vicar of Westport and Charlton.

Hobbes completed his education in Church school and then went on to graduate at what would later become the Hertford College, Oxford. He is understood to have loathed scholastic philosophy from early on and left his B. A. degree to become a tutor to the son of Baron of Hardwick. This would become a lifelong acquaintance and played a crucial role in Hobbes' life. The Europe trip that Hobbes had a chance to undertake with the Cavendish family gave him a chance to meet scientists and philosophers. His meetings and conversations with Descartes, Galileo, and mathematicians like Mersenna and Gassendi and Francis Bacon not only convinced him that his skepticism of scholasticism was correct but also helped him develop a nuanced critique of the traditional defenders of the divine rights theory. The Divine Rights theory as has been discussed in the earlier chapters extended the Aristotelian system of things to politics and thereby saw politics as a part of nature. The influence of geometry and physics and the developments in these sciences at the time had a profound impression on Hobbes and it is from here that he developed his critique of the divine right of kings, because for Hobbes politics was artifice – a sphere of man's own wilful creation and thus he wanted to forward the

science of politics which like physics will follow the laws of motion of human body and affections. Hobbes was the first thinker to lay down an architectonic theory of politics– a meta-narrative where the units and their properties could be used to understand all that they could build up. The influence of the sciences was immense in the conceptualisation of the model but this model was not in contravention to the scriptural model, it was only an addition and gave a fuller understanding of the human imitation of the natural or divine world. Thus Hobbes introduced the *Leviathan* as 'artificial man' whose soul is the "artificial soul" – of sovereignty that holds obedience of the 'whole body'. Here artificial is an imitation from the natural– to be understood as the extra-human but also as divine. Shortly after stating this, Hobbes gave us the necessary conditions of this Leviathan primary among which are memory, equity and laws, will, health andconcord; but also 'artificial reason.' These according to Hobbes are qualities a Leviathan must possess. There is a need to ask why in the set of ten odd needful for a *Leviathan*, only one variable is ascribed the adjective of 'artificial' and not others – an epithet shared by the both the body politic – the *Leviathan* as 'artificial man' and its "artificial soul" – of sovereignty. Clearly in the parallel overarching automata of the universe of which the *Leviathan* is an imitation only, those things that exist in the natural world can be imitated. Hobbes was an avid reader of classics and their understanding of limits of how far the humans could imitate nature to set themselves free from necessary conditions of lifewas paralysing to him. His classical sources prescribed the formation of a political society based on various principles as the only solution to the delimiting nature of human social life. This scepticism about classics turned into a vitriolic critique of the classical literature in Hobbes whereby he identified that it was the classics that instilled a wrong sense of what freedom meant for the people. He was especially influenced by Livy's history and disturbed by its overwhelming influence on people in making them believe that freedom was contingent upon a type of government. These books according to Hobbes were instrumental in instilling in the people the drive to disobey authority in favour of people's rule and individual freedom which to Hobbes meant anarchy. Hobbes' artificial reason was to be a navigational principle for this major problem. Amongst his contemporary

intellectual rivals were the leading Parliamentary theorist of his time – Henry Parker – who defended people's right to disobey authority and Sir Robert Filmier who argued for the unaccountable and unquestioned power of the monarch as he was the God's representative on earth. Hobbes' *Leviathan* was in many ways also a critique of these two mainstream positions of his time.

In *The Leviathan*, we see the use of both the methods of reason and rhetoric (Skinner 1978 b). It is important to identify where and how these methods are employed in the text, but more important is to ask as to why these methods are employed together, as Hobbes had repudiated the rhetoric in the first place. Secondly, how Hobbes achieves his political argument and why exactly was he arguing for a *Leviathan* that is the unquestioned obedience to the authority. There are two ways of answering this question – first is the prevalent explanation forwarded by Skinner *et al* on the limited use of mixed method by Hobbes and the answer to this question determines 'how his political argument is achieved'. The following section will explain this interpretation first. This will then be followed by the argument that such a distinction makes invisible the influence of Christian natural understanding of the universe which is collapsed in Hobbesian 'reason'. It will then also be argued that this is not an instance of oversight by Hobbes but a part of his conception of commonwealth, that reason was not to be seen as negation of scripture but could be procured in its distilled form by the methods of science.

In the prevalent view, firstly, on the question of mixed method, it would not be incorrect to argue that though Hobbes uses the rhetorical method in *Leviathan* it is not used for analysis but for explanation. Hobbes seems to be convinced about two things – first, the inevitability of the scientific or rational method from the influence of geometry and physics; and secondly, the need to communicate his argument to the largest possible audience. Given that the large number of people in the England of Hobbes' time were used to reading in the rhetorical method, the political motive of *TheLeviathan* required

the use of rhetoric as a matter of strategy. Hobbes adopts these methods in the discussion on the Covenant. As stated earlier, Hobbes was writing *The Leviathan* at a time when the political opinions like the political environment was volatile and polarised. Moreover, the argument that Hobbes was making in the Leviathan was not at the time an easy argument to make. Caught between the defenders of the traditional rights of the kings to rule as the appointees of God on earth and the Parliamentarians who argued for freedom from the authority which had forfeited the trust of its population, Hobbes was trying to argue that the people owed full and unquestioned obedience and allegiance to the protector and this was not so because it was natural or divinely ordained but because it was required to be chosen in order to abet anarchy. Therefore, given that Hobbes had already freed the realm of politics from being an extension of the divine order (but still arguing that it was made by humans in the light of Gods' creation and is therefore incomplete), the realm of politics required a covenant to function. Now the Parliamentarians argued that the nature of the covenant was such that the people together as a corporate body enter a covenant with the ruler and as in England's case the ruler had failed to respect the contract, it was the right of the people to withdraw their obedience to the king. Hobbes countered this firstly by deconstructing the notion of people as a corporate body. For him, a body in which members are divided against each other cannot be considered as a corporate body and thus the sovereign or the ruler must stand outside the populace. Secondly, he forwarded his own conception of the covenant whereby he argued that the party of the covenant actually are the people where every one person is contracting with the entire whole – each to each – 'people are not a corporate identity, they are a multitude' (Skinner 1978 b). The ruler is thus not a party to the contract and thus not bound by its terms for Hobbes. This is how he countered the second line of opposition who in his views were intoxicated by the classical notions of free man in nature – which to Hobbes becomes a myth once humans enter the realm of politics. From this, is derived the rationale behind Hobbes' argument for *Leviathan*.

The question is why is it that Hobbes as someone who is disenchanted with the influence of religion in politics still argues for an unquestioned authority and here again as in the text, the context takes prominence. The first question that the times pose to the political thinkers is the viability of the monarchy. Had the monarchy run its course with the parliament in place? Now it may seem very democratic to talk in favour of a parliament over the monarch in today's context, it must however be underlined that the English parliament at that time was not only a group of elite and rich white men but it was also against the people's common rights to land; it was representative only of the rich white men. It was thus wrong to presume that they represented the voice of the common people in England. The enclosure movement which earned the parliament of England the name of the "Committee of Landlords" is a good example of this. Moreover, the parliament was not even in support of religious liberty which for Hobbes meant a prospect of complete anarchy in an England and Europe completely torn by religious denominations and their struggle for their right to believe. The Civil war of August 1642 had heightened the need for a stable and peaceful order for Hobbes. This made the existence of monarchy essential for Hobbes.

