

GREAT WESTERN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
IN XINJIANG, 2001-2013

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for award of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2017



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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "GREAT WESTERN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN XINJIANG, 2001-2013 ", submitted by me for the award of the degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.



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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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DEDICATED TO MY LOVING MOTHER

(REGINA PINGUA)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

For the completion of my thesis, I express my gratitude towards all who helped me in my endeavours. I am indebted to my supervisor Dr. Mahesh Ranjan Debata, for his valuable guidance, excellent supervision and constructive suggestions which helped me a lot to pursue this research work smoothly. The motivation and the constant encouragement provided by him helped me to complete my thesis in record time. I have high regards for him for giving enough space to my ideas and suggestions. At the same time giving a right shape to those ideas whenever required.

I express my gratitude to Prof. K. Warikoo for his guidance. I am indebted to Dr. Mondira Dutta, Dr. Sharad Kumar Soni, and Dr. Ambrish Dhaka and for their support and suggestions during the initial course of this work.

I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to all the other faculty members and staff members of the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, (CIAS) of the School of International Studies & Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), whom I have not mentioned here for their kind support during the study period. The library staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Library of SIS.

Regarding my field visit during (31st March to 20th April 2016) to the Shanghai-Beijing, Jishou University and Peking University (Beijing, China), for Ph.D. Data Collection. It was the great expression to meet the expert faculty member and research scholar for getting valuable information related my thesis work.

My thanks also go to Arup Bezbaruah, Lakhima & Sameer and for their constant help.

The primary education that I received from my Dadaji Late Manna Pingua on the back of his horse at the time of going to his school and coming back home has always shown me the path of success. The blessing and teaching of my honorable father-Late Jagannath Pingua have given me the much-sought strength to go ahead with my purposeful achievement.

I take this opportunity to thank my dear and the nearer most adorable persons of my life who always live in my corner of the heart, Mina, Fatima, and but last not the least my brother friend Raja Pingua (Raj) for their deep-rooted love and rocklike support at my odd times. I am grateful to my parent, who despite many challenges, has always provided economic as well as emotional support and wished me to concentrate on this work.

I am also grateful to my brother and sister- Manish Bhaiya, Vijay Bhaiya, Chote Bhaiya, Balaji, Sabri di, Tuli di and my adorable Nani (Nimunti) for their love and encouragement. In spite of their busy time, they are always ready to spend time with me whenever I needed the most.

I am grateful to my mother, Regina Pingua and elder brother Mrinaal Pingua for their constant support and encouragement during the ups and down in my professional and personal life. I am once again thanking, Raja, Mina, Fatima, deserves my special thanks as they tolerated my emotional outbursts relieved my tension through their active presence.

Date:21/07/17

(POOJA PINGUA)

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

Serial no.	List of Abbrevition
CAU	Central Asian Union
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPC	Communist Party of China
CLSG	Central Leading Small Group
CMC	Central Military Commission
CNPC	China Congress National Petroleum Cooperation
CPPCC	Chines Peopl's Political Consulation Conference
DDD	Direct Distance Dialing
ETR	East Turkistan Republic
ETIN	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
ETLO	East Turkistan Liberation Organisation
FDI	Foreign Development Investment
GDP	Gross Development Product
GLF	Great Leaf Forward
GDP	Gross Development Product
GMD	Guomingtang
GWD	Great Western Development
GWC	Go West Campaign
HT	Hizb-ut-Tahrir

ILI	Ili National Army
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
MSR	Maritime Silk Road
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NPC	National People Congress
NPO	Nation and People Organisation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PCR	People's Republic of China
PBSC	Politburo Standing Committee
RNAS	Regional National Autonomy System
SEAC	State Ethnic Affairs Commission
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SOE	State Owned Enterprises
TAR	Tibet Autonomous Region
US	Union Soviet
USSR	Union State of Soviet Republic
URWD	United Front Work Department
UNHR	United National High Commission for Refugees
WDP	Western Development Programme
WDS	Western Development Strategy
WHO	World Health Organisation

WTO	World Trade Organisation
WTC	World Trade Centre
XPSC	Xinjiang Political Security
XRPC	Xinjiang Regional Political Party
XPCC	Xinjiang Production Coonstruction Corps
XNA	Xihua News Agency

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PREFACE

When China's economic development programme under the process of liberalization was initiated in the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, the main focus was on the development of eastern coastal belt of the country. While the eastern region prospered by leaps and bounds due to this developmental initiative, China's western region, despite having 6.85 million square miles of landmass, which accounts for 71 per cent of the whole of the country, and nearly 30 per cent of China's total population with over 80 per cent of total minority population, significant natural resources and a region with considerable strategic importance (18,000 miles long borders with many countries like Mongolia, Russia, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Myanmar and Laos), did not get its due. This led to simmering discontent among the ethnic minority people (known as *minzu* in Chinese) living in the country's western region against Chinese policy of uneven economic development that fuelled violent separatism in three autonomous regions - , Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. A violent form of separatism coupled with religious extremism and terrorist activities in the last six decades or so has made Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) a volatile region. This state of affairs prompted China to implement the Great Western Development Programme (*Xibu Da Kaifa*) in the 1980s, which aims at bridging the gap between the eastern and western regions by means of development in the western region.

The Western Development programme in Xinjiang started with the motive to develop the backward areas of the region and most importantly, the Central government's economic strategy of promoting trade between its western region and the neighbouring Central Asia. The Chinese Government has made it a national policy to help the frontier areas develop their economy and worked out a series of strategic decisions to promote development. The Chinese leadership in Xinjiang has focused on economic restructuring and changing the mode of economic growth, infrastructure construction and environmental protection, along with the improvement of people's livelihood and basic public service, so as to keep the development of Xinjiang at pace with the national development. Thus, under the ambit of Western Development Programme, development of transportation, energy, communication, skilled labour and irrigation took place in order to improve the urban infrastructure in this interior

pocket of the country. As a result, Xinjiang has been witnessing rapid economic and social progress and comprehensive growth, with the local people enjoying tangible benefits. In the past ten years, Xinjiang has been able to attract huge investment and ushered in fast economic growth, which in turn has proved to be most effective and beneficial for the common people of Xinjiang.

Due to vigorous implementation of the Western Development Programme throughout the 1990s, Xinjiang which was once dubbed as western China's economic "depression", has become China's "bridgehead" open to the countries of Central Asia, South Asia and Eastern Europe. Being rich in natural resources makes Xinjiang the most attractive treasure trove for the domestic enterprises and groups. Xinjiang has become China's forward-post to its western neighbours. During the last 10 years, over 66.4 billion yuan have been invested in building the transportation infrastructure in Xinjiang, which showcases the level of infrastructure development. It has accelerated the growth of local economy and provided job opportunities and generated substantial income for local people. This has facilitated export of Xinjiang's local products to the markets of neighbouring countries and helps in Xinjiang's sustainable development. In addition, a number of key industries has been set up in Xinjiang to make optimum use of oil, natural gas and coal resources further contributing to Xinjiang's economic development. Now, Xinjiang has become China's major important oil and natural gas production and petro-chemical industrial base. The strategy of utilizing Xinjiang's resources has attracted many enterprises and groups to invest in Xinjiang. There are 89 enterprises having their affiliate organizations in Xinjiang. According to the People Daily, the Central government has increased the financial transfer payments to Xinjiang at a regular basis and the cumulative subsidies offered to Xinjiang between 2000-2009 amounts to a whopping 400 billion Yuan. Out of this, 110.9 billion Yuan have been invested in nearly 20,000 infrastructure projects in the agricultural, forestry, hydraulic, transportation and energy sectors. In 2010, the state-owned companies invested over 6 billion Yuan in Xinjiang. In 2011, there were 1,738 new projects in Xinjiang, including infrastructure, quake proof houses and government subsidized houses. The Central government promises to provide Xinjiang 2.1 trillion Yuan of financial aid from 2011 to 2020, which is three times the transfer payment to Xinjiang over the last 30 years. The total fixed asset investment in Xinjiang will reach 2.6 trillion Yuan by the end of the 12th Five Year Plan period (2011-2016). In 2011,

the first year of the 12th Five Year Plan, Xinjiang plans to complete a fixed asset investment of over 620 billion Yuan. As indicated by the regional government's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), Xinjiang will turn into a key center point for textile production. It will likewise augment the industry chain from cotton turning to making pieces of clothing. By 2020, Xinjiang is relied upon to produce around 500 million clothing yearly and make more than 600,000 employments. The investment of the 13th Five Year plan (2016-2020), 743.8 billion yuan was invested in 30 major projects in western region. The 13th Five Year Plan will further help in facilitating the initiative because it lays a great deal of emphasis on the Free Trade Zone (FTZ).

Xinjiang has also been the pivot of China's ambitious One Belt, One Road (OBOR) strategy to connect Asia and Europe.

Since June 2004, the authorities in Xinjiang are promoting a nationwide campaign to achieve economic integration of Kashgar, a town known for its historic role in matters of China's trade through the ancient Silk Route, with eight countries in Central and South Asia, including India. The main thrust of Kashgar's economic integration with Central and South Asia is to ensure security, stability and prosperity of the volatile region of Xinjiang. In 2009, Kashgar was made a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on the model of two developed provinces of China - Shenzhen and Guangdong.

Amidst rapid economic development of Xinjiang, important issues such as environment protection have not lost sight of. In order to maintain a balance between the Western Development Programme and environment protection, Chinese government considers basic infrastructure and environmental protection as the prerequisite for Xinjiang's development. There are several ecological landmarks in the Western Development Programme, such as the comprehensive improvement of Tarim River. Xinjiang has been taking up forest protection projects as a result of which 120 million acres of natural grassland have been restored. In Tianshan and Altai mountain and other major forest areas, Xinjiang has banned logging and forestry workers have now turned into plantation workers. In the year 2000, Xinjiang's sand desertification speed was 2 million square miles per year. After the implementation of ecology project, the sand desertification has been contained effectively. By the year 2009, the sand desertification speed declined to 0.8 million square miles per year.

Xinjiang region and over 44 minorities living there are crucial for the Chinese government. The region is surrounded by eight countries such as Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Mongolia. Uyghurs, who consist 44 per cent of the local population, have been demanding separate homeland out of China. Keeping in view the geostrategic sensitivity of the region and the Uyghur demands, Chinese government has been devising policies and programmes from time to time. In this context, the Great Western Development Programme (WDP) bears greater significance. The study concerns with the Great Western Development Programme in Xinjiang during the period from 2001 to 2013. The rationale behind this research study lies in the fact that after 9/11 terrorist strike in US and the subsequent US led campaign in Afghanistan made China apprehensive of threats to Xinjiang's security. This prompted the Chinese authorities to craft a well planned policy, which is often being dubbed by some scholars as 'carrot and stick policy'. While the carrot side is all round prosperity of Xinjiang through socio-economic, cultural and religious reformation and the stick side is crackdown on the separatists, splittist and anti-Chinese elements. In this context, the Great Western Development Programme assumes great significance. This Programme not only stresses all out development of the backward areas of Xinjiang, but also advocates direct trade connectivity with Central Asian states. An important goal of this programme is to improve the standards of living of the ethnic Uyghurs, which will lead to overall development of the region. The study will highlight the Chinese efforts to foster regional development programme in the interior parts of Xinjiang by means of domestic and foreign investment.

The main objectives of this research work are: i) to discuss what Xinjiang problem is all about, especially its strategic significance; ii) to examine various aspects of Chinese government's minority policy, particularly in the context of Xinjiang; iii) to discuss Economic Development Programme in Xinjiang in general and development under the ambit of Western Development Programme in particular; and iv) to evaluate Uyghur response to Western Development Programme in Xinjiang. This research work touches upon the following research questions: a) Why is Xinjiang important for China? b) What are the factors that have made Xinjiang a volatile region? c) What are the basic tenets of China's minority policy in Xinjiang? d) What are the main aims and objectives, and successes and failures of Western

Development Programme in Xinjiang? and e) Has Western Development Programme been an important factor for Uyghur nationalism? In addition the following couple of hypotheses have been proved in the fourth and fifth chapters of the research work: 1) Chinese policy in Xinjiang, often dubbed as carrot and stick policy, has resulted in simmering discontent among the Uyghurs and further contributed to volatility of the region; and 2) the Great Western Development Programme aims at ending alienation and marginalisation among the minorities through economic development. The proposed study analyzes the Western Development Programme in Xinjiang by following historical and analytical methods. The study shall use inductive and deductive method wherever applicable. The study has consulted primary sources materials like various statutes, decrees, White Papers and laws passed by the Chinese government. The study has used data and information collected from various secondary sources material such as books, monographs, articles published in various news magazines, journals and newspapers. The Chinese and Uyghur language data material and information collected during the field visit to Xinjiang and China are also being used for this purpose.

The review of literature covers three distinct themes based on their correlation with the chapters of this study: a) Chinese Minority Policy in Xinjiang; b) Economic Development Programme in Xinjiang; and iii) Xibu Da Kaifa

Chinese Minority Policy in Xinjiang

There are 55 national minorities in China living mainly in the western part of the country, constituting a considerable portion of the country's total population. Uyghurs of Xinjiang, one of the largest minority groups in China, have been demanding separate homeland out of China. In this context, Gladney's (1996) argument is noteworthy. According to him, the minorities and the Muslim of Xinjiang have generally been marginalized on the geographic and social horizons of discourse and power in China, which has resulted in simmering ethnic discontent leading to a violent form of separatism. Since Xinjiang is a strategically important region in China's northwest part having border with eight countries, the Chinese government has a well thought minority policy to pacify Uyghurs in order to secure stability and security of the region. Immediately after China's independence in 1949, the Chinese government devised a full-fledged minority policy to sort out the minority related issues. Some White Papers published by the Information Office of the State Council

of People's Republic of China are important in this regard. The first one (2003) describes Xinjiang as a multi-ethnic region since ancient times with diverse religions coexisting and spreading in Xinjiang besides upholding equality and unity among ethnic groups. It announces that all the ethnic groups in the Peoples Republics of China's are equal. Further, the Paper states that the Chinese state protects the lawful rights and interests of the ethnic minorities and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China's ethnic groups. Discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic groups are prohibited; any act which determines the unity of the ethnic groups or instigates division is prohibited. The second one (2005) while discussing the political status of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities and the establishment of ethnic autonomous areas, the right of self-government of ethnic autonomous areas, advocates regional autonomy for ethnic minorities. The paper further states that the establishment of an ethnic autonomous area, the delimiting of its boundaries and what name this autonomous regions is to assume shall be decided after these matters are fully discussed among state organs at a higher level, the state organs of the locality concerned and the representatives of the relevant ethnic groups, and their decision shall be submitted for approval in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law. It analyses the Central Government's support and assistance for autonomous areas and the development of various undertakings in these sensitive areas. The third one (2009) is a significant one as far as the current situation in the volatile region of Xinjiang is concerned. While hailing the Chinese policy in the region, the Paper states that the Chinese government has employed legal, economic and administration means to eliminate ethnic discrimination and to promote unity and development. The paper discusses minority policies, such as protecting and developing the spoken and written languages of the ethnic minorities, supporting and helping the ethnic minorities to develop education, rescuing and preserving cultural heritage of the ethnic minorities. It calls for great unity among all ethnic minority people and their socio-economic development of the ethnic minorities and protection and development of their culture. The White Paper published in 2012 highlights economic development of all ethnic people in the country, particularly of Uyghurs and Tibetans, since both these ethnic minority groups have been demanding separate statehood out of China. It discusses one important element of the process of development that is the thriving energy industry in the country which provides a guarantee to reduce poverty, improve

people's livelihood, and maintain long-term, steady and rapid economic growth, particularly in backward regions like Xinjiang. The White Paper published in 2015 highlights that the ethnic groups in Xinjiang have kept up close relations with each other, trusting and relying on each other and sharing weal and hardship together. They have endeavoured to assemble Xinjiang, to defend border stability, national unification, and ethnic solidarity, and to advance the improvement and progress of China. Executing the arrangement of ethnic territorial self-governance in Xinjiang is a measure that accords with the predominant circumstance in China and with the substances of life and the needs and aspiration of people in Xinjiang. This has resulted in national unification and the uniformity, solidarity, and advancement of every ethnic group in Xinjiang. The White paper published in 2016 highlights the for building a modestly prosperous society and understanding the Chinese Dream of the remarkable revival of the Chinese country.

Some scholars working on the Chinese minority policy in ethnic minority dominated are noteworthy. According to Shi Bai (2012), Xinjiang, while having grown into a prosperous continental bridge linking China with its neighbouring Eurasian countries, has been benefiting from favourable government policies and improved social stability. Shi Bai is optimistic about the perspective of population and development, a combination of family planning, education and training and migration policies, which would greatly facilitate the development of Xinjiang bringing prosperity for its people. Potter (2010) examines the Chinese government policies and practices in the inner periphery area such as Xinjiang focusing on themes of political authority, ethno-nationalism, socio-cultural relations and economic development. He unfolds the Chinese concerns about relations between Han and other ethnic groups, which continue to dominate Chinese law, policy and practices regarding governance in Xinjiang. Keeping in view the re-emergence of growing ethnic sentiment in Xinjiang that has serious implications not only for China's internal economic and political development, but also for its foreign relations with the neighbouring Central Asian Republics, Clarke (2003) argues that this situation is going to have considerable influence on China's policies in Xinjiang. Cao (2010) looks at another angle of the rise in ethnic sentiment among Uyghurs in Xinjiang. He discusses how the spatial distribution of ethnic minorities reflects their spatial segregation resulting in their socio-economic exclusion from the majority Hans. Sautman's (1998) analysis of

Chinese government's preferential policies and its impact on Han-Uyghur relations, Dwyer's (2005) critical view on Chinese language policy in Xinjiang and the politics of Uyghur identity, and Clothey's (2005) take on the debate on language and ethnicity in Chinese education policies in Xinjiang have considerable importance for this study.

Some Indian scholars have given a balanced view on China's minority policy, particularly in the context of the problem in Xinjiang. Warikoo (2010) narrates how Chinese leadership has been attaching importance to address domestic concerns simultaneously with the expansion and consolidation of its infrastructure, industry, economy, science, technology, education and health sectors. Social cohesion, national unity, political stability, sustainable development, energy security, financial stability, containing price rise, employment, better education and health services and ecological protection are on the constant agenda of the Chinese leadership. The new approach, according to Warikoo, is to turn Chinese economic growth from quantity based to quality oriented development by promoting indigenous scientific and technological innovations. While retaining its basic structure, functions and doctrines the Chinese Communist Party is adapting to the new social, economic and political realities to meet the challenges of modernization and globalization. The Chinese are acutely conscious of their history and importance as a major power and they never let their country's interests down, with Han nationalism binding the nation together (2010). While Debata (2007) makes a critical analysis of the Chinese policy towards the minority nationalities of the country in general and Uyghurs in particular, Chaudhuri (2009) elaborates Chinese Central Government's basic policy towards Xinjiang and its impact on the nature of Uyghur activities and the consequences for the region's future.

McMillen (1984) sums up China's minority policy by analysing the recent leadership and policy trends in strategically located Xinjiang and discusses their relevance to security and defence related issues. According to him, China has been able to integrate the minorities economically, educationally and religiously. In economic terms, the minorities are much better integrated into the Chinese nation state than even before. Improvement in infrastructure and communications and above all tourism development are given importance as part of the economic development programme. There are more trade and other dealings between the eastern seacoast and the western region. Communication systems have been improved and investment has

grown greatly. He expresses hope that the ongoing economic development under the Great Western Development Programme will definitely change the overall economic conditions of the minority nationalities.

Economic Development Programme in Xinjiang

This is a general feeling that in the present globalised era, economic development is a panacea for all evils. Chinese government echoes the same feeling and minds in the economic development of the underdeveloped minority areas, particularly Xinjiang, with a hope to bring an end to the discontent, marginalization and alienation among the minorities. In this context, a White Paper (2005) released by the Information Office of the State Council of People's Republic of China dubs regional ethnic autonomy as the correct solution for ethnic problem in China. According to another White Paper (2009), national unification, ethnic unity, social stability, coexistence and development are important factors of regional development and progress. Further, Yong (2010) narrates the Chinese government efforts to launch a new development campaign in Xinjiang. After studying the root of instability that imbalances economic development across the entire Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Yong argues, new Chinese policy is to realize long-term social stability through "leap-frog economic growth". Pointing out the significance of economic development of Xinjiang as an important policy measure devised by the Chinese government, Yue (2010) discusses Chinese government's Partner Assistance Program in Xinjiang, which to him, is an essential ingredient of economic prosperity and social stability in this volatile region. This is a 10-year long program to power up the growth engine of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Yue concludes. Gosset (2006) looks at Xinjiang's development from a different angle. According to him, the Chinese policy of development of the western region in general and Xinjiang in particular, aims at correcting the imbalance of development between the eastern coastal belt and the underdeveloped western region, which in turn will reinforce Xinjiang's economic momentum. He argues that Chinese government has been able to keep the situation in Xinjiang under control through effective economic development and trying to manage internal difficulties in the region by means of huge investment. Xiaolei (2008) describes the resources and economic patterns of the vast rural region of Xinjiang and the astounding development in Xinjiang's agrarian sector.

Becquelin has a couple of research articles with regard to the economic development in Xinjiang. In the first one (2000), Becquelin has dubbed Chinese agriculture policies, large reclamation programmes and urban networks in Xinjiang as key elements of Chinese policies in the region. The role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) in facilitating the Chinese policies is critically analysed in this research work. The second article (2004), he argued that the intertwined dimension of Chinese state building and nation building has embedded in the campaign to open up the west, which responds to the long-term strategic goal of placating the threat of ethno-nationalist unrest. The term “Staged Development” he used in this paper accounts for the manifold dimension of the campaign to open up the west and their intertwinement with Xinjiang policies. This article examines the economic objectives and tangible aspects of the campaign and their implementation by the Xinjiang provincial government and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, with an emphasis on how these processes intersect with past and present. Zhao analyses the Chinese policies in Xinjiang and the response by the Uyghur in three articles. In the first article (2001), he discussed that in Xinjiang, the Chinese government is developing an economy with local characteristics. This region has heightened efforts to turn local resources for greater economic advantage. In the second article (2002), he argues that China has been making sincere efforts to improve the living standards of ethnic minorities in an effort to build a more harmonious society. In his article in 2011, he discusses regional development in Xinjiang in details.

Andresy and Raballand (2007) dilate upon Chinese government’s overall policy for its western region which has led to a strong expansion of Sino-Central Asian trade, particularly the growth of border trade between Xinjiang and Central Asia. Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Zhejiang investors installed based in Xinjiang account for a major share of this increase. The Chinese government’s liberal trade policy in western China explains this new impetus for Sino-Central Asian trade. Xiaolei (2007) echoes the same describing Xinjiang as the gateway to get energy from Central Asia. Jianhua (2002) analyses how Chinese government has heightened efforts to turn local resources into economic advantages. Shen (2004) mentions about the potential for ecological conversation and economic development and the measure needed to achieve these goals Xinjiang. This plan aims

to provide social stability, production, construction, and economic development, unification of the motherland, consolidation and the defence of the western frontier.

Xibu Da Kaifa

The Western Development programme in Xinjiang was started in 1990s with the motive to promote development of the backward region of the volatile region and the Chinese economic strategy of promoting trade between Central Asia and western China. In this context, OECD (2002) sums up the Chinese government's 'Western Development Strategy' to foster the regional development of the inland regions. The plan stipulates a greater role for foreign investment, particularly in the less or least developed western region to improve China's rapidly growing economy with sustainable, clearness and secure energies. Shujun (2010) argues that development of Xinjiang is a strategic choice to deepen the western development strategy and tap new sources of economy growth. He emphasizes that in order to have economic development of the region, opening up of Xinjiang region and its natural resources to the outside world is a veritable need. Lai (2002), however, argues that the Western Development Programme not only addresses economic issues, but also regional, ecological and security concerns. According to Rahman (2005) the Western Development Programme as a long term strategy, which not only sets out guidelines for all policies, programmes and projects, but also lays out the political boundary for Xinjiang's economic development. Castets (2003) has made some observations with regard to the Western Development Programme in Xinjiang. He highlights the security interests, fear of separatism, economic interests and WTO imbroglio, environment issues as well as stimulation of domestic demand as the important factors behind the focus on Western Development Programme in Xinjiang. Goodman (2004) analyzes that the present progressive development scheme for China's western regions, particularly the campaign to open up the west, has been a major state project of nation building directed at the interior provincial-level jurisdiction in order to encourage endogenous economic growth to reduce social and economic inequalities and to ensure social and political stability in Xinjiang. He details the ways in which the call to open up the west has provided the provincial leadership with an opportunity to resolve some of the long term difficulties through adopting markedly different perspectives on development. He suggests that in order to achieve wider goals of social stability and economic development, inherent political, social and cultural

contestation require more sophisticated management by the Chinese authorities. Wang (2010) analyses how some measures such as resource tax reform, partnership assistance programme have been crucial for development and stability in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. News from China (November 2011) has put some details about Western Development Programme in Xinjiang that provides incentive for investors to bring about industrial development in the region. However, Holbig (2004) dubs Western Development Programme as a “soft policy” to placate the minorities, particularly the Uyghurs, who have been criticizing the Chinese policies towards minorities.

Dillon (2009) states that the responsibility for the implementation of the development of the western region falls under the overall direction of the State Council and it was agreed by the Chinese leadership that this specific plan for the western region should be included in China’s tenth Five Year Plan. He analyzes various policies initiated by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao on the development scheme for economic, political, cultural and social development. One Chinese scholar Rongxia discusses Western Development Programme in Xinjiang and its positive impact on the region in his four scholarly papers published in the year 2000. In the first one, while summing up the developments in Xinjiang under the ambit of the Western Development programme, Rongxia suggests that for formulation of any policy with regard to the Western Development programme, emphasis should be put on the study of measures for deepening the reform process and enlarging the opening-up programme. He highlights the reform of state owned enterprises, enhancing the validity of enterprises, developing urban and rural collective, individual, private and foreign funded enterprises leading force in the development of the western regions. He narrates the role of China’s State Development Planning Commission in formulating medium and long term plans concerning development in the western region and putting forward projects in sectors like infrastructure and ecological construction. It is imperative to narrate the highlights of China’s 11th Five Year Plan for Energy Development (2006-2010) being released by the National Development and Reform Commission. In the second article, Rongxia discusses Chinese Government’s efforts to implement the strategy for large scale development of Western China, shifting the focus of economic construction from the eastern to the western parts of the country. According to him, the opportunity to adjust and optimize

domestic economic and industrial structure is an important issue China faces in its development in the early 20th century. Developing the western part of China is not only advantageous to restructuring there, but also a broad development space for central and eastern region structural readjustment and also contributing factor for upgrading the economic structure in the eastern region. In third article, Rongxia highlights the remarkable advantage the western region does have, which has rich land and natural resources with great potential for development. Rationally using and tapping local resources is very important to the development of the western region, suggests Rongxia. In the fourth article, Rongxia reiterates the view of the State Council regarding the plan for western region development that the emphasis will be on i) unified policies, ii) overall planning, iii) infrastructure construction and ecological conservation, and iv) agriculture science and education. Moneyhon (2003) differs here while addressing the Western development campaign's impact on Xinjiang, especially as the plan fits into Beijing's greater strategy for integration and assimilation of Xinjiang's restive Uyghur population. He concludes that even though the Central government's economic promises bear fruit, prosperity in Xinjiang may not yield desired result for Beijing. However, Fleischer (2004) argues that with the Western Regional Development Programme becoming an undertaking of comprehensive social engineering in the region. While Kerr and Swinton (2008) feels that this Programme supplements China's intensive security campaign to eradicate the three evil of splittism, terrorism and extremism and to promote a common political identity, Krishnan (2011) talks about the successful Chinese endeavour to make Kashgar a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which has been the target of ethnic unrest in recent times.

The review of literature of this study includes mostly English language materials as there is dearth of Chinese and Uyghur language source materials. This gap is being filled up by using materials in Chinese and Uyghur languages during the final preparation of the research work. Besides, the translated version of Chinese and Uyghur language source materials has also been used.

This research work has six chapters including an introduction and conclusion. The introductory chapter would analyzes the strategic significance of Xinjiang with a brief historical background. Besides, this chapter discusses geo-political and geo-economic importance of Xinjiang that has made it one of China's most important

regions. Chapter two, which is titled as “Chinese Policy in Xinjiang during Mao Period” deals with the Chinese policy towards minorities in general and the Uyghurs in particular during the Mao rule (1949-1976). This chapter covers the economic, religious and cultural policies by the Chinese Central Government and analyse how these policies have brought simmering discontent among Uyghurs of Xinjiang. The third chapter narrates how Chinese leadership under Deng Xiaoping tried to re-correct the minority policy devised during the Mao period. This chapter discusses the economic initiatives taken up by the Chinese Central Government in order to ameliorate the standard of living in Xinjiang and general economic development. The fourth chapter highlights development under the Five Year Plans and role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) in this regard. This chapter analyzes the main features of China’s Western Development Programme in Xinjiang, which has been an important Chinese government economic measure in Xinjiang. It will examine the successes and failures of the Programme in Xinjiang. Fifth chapter titled as “Uyghurs’ Response to Chinese minority Policy”, highlights the Uyghurs’ response to Chinese minority policy in Xinjiang in general, the Western Development Programme in particular. The concluding part wraps up this research work with the summary of the findings.

CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER- 1

INTRODUCTION

China's economic restructuring programme under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping started in the late 1970s along the eastern coastal belt. The consequence of this was that China's western frontiers, which have been strategically bounded with Central Asia, South Asia and Eastern Europe, began to feel alienated from the mainstream. The western borderland of the country comprising a landmass of about 6.85 million square miles (rich in natural resources) and 30 per cent of China's total population did not figure in the Chinese development programme (Jianming 2016: 149-150). This state of affairs led to simmering discontent among ethnic minority people in the western region against Chinese policy of uneven economic development, which virtually fuelled violent separatism in three autonomous regions situated in the western part – Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Chinese authorities launched an important economic initiative known as Great Western Development Programme (*Xibu da Kaifa*), keeping in view the anger and angst among the people, which would aim at developing the impoverished regions of western China as well as bridging the gap between the eastern and western regions. The Western Development programme in Xinjiang started in the 1990s with the following motives- i) to promote the development of backward areas of this volatile region and ii) the Chinese economic strategy of promoting trade between the neighbouring Central Asia and its western region. In accordance with the rules of the programme, the central government of China opted for a national policy, which would aim at the development of the backward frontier regions and help them grow on the economic front. As a result, various issues such as the development of transportation, energy, communication, skilled labour and irrigation and improving the urban infrastructure in the interior regions became the main focus and got the priority.

The Chinese intention was clear that it wanted to bring Xinjiang to an equal pedestal with the overall national development of the rest of the country and the reason was to lessen simmering discontent among the local people. This has led to the province of Xinjiang undergoing a rapid, comprehensive growth in both economic and social

sectors with the populace enjoying tangible benefits. In the past ten years, Xinjiang has been able to attract huge investments and ushered in fast economic growth, which in turn has proved to be most effective and beneficial for the common people of Xinjiang (Wang 2016: 150).

By its very name coined under the Qing Dynasty, Xinjiang (which literally means ‘New Frontier’), which has otherwise been known as Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang and East Turkestan, is home to ethnically diverse 22 million people comprising 47 nationalities including Uyghur, Han, Kazakh, Hui, Kyrgyz and Mongol. Xinjiang was liberated on 25 September 1949, and a provincial government was set up at Urumqi on 17 December 1949. The regional concentration of various ethno-religious groups resulted in the Chinese policy of creating separate administrative divisions, autonomous prefectures, autonomous counties and towns within prefectures, where a particular ethnic or religious group is in the majority. These divisions were already created in 1954 before Xinjiang was made an autonomous region on 1 October 1955-and rechristened as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) (Millward & Tursun 2004: 91). The name of Uyghuristan has been used by those who have been trying to achieve independence of Xinjiang from People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, the Kazaks renamed it as “Chinese Turkistan” in order to distinguish it from the Russian Turkistan, which formed the part of the former Soviet Central Asia. On the other hand, it is popularly known as Dogu Turkestan among the Uyghur population living in Turkey (Debata 2010: 55-78).

The present study examines the following factors, which are imperative to understand the situation in this strategically important frontier of China:

1. Strategic Location
2. Geographical Perspective
3. Population
4. History
5. Ethnic Issue
6. Xinjiang’s Natural Resources
7. Disintegration of USSR and emergence of the Central Asia
8. Separatism, Extremism and Terrorism

Map:1

Map of Xinjiang



Sources: www.google.com.in/search?q=china+north+west+frontier+map&bin=1366&bih+638&tbn+isch&imgil+hHTOV-tEjNIWtM%253%253 Bk5fa6-e9OvUMM%235Bhttps%25253A, (Accessed on 19 February 2017).

1.1 STRATEGIC LOCATION

With a total international border of 5,600 km, Xinjiang constitutes almost a quarter of the whole Chinese border area. Being located in the northwest of the Chinese province, Xinjiang region serves and shares a border with all strategic allies the Chinese state. While Mongolia is a northwest neighbour, Russia rests on the north of this region. On the West, it shares its frontiers with the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and on the south rests the states of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. On the South side, there are the Chinese provinces of Tibet, Qinghai and Gansu (Raczka 1998: 34). All the countries bordering this region have a sizeable population of Muslims, and almost all the eight countries are having problems of separatism, religious extremism and terrorism, which have a substantial effect on the situation in Xinjiang. (Debata 2007: 35-36).

Table: 1.1
Xinjiang Borders with Foreign Countries

Country	Distance (km)
Russia and Central Asia, (Xinjiang, China share border in north-west)	3,200 Km ¹
Russia	56 Km ²
Central Asian Region	
1. Kazakhstan	1,718 Km
2. Kyrgyzstan	980 Km
3. Tajikistan	450 Km
4. Mongolia	1,435Kms
5. Afganistan	80 Km
6. Pakistan	530 Km
7. India	350 Km

Sources: Wit, Rackza (1998), "Xinjiang and its Central Asian Borderland", *Central Asian Survey*, 17 (3): 373-407.

During my Field visit to China, while talking to some Chinese people in Hunan Province, mostly students and local people, it was found that how important the Chinese people consider Xinjiang important, because of its boundary with as many as eight countries and the rich mineral reserves it does possess. Even one of the respondents went to the extent of analysing the importance of the region on three counts: i) most of them were the poorest people in a small part of the area; ii) foreign influence; iii) bilingual education.

Xinjiang, being China's largest province is not just an important energy resource for China in the 21st century, yet it is also an extensive channel connecting China with Russia and other Central Asian countries. Therefore advancing improvement of the energy industry in Xinjiang is off to a great vitally significant not just for the economic

¹Sources: Yeuhan Hao & Weihua Liu (2012), "Xinjiang increasing Pain in the Heart of China's Borderland", *Journal of Contemporary*, 17 (74): 209.

² Before the disintegration of erstwhile USSR, Xinjiang border with Russia was 3200 kms. For more details, see Raczka Wit (1998): 373-407.

and social development of the area itself additionally for China's energy supply and energy security region also.

1.2 GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

In Xinjiang's west, there is the Great Tianshan mountain range, which rises in the northern part of neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and enters Xinjiang, north of Kashgar, dominating the region with an area of 250 to 300 kilometres wide and 1,700-kilometer length. It is China's largest glacier area, with 6,890 glaciers covering some 7,790 square kilometres. These glaciers are Xinjiang's greatest water source; supplying water for the irrigation system and feeding some of the region's huge natural lakes. The other part of Xinjiang is known as the Tarim Basin, at the center of the Taklamakan Desert, covering over 45 percent of the region's landmass. The eastern most part is the Lop Nor region, it is surrounded by marsh and reeds and fed by the 1,000 km long Tarim River, China's longest inland river (Benson 1998:11-12).

Xinjiang's uniqueness stems from its geographical and ethno-cultural diversity, strategic importance as well as huge amount of oil and natural gas reserves. Xinjiang, while occupying one-sixth of the total area of the People's Republic of China, is surrounded by eight countries, three of them being nuclear powers, Russia, India and Pakistan. On the domestic front, two Chinese provinces- Qinghai and Gansu and one Autonomous Region. Tibet also shares borders with this region. Xinjiang's geographical location enables us to understand why this occupies a region is an important place in China's modernisation and development of economic and cultural exchange with the outside world (Dowamat 1993: 1-2).

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is arranged in the northern fringe range of China. Geographically, Xinjiang is situated in 73° 40' - 96° 23' East longitude and 34° 25' -49° 10' north latitude. It is 2,000 kms long from its eastern border to the western border. It covers a region of 1,664,900 square kms, representing 1/6th of Chinese territory (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 7). Xinjiang consists of three basins surrounded and divided by the mountain ranges. The Tarim Basin, divided by the mountain ranges of Kunlun Shan, the Pamirs and the Tianshan, rimmed in the north east

by the Tarim River comprises the Southern Xinjiang. At the centre of the Tarim Basin lies 32,000 square kms long of Taklamakan desert around which lay a chain of fertile oases, watered by the Khotan, Yarkand and Aksu rivers (Millward and Perdue 2004: 29).

The Tianshan mountain range, which is divided into two ranges, is the most important mountain range in Xinjiang. North of the Tianshan range is Zhungaria, which comprises grasslands, desert and the oases. South of the Tianshan range is the Taklamakan desert and Tarim Basin, which is largely an unpopulated wasteland, but possess a huge amount of hydrocarbon reserves. The northern region is being traditionally dominated by pastoral nomads, and the Southern region has numerous fertile oasis settlements with well-established agricultural and trading traditions (Warikoo 2000: 32).

This region also shares an economically significant region, Ili to the west of Zhungaria. It was under Russian domination in the 19th century, with some portion becoming part of the Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic (Forbes 1986: 3). At the centre lies the Tarim Basin comprising of the Taklamakan desert. The oasis that marks the Tarim Basin formed the eastern end of the fabled Silk Route. The oasis was instrumental in spreading Buddhism in China and cross pollination of ideas from India, Central Asia and China (Betta 2001: 3-4).

1.3 POPULATION

Xinjiang is an area of numerous nationalities, both indigenous and settled. Among the different indigenous Muslim nationalities of Xinjiang, the most politically noteworthy are the Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking, fundamentally sedentary agriculture people living in the oasis of the Tarim Basin, Turfan, Kumul, and also the developed marshes of the Ili Valley. The second biggest Muslim community in Xinjiang is the Kazakh, while Kyrgyz are third population-wise. Both the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz of Xinjiang are the Turkic-speaking people settled in and around areas of Zhungaria and the Ili Valley, as well as the upland field of Tianshan and the Pamirs respectively (Forbes 1986: 6). Uyghurs, however, have an overwhelming ethnic group in Xinjiang, consisting of over 46.6 percent of the Xinjiang's total population (<http://www.cia.gov/library/publication/the>

worldfactbook/geos/ch.html). The Uyghurs predominantly live in Kashgar, Khotan, Kizilsu, Kyrgyz region and Turfan. Hans, the second largest group in Xinjiang, are primarily bound toward the northern and eastern part and in urban zones of Xinjiang. Despite their intra-ethnic contrasts, the majorities of the non-Han population of Xinjiang is of Turkic stock and are Muslims by denomination. They share their religion, a Turkic dialect and culture with their brethren in neighbouring Central Asian nations (Warikoo 2000:35).

In table 1. 2, the data information on various population history of Urumqi (Xinjiang), since the 1990s to 2010 and likewise the rise and decline of the population of the year has been recorded here. The Statistical Communique of Xinjiang on the 2012 regional economic and social development show the population of Xinjiang is 22.33 million (Yaqing 2013: 39). Now, the total population of Xinjiang in 2015 is 23. 60 million (China Statistical Yearbook 2016).

Table: 1.2

Xinjiang: Population at Year end by Region (10000 persons)

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Xinjiang region	1963	2010	2050	2095	2131	2159	2185	2209	2233	2464	2298	2360

Note: Data of 2010 are the census year estimate, the rest is the estimate from the annual national survey sample of population. Since 2005, data by region are usually resident.

Sources: China Statistical Year Book 2016 [Online: Web] Accessed on 7th June 2017, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm>.

Table: 1.3

Urumqi: Population History (in thousand) - 1990s to 2010

Year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Urumqi Population History in Xinjiang	1,172.00	1,500.00	1,829.56	2,380.00	2,853.40

Source: Population. City/china/ueruemqi/sources, accessed on (4th January 2017).

Xinjiang is a multi-ethnic area. It has 55 different nationalities, including 13 nationalities that have lived here for ages, i.e. Uyghur, Han, Kazakh, Hui Mongolian, Kirgiz, Xibe Tajik Uzbek, Manchu, Daur, Tatar, Russian (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 29).

The population of Ethnic Minorities of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of 2011 is given in a table below:

Table: 1.4

Ethnic Minority and their percentage of total Population in Xinjiang (2011)

Ethnic Minority People of Xinjiang	Percentage of total population of Xinjiang
Uyghur	46.40%
Han	39.30%
Kazak	7.08%
Hui	4.50%
Kirghiz	0.87%
Mongolian	0.85%
Tajik	0.21%
Xibe	0.20%
Manchu	0.12%
Uzbek	0.08%
Russian	0.06%
Daur	0.03%
Tatar	0.02%
Other	0.59%
Total Population	22,087,100

Source: The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China, 2012, p.29.

By the end of 2011, the total population of Xinjiang is 22,087,100 among which 61 percent are minority nationalities. As indicated by nationalities commission of China the number of inhabitants in Uyghurs involves 46.4 percent of the total population of Xinjiang (The Fact and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 29).

As indicated by 2010 Statistics Yearbook of Xinjiang, the total population of Uyghur is 10,019,758, just about 46.40 percent of the total Chinese population, and Han is 8416,867, is just about 39 percent of the total population as 2010 census in Xinjiang region recorded (Online: Xinjiang: The China Story (2 August 2012), <https://www.the>

chinastory.org/lexicon). As per 2011 census, the number of population of Han is 39.3 percent, the population of Kazak is 7.08 percent, the population of Hui is 4.50 percent, the population of Kirgiz is 0.87 percent, and the population of Mongolian is 0.85 percent, the population of Tajik is 0.21 percent, Xibe is 0.20 percent, the population of Manchu is 0.12 percent, Uzbek is 0.08 percent, Russian is 0.06 percent, the population of Daur nationality is 0.03 percent, and Tatar is 0.02 percent and population of other nationality is 0.59 percent (The Facts and Figures, Xinjiang, China, 2012: 29).

According to China Statical Yearbook of 2013, the population of ethnic minorities are Uyghur 10,069,246, Hui 10,586,081, and Mongolian 59,818,90, Manchu is 10,387,958, Kazak is 14,625,88, Kirgiz is 18,670,8, Daur reach 13,199,2, Xibe is 1,904,81 and Tajik is 5,106,9, Uzbek is 1,056,9, Russian is 1,5393 and Tatar is 3,556 (China Statistical Yearbook 2013: 31).

Table: 1.5

Population at Year-end by Region (10,000 persons) -2004-2015

Region	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Chongqing	2793	2798	2808	2816	2839	2859	2885	2919	2945	2970	2991	3017
Sichuan	8090	8212	8169	8090	8138	8185	8045	8050	8076	8107	8140	8204
Guizhou	3904	3730	3690	8127	3596	3537	3479	3469	3484	3502	3508	3530
Yunnan	4415	4450	4483	3632	4543	4571	4602	4631	4659	4687	4714	4742
Tibet	276	280	285	289	293	296	300	303	308	312	318	324
Shaanxi	3681	3690	3699	3708	3718	3699	3735	3743	3753	3764	3735	3793
Gansu	2541	2545	2547	2548	2581	2547	2560	2564	2578	2582	2592	2600
Qinghai	539	543	548	552	544	548	563	568	573	578	583	588
Ningxia	588	596	604	610	618	604	633	639	647	654	663	668
Xinjiang	1963	2010	2050	2095	2131	2131	2185	2209	2233	2264	2298	2360
Total	129988	130756	131448	132129	132802	133450	134091	134735	135404	136072	136072	137462

Source: China Statical Yearbook 2016, [Online: Web], Accessed on 7th June

2017, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm>.

1.4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Autonomous Region of Xinjiang has been connected to Central Asia through China through hundreds of years. The earliest historical records that we have of Xinjiang depict the zone staging ground for the raid of various Central Asian barbarians into neighbouring area particularly, the Chinese empire (Dickens 1990: 1, Online: http://www.oxuscom.com/Soviets_in_Xinjiang.pdf). The historical background of Xinjiang can be understood by an analysis of the history of the region from Han to Manchu Qing rule.

a) The Han Dynasty (206- 220 A.D)

The Chinese entry into Central Asia was made amid the rule of Han administration (206 BC - 220 AD), when a political mission was initiated by the Han ruler, Wudi (140-86) in 138 BC to Ferghana Valley under the authority of Zhang Qian. In 121 BC, the Han armed force crushed Xiongnu, a powerful Central Asian tribal confederation. The Chinese conquered the city of Kokand in the Ferghana Valley in 102 BC, which amplified Chinese military and political power in Central Asia. The strategic ties between the Chinese and Persians were built up in 106 BC. Because of expansion of Chinese military and political power into Central Asia, it soon ended up plainly feasible for brokers to pass securely between the Persian and the Chinese empires thus emerged one of the most renowned exchange courses ever, the Silk Road. Therefore, Chinese control of Xinjiang gave a defensive support zone from pillaging marauders on the one hand and guaranteed the continuation of lucrative business exchange with the West on the other (Dicken 1990: 2, Online: http://www.oxuscom.com/Soviets_in_Xinjiang.pdf).