It is with these concerns, argues Skinner that Hobbes forwarded a theory of a neutral relation between dominance and obedience. Freedom for Hobbes is merely absence of impediment and that does not have to be contingent upon what type of government one has. For Hobbes thus dominance is better than anarchy. Hobbes thus paves the way between the arguments for excessive liberty and excessive authority as a measure for peace in *Leviathan*.

The other way of looking at this can be to problematise the dichotomy of this mixed method paradigm to read Hobbes. This can be done by scrutinising the understanding of reason and delineating its sources in Hobbes. It has been briefly discussed above that

reason in Hobbes is part of the imitation architectonic[39]that he conceived his *Leviathan* to be. This reason is achieved by principle of Nosce teipum (read as thyself), where one man becomes the unit of whose multiple imitation is the Leviathan. Though Hobbes relied heavily on the laws of motion and its uniform applicability to the universe, he was not, so to speak,a strict atomist by the time he was writing. This atomism is derived from the Christian understanding of the human population being the descendants of Adam and Eve and thus one God. What applies to one unit by that reason applies to all – and we have the principle of imitative artificial reason.

> But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, *Nosce teipsum*, *Read thyself*: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance either the barbarous state of men in power towards their inferiors, or to encourage men of low degree to a saucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc. (Hobbes 1651 :82).

> But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly; it serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science (Hobbes 1651:83).

This is not to argue that there is no influence of science on this conceptualisation of reason, rather it is treated as a final validation of the universe working with uniform laws like a big watch. The undertone of the same watchmaker is never lost in the text and thus if the leviathan- the imitation of this larger model, is to be ruled it is by its very definition to be ruled with similar dictums. This comes out quite clearly when Hobbes discusses the unity of methods in all faculties of human knowledge. The physical and the cognitive is

[39] An elaborate architecturehaving a clearly defined structure. Hobbes used this to describe the commonwealth, which according to him was to be an architectural imitation of the natural world which ran on the laws of motion.

premised on the same principles or laws in the Hobbesian scheme. If we look at this in the context of the religious- temporal separation, we do not have a model of fission in Hobbes but that of a continuous non-conflictual relationship as long as it is the sovereign or the temporal has precedence. And it becomes possible for the Sovereign to achieve this only because it is ruled by the principle of artificial reason which is a derivative distillation of natural or divine reason.

> These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers, so the geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficial), angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power, and the like; the logicians teach the same in consequences of words, adding together two names to make an affirmation, and two affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllogisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or conclusion of a syllogism, they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers of politics add together *Pactions*, to find men's duties; and lawyers, laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter so ever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for reason; and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do (Hobbes 1651: 110).

This becomes clearer when Hobbes gives us his definition of reason which he qualifies with his understanding of science. Reason for Hobbes is the process of computation of objective knowledge which is collectively accessible. Reason is not just metaphysical but an act of conquest of humans through naming, classifying, deciphering and thus acquiring the parts of the sensible and physical world. This understanding of reason is very characteristic of enlightenment thinking about how far natural and political world can be understood as a seamless system governed by uniform laws.

> For reason, in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying

> of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by ourselves; and signifying, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men …Reason is not as sense borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attended by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good orderdly Method in proceeding from elements, which are names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to Syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Asseertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand, and that is it, men call science (Hobbes 1651: 111, 115).

The dissection of Hobbesian reason when escaped from the theory that it is a pure derivative from science can not only help us explain Hobbes' *Leviathan* and its Christian undertone but also gives some ammunition to understand the paradox of how the theory of state carries within itself the potential of legitimizing empires with a religious axis that can be argued or obfuscated as reason. This reason as imitation of the natural – a condensed form of scriptural replication so to say, when developed into the category that legitimises the rule of the *Leviathan* not only explains better the reluctance of Hobbes' disobedience but also how the same tradition can be used to argue for say the Lockean enclosures.

> Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of nay private man nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine, farther than it is comfortable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our saviour, supply the place, and sufficiently recompense the want of all other Prophecy;….And this scripture is it, out of which I am to take the principles of my discourse, concerning the Rights of those that are the Supreme Governors on earth, of Christian Common- wealths, and of the duty of Christian Subjects towards their sovereigns…But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false; though it be commonly called error, it is indeed an absurdity, or senseless speech. For error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility discoverable (Hobbes 1651: 414).

It is in his tract on the citizen, titled *De Cive* written before *Leviathan* that Hobbes frontally takes up the issue of Empire. In this tract divided into three sections on Liberty, Empire and Religion, he states why and how religion can and must be used to keep the citizen in obedience to the empire:

> I suppose those ancientsforesaw this,who rather chose to have the Science ofJustice wrapt up in fables, then openly exposed to disputations: for before such questions began to be moved, Princes did not sue for, but already exercised the supreme power. They kept their Empire entire, not by arguments, but by punishing the wicked, and protecting the good; likewise Subjects did not measure what wasjust by the sayings and judgements of private men, but by the Lawes of the Realme; nor were they kept in peace by disputations, but by power and authority: yea they reverenced the supreme power, whether residing in one man or in a councell, as a certain visible divinity; therefore they little used as in our dayes, to joyn themselves with ambitious, and hellish spirits, to the utter ruine of their State; for they could not entertain so strange a phansie as not to desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved; in truth, the simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly. Wherefore it was peace, and a golden age, which ended not before that Saturn being expelled, it was taught lawfull to take up arms against Kings (Hobbes 1642:31).

For Hobbes, the Roman Empire is a good example to emulate not only in its grandeur and power but also in terms of the methods it used. The Empire he argues must use religions no matter how convoluted it is in its endorsement of authority, because of its immense power over the populace. He argues for the rule of the law over liberty to dispute and question of authority, because this he argues finally lapses into only contending claims of power- between princes themselves, amongst citizens and between the princes and the citizens. This for Hobbes is a recipe for ruin and anarchy. For the preservation of the liberty to rule thus, the liberty to disobey must be curtailed. Imperial power is thus justified even if it means the suppression of liberty. Having wrestled with this paradox in *De Cive*Hobbes tried to resolve it in the Leviathan by magnifying the scale not of the empire but that of the laws by which it ought to be governed, central to which is his principle of artificial reason.

Before getting into this question and how that answers our paradox it is necessary to discuss the context that Locke finds himself in. For, it is with John Locke we finally enter the timeline of what we can term as colonial thinkers.

Lockean Defence of Empire

Born in the time of the civil war and having grown up watching his father fighting on the side of the parliament, Locke was a man made by his times. Locke, also known as the father of Liberalism and Empiricism has been equally termed as a theorist of Empire. Starting off on a fairly conservative note, Locke's scholarship took a liberal turn by the acquaintance of his patient[40] and then a lifelong friend the first earl of Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper. All his major works that gained him importance including the text chosen here – *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) were written in the later part of his life. Locke was also deeply interested in questions of religious tolerance and wrote extensively on the subject. As England was increasingly being devoured by the fear of Catholicism taking over, it is argued that Locke's plea for religious toleration could have easily been a form of opposing the monarchical domination. Nevertheless, his writings on religious toleration gained a noticeable traction and were translated in several languages immediately. It is this moment in the thinkers of this cusp that the answer for the empire paradox lies. Though there is an evident commitment in these thinkers to the desire for certainty to be achieved through scientific method rather than through religion or tradition, their understanding of what science constitutes was radically different. In the Lockean scheme of things, the empirical truths or the *aposteriori* truths were relegated to a lower realm than the *apriori* truths which derived their force from their very propositions or definitions. Given that both Hobbes and Locke were basing their theory on human nature and thus were to that extent naturalists. However, for them

[40] Locke had attended classes in iatrochemistry (the early application of chemistry to medicine), and also collaborated with Boyle on important medical research on human blood. In 1666 Ashley was so impressed with Locke that he invited him to become his physician and aide. Later, Locke received a bachelor's degree in medicine from Oxford.

*aposteriori*truths were scientific as opposed to *apriori* or empirical truths because the realm of the *aposteriori* was causal. In other words, we can be certain only of those truths which we can define and use to create knowledge about – like geometry. This did not apply to the natural world – rocks, plants – which we could only observe and speculate but not define as we did not create them. Given that civil and political societies were human creations and we defined their causes, it was categorised into the sphere of propositional or scientific truths – ruled by universal laws – whose spectrum of outcomes can be accurately defined. As a result, moral or normative principles that ruled society also came to be treated as *aposteriori* truths. This became internalised in the political thought laying ground for insistence on objectivity and positivism in the study of political life. This reached its apogee in the Descartian[41] framework where certainty about the political –social world was not only possible but also discernible by mechanistic natural laws.

Hobbes' retention of the scriptural authority as reasonable has been discussed above, this is taken to another level in Locke through a refined architectonic model which can also be called the workmanship model. As discussed above, Locke spent a considerable time on the conflict of whether God can change the natural laws or not. This was arguably the biggest philosophical question of the cusp period. If God could not change the natural laws, it meant that he was not all powerful, and if he could, it meant that the timeless universality of all of the natural laws and by that effect, of all of certainty that science could achieve was brought into question. Locke, an ardent believer and Thomist[42] retained the power of God to alter the natural laws, thereby not only making his theory vulnerable to attacks of incoherence but also uncertainty.

[41] René Descartes (1596—1650).

[42] The theology and philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and its various interpretations, usages, and invocations Aquinas achieved an original synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology. He Thomists treated existence as the supreme act or perfection of being in God as well as in created things, reserved the creative act to God alone, denied the presence of matter in angels, and thus distinguished between God and created beings by positing that only in created beings is existence distinct from essence.

The workmanship model or the creator model that emanates from this treats the political sphere as the creation of human beings, of which they constitute law and those laws are universal and timeless. This was a direct extrapolation of the creation theory and its logic of divine will and its provenance laid down in Christianity. Even the conception of individual rights was then derived from the logic that Creator owns the creation. Thus as God owns human beings because he creates them, human beings can own the political to serve their own freedoms by granting themselves their individual rights. This model however,was given a value neutral character over time and was retained even in the later theories of political thinking in their more secular forms. The following section tries to analyse how these seemingly benign principles seep out an ideology for an empire in Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*.

Of the two treatises, the first one is a critique of the Sir Robert Filmier (also discussed briefly in the section of Hobbes); the defender of the king's divine right to rule in an absolute fashion. Filmier had written a treatise titled *Patriarcha* which Locke rubbishes as a treatise of slavery in his own treatise. Thus Locke begins his first treatise, by stating that...

> Slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it. (Locke 1690:7).

Locke begins by questioning the basic premise of Filmier's treatise that 'All men are born unfree'. He then launches an empirical attack based on facts and definitions used and absent in Filmier's work respectively. Locke also reveals scriptural inconsistencies in Filmer's work. The basic premise of *Patriarcha* is that all men are born under the authority of their parents and that the monarch is an extension of the patriarch. The second assumption which Filmier adopted from Aristotle that Locke refutes is that 'the assumption of human freedom is the denial of creation of Adam'. Locke gives a reasoned analysis of how what Filmier is basically committing is an error of understanding the law

of nature as appointment by God and his sovereign's habit of ruling as a divine right of kings to rule.

Locke very methodically rejects the arguments of the patriarch regarding the absolute sovereignty granted to Adam by subjection of Women deriving its source from the original punishment granted to Eve and thus to all of womanhood, by donation, by fatherhood and monarchy by inheritance. In doing this, Locke lays down the very formative principles of not just the proposition that politics is not a sphere present in nature, but is a creation of human necessity. Going beyond Hobbes, he lays down the principle that the consent of those who are obeying is also important. In Chapter XI, he states,

> To settle government in the world, and to lay obligations to obedience on any man's conscience, it is as necessary to satisfy him, who has a right to this power,…. that the great question is, (and that which our author would be thought to contend for, if he did not sometimes forget it) what persons have a right to be obeyed… (Locke 1690:79).

It is in the second treatise that he goes on to develop this idea to argue for the subject's right to overthrow the government if it does not fulfil the social contract.

Having thus devastated the grounds for the divine right of kings to rule, Locke goes on to further his ideas on the meaning and ends of civil government in the second treatise. The second treatise written much before the first, starts by establishing that man earns the freedom to act according to his will vis-à-vis the authority by virtue of the fact that he possesses reason. Locke removes his political subjects from Filmier's infantile dependants under a patriarch to equals; these equals then agree to be ruled on certain terms. The state of nature as characterised in Locke is quite opposite to that of Hobbes. In contrast to the Hobessian state of nature which is a permanent state of war of all against

all,for Locke the state of nature is a state of perfect freedom in which all equals have the liberty to preserve themselves, the only limitation being that they do not bring harm to others. This state of nature by itself is peaceful. This notion stands firstly, on the distinction that Locke draws between the state of liberty and the state of license. That is, the state of nature is not a state of license.In other words, despite the chaos there is an understanding of what is and what isn't permissible behaviour; what is absent is the enforcer of this code. Secondly, the state of nature is peaceful because this peace is guided not by any virtue but by reason – that humans rationally derive the need to respect the freedoms and possessions[43] of others in order to realise their own. From this state of nature are derived the institutions of family and society. However, the primary obligation of every free individual is to preserve and develop his/her own liberties and capabilities and this cannot be done unless one acquires a certain degree of property one can call private. One's body too, argues Locke, is a gift from God and thus its preservation is a responsibility.