In 138 BC, Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty asked Zhang Qian (164 BC-114 BC) to be the diplomatic official of the Han kingdom in the western region. Zhang Qian thus became the first official emissary sent by the Chinese government to Central Asia. His specific objective was to find the Da Yuezhi tribe, who had been driven away by the Huns from the Hexi Corridor to the West. Zhang intended to persuade them to join forces with the Han army to fight against the Huns. With the critical mission, he crossed the Yellow River through Litao to the west followed by the entourage up to a hundred

people. Unfortunately, the area to the west of the Yellow River was completely under the control of the Hun (Chinese Civilization Centre: 2007: 412-413).

As indicated by Shi Ji, Zhang Qian (164 BC-114 BC) headed a troop of more than 100 individuals to the Western region in the year of 139 BC, with a mission to look for cooperation among the nomadic groups in the area, in order to counter the Huns. In fact, China proper went under various Hun invasion from its western frontier, and when defeated after every attack, the Han Emperor was subjected to pay heavier tributes, in exchange for peace with the Huns. During his initial thirteen-year mission in the Western Region, Zhang Qian failed to find a nomadic alliance for the Han Emperor (Rahman 2005: 28). In 126 BC., Zhang Qian came back to China, bringing with him a lot of information about the Western region and the nomadic people living there. In 199 BC., Zhang Qian made his second journey into Central Asia, where he attempted to build up contacts with Farghana and the Sogdians (Rahman 2005: 28).

Despite the fact that Zhang Qian's mission was unsuccessful despite his two long journeys, his information on the nomadic culture, their force and weakness had been valuable for the Han to set up a military force. Zhang Qian himself even took an interest in the first military undertakings against the Huns. Zhang Qian was the first person who opened a communication line between China proper and the West through Xinjiang, called Silk Road. Zhang Qian's two missions toward the western region had played a vital part in China's later engagement in Xinjiang. Maybe, he never imagined that the journey would later assist the Han dynasty by making a successful victory in the western region, and the foundation of his administration in Xinjiang, which had been thought impossible by the Chinese who travelled and lived in Xinjiang, which denoted the beginning of an area of Chinese military engagement in the Central Asian region (Rahman 2005: 29)

After Zhan Qian, famous commanders like Weiqing, Huo Qubing and Li Guang led the Han military to battle against the Hun. When the Huns waned, the western regions were absorbed into the Han Dynasty. In 60 BC, the Han dynasty assigned Zheng Ji to be the commander of west regions, and thus, Xinjiang became part of the Han empire. This was the period when the fabled Silk Route rose to prominence with continuous trade in

silk, and other precious goods travelled through high mountains and huge deserts of China to Persia and Rome (The Fact and Figure 2012: 53). Of late, relics of Han dynasty have been found by Chinese archaeologists in Lop Nor area in northwest Xinjiang, which contended that the Chinese beacon towers could be found similar to Kashghar in Xinjiang's southwest. The current disclosure has made the population politically delicate on the grounds that China guarantees the locale as its part since antiquated circumstances (Debata 2007: 42).

After the Han rule, the dynasties who ruled over the western regions of China from (220-589 AD) Wei Jin, Western Jin (265-315 AD), Eastern Jin (317-420 AD) and Sui and Tang dynasty (589-907 AD), Song dynasty (960-1279), Northern Song dynasty (960-1127) and Southern Song dynasty (1127-1279) and Yuan and Ming line (960-1644), which is considered as the golden age of Chinese history..

b) Wei Jin Southern and Northern Dynasties (220-589 AD)

After the Western Jin Dynasty, wars still occurred as often as possible. Hun, Xianbei, Jie, Shi, and Qiang attacked central plain in succession. Jin Dynasty of two dynasties is the Western Jin (265-316 AD) and the Eastern Jin (317-420 AD). The Western Jin was established by Sima Yun with Luoyang as its capital city, while the Eastern Jin was established by Sima Rui with Jiankang (now Nanjing) as its capital. In 265, as a chancellor of the Kingdom of Wei, Sima Yan replaced the last Emperor of Wei, Cao Huan. After Sima Yan acceded to the throne, broadcasted himself Emperor Wu in Luoyang and built up the Jin Dynasty. In 280, Sima Yan sent his troops to assault the Kingdom of Wu and in the end crushed the last kingdom of the Three Kingdoms Period (220 -280 AD) (<https://www.jindynasty.com/intro/history/jin/>). At this point, the economy of Xinjiang grew consistently because this region was less affected by the wars and politics and was relatively steady. Buddhism spread comprehensively in the Tarim Basin at the time, and the western area turned out to be outstanding Buddhist. Numerous grottos in the southern slope of Tianshan mountains were built. In north Xinjiang, the migrant Turkic tribes Turk ruled the roost (The Fact and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 53-54).

c) Sui and Tang Dynasty (589-907 AD)

The Sui and Tang rules are the flourishing times in Chinese history and also the golden age in the history of Xinjiang. Especially, after Emperor Tai Zong conquered Gaochang in 640 A.D., Yanqi in 644, Qiuci in 648 and East and West Turk, the military strength and political reputation of Empire Tang were dramatically increased. Keziergaha made the domain of the Tang Dynasty across the Cong Ridge and outskirts in Central Asia. At that point, Xinjiang appeared to be the hinterland of China. Also, the border has opened as the nation was capable and wasn't anxious about any reversals. A considerable measure of fantastic new towns with incredible scale sprang up in Xinjiang during the Tang rule. The Protectorate Anxi and The Protectorate Beiting which governed military and political affairs of the region toward the east and south of Lake Balkhas were set up in progression by the Legislature of the Tang. Furthermore, four military towns of Qiuci, Hotan, Shule and Suiye were developed to guard the western border and reinforce safeguard (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 54).

Education was given top priority. Schools were built up, and classes on Confucius and Xiao Jing (Classic of Filial devotion) were taken up. It has seen from the uncovered parallel writing, calligraphy, drawing and open and private reports that the cultured level of Turpan then was not lower than that of inside China. The administration designated the capable, insightful and able locals of western regions authorities or sent to inside China and capital to work. The troopers of Western Plain went to the garrison in inside China as authorities and officers from inside China moved to guard borders in the Western Regions (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 54).

During Tang rule, China broadened and solidified its run in the area of the west and caught the area overwhelmed by Sui Dynasty. It is likewise evident that Chinese armed force vanquished important cities in the region, for example, Kucha, Khotan, Kashgar, Yarkand and Turpan during the second Tang emperor Li Shi-min between 630 AD and 640 AD and marched towards Bukhara and Samarkand in 659 AD. The Tang developed a separate system of organisation for Han and other ethnic groups in the western region of the country. They embraced the administrative arrangement of Prefectures, Sub-Prefecture, County, Township and Equal field framework, tax collection

structure instalment in kind and work and the arrangement of military charge at the prefecture level (Debata 2007: 43).

During the eighth Century, the Arabs went into Central Asia, to preach and spread Islam in the region. They attacked Persia, Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent and crossed the Oxus River in 654 AD. Arabs defeated the Tang armed force at the battle of Talas River in the Ferghana Valley in 751 AD and laid the foundation of Islam in the Turkistan area (Debata 2007: 43-44). In 840 AD, the kingdom established by the Uyghurs in Mobei broken down and the Uyghurs migrated into Xinjiang westward. This incredible movement occurring in late Tang Dynasty made Uyghurs incorporate into the locals of Western Regions and from the present Uyghur nationality, which steadily formed into major ethnic groups in Xinjiang (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 55).

d) The Song, Yuan and Ming Dynasty (960-1644 AD)

The Song Dynasty (960 AD-1279 AD) consisted of the Northern Song (960-1127) and the Southern Song (1127-1279). With a prosperous economy and radiant culture, this period has considered as another period of 'golden age' after the glorious Tang Dynasty (618 - 907). The Northern Song dynasty was founded by Zhao Kuangyin, a military general in the Latter Zhou (951 - 960). In 960, Zhao Kuangyin launched an offensive in Chenqiao county (in current Henan Province). It was not long before the last king of the Latter Zhou was forced to abdicate. Thus a new dynasty - Song was established in Kaifeng. In that period, most of China's territory has unified. However, in late Northern Song dynasty, political corruption led the regime began to decline. In 1127, it was destroyed by the Jin (1115 - 1234) (Online:<https://www.songdynasty.com/intro/history/song/>).

The Southern Song was set up by Zhao Gou, son of the last emperor of Northern Song. After Jin had defeated the Northern Song, many imperial clansmen were captured by Jin's army. Fortunately, Zhao Gou had a lucky escape. In 1127, he fled to Nanjing Yingtianfu (in current Shangqiu of Henan Province) and established the Southern Song Dynasty there. Later, the capital city has moved to Lin'an (currently Hangzhou City in

Zhejiang Province). The Southern Song's regime was subject to the Jin. In 1279, the army of the Yuan Dynasty captured Lin'an, putting the Southern Song to an end (Online:<https://www.songdynasty.com/intro/history/song/>).

The administration under the Song Dynasty was excessively feeble, making it impossible to guard the western border. It led to numerous autonomous governments in Xinjiang, such as Gaochang Uyghur (Turpan), Dabao Yutian (Hotan as the middle and Karahan Dynasty with Kashgar as East Capital, which transferred east and west of Cong Ride (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 55).

At the Beginning of the thirteenth Century, Mongolia defeated Mobei and Gaochang in 1209, and soon Kashgar was vanquished. More often than not in the Ming Dynasty Xinjiang was still controlled by the relatives of Mongol ruler Chagatai. Toward the end of the Ming rule, Wala defeated northern Xinjiang. Wala, which was Velatic Mongolia, was partitioned into four gatherings, i.e. Tuerhute, Durbat, Qosot and Soongor. After the 1630s, Soongor controlled the entire Xinjiang and ruled the northwest. They likewise cleared Qinghai, Tibet and Mongolian grassland and after that turn into the biggest isolated power at the beginning of the Qing rule. The Qing Army had battled with Soongor Army for over 10 years before consolidating power in Xinjiang (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 55-56)

In 1368, ZhuYuanzhang announced himself sovereign in Yingtian and built up the Ming dynasty. Zhu Yuanzhang declared himself Emperor Taizu of the Ming dynasty. Emperor Taizu took twenty years to evacuate the warlords before unifying the northwest. (The Editorial Committee of Chinese Civilization 2007: 95). The Ming acquired power and supremacy in 1368 AD. In comparison to its predecessors and successor Manchu Qing, the Ming administration was, actually, ethnically mixed. The Mings merged their rule, gave firm resistance to resurgent Mongols in the Steppes and joined the Oasis societies of Central Asia into China (Debata 2007: 47). Additionally, crucial economic growth, benefit in trade and defences were other important highlights of the Ming rule. Keeping in mind the end goal to direct relations with the Central Asian States, the Ming set up as Board of Rites, which later turned into the Court of Colonial Affairs under the Qing to deal with the affairs of Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet (Debata 2007: 47).

e) Manchu Qing Dynasty

During the Manchu Qing rule, the entire Xinjiang region, including Zhungaria, Eastern Turkistan and the principalities of Hami and Turfan were conquered and brought under the Chinese rule (Milward 2004: 2). Manchu Qing dynasty also followed the policy of divide and rule through which they tried to dismantle Zhungar khanates, the state of Oirates and the East Turkistan kingdom. It also brought its borders closer to the territories of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Qing used the military and diplomatic means to conquer Xinjiang. They also pursued the policy of military conquest, territorial expansion, political manoeuvring and economic benefits and the trade concessions for territorial gains (Warikoo 2000: 33). However, various groups of Xinjiang, for example, Kazakhs and Uyghurs and other Muslims of Xinjiang showed resentment against the repressive policies of the late Qing rulers. The Rebellion continued throughout the 1860s and 1870s, leading to deterioration in military - bureaucratic machinery, exploitation of peasant, financial crunch, oppression of ethnic minorities and rampant corruption led to the decline of the Qing rule in the late eighteenth century. Xinjiang got provincial status in 1884 AD with which Xinjiang would no longer be under the jurisdiction of the Manchu General in Ili, but under a Han Governor in Urumqi (Debata 2007: 47).

Xinjiang, which had been isolated for long was brought together subsequent to putting down the uprisings of Zhungar of north Xinjiang and Burhan al-Din and Khwaja Jinan of south Xinjiang. Authorities were sent to manage regulatory issues, develop water conservancy, set up government workplaces and start currency. The General situated in Ili administrated all the military issues over Xinjiang. A military government framework which for the most part went for shielding grounds was set up. In any case, the common undertakings were still administered by neighbourhood Beg (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 56-57).

At the start of the nineteenth century, relatives of Burhan al-Din and Khwaja Jinan had attacked south Xinjiang. Amid the period between 1864 and 1876, Kokandi general Yakub Beg seized the greater part of Xinjiang and Ili was possessed by Tsarist Russia. The lost grounds were recovered, and ranges of more than 1.6 million square kilometers around the south and north of Tianshan Mountains were saved after several

fights and the battling campaign toward the west driven by Zuo Zongtang, yet territories of more than 0.5 million square kilometers in the northwestern corner were surrendered to Tsarist Russia (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 57).

In 1884, the administrative authority was set up in Xinjiang with Dihua as the capital, Prefectures and counties were set underneath. The neighbourhoods, authorities of each level were delegated by the local government. The Bek System was cancelled, and measures were taken to dispense with some social detriments, build up genuine businesses and develop schools. Economy, culture, instruction, city foundation, trade and transportation of Xinjiang had gained emotional ground, which pulled in numerous residents of Hexi and agents of Beijing and Tianjin to work together, bring home the bacon and live in Xinjiang. The provincial capital Dihua turned out to be the first city in the territory past the Great Wall. The association between the more distant border and inferior China was phenomenally close (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 57).

The Qing rule witnessed administration, development and diligent work of people of each nationality set up a strong establishment for Xinjiang's improvement of present day times as well as contemporary circumstances(The fact and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 58).

f) The Republican Period (1911-1949)

The Revolution of 1911 led by Sun Yat Sen brought about the downfall of Qing Dynasty. In 1912, Republic of China was established, and the brief central government changed the governor Xinjiang from Xunfu to Dudu. Uprisings in Wuhang, Dihua and Ili, broke out in Xinjiang during this time. The uprising failed in progression because of the crackdown of the primitive neighbourhood administration on of Xinjiang. In 1912, the Republican time began. Yuan Dihua, the last Qing legislative head of Xinjiang, fled. One of his subordinates Yang Zengxin took control of the territory and acquiesced in name to the Republic of China in March 1912. Yang's administration drew both acclaim and judgment, Aitchin Wu, a Republican authority in Xinjiang, hailed Xinjiang as an "early paradise" (Aitchin Wu, 1984:38). Having huge power, Yang sought after his main goal,

to wrest control by disengaging the territory. During an uprising in Hami and Turpan in 1912, which had raised the phantom of the Uyghur rebellion, Yang, through the creation of ethnic constituencies, built up control over Xinjiang till his death in 1928 (Millward and Tursun 2004: 70).

After Yang, Jin Shuren pronounced himself as a commonplace representative in 1928. His rule witnessed a few rebellions in the mid -1930s all through Xinjiang, including Uyghurs, and other Turkic groups, other than Russians and Hui Chinese. In the Kashgar area, on 12 November 1933, the first East Turkistan Republic (ETR) was pronounced. The ETR asserted control over the domain extending from Aksu along the northern edge of the Tarim Basin to Khotan in the south (Millward and Tursun, 2004: 71).

Xinjiang was brought under the control of Chinese warlord Sheng Shicai in 1934, who ruled Xinjiang for the next decade with support from the Soviet Union. Second time in 1944, ETR was built up in three districts of Xinjiang - Ili, Tarbagatay and Altay (Millward and Tursun 2004: 82). In August of 1945, the Kuomintang government completed peace negotiation with Three-District. In June of 1946, both parties signed Provisions of peace, and after that, in July the unified legislature of Xinjiang was established (The Fact and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 59). The insurgency was bolstered by the Soviet Union and Soviet government prepared and repatriated its supporters from Xinjiang and revolutionaries to control Ili. The rebellion in Ili appeared at first to have an Islamic character. In any case, by the late spring of 1946, Elihan Tore vanished under secretive conditions along the Soviet border; also, Esmetjan Qasimi drove the Ili group and sought after a mainstream and communist plan. With the assistance of GMD, Qasim filled in as common Vice Chairman and positioned second to Zhang. It represents an independent state with Uyghurs, Tungans, Manchus, Mongols, and different nationalities (Millward and Tursun 2004: 84).

In June of 1949, the People's Liberation Army of China crossed the Yangtze River leading to the fall of Kuomintang. The victory in the northwestern battlefield of the PLA of China accelerated the military divisions of Xinjiang. On September 25th and 26th, a leader in chief of Xinjiang province Tao Zhiyue and the Chairman of the

administration of Xinjiang particularly representing the military and political authorities helped and Xinjiang peacefully liberated (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 59-60).

After the 'peaceful liberation', Xinjiang was administered by the PLA first armed force under General Wang Zen (Millward and Tursun 2004: 86). On 1 October 1949, People's Republic of China was established (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 60).

In December 1949, the people's government in Xinjiang province was set up. Boa Erhan was chairperson the officials of the area government were made out of individuals of different nationalities like Uyghur, Han, Kazakh, Hui, Mongolian and Kirgiz (The Fact and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 60).

After the foundation of the People Republic of China, the nationality relationship of equality, friendliness and supportiveness was set up. As indicated by the normal common programme of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Regional National Autonomy System was put into the impact in Xinjiang. In 1954, 16 districts-level, 6 nations-level and 5 special office-level national autonomy regions were established in progression (The Fact and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 60). The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established on 1 October 1955 It is a major issue in the political existence of people of various nationalities of Xinjiang, which strengthened the solidarity of each nationality and incited the improvement of the political, economic and cultural reason for Xinjiang (The Fact and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 61). The plans, programmes and policies of the Chinese Central government towards Xinjiang will be discussed in the next few chapters.

1.5 ETHNIC ISSUE

Ethnic issues have become an important segment of Xinjiang problem. Xinjiang has around 47 ethnic groups with Uyghurs as the majority. As per the 2010 census of China, the Uyghur Population in Xinjiang is 21.82 million (Online: economist.com/blogs/analects/2014/07/chinas-xinjiang-problem]. Now, as per 2013 data, the Uyghur population in Xinjiang is 10,069, 346. (China Statistical Yearbook 2013: 31).

Uyghurs are the majority in southern Xinjiang, including the prefecture of Kashgar, Khotan, Kizilsu, Aksu and eastern region of Hami and Turpan. The Han Chinese, who were a mere seven percent of the Xinjiang population in 1949, is next to the Uyghurs in numbers, 41 percent of the population. They are in the majority in eastern and northern Xinjiang, including the cities of Urumqi, Karamay, Shihezi, Changi, Bortala, Bayingholin, Ili and Kumul. The Kazakhs, the third largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, are mostly concentrated in the Ili prefecture in northern Xinjiang, close to the border of Kazakhstan (Xinzhong and Haibin Song, 2008: 3). Notwithstanding their ethnic-differences, most of the non-Han people of Xinjiang are of Turkic stock and are Muslim by faith stretching their region, a Turkic language and culture with their counterparts in neighbouring Central Asian Republics (Warikoo 2000: 35).

Table: 1.6


Uyghur-Han Population of Xinjiang-2013

Year	2013	
Xinjiang Ethnic Groups	Uyghur	Han
Percentage (%)	47%	41%

Source: Zhang, Sheng, Miaoxu, Li Xueting, Fang Huizhen, et.al (2013), “Implicit Trust between the Uyghur and the Han in Xinjiang, China”, [Online], Accessed on 15th June 2017, [URI:http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0071829](http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0071829). p.1.

Figure: 1.1

Uyghur and Han Population in Xinjiang 2013



Source: Zhang, Sheng, Miao Xu, Li Xueting, Fang Huizhen, et.al (2013), “Implicit Trust between the Uyghur and the Han in Xinjiang, China”, [Online], Accessed on 15th June 2017, [URL:http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0071829](http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0071829). p.1.

The increase in Han population of Xinjiang has been the single most factor of Uyghur resentment in Xinjiang, and many scholars believe that this has been a prominent factor in prompting Uyghurs to demand a separate homeland out of China. Uyghurs allege that Han population has increased six times in the last 50 years through a systematic state-sponsored plan of population transfer. They accuse the Han Chinese of dominating in every sector of Xinjiang, not giving Uyghurs their share. The Hans play an important role at all the crucial positions in the region, be its administration, political or even military (Shichor 2005: 121 -122).

Uyghurs criticised the policy of separate school of Han and Uyghur students. The policy which allowed the minority to become aware has led to rising discontent among the ethnic groups. It is clear that the Beijing in the 1990s has switched over from a policy of discrimination in dealing out favourable or unfavourable treatment on the basis of nationality with a much more separate policy which seeks to isolate and dissociate one group of people from the whole (Becqueline 2000: 90). The changes and the influence are also apparent in the housing policy where the minority cultures are bound to be

respected by one and all. This is also being reflected in the housing policy, the rationale of which, according to the government official is to preserve and respect minority cultures. This has led to the bifurcation amongst the students and the staff on ethnic lines (Debata 2007: 65).

Herbert S. Yee has observed the following with regard to Uyghur and Han relations in Xinjiang; i) strong sense of ethnic and local identity amongst the Uyghur populace; ii) a sense of distrust which exists between the Uyghur and Han; iii) both Uyghur and Han express prejudices against each other; and iv) both the Uyghur and Hans seem to be doubtful about how effective the government policies are in regard to maintenance of healthy ethnic relations (Debata 2007: 65-66).

The economic strategy, which is based on primary products such as cotton, oil, mineral grain, has been of the major factors of Uyghur discontent. The Chinese authorities have a major effect on these primary products of Xinjiang region; for example, almost six percent 5,00,000 tonnes of the 8.2 million tonnes of grain produced in Xinjiang in 1997 were mostly in neighbouring provinces. Two-thirds of Xinjiang's cotton output is sold to other provinces. Though there is a need for 14 million tonnes of oil for the local consumption, 50 percent of Xinjiang's oil output was shipped out to the other provinces. There is also an apparent ethnic division of labour in the region as Hans live in large cities and most of the minority people live in rural pockets. In 1997, 76 percent of capital Urumqi, 95 percent of Shihezi and 76 percent of Karamay population were Han (Debata 2007: 65-66).

The Ethnic income disparity is one of the important causes of Han migration. Among the Uyghurs, the urban-rural income divide is an indirect indicator of ethnic tension. In 1997, Xinjiang's per capita rural and urban incomes were 1504 and 4859 Yan respectively, which was much lesser than the national average. Though there was no major difference between urban and rural consumption levels in 1997, consumption in Han dominated cities like Urumqi, Shihezi and Karamay was higher than the rural consumption levels. In as many as 30 poor and largely minority countries, peasant income was below 1000 Yuan. The other component in the ethnic division was about political power. The real political power remains in the hand of the Chinese Communist

Party. In 1993, minorities were 62 percent of Xinjiang's population, but only 40 percent of them were members of the Chinese Communist Party. The Xinjiang Regional Party Committee has minority members, including deputy party secretaries, but the very top party posts at regional, Prefecture and County levels are generally given to Han. The regional CCP secretaries Wang Lequan and his predecessors like Song Hanliang, Wang Enmao and Wang Feng were all Han (Debata 2007: 66-67). Chinese Communist Party has been accused of consolidating its holds on Xinjiang through military right, repression and a strategy of "ideological incorporation". The chief agency of incorporation of Xinjiang within China as has been the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) most of whose members are Han Chinese (Debata 2007: 66-67).

The simmering discontent among Uyghurs against the Hans has resulted in separatist activities, which were translated into violent forms of terrorist attacks in the post-Cold War period. The period from 1949 to 1990 has witnessed some 400 small, medium and large scale separatist activities in the region. However, the Chinese have a different view. Countering the Uyghur argument, the Chinese assert that Xinjiang is an integral part of China and is a strategically important region of China. Refuting the allegation that Hans has dominated all sectors of life in Xinjiang, the Chinese argue that since most of the Uyghurs live in rural pockets of southern Xinjiang and not so educated, the Han Chinese are sent to Xinjiang in order to bring about all round development in the region. They also argue that since Xinjiang is China's gateway to the outside world, the development of this region will facilitate China's trade with neighbouring countries. Though there are arguments and counter arguments by both the sides, it remains clear that Xinjiang is an extremely important part of China and China will do anything to safeguard this strategically important frontier (*ibid*).

In addition, worldwide constellations, social, political, and economic issues are playing a unique part in developing formative inconsistencies amongst Xinjiang and eastern China. Inadequate self-sufficiency rights, unchecked immigration of Han Chinese, rigid population policies, and ecological disaster are some of the other causes. Disappointment is fueled further by high unemployment among young Uyghurs, enormous numbers of whom hold a feeling of discrimination in employment, education,

Uyghur customs and dialect utilise, and the limitation of religious exercises. Many Uyghurs like Jume Tahir and Ilham Tohti trust that Han Chinese are around 40 percent of Xinjiang's whole population and the essential recipients of the abuse of its natural resources and economic improvement (Heberer 2014:90). Developing bias among Han Chinese toward Uyghur and other Chinese Muslims, progressively strict control of the Uyghurs, and further limitations on religious practices are not liable to alleviate the issues. Restriction on the wearing of headscarves, hijabs, cover, and burkhas, and long beards on accessible transportation; forbidding government employees and students to observe fasting during auspicious Ramadan, and high bonuses for Han-Uyghur intermarriage all send wrong signals to Uyghurs and may well end up being counterproductive. (Heberer 2014: 90-91).

In April 2016, while conducting field work in Hunan province, a Han taxi driver from Sichuan told this researcher about the general feeling of Hans towards Uyghurs. According to him, Uyghurs is not being liked by the Hans and are often dubbed as thieves and swindlers. He added further that the Chinese government now has started designating the Uyghurs as terrorists. This attitude has widened the gap between the two important groups in Xinjiang. While interacting with some 10 students, some of which were Uyghurs, this researcher found some information about the the social relationship between Uyghurs and Hans of Xinjiang. While some of them criticised Chinese policies of religious restrictions and giving primacy to the Chinese language instead of Uyghur language, there was almost a common consensus on inter-ethnic marriages, which they feel could help re-establishing the waning Uyghur-Han relations. The inter-group trust between the Uyghur and Han has been an important initial move towards brushing the psychological component of the ethnic tension between the two communities. This study offers a complete analysis of the ethnic attitude between Uyghur-Han in Xinjiang and gives an interesting complexity of the other inter ethnic relationship and suggest that the idea of ethnic relationship may rely on upon particular cultural setting.

1.6 XINJIANG'S NATURAL RESOURCES

Xinjiang is rich in mineral resources. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Xinjiang ended up being one of the areas with a nearly entire scope of mineral, after logical examination of topographical, mineral petroleum, coal building material, and non-ferrous metal departments. The region's mineral resources that have been found include coal, petroleum, uranium, beryllium, lithium and building-material enterprise and nonmetallic mines (Dowamat 1993: 29-30).

Abundant reserves of natural resources in Xinjiang have made this region an important one. Xinjiang is rich in natural resources such as aluminium, zinc, lead, manganese, chrome, mica and asbestos, etc. The people of this region produce a number of agricultural commodities such as rice, maize, wheat, gasoline and barley, millet besides cotton, oil, beet, sugar, hemp and tobacco. There is also a significant reserve of salt in the region. Xinjiang's Tarim basin, Zhungar and Turpan- Hami basin are home to 20.9 billion tonnes of oil resources and 10.85 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. The region accounts for 25.5 percent of China's inland oil resources and 27.9 percent of inland gas resources (Online:[http:// www. asianew.it/view-p.php](http://www.asianew.it/view-p.php)]. Xinjiang also has a huge reserve of renewable energy resources such as solar, wind power, etc. (Xinhua 23, April 1999).

Xinjiang has 138 minerals in addition to the possible reserve of 99 minerals. Petroleum, natural gas, coal, gold, chromium, copper, nickel, rare metal, salt mineral, constructions non-metal and different minerals have rich reserves in Xinjiang. As indicated by China's second assessment of oil and gas resources, the reserve of petroleum resources in Xinjiang is 20,922 million tonnes, representing 30 percent of the total reserves of the land petroleum resources in China. The normal reserve of natural gas is 1,040 million cubic meters, representing 34 percent of the total reserves of the land natural gas resources of China. The normal reserve of coal is 2,190 billion tonnes, accounting 40 percent of the total reserves in China. Furthermore, Xinjiang has been well known worldwide since ancient times for the resources of the gold, precious stone, jade and other mineral resources. In 2006, Xinjiang found Natron saltpeter deposit with an a total area of 3,000 square kilometres with exploitative potential is 184 million tonnes,

which makes it the second largest Natron saltpeter deposit in the world, after Chile (The Fact and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 26).

The territory holds more than 20 percent of the petroleum reserves, Oil, gas, coal and mineral salts are in galore in large basins like Tarim, Junggar and Turpan which account for one- third of the country's resources. Xinjiang is quickly turning into China's largest vital area for the petroleum in the industry. Oil exploration started in 1951. The first well was drilled in 1955 (Dillon 2004: 39). Between the 1990s and 2001, more than 15 billion US dollars were invested in infrastructure development of the region's energy sector. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China's largest oil enterprise has taken up oil and gas extraction in the field of Tarim, Karamay and Tuha (Online: <http://www.southasiananalysis.org>).

Oil refineries at Dushanzi, Karamay and Zepu have been supported by British and Italian firms and French, Japanese and British Commercial Cooperation (Dillon 2004: 40). The aim of the Chinese government is building a strategic in Xinjiang as a center for energy security (Online; <http://www.southasiananalysis.org> Xinjiang Oil Industry and Development). Iron, copper, nickel and jade stone for ornaments have also been discovered in Xinjiang (Tang Lu 2009: 6-7). In 2008, crude oil production reached 27.22 million tonnes, demonstrating an expansion of 6.7 times since 1978. Xinjiang has turned into the second crude oil production area in China. By 2012, the crude oil production touched 34.00 million tonnes. Natural gas production in 2008 was 2.40 billion cubic meters, showing an increase of 9,230 times since 1953, 95 times since 1978 and 4.7 times since 2001. It is ranked first in China. By 2012, the natural gas production reached 3.50 billion cubic meters. With the exploration of Xinjiang's oil and gas and natural gas and the collaboration amongst China and West Asian countries in pertinent fields, the pipeline transportation kilometres of oil and gas transmission pipeline 2008 and an oil and gas pipeline arrange interfacing northern, southern and eastern Xinjiang has appeared. (Tu 2016: 24-25).

Since the implementation of the Western Development Strategy, the country has contributed 120 billion Yuan (including 28 billion Yuan by Xinjiang) in the "Eastern-Transmission of Western-Gas" Project, which has been put into utilisation, beginning

from starting from the Lunnan area, Tarim, Xinjiang, passing through Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu up to Shanghai, and its total length is 4,200 kilometers. The annual gas transmission in the early stage has been 12 billion cubic meters, and the activities can understand stable gas supply for 30 years, which is a key project of the Western Development Strategy (Tu, Zhang Ji 2016: 25).

Table: 1.7

Composition of total Energy Production of Xinjiang

Year	1978	1990	2000	2015
Natural Resources				
Coal	70.3	74.2	72.9	72.1
Crude Oil	23.7	19	16.8	8.1
Natural Gas	2.9	2	2.6	2.9
Primary Electricity and other Energy	3.1	4.8	7.7	14.5
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2016, [Online: Web], Accessed on 7 th June 2017, URL:www.state.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indeseh.htm.				

Table: 1.8
Major Energy Resources and Ferrous Metals by Region (2012- 2015)

Year	Mineral Resources Major Energy and Ferrous Metal	Petroleum (1000 tonnes)	Natural Gas (100 million cu.m)	Coal (100 million tonnes)	Iron Ore (100 million tonnes)	Manganese Ore (10,000 tonnes)	Chromite Ore (10,000 tonnes)	Vanadium (10,000 tons)	Titanium (10,000 tonnes)
2012	Xinjiang region	56464.74	9324.37	152.47	4.27	569.93	44.18	0.16	46.05
	China	33258.33	43789.9	2298.88	194.77	20938.18	405.01	877.99	21088.2
2015	Xinjiang Region	60112.7	10202	158.7	8.3	562.4	44.7	0.02	45.3
	China	349610.7	51939.5	2440.1	207.6	27626.2	419.8	887.3	21434

Sources: a) China statistical Yearbook 2013, p. 26; b) China Statistical Yearbook 2016, [Online: Web] Accessed on 7th June 2017, URL: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.ht>

Table: 1.9
Major Non-Ferrous Metal and Non-Mineral in Xinjiang (2012-2015)

Year	Mineral Resources Major Energy and NonFerrous Metal Mineral	Copper (10,000 tons)	Lead (10,000 tonnes)	Zinc (10,000 tonnes)	Bauxite Ore (10,000 million tonnes)	Manganese Ore (10,000 million tonnes)	Pyrite Ore (100 million tonnes)	Phosphorus Ore (10,000 million tonnes)	Kaolin Ore (10,000 million tonnes)
2012	Xinjiang region	82.06	78.86	118.2			17.44		12.16
	China	2734.41	1454.65	3490.74	90590	156499.3	134285	30.74	38143.5
2015	Xinjiang Region	226.7	102.6	188.3			3774.9		7.8
	China	2721.8	1738.8	4102.7	99758.2	103923.6	131101	33.1	57402.8

Sources: a) China Statistical Yearbook 2013, p.265.; b) China Statistical Yearbook 2015, [Online: Web], Accessed on 7th June 2017, URL: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.ht>

In 2011, coal reserve in Xinjiang was 130.7 billion tons, iron over 0.32 billion ton; Sylvite 60 million tons, of which 36 million tons are workable, copper-nickel ore were 1 million tons, a total demonstrated reserves of 4 million tons, and molybdenum 500,000 tons and a total proved reserves of 1 million tons. In 2012, petroleum production witnessed 56464.74 percent increase, natural gas 99324.37 percent, coal 152,47 percent, and iron ore 4.27, manganese 569.93 percent, chromite 44.8 percent increase in Xinjiang. In 2015, petroleum production increased by 60112.70 percent, natural gas 10202.00 percent, iron ore 8.30 percent and manganese 562.40 percent.

China's Statistical Yearbook, 2013 shows that non-ferrous metal and non-minerals in Xinjiang, extraction of metal and copper in Xinjiang reached 82.06, Lead reach 78.06, Zinc 118.12 which is the highest increase in comparison to copper and lead. Pyrite Ore contains 17.44, and Kaolin Ore included 12.16 rises in 2012. Bauxite Ore and Magnesite Ore were showing zero output in 2013. China's Statistical Yearbook, 2016 indicates that extraction of metal and copper reaches 2721.80, lead reach 1738.80, Coal reaches 4102.70. Bauxite and Magnesite ore has zero production in 2012 and 2015. In 2012, Pyrite Ore was 17.44, and 2015 Pyrite Ore is 3774.90 percent reach the highest production in this year. Kaoline Ore includes 7.8 percent, which is the least productive in this year.

Non-renewable energy resources like wind energy have also made this region an important one. Xinjiang is a windy region, particularly Alataw Pass and Karamay in northern Xinjiang and Shisanjianfang and Qijiajing in eastern Xinjiang (Dowamat 1993: 39). The annual wind energy is around 3,000 billion kWh (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 23). The reserves of Xinjiang's wind energy that is, at the height of ten meters, or 872 million kilowatts, accounting for 20.8 percent of the national storage (Jin Zhen Tu 2016: 23). The wind season is from March to June and from August to September. The wind direction is predominantly northwest and northeast. It is typically 5-9 force wind, and once in a while, it could get to 10-12 force wind (The Facts and Forces in Xinjiang, China 2012: 23). There are 166 days a year in Alataw Pass with over force 8 winds and a higher wind speed of 55 m/second; the highest wind speed in

Karamay reaches 46 m/second. Dabancheng, in the suburbs of Urumqi, has over force 8 winds 147 days a year” (Dowamat 1993: 39-40).

The wind energy resources in Xinjiang accounts for 37 percent of the total reserves in China and second to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 23). Xinjiang led survey and assessment of the wind energy resources in the area in 2004. Nine territories of rich wind energy resources have been chosen from the north to the south, i.e. the west wind part of the Irtysh river valley, the old wind gap in Emin county, the wind region of Alashankou, the west region of Turpan, the wind region of Dabancheng, the Gobi region of northern Hami, the wind regions in the Gobi of southern Hami, the wind regions of Lop Nor, and the region of Baili. (The Facts and Figures, Xinjiang, China 2012: 23).

Dabancheng Wind Power Plant, which was built in 1989, has been the main wind power plant in China and the number one in Asia. Before the end of 2007, Xinjiang’s wind power collecting scale achieved 279,000 kilowatts. Since the second half of 2008, Xinjiang’s power supply load has expanded gradually. On December 2008, the function for the end of the main period of the Mayitasi Wind Power Plant project and the beginning of its second stage was held in Emin County. In January 2009, the Altai Golden Wind Buerjin Wind Power Plant, with a venture of 400 million yuan and 495,000 kilowatts of getting together limit, started creating power (Jin Zhen Tu 2016: 26). In 2010, a few wind power projects contributed by enormous endeavours had begun developing. Meanwhile, Hami, which was earlier famous for its melons, has been recorded as one of the seven national wind power stations with a capacity of ten million kilowatts.” (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 23-24).It is assessed that Xinjiang’s wind power will be ten million kilowatts by 2020 (Tu, Zheng Jin 2016: 26).

Table: 1.10**Output of Wind Power in Xinjiang: (2014-2017)**

Xinjiang	Year			
Indicator	2014	2015	2016	2017
Output of Wind power current period (100 million kWh)	9	7.1	14	24
Output of Wind power, Accumulated (100 million kWh)	105.3	131.2	174	93.9
Out of Wind power, growth rate (The same period last year+100) %	77.3	-34.9	82.3	31.8
Out of Wind power, Accumulated growth rate	52.8	7.9	33.9	46.5

Sources: National Data, National Bureau of Statistics of China, NBS 2017 [Online: Web] Accessed on , URL:data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103.

a) Hydropower Resources

Hydropower resources in Xinjiang are 96,282 million cubic meters, representing 3 percent of the total amount in China. The surface water resources are 91,066 million cubic meters and the groundwater resources 56,257 million cubic meters. The average water resources per capita are 4,789 cubic meters as much as that in China. Xinjiang has 18,600 glaciers, and the total area is 23,000 square kilometres, representing 42 percent of the total in China. The total glacier reserve is 2,130 billion cubic meters, and Xinjiang is called “solid reservoir” (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 21). Xinjiang has 139 lakes that each spreads more than one square kilometre. The total water area is 5,504.5 square kilometres. The natural lakes are Bosten Lake, the Ulungur Lake, the

Sayram Lake, the Aybi Lae, Tianchi and the Kanasi Lake. The Bosten Lake covers an area of 980 square kilometres and is the largest inland fresh water lake in China (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 21). The glaciers resources are fundamentally appropriated in the Altai, Tianshan, Kunlun and the Pamir mountain areas. The reserve of water, energy resources is 38.178 million kilowatts, and the total explorable substantial scale hydro power stations all through the region are 4,370,000 kilowatts (Tu 2016: 23). Altogether, Xinjiang has more than 570 rivers and more than 270 mountains spring. The total overflow of surface water is 111.99 billion cubic meters, and annual overflow is 60,863 million cubic meters, among which the Ili River is 16,500 million cubic meters, the Tarim River 15,000 million cubic meters and the Irtysh River 11,700 million cubic meters. The full length of the Tarim River is 2,179 km, and it is the longest inland river in China (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 21).

Table:1.11
Hydropower Resources

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Xinjiang					
Hydropower generation (100 million kWh)	11.458	105.66	206.95	161.38	209.05

Sources: NationData, National Bureau of Statistic of China, NBS 2016, [online: Web], Accessed on 8th June 2017, URL: data.stats.gov/cn/English/easyquery.htm?cn-E0103.

1.7 SEPARATISM, RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

As has been discussed earlier, Xinjiang has been experiencing separatist activities since 1949. The Uyghurs, who claims to have inhabited this region for the last 6,000 years, are demanding the separate East Turkistan Republic for them out of the People’s Republic of China. While the Uyghur calls their efforts as a freedom movement for a separate homeland, the Chinese dub it as separatist activities. As often said in the academic vocabulary, one man’s separatism is another man’s freedom movement; the

Xinjiang issue gives a clear example here. Separatism can be defined as a process where a coalition of ethnic groups or territorial units consisting of a majority or subordinate ethnic groups assert themselves politically, challenging a particular authority being administered by a different ethno-linguistic or religious groups (Wei 2002).

The phenomenon of separatism is nothing new in China. Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang are the three minorities dominated areas where minority voices have been raised time and again. In the 1990s, with the political violence gradually spreading throughout Xinjiang with its clash with the Chinese government, conflicts had come out openly in the region. The forces of extremism, separatism and international terrorism have had to give a boost to the separatist and sabotage activities (Debata 2007: 164-165).

The Chinese argue that it is the duty and responsibility of every nation state to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and maintain stability. The Chinese authorities criticise the Uyghur separatist activities, which to them, have shifted its mode and scope and now become violent terrorist activities being perpetrated by East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), with the external support of terrorist groups like Al Qaida, Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and even some jihadi groups in Pakistan (Chung 2002: 8). They even accused Pakistan of harbouring and imparting training to Uyghur terrorists in its land, when the Khotan region of Xinjiang witnessed a violent attack on July 2011. (Online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/world/asia/02china.html>).

The Chinese government views these activities as externally-funded movement mostly blaming the umbrella organisations of Uyghur diasporas across the globe, the World Uyghur Congress based in Munich and Rabiya Kadeer, a US based exiled Uyghur businesswoman who heads this organisation, for working against the unity of the Chinese Republic (Singh 2010: 5-6). Shocked by the 5th July 2009 incident the Chinese government has termed Rabiya as the “Black Hand”, viewing her as the face of ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism, which further aims at sabotaging regional stability of China (Yufan Hao & Weihua Liun 2012: 205). Few Chinese sources argue that radical Islam has gained momentum in Xinjiang (Shichor 2005: 6) under the active leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which was established in Bayt ul-

Maqdis in 1953 by Sheikh Taqi Al-Din Al- Nabhani, a Palestinian radical activist and Shariah judge in the Jerusalem Appeals Court (Debata 2010: 125).

After the tight Chinese religious policy had been relaxed in Xinjiang by the reformist leaders like Deng Xiaoping, the Uyghurs got the chance to interact with their brethren across the globe. During the Haj pilgrimage and visit to West Asian countries, as the Chinese argument goes, the Uyghurs got in touch with the Arabians, who provided the literature on a radical form of Islam. When the Haj pilgrimage was resumed in October 1979, thousands of Uyghurs visited the holy place; they came back with religious literature and video cassettes which further boosted the forces of religious extremism (Shichor 2005: 122-23). Originally the believers of a kind of Sufi Islam, many Uyghurs were radicalised. Besides, in the next door in Central Asia, the Uyghurs found their ethnic cousins enjoying enormous freedom. The Uyghurs being suffocated of tighter Chinese policy found that small countries, both region and population wise, are enjoying independent nationhood. This generated a high sense of nationalism among them to be independent of the Chinese yoke (Shichor 2005:123).

Many scholars believe that the persistent ban on Uyghurs' religious activities fuelled a strong sense of nationalism among them, which later culminated in a radical form. In its latest report, prominent human rights organization Amnesty International listed the prominent restrictions which had been time and again imposed on religious freedoms in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: i) intervention in the appointment of local Imams; ii) stationing of police both inside and outside mosques; iii) close monitoring of all religious activities for all government employees including teachers, police officers and state enterprise workers; iv) denying Haj pilgrimage to Mecca; and v) banning children under the age of eighteen from entering mosques or receiving any sort of religious education (Amnesty International 2009: 3). This encouraged some radical Uyghurs to continue religious activities secretly with increasing household meeting (*Masharp*) (Shichor 2005:122).

With no distinction between separatism and Islam, Beijing regards both to be highly interconnected. Considering it to be a threat, not just to regional stability but regarded as the Chinese stability as a whole. The warnings against these have been

accompanied by concrete legal, social, political and military measures taken by the regional and national authorities against Uyghur separatism (Shichor 2005: 122-23). The coming up of the Taliban in Afghanistan gave a boost to the terrorist organisations functioning in the country, especially that of Al-Qaeda, with Xinjiang becomes a breeding ground for the training of these groups. Afghanistan turned out to be a paradise for the Uyghurs to carry out their jihadi activities unabated safely. China blamed the extremist and fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan for fuelling Uyghurs separatist activities (Debata 2009: 302). Several press reports in the Chinese media claim that the Uyghurs train along with Islamic groups in Central Asia, even in Chechnya (Singh 2010: 5-6).