As God grants common natural resources to all beings, what these beings make out of it or acquire out of it is due to their own labour and thus their private property. Locke was the first thinker who argued that it is human labour that creates and becomes the marker of what can be called one's property. Locke does lay down certain limitations on acquisition of property like one cannot acquire more than one's needs, or by coercion or in a way that it leaves nothing for the others. But he repudiates contradictions like slavery, big land ownership, poverty, etc. by bringing in money. Humans thus can sell and buy money in which case it is perfectly fine as acquiring money; for buying a slave's labour too requires labour in the first place. Locke thus functions on an assumption that those who are propertied are so on the basis of their own physical labour.

[43] Many scholars, especially Tully, argues that Locke does not mean material possessions while speaking of possessions but qualify liberty itself as a possession.

Given that this preservation requires acquisition and protection of property, a civil government is required to perform three functions-those of laying down laws, of administering justice and of granting and executing punishment. Thus in Locke, the need for a civil government arises with the rise of private property and the hindrances caused to its realisation. Moreover this civil society is one in which only political liberty and not economic liberty is either guaranteed or desired.

Though the discussion on Locke and his defence of the empire will be done in the next section it is important here to mention an important debate on the interpretation of what constitutes the private property in Locke. The debate between Macpherson and Tully defines this problem. Macpherson is critical of Locke in defining that the function of the state is only to act as a facilitator of right to acquire and hold on to private property. The Lockean government has no right to inquire into the primary justiciability of the acquisition nor can it infringe the right of an individual to acquire property without their consent (Macpherson 1962). The government thus is more like a referee on the side of the rich. However, Tully argues that this is a very limited understanding of the concept of private property in Locke and he means individual freedom and capabilities and its protection when he is defending the right to private property (Tully 1993).Though Locke's own defence of slavery and his subjection of women to men suggests otherwise, a contextual reading gives a more inquired view of the possible rationales that Locke might have considered. Writing in the time when it was the absolute monarch who was protecting the rights of religious minorities and the parliament which spoke for limited government but was talking about religious uniformity, the political and religious tensions of Locke's times must have seemed intractable. Locke's writings on religion and toleration throw light on freedom of religious belief and plurality being a cornerstone not just of one's political liberty but also of true faith. For Locke, God judged humans based on their sincerity and not the truth of their faith. Such openness about the possibility of the knowledge of one's religious faith being flawed laid down the epistemological

cornerstone of scientific inquiry that Locke brought to social sciences. He did not proclaim religious truths, and doing so in politics he considers un-Godly (Locke 1970).

Finally, the issue of Locke as a theorist of empire is one that has gone back and forth in the study of international political thought. Locke's proposition that when natural resources which are tended by labour, becomes the property of those who put in that labour; was used to garb indigenous "wastelands" citing that the colonists who cultivated the land also earned the right to its ownership Locke is explicit about this in his Second Treatise.

> Though the Earth and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property (Locke 1689:9).

> It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, no one can enclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common bycompact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in respect of somemen, it is not so to all mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the whole was when they could allmake use of the whole; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it wasquite otherwise(Locke 1689: 11).

Some scholars however defend Locke by the absence of what they consider the essentials of being characterised as an empire. The absence of a linear and progressive vision of history, a hierarchical vision of the world and the belief in the universalist superiority of European culture (Armitage 2013). Though we know from Locke's own writings that he read Grotius and Machiavelli,if we are to go by the treatise itself, then we have Locke calling the American Indians both irrational and later on as they are 'closer to nature' also

'fitter to give us rules'. The principle of exclusion or inclusion remains in reason. The point that Locke's defenders obviously miss is not that Locke was an inclusionary universalist in theory but exclusionary imperialist in practice; but also that he essentialises reason to be embodied only in Europe independent of the fact that he gives reason a higher value in the hierarchy or not. Without committing the fallacy of anachronism however, it will suffice to say that the justifications of empire were not mistakenly drawn from Locke's thought but germinated from his own conceptions and prejudices of non-Europeans. Also whether his conception of empire was of sovereignty and not *imperium* does not absolve Locke from the fact that his works justified the basis of colonial expansion. It is nevertheless important to qualify his position on empire without reducing imperialist thinkers to the degree to which they of their supportedcolonial expansion.

Hume:Reason at the Service of Empire

It would however be important to discuss that this way of thinking about certainty through causal creation was challenged simultaneously. The category of reason was thus put into question by an important thinker called David Hume. It is necessary to discuss Hume here, as his scepticism for reason did not draw him back to religion, unlike Hobbes and Locke who framed themselves vis-a-visscriptures. Hume instead developed a critique of reason itself. This may be attributed to his oppositional training earlier in Calvinism and then in French Renaissance philosophy. Born in Scotland in 1711, David Hume was a son of an advocate father who passed away when he was two. Mother Katherine raised Hume and his two siblings by herself. Hume entered the University of Edinburgh at an early age of 12. He was enrolled to study law but was so fascinated by philosophy that he did not finish his law degree. Brought up under strict Calvinist strictures, Hume's early education was scholastic but he later went on to become influenced by Cicero and Virgil. As he was not from a wealthy family his finances required him to take up an internship with a merchant in France. He settled in France in a small village near Anjou where he

read the continental philosophers and French scholars like Malebranche, Descartes, Dubos, Mersenne and Bayle. Hume's scepticism for organised religion now turned into complete rejection of religious beliefs. This cost Hume his academic career such that he was never given any academic appointment in his lifetime. His work which came to gain both scorn and popularity were constantly denied publication. Hume thus had to settle for the position of a librarian at the Edinburgh university faculty of advocates – a position nonetheless that granted him access to a lot of scholarly literature with the help of which he wrote an extensive work *The History of England*. Hume then went on to accept the position of secretary to the British ambassador to France, a position that further broadened his circle of scholarly exchange. He became a typical renaissance man in colonial Europe exchanging ideas over wine and food at the exuberant and opulent cultural ceremonies in the colonial capitals. His circle included the famous Adam Smith whose *Wealth of Nations* justified the colonial expansion through free trade. Adam Smith despite being a friend is also understood to have rejected endorsement of an academic position for Hume citing that his religious views might lead to unnecessary disturbance.