From 1949 to 1990, Uyghurs had reportedly been engaged in at least 200 violent terrorist attacks, killing 162 people and wounding more than 440. Between 1992 and 1997, more than thirty Uyghur Organisations were reportedly uncovered in Xinjiang and hundreds of Uyghur cadres were captured. Even on the funeral day of Deng Xiaoping in May 1997, a couple of bomb blasts rocked Xinjiang's capital Urumqi. Since 1997 the East Turkistan organisations have brought up various attacks and assassinations (White Paper 2003). On 10 September 2002, Chief of Xinjiang's Public Security Department, Zhang Xiuming talked about four waves of terrorist activities in Xinjiang in the 1990s. The first wave occurred from 1990 to 1995, when the terrorists themselves capable of taking power through arms following a decade long ideological and organisational preparations. The second wave in 1996 and 1997 was characterised by a chain of assassinations culminating in the Ili incident on 5th February 1997. The third wave was the end of 1997 to 1999. It has featured explosions and assassinations command by organisations outside China or foreign terrorists. The fourth wave started from the second half of 1999 onwards during which some Islamic extremist organisations were found in Xinjiang for the first time to develop their network within China (Debata 2007:165).

The September 11 terrorist attack on the United States was a symbolic one so far as the terrorist activities in the world are concerned. China was one of the first countries to join the USA in its War on Terror Side by side, China launched its own "war on terror" against separatists and terrorists inside the country (Chung 2002: 8) through a tough

measure known as a Strike Hard campaign, which involved systematic military crackdown against anti-Chinese forces. On January 2007, Chinese security personnel destroyed a terrorist training camp in the Pamir plateau, killing 18 terrorists and arresting 17 others. They seized 22 hand grenades and more than 1,500 half-finished grenades and explosive devices. Further, Chinese police smashed a terrorist gang on 27 January 2008 in Urumqi, killing two and arresting 15 others. (Beijing Review: 16 July 2009: 21).

There has been no slowdown in the terrorist activities in Xinjiang. On 7 March 2008, an attempt to hijack China Southern Airline was made by a 19-Year-old ethnic Uyghur woman who was banned from Urumqi to Beijing. In another attack, two terrorists, armed with gun, explosives, knife and axes, drove a heavy truck into a squad of more than 70 police forces at Kashgar on 4 August 2008. An event which happened on the eve of the start of the Beijing Olympics caused the death of around 17 people while around 15 were injured in the incident. It was followed by a series of explosions on 10 August 2008, which took place in various sites (super market, hotel and government buildings) in Kuqa County killed a security guard and injuring two police officers. As a result, eight terrorists were shot dead by the police while two others killed themselves in suicide bombings (Beijing Review: 16 July 2009: 21).

The act of violence occurred on 26 June 2009, with mass brawls between the two ethnic groups in a factory in China's southern Guangdong province, leaving more than hundred people injured. The violence triggered after a message on a website claiming that six Uyghurs have raped two Han Chinese women. This followed a riot that left two Uyghurs dead and 118 others injured. During the riot, Uyghur rioters armed with batons and bricks smashed shops and vehicles while beating people passing by. Another violent ethnic clash between Uyghur and Non-Han took place on 5 July 2009, in which at least 140 people were killed, and 828 others were injured in Xinjiang. It has been the biggest violence in China since the Tiananmen Square episode of 1969. On 5 July 2009, mass riots broke out in Urumqi following a protest march carried out by hundreds of Uyghur Muslims who were calling for an investigation into the incident (The Hindu, 7th July 2009). The violence involved beating, smashing, looting and burning. Nearly 400 kg of

batons and brick, stained with blood were used as deadly weapons in the riot (China Daily, 20th July 2009).

Two incidents of terrorist attacks had happened in Khotan within a short span of two weeks in the month of July 2011, killing 18 people. The first was happening on 18th July where a group of people attacked a police station and killed four policemen. During a rescue operation, fourteen attackers were also killed. Another one broke out in Kashgar on 30th July 2011, where the fourteen civilians were killed (Online: Blanchard (2011); <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011>). In March 2014, the special armed police officers arrived and engaged the attackers, killing four of them and detaining one female. The attacks lasted for 25 minutes, and 29 people were confirmed dead and 147 injured (Yuan 2014: 22).

On July 2012 a plane was hijacked in Khotan. The six hijackers, who were between 20 and 33 years of age, were from the city of Kashi, Hou and Hanmin. In the hijack, around ten people were injured (Yin Pumin 2012: 23)

Table: 1. 12

Terrorist Attack in Xinjiang, 2013

<u>Time</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Causalities</u>
April 23	Bachu Country, Kashgar	21 dead, including 6 terrorist and 15 police officers and community workers 2 injured
June 26	Shabshan country, Turpan	35 dead, including 11 terrorists, 2 police officers and 22 civilians, 21 injured
August 20	Yecheng Country, Kashgar	16 dead, including 15 terrorist and 1 police officer
November	16 Bachu Country, Kashgar	11 dead, including 9 terrorists and 2 police officers; 2 other officers injured
December 16	Shufu Country, Kashgar	16 dead, including 14 terrorists and 2 police officers.
December 20	Shache Country, Kashgar	8 terrorists dead.

Sources: Yin Pumin, "Tackling Terrorism: Increases in terrorist activity have promoted Chinese authorities to undertake countermeasure in Xinjiang", *Beijing Review*, 22nd January 2014, 57 (4) : p. 23.

There is more terrorist attack between 2013 to 2016 in Xinjiang. In 2013, five Uyghur crashed their 4x4 vehicle into a guardrail in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, killing the occupants and injuring forty people. In 2014, Uyghur terrorists attacked civilians in Kunming main railway station, killing more than sixty people in total (Bossang and Holmes 2016: 84). On 1st March 2014, attackers armed with knives killed 29 and injured 130 people at a train station in Kunming (the capital of Yunnan province in Southern China). On 30th April 2014, 3 people were killed and 79 wounded in a bomb and a knife attack in Urumqi railway station. On 21st August 2014, a knife attack at a railway station in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, left seven people injured. On 22nd May 2014, a bomb attack on a street market in Urumqi. The deadliest incident of the yearbook place in Shache Country (also known as Yaskant) in Xinjiang. On 28th July 2014, when 37

civilians and 59 attackers were killed in an assault on a major road and government facilities (SIPRI Yearbook 2015: 286). In February 2015, it was reported that eight suspected terrorists were killed by the police and three others killed themselves in an attack targeted at the police in Xinjiang province Wusi County. Another terrorist attack in 2015 involved a group of terrorist who used vehicles to plunge into a police patrol car while throwing man-made bombs but the terrorist was subdued by 15 police officers. (Lo Hing- Shiu 2016: 59). In June 2015 attack in Xinjiang that left eighteen dead was also blamed on Uyghur terrorist (Bossang and Holmes 2016: 84). On 18 September 2016, at least 50 people injured and so 50 other were injured when knife-wielding assailants descended on a coal mine operation in the Central Western County of Baicheng in Aksu prefecture. (Online: <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1878940/mainland-officials-confirm-xinjiang-terrorist-attack>).

It is found that the above factors discussed in this have affected the situation in Xinjiang. Since Xinjiang is an integral part of China and also the most important strategic frontier, the Chinese Central government has not only devised a clear cut minority policy but also implemented the programmes under this policy. China's agenda is very much clear in Xinjiang. In order to safeguard unity, integrity and stability in this important northwest borderland, China has used all means and endeavours, whether they pacify the local populace and satisfy their needs, especially the Uyghurs or not. However, the Chinese leadership understands the gravity of the situation in this important region and also the importance of Xinjiang of China in terms of its trade and business with the outside world, energy issues and military strategy. And also, the Chinese authorities now understand very well that it is not wise to confront the Uyghurs, though they are minuscule in number. That's why the Chinese Central government takes pragmatic steps through its minority policy, which will be discussed in the next chapter in details.

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER II

CHINESE MINORITY POLICY DURING MAO ERA

2.1 EVOLUTION OF CHINESE MINORITY POLICY

The Communist Party of China has developed a particular policy to manage the national minorities in China. This programme was an adjustment of Marxist-Leninist theory on the national question, which was initially figured by the Austrian Social-Democrats and after that changed by Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin (Saheen 1956: 37). The CCP embraced the Soviet theory during the pre-Mao period. It was for the first time in July 1921; the CCP considered the national question. It has set out that the party's principle assignment was to secure the social and national liberation of ethnic groups of China (Sladkovsky 1972: 102). Its position had plainly expressed at its Second Congress in July 1922. It recommended that various republics shaped for the Han, Mongol, Tibetan, and Turkic people groups of China, and reaffirmed at the Sixth Congress in September 1928 (Mosely 1973: 4).

The government, state structure was made much more unequivocal in the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of China proclaimed by the CCP in 1931. It perceived the right of self-determination of the national minorities, their right to secede from China and to the arrangement of a free state for every national minority. While Tibet, Xinjiang and even the provinces of Yunnan and Kweichow were said at the Chinese Communist meeting as a possibility for autonomous statehood later (Conard Brandt and Schwartz 1973: 217).

Here it is fascinating to take note that there was no mention of assimilation; however, the Constitution even held out the possibility of a free confederation or even no confederation by any means. Be that as it may, this approach has disposed of by Mao Zedong not long after the presumption of administration of the Party following the Zunyi conference in 1935 (Norbu 1988: 327-29). The Zunyi Conference held on 15-17 January 1935 amidst the Long March, helped Mao's position. In December 1934, the party had

asserted that the events of the previous year 1934 had confirmed it. Mao had precisely arranged the foundation for an assault on the failed military strategy of the individuals who had pushed him aside. With the help and arguments organised, Mao effortlessly won the challenge. While the conference set up on the Russia prepared leaders of another as party head (Zhang Wentian succeeded Bo Gu), it did lift Mao into the Political Bureau Standing Committee and opened the path for his developing control of military issues in 1935-1936. Mao Zedong in his presidential report to the second national congress held at Ruijin on January 1934, contended that the national minorities had been abused by their customary decision class and by the Kuomintang government; and Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, specifically, had surrendered to their colonial masters. Mao implied that the response to the national minority issue was not autonomy from China, but rather the freedom from mistreatment (Norbu 1988:327-329). He was of the view that national question which was proper to Soviet context was not necessarily correct for China. To him, anti-imperialism rather than national self-determination turned into the cornerstone of the communist party's nationality policy (Norbu 1988; 327-329) For Lenin and Stalin, the adherence of the Russian people groups to the Bolshevik cause was thought to be a critical for the revolutionary struggle, while in China the seizure of power was solely a Han Chinese affair (Online: <http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/.pdf>).

Mao wanted to prevent the loss of national minority areas in the course of the revolution. In his presidential report to the Second National Congress in January 1934, Mao proposed his line on the national question. By December 1935 the line was being implemented. This report was an outline of what it called the national policy of the Soviets, which began to influence the Chinese communist policy towards the national minorities. The basic premise of the report on national the question was that the Chinese communists would cease to call for self-determination even for anti-imperialism rhetorical purposes. It considered autonomy sufficient for the national minorities (Norbu 1988: 375).

Ever since the time of the Qing dynasty, successive Chinese governments firmly upheld their belief that Han culture and civilisation were pre-eminent. This notion of cultural superiority evolved over an extended period. He began as a means of

intellectuality compensating for Han's inability to maintain physical control over the non-Han people (Grunfeld 1985: 57). It later evolved into a concept of a Chinese state not just defined by its territorial boundaries. Though the Han belief of their cultural superiority persisted, this argument did not carry much weight among the non-Han. There are instances in China's history where the non-Han formed alliances which excluded the Han or even openly conspired against the latter (Mancall 1968: 67-68).

Two important issues will be discussed here which are pertinent to minority policy in Xinjiang. Firstly, how the role of Qing dynasty, figured an all around ascertained strategy to keep Xinjiang within the Chinese orbit. Evaluating the Qing Policy in Xinjiang, one researcher expressed that land reclamation, Han settlement and restructuring of the area's administration by the general provincial government later shaped the base of the Chinese minority policy in the region (Millward 2004: 82-83). For some scholars, Qing rulers were the first to establish necessary rules, norms, and procedures in Xinjiang keep it under control. Secondly, in the post-Qing period, the Chinese Communist Party, which has constituted in July 1921, took administrative control over Xinjiang. The period when the Soviets wielded considerable influence in Xinjiang, which paved the way for Uyghurs and other Turkic people such as the Kazakhs to demand separate autonomous republics. In the first one and half decades of its establishment in 1949, the CCP had no immediate contact with frontier areas where the non-Han people lived and had over half of the total area of the nation. So the CCP began to have a favourable attitude towards the minorities. For example, CCP promised self-determination and autonomy to the national minorities after the independence of China, on the line followed by the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) (Dreyer 1976: 63).

The cultural predominance of Han Chinese made strides until Sun Yat Sen's time. In the beginning, Sun was of the view that inevitable assimilation of the non-Hans into Han culture could accomplish through social intercourse and intermarriage. For this reason, he wanted to open up Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang by rail streets and fill them with Chinese settlers who might build up their regions (Wilson 1966: 102). At the first National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, Sun Yat Sen stated that “the nationalism”

of the Kuomintang focused on the self-determination of the Chinese country, and the equality of all national minorities in China. The Kuomintang perceived that the privilege of self-determination of all national minorities in China, which will bring together Chinese Republic (Grundeld 1985: 57). Other than this, the proclamation of the Kuomintang's first National Congress on 1924, additionally mentioned that “the administration should help the powerless and racial gatherings inside its national limits towards self-determination and self-government” (Dreyer 1976: 17).

Sun Yat Sen declared that as opposed to the circumstance in different nations the expressions “state” and “nation” implied a similar thing in China for their single state was created from a single race (Hsu Leonard 1933: 168). He further expressed that the name ‘Republic of Five Nationalities’ exists just because there exists a particular racial refinement. He gave a clarion call to unite the considerable number of races politically and culturally (Online <http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream>).

Sun Yat Sen supported the ‘withering of particular nationalities keeping in mind the end goal to join them in a single entity, yet he additionally called upon the legislature to help and guide the feeble and little racial groups inside China to limit their march towards self-determination and self-government (Dreyer 1976: 16-17). The official perspective of Kuomintang followed the more conventional example after Chiang Kai-shek rose to power. He was of the view that the separation among China's five people groups is because of local and religious elements, and not of race or blood (Online: <http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/>). The theory of the ‘Greater Han,’ promoted by Chiang Kai-shek and the conventional components of the decision Kuomintang was the most popular development of the Republican time frame. This theory holds that the five nationalities of China - Han, Tibetan, Mongol, Manchu and Tatar - come from the same racial stock and are isolated from each other by manufactured elements of dialect, religion, the accident of geographical distribution. Chiang and his supporters intended to annihilate the divisive attributes and reunite the greater Han race through forcible assimilation (Staats 1978: 70).

During the 2nd National Congress of the CCP in the year 1922, the CCP manifesto recommended separate republics for the Hans, Mongols, Tibetans and the

Turkic people of China (Cornad, Schwartz and Fairbank 1952: 64). Chiang-Kai-shek, advocated for free and the natural union of the five people of China that included the Uyghurs (Moseley 1969: 309). However, the KMT nationality strategy that was expounded by the Third National Party Congress in 1929 tried to prevent the presence of national minorities in China (Dreyer 1976: 39). In November 1931, the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” proclaimed by the CCP, put forth a unique expression. Article 14 of the document, which supported the improvement of culture and language of the minority people in the country, expressed:

“The Soviet government of China recognised the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China their right to accomplished separation from China, and to the formation of the independent state for each national minority. All Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao-Yao Korean and others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the right to self-determination, i.e. they may either join the union of Chinese, Soviet or secede from it and their state as they may prefer. The Soviet regime of China will do it at most to assist the national minorities in liberating, the KMT militaries t’u-ssu (tribal headmen), the prince’s lamas and others and in achieving complete freedom and autonomy”(Conrad 1952: 223).

However, this approach was discarded by Mao Zedong after completing the famous Long March (1933-36). After having a major say in the Central Committee of CCP in the year 1935, his emphasis was much against colonialism, because of which the self-determination of the minorities took back seat. Mao’s expectations were reflected in the CCP declaration on 20 December 1935 and 25 May 1936, which tended to correspond to the Mongols of Inner Mongolia and Muslims of Xinjiang. He figured out how to prepare the non-Han population that their help to the CCP in contracting and battling hostile Japanese forces and vanquishing Chang-Kai-shek would commensurate to autonomy for non-Hans or equal status in new China (Moseley 1973: 4). The purpose of dropping ideal to self-determination may have been because of the developing unwinding of Soviet Union's plans on Xinjiang. (Online: <http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603.pdf>).

From 1936 to 1949, the CCP incorporated two important points in its policy towards the minorities. Firstly, the equal right of self-administration, economics, and culture and

secondly, that all must impart the solidarity of the motherland with the Han Chinese (Hsieh 1986: 6-7). At the Sixth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee on 6 November 1938, Mao laid out the blueprint of CCP's policy towards minority nationalities in the following few points:

- The Mongol, Moslems, Tibetan, Miao's, Yis and Fans have equal rights with the Han. In the joint struggle against Japan, they might have the privilege to deal their particular issue and in the meantime to join with the Han in building a unified country.
- In a region where national minorities and the Han people live together, the regional governments should set up committees composed of the people of minority nationalities and county government to attend to affairs concerning them and to change the relationship among numerous nationalities. Each of the diverse nationalities should have various posts in the provincial and county government (Chinese Law and Government, Occasional Paper 1981-82: 7-8).

In 1945, Mao stressed the 'issue of the minority nationalities' and repeated the need to maintain Sun Yat-Sen's theory of nationalism. The liberty of the Chinese nation and the equality of all ethnic groups in China should accomplish with a specific end goal to set up a free and united republic. Basically, the Chinese Communist Party's minorities policy, as it developed preceding to the liberation of China in 1949, involved equality of nationalities and their right to autonomy within a unified state, a united front with nationalities, upper class and clergymen who were willing to be cooperative, regard for nationalities, the right to education in one's native language and the development of a better standard of living for all, alongside a republic on the need to combat Han Chauvinism (Mao-Se-Tung 1967: 225-256).

2.2 POLICIES ON MINORITIES 1949-1976

Mao had fundamentally three policies on ethnic minorities, which he summed up with the slogan 'equality and unity' in the Common Programme, which was later

accepted on 29 September 1949 Constitution and formally became part of PRC's first Constitution adopted in 1954. Mao's policies can be summarised as.

His government said that all nationalities were equivalent in theory, in spite of the fact that this has not realised in practice.

- Ethnic minorities were permitted some autonomy, which means they could utilise their language, look after their religions and customs, and have their people in at least some government positions.
- Ethnic minorities must remain part of the PRC. Mao's government curbed all attempts to separate from China (Mackerras 2011: 229).

Mao criticised "Han chauvinism," an expression implying that the Han people would look down upon the ethnic minorities and treat them as inferiors. The slogan means that local ethnic groups would find leaders who might attempt to set themselves and their peoples' group as separate from China. The worst period for the ethnic minorities during the Mao period was the Cultural Revolution. In any case, the autonomy belief was still in force. The Red guards loyal to Mao destroyed anything traditional, including monasteries, mosque and valuable work of art. They abused priests and other individuals speaking to conventional belief, torturing and slaughtering many of them (Mackerras 2011: 229).

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) embraced the system and meaning of Minzu (country/ nationality) in 1949 given the Stalinist policy on national minorities. In any case, the Chinese leadership took new alert, since the region had witnessed the creation of independent republics in Xinjiang over the last four decades. As part of a robust military strategy, Chinese authorities entrusted considerable power in the hands of the People's Liberation Army. The basic tenet of Chinese minority policy in Xinjiang from 1949 onwards was to incorporate interest of all ethnic groups. The announcement of the PRC on 1 October 1949 declared China as a unified multi-national state.

Between 1949 and 1976, there were two phases of Chinese policy for the internal administration of Xinjiang and the PRC's foreign relations that reflects an entrenched

goal of integration. During the first period (1949-55) government policy characterised by strategies and techniques primarily aimed at consolidating and establishing a communist foothold in Xinjiang. Parallel to this, the PRC's foreign relations were, in the context of Xinjiang, structured around a similarly cautious and tentative approach to relations with the Soviet Union. The dynamics that developed both within Chinese administrative policy and the PRC's foreign policy regarding Xinjiang illuminate the continuity of the main techniques and strategies of the rule established in the Qing and Republican eras (Clarke 2011: 43).

Instead of the cautious approach of the post-liberation years, the second time frame (1957-76) was described by the deliberate endeavours to quicken the political, economic, and social consolidation of Xinjiang with whatever remains of the country. A progression of policies has executed that expected to absorb the ethnic nationalities with the Han and set up the total incorporation of the region in mainland China. The foreign relations of China during this period saw related statements of Chinese controls the authorities tried to invalidate the impact of the Soviet Union in Xinjiang's issues. They achieved success during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when Beijing endeavoured to reassert central control over the area's political and military experts whom it blamed for making 'an autonomous kingdom.' This procedure as plainly connected to Beijing's view of the vital signs of Xinjiang when it saw it was on the threshold of jeopardising national security' (Clarke 2011: 43). The Cultural Revolution corresponded with the height of the PRC's ideology part and clear military conflict with the Soviet Union, the effect of which has intensely felt in Xinjiang. One scholar has contended that the China's strategy in Xinjiang should be viewed as a component of the statewide political and ideological campaign started from Beijing in this period (Connor 1984: 408).

2.3 MILITARY MEANS AND THE ROLE OF PLA

Between 1936 and 1942, the CCP had neither any provincial association nor political legitimacy in Xinjiang, which was under the rule of Chinese warlord ShengShicai. The CCP confronted various political rivals in the area. The rest of the KMT authorities and troops, regardless of their surrender in October 1949, have an

unknown amount political loyalties among the ethnic minority pioneers, such as Masud Sabri, who stayed focused on restricting the Communist takeover of Xinjiang. The CCP needed to manage the less obvious threat to Chinese power in Xinjiang as the ETR (Eastern Turkistan Republic) and its military, the INA (Ili National Army). Regardless, there existed a critical ethnic minority elite that had served in either the ETR or KMT organisation. (Clarke 2011:43-44).

The determination of this issue was accomplished through a combination of force and influence, in which the PLA assumed two crucial roles: a) the political administration of Xinjiang in this period is primarily drawn from among the PLA is the First Field Army leadership and political commissars. While the administrator of the PLA, Peng Dehuai, expected the titles of the officer and political commissar of the Xinjiang Military District (XJMD), his authority was mostly delegated to the vice-commander of the XJMD Wang Zheng (McMillen 1979: 29); b) The other significant figure to expect the major authority during this period was Wang Enmao, the head of CCP in Xinjiang (McMillen 1979: 29-30).

The Chinese military policy in Xinjiang reflects Beijing's response to Russia's changing needs. Moscow has been extraordinarily inspired by Xinjiang and had by chance contemplated it joining the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership had reliably seen northwestern China as of auxiliary significance appeared differently about Manchu and the northeast China. Mao Zedong denied Moscow to separate Xinjiang from China and to set another the the Central Asian Republic under its support. This understanding has framed China's military request structure, association, and arrangement (Starr 2004: 126-7). In the mid-year of 1947, Chinese military procedure overwhelmed nationalist settlement in Xinjiang (Bensons 1990: 44-49). The quasi- military Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) was set up on 7th October 1954 to help the military (Dillon 2004: 35).

The leader of the First Field Army and the Northwestern Military region took Xinjiang's civil administration under his control, which was immovable under Wang Enmao, who supplanted Wang Zhen in 1952 as the highest Chinese authority of the Chinese field Army in Xinjiang (Macmillian 1984: 570). Wang, the Commander of the

First Field Army in Xinjiang from 1949-1952, was the most capable military-civilian administrators in Xinjiang. Comprising the Soviet threat, ethnic resentment, Xinjiang removes from the Centre, the significance of nuclear installation in Xinjiang, Wang utilised both explosive and reformative measures to keep Xinjiang inside the Chinese circle (Lo 1961: 93).

The First Field Army monopolised Xinjiang's military command and controlled each level, from the commonplace government in the capital Urumqi to the nearby individuals, and town level, other than caring for Xinjiang's defence, border patrol, autonomous divisions and local armies (Debata 2007: 103-104).

In 1960, nuclear weapons test base was built in Xinjiang. Beijing's connection with two leading countries bordering the region, the Soviet Union and India, had declined, prompting hostilities. Knowing this as a threat to its nuclear and military facilities in Xinjiang and its territorial integrity, China, increased its official military organisation in Xinjiang to 500,000 troops. In the spring of 1965, Moscow started to arrange its forces along the Chinese border. Leading to severe Sino-Soviet military strain in 1969. Soviet constraint levels along the northern Chinese border had increased radically. From about 14 divisions in 1964, they developed to twenty-eight to 34 ground force group in 1969 allegedly coming around 48 units in the mid-1970s (Shichor 2004: 132-133). Moscow doubled its military presence along the Chinese border in the latter half of the 1960s, precisely when the Chinese by and large and the PLA in specifically, were anxious with the Cultural Revolution (Shichor 2004: 133). The Second Corps has started in Xinjiang and the Ninth Air Corps Unit 7335 was commissioned to sustenance ground force troops, and also to protect Red Guard organisation from Wang Enmao. In 1969, Xinjiang Military Region (XMR) had an armed force of 85, 000 (White Son 1970: 490-491, Chinese High Command 1970: 605-664).

The authority of the military over the civil administration in Xinjiang has, while, welcomed resentment and disappointments of Uyghur, who claim that the Chinese army officers have ruled the Uyghurs and reduced their freedoms (Debata 2007: 108).

2.4 LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS TO ADOPT MINORITY POLICY

The Chinese Central Government understood the need for ethnic minority policies and to manage the needs and aspirations of 55 ethnic minority groups in the country soon after the foundation of the People's Republic of China in the year 1949. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established a Nationalities Affairs Commission to look after the issues related to minority groups in the country. (Debata 2007: 78-79). The Commission achieved working at the grassroots level through its provincial units in the minority-dominated regions and made a careful study of the circumstances there. The primary objectives of the Commission were that it included both Hans and native minority areas, 30 Autonomous Prefectures and 124 autonomous counties, which represent 64 percent of China's total land mass and 78 percent of China's minority population groups. It was an unusual policy move in the Communist party plan in the mid-1950s period, which highlighted that autonomous regions are the autonomous political elements. (Debata 2007: 79-80).

. Articles 9, 50, 51, 52 and 53 of the People's Republic of China describe the Chinese policies towards its minorities in its constitution as a standard programme. As indicated by the article 9, no area of China could withdraw from the mainland. Many articles of the Chinese Constitution remark that all ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal. The state protects the legal privileges of the ethnic minorities and maintains and develops a relationship of equality, solidarity and mutual assistance among every ethnic group of China. Discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic groups is prohibited (Debata 2007: 80).

As per article 50 of the Chinese constitution, "all nationalities within the borders of the People's Republic of China are equal. They might establish unity and mutual assistance among themselves and should contradict imperialism and their possible enemies so that the People's Republic of China will become a big fraternal and cooperative family made out every one of its nationalities. More Noteworthy, nationalism and chauvinism shall be opposed, acts including discrimination, oppression, and splitting of the harmony of various nationalities should be prohibited" (Debata 2007: 80). Article 51 provides for the establishment of the autonomous organs of government in areas

entirely or mostly inhabited by national minority groups. Article 52 provides for equal rights to all minority nationalities in China. It emphasises that all Chinese citizens have freedom of religion and culture besides the freedom to continue traditional practices. Article 53 describes the freedom to develop dialects and language of the nationalities and to prescribe or reform their traditions, customs, and religions. National People's Congress, the National Assembly of China built up nationalities committee bringing together all the minority community delegates at the Congress. It was consultative in nature to deliberate the law and legislations regarding minority nationality issues related to them (Debata 2007: 80).

2. 5 HUNDRED FLOWERS MOVEMENT AND MINORITIES

In the late 1950s, through Hundred Flowers³Movement, Mao called for open criticism that was directly followed by the anti-rightist campaign to silence his critics, particularly those who held pro-Soviet views. Hundred Flower Movement led to rapidly degenerating relationships between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist government then (Starr 2004: 92). The anti-rightist campaign concentrated in Xinjiang on “Local nationalists” could eradicate all Uyghur who held positions in government (Starr 2004: 92) Thus the ultimate sufferers were the national minorities. The movement exposed the Uyghur's attitude towards the CCP and Han Chinese rule in Xinjiang. Many Uyghur voiced dissent, for being banned from places of real power inside the government and military (Starr 2004: 92-93). The anti-rightist campaign taking after the Hundred Flowers Movement kept on to alienate the Uyghurs and the other northern Xinjiang ethnic groups Uyghur and Kazakh through the Great Leap Forward. The perspectives contributed heavily to the late 1962 mass resettlement of Uyghurs and Kazaks from Xinjiang into the Soviet Union (Starr 2004: 94). After this, the Great Leap Forward imprinted a watershed between the moderately more tolerant, pluralistic approach of the early 1950s and the later period. When the “ Great Han Chauvinism” had formally condemned as “local nationalism,” and the distressed absorption of the following Maoist

³ “Let Hundref flower bloom Movement” was designed to promote the flourishing art and progress of science. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was announced by Mao-Tse-Tung at the Supreme State Conference, For details see Haulting (1981), “Literature Press of the Hundred Flower: Criticism and Polemics”, Columbia University Press, Vol.1: p.19.

year of 1956 (Starr 2004: 92). Despite the fact that the Hundred Flower Movement has limited towards the concerns of the Uyghur ethnic group, it altogether influenced the Uyghur elite and the northern regions of Xinjiang like the Great Leap Forward would come to do. The Great Leap Forward was more prohibitive in light of the fact its campaign had a better reach than previous campaigns and provided for dynamic pressure on Uyghur inhabitants to conform to Communist Policy (Dreyer 2007: 88-89).

As discussed previously, during the early years of its rule, CCP's policy towards national minorities appears to have been confirmed to ideas of unity inside diversity that permitted a measure of ethnic and cultural plurality. By the year 1958, the party had made remarkable progress in the ethnicization of cadres and subsequently the organs of self-government in the minority regions. The party offered several concessions and making negotiations with several nationality groups. The Hundred Flowers Bloom movement had, in any case, demonstrated that the elite classes among the minorities have begun taking this pluralistic policy of the party for granted. So, several Han cadres additionally held 'wrong-ideas' about the party's programme expected for implementation in the minority regions. From 1957-1961 CCP policies moved towards a more radical with less thought has given to conditions particular to Xinjiang. The policies during the Great Leap Forward incorporated the launching of the communes, abolition of material incentives, curtailment of private plots, virtual closure of rural market and bazaars, attacks on religion (Islam) and emphasis on more assimilation (fusionist) nationality policies ended up being considerably more untimely and destabilizing these than in the more advanced Han regions of China (McMillen 1984: 570).

In the year 1957, closure of all ties between the Soviet Union and China, especially economic relations, prompted China to embark upon a process of economic development that included launching of communes, abolition of material incentives and crash the industrial development programme, besides simplification of administrative machinery and the elimination of bureaucracy. In the economic field, the slogan, "more, better, faster and more economical" appropriately symbolised the essence of the Great Leap Forward (Dreyer 1975: 50-62).

2.6 GREAT LEAP FORWARD

The Great Leap Forward period is for the most part known for its cultural interest and acceleration of collectivisation of China's agrarian division with massive public work in advance. The Great Leap Forward Plan was successful, particularly in pastoral nomadic areas, where CCP had the agricultural field to implement important land reforms. In 1958, CCP started its policies for the sake of "Mass Education" cooperation. During Great Leap Forward, collectivisation was started by Kazakh production bridges and made immense agrarian, pastoral communes (Milward 2004: 92). After actualising radical policies, the relationship between minorities and Chinese government intensified. It was clear in the Great Leap Forward period that the minority policy was substituted to the general national political needs. People's commune that was established in 1958 turned into the major sources of discontent among Uyghurs and Kazaks. To consolidate different ethnic groups and to maintain peace, government devised new policies to walk a middle ground between pre and post-Great Leap Forward period, China' started developmental works and national propaganda programme to emphasise the historical connection among ethnic minorities and the mainland of Chinese's (Debata 2007: 82).

The Great Leap Forward attempted to accelerate collectivization of China's agrarian sectors profoundly, reshape the land with massive public work projects, a decentralised industry, all depending not on material efforts, but instead on political urging and the activated will of the people (Starr 2004: 93). Farmers and other people have constrained onto expansive farming collectives that were intentionally ethnically assorted so as to accelerate the combination of the race and keep the natives under tight control. Hundreds of thousands Han immigrants swarmed into Xinjiang to help in the agriculture development of Xinjiang (Tyler 2004:145-147). The result of this massive undertaking was widespread famine all from China, including Xinjiang. Indeed, after the dramatic increase in arable land because of the activities of Han migrants, there was still starvation in Xinjiang. Starvation begun in Xinjiang was not so awful the same number of the different area because of the superior irrigation system and the viability of the CCP to maintain complete control in Xinjiang (Tyler 2004: 146). Regardless of Xinjiang's capacity to have these simple methods for production, these farms were the exceptions,

not the norm, and thousands of Uyghur in Xinjiang died of starvation during the Great Leap Forward (Starr 2004:93).

What suffered most during the Great Leap Forward in Xinjiang was Uyghur language. Towards the beginning of the Great Leap Forward, the Central Han Chinese, the government applied a campaign for all ethnic minorities to learn Han Chinese language. There was resistance, mainly because the minority languages were being rewritten in the Chinese script. It has been particularly risky for the Uyghurs because of their alphabet having just been changed to Cyrillic two years earlier. While the changing of the writing system was a very preventive factor in Uyghur life, minority language was endured by the CCP to the degree that migrant Han workers in Xinjiang were urged to acquire the local language (Dreyer 1978: 362-366).

In the period between the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, there was a slight reduction in Uyghur unrest, yet the CCP under Mao asserted power. Mao was likewise aware that when Stalin started his Five Year Plan, he collectivised agriculture keeping in mind the end goal to have control over what was planted and produced. However, the collectivisation programme in the Soviet Union was an incredible disappointment in terms of production, (Online: <http://www.sjsu.edu/facult/>). Agricultural development increased slightly because of the loosening of after the Great Leap Forward. Due to an influx of Han migrants, Uyghur farm workers in Xinjiang got little of the profits, or no benefit (Svanberg 1998: 104-105). There was the difference between Xinjiang provincial government members and factory leaders, which led to a slowdown in the economy. While there was growth in population, the food grain production barely increased, further aggravating the economic situation. What added insult to injury was that agricultural production in Xinjiang could barely reach the levels required to feed the remaining population after the Great Leap Forward famine, more individuals were regularly brought into the region causing food shortages and further starvation (Starr 2004: 95-96).

Uyghur people were banned from taking any anti-government stand and needed to comply with the Chinese government rule. It resulted in the negligible representation of the non-Hans in the governmental structure in Xinjiang. Along these lines, the Uyghur

minority just held a small handful of representatives throughout Xinjiang. In this manner, the Uyghur's were thought to be culturally outlandish and appalling by whatever has left of the Han population. Subsequently, the traditional dress was forbidden, and the Uyghur youth's hair has forcibly cut while Islamic texts, including the Quran, were burnt, religious sites demolished, and mosques changed over into pigpens. The limitations that had been forced by the Han Chinese on the Uyghur people were terrible. (Starr 2004: 97).

Evaluating Chinese policy during the Great Leap Forward period, a western scholar stated that it failed to build up a healthy relationship between the government and minority nationalities. Keeping in mind the goal to set up Chinese rule, the CCP promoted a policy of population exchange, sending people from other parts of the country to Xinjiang. During the 1950s and 1960s, Han Chinese has settled in Xinjiang, which had named as an absorption policy of the Central government. This policy, together with the notorious famine caused a migration of 60,000 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others minority nationalities to the Soviet Union in 1962. This incident set off the "Yi-Ta occurrence in the city of Yining" inciting Chinese authorities to have a cautious approach in Xinjiang. Instead of interpreting this as a local reaction to the disastrous policies of the Great Leap Forward era, the administration at last connected the departure of 1962 to outside interference and the finger has pointed at the Soviets. In 1962, there was a subtle change in the CCP policies towards minorities. In Xinjiang, Muslim culture has given some importance. Muslim religious festivals, the celebration of which had been accounted for in the press each year preceding the start of the Great Leap in 1958, were at the end of the day much promoted (Benson 1998: 104).

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) policies in Xinjiang during 1949-60 period, one as per Australian scholar divides was divided into two stages. The primary stage (1949-56) characterised by the 'united front' strategy of gradual reform of the existing political, economic and cultural order through the cooperation of ethnic elite. The CCP's consolidation of position in Xinjiang was through the activities of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), which was primarily, composed of demobilised PLA soldiers. The second phase, the Great Leap Forward policies of 1958-60, endeavoured to accelerate the procedure of assimilation or fusion of Xinjiang's ethnic

minorities with the Han using the usage of the political and economic programmes under way in non- minority areas (Clarke 2003: 166).

2.7 CULTURAL REVOLUTION

China has taken various efforts to assimilate minority groups in Xinjiang. Through Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), China campaigned to revolutionise cultural, ethnic references to and vestiges of the decadent past, and criticised those who opposed such radical ideas. The Cultural Revolution also curbed the concept of 'Four Olds,' i.e. customs, old habits, old culture and old thinking of the minority area (Debata 2007: 83). The traditional culture of minority nationalities suffered due to these incidents and the autonomous region of Tibet was the worst sufferer. Tibetan temples and architecture came under attack. The basic idea behind the separation of minorities was the thinking that they could challenge the unity, integrity, and solidarity of China. For this, the rights of the minority nationalities were curtailed, and there was a drastic cut in subsidies conferred on minority people. All religions were subject to relentless persecution, and all worship and religious education were forbidden (Debata 2007: 83).

During the Mao era (1949-1976), the CCP employed several methods and tricks to involve some Uyghurs with different political or religious views as part of the provincial government in Xinjiang (Millward and Tursun 2004: 88-89; Shichor 2005: 127; Van Wie Davis 2008: 2; Hess 2009: 85-86). The Pillar of China's ethnic minority's policies was provincial autonomy for ethnic minorities (*minzu Quy uzi Zhi*) which enable ethnic minorities to involve best administrative and legislative posts and many offices a space in autonomous regions (Shen Wei and Wen Gang 2009: 17).

The establishment of minority increased to such an incredible measure, to the point that while in 1973, there were just two minority chairpersons, the number increased manifold to thirteen vice presidents in the year 1978. Tomur Dowamat is a male Uyghur nationality, a native of a Toksun in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was the Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China from 1983 to 1993. He was also the member of the 12th,13th and 14th CPC

Central Committees and Vice-Chairman of 8th and 9th NPC Standing Committee. By 2003, 63 percent of the total positions in the provincial workplaces have held by the ethnic minorities (White Paper 2003: 4). The number of cadre personnel was 12,841 in the 1950s, 1,06,000 in 1965, and 80,000 during the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1969) and 1,81860 in 1983. By 1990s, the CCP requested that there was a total of 2,25,000 minority cadre, which is around 46 percent the regional government staff (Benson and Svanberg 1989: 109).

In 1962, some of 60,000 Uyghur and Kazaks fled northern Xinjiang into the Soviet Union worsened with CCP policies and with the number of Han migrants that had flooded the region in the wake of the famine-related with the Great Leap Forward (McMillen 1979; Niu 2005: 23; Bovingdon 2010: 51). During Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), injustice was done to ethnic minorities; their religious and ethnic culture was suppressed. (Shen Wei and Wen Gang 2009: 17).

This condition changed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when the CCP acknowledged a draconian political campaign against the so-called “agent of local nationalism” (Rudelson 1997: 104; Heller 2007: 47-48). During the first stage of the Cultural Revolution, the urban youth was mobilised against the intelligent and better off or educated sections of the working class. Mao appealed to the young people to show loyalty to the revolution and taught the young people to regard all manifestations of culture as bourgeois and counter-revolutionary. The lesson has stopped, all entertainment and social life other than politics denounced, and politics reduced to mindless repetition of Mao’s thoughts and the witch-hunting of anyone unwilling or unable to follow his diktats. In the second stage of the Cultural Revolution, the atomised and terrorised population was mobilised against the Party. On December 1966, Mao declared that the ‘bourgeois headquarters’ was in the top leadership of the Party administration in their area. Mao had no system for controlling or coordinating the “revolution” subsequently, in every aspect of the nation, a rival group claimed the mantle, and propelled a holy war, not just against the “capitalist roaders.” China declined into the chaos of factional fighting (Online: <https://www.marxists.org/glossary/event/c/u.htm>). This period witnessed reassertions of the assimilationist policies of the Great Leap period. The CCP aims at

incorporating minority regions into the PRC, isolating the region from Soviet impacts and the assimilation of the ethnic minorities stayed constant. The central problem for the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang throughout the 1949-76 periods were the means by which to accommodate the inconsistency made by the policy orders from Beijing and what was practicable in Xinjiang conditions (Clarke June 2003:166). The policies during the Great Leap Forward were active, particularly in pastoral nomadic areas, where CCP had agriculture field to implement significant land reforms. In 1958, CCP started its policies in the name of “mass education” cooperation. During Great Leap Forward, the underlying farming collectivization had begun by Kazakhs, who made large agrarian, pastoral cooperatives (Millward 2004: 92).

This procedure continued to some extent after the emergence of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. Reform in nationality policies with particular reference to Xinjiang relaxed the assimilation aspect and brought back many non-Han cadres into CCP and the government (Millward 2004: 8-10). This exertion by the Chinese leadership has criticised by the Uyghurs, who termed it as a process of natural meaning. Once the Hans, who are for the most part educated and skilled, entered Xinjiang, they occupied critical offices and took away the biggest pie of the economy. This is made embitterment among Uyghurs. The Chinese government admitted its mistake and formulated news policies to walk a middle ground between the pre and post-Great Leap Forward period. Advancement works have embraced, and national propaganda campaigns were implemented to stress the historical links among the ethnic minorities and the mainland Chinese (Debata 2007: 82).

CCP introduced more radical policies during the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976. The Chinese Communist Party removed itself from the issue of absorption of minority groups amid this revolution, which was a campaign to revolutionise the culture, erase reference to and vesting of the decadent past and criticise those who restrict such thoughts. Minority policies progressed toward becoming subordinated to the general national political priorities (Debata 2007: 81-83). During, the Cultural Revolution period, the institution of Islamic worship and education stayed untouched. However, by 1964, a new campaign against religion was launched, and a few mosques were shut down

(McMillen 1979: 117-126). During these years, a procedure of forced assimilation into Han proletarian culture targeted minority areas (Bovingdon 2004: 124).

The reason behind this was to check national separatism and bring harmony, integrity, and solidarity in China. In Xinjiang, as wherever else, intellectuals, artists and religious supporters, even regular people were persecuted. The Cultural Revolution started in Xinjiang on 3 August 1966 with a broadcast by Zhou Enlai over Radio Urumqi addressing the people of Xinjiang for their support in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. After that, Urumqi invited 400 Han Chinese Red Guards. In this procedure, privileges of minority nationalities have shortened, and they were permitted no special treatment. In spite of the fact that administrative assistances like the making of collectives have given on the economic front, there has radically cut in subsidies. All religions, particularly Islam, were subject to oppression amid the Cultural Revolution (Debata 2007: 83-84). The Red Guards frightened the different Turkic individuals into throwing their constant pieces of clothing, decorations, scarves, and caps for Mao suits. Activists additionally devastated mosque and even constrained many religious leaders and general Muslim to bring pigs evidently up in an endeavour to design fast and through combinations (Bovingdon 2010: 52).

The most radical period of the Cultural Revolution was the six-year period frame from 1966-1971. Conditions turned out to be so chaotic in Xinjiang that the central authorities were compelled to suspend the movement officially there and handed over power to the PLA. (McMillan 1984: 572) These progressions have been seen as positive by the local population. Recruitment of national minority cadres in increasing numbers was one method for defending endeavours to part Xinjiang from China (Benson 1998: 105). The administration's steady end of the Cultural Revolutions in Xinjiang by 1972-73 made an uneasy five-year interregnum. The proceeding portrayed this period with a weakening of Xinjiang's economic and security situations (Clarke 2003: 167).

In 1952, the Tianshui to Lanzhou segment of the track between Lianyungang in Jiangsu Province and Lanzhou in Gansu Province had officially opened to traffic. Taking after Chairman Mao's direction to proceed with an endeavour to construct a Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway, the building had begun in Lanzhou and overview, and project work for

753 km in Xinjiang was additionally started, introducing a new era in the historical backdrop of Xinjiang railroad development. In 1958 ten thousands of railway labourers went to Xinjiang to begin developing the longest rail route. About 10,000 recoveries Soldiers from Xinjiang's production and construction Crops built a railroad. Military officers and men manufactured more than 30 km of roadbed amongst Turpan and Hougou. More than, 1,000 young people from all nationalities in southern Xinjiang took an interest in railroad development in northern and eastern Xinjiang. People of different nationalities along the road utilised trucks and horse and ox carts to transport development material day and night to railroad construction (Dowamat 1993: 211-213).