Politically, Hume was a generation that saw the 1707 CE integration of Scottish and British Parliaments and Crowns. Hume was born thus into what came to called the Great Britain. The Calvinist sentiment was strong in Scotland and this made the post integration dynamic in terms of religious integration in politics all the more difficult. However, it was the Jacobite uprisings of 1715 CE and 1745 CE that wanted to replace the king which caused a larger political upheaval. This was also a time when Great Britain was expanding massively along the seas and with India in its kitty, it was booming with trade companies which were trading across the Americas and Asia. This brought in a lot of wealth into Britain as well as other colonial countries and which in turn heightened the self- perception of Britain as a country superior than others. The first world empire ascribed this exceptionalism not only to its trade but to its civilisation in which reason was hailed as opposed to primitivism prevalent in colonies. This reason of course was not untouched by religion but this was only true for the Christian religion. In Europe

however, this discourse of Christian religious exceptionalism was more difficult to imbibe as the continent itself was ravaged by the infighting between different strands of Christianity itself. The money that came in was used by mercantilists to develop and patronize sciences which could make their trade acquisition easier by better navigational knowledge, transportation, etc. This fuelled the great discoveries in sciences and the revolution that it led to did not leave any discipline untouched. From Hobbes to Descartes, the way humans perceived their own existence with respect to the universe came to be governed by the knowledge of the new laws that governed the universe. The Newtonian physics further radicalised the demystification of the human world and the universe became conquerable by human reason. In the sphere of politics this came to be extended to the globe, which like the universe was to be governed under one universal law in one direction guided by universal reason. There has been immense scholarly research on the Christian biases in the enlightenment thinking but what one cannot rule out is that this articulation of reason as independent of the metaphysics de-centered faith and became the new rule in politics. The British Empire was thus justified by political thinking of a very different character than the one which justified the Holy Roman Empire. This also reflected in the way these two empires articulated their imperial project and politics. The religious emancipatory tone of the Holy Roman Empire was very different from that of the progressive universalist tone of the British Empire. Hume wrote amidst this political and intellectual context. He was someone who was isolated for his religious views and celebrated for his empiricism at the same time. It thus interesting that we have access to the 18th century debates on natural religion in the words of Hume himself. The text *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is Hume's* important contribution to the philosophy of religion but also gives a rationale of how faith is replaced by reason as a legitimizing principle of organizing supra political units like empires. Hume then defends empire from an anti – religious standpoint as a political unit which is good for commerce and thus reasonable to accept. Almost all of Hume's works are written in two phases. First is the critical phase where Hume gives an overview of the work that has been done on the subject and introduces the scholarly dynamic in which his

subject is placed. He then moves on to the constructive phase where he analyses and tries to put forth his own arguments. The text which Hume started writing in 1750 was finished by 1776 but Hume's friends advised him not to publish it as there was immense hostility at the time to his anti- religious views. It was then published posthumously without Hume's name. Given that this is the last work written by Hume, it also depicts his final thoughts on the subject of religion and reason. The text begins by stating why it has been written in a dialogue form. It is a letter between two friends Pamphilius and Hemippus. Hume first makes a comment on the dialogue form, gives its pros and cons, writing at a time when methodological exposition has been accepted as a form for making orderly and precise arguments, he explains why he chose the dialogue form for the subject of natural religion. He states,

> On the other hand, any question of philosophy that is so obscure and uncertain that human reason can't reach a secure conclusion about it seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to differ on a topic regarding which no-one can reasonably be confident (Hume 1779).

Thus,at the very onset, Hume is setting the tone for the provisional nature of all knowledge including on the subject of religion. It is reasonable for Hume to doubt the available knowledge and thus he establishes the most important quality of science which is that it does not proclaim the final truth. Hume thus from the very beginning rescues his work from the clutches of religion.

The text is divided in terms of subject matter into two parts. The first eight chapters deal with the natural attributes of God and the last chapters talk about God's moral attributes. Pamphilus is writing to his friend Hermippus about a conversation on the nature of God between three philosophers Cleanthes, Demea and Philo. These three philosophers are characterised after three stands of religious philosophy prevalent during Hume's time in England. The first two Cleanthes and Demea represent two major schools, the debate between whom defined the religious debate of the 18th century CE England. On one side

were the British Royal Society members whose understanding was dominated by physics and thus they rejected the earlier understandings of pure mathematical forms as the expression of God's existence – an understanding also called as the demonstrative proof of God. These scholars rather believed in the intelligent design of the universe and saw the proverbial watchmaker running the rhythm of the universe. This for them was the empirical proof of the existence of God. These thinkers called themselves "experimental theists" as Cleanthes called himself. Cleanthes thus was the representative of this first group. The second group consisted of the traditionalists who believed that God is in mystery, not out there to be exhibited and thus God's existence can only be proven by demonstrative proof. They criticised Cleanthes' clique for their anthropomorphism and thus reducing God to something as ordinary and mundane as the human physical experience. This was also the time when some discoveries in the human biology and workings of the human body were being made. Marveled at the intricate clock work of the human machine, the human body itself was seen as the repository of the intelligent design. In Hume's work this school is represented by Demea. The third character in Pamphilius' letter is Philo, who can be understood to be stating Hume's own philosophical position vis-à-vis religion which was at the time termed as mitigated scepticism. Philo's position both repudiates and builds upon Cleanthes' design argument. Recognizing intelligence in design of the everyday world says Philo, is too simple and the existence of God and its laws (of the world) are not so obvious. He in a way blames Cleanthes for trivializing the nature of God and things to the point of misleading. Such an approach, for him, has no explanation for phenomenon like the actions of these designs and the limits of their pre-determined nature. For example, how would such a design analogy explain the presence of free will and if it denies that then, what is the difference between them and the traditionalists? Secondly for Philo, the problem of similarity and difference exhibits the intractability of design argument because similarity and difference is always a matter of degree and thus his argument can be summed up from Hume's another work in which he states,

> ....the idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom (Hume: 1748).

Thus, in Hume we have a radical alteration of the characterization of human nature and its relationship to God. This meant a radical alteration for the ontology of politics and the way politics could be organised around units. Hume's defence of the British Empire is an informing example of this. Though Hume accepts the presence of an underlying pattern in the human political societies come to organise themselves from smaller undifferentiated to larger more complex forms, his altered thesis of the human relationship to God, leads him to distance himself from generalised acceptance of the good in the latter imperial forms. In his six volume study of the History of England, he differentiates sharply between the British and the other colonial empires. He was especially critical of the Spanish acquisition of colonies. For Hume, this differentiation of a good and a bad empire could be done through examining whether the colonial rule was beneficial to the colonised population or not. Locke justified the English occupation of America in the following words:

> ..colonies established on the noblest footing that has been known in any age or nation. ... peopled gradually from England by the necessitous and indigent, who at home increased neither wealth nor populousness, the colonies which were planted ... have prompted the navigation, encouraged the industry, and even perhaps multiplied the inhabitants of their mother country. The spirit of independency, which was reviving in England, here shoneforth in its full lusture and received new accession from the aspiring character of those who, being discontented with the established church and monarchy, had sought for freedom amidst those savages (Hume1778).