The Xinjiang segment of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway had worked toward the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. Through the joint endeavours of the state, autonomous region, the railroad constructed and the area's armed force and people, in 1958, the tracks of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway achieved a station ten km inside Xinjiang-Tianshan station ending Xinjiang rail Roadless history. In 1959 the railways reached Hami, a deliberately critical city in eastern Xinjiang

The “Cultural Revolution” forced suspension of Xinjiang’s Railway construction. Construction began in 1971 on a railway from Turpan to Korla, the capital of the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, with a total length of 476km. There are 36 railway stations on the line, and the highest, Wusite station, was constructed at 2,931 meters above sea level (Dowamat 1993: 214). For a considerable length of time after the Southern Xinjiang Railway opened to traffic in December 1984, the state allowed authorization to manufacture the western section of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway-Urumqi to Alataw Pass at the border of Bole Country, Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, with a length of 460 km and built begun in 1985. Prior, in 1956, this segment was incorporated into an agreement signed by China and the Soviet Union to build a railway Lanzhou to Aktogay (in the former Soviet Union, and review and design work had accomplished in 1958 (Dowamat 1993: 215).

2.8 RISE OF UYGHUR NATIONALISM

The third stage of Cultural Revolution witnessed the ascent of Uyghur nationalism, which was a reflection of the pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism under the administration of a progression of Chinese authorities the late Manchurian Qing Dynasty (1880-1911 AD) and also during rule by Chinese warlords (1911-1949 AD). In 1864 AD, when the Qings were at the helm of affairs, the Uyghurs revolted against the Qing policy of using local Begs (Turkic landowners) and Khojas to control Kashgar indirectly. Under Yaqub Beq (1820-1877 AD), who declared a holy war to expel Chinese speaking Muslims and Han traders from the area (Bowering, Crone and Mira 2013: 573). This was the beginning of the spread of the idea of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, which supported the broad separatist sentiments. At the point when Chinese warlords ruled Xinjiang (1911-1949 AD), the revolt against Chinese was launched by Kazakhs and Uyghurs from the 1920s onwards. Dynamic Uyghur intellectually received Islamic and Turkic modernisation to advance illumination of Turkic individuals and national awareness through education, teaching Islam alongside present-day natural science. During this over three decades extended period, the Uyghurs and Kazakhs were able to establish separate republic named as Turkic Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (TIRET), first on November 12, 1933, and later from 1944 to 1949. During the first TIRET, the Islamic Republic was set up under the administration of Khoja Niyaz, which turned into a symbol of present-day Uyghur nationalism. Its constitution mirrors its Islamic character with a modernising and nationalising belief system. The second Eastern Turkistan Republic (established in 1944 AD and driven by Ahmatjan Qasimi) which additionally encapsulated both Islamic and mainstream in the long run fell after the Chinese communists took control of Xinjiang in 1949 AD. During the Cultural Revolution, both Muslim and Uyghur freedoms were stifled, and class struggle turned into the separating line among the Uyghur (Bowering, Crone and Mira 2013: 573).

2.9 CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE POLICY

China's language policy has been based on Marxism and an egalitarian discourse, which being critical for building national unity, would likewise set up a new system of governance and society while doing away with colonialism and feudalism. The Chinese government had formulated a language policy for the national minorities instantly after 1949. The article 53 of the general programme of September 1949 states that the national minorities should have "freedom to develop their dialect and language and to preserve or reform their traditions, customs, beliefs" (Dwyer 2005: 7). The language Planning Office was set up just months after independence. Chinese Committee on Script Reform was the official organisation for central language planning in Beijing from 1954-1986. It has later rechristened as the National Language and Script Working Committee. Its local level branch in Xinjiang, which was known as the Autonomous Region's Language and the Script Working Committee, utilised dialect specialists to change, in Arabic-based script especially for the Uyghurs (Debata2007: 129-130). This commission likewise published journals, language learning, and translations in Chinese, Uyghur, Kazak, Kyrgyz, and Oirat Mongolian dialect. In 1956, at Linguistic Congress held in Urumqi, the Chinese government had accepted, modified Cyrillic alphabets for the Turkic language spoken in Xinjiang, yet in 1960 (Wheeler 1963: 58).

The state cultural policy and orthographies policy are noteworthy for characterising the ethnic policy of the state towards various area and ethnicities. In such procedures, Uyghurs of Xinjiang have experienced and changed the script with rethinking themselves in the prism of their ethnic identity. It has increased resistance towards the Chinese population as Uyghur experienced an identity crisis.

In the period between 1949 and 1957, Chinese language policy was in close terms with the Soviet Union policies and even endorsed by the Soviet Central Asian Republics in 1946 prompting Arabic-based Uyghur script being re-institutionalized and affirmed in 1951. This standard has received on the advice of Soviet consultants in China's new Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1954. The utilisation of Cyrillic achieved its top in the year 1955-1958 when this was announced even in schools (Dwyer 2005: 18-19). During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution period, the Chinese turned

into the primary language jeopardising the linguistic egalitarianism defined in Article 53 of the Common Programme. The minority languages and cultural practices, a legislative mandate in February 1960 looked for the substitution of the Arabic and Cyrillic alphabets by Latin letters of Chinese Orthographical systems. The native people, particularly the Uyghurs and Kazaks termed the Chinese language as only chronological registries and raised the issue of linguistic freedom (Lo 1961: 101:103). In 1976 the Language and Script board formally received another Latin-based script (Dwyer 2005: 20). In the 1980s, there witnessed the development of the dialect of the minority nationalities, with the production of numerous new languages and materials in this respect. The Chinese government established two important laws in 1984 about the language policy towards the minority nationalities:

- a) Article 46 of the law on citizenship, which ensures the residents of each nationality the right to sue in their nationality spoken and written the language in carrying out litigation.
- b) Article 38 encouraged literature, art news, publishing, broadcasting, films, and TV in nationality form and with the characteristics of the significant minority. This Law likewise upheld the publication of nationality books and the preservation of nationality, historical and cultural heritage (Dwyer 2005: 11).

During Cultural Revolution, the minority language policy changed its direction. Han Chinese predominately spoke Mandarin, and Uyghur the Turkic dialect. Mandarin Chinese turned into the official dialect in the school guideline in the minority areas, and assimilation transformed into the objective of minority instruction. The study done by me to examine the minority language policy and practices in China during my field visit to (Hunan area and Beijing) has discussed huge gaps between what is stipulated by law and what is practical with regard to language policy (Bowering, Crone and Mira 2013: 573).

The Uyghur People of the XUAR showed remarkable courage in defending their identity of being the people of the oasis along the Silk Road and in and around Turkic Central Asia. Uyghurs through these years have held a high character which has been in root inside the norms of ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic assimilation. The

connection between the two Chinese and Uyghurs was problematic as the Uyghurs identity was an adaptation of religion and dialect nearby attached to the ethnic groups of the region (Gladney 2004: 227). This time of suppression ended by leaving a dissenting note among the minorities of Xinjiang, particularly Uyghurs. The period after the end of Mao Zedong introduced in reorientation and rearrangement of the socioeconomic set up in minority areas. There was a significantly more noteworthy emphasis on economic rebuilding. Economic ideals replaced ideological narrowness which was a standout amongst essential features of the Cultural Revolution era. Endeavours were made on social, cultural, educational and economic fronts. Minority issues, for example, protection and privileges of the minority communities were taken care of (Debata 2007: 84).

The modernisation procedure may have profound effects on minorities and their willingness to relate to their ethnic group. It is as basic as economically and socially convenient to abandon their ethnic identity for a Chinese identity, at any rate in term of Chinese language proficiency, keeping in mind the end goal to have a more prosperous future. Numerous others kept up that economic reforms and the household responsibility framework will prompt to the renaissance of the cultural practices. As indicated by the Hinton, an agronomist, unfortunately, refers to this as ‘cultural regression’ and say:

“The most affecting consequence of reform was the far-reaching cultural regression. Privatisation. Carried with it, a revival of all the worst features of the old society. Customs, Old habits, Old ideology and Old superstitions, all bearing a distinctly feudal flavour, additionally surfaced” (Robyn, Naran & Su 2001: 80).

The institution of a direct language policy in the reform era, Uyghur literary journals, which were published in the late 1970s and early 1980s, included Bulaq (Well, spring) and Kashgar adabiyat San iti (Kashgar Literature and Art), Tarim and Dunya Adabiyat (World literature). Some other periodicals published in minority language included Xinjiang Kyrgyz Literature, Xinjiang Gazetteers and Kazak literacy journal Mura (Debata 2007: 131).

In the post-1949 period, the communist Chinese government takes after a considerate policy of empowering their legends, song and dance ensembles, and regional

festival and ethnic games as a component of their plan to advance the evidence and thought of various cultural identities. The Arabic script which was permitted to be utilised by Uyghur for same time exchanged in 1985. By the way, altered scripts in the view of the Chinese framework in the meantime new script based on the Chinese context were conceived for the few ethnic languages, since which did not have their very own script (Warikoo 2016: 18).

The Chinese policy toward religion and culture was liberalised in 1978 with the onset of the liberalisation process in the country. The Uyghur book in Arabic script was revived in 1982, with regards to the Uyghur to the necessities of Uygur. The improvement of scholarly communication facilities and its communication of Han and Uyghur in Xinjiang in contemporary time additionally brought about the formation of a new generation of Uyghur, who have impacted by the Chinese language, literature, arts in short by all aspects of Chinese everyday life. A significant number of Chinese words have infiltrated the Uyghur language. However, the effects of Chinese, the Uyghur in Xinjiang has not wavered from their recognition of their faith, tradition, culture and the lifestyle. After that, they have been a voice of protest from Uyghur academic, intellectual and literature on various issues of the history, culture, and society in Xinjiang (Warikoo 2016: 18).

Xinjiang has implanted in Chinese memory and consciousness since ancient times as the many Chinese records have recorded several episodes of China's deeds in their remote northwestern outlying border area. The Chinese Cultural Policy in Xinjiang has the accompanying main features:

- To pressure, manage and advance everyone this subject, historical and cultural sites and the episode in Xinjiang history, which shows China's organisation and political jurisdiction around there.
- According to various locations in Xinjiang, which have attributed cultural and national significance are appropriated and introduced as a treasured part of ancient Chinese civilisation and its pressure in Xinjiang.

- To advance Uyghur shrines and tourist spots as an aim of cultural tourism, which attracts both Chinese tourists from the mainland and furthermore from Hong Kong, Taiwan, etc., besides the Uyghur pilgrims.
- Xinhua Bookstore in Kashgar and Urumqi, are housed in Chinese representing the majority of the stock. Nonetheless, the book in Uyghur, Kazakh; Kyrgyz, Mongolian and Xibe are additionally accessible in substantial quantities. Their books are primarily an interpretation of Chinese work, historical literature, etc. (Warikoo 2016: 18).

The doubtful of the education system and also, economic development remains a question as it appears that people with high open door and instructive foundation come back their homes. The same is the situation in Xinjiang. With the absence of educational elite and the once submerged in the Han culture, the Uyghur or the ethnic culture has disintegrated, prompting the Xinjiang territory to lag behind intellectually. (Chou.P.K. Bill 2012: 5).

However, CCP has earmarked the following goals for reform and development of education in Xinjiang:

- By 2020, the finale rate for senior school needs to achieve to reach 90 percent, 98 percent of the nine-year mandatory training 80 percent of the pre-school instruction net affirmation rate.
- The gap amongst strong and weak school, and also amongst urban and rural schools must be limited.

While in Xinjiang the Han language is anticipated as a method for more prominent open doors for the marginalised ethnic communities, it additionally observed a weapon which demolishes the well-established culture that the Uyghurs has been fighting for since long. This cultural value is believed to end the solidarity amongst the Uyghurs and undermine Uyghur culture (Chou. P. K. Bill 2012: 7-8).

It is understood well that the policies undertaken during the Mao era were not in sync with the promises made during Mao's famous Long March and after he assumed

power as the supreme leader of the People's Republic of China. Mao's vision to achieve something great for himself and the country within a short span of time through his brainchild Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution did a disservice to the national minorities and Uyghurs of Xinjiang and Tibetans suffered the most. The Uyghurs lost all hopes to have autonomy over their land, resources, and culture. The fatal blow was to the culture of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, which prompted them to have a notion of nationalism, to upkeep their age-old culture. However, the leadership after Mao's death gave a thought to the entire gamut of issues that brought dissent among the national minorities, especially Uyghurs and understood well that this was not going to augur well for the entire nation. Hence, Deng Xiaoping and the next generation leaders brought corrective measures to assuage the Uyghurs and other national minorities and initiated a pro-minority policy, often known as preferential policy, which will be discussed threadbare in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER-III

CHINESE MINORITY POLICIES IN REFORMIST ERA

The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping attempted to amend the excesses meted out to ethnic minorities during the first two and half decades when Mao was at the helm of affairs. The policies undertaken and implemented during the Mao era, especially towards minority ethnic groups in Xinjiang and Tibet, were dubbed as anti-minority. Two main highlights of Mao rule, such as the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, did not fulfil the aspirations of the minority nationalities of the country. Instead, these resulted in simmering discontent among them. Hence, there was an urgent need to pacify the minority groups so that these groups involve themselves in anti-Chinese activities. This era of reform started with the onset of an economic liberalisation process in the late 1970s and continued to date. This section will talk about the economic reform measures taken up by the Chinese Central Government so as to improve the overall standard of living in Xinjiang, which to them would carry on the general economic development programme. Thus, it is imperative to analyse the reform measures undertaken by various leaders starting from the generation leader Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to the present President Xi Jinping.

3.1 CORRECTING MAO POLICY TOWARDS UYGHURS

China's national policies towards its ethnic minorities have wavered since 1949. In the period of Mao Zedong, minority policy blow from diversity to integration. Under the Deng Xiaoping, this plan turned out to be all the more pleasant. However, there was a strong emphasis on integration. In both scholarly world and approach, ethnic integration is viewed as a regular talk, which concentrates on the ethnic relationship (Chen 2008: 1).

As indicated by the two elements of the social atmosphere of Republican-era Xinjiang figured unmistakably in Communist Party leader's control of the policy. As talked about in Chapter II anti-Han sentiments were deep and across the board among the Uyghurs, Party as a consequence of the decade of cruel, unfair rule of the Han

warlords and neighbourhood heads. At the time, widespread resistance to Han, which may have drawn Uyghurs and other Turkic people's together, was counterbalanced religious, political and cultural contrasts of long duration (Bovingdon 2010: 49).

Resentment of the Han represented a test to CCP policymakers. However ill will inside the Turkic population gave the party a chance to set the group against each other and hence to deal with that experience (*ibid*). The political history of post-1949 Xinjiang reveals considerably more about the administration in Xinjiang than does the investigation of independence law. If Xinjiang had truly been autonomous, it would have had its political cycles and campaign throughout the last 50 odd years. Indeed, even a rapid summary of the significant political event since the insurgency appears that Xinjiang arrangements and campaign nearly took over those in China proper (Bovingdon 2010: 50).

In the mid-1950s, those policies were moderately tolerant. The CCP's "joined front" policy prescribed the foundation of connections with "progressive members" of the social and religious elite which, in turn, required unnecessary interference in business, religious practice, and the social norms. The party did, in any case, step by step take control of religious establishment through the China Islamic Association, and additionally through the seizure of mosque lands and the necessary replacement of religious court with " People Court" (McMillen 1979: 113-14).

By mid-1950 as Mao pressed regional leader to make more additionally clearing economic improvement all through the nation in the alleged communist tide, the Xinjiang administration faced resistance to such activities. Collectivisation required estranging the "progressive elite" with which the party had participated before. After, the cadre endeavour to mobilise the exploited classes (for the most part labourers in the overwhelmingly agrarian area) against the elite instead rather drove many Uyghurs and others together to the party. In China proper, Mao Zedong invited criticism of CCP policies from the masses in his 1956 Hunder Flower Campaign. The emphasis and the volume of protest shocked the initiative, which at that point looked the anti-rightist development in 1957 to quiet the restriction. In Xinjiang Uyghurs Qazaqs, and others denounced the arrangement of anti-rightist full of feeling and requested a far more

prominent part in neighbourhood administration. The party hard-line immediately diverted the counter rightist development into a development against "local nationalism" blaming such commentators for looking to administer Xinjiang, as a free nation or of opposing CCP run the show. The administered were especially irritated by the charge that the PCC warrior rancher was "Han colonialists" confronted with such difficulties the gathering tried harder to mobilise class against *minzu* intrigue (Bovingdon 2010: 50).

Mao's radical military, volunteer, the Great Leap Forward, started in 1958, driven in Xinjiang to call for fast social homogenisation to the convoy and encourage the jump. He has implied a great deal less resistance of contrast. Indeed, even ethnicity itself because an "obstacle to progress" and party leader ventured up to their assaults on Islam and other "backward custom" (Bovingdon 2010: 50). As is presently generally known, the blend of the Great Leap Forward approach, poor choice to send out pick up to meet its obligations to the Soviet Union brought on a terrible famine party pioneer temporarily prevailing on Mao to reestablish a more direct economic course in the mid-1960s. The Cultural Policy in Xinjiang looses marginally amid this period, as officially recognises that linguistics and the cultural differences would persist over the long term. The Muslim was again permitted to praise religious festivals (Benson and Svanberg 1998: 139).

Despite this policy retrenchment across the board starvation in a China's inside increased the Great Leap's impact in Xinjiang. Notwithstanding party ordered population stream, an immense individual from hungry vagrants filled Xinjiang all alone activity. This surplus stream arranges Han migration for more than 800,000 its higher amount ever in both 1959 and 1960s (Bovingdon 2010: 50).

PCC farms invited a significant number of the displaced people to settle and claim land, inciting increased resentment by Uyghur and other. In 1962, more than 60,000 Uyghur and Qazaqs fled over the border into the Soviet Union, aggravated with CCP policies and attracted by consistent radio propaganda, promoting for the average living conditions on the Soviet side of the outskirt. The extending Sino-Soviet split assumed a part of the departure Soviet consular authorities had evidently plotted in the mass movement by conveying previously arranged travel papers. For managers in Xinjiang and Beijing the sheer number of travellers preparing abroad, at that point, aiding the reason

for "Soviet social imperialism" by helping tackle Xinjiang by force. Accordingly, the government closes the border and forcibly migrated a large number of non-Han families far from the frontier area, replacing them with Han PCC part (Bovingdon 2010: 51).

The punishment that the Cultural Revolution visited on intellectuals, mainly targeted Uyghur culture. The famous linguists Ibrahim Mutte'i was too tortured by having the huge volume of a multi-lingual dictionary he had helped edit with the full CCP support (Bovingdon 2004: 20). In this way, Uyghur meet each other in with "Long Live Chairman Mao's" in Chinese. But in 1975 many Muslim's finally lost patience and staged a protest when forced to work on the Muslim holiday. In this review, it is clear that policy toward non-Hans was the most absorption and intolerant during the cultural revolution. After the death, Mao's death in 1976 and the fall of the Gang of Four, Party leader faced a crisis. The Cultural Revolution had alienated a large segment of the population throughout China. Resentment has been especially severe among Uyghur and other non-Han because of them; it had been not merely a political and social attack but an assault on their identities. The continuation of hard-line policies appeared sure to provoke increasing discontent and thus instability. But officials worried that a more liberal policy was allowing cultural exploration and free religious practice, might similarly open the door to unrest (Bovingdon 2004:20-21).

In the 1980s, Hu Yaobang, one of the young pioneers in the Central Committee went to Tibet to explore local conditions. Shocked by the poverty and despair, he found there; Hu contended that hard-line policy toward non-Han is casual. He distraught comparative proposition in Xinjiang in July 1980s.He felt at the time that Xinjiang exhibited less a separatist threat than Tibet since it needed to exile religious or political pioneer like the Dalai Lama and had no "oversea help" for freedom (Dillon 2004: 36). A Han official report produced for internal circulation in 1982 agreed with this view. The expulsion of Han frameworks had "made it inconceivable" the report contended, " Han cadres to work Xinjiang with a conviction that all is good, and furthermore spread dangerous ideological chaos among minority *minzu* solidarity (Bovingdon 2004: 21-22).

In mid-1992 Deng Xiaoping indicated his underwriting of reviving economic reform and his protest to traditionalist economic policies by going to South China,

including Shenzhen, which had made most market progression and by calling for re-establishing change. At the Fourth Party Congress that October, the Communist Party formally proclaimed the worldwide of working up a communist market economy, strangely since the change began that making a market economy was the conveyed goal of progress. Since China's pioneers have revealed a whole plan of development attempts, including enabling private business visionaries to join the Communist Party (Robert Andre Lafleur, Warren Bruce Palmer 2003: 103-104). By 1992, the XUAR authority had gone to a contention that reform was average. The general Uyghur official Ismayil Ahmed declared in the 1992 year that the central government would offer more autonomy to Xinjiang. He proposed this would incorporate local expert over outside exchange, control of the border, and administration (Bovingdon 2004: 22).

a) Major Criticisms of Mao's Policies

First, Deng Xiaoping leadership had four unusual reactions against Mao's policies and the Cultural Revolution. Firstly, socialism was not about poverty, but rather enhancing the material condition of people to accomplish an egalitarian society. To be sure, the development rate of the change has developed with a modern day foundation and better living conditions for all considerable reducing in poverty.

Second, mass campaigns for the sake of fighting class enemies suspended all institutions, prompted discretionary utilisation of power and expanded and killed numerous innocent individuals. For sure, since 1978 the organs of State and the Party have frequently met as indicated by the constitutions and even guaranteed a smooth move of leadership starting with one generation to another.

Third, the theoretical premise that regards culture or ideology as autonomous is as indicated by the critics, an idealist deviation of Mao which put the tents of dialectical and historical materialism. It is this point of view which raised set such a high amount of emphasis on independence as a rule that amid the Great Leap Forward there was a severe shortage of food and caused a massive famine in which million of individuals died. The Deng administration focused on the requirement for 'open door' inside the nation and globally, to share the information and different assets.

Fourthly, the egalitarians advanced amid the Cultural Revolution were endeavouring to misleadingly make states of balance independent of the commitment made by a labourer. The various Maoist arrangements, including people, collectives, were viewed as 'eating from the iron bowl' or everybody getting the same out of the common fund. (Mohanty 2014: 12-13).

b) Preferential policy during Reformist Era

Beijing has rehearsed a preferential policy for minorities in various regions. In education, minorities, get needs in school confirmation, family planning, and are permitted to have more than one child, in legal affairs minority suspects receive lenient treatment. Consequently, the preferential policy has heightened the ethnic awareness of the minorities and the Han, sharpening the ethnic divide (Wei and Chen: 19). These preferential policies have failed to create this expected result. Minorities are not content with their treatment, and the Han complains about "reverse discrimination." Because of preferential employment, the government requires 15 percent of the workers, including administration position, in the state-owned enterprise to be the ethnic minority in Xinjiang, many Uyghur never needs to appear to work yet at the same time get to pay. Due to the preferential education policy, many Han youth lose their chance of a school education to the minority student who has lower scores in school (Wei and Chang: 19). In truth, as a monitored protector of the policies points attention to, proper measures fail to address the genuine imbalances amongst Hans and Uyghurs (Sautman 1998: 100-102).

In Xinjiang, Uyghur, are poorer, less urban, more averse to go to secondary school and college and have fewer occupational prospects than Han. Employment variations between the two groups are mainly extreme in the oil industry and in private enterprise, where official can't force quantities. Uyghur have been rejected from the most powerful and profitable areas, and thus the gap amongst them, and Xinjiang's Han population will enlarge with facilitating economic development (Bovingdon 2004: 37). The techniques in this way extended and empowered strength and economic change closes by a rebuilding of religion and culture (McMillian 1984: 57). Notwithstanding, Heller portrays these progressions as a full-scale assault on ethnic minority culture coming up as key

components for the improvement of ethnic perception and hatred towards the CCP among Uyghur in the post-1978 period. (Heller 2007: 49).

c) Economic Liberalisation

China's Economic Liberalisation started in 1979 the Deng Xiaoping with the motivation behind making a current, prosperous modern economy with communist value. The Western-style current government or social equality don't fit in the picture since they are exceptionally alien to five thousand years of Chinese culture. Beijing's desire for the foundation of the economy has been both sweet and sour. A few choices have been wise. Instead of quickly offering or disbanding state businesses (as in a few countries in Eastern Europe), China has let the typical advancement of private industry, gradually supplant state enterprises. It had been a great deal less troublesome. However, construction policy, which favoured factories for quite a while, cause an extreme deficiency of office space. Government direction and ownership stay higher than in the west (Leppert 1994: 44-45).

d) Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

Deng drove a movement of progress, economic approach that changed China in the 1980s, with an effect that has felt today. Agriculture has collectivised, and the farmer was allowed to use their surplus as they required. Deng Xiaoping enabled the outside venture and set up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in which entrepreneur visionary style changes could occur in the enthusiasm with "communism with Chinese attributes." (Lafleur Andre, Robert 2003: 215). Special Economic Zone functioned admirably in Taiwan. They are intended to draw in outside assembling innovation by disposing of some tax, decrease bureaucracy, and permitting industrial facilities adaptabilities in wages and creation. Most assembling in China's SEZs includes purchase gadgets, watches, home appliances and transportation equipment. Joint ownership has supported, and a few benefits could repatriate (Leppert 1994: 45).

The Special Zone, attractive in practice, impulsive unofficial zones, shaped for illegal activities such as smuggling, black marketing, and money infringement have regularly closed by the government (Leppert 1994: 45). Shenzhen on Hong Kong border is the

largest Special Economic Zone. These zones have utilised as a test base for the advancement of trade, tax and the different policies that then stepped by step down to the earth rest of the economy (Wang 2010: 5-6, Online: <http://editorialexpress.com/cgi-container/meeting>). The Special Economic Zone (SEZs) has been alluring foreign investors to do work together in China (Mark, Online: <https://www.thoughtco.com/chinas-unique-monetary-zones>).

In August 1980s the People's Congress passed the first law run on the SEZs, "the control for Guangdong SEZs." The provincial law was the first of its kind to be tried, enlisted with the assistance of the Central government.

e) Social and education development

During the 30 years of CCP rule in Xinjiang, policies on state-supported education were conflicting and opposing. At first, CCP strategy concerning education extended enrollment in Public school strongly. In Xinjiang from 1952 to 1958 when the CCP endured, and to a degree, even advanced, the utilisation of minority language, enrollment in Primary School expanded from 307,000 students to 718,000, and enrollment in Secondary School rushed from 16,162 to 61,006 students. At that point state of mind moves some CCP leader towards the utilisation of minority dialect, together with the more communist campaign, for example, the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), inhabited the improvement of public education Xinjiang. From 1956 to 1984, Uyghur Script has adjusted, and after that to a changed Arabic Script, which was utilised today. During the Cultural Revolution (1961-1976) most schools in China were shut, and in Xinjiang, some government public school did not continue operation until 1976. Xinjiang college did not completely revive until 1978. Rather than joining the Uyghur with many years of the CCP made illiteracy, confusion, and at last discontent among the individual from Xinjiang's Uyghur population (Grose 2010: 98). Earlier, there was an assurance to Uyghurs to continue their own written and spoken dialect in 1978 (Dreyer 1978: 372), which had suffered during the Mao period. Education of Uyghur children was presently permitted to be in their local dialect with the training of ethnic minorities turn into the piece of local government in 1984, which prompted the Uyghurs achieving more prominent self-governance in

education (Iredale, Bilik, et.al. 2001: 60). As indicated by Dreyer, 70 percent of all rudimentary matured minority children in China were going to class, and Turkic Uyghur reading material was accessible (Dreyer 1978: 373). However, there was an absence of assets for school repairs and educators preparing incorrect data had instructed and student, therefore falling flat the national examinations, prompting them to join religious schools (Dreyer 1978: 375-377). Religious foundations, then again, were at times supported by the central government, thus of which the religious establishments in Xinjiang, ruined during the Cultural Revolution. It has sufficiently given subsidising more assets than any time in recent memory by the state for reclamation and even the religious practices which were at the end of the day allowed by the state (Iredale, Robyn, NaranBilik, et.al. 2003: 59).

The CCP did not build up the long-term development of State supported education for Uyghurs and different minorities to the point that the making of China's Constitution. In 1982, under the Constitution, every single Chinese subject was ensured, the privilege and obligation to be education and the utilisation of minority language for classroom guideline are secured.

Article 12 of the Constitution “School or other educational institutions which for the most part consist of the student from minority nationalities may use in teaching the language of the respective national or the native language commonly adopted in the region.

Furthermore, the Ninth Five-Year Plan for China's Educational Development keeps up "the interpretation and production of teaching material for ethnic minority education should be guaranteed. Their minority education should have ensured. These laws have made public schooling, more available to Uyghur in Xinjiang (Grose 2010: 98-99).

3.2 OPENING UP THE WEST IN XINJIANG

The CCP revealed its ‘Open Up the West’ campaign in 1999 to handle rising needs that has nearly connected with the consequences of economic reform it present in the late 1980s. The Chinese state's quest for significantly more prominent supplies of

average assets and its desire to end up noticeably the world's driving economies elevated the CCP to fix political gets control over less developed territories (Ryono Angel and Matthew 2015: 241). The CCP produces the artificial consensus for reconciliation strategies by including a party-friendly investor in Xinjiang to execute 'Go West Campaign' and gathers support from systematic Central Asian governments to capture Uyghurs, who take a stand in opposition to the Chinese authorities. These moves bear the cost of the Express, political support, from the ethnic, minority and neighbourhood governments, to keep stifling challenges that emerge from ethnic minorities. However, the 'Go West' policy, practice and assimilation strategies undermine the PRC's constitution Section VI, Article 116 to 122, which outlines the autonomous regions to self-administer and self-oversee assets, funds and even local directions and mandates. The routine with regard to smothering minority resistance to the campaign likewise reserve Mao Zedong's call or anti-imperialist examination of Sinicization of the recognise that ethnic minorities are vulnerable to institutional discrimination (Ryono Angel and Matthew 2015: 241-242).

3.3 THIRD PLENUM OF THE ELEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Third Plenum session, which took a position from 18th to 22nd December 1978 is, for the most part, observed as something which went before a time of change in the Deng Xiaoping period. Hu Guofeng managed the Third Plenum, and it remained on the CCP Chairperson until the center of 1981, Deng Xiaoping thoughts are unmistakable in every one of its choices, and these are the essential time frames (Mackerras with McMillen and Watson 1998: 310).

- To modernise China as quickly as could be expected under the circumstances.
- To concentrate energy on advanced horticulture.
- To declare high valuation on the exchange about whether the practice is the part standard for demonstrating the precision.
- To reinterpret the Tiananmen Incident of 1976.

From the perspective, the Tiananmen incident of 1976, or the April fifth development, it later became known as the self-conscious reluctant reference to may fourth as the most spectacular demonstration of the political utilisation of poetry in present day Chinese history. Underground distribution expanded in number and dissemination during the excitement of the death of Mao and the capture of the "Gang of Four" in the late 1976, the reestablishment of Deng Xiaoping in 1977, and the inversion of decisions in the 1978 on the 1950 'Rightists and the Tiananmen demonstration' (Mcdougall 2003: 173). Tiananmen Incident of 1976: In 1976, the square was the site of what has turned out to be known as the Tiananmen episode. On 4 April the day preceding China's Qingming celebrations, during which people pay tribute to the dead thousand of individuals grouped around the landmark of the general people heroes. Laying wreaths and bloom to respect the, as of late diminished Premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping had been noted as a director who contradicted the more, fundamental part of the Cultural Revolution. Both were regarded by the minority of the Chinese individuals, Although many other socialist pioneers opposed their perspectives. The most paramount to Zhou in the Square were joined by messages of help for Deng considered his beneficiary the voice of reason in China. The reality the Deng was tumbling from support with Party authorities made at such a show disputable. Along these lines, When the group comes back to the square the morning of April 5. They found the police had evacuated the earlier day's putting forth. Incensed authority impedance the group dissented, a demonstration that immediately prompted savagery amongst police and regular citizens (Schellinger, et.al 2012: 111).

As the incident escalated, some 100,000 people poured into the square and surrounding governments building. Although most of the gathered had gone home by evening, a small group of protesters remained. According to the official counts, 388 people were arrested, but much Chinese believe the total to have been much higher. The arrested either put enough a mass trail or were set, sent to prison camps for reform (Schellinger, et.al 2012: 111). Two years later, in the fall of 1978, China seemed to begin to open up, both in term of its relationship with the west in the time of intellectual privilege and freedom of expression. Those found guilty of the crime against the state in the Tiananmen incident of 1976 had their verdicts reversed even more surprising, though,

was the willingness of people to put their thoughts in writing was not a safe environment for self-expression. Many people wrote essays that were posted on a long segment of the wall near the forbidden city. A large number of the essay contained a bold call for freedom and democracy in China. The freedom wall, as the long stretch of the poster, was called quickly separated further protest against the Chinese government. On December 17, 1978, 28 youth gathered in Tiananmen square to express their dissatisfaction with living and working conditions in the solution province (Schellinger, et.al 2012: 111)

To open the route for aggregate cancellation of the Cultural Revolution, taking after at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee;

- To make a few solid imperative administrative change (Mackerras McMillen and Watson 1998: 310).

The Sixth Plenum of mid-1981 recorded the view that the Third Plenum has been to be set apart as a crucial point with expansive significance in the historical backdrop of our Party since the introduction of the People's Republic of China. As it had given various explanations behind its view, among them were an expected of liberal blunders while settling on the important choice of moving the concentration of work to communist modernisation. Indeed, even after the occurrence of Tiananmen, Deng Xiaoping engaged the rule and strategies of the Third Plenum session of the Eleventh Central Committee for remedy to change, modernisation while opening China to the outside world (Mackerras with McMillen and Watson 1998: 310)

One of the concentrates in the Plenum's Third which stresses modernisation keeps running as takes over: These days is a fitting time to make a choice to close the vast scale across the country. A mass development to uncover and subject Li Biao and the group of four and to move the accentuation of our Parties work and the consideration of the people of the whole nation to socialist modernization is consequently a significant and broad unrest (Mackerras with McMillen and Watson 1998: 310-311).

The Plenum Third named the Tiananmen Incident as a progression of whole progressive activity, which was the exact inverse of the official decision of 'a counter-progressive political episode.' The Third Plenum inversion was an inferred cancellation

of the Cultural Revolution and the feedback of Mao because of Ma Zedong and the pack of four, being standard supporters of the Cultural Revolution (Mackerras with McMillen and Watson 1998: 311).

Here the formal administration, choice, were as per the following by Deng Xiaoping

- To choose Chen Yun as new bad habit director of the CCP Central Committee.
- To accept Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen as the further individuals from the Politburo; and To choose a Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, this would be going by Chen Yun (*ibid*).

The Deng Xiaoping, the primary victor from the Plenum, was the Chen Yun, whose economic and different strategies have saved in its choice. The fundamental point of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection was to counteract and wipe out corruption inside the party. The Cultural Revolution had delivered aggravating impacts on the legal framework. The Third Plenum fundamental to the new legitimate framework ought to be set up and took over. It expressed that there ought to be a law for individuals to take over, these must watch, their implementation must be stuck, and crooks must convey to them in the first years (Mackerras with McMillen and Watson 1998: 310).

3.4 THIRD GENERATION POLICY

Perhaps the most vital move in the PRC policy making process in regards to Taiwan in the previous two decades occurred in the mid -1990s, with the take off from the political scene of Deng Xiaoping and his partners and also the ascent of the alleged third era of pioneers driven by Jiang Zemin. As an of a progressive leader, Jiang was derived principally from his continuous accreditations, personal prestige, and personal relations. The initiative gathering that supplanted him comprised a large degree of more even minded, bureaucratically-trained technocrats whose expert depended basically on approach triumphs, substantive policy expertise, hierarchical control, and the capacity convinces as opposed to a command. This transition "reinforced the pattern toward a broader, bureaucratic, and agreement situated arrangement, making process which displaced the to a great extent top-down, dictator, identity, and now and again an

ideological example of the central leadership of the Deng era (Lo Chih Cheng 2006: 355).

Jiang Zemin offered preferential policies and treatment if they opted to stay in China, with a lot of economic and different motivating forces and to enhance the way of life. Nonetheless, he asserted that the government would not endure separatism and would promptly suppress any endeavour at secession on an ethnic group (Mackerras 2003a: 38). One noteworthy indication of the updating of ethnic affairs was the reconvening of the irregular Central Ethnic Work Conference late in September and early October 1999. Both CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji called for better treatment of ethnic issues. The media highlighted Jiang Zemin's view that poor treatment of ethnic issue can prompt war and foreign intervened (Mackerras 2003a: 38-39).

The impact of Jiang Zemin over the party policy may support long-term ethnic policy reform. Jiang Zemin utilising his impact made four out of seven as a significant aspect of the Politburo and PBSC. Hu Jintao's "populist/tuanpani consider" has sidelined by the tip top princeling element of Jiang and Xi. As per the principal investigator Willy Lam (2009), Jiang Zemin had even endeavoured to impact the Central Military Commission and PBSC individuals that Hu's ethnic strategies had bombed in Xinjiang and Tibet and the new approach has required for the same(*ibid*).

3.5 FOURTH GENERATION POLICY

The "Reform and Open Door" policy has repeated as it had been in charge of China's fast improvement. For diminishing provincial imbalances, in expansion to the "Western Development Strategy", new programme for the northeastern region an old industrial base built during Japanese occupation and the central region encompassing has been reported. The Plan is to assemble a few economic edges cutting across the province and also to develop the area with growing cities and growth poles. A standout amongst the most talked out topics in modern China was Hu Jintao's call for spreading another "conservative culture" and building energy, and environment responsibility system like

the creation duty framework has based on incentives and disincentives that spurred economic development amid the previous three-decade (Monhanty 2014: 139-140).

The present ethnic policy has nearly connected with the inheritance of former General Secretary Hu Jintao, who assumed the next part in the coordination of these approaches during his ten-year term. Hu recognised ethnic issues as an important measure for judging the capacity of the CPC (Communist Party of China) to represent and the limit of gathering association to the driving administration of the SEAC (State Ethnic Affairs Commission 2012). Some radical or sudden move in the policy would be seen as a dismissal of Hu Jintao's policies. The current regulatory arrangements likewise recommend that the Hu Jintao's ethnic policy heritage is probably going to be admirably watched for at any rate the coming future (Leibold, 2013: 43-44).

Hu turned into a piece of the Politburo Standing Committee in 1992 presented to the post by Deng Xiaoping, who had placed him accountable for the individual game plan for the Fourteenth Party Congress. Deng promoted Hu as Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1997 while hoisting him to be Vice-President of the PRC in 1998. (Fewsmith 2008: 239). The sixteenth Party prompted Hu's height to party leader individual in the first quiet movement of energy in CCP history. Hu solidified power in a curiously brief time frame because of his own ability as a political pioneer, and furthermore the heaviness of Deng Xiaoping course of action than it meant that initialisation (Fewsmith 2008: 239).

On 12th November 2015, presenting the new Standing Committee of the Communist Parties of China's (CPC) Politburo to the press, Hu Jintao's Successor, the new General Secretary Xi Jinping took over and put the CPC's primary goal as to restoring the Chinese country, rising to its five thousand year's convention (Mohanty 2014: 142).

Lin Yunshan, alongside two new deputies with broad experience of ethnic policy work on the ethnic policy (Leibold, James 2013: 45). One of them was outgoing chiefs of the UFWD, Du Qinglin and

The March 2013, Yang Jiang's rise of the Secretary-General of the State Council has prompted him to come nearer to the party and state organisations. Yang or Wang Zhengwei, his successor at the SEAC (State Ethnic Affairs Commission), undertook ethnic strategy under Xi (Leibold 2008: 45). Yu Zheng Sheng, who was the leader of the party of Central Leading Small Group (CLSG) on Tibet and Xinjiang became an important person on ethnic issues at the PBSC (Politburo Standing Committee) and CPPCC (Leibold 2008: 45).

The General Liu Yazhou has been a close confidant for both Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping, as a “princeling general”, who additionally remains for another way to deal with ethnic issues. Liu contended that China's future lies in the west, particularly Xinjiang and the Central Asian Corridor (Leibold 2008: 46). The threat of ethnic and religious separatism prompts religious and ethnic issue staying significant to the successor of Liu ‘Go West’ strategy as an outcome, Liu has supported separating both the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) into little managerial bodies. This activity as per him would lessen separatist constraint and better ethnic management through a procedure of governing framework, through more Han migration into these areas (*ibid*).

3.6 FIFTH GENERATION POLICY

President Xi Jinping accepted that social instability threatens to undermine to wreck the communist system several facets of the economic and policy framework should have modified. Since 12th November when he took office, control has been combined at the top (Kerr 2015: 240).

Xi Jinping, who had expected the post of CPC’s General Secretary and Chairperson of the Central Military Commission at the conclusion of the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2012, was elected to the People Republic of China’s by the National People’s Congress in March 2013. Just in the early months of his administration, he has obtained the notoriety of visionary with a pragmatic approach. He stressed on focusing on day –to –day issues, for example, jobs, housing, education and health care while taking up a position for making clean administration and anti-corruption

a top priority. Prompting to “China Dream” by reviving the Chinese country turning into a trademark of his leadership (Minxin, Pei 2012; www. Online web).

However, the regularly expanding violence among the minorities was the biggest challenge for the Chinese dream. The violent incident in Lhasa in the number one spot up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the rising body-count from self-immolation as a real part of the Tibetans have questioned strategy discussions.

Another uprising of July 2009 prompted then Guangdong Party Committee Secretary and now the Vice Premier, Wang Yang, alter ethnic minority policies keeping in mind the end goal to stay away from further troubles (James Pomfet 2009:). Accordingly, the Lhasa 2008 and Urumqi 2009 came up as a turning point for ethnic relation in China (Zhang Haiyang 2012:). Thus the ethnic unity (*Minzu tuanjie*) is a zero-sum political conflict of last chance (Ministry Information 2009: 15). Therefore, the arrangement of provincial autonomy and preferential policies (*Youhui Zhenger*) for ethnic concord have turned into an interesting issue in China. The ethnic minority identity is not the wellspring of backwardness and insecurity for the Chinese leadership (Tobin 2014: 67).

“The nationalist quality of Xi Jinping interpretation of the Chinese Dream is increasingly apparent and suggests that his administration will demand on original models of policy reform and innovation. There is the indication that Xi Jinping and his supports view Singapore, with its Asian values as a suitable model for managing ethnic relation in China” (Leibold 2013: 49).

The Xi Jinping had a little direct experience with ethnic issues and would need to explore the contention of creating enthusiasm for pushing forward any policy change. In any case, we can't help thinking that Xi will take after his predecessor in stressing ethnic and national identity. In November 2012, he recognised “great revival of the Chinese country and race, as the mutual dream of the Chinese people (Renmin Robao 2013: 12). He came back to this matter in March 2013 amid his inaugural speech as Chinese President. Despite the fact that his brief comments Xi's talked about the need for ‘walking the Chinese road,’ ‘Cultivating the Chinese spirit’ and consolidating Chinese

power' making the aggregate nature of this vision clear through his utilisation of unity ten times in the short address (Leibold 2013: 47). The broader implication of "Xi Jinping is a Chinese dream for non-Han minorities, and ethnic policy are unsure at this stage had demanded that there was no space for Tibetans in this Han center vision for the future. While, the new leader of the SEAC, Wang Zhengwei stated that Xi's China dream was a reality. We should have to go above and beyond our ethnic work. And also agree with and vision of the fifty- six ethnic groups, stand up walking on Chinese road, developing the might Chinese spirit and bringing China's considerable power into play, this is how we pursue, unify and realise the Chinese dream" (Xinhua 2013).

The Xi's translation of the Chinese dream is progressively apparent on reform and development. There are signs that Xi and his supporters view Singapore. With its Asian incentive as an appropriate model for overseeing ethnic relation in China. In 2012, Xi announced in a allowing a tenth section China Central Television (CCTV) interview to incorporate a sense of ethnic policy through the idea of 'Melting Diverse Ethnic Groups' (Leibold 48-49).

China found Singapore as a positive model for ethnic policy reform. China's present approach Singapore stresses national interest and equality over restricted group interest and individual right. Singapore monitors ethnic minorities and religious practices while cultivating a collective feeling of nationalism through a progression of unequivocally integration policies (Elizabeth Van Wie 2012: 49-50).

3.7 ONE BELT ONE ROAD

The OBOR will be the keystone of the foreign policy of China for the following couple of decades. Consequently, it has begun an exchange on the bearing of Chinese international strategy. Border Diplomacy has been the thrust of Chinese foreign policy since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, where the central task of the party has changed from class struggle to economic development. Deng Xiaoping and other reformist leader were resolved to end the domestic political turmoil and make an ideal worldwide condition for economic modernisation. The reformist pioneer in Beijing made a think push to devise an is integrated local arrangement known

as the “*zhoubianzhengce*” (peripheral policy) or “*mulinzhengce*” (great neighbourly policy) to adapt to the change that influences its relations with neighbouring countries (Singh 2016: 180).

China has concentrated on the improvement of the 'periphery policy/great neighbourly' relations and organisations with bordering nations to keep external threats from fueling internal friction. China does as such to guarantee that its modernisation programme runs efficiently. Advance financial modernization built up the eastern border of China more than the west. Therefore, to diminish the economic gaps between the eastern and the western area, China launched its Western Development Strategy (WDS). The region of the West comprises of six territories, five autonomous regions, and the Chongqing region, representing more than 70 percent of the mainland area and is the living space of 75 percent of the nation's ethnic minority population. Because of this methodology, the joined GDP of the western region rose to 6.69 trillion RMB in 2009, i.e., four times more than the 1.67 trillion RMB in 2000 (Singh 2016: 181).

In 2003, China contributed around 200 billion RBM (\$24.3 billion) in infrastructure projects in the western area. Eight Key projects, including three street development, extends, an airport extension in Shaanxi area and four west-east natural gas pipeline ventures, beginning from Tarim of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to Shanghai. The belt specifically intends to advance dependability, China's restive west, particularly Xinjiang, which is of vital significance for the smooth implementation of the OBOR. The year 2015 imprints the 60th anniversary of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XUAR). It is the bridgehead for China's Western Development Strategy (WDS) and has assigned as the 'core area.' China's White Paper on Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region expresses that 1.7 trillion RBM has been allowed to Xinjiang over the past 60 years. To support its development. The westernmost land port in Xinjiang territory, i.e., Horgos Port (bordering Kazakhstan) has as of now been moved up to a city. The pipeline from Turkmenistan likewise enters China in Horgos. Further, this port is being worked to enhance the possibilities of shifting investment and to make employments with different countries and promote currency exchange (Singh 2016: 181).

The strategy has supported by a progression of Preferential policies defined for the improvement of the western area that consideration higher investment, preferential tax rates, and flexible plans. China's State Council endorsed the 12th Five Year Plan for advancing the economy of the Western locale. The Plan targets 12 territories of the region of the west that have additionally clubbed into economic zones. It gives particular emphasis on the framework advancement in the area. Apparently, the OBOR is a national level program, and for this reason, the central governments need to incorporate the western area through the network of rail and road. Among the nations along the belt, China is more keen on Afghanistan both for geopolitical and geo-economic reasons. Afghanistan is China's neighbour, and any development in the country will undoubtedly influence interior flow in China, the Beijing will engage with Kabul to secure its western border, particularly the Xinjiang area. China needs a steady and safe neighbourhood for its 'Peaceful Development' Plan that added stress a stable and secure region (Singh 2016: 182).

a) China “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) Initiative

The introductory remarks at a Conference in New Delhi, on ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy has considered the OBOR as a ‘blueprint for the push forward’ or ‘second period of economic revival’. Outside China, people see this strategy as ‘China’s Marshall Plan’ or ‘China’s new strategy’. While discussing the importance of Xinjiang in the context of OBOR, it was observed that there are three reasons for attaching importance to Xinjiang; internal factor, international factor and link between central Asia and China. Xinjiang shares border with eight countries and if contrasted and the Maritime Silk Road, this region is without inconvenience as 90 percent of trade is done by the sea, and China needs to change this over-dependence on the sea. By concentrating on Xinjiang, China aims at fastest real-time coverage in transporting goods to Central Asia and even Europe. Also, there are security worries in Xinjiang that often disturb domestic situation. It is also argued that China wants to make full utilisation of OBOR to acknowledge ‘Go West Policy’. There are worries in the West that ‘China is the next Eurasian Empire in the West’, then again China contends that they consider turning into an Asian empire. It has also been argued that “in the past Great Wall of China" was used to unify China and now

In the mix with the land route of the Silk Road Economic Belt, the entire picture is totally reliable with the government's activity strategy, mutually free by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce in 28th March. The on-land belt indicated three directions: from China to Central Asia and Russia, then to Europe; via Central Asia and Western Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea; and via South Asia to the Indian Ocean (Jia, 2015:17).

In New World arrange additionally incorporate the Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road connects Asia to Europe. China has embraced the "One Belt and One Road (OBOR)" as its foreign policy. The OBOR economic, political, and military strategies will vigorously advance throughout the following decade. In this manner, the OBOR, alongside the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as China's master plan could change the country from a provincial power to a worldwide presence (Kerr 2015: 244-245). Earlier, in 2013 President Xi, set forth a blueprint to fortify growth of Eurasia termed the Silk Road Economist Belt and Maritime Silk Road, which has abbreviated to the One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR) (Kerr 2015: 245).

In June 2015, Stratfor Global Intelligence reported that the OBOR strategy included six Eurasian corridors, intended to renew the slowing Chinese economy and ease China's exchange vulnerability among officially settled marine routes, and particularly at choke points (Kerr 2015: 245). The Six corridors are:

1. China-Russia Corridor tiewn by the current Trans-Siberian railroad. Plans are in progress for the beginning a Chinese high-speed railway framework on Foreign soil.
2. Eurasia route from inside China to Europe.
3. New Silk Road from Xinjiang via Central Asia to Europe.
4. The Pakistan to China movement broadening from the Port of Gwadar to Xinjiang.
5. Indochina Peninsula Corridor through Laos, Thailand and Cambodia and;
6. India, Bangladesh, Myanmar passage (Kerr 2015: 245).

These routes will comprise pipeline, railroads, power plants, port facilities strengthened by the abiding project that will help China in earning political and economic support. On one route China will build a pipeline amongst Pakistan and Iran called “peace-pipeline” (Kerr 2015: 246).

The Chinese government trusts that the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) will advance economic development in Xinjiang and economic integration in the area, and after that adds to the stability. At the National People’s Congress (NPC) annual session in Beijing on March 2015, the Xinjiang Party Secretary expressed that the “One Belt, One Road” is a vital notable chance to defend social stability (Bekkevold and Sunniva 2016: 154).

In this manner, OBOR will give various favourable circumstances:

- a) Open to market to Chinese enterprise exchange.
- b) Transfer labour escalated low-value added facilities to different nations.
- c) Accelerated domestic economic rebuilding and stimulate the development of China’s province in the inside and west (Kerr 2015: 246).

The OBOR, according to the reports to published by the Chinese Academy of Social Science here:

- i) First OBOR is an economic strategy that means to focus on the World market and not the local market.
- ii) Second, OBOR helps to promote economic integration against China and key nations or partners.
- iii) Third OBOR is an economic strategy, with the aid of political practices.
- iv) OBOR endeavours to advance economic integration beyond existing mechanisms, for example, the World Trade Organization

(WTO), Free Trade Area (FTA) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Hung 2016: 254).

3.8 ABOUT CHINA- PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC)

On 12th August 2015, China and Pakistan signed twenty agreements, which was worth 1.6 billion U.S dollar to execute the aspiring China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) venture. These agreements were signed during the CPEC Forum held at Karamay city in Xinjiang. Both the nations together additionally issued the Karamay Manifesto on the China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC), as significant venture added China's Belt and Road Initiative (Current Affairs August 2015: 31-32).

- CPEC Project was announced during Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Pakistan in April 2015. Around 51 on agreements have signed of which 30 has linked to the strategic corridor.
- It is part of its six economic corridors considered under the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st century Maritime Silk Road.
- It links the Xinjiang province of China with Pakistan's Strategic Gwadar Port.
- CPEC Projects aims at supporting and boosting economic collaboration, political trust and cultural exchange between China and Pakistan. It is viewed as the greatest network extends between the two nations with total investments around 46 billion U.S dollars (Current Affair August 2015: 32).

OBOR initiative is a combined result of numerous political factors and economic factors. In this way, we see that the essential circumstances about utilising FDI in Xinjiang and proposes plans and suggestions to upgrade utilising FDI, develop the source of FDI, improve the scale and nature of foreign investment with a perfect arrangement system of Xinjiang government.

The Chinese government launched the Western Development Programme in 1999 in response to the wealth disparity eastern and western China. The next chapter examines the Western Development programme effects on the Uyghurs, a Turkish-speaking minority group in Xinjiang Province. Beijing openly stated that the chief goal of the Western Development Programme is to improve the economic development of ethnic minority group residents in the west and that doing so will reduce ethnic nationalist tension. The next chapter addresses the relationship between economic growth and decrease nationalism, and applies this issue in the case of the Uyghurs. The remarkable economic growth experienced by China over the last decades unequally distributed throughout the countries. The growing division in China, today between its richer and poorer citizen, is an agreed point in the governing Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) policies. This gap exists within cities and regions, but it also physically divides the country almost down the middle. The eastern seaboard provinces were targeted in the early 1980s by the CCP leadership's in Beijing as the first to receive the benefit of the economic opening. He has brought about the successful impoverishment of approximately fifteen western regions, the greater part of China's territory area. In light of the enlarging riches dissimilarity in 1999, the CCP formally started the Western Development Programme is differently known as the 'Go West Plan' or the Open Up West. This venture was an arrangement to kick off the West's economy through state provision of assets and framework and financial boosts expected to open the west to the worldwide economy. Billions of Yuan have been apportioned toward the Western Development Programme and early evaluation consistently not developing GDP in the west. Xinjiang region has achieved considerable development in each, and every sector, starting from the agricultural to the industry which will be discussed in details in the next chapt

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER IV

GREAT WESTERN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN XINJIANG

China comprises three regions- coastal, central and western region. Two-thirds of the China's international border is surrounded by the central and west provinces which have immense geopolitical importance for China. The western part of China has 23 percent of the total population of the nation, and it represents 56 percent of the country's ethnic minorities, which are likewise found in a few region viz., 94 percent in Tibet, 61 percent in Xinjiang and Qinghai (Lai 2002: 446). At the front line of China's economic package in the western region, Xinjiang in specifically has been the Western Development Programme. The Western Development Programme began in the 1990s with the rationale to advance the economic development of the backward regions of the western part of the nation and Chinese national strategy to endorse trade between Central Asia and western China. Through the programme, China trusted that it would legitimise its power in the region and bring about financial prosperity and stabilise border security. Under the Western Development Programme, the administration concentrated on different issues, for example, development of transportation, energy, communications and irrigation and improving urban infrastructure in the interior region.

4.1 WESTERN REGIONS OF CHINA

Before China's economic policy for the western region of the country can be analysed, it is necessary to understand the importance of the resource rich, but economically poor western region. This region has long been under the imprecise social and political construct due to the social and cultural characteristics of the region being in constant change (Newby 1996: 62-85). The provinces in the western part of China have been poor because they do not have the necessary preconditions of modern economic development, such as transportation, communication facilities, power and water supply and skilled human resources. During the ninth Five Year Plan (1995-2000), the Western region was identified as the region covering in its ambit underdeveloped regions of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Tibet, Yunnan, Sichuan, Chongqing and Guizhou (Holbig 2004: 351). Initially along with the western provinces and the

municipality of Chongqing, the central provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Shanxi, Hunan, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Henan were also brought together with the target of an overall development of the region(Holbig 2004: 354; and Jacobs 2011: 7, 24).

Another important factor that prompted the Chinese authorities to focus on the western region was the availability of energy resources in the region, particularly natural gas. In Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia, a combined reserve of 334 billion cubic meters; in Sichuan, 579.5 billion cubic meters and 147.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves have been found in Qinghai province's Qaidam Basin. In order to secure this huge natural gas reserve, the Chinese authorities started laying pipelines from these areas to the coastal areas. The West to East Pipeline, which covers 4,200 km from Xinjiang's Tarim Basin in Shanghai, crossing Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu, is an important one. With a diameter of 1.5 meters, this pipeline has an annual gas transmitting capacity of 12 billion cubic meters (Holbig 2004: 355-356).

The Chinese oil geologists estimate that the western region has 26,000 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, accounting for 86.7 per cent of China's total continental natural gas. CNPC found a tremendous natural gas zone of 3,000 billion cubic meters, seven large gas fields and 11 geological structures with rich gas reserves in Xinjiang's Tarim Basin (Holbig 2004: 355-356). The pipeline linking the major gas bases in western China such as Tarim, Qaidam and Ordos Basins to the eastern part of the country has an annual capacity of a 12bcm/y. While also containing numerous regional branch lines along the main route resulting in an improved interconnectivity of China's natural gas transport network. The Chongqing gas field is another large gas field in northern China. In the first half of 2010, it produced 10.9 cm, an increase of 13.5 per year. In September 2010, Petro-China discovered a new high-yield well in the gas field of one 1.07 million cubic meters per day (Online web: www.wsichina.org/cs4_7).

Map: 4

The Map of Western China



Sources: Map of Western China, [Online: Web] Accessed on 17 July 2017, URL: https://www.google.co.in/search?q=THE+map+of+western+China&tbn=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewiW3MSStl_VAhUEzLwKHfyDDfsQsAQIIg&biw=1.

The main issues pertaining to the Western Development Programme are social development, security, stability and infrastructure development. The Chinese authorities understood well that since the region was dominated by minority groups, socio-cultural issues cannot be sidelined. Further, the sensitivity and strategic importance of the region and its share of the western border with many countries compelled the Chinese Central government to focus on the development of the region through which the hearts and minds of minority groups, particularly who have been demanding separate statehood, can be won. Lastly, the absence of infrastructure in the region had added to the impoverishment of the region, which the Chinese leadership in its policy of western

development programmes given first and foremost importance as it would be the stepping stone to the overall economic development of the region. Besides, the leadership focused on improving the ecological environment, readjusting the industrial structure, developing science and technology and using it for the purpose of development in the western region (Fengjun and Qian 2003: 6)

As part of this comprehensive development programme, the political leadership in China devised a programme based on economic calculations within redistributive policies of reallocation of financial resources through developmental projects. Since the region is politically sensitive, there was concern about a stable political environment in western China, which would guide and govern policy designs and measures regarding it. With changes taking place within the national and international arena of economic environment, and with China's integration into the world markets, accession of China to the international trade regime governed by World Trade Organization (WTO) and China being the second largest economy in the world, it was imperative to improve the standard of living of the people in the region and to assimilate the entire western China into the national mainstream. Keeping in view the social contrasts and cleavages between the eastern and western regions of China, which gave birth to destabilizing political situations, the Chinese leadership favored a systematic diffusion of modern values in the western regions in order to bring changes in the economic and social fields (Heinz, Dieter Assmann et al 2005: 187-188).

China's concern for comprehensive security is the most important driving force behind the Western Development Programme. Three aspects of national security can be analysed here, i.e. national political stability, economic sustainability and social development (Heinz, Dieter Assmann et.al, 2005:188) With respect to Western Development Programme, national political stability is conceived as inclusive of geographical as well as societal imperatives whereas economic sustainability contains economic measures for companies to adapt to internationalization as well as accelerated economic development in the East. Social development refers to comprehensive reform of welfare provisions, e.g., education and cultural changes, which are considered to be fundamental for sound social development in Western China. The Chinese leadership

devised policies to tackle two issues in the economic field, firstly, to improve economic performance in the Western China, which was closely linked to the reforms of the state-owned enterprises and an extension and expansion of the regional infrastructure and secondly, the problem of integration of the Chinese economy into the world economy after having joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Heniz, Dieter Assmann et al 2005: 188-189).

The unwillingness of Chinese companies working and operating in the eastern part of China to shift to the economically risky western region paved the way for the Central Government to increase its investment as an instrument to improve the economic performance of the Chinese companies working in western China. Infrastructure projects were considered crucial as they improve the investment environment, back the competitiveness of western Chinese companies and the development demands primary goods that will stimulate growth in the region and also attract foreign direct investments. In the 1990s, Western part of China was opened for Foreign Direct Investments and is the major source of financing Great Western Development Programme. In addition, the Chinese Central Government has acquired funds from international development agencies such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. As an important measure to attract FDI, the Chinese government has created a favourable investment climate and eased tax norms and policies (Heniz, Dister Assmann et. al 2005: 189-192).

At the outset, the Chinese leadership in Xinjiang focused on economic restructuring and changing the modes of economic growth, infrastructure construction and environmental protection, along with the improvement of people's living standards and providing basic public amenities, so as to keep the development of Xinjiang at pace with the national development. As a result, Xinjiang has been witnessing rapid economic and social progress and comprehensive growth, with the local people enjoying tangible benefits. In the past one decade or so, Xinjiang has been able to attract huge investments and ushered in fast economic growth, which in turn has proved to be beneficial for the common people of Xinjiang. China has thus adopted measures for acceleration of the construction and up gradation of regional inter-provincial and local highway. China, thus,

has expanded the railway network and built internal and external link along the length of 12,600 km connecting the major cities in the region (Lai 2001: 451).

Commending the Chinese central government's economic development programmes in Xinjiang, Ismail Tiliwaldi, and the Governor of Xinjiang stated in a press conference on 12th April 2004 that "not one occurrence of blast or death occurred over the most recent couple of years." He included that "terrorists" had "incurred public wrath like a rat running across the streets." In an interview with Beijing Review, he advised that because of the opening up policy together launched by the Central government and the XUAR, trade relations have been built up with 108 countries and foreign firms from more than 30 countries have been set up in Xinjiang. He likewise said that as of late, the numbers of domestic tourists, including tourists from Taiwan and Hong Kong, to Xinjiang exceeded 10 million every year. There have additionally been about 250,000 foreign explorers in Xinjiang every year. Western scholars while supporting the Western Development programme trust that the Chinese experts were attempting to enhance the economic well-being of Xinjiang's population. Him, improvement, extensively prevails with regards to making wealth, reducing poverty and improving general living standards in Xinjiang. He additionally adds that to leave people poor would result in more instability, terrorism and resentment against the Hans (Debata 2007: 189-190).

Summary:

The summaries of filed visited perspective regarding the Great Western Development Programme in Xinjiang.

China's ambitious of Great Western Development Programme and its impact on Han and ethnic minority populations in Xinjiang. It focuses on analysing the components of the campaign that are being implemented to develop Xinjiang through the intensification of agriculture, exploitation of energy resources, and reforms to Xinjiang's education system, revealing that this programme, rather than alleviating poverty, is leading to the greater asymmetry between Han and ethnic minority populations within Xinjiang. Rather than a plan for bridging the gap of economic disparity between the eastern and western regions of China, as construed by Beijing, the plan fits into a great

strategy for integration and assimilation of Xinjiang's restive ethnic population by Beijing Great Western Development Programme in Xinjiang was a tool to promote Han migration in Xinjiang to increase Chinese internal security in Xinjiang. Because it is one of the most important ways along with economic development policies to decrease ethnic and separatist tension and marginalisation in Xinjiang.

Due to dynamic implementation of the Western Development Programme throughout the 1990s, Xinjiang which was once dubbed as western China's economic "depression", has become China's "bridgehead" open to the countries of Central Asia, South Asia and Eastern Europe. Abundant natural resources in Xinjiang make her the most attractive treasure trove for the domestic enterprises and groups. Xinjiang has become China's forward-post to its western neighbours (Jianming 2016: 149). During the last 10 years, billions of dollars have been invested in building the transportation infrastructure in Xinjiang, which showcases the level of infrastructure development. It has accelerated the growth of local economy and provided job opportunities and generated substantial income for local people. This has facilitated the export of Xinjiang's local products to the markets of neighbouring countries and helps in Xinjiang's sustainable development. In addition, a number of key industries have been set up in Xinjiang to make optimum use of oil, natural gas and coal resources further contributing to Xinjiang's economic development. Now, Xinjiang has become China's major important oil and natural gas production and petrochemical industrial base. The strategy of utilising Xinjiang's resources has attracted many enterprises and groups to invest in Xinjiang. There are 89 enterprises having their affiliate organisations in Xinjiang. According to the People's Daily, the Central government has increased the financial transfer payments to Xinjiang on a regular basis, and the cumulative subsidies offered to Xinjiang between 2000-2009 amounts to a whopping 400 billion Yuan. Out of this, 110.9 billion Yuan have been invested in nearly 20,000 infrastructure projects in the agricultural, forestry, hydraulic, transportation and energy sectors. In 2010, the state-owned companies invested over 6 billion Yuan in Xinjiang. In 2011, there were 1,738 new projects in Xinjiang, including infrastructure, quake proof houses and government subsidised houses. The Central government promises to provide Xinjiang 2.1 trillion Yuan of financial aid from 2011 to 2020, which is three times the transfer payment to

Xinjiang over the last 30 years. The total fixed asset investment in Xinjiang will reach 2.6 trillion Yuan by the end of the 12th Five Year Plan period (2011-2016). In 2011, the first year of the 12th Five Year Plan, Xinjiang plans to complete a fixed asset investment of over 620 billion Yuan. As indicated by the regional government's thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), Xinjiang will turn into a key center point for textile production. It will likewise augment the industry chain from cotton turning to making pieces of clothing. By 2020, Xinjiang will produce around 500 million textile products on an annual basis and generate more than 600,000 jobs.

4.2 WESTERN REGION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT SCHEDULE FOR 2000

Following are the projects under Western Development Programme

- Eight National Highways of 12,600 km have been constructed to connect the major cities (Lai 2002: 451).
- China has accelerated its construction and up gradation of regional inter-provincial and local highways.
- China has constructed 50,000 kilometres of road amongst township and villages in the West.
- China has extended the railway network and manufactured east-to-west additionally as interior and exterior connections.
- China has upgraded and developed air terminal as national and provincial center point. A few airports have been promoted in the Xianyang International Airport in Xian, Shuaonngliu Airport in Chengdu, Wujiba airport in Kunming, Zhongchuan airport in Lanzhou and Urumqi airport.
- An essential West to the East natural gas pipeline from Yunnan in the Tarim Basin to Shanghai, widening 4,200 km.
- The reclamation of the lower reaches of the Tarim River financed by the World Bank (Lai 2002: 451).

There were about 10 projects which were put forward by the office of the Western Region Development and the State Development Planning Commission in the year 2000: (National Report 2000: 17).

- The Xi'an-Hefei section of the Xi'an –Nanjing railway: Emphasis was given to the expansion of the railway network and the construction of east-west, internal and external passageways. The Xi' and Nanjing Railway via Nanyang will be a convenient passage linking China's northwest, reducing the distance in railway transport and optimising the railway network.
- The Chongqing- Huaihua railway is of great strategic significance to the railway network in the south, forming a convenient external passageway and sustaining the development of the local economy and the economy of the western region as a whole.
- While properly implementing the current plan for the layout of national trunk highway, new roads and highway will be built to form major passageways that connect the west with the mid-east, the south-east to the north-west. The highway construction in a poverty stricken area will be strengthened, besides improving the highway network. The construction of trunk highways that connect west China and the central China will be arranged currently.
- The construction of the first phase of the Chongqing light trunk highway will be given priority in order to improve urban transportation level and investment environment in the entire western region.
- The development of Qaidam Basin in Qinghai province, which is a region rich in natural gas. The utilisation of natural gas as a clean and high quality, energy will not only improve the energy mix and the air quality in

these two cities but also promote economic development in Gansu and Qinghai (National Report 2000: 17).

- Airport network is taking shape in the western region; mainly consist of the major airports in Chengdu, Chongqing, Xian, Kunming, Urumqi, Lanzhou, Guilin, Nanjing and Hohhot. Developing airports, improving air route structure and enhancing efficiency will be a key component.
- The functioning of the Zipingpu water conservation project in Sichuan, which is a large scale project for irrigation and water supply besides power generation.
- In 2000, the pilot project of converting land for the forest and pasture will be carried out in 13 provinces and the regions in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, the middle reaches of the Yellow River like Yunnan and Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu.
- Qinghai region is a poor region in western China. The construction of large industrial projects in this area can bring great political and economic development. The salt water lake in Qinghai is rich in potash, which not only guarantees the current production capacity but also safeguards the needs of this project.
- This project is also forecasted to improve the educational and technical level of the labourers, to accelerate the development of education and recruit talented students for schooling in the western region (National Report 2000: 17).

4.3 WESTERN REGION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FOR 2013-2015

According to the latest figure released on the National Development and reform commission's websites, 33 infrastructure projects kicked off in 2014 in the region, with the worth of the total investment of 835.3 billion Yuan (\$134.7 billion) compared to the total investment of 326.5 billion Yuan on 20 projects in 2013.

- New railway construction, particularly, for example, the line being built from Lhasa to tourist resort Linzhi in the Tibet Autonomous Region and from Chengdu to Ya'an in Sichuan will help in increasing the business and tourism in the region.
- The NDRC has revealed a long list of new national projects in recent month (which month), emphasising that infrastructural investment will continue to play a significant role in supporting the economy over the coming twelve months (give correct information).
- The new railway and water projects will serve to revive western region and the intercontinental land routes, as said by Guo Xiyie, an official of the NDRC's Department of Western Region Development. The new Silk Road initiative has injected more momentum into the development of the western region, while the new infrastructure projects will bolster the implementation of the strategy.
- President Xi Jinping was the first to propose in 2013 that China should work with the other Central Asian countries in order to build an economic belt along the route of the ancient Silk Road, which would be a Trans-Eurasian project linking the Pacific Ocean on one end to the Baltic Sea on the other.
- The NDRC is pushing ahead with a plan to build more railway projects, including a line from Zhengzhou in the Henan province to Wanzhou in Chongqing and one from Yuxi to Mohan in Yunnan province.
- The Zhengzhou- Wanzhou line had already been approved by the NDRC, worth an estimated total investment of 97.4 billion Yuan.
- The new economic belts along the western region and the Yangtze River, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hubei region and the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone will become China's new economic growth policy (Lan, 26 December 2014).

4.4 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS (FDIs) IN XINJIANG

With the implementation of economic reform and Opening Up policy more than 30 years, the utilisation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Xinjiang, has been growing exceptionally very fast. (Li and Xiaowei 2016: 647).

Table: 4.1

The Amount of Utilisation of FDI in Xinjiang 1980-2013 (US\$ 1000)

Year	Contractual FDI				Actually used FDI
	Total Amount	Foreign Amount	Contractual Amount	Other Foreign Investment	Amount
1980	601		492	109	109
1985	4804	1096	3588	120	518
1986	1370	570	318	482	2822
1987	8616	8000	616		3617
1988	3405	2415	966	24	2805
1989	10550	9826	267	457	7796
1990	4463	3500	881	82	7629
1991	8368	5312	3056		12193
1992	81090	70509	8795	1786	65684
1993	36737	10643	25744	350	13051
1994	19122	10549	8547	26	14543
1995	42039	29402	9245	3392	54699
1996	18106	4126	10104	8440	26568
1997	39787	34707	4127	953	8691
1998	39787	6514	13827	29792	16225
1999	50133	15449	6151		14022
2000	21600		9212		13800
2001	9212		12590		16335
2002	12590		15443		16834
2003	15443		16147		17916
2004	16147		25786		20690
2005	25786		27237		4749
2006	27237		36439		10366
2007	36439		45679		12484
2008	45679		64555		18984
2009	64555		47000		21570
2010	47000		30091		23742
2011	30091		55834		33485
2012	55834		61056		40795
2013	61056		36034		480102

Sources: Cali Li, Zhang Xiaowei (2016),“ Research on the Utilization of Foreign Direct Investment in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China”, *Journal of Research in Business, Economic and Management*, 5(4): 648.

Xinjiang follows the Chinese government policy actively to attract Foreign Direct Investment. From January to April 2015, there was more than a fifteen FDI project being launched one by one with the continuous expansion of the scale of foreign capital, upgrading the utilisation of FDI and enhancing the quality of FDI has turned into a significant issue. As utilisation FDI by form, the quantity of FDI projects decreased and the contractual amount of FDI decreased by 50 percent in 2013, however, the quantity of real utilised FDI increased in Xinjiang, looking at the real utilised FDI in 2012 with that of 2013. It is predictable that completely foreign owned-enterprises and equality joint venture will turn into an essential power in foreign investment in Xinjiang (Li and Xiaowai 2016: 649).

Regarding the type of utilization of FDI in 2014, assembled by from enrollment that import and export volume of state owned enterprises was USD 5.522 billion, decreasing by 23.3; percent collectively-owned enterprises, USD 0.204 billion, increasing by 74.9 percent; foreign invested enterprises, USD 0.212 billion, diminished by 15.6 percent; private companies, USD 21.731 billion, increasing by 8.6 percent. 49 Foreign Direct Investment companies were recently allowed to set up expanding by 16.7 percent. There were 49 contractual FDI projects approved. The amount of contractual (FDI) projects USD 0.56 billion, increasing by 46 percent actually utilised FDI, USD 0.417 billion, diminishing by 13.3 percent (Li and Xiaowai 2016: 649).

Xinjiang ought to enhance the collaboration of venture and guide the enterprises, particularly the inland Chinese enterprise to build up high-priorities to develop import or export preparing projects that confronted with the neighboring markets Xinjiang require presents currents, administration undertaking, devote more effort to transform and improve traditional service industry, promote productive service, developed industries that attract foreign investment and construct energetic, social modern service system. Xinjiang keenly endorses the healthy development of the real estate market to increase investment in real estate and create venturing tourism sector for further development. Xinjiang ought to reinforce the organised administration of key projects for strengthening communications, funding problems and taking care of issue of the challenges of advancing FDI extends and ensure the implements of significant FDI projects, especially

concentrating on the accompanying essential occasion, for example, the Asia and Europe Expo, The Investment & Trade form for cooperation between East & West of China, the Western China International Economy and Trade Fair and etc (Li and Xiaowai 2016: 652-653).

In 2015, Hong Kong was the main sources of FDI in Xinjiang, representing 36.8 percent of the total utilised FDI. Other primary investments originated from the Netherland, Germany and Kazakhstan. The main areas which pulled in the area most Foreign capital in 2015 were manufacturing representing for 59.7 percent of the total FDI. This data demonstrate that there is a progressive improvement in the utilisation of the FDI, which showed the increase in 2011 to 2013 and later continued in a gradual manner till 2015

Table: 4.2


Utilised FDI of Xinjiang US\$ (million) 2008-2015

SL. No.	Year (2008-2015)	US\$ (million)
1	2008	190
2	2009	216
3	2010	237
4	2011	335
5	2012	408
6	2013	481
7	2014	417
8	2015	453

Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

Figure: 4.1

Utilised FDI of Xinjiang US\$ (million): 2008-2015



Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

This data shows that FDI of Xinjiang, which rose from mere 335 US\$ million in 2011. In 2012, the utilisation was 408 million USD and in 2013 the utilised FDI of Xinjiang 481 million USD.

a) Market Profile Development in Xinjiang (2015)

Table: 4.3

Major Economic Indicator

Economic Indicator	2015		Jan-Sep 2016	
	Value	Growth (%, y-o-y)	Value	Growth (%, y-o-y)
Gross Domestic Product (RBM bn)	932.5	8.8 ¹	671.8	7.9 ¹
Per Capita GDP (RMB)	40,036	6.6 [□]	-	-
Added Value Output				
Primary Industry (RBM bn)	155.9	5.9 ¹	108.9	5.7 ¹
Secondary Industry (RBM bn)	359.6	7.3 ¹	245.9	6.3 ¹
Tertiary Industry (RBM bn)	416.9	12.2	316.9	10.1 ¹
Value-added Industrial Output ² (RBM bn)	266.3	5.2 ¹	185.4	4.4 ¹
Fixed- assets Investment (RBM bn)	1,072.9	10.1	792.3	7.4
Retails Sale (RBM bn)	260.6	7.0	198.6	8.0
Inflation (Consumer Price Index %)	-	0.6	-	1.1
Exports (US\$ mn)	17,506	-25.4	10,931	-14.4
By-Foreign-invested-enterprises (FIEs) (US\$ mn)	74	-16.2	50	-11.3
Imports (US\$ mn)	22,172	-48.2	1,491	-10.2
By Foreign- Invested-enterprises (FIEs) (US\$ mn)	177	43.4	109	-18.2
Utilised Direct Foreign Investment (US\$ mn)	453	8.5	372	0.1

Notes: ¹ In real form; [□] For all State-Owned Enterprises and another form with annual sale over RMB20 million.

Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

b) Industries

Xinjiang is noteworthy for its primary industry that represented for 16.7 percent of GDP in 2015, Urumqi, Karamay and Ili Kazakh are major industrial hubs in Xinjiang. Oil and petrochemical, electric power production, metallurgy, chemical and food processing are among the pillar industries in Xinjiang (China-trade-research.hktdc.com business-news/article).

Table: 4.4
Composition of GDP (%)

	2000	2015
Primary	21.1	16.7
Secondary	39.4	38.6
Industry	30.7	29.4
Tertiary	39.5	44.7

Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

The above data can show that in 2000 primary GDP accounted 21.1% increase, but in 2015 decreased to 6.7 %. From 2000 to 2015, secondary GDP composition was 39.4% and 38.6%. In tertiary, it fell to 39.5% in 2000 and was increased 44.7 % in 2015. And the industry indicates 30.4%, which increased in 2000. In 2015, industry GDP decreased by 29.4% in Xinjiang region.

Table: 4.5

Output share of leading Industry Group (2015)

	% Share value-added industrial output*
Extraction of petroleum and natural gas	22.9
Oil processing, cooking and nuclear fuel processing	18.8
Production and supply of electricity and heat power	12.7
Raw chemical materials and products	6.8
Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metal	5.7
Manufacture of non-metal mineral products	3.9
Processing of food from agricultural products	3.6
Manufacture of electric equipment and machinery	3.6

Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

The above table, mentions the output of the leading of Industry group in 2015. A) extraction of petroleum and natural gas was a 22.9% share of value –added industrial output in Xinjiang. B) Oil processing, cooking and nuclear fuel processing were 18.8 %, of the value-added industrial production. C) In 2015, output and supply of electricity and heat power were 12.7% of value-added industrial output in Xinjiang region. D) Raw chemical materials and products were 6.8 %. E) Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metal were 5.7 % of the value -added industrial output. F) Manufacturing of non-metal mineral products was a 3.9% of industrial production. G) In 2015, output shares the leading industrial group for processing of food from agricultural commodities was 3.6% and manufacture of electric equipment and machinery was 3.6% of value-added industrial output.


c) Foreign Trade

During 2001-2011 period , Xinjiang foreign trade ascended from US\$ 1.8 billion to US\$ 22.8 billion, more than ten times. In spite of the facts that its trade performance loosened in 2009 due to the global financial crisis, it exports still bounced from US 700 million in 2001 to US\$ 16.8 billion in 2011. Countries in Asian continent accounts for more than 85 percent of the autonomous region's total trade. Three Central Asian Countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are Xinjiang largest export accounted for 72 percent of Xinjiang exports and 68 percent of its imports. In 2011, product exported to Kazakhstan custom accounted for 70 percent, 76 percent and 84 percent separately of every single Chinese item exported to these here Central Asian markets. The reflects the essential role played by Xinjiang (Online<http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Research-Articles/Xinjiang>) .

Figure: 4.2

Xinjiang's Import and Export Trade

Xinjiang's Import and Export Trade



Source: *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2015*, Urumqi Customs

Sources: A Belt and Road Development Story Trade between Xinjiang and Central Asia, [Online: Web] Accessed on 23rd January 2017, URL: <http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Research-Articles/A-Belt-and-Road-Development-Story-Trade-between-Xinjiang-and-Central-Asia/rp/en/1/1X000000/1X0A5F0R.htm>.

Xinjiang's total export and import value dropped to US\$ 19.68 billion in 2015. In any case, reality cap import or export trade with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan accounted for 46 percent of Xinjiang's total trade value (<http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Research-Articles/A-Belt-and-Road-Development-Story-Trade-between-Xinjiang-and-Central-Asia/rp/en/1/1X000000/1X0A5F0R.htm>).

Table: 4.6

Xinjiang's Top Six Trading Partners in 2015

	Xinjiang's Total Imports & Exports (US\$ million)	Share of Xinjiang's Total Exports (%)	Share of Xinjiang's Exports and China's Exports to the Country (%)	Share of Xinjiang's Total Imports (%)	Share of Xinjiang's Imports and China's Imports to the Country (%)
Kazakhstan	5.748	30.1	62.3	22.3	8.3
Kyrgyzstan	3.237	18.2	74.7	1.7	65.0
Russia	0.938	4.7	2.4	5.6	0.4
Tajikistan	1.393	7.9	76.7	0.7	29.0
US	2.072	9.3	0.4	20.1	0.3
Uzbekistan	0.527	2.0	15.8	8.1	13.8

Source: Xinjiang's Customs Statistics 2015.

In 2015, Xinjiang's export to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan accounted 62.3 percent, 74.7 percent, and 76.7 percent, respective (<http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Research-Articles/A-Belt-and-Road-Development-Story-Trade-between-Xinjiang-and-Central-Asia/rp/en/1/1X000000/1X0A5F0R.htm>).

In 2015, noteworthy export included garments, shoes and textiles. The significant export market included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the U.S. These three

markets in Central Asia represented around 56 percent in Xinjiang total exports in 2015. The major imports included crude oil, medical instruments and agricultural products. The significant import sources included Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the US and Russia Border trade extended US\$ 9.62 billion in 2015, representing 49 percent of the trade (China-trade-research-hktdc).

4.5 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER FIVE YEAR PLAN

The Planning and Programme of economic development in whole China began with the Five Year Plans. Only four years after independence, the policy makers offered significantly to the economy of the entire nation and completely concentrated the capability of every region. In Xinjiang, agriculture was the pillar of the economy. The First Five Year Plan (1953-57) had tried to accomplish economic self-sufficiency in Xinjiang through the process of land reclamation and irrigation. To achieve this aim, a paramilitary institution Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) was set up keeping in view the oil and natural gas resources in this region and the strategy gave emphasis on petroleum exploration in Xinjiang and construction of Xinjiang-Tibet highway. In July 1955, Mao collectivization process prompted pastoral areas of Xinjiang being transformed to improve things. During the period, per capita food grain production in the southern part of Xinjiang, which was 800 pounds, grew to 1,100 pounds in 1958. Per capita, cotton production in 1958 rose to 68.8 pounds from mere 22.8 pounds in 1949 (Debata 2007:113).

One scholar divides the stages of economic development in Xinjiang from the 1950s to 1960s into three: i) rehabilitation (1950s-1952), ii) the First Five Plan (1953-57), and iii) the Great Leap Forward (1958-1959). The first stage saw the start of socialisation of private trade and industry with the closing of the land redistribution programme. From 1953 to 1957, the total amount of state investment, adding to 49.3 billion Yuan of which 3/4th went to industry, transportation and communication got 18.7 percent and just 8.2 percent to agriculture, forestry and water conservation. Out of the 27.6 billion Yuan of the venture in the industry, 87 percent was for heavy industry, leaving just 13 percent for light industries (Li 1960: 36-38).

In 1958, the Second Five Year Plan (1958-62) was declared. Inconsistency with the order of Eighth Party Congress, the Party Committee of Xinjiang promised to make Xinjiang a critical base for production of iron, steel, oil, coal and cotton. Opening way to the growth in sectors of industry, agriculture and education sectors and mineral and oil exploration in Xinjiang. More than 58,000 tonnes of cotton were produced in 1958, which was eleven times that of the output in 1949 (Debata 2007:117). The significance of this Five Year Plan in contrast to the First Five Plan was essential for the industrialisation of Xinjiang. In spite of the fact that significance has been paid to massive venture yet, agriculture did not lose its importance it held between the (Li 1960: 42-43).

Industrial development was the premise of the Second Five Year Plan period with the Chinese authorities putting stress on the production of petroleum, coal, iron and steel and electric power, etc. Industrial facilities along these lines expanded from 64 tonnes in 1955 to 1,500 tonnes in 1985. Oil industry of Xinjiang begun during the World War II went ahead to create 330,000 tonnes in 1958, later increasing to 400,000 tonnes in the first six months of 1959. So also, coal production in Xinjiang received a boost after the construction of hydroelectric plants in Urumqi and Kashgar and about 200 small Hydrel plants in different parts of the regions. During Great Leap Forward period (1958-66), fast collectivization and the establishment of cooperatives in urban, rural and pastoral areas were the key focus of the whole strategy. Within a period six month of the launching of the Great Leap Forward, 93 percent of the agrarian population and 70 percent of pastoral herdsmen had been brought under the cooperative system (Debata 2007: 113-114).

The third Five Year Plan (1962-66) put stress on economic development in the backwards regions in Xinjiang. The political leadership under Wang Enmao, who turned into the first Secretary of the XPCC in March 1966 and Chairman of Xinjiang government Saifuddin underscored the need to upsurge grain production and cash income, decrease the prices of manufactured goods, land reclamation and water conservation work in Xinjiang. There was a steady rise in food grain production, cash income and industrial yield. By 1965, industrial output increased to 636 million Yuan, which was 81 million Yuan in 1949. Saifuddin announced this phenomenal economic success as earth shaking (Benson and Svanberg 1998: 105).

The Cultural Revolution period (1966-69) witnessed global downturns in the regional economy. The Reformation under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping laid stress on the replacement of the cooperative framework by an open economy. The procedure of separation of government administration of the cooperative system in 1985 prompted the making of free markets. The policies on an economic restructuring of Xinjiang permitted the opening up of its economy to the outside world (Debata 2007: 114). It has expected that by the end of the third Five Year plan, China would be capable of producing all the machinery and equipment needed for further economic development in the country.

The Cultural Revolution and the power struggle proceeded and reached out in China during the period of the fourth Five Year Plan. Premier Zhou Enlai, who was in charge of economic management, focused on the following:

- The Open door policy, to improve China's economic relations with Western countries.
- Policy, encouraging the import of foreign technology for the modernization of China's agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defence (Liou 1998: 12).

The government additionally emphasised the need to develop the minority-dominated regions. In the fifth Five Year Plan (1976-1980s), government investment in capital construction for the western region was not all that noteworthy (Asian Development Bank 2002: 26).

In the sixth Five Year Plan (1981-85), the Chinese government gave special treatment to the coastal provinces in investment allocation, which brought about developing resulted in regional economic disparities. The circumstances additionally exacerbate when Premier Zhao Jiang announced in 1984 the nation's coastal belt as vital to China's economic development and asked Xinjiang and other backwards regions of the western part to wait till the 1990s for larger investments. (Yang 1990: 245).

In the sixth Five-Year Plan, China's distribution of productive force essentially focused on the improvement of economic returns and targeting regions with advantages.

Regarding the conveyance of the national capital investment, the percentage of the coastal area increased from 42.2 percent amid the Fifth Five Year Plan to 47 percent. The proportion allocated to Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang and Jiangxi expanded from 11.6 percent to 13.9 percent. This prejudicial state of mind of Chinese leadership was a reason for discontent among the minorities, who had been holding up to revive the reward of opening up programme in the country (Teiying 2011: 124).

During the sixth Five Year Plan, the focus was on economic construction and ensuring the implementation of particular policies which will practice in Guangdong and Fujian for the establishment of Special Economic Zones. This opening up of coastal cities laid the practical foundation for advancing the “theory of stratified development” as proposed in the seventh Five Year Plan and implementing an outward-looking economic strategy for coastal Areas (*ibid*)

The period from 1980 to 1990 most recent decade was the best time frame in the 40 years for the development of Xinjiang tourism, foreign trade and economic and technological cooperation with foreign countries. The international trade has grown for the most part, since the Sixth Five Year Plan. Besides the trade with Pakistan, developed trade with many countries and region in Asia, Africa, North America and Europe and step by step restored trade relations with the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. The total import and export increased amid the periodically added to the US \$240 million. There was an annual average increment of 36.1 percent, with trading, representing the US \$240 million (Dowamat 1993: 332).

Amid the Seventh Five Year Plan period (1986-90s), the Central government decided to allocate funds, as indicated by a region’s economic productivity performance. The geographical position, weak infrastructure, low educational levels and poorly developed light industry in the western part of the country made the region unfit for rapid economic development during this plan period (Beijing Review 1985: 7). Both the sixth (1981-85) and seventh Five Year Plans (1986-90) stressed on the qualification of various sets and levels of economic development levels in the coastal areas and the interior pockets. Despite the fact that in the seventh Plan, the interior part was additionally divided into central and western regions; while an expansive extent of the country’s

major industrial cities and each one of the four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were built on the coastal lines. In this manner, the goal was clearly expressed as to “speed up development of the coastal region, to put emphasis on energy and raw material constructed in the central area and to actively make arrangement for the further evolution of the western region.” Subsequently, minority dominated areas like Xinjiang got negligible government Investment (Loughlin and Panel 2001: 467-477; Christofferson 1993: 132-133). A noteworthy outcome of this coastal-oriented economic development plan was a disparity between the eastern and western regions of the country, which created a disintegrating influence on the national economy that was left alone in the circle. For example, Xinjiang had to consider and grow its economic plans (Zhao 2001: 200-2001).

During the seventh Five-Year Plan, the total import and export volume expanded by 130 percent from the previous Plan period, accomplishment US \$1.904 million and the development rate of import which the total US \$480 million was 100 percent (Dowamat 1993:332). The seventh Five-Year, following objectives were set to achieve socio-economic development Xinjiang. They were:

- To upgrade airport and air services in Xinjiang.
- To update the railway network in Xinjiang and to renovate existing rail route connection.
- To set up sugar refineries in Xinjiang.

During this plan, the goal allocated for the western region has focused on increasing agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and transportation. Also, it has additionally decided that the area of the West, particularly Xinjiang, should likewise grow in energy and mineral resources, the main thrust was on the development of coastal regions of China. The Western Province in China has relegated to the role of provider of mineral and Agro-raw material (Ferdinand 1995: 101-102).

The start of the 1990s was another period of economic development in Xinjiang. In the mid-1990s, Beijing set up Special Economic Zones in Xinjiang, provided subsidies

to local cotton farmers and repaired its tax system as a significant aspect of the economic development process. In August 1991, the government Xinjiang launched the Tarim Basin Project alongside the help of the World Bank going for expanding the agrarian production. While Beijing puts resources in the region's infrastructure, building a massive project like the Tarim desert highway and rail link to the western Xinjiang. The 1990s in this manner prompted an influx of immigrants with Han Chinese in specifically in the area. From the 1990s to 1995, there were more than one million inter-provincial migrants, who arrived up in Xinjiang for business purposes. The building of the railway network to Kashgar in 1999 additionally filled as a support to the Han for migrating into the internal parts (Debata 2007:111).