Hume's endorsement of the value that Empire added to the commerce of the colonies was not unqualified. He did not write as favourably of the Spanish Empire for example as he did of the English Empire. It was in the hands of the likes of Hume that anti- naturalist explanations of imperial control were ascribed value- neutrality- the empires were noble,

bringing prosperity, industry and culture to the barren and un- populated colonies. With all his scepticism of religion as a tool for political expansion and advocacy of religious toleration and even scepticism, Hume gave a secular value to colonial expansion. The colonies were vacant receivers, mere subjects who were acted upon by the imperialists for their own good. In all three authors thus we see a progression in naturalist explanations become farther from religion but being employed with the same vigour at the service of the empire. In Hobbes the use of religion is more obvious and direct, so is the endorsement for imperial control. He however hones the earlier religious right to rule with the laws of motion, with which an artifice or imitation that is, political life must run. In Locke and Hume this is further extracted from religion, and the natural right to rule relocates itself from the religion of the Empire to the more ambiguous- culture, commerce, liberty and civilisation that the empire brings to the colonies. Faith thus became de-centred by the new naturalist explanations of politics but these same reasoned explanations also granted it (the Christian faith) an exceptionalism which was ascribed the vantage point of value- neutral universality. This was an important turn in the way ideas of legitimizing empires evolved. The next chapter summarises this process and maps the challenges and patterns that can be drawn from this process.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

In its attempt to trace the selective history of the two empires – the Holy Roman Empire and the British colonial empire, the work traverses through twenty one primary texts in political thought. This period covers a broad span of over 1500 years – from 313CE– the year that Christianity was adopted as the official religion of the empire by Emperor Constantine and panegyrics started to legitimise his empire to about 1750 CE when the project of legitimizing the expansionist ambitions of the British was sufficiently in place. It then examines the constitutive role played by two major ideas of faith and reason and how they came to define empires and were in turn defined by the empires.

Firstly, on the question of the empire shaping the discourse of faith and reason, we have the Christian doctrines undergoing immense re-interpretation post the adoption of the Christian religion as an official religion of the state. This was essential, because for a mendicant and persecuted faith like Christianity, state patronage and retaining it was essential. This is not to argue that faith was invoked only as rhetoric, far from it. But the imperial reason addressed the faith. This remains true for the tolerance of paganism in the populace and the palace, justifying imperial wars and the adoption of the Saint tradition as demigods and symbols by a professedly monotheistic faith. This also meant the evolution of a hierarchical and bureaucratic system of institutionalisation in the Church – with its intricate system of parishes as bishops in all regions of the empire through which the parallel network of authority ran throughout the empire. The compulsions of empire meant rearticulating the reason of faith as the reason of empire. It is on this foundation that Augustine further modified the logos as understood by Eusebius. Reason as deliberation remained important for collective life but impossible without the mediation by God. Faith is thus the only medium through which Augustinian reason can be

accessed. It is this reason that can define the "justness" of Empire's expansionist wars – when they are undertaken to defend the faith of those who understand its meaninglessness. This Christian Platonism then became the dominant theory that dictates the narrative of this new empire – the principle through which acts of empires could be judged and measured against. These principles were also used to resolve the central paradox of wars in the Christian empire and the resultant contestations that flew from this central paradox – such as punishments for crimes in the empire, treatment to the prisoners of war, etc. In the hands of Augustine thus, imperial reason was permissible only when mediated by the overarching principle of faith. The persistence of imperial reason as the "common people living in a commonwealth" also persisted in the empire through Roman laws. The first reluctant and then creative use of law in terms of papal bulls was an addition to the parallel empire of a hierarchical empire of Christian faith, of which papal bulls and decrees became an integral part. It is thus no surprise that the attack on all of this in the Protestant revolution meant a huge blow to the Holy Roman Empire. For the empire on the other hand, the discourse shaped by the principle of faith gave an opportunity for the creative use of religion in diplomacy within an existent heterogeneous empire but also extended to the ethnically and culturally very diverse regions that bordered the empire. Though the empire inherited by Constantine in 313CEhad already undergone a transformation from the *polis* to a *megapolis*, the conflation of a monotheistic religion to its authority gradually tightened the religious noose around the imperial activity. This applied most prominently to the problem of continuous religious heresies and controversies that were bound to arise in a large and diverse empire. On the question of war however, it was the development of Christian Platonism that elevated the Holy Roman Empire to the mirror of the earthly empire. Both the theory of divine rights and the doctrine of just war that emanated from it bolstered the expansionist claims of the empire which were internalised not only by generations of emperors but even later kings and usurpers who rebelled against the empire or opposed it. The fashioning of Christian faith as a reason for the imperial authority thus created a very prominent edifice against

the principle of polyarchy for centuries after Constantine's adoption of Christianity as the religion of the empire.

By the tenth century, the rise of the Islamic empire based on another monotheistic faith however challenged the exclusivity that the Christian Roman Empire had hitherto enjoyed. This became most evident in the iconoclastic controversy. The development of faith as the basis of political authority in this new empire which eventually sacked the capital of Constantinople had a very different trajectory, which immensely affected the political thinking in the Christian Roman Empire. One important origin of this difference was the prominence of Aristotle in Islamic political thought whose introduction to the Christian world through Arab translations challenged the Christian Platonist narrative and the primacy of faith in the political. The emphasis on method then gained immense prominence because it was through method of logic that reason came to invert the supremacy of faith. This affected political philosophy and later thinking about truth in other spheres of knowledge. This laying down of certain truth criteria as all accessible through the faculty of reason which was seen as universal and impersonal was a revolutionary turn in the way knowledge was accessed. This change in the epistemic outlook revolutionised everything from the subjects of knowledge and inquiry to the very ontology of being. This automatically changed the way political power derived its legitimacy. As the monopoly of theology and scripture on truth came under challenge, their claim to political power also weakened and so did the reliance of the rulers on faith to back their power claims. However, this transformation occurred at a glacial pace. The transformation that we see from Ibn Sina, the reaction in Ghazali and later the fortification in favour of the method of logic and argumentation with rationality or reason in Ibn Rushd, as its truth test; are all significant in that these thinkers use the same Aristotelian standard of logical consistency and truth criteria. The issue of conflict is thus not whether the human reason has the capacity to know the truth but whether whatever capacity it has should precede the dictates of scripture. The answer comes out to be overwhelmingly, if not definitively, the precedence of the appeal of reason over scriptural

faith. The conquest of reason thus made its way through the conquest of Aristotelian method.

This found its resonance in the Christian political thought initially in terms of challenging the rigidity of interpreting religious scriptures. The early champions of this from within the Christian Empire were Moses Maimonides and Marsilius of Padua. The development of the Aristotelian method also used logical causation to challenge basic claims of Christianity such as the apocalypse. This debased the redemptive role of church and thus dealt a major blow to the theory of two empires – the earthly and the heavenly and their ascending order of hierarchy. This bolstered the claims of kings against the empires as the division of the spiritual and temporal, released the power of universal claims of both religion and the empire, and also the papacy's claim of authority over the temporal sphere. It must be pointed here that the empire had already been divided and further fragmentation especially in the West was on the rise. Aquinas gave the final blow to papal authority by the elevation of temporal authority by establishing that both the spheres derived their authority directly from the divine and thus the authority of the temporal did not flow from the church. However the period also witnessed a debate on the relationship between the spiritual and the temporal. John of Paris, who conceded that papacy by the reason of what it covers as a universal sphere is superior but both kingship and priesthood derive their power from one origin i.e. God, contributed to the debate helping the church, though minimally. Resultantly a contest for power between the Church and the emperor on the one hand, the church and the kings on another and the empire and the kings on yet another hand ensued. The text thus is a logical assessment and re-assessment of the relationship between the papacy and the monarchy in this period. This gave birth to the papal-monarchy paradox which remained unresolved till the Protestant Reformation. The reasoned redrawing of the sphere of authority for religion led to the imagination of the secular sphere for the first time as the negation of the religious which it was argued was at the same time universal, overarching yet limited in

the functions it could/ was ought to deliver. This was done exceptionally elegantly in the work of Ibn Khaldun.

This debate was formative and informed the political thinking for centuries to come. Ignoring this debate led to the foundation of the dominant understanding prevalent in most accounts of history of ideas, that modern nation state and the disintegration of *Respublica Christiana* was also the disintegration of the universal appeal of a legitimizing empire. It is argued that, this thereby initiated secularisation and also led to nationalisation and emergence of the nation state. Such an account fails to explain the simultaneous rise of new empires in Europe by states who came out of the *Respublica Christiana* decrying church's universalism two centuries later.

It is thus important to see these two very important but related phenomenon intersecting with each other. One is the crystallisation of the antagonism between the church and the monarchs. This makes the question of the realms and nature of acceptable authority an immediate question for the political thinkers of the time. Secondly, as the scale tips in the favour of the monarchical power and the legitimacy of its authority, we see that the corpus from which truth claims and methods are both derived also become increasingly non-religious. Though the idea of the supreme creator still remained inherent in the background, the development of double truths – which in the modern language of social science can be called truths of science and the impending problems of philosophy, present themselves in their nascent forms. The Aristotelian method became the tool for the secularists. This we see starkly in Marsilius, but it is in the Islamic philosophy that the more calibrated analysis of the questions that the polity faced came to be articulated. The period from 11thCEto 13thCEthus setsthe stage for the arrival of the secular sphere in politics – one that remains semi-porous, contested but still a valiant category in politics till date.

The papacy was arguing for universality of its rule in both the temporal and spiritual sphere, thereby leaving the monarchs to embattle them by arguments of particularity – for their own kingdom – a kind of thesis developed by some historians to point out how the church played important role in generation of states by being opposed to them. These thinkers like Grotius, however were pointing out the paradox that this was liable to generate – if one was to concede universality in the sphere of the temporal and grant it only to the spiritual – meant that not only philosophical imperfection, scriptural fallacy but also spiritual sphere gets placed as higher to the temporal; and thus this means wrongly granting it a supremacy over the temporal. Both the subtractionist definitions of our secular today and the re-emergence of the empires of nation states can possibly be scrutinised through the arguments which these thinkers were trying to navigate through. Political history however, shows that the immediate concerns got the better of the philosophical attempts that these theorists were trying to make. The discord became more acute with the Lutheran reform thereby the immediate realpolitik concerns gained precedence over theoretical speculation and their consideration for political decision making. This immediacy presents itself more prominently in the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes.

Both Luther and Machiavelli are very important thinkers to understand how from decrying the church and embracing national particularism, the nation states went on to establish their own empires. Luther transformed the anti-papal authority movement into a new reified religious identity – a faith which was more amenable to reason than its predecessor. This did away with the metaphysical burden of classical Christianity and freed itself of its “unreason”. This also madethe transition of Christianity into the age of enlightenment easier. What this new religion also did was that it superimposed itself on some national identities. The situation of increasing national fervour in Europe was a resultant reaction; especially the autonomy proclaimed by England, France and Spain. Internally this meant less control from the weakened Roman Empire and more power to the king. In the case of Britain, it became synonymous with Englishness and was used by

the Stuarts to weave a seamless narrative of Anglo-Scottish Union. The new national particularisms that arose as a reaction to papacy were not strictly anti-religious.Protestantism thus became both a symbol of opposition to the authority of Roman Catholicism as well as unifier of the three civilised peoples of Britain, Scotland and Ireland. The narrative had to be adduced with new justifications and qualifiers with time, as the Empire was extended to the Americas and subsequently to India, but the origins of the British imperial project were rooted strongly in Protestantism more than any other ideology.

The sustenance of the Empire posed another crucial challenge to the British Empire especially at home, as the idea of national particularism was centred on Englishness and the liberty of the English. The English expansion mobilised legitimacy at home on the basis of Protestantism and the need to form a political dominion of its own. The expansion to other lands exhibited as a problem of justifying and sustaining the power that extended beyond dominions – it was here that Machiavelli was brought to the rescue of British imperialism. The navigation of empire through the category of liberty in Machiavelli thus is done through the use of his insistence on the concept of *Grandezza* or the importance of greatness in imagining and more importantly sustaining a political dominion. The paradox which generated from the fission of the religious and temporal led to a partial translation of the religious in the temporal authority–simultaneously obfuscating and strengthening the religious logic– Christian logic–in the modern political theory. This obfuscated "religio-temporal" understanding was then fashioned as universal and ahistorical reason especially when it was required to be employed for imperial purposes. This was achieved by political theories by employing readily available justifications from natural sciences,as was done by Hobbes. This was followed by the superimposition of Protestantism on the category of civilisation in Locke and its employment for the imperial expansion. Hume then attempted to scrutinise the underlying assumptions of such an exercise through which this new legitimizing principle of reason– at once both oppositional and superior to and derivative of the earlier

legitimizing principle of religion. The persistence of the Christian empire, which survived despite its politically and administratively relatively weak character, is attributed to its success in emanating in its population a sense of being part of one Christian society.

Machiavelli onwards however, political thought is studied as a radical break from the medieval explanations of legitimate authority. In this explanation, as the Reformation breaks this religious coherence, which again is an ideal type, we have the empire unable to sustain itself as a society and thus we have the Bodin's commonwealths. These explanations argue on the one hand that this change was final and irreversible and determined the fate of political units and their uni-directionality from empires to nation states. Such an approach forces one to either see colonial empires as a separate political category from religious empires altogether or to not characterise them as a novel political unit. This is not only in contravention to historical evidence, but introduces an artificial break in the political thinking which otherwise has progressed not throughthe process of elimination but also retention and assimilation of old ideas by transforming them.

The other way of looking at this can be to problematise the dichotomy of this mixed method paradigm to read Hobbes. This can be done by scrutinising the understanding of reason and delineating its sources in Hobbes' writings. The dissection of Hobbesian reason when escaped from the theory that is a pure derivative from science can not only help us explain Hobbes' *Leviathan* and its Christian undertone but also gives some ammunition to understand the paradox of how the theory of state carries within itself potentials of legitimizing empires with a religious axis that can be argued of or obfuscated as reason. The issue of Locke as a theorist of empire is one that has gone back and forth in the study of international thought. Locke's proposition that when natural resources which are common tended by labour, become the property of those who put in that labour; was used to garb indigenous "waste lands" citing that the colonists who cultivated the land also earned the right to its ownership. Some scholars however defend Locke by the absence in him, of what they consider the essentials of being characterised

as an imperialist. These are the absence of a linear and progressive vision of history, a hierarchical vision of the world and the belief in the Universalist superiority of European culture in Locke.