During the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-95) period, investment in the infrastructure rose from 7.3 billion Yuan to 16.5 billion Yuan, and the region's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) doubled. While in 1992, the total grain production had achieved 7.0 million tonnes, however, the total area of land for food cultivation had decreased to 60,000 hectares at this point. In 1993, the per capita income of the rural and pastoral residents increased to 780 Yuan. The Gross Domestic Product in Xinjiang, which was 11,200 million Yuan in 1985, rose to 220,000 million Yuan in 2004. Throughout the eighth and ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000) periods, Xinjiang got billions of Yuan as state grants and infrastructure investment (Debata 2007: 115).

These projects were a force of these projects was set to proceed with ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000). The Central government sets the aim of raising the living standards of 80 million people, through the provisions of infrastructure development, for example, roads, drinking water, electric supply and improvement in education (Tian 2004: 621). The development drive prompted a considerable increase over the ninth Five Year Plan (1996- 2000), which added to 254 billion Yuan. The essential ventures assigned as a part of Xinjiang's Campaign to open up the West, where the West to East natural gas pipeline and the far-reaching rehabilitation of the Tarim River was done (Becquelin 2004: 364).

During the tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001-2005), the state kept to expanding investment in the area's infrastructure construction, with a focus on developing local

water conservation, transportation and energy and telecommunication facilities. In 2000, more than 62 billion Yuan were put resources into the foundation of Xinjiang, an expansion of 40 billion Yuan, contrasted to the annual investment in the sector during 1990-1999 (Zi 2002: 25). As indicated by eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-2010), public infrastructure and ecological environment of Xinjiang was the primary focus, other than poverty and improvement in the standard of living of the minority people in the region. Significant measures were taken in the strategy, including optimisation of their economic structure, promotion of science and technology and training of more qualified professionals (Jinhua 2007: 20-21). China's State Council accepted the twelfth Five Year Plan (2011-2015) keeping in mind the end goals to limit the gap between the nation's built up coastal region and the underdeveloped western region. Mainly, the 12th plan aims at 12 backwards provinces: Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Guizhou and Yunnan (Pumin 2011: 24).

There have been outstanding accomplishments in the growth of the Xinjiang economy in the reformist era. While China's gross domestic product (GDP) has apparently developed at the extraordinary rate of 9.5 percent per year during the 1978-2000 periods, Xinjiang's GDP expanded even faster at 10.3 percent per year (Starr 2004: 164).

The thirteenth Five Year Plan followed the strategies and courses of action of the CCP Central Committee and aimed at improvement of standard and fulfills targets, tasks, and measures. Development of all the local governments figures in 13th Five Year Plan as indicated by to their particular conditions. Plan at all levels and for all philosophy of individual, coordinate, green, open and shared development, binding upsurge targets relating to the performance of government duties are the main objectives of this plan (The Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on October 29, 2015: 91).

4.6 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Beijing appears to be persuaded the Western Developments programme ought to concentrate on making better and conditions in the with an overwhelming focus on massive infrastructure improvement ventures (CRS Report for Congress 2001:5). Improvement in infrastructure is essential to Xinjiang's increasing speed of territorial improvement, while additionally being critical for the development of a unified and incorporated national economy. The Chinese government understanding the significance of this framework has in this manner raised ventures worth billions of dollars in XUAR, which cross-examines the territory with the far away regions. Since the change started, Xinjiang has created for itself a cross-shaped transportation network (expressway,s and railroad, aviation, and correspondence and pipeline courses (Macmillan 1984: 576; Zhao 2011: 21).

The establishing of new China opened a golden age for Xinjiang's correspondence. Presently Xinjiang has an evaluated exhaustive transportation organise and a post and telecommunication network connected with all parts of the country. The opening of a level one highways between Urumqi and Changjie, coordination with Global Parkway, the connecting of the second Eurasian Continental Bridge, and the operation of programme-controlled and automatic telephone equipment have reinforced the far-reaching association between Xinjiang, the hinterland and the world. Xinjiang's transportation and telecommunication have entered another phase of modernisation (Dowamat 1993: 204).

The Xinjiang transport, organise comprises in regards to railroads, roadways, carriers and after that pipeline. Xinjiang transportation has experienced floor-shaking changes (Dowamat 1993: 204).

The manufacture of the western segment of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway has been in progress since 1985. The entire line was done in the 1990s, connecting with railway within Kazakhstan. The route turned into the second Eurasian Continental Bridge, connecting Lianyungang in the east to Rotterdam in the west (Dowamat 1993: 216).The multi -track project between South Wuwei and West Urumqi stations on the

Lanzhou-Xinjiang was completed in 1995 (Dowamat 1993: 217). As indicated by the closing of the railway, experiencing southern and northern Xinjiang and the Lanzhou of the railroad in Xinjiang surpassed 3,000 km by 2008 (Warikoo 2009: 10-11).

Xinjiang's railroad construction has registered a remarkable development. In October 2008, the building of Lan (Lanzhou)-Xin (Xinjiang) other railway had started with a whole venture of 145 billion yuan. The time from Beijing to Urumqi by train was about 42 hours, which will be reduced to 11 or 12 hours. The number of airports in Xinjiang province increased from 14 to 17 in the year 2010 (Jianming: 151).

In 2010, railroad in Xinjiang, Jinghe-Yining-Horgos, Railways, was officially opened and put into passenger transport operation. On November 6, 2010, the construction of the Kashgar-Khotan Railway was completed. This train links ten counties and cities in southern Xinjiang and is called the “Line of Economic Revitalisation in Southern Xinjiang”. With the closing of the construction of the Jinghe-Yining-Horgos railway, Kuitun-Beitun railway, the northeast session of the Urumqi North-Dzungarian Basin rail, and the Kashgar-Khotan railway, the total mileage of electrified railway in Xinjiang is 733 km (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 119-120).

In 2011, total investment in railroad construction in Xinjiang was approximately RMB 11.6 billion. The Urumqi West-Alataw Shankou had electrified railways (some portion of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway) is open to traffic. The constructions of Kuqa West-Hobulak of Russian Railways is completed and open to traffic. The Horgos railways and the ports have linked to Kazakhstan Railways; Anbei-Liuyuan electrified railway (some portion of Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway) was advanced and open to traffic. The construction of the second line of Korla-Aksu railway, which has extended to Luntai, has been finished and opens to traffic. The structure of the second line Urumqi-Korla railway, which has stretched out to Zhenzhu Quan, has been completed and furthermore opens to traffic (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012:121). Before the end of 2011, the total length of the railroad in participation is 4,336 km. The total passenger traffic of trains in Xinjiang is 20,017,000 people, and the cargo of rails is 69,037,000 tonnes, 28.8 percent and 0.7 percent increase individually contrasted 2010 year (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 121). The Lanxin high-speed railway linking

Lanzhou and Urumqi is pushing the Silk Road. Economic Belt to boost commercial ties with countries in Central Asia (China Daily 27-28 December: 3).

Map: 5

3 New High-Speed Railways Launched in Xinjiang



Sources: China Daily (2014), “New high-speed railways reach Xinjiang”, *China Daily*, 27th -28th December, pp. 3.

- Lanzhou-Urumqi high-speed railway length 177 km and speed up to 250km in December 2014 (China Daily, 27-28 December 2014: 3).

Table: 4.7

Infrastructure Investment Climate

Geographical and Social condition	The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is situated in the northwest of China, bordering the Mongolian People's Republic, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and the Islamic Republic of Afganistan. Gansu Province is toward the East, and the Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province sit just on the opposite side of the Kunlun Mountains to the south. The area is the largest administrative division in Chian. Approximately 45 percent of the population is comprised of the Uyghur people, while 40 percent is Han Chinese.	
Resources Distribution	The region has the largest oil reserves in the country. This area additionally has the largest reserves of natural gas, third largest reserves of coal, and fourth largest reserves of chromium in China.	
Major Industries	Development and processing of oil and natural, along with agriculture.	
Infrastructure	Railways	The Lanxin Railways, Railways (Lanzhou - Urumqi) while the Kahe Railway (Kashgar-Hotan), etc. The first high-speed railway in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region the Lanxin Second Railway (Lanzhou-Urumqi), was begun a test run in August 2014 for this region's section.
Expressways	TheTurpan-Urumqi-Dahuangshan Expressway, Urumqi-Kuytun Expressway, etc. The Jingxin Expressway (Beijing-Urumqi) and the Akesu-Kashgar Expressway is under construction.	
	Airports	There are 16 airports in the region, incorporating those in Turpan, Kashgar, Aksu, Karamay, Ghulja, and Kumul, and also Urumqi Diwopu International Airport. Qiemo Airport is experiencing relocation, while the Hotan Airport is experiencing extension work from August

		2014. Likewise, extension work for Korla Airport and Kumul Airport is planned to begin by the end of 2014.
	Subway	Urumqi Subway Line1 is currently being built.
Transportation and Access	Rail	It takes approximately 45 hours from Urumqi to Shanghai and roughly 33 hours from Urumqi to Beijing.
	Air	There are consistent services from Urumqi Diwopu International Airport to different cities in Central Asia, including Bishkek (Kyrgyz Republic) and Ashgabat (Turkmenistan), and also Moscow (Russia) and Jeddah (Saudi Arabia).
Major Development Zones	National Development Zones	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Urumqi Economic and Technological Development Area. 2) Shihezi Economic and Technological Development Area. 3) Korla Economic and Technological Development Area. 4) Zhundong Economic and Technological Development Area. 5) Urumqi Ganquanbao Economic and Technological Development Area. 6) Wujiaqu Economic and Technological Development Area. 7) Xinjiang Kuytun- Dushanzi Economic and Technological Development Area. 8) Aral Economic and Technological Development Area. 9) Changji and New & Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone. 10) Urumqi New & Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone.

		11) Xinjiang Production and Construction Crops. Shihezi New & Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone.
	Regional-Level Development Zones	Urumqi Shuimogou Industry Park, Urumqi Toutunhe Industry Park, Xinjiang Shanshan Chemical Industry Park, etc.
Japanese Sister Prefectures	Cities/	None
Recent Topics	<p>1) In September 2014, Taiheiyu Cement Corporation announced that its Chinese Subsidiary, Taiheiyu Cement Investment Co., Ltd., had cancelled the joint enterprise contract signed with a local company in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Taiheiyu Cement Corporation explained that this is because the Chinese government has been strengthening its policy against the construction of new factories in industries with the excessive production capacity, including the cement industry, resulting in no prospects for government approvals or licenses for such business.</p> <p>2) A Pilot operation was started in August 2014 on the route is located in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region for the Lanxin Second Railway (Lanzhou City-Urumqi City), the first high-speed railway in the region. Full operation is due to start at the end of the year.</p> <p>3) The Aksu-Kasghar Expressway, which is the longest expressway in China, is now under construction. The Expressway is due to open at the of the by 2014. 4) In March 214, the construction of Urumqi Metro Line 1 was started.</p>	

Sources: Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Overview [Accessed on 30th March 2015] www.Mizhuobank.com/service/global/cndb/regions/pdf/R521-0014-XF-0104.pdf.

As indicated by the Xinjiang government work report, Xinjiang plan to invest 1.5 trillion Yuan is fixed in 2017, up to 50 percent year-on-year to advance nearby infrastructure, including, railway, airport, water resources, energy and communication, etc.(www.chinadaily.com/cn/buisness/2017_02/24/content_28335021.html).

a) Highway Transportation

In 1994, Xinjiang's total road distance, which achieved 17,875 miles, eight and a half times more than that was in 1949, are currently expanding to 21,875 miles. In 1995, the highways had connected 96 percent of Xinjiang's villages and town. During 1996-2000 periods, approximately 10.8 billion was had utilised for highway construction representing 63 percent of the total investment in Xinjiang's highway facilities since 1949 (Yusup 1996: 36).

With assistance from the World Bank, two noteworthy state-level roads, 177 miles of length Turpan-Urumqi-Dahuangshan highway and the 166-mile long Urumqi- Kuitun railroad were built. (Zhao 2001: 212) In 2008, Xinjiang finished eight National Highways, 66 inter-province roads and more than 600 region level roads of 14,700km (White Paper 2009). What's more, a highway connecting Lianyungang city on the east coast and Khorgos border port in Xinjiang is under construction. The long term target by 2020 is to develop and improve a Y-shaped highway from eastern Xinjiang, Central Urumqi and continue it on both the northern and southern sides of Xinjiang. Hami, Turpan and Urumqi will be on the east route, Changi-Kuitun-Wasu-Khorgas in the northern route and Urumqi-Korla-Aksu, Kashgar-Khunjerab in the southern route (Yusup 1996: 36 -38). The network of the three vertical and three horizontal highways will circle the Tarim Basin and the Dzungaria Basin, attach north and south Xinjiang by cutting over the Tianshan Mountain, and join the inland territories in the east and connection Central Asia and other neighbouring countries to the west. (Zhao 2011: 212).

Development of the roads and highway network has contributed the economic development of Xinjiang altogether. Road and highways are wide and intricately laid out with separate provision for pedestrians, two-wheelers and on each side of the roadway. The main road from Kashgar airport to the town is broad and well built in a way that an

aircraft can land on this path in case of emergency. The highway to Tashkurghan, Pamirs which passes from Kashgar to Kyrgyz stan is built and under constant repair. The huge trucks are working along this route to ship ferrous metallic mineral, stone from the mountains towards Kashgar and also to carry goods towards Tashkurghan. Another Express Highway that links Kashgar with Aksu is around 500 km long and passes through the desert and barren sand mountains. This National Highway joins Turpan with Khunjerab pass. This highway is in excellent state, aside from a couple of unpleasant fixes here brought except for a few rough patches here caused due to desert storm or overflowing water. The 200-km long Express Highway that links Urumqi with Turpan symbolises the condition of road infrastructure in the region and its takes just two and half hours to cover this expressway (Warikoo 2010:5-6).

The world’s construction desert high highway is

- Minfeng and Luntai roads and traverses the Taklimakan desert is so called “the Sea of Death” has been worked with a total length of 522 km;
- The Alaer-Hotan highway has collaborated with a length is 424 km (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 117).

Table: 4.8

Road & Railways Transportation in XUAR

Year	Length of Highways (km)	Length of Railways in Operation (km)	Freight Traffic (10,000 tonnes)	Passenger Traffic (10,000 people)
2006	112277	2925	40839	34476
2007	145219	2925	44354.52	38378
2008	147000	2925	56554.01	42110.86
2009	150700	3180.7	52033.14	30347.53
2010	152900	4393.3	48542.83	32458.01
2011	154900	4336	62880.3	51351.7

Note: The Length of highway includes the highways of the Construction Corps after the year 1999.

Sources: The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012, pp. 118

Together with the national highway No. 314 and No. 315, they shaped the fundamental communication lines for expensive transportation in Southern Xinjiang. In 2011, several of key projects, including Korla-Kuqa highway was finished and open to traffic. In 2011, the total passenger traffic highway was 559.65 million tonnes, representing 89 percent of the total cargo traffic in Xinjiang. Xinjiang has built the multi- worldwide highway transportation line for both cargo and passenger. No. 107, represents roughly half of the total number of China's present international highway transportation in Xinjiang (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 118).

In 2014, 175,500 km of the highway was open to the movement of which 4,316 were Expressway, five times more than in 2009. Xinjiang held 12th place among all province-level administrative divisions in China from the 27th in 2009. A total of 135,000 km of roads served the traffic in rural areas, connecting 99.93 percent of the town and 98.71 percent of an administrative village. (www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinalic/2015_12/01/content/22596237.html). They have turned into a primary force in the region's transportation industry and will unavoidably significantly affect the economic construction and social development in Xinjiang.

b) Civil Aviation Sector

By 1993, there were 15 domestic routes opened from Urumqi to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Dunhuang, Harbin, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Dailian, Hangdou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shenyang, Guilin and Wenzhou. The route from Urumqi to Xiamen by means Xi'an, a distance of 4,238 km, is the longest through route in China. A regional network has been formed with Urumqi as the center connecting with 15 huge and medium-size cities and 11 prefectures, cities and countries (Dowamat1993: 220).

Xinjiang has the longest air routes and most terminals in China. In 2010, the total mileage of civil aviation was 177,000 km. Presently, Xinjiang has 22 airports in operation and has turned into the region having the most number of regional airports in China. The international air routes connect Istanbul of (Turkey), Almaty of (Kazakhstan), Tashkent

(Uzbekistan) and Bishkek of (Kyrgyzstan), Novosibirsk and Moscow and Islamabad in (Pakistan) (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 122).

The total range of air traffic control zone is over 2 million square kilometres, the largest air traffic zone in China. In 2011, the total number of passengers took care of by the Xinjiang Airports Group is 14,230,000, and it saw a 21.6 percent increase. The total volume of cargoes and mail is 116,000 tonnes and 14.7 percent. Presently, 29 airlines have regular flights to Xinjiang, and 141 air routes are in the standard procedure. In 2011, Xinjiang airport operationalised nine new regional air routes. There are three new international and three recently helped Xinjiang air routes, which have been opened in 21 countries, 31 international cities, and 52 domestic cities flights from Urumqi (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 122). By 2014, it had in operation 16 civil airports, and 115 air routes are totalling 16,000 km. (www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinalic/2015_12/01/content/22596237.htm)

From January to November (2014), Xinjiang has 238,000 civil flights and saw an increase of over 20 million passengers and 163,000 tonnes of freight and mail which has risen up to 20.5 percent, 9.8 percent and 8.8 percent (http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-12/21/content_19134430.htm).

In 2015, the airport in the Xinjiang transported a total 25.36 million passengers, up by 15.7 percent year over. Urumqi Airport works flight to 17 countries, 27 international (regional) cities and 62 domestic cities. Presently, Xinjiang has 18 civil transport, airports, the highest in China (www.caac.gov.cn/XWZX/201603/t20160318_29938.html).

4.7 POST AND TELECOMMUNICATION

The post and telecommunication industry has seen fast development. A total current communication system has been set up, made out of the programme controlled trade, fiber optical communication, digital microwave as well as satellite and mobile communication (White Paper 2009). Telecommunication has seen huge where large development. The operation of the optical fiber cables, Xinjiang telephone, fax and other telecommunication services have moved forward. The important Shanghai-Frankfurt

Eurasian optical fiber through Xinjiang is completed. In 1996, Xinjiang had the largest optical fiber networks in China (Zhao 2011: 211).

The improvement of telecommunication facilities in Xinjiang has kept pace with the national system. Xinjiang has manufactured digital microwave trunk circuits connecting Urumqi with Ili through Kuytun and Bole, connecting Kuytun with Altay through Karamay, and from Turpan to Khotan through Korla and Aksu and Kashi digital microwave communication interface Urumqi with Xian, Lanzhou, Yinning, Khorgas checkpoint, Turpan, Korla, Ruoqiang and Mangya. Direct Distance Dialing (DDD) telephone networks now connect the in Xinjiang with all other parts of China. The member of phone subscribers have reached the total of 2.626 million. A mobile phone network with a limit of 2.942 million users is currently set up over the entire area (White Paper 2003).

In 2010, Xinjiang had 1,370 postal officers in altogether. The length of the postal route is 140,900 km. Xinjiang can access by postal communication to anywhere in China and also 200 countries and region around the world. In 2011, the total volume of postal services RMB 1.149 billion, 27.8 percent decrease on a year ago (The Facts and Figure on Xinjiang, China 2012: 127).

Xinjiang brings long distance digital transmission network, programme telephone network, digital, meeting video network, digital data network, language information network, all of which formed modern communication network linking Xinjiang with another part of China. By 2011, the optical cables are 28,915 km in all out the length. Some fixed telephone subscribers achieved 6.12 million, and the mobile phone subscriber came to 5.31 million. Tianshan network website of Xinjiang government new Silk Road net is built. The e-government is making steady growth in 15 autonomous prefectures, autonomous prefectures, 13 departments of Xinjiang government and 26 regions have done their public information websites. The number of subscribers of the Internet has increased to 1.06 million (Online: <http://www.english.mof.com.cn/around china/>).

4.8 OIL AND NATURAL GAS PIPELINES

Pipeline transportation has assumed a major part and turn into a vital method for petroleum and gas export. Of late, the conveying limit of the pipeline in Xinjiang has expanded fundamentally. The separation, transport remove has increased quickly. At present, the total length of pipeline in Xinjiang is more than 8,000 km. Xinjiang is the area with the longest pipeline in China (The Fact and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 122-123). The China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, from Atasu town of east Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan to Alashankou (Alataw Shankou)) port with a total length of 962.2 km, has been built with an annual limit of 20 million tonnes (The Fact and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 122-123).

The west to East natural gas pipeline from Lunnan in the Tarim Basin in Shanghai widening 4,200 km at the cost of 15 billion US dollars (Debata 2007: 189). The pipeline was completed in three years in two phases. The primary stage from Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Gas Field had completed in 2002 and the second phase of the pipeline from Lunnan in the Tarim Basin to Jingbian was completed in 2003. This pipeline has been transmitting natural gas from the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang straight to the Yangtze River Delta in the east (Ning 2000: 13). The production of crude oil increased from 18,484 million tonnes in 2000 to 27,151 million tonnes in 2008. Natural gas generation increased from 3.539 billion cubic meters in 2000 to 23.589 billion cubic meters in 2008. It is turning into the second biggest natural gas production area in China from the year 2006 (Jianming 2016: 152). In 2011, the total volume of crude oil transportation via Alataw Shankou port petroleum pipeline was more than ten million tonnes. China's first international natural gas pipeline, Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China natural gas pipeline with the total length of 7,000 km. Earlier the end of 2011, the total volume of gas imported from Horgus is 19.683 billion cubic meters (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 123).

a) Xinjiang-Shanghai Pipeline:

China has dug 52 deep wells in Xinjiang's Tarim Basin and from eight of China's fourteen oil fields and the Tarim Basin and that 20 million tonnes of oil have been

extracted. China at present sits on 10.7 billion tonnes of crude oil and 8.4 trillion cubic meters of natural gas in Xinjiang (CRS Report 2001: 4-5).

b) Uzbekistan to China's Xinjiang Oil Pipeline

China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC), Signed to an agreement with Uzbekistan to put \$20 million in oil and gas exploration throughout the following five years. Beijing and Ashgabat signed to a General Arrangement on Building a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China on 3rd April 2006. Article two of the understanding states that "The Chinese party will buy 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas every year from Turkmenistan at the Turkmenistan outskirts more than 30 years, beginning from extending that would convey gas supplies from Turkmenistan to China using Uzbekistan." Furthermore, China is squeezing ahead with the development of the railroad line connecting Uzbekistan, and China's Xinjiang Province use Kyrgyzstan. This country showed China's political and economic duties regarding guarantee oil and gas supply from the Central Asian Republics (Dweidi 2006: 148).

c) Russian investment in Oil pipeline in Xinjiang

. Russia has made an agreement with China to construct, develop a \$30 billion oil pipeline through China's restive Xinjiang province. (Daly 2014: Online <http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Russia-India-Plannin>).

The Pipeline could enter the Xinjiang territory in China at Altay, climb the Tianshan Mountain and outside southward to the Kunlun Mountain in India. India's ONGC has proposed another energy interstate to build a Russia-China-India through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, to Kashgar in China's Xinjiang. It could enter India using Ladkha, crossing the Siachen glaciers and the India-China line of Control or on the other hand through Himachal Pradesh to supply gas to north India. The proposed pipeline would reach out finished a to a high degree long extent of shifted landscape, and the investigation demonstrated that development of the pipeline might cost some place up to \$15 billion, or marginally less it associated with officially operating a pipeline (Kundu 2016).

4.9 TOURISM

Xinjiang has precious and unique tourist resources of Xinjiang, including exotic natural landscapes, historical relics, and colourful ethnic cultures and folk customs. Xinjiang has an enormous potential for tourism development. Now, tourism has become the new regional economic growth point and one of the competitive industries with a lot of development potential (The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China 2012: 149).

According to the classification of “Criterion of General Investigation of Tourism Resources in China”, Xinjiang has all the six categories of tourism resources completely. Well, known scenic and historical interests include Heavenly Lake, Bosteng Lake, the ruin of Loulan and Gaocheng ancient city (<http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article>). Keeping in view the tourism potential of the region, the Chinese leadership in Xinjiang has tried to make it a major tourist hub in the country. By 2006-2007, the number of domestic tourists, including tourists from Taiwan and Hong Kong, to Xinjiang exceeded 10 million each year. There have also been about 250,000 foreign visitors to Xinjiang annual (Debata 2007: 190).

Tourism sector earned jumped 16.9 percent to 67.3 billion Yuan (\$10.9 per billion) in 2014, accounting for more than 8 per cent of regional GDP. A record number of 52 million tourists visited Xinjiang in 2014. A target had set for 13 per cent more tourists and 23 more revenue, with the aim of more than 100 billion Yuan in revenue by 2015 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/china). The development of tourism has promoted the production and sale of tourist products with distinctive features of minority ethnic groups and growth of local handicraft directly or indirectly producing hundreds of thousands of jobs per household (White Paper 2009).

Table: 4.9**Foreign Exchange Earning International Tourism by Region**
(USD million)

Year	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012
Xinjiang	74.36	100.94	94.94	186.42	465.19	550.57

Sources: Chin Statistical Yearbook 2013, pp. 658.

Table: 4.10**Number of Overseas Visitors in Xinjiang (10,000 person)**

Year	2000 (total foreigner)	2005 (total foreigner)	2010 (total foreigner)	2011 (total foreigner)	2012 (total foreigner)
Xinjiang	25.61-20.84	33.11-29.01	50.94-45.44	56.37-48.77	62.49-49.02

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2013, pp. 659.

Table: 4.11**Tourism in Xinjiang**

Xinjiang	Number of domestic visitors (million)	Income generated (RBM bn)	Number of Oversea visitors (million)	Foreign exchange visitor (USD\$)
Year (2015)	59.3	98.5	1.68	607.8
Percentage change	23.5	59.1	13.3	22.3

Sources: "Xinjiang Gateway to Central Asia Market", [Online: Web], Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Research-Articles/Xinjiang-gateway-to-Central-Asia-s-markets>.

4.10 RAPID DEVELOPMENT IN XINJIANG

Notwithstanding, Xinjiang's rapid development in recent years it has failed to stay aware of whatever is left of the nation and has even fallen behind different provinces and regions in west China. In 2009, Xinjiang Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 8.1 percent year on year, yet at the same time lower than the country's average, which was 8.7 percent. Xinjiang's per capita GDP was just \$2,917 in 2009 as contrasted to the state's average of 3,679 US dollars in 2009. It's urban and rural residents per capita annual incomes were lower than the national level as well (Shujun 2010: 26-27). Yu Shujun proposes that the Chinese government should push forward its economic, political, cultural and social development in Xinjiang to accomplish a prosperous society in Xinjiang by 2020. According to him,

“By 2015, Xinjiang's per capita GDP should make up with the nation's average level, and resident's income and access to vital public facilities should achieve the average level of China's western region. Development must have accomplished in Xinjiang's infrastructure facilities, self-development capability in the following five years. It's resource advantage had exchanged to actual economic strength. Industries with economic power and local characteristics should be propped up. Agriculture production capacity should expand. The development framework should be set up, and Hi-tech industries are promoted. Xinjiang's tourism industry deserves a boost. State investment in this area is a genuine need, which should give more support for transportation, infrastructure facilities and projects that specifically advantageous for local people. Social capital was more likely than not used in the open administration services sectors and significant public welfare projects. Public services should be improved. All levels of education had developed. Social security and assistance system need to be built. Xinjiang should be urged to coordinate with other regions to open up to the outside world. The Central Government, the partnering regions and alongside increased income from the asset tax change must be utilised to enhance people's living standards and production condition. Exploration and extraction of resources should directly benefit the local population. More occupations had been made, and more endeavours should be taken to alleviate poverty and poverty should be eliminated by 2020” (Shujun 2010: 28).

As an essential step in such manner, the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that the Central Government has decided to launch a series of supportive policies for Xinjiang to accelerate the area's economic and social development. The policies are a pilot reform on assets in Xinjiang, such as crude oil and natural gas. Xinjiang government and the XPCC will enjoy preference in getting Central government aids. There will be investments in the fixed assets of the region over the five-year period (2011-2015) which will double the investment in the past five years. Commercial banks will be urged to open outlets in remote areas. The commercial bank and the foreign bank will be welcome to set up branches in Xinjiang. Social development, with an emphasis on enhancing people's prosperity, should be advanced. Infrastructure construction should be improved. Industries with local advantage and local characteristics should be forcefully developed (Shujun 2010: 29).

Besides, the Central Government has allotted eight most economically advanced provinces and urban areas to specifically aid three counties in the southern part of Xinjiang. Thus, an established province like Guangdong and Shenzhen donated 9.6 billion Yuan for local education and public service facilities in Kashgar in between 2005 and 2010 (Yong 2010: 47-48). The then governor of Xinjiang Ismail Tiliwaldi expressed in a public interview on 12th April 2004 that the XUAR has possessed the capacity to build up trade relations with 108 domestic and also a foreign company from more than 30 nations (Debata 2007: 190).

4.11 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Xinjiang is rich in abundant agricultural resources (White Paper 2009). In the late 1990s, a whole farmland irrigation network in Xinjiang was shaped to help the operation of the agrarian development. In 2001, the total power yield of farm machinery came to 8,808,800 kW the net value of chemical plant foods utilised for the farmer was 832,900 tonnes, and rural energy consumption totalled 2.45 billion KWH. The total yield of grain texture, cotton, and sugar beet was 7.96 million tonnes, 1.57 million tonnes and 4.55 million tonnes separately, which is 5.4 times, 6.25 times and 4,551.2 times individually that of the production in 1955. Xinjiang area has nearly 35 million livestock by 2000 (White paper 2003). Present animal husbandry has accelerated development, and it now

represents 27 percent of local agricultural production costs. Xinjiang is China's largest manufacturers of cotton and producing about one-third of the total cotton in the state. In 2011, Xinjiang harvested 11,707 million lots of grain, ensuring its food security, as well as getting the region an important grain producer in the country (Ying 2011: 18). In 2012, Xinjiang was a noteworthy agricultural base for essential industries. It has represented for 17.6 per cent of GDP in 2012 (Online web: www.china-trade-research.hktdc.com/buisness-news article).

Xinjiang has around 1.22 million hectares of orchards (White Paper 2009) Grape production has prompted the advancement of the processing industry with different grape-processing enterprises been set up including that of Loulan wine. The regions planted with Grape vineyards were developed to obtain 42 percent of Turpan's total arable land, and 14,000 hectares have yielded grapes (Jianhua 2002: 18-19). The advantage of Xinjiang's rapid development is apparent in Teak village, Tekas Darga County. Situated in the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, the village produces fruit likes apple and apricot with a yearly income of 105,000 Yuan to 120,000 Yuan (\$ 16,155 to \$ 223, 07). Around 80 percent of the village's apple was sold to Central Asian countries. (Ying 2011: 18). Hami melons, Hotan jojoba and Korla pears are other exportable fruits found in galore in the regions.

Agriculture is a principal industry for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which keep on building large scale farm profits. In 2013, it grew 1.47 million metric tonnes of cotton, which represented about 23.3 percent of the national total. Alongside that, water- management company operating close by the Corps has explored different avenues regarding drip- irrigation technique to plant rice on dry farmland bringing about higher yields than traditional planting methods. The new technology was yet widely used across Xinjiang in 2015 (Gao Bo 2014: 6).

4.12 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

In the mid-1980s, Xinjiang had officially created industries which extended from ferrous and non-ferrous metal. The crude and refined oil, natural gas, coal, electric power, petroleum, chemical, machinery, electronics, building material, food processing, wool,

silk, textiles, sugar, cement, steel, mini-tractors, harvesters, electric transformers, sewing machines, chemical fertilisers, leather and paper pulp. The sequence of making joint ventures begun in 1980 and around 32 MoU was signed with foreign-funded ventures in Xinjiang by 1986. (Dai 1986: 23). The industrial landscape of Xinjiang has totally changed with the technological restoration in the old industries and foundation of technologically advanced industries. In 2000, in Xinjiang, mineral extraction massive extractives sector constituted 61 percent of the industrial share of the GDP (Wiemer 2004: 174)

The extraction of petroleum resources has been considered as one of the main economic activities for the future development of Xinjiang. In the year 1989, hundreds of professionals worked in the oil fields of Xinjiang accomplishing a noteworthy achievement in advancing investigation, drilling and production techniques (Li 1995: 10-13). The gas fields such as Lunnan, Tazhong, Yining, Hetianhe and Tahe in Tarim Basin, Huoshaoshan, Shanxi, Cainan and Beitai in the Dzungar Basin, Shanshan, Qiuling, Baka, and Mideng in the Turpan-Hami Basin and some smaller basins like Yanqi and Santanghu have been extracted. As indicated by to the third National Resources Estimation Report, Xinjiang's total oil and natural gas reserve are around 20.92 billion tonnes and 10,790 billion cubic meters respectively.

While in the 1990s, crude oil production in Xinjiang crossed the limit of 10 million tonnes, while in 2001 production was 19.47 million tonnes, constituting 12 percent of total domestic production. The Ninth Five Year Plan prompted the rapid development of crude oil processing industries. In 2001, the region's production of refined oil achieved 10.14 million tonnes, covering 5 percent of the total refined oil production in China. In 2001, the total output value of petroleum and petrochemical industry in the area was around 24 billion Yuan (Dorian et.al 1997:471). The building of a 4,000 km long pipeline from Lunnan to Shanghai via Jingbian in the Shaanxi province in mid-2000 came up as a part of a long-term plan to link this pipeline with major oil and gas producing regions of Kazakhstan and Russia (Ogutcu 2002: 154).

In spite of the fact that Xinjiang is a noteworthy base agriculture, and primary industry sector represented 19.8 percent of GDP in 2010. Karamay, Urumqi, and


Bayangol are the major industrial centres in Xinjiang, representing 70.2 percent of the gross industrial output in 2010. Oil and petrochemical, food and beverage, textiles, metallurgy, building material, and electric power are the pillar industries in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang industrial structure has always been balancing and enhanced. Primary, secondary and tertiary industries accounted for 19.4 percent, 42.4 percent and 38.2 percent of the GDP in 2001 individually (White Paper 2003). In 2008, primary, secondary and tertiary industries represented 16.4 percent, 49.75 percent and 33.9 percent of the provincial GDP respectively (White Paper 2009). In 2011, the investment in primary, secondary and tertiary industries was 679.2, 13,226.3 and 16,287.7 billion Yuan individually (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011).

In 2012, Urumqi, Karamay, and Ili, are the major industrial centers in Xinjiang, it was accounted for about 60 percent of the industrial output. Oil, petrochemical, electric power production, metallurgy, chemicals and food processing are among the pillar industries in Xinjiang regions (Online web: www.china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news article).

4.13 ROLE OF PRIVATE SECTOR IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Xinjiang's economy varies mainly from that of China's coastal areas, where the individual segment represents more than 70 percent of the national GDP (Harlen 2009: 408-409). Like another Western province in China, Xinjiang remote area has hindered foreign trade and investment until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Instead, the Central government depended on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) an inactivated branch of the People's Liberation Army to recover land to set up large-scale cultivating (Harlen 2009: 407-408).

Figure: 4.3
Change in employment by type of ownership, Xinjiang: 2000-2006



China Statistical Yearbook 2007, NBS 2008 (Table 5-2, 5-13, and 5-14). Accessed on 5th April 2017, [Online Web], URL:<http://www.eps.revues.org/3772#article-3772>.

Notwithstanding, the massive control of the state over Xinjiang’s economy, the amount of producing a unit in the private area has consistently improved over the most recent years. Private enterprises rose from 3,251 to 5,099 from 2001-2004, and self-employed units (under eight representatives) increased from 643,000 to 742,000 during the same period. Some employed persons in private and independent likewise flourished with the foundation of new initiatives (Figure) (Harlen 2009: 208). A few expensive privately- owned enterprises from eastern China have set up branches in Xinjiang (Zhao 2001:218). The Local governments now effectively encouraged the development of Xinjiang by the medium enterprise, through a tax break and additionally giving preferential tax policies for foreign-funded enterprises (Harlen 2009: 208-209) (Weimer 2004: 179).

With declining work in the state and collective sectors, the private sectors will be relied upon to assimilate surplus worker and migrants in Xinjiang. In any case, while the

Private sector on XUAR keeps on developing, economic development has been focused in the industrialised, Urban- North at the expense of Rural South (Harlen 2009: 208-209).

4.14 ROLE OF XINJIANG PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION CORPSs (XPCC)

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC, or Bingtuan) was established in 1954 to adjust the ethnic makeup of the population in Xinjiang and confirm Beijing's control (Yong 2010: 46). Otherwise known as the Bingtuan, the XPCC is entrusted with the duty to develop agricultural in the area through cultivation, other than guarding the Chinese border at whatever point required (O' Neill 2004: 12-15). Initially, built up by the demobilised Kuomintang and PLA soldiers by 2004 the XPCC had developed into an agency composed of 2.5 million members, 88 percent of which are Han, being administered by the State Council (Becquelin 2004: 360). In the late 1960s, there were eight XPCC units in northern Xinjiang and four in the south with a total number of 500,000 men. The XPCC was a well sorted out workforce with the following purposes:

- strengthening long-term and sustainable national defence.
- supplying military labour for investigation and the improvement of state resources in the border areas.
- Bolstering border resistance militarily and politically.
- Solving the problems of unemployment for resigned and dismissed the soldiers.
- Engaging, educated youth to turn away social issue, and creating new prospects to utilise the workforce resources (Chaudhari 2016: 72).

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the XPCC was broken up in March 1975. After Deng Xiaoping, as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission visited Shihezi in 1981, chose to reestablish the XPCC as an essential force to bring about Xinjiang stability (China Daily 2014: 6). Significantly, the XPCC was initially approved

to discover land, garrison the frontier region with Central Asia, and also to possess strategic border areas and transportation corridors along the area of Xinjiang. In the 1990s, the XPCC has proceeded with this cycle of establishing cities and garrisons to encourage settlement and to exercise rule over the frontier regions (Gaubatz 1995: 76). With the adjustment in the international and regional front, the XPCC obtained the part of protecting Xinjiang from internal threats, for example, ethnic-nationalist discontent (Becqueline 2004: 366). Indeed, even without its new order to defend against internal threats and its part in the “Go West Campaign”, the XPCC has an impact on the internal organisation of Xinjiang. (Becquelin 2004: 367).

The Central government trusted the XPCC for the obligation and the duty of cultivating and guarding the border regions. As the largest element of Xinjiang’s general land reclamation framework, (others are the agricultural structures under provincial government and farms under the PLA. It has handled the administrative and judicial affairs in the reclamation of the PRC and XUAR (White Paper 2003: 20).

The XPCC dispatched more than 17,000 officials and labours to the regions for the support of social order and additionally get the farmland and livestock of those that had left. A belt of regimental farms along more than 2,000 km of the border area as emergency militia battalions as a measure for rapid reaction to terrorist activities. (China Daily, 15th October 2014: 6).

The Deputy Commander of the Corps, Chen, Jiazhu said that:

“The XPCC is not an armed force, but it certainly has the power to maintain social stability. Everyone performs different production tasks. When we required for missions, we must be ready. The Corps aims to become a top militia force in China and stabilise Xinjiang. We could achieve what the army cannot, which is to stay permanently in Xinjiang and build it as our home” (China Daily, 15th October 2014: 5).

In 1998, the XPCC was given bureaucratic status equal to that of the Xinjiang provincial government. The special paramilitary force now covers a territory of 70,600 square km and handles its own administrative and judicial affairs under army division and regiments (China Daily, 15th October 2014: 6). As per the law and regulation of the

state and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and with the economic planning supervised by the state, XPCC handles its administration and judicial affairs while reclaiming regions under its administration. The XPCC has 14 division reclamation area, 174 regimental agriculture and 4,391 stock breeding farms, XPCC minds in industrial, construction, transport and commercial enterprise and well-run social undertakings covering scientific research, education, culture, health, sports, finance and insurances as well as judiciary organs. The total population of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is, 2,453,600, including 933,000 workers (White Paper 2003). By 2013, the corps had 14 divisions and 176 regiments, and its 2.7 members represented for about 12 percent of Xinjiang's total population. (China Daily, 15th October 2014: 6). In 2014, the XPCC had had under it 14 divisions included of 176 regiments and was exercising jurisdiction over the territory of 70,600 square km blowing a total population of 2,732,900 (White Paper 2015).

The Corps economic activities within Xinjiang are additionally massive with the Corps leading 174 agricultural and animal husbandry regiments farm, and more than 427 commercial and industrial enterprises. In the center, the Corps functions like a State-owned enterprise (SOE), with a significant portion of the identity issues such as low productivity, an ageing workforce, an inability to compete adequately with private industry, and depending upon central government assets of its financial budget (Becquelin 2004: 84-86). However, the XPCC's role as the first player in the "Go West Campaign" is laudable. The Corps' land reclamation activities, capacity to attract migrants from interior China and also demobilised soldiers, and consolidation of regional control through municipalities administered by it, such as Shihezi, gel well with the primary objectives of the Go West Campaign. It has reflected through the XPCC's association with the Tarim River Rehabilitation Project, a unique segment of the campaign in Xinjiang, and also the XPCC's increasing involvement in construction, infrastructure, and the extraction of energy sources which are all openly stated in the Campaign. Applicability of the Campaign in Xinjiang is likewise revolving around XPCC strongholds in the north, for example, Shihezi. It has been observed that the "future of the Corps is the most fundamental question regarding the stability and development of Xinjiang" (Ma 2002:7).

The XPCC'S activities have added to an influx of Han migrants under a policy of 'mixed sand' or *Chan Shazi*. To settle Han migrants in regions that have large concentrations of the minority population. It fixed with the prevalence of Han cadre 52 percent and few minority leaders at the country level and above 13. 7 per cent weakened the impact of minority groups such as Uyghurs in Xinjiang and gave other groups, including the Han, person's disproportionate authority in the governance of Xinjiang (Zhang 1998: 115-117).

Before the end of 2009, the XPCC had 412,800 people working in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, the food and beverage sector, fisheries. The XPCC's agricultural development presented a real growth in the first half of 2010. The quantity of land for spring harvests was 1.05 million hectares, which was an increase of 0.7 percent from 2009. Cotton was planted in 467,513 hectares, an increase of 0.4 percent over 2009. Grain plantation was 266,960 acres. The summer grain yield was 1.02 million tonnes. There was a noteworthy increment in few crops. Beet production saw an increase of 27.2 percent, tomatoes 10.9 percent and peppers 24 percent. In 2010, the amount of XPCC's livestock grew 13.1 percent, and milk output was up by 10.2 percent, egg by 4.7 percent and wool by 20.7 percent. (China Daily, 15th July 2012, China daily).

In 2004, XPCC's trade accounted for 38 percent of total Sino- Central trade. XPCC's exchange flows are impossible because this body is a government institution, independent from Xinjiang's regional government and with military and politically impartial. XPCC counterparts in Central Asia are principally Chambers of Commerce or Official Business Organization. XPCC dependably introduce its product amid trade fairs sorted out to grow trade amongst China and Central Asia (Raballand and Andresy 2007: 244-245). In 2005, it started pairing-assistance to the four prefectures and the three divisions under the XPCC in southern Xinjiang. In 2007, it broadcast the opinions of the State Council on Further Boosting Xinjiang's Economic and Social Development. (White Paper 2015).

Map: 6

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

HEADQUARTER LOCATIONS OF THE 14 DIVISIONS OF XINJIANG PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION CORPS



Sources: Jai, Cui and Gao Bo (2014), “From Soldiers to Farmers”, *China Daily*, October 15, 2014, p.6.

Maintaining the national interests as it owns interests and general situation of Xinjiang, its foremost concern, the XPCC has remained a vital force in building Xinjiang and conveying benefits to people of all its ethnic groups, and also in protecting national unification and keeping stability in Xinjiang (White Paper 2015).

The Western Development Programme, despite its novelty as per the Chinese claim, has been seen by the Uyghurs as another Chinese bulwark to cut the Uyghurs to size economically. It has not up to the expectation of each of the Uyghur ethnic people, rather has contributed to further discontent among them against the Chinese. The Uyghur reactions to this economic initiative undertaken by the Chinese Central government will be examined in the forthcoming chapter with greater details.

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER V

UYGHUR RESPONSE TO CHINESE MINORITY POLICY

5.1 UYGHUR RESPONSE CHINA MINORITY POLICY DRING MAO ERA

Chinese policy toward minorities, be it during the Mao period or the Post- Mao period till date, has not found any taker among the national minorities. The ethnic people have not forgotten the excesses done during two and half decades of Mao rules. The policies during Great Leap Period and Cultural revolution may have satisfied the Mao's desire the strengthen China but invited dissent and discontent of the ethnic minority groups, especially Uyghur and Tibetans. Some hope among the ethnic people was generated when Deng Xioping and his predecessors took up the initiative to rectify Mao's policies and usher in minority-friendly policies. However, it could not satisfy the needs and inspiration of ethnic people because the Uyghur and Tibetans dubbed these policies as Chinese bid to control minorities in a much-sophisticated manner by offering lullabies in the form of Preferential policy, of which western Development Programme has been part and parcel. Hence, the Uyghur discontent against Mao refurbished with a similar tone and tenor. The Uyghurs used both peaceful and violent mens against the Chinese Central government.

5.2 RESPONSE AFTER WESTERN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

The response after western development programme may divide into two the following:

- a) Peaceful Means and;
- b) Violent Means

A) PEACEFUL MEANS

a) Protest, Strikes and Demonstrations

The Mao period, Nationalist dissent by Uyghurs began in the 1980s and 1981. At that point when a riot happened in Kashgar, many Uyghurs were arrested and were executed. (Sautman 2000: 245).

The 1980s, widespread discontent with Chinese policies in Xinjiang. The depth and the spread of disappointment have been noticeable in the measure of dissent group, and incidents of protest have snowballed rapidly regardless of Beijing's best attempts to pacify the minorities. The protest and riots additionally demonstrate the foundation of the discontent. The slogans have been shouted or written on placards and banners at these mass social affairs, giving story confirmation that the particularities of the arrangement of self-governance have invited Uyghurs and worsened the conflict (Bovingdon 2004: 6).

In 1981, after the trial of a Han youth blamed for killing an Uyghur in the fight, a major riot broke out in the street of Kashgar, and participants gave slogans against Hans, and the Han government called the "Republic of Uyghuristan.". After four years, the rejection of a popular Uyghur governor invited another major demonstration. On December 1985, Ismayil Ahmad was expelled from his post as chairperson of the Xinjiang government and kicked upstairs to Beijing to head the Minzu Affairs Commission (*Minwei*). As the news of Ahmad spread, Uyghur students at Xinjiang University boycotted classes, and a few thousand marched in the street of Urumqi to condemn the move, protesting that Ahmad had removed for demanding that all Uyghur should get work before more Hans were permitted to run. The Slogans at the dissent included "Han out of Xinjiang" and "Independence, freedom and sovereignty of Xinjiang" (Bovingdon 2004: 7).

The demonstrators gave the slogans like, "Establish a Kazakh state", "End Communist Rule in Xinjiang", "Long Live Uyghur Xinjiang. (Dillon, 2004, p. 69) Their demands included an end to Chinese rule in Ghulja region and its incorporation into Kazakhstan. In towns like Zhaosu and Gongliu, local residents ransacked the local government offices and looted vehicles and ammunitions from police stations. There

were armed attacks on the government vehicles and offices, as well as looting and arson in the Tekes town on 25 April 1995. After the local security officials had failed to control the situation, the military units from Ghulja and Bole were deployed immediately and clamped curfew on the entire Zhaosu town on 25 April 1995. Reports say as many as 220 people were killed or injured, over 80 suspected vandals arrested and over 8,500 rounds of ammunition fired (*ibid*)

In the 1980s, riots and unrest by ethnic minorities occurred in Tibet and Xinjiang at regular intervals. There were tensions between these ethnic minorities and different minorities in these regions, including the Han, Lai 2009: 77).

In 1985, Xinjiang was opened to global exchange and tourism and for a long time could properly work new soft policies permitting Uyghur to construct mosques, composed historical studies of the people, and re-privatize their property (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004: 307-308). In 1985, students Urumqi against Beijing's imposition aimed to extend "China's one-child policy for non-Han people and criticised the exploration of Xinjiang mineral resources (Dillion 2004: 60).

In 1985, Uyghur student protested against the nuclear test. About 1000 individuals likewise joined the Lop Nor test site in 1993. The People Liberation of Army had to step in to control the mob (Dillion 2004: 60, 155) In 1988, Uyghur student in Beijing demanded of Minzu human rights. With the Tiananmen protests of 1989, China backtracked on its soft policies that advanced ethnic autonomy. It received hard policies that considered all types of dissent or protest as change over endeavours by Islamic fundamentalist to overthrow the government. The unintentional significance of China's hard policies was to create more dissent among its Muslim population, particularly the youth. Hard policies were and are utilised to smoke out Uyghur upholding autonomy, plotting armed attacks, or just demonstrating dissent against the Chinese (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004: 307-308).

The Uyghur student protest in Beijing and Urumqi in 1988 against radical insults, and the annihilation of the Xinjiang Party Office in 1989. Muslim challenge in Qinghai, Gansu and Shaanxi in 1989 against the infringement. The book entitled '*Sexual Custom*'.

The students said the book they were protesting, "Sexual Customs," has a section that refers to the architecture of a mosque as a phallic symbol and other sexual references. They demanded that the Government punish the authors, who wrote the book under pseudo names, and the Shanghai publishing company that first released the book in March 1989 (Lai 2009: 77). The book compared the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca as 'homosexual orgies and sodomy with camels (Kilgour 2006: 24). The dissenters have likewise guaranteed on the few occasions that official policies have bridged Uyghur's right or failed to estimate discrimination (Kilgour 2006: 24).

Afterwards, the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989 established that the party would not acknowledge any protest, regardless of the possibility that peaceful vanished. These are just served to enhance Uyghur hostility to the regime. Protest, Violence, the organisation of Uyghur separatist and the harshness of the Chinese response all expanded in the 1990s (Kilgour 2006: 24). Finally, the protest raised the greater part of the issue said above. The Barren uprising in April 1990 started with a dissent in a mosque. An issue like Family Planning, weapons, testing and oil exploitation enraged the Uyghurs, and their protest turned into violent riots with a call for Jihad and overthrow of commission (Bovingdon 2004: 8).

In 1995, there was a spate of protests in northwest Xinjiang. Communist control in the district and autonomous state for Qazaqs and Uyghurs. There are reports that no less than 50,000 individuals were had taken an interest in these protests, and that 100,000 participated in strikes . in Ghulja (Yining) exhibits in early February 1997, one thousand protestors yelled that they would expel Han and cut off relation with the Chinese government (Bovindon 2004: 7).

Some protests in Xinjiang have focused on policies representing religion and the treatment of Muslims. Students in major protests in both in both 1988 and 1989 challenged the distribution of books they trusted dis-paragraphed Uyghur, kazakhs and Islam; they are likewise requested more broad regard for their way of life and religion. In Khotan in 1995 hundred part took part in riots after the rejection by Hans of a famous Muslim priest giving subversive sermons. During the 1997 Ghulja uprising, protestors marching behind a banner printed with the Islamic Shahada announced defiantly they

would carry in prison for the rights to follow of this religion responsibly, and this was called to “Establish an Islamic caliphate” (Bovingdon 2004: 7-8).

The majority of visible Uyghur political activity got to be distinctly separatist in nature. January 1990 separated the shutting down of all Quranic schools by the Chinese government in Xinjiang cities. While protests occurred a short time later when a gathering was unleashing attack against government structure in Southern Xinjiang was stopped. As their strategy broadly known all through Islamic circles, hundred of protester showed outside of the government building. Taking after events, several Uyghur, and Kazakhs were killed by Chinese forces (Enright 2014: 37).

Taking there was a number of bombing in southern Xinjiang all through 1991 and 1992. As indicated to Millward, “from 1990 to 1995 security forces apparently gathered together more than one hundred ‘separatist counter-revolutionary organisations, illegal groups and reactionary gangs’, arresting 1,831 people” In spite great deal of arrests, the most of the dissents by the Uyghurs individual amid this period was in 1995 (Millward 2009: 328).

The year 1996 witnessed the persecution of several Uyghur political activities. These attempted murders just energised great turmoil in Xinjiang. The agitation aggregated into the second biggest protest of present-day Xinjiang in 1997. While the PRC portrayed the protest as a massive riot, Uyghur depicted the occasions in an unexpected way and blamed restrictive passed by the central government (Enright 2014: 37-38).

Though the year 1994 was relatively calm with stray cases of violence, the simmering discontent continued and spread like a virus into the adjacent areas of the Baren Township. The most affected were Ili, which is close to Xinjiang's border with Kazakhstan. Between 22 to 24 April 1995, as many as 50, 000 people organised massive rallies and demonstrations in the Monggoljure (Zhaosu), Tekes, Kunes (Xinyuan), Qapqal, Gongliu and Nilka towns around the Ili city. There were armed attacks on the government vehicles and offices, as well as looting and arson in Nilka and Qapqal areas on 22 April followed by demonstrations on 23 April and strikes on 24 April 1995. They

even cut off water, electricity and gas connections. (Ibid, pp. 68-69) On 24 April, as many as hundred thousands people including workers, teachers and shopkeepers carrying placards and banners containing anti-Chinese slogans protested against the local authorities (Debata 2001: 166).

Baren Township in Aksu country came into prominence in April 1990, when Uyghurs launched an attack against the Hans (Lai 2009: 75) The protest in Khotan in Xinjiang 1995, small armed attack in Aksu in 1996, fight amongst Uyghur and Officials in Urumqi in 1996 aggravation and Ghulja in April 1995 riots in the city in February and April 1997 (Lai 2009: 75-76). were other attacks

In April 1995, there were nine protests in northwest Xinjiang. There are reports that no less than 50,000 people took part in these protests, and that 100,000 participated in the strike (Bovingdon 2004: 7). A Turkish report started that some Muslim women were offering prayers in a private house when they were arrested. Another view was that the riots started when police attempt to stop two Uyghur religious school student towards the end of Ramadan. The Yining riots to the begin about the ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ was launched in April 1996 led the arrest of 57,000 Uyghurs. The reason where Han demographic dominance, inhumane birth control policy, and job discrimination (M Vicziany 2003: 252). The reaction to police meditation during Ramadan in the form of demonstration by 100 protestors on 5 February 1997. The police endeavour to disperse the crowd brought about an increased clash and a riot in the 6 February 1997 during which no nine people were killed and 200 injured. A few Uyghur sources assert that 100 Uyghur were killed. A moment episode happened in Ili in response to a ‘public sentence rally’ of 30 Uyghur leaders on 24 April 1997, who were blamed for including riots of 5-6 February 1997. There are 30 were executed instantly. Around 100 families and relative of the sentenced men attempted to either speak to them or rescue them from the trucks used to transport them. In another incident in Ili in July 1997, 9 people were executed (M Vicziany 2003: 251).

The tension increased in Xinjiang in 2001 and forcefully since public protests transformed brutal violence into 2009. The rally in 2009 was themselves a reaction to serve government policies in Xinjiang. The hundreds of Uyghur arrested for either

supporting terrorism or endangering state security (R. Rudolph. 2015: 109). An Act of brutality has without a doubt expanded in Xinjiang in the course of the most recent decade, back in government straightforwardness and control of information. when the protest erupted in Xinjiang in July 2009, internet connection had been cut and not reestablished until right on time in 2010, and the unknown writer has banned from the region (*ibid*).

Around, the 5th July violence, the government endeavored to detach Xinjiang by removing the Internet, text messaging services, and international calls. A Xinjiang immense Web had set up, which at first had just a single web address accessible as the government run Tianshanan. The serving of inter-provincial lines of communication was incredibly destructive to business and social life, bringing on complex a huge number of Yuan of lost income for Xinjiang-based business both substantial and little and making far-reaching hatred among the population. These interruptions had confined inside the talk of securitisation as a given up that was important to prevent law breakers understood to mean Uyghur, arranging further occurrence of a brutal criminal action (Cliff 2012: 92).

The main reason for the Internet power outage in Xinjiang was government fear of Han criticism and talk mongering more than fear of Uyghur violence. All of a sudden, after the 5th July revolt, a coordinated hostile to the story campaign launched a slogan ‘don’t believe the rumour, don’t spread a rumour, don’t start rumours’, trust the gathering. It has clarified to the public population that the punishment for spreading the news was 5-10 days in prison. In a decade, the top central propaganda official Wang Chen visited Xinjiang and at a meeting with the provincial leader and media personnel, emphasised the media’s fundamental part in managing the recent assessment by transmitting the visitor voice of the Party, government, and the masses (*ibid*).

On 5th July 2009 in Urumqi, an Uyghur protest erupted into revolting and Han-Uyghur ethnic violence for a couple of days and result in about 200 death, more than 1500 injured, and the massive property was damaged (Culperpper 2012: 198).

The imminent Party Secretary, Zhang Chunxian conveyed to him any state capital investment, subsidies and preferential policies went from taking an intrigue

Xinjiang into whatever stay in China and profiting, and along these lines assuaging the Han population (*ibid*). Authorities in Beijing and Urumqi have rejected public protests as the work of a few malcontents, yet the joined record of clear and incognito resistance recommend rather that the majority of the Uyghurs are miserable with the arrangement of autonomy and the course of administrative issues (Bovingdon 2004: 9). Most big issues that Zhang Chunxian did when he took office were to reconnect Xinjiang at the similar level of Internet service as whatever has left of China. The re-opening the Internet must be Zhang's benefit it served to recognise him from his disliked predecessor and was intended to demonstrate that he was in control, that he was conveying Xinjiang back on the way to certain solidity, and that he was consequently not anxious about opening lines of communication. On the first anniversary of 7/5, he made an obviously casual voyage through Xinjiang going down to ground level and taking to the healthiest individuals to strengthen that signal (Cliff 2012: 99).

Zhang Chunxian utilised the reputation created by his micro-blogging for encouraging favourable treatment of people appeals by local officials, suggesting an acknowledge of the general population accord that Xinjiang official, particularly local official, had been slow to respond to people's need. Along these line needs of 'Internet Card' was one of the first of a progression of instruments went to helping Zhang to set up his claim to be a good and able leader having the middle support and the best interest of the people at heart. Consistently positive reviews in the nearby and national media have kept on actually expressing this idea to the Han open Xinjiang (*ibid*).

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is one of the more outrageous Uyghur gatherings. A sign that ETIM is an uncommon worry for Chinese experts went ahead 15 Dec.2003 as the PRC Ministry of Public Security issued surprisingly a most needed rundown of individuals named East Turkistan fears based oppressor including 11 names having a place with four separatist gatherings all based abroad. ETIM was unmistakable in the rundown. The service's announcement said that in recent years ETIM had set up no less than ten fear based oppressors preparing camps.

It affirmed that before the finish of 1999 it had more than 1000 individuals and had amassed 5.000 anti-tank projectiles. The development was blamed for sorting out a

progression of thefts and murders in Xinjiang in 1999 which left six persons dead. The service said the association had gotten a few million US dollars from Osama Bin Laden. It likewise charged the gathering raising cash by sneaking medications and weapons, hijacking, extorting and burglary. Chinese portrayal of ETIM as a fear based oppressor assemble is however not restrictive. In 2002, the organisation of U.S. President George W. Shrub solidified the gathering's U.S. resources. On 26 August 2002, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reported that Washington had set the East Turkistan Islamic Movement on the U.S. rundown of militant psychological associations. The gathering "conferred demonstrations of savagery against unarmed regular citizens with no respect for who was harmed," he said. Despite the fact that ETIM has traditionally centered around Chinese focuses on, the American organisation clarified that it might have had plans likewise to assault American interests. The State Department said development individuals endeavoured to attack the U.S. government office in Kyrgyzstan's capital, Bishkek, and also different U.S. interests abroad. In May 2002, two people were expelled to China for the plot. The gathering was not put on the best need rundown of psychological oppressor associations yet rather on, the more great unrest of groups subject to budgetary assets. State Department authorities clarified that they took a harder line on account of important new proof that the ETIM has monetary connects to al-Qa'ida and has focused on American interests abroad. In any case, to Uyghur separatist, who have felt intensely disillusioned by the move in U.S. approach on Xinjiang. This may have rather showed up as an undeniable offered for nearer relations with China, which came at the season of vital UN Security Council transactions over a determination on Iraq and before Chinese President Jiang Zemin's planned October 2002 visit to President Bush's Texas farm. Outside Xinjiang, ETIM cells are said to be working in Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan (Online article: Giglio <http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/giglio.pdf>).

US presence in Central Asia since the independence of the five republics, 9/11 terrorist strikes in US, the subsequent US-led campaign in Afghanistan and creation of US military bases in Central Asia made China apprehensive of threats to its security in Xinjiang and also about the challenge to political, economic and strategic influence in neighbouring Central Asia. To counter such an imminent threat, China understood that

meaningful relationship with the Central Asian Republics particularly Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan would augur well for its economic, security and military interests in the region. China has used to keep these countries very close to her through the means of its most important security mechanism - Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. China's initiative in setting up the SCO is a manifestation of its positive efforts to develop a stable regional environment for economic development in Xinjiang as well as of its fears that the three "evil forces" (separatism, extremism and splittism) might affect Xinjiang. (Starr, 2004, p. I 8).

b) Cyber Separatism

Segments of the Uyghur diaspora, especially of the one settled in the Western nations, are occupied with a backing for the Uyghurs' separatist activities. Their exercises were nearly observed by China, which charges that their advancement of the East Turkistan cause goes well past the basic ideological help to trespass into the criminal activities Uyghur living in Turkey, the United States, and Germany are dynamic in coordinating Uyghur publicity and in the light of the limitations postured by China to handle work in Xinjiang. Their action seems, by all accounts, to be for the most part restricted to online activists and has subsequently has been proclaimed as a vocal, yet moderately un-viable 'cyber-separatism.' (Online: <http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/giglio.pdf>).

Since in Xinjiang political resistance in the public domain is prohibited, it is affirmed of cultural realms, and alongside embracing a westernised language of democracy, a new democracy of Uyghur finds a political chance of resistance in the cyberspace. The YouTube video recording turned into another medium of the soft or non-violent channel of resistances against the Chinese videos recording by the Uyghurs on YouTube fills in as political communication, and implanted the case of Uyghur Nationalism and the history of the Han-Uyghur ethnic relations (Matteo Vergani and Dennis Zuev 2003: 84).

The term Chinese state media utilised to refer to the website of new media outlets, sponsored by the CCP or the state bureaucracy. The term Uyghur diaspora online group used to apply to the member of the Uyghur diaspora who takes an interest on the

Uyghur diaspora website or in the organisation that keep up this site Culpepper 2012: 190).

A website's impact has considered both a component of how well known the site is the web index comes about whether it adds to nationalist rivalry by asking response from another the s side. For example, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) website ([www. Uygur Congress.org](http://www.UygurCongress.org)) has straightforwardly changed by Chinese government authorities, Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, and other state media of organising and coordinating separatist and terrorist activities in XUAR from abroad. Other Uyghur diaspora websites broke down in this review include incorporating the 'Uyghur American Association' (UAA) (Culpepper 2012:190).

The Chinese state media websites that broke down this review incorporated includes www.XinhuaNet.com, www.ChianDaily.com.cn, www.TrueXinjiang.com, and official government websites; www.Xinjiang.gov.cn and www.Gov.cn. An Uyghur diaspora website frequently gives connections to these websites or Newsfeed is running reports from these sites on a regular basis provides links to these locations, accordingly, adding to the communications and culmination of Chinese and Uyghur nationalism. Uyghur diaspora sites challenge Chinese government sites, instead of Chinese intellectuals, the China opens or another section of Chinese society (*ibid*).

However, Chinese authorities have taken stock of the cyber activities of Uyghur and thus have brought new strict cyber laws. The Article 40 of the 2009 Internet rules prohibits anybody from utilising the Internet to:

- Endanger state security or harm national and social interest;
- Destroy ethnic solidarity, inflame racial separatism or threaten social stability;
- Jeopardise the safety of the Internet and information system;
- Violate intellectual property rights, trade secrets, or the lawful rights and interests of individual privacy, citizens, corporations, or another group.

- Furnish, produce or disseminate false or harmful information. Create or spread information that is obscene, pornographic, violent terrorist, homicidal or that instigate crime; and
- Carry out different acts prohibited by laws and regulation. Those who engage in the most intolerable crime against the state might face criminal prosecution. Otherwise, they may face fines ranging between 3,000 RMB (approximately \$480 USD) to 30,000 RMB (roughly \$ 4,850 USD) for organization or 200 RMB (approximately \$30USD) to 3,000 RMB (approximately \$485 USD) for individuals (Famularo 2015: 4).

In 2014 Internet ruling went one step ahead and about new structures in the matter of state security and combatting the three evil force. According to Article 6. made the following rulings to brought a person to justice if he (Famularo 2015: 4).

- Opposes the fundamental principle of the constitution or slander the law and regulation of the Constitution
- Harms the national honour and interests, endanger state security, divulges state secrets, subverting state power or undermine national religion religious policies, or promote cults and feudal superstition.
- Manufacturers or spreads rumours disturb in public order or threaten social stability.
- Disseminates violent terrorist ideology or violent terrorist audio-visual materials, or covers, manufactures or uses explosive devices, fire arms, control equipment, hazardous material, and other violent terrorist criminal methods and technical abilities.
- Incites violence to endanger the lives of others as well as public and private property.
- Spreads obscene or pornographic, gamble or abet the crime.

- Insults or slanders others or harms the legitimate rights and interests of another, and
- carries out different acts prohibited by laws and regulation. Xinjiang Daily, which published the rules, includes no information regarding potential fines for transgressors (Famularo 2015: 4).

About the ownership and dissemination of denied religious publication and audio-visual materials, 2015 XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations stipulates higher fines for transgressions. In Article 40 prohibits any materials that

- Undermine national unity, social stability, economic development or scientific and technological progress.
- Incite ethnic hatred, instigate ethnic discrimination, or undermine national unity. Promote ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism.
- Affect religious harmony, or cause strife among various religious or internally within a religion, and disseminating such materials via the Internet, mobile phones, or other digital platforms. Finally, Article 62 describes the punishment for any transgression, which includes possible fines ranging between 5,000 RMB (approximately \$ 800 USD) and 30,000 RMB (approximately \$4850 USD) (Famularo 2015: 4).

5.3 ROLE AND RESPONSE OF UYGHUR DIASPORA

The word diaspora belongs from two Greek words ‘DIA’ which means through ‘and’ ‘superior’ means ‘scatter’. Steven Vert over examined three meanings of the diaspora in its human shape with an accentuation on a group’s intra-relationship regardless of dispersal, whether for intended purposes behind by forced migration. These social relationships to history and geography, play out in a political introduction and economic strategies. The second significance lies in the orientation of a diasporic consciousness, a particular sort of mindfulness said to be produced among contemporary, transitional groups. The diasporic consciousness knows about its multi-region, constituted by a negative encounter with discrimination and avoidance and positive experience through

identification proof with one's legacy. The third comprehension of diaspora is through its made of cultural creation joined with grants in hybridity and new ethnicities (Tian Guang and Debata 2010: 62).

The Uyghur diaspora constitutes a sizeable population in a few nations around the world such as the Central Asian Republics, Turkey, United State, Canada, Australia and the European countries like Germany and England. It kept up the nearby contact among themselves, with the kith and kin around the world, incorporating relatives back home in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It's believed that roughly 500,000 lived abroad, adding up to around 5-6 percent of the total World Uyghur population of 15 million (Guang and Debata 2010: 66).

The Uyghur, who have settled abroad, migrated from the north-west region of Xinjiang as the People's Republic of China. The Uyghur's emigration from Xinjiang has a long history. Uyghur had moved from China in waves. In the mid-1930s after the first and the Eastern Turkistan Republic collapsed, Uyghur moved to Turkey and Saudi Arabia, a few hundred of Uyghur, who gone Xinjiang in late 1949 after the communists took over China first in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and afterwards moved to Turkey where they set up Uyghur Diaspora organisation with Ankara's support (Guang and Debata 2010: 66-67).

Later Deng Xiaoping launched changes and the Open Door Policy in the late 1970s. More Uyghur could leave Xinjiang and, since the 1980s, a couple of thousands of them settled various parts of the world. In any case, some of them with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began migrating to developed nations in Europe and America in the mid-1990s. Because of the restrictions by the Chinese authorities, the Uyghurs now first went to the Central Asian countries, Turkey, Germany and from there, they moved to the United States of America. Uyghur living abroad are presently delighted with their social, cultural and historical heritage (Guang and Debata 2010: 67).

5.4 Role of World Uyghur Congress and American Uyghur Congress

➤ World Uyghur Congress (WUC)

The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) is an International organisation that represents to the aggregate enthusiasm of the Uyghur individuals both in East Turkestan and abroad. WUC was established on April 16, 2004, in Munich, Germany after the East Turkestan National Congress and the World Uyghur Youth Congress converged into one joined the association. The first target of the WUC is to advance the privilege of the Uyghur individuals to utilise reasonable, peaceful, and democratic means to decide the political future of East Turkestan. On the second General Assembly of WUC which held in Munich, from November 24 to 27, 2006, all representatives have chosen Ms. Rebiya Kadeer the pioneer of the Uyghur National Movement and the Spiritual Mother of Uyghur people, as the leader of the WUC. Before Ms. Rebiya Kadeer is chosen as the leader of the WUC, she established the “Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation” and headed. “The Uyghur American Association” situated in Washington DC. She was likewise the achiever of Rafto Prize and the nominee for 2005-2006-2007-2008 Noble Peace Prize. For a long time, she spent her life in the notorious Chinese jail. After her discharge, she has been applying all her vitality to battle for flexibility, vote based system and human rights of the Uyghur individuals. For her incredible work, she is entitled as “The Leader and The Spiritual Mother of Uyghur’s” (World Uyghur Congress Report 2009: 3).

On the main General Assembly of WUC in 2004 Mr. Erkin Alptekin was chosen as a president. He had first WUC to its second General Assembly in 2006. Mr. Alptekin is a former general secretary of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) situated in The Hague, the Netherlands. He has a surprising background in working with worldwide associations and governments in campaigning for the Uyghur individual's entitlement to self-determination. He is additionally a close companion of the Dalai Lama, profound pioneer of the Tibetan people. WUC is a democratic association. All of the WUC democratically elected by the members from everywhere throughout the world in the General Assembly. They all serve a three-year term. WUC has close contacts and working relations with most Uyghur associations on the planet that gently advance the

human rights, religious freedom, and majority rules system for the Uyghur individuals in East Turkestan (World Uyghur Congress Report 2009: 3).

➤ **Uyghur American Association (UAA)**

The Uyghur American Association (UAA) has been mainly instrumental in internationalising the Uyghur cause. As a noticeable diaspora association of the Uyghurs in the United States, UAA is situated in Washington DC. As a non-political non-benefit and deliberate affiliation, it acts as an umbrella organisation for the Uyghurs living in various parts of the United States and Canada. It sets up religious celebrations, social party, cultural events and takes an interest in the social existence of the neighbourhood group as illustrative of the Uyghur culture. The UAA has embraced the Uyghur Human Rights Project with a specific end goal to discover the possibility towards enhancing human rights states of their group (Debata 2007: 175).

The Uyghur American Association (UAA) keeps on endeavouring to be an essential issue of all Uyghurs in sustaining and advancing the Uyghur cause, their legacy and culture through gatherings. A little group of young Uyghur experts had sorted out a business symposium in 2004, where they set forth their grievances before Congressmen and also human rights activists from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The UAA, through its bulletin and different instructive projects, has been attempting to enhance the correspondence and communication between Uyghur people in Xinjiang and America and bridging the gap between Uyghurs everywhere throughout the world and in Xinjiang. Uyghur American Association (UAA) was mainly instrumental in internationalising the Rebiya Kadeer issue. The Chinese specialists discharged Rebiya Kadeer in April 2005 (Debata 2007: 175).

c) Violent Uyghur Attack in China in the post 9/11 period till 2014

As indicated by Zhang and Mcghee has outlined violent Uyghurs attacks in China in the post 9/11 period to till 2014

Prior to 9/11, no terrorist incident, domestic or transnational, resulted in more than 500 casualties. On 18th July 2011, 18 suspects attacked the local police station in

Hotan City, where no less than two police officials and two women were killed, with four others injured; 14 suspects were shot dead, and four suspects have caught. On 19th August 2010, an Uyghur bomber attacked a nearby joint patrol group, with no less than seven killed and 14 injured. On 28th December 2011, 14 suspects hijacked two hostages in Pi Shan Country of Hotan City. Police shot dead, seven suspects, injured four arrested, while one police official had killed, and one was injured. On 30th July and 31st July 2011, six suspects independently attacked Han People in Kashgar, leaving 19 dead and 43 injured. On 28th February 2012, in Ye Cheng Country of Kashgar, seven suspects attacked local people with Knife and 15 people had killed, and two suspects were caught. On 29th June 2012, a group of Uyghur endeavoured to hijack a flight in Tianjin; no casualties have announced, and all suspects were caught. On 1st October 2012, an Uyghur suicide bomber attacked a base of armed police in Kashgar, with more than 20 casualties (Unreported by Chinese media). On 23rd April 2013, 14 suspects attacked local police in Ba Chu Country of Kashgar; 21 people killed, including 15 police officials and six suspects were caught. On 26th June 2013, no less than 35 people had killed when “Knife-wielding thugs” attacked a police station in the Shanshan Country in Turpan prefecture, including nine police officials and ten suspects. On 28th June 2013, up to 100 people on a motorbike attacked a police station in Hotan. On 1st March 2014, eight Knife-wielding Uyghur men and women attacked passenger at Kunming railway station, leaving 29 civilians dead and more than 140 others injured.

Beijing has tried to use the International community's worry over Islamic extremism of the Al Qaeda assortment to decrease the response of its treatment of Uyghur dissent in Xinjiang. In this respect, Beijing was separately successful with the US State Department position on the 'East Turkistan Islamic Movement' (ETIM) (Mackerras 2009:138-140).

Notwithstanding, from 2003 onward, this strategy went bad, as Washington started to endeavour to rebalance its usual worries to advance and secure human rights in China with the emergencies of the ‘war on terror.’ This rebalancing was best affected Washington's treatment of the Uyghur at Guantanamo Bay and in its rhetorical bolster for Uyghur Human right issues. The primary indications of this rebalancing came in the last

months of 2003 when the Bush administration declined to recognise China's crackdown of Uyghur 'terrorist administration'. The equivocation was additionally underlined in 2004 when the controversy broke out in the US over the destiny of the Uyghurs detained at Guantanamo. Secretary of State Colin Powell is proclaiming in August 2004 that Washington would not repatriate them to China the occasion of their because of worries about their possible treatment. Indeed, in May 2006 when five of the twenty-two Uyghurs held at Guantanamo Bay were executed because of concerns about their feasible treatment (Clarke 2011: 156-157). In May 2006 five of the twenty-two Uyghurs held at Guantanamo Bay were discharged, they were not repatriated to China but instead conceded haven in Albania, advancing a quick strategic challenge by China to Tirana and Washington. Regardless of this, the Bush organisation kept up that the seventeen remaining Uyghurs were, in fact, enemy combatants and should not be discharged. However, in late 2008 a Washington DC circuit judge decided that the rest of the Uyghurs should to be liberated and resettled in the US, a result that the Bush administration declined an acknowledge. It has therefore risen out of case mounted against the US government by various law firms representing. the Uyghur detained the Bush administration had, in fact, be told, as early as 2003, designated some of them as 'non-enemy combatant.' These discharge, however, is hindered when the USA re-characterized them in 2005 as 'no longer enemy combatants,' in this way implicitly advocating their proceeded with confinement on the premise that they had sooner or later in the past been 'enemy combatants' (Clarke 2011:157).

Beyond the Uyghur detainee issue itself, the Bush administration moved more toward the US general concern in regards to the privilege of ethnic and religious minorities in China. This step, as reflected in various Uyghur related improvements.

- First, in 2004 the National Endowment for Democracy, the government gave US\$ 75,000 yearly subsidising to the Uyghur American Association (UAA), an administration that advances autonomy for 'East Turkistan,' much to the disappointment of Beijing.
- Second, President George W. Hedge actually met with Rebiya Kadeer in Prague in June 2007 and commended her as a 'human rights defender', while going to the

inauguration of the 2008 Beijing Olympics Bush likewise made direct reference to the Uyghurs and Tibetans in a discourse praising the tenth anniversary of the US Congress passing the 'International Religious Freedom Act'. Under the Obama administration, the profile of the Uyghur issue has kept on ascending because of various components. The Obama administration, much like its ancestor, had needed to think about the issue of the rest of the Uyghur prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. In May 2009, the Obama administration intended to discharge and resettle the rest of the Uyghur detainees in Virginia as, similar to its ancestor, it couldn't induce third nations, for example, Germany, Sweden or Australia to acknowledge the previous Guantanamo prisoners.

- This Plan fell victim to US local governmental issues as Republicans seized on it, for instance, of Obama's delicate position on terrorism with a specific end goal to score hit on the administration. This plan may be helped for the Obama administration gave that the disdain of Uyghur detainees in the US would have without a doubt be seen in Beijing as a slap in the face (Clarke 2011: 157).

d) Post 9/11 Situation

Following the 9/11 event, the U.S. attack on the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, and foundation of U.S. Army military base in the Central Asian republics. The circumstance of the Uyghurs has received uncommon consideration in university and research organisation settings and even say by the U.S. Vice President on one of the Sunday morning news appears. This slow development of attention to Xinjiang's issues over the previous decade has given journalists and other outside observers the feeling that separatist unrest and savage incident have themselves been raising along a relative, consistently upward direction toward an emergency point today. The sudden 180-degree move in official Chinese depictions of the circumstance in Xinjiang in September 2001, as we should see, has bolstered this impression, as has the U.S. emergency attitude on worldwide terrorism following the attack on New York's World Trade Center. Indeed, in any case, the violent outbreak in Xinjiang have happened in bunches. Notwithstanding, the less large scale incident in the 1990s was preferred promoted over those of the 1980s, they were not greater or additionally threatening to the state. There have been,

additionally, few incident of anti-state violence, no significant scale since mid-1998 (Milward 2004: 11).

Xinjiang experts started talking about the violence in Xinjiang straightforwardly in the late 1990s. In March 1999, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Governor Abdulahat Abdurishit (Abdurixit). He asserted that there had been a significant number of blasts, deaths, and incidents in the 1990s; around a similar time, internal party records guaranteed 380 fatalities from the grave incident in 1998 alone and 100 casualties from twenty-seven incident in the first months of 1999. In inviting Chinese and international trade partners to the Urumqi exchange reasonable on September 2, 2001 (Milward 2004: 10-11).

The Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan together with Abdulahat Abdurishit declared that the circumstance in Xinjiang was better than anyone might have expected ever. While specifying Separatism, they focused on that society is steady and individuals are living and working in peace and happiness. After two weeks, the official line on Xinjiang's stability reserved again. Following the September 11 Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States, official PRC professions started to stretch the threat of terrorism in Xinjiang as China's administration moved to position itself one next to the other with the United States in the war against dread. This apparently required an amendment of the official depiction of separatists in Xinjiang region. What had, for the most part, depicted as a modest bunch of separatists was presently a full-blown terrorist organisation. While frequently translated basically as a PRC push to pick up cover for its progressing crackdown in Xinjiang. This move should likewise found in the large set of U.S.- China relations since the coming to the energy of the Bush organisation, which right off the bat had scandalously described China as a strategic competitor with the United States. Situating itself as a partner in the "war on terror" has helped Beijing warm its relatively crisp relations with Washington (Milward 2004: 11). On January 21, 2002, the Information Office of the People's Republic of China (PRC) State Council discharged a record titled 'East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity' that gave a list of violent acts allegedly dedicated by separatist gatherings in Xinjiang. It likewise specifies a few associations in suggested partnership with the incident on the list

(*ibid*). The PRC's 2002 report is not as much as precise in its treatment of terrorists or separatist organisations. In spite of the fact that it says a few, it does as such in scattered references all through the archive. Also, the record in the two its Chinese and English adaptations depends every now and again on such dubious, nonspecific terms as the East Turkistan terrorist organisation, which it mixes mistaken for references to special gatherings, a considerable lot of which likewise have East Turkistan in their names. Since in Chinese the compound "Dongtu" (East Turkistan) is utilised both in a generic sense, for all East Turkistan groups, and as a particular contraction for any name starting with East Turkistan. The result is ambiguity about whether a given demonstration was conferred by a particular group known to uphold a separatist line. For example, the East Turkistan Liberation Organization, or ETLO or by unknown perpetrators whom the author of the document claim, without providing the evidence, to be East Turkistan separatists (Milward 2004: 13).

The U.S. government has sadly enhanced the wrong impressions passed on by the PRC's 2002 archive on East Turkistan terrorist. At the point when in August 2002 the U.S. international haven in Beijing reported the assignment of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organisation related to Al Qaeda. Its announcement received a significant part of the dialect of the PRC archive and blamed ETIM particularly for more than two hundred demonstrations of terrorism bringing about 162 passings and 440 wounds. In throwing the declaration in these terms, the U.S. representative in this way ascribed to ETIM particular all the violent incident of the previous decade in Xinjiang that the PRC report it faults just on the anonymous group or on ETLO. PRC press reports resulting to Washington's declaration exploited the U.S. blunder by announcing that the United States had assigned the East Turkistan Movement that is, all groups upholding autonomy, even quiet ones to be terrorist (*ibid*).

The mixed up thought that a unifies anti- American and anti-Chinese organisation, ETIM, is mainly responsible for the violence in Xinjiang is ending up plainly part of the tried and true way of thinking in the area through redundancy in press records and research organisation pieces. In December 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security discharged an official rundown of terrorist organisation containing the

names of four groups, including ETIM and ETLO, and also the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) and the East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) of Xinjiang. The initial two groups figure conspicuously in the January 2002 record; the last two don't show up by any means (Milward 2004:14).

B)VIOLENT MEANS

a) Rise of Radical Islam

Radical Islam has changed the first importance of Islam and has turned into a matter of incredible concern nowadays. Radical Islam has spread into Xinjiang because of freedom of religious practices and regular communication with the outside Muslim world. It is additionally difficult to disregard the actualities like the development of autonomous Muslim Central Asian Republics, which filled in as an assurance supporter for the radicalisation of Uyghur Muslims. The causes behind the restoration of Uyghur nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s were the opening up of border as a feature of the economic change programme, China's liberal policies permitting religious and cultural freedom, the rise of radical Islam and Han influx. Also, linkages with Pakistan, Turkey and Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang's expanding cross-border exchange with neighbouring Muslim countries have brought about more prominent preparation and the affirmation by the Muslims of Xinjiang on ethnic and religious lines. Enhancing contacts with the Middle East provoked them to criticise Islamic practices at home and presented China's Muslims to new radical Islamic standards (Debata 2007: 147).

b) Violent Separatism

By the mid 21 century, East Turkistan strengths had apparently been occupied with no less than two hundred Violent terrorist assaults, having executed 162 individuals and injured more than 440. Between 1992 and 1997, more than thirty 'East Turkistan Terrorist Organisation' were apparently revealed in Xinjiang and 'hundred terrorists' were caught, and many, executed. Since 1997, the Eastern Turkistan terrorists organisation have dispatched more than one hundred professionally, prepared terrorists back, in China and have completed arson and poisoning. Some of this encounter principally in Baren in the 1990s, and in Yining in 1997 attracted in international aid and

expected, Beijing to mobilise its military units to suppress the uprising or quite a while parts of Xinjiang. He has reportedly been closed to foreigners, while the Chinese repeated that Uyghur separatism or splittism, had been an internal issue in which no interminable worldwide would be endured. In any case, the Uyghur journey for autonomy has had international dimensions from the earliest starting point (Shichor 2005:120-121).

From the mid-1990s, when the Uyghur threat in Xinjiang started to be examined out in the open, both inside and outside China, an impression had been made that the unrest had not been nourished only by internal Chinese grievances but rather that external strengths were likewise had included. Beijing has sporadically denounced foreign agents and additionally government for instigating Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang, yet has seldom recognised them except by implication. These incorporate Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and some the Central Asian Republic, for example, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and also the western government, outstandingly Germany, Belgium, Sweden, and the United State (Shichor 2005: 121). Indeed, some of these governments had unrevealed a developing enthusiasm for the destiny and reason for the Uyghurs and criticised Beijing for harsh treatment of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim population. This Issue has been brought up in European parliaments and furthermore in different U.S organisation commission, also the media. Therefore, the offer of the Han in Xinjiang's population has developed significantly from around 5 percent in 1949 and 42 percent today. Getting a charge out of governmental policy regarding minorities in society Han possesses not just the crucial position in the district's organisational, legislative issues and the military, additionally, have better and less demanding access to its economic benefits, while Uyghur is efficiently discrimination (*ibid*).

c) Baren Incident

The most violent armed riot in Xinjiang occurred in April 1990 in Baren, a town 50 km southwest of Kashgar. It is in "Akto" County of Urizlsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture in southern Xinjiang, which imparts common borders to the Kashgar areas of Shufu, Shule and Yengihisar and closest to the Pamir mountain range and China-Afghan borders. The barren uprising began by gatherings, is mainly comprised of Uyghur Muslims. The primary purpose for Barren Uprising was disappointed with the Chinese

strategy of operation against Uyghurs. It was started on 5 April 1990. They openly called the jihad against the Han Chinese. The essential reason was the restriction on the development of a secretly supported mosque close to the Oasis of Kashghar. On 6 April 1990, Uyghur rebels assaulted by police, authorities and government structures by little arms and bombs. After the occurrence, the idea of 'Muslim vs. Infidels', get combined among Han and Uyghur nationalities. The principle of this uprising Zahideen Yusuf was a Talib, motivated by the techniques and strategies of the Afghan Mujahideen, and lectured a comparable sort of jihad. He headed the 'Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party,' which was set up in 1989. The young wing of the gathering was known as "Islamic Dare to Die Corps." An individual from the ETIP broadcast the virtual of jihad through audio and video cassettes and tapes and masterminded a few offices through which they swear they help for Jihad and end of the individuals who double-cross Islam in Xinjiang. They made their message clear to local small Han dealers and merchants. To advance their motivation, they droned trademarks, for example, "We don't have faith in Socialism," "We are opposed Socialism" and "in the past Marxism-Leninism-Leninism stifled religion now religion would suppress Marxism-Leninism" (Debata 2007: 145). But, this uprising met its positive end on account of the Chinese security workforce. PLA troops by utilising air power crushed the rebellion and started a crackdown capturing rebel Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang. In any case, the fire of the riots spread into cities, for example, Urumqi, Kashgar, Khotan, Kuqa, Aksu, and Artash. Around fifty to sixty people were killed in Artash revolt. Various specialists have said it on Xinjiang contemplates that Baren incident was the first devotee radical resistance that represented a serious challenge to the Chinese government (Debata 2007: 145). This episode functioned as a venturing stone for future ethnic uprisings.

d) Impact of Soviet disintegration

During 1989-91, when the USSR disintegration and created 15 States, it also lost Central over the client State like Mongolia and debilitated the border security with PRC's. The shortcoming implied more open doors for minorities to push ahead with their motivation. The XUAR now has borders with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mongolia and Russia (Kolhe 2011: 249).

i. Separatist components

The discontent that has been blended in Xinjiang exploded in 1989. At first, it has started with the exhibition of almost 2,000 and 3,000 students who were challenging to help the strikers at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing. However, the protesters were joined by fundamentalist Muslim from Urumqi Kroanic Studies Institute. Also, it likewise had individuals who needed to challenge the distribution in Shanghai of an anti-Muslim book. The offering book purportedly said that Muslims go to the Mecca for sexual liberality (Kolhe 2011: 249).

The year 1990s demonstrated far and away more terrible as, on 5 April riots softened out up numerous urban areas of Xinjiang. The epicentre was Baren Township in Akto Country, because of the pressure made by the administration's choice to boycott a mosque that had worked without official consent. The riots were affected by 'East Turkistan Islamic Party' (*ibid*).

The rioters transparently lectured a 'holy war' and requested the foundation of 'East Turkistan Republic.' There is additionally the recently established "East Turkistan Islamic Party" (ETIP) which controlled the religious assumptions of the youthful era. The ETIP likewise settled a military wing called 'Islamic Warrior.' There were hostile to government exercises like resistance to family planning programme challenge the expulsion of the prominent imam and so on (Kolhe: 249-230).

The Baren riots were bloody affairs that according to eyewitness accounts, appeared like a real battle, in which nearly 3,000 may have been killed. Similarly, the second most important incident occurred in Xinjiang were the Yining riots in 1997 and 1998. According to the official sources, the Yining riots were the handiwork of the 'East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah' seven people were killed, 200 were injured, and 30 vehicles were damaged (*ibid*).

e) Attack on 1992 Onward

1. February 5, 1992: Urumqi Bus Bombs-Three were killed and twenty-three harmed in two blasts on transports in Urumqi, the PRC's 2002 record asserts that different bombs

were found and defused around a similar time in a cinema and residential building. Five men were later indicted for this situation and allegedly executed in June 1995.

2. February 1992: September 1993-Bombings, amid this period, were a few blasts in Yining, Urumqi, Kashgar, and somewhere else; targets included a departmental store, market, hotel, and the center of “cultural activity” in Southern Xinjiang. A bomb in a working of the Nongji Company (actually a firm worried about agricultural equipment) in Kashgar killed two and harmed six on June 17, 1993. A bomb went off in a wing of the Seman Hotel in Kashgar. However, nobody was injured in the blast. The PRC's 2002 reports guarantee that in the 1993 bombing two peoples were killed and thirty-six harmed by and large.