The question of whether legitimizing principles affect imaginations of political units that emanate from them is a tricky question. This is primarily because all political units draw their legitimacy simultaneously from more than one principle. It can however be concluded from the study of the history of major ideas that helped evolve and shape the political thought over the period chosen for this work, that this evolution pendulum swings within a spectrum of faith to reason. Having said this, the articulation of this legitimacy always aspires to an ideal type of universal kingdom or empires, taking a particularistic turn only for a short duration because the insistence of temporality gives this turn and results in the process of formation of states. The empire nevertheless persists not only because of instrumental reason which later came to be defined as a negation of faith claims – a location of universal certainty for itself – but also because this reason is extracted from the Christian theological influence on thinking about politics. In their analysis of the rise of the nation state across the world, Andreas Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein declare the conclusive tidal crossing over of political units in favour of the nation state only in the twentieth century. Describing the late eighteenth century, they observe:

> The French and American revolutions of the late eighteenth century gave birth to the ideal of the modern nation state – an independent state with a written constitution, ruled in the name of a nation of equal citizens. During those days, all other states were still governed on the basis of other principles of legitimacy. In dynastic states, a prince was entitled to assume the mantle of power upon death of his father (as in multi-ethnic Habsburg and Ethiopian empires); in theocracies, religious leaders guided their flocks in worldly matters as well (eg. Tibet and Montenegro); Ottoman and Spanish elites spread the true faith across the globe, British brought progress to “backward” peoples in far-away places ... (Wimmer & Feinstein 2010 : 764).

This Universalist tendency in the rhetoric of nation states that persists till the twentieth century can be understood and attributed to the evolutionary process of faith and reason and their relationship to the category of an expansionist political unit. As a logical corollary of which is the question of whether the resurgence of religion can mean the evolution of political unit of the nation state to a new or old form of expansionist order? What would the imagination of such a political unit imply in a world where religious identities are diffused in an increasingly globalised world? Will they mean more homogenous nation states or regional alliances warped around religious identities? The present analysis suggests that the shiftin legitimizing principles do potentially affect the configuration of political units. A more incisive answer can be found, however by reading the present as history.

On Further Inquiry:

Another important co-relation that comes out from the evolution of these ideas is the role that knowledge about the natural world plays in defining the very constitutive categories of the social. This section introduces an alternative way of approaching the resurgence of religion problem in International Politics.

Philosopher Brian Epstein begins his book *The Ant Trap* by making a case for how the Social Sciences have failed us. He argues that the major disciplines of social sciences be it economics, sociology or political science have failed to provide us with answers to the most difficult questions of our time. His example of the inability to predict, understand or address the global economic recession may in turn raise several questions on whether social sciences can be studied just as the natural sciences, whether a theory or discipline's worth can be judged by its predictive power alone etc. However, Epstein is also arguing that even on the parameters of their explanatory potential, the theories of social sciences are failing us. He situates the problem in the over-obsession of social sciences with the operational questions of 'how does it work?' and a complete neglect of 'what is

it?'(Ontology of the social) question. The discontent is rising from various corners against the inadequacy of our knowledge of the social. In the field of IR too, though there has been an intensive integration of constitutive categories at the level of actors, processes and intervening variables the descriptive broadening has not edified our understanding in a way as to enable us to engage constructively with our situations. The question of resurgence of religion in international relations, the study would like to argue, should be treated as a 'what is it question?' For the world religions that are at war within and without,not just for allocation of resources but also on deeper questions about what constitutes the category of the citizen in a highly secularised but deeply divided and unjust order of the International?Religion has always had a say not only in how to perform our lives but also about what is a conception of a good common societal life. It is at this level, that observance of religion seems to clash and the force of collective identity of religion becomes easier to evoke across the conventional models of international organization. It is here that the appeal goes deeper. How else are we to explain the non-Muslim, affluent, White, Western men and women joining the ISIS? Psychological micro-explanations again answer the 'why is it?' and not the 'what is it' question.

The study argues that the question of religion is deeply embedded with the ontology question in history. Mc Graw in his critique of liberal democracy argues that the project has politically been incapable of devising methods beyond instrumental reason to achieve a common understanding of good life. It is because of this that people and polities seek other explanations of the –'what is it?' question. This disgruntles with the secular atomistic state model.

The tracing of the intellectual history points to a clear connection between the increasing developments in science and human knowledge about the natural world and the transition from faith to reason being the dominant legitimizing idea or principle for political expansion. This is especially true for the relation between the certainty of Newtonian Physics and the rise of the individual rational being in intellectual history but equally true

for the Baghdad school and the questioning of causal methods. The question that it thus raises is whether the present resurgence can be explained by the new turns that scientific knowledge, especially our knowledge of the quantum world – its intricacies and the challenge it imposes on the earlier models of mechanical certainty – could enable us to make better sense of our existence in the world?

Alexander Wendt in his book *'Quantum Mind and Social Science'* makes this argument that the new discoveries of Quantum Physics challenge the older ontological conceptions of our relationship to the world. Among other things,he challenges the causal analysis i.e. the cause-effect method of thinking in the social sciences and argues that this demands a revision in the basic categories of thinking about the social. Whether this can be seen as a reason for the current resurgence of faith making a comeback and what this means for our apparatus of understanding and making sense of the world are huge but very important questions. As stated in the introduction, there are various ways in which scholars are trying to make sense of the resurgence of religion as a category driving international politics not only in term of violence or peace-making but also in domestic policies of states. The present approach is advanced on the following thesis extracted from the present analysis of the history of ideas.

1. Faith and reason though have not always been used as mutually exclusive, the development of science and gradual increase of knowledge about the real world complemented the process of the churning in political thinking and method of reasoning itself which made faith as oppositional to reason.
2. It is from this opposition that the faith-reason and religious-secular co-relation is developed and the history of the transition of political thought can be said to be validating this co-relation.
3. In the light of these findings, though it can't be refuted that ideas that derive from or are given truth value by science, affect the method and meaning of constitutive

categories of social science whether the present uncertainties of modern science especially of the discipline of physics is a question that needs deeper inquiry .

4. Though some scholars have seen the rise of phenomenon like the appeal of eastern mystic religion, Taoism or even the literature such as the bestselling books like *The Secret*[44], etc. arguing that the participation of individuals has creative influence on reality as has been observed in experiments observing quantum behaviour as fodder against scientific certainty. This in absence of a thorough engagement with the present philosophy of politics seems a tall claim to make.

What cannot be denied however is the demand to problematise our understanding of basic conceptions of how the social works. It must also be stressed that the current resurgence of religion is not necessarily a turn back to faith (as supernatural creator) but also faith (as a loci of identity) as a 'post' phenomenon of secular nationalisms in contemporary international politics.

[44]*The Secret* is a self- help book written by Rhoda Bryne which claims that laws of attraction and positivity can change people's lives in real time. It bases its claims on several pseudo-scientific claims including the use of quantum physics to argue that participation and direct intervention in the physical universe is possible through changing one's thoughts and energy. The book sold over 19 million copies worldwide and has been translated into 46 languages.

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