3. July 7, 1995: Khotan exhibition, going before this event, the Chinese specialists had captured two leading imams of the Baytulla mosque in Khotan for examining the current event in their Koranic instructing and supplant them with another Imam, the youthful and magnetic Abdul Kayum. At the point when Kayum started to advocate enhanced ladies' ideal in his sermons. He too was captured for raising denied the topical issue. Some days after the fact, on July 7, a group joined at a gathering and government office compound close to the mosque, requesting data about the imam's whereabouts. At the point when the encounter turned violent, the legislature brought in the substantial number of riot police who caught the demonstrators in the compound, deployed tear gas, and arrested and beat many of them. Official reports mention injuries to 66 authorities and police, yet supply no figures on demonstrators setbacks. The event is not specified in the PRC record on East Turkestan Terrorism.

4. April-June 1996: Protests, Assassinations, Bombings, Crackdown. The reports demonstrate an expansion of violent protests and authority, restraint in the spring of 1996. Worldwide daily papers and wire administrations give vague and unsubstantiated records of various uprisings or dissents all through Xinjiang; some exiled Uyghur sources claim injuries in the hundreds and upwards of 18,000 arrests. A particular incident in this period incorporates bombings in Kucha (claimed to have killed four) and deaths in the Kashgar, Kucha, and Aksu ranges of Uyghur authorities having a place with, the Islamic

Organisation of China and an Uyghur deputy to the XUAR People's Congress (Yongnian 2009: 11-12).

5. February 5-8, 1997: Yining (Ghulja) Incident. The Official Chinese reports are themselves conflicting on the causes and nature of this event extending from dissents that it happened, to calling it an instance of “beating, crushing, and looting” by “drug addicts, thieves, and ‘social garbage,” and to pointing the finger at it on separatists and religious components set on blending up holy war. The PRC's 2002 record accuses this “serious riot” on the “East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah’ and some other terrorist organisation.”

6. 12 March 1997: Disturbance at the Chinese Consulate-General in Istanbul. The PRC's 2002 archive on East Turkistan terrorist claims that shots were discharged at the Chinese office general in Turkey in March 1997 and a banner was flagged during a demonstration. Autonomous news sources gave an account of the flag burning (on February 8, 1997, after the Yining Incident) however, not the gunfire (Yongnian 2009: 11-12).

f) Kashgar (2008) Attack

The 2008 Kashgar attack occurred on the morning of 4 August 2004, in the city of Kashgar in Xinjiang. According to the Chinese government sources. It was a terrorist attack perpetrated by two men with suspected ties to the Uyghur separatist movement. The men reportedly drove a truck into a group of approximately 70 jogging police officers and proceeded to attack them with grenades and machetes. This attack resulted in the deaths of 16 policemen and another 16 being hurt (Guo 2015: 46).

Two attackers were involved in the incident near the western city Kashgar. The Xinhua New Agency said the attack happened at about 8:00 Am (local time). One of the men drove a drum into a group of border patrol police officers as they were jogging on the street. The attacks then got out of the truck and started attacking other officers with homemade explosive. The explosives went off prematurely and blew off one of his arms. The other attackers threw improvised explosive devices at a near police officer inside the complex. Both perpetrators were captured during the raid. The attackers were later

identified as two men, including a 28-year-old taxi driver and a 33-year-old vegetable vendor. They are members of the Uyghur ethnic groups, and it has suspected that the attack group was supported by East Turkistan Separatist (Guo 2015: 46-47).

The Chinese government claimed that the incident was a terrorist attack. Further, the police claimed that the design of this explosive was very similar to the explosive made by the militant ETIM when Chinese police raided their training facility in January 2007. Xinjiang regional public security department also claimed that it had received intelligence that the ETIM planned to carry out as a terrorist attack during the week before the opening ceremonies of the “Beijing Olympic Games”. This incident happened 4 days before the Beijing Olympic after repeated warning in recent month’s from the Chinese government that militants from the restive Xinjiang region were planning to stage an attack to disrupt the game (Guo 2015: 47).

g) Urumqi riots (2009) and Worldwide response

The Urumqi riots were a series of violent riots more than a few days that broke out on 5 July 2009 in Urumqi. The first-day rioting which started as a protest, however, grow into the violent attack that mainly targets ethnic Han Chinese individual’s Armed police were conveyed, and after two days, hundred of Han people conflicted with both police and Uyghur. People Republic of China (PRC) officers said that a total of 197 individuals passed on with, 1,721 others injured and numerous vehicles and building devastated. Then again, Uyghur exile groups say the death toll was higher. Rioting started when the police confronted into the violent incident in Shaoguan, a fight in southern China a few days prior in which two Uyghurs were killed (Guo 2015:48).

At the point when the riot started, communication was promptly cut off. In the weeks that took after, official sources were briefly closed. By the November 2009, more than 400 people confronted criminal charge for this activity amid the mobs. The nine were executed in November 2009, and by February 2010, no less than 26 had received death sentences. The official disconnected was that the violence was started by the protestors and had been on the evening of July 5 with a protest in a Da Bazar (big market) (Guo 2015: 48). The demonstration started calmly, and authority and observer accounts

announced that it required around 1,000 Uyghurs. The first days' rioting comprised essentially of Han stabbed by ravaging 'gang of Uyghurs' (Guo 2012:48-49).

On July 7, there was the large-scale armed demonstration in Urumqi. The time they were directed by ethnic Han, Conflicting assessment of the Han demonstrator's number was accounted for by the western media and shifted from the hundred to as high as 10,000. The time detailed that smaller battles were as often as possible breaking out between the Uyghur and Hans and that group of Han citizen organised to take revenge on 'Uyghur mob.' Police used the tear gas and barricades trying to scatter the show and encouraged Han natives over the amplifier to calm down and gives the police a chance to carry out their employment (Guo 2015: 48-49).

On July 10, city experts closed Urumqi mosques. A Large crowd of Uyghur gathered for prayer anyways, exhibiting own people detained after the riots, however, were scattered by revolt police with five or six people's arrested. In consequence the July the 2009, Urumqi riots, Urumqi encountered a time of unrest in September 2009. Late, August and early September saw a progression of syringe attacks on the citizen. Because of the attack, thousand of inhabitant held protests for a few days, resulting in the death of five people (*ibid*).

The Chinese experts, which put the blame for the riots on the separatist forces were quick to improve a curfew and arrested hundred of Uygur suspects in Urumqi. The Chinese foreign ministry, which additionally dispersed recordings of the violence depicting gruesome scenes of individuals being executed and set on fire, denounced the World Uyghur Congress and its US-based head Rabiya Kadeer as being behind these mobs (Warikoo 2016: 177).

h) International Response:

The International response to the July 2009 ethnic rioting in Urumqi was to an extent mild when contrasted with that with the 2008 Tibetan disturbance, especially from the west. The U.S Secretary of the state's communicated concern's however in a way figured not to irritate China a superior authority lauding the U.S for its direct line in Xinjiang. The most grounded unfriendly government response originated from Turkey,

the Turk has an ethnic affinity with the Uyghurs. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan connected the mobs of 'genocide,' However, he is notable for talking first and thinking just later and his comments made by little effect (Mackerras 2011: 301).

There was some criticism of China's treatment of the dispersion of the Muslim world, yet all in all not from governments. Xinjiang and Central Asia region might not have accomplished what one researcher calls centrality in global undertakings, however since 1991 both have turned out to be especially more imperative in world issues than whenever for no less than two centuries and likely more (Mackerras 2011: 301).

China's reaction to the emergency has been quick, intense and adjusted taking safety efforts to control the circumstance, keeping a hundred individuals, summary trials and obstruction discipline to the sentenced riots, restricting internet phone correspondence, controlling the flow of information on the mobs to the media and the outside world. Finding a way to console Han Chinese pilgrims in Urumqi and connecting with Muslim countries in Central Asia and South Asia looking for their participation. Solidly blaming the three strengths of "radicalism, separatism and terrorism" for the mobs, the Chinese administration reaffirmed the current approaches in the locale. That Cambodia, disregarding US pleadings, deported back to China 20 Uyghur Muslim in December 2009, who had looked for shelter in Cambodia and were under the security of the UNHCR following the July revolts in Urumqi. On the eve of a visit to Phnom Penh by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping focuses to the accomplishment of China's strategic (Warikoo 2016: 178).

5.4 ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

By the expression "internationalisation" of the Xinjiang, issue. We allude to the conveying by the groups included that is the administration of China. Uyghurs and human right groups, of the subject to the consideration of worldwide performers, be it the universal group when all is said in done or international community and individual nations with expects to enlist their help for this separate causes. Along these lines, the internationalisation on-screen characters. The most recent twenty years demonstrate that each previously mentioned party has conveyed in Xinjiang issue to the consideration of

the international community and some degree understood their desires in the internationalisation of the Xinjiang issue with changing the level of accomplishment (Demirtepe and Bozbey 2012: 166).

It is sensible to contend that China's uplifted enthusiasm for conveying the Uyghur issue to the consideration of the international community, expanding responsiveness to the situation of the Uyghurs. In this manner, China wishes to pass on to the western world, its particular perspective. Accordingly, charges of Uyghur living abroad in regards to infringement of human rights in Xinjiang, China positions its assimilatory strategies inside the setting of the war on terrorism and battle against the radical Islamic terrorist group. To that influence, China affirms that the displeased Uyghurs, who express now and again their discontent with and resentment towards assimilatory. Chinese policies are Islamic terrorist endeavouring to derail stability in the region and make an Uyghur state where radical Islamism will command (Demirtepe and Bozbey 2012: 166).

There is a growing tendency among human right groups to recognise that China makes little distinction between separatist, terrorist and civil rights activities, regardless of whether they are Uyghur, Tibetans, Taiwanese Falungong Buddhist. China, attempt to support its claims with a suggestion like between Uyghur dissents and international terrorist organisation like Al- Qaida and the Taliban. While the accuracy of the claims remains highly questionable and should be taken with a grain of salt, the damage is done, as the more suggestions of such connection tips the international community away from Uyghur towards the Chinese government. This strategy works especially well with the United States a partner who has pursued a war from the previously mentioned terrorist groups. There are, moreover, specialists who contend that not at all like the impression made both earlier and entirely after 9/11 of the rise in terrorist activities in Xinjiang and a relating striking back by the Chinese Uyghur military and savage encounters have generous declined since (*ibid*).

- Shanghai collaboration in China's most imperative international instrument to legitimise its assimilatory, arrangements toward Xinjiang. Under the initiative of China and Russia with the support of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the

Shanghai five was built up in 1996 and changed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation with the investment of Uzbekistan in 2001.

- The Shanghai Co-association was established as a security association against “secessionism, terrorism and extremism” which China refers to as “three evil force” and the Xinjiang issue constitutes its most vital motivation subject.
- China's with distinguishing proof of the Xinjiang issue with secessionism, terrorism and extremism through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation tries to turn away the criticism of its coercive strategies.
- World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur American Association are the prominent organisation led by Uyghurs for the Uyghur cause. They make peaceful endeavours to make known the Uyghur cause in the western world and to gather acknowledgement and support from the international community (Demirtepe and Bozbey 2012: 168).

And the last chapter wrap on with discussion and Conclusion.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The Great Western Development programme of the Chinese Central government has been the first strategy and structure to manage the situation in the western area of China, which has been deliberately found, minority commanded and economically in reverse notwithstanding having abundant natural and mineral resources. Since its origin, the Western Development Programme has concentrated on different issues, for example, the advancement of agriculture, irrigation, infrastructure, transportation and communication, investigation and extraction of energy resources in the inside pockets of the western areas. The Chinese authority in Xinjiang has pledged to rebuild the weak economy by changing the methods of financial development, without hurting nature, along with the improvement of people's livelihood and essential public services, to keep the advancement of Xinjiang at pace with the general increase. As already discussed in this research work, several domestic and external factors prompted the political leadership of the People's Republic of China to devise such a policy that on the one hand brings hope for the local minority populace through economic development and sufficing to the Chinese need to keep its tab on this sensitive region on the other. In this context, the significant findings of this research work have given in below.

First and foremost, it is crystal clear that China as a nation-state wants to preserve its national unity and territorial integrity and to achieve this goal, and the Chinese Central government has been devising policies from time to time which suits their national interests. The Great Western Development Programme is one such strategy to nurture the supreme Chinese national interests. Since the independence of China in September 1949, the western region, where most of the minority nationalities live, has been a volatile region posing serious challenges to security and stability of the country. The period from 1949 to 1976, often dubbed as the Mao Tse Tung period, was considered by many as an anti-minority era. Though Mao had promised during the pre-independence period to give the minority groups their due to garner support for the independence movement in the country, after 1949 the situation changed, the promise proved to be false, and the minority nationalities got an ill treatment. To name a few, the Hundred Flowers Bloom

movement coinciding with the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution period happened to be an era of maltreatment for the minority groups.

There was a considerable decrease in their freedom, particularly religious freedom, and the Gang of Four unleashed assaults against minority individuals. This quarter century of the Chinese policy towards minority groups brought about a critical issue. This fortified the resolve of the minorities to demand separate statehood vociferously, and in this process minority groups such as the Uyghurs and Tibetans were at the vanguard. The strength of Han Chinese in each part combined with the uneven economic development and the misuse of the resources of the western region for the advantage of the eastern coastal belt angered the national minorities, who later took up cudgels against the Chinese state. The Uyghurs of Xinjiang not just dissented the unfair demeanour of the Chinese Central government, but also indulged in separatist activities.

The period from 1949 to 1989 witnessed some 450 small, medium and large-scale separatist activities in Xinjiang region only. This tragic situation rang the alert for the Chinese Communist Party, which tried to ward off the challenges, especially the anti-Chinese sentiments among the minority people. In order to manage the separatist problem, the Central government took stern measures, for example, abuse of minorities, military crackdown against anti-Chinese elements. In any case, they couldn't have the capacity to stop the fire, as even latterly, both Xinjiang and Tibet have witnessed violent separatist activities. The leadership felt the need of economic development programme, who felt ironically this could heal the injuries that were meted out to the minorities during Mao era.

The Great Western Development Programme as a feature of the official Chinese economic policy assumes significance in this context. The process of development in Xinjiang now continues without any interruption. Even if the terrorist and anti-state activities by some insurgent forces continue in Xinjiang, the Chinese authorities are dealing with it in an iron fist. At the present stage, economic development of Xinjiang is one of the top most priorities for the Chinese leadership. The leadership, both at Central and regional level feels that once the local people of Xinjiang reap the benefits of economic development, there will be a shift in their anti-Chinese attitude. Improvement

in the standard of living, job opportunities, development of agriculture and other important economic issues that come with the economic development. The programme could help reduce separatist activities. In this way, the national objective of unity and territorial integrity can be achieved.

Secondly, China's economic interests in the resource-rich western region need to be noted here with the changes taking place within the national and international arena of the economic environment. Due to China's integration into the world markets, accession of China into the international trade regime World Trade Organization (WTO) and importance as the number two economy in the world, it was an imperative need to improve the standard of living of the people in the Xinjiang region and to assimilate this northwestern borderland into the national mainstream. As discussed in the introductory chapter, Xinjiang possesses an abundant source of energy such as solar, wind power, petroleum, natural gas and coal in the region. The country holds more than 20 percent of the nation's potential petroleum reserves with an approximately 20-40 billion tonnes of oil produced in Xinjiang area and 12.4 trillion cubic meters of petroleum gas. Oil, gas, coal, and mineral salts are in abundance to the large basin like Tarim, Junggar, and Turpan with a savings of more than 30 billion tonnes, which represent about one-third of the nation's total reserves. Xinjiang is rapidly becoming China's largest strategic region keeping in view the energy required in the country that has achieved robust economic growth in the recent times.

Thirdly, the Chinese authority under Deng Xiaoping attempted to re-correct the minority strategy formulated during the Mao regime. This section will talk about the economic initiatives taken up by the Chinese Central Government so as to improve the way of life in Xinjiang and general economic advancement. The economic development with the onset of the process of economic liberalisation in the country under reformist Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping is the main highlight. Even though the economic development programme under the Great Western Development Programme undertaken by the Chinese Central Government has not satisfied the needs and aspirations of the minorities in Xinjiang, especially Uyghurs, Xinjiang has progressed by leaps and bounds. Xinjiang has been witnessing rapid

economic and social development and overall growth, with the local people enjoying tangible benefits. In the past ten years, Xinjiang has been able to attract massive investments and ushered in fast economic growth, which in turn has proved to be beneficial for the ordinary people of Xinjiang. In the last three decades, Xinjiang has achieved considerable development in each sector, starting from agriculture to industry and from infrastructure to energy. Under the Western Development Programme, the Chinese authorities have crafted numerous policies to achieve overall economic development in Xinjiang. Which to some extent has toned down the dissent and discontent among the minority groups, especially Uyghurs. Slowly and steadily, economic development in Xinjiang is taking up, with the northern areas of Xinjiang getting the maximum benefit and the southern regions where Uyghurs are dominant in number, are trailing behind. The Chinese leadership is making all out efforts to bring development to the poor and impoverished areas of southern Xinjiang in the same tone and tenor as in the northern part. Xinjiang was keeping in view the present critical situation in the region with the number of violent activities growing up in the one decade or so, and the Central government is mulling over more and more development-oriented policies so that the dissenting population is engaged and shares the benefits out of all round development in the region.

Fourthly, the Western Development Programme has been an outcome of the interests and influence of external actors in the area adjacent to this restive region of Xinjiang. The disintegration of Soviet Russia and emergence of five Central Asian republics with whom Xinjiang shares commonalities such as ethnicity, religion, language, culture, and history played a significant role. Another key factor that prompted China to take this initiative was the American presence in this region for strategic, economic and energy purposes. Both these countries enjoy a love-hate relationship in the recent times. With the People's Republic of China becoming a dominant and influential actor in the global corridor, having its business hooks all across the globe, from Asia to Africa and from Central Asia to Latin America, the USA fails to tolerate the emergence of China as a fierce competitor. Another external force is Russia, which was active in Xinjiang under the Tsarist leadership, and further became a dominant force in Xinjiang in the Republican period from 1911 to 1949. The period from the independence of China in 1949 to the

disintegration of the USSR in 1991 did see enmity between China and the former Soviet Union. At this juncture, Chinese bid to improve the situation in Xinjiang, at least in the economic field, is significant. Since Xinjiang is an integral part of China and also the most important strategic frontier, the Chinese Central government has not only devised a clear cut minority policy but also implemented the programmes religiously. China's agenda is very much evident in Xinjiang. To safeguard unity, integrity, and stability in this critical northwest borderland, China has used all means and endeavours, whether they pacify the local populace and satisfy their needs, especially the Uyghurs, or not. China continues to give importance to this region as its gateway to the outside world and a floodgate of opportunities for further trade and commerce with the neighbouring countries. Since China has been able to get oil and natural gas from Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan through pipelines via Xinjiang region, China needs to focus on the all-round development of this area. Former provincial governor of Xinjiang, Ismail Tiliwaldi stated in a press conference on 12 April 2004 that the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has been able to establish trade relations with 108 domestic as well as foreign companies from more than 30 countries.

In this process of economic development in this Chinese borderland, the most powerful bulwark that has been working on behalf of the Chinese Central government is Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). As indicated by a Chinese White Paper on XPCC, it is a first social association, which handles its own particular authoritative and legal affairs within reclamation area under its organisation, as per the law and controls of the state and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and with economic planning specifically directed by the state. In addition, XPCC has been known as an extraordinary operation force that could either defend the borders or combat terrorism

The Chinese leadership understands the gravity of the situation in this critical region and also the importance of Xinjiang of China regarding its trade and business with the outside world, energy issues, and military strategy. And also, the Chinese authorities now understand very well that it is not wise to confront the Uyghurs, though they are minuscule in number. The two parties – the People's Republic of China and the Uyghurs

– should pay equal attention to the Xinjiang problem and play their part. Although the economic development in Xinjiang under the Great Western Development Programme is showing signs of success, it is not addressing ethnic issues. The Chinese leadership should understand well that in the present day world, economic prosperity is not the only solution to problems like ethnicity, religion, and nationalism. They should not misunderstand that minority communities will be less concerned about their cultural and national identities and aspirations. At this juncture, China should adopt such measures that benefit the minorities, particularly Uyghurs, to the maximum. Most of the Uyghurs feel that they are being alienated, marginalised and segregated by the Chinese state and dub the minority policy of the Central government as discriminatory. Even most of the Western scholars working in Xinjiang and Uyghurs subscribe to this view. A need of the hour is to assimilate the minority Uyghurs into the mainstream giving them their rights and freedoms. They should not even interfere with the religious practices of the Uyghurs. Since religion, particularly Islam, is a sensitive issue, the Chinese state should allow the Uyghurs the fundamental religious freedoms. However, if anybody, be it Uyghur or any other minority people, uses religion to nourish their selfish interest that hampers national unity and territorial integrity of China, the Central government should take necessary measures to fend off those disturbing elements.

Fifth, the Uyghurs almost no diverged from the Tibetans in internationalising their motivation. Both Uyghurs and Tibetans have an engaged country, and strong ethnic identity has given cultural tradition, dialect, and religions, confounded primordial history with Hans and distinctive Chinese rulers, border question, inner homogeneity in the demographic sense and active remote associations. In any case, Tibetans have picked up by Dalai Lama's popularity. After he got the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, he transformed into a commonly recognised name, and the Tibetan developments made a Leap Forward.

The Uyghur diaspora associations have similarly neglected to alarm the world opinion. Through the Uygur Diaspora in Turkey, Germany, Central Asia, USA, Europe and other developed countries have been endeavouring to internationalise the Uyghur development through promulgation, campaigning, raising support, and so forth., they have failed to accomplish the much-required mileage for this reason. Two prominent

Uyghur diaspora associations in the United States of America, one driven by Ahmed Turani and the Uyghur American Association (UAA) have been attempting consistent endeavours to internationalise the Uyghur issue. One would be doubtful how far segment of Pan-Islamic constraint in Xinjiang, who found a private partnership among global Islamic terrorist, would be successful in getting support from Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda association under the vigilance of the Chinese security force. There is certainly after 9/11 terrorist militant assaults in the USA, and the Uyghur separatists are confronting more significant inconvenience considerably and continuing to fight. To satisfy the right adjust, China needs to review its policies towards the Uyghur and address the long-standing socio-economic and political foundation of Uyghur discontent. China's brutal policies to combat the evil force “separatism, extremism, and terrorism” may well energise direct and peace to love Uyghurs in Xinjiang. China must take effective measures to repay the long-standing grievances inside Uyghur Community and quit putting weight on various states to turn away Uyghur Diaspora affiliations and people from participating in peaceful and legitimate activities for accomplishing their central human right. As the season of pluralism, the propaganda is to approach the question of national minorities will only make repulsiveness among Uyghur, Tibetan, Inner Mongols and different nationalities. The new authority in China can reproduce a state grasping all individuals inside the limit of the country by on benefit of various nationalities inside the socio-political system of the People's Republic of China.

On the part of the Uyghurs, who have been vociferously demanding a separate nationhood out of China, they should understand the reality. It is tough for a small minority group like Uyghurs, who accounts less than one percent of the total Chinese population, to carve out a separate state of East Turkestan. Violence is not a solution to achieve their goal. In the past, some Uyghurs have tried to realise their goal through violent separatist activities, but have failed miserably. The Chinese state is too high for them. Even the separatist Uyghur cadres of East Turkestan Islamic Movement, who have attacked Chinese interests in Xinjiang. The other places of China and even abroad, and involved in terrorist activities in the region, through the help of international terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, Taliban and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have not been able to challenge Chinese authority. Further, the international community does not

support any separatist and terrorist activity in any part of the world. Even big powers do not interfere in the Xinjiang affairs and consider it as China's internal affair. At this juncture, it is wise for the Uyghurs to relish the fruits of economic development under the Great Western Development Programme. And one thing the Uyghurs can do is to persuade the Chinese authorities for more freedoms and end the marginalisation of this minority community.

During a field visit conducted in China as part of this research work, It was found that Great Western Development Programme in Xinjiang has been a tool to promote Han migration in Xinjiang as Uyghurs most often view in this way. However, it is one of the most important Chinese economic development policies to pacify ethnic Uyghurs in the region and put an end violent separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX-1

FIELD WORK EXPERIENCE: During Field Visit of Jishou University and Peking University

Regarding my field visit to the Shanghai-Beijing and Jishou University for PhD Data Collection, I am providing the Report below clearly stating where I had visited and whom I met from 31st March to 14th April 2016. I reached Delhi on 15th April 2016. For the required purpose, I had visited and meet the experts residing in the Shanghai (Fudan University), Jishou University and Peking University (Beijing), Minzu University and Business School of Shantou University. During this period, I also visited Government Organization in Beijing, especially China and Embassy of India, Beijing. I also collected some empirical data for my research work from Shanghai, and Beijing (China).

I visited multiple cities of China (Beijing), Shanghai and Jishou and met various resource people related to my area of research. Following are the experts whom I met and conducted interviews with: He returned to this matter in March 2013 during his inaugural speech as Chinese President. Though his brief remarks Xi's spoke of the necessity of 'walking the Chinese road', 'Cultivating the Chinese spirit' and 'consolidating Chinese power' making the collective nature of this vision clear through his use of unity ten times in the short address (Leilod 2013: 47).

The border implication of Xi Jinping is a Chinese dream for non-Han minorities and ethnic policy are uncertain at this stage had claimed that there was no room for Tibetans in this Han center vision for the future. While, the new head of the SEAC, Wang Zhangwei who belonged to a Hui ethnic

group, stressed at its inclusive message. To make this dream a reality we must go a step further in our ethnic work and to mobilize and vision the fifty- six ethnic groups, confront walking on Chinese road, cultivating the might Chinese spirit and bringing China's formidable power into play, this is how we pursue, unify and realize the Chinese dream (Xinhua 2013).

Though his first interview as SEAC chief, Wang spoke of China's ethnic work entering a new era of significant transformation without mentioning any specific policy initiative. He also stressed that ethnic unity is like air and sunshine, we benefit from it without knowing it, and it would be disastrous to lose (ibid).

There are hints of a Chinese for policy innovation in the SEAC's annual grant based research agenda. The topics for 2013 places more emphasizes on fresh thinking in on altered Post-Eighteenth Party congress environment. There are four things that need to be mentioned such as i) new demand; ii) new policies and; iii) new strategies for new circumstance and new problem.. These notes include two addressing research into new capacity and methods and administrative and structural reforms of the system of the regional ethnic autonomy (Leibold 2013: 48).

The Xi's Jinping interpretation of the Chinese dream is increasingly evident of policy reform and innovation. Because there are indications that Xi and his supporters view Singapore, with its Asian value as a suitable model for managing ethnic relation in China. In 2012, it was reported that Xi personally permitted a ten part China Central Television (CCTV) documentary series will include an episode on the ethnic policy title 'Melting Diverse Ethnic Group' (Leibold 48-49).

Zheng put forward Singapore as a positive model for ethnic-policy reform. China's current approach Singapore stresses national interest and

equality over narrow group interest and individual right. The city, state closely monitors minorities' ethnic and religious practices while fostering a shared sense of national belonging through a series of explicitly integration policies (Elizabeth Van Wie 2012: 49-50).

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I have also visited the National Museum of China and Shanghai History Museum. I had also visited a few historical places to increase my knowledge about their society and their past. I have consulted many books written in Chinese Literature. I also got study material related to my topic like journals, books and maps in English. I took some help from students and translator there. A round of discussions with the Jishou University, Peking University students about Xinjiang issue and related problems (Western development Programme). Interaction with the university students was fruitful for my research work. This discussion helped me a lot in terms of understanding the general perceptions of the Uyghur-Han relation as well as the execution of the Western Development Programme in the region. I have interviewed the Uyghur students and collected data from them. At the cost of digressing from the topic, it was not hassle-free to interview Uyghur students because it was difficult for me to find them. For the interview, I found most of the student at the mess, canteen area around 7:30 am daily. It was too tough but a good experience for me. Here, i made lots of friends from Han Chinese and Uyghur community. I also visited the local area of Shanghai, Peking and Jishou for more information about the western development Programme in Xinjiang. When I discussed with students they told me that questions regarding Uyghur people are too sensitive to answer. Most of the Chinese students helped in my interview.

During my interview some of the scholars and faculty raised a question regarding the relevance and rationale of my topic. I told him regarding my interest, because Xinjiang is an autonomous region of China and borders with eight countries. Western development Programme is the economic based policy. This State of affairs promoted the China to implement the Great Western Development Programme (*Xibu Da Kaifa*) which aims at

bridging the gap between the eastern and western regions by means of development of backward area in the western region. I told him India and Xinjiang have cultural ties with each other.

Most of the scholars also addressed the much highlighted issue with reference to Xinjiang i.e. the China minority policy, Xinjiang and India's relation, economic development.


Some of the scholars also pointed out that people prefer private job because of low salary given by the government. In this field trip I also interacted with the local people during the visit to historical places.

Finally, after the discussion with experts and scholars I concluded that today Western Development Programme in Xinjiang is dominated by a need to secure China's minority policy, standard of living of ethnic Uyghur and economic development in China's Xinjiang region. In this context, the Great Western Development Programme assumes great significance. This Programme not only stresses all round development of the backward region of Xinjiang, but also advocates its direct trade with Central Asian states. An important goal of this Programme is to improve the standard of living of the ethnic Uyghurs, which lead to overall development of the region

Prof. Luo Kanglong and Prof. Wu Hexian, of School of History and Culture (Jishou University), Prof. Zhang Zhirong of Peking University of China has told me that the Uyghur – Han relation is a very sensitive case in China. Luo Kanglong and Wu Hexian, had also given brief importance related to my topic that the Western Development Programme not only addresses the economic issue but also regional, ecological and security concern. The Western Development Programme as a long term strategy, not only sets guideline of all policies, Programme and project, but also lays out the political boundary of Xinjiang's economic development. He suggested

some of the points such as Western Development Programme as a” soft policy” to placate the minorities, particularly the Uyghur, who have been criticizing the Chinese policies towards minorities. In this way, my field trip was very successful and very fruitful for my Ph.D. thesis

APPENDIX-II



Sources: [Page | 237](http://www.google.com.in/search?q=china+north+west+frontier+map&bin=1366&bih+638&tbn+isch&imgil+hHTOV-tEjNIWtM%253%253 Bk5fa6-e9OvUMM%235Bhttps%25253A,(Accessed on 19 February 2017).</p></div><div data-bbox=)

APPENDIX-III

Country	Distance (kms)
Russia and Central Asia, (Xinjiang, China share border in north-west)	3,200 Kms ⁴
Russia	56 Kms ⁵
Central Asian Region	
8. Kazakhstan	1,718 Kms
9. Kyrgyzstan	980 Kms
10. Tajikistan	450 Kms
11. Mongolia	1,435Kms
12. Afganistan	80 Kms
13. Pakistan	530 Kms
14. India	350 Kms

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⁵ Before the disintegration of erstwhile USSR, Xinjiang border with Russia was 3200 kms. For more details, see Raczka Wit (1998): 373-407.

Table: 1.2

Xinjiang: Population at Year end by Region (10000 persons)

<u>Year</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>2005</u>	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>2011</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>
<u>Xinjiang region</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>2050</u>	<u>2095</u>	<u>2131</u>	<u>2159</u>	<u>2185</u>	<u>2209</u>	<u>2233</u>	<u>2464</u>	<u>2298</u>	<u>2360</u>

Note: Data of 2010 are the census year estimate, the rest is the estimate from the annual national survey sample of population. Since 2005, data by region are usually resident.

Sources: China Statistical Year Book 2016 [Online: Web] Accessed on 7th June 2017, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm>.

Table: 1.3

Urumqi: Population history (in thousand) - 1990s to 2010

<u>Year</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2005</u>	<u>2010</u>
<u>Urumqi Population History in Xinjiang</u>	<u>1,172.00</u>	<u>1,500.00</u>	<u>1,829.56</u>	<u>2,380.00</u>	<u>2,853.40</u>

Source: Population. City/china/ueruemqi/sources, accessed on (4th January 2017).

Table: 1.4

Ethnic Minority and their percentage of total Population in Xinjiang (2011)

Ethnic Minority People of Xinjiang	Percentage of total population of Xinjiang
Uyghur	46.40%
Han	39.30%
Kazak	7.08%
Hui	4.50%
Kirghiz	0.87%
Mongolian	0.85%
Tajik	0.21%
Xibe	0.20%
Manchu	0.12%
Uzbek	0.08%
Russian	0.06%
Daur	0.03%
Tatar	0.02%
Other	0.59%
Total Population	22,087,100

Source: The Facts and Figures on Xinjiang, China, 2012, p.29.

Table: 1.5

Population at Year-end by Region (10,000 persons) -2004-2015

Region	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Chongqing	2793	2798	2808	2816	2839	2859	2885	2919	2945	2970	2991	3017
Sichuan	8090	8212	8169	8090	8138	8185	8045	8050	8076	8107	8140	8204
Guizhou	3904	3730	3690	8127	3596	3537	3479	3469	3484	3502	3508	3530
Yunnan	4415	4450	4483	3632	4543	4571	4602	4631	4659	4687	4714	4742
Tibet	276	280	285	289	293	296	300	303	308	312	318	324
Shaanxi	3681	3690	3699	3708	3718	3699	3735	3743	3753	3764	3735	3793
Gansu	2541	2545	2547	2548	2581	2547	2560	2564	2578	2582	2592	2600
Qinghai	539	543	548	552	544	548	563	568	573	578	583	588
Ningxia	588	596	604	610	618	604	633	639	647	654	663	668
Xinjiang	1963	2010	2050	2095	2131	2131	2185	2209	2233	2264	2298	2360
Total	129988	130756	131448	132129	132802	133450	134091	134735	135404	136072	136072	137462

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2016, [Online: Web], Accessed on 7th June 2017, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm>.

Table: 1.6

Uyghur-Han Population of Xinjiang-2013

<u>Year</u>	<u>2013</u>	
<u>Xinjiang Ethnic Groups</u>	<u>Uyghur</u>	<u>Han</u>
<u>Percentage (%)</u>	<u>47%</u>	<u>41%</u>

Source: Zhang, Sheng, Miao Xu, Li Xueting, Fang Huizhen, et.al (2013), “Implicit Trust between the Uyghur and the Han in Xinjiang, China”, [Online], Accessed on 15th June 2017, [URI:http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0071829](http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0071829). p.1.

Table: 1.7
Composition of total Energy Production of Xinjiang

Year	1978	1990	2000	2015
Natural Resources				
Coal	<u>70.3</u>	<u>74.2</u>	<u>72.9</u>	<u>72.1</u>
Crude Oil	<u>23.7</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>8.1</u>
Natural Gas	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.9</u>
Primary Electricity and other Energy	<u>3.1</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>14.5</u>

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2016, [Online: Web], Accessed on 7th June 2017, URL: www.state.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indeseh.htm.

Table: 1.8
Ensured Reserve of Major Energy Resources and Ferrous Metal by Region (2012- 2015)

Year	Mineral Resources Major Energy and Ferrous Metal	Petroleum (1000 tons)	Natural Gas (100 million cu.m)	Coal (100 million tons)	Iron Ore (100 million tons)	Manganese Ore (10,000 tons)	Chromite Ore (10,000 tons)	Vanadium (10,000 tons)	Titanium (10,000 tons)
2012	Xinjiang region	56464.74	9324.37	152.47	4.27	569.93	44.18	0.16	46.05
	China	33258.33	43789.9	2298.88	194.77	20938.18	405.01	877.99	21088.2
2015	Xinjiang Region	60112.7	10202	158.7	8.3	562.4	44.7	0.02	45.3
	China	349610.7	51939.5	2440.1	207.6	27626.2	419.8	887.3	21434

Sources: a) China statistical Yearbook 2013, p. 264. Sources: b) China Statistical Yearbook 2016, [Online: Web] Accessed on 7th June 2017, URL: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm>

Table: 1.9
Output of Wind Power in Xinjiang: (2014-2017)

Xinjiang Indicator	Year			
	2014	2015	2016	2017
Output of Wind power current period (100 million kWh)	9	7.1	14	24
Output of Wind power, Accumulated (100 million kWh)	105.3	131.2	174	93.9
Out of Wind power, growth rate (The same period last year+100) %	77.3	-34.9	82.3	31.8
Out of Wind power, Accumulated growth rate	52.8	7.9	33.9	46.5

Sources: National Data, National Bureau of Statistics of China, NBS 2017 [Online: Web] Accessed on , URL:data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103.

Table:1.11
Hydropower Resources

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Xinjiang					
Hydropower generation (100 million kWh)	11.458	105.66	206.95	161.38	209.05

Sources: NationData, National Bureau of Statistic of China, NBS 2016, [online: Web], Accessed on 8th June 2017, URL: data.stats.gov.cn/English/easyquery.htm?cn-E0103.

Table: 1. 12
Terrorist Attack in Xinjiang, 2013

<u>Time</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Causalities</u>
April 23	Bachu Country, Kashgar	21 dead, including 6 terrorist and 15 police officers and community workers 2 injured
June 26	Shabshan country, Turpan	35 dead, including 11 terrorists, 2 police officers and 22 civilian, 21 injured
August 20	Yecheng Country, Kashgar	16 dead, including 15 terrorist and 1 police officer
November	16Bachu Country, Kashgar	11 dead, including 9 terrorists and 2 police officers; 2 other officers injured
December 16	Shufu Country, Kashgar	16 dead, including 14 terrorists and 2 police officers.
December 20	Shache Country, Kashgar	8 terrorists dead.

Sources: Yin Pumin, “Tackling Terrorism: Increases in terrorists activity have promoted Chinese authorities to undertake countermeasure in Xinjiang”, *Beijing Review*, 22nd January 2014, 57 (4) : p. 23.

Table: 4.1**The Amount of Utilisation of FDI in Xinjiang 1980-2013 (US\$ 1000)**

Year	Contractual FDI				Actually used FDI
	Total Amount	Foreign Amount	Contractual Amount	Other Foreign Investment	Amount
1980	601		492	109	109
1985	4804	1096	3588	120	518
1986	1370	570	318	482	2822
1987	8616	8000	616		3617
1988	3405	2415	966	24	2805
1989	10550	9826	267	457	7796
1990	4463	3500	881	82	7629
1991	8368	5312	3056		12193
1992	81090	70509	8795	1786	65684
1993	36737	10643	25744	350	13051
1994	19122	10549	8547	26	14543
1995	42039	29402	9245	3392	54699
1996	18106	4126	10104	8440	26568
1997	39787	34707	4127	953	8691
1998	39787	6514	13827	29792	16225
1999	50133	15449	6151		14022
2000	21600		9212		13800
2001	9212		12590		16335
2002	12590		15443		16834
2003	15443		16147		17916
2004	16147		25786		20690
2005	25786		27237		4749
2006	27237		36439		10366
2007	36439		45679		12484
2008	45679		64555		18984
2009	64555		47000		21570
2010	47000		30091		23742
2011	30091		55834		33485
2012	55834		61056		40795
2013	61056		36034		480102

Sources: Cali Li, Zhang Xiaowei (2016),“ Research on the Utilisation of Foreign Direct Investment in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China”, *Journal of Research in Business, Economic and Management*, 5(4): 648.

Table: 4.2
Utilised FDI of Xinjiang US\$ (million) 2008-2015)

SL. No.	Year (2008-2015)	US\$ (million)
<u>1</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>190</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>216</u>
<u>3</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>237</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>2011</u>	<u>335</u>
<u>5</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>408</u>
<u>6</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>481</u>
<u>7</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>417</u>
<u>8</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>453</u>

Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

Table: 4.3
Major Economic Indicator

Economic Indicator	2015		Jan-Sep 2016	
	Value	Growth (%, y-o-y)	Value	Growth (%, y-o-y)
Gross Domestic Product (RBM bn)	932.5	8.8 ¹	671.8	7.9 ¹
Per Capita GDP (RMB)	40,036	6.6 [□]	-	-
Added Value Output				
Primary Industry (RBM bn)	155.9	5.9 ¹	108.9	5.7 ¹
Secondary Industry (RBM bn)	359.6	7.3 ¹	245.9	6.3 ¹
Tertiary Industry (RBM bn)	416.9	12.2	316.9	10.1 ¹
Value-added Industrial Output ² (RBM bn)	266.3	5.2 ¹	185.4	4.4 ¹
Fixed- assets Investment (RBM bn)	1,072.9	10.1	792.3	7.4
Retails Sale (RBM bn)	260.6	7.0	198.6	8.0
Inflation (Consumer Price Index %)	-	0.6	-	1.1
Exports (US\$ mn)	17,506	-25.4	10,931	-14.4
By-Foreign-invested-enterprises (FIEs) (US\$ mn)	74	-16.2	50	-11.3
Imports (US\$ mn)	22,172	-48.2	1,491	-10.2
By Foreign- Invested-enterprises (FIEs (US\$ mn)	177	43.4	109	-18.2
Utilised Direct Foreign Investment (US\$ mn)	453	8.5	372	0.1

Notes: ¹ In real form; ¹¹ For all State-Owned Enterprises and another form with annual sale of RMB20 million

Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

Table: 4.4
Composition of GDP (%)

	2000	2015
Primary	21.1	16.7
Secondary	39.4	38.6
Industry	30.7	29.4
Tertiary	39.5	44.7

Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

Table: 4.5
Output share of leading Industry Group (2015)

	% Share value-added industrial output*
Extraction of petroleum and natural gas	22.9
Oil processing, cooking and nuclear fuel processing	18.8
Production and supply of electricity and heat power	12.7
Raw chemical materials and products	6.8
Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metal	5.7
Manufacture of non-metal mineral products	3.9
Processing of food from agricultural products	3.6
Manufacture of electric equipment and machinery	3.6

Sources: Xinjiang Market Profile, 3 February 2017, [Online: Web] Accessed on 15 March 2017, URL: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.

APPENDIX-IV
List of Chinese Pronunciation

Beijing	bay ZHING
Bo Xilai	bow she ly
Chang Jiang	Chang jee ahng
Chiang Kai-shek	jee AHNG kye SHECK
Chongqing	Chong-Chinq
Dalai Lama	dah lye LAHMA
Deng Xiaoping	DUNG Shau ping
Diaoyu	dee ow you
Genghis Khan	JING gas Kahn
Gru Kailai	Gao kai lie
Guangdong	gwahng DUNG
Guangzhou	gwang JOH
Hanshou	han JOH
Hegemony	heh Jeh muh nee
Hu	Hoo
Huang He	HWANG huh
Hukou	who koo
Jiang Zemen	Jee AMNG juh Mini
Kuomintang	Kuo ming Jang
Lioning	Lee ow ning
Lilasa	LAN suh
Macao	Ma Know.

ANNXURE-I

Interview Schedule

Great Western Development Programme in Xinjiang, 2001-2013.

Research Methodology

The proposed study would attempt to analysis the Western Development Programme in Xinjiang by following historical and analytical methods. The study shall use inductive and deductive methods where applicable. The study will be based on primary sources materials like various statutes, decrees. The study will focus on data and information collected from various secondary sources material such as books, monographs and article published in various news magazines, journals and newspapers. The Chinese and Uyghur language data material and information collected during the visit to Xinjiang and China will be used for the Purpose.

- 1) Why is Xinjiang important for China?
a) Yes b) No

- 2) What are the factors that have made Xinjiang a volatile region?

- 3) What are the basic tenets of China's minority policy in Xinjiang?

- 4) What are the main aims and objectives, and successes and failures of Western Development Programme in Xinjiang?

- 5) Has Western Development Programme has an important factor for Uyghur nationalism?

- 6) What is the actual difference in governance between China's autonomous regions and the rest of the provinces?

- 7) Why did the Chinese government introduce the Campaign to Open Up the West?

- 8) What kind of policy measures is being implemented?

- 9) Do you follow the One Child Policy?
a) Yes b) No

- 10) How likely is policy to succeed in reducing and reversing the rise in regional inequalities?
- 11) What are the major obstacles to successes?
- 12) Is there any link between current Muslim Uyghur in Xinjiang and the ancient Buddhist Uyghur Khaganate in 8th-9th Century?
- 13) Why did China's Uyghur Autonomous Region include Dzungaria when it belonged to the Oirates?
- 14) Why doesn't China allow Xinjiang its independence?
- 15) How is the political unrest in the Xinjiang region affecting the Uyghur people?
- 16) What is the rationale for Chinese Uyghur in exile claim the ownership of Xinjiang?
- 17) Do you believe in Western Development Programme policy?
 - a) Yes
 - b) No
- 18) Are Han and Uyghur are the good relation to each other in the current scenario?
- 19) What do you think about the Western Development Programme improving the standard of living of Uygur people?
- 20) What is the new policy implemented for Uyghur people?
- 21) What is the difference between Han and Uyghur? Do they agree with the implementation of Western Development Programme in Xinjiang?
- 22) Do they still migrate for the job?
- 23) How is the political unrest in the Xinjiang region affecting the Uyghur people?
- 24) How are Uyghur culturally different from the mainland Chinese?
- 25) What are the Economic development programmes in Xinjiang undertaken by the Chinese central government?
- 26) Does religion play an important role in Xinjiang?

ANNEXURE -II
Uyghur Respondent Photo



An Uyghur student at Jishou University 1st April 2016.

ANNEXURE-III

Jishou University (Meeting with Dean and Professor)



From left side Prof. and Dean Luo Kanglong and my right side Prof. Wu Hexian (History of Culture, Jishou University, Hunna Province). 5th April 2016.

Minzu University of China



Prof. Wang Tianjin, College of Economics, Zhongguancun South Street, No.27, Haidain district, Beijing, 7th April 2016